[Senate Prints 112-44]
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112th Congress } { S. Prt.
2d Session } COMMITTEE PRINT { 112-44
_______________________________________________________________________
CHINA'S IMPACT ON KOREAN
PENINSULA UNIFICATION AND
QUESTIONS FOR THE SENATE
__________
A MINORITY STAFF REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
Second Session
December 11, 2012
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
William C. Danvers, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Background....................................................... 1
Introduction..................................................... 1
Questions for the Senate......................................... 2
China's Historic Claims Throughout Time.......................... 2
The Recent Past.................................................. 3
Today............................................................ 4
Institutional Policy Coordination Between China and North Korea.. 4
The Move Toward Economic Integration-The Making of a 21st Century
Tributary Province............................................. 5
Points of China-North Korea Commercial Intersection.............. 5
A Magnet for China-North Korea's Natural Resources-Mining and
Rare Earth Materials........................................... 8
Unintended Consequences by and for North Korea................... 9
Is The Trend of North Korea Becoming a Chinese Protectorate and
Economic Colony Irreversible?.................................. 10
In Summary....................................................... 10
Acknowledgements and Appreciation................................ 11
Appendixes
Appendix I.--Bibliography........................................ 17
Appendix II.--Congressional Research Service Memorandum to
Senator Lugar Regarding China's Perspective on Historical
Borders on the Korean Peninsula................................ 21
Appendix III.--Korean Perspectives on Historical Change in the
Borders between Korea and China: A Review and Comments on the
Congressional Research Service Memorandum of March 9, 2012..... 33
Appendix IV.--``Reading Current & Future Commercial Tea Leaves:
New Insights into DPRK Regime Dynamics'' John S. Park, Ph.D.,
November 27, 2012.............................................. 69
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, December 11, 2012.
Dear Colleagues: When we consider the possible unification
of the Korean Peninsula at some time in the future, the German
model of unification often comes to mind. The purpose of the
attached report is to alert Members that another outcome is
possible.
China's historical claims to territory within the borders
of the Korean Peninsula and the expanding investment by China
within North Korea point to a situation where China may attempt
to manage, if not oppose, the process of Korean Peninsula
unification.The attached report includes extensive information
regarding China's trade and economic interaction with North
Korea and the growing investment by Chinese companies inside
North Korea.
For historical perspective, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee staff obtained information about Chinese claims that
parts of the Korean Peninsula were historically part of China,
and South Korean assessments about those claims. The
Congressional Research Service (CRS) was asked to write about
how China presents its historic claims to the Korean Peninsula
so that Members would be alerted to this situation. The
Northeast Asia History Foundation in Seoul greatly assisted by
providing South Korea's view of China's historic claims.
Neither the committee nor I take any position on the disputes
over the history of the Korean Peninsula discussed in this
report.
Important questions are raised toward the beginning of the
attached report for the Senate's consideration regarding
prospects for unification, the significance to the United
States and our overall Korea policy.
I would like to express appreciation to several scholars on
North Korean affairs (referenced in the Appendix section) who
assisted Keith Luse and other Committee staff in the
development of this report, which may be a helpful future
reference on Korean Peninsula unification.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Member.
(v)
CHINA'S IMPACT ON KOREAN
PENINSULA UNIFICATION AND
QUESTIONS FOR THE SENATE
``Pyongyang today looks more like a tidy Chinese
provincial city than the Spartan capital of the world's
last Stalinist state.'' \1\
Background
For some time, China has been viewed by the West as the
main intermediary with North Korea. The West has believed with
some justification that because China serves as a lifeline and
benevolent provider for the North, it would leverage that role
to influence North Korea's decision--making process in such
matters as nuclear weapons development, nuclear tests, missile
launches and other areas of international concern.
In recent years, as official Washington has assessed
denuclearization prospects in North Korea, it has viewed the
China factor with varying degrees of hope, anticipation, and
dismay. China's willingness and desire to chair and manage the
Six Party Talks process was accepted with optimism by many in
the White House and the Congress. Reality has however begun to
come to the forefront. The interests of China and the United
States related to North Korea--regional stability vs.
denuclearization--are not the same. In looking to the future,
for similar reasons, China is a wild card on the subject of
Korean Peninsula Unification--an eventuality that Chinese
leaders may determine they cannot allow.
Introduction
When Members of the U.S. Senate consider prospects for
unification of the Korean Peninsula, they often reflect upon
the demise of the East German government and the unification of
East and West Germany, anticipating a similar outcome on the
Korean Peninsula.
However, another outcome is possible.
China's historical claims to territory within the borders
of contemporary North Korea (and across parts of the entire
Peninsula) and the expanding economic footprint of China in the
North are among the factors creating a dynamic that leads away
from eventual Peninsula unification.
Whether the impetus for unification is the warming of
relations between the North and the South, accompanied by
accelerated commercial and other activities, or an abrupt
seismic event within North Korea contributing to the demise of
the present government, China could attempt to manage, and
conceivably block the unification process. While working to
safeguard its own commercial assets, and to assert its right to
preserve the northern part of the peninsula within China's
sphere of influence, Beijing might seek to defend its actions
as necessary to ensure regional stability. (Another important
point to note is that increased economic cooperation between
China and North Korea benefits China's own development as well
and enhances China's access to North Korean natural resources
for energy and other purposes.) \2\
The possible presence of American military personnel north
of the 38th Parallel does not conform to China's definition of
regional stability and is unacceptable to most Chinese
officials.
``The conventional thinking in China is that it
benefits from the maintenance of a divided peninsula
and a fraternally allied socialist state on its
border.'' \3\
As noted in the Interim Report of the University of
Southern California (USC) Center for Strategic & International
Studies (CSIS) regarding Challenges for Korean Unification
Planning, ``There has been a traditional resistance to talking
openly about unification scenarios. Policy-makers and scholars
avoid the issue for fear of diplomatic fallout from China or
the DPRK or because it operates in the realm of meaningless
speculation and punditry. The absence of such discussion is a
recipe for disaster.'' \4\ (emphasis added)
The preparation of this report revealed a series of
questions for Members.
Questions for the Senate
What are the foreign policy and national defense
implications for the United States of an ongoing
divided Korean Peninsula in comparison to a unified
Peninsula?
What are the origins of resistance, and in some cases
outright opposition to unification within South Korea?
Is China's incremental economic integration with North
Korea similar to its intent for relations with South
Korea?
What is in the best interest of the United States--to
pursue multilateral ``Six Party Talks'' with North
Korea or engage in bilateral negotiations between the
U.S. and North Korea, having separate and concurrent
consultations with South Korea, Japan, China and
Russia? Or is a ``third way'' preferable?
China's Historic Claims Throughout Time
`` . . . disputes (between China and South Korea),
have become intense and frequent over the past several
years as China has increasingly asserted cultural
hegemony, or Sinocentrism, commensurate with its
ascendancy in the global economy and politics.'' \5\
To document China's long-term interest in and claims on the
Korean Peninsula, the Committee obtained South Korean and
Chinese perspectives on the issue.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) was asked to
provide information about Chinese claims that territory on the
Korean Peninsula was historically part of China, with a focus
on maps published in the People's Republic of China depicting
those claims. The CRS memorandum, authored by Susan V.
Lawrence, a CRS Specialist in Asian Affairs, discusses several
works of state-supported Chinese scholarship on the subject,
including maps depicting borders on the Peninsula at points in
history between 475 B.C. and 1982 A.D. The CRS memorandum is
included in an appendix to this report.
Yong Ho Kim, Director of the Office of Policy Planning of
the Northeast Asia History Foundation in Seoul, was the point
person for a team of Korean experts who provided analysis on
behalf of the Republic of Korea regarding the Chinese
perspective on this issue. The Foundation's report is also
included in an appendix to this report.
China's historic claims on the Peninsula raise the
possibility of future Chinese intervention in the Korean
unification process.
The Recent Past
The 1976 Area Handbook for North Korea prepared by Foreign
Area Studies program of The American University provides an
overview of China-North Korea relations following the Korean
War. Excerpts included below provide important background:
During the last six decades, China and North Korea have
experienced a generally amiable relationship deemed of
mutual benefit. China's intervention in the Korean War
prevented the almost certain demise of North Korea as
an independent state, and in the postwar years
stationed troops inside North Korea until 1958. In
1961, North Korea and China signed a treaty of
friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance.
As North Korean-Soviet relations cooled, North Korea
maintained an active relationship with China. In the
early 1960's, Kim Il-Sung supported China verbally
during the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Indian
border conflict of 1962. ``It was against this backdrop
of comradeship that an old border dispute between the
Chinese and Koreans over Mount Paektu (Paektu-san) was
reportedly settled when the PRC Chief of State, Liu
Shao-chi, visited Pyongyang in September 1963. At that
time, the PRC apparently recognized North Korean
sovereignty over much of the disputed 100-square-mile
area involving Mount Paektu, a major concession to the
Koreans.''
Following Premier Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, the Soviet
Union took a more conciliatory approach to North Korea
which was immediately noticed by the Chinese. There
were mild tremors in the relationship which became more
publicly apparent e.g. in 1965 when the North Korean
Embassy in Moscow reported that Peking had claimed the
Mount Paektu area as ``compensation'' for its military
intervention and assistance during the Korean War; and
in 1967 the Chinese Red Guards alleged that Kim Il-Sung
had been arrested by his army following a coup. In 1969
North Korea-Chinese relations began to improve and in
1970 Premier Chou En-lai paid a state visit to North
Korea where he heralded a new era of cordiality and
mutual cooperation.
Warm relations between North Korea and China continued in
the 1970's with evidence that Pyongyang was taking an
``evenhanded or independent posture toward Peking and
Moscow.'' During a nine-day visit to China in 1975, the
two sides reaffirmed a ``blood-sealed militant
friendship.'' \6\
Disputes about the Korea-China borderline are historic and
endless. Complicating analysis of research on borders is the
fact that authoritative sources within China do not always
agree.\7\ The attached analysis and documentation of China's
numerous historic claims on the Korean Peninsula may mean that
many within Chinese leadership circles believe that areas of
the Koreas (North and South), are in fact, part of China.
Through the careful review of Chinese and Korean sources,
analysts have documented China's tenacious commitment to
viewing parts of the Korean Peninsula as historically its own.
Any future success at negotiations between North Korea and the
United States, or with North Korea in a Six-Party or other
multilateral context, is unlikely to change China's perspective
of its paternal role with North Korea. China is likely to
resist direct or indirect challenges to its preferred status
quo.
Today
Chinese officials are prepared to take action as they deem
necessary to preserve regional stability, (especially stability
along the border with North Korea). Chinese officials earlier
informed Senate Foreign Relations' Committee staff that China
reserved the right to place troops across the border inside
North Korea to prevent hungry or impoverished North Koreans
from fleeing into China. These plans have been described not as
an invasion, but as a pre-emptive move that would be taken in
consultation with North Korean authorities. In addition, China
has contingency plan options to respond unilaterally to
situations within North Korea which Chinese officials might
deem as potentially destabilizing.
Institutional Policy Coordination
Between China and North Korea
There are multiple examples of increased policy
coordination between China and North Korea at the institutional
level. Examples include:
Strategic consultations between senior leaders.
Policy discussions and harmonization at the inter-party,
inter-military, inter-governmental and inter-
ministerial levels and exchanges between provincial and
local authorities (party, people's committees, mass
public organizations, civil groups, etc.)
Chinese advisory role and sharing of technical expertise at
the sub-ministerial and sub-agency level, including
regular exchanges and technical assistance at the vice-
ministerial level (e.g. agriculture, electric power,
light industry, banking, transportation, etc.)
Sharing of managerial control at mainstream North Korean
enterprises with Chinese stakes.\8\
In addition, during 2011, China's Ambassador in Pyongyan,
Liu Hongcai, ``had an extraordinarily active year, . . . both
as a facilitator of exchanges and as a support base for
managing the comprehensive contacts between Chinese leaders and
the full range of DPRK elites at the top ranks of leadership.''
\9\
But even more significant than the Ambassador's
public schedule is the reach of the embassy into the
top echelons of North Korea's elite leadership during
visits by Chinese senior officials . . . as well as
efforts by the embassy to follow-up with Kim Jong-il to
schedule various special occasions following his visits
to China.\10\
The Move Toward Economic Integration--The Making
of a 21st Century Tributary Province
. . . keeping Pyongyang afloat is not only an
immediate consideration, but also a long-term security
hedge (for China).\11\
For over a decade, Chinese authorities ``have attempted to
put the economic relationship with North Korea on a market
basis by reducing the amount of subsidies provided to North
Korea from China's central, provincial and local governments.''
North Korean leaders rejected this approach preferring the
subsidies over assuming political risks accompanying economic
reform.\12\
The more recent China-launched investment and trade
offensive directed at North Korea reflects an incremental
economic integration with the North and is reminiscent of
similar situations involving other sovereign states bordering
China including Cambodia and Laos. However, North Korea
represents a point of unique anxiety for Chinese officials' who
are determined to preserve what they call ``regional
stability.'' China's active facilitation of closer economic
ties with North Korea supports China's economy while quietly
establishing an extensive business and trade infrastructure
within North Korea that China will be prepared to protect, if
ever necessary.
. . . a significant challenge for future North-South
relations is the dominance of China in North Korea's
current external economic relations and the diversity
and genuinely commercial motivations for the rapidly
expanding trade and investment activities along the
China border. These are indicators of a process of
economic integration underway....The large ethnic
Korean population on the Chinese side of the border
also provides a fertile soil to nurture this process of
gradual economic integration in the border areas.\13\
Points of China-North Korea Commercial Intersection
The October 2009 visit to North Korea by Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao was a benchmark event which leveraged Communist
Party of China (CPC) ties with the Workers' Party of Korea
(WPK) ``to deepen (the) bilateral commercial relationship for
mutual benefit. Beijing shored up (the) stability of (the) Kim
Jong-il regime and Pyongyang agreed to jointly develop DPRK
natural resources--inputs which will significantly aid
sustainable economic development of (the) PRC's three
northeastern provinces.'' \14\
It is important to note that it is difficult to obtain
accurate information regarding the status of North Korea's
economy or precise figures on the sources and amounts of
Chinese investment in North Korea.
There is more going on than meets the eye, both
positively and negatively. It is very unusual for
Chinese firms to complain publicly about their hosts,
as Xiyang did, especially in sensitive situations. Most
likely, this was the culmination of a number of
fundamental problems. The North Koreans have shown no
sign they understand what a commercial contract is. The
notion of $7 billion in pending Chinese investment is
thus difficult to accept. Moreover, some sources,
notably in South Korea have a record of exaggeration
when it comes to DPRK economic reporting.
On the other hand, the scope of the land leases,
infrastructure development (drop in the bucket though
it is), and mining operations indicate that the UN
figure for investment stock is too low. It should
either be read as excluding non-monetary transactions
or representing nominal prices far below those even in
other poor economies. Trade figures are similarly too
low.\15\
In March of 2012, the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA)
published new foreign investment laws for the two
special economic zones North Korea is promoting on the
Chinese border--Rason as well as the Hwanggumpyong and
Wihwa Islands Zone.\16\ (Since 1993, North Korean laws
governing the status of the special economic zones
(SEZs) have been amended six times in an effort to
improve incentives for foreign investors).\17\ A joint
China-North Korea Committee oversees the development of
the two special (SEZs). ``SEZs are acceptable to the
North Korean government because they are relatively
easy to control.'' \18\
Rason (the combined towns of Rajin and Sonbong) was
established as an SEZ in 1991. While the North Koreans
have tried to attract investment there with poor
results in the past, a new push is now underway.\19\
In 2011, China's Shangdi Guanqun Investment Company signed
a letter of intent with North Korea's Investment and
Development Group for an investment of $2 billion in
the Rason Industrial Zone.\20\
The road to the Chinese border from the Rason Economic Zone
is now finished, cutting a 3-hour journey to under 50
minutes. The road has also improved connectivity
between regions in the Special Economic Zone for local
citizens.\21\
North Korea's Joint-Venture & Investment Commission,
designed by the North Korean government to attract foreign
investment, signed an agreement in September with the Chinese
Overseas Investment Federation to jointly launch the ``Special
Funds for North Korean Investments'' project, supported by (US
$480 million) from Chinese sources.\22\
The lack of electricity is a major challenge to Chinese
expansion along the border and within North Korea -a drag on
investment in production factories. The lack of a credible plan
for infrastructure investment in the Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa
Islands zone is a major obstacle as well.\23\
. . . integration of North Korea's economy and
China's northeastern provinces, particularly the
provinces of Liaoning and Jilin, ensure that Northeast
China will pay a significant price should North Korea
implode. Economic stability in these ``rust belt''
provinces, part of the struggling industrial region
known informally in the West as Manchuria, is a key
concern for Beijing.\24\
The proportion of North Korea's total foreign trade that is
accounted for by China-North Korea trade increased to
more than 60% in 2011.\25\
Chinese visitors are one of North Korea's key sources of
foreign currency. Sixty thousand to seventy thousand
Chinese tourists visited North Korea in 2011 compared
to an estimated 40,000 visitors from China in 2010.\26\
China, along with Germany, France and South Korea are among
the countries producing clothing in North Korea for
export. Tens of thousands of North Koreans, many highly
skilled, are employed by companies from these
countries.\27\
In August of 2012, a high level North Korean delegation
visited China to develop consensus on renewed
cooperation in key sectors of North Korea's economy
including emphasis on the development of economic zones
along the China-North Korea border.
Although unlikely to facilitate system-wide DPRK economic
reform in the near-term, Beijing's Sunshine Policy appears to
be sufficient to bolster the stability of the new regime
through the immediate benefits that the Kim Jong-un leadership
can realize from preferential commercial arrangements with PRC
partners. In practice, the Communist Party of China is bailing
out the Workers' Party of Korea via political and commercial
arrangements.\28\
Since earlier this year, China has issued over 40,000 work
visas for North Koreans to work in three Northeast
provinces: Jilin, Lianoning and Heilongjiang.\29\ (Some
suggest that whether or not this number of visas has
been issued, the number of North Koreans presently
working in China may be fewer than 40,000).
Press reports suggest that China and North Korea have
reportedly agreed on a labor program under which China
would take anywhere from 40,000 to 120,000 North
Koreans to work in factories as industrial trainees and
to work in the hospitality industry.\30\
(North Korea has also increased the number of workers at
the Kaesong Industrial Complex which is managed by South Korean
companies. Over 46,400 North Korean workers were at the
industrial park in February, 2012, compared to 42,415 over a
year ago. South Korean companies have reportedly asked North
Korea for an additional 20,000 workers for the Kaesong Complex.
North Korean workers at Kaesong, in China, in Mongolia and
other countries provide millions of dollars of annual income
for the North Korean government).\31\
China has gained the rights to use North Korea's port of
Chongjin on the East China Sea. The agreement
reportedly provides China with the rights to use two
wharves at Chongjin for 30 years which are capable of
processing 7 million tons of cargo on an annual
basis.\32\
Total accumulated FDI in North Korea reached $1.475 billion
in 2010--according to the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development.\33\
Nearly $7 billion of additional FDI ``is in the works as
Chinese infrastructure companies plan new ports,
highways and power plants, according to Samsung
Economic Research Institute in Seoul.'' \34\
As of 2010, 138 Chinese companies were registered as doing
business in North Korea.\35\
The North Korea-China trade and economic interaction is
augmented by a network of state trading companies in North
Korea with affiliations to the Worker's Party of Korea, the
Korean People's Army and North Korea's Cabinet. ``While
financial sanctions continue to dominate (the) U.S. approach to
dealing with (the) DPRK, PRC companies have been deepening
their interactions with (the) DPRK state trading companies
operating in China.'' \36\
All of the indications about expanding Chinese investment
in North Korea do not mask the enormous challenges to investors
resulting from the lack of transparency and rule of law in
North Korea. Actions by the North Korean government to revise
investment law do not compensate for the challenges to
investors posed by some North Korean officials or business
people making their own rules and issuing new demands on an
individual deal basis. There have been multiple reports in 2012
of Chinese partners pulling out of deals due to friction with
their North Korean business partners or government officials.
North Korea does not have a good reputation in
honoring contracts, and surveys of Chinese investors
and traders with North Korea have documented both the
risks they face and mitigation strategies that have
been adopted by those choosing to invest and trade.\37\
A Magnet for China--North Korea's Natural Resources--Mining and Rare
Earth Materials
North Korea has sizeable deposits of over 200 different
minerals including coal, iron ore, magnesite, gold ore, zinc
ore, copper ore, limestone, molybdenum and graphite. It is
estimated that North Korea has up to 20 million tons of rare
earth materials (rem) deposits.\38\
Using 2008 as the base year, one estimate projected the
potential value for key mineral deposits in the North at over
$6 trillion. Exports of rare metals to China in 2009 stood at
$16 million.\39\ A 2012 report suggests that North Korea's
underground mineral resources amount to nearly $10
trillion.\40\
A November, 2011, North Korean science journal article
identified the ``main industrial rare earth materials in North
Korea as monazite, bastnasite, cerium pyrochlore and
britholite, while secondary minerals include fergusonite,
gadolinite and cerite. The genetic-petrographic types of rem
deposits are deposits related to laurvikites, placer deposits,
apogranite deposits and pegmatite deposits. Laurvikites and
placer deposits are large-scale deposits and main industrial
genetic types that are widely distributed.'' \41\
As North Korea seeks outside assistance related to its
mining projects China is an attractive partner for joint
operations. ( North Korea's main gold mine in Unsan County,
North Pyongyang province, was originally opened by a United
States company in 1896.) \42\
Forty-one percent of the Chinese companies registered as
doing business in North Korea in 2010 extract coal, iron, zinc,
nickel, gold and other minerals.\43\
North Korea mining projects announced or underway include
the following.
Beijing Bao Wian Hung Chang International Trading Ltd and
North Korea reportedly signed a deal to develop three
mines in North Korea--one gold and two iron-ore.\44\
In 2007, the DPRK Ministry of Mining Industries and the
Wanxiang Resources Limited Company of China established
Hyesan-China Joint Venture Mineral Company. Copper ore
production from the Hyesan Youth Mine goes to China.
North Korean and Chinese workers completed a
modernization project of the mine in September of
2011.\45\ The Hyesan Youth Mine reportedly has an
annual capacity of 50 to 70,000 tons of copper
concentrate that is expected to contain 20-30% copper
with all of it to be sold to China.\46\ Also, China has
reportedly invested $860 million in the mines under
this joint venture and holds a 51% stake.\47\
Four Chinese corporations acquired 50-year development
rights to Musan Iron Mine according to the ROK's ``The
Institute for Far Eastern Studies.'' \48\ 120 tons of
iron ore are reportedly exported to China annually from
the Musan Mine which is believed to be the largest
outdoor mine in Asia.
Chinese, South Korean and about 30 European companies have
invested in copper and gold mines in North Korea, as
well as factories producing medications and blue jeans,
and even Internet Service.\49\
Unintended Consequences by and for North Korea
North Korean leaders' steady refusal to give up their
nuclear weapons program continually has diminished prospects
for economic development assistance from international
financial institutions, the United States and other countries.
This economic estrangement, combined with South Korea's policy
of disengagement from North Korea\50\ has resulted in the
growing economic and other assistance from China.
This scenario is not particularly discomforting to Chinese
leaders who carefully managed the Six Party Talks process to
maintain ``balance''--preserving regional stability. Chinese
leaders have adeptly cajoled or pressed North Korean leaders
according to the situation at hand--in response to Beijing's
own ``loss of face'' when North Korea proceeded with a nuclear
test, for instance, as a result of U.S. impatience with the
North.
As a former State Department official with long experience
in Korea noted, ``The day China decides to break with the DPRK
and the moment the PRC decides that a reunified Korean
Peninsula (under Seoul's aegis) is more in its interest than a
divided peninsula, that is when the process of Korea's national
unification will begin in earnest, and there will be little the
DPRK can do to sustain itself as an independent entity. It is
for that reason that the North has been extremely cautious in
its ties with Beijing. . . . China is the DPRK's lifeline and
insurance policy, which for a nationalistic North Korea is
something that necessarily sticks in the craw, but it is a fact
of life.''
Is the Trend of North Korea becoming a Chinese protectorate and
economic colony irreversible?
Some would suggest that the present trend is not
necessarily irreversible, as there ``is no love lost between
Pyongyang and Beijing. The North Koreans are intensely
nationalistic and do not want to become overly dependent on
Beijing. And there are many in China who warn that North Korea
is a strategic liability.'' \51\
In addition, it is important to note that North-South
relations impact the degree to which North Korea engages (or
needs to engage) China. Will a new government in the Republic
of Korea seek closer relations with the North?
However, these points do not counter the reality of China's
historic claims to the Korean Peninsula and that China views
the North Korea as a ``strategic buffer against a unified, pro-
American Korea.'' \52\
In Summary
In the event the unification of the Peninsula does proceed
in some manner, and/or there is a collapse of the North Korean
government unification will be complicated. Depending on the
circumstances that prompt a move toward unification, would
consensus be achieved among key players (including China, the
U.S. and South Korea), to focus on ``securing stability on the
Peninsula versus creating legitimacy?'' \53\
The findings of the USC-CSIS interim study on Korean
Peninsula unification were that ``for the Korean case, finding
the balance between stability and legitimacy . . . becomes key.
First-movers into a collapse of the DPRK may be trying to act
in the name of efficiency, but will they necessarily be seen as
legitimate? South Korea undeniably sees itself as the only
legitimate party with the authority to act. But China is likely
to focus legitimacy on a UN process that is protracted. China
is therefore likely to focus on a longer time line for
intervention and would only see a UN process as legitimate.
This fits with the Chinese proclivity to be good at investing
in the status quo rather than reacting to rapid change. The
United States and the ROK, conversely, are better at responding
to crises and trying to shape the outcome.'' \54\
Acknowledgements and appreciation
Special thanks to those persons who assisted with the
preparation of the report. They include Bradley O. Babson, SFRC
colleague Jay Branegan, Victor Cha, Alexander Mansourov, Marcus
Noland, John Park, Derek Scissors, and Scott Snyder.
Also, deep appreciation is in order to Susan Lawrence at
the Congressional Research Service and Yong Ho Kim of the
Northeast Asia Foundation in Seoul.
Bradley Babson, Chair of the DPRK Economic Forum at the
U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS
Jay Branegan, Senior Professional Staff Member, U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee
Victor Cha, Senior Advisor and Korea Chair, CSIS
Joseph DeTrani, former Special Envoy for the Six Party
Talks with North Korea
Ben Dolven, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional
Research Service
Nicole Dube, Staff Assistant, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
Daniel Gestal, Intern, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
Mr. Jimin Ha, Economic Researcher, Embassy of Korea,
Washington, D.C.
Stephan Haggard, Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor,
University of California, San Diego Graduate School of
International Relations and Pacific Studies
Chris Hudnut, Intern, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Frank Jannuzi, former East Asia Foreign Policy Adviser to
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry
Professor Chung Jae Jeong, former President of the
Northeast Asian History Foundation.
Yong Ho Kim, Director of the Office of Policy Planning,
Northeast Asian History Foundation
Karin Lee, Executive Director, National Committee on North
Korea, Washington, D.C.
Jongjoo Lee, Unification Attache, Embassy of the Republic
of Korea, Washington, D.C.
Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Ph.D., Visiting Scholar, U.S.-Korea
Institute at SAIS, John Hopkins University
Mark Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional
Research Service
Nicholas McCormick, Staff Assistant, U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee
Marcus Noland, Deputy Director, Peterson Institute for
International Economics, Washington, D.C.
Open Source Center, Washington, D.C.
Han S. Park, Director of The Center for the Study of Global
Issues (Globis), University Professor of Public and
International Affairs, University of Georgia
John Park, Stanton Junior Faculty Fellow, Security Studies
Program, MIT
Evans Revere, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings
Institution
Derek Scissors, Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage
Foundation
Scott Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korean Studies and
Director, Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, Council on Foreign
Relations
Henning Speck, First Secretary, Political Affairs, Embassy
of the Federal Republic of Germany, Washington, D.C.
David Straub, Associate Director, Korean Studies Program,
The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center,
Stanford University
Sue Terry, Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University
Weatherhead East Asian Institute
Alex Utsey, Staff Assistant, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
Professor Donald S. Zagoria, Senior Vice President,
National Committee on American Foreign Policy
--------------
Notes:
\1\ ``The View from Pyongyang,'' Charles K. Armstrong, The New York
Times, August 15, 2012.
\2\ ``Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, A Report
of the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies,'' Bonnie S. Glaser
and Brittany Billingsley, Principal Authors, and Stephen
Haggard, Marcus Noland and Scott Snyder, Contributing Authors,
November 2012.
\3\ Avoiding the Apocalypse, Marcus Noland, Institute for
International Economics, Washington, D.C. , June, 2000, p. 372.
\4\ ``Challenges for Korean Unification Planning, Justice, Markets,
Health, Refugees and Civil-Military Transitions--An Interim
Report of the USC-CSIS Joint Study, The Korea Project: Planning
for the Long Term,'' Victor Cha and David Kang, Principal
Investigators, December, 2011.
\5\ ``Spats Mar 20 Years of China Ties,'' The Korea Herald, August 8,
2012.
\6\ Area Handbook for North Korea, Nena Vreeland, Rinn-Sup Shinn,
Peter Just, Philip W. Moelle, Foreign American Studies of the
American University, 1976, p. 206.
\7\ ``China's Perspective on Historical Borders on the Korean
Peninsula,'' Congressional Research Service, Susan V. Lawrence,
Specialist in Asian Affairs, March 9, 2011.
\8\ Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Ph.D., Visiting Scholar, U.S.-Korea
Institute at SAIS, John Hopkins University.
\9\ ``Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, A Report
of the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies,'' Bonnie S. Glaser
and Brittany Billinglsey, Principal Authors; Stephan Haggard,
Marcus Noland and Scott Snyder, Contributing Authors, November
2012.
\10\ Ibid.
\11\ Alliance Diversification & the Future of the U.S.-Korean Security
Relationship, Charles M. Perry, Jacquelyn K. Davis, James L.
Scoff and Toshi Yoshihara, The Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis, Inc., p. 137
\12\ China's Rise and the Two Koreas, Scott Snyder, Lynee Rienner,
Publishers, London, 2009, p. 146
\13\ ``South-North Relations: Present Situation and Future Challenges
and Opportunities,'' Bradley O. Babson (A paper prepared for
presentation at the IGE/KEXIM/KDI/PIEE Conference on
Unification and the Korean Economy, October 22, 2012).
\14\ ``Reading Current & Future Commercial Tea Leaves: New Insights
into DPRK Regime Dynamics,'' presentation by John S. Park,
Ph.D., Stanton Junior Faculty Fellow, Security Studies Program,
MIT Associate, Managing the Atom Project, Harvard Kennedy
School, November 27, 2012.
\15\ Derek Scissors, Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation.
\16\ ``Will North Korea's Plans for Foreign Investment Make it a More
Prosperous Nation?''; Bradley O. Babson, 38 North, May 2, 2012.
\17\ Ibid.
\18\ ``North Korea-China Special Economic Zones,'' East Asia Forum,
Andrei Landov, July 14, 2011.
\19\ ``Tending a Small Patch of Capitalism in North Korea,'' The New
York Times, Edward Wong, October 12, 2011.
\20\ ``Chinese Firm to Invest in North Korea,'' Jay Solomon and Jeremy
Page, The Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2011.
\21\ ``The Honeymoon Period is Over,'' CHOSON EXCHANGE, Andray
Abrahamian, August, 2012.
\22\ ``China Eyes Big Investment Opportunities in North Korea,''
Economic Observer, Chen Young, November 6, 2012.
\23\ Bradley Babson, Chair of the DPRK Economic Forum at the U.S.-
Korea Institute at SAIS.
\24\ ``China's Cheonan Dilemma,'' Drew Thompson, Foreign Policy, June
7, 2010.
\25\ ``North Korean Economy: Can They `Open the Door to Being a Strong
and Prosperous Great Power,' '' Jin Meihua, Beijing Shijie
Zhishi, June 16, 2012.
\26\ ``North Korean Minders Endure Chinese Invasion,'' Asia Times
Online, Yvonne Su, November 8, 2012.
\27\ ``Garment Production in North Korea,'' 38 North, Paul Tija,
August 30, 2012.
\28\ John Park, Stanton Junior Faculty Fellow, Security Studies
Program, MIT, email content to Keith Luse, August 17, 2012.
\29\ ``Garment Production in North Korea,'' 38 North, Paul Tija,
August 30, 2012.
\30\ ``145 North Korean Laborers Work at Garment Factory at China
Border Town,'' Kyodo News article as appeared in The Mainichi,
July 31, 2012. Also, ``120,000 North Koreans to work in
China,'' China Daily Mail, August 2, 2012.
\31\ ``North Korea Keeps Sending More Workers to Kaesong Complex,''
Chosun Ilbo, May 17, 2011.
\32\ ``China Gains Use of Another N. Korean Port,'' Chosun Ilbo,
September 11, 2012.
\33\ ``North Korea, New Land of Opportunity?''; Dexter Roberts,
Bloomberg Businessweek, January 19, 2012.
\34\ Ibid.
\35\ ``North Korea, New Land of Opportunity?,'' Dexter Roberts,
Bloomberg Businessweek, January 19, 2012.
\36\ ``Reading Current & Future Commercial Tea Leaves: New Insights
into DPRK Regime Dynamics,'' John S. Park, Ph.D., Stanton
Junior Faculty Fellow, Security Studies Program, MIT Associate,
Managing the Atom Project, Harvard Kennedy School, November 27,
2012.
\37\ ``Will North Korea's Plans for Foreign Investment Make it a More
Prosperous Nation?''; Bradley O. Babson, 38 North, May 2,
2012--``Silent Partners: Chinese Joint Ventures in North
Korea,'' Drew Thompson, U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, February
2012; and Stephen Haggard, Jennifer Lee and Marcus Noland,
``Integration in the Absence of Institutions: China-North Korea
Border Exchange,'' Working Paper 11-13, Peterson Institute for
International Economics, August, 2011.
\38\ ``Could North Korea Be the Next Rare Earth Powerhouse?''; Rare
Earth Investing News, Adam Currie, August 20, 2012.
\39\ Ibid.
\40\ ``North Korea's Mineral Resources Potentially Worth $9.7
Trillion,'' The Korea Times, August 26, 2012.
\41\ ``Main Rare-Earth Element Mineral of Our Country and Its
Metallogeny,'' Kim Il-so'ng Chonghap Taehak Hakpo: Chayo'n
Kwahak, Han Ryong-ryo'n and Ryang Mun-hyon, November 20, 2011.
\42\ ``North Korea's Golden Path to Security,'' Asia Times Online,
Bertil Lintner, January 18, 2007.
\43\ ``North Korea, New Land of Opportunity?''; Dexter Roberts,
Bloomberg Businessweek, January 19, 2012.
\44\ ``North Korea, China Agree to Jointly Develop Three Mines in
North Korea,'' Yonhap, August 9, 2012; and ``North Korea Deal
to Allow Chinese Company to Develop 3 Mines,'' ROK Daily,
August 10, 2012.
\45\ ``Work on Border Bridge Source of Conflict Between PRC, DPRK,''
ROK Online Daily, November 1, 2011, and ``Modernization Project
and Joint Venture Company Go Operational,'' KCNA, September 19,
2011.
\46\ ``China-N.Korean JV starts production at Copper Mine,'' Reuters,
September 20, 2011.
\47\ ``North Korea, China Agree to Jointly Develop Three Mines in
North Korea,'' Yonhap, August 9, 2012.
\48\ ``Increase in DPRK's Mineral Resources Exports to China Expected
Again this Year,'' The Institute for Far Eastern Studies,
February 24, 2011.
\49\ ``North Korea, New Land of Opportunity?,'' Bloomberg Business
Week, Dexter Roberts, January 19, 2012.
\50\ ``Changes in the North Korean Economy in the Next 5-10 Years,''
Bradley O. Babson, October 18, 2012.
\51\ Professor Donald S. Zagoria, Senior Vice President, National
Committee on American Foreign Policy.
\52\ Ibid.
\53\ ``Challenges for Korean Unification Planning, An Interim Report
of the USC-CSIS Joint Study, The Korea Project: Planning for
the Long Term,'' pp. 7,8, December 2011, Victor Cha and David
Kang, Principal Investigators.
\54\ Ibid.
?
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X E S
=======================================================================
APPENDIX I.--BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alliance Diversification & the Future of the U.S.-Korean
Security Relationship, Charles M. Perry, Jacquelyn K. Davis,
James L. Schoff, and Toshi Yoshihara, The Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, Inc.,221 pp.
Area Handbook for North Korea, 1969, Rinn-Sup Shinn,
Foreign Area Studies, The American University, U.S. Government
Printing Office, 481 pp.
Area Handbook for North Korea, 1976, Rinn-Sup Shinn, Nena
Vreeland, Peter Just, Phillip W. Moeller, Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, U.S. Government Printing Office, 394
pp.
Avoiding the Apocalypse, Marcus Noland, Institute for
International Economics, Washington, D.C., June, 2000.
``North Korean Economy: Can They Open the Door to Being a
Strong and Prosperous Great Power", Jin Meihua, Beijing "Shijie
Zhishi", June 16, 2012.
``Challenges for Korean Unification Planning, An Interim
Report of the USC-CSIS Joint Study, The Korea Project: Planning
for the Long Term", pp. 7 and 8, Victor Cha and David Kang,
Principal Investigators.
``Changes in the North Korean Economy in the Next 5-10
Years", Bradley O. Babson, October 18, 2012.
``China Eyes Big Investment Opportunities in North Korea",
`Economic Observer', Chen Young, November 6, 2012.
``China Gains Use of Another North Korean Port", `Chosun
Ilbo', September 11, 2012.
``China-North Korea Relations", Dick K. Nanto, Specialist
in Industry and Trade; Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian
Affairs, "Congressional Research Service", December 28, 2010.
``China-North Korean JV Starts Production at Copper Mine",
`Reuters', September 20, 2011.
``China Offers North Korea security from any US Attack",
Ching Cheong, The Straits Times Interactive, May 3, 2003.
``China's Perspective on Historical Borders on the Korean
Peninsula,'' Congressional Research Service, Susan V. Lawrence,
Specialist in Asian Affairs, March 9, 2011.
China's Rise and the Two Koreas, Scott Snyder, Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 2009.
``China's North Korea Policy, Assessing Interests and
Influences", Bates Gill, United States Institute of Peace
Special Report, July, 2011.
``Chinese Firm to Invest in North Korea", `The Wall Street
Journal', Jay Solomon and Jeremy Page, January 19, 2011.
``Chinese Infrastructure and Natural Resources Investments
in North Korea", Daniel Gearin, Research Fellow, U.S. - China
Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Backgrounder,
October 20, 2010.
Cold War International History Project -BULLETIN-New
Evidence on North Korea, Christian Friedrich Ostermann, Editor;
Kathryn Weathersby, Co-Editor, Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, Winter 2003-Spring 2004.
``Could North Korea Be the Next Rare Earth Powerhouse?",
`Rare Earth Investing News', Adam Currie, August 20, 2012.
Do You Know About Korea? Foreign Languages Publishing
House, Pyongyang, 1989.
``Garment Production in North Korea", '38 North', Paul
Tija, August 30, 2012.
``Increase in DPRK's Mineral Resources Exports to China
Expected Again this Year", The Institute for Far Eastern
Studies, February 24, 2011.
``Integration in the Absence of Institutions: China-North
Korea Border Exchange", Working Paper 11-13, Peterson Institute
for International Economics, Stephen Haggard, Jennifer Lee and
Marcus Noland, August, 2011.
``International Workshop on Foreign Relations of the Two
Koreas during the Cold War Era", The Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars and The Institute for Far
Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, May 11, 2006, Seoul.
Korean Unification and the Neighboring Powers, KINU
Unification Forum 2010, Choi Jinwook, Editor, NEULPUMPLUS,
2011.
``Main Rare Earth Element Minerals of our Country and its
Metallogeny", `Kim Il-so'ng Chonghap Taehak Hapko: Chayo'n
Kwahak', Han Ryong-ryo'n and Ryang Mun-hyo'n, November 20,
2011.
``Modernization Project and Joint Venture Company Go
Operational", `KCNA', September 19, 2011.
``North Korea, China Agree to Jointly Develop Three Mines
in North Korea", `Yonhap', August 9, 2012.
``North Korea - China Special Economic Zones", `East Asia
Forum', Andrei Lankov, July 14, 2011.
``North Korea Deal to Allow Chinese Company to Develop 3
Mines", `ROK Daily', August 10, 2012.
North Korea International Documentation Project, The
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington,
D.C..
``North Korea Keeps Sending More Workers to Kaesong
Complex", `Chosun Ilbo', May 17, 2011.
``North Korea, New Land of Opportunity?", `Bloomberg
Businessweek', January 19, 2012.
``North Korean Economy: Can They `Open the Door to Being a
Strong and Prosperous Great Power'", `Beijing Shijie Zhisi',
Jim Meihua, June 16, 2012.
``North Korean Minders Endure Chinese Invasion", `Asia
Times Online', Yvonne Su, November 8, 2012.
``North Korea's Golden Path to Security", `Asia Times
Online', Bertil Lintner, January 18, 2007.
``North Korea's Growing Trade Dependency on China: Mixed
Strategic Implications", Scott A. Snyder, "Asia Unbound",
Council on Foreign Relations, June 15, 2012.
``North Korea's Mineral Resources Potentially Worth $9.7
Trillion", The Korea Times, August 26, 2012.
``Path Emergence on the Korean Peninsula: From Division to
Unification", Ki-Joon Hong, "Pacific Focus, The Journal of
International Studies", Inha University, 2012.
``Prospects from Korean Unification", Colonel, Australian
Army David Coghlan, Strategic Studies Institute, United States
Army War College, April, 2008.
``Reading Current & Future Commercial Tea Leaves: New
Insights into DPRK Regime Dynamics", John S. Park, Ph.D.,
Harvard Kennedy School of Government, November 27, 2012.
Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation, Jeffrey
Knopf, Editor, Stanford Security Studies, 2012.
``Silent Partners, Chinese Joint Ventures in North Korea",
U.S. - Korea Institute at SAIS, Drew Thompson, February, 2011,
``South-North Relations: Present Situation and Future
Challenges and Opportunities,'' Bradley O. Babson, ``A paper
prepared for presentation at the IGE/KEXIM/KDI/PIEE Conference
on Unification and the Korean Economy,'' October 22, 2012.
``Spats Mar 20 Years of China Ties,'' The Korea Herald,
August 8, 2012.
``Status and Future of the North Korean Minerals Sector,''
Edward Yoon, Nautilus Institute, January 6, 2011.
``Tending a Small Patch of Capitalism in North Korea,'' The
New York Times, Edward Wong, October 12, 2011.
``The Honeymoon Period is Over,'' A Short Report on Rason
Special Economic Zone, Andray Abrahamian, CHOSUN EXCHANGE,
August, 2012.
The Impossible State, North Korea, Past and Future, Victor
Cha, Harper Collins Publishers, 2012.
The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean
Nuclear Crisis, Yoichi Funabashi, The Brookings Institution,
2007.
The United States and The Korean Problem, Documents 1943-
1953, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Alexander Wiley,
Chairman, 1953, AMS Press, New York.
``The View from Pyongyang,'' The New York Times, Charles K.
Armstrong, August 15, 2012.
Triad Track-II Seminar on Peace Building and Reintegration
of the Korean Peninsula, Center for the Study of Global Issues,
School of Public and International Affairs, The University of
Georgia, October 17-20, 2011.
US-China Relations and Korean Unification, KINU Unification
Forum 2011, Choi Jinwook, Korea Institute for National
Unification, 2011.
``USGS 2007 Minerals Yearbook for North Korea,'' U.S.
Geological Survey, December, 2009.
U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, Council on Foreign
Relations, Independent Task Force Report No. 64, Charles L.
Pritchard and John H. Tilelli Jr., Hairs, Scott A. Snyder,
Project Director, 2010, 85 pp.
``Will North Korean's Plans for Foreign Investment Make it
a More Prosperous Nation?'', 38 North, Bradley O. Babson, May
2, 2012.
``Work on Border Bridge Source of Conflict Between PRC,
DPRK,'' ROK Online Daily, November 1, 2011.
APPENDIX II.--CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE MEMORANDUM TO SENATOR
LUGAR REGARDING CHINA'S PERSPECTIVE ON HISTORICAL BORDERS ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA
March 9, 2012
This memo responds to your request for information about
areas of the present-day Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) and Republic of Korea (ROK) that the People's Republic
of China (PRC) considers to have once been parts of China. Per
your request, the memo includes detailed discussion of Chinese
maps showing those claims and also examines other state-
supported PRC scholarship on this subject. CRS was asked only
to summarize PRC state-supported scholarship, so this memo does
not reflect scholarship by experts from the ROK, DPRK or other
countries.
This memo provides both Chinese and Korean names for
ancient kingdoms and certain place names, with the Chinese
listed first because of the memo's focus on PRC claims.
Overview
Since the early years of the People's Republic of China
(PRC), the Chinese government has devoted significant resources
to research on China's historic borders. In promoting such
research, the Chinese government has appeared to be driven by
several motivations:
The Chinese government sees the research as contributing to
national unity and the ``stability and development of
China's border areas.'' With non-Han Chinese ethnic
minorities occupying large swathes of territory within
the borders of the PRC, the government appears to
believe that research showing border areas as
historically part of China can help solidify those
areas' sense of belonging to the PRC, and undermine any
calls for such areas to break away from the PRC.
The Chinese government seeks to amass historic evidence to
rebuff any claims by other nations to what the PRC
considers to be its territory. For Chinese
policymakers, memories remain fresh of Japan's efforts
to justify its invasion of China in the first half of
the 20th century on the basis, in part, of claims to
ancient kingdoms. China has commissioned historical
research to defend all its sovereignty claims and has
deployed historians to help make the historical case
for its sovereignty over contested territory in such
places as the South China Sea.
The government seeks to foster patriotism by highlighting
what many in China see as the indignities that a weak
China suffered in the 19th and 20th centuries at the
hands of imperialist powers, and contrasting those
humiliations with what the PRC portrays as its vigorous
defense of Chinese territorial integrity and
sovereignty. The indignities highlighted include
``unequal treaties'' that forced China to cede
territory and acquiesce to foreign exploitation of
Chinese resources.
This memo presents PRC views about the history of the
Chinese land border with North Korea. It does so by examining
three significant works of state-sponsored PRC scholarship
chronicling China's historic borders. The first work of PRC
scholarship examined is an eight-volume set of maps, published
in the 1980s as The Historical Atlas of China. Thirty-nine maps
from the Atlas, depicting areas of the Korean peninsula over
the course of a millennium and a half, are discussed. The
second work of PRC scholarship examined is a 67-page chapter on
the Chinese-Korean border included in History of China's Modern
Borders, a two-volume study charting the history of China's
land and maritime borders. It was published in 2006. The third
work examined is an essay in a 2003 volume, Research on China's
Northeast Borderland, published by the Northeast Project, a
collaboration among the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and
the Communist Party Committees of three provinces. The essay,
``Certain Issues in Gaogouli Research,'' explores the political
motivation for Chinese scholarship on an ancient kingdom known
in Chinese as Gaogouli and in Korean as Koguryo. The Koguryo
kingdom once straddled the present day Chinese-North Korean
border. Chinese scholars associated with the Northeast Project
consider the kingdom to have been Chinese; Koreans consider it
to have been Korean.
In summary, the first PRC work examined, The Historical
Atlas of China, depicts Chinese territory as having once
extended along the western half of the Korean peninsula all the
way to the peninsula's southern tip. It also presents as
historically parts of China a number of ancient kingdoms that
many Koreans consider to have been Korean. Such an approach has
raised concerns among China's neighbors that China may be
seeking to rob them of their history. China's historical claims
have also raised fears among some of China's neighbors that
China may be seeking to lay the groundwork for possible future
territorial claims on the Korean peninsula and elsewhere. China
shares land borders with 14 countries. Listed by geographic
location, they are North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Bhutan,
Nepal, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Russia. In addition, China claims
maritime territory that is also claimed by one or more of eight
governments: Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, the
Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
The opening chapter of the second PRC work examined, the
History of China's Modern Borders, presents the view that the
contours of the current Chinese-North Korean border were
largely settled in the 15th century, during the Ming Dynasty,
when Chinese and Korean rulers agreed that the Tumen/Tuman and
Yalu/Amnok Rivers should form their border. It describes
disagreement, however, between China and Korea over where the
border lies in the short stretch of territory between the
sources of the two rivers. The chapter also covers what the
author describes as China's uphill struggles in the late 19th
century and early 20th century to persuade Korea, Japan, and
Russia to accept and respect the Tumen/Tuman River and Yalu/
Amnok River borders. History of China's Modern Borders suggests
a strong current Chinese commitment to the Tumen/Tuman and
Yalu/Amnok River borders, but suggests some Chinese
dissatisfaction about the status of the border with North Korea
in the territory between the two rivers.
The third PRC work examined, the essay in Research on
China's Northeast Borderland on the political motivations for
China's research on the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom, portrays
China's research as primarily defensive in nature, intended to
fend off potential efforts by North Korea to claim territory in
the present PRC. The author appears to undercut his argument
that the research is defensive, however, when he urges Chinese
scholars to document Chinese claims to other ancient kingdoms
on the Korean Peninsula, too, including those kingdoms that
occupied the southern end of the peninsula, far from the
current Chinese-North Korean border.
Complicating analysis of this state-supported research on
China's historical borders is the fact that authoritative
sources do not always agree. While the essayist on the
Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom insists that the kingdom was always
Chinese, for example, The Historical Atlas of China depicts the
kingdom, in different periods, as having been under the
jurisdiction of the central Chinese regime, having been a
Chinese border minority-controlled territory, and having been
an independent, non-Chinese kingdom.
1. The Historical Atlas of China (1982-1987)
In 1954, just five years after the Communist Party took
power in China, the official Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)
launched a major project to update maps depicting Chinese
territory over the centuries. The project ultimately lasted
three decades and involved more than 100 scholars from a dozen
institutions. In the project's later years, sponsorship shifted
from one official research institution, CAS, to another, the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The project
culminated in the publication of an eight-volume atlas set, The
Historical Atlas of China, the last volume of which was
released in 1987. China's premier modern cartographer, Tan
Qixiang, served as the chief editor for all eight volumes, as
well as for The Concise Historical Atlas of China, based on the
eight volume set and published in 1991.\1\ The Historical Atlas
of China and The Concise Historical Atlas of China, both
published by the official Cartographic Publishing House, are
considered the most authoritative maps of China's historical
borders yet produced in the People's Republic of China.
The scope of The Historical Atlas of China is considerably
broader than the most ambitious previous effort to compile
historical maps of China, undertaken by the celebrated Qing
Dynasty cartographer Yang Shoujing. In a foreword to the first
volume of The Historical Atlas of China, Chief Editor Tan notes
that Yang's maps, ``were limited to areas under the direct
jurisdiction of central China regimes, and what they actually
gave was an incomplete picture even of the central China
regimes.'' In contrast, Tan explains, the compilers of the PRC-
era The Historical Atlas of China embarked on their work under
the principle that, ``our great motherland has been the joint
creation by dozens of nationalities, of which all the national
minorities constitute an inseparable part of China no matter
what historical period they existed in and what form of regime
they established, independent or in vassalage to the existing
central China regime. The scope and range our maps cover should
include all their distribution areas and the territories of the
regimes they founded.'' \2\
Much of the controversy that has attended Chinese
scholarship on China's historical borders stems from this
decision to characterize as part of China all territory once
occupied by ethnic minorities that are now part of the People's
Republic of China (PRC), even if those ethnic minorities'
kingdoms were once independent. Visually, The Historical Atlas
of China distinguishes between the territory of ``the central
China administration'' and areas occupied by ``China's border
minorities'' by depicting them in different colors. The
compilers of The Historical Atlas of China make clear, however,
that they consider both categories of territory to make up the
contours of ``China'' in each historical period.
The Historical Atlas of China's Treatment of the Korean Peninsula
Of the 304 maps in The Historical Atlas of China, several
dozen include the Korean Peninsula. The maps show Chinese
territory extending the furthest south on the peninsula in the
Tang Dynasty (618-906). A map for 669 AD, after the Tang allied
with the Xinluo/Silla Kingdom to defeat the Gaogouli/Koguryo
Kingdom, shows Tang territory extending along the west side of
the peninsula to the peninsula's far southern tip. (The Xinluo/
Silla Kingdom is shown controlling the eastern side of the
peninsula.)
For many hundreds of years, the maps show Chinese territory
covering all or part of the northern half of the peninsula, to
between approximately 37 and 40 degrees north latitude. The
maps indicate that today's border between China and the DPRK,
which follows the Yalu/Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, was
largely established as the border between China and Korea by
1433, during the Ming Dynasty.
A narrative of the territorial shifts over the centuries,
as depicted by the maps in The Historical Atlas of China,
follows below. The maps are discussed chronologically, from
earliest history to most recent. CRS numbering is followed, in
parentheses, by location of the maps in the Atlas.
Maps 1 and 2 (Vol. I, Maps 31-32 and 41-42), from the
Warring States Period (approx. B.C. 475-B.C. 221), show the
course of a series of stone and earthen fortifications that
later came to be considered part of the Great Wall of China.
The maps show the fortifications extending well south of the
Yalu/Amnok River into the current territory of the DPRK.
Maps 3 and 4 (Vol. II, Maps 3-4 and 9-10) show the first
borders of a central Chinese administration, the Qin Dynasty
(B.C. 221-B.C. 206 BC). The maps show the fortifications
extending still further south, to approximately 39 degrees
north latitude (also known as the 39th parallel), stopping just
short of today's Pyongyang. The maps indicate that the Qin
state encompassed the full area inside the fortifications. The
Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is listed on the map as Chinese border
minority territory, although the map does not mark its borders.
Maps 5 and 6 (Vol. II, Maps 13-14 and 27-28), depicting the
Western Han Dynasty (B.C. 206-A.D. 8), show the territory of
the central Western Han state extending down the full width of
the peninsula to south of the 38th parallel, just north of
today's Seoul. The Gaogouli/Koguryo kingdom is depicted as part
of the central Western Han state, with Map 6 showing the
kingdom's borders within the central Western Han state. In
yellow shading, map 5 shows much of today's Northeast China,
including the modern Chinese cities of Changchun, Harbin, and
Yanji, as occupied by Chinese border minorities, outside of the
borders of the central Chinese administration.
Maps 7 and 8 (Vol. II, Maps 40-41 and 61-62), depicting the
Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220), show the central Eastern Han
state occupying the western part of the Korean peninsula to
just south of the 38th parallel. The eastern boundary of the
Eastern Han's territory on the peninsula is depicted as being
at roughly 127 degrees east longitude. In these maps, the
Gaogouli/Koguryo kingdom is again depicted as outside the
borders of the central Chinese administration. The border
between the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom and a more northerly
kingdom, known in Chinese as Fuyu and in Korean as Puyo, is not
marked, but both kingdoms are depicted as occupied by Chinese
border minorities.
In Maps 9 and 10 (Vol. III, Maps 3-4 and 13-14), which
depict China's borders in A.D. 262, during the Three Kingdoms
Period, the Wei Kingdom's territory is shown as extending
across the full width of the Korean Peninsula down to below the
38th parallel. Gaogouli/Koguryo is depicted as Chinese border
minority territory just outside the territory of the Wei
Kingdom. As before, the border between the Gaogouli/Koguryo and
Fuyu/ Puyo Kingdoms is not marked, but both kingdoms are
depicted as the territory of Chinese border minorities. Maps 11
and 12 (Vol. III, Maps 33-34 and 41-42), show China's borders
19 years later, in 281, and depict the borders on the Korean
Peninsula as largely unchanged.
Map 13 (Vol. IV, Map 3-4) shows China's borders in the year
382, during the turbulent Eastern Jin and 16 Kingdoms Period.
The territory of the Former Qin rulers, shown in bright yellow,
is depicted as extending only a little east of today's Chinese
border city of Dandong. The area controlled by Chinese border
minorities is, however, shown in mustard yellow as extending
down the peninsula to an east-west line that includes today's
Seoul. The Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is shown as part of this
Chinese border minority territory.
Maps 14 through 19 (Vol. IV, Maps 17-18, 19-20, 21-22, and
23-24, and Vol. V, Maps 3-4 and 19-20), showing China's borders
in 449, 497, 546, 572, and 612, show a major retreat of Chinese
control on the Korean Peninsula. In these maps, the Gaogouli/
Koguryo Kingdom is depicted as being in control of much of the
peninsula and, significantly, as being non-Chinese. Non-Chinese
territory under Koguryo control is shown as extending as far
north as the current Chinese city of Changchun.
Map 20 (Vol. V, Map 32-33), depicting the situation in 669,
during the Tang Dynasty, shows a dramatic territorial shift.
After the Tang allied with the kingdom of Xinluo/Silla to
defeat the Gaogouli/Koguryo and Baiji/Paekche kingdoms, the map
shows Tang territory extending all the way to the southern tip
of the Korean Peninsula, with Xinluo/Silla-controlled territory
on the east side of the peninsula depicted as non-Chinese. This
was the only time over the centuries that the maps show Chinese
territory extending so far south on the peninsula.
Maps 21 and 22 (Vol. V, Maps 34-35 and 50-51) show a very
different situation just 72 years later, in 741. Here, the Tang
Dynasty's territory has shrunk back to north of what is now
known in Chinese as the Datong Jiang, and in Korean as the
Taedong River, leaving today's Pyongyang in Chinese Tang
Dynasty territory. The Korean peninsula south of that line is
shown to be the non-Chinese territory of the Xinluo/Silla.
Map 23 (Vol. V, Map 36-37), showing the situation in 820,
depicts Tang territory on the peninsula as having receded
further, to include only a small portion of the northwest side
of the peninsula, including Pyongyang. The map shows the
current Chinese cities of Dandong and Shenyang as being part of
central Tang Dynasty territory, but shows today's Chinese
cities of Changchun and Yanji and areas north as being the
territory of Chinese border minorities.
Map 24 (Vol. V, Map 82-83) shows the situation in 943,
during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Period. It depicts
the Liao Dynasty, also known as the Khitan Empire after its
ethnic-Khitan founders, as controlling a broad swath of
territory north of the Korean Peninsula. The Liao's border with
Korea is depicted as being well south of the Yalu/Amnok and
Tumen/Tuman Rivers, following a curved line whose northern tip
is just below the 40th parallel. The peninsula south of that
line is shown as non-Chinese Gaoli/Koryo territory.
Maps 25 through 29 (Vol. VI, Maps 3-4, 8-9, 42-43, 48-49,
and 44-45), covering the years 1111, 1142, 1189, and 1208, show
the Korean peninsula as non-Chinese territory under Gaoli/
Koryo rule up to a line just north of the 40th parallel.
Map 30 (Vol. VII, Map 3-4), depicting the situation in
1280, during the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty, shows the Chinese
border further south, just north of Kaesong.
Maps 31 and 32 (Vol. VII, Maps 5-6 and 13-14), showing the
situation in 1330, still during the Yuan Dynasty, depict the
border as having crept north again, to just above the 40th
parallel on the west, though Yuan Dynasty territory is shown
extending below the 40th parallel on the east.
Maps 33-38 (Vol. VII, Maps 40-41, 42-43, and Vol. VIII,
Maps 10-11, 3-4, 12-13, and 5-6), showing the years 1433, 1582,
1820, and 1908, depict Chinese territory as ending at the Yalu/
Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, the rivers that form all but a
small portion of the modern border between China and North
Korea.
Vol. VII, Map 1-2, the final map in the set, shows the
territory of the People's Republic of China as of 1982.
Continuity with the Republic of China
To probe whether The Historical Atlas of China represented
a departure from claims made by the PRC's predecessor regime,
the Republic of China (ROC), CRS examined a set of four maps
commissioned by the ROC's Ministry of Education and printed in
1947 for use in Chinese classrooms.\3\ The maps provide a crude
snapshot of the territory ascribed to various Chinese dynasties
and show a significant degree of continuity between Chinese
claims during the PRC and ROC eras. The first map, depicting
the territory of China's Han Dynasty (206 BC to 220 AD), shows
the Han border extending to a line south of present-day Seoul.
The second map, depicting the territory of the Chinese Tang
Dynasty (618-907), shows Chinese control extending down the
west side of the Korean Peninsula to the peninsula's southern
tip. The third map, showing the territory of the Yuan Dynasty
(1271-1368), depicts the Yuan border extending to a line south
of Pyongyang and north of Kaesong. The final map, depicting the
territory of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), shows the Chinese
border with the DPRK largely as it is today.
2. History of China's Modern Borders (2006)
In 1983, as work on the Historical Atlas of China was
winding down, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
established a new research center focused on study of China's
historical borders, the Research Center for Chinese Borderland
History and Geography (Zhongguo Bianjiang Shi Di Yanjiu
Zhongxin). The center's Chinese-language website portrays the
center's goals as including ``to inherit and carry forward the
great heritage of China's borderland history and geography and
the patriotic tradition of the Chinese peoples,'' and to ``make
contributions to the safeguarding of national unity and the
stability and development of China's border areas.'' \4\
According to the Research Center's website, the center
currently has 32 staff and is divided into several research
sections, including sections focused on China's northeast and
northern borders, its northwestern borders, its southwestern
and maritime borders, and ``theoretical'' questions related to
borders. The center has also established ``work stations'' in
Yunnan Province (which borders Vietnam, Laos, and Burma),
China's northeast (which borders North Korea and Russia),
Xinjiang (which borders Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and areas of Kashmir controlled by
Pakistan and India), and Guangxi (which borders Vietnam). In
addition, the center oversees an ``Information Center on
China's History and Culture,'' a ``Research Center on
Xinjiang's Development,'' and a ``Research Base on Conditions
along China's Northeast Border.''
In 2007, the Research Center produced a 1,228-page two-
volume study charting the history of all China's land and
maritime borders, History of China's Modern Borders. \5\ It is
in some ways the textual counterpart to The Historical Atlas of
China. The study was originally launched as a high profile
project for the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences during the
1986-1990 Seventh Five-Year Plan, and took two decades to
complete.\6\ A top UK-based expert on the relationship between
Chinese maps and national identity refers to it as a
``standard-setting'' work.\7\
In a preface, the chief editor of History of China's Modern
Borders, Lu Yiran, describes the study as being intended to
``make people understand how China's modern borders were
formed, how the imperialist powers cut up and occupied China's
territory, how the corrupt Chinese [Qing Dynasty] government
was forced to conclude and sign unequal treaties, and how the
Chinese people struggled to safeguard the country's territory
and sovereignty.'' Lu wrote that a major goal for the book was
``to sum up lessons from historical experiences.'' \8\
Treatment of the Chinese-Korean Border in History of China's Modern
Borders
The opening chapter in History of China's Modern Borders is
a 67-page exposition on the Chinese-Korean border, written by
Yang Zhaoquan, a researcher with the Korean Studies Institute
of the Jilin Province Academy of Social Sciences.\9\ The
chapter begins in 668, the year that the Chinese Tang Dynasty
allied with the Xinluo/Silla Kingdom to defeat the Gaogouli/
Koguryo Kingdom. It describes how the Tang established
administrative control over the area previously occupied by the
Gaogouli/Koguryo, and made Pyongyang its local capital. After
the alliance between the Tang and the Xinluo/Silla broke down,
the chapter relates that the Tang was forced in 676 to move its
local capital north. By 735, the Tang was forced to cede all
territory south of the Datong/Taedong River to the Xinluo/
Silla. The border moved north again some 200 years later, after
the collapse of the Tang in 907 and the Xinluo/Silla in 936.
The chapter records the border as following its present course,
along the Yalu/Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, as of 1440, during
the Chinese Ming Dynasty.
Yang nonetheless devotes considerable space to
controversies over the border that arose in later centuries. In
the 18th century, the Chinese and Korean governments found
themselves at odds over the course of the border in the short
stretch of territory between the starting points of the Yalu/
Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, both of which originate in
streams that flow from the Changbai Mountains. Yang writes that
in 1712, the Qing Emperor Kangxi sent a local official to
inspect the area in the company of a Korean official. They
placed a boundary marker between the rivers, on a ridge near
the peak of what China calls Xiao Bai Shan and Koreans call
Mount Sobaek in the Changbai Mountains. Characters carved on
the marker noted that the Yalu/Amnok River lay to the marker's
west and the Tumen/Tuman River to its east. Yang relates,
however, that in 1885, when Chinese Qing Dynasty officials
attempted to work with Korean officials to demarcate the
border, teams sent to scout for the marker found it in a
different spot. The Qing government charged that it had been
intentionally moved in order to influence decisions about which
of the streams that feed the Yalu/Amnok and the Tumen/Tuman
Rivers should be considered their ``true'' headwater streams
for boundary purposes.
China's position, according to Yang, was that the Tumen/
Tuman River has three headwater streams, the Xidou Shui,
Hongdan Shui, and Hongtu Shui, and that only the Hongdan Shui
lies to the east of the original site of the 1712 marker, the
direction in which the marker indicated that the Tumen River
flowed. The Qing government thus believed that the Hongdan Shui
should form the border. The Korean position, however, was that
the Hong Tu Shan Shui, should be recognized as the headwater
stream, and form the border. In 1887, the Qing government
proposed what Yang describes as a compromise, suggesting that
another stream, the Shiyi Shui, known in Korean as the Sogul,
be deemed the headwater stream of the Tumen/Tuman River and
form the boundary between the two countries. In 1889, with no
agreement on which stream should be deemed the headwater
stream, the Qing Emperor Guangxu ordered the erection of ten
boundary markers, starting at the Shiyi/Sogul stream. Yang
reports, however, that Koreans destroyed the boundary markers
shortly after they were installed. The dispute went unresolved.
Another dispute that erupted in the late 1800s centered on
the question of whether the Tumen River should, in fact, be
considered the boundary between China and Korea. The Korean
side asserted that what it called the Tuman River was not the
Tumen River that formed the border, opening the door to claims
that territory north of the Tumen/Tuman River, including the
ethnic Korean area around Yanji, was not in fact Chinese. Japan
later adopted the same position. Yang chronicles Korean
attempts to assert control over areas north of both the Yalu/
Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, and Russian and then Japanese
moves to abet those efforts. At the turn of the 20th century,
Japan, Yang observes, was keen to gain control of Chinese
Yanbian as a ``back door'' for its planned expansion into
China.
The chapter ends with discussion of a 1909 treaty between
China and Japan. Japan had by then turned Korea into a
protectorate, and was on the verge of annexing it. In the 1909
treaty, Japan ultimately recognized the Tumen/Tuman River as
forming part of the border between China and Korea. It also
specifically agreed that this part of the border ran from the
1712 border marker to the Shiyi/Sogul stream and along the
stream to the Tumen/Tuman River. In exchange for that
recognition, China granted Japan a broad array of rights in
Chinese territory, including the right to open trading posts
and establish consulates and sub-consulates. China also agreed
to extend a railway to the Korean border, where it would link
up with a railway on the Korean side. Yang notes that this
agreement facilitated Japan's later transport of troops to
occupy northeast China.
In documenting China's struggles in the 19th and 20th
century to secure agreement that the Tumen/Tuman and Yalu/Amnok
Rivers form the border between China and Korea, Yang appears to
signal a strong continuing Chinese commitment to those river
borders. From Yang's account, China's position on the stretch
of territory between the Tumen/Tuman and Yalu/Amnok Rivers may
be less clear. The issue is significant not for strategic
reasons, but because the area in question is in the Changbai/
Choson'gul Mountains, which Chinese consider the mythical
birthplace of the ancestors of the Manchu Emperors, and Koreans
consider the birthplace of the Korean people. The official
biography of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il lists him as
having been born on Mt. Paektu, the tallest peak in the
mountain range, although most scholars believe he was actually
born in Russia.
3. Research on China's Northeast Borderland (2003) and the Essay,
``Certain Questions in Gaogouli Research''
One of the Research Center for Chinese Borderland History
and Geography's most controversial projects has been its
``Northeast Borderland History and Current Situation Series
Research Project,'' launched in February 2002 and known in
abbreviated form as the ``Northeast Project.'' The project is a
collaboration among the Research Center and the Communist Party
committees of China's three northeastern provinces, Jilin,
Liaoning, and Heilongjiang. The center's website portrays the
project as a response to challenges presented by ``some
countries' research institutions and scholars with ulterior
motives engaging in `research' on historical relations that
distorts historical facts, and a few politicians with political
purposes publicly promoting all sorts of fallacies, creating
chaos.'' Among the Northeast Project's goals is to, ``further
safeguard the stability of the Northeast border areas.'' \10\
Controversy has sprung from efforts by scholars associated
with the project to claim the ancient kingdom of Gaogouli or
Koguryo as Chinese, rather than Korean. Critics in South Korea,
in particular, have castigated such efforts as a Chinese
attempt to steal Korean history. Some critics have worried
openly about whether the Chinese interest in the Gaogouli/
Koguryo may presage a future Chinese attempt to make a history-
based claim to territory on the Korean Peninsula.
In 2003, the Northeast Project published Research on
China's Northeast Borderland, a collection of papers from a
conference held a year earlier. The collection includes a
revealing essay by a Chinese scholar presenting an explanation
for the new scholarly interest in China in the Gaogouli/
Koguryo, a kingdom that collapsed more than 1,300 years ago. In
``Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research,'' author Jiang
Weidong of the Northeast Asia Research Institute at Changchun
Normal University in China's Jilin Province insists that the
research is defensive in nature, intended to guard against
territorial claims to parts of the present-day PRC primarily
from China's ostensible ally, North Korea. \11\ Jiang writes
that Chinese concerns about North Korean intentions toward
Chinese territory have been longstanding, but that for many
years, they took a back seat to the Chinese leadership's
insistence on the need to emphasize the friendship between the
Chinese and North Korean peoples. The implication of his
account is that the friendship has now frayed sufficiently to
allow such concerns to be aired openly.
Jiang makes no bones about his position that the Gaogouli/
Koguryo Kingdom was Chinese. It was ``an ancient local regime
of our country whose people were mainly ethnic Han migrants,''
he writes. He adds, ``Because of geography, their economy and
culture could not keep pace with the interior. Gradually, they
became indigenized and the central plains dynasties came to see
them as Yi and Di tribes.'' Jiang charges that Korean efforts
to claim the kingdom as Korean are a legacy of imperial
Japanese scholarship, which sought to develop pseudo-historical
justifications for Japan's invasion of China. Japan, Jiang
says, worked hard to develop a theory that Japanese and Koreans
were of shared ancestry, and then sought to claim for Korea the
ancient kingdoms of Gaogouli/Koguryo, Baiji/Paekche, and Bohai/
Parhae in order to provide historical cover for Japanese
expansion into northeast China. The Gaogouli/Koguryo and Bohai/
Parhae kingdoms were particularly important because their
territories extended well into areas of northeast China that
Japan coveted.
After Japan's defeat in World War II, Jiang writes, North
Korean scholars picked up the research into the ancient
kingdoms. Meanwhile, Chinese scholars hands were tied, he
laments, because China and North Korea shared a special
relationship as socialist allies, and any research that might
``harm Chinese-Korean relations'' was restricted, including
research on ancient Korean history.
Jiang reports that North Korea sent scholars to China after
1960 to gather materials about the ancient kingdoms. He names
one such North Korean scholar, Ri Jirin (known in China as Li
Zhilin), who spent five years at Peking University, with the
years unspecified. Jiang tells us that Ri's Chinese advisor
reported serious concerns about the direction of Ri's work, but
was ignored. Ri's Chinese advisor warned his superiors that in
researching the ancient kingdoms, Ri had come to see ancient
Chinese rulers as having ``invaded'' Korean territories, Jiang
tells us. Ri, the advisor reported, became focused on
``recovering lost lands'' from China.
Jiang does not present any further information about North
Korean scholarship, except to assert that North Korean scholars
are particularly fixated on the Gaogouli/Koguryo. They see
their country, Jiang claims, as the successor to a proud
Koguryo regime that shared their capital, Pyongyang, boldly
expanded its territory in the Wei and Jin Dynasties, and for a
period stood as an equal to the Chinese Sui and Tang Dynasties.
Jiang quotes Ri's Peking University advisor as warning that
while North Korean scholars' desire to ``recover lost lands''
might not now amount to anything, if such positions are not
countered, North Koreans might in future generations ``use this
excuse to grab territory.'' Jiang reports approvingly that
China's government has come to recognize the dangers of
allowing Japanese and Korean scholarship on the ancient
kingdoms to go unchallenged, and has lifted taboos on Chinese
scholarship on the ancient kingdoms.
In an exhortation that may alarm China's neighbors,
especially South Koreans, Jiang concludes by urging his
academic colleagues not to neglect research on the ancient
Baiji/Paekche Kingdom, which once occupied the southwestern
part of the Korean Peninsula. ``We must not abandon it because
its territory is not in our possession today,'' Jiang writes.
Jiang also urges his colleagues to study the Xinluo/Silla
Kingdom, saying, ``We cannot, because it is the predecessor of
a Korean nation today, overlook the fact that it was
subordinate to us in the Sui, Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing
[Dynasties].''
--------------
Notes:
\1\ The Historical Atlas of China (Zhongguo lishi ditu ji), ed. Tan
Qixiang, vols. 1-8, Cartographic Publishing House (Ditu
chubanshe), 1982-1987. A Concise Historical Atlas of China
(Jianming zhongguo lishi ditu), ed. Tan Qixiang, Cartographic
Publishing House (Ditu chubanshe), 1991. Information about the
project that produced the atlas is drawn from Tan Qixiang's
forewords to Volumes 1 and 8.
\2\ Tan Qixiang, ``Forward,'' in The Historical Atlas of China, Vol.
1 (Cartographic Publishing House, 1982), p. 3. The forward is
published in both Chinese and English. The quote here is from
the English-language version.
\3\ Lu Dianyang, ed., Maps of the Territory of the Han and Tang at
their Height (HanTang shengshi jiangyu tu) and Maps of the Yuan
and Qing at their Height (Yuan Qing shengshi jiangyu tu),
commissioned by the Ministry of Education (Republic of China),
Yaguang xingdi xueshe chubanshe, 1947. Chiang Kai-shek's
Republic of China was in power in mainland China until 1949,
when it fled to Taiwan, leaving Mao Zedong's Communists to
proclaim the People's Republic of China on the mainland.
\4\ ``A Brief Introduction to the Research Center for Chinese
Borderland History and Geography,'' accessed at http://
bjzs.cass.cn/news/129888.htm.
\5\ History of China's Borders (Zhongguo jindai bianjie shi), ed. Lu
Yiran (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2007).
\6\ Lu Yiran, ``Preface,'' in History of China's Borders (Zhongguo
jindai bianjie shi), vol. 1 (Sichuan People's Publishing House,
2007), p. 7.
\7\ William A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford
University Press, 2010), p. 114.
\8\ Lu Yiran, ``Preface,'' in History of China's Borders (Zhongguo
jindai bianjie shi), vol. 1 (Sichuan People's Publishing House,
2007), p. 5.
\9\ Yang Zhaoquan, ``The Chinese-Korean Border,'' in History of
China's Borders (Zhongguo jindai bianjie shi), vol. 1 (Sichuan
People's Publishing House, 2007), pp. 3-70.
\10\ ``A Brief Introduction to the Northeast Project (Dongbei
gongcheng jianjie),'' accessed at http://bjzx.cass.cn.
\11\ Jiang Weidong, ``Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research (Gaogouli
yanjiu de ruogan wenti),'' in Research on China's Northeast
Borderland (Zhongguo dongbei bianjiang yanjiu), ed. Ma Dazheng,
Beijing: China Social Sciences Press (Zhongguo shehui kexue
chubanshe), August 2003, p. 149-161.
APPENDIX III.--KOREAN PERSPECTIVES ON HISTORICAL CHANGE IN THE BORDERS
BETWEEN KOREA AND CHINA: A REVIEW AND COMMENTS ON THE CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE MEMORANDUM OF MARCH 9, 2012
Explanation of the Format of the Review and Comments
This text treats historical border issues between Korea and
China from ancient times to the early twentieth century. The
historical sources used for research in this topic were written
in Chinese characters, and typically in Chinese grammar.
However, place names had different pronunciations, and thus
different names, in the Chinese and Korean languages.
Presenting those pronunciations in English thus has posed
important problems of representation. The explanations below
will introduce how these issues have been resolved for this
text.
Korean words have been romanized using the McCune-
Reischauer System. The government of the Republic of Korea uses
a different system (Revised Romanization), but for this text
the Northeast Asian History Foundation has chosen to use the
system preferred by many scholars writing in English. Chinese
words have been romanized through the Pinyin system.
For the names of rivers and mountains in the border area
between today's Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the
People's Republic of China, the following pattern has been
used. The Korean name is provided first and then followed by
the Chinese name in parentheses. For example, the river called
Amnok in Korean and Yalu in Chinese is written as ``Amnok
(Yalu) River.'' The mountain called Paektu in Korean and
Changbai in Chinese is written as ``Mt. Paektu (Mt.
Changbai).'' Foreign-language terms in parentheses are preceded
with ``C.'' or with ``K.'' so to identify the language (Chinese
or Korean) and are italicized.
At the end of this text is an Appendix. Here are found
three sections, a collection of maps compiled by the Northeast
Asian History Foundation that is called ``Borders between Korea
and China in Historical Maps of Korea,'' a list of Korean reign
periods and their dates, and a glossary of terms that appear in
this text.
Introduction: The Purpose of the Review and Comments
The Northeast Asian History Foundation, which has prepared
``South Korean Perspectives on Historical Change in the Borders
between Korea and China: A Review and Comments on the
Congressional Research Service Memorandum of March 9, 2012,''
is the representative South Korean research institute for
research in the histories of Northeast Asian countries and
peoples. It has launched various academic projects to move
beyond history issues between Korea and China or between Korea
and Japan, and endeavors to construct stronger relationships of
amicability and cooperation between and among these countries.
The Review and Comments has been prepared for the following
purposes.
First, the Northeast Asian HIstory Foundation agrees with
the critical view of the CRS Memorandum of March 9, 2012, that
the way in which the government of the People's Republic of
China (hereafter as ``PRC'') understands the historical borders
between Korea and China by relying solely upon Chinese
historical maps and scholarship can result in incomplete
research.
Second, we present the standard view in academic circles in
the Republic of Korea on the historical borders between Korea
and China by utilizing primary resources and research from such
academic fields as history, archaeology, anthropology, and
geography.
Third, in so doing we have prepared the Review and Comments
to develop a fact-based understanding of how the borders
between Korea and China have changed over time and how they
have been represented in maps.
Outline of the Review and Comments Regarding
the CRS Memorandum
1. The Historical Atlas of China
The CRS Memorandum concentrated on three texts recently
published in the PRC in Chinese and one report issued by the
United States Department of State which treat China's
historical borders. These four texts are The Historical Atlas
of China (C. Zhongguo lishi ditu ji, 1982-1987; hereafter as
``the Atlas''), History of China's Modern Borders, vol. 1 (C.
Zhongguo jindai bianjieshi, 2007), Research on China's
Northeast Borderland (Zhongguo dongbei bianjiang yanjiu, 2003),
and the Department of State's International Boundary Study
(1962). More specifically, the CRS Memorandum concentrated on
one chapter from each of the latter two Chinese-language books.
From History of China's Modern Borders was used Yang Zhaoquan's
chapter entitled ``Zhongguo yu Chaoxian de bianjie'' (The
Chinese-Korean Border). And from Research on China's Northeast
Borderland was used Jiang Weidong's ``Gaogouli yanjiu de luogan
wenti'' (Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research). The sections
of these four texts that focused on historical borders with
Korea will be treated separately. Presented below are brief
introductions to these texts and the issues that they raise.
The Atlas is a collection of historical maps published in
an atlas format in the PRC, and is the atlas that has been most
widely used in that country. The most important problem in this
work is in the inclusion of areas that belonged to neighboring
countries and peoples in the past. This problem stems from the
three China-centered interpretations outlined below.
First, the Atlas depicts in a sweeping manner the borders
of Chinese countries by the standard of their greatest
territorial size as achieved through war. This means that all
of the histories of the peoples who lived in the territory that
is now contemporary China are China's history. Such an approach
may lead readers of the Atlas to misconstrue the territory of
neighboring countries or peoples under the occupation or
influence of a Chinese country as being a fixed territory.
Second, in the Atlas, the process of determining borders
follows the military activities of Chinese governments to the
neglect of such aspects of history as the lives of local people
and the exercise of dominance. Most of the military engagements
of Chinese governments with countries in the Korean Peninsula
and in Manchuria resulted in short-term military occupations.
Nevertheless, the Atlas demarcates the occupied areas of those
countries as the territory of the Chinese countries. As a
result, those areas are marked as if they had been directly
controlled for a long period of time by Chinese governments.
Also important is that the counties and prefectures that
Chinese governments established in the northern part of the
Korean Peninsula and in Manchuria were frontier counties and
prefectures, and thus differed from those administrative units
in China. The occupied lands were controlled in strategic areas
whose defense was protected by fortresses, and along traffic
routes that connected those areas. The Atlas errs in
considering the frontier counties and prefectures, which were
far from direct Chinese rule, as having been administered
through the same type of direct control as were those in China.
Third, the Atlas merges non-Han Chinese peoples, which were
ethnically, historically, and culturally different from
Chinese, and their territories into the current boundary of the
PRC under the principle of the ``unified multi-ethnic country''
(C. tongyi de duominzu guojia). For example, the Jurchens, who
resided in areas between Liao (916-1125) of Kara Khitan
ethnicity and Koryo (918-1392), were a third force that did not
belong to either country but still were included in a Chinese
country's territory in these Chinese maps.
2. Chapter One of History of China's Modern Borders
The CRS Memorandum introduces the debate over the borders
that followed the Amnok (C. Yalu) River, Mt. Paektu (Mt.
Changbai; C. Changbai-shan), and the Tuman (C. Tumen) River
based upon Yang Zhaoquan's ``The Chinese-Korean Border,'' which
is chapter one in History of China's Modern Borders, and
focuses on China's effort to secure the border. Seen from South
Korean scholarship, this chapter has three important problems.
First, by describing the establishment of the Amnok (Yalu)
River-Tuman (Tumen) River formed through the expansion of
territory under Ming China's rule in the fifteenth century, the
chapter passes over the fact that the domain of Ming China
(1368-1644) was limited in this region to the southern part of
the Liaodong River and to the western downstream area of the
Amnok River.
Second, without referencing historical sources, this
chapter describes the original location of the Mt. Paektu
boundary marker erected in 1712 as being on Mt. Sobaek. And it
states that the determination of the border between Choson and
Qing China as being along the Mt. Sobaek-Sogol River (Mt.
Xiaobai-Shiyi Stream; C. Xiaobai-shan, Shiyishui) resulted from
the border conference held between the two countries in 1887.
This claim overlooks the fact that the border between Choson
and Qing China had already been decided as following the Amnok
(Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)-Tuman (Tumen) River in
1712.
Third, by highlighting the efforts of China in defending
the Tuman (Tumen) River border in the negotiations held between
Qing China and Japan from 1905 to 1907, this chapter discounts
the fact that the Kando (C. Jiandao) Agreement between Qing
China and Japan in 1909 excluded Korea, which should have been
a participant because this issue treated the border between
Korea and Qing China.
3. ``Certain Questions in Gaogouli Research,'' in Research on China's
Northeast Borderland
The Chinese scholar Jiang Weidong argues in his chapter
``Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research'' in Research on
China's Northeast Borderland that Koguryo (C. Gaogouli) was
``an ancient local regime of our country whose people were
mainly ethnic Han migrants.'' (CRS Memorandum, 9.)
However, Yemaek tribes established Koguryo (?-668).
Differing from the Mo people who were active in northern China,
these tribes came from a non-Han Chinese Dongyi people living
in the Liaodong Peninsula and the northern and central areas of
the Korean Peninsula. PRC scholarship believes the Mo or the
Gaoyi people that appear in ancient Chinese sources to be the
ethnic origin of Koguryo. However, there is from 1,500 years to
2,000 years between the historical activities of the Mo and
Gaoyi peoples and the establishment of Koguryo.
Further, there is little archaeological evidence through
which the Mo and Gaoyi peoples may be linked to Koguryo. As
Koguryo expanded, some Han Chinese people became Koguryo
people, but their numbers are thought to have been small
compared to the Koguryo population.
That is, Koguryo was a different country from the
contemporary Han Chinese countries. The ancient Chinese
records, too, relate distinctions between Koguryo and these
Chinese governments. In the ``Records of the Dongyi People'' in
the Book of Wei (C. Dongyi zhuan, in Wei shu), which was
included in the History of the Three Kingdoms (C. Sanguo zhi),
one of the Chinese dynastic histories, are entries regarding
Puyo (C. Fuyu), Koguryo, Ye, Eastern Okcho, Mahan, Chinhan,
Pyonhan, and Wa (ancient Japan).
The ``Records of the Dongyi People'' describes the Dongyi
as peoples having histories that differed from those of Wei
China (220-265), Shu China (221-263), and Wu China (229-280).
This pattern in the historiography on the historical
governments in Manchuria and in the northern part of the Korean
Peninsula continued into later historical records in
traditional China. Further, the ``Records of the Dongyi
People'' recorded the heaven-worship ceremonies of the Puyo,
Koguryo, Ye, and Mahan peoples. Those descriptions show that
these peoples sought to communicate directly with heaven and
endeavored to introduce a means of receiving divine legitimacy.
In other words, these four governments each formed a polity
that was neither a vassal state nor a satellite regime of
Chinese governments.
4. The United States Department of State International Boundary Study
Noting the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereafter
as ``DPRK'')-PRC boundary treaty in 1962 and the DPRK-PRC
border protocol in 1964, the CRS Memorandum notes the
unresolved sovereignty over some sand islets. The 1962 treaty
was of great significance in that it not only succeeded to the
boundary conference held between Choson and Qing China in the
1880s, but also finalized the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu
(Mt. Changbai)-Tuman (Tumen) River border between the DPRK and
the PRC in the form of a modern treaty. The sovereignty of 451
islands and islets (264 to the DPRK, 187 to the PRC) along the
Amnok (Yalu) River and the Tuman (Tumen) River was determined
as recorded in the List of Sovereignty of Islands and Islets
attached to the 1964 protocol.
5. Outline of Korean Historical Maps Accompanying the Review and
Comments
Regarding the dispute over historical borders between Korea
and China in the modern period, a problem that emerges in the
PRC scholarship is the inclusion of historical areas with
unclear borders or buffer zones that were not clearly
determined in terms of sovereignty.
The Northeast Asian History Foundation has for several
years compiled historical maps of Northeast Asia, including
East Asia and Central Asia, in order to reflect research in
other countries and to provide more accurate and impartial
historical maps of the region. For this Review and Comments the
Foundation has prepared a set of twelve historical maps. These
twelve maps show historical borders between Korea and China
over the past 2,000 years. They are intended to assist in
clarifying issues of interpretation introduced above and
discussed in further detail below. Readers of this Review and
Comments are encouraged to consult these maps, as they read the
Review and Comments. This set of maps, entitled ``Borders
between Korea and China in Historical Maps of Korea,'' may be
found in the Appendix. The maps are divided into four groups
according to the standard periodization of Korean history. This
periodization, too, may be found in the Appendix. These four
groups are introduced in the following paragraphs.
Maps 1, 2, 3, and 4 mark the territories and borders of Old
Choson (K. Kojoson) and the Four Han Chinese Commanderies (K.
Hansagun). The earliest chapter of Korean history started with
the foundation of Old Choson, which controlled the northwestern
part of the Korean Peninsula and the northern part of the
Liaodong Peninsula. This country was destroyed by Han China in
108 BCE. Han China then established four commanderies in this
large area. These administrative units, which differed from the
county-prefecture system for local administration in Han China,
were used for temporary purposes. The extent of Han China's
territorial control was limited to the main fortresses and the
traffic routes connecting these military facilities. In 82 BCE,
or about twenty-five years after the establishment of these
commanderies, two of them were closed, and the Hyondo
Commandery (C. Xuantu-jun) was later pushed back into the
Liaodong area. In 313 CE, the Nangnang Commandery (C. Lelang-
jun) was destroyed by Koguryo. And in 314, a new commandery,
the Taebang Commandery (C. Taifang-jun), which was not
established by Han China, was driven out by Paekche (?-660).
Maps 5, 6, and 7 cover the periods of Koguryo, the
unification of the Three Kingdoms, and Parhae (698-926). The
western border of Koguryo during the reign of King Kwanggaet'o
(r. 391-412) was the Liao River, and it remained there until
the collapse of Koguryo in 668. The allied forces of Tang China
(618-960) and Silla (?-935) destroyed Paekche in 660 and
Koguryo in 668. Tang China established the Ungjin Commandery
(C. Xiongjin dudufu) in the former territory of Paekche and the
Andong Commandery (C. Andong duhufu) in the former territory of
Koguryo for military purposes. As the Andong Commandery was
moved to the Liaodong Peninsula in 676, the influence of Tang
China withered in the former Koguryo territory east of the
Liaodong area. In 698, Parhae (C. Bohai) was established under
the leadership of the former Koguryo people in the former
territory of Koguryo. Parhae followed Koguryo as an independent
state. During the reign of King Son (r. 818-830), Parhae
achieved its largest size, facing Tang China along the Liao
River and the Khitans north of the Liao River.
Maps 8, 9, and 10 chart the borders between Korea and China
during the Koryo period (918-1392) in Korean history. In its
first years, Koryo established a local administration system in
which the northern frontier was settled along the southern
shore of the Taedong River (C. Datong-jiang) and Wonsan Bay. In
the early eleventh century, the mouth of the Amnok River became
the border between Koryo and the Khitans. One century later,
the military expedition of Yun Kwan (d. 1111) led Koryo to
achieve tighter control over the Jurchens in the Mt. Paektu and
upper Tuman River areas. During the Mongol Intervention of 1259
to 1356, the area north of Ch'ollyong was left under the direct
control of the Mongols. These areas were later restored to
Koryo during the reign of King Kongmin (r. 1351-1374).
Maps 11 and 12 depict the borders between Korea and Ming
China and between Korea and Qing China during the Choson period
(1392-1910). In its first decades the Choson government
expanded its northern frontier to the Amnok (Yalu) River in the
northwest and to the coast of Hamgyong Province in the
northeast. In the fifteenth century, the border extended along
the full lengths of the Amnok (Yalu) River and the Tuman
(Tumen) River. In 1712, with the placement of the Mt. Paektu
(Mt. Changbai) boundary marker, the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt.
Paektu (Mt. Changbai)-Tuman (Tumen) River border was confirmed.
The border treaty between the DPRK and the PRC in 1962 and the
border protocol between these same two governments in 1964
reaffirmed the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)-
Tuman (Tumen) River border, and this remains the boundary
between the DPRK and the PRC today.
Review and Comments on Texts Published
in the People's Republic of China
The three texts introduced above that were published in the
People's Republic of China are discussed in the sections that
follow. Each section includes direct quotations from the CRS
Memorandum that are then followed by analysis and discussion.
These comments, analysis, and discussion are not critical of
the CRS Memorandum. Rather, they focus upon the information and
interpretations provided in the Chinese texts.
1. The Historical Atlas of China
``Much of the controversy that has attended Chinese
scholarship on China's historical borders stems from this
decision to characterize as part of China all territory once
occupied by ethnic minorities that are now part of the People's
Republic of China (PRC), even if those ethnic minorities'
kingdoms were once independent. Visually, The Historical Atlas
of China distinguishes between the territory of `the central
China government' and areas occupied by `China's border
minorities' by depicting them in different colors. The
compilers of The Historical Atlas of China make clear, however,
that they consider both categories of territory to make up the
contours of `China' in each historical period.'' (CRS
Memorandum, 3-4.)
The Atlas's treatment of both the ``central Chinese
administration'' region and the areas where ``China's border
minorities'' lived as Chinese territory in each historical
period may be questioned. For example, the Jurchens, situated
between Liao and Koryo, did not belong to either Liao or Koryo.
However, the Atlas includes the Jurchens in PRC territory.
Since the 1980s, scholarship in the PRC has merged the history
of foreign countries, such as Koguryo, into the history of
China through the theory of the unified multi-ethnic country.
As a result, areas that once were considered to be part of
foreign histories have come to be incorporated into the history
of China. Thus, the Atlas does not always reflect historical
processes.
``Maps 1 and 2, from the Warring States Period (approx.
B.C. 475-B.C. 221), show the course of a series of stone and
earthen fortifications that later came to be considered part of
the Great Wall of China. The maps show the fortifications
extending well south of the Yalu River into the current
territory of the DPRK.'' (CRS Memorandum, 4.)
A key element in understanding the extent of the Great Wall
is the location of the Taeryong River Long Wall (C. Daning-
jiang changcheng). Contrary to claims in PRC scholarship, this
military fortification was not constructed by Chinese
dynasties, but rather by Old Choson or by Koguryo in the
northern half of the Korean Peninsula for defense against
contemporary Chinese dynasties such as Yan, Qin, and Han.
Objects appear infrequently in excavations there, but those
items provide evidence of interactions between Korea and China
in ancient times. It thus may be suggested that the argument
that the Great Wall extended into the northwestern Korean
Peninsula and that that area became part of Chinese territory
in ancient times seems to lack empirical foundation.
The assertion in PRC scholarship that the Great Wall was
extended into the northwestern area of the Korean Peninsula in
the Warring States Period (475 BCE-221 BCE) is predicated upon
two facts. The first is that the Taeryong River Long Wall was
part of the Great Wall. The second is that some excavated
objects, which were made in Yan or in styles common in Yan, are
occasionally found in the northwestern Korean Peninsula.
However, scholarship published in the Republic of Korea
believes that the Taeryong River Long Wall was constructed
during the Old Choson period or the Koguryo period, and that
the wall was used even during the Koryo period. Further,
considering its location, this wall was designed to block
enemies from the west to the east. The Yan, who resided
northwest of the wall, cannot have been the people that
constructed this impediment. Consequently, it is inaccurate to
argue that this long wall was contructed by the Yan, that it
was part of the Great Wall, and that the northwestern area of
the Korean Peninsula was part of Yan territory.
``Maps 3 and 4 show the first borders of a central Chinese
administration, Qin China (B.C. 221-B.C. 206). The maps show
the fortifications extending still further south, to
approximately 39 degrees north latitude (also known as the 39th
parallel), stopping just short of today's Pyongyang. The maps
indicate that the Qin state encompassed the full area inside
the fortification. The Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is identified
on the map as Chinese border minority territory, although the
map does not mark its borders.'' (CRS Memorandum, 4.)
The statement that the Great Wall was extended to
P'yongyang during the Qin period is not accurate. This
statement found in PRC scholarship is based upon unreliable
documents. Historically, the northwestern part of the Korean
Peninsula belonged to Old Choson in the early third century
BCE. (See the commentary on maps 1 and 2 in ``Borders beween
Korea and China in Historical Maps of Korea'' below.) Given the
information in two Chinese texts, Treatise on the Xiongnu (C.
Xiongnu liezhuan) and Biography of Meng Tian (C. Meng Tian
liezhuan), which are included in Records of the Grand Historian
(C. Shiji) by Sima Qian (circa 145 or 135 BCE-86 BCE), the area
east of the Great Wall is believed to have been in today's
Liaoyang, in Liaoning Province.
Sources from later Chinese dynasties, however, sometimes
wrote Jieshi instead of Liaodong, Nangnang instead of Jieshi,
Koguryo instead of Nangnang, and P'yongyang instead of Koguryo.
The inconsistent use of these place names in Chinese sources
weakens the argument in PRC scholarship that the eastern end of
the Great Wall reached P'yongyang. Further, it should also be
noted that ``Jieshi'' was a common place name in ancient China,
and may be seen in various locations in ancient Chinese
sources. As a result, it is not accurate to describe Qin's
borders as extending to 39 degrees north latitude and near to
P'yongyang.
``Maps 5 and 6, depicting the Western Han Dynasty (B.C.
206-A.D. 8), show the territory of the central Western Han
state extending down the full width of the peninsula to south
of the 38th parallel, just north of today's Seoul. The
Gaogouli/Koguryo kingdom is depicted as part of the central
Western Han state, with Map 6 showing the kingdom's borders
within the central Western Han state. In yellow shading, map 5
shows much of today's Northeast China, including the modern
Chinese cities of Changchun, Harbin, and Yanji, as occupied by
Chinese border minorities, and outside of the borders of the
central Chinese administration.'' (CRS Memorandum, 4.)
It is believed that the southernmost area of the four Han
commanderies was in the Korean Peninsula, in the area of the
Chaeryong River, Hwanghae Province (north of Mt. Myorak), and
in northern Kangwon Province. The area south of the four Han
commanderies was beyond the control of China. In general,
little has been clarified regarding the relationship between
early Koguryo and Han China's county-prefecture administration,
and scholars have not reached any definite conclusions.
However, it is important to note that, as in the case of Hyondo
Commandery relocation in 75 BCE, the retreat of Han China's
county-prefecture administration back to China coincided with
the growth of Koguryo. The Atlas map which shows Koguryo in the
territory of Western Han (202 BCE-9 CE) would thus seem to be
out of historical context. And, such historical peoples as the
Okchoand the Suksin (C. Sushen) lived in the Changchun, Harbin,
and Yanji areas of the present-day PRC and were independent
people that differed from Han China in ethnicity and in
culture.
The four Han commanderies, which were established after the
collapse of Old Choson, did not last. The Chinbon (C. Zhenfan)
Commandery and the Imtun (C. Lintun) Commandery were closed in
82 BCE. The remaining prefectures attached to these two
commanderies were incorporated into the Nangnang Commandery and
the Hyondo Commandery. The influence of these county-prefecture
areas was limited to the surrounding areas, and their
administration tended to be loose and indirect. Therefore, Han
China's territory cannot be marked as extending to the south of
38 degrees north latitude. Specifically, Han China's influence
could only cover the area between the Taedong River and the
Chaeryong River, and part of the Hamhong Plain in the
northwestern Korean Peninsula. Other areas should be described
as the lands of indigenous peoples from the time of ancient
Korea.
To be discussed next are maps depicting the first three
centuries of the Common Era.
``Maps 7 and 8, depicting the Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220),
show the central Eastern Han state occupying the western part
of the Korean peninsula to just south [of] the 38th parallel.
The eastern boundary of the Eastern Han's territory on the
peninsula is depicted as being at roughly 127 degrees east
longitude. In these maps, the Gaogouli/Koguryo kingdom is again
depicted as outside the borders of the central Chinese
administration. The border between the Koguryo Kingdom and a
more northerly kingdom, known in Chinese as Fuyu and in Korean
as Buyeo or Puyo, is not marked, but both kingdoms are depicted
as occupied by Chinese border minorities.'' (CRS Memorandum, 4-
5.)
During the Eastern Han period (25-220), the Nangnang
Commandery could not extend southward to the Han River area.
The growth of indigenous forces such as Koguryo accelerated the
retreat of Han China's county-prefecture administration back to
China. (The second relocation of Hyondo Commandery and the
reduction of the area controlled by Nangnang Commandery were
also caused by the expansion of Koguryo.) The description in
the Atlas of Koguryo, Puyo, Umnu, and Okcho as border areas of
Eastern Han points to an arbitrary interpretation based on the
theory of the unified multi-ethnic country. This interpretation
conflicts with historical facts, however. Koguryo, Puyo, and
Okcho emerged from the Yemaek people and became part of the
origins of the Korean people. Therefore, these peoples and
countries are to be expressed as belonging to the realm of
Korean history.
The borders of China in the second half of the third
century appear next. ``In maps 9 and 10, which depict China's
borders in A.D. 262, during the Three Kingdoms Period, Wei
Kingdom's territory is shown as extending across the full width
of the Korean Peninsula down to south of the 38th parallel.
Gaogouli/Koguryo is depicted as Chinese border minority
territory just outside the territory of the Wei Kingdom. As
before, the border between Gaogouli/Koguryo and Fuyu/Buyeo
Kingdoms is not marked, but both kingdoms are depicted as the
territory of Chinese bordere minorities.'' (CRS Memorandum, 5.)
The Atlas exaggerates the dominance of Wei in occupying the
northern half of the Korean Peninsula. It is true that Wei
occupied the Nangnang Commandery and Taebang Commandery areas,
but these two commanderies each administered only six
prefectures. Considering this, Wei's administration could not
reach the middle of the Korean Peninsula. Thus the borders
shown south of 38 degrees north latitude are inaccurate.
Revision is also required of the depiction of the Ye area in
the northeastern Korean Peninsula. The area is drawn as having
been thoroughly controlled by the Nangnang Commandery when, in
fact, the governance of the Nangnang Commandery centered mostly
on the Pullae area. Further, the Umnu people, who were of
Suksin ethnicity, cannot be placed into the history of the Han
Chinese dynasties.
``In Maps 11 and 12, showing China's borders nineteen years
later, in 281, the borders on the Korean Peninsula are shown as
largely unchanged.'' (CRS Memorandum, 5.)
Long belonging to Koguryo, the northeastern Korean
Peninsula should be depicted as territory of the Korean
governments that followed Koguryo.
``Map 13 shows China's borders in the year 382, during the
turbulent Eastern Jin and 16 Kingdoms Period. The territory of
the Former Qin rulers, shown in bright yellow, is depicted as
extending only a little east of today's Chinese border city of
Dandong. The area controlled by Chinese border minorities is,
however, shown in mustard yellow as extending down the
peninsula to an east-west line that includes today's Seoul. The
Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is shown as part of this Chinese
border minority territory.'' (CRS Memorandum, 5.)
Countries such as Koguryo, Puyo, Okcho, and Yemaek were
important agents in Korean history. And the Khitan, Kumoxi,
Rouran, and Didouyu belonged to neither traditional Korean
history nor traditional Chinese history. The Atlas, however,
places them in PRC territory or it ahistorically identifies
them retrospectively as China's border minorities (as is seen
in other maps in the Atlas, as well).
``Maps 14 through 19, showing China's borders in 449, 497,
546, 572, and 612, show a major retreat of Chinese control on
the Korean Peninsula. In these maps, the Gaogouli/Koguryo
Kingdom is depicted as being in control of much of the
peninsula and, significantly, as being non-Chinese. Non-Chinese
territory under Koguryo control is shown as extending as far
north as the current Chinese city of Changchun.'' (CRS
Memorandum, 5.)
Given that Koguryo continuously expanded its territory
toward the northeast, as shown by its expedition against
Eastern Puyo (?-410) and its control over the Malgals (C. Mohe)
during the reign of King Kwanggaet'o, Koguryo's northeastern
borders at that time should be corrected as in Map 5, ``Koguryo
Territory Following the Reign of King Changsu (circa 450),''
compiled by the Northeast Asian History Foundation.
``Map 20, depicting the situation in 669, during the Tang
Dynasty, shows a dramatic territorial shift. After the Tang
allied with the kingdom of Xinluo/Silla to defeat Gaogouli/
Koguryo and Baiji/Paekje kingdoms, the map shows Tang territory
extending all the way to the southern tip of the Korean
Peninsula, with Xinluo/Silla-controlled territory on the east
side of the peninsula depicted as non-Chinese. This was the
only time over the centuries that the maps show Chinese
territory extending so far south on the peninsula.'' (CRS
Memorandum, 5.)
After the war in the Korean peninsula that ended in 668,
Tang China failed to integrate the former territories of
Paekche and Koguryo into its own territory. It succeeded only
in destroying these two dynasties and temporarily establishing
administrative districts. Although Tang China's occupation of
the Paekche and Koguryo capitals and the stationing of troops
in those capitals cannot be regarded as territorial
acquisition, Map 20 in the Atlas depicts the former land of
these two countries as Chinese territory. The Atlas greatly
exaggerates Tang China's boundaries.
The Ungjin Commandery was established after the fall of
Paekche in 660, but it does not appear in historical sources
after 665. In this same period, a Silla province called Soburi
appeared in former Paekche territory. Given this historical
context, the Ungjin Commandery may be characterized as a
headquarters for Tang Chinese troops during the war in the
Korean Peninsula in the 660s. The Atlas inaccurately depicts a
temporary occupation as complete control over the southwestern
Korean Peninsula. While Tang destroyed Paekche in alliance with
Silla and established the Ungjin Commandery, Silla's army was
also stationed in former Paekche territory. Thus it cannot be
said that Tang China occupied all of the former Paekche
territory. Describing the Ungjin Commandery as Tang Chinese
territory should be reconsidered. As a result of the war
between Silla and Tang fought from 668 to 676, Silla occupied
areas south of the Taedong River to the Wonsan Bay in the
Korean Peninsula. The depiction of the areas south of the
Taedong River as Tang China territory in Map 20 thus is not
accurate.
After the fall of Koguryo in 668, Tang China established
the Andong Commandery in P'yongyang to govern the surrounding
areas in a temporary form of administrative district. However,
numerous attacks from military units organized by the former
Koguryo army, and the Silla army compelled Tang China to
relocate the Andong Commandery to Xincheng, in Liaoning
Province, in 670 and then to Liaodong Fortress, in Liaoning
Province, in 676.
In 741, Tang China's territory stopped west of the Liao
River, and thus did not reach the Taedong River in the present-
day DPRK. Parhae was east of the Liao River. This period is
depicted in Map 21 of the Atlas. However, Map 21 does not
include Parhae (698-926), a country which is part of Korean
history. The period depicted in this map of Parhae's history is
that of the reign of King Mun (r. 737-793), the country's third
king. Most of the former Koguryo territory had been recovered
during the reign of his predecessor, King Mu (r. 719-737).
Thus, Tang China did not control any territory on the Korean
Peninsula from the 670s on.
Although scholars in the PRC identify Parhae as an ethnic
minority state under Tang China, the following facts show that
as a successor to Koguryo, Parhae was an independent state not
subjugated by Tang China. First, Parhae called its ruler Great
King, the Reverent, and Imperial Highness. Parhae also had its
own reign names and posthumous epithets (or, temple names) for
its rulers. Second, Parhae people were permitted to sit for the
Tang government's special examination conducted only for
foreigners. Third, Parhae placed the neighboring Malgals in a
hierarchical relationship and had its own imperial government.
Fourth, in official letters sent to the court of Japan at that
time, the king of Parhae referred to himself as the ``King of
Koryo'' or as the ``heavenly descendant,'' thus repeating the
tradition of Puyo. Fifth, Parhae was a sovereign state that
conducted independent diplomatic relations with neighboring
countries, including Japan and Silla, as well as with Tang
China.
``Map 23, showing the situation in 820, depicts Tang
territory on the peninsula as having receded further, to
include only a small portion of the northwest side of the
peninsula, including Pyongyang. The map shows the current
Chinese cities of Dandong and Shenyang as being part of central
Tang Dynasty territory, but shows today's Chinese cities of
Changchun and Yanji and areas north as being the territory of
Chinese border minorities.'' (CRS Memorandum, 5.)
Around 820, the area extending from P'yongyang to the
western coast of the Korean Peninsula and to the Liaodong
Peninsula was under the control of Parhae, and not Tang China.
The northeastern Korean Peninsula, Liaoning Province, Jilin
Province, and Heilongjiang Province in the present-day PRC, and
the Primorsky region of present-day Russia were also part of
Parhae territory.
``Map 24 shows the situation in 943, during the Five
Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Period. It depicts the Liao Dynasty,
also known as the Khitan Empire after its ethnic-Khitan
founders, as controlling a broad swath of territory north of
the Korean Peninsula. The Liao's border with Korea is depicted
as being well south of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, following a
curved line whose northern tip is just below the 40th parallel.
The peninsula south of that line is shown as non-Chinese,
Gaoli/Koryo territory.'' (CRS Memorandum, 5.)
After 933, Koryo territory was shaped by the lower reaches
of the Amnok River and the Long Wall, which was in the Korean
Peninsula. An important problem in setting the territory of
Korea and China during the Koryo and early Choson periods in
the Atlas is the absence of a buffer zone or a neuteral zone.
In the early Koryo period, there were two groups of Jurchens
living between Koryo and Liao (916-1125). The first group
resided near Liao. The second group lived near the Koryo border
and submitted to Koryo authority. If the first group were to
belong to Liao, the second group must be included in Koryo
territory. From the 1020s to the 1110s, Koryo significantly
extended its influence to north of the Long Wall. During this
period, Koryo ended the long state of hostilities with Liao and
prepared a new stage of warfare with Qin (1115-1234), which was
founded by Jurchens and had destroyed Liao.
``Maps 31 and 32, showing the situation in 1330, during the
Yuan Dynasty, depict the border as having crept north again, to
just above the 40th parallel to the west, though Yuan territory
is shown extending below the 40th parallel to the east.'' (CRS
Memorandum, 6.)
In 1356, during the reign of King Kongmin, Koryo reclaimed
the Ssangsong Commandery (C. Shuangcheng zongguanfu), which had
earlier been incorporated into a frontier district of Yuan
China. Koryo's territory now reached the Amnok (Yalu) River and
the Tuman (Tumen) River.
``Maps 33-38, showing the years 1433, 1582, 1820, and 1908,
depict Chinese territory as ending at the Yalu and Tumen
Rivers, the rivers that formed all but a small portion of the
modern border between China and North Korea.'' (CRS Memorandum,
6.)
In the early Choson period, during the reign of King Sejong
(r. 1418-1450), specifically in the 1430s, Choson conquered
Jurchen and established four counties in the upstream area of
the Amnok (Yalu) River and six garrisons in the downstream area
of the Tuman (Tumen) River, setting the two rivers as the
country's northern borders. During this period, Ming China's
control over the area north of the Great Wall was limited to
the southern region of Liaodong and the western area of the
downstream region of the Amnok (Yalu) River. The Jurchens
conquered the whole of mainland China and established the Qing
government in 1644, and the Amnok (Yalu) River and the Tuman
(Tumen) River became settled as the border between Choson and
Qing China in the mid-seventeenth century.
Regarding text from ``Continuity with the Republic of
China'' in the CRS Memorandum:
``Map B, depicting the territory of the Chinese Tang
Dynasty (618-907), shows Chinese control extending down the
west side of the Korean Peninsula to the peninsula's southern
tip.'' (CRS Memorandum, 6.)
Before its collapse in 668, Koguryo held the eastern part
of Liaodong River and the northern part of Korean Peninsula as
its territory. Later, these regions were taken over by Parhae
(698-926). Tang China established the Ungjin Commandery after
Silla and Tang together destroyed Paekche. However, Tang's
military occupation in the former Paekche territory was
temporary because Silla also stationed troops there. Regarding
the former territory of Paekche in its entirety as Tang China's
territory thus is not accurate.
``Map C, showing the territory of Yuan China (1271-1368),
depicts the Yuan border as extending to a line south of
Pyongyang and north of Kaesong.'' (CRS Memorandum, 6.)
The Tongnyong Commandery (C. Dongning-fu), which was
constructed by Yuan, was taken back by Koryo in 1290. Koryo
also used force to restore the Ssangsong Commandery in 1356.
Lacking information about this history provided in this Review
and Comments, this map may misrepresent the areas as belonging
entirely to Yuan China at that time.
2. Chapter One of History of China's Modern Borders
In this section, the second of the three texts published in
the People's Republic of China, History of China's Modern
Borders, in particular, chapter one, ``The Chinese-Korean
Border,'' will be discussed.
In the first half of the fifteenth century, Choson
established its northern borders along the Amnok (Yalu) and
Tuman (Tumen) rivers after defeating Jurchen communities in
that area. On the other hand, Ming China's control was limited
only to the southern area of the Liaodong Peninsula and the
area west of the downstream part of the Amnok (Yalu) River.
Chapter One of History of China's Modern Borders describes from
the perspective of China's territorial expansion the formation
of the Amnok (Yalu) River-Tuman (Tumen) River border between
Ming China and Choson in the early fifteenth century. PRC
scholarship notes that the control of the Ming government's
Nuergan Regional Military Commission (C. Nuergan dusi) which
administered the Left Jianzhou Commandery (C. Jianzhou zuowei)
reached the region north of the Amnok and Tuman rivers.
However, as Ming China's control did not extend into Jurchen
areas after the early fifteenth century, the view that Ming
China and Choson then made these two rivers the border between
their countries is inaccurate. According to Korean sources,
during the reign of King Kongmin, the Koryo government
established counties and prefectures for local administration
and defense structures in the Amnok (Yalu) River area so that
it controlled territory south of the Amnok (Yalu) River. Later,
during the reign of King Sejong in the first half of the
fifteenth century, the Choson government defeated Jurchen
communities and then established four counties in the Amnok
(Yalu) River's upstream area and six military garrisons in the
downstream area of the Tuman (Tumen) River. In this way the
Choson government extended its administrative control to the
Amnok (Yalu) River and Tuman (Tumen) River areas.
From the CRS Memorandum, item 1: ``In 1712 . . . [t]hey
placed a boundary marker between the rivers, on a ridge near
the peak of what China calls Xiao Bai Shan in the Changbai
Mountains, known in Korean as the Choson'gul or Jangbaek.
Characters carved on the marker noted that the Yalu River lay
to the marker's west and the Tumen River to its east. Yang
relates, however, that in 1885, when Chinese Qing Dynasty
officials attempted to work with Korean officials to demarcate
theborder, teams sent to scout for the marker found it in a
different spot. The Qing government charged that it had been
intentionally moved in order to influence decisions about which
of the streams that feed the Yalu and the Tumen Rivers should
be considered their `true' headwater streams for boundary
purposes.'' (CRS Memorandum, 7-8.)
PRC scholarship introduced the ``move of the Mt. Paektu
boundary marker'' explanation according to which the marker was
originally placed at the watershed of Mt. Sobaek (Mt. Xiaobai)
but was later moved by Koreans to the southern foot of Mt.
Paektu (Mt. Changbai). However, extant documents and historical
maps concerning the erection of the boundary marker show that
this explanation lacks supporting evidence. The ``Mt. Paektu
Boundary Marker Map'' (K. Paektu-san chonggyebi to, 1712), held
by the Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies at Seoul
National University, in the Republic of Korea, clearly portrays
the boundary marker as a headwater marker (K. kangwonbi) at the
southern foot of Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai). Kim Chinam (1654-
1718) accompanied the Escort Commissioner Pak Kwon (1658-1715)
in his capacity as First Chinese-language Translator (K. Susok
t'ongyokkwan) at the time of the marker's placement. Kim Chinam
left a detailed account in his Records of the Northern
Expedition (K. Pukchong rok). This text related the negotiation
process between the Chinese representative Mukedeng and the
Korean representative Pak Kwon. Hong Set'ae (1653-1725) left
Writings on Mt. Paektu (K. Paektu-san ki). In this travelogue
based on information from Kim Kyongmun (dates unknown), who
climbed Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) together with Mukedeng, Hong
described the situation in which the Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)
boundary marker was erected. These documents describe clearly
and concretely the process by which the boundary marker was
erected. It thus is certain that the Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)
boundary marker was located at the southern foot of Mt. Paektu
(Mt. Changbai).
The Korean historical map below, which was compiled in
1712, shows the boundary marker on Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)
erected earlier that year. In this map, the boundary marker is
clearly depicted as a headwater marker. Meanwhile, Mt. Sobaek
(Mt. Xiaobai), drawn as a separate peak to the southwest of the
marker, is next to Taegak Peak and Yonji Peak.
Map 1: Mt. Paektu Boundary Marker Map (K. Paektu-san chonggyebi to),
held at the Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, Seoul National
University
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
From the CRS Memorandum, item 2: ``China's position,
according to Yang, was that the Tumen River has three headwater
streams, the Xidou Shui, Hongdan Shui, and Hontu Shui, and that
only the Hongdan Shui lies to the east of the original site of
the 1712 marker, the direction in which the marker indicated
that the Tumen River flowed. The Qing government thus believed
that the Hongdan Shui should form the border. The Korean
position, however, was that the Hong Tu Shan Shui, should be
recognized as the headwater stream, and form the border. In
1887, the Qing government proposed what Yang describes as a
compromise, suggesting that another stream, the Shiyishui,
known in Korean as the Sogul, be deemed the headwater stream of
the Tumen River and form the boundary between the two
countries. In 1889, with no agreement on which stream should be
deemed the headwater stream, the Qing Emperor Guangxu ordered
the erection of ten boundary markers, starting at the Shiyishui
stream. Yang reports, however, that Koreans destroyed the
boundary markers shortly after they were installed. The dispute
went unresolved.'' (CRS Memorandum, 8.)
PRC scholarship avers that Qing China erected ten border
markers from Mt. Sobaek (Mt. Xiaobai) to the Sogol Stream
(Shiyi Stream) soon after the 1887 Choson-Qing China Border
Conference in order to prove the agreement of the two countries
on the Mt. Sobaek (Mt. Xiaobai)-Sogol Stream (Shiyi Stream)
border. However, no official records from Qing China prove that
these ten markers were erected. There is one record which
indicates that a border-demarcation committee member petitioned
the General of Jilin for placing ten border markers from Mt.
Sobaek (Mt. Xiaobai) to the Musan area. Wu Luzhen (1880-1911),
who was in charge of negotiations with Japan over Kando
(Jiandao), conducted extensive research on border-related
documents. His Yanji Border Issue Report (C. Yanji bianwu
baogao) in 1908 states that the markers were prepared but not
erected because Qing China and Choson failed to reach
agreement. There is no record of discussion of the placement of
ten border markers in Korean documents, either. Qing China
requested that another border conference be held in 1888. These
three facts also support the view that ten boundary markers
were not erected.
From the CRS Memorandum, item 3: ``The Chapter ends with
discussion of the 1909 treaty between China and Japan. Japan
had by then Korea into a protectorate, and was on the verge of
annexing it. In the 1909 treaty, Japan ultimately recognized
the Tumen River as forming part of the border between China and
Korea. It also specifically agreed that this part of the border
extended from the 1712 marker to the Shiyishui stream and along
the stream to the Tumen River.'' (CRS Memorandum, 8.)
PRC scholarship contends that the Tuman (Tumen) River
border was determined in the Kando (Jiandao) Agreement of 1909.
However, the Kando (Jiandao) Agreement is null and void on the
grounds that it was concluded by Japan, which intended to
occupy Manchuria, and without agreement from Choson, the very
government with the authority to discuss such a border issue.
In relation to this, another difficult point in this Chinese
argument stems from the exclusion of Choson from involvement in
this border issue. Moreover, Choson raised the question of the
Tuman (Tumen) River border in order to solve the issue of
immigrants moving to the north of the Tuman River, whereas
Japan raised the question by opening the Kando (Jiandao) Police
Substation at Longjing (K. Yongjong) in 1907 for the purpose of
invading Manchuria. However, this agreement was signed without
the participation of the Korean government during the
negotiations and based upon the 1905 Protectorate Treaty, which
had forcibly deprived Choson of its diplomatic rights.
From the CRS Memorandum, item 4: ``In documenting China's
struggles in the 19th and 20th century to secure agreement that
the Tumen and Yalu Rivers form the border between China and
Korea, Yang appears to signal a strong, continuing Chinese
commitment to those river borders. From Yang's account, China's
position on the stretch of territory between the Tumen and Yalu
Rivers may be less clear. The issue is significant not for
strategic reasons, but because the area in question is in the
Changbai/Choson'gul Mountains, which Chinese consider the
mythical birthplace of the ancestors of the Manchu Emperors and
which Koreans consider the birthplace of the Korean people.''
(CRS Memorandum, 8-9.)
Although the Amnok (Yalu) and Tuman (Tumen) rivers formed
the border between Choson and Qing China from the seventeenth
century, the drawing of the border at the headwater stream of
the Tuman (Tumen) River had not been finalized. In 1712, Qing
clarified the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)-
Tuman (Tumen) River border by erecting the Mt. Paektu (Mt.
Changbai) boundary marker at the watershed running from the
foot of Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai). During the Choson-Qing China
border conference in the 1880s and during the negotiations over
the Kando (Jiandao) issue from 1907 to 1909, the Tuman (Tumen)
River border was at the core of the controversy. Mt. Paektu
(Mt. Changbai) itself was not brought into the dispute. Insofar
as the starting point of the border discussion was the Mt.
Paektu (Mt. Changbai) boundary marker, it can be said that Mt.
Paektu (Mt. Changbai) has been the border between Korea and
China since that time.
3. ``Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research,'' in Research on China's
Northeast Borderland
In this section, too, direct quotations from the CRS
Memorandum are followed by comment and discussion.
From the CRS Memorandum, item 5: ``In 2003, the Northeast
Project published Research on China's Northeast Borderland, a
collection of papers from a conference held a year earlier. The
collection includes a revealing essay presenting a Chinese
explanation for the new scholarly interest in the Gaogouli/
Koguryo, a kingdom that collapsed more than 1,300 years ago. In
``Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research,'' author Jiang
Weidong of the Northeast Asia Research Institute at Changchun
Normal University, in China's Jilin Province, insists that the
research is defensive in nature, intended to guard against
territorial claims to parts ofthe present-day PRC primarily
from China's ostensible ally, North Korea. Jiang writes that
Chinese concerns about North Korean intentions toward Chinese
territory have been longstanding, but for many years, they took
a back seat to the Chinese leadership's insistence on the need
to emphasize the friendship between the Chinese and North
Korean peoples. The implication of his account is that the
friendship has now frayed sufficiently to allow such concerns
to be aired openly.'' (CRS Memorandum, 9.)
Research by scholars in the PRC on the northeast region in
the modern period began with Jin Yufu's Dongbei tongshi (A
History of the Chinese Northeast, 1943), which was published
before the founding of the PRC, and did not originate in
concerns about the DPRK, the PRC's ally. Jin believed that
territory is historically formed, thus expanding or diminishing
over time. However, as PRC scholars promoted the theory of the
unified multi-ethnic country in part so to revise the history
of Koguryo, but inaccurately marked the current territory of
the PRC as if it had been the territory of China in the past.
However, no historical sources support this argument. This
argument of scholars in the PRC may be a good example of how
China has reduced and expanded the borders for political needs,
but this interpretation ultimately is not accurate history.
From the CRS Memorandum, item 6: ``Jiang charges that
Korean efforts to claim the kingdom as Korean are a legacy of
imperial Japanese scholarship, which sought to develop pseudo-
historical justifications for Japan's invasion of China. Japan,
Jiang states, worked hard to develop a theory that Japanese and
Koreans were of shared ancestry, and then sought to claim for
Korea the ancient kingdoms of Gaogouli/Koguryo, Baiji/Paekje,
and Bohai/Balhae in order to provide historical cover for
Japanese expansion into northeast China. The Gaogouli/Koguryo
and Bohai/Balhae kingdoms were particularly important because
their territories extended well into areas of northeast China
that Japan coveted.'' (CRS Memorandum, 9-10.)
In the 1930s and 1940s, Japanese historians studied Koguryo
history through the Manchuria-Choson view of northeast Asian
history (J. Mansen shikan). This approach, which separated the
history of Manchuria from those of the Chinese dynasties,
juxtaposed Manchuria, Korea, and Japan in the same historical
framework, which had been introduced for the ideological
purposes of Japanese imperialism, and rationalized the
occupation of Manchuria. Jin Yufu caught such intentions of
Japanese scholarship and wrote, ``Koguryo was a local polity of
ancient China,'' in order to stress that Manchuria and Chinese
governments originally were a single historical community in
the past. He also argued that the basic premise of research on
Koguryo history should be predicated upon the exclusion of any
political perspectives from the countries of China and Japan.
Jin also wrote that Koguryo history should be seen only through
historical facts.
Regarding the history of Koguryo, scholars in the Republic
of Korea are agreed that a) the growth and development
proceeses in Koguryo emerged from the struggles with the local
administration of Han China and from the withdrawal of Chinese
administration from the Koguryo area; b) Koguryo, as an
independent state, had its own reign names and royal succession
system; c) Koguryo established tributary relationships with
both the Southern and Northern dynasties in China based upon
its own interests; d) Koguryo created a unique culture by
incorporating Chinese and Central Asian cultures into its
traditional culture; e) Koguryo had a Koguryo-centered world
view that differed from those of contemporary Chinese
governments; and f) the war between Koguryo and Tang China in
the 660s was not a civil war but rather a war between two
countries. Academics in the PRC had acknowledged these facts
regarding Koguryo's history until the launch of the PRC
government's Northeast Project in 2002.
Having a history can occur only when later generations
recognize that history as theirs, record that history, and have
a clear sense of succession to that history. Considering this,
attention must be paid to the fact that official records of
traditional Chinese history have described Koguryo as a
predecessor of Koryo since the History of Song (C. Songshi) was
completed in the fourteenth century. As seen clearly in the
Korean texts History of the Three Kingdoms (K. Samguk sagi)
completed by Kim Pusik (1075-1151) in 1145 and Memorabilia of
the Three Kingdoms (K. Samguk yusa) by Iryon (1206-1289) in
1281, too, Korean historians in premodern times also depicted
Koguryo as a central part of their history together with
Paekche and Silla. The Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms
presents the mythical leader Tangun of Old Choson as the
founder of the Korean people, and Chumong, the founder of
Koguryo, as the son of Tangun. That is, Korean historians in
the Koryo period understood that their history flowed from Old
Choson to Koguryo, and then to Koryo. That history subsequently
continued from Koryo to Choson, a kingdom that was founded in
1392. This perception of historical succession is clearly
reflected in the English names of the two Koreas, the Republic
of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. (The
name ``Korea'' came from ``Koryo.'')
From the CRS Memorandum, item 7: ``Jiang reports that North
Korea sent scholars to China after 1960 to gather materials
about the ancient kingdoms. He names one such North Korean
scholar, Ri Ji-rin (known in China as Li Zhilin), who spent
five years at Beijing University, with the years unspecified.
Jiang tells us that Ri's Chinese advisor reported serious
concerns about the direction of Ri's work, but was ignored.
Ri's Chinese advisor warned his superiors that in researching
the ancient kingdoms, Ri had come to see ancient Chinese rulers
as having `invaded' Korean territories, Jiang tells us. Ri, the
advisor reported, became focused on `recovering lost lands'
from China.'' (CRS Memorandum, 10.)
Based upon differences in the bronze relics and graves
discovered in the Liaodong area from those found in the central
plains of China, Ri Jirin argued that the center of Old Choson
was in the Liaodong region. (See Map 1, ``The Territory of Old
Choson.'') He believed that Old Choson territory extended
across Liaodong and the northwestern Korean Peninsula, and at
its peak reached the Daling River, which is west of the Liao
River. However, Ri's book, Kojoson yongu (Studies in Old Choson
History), which was published in 1963, does not urge the
recovery of the ancient territory of Old Choson in the Liaodong
region. Nevertheless, Ri's adviser at Beijing University and
Jiang Weidong understood his argument as being for the purpose
of territorial recovery. Their views, however, were assumptions
that applied a Chinese perspective to Ri's research.
From the CRS Memorandum, item 8: ``Jiang does not present
any further information about North Korean scholarship, except
to assert that North Korean scholars are particularly fixated
on the Gaogouli/Koguryo. They see their country, Jiang claims,
as the successor to a proud Koguryo regime that shared their
capital, Pyongyang, boldly expanded its territory in the Wei
and Jin Dynasties, and for a period stood as an equal to the
Chinese Sui and Tang Dynasties. Jiang quotes Ri's Peking
University advisor as warning that while North Korean scholars'
desire to `recover lost lands' might not now amount to
anything, if such positions are not countered, North Koreans
might in future generations `use this excuse to grab
territory.' Jiang reports approvingly that China's government
has come to recognize the dangers of allowing Japanese and
Korean scholarship on the ancient kingdoms to go unchallenged,
and has lifted taboos on Chinese scholarship on the ancient
kingdoms.'' (CRS Memorandum, 10.)
The PRC's assertion that scholars in the Republic of Korea
and the DPRK are studying Koguryo history in order to justify
the future recovery of lost territory reveals a Chinese
perspective in which the PRC government would in the future
absorb the history of that area into Chinese territory. It
would appear that scholars in the PRC seem to have considered
an example from Japan, which developed the theory of the Imna
Nihon-fu in order to rationalize a historical claim to
territory in the Korean Peninsula. However, the basic
perspective in the historical scholarship conducted by scholars
in the Republic of Korea is that historical research should
exclude political purposes and move forward based upon facts.
From the CRS Memorandum, item 9: ``In an exhortation that
may alarm China's neighbors, especially South Koreans, Jiang
concludes by urging his academic colleagues not to neglect
research on the ancient Baiji/Paekje Kingdom, which once
occupied the southwestern part of the Korean Peninsula. `We
must not abandon it because its territory is not in our
possession today,' Jiang writes. Jiang also urges his
colleagues to study the Xinluo/Silla Kingdom, saying, `We
cannot, because it is the predecessor of a Korean nation today,
overlook the fact that it was subordinate to us in the Sui,
Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing [Dynasties].' '' (CRS Memorandum,
10.)
Jiang Weidong believed that Paekche and Silla, like
Koguryo, were subordinate to Chinese dynasties because these
two southern Korean kingdoms had tributary relationships with
Chinese governments. However, scholars in the Republic of Korea
believe that the tribute system in pre-modern East Asia was an
international order for diplomatic relations and one form of
trade. Viewing the international order and diplomatic relations
between China and neighboring countries in pre-modern East Asia
through the logic of subordination and dominance in the
imperialist age does not correspond with historical facts.
The CRS Memorandum makes the excellent point that Jiang
contradicted his own argument regarding the defensive nature of
the historical scholarship in the PRC when he urged his
colleagues not to neglect research on several ancient kingdoms
in the Korean Peninsula, including the kingdoms which had once
ruled the southernmost part of the Korean Peninsula, far from
the current border shared by the DPRK and the PRC.
Conclusion
The Review and Comments has offered a Korean perspective on
the historical borders between Korea and China. As shown above,
this analysis sometimes matches and sometimes differs from
those presented in the PRC. The Northeast Asian History
Foundation believes that ongoing open dialogue among Korean and
Chinese scholars will enhance discussion and contribute to
future research on border issues in history, and enable
countries in Northeast Asia to continue moving forward toward
peace and cooperation.
----------
BORDERS BETWEEN KOREA AND CHINA IN
HISTORICAL MAPS OF KOREA
Map 1: The Territory of Old Choson
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Map 1 shows the territory of Old Choson, the earliest
government in Korean history. It is believed that Old Choson
controlled a considerable area of the Korean Peninsula and
Manchuria (present-day Northeast China) in ancient times. It
developed a polity which differed from and was independent of
the Chinese dynasties at that time. As early as the third
century BCE, its territory is believed to have concentrated in
the northwestern part of the Korean Peninsula and the northern
part of the Liaodong Peninsula.
Map 2: The Clash between Old Choson and China (196 BCE)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Map 2 depicts Qin China's borders before the collapse of
Old Choson in 108 BCE. P'aesu, generally considered to be the
present-day Amnok River, formed the border between Old Choson
and Han China.
Map 3: The Territory of the Han Commanderies at the Time of the
Collapse of Old Choson (108 BCE)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Map 3 shows the territory of the Four Han Commanderies
after Old Choson's conquest by Han China in 108 BCE. These
commanderies, including the Nangnang Commandery, were
established in the former territory of Old Choson. Most of the
Han Chinese commanderies were pushed into the Liaodong
Peninsula by resistance from local residents, and, as in the
case of the Nangnang Commandery, cultural and political
attitudes of the Chinese were assimilated into local areas.
Map 4: The Territorial Decrease of the Han Commanderies and the Growth
of Koguryo (ca. 106 CE)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Map 4 presents the situation in 106 CE when the Hyondo
Commandery (C. Xuantu Commandery) was pushed into the Liaodong
Peninsula while Koguryo controlled Manchuria and both sides of
the Amnok (C. Yalu) River. In the eastern coastal area, Okcho
and Eastern Ye (K. Dongye) emerged near Koguryo.
Map 5: Koguryo Territory from the Reign of
King Changsu (r. 413-491)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Map 5 shows the border with China at the time of Koguryo's
greatest expanse. Koguryo restored the territory of Old Choson
by expelling the Nangnang (C. Lelang) Commandery in 313 and the
Taebang (C. Daifang) Commandery in 314. During the reign of
King Kwanggaet'o (r. 391-412), Koguryo's western border reached
the Liao River. Later, Koguryo conquered Puyo (C. Fuyu) in the
Nongan (C. Nongan) area and constructed the Puyo fortress. Its
northernmost border was thus established. Koguryo maintained
this border until defeated in war in 668.
Map 6: The Territories of Silla and Tang China after the Relocation of
the Andong Commandery (ca. 676)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Map 6 shows the period when the Andong Commandery moved to
the Liaodong Peninsula and the influence of Tang China had
completely waned. The Silla-Tang China forces defeated Paekche
in 660 and Koguryo in 668. Tang China established the ongjin
(C. Xiongnu) Commandery in the former territory of Paekche and
the Andong (C. Andong) Commandery in the former territory of
Koguryo. However, Tang China's control over these two areas was
for the stationing of troops. Paekche and Koguryo people fought
against the Tang troops, and even Silla started to gradually
control area formerly held by Tang China. Later, Silla
established Soburi Province in the former Paekche territory in
671 in order to push out the ongjin Commandery. The Andong
Commandery relocated to the Liaodong Peninsula in 676. This
situation forced Tang China to wield a limited control over the
Liaodong Peninsula. Subsequently, the Korean Peninsula was
governed by two countries, Silla and Parhae.
Map 7: The Border between Parhae and Tang China
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Map 7 shows the border between Parhae and Tang China in
698, the year Parhae was founded by former Koguryo people in
the former territory of Koguryo, particularly in Manchuria.
Part of Korean history, this country's territory also included
area in the LiaodongPeninsula. As an independent state, Parhae
inherited history and culture from Koguryo. During the reign of
King Son (r. 818-830), Parhae achieved its greatest expansion,
facing Tang China along the Liao River and the Khitans west of
the Liao River.
Map 8: The Northern Border in the Early Koryo
Period, 940-1044
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Map 8 traces territorial changes in the early Koryo period.
Line I shows that in its early decades Koryo established local
administration in the northern frontier area along the Taedong
River and Wonsan Bay. Line II shows the Koryo-Khitan border
around 1044. By this time, Koryo had secured the downstream
area of the Amnok River, particularly the six garrison
settlements east of the Amnok River, through warfare and
negotiations with the Khitans. Line III highlights Koryo's
indirect control over the Jurchens after the border settlement
with the Khitans.
Map 9: The Border and Area under the Indirect Control of Koryo in the
Late Eleventh Century
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Map 9 illustrates the borders of Koryo and the areas to the
northeast that were under Koryo's indirect control in the late
eleventh century. The black line marks the border and the red
line marks the area where Koryo exercised indirect control over
the Jurchens. In 1073, Koryo established fifteen garrison
settlements up to the present-day Kyongsong area of northern
Hamgyong Province, where resided Jurchen tribes that were
either politically loyal to the Koryo court or generally
submissive to Koryo authority.
Map 10: The Northern Border of Koryo during the
Mongol Intervention of 1259-1356
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Map 10 represents the northern frontier of Koryo during the
Mongol Intervention of 1259-1356. Koryo concluded a truce with
the Mongols after a war that lasted thirty years. The areas
north of Ch'ollyong, centering on the Ssangsong Commandery,
were left under the direct control of the Mongols. Later, the
region was restored through the military activities of King
Kongmin (r. 1351-1374) in 1356.
Map 11: The Land Border of Choson, 1392
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Map 11 shows the border of Choson (1392-1910) in its first
years. Subsequently, Choson expanded its northern frontier to
the Amnok (Yalu) River in the northwest and to the coast of
northern Hamgyong Province in the northeast. Meanwhile, in the
fifteenth century, Ming China exerted direct influence over
part of the Liaodong Peninsula. The border between Choson and
Ming China was formed along the downstream area of the Amnok
(Yalu) River at that time. The Jurchens in contemporary
Manchuria were largely independent of both Choson and Ming
China.
Map 12: The Amnok River-Tuman River Border between Choson and Ming
China in the Early Choson Period
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Map 12 shows the Amnok (Yalu) River-Tuman (Tumen) River
border between Choson and Ming China in the early Choson
period. During the reign of King Sejong (r. 1418-1450), Choson
built six garrisons after defeating several Jurchen communities
in the Tuman (Tumen) River area and established four counties
in the upstream area of the Amnok (Yalu) River, thus setting
the two rivers as its northern border. During this period, Ming
China's control over the area north of the Great Wall was
limited to part of the Liaodong Peninsula. And, as shown in the
map, Ming China shared its western border with Choson in the
downstream area of the Amnok (Yalu) River.
GLOSSARY
Korean Terms:
Place Names and General Terms:
1905 Protectorate Treaty
Amnok River C. Yalu River
Andong Commandery C. Andong duhufu
Ch'ollyong
Chaeryong River
Chinbon Commandery C. Zhenfan-jun
Chinhan
Choson 1392-1910
Eastern Okcho
Eastern Puyo
Four Han Chinese Commanderies K. Hansagun
four counties
Hamgyong Province
Hamhung Plain
Hwanghae Province
Hyondo Commandery C. Xuantu-jun
Imtun Commandery C. Lintun-jun
Kando (C. Jiandao) Agreement
kangwon marker headwater marker
Kangwon Province
Koguryo (C. Gaogouli) ?-668
Koryo , 918-1392
Mahan
Malgals C. Mohe
Map of Mount Paektu Boundary Marker
Mt. Myorak
Mt. Paektu C. Changbai-shan,
Mt. Paektu boundary marker
Mt. Sobaek C. Mt. Xiaobai
Musan
Nangnang Commandery C. Lelang-jun
Okcho
Old Choson (K. Kojoson)
P'yongyang
Paekche C. Baiji, ?-660
Parhae C. Bohai, 698-926
Puyo C. Fuyu
Pyonhan
Records of the Northern Expedition K. Pukchong rok
History of the Three Kingdoms K. Samguk sagi
Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms K. Samguk yusa
Silla C. Xinluo -935
six garrisons
Sogul River C. Shiyi Stream
Ssangsong Commandery C. Shuangcheng zongguanfu
Susok t'ongyokkwan First Chinese-language Translator
Suksin C. Sushen
Taebang Commandery C. Taifang-jun
Taedong River C. Datong-jiang
Taegak Peak
Taeryong River Long Wall C. Daning-jiang changcheng
Tongnyong Commandery C. Dongning-fu
Tuman River C. Tumen River
Umnu
Ungjin Commandery C. Xiongjin dudufu
Wonsan Bay
Writings on Mt. Paektu K. Paektu-san ki
Ye
Yemaek
Yonji Peak
Personal Names:
Hong Set'ae 1653-1725
Iryon 1206-1289
Kim Chinam 1654-1718
Kim Kyongmun dates unknown
Kim Pusik 1075-1151
King Changsu, of Koguryo r. 413-491
King Kongmin, of Koryo r. 1351-1374
King Kwanggaet'o, of Koguryo r. 391-412
King Mu, of Parhae r. 719-737
King Mun, of Parhae r. 737-793
King Sejong, of Choson r. 1418-1450
King Son, of Parhae r. 818-830
Pak Kwn 1658-1715
Ri Jirin
Yun Kwan d. 1111
Chinese Terms:
Biography of Meng Tian C. Mengtian liezhuan
Book of Wei C. Wei shu
Dongyi ``eastern barbarians''
Eastern Han China
Gaoyi people
General of Jilin
Heilongjiang Province
History of Song C. Songshi
History of the Three Kingdoms C. Sanguo zhi
Jiandao K. Kando
Jieshi
Jilin Province
Left Jianzhou Commandery C. Jianzhou zuowei
Liaodong River
Liaoning Province
Liaoyang
Longjing K. Yongjong,
Ming China 1368-1644
Mo people
Nuergan Regional Military Commission C. Nuergan dusi
Pullae
Qin China 221 BCE-206 BCE
Jin China 1115-1234
Qing China 1644-1910
Records of the Grand Historian C. Shiji
Shu China , 221-263
Tang China 618-960
Treatise on the Xiongnu C. Xiongnu liezhuan
``unified multi-ethnic country'' C. tongyi de duominzu
guojia,
Wei China 220-265
Western Han China BCE 206-CE 8
Wu China 229-280
Yan China
Yanji Border Issue Report C. Yanji bianwu baogao
Personal Names:
Jin Yufu 1887-1962
Sima Qian circa 145 BCE or 135 BCE-86 BCE
Mukedeng 1664-1735
Jiang Weidong
Wu Luzhen 1880-1911
Yang Zhaoquan
Other Terms:
Didouyu
Jurchens
Kara Khitan
Kumoxi
Liao 916-1125
Manchuria-Choson View of Northeast Asian History J. Mansen-
shi kan
Primorsky region
Rouran
Theory of the Imna Nihon-fu
Wa
Periodization of Korean History
Old Choson (K. Kojoson) ?-BCE 108
Paekche ?-660
The Three KingdomsKoguryo ?-668
Silla ?-935
Parhae 698-926
Koryo 918-1392
Choson 1392-1910
APPENDIX IV.--``READING CURRENT & FUTURE COMMERCIAL TEA LEAVES: NEW
INSIGHTS INTO DPRK REGIME DYNAMICS'' JOHN S. PARK, PH.D., NOVEMBER 27,
2012
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