[House Prints 114-B]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
114th Congress } { Committee
COMMITTEE PRINT
1st Session } { Print 114-B
_______________________________________________________________________
FINAL REPORT
of the
TASK FORCE ON
COMBATING TERRORIST AND FOREIGN
FIGHTER TRAVEL
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
October 2015
FIRST SESSION
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
97-200 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
TASK FORCE ON COMBATING TERRORIST AND FOREIGN FIGHTER TRAVEL
John Katko, New York, Republican Loretta Sanchez, California,
Lead Democratic Lead
Will Hurd, Texas Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia Filemon Vela, Texas
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Miles Taylor, Republican Staff Lead
Nicole Tisdale, Democratic Staff Lead
Special thanks to Committee Staff who contributed to this
final report:
Paul Anstine, Lanier Avant, Kate Bonvechio, Mandy Bowers, Adam
Comis, Cate Cullen, Moira Bergin, Luke Burke, Alan Carroll,
Paige Davies, Steven Giaier, Katy Flynn, Laura Fullerton, Hope
Goins, Cedric Haynes, Kerry Kinirons, Kyle Klein, Vanessa
Layne, Tyler Lowe, Kyle McFarland, Jason Miller, John Neal,
Ramzi Nemo, Leaksmy Norin, Alison Northrop, Joan O'Hara, Jason
Olin, Christopher Schepis, Brendan Shields, Andrea Thompson,
Claire Woolf, and Maseh Zarif.
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter
Travel,
Washington, DC, October 2015.
Dear Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson: We are
transmitting to you the final report of the Task Force on
Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel for review. The
final report is an examination of the Government's preparedness
to respond to the global surge in terrorist travel, in addition
to key findings and recommendations for the United States to
consider as we look to combat the threat at home and abroad. We
look forward to working across the aisle and with other
committees to develop much-needed legislation to tackle this
issue.
Sincerely,
John Katko,
Republican Lead, Task Force.
Loretta Sanchez,
Democratic Lead, Task Force.
Will Hurd.
Barry Loudermilk.
Martha McSally.
John Ratcliffe.
Donald M. Payne, Jr.
Filemon Vela.
C O N T E N T S
Introduction..................................................... 1
Executive Summary............................................ 1
Threat Environment....................................... 1
Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter
Travel................................................. 1
Results of the Review.................................... 1
Notes on Methodology......................................... 2
The Threat................................................... 3
The Global Surge in Foreign Fighters..................... 5
The Danger of Foreign Fighters: Recruits, ``Returnees,''
and Remote Radicalization.............................. 10
Americans on the Pathway to Terror....................... 15
Key Findings and Recommendations................................. 21
Overview..................................................... 21
U.S. Government Strategy and Planning to Combat the
Threat................................................. 21
Identifying Terrorists and Foreign Fighters--and
Preventing Them From Traveling......................... 21
Detecting and Disrupting Terrorists and Foreign Fighters
When They Travel....................................... 22
Overseas Security Gaps................................... 23
U.S. Government Strategy and Planning........................ 23
Identification and Prevention................................ 28
Watchlisting............................................. 29
Information Sharing...................................... 31
Prevention Activities.................................... 38
Detection and Disruption..................................... 47
Pre-Travel Phase......................................... 48
Travel Phase............................................. 53
Overseas Gaps................................................ 56
Intelligence Collection and Information Sharing.......... 59
Traveler Screening....................................... 60
Counterterrorism Laws and Prosecutions................... 62
Border Security.......................................... 63
Appendices....................................................... 73
Appendix I: Task Force Activity.............................. 73
Official Member Briefings................................ 73
Official Staff Briefings................................. 74
Official Member Travel................................... 74
Official Staff Travel.................................... 74
Other Task Force Meetings and Consultations.............. 75
Appendix II: American Foreign Fighter Aspirants and Recruits. 77
Appendix III: Abbreviations.................................. 79
INTRODUCTION
Executive Summary
THREAT ENVIRONMENT
Today we are witnessing the largest global convergence of
jihadists in history, as individuals from more than 100
countries have migrated to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq
since 2011.\1\ Some initially flew to the region to join
opposition groups seeking to oust Syrian dictator Bashar al-
Assad, but most are now joining the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS), inspired to become a part of the group's
``caliphate'' and to expand its repressive society. Over 25,000
foreign fighters have traveled to the battlefield to enlist
with Islamist terrorist groups, including at least 4,500
Westerners. More than 250 individuals from the United States
have also joined or attempted to fight with extremists in the
conflict zone.\2\
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\1\ Barbara Starr, `` `A Few Dozen Americans' in ISIS Ranks,'' CNN,
July 15, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/15/politics/isis-american-
recruits/.
\2\ Ibid.
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These fighters pose a serious threat to the United States
and its allies. Armed with combat experience and extremist
connections, many of them are only a plane-flight away from our
shores. Even if they do not return home to plot attacks,
foreign fighters have taken the lead in recruiting a new
generation of terrorists and are seeking to radicalize
Westerners online to spread terror back home.
TASK FORCE ON COMBATING TERRORIST AND FOREIGN FIGHTER TRAVEL
Responding to the growing threat, the House Committee on
Homeland Security established the Task Force on Combating
Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel in March 2015. Chairman
Michael McCaul and Ranking Member Bennie Thompson appointed a
bipartisan group of eight lawmakers charged with reviewing the
threat to the United States from foreign fighters, examining
the Government's preparedness to respond to a surge in
terrorist travel, and providing a final report with findings
and recommendations to address the challenge. Members and staff
also assessed security measures in other countries, as U.S.
defenses depend partly on whether foreign governments are able
to interdict extremists before they reach our shores.
RESULTS OF THE REVIEW
The Task Force makes 32 key findings and provides
accompanying recommendations, which can be read in full
starting in the second part of this report. Among other
conclusions reached, the Task Force finds that:
Despite concerted efforts to stem the flow, we have
largely failed to stop Americans from traveling
overseas to join jihadists. Of the hundreds of
Americans who have sought to travel to the conflict
zone in Syria and Iraq, authorities have only
interdicted a fraction of them. Several dozen have also
managed to make it back into America.
The U.S. Government lacks a National strategy for
combating terrorist travel and has not produced one in
nearly a decade.
The unprecedented speed at which Americans are being
radicalized by violent extremists is straining Federal
law enforcement's ability to monitor and intercept
suspects.
Jihadist recruiters are increasingly using secure
websites and apps to communicate with Americans, making
it harder for law enforcement to disrupt plots and
terrorist travel.
There is currently no comprehensive global database
of foreign fighter names. Instead, countries including
the United States rely on a patchwork system for
swapping extremist identities, increasing the odds
foreign fighters will slip through the cracks.
``Broken travel'' and other evasive transit tactics
are making it harder to track foreign fighters.
Few initiatives exist Nation-wide to raise awareness
about foreign-fighter recruitment and to assist
communities with spotting warning signs.
The Federal Government has failed to develop clear
early-intervention strategies--or ``off-ramps'' to
radicalization--to prevent suspects already on law
enforcement's radar from leaving to fight with
extremists.
Gaping security weaknesses overseas--especially in
Europe--are putting the U.S. homeland in danger by
making it easier for aspiring foreign fighters to
migrate to terrorist hotspots and for jihadists to
return to the West.
Despite improvements since 9/11, foreign partners
are still sharing information about terrorist suspects
in a manner which is ad hoc, intermittent, and often
incomplete.
Ultimately, severing today's foreign-fighter flows
depends on eliminating the problem at the source in
Syria and Iraq and, in the long run, preventing the
emergence of additional terrorist sanctuaries.
The Task Force's final report is divided into two primary
sections. The Introduction provides background on the foreign
fighter phenomenon, an assessment of why it is a threat to the
United States, and an analysis of 58 case studies of Americans
who traveled or attempted to travel to fight in Syria and Iraq.
The Key Findings & Recommendations section outlines the
Task Force's main conclusions and is sub-divided into four
parts: (1) U.S. Government strategy and planning to combat the
threat; (2) efforts to identify terrorists and foreign
fighters--and prevent them from traveling; (3) efforts to
detect and disrupt terrorists and foreign fighters when they
travel; and (4) overseas security gaps.
Notes on Methodology
The Task Force conducted the investigation over a 6-month
period. Its final report is based on briefings, meetings,
domestic and foreign site visits, and analysis of Classified
and Unclassified documents. A summary of the group's activity
can be found in Appendix I. The Task Force spoke with current
and former Federal officials throughout the National security
community and at all relevant departments and agencies. The
group also consulted with State and local law enforcement,
outside experts, and foreign officials on several continents.
Members and staff did not examine all U.S. Government
efforts to stop extremists from crossing borders but instead
focused on those with the most relevance to the foreign fighter
threat. Nevertheless, the Task Force's review is one of the
most extensive public examinations of U.S. Government efforts
to counter terrorist travel in the post-9/11 world. The 9/11
Commission gave considerable attention to the subject, but
since then Government activity in this space has expanded
rapidly. The proliferation of these programs, projects, and
activities is one reason the Task Force urges more regular,
Government-wide audits of America's defenses against terrorist
travel.\3\
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\3\ See Key Finding 1.
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Where practicable, we have tried to cite publicly-available
sources, due to the fact that many of the Task Force's
briefings were either closed to the public or Classified. Our
written analysis of U.S. foreign fighter case studies, for
instance, relies entirely on open sources. However, some
material is cited anonymously in cases where individuals were
assured confidentiality in order to discuss issues more freely.
The Task Force's final report was submitted to the Chairman
and the Ranking Member of the House Homeland Security Committee
in September 2015 to be considered and prepared for final
release.\4\ Prior to publication, it was shared with the White
House and all departments and agencies that cooperated with the
review, partly to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of
sensitive information. The Committee made technical,
conforming, and other edits to the report based on agency
comments and corrections.
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\4\ The Committee was given discretion to make technical,
grammatical, and other conforming changes prior to release.
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The Threat
The United States and the international community face a
grave and growing threat from jihadist foreign fighters. These
are individuals who leave home, travel abroad to terrorist safe
havens, and join or assist violent extremist groups. Today's
foreign fighters are being lured overseas largely by groups
like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaeda's
affiliates to promote a perverse brand of militant Islamism.
Not only are they strengthening terrorist armies that oppress
millions, but some are also plotting attacks against the West
and radicalizing new generations.
Foreign fighters have contributed to an alarming rise in
global terrorism by expanding extremist networks, inciting
individuals back home to conduct attacks, or by returning to
carry out acts of terror themselves. For instance, one
prominent British foreign fighter killed this year in Syria was
linked to terrorist plots spanning the globe, from the United
Kingdom to Australia, without ever having left the Middle
East.\5\ In another case, an American from Ohio was arrested in
April after returning from Syria to plan an attack on a U.S.
military base, where he intended to behead soldiers.\6\ This
case is part of a broader challenge. Indeed, since early 2014
more than a dozen terrorist plots against Western targets have
involved so-called ``returnees'' from terrorist safe havens
like Syria and Libya.\7\
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\5\ Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura, ``Junaid Hussain, ISIS Recruiter,
Reported Killed in Airstrike,'' The New York Times, August 27, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/world/middleeast/junaid-hussain-
islamic-state-recruiter-killed.html?_r=0; Mark Schliebs, ``American
Drone Expunges Aussie-Linked Islamic Terrorist,'' August 28, 2015,
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/terror/american-drone-
expunges-aussie-linked-islamic-state-terrorist/story-fnpdbcmu-
1227501807553?sv=3c3f680b59882e16aa53c911d5b7047d.
\6\ John Bacon, ``Ohio Man Accused of Planning U.S. Terror
Strike,'' USA Today, April 16, 2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/nation/2015/04/16/ohio-indicted-islamic-state-terrorism/25879443/.
\7\ See ``The Danger of Foreign Fighters'' subsection of this
report for a list of recent returnee attacks.
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Foreign fighters are also the motive power behind the
growth of ISIS. Despite a year of U.S. and allied airstrikes,
the group has held most of its territory and continues to
replenish its ranks with outside recruits.\8\ Military
officials estimate airstrikes have killed around 10,000
extremists, but new foreign fighters replace them almost as
quickly as they are killed.\9\ ISIS has also grown from a
single terrorist sanctuary to having a direct presence,
affiliates, or groups pledging support in 18 countries.\10\ The
organization is believed to have inspired or directed nearly 60
terrorist plots or attacks against Western countries, including
15 in the United States.\11\ Some of these were masterminded by
foreign fighters based in Syria, while others were carried out
by returnees themselves or homegrown extremists.
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\8\ Ken Dilanian, Zeina Karam, and Bassem Mroue, Associated Press,
``Pummeled in Its Capital, Islamic State Group Still Hanging Tough
across Iraq and Syria,'' U.S. News, July 31, 2015, http://
www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2015/07/31/despite-bombing-
islamic-state-is-no-weaker-than-a-year-ago.
\9\ Ibid.
\10\ U.S. Congress. Majority Staff of the House Homeland Security
Committee. Terror Threat Snapshot: September 2015, https://
homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Complete-September-
Terror-Threat-Snapshot.pdf.
\11\ Ibid.
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The foreign fighter phenomenon is not new. For decades,
Western citizens have gone to extremist hotspots to fight or
train with Islamist terror groups, from Afghanistan to Somalia,
and many of them have returned with nefarious intentions. Since
9/11, dozens of Americans extremists have been arrested after
coming back home from terrorist safe havens, including
individuals plotting attacks.\12\ In 2002, for instance,
American citizen Jose Padilla was arrested in Chicago for
allegedly planning a ``dirty bomb'' attack; he had attended an
al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan in 2000. In another case,
Afghan-American Najibullah Zazi traveled from New York to
Pakistan and was arrested in 2009 after returning home to
conduct a suicide attack on the New York City subway system.
The same year Faisal Shazad went abroad and received training
from the Pakistani-Taliban; he came back to the United States
and was arrested after attempting a car bombing in Times
Square.
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\12\ Brian Michael Jenkins, ``When Jihadis Come Marching Home: The
Terrorist Threat Posed by Westerners Returning from Syria and Iraq,''
Perspectives. RAND Corporation, 2014, 12-13, http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE130-1/RAND_PE130-1.pdf.
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The level of terrorist travel we are seeing today, however,
is without precedent. The numbers are now so high that Western
governments are becoming increasingly worried they will be
unable to prevent violent extremists from entering their
countries undetected. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Director James Comey warned last year that we need to brace
ourselves for a wider ``terrorist diaspora'' out of Syria and
Iraq.\13\ Whether directed to conduct attacks or not, many of
these individuals will return with the combat experience,
extremist connections, and motivations to do so. Indeed, the
ripple effect of terror created by foreign fighter travel to
and from Syria and Iraq, in particular, will pose a threat to
America for decades to come unless dealt with quickly and
decisively.
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\13\ House Committee on Homeland Security, Worldwide Threats to the
Homeland: Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security, 113th
Cong., 2nd sess., September 17, 2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CHRG-113hhrg93367/html/CHRG-113hhrg93367.htm.
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THE GLOBAL SURGE IN FOREIGN FIGHTERS
Today's explosive growth in foreign fighter travel to Syria
and Iraq has surpassed other jihadist conflicts in both scope
and magnitude. Travelers hail from all corners of the globe,
represent an array of ethnicities, and span virtually all age
ranges. While some individuals initially traveled to the region
for humanitarian purposes, the overwhelming majority are now
headed there because of jihadist ideology or to live in the so-
called Islamic State. Migration to the conflict zone does not
appear to have abated, and the threat continues to evolve as
new safe havens attract additional foreign fighters.
From Afar: Foreign Recruits and the Syrian Civil War
The foreign fighter phenomenon in Syria and Iraq has its
origins in the Syrian civil war. Local protests broke out in
Syria in March 2011 after a group of teenagers were arrested
and tortured by Syrian authorities for painting revolutionary
slogans on school property.\14\ Security forces opened fire on
the protestors, sparking nationwide demonstrations that shifted
from pro-democracy demands to calls for the Bashar al-Assad
regime's ouster. By July 2011, hundreds of thousands had taken
to the streets as the government tried unsuccessfully to crush
the rebellion. The opposition soon took up arms to expel
Assad's security forces from their local territories.\15\
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\14\ Kareem Fahim and Hwaida Saad, ``A Faceless Teenage Refugee Who
Helped Ignite Syria's War,'' The New York Times, February 08, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/world/middleeast/a-faceless-teenage-
refugee-who-helped-ignite-syrias-war.html?_r=2.
\15\ Lucy Rodgers, David Gritten, James Offer, and Patrick Asare,
``Syria: The Story of the Conflict,'' BBC News, March 12, 2015, http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868.
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The country descended into full-scale civil war by 2012.
Rebel brigades assembled to fight government forces for control
of cities and towns across Syria. Several high-level defectors
from the regular Syrian Army formed the Free Syrian Army,
attracting thousands of recruits. But the conflict devolved
further as various nationalist, sectarian, and religious
factions, primarily Sunnis, emerged to fight Assad's Shia
Alawite government. War volunteers trickled into the country
from abroad, with some traveling to support the anti-Assad
insurgency and others arriving with more radical goals.
Jihadist groups capitalized on the chaos and gained influence.
By 2013, the influx of foreign fighters was growing
quickly. Rebel fighters on the ground appealed to the world by
documenting the regime's atrocities on social media, and
prominent Sunni clerics called for Muslims to travel to the
war-torn country to oust Assad.\16\ By summer, nearly 5,000
foreign fighters from 60 countries had arrived.\17\ One scholar
observed that the numbers ``exceeded that of any previous
conflict in the modern history of the Muslim world.''\18\
Although an estimated 10,000 total fighters came to Afghanistan
to attack the Soviets in the 1980s, there were likely never
more than 3,000 to 4,000 at any given period.\19\
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\16\ Thomas Hegghammer and Aaron Y. Zelin, ``How Syria's Civil War
Became a Holy Crusade,'' Foreign Affairs, October 15, 2014, https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2013-07-03/how-syrias-
civil-war-became-holy-crusade.
\17\ Ibid.
\18\ Thomas Hegghammer, ``Syria's Foreign Fighters,'' Foreign
Policy, December 9, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/09/syrias-
foreign-fighters/.
\19\ Ibid.
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By the end of 2013, analysts estimated more than 8,500
foreign fighters had flocked to Syria to fight with the anti-
Assad opposition or join Sunni jihadist groups.\20\ Around 70
percent were from the Middle East and North Africa, but 2,000
or so were assessed to be from Western countries.\21\ U.S.
intelligence and security officials grew especially alarmed
about the number of extremists entering the conflict zone,
which was then thought to include ``dozens'' of Americans.\22\
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\20\ Aaron Y. Zelin, ``Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria;
Steep Rise among Western Europeans,'' ICSR Insight, December 17, 2013,
http://icsr.info/2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fighters-syria-
steep-rise-among-western-europeans/.
\21\ Ibid.
\22\ Eric Schmitt, ``U.S. Says Dozens of Americans Have Sought to
Join Rebels in Syria,'' The New York Times, November 20, 2013, http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/world/middleeast/us-says-dozens-of-
americans-have-sought-to-join-rebels-in-syria.html.
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The Rise of ISIS
One jihadist group in particular saw an opening. The
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), a successor organization to al-
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), called for sectarian war and the creation
of a regional Islamic state.\23\ AQI was a terrorist group
whose leadership had pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden in
2004 and which led an insurgency against U.S. forces in the
country. After the group's leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was
killed in a 2006 U.S. airstrike, it rebranded as ISI. The
terror outfit was weakened by the surge of U.S. troops into
Iraq, the Anbar awakening, and later the death of its two top
leaders in 2010. With the eventual withdrawal of American
forces, however, ISI took advantage of the security vacuum and
Sunni disenfranchisement with the central government to ramp up
attacks. Its new leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, oversaw the
escalation in violence.
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\23\ Christopher M. Blanchard, Carla E. Humud, Kenneth Katzman, and
Matthew C. Weed, The ``Islamic State'' Crisis and U.S. Policy (CRS
Report No. R43612) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf.
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In April 2013, al-Baghdadi declared the creation of the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (hereafter, ISIS). He
sought to merge his forces with those of al-Qaeda's Syrian
affiliate, but al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri rejected the
merger, creating a schism between the groups. Nevertheless,
ISIS expanded its operations in northern and eastern Syria,
claiming territory and creating tension with other rebel
factions. The momentum allowed ISIS to attract additional
resources, especially more foreign fighters.\24\
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\24\ Barak Mendelsohn, ``After Disowning ISIS, Al Qaeda Is Back On
Top,'' Foreign Affairs, February 13, 2014, https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-02-13/after-disowning-
isis-al-qaeda-back-top.
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On New Year's Day 2014, ISIS convoys stormed Falluja and
Ramadi, Iraqi cities which only a few years earlier had been
liberated from extremists by U.S. forces. The Iraqi army
crumbled as the fighters arrived in convoys of 70-100 trucks,
armed with heavy weapons and anti-aircraft guns.\25\ The
group's growing success resonated with Islamist radicals across
social media. ISIS launched another major offensive in June
2014, capturing Iraq's second largest city, Mosul, and taking
control of others towns as it pushed south toward Baghdad.
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\25\ Brett McGurk, Al-Qaeda's Resurgence in Iraq: A Threat to U.S.
Interests: Hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
testimony, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., February 5, 2014, http://
www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/221274.htm.
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The Declaration of the Caliphate and the Great Jihadi Migration
On June 29, 2014, ISIS declared it was re-establishing the
``caliphate,'' or Islamic State, on the territory it controlled
in Syria and Iraq.\26\ Baghdadi was declared the State's
leader--the caliph--via an audio recording posted on-line. In
the eyes of ISIS followers, he was a successor to the prophet
Muhammad and now the self-appointed leader of the Muslim world.
ISIS called on Muslims to swear allegiance to the caliphate or
be branded ``apostates.'' Mainstream Muslims and even other
jihadist groups dismissed the declaration as a stunt and
declared the caliphate to be illegitimate.\27\
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\26\ ``Isis Rebels Declare 'Islamic State' in Iraq and Syria,'' BBC
News, June 30, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
28082962.
\27\ Paul Cruickshank, ``Al Qaeda in Yemen Rebukes ISIS--CNN.com,''
CNN, November 21, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/21/world/meast/al-
qaeda-yemen-isis/.
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For many extremists, however, the announcement was
groundbreaking. The establishment of an Islamic State had been
the long-term goal of Osama bin Laden, though he did not
believe it would happen in his lifetime. The declaration marked
the first time in 90 years--since Turkish secularist Kemal
Ataturk abolished the Ottoman Empire--that an Islamist group
claimed dominion over the entire Muslim world.
A new wave of travelers headed to the region, aspiring to
become jihadists and to participate in what they saw as a
historic movement. Just days after the announcement, U.S.
officials put the number of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq
at more than 7,000.\28\ Within 2 months officials revised the
figure upward to between 12,000 and 15,000.\29\ The United
Nations (UN) assessed militants from more than 80 countries had
arrived.\30\ The increase in numbers was partly from greater
global awareness; as countries became more attuned to the
threat, they realized more of their citizens traveled to the
conflict zone and revised official figures accordingly.
However, much of the growth was from new travelers.
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\28\ U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Public Affairs. Attorney
General Holder Urges International Effort to Confront Threat of Syrian
Foreign Fighters, July 8, 2014, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-
general-holder-urges-international-effort-confront-threat-syrian-
foreign-fighters.
\29\ Daniel L. Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, ``Managing the Foreign
Fighter Threat,'' The Brookings Institution, January 14, 2015, http://
www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/01/14-byman-shapiro-foreign-
fighters.
\30\ U.N. Department of Public Information, ``Security Council
Unanimously Adopts Resolution Condemning Violent Extremism,
Underscoring Need to Prevent Travel, Support for Foreign Terrorist
Fighters,'' SC/11580, September 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/
2014/sc11580.doc.htm.
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ISIS militants started a new recruitment campaign to sell
their society to a wider audience. The group promoted its
territory as a place not just for fighters but also for
families and called for extremists to bring their entire
households--mothers, fathers and children--to the new Islamic
State.\31\ The group promised religious schooling for girls and
boys and instruction for children on how to dress and maintain
a household.\32\ Women were promised homes with electricity,
food, and salaries of up to $1,100 for each family--though they
were likely not told the homes had come from locals who had
been thrown out and the salaries looted from banks, oil
smuggling, and kidnapping ransom.\33\
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\31\ Keith Sullivan and Karla Adam, ``Hoping to Create a New
Society, the Islamic State Recruits Entire Families,'' Washington Post,
December 24, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/hoping-to-create-a-new-homeland-the-islamic-state-recruits-
entire-families/2014/12/24/dbffceec-8917-11e4-8ff4-
fb93129c9c8b_story.html.
\32\ Ibid.
\33\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite using a softer pitch, the group's strongest appeal
was to hardcore and aspiring extremists. ISIS promoted videos
depicting its brutal murder of non-believers and sought to
demonstrate its leadership of the global jihadist movement by
intimidating Western countries. In August and September 2014,
it released grisly videos of the beheading of several American,
British, and Australian hostages.
Undeterred: Military Intervention and Continued Foreign Fighter Flows
The United States conducted its first series of coordinated
airstrikes against ISIS in August 2014. The strikes focused
initially on curbing ISIS advances in northern Iraq and
protecting religious minorities but eventually shifted to
supporting offensive operations against the militant group in
both Iraq and its Syrian territory. In September, President
Obama declared the aim of degrading and ultimately destroying
the group. The United States has since conducted more than
5,000 airstrikes against ISIS.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ U.S. Department of Defense, ``Special Report: Inherent
Resolve,'' Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Operations Against ISIL
Terrorists, accessed September 19, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News/
Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airstrikes, however, do not appear to have kept aspiring
foreign fighters away. When the strikes began, counterterrorism
officials estimated the total number of extremists was around
15,000.\35\ However, fighters continued to enter Syria at a
rate of about 1,000 per month. In December 2014, intelligence
officials pegged the total at more than 18,000,\36\ and by
February 2015 it surpassed 20,000.\37\ Today the figure stands
at 25,000-plus foreign fighters, more than triple the number
from just a year ago.\38\ The majority of these fighters still
come from the Middle East and North Africa, with Tunisia as the
most significant source country. But the total also includes
4,500 Westerners and more than 250 Americans, figures which
have surged since 2014.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Matthew G. Olsen, Worldwide Threats to the Homeland: Hearing
Before the Committee on Homeland Security, 113th Cong., 2nd sess.,
September 17, 2014, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20140917/
102616/HHRG-113-HM00-Wstate-OlsenM-20140917.pdf.
\36\ Jeff Seldin, ``More Foreign Fighters in Iraq, Syria,'' VOA,
December 24, 2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/estimates-rising-of-
foreign-fighters-in-iraq-syria/2572994.html.
\37\ Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Countering Violent Islamist Extremism:
The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror: Hearing
before the House Committee on Homeland Security, 114th Cong., 1st
sess., February 11, 2015, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/
20150211/102901/HHRG-114-HM00-Wstate-RasmussenN-20150211.pdf.
\38\ Using U.S. Government public estimates, the overall number has
risen from 7,000-plus in July of last year to 25,000-plus today.
\39\ Homeland Security Committee. Terror Threat Snapshot: September
2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, foreign fighters have helped ISIS to remain strong.
Nearly 10,000 of the group's foot soldiers have been killed by
airstrikes, but they have been replaced by new foreign and
domestic fighters almost as quickly as they are taken off the
battlefield.\40\ There has been ``no meaningful degradation in
their numbers,'' according to one defense official, as
estimates place ISIS's total fighting force at 20-30,000--the
same as it was last fall.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Dilanian, Karam, and Mroue, AP, ``Islamic State Hanging
Tough.''
\41\ Laura Smith-Spark and Noisette Martel, ``U.S. Official: 10,000
ISIS Fighters Killed in 9 Months,'' CNN, June 3, 2015, http://
www.cnn.com/2015/06/03/middleeast/isis-conflict/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Sanctuaries
While ISIS is focused on holding its territory in Syria and
Iraq, the group has also declared other ``provinces'' in places
like Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, and Libya.\42\ ISIS
recruiters on social media have called for followers to travel
to these locations if they cannot make it to Syria and Iraq,
and it appears many have heeded the call. The groups has also
publicly accepted pledges of allegiance from established
Islamist terrorist groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria. Unlike
al-Qaeda, ISIS does not require a multi-year application
process for groups to become a franchise of its terror brand,
enabling it to grow faster and farther.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Eric Schmitt and David Kirk Patrick, ``Islamic State Sprouting
Limbs Beyond Its Base,'' The New York Times, February 14, 2015, http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/world/middleeast/islamic-state-sprouting-
limbs-beyond-mideast.html.
\43\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Taking advantage of a post-Qaddafi security vacuum, ISIS
has reportedly sent two senior foreign fighters to Libya to set
up a new base of operations, and members of the group have put
out recruitment calls for extremists to migrate there.\44\ In
early 2015, Libya's foreign minister estimated that more than
5,000 foreign fighters aligned with an array of terrorist
groups had arrived in the country.\45\ ISIS-linked militants
trained in Libya are suspected of being responsible for
devastating terrorist attacks in neighboring Tunisia, and
officials fear the group may use Libya as a staging area to
enter Europe by sea to attack Western countries.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Jack Moore, ``5,000 Foreign Fighters Flock to Libya as ISIS
Call for Jihadists,'' Newsweek, March 3, 2015, http://
europe.newsweek.com/5000-foreign-fighters-flock-libya-isis-call-
jihadists-310948.
\45\ Ibid.
\46\ Everett Rosenfeld, ``Fear Grows in Europe as ISIS Comes to
Libya,'' CNBC, February 20, 2015, http://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/20/
islamic-state-terrorism-fear-grows-in-europe-as-isis-comes-to-
libya.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Foreign fighters pledging allegiance to ISIS have similarly
been building a base of operations in Afghanistan and have been
taking advantage of the Taliban's leadership vacuum to recruit
additional fighters in the wake of its leader Mullah Omar's
death. ISIS is reported to have amassed hundreds, if not
thousands, of fighters in the country already.\47\ Earlier this
year Afghan President Ashraf Ghani warned of the ``terrible
threat'' from the group, noting that it had ``[sent] advance
guards to southern and western Afghanistan to test for
vulnerabilities.''\48\ ISIS now claims credit for terrorist
attacks across Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Seth G. Jones, ``Expanding the Caliphate,'' Foreign Affairs,
June 11, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/
2015-06-11/expanding-caliphate.
\48\ Emma Graham-Harrison, ``Taliban Fears over Young Recruits
Attracted to Isis in Afghanistan,'' The Guardian, May 7, 2015, http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/07/taliban-young-recruits-isis-
afghanistan-jihadis-islamic-state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While it is unclear whether any Western, or specifically
American, foreign fighters have traveled to other ISIS terror
sanctuaries, the group's expansion in these locations
nevertheless provides a potential ``menu'' of options for
jihadist travelers. Not only does this make it harder to roll
back groups like ISIS, but it increases the challenges
authorities face in tracking their own citizens who try to join
the extremist movement.
THE DANGER OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS: RECRUITS, ``RETURNEES,'' AND REMOTE
RADICALIZATION
Foreign fighters represent a three-fold threat to the
United States and the international community. First, they
supply the human capital terrorist groups like ISIS need to
operate, expand, and plot against the West. Second,
``returnees'' who come back from jihadist battlefields are
often armed with the training to conduct attacks and the
extremist connections to build terrorist networks at home.
Third, even if fighters do not return home, they can engage
others on-line from terror safe havens and inspire them to
radicalize--or worse--to commit acts of violence without ever
stepping foot out of the country.
Jihadists Without Borders
Foreign fighters have proven instrumental in fueling
Islamist terror groups like ISIS. As noted earlier, jihadists
from abroad have steadily backfilled the group's losses,
preventing thousands of U.S. and coalition airstrikes from
diminishing its ranks. This of course has allowed ISIS to
continue its reign of terror and even expand. Indeed, those who
arrive in the conflict zone are typically willing and ready to
participate in the group's atrocities. ``We believe the hardest
fighting people in ISIS are the foreign fighters,'' one
official told the Task Force staff.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Task Force staff briefing, March 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Western recruits in particular have ended up at the
forefront of the violence, and as one ISIS defector noted, they
can be even more brutal than local jihadists.\50\ Take the case
of 26-year-old British citizen Mohammed Emwazi, better known as
``Jihadi John.'' He is believed to have traveled to Syria
around 2012 and to have later joined ISIS.\51\ Before long, he
had become the group's most visible spokesman and the masked
face in its grisly beheading videos. After disappearing from
public view for months, the British jihadist recently released
a video pledging to return to Britain and ``carry on cutting
heads off.''\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Geoff Earle, ``Western ISIS Fighters Are the Most Brutal:
Defector,'' New York Post, September 29, 2014, http://nypost.com/2014/
09/29/western-isis-fighters-are-the-most-brutal-defector/.
\51\ Soaud Mekhennet and Adam Goldman, `` `Jihadi John': Islamic
State Killer Is Identified as Londoner Mohammed Emwazi,'' Washington
Post, February 26, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/jihadi-john-the-islamic-state-killer-behind-the-mask-is-a-
young-londoner/2015/02/25/d6dbab16-bc43-11e4-bdfa-
b8e8f594e6ee_story.html.
\52\ Omar Wahid, ``Jihadi John--`I Will Go Back to Britain . . .
and Will Carry on Cutting Heads Off': In a Chilling New Video, Man Said
to Be Hooded Butcher Vows to Return . . . and Murder All Unbelievers,''
Daily Mail Online, August 22, 2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-3207366/Jihadi-John-Britain-carry-cutting-heads-chilling-new-
video-man-said-hooded-butcher-beheaded-two-British-hostages-vows-come-
home-murder-unbelievers.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But Jihadi John is not an exception. Western foreign
fighters have engaged heavily in the group's atrocities.
Analysts for the International Center for the Study of
Radicalization say extremists in Syria use Westerners for
``excessively brutal operations that locals may refuse to be
involved in,'' including suicide bombings, beheadings, and
torture.\53\ In fact, U.S. officials estimate most of the
group's suicide bombers are from foreign countries.\54\ One of
the first Americans to die in the conflict, Moner Mohammad
Abusalha, was responsible for a suicide bombing attack on a
Syrian restaurant, the video of which was later distributed by
extremists on social media.\55\ In the recording, Abusalha rips
up his American passport, urges others to travel to the
conflict zone, and warns that America ``is not safe''; it ends
with him driving an explosive-laden truck into the attack site
and detonating it.\56\ In yet another indication Westerners are
engaging in serious violence, Germany recently estimated that
100 of its 700 citizens who went to Syria had been killed while
fighting alongside ISIS.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Peter Neumann, ``War on Two Fronts: Perceptions on the Fight
against the Islamic State,'' The Finnish Institute of International
Affairs, October 29, 2014, http://www.fiia.fi/en/event/702/
war_on_two_fronts/.
\54\ McGurk, Al-Qaeda's Resurgence in Iraq.
\55\ Peter Bergen, ``The All-American Al Qaeda Suicide Bomber,''
CNN, July 31, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/31/opinion/bergen-
american-al-qaeda-suicide-bomber-syria/.
\56\ Meg Wagner, ``Video: American Suicide Bomber in Syria
Threatens U.S.,'' NY Daily News, July 30, 2014, http://
www.nydailynews.com/news/world/american-suicide-bomber-syria-threatens-
video-article-1.1885341.
\57\ Suman Varandani, ``About 100 Germans Killed Fighting Alongside
ISIS In Iraq And Syria Since 2012, German Interior Minister Says,''
International Business Times, August 24, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/
about-100-germans-killed-fighting-alongside-isis-iraq-syria-2012-
german-interior-2064892.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ``Returnees''
The biggest fear about those who travel to fight in
terrorist hotspots is that they will return to plot attacks or
to recruit others for their extremist networks. A 2013 study
found that one out of nine Western jihadists conducted attacks
when they came back from conflict zones.\58\ While this is only
around 10 percent, it is still a worrying figure, given the
fact that more than 25,000 extremists have gone abroad to
become foreign fighters in Syria alone. Moreover, unlike many
of the jihadists tracked in the study, today's extremists are
more plugged into social media, allowing them to stay
radicalized and engaged long after they have left the
battlefield. Research also finds attacks conducted by returnees
are more deadly than those carried out by home-grown
extremists.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ The study was based on an analysis of Western returnees from
1990 to 2010 who had joined insurgencies in places like Afghanistan and
Somalia. See: Thomas Hegghammer, ``Should I Stay or Should I Go?
Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists Choice between Domestic and
Foreign Fighting,'' American Political Science Review, February 2013,
doi: 10.1017/S0003055412000615.
\59\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These worries have materialized in the United States this
year, as several American returnees have been arrested and
charged by authorities.\60\ In February, the FBI detained an
Ohio man, Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud, who reportedly came back
from training with extremists in Syria and planned to attack a
U.S. military base and kill soldiers execution-style.\61\
Mohamud returned after a radical, al-Qaeda-affiliated cleric
urged him to conduct an attack in the United States.\62\
Another suspect, New York resident Arafat Nagi, was arrested in
July and charged with attempting to recruit for ISIS after
coming back from Turkey where he had sought to join the
group.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ These arrests are in addition to the dozens of Americans
arrested this year either attempting to travel to Syria or engaging in
support or plotting inspired by ISIS.
\61\ United States of America v. Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud, April
16, 2015, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/04/16/mohamud- _indictment.pdf.
\62\ Ibid.
\63\ While Nagi is not a Syria returnee--as it does not appear he
crossed from Turkey into the conflict zone--his case is nevertheless
emblematic of radicalized individuals who come back and attempt to
recruit others to join the group. See: Lou Michel, ``Accused ISIS
Recruiter Had Threatened to Behead Daughter, Sources Say,'' The Buffalo
News, July 29, 2015, http://www.buffalonews.com/city-region/lackawanna/
accused-isis-recruiter-had-threatened-to-behead-daughter-sources-say-
20150729%20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, American returnees are not the only threat to the
United States. Other Western citizens in the conflict zone--
from dozens of countries--can travel easily to U.S. territory
without applying for a visa, including most European
jihadists.\64\ European security officials estimate 20 to 30
percent of their foreign fighters have already departed Syria
and Iraq.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ The security of the Visa Waiver Program is discussed elsewhere
in the Task Force's report, especially in Key Finding 23.
\65\ Gilles De Kerchove et al., ``Rehabilitation and Reintegration
of Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters,'' The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, February 23, 2015, http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/rehabilitation-and-
reintegration-of-returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since early 2014, there has been an alarming global uptick
in terrorist plots involving foreign-fighter returnees. They
include, but are not limited to, the following:\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ This list is not comprehensive and also does not reflect
Islamist terror plots by returnees from other jihadist safe havens,
such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. The Charlie Hebdo attacks,
for instance, were plotted by suspects alleged to have trained in
Yemen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
August 2015 (France).--Plot to attack a concert on
French soil; suspect allegedly returned from ISIS'
stronghold in Raqqa, Syria with instructions to conduct
the attack.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ ``Arrested French Jihadist `Instructed' to Attack Concert,''
France 24, September 18, 2015, http://www.france24.com/en/20150918-
france-jihadist-arrested-terrorist-attack-plot-concert.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
August 2015 (Belgium).--Attempted mass shooting
against passengers on a train from Amsterdam to Paris;
suspect alleged to have fought in Syria.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ ``Suspected Train Gunman `known to French Intelligence',''
France 24, August 23, 2015, http://www.france24.com/en/20150822-france-
train-attack-suspected-gunman-known-french-intelligence-syria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
July 2015 (Kosovo).--Plot to contaminate the
capital's water supply; two suspects believed to have
fought in Syria.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ Rick Lyman, ``Kosovo Charges 5 People in Plot to Poison
Water,'' The New York Times, July 12, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/07/13/world/europe/kosovo-charges-5-people-in-plot-to-poison-
water.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
June 2015 (Tunisia).--Mass shooting on resort beach
killing 40 people, mostly Western tourists; while
suspect did not travel to Syria, he is said to have
trained with ISIS in Libya.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ Chris Stephen, ``Tunisia Gunman Trained in Libya at Same Time
as Bardo Museum Attackers,'' The Guardian, June 30, 2015, http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/30/tunisia-beach-attack-seifeddine-
rezgui-libya-bardo-museum-attackers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 2015 (Saudi Arabia).--Plot to bomb U.S.
Embassy in Riyadh; suspects include two Syrian foreign
fighters and a Saudi citizen.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ ``Saudi Arabia Arrest 93 Terror Suspects, Foils Car Bomb Plot
on U.S. Embassy,'' Fox News, April 29, 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/
world/2015/04/29/saudi-arabia-arrest-3-terror-suspects-foils-car-bomb-
plot-on-us-embassy/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 2015 (United States).--Plot to attack a U.S.
military base, as noted above; suspect trained in Syria
and was directed to return to the United States to
conduct attack.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Bacon, ``Ohio Man Accused of Planning U.S. Terror Strike.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 2015 (United Kingdom).--Plot to conduct mass
public shooting; suspect was a British MI5 agent who
had traveled to Syria and reportedly double-crossed his
U.K. handlers.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Duncan Gardham, ``British Double Agent `plotted to Kill His
MI5 Handler and Attack UK' after Infiltrating Jihadist Group in
Syria,'' Daily Mail Online, March 28, 2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-3016480/British-double-agent-plotted-kill-MI5-handler-
attack-UK-infiltrating-jihadist-group-Syria.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 2015 (Tunisia).--Mass shooting attack killing
19 people at the National Bardo Museum in Tunis; two
suspects allegedly trained in Libya with ISIS, which
claimed credit for the attack.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ Faith Karimi, Tim Lister, and Greg Botelho, ``2 Suspects in
Tunisia Attack Trained in Libya,'' CNN, March 20, 2015, http://
www.cnn.com/2015/03/20/africa/tunisia-museum-attack/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 2015 (Canada).--Plot to bomb U.S. consulate in
Canada; suspect who had allegedly trained with
extremists in Pakistan and Libya.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ Michele Mandel, ``Man Accused of U.S. Consulate/Bay St. Bomb
Plot to Be Deported,'' Ottawa Sun, June 5, 2015, http://
www.ottawasun.com/2015/06/05/man-accused-of-us-consulatebay-st-bomb-
plot-to-be-deported.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 2015 (Turkey).--Plot to attack U.S., French,
and Belgian consulates in Istanbul; suspects included
17 militants from Syria who infiltrated Turkey.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ Yuksel Temel, ``Intelligence Uncovers ISIS Plot to Attack
Consulates,'' Daily Sabah, January 25, 2015, http://www.dailysabah.com/
nation/2015/01/25/intelligence-uncovers-isis-plot-to-attack-consulates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 2015 (Belgium).--Plot to conduct a major
attack on police; two suspects killed during raid and
had reportedly returned from Syria.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ Matthew Dalton, ``Belgium Antiterror Raid Leaves Two Suspects
Dead,'' The Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/
articles/belgium-antiterror-raid-leaves-two-dead-official-says-
1421350264.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 2015 (France).--Shooting attack in Paris
against cartoon publication; at least one suspect is
believed to have returned from Yemen.
May 2014 (Belgium).--Shooting attack killing four at
a Jewish museum in Brussels; suspect allegedly was ISIS
militant in Syria.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ Kevin Rawlinson, ``Jewish Museum Shooting Suspect Is `Islamic
State Torturer' '' The Guardian, September 6, 2014, http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/06/jewish-museum-shooting-suspect-
islamic-state-torturer-brussels-syria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
February 2014 (France).--Plot to bomb a carnival in
the French Riviera; suspect had traveled to Syria to
fight for ISIS.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ Ben McPartland, ``Several `planned Terrorist Attacks' Foiled
in France,'' The Local France, November 03, 2014, http://
www.thelocal.fr/20141103/terrorist-attacks-foiled-in-france.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When they come back, foreign fighters are still a long-term
threat no matter whether they engage in immediate attack
plotting. Peter Neumann, a U.K.-based expert on the phenomenon,
outlined the concerns clearly:
``We don't know whether they will act today or tomorrow, but
what we do know is that in five, 10, 15 years, not just next
month, they will pose a danger. They've had military training;
they've set up networks. We've seen it with the Afghan Arabs
[i.e. the fighters who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the
1980s]. Many of them subsequently became involved in every
conflict of the 1990s: Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya. Others went
home to Libya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and, once there, like the
other Afghan Arabs, they became the elite: the leadership of
the new jihad.''\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ Mary Anne Weaver, ``Her Majesty's Jihadists,'' The New York
Times, April 14, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/magazine/her-
majestys-jihadists.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Remote Radicalization
Even if foreign fighters do not return to the West, they
still pose a threat by radicalizing others on-line. Most of the
recruiting by groups like ISIS is not done through a central
unit; it is performed at the grassroots by rank-and-file
foreign fighters.\81\ They have taken the lead in seeking new
jihadist followers by communicating with others back home,
documenting their battlefield experiences on-line, and
distributing extremist propaganda on social media.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ Jenkins, ``When Jihadis Come Marching Home,'' 5-6. http://
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE130-1/
RAND_PE130-1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many Islamist terror groups initially sought to recruit
only men for the fighting. The approach has shifted, though,
and groups like ISIS are encouraging women to migrate to its
territory. Females who have made it to the conflict zone are
now actively drafting other women. Umm Layth, a 20-year-old
British citizen in Syria, for example, boasts a large social-
media following and advises women on traveling to Syria, while
others use Tumblr accounts to blog about daily ISIS life.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ Aryn Baker, ``How ISIS Is Recruiting Women Around the World,''
Time Inc., September 6, 2014, http://time.com/3276567/how-isis-is-
recruiting-women-from-around-the-world/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Foreign jihadists have proven skilled at producing on-line
content for each of their target audiences. Gruesome,
Hollywood-style videos have been directed at recruiting
potential martyrs and hardcore fighters. But ISIS has also
sought to portray the lighter sides of its perceived caliphate
to attract a wider following. The ninth issue of Dabiq, the
group's on-line magazine, included a feature article on
``Healthcare in the [Caliphate],'' claiming ISIS provides
``extensive healthcare by running a host of medical facilities
including hospitals and clinics in all major cities.''\83\ The
article adds that these facilities provide a ``wide range of
medical services,'' from X-rays and complex surgeries to
ultrasounds and brain scans.\84\ ISIS foreign fighters have
also sought to appeal to those back home by emphasizing
Western-style comforts. One social media campaign showed ISIS
supporters posing with jars of Nutella,\85\ while another
documented the caliphate's ice cream parlors.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ ``Health Care in the [Caliphate],'' Dabiq, no. 9, 25-26,
http://media.clarionproject.org/files/islamic-state/isis-isil-islamic-
state-magazine-issue%2B9-they-plot-and-allah-plots-sex-slavery.pdf.
\84\ Ibid.
\85\ Natalie Andrews and Felicia Schwartz, ``Islamic State Pushes
Social-Media Battle With West,'' The Wall Street Journal, August 22,
2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/isis-pushes-social-media-battle-with-
west-1408725614.
\86\ Ruth Pollard, ``Islamic State Propaganda: What the West
Doesn't Understand'' The Sydney Morning Herald, July 9, 2015, http://
www.smh.com.au/world/islamic-state-propaganda-what-the-west-doesnt-
understand-20150708-gi86qu.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to promoting travel to Syria and Iraq, foreign
fighters also aim to radicalize Westerners back home to conduct
attacks. For instance, authorities believe one of the shooters
in the May assault on a draw-Mohammad contest in Garland, Texas
was radicalized and directly encouraged on-line by a known ISIS
recruiter in Syria.\87\ This approach to supporting attacks--
virtually reaching out to potential foot soldiers--has allowed
the terror group to scale-up its violence. At the time of
writing, there had been nearly twice as many ISIS-linked attack
plots against the West in 2015 (37) as there were in all of
2014 (20).\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\ Evan Perez, Pamela Brown, and Jim Sciutto, ``Texas Attacker
Had Private Convos with Known Terrorists,'' CNN, May 7, 2015, http://
www.cnn.com/2015/05/07/politics/fbi-warning-elton-simpson-cartoon-
event-attack/index.html.
\88\ House Homeland Security Committee. Terror Threat Snapshot:
September 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AMERICANS ON THE PATHWAY TO TERROR
Intelligence officials estimate more than 250 Americans
have tried or succeeded in getting to Syria and Iraq to fight
with militant groups.\89\ This includes individuals who were
stopped before traveling, who made it to the conflict zone and
are still there, who were killed, and others who have come
back. Some have been arrested on terror charges, though most
have not. Americans are being recruited in growing numbers and
continue to attempt to migrate to jihadist battlefields in
Syria and beyond, posing a serious counterterrorism challenge
for the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ Starr, `` `A Few Dozen Americans' in ISIS Ranks.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By-The-Numbers
The Task Force reviewed 58 cases of Americans who joined or
attempted to join Islamist terrorists in Syria and Iraq since
the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011.\90\ These
individuals are listed in Appendix II. We did not review all
American foreign fighter cases, only those which were publicly
available. Some cases are not public due to on-going
investigations, while data about other suspects is often
unconfirmed or Classified.\91\ Nevertheless, the instances we
reviewed provide a sample of how wide-spread the foreign
fighter phenomenon has become.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ The overwhelming majority of individuals reviewed were U.S.
person; in other words, they were U.S. citizens or legal permanent
residents of the United States. Only several cases concerned subjects
with other kinds of immigration status, e.g. visa overstays or
refugees.
\91\ While we assessed some Classified information related to these
cases, we strongly urge the administration to conduct a full end-to-end
review of all U.S. foreign fighter cases, recommended as part of Key
Finding 2 in this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The majority of aspiring foreign fighters have managed to
make it out of the United States without being stopped.--Of the
250-plus Americans who have joined or tried to join extremists
in Syria and Iraq, we were able to identify only 28 cases in
which U.S. authorities apprehended suspects before they
departed for the Middle East. A handful of suspects were
stopped in other countries, but it appears the majority--more
than 85 percent--still managed to evade American law
enforcement on the way to the conflict zone. The first suspect
authorities seem to have stopped was a 21-year-old Illinois
man, Abdella Ahmad Tounsi, whose case is representative of many
others. He was flagged after reaching out to an on-line
terrorist recruiter, who was really an undercover FBI agent,
and searching for ways to fight in Syria.\92\ Tounsi was
arrested in 2013 at O'Hare Airport where he planned to fly to
Turkey and then travel into Syria to join al-Qaeda's affiliate
in the country.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ Michael Tarm, ``Chicago-area Teen Latest Snared in Website
Traps,'' Yahoo! News, April 23, 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/chicago-
area-teen-latest-snared-website-traps-195908623.html.
\93\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airstrikes have not deterred radicalized Americans, who are
attempting to travel to Syria at a growing rate.--Based on the
58 cases we reviewed, there have been sharp increases in the
number of Americans trying to travel to Syria each succeeding
year (10 percent of known cases occurred in 2013, 40 percent in
2014, and 50 percent in 2015), indicating that coalition
airstrikes in the region have not dissuaded travelers. Overall
U.S. Government figures confirm the growth: In late 2013, U.S.
officials said ``dozens'' of Americans had sought to join
Syrian rebels;\94\ in July 2014, they estimated the figure to
be around 100;\95\ and by July of this year the estimates
reached 250-plus.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ Schmitt, ``U.S. Says Dozens of Americans Have Sought to Join
Rebels in Syria.''
\95\ Reuters, ``Fewer than 100 Americans Probed for Fighting in
Syria, Iraq: U.S. Attorney General,'' Business Insider, July 08, 2014,
http://www.businessinsider.com/r-fewer-than-100-americans-probed-for-
fighting-in-syria-iraq-us-attorney-general-2014-08.
\96\ Barbara Starr, `` `A Few Dozen Americans' in ISIS Ranks,''
CNN, July 15, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/15/politics/isis-
american-recruits/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most aspiring fighters are now specifically attempting to
join ISIS, not other terrorist groups.--Early in the conflict,
Americans were traveling to enlist with al-Qaeda's affiliate in
Syria, Jabhat al-Nusrah; around 20 percent of those we studied
tried or succeeded in joining the group. However, the last
known suspect traveled to join al-Nusra in early 2014; the
other 80 percent sought to join ISIS. In March 2014, the FBI
made its first arrest of an American trying to join ISIS when
20-year-old community college student Nicholas Teausant was
caught fleeing the country; the suspect had broadcast his
extremist views widely on Facebook and Instagram before setting
off for Syria.\97\ Since then, many U.S. suspects have tread a
common path: Espousing their support for ISIS on social media
and then attempting to leave America, en route to the so-called
caliphate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ ``Arrest Demonstrates Influence of Online Terrorist
Materials,'' Anti-Defamation League (Blog), March 20, 2014, http://
blog.adl.org/extremism/arrest-demonstrates-influence-of-online-
terrorist-materials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. recruits are young and most are men.--The average age
of U.S. foreign fighters and aspirants in our sample was 24
years old, demonstrating jihadist groups are still primarily
catering to a young audience. The youngest was 15 years old,
while the oldest was 47. The majority we studied, 85 percent,
were men. However, a growing number of women are being drawn to
the conflict zone. Based on our sample, we estimate more than
30 American women have joined or attempted to join ISIS.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ Of the aspiring U.S. foreign fighters in our sample, nine (15
percent) were women. If applied to the 250-plus estimate of total
Americans who have traveled or attempted to travel, you get a
prediction of around 38 females.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aspiring foreign fighters come from across America.--We
found young people from at least 19 U.S. States have sought to
become foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, with the most in our
sample coming from Minnesota (26 percent), California (12
percent), and the New York/New Jersey area (12 percent).
On-line propaganda and social media are major factors in
U.S. recruitment.--In almost 80 percent of cases, we found
examples of U.S. foreign fighter aspirants downloading
extremist propaganda, promoting it on-line, or engaging with
other extremists on social media. Some communicated with ISIS
fighters in Syria using secure messaging apps like Surespot or
posed questions to overseas jihadists via the anonymous website
Ask.fm; others promoted jihadist content across multiple
platforms. Keonna Thomas, a Philadelphia mother who was
arrested in April before attempting to leave the country, did
both. She tweeted about becoming a martyr and responded eagerly
to an ISIS fighter in Syria who messaged her about whether she
would want to join a suicide operation. ``That would be
amazing,'' she responded. ``A girl can only wish.''\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Public Affairs.
Philadelphia Woman Arrested for Attempting to Provide Material Support
to ISIL, April 3, 2015, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/philadelphia-
woman-arrested-attempting-provide-material-support-isil.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Americans who make it to the conflict zone are reaching
back to recruit others.--A number of the cases we reviewed
involved Americans who made it to Syria and attempted to
remotely recruit others back home. Abdi Nur, only 20 years old
when he left Minnesota for Syria last year, is a prime example.
Once in the conflict zone, he spent months persuading his
friends in Minneapolis to join him. His peer-to-peer recruiting
nearly worked, as six of his friends attempted to leave the
United States for Syria; they were arrested by the FBI this
April.\100\ In a separate case, Ohio suspect Abdirahman Sheik
Mohamud was urged by his brother Aden to join him overseas.
Aden provided detailed instructions and contacts for getting
from Turkey into the conflict zone.\101\ Mohamud agreed to join
him and left the United States for Syria, though his brother
was later killed in the fighting.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ Evan Perez and Shimon Prokupecz, ``ISIS Arrests Highlight
Role of American Recruiter,'' CNN, April 20, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/
2015/04/20/politics/isis-minnesota-arrests-abdi-nur/.
\101\ U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Public Affairs.
Columbus, Ohio, Man Charged with Providing Material Support to
Terrorists, April 16, 2015, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/columbus-
ohio-man-charged-providing-material-support-terrorists.
\102\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Roughly 20 percent of aspiring U.S. foreign fighters have
been killed in Syria.--Twelve of the 58 individuals we reviewed
died after joining jihadist groups in the terrorist hotspot.
Accordingly, we estimate nearly 1 in 5 Americans who have
traveled or attempted to travel to Syria have been killed in
the fighting. U.S. intelligence officials have already
indicated more than 20 American have been killed.\103\ Some
reportedly died in fighting on the battlefield while others,
like Florida resident Moner Abusalha, conducted suicide
bombings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ Starr, `` `A Few Dozen Americans' in ISIS Ranks.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nearly all of those who have been apprehended are charged
with ``material support,'' but other charges have also been
used.--Ninety percent of arrested suspects have been charged
with providing or attempting to provide ``material support to a
foreign terrorist organization''--usually in the form of trying
to provide themselves as recruits to an extremist group.
Several suspects have been arrested on charges of lying to
authorities, passport fraud, gun crimes, or other infractions.
Around 10 percent of U.S. returnees have been arrested by
authorities.--Intelligence officials have indicated that around
40 Americans have returned from Syria after engaging with or
pledging allegiance to jihadist groups, and our review found
five of them have been arrested by authorities. Three were
charged with providing material support to a foreign terrorist
organization for allegedly engaging with al-Nusrah Front while
in Syria; two others were charged with lying to the FBI, one of
which had pledged allegiance to ISIS. One of the returnees was
arrested plotting a terrorist attack against a U.S. military
base.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\ U.S. Department of Justice, Columbus, Ohio, Man Charged with
Providing Material Support to Terrorists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Human intelligence has been critical in stopping
suspects.--More than 75 percent of U.S. foreign-fighter arrest
cases involved a confidential source, informant, family member,
or concerned community member who cooperated with or tipped off
authorities. In other words, private citizens have been key to
detecting aspiring travelers. For example, in October 2014
three teenage girls from Denver attempted to join ISIS in
Syria, but they were stopped when their parents alerted law
enforcement.\105\ The girls were detained in Germany and
deported back to the United States.\106\ In another case,
several suspects were stopped in part because of a community
member who changed his mind about joining ISIS and decided to
cooperate with authorities.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ Shimon Prokupecz, ``3 Denver Teens Back Home after Failed
Trip to Syria,'' CNN, October 23, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/21/
us/colorado-teens-syria-odyssey/.
\106\ Ibid.
\107\ U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Office of Public Affairs. Six Minnesota Men Charged with Conspiracy to
Provide Material Support to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant:
Four Defendants Arrested in Minneapolis; Two Arrested in San Diego,
April 20, 2015, https://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/press-releases/2015/
six-minnesota-men-charged-with-conspiracy-to-provide-material-support-
to-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-the-levant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peer-to-Peer Extremism: How Americans are Recruited On-line and Lured
Across Borders
Many past foreign-fighter cases involved individuals who
were radicalized through personal contact with extremists, but
that paradigm has changed. Based on our review, we find that
the majority of U.S. foreign fighter aspirants were radicalized
in part on-line, either through Islamist terror propaganda or
peer-to-peer recruiting on social media. Indeed, as noted
above, almost 80 percent of cases we studied involved
radicalized Americans downloading extremist propaganda,
promoting it on-line, or engaging with other extremists on
Twitter, Facebook, and the like.
Recruits are motivated to join terrorist groups for a wide
array of reasons. Many ISIS recruits, for instance, are
inspired by jihadist ideology and see a historic opportunity to
live in the caliphate. Others are motivated by the desire for
adventure, to be a part of a cause larger than themselves, or
for camaraderie and a sense of belonging. In almost all cases,
though, suspects feel excluded from society or think they have
failed to live up to expectations. These perceptions are often
reinforced by a stressor life event, such as a drug arrest or
school expulsion, that moves them to act. Other Americans
aspired to travel to the terrorist safe haven believing they
would find love, such as 19-year-old Shannon Maureen Conley, a
nurse's aide from Colorado. She received a 4-year prison
sentence this year for attempting to join ISIS in Syria, where
she planned to marry an ISIS fighter she met on-line.\108\
Conley still reportedly signs her letters from jail with the
closing ``behind enemy lines.''\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\ Michael Martinez, Ana Cabrera, and Sara Weisfeldt, ``Colorado
Woman Gets 4 Years for Wanting to Join ISIS,'' CNN, January 24, 2015,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/23/us/colorado-woman-isis-sentencing/.
\109\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On-line recruiters follow a similar path in trying to
seduce Americans and other Westerners. They start by soliciting
followers on social media, such as Twitter or Ask.fm, and
``field questions about joining the Islamic State.''\110\ They
then subtly proselytize to interested parties, providing
``almost the on-line version of [a] religious seminar,''
observers note.\111\ Once they spot promising extremists,
recruiters will communicate with them using direct-message
tools to determine whether they are serious and to weed out
``spies.''\112\ Often extremists move the conversations to
secure apps and encrypted platforms so they cannot be monitored
while giving recruits instructions on traveling to Syria or
even attack orders. FBI Director James Comey has equated the
sophisticated outreach by ISIS recruiters to ``a devil on their
shoulder all day long saying, `Kill, kill, kill.' ''\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\ Alessandria Masi, ``ISIS Recruiting Westerners: How The
`Islamic State' Goes After Non-Muslims And Recent Converts In The
West,'' International Business Times, September 08, 2014, http://
www.ibtimes.com/isis-recruiting-westerners-how-islamic-state-goes-
after-non-muslims-recent-converts-west-1680076.
\111\ Ibid.
\112\ Ibid.
\113\ Dustin Volz, ``FBI Director: ISIS Is Relying on Encryption to
Recruit Americans and Order Killings,'' National Journal, July 8, 2015,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/fbi-director-isis-is-relying-on-
encryption-to-recruit-americans-and-order-killings-20150708.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One 23-year-old American woman reported that ISIS
recruiters spent hours each day chatting with her.\114\ ``I was
on my own a lot,'' she explained to The New York Times, ``and
they were on-line all the time.''\115\ One extremist in Syria
with whom she communicated used methods consistent with a
manual written by ISIS's predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq: ``A
Course in the Art of Recruiting.''\116\ The manual recommends
recruiters develop a relationship by keeping in regular touch
with prospects, spending as much time with them as possible,
listening to them carefully, and then drawing them closer to
instill the basics of their ideology.\117\ The woman's contacts
spent months chatting with her, with one eventually urging her
to travel to Syria.\118\ The FBI reportedly interceded in the
case, but several months later, the Times says the woman was
still communicating on-line with extremists.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\ Rukmini Callimachi, ``ISIS and the Lonely Young American,''
The New York Times, June 27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/
world/americas/isis-online-recruiting-american.html?_r=0.
\115\ Ibid.
\116\ Ibid.
\117\ Ibid.
\118\ Ibid.
\119\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Routes to the Conflict Zone: The ``Jihadi Superhighway'' and Beyond
Most American foreign fighters have traveled--or planned to
travel--through Europe to get to Syria, according to the
results of our review. The continent has become a ``jihadi
superhighway'' to and from the conflict zone.\120\ Turkey in
particular has served as the primary point of entry and exit
into Syria. In 55 percent of the cases we studied, suspects
plotted to travel from America to Turkey, where they then
planned to cross into Syria. The country's porous border has
been an ideal gateway for aspiring jihadists seeking to get in
and out of the terrorist safe haven.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ Michael McCaul, ``Europe Has a Jihadi Superhighway Problem,''
Time Inc., November 11, 2014, http://time.com/3578462/european-union-
security-gap-foreign-fighters-terrorists/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Turkey has begun to crack down on illegal border
crossings, foreign fighter flows appear to continue
unabated.\121\ ``This is an easy battlefield to get to,'' an
administration official conceded to the Task Force.\122\ One
American who traveled to Syria and fought on the front lines
with rebels echoed the assessment. ``I just went on-line and
bought a ticket,'' he explained. ``It was that easy. It was
like booking a flight to Miami Beach.''\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\ Findings and Recommendations regarding overseas security gaps
which have facilitated this type of terrorist travel are outlined in
the ``Detection & Disruption'' section of this report.
\122\ Task Force briefing, July 2015.
\123\ Cheryl K. Chumley, ``U.S. Veteran: Going to Syria to Fight
`like Booking Flight to Miami Beach','' Washington Times, January 2,
2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/2/us-veteran-going-
to-syria-to-fight-like-booking-fl/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Foreign-fighter recruiters have tried to make it simple for
Americans to join them abroad. Supporters distribute manuals
providing plain, English-language advice on getting to the safe
haven. In February 2015, ISIS published ``Hijrah to the Islamic
State,'' a how-to guide for dealing with border security,
planning travel routes, and deciding what to pack.\124\ Another
manual, ``How to Survive in the West,'' advises followers on
avoiding law enforcement detection and instructs them on
getting in touch with extremists once they arrive.\125\ FBI
Assistant Director Michael Steinbach said in a February hearing
that the support individuals receive as they prepare to migrate
to the conflict zone has been tough to combat. The problem is
``not even close to being under control,'' he explained.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ Constanze Letsch, ``UK Police Move to Take down Islamic State
How-to Guide from Internet,'' The Guardian, February 25, 2015, http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/25/uk-police-islamic-state-travel-
guide-hijrah-turkey-syria-ctiru.
\125\ ``How to Survive in the West: A Mujahid Guide,'' 2015.
\126\ Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of
Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror, House Committee on Homeland
Security: Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives, 114th Cong., 1st sess., February 11, 2015, http://
homeland.house.gov/hearing/hearing-countering-violent-islamist-
extremism-urgent-threat-foreign-fighters-and-homegrown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Extremists are also advising travelers to ``break'' their
travel to make it more difficult for authorities to catch
them.\127\ ISIS recruiters are urging followers to buy airline
tickets to holiday destinations that do not look suspicious
and, once there, book onward travel to Turkey.\128\ Would-be
fighters are also using what is popularly known as ``hidden
city ticketing'' by booking a flight to a false end-destination
and getting off the plane at the connecting stop. One of the
Americans who made it to Syria used this tactic. He bought a
one-way flight to Greece with a connection in Istanbul.
According to the indictment, he never boarded his connecting
flight and instead made his way to the battlefield.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\ The challenge of ``broken travel'' is covered further in this
report in Key Finding 25.
\128\ James Dowling, ``Jihadists Urged to Take European Holiday
before Joining Islamic State to Avoid Raising Suspicion,'' Herald Sun,
June 14, 2015, http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/jihadists-
urged-to-take-european-holiday-before-joining-islamic-state-to-avoid-
raising-suspicion/story-fnpp4dl6-1227397514580.
\129\ United States of America v. Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Extremists on no-fly lists or seeking to avoid law
enforcement scrutiny at airports have opted instead to travel
by land or sea. Most commonly, these aspiring fighters have
driven or taken buses through the Balkans to the Bulgarian or
Greek border, where they then enter Turkey.\130\ Alternatively,
extremists have found they can board Turkey-bound ferries and
cruise ships from Mediterranean countries, where there is
little security and passports are often not checked.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ Alessandria Masi and Hanna Sender, ``How Foreign Fighters
Joining ISIS Travel To The Islamic State Group's `Caliphate' ''
International Business Times, March 03, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/
how-foreign-fighters-joining-isis-travel-islamic-state-groups-
caliphate-1833812.
\131\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Overview
The Task Force makes 32 Key Findings and associated
recommendations to improve America's security posture--and to
ensure foreign countries are doing the same. Below is an
abbreviated summary with references to the appropriate sections
where complete descriptions of each Key Finding can be found.
U.S. GOVERNMENT STRATEGY AND PLANNING TO COMBAT THE THREAT
1. The United States lacks a comprehensive strategy for
combating terrorist and foreign fighter travel (see p.
24).
2. Despite concerted efforts to stem the flow, we have
largely failed to stop Americans from traveling
overseas to join jihadists (see p. 25).
3. The growing complexity of the threat may be creating
unseen gaps in our defenses, yet it has been years
since any large-scale ``stress test'' has been
conducted on U.S. defenses against terrorist travel
(see p. 26).
4. ISIS operatives are urging followers to travel to the
group's other ``provinces'' in places like Libya, yet
it is unclear whether agencies are keeping pace with
changes in foreign-fighter destinations (see p. 27).
5. Ultimately, severing foreign fighter flows depends on
eliminating the problem at the source (see p. 28).
IDENTIFYING TERRORISTS AND FOREIGN FIGHTERS--AND PREVENTING THEM FROM
TRAVELING
6. Improvements have been made to the terrorist
watchlisting process, yet no independent review has
been done to assess them and whether more are needed in
light of the evolving threat environment (see p. 29).
7. Individuals can now contest their status on the no-fly
list; however, more should be done to ensure the new
process will appropriately balance due process rights
with National security concerns (see p. 30).
8. Despite improvements since 9/11, foreign partners are
still sharing information about terrorist suspects in a
manner which is ad hoc, intermittent, and often
incomplete (see p. 32).
9. There is currently no comprehensive global database of
foreign fighter names. Instead, countries including the
U.S. rely on a weak, patchwork system for swapping
individual extremist identities (see p. 33).
10. DHS should continue its efforts to quickly leverage
Unclassified data in Classified environments to
identify potential foreign fighters (see p. 34).
11. The DHS Counterterrorism Advisory Board has not been
authorized by Congress nor does its charter reflect
recent changes to the threat environment, including the
rise of the foreign fighter threat (see p. 35).
12. More can be done to incorporate valuable ``financial
intelligence'' into counterterrorism screening and
vetting processes (see p. 36).
13. State and local fusion centers are underutilized by
Federal law enforcement Nation-wide when it comes to
combating the immediate foreign fighter threat and
terrorist travel generally (see p. 36).
14. State and local law enforcement personnel continue to
express concern that they are not provided with the
appropriate security clearances to assist with
counterterrorism challenges (see p. 38).
15. The unprecedented speed at which Americans are being
radicalized by violent extremists is straining Federal
law enforcement's ability to monitor and intercept
suspects before it's too late (see p. 39).
16. Few initiatives exist Nation-wide to raise community
awareness about foreign-fighter recruitment and to
assist communities with spotting warning signs (see p.
39).
17. The Federal Government has failed to develop clear
intervention strategies--or ``off-ramps'' to
radicalization--to prevent suspects already on law
enforcement's radar from leaving to join extremists
(see p. 41).
18. Jihadist recruiters are increasingly using secure
websites and apps to communicate with Americans, making
it harder for law enforcement to disrupt plots and
terrorist travel (see p. 42).
19. The administration has launched programs to counter-
message terrorist propaganda abroad, but little is
being done here at home (see p. 43).
20. The United States has not made adequate use of ``jaded
jihadists'' to convince others not to join the fight
(see p. 44).
21. Unlike many other governments, U.S. authorities have
not relied heavily on passport revocation to stop
extremists (see p. 45).
DETECTING AND DISRUPTING TERRORISTS AND FOREIGN FIGHTERS WHEN THEY
TRAVEL
22. While substantial progress has been made since 9/11 to
enhance visa security, there may be additional
opportunities to expand screening to identify potential
extremists earlier in the process (see p. 48).
23. The administration has improved the security of the
Visa Waiver Program, but continuous enhancements must
be made in light of the changing threat (see p. 50).
24. U.S. authorities remain concerned about terrorists
posing as refugees, yet it is unclear to what extent
security improvements to the refugee screening process
mitigate potential vulnerabilities (see p. 52).
25. ``Broken travel'' and other evasive tactics are making
it harder to track foreign fighters (see p. 54).
26. More could be done to give front-line operators at
borders and ports better intelligence reach-back
capabilities so DHS can ``connect the dots'' and
uncover previously unidentified terrorists and foreign
fighters (see p. 55).
27. U.S. authorities continue to ``push the border
outward'' by deploying homeland security initiatives
overseas. Expanding these efforts might help detect
threats sooner (see p. 55).
28. Only a fraction of U.S. States have access to INTERPOL
databases; wider access could help spot wanted foreign
fighters who have slipped past border security (see p.
56).
OVERSEAS SECURITY GAPS
29. Gaping security weaknesses overseas--especially in
Europe--are putting the U.S. homeland in danger by
making it easier for aspiring foreign fighters to
migrate to terrorist hotspots and for jihadists to
return to the West (see p. 57).
30. Extremists are using fraudulent passports to travel
discretely. However, a third of the international
community--including major source countries of foreign
fighters--still do not issue fraud-resistant ``e-
passports,'' and most countries are still unable to
validate the authenticity of ``e-passports'' (see p.
67).
31. Many countries do not consistently add information to
INTERPOL's databases, and the majority do not screen
against INTERPOL databases in real-time at their
borders and airports (see p. 68).
32. U.S. departments and agencies have spent billions of
dollars to help foreign partners improve their terror-
travel defenses, but the lack of a coordinated strategy
for such assistance results in greater risk of overlap,
waste, and duplication between programs (see p. 71).
U.S. Government Strategy and Planning
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, it was clear
America needed to take urgent steps to keep terrorists from
entering its borders. The 9/11 Commission, for instance, found
it was so easy for the hijackers to operate within the United
States that they traveled ``into, out of, and around the
country and complacently [used] their real names with little
fear of capture.''\132\ Since then, the U.S. Government has
taken extraordinary steps to disrupt terrorists at all stages
of travel--from fusing real-time intelligence into the border
screening process to enhancing travel-document security. These
measures have made it harder for extremists to cross our
borders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States, ``What to do? A Global Strategy: Reflecting on a Generational
Challenge,'' chap. 12, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/
911Report_Ch12.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But the threat environment has evolved, which is why the
Task Force conducted its review. While post-9/11 reforms
focused largely on preventing terrorists from infiltrating our
country to attack, today we need to be equally concerned about
keeping Americans from exiting our country to join terrorist
groups. The latter challenge demands a different set of tools.
This is why it is important for the Government to be able to
adjust its strategies and plans. We must adapt to new threats
and get resources where they are needed.
Unfortunately, our country has a surplus of programs for
combating terrorist travel but a deficit of strategic guidance
to keep them aligned with the threat. Agencies must be able to
make sense of new trends, take stock of existing
counterterrorism efforts, and pivot to fix weaknesses. Yet the
Task Force found there is no clear, whole-of-Government system
for cataloging the proliferation of terror-travel programs, nor
a strategy to ``stitch the seams'' between them.
The administration has undoubtedly stepped up security to
cut off foreign fighter flows, as documented throughout this
report, but more must be done to identify and close potential
gaps in our defenses against terrorist travel writ large.
Key Finding 1.--The U.S. Government lacks a comprehensive
strategy for combating terrorist and foreign fighter travel and
has failed to maintain a system for identifying and plugging
related gaps in America's defenses.
It has been nearly a decade since the Executive branch
produced a whole-of-Government plan to constrain terrorist
movements. In its 2004 final report, the 9/11 Commission
recommended the United States develop ``a strategy to intercept
terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain
terrorist mobility.'' That year, Congress passed the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevent Act, which mandated
such a plan, required the administration to explain how it
would be implemented, and called for an assessment of
vulnerabilities in U.S. and foreign travel systems that could
be exploited by extremists.\133\ The result was the 2006
National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel.\134\ It has not
been updated since.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ National Security Intelligence Reform Act, 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, 108th Cong., http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
IRTPA%202004.pdf.
\134\ National Counterterrorism Center, ``National Strategy to
Combat Terrorist Travel.'' May 2, 2006. http://fas.org/irp/threat/
travel.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2006 Strategy is woefully outdated. While it provided a
thorough overview of U.S. efforts to keep extremists from
crossing borders, some of those programs have changed or are
now defunct, and new ones have been created. The evolving
threat environment has also made the document obsolete. For
instance, the Strategy makes no mention of foreign fighters or
the challenges associated with extremists' social media
recruiting.
There appears to be no comprehensive accounting of
terrorist-travel programs in the U.S. Government or any
systematic Government-wide efforts to identify gaps between
them. The President's 2011 National Strategy for
Counterterrorism makes little mention of the subject aside from
noting the United States will work with foreign partners to
``identify terrorist operatives and prevent their travel . . .
across National borders and within States.''\135\ A full audit
of America's terror-travel preventative and protective measures
should be produced, as the administration has identified
``disrupting the flow of foreign fighters'' as one of its top
priorities in the fight against ISIS.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\135\ The White House, ``National Strategy for Counterterrorism,''
June 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
counterterrorism_strategy.pdf.
\136\ Individual departments and agencies have been tasked to
determine how they can improve security to defend against the foreign
fighter threat, and those reviews have produced notable enhancements in
security. This is not the same, however, as producing a Government-wide
strategy that outlines all relevant programs, identifies gaps, and
prioritizes resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We found that hundreds of programs, projects, and
initiatives have sprouted up to combat terrorist travel since
9/11, but without an overarching strategy to coordinate them,
the United States may be wasting taxpayer dollars and failing
to allocate resources where they are needed most. Indeed, lack
of a strategy not only increases the risk terrorists might
exploit weaknesses in the U.S. travel system, but also raises
the prospect of waste, overlap, and duplication between
agencies.
Recommendation.--The Executive branch should provide
a National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel to
Congress. Thereafter, the administration should
annually assess the evolving terror threat to the
United States, catalogue existing U.S. Government
programs designed to obstruct terrorist travel, propose
areas for reform and the elimination of duplicative
programs, identify gaps in our defenses, and prioritize
resources to fill gaps in a risk-based fashion. The
strategy should not only take into account the travel
into the United States of known or suspected terrorists
but should also consider foreign fighter travel to
terrorist safe havens.
Key Finding 2.--Despite concerted efforts to stem the flow,
we have largely failed to stop Americans from traveling
overseas to join jihadists. Of the hundreds of Americans who
have sought to travel to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq,
authorities have only interdicted a fraction of them. Several
dozen have also managed to make it back into America.
The Task Force was only able to identify 28 cases where
U.S. individuals were stopped before leaving the United
States--a small fraction of the total that have attempted to
travel to the conflict zone.\137\ A handful of others were
stopped at other stages of the journey. The majority appear to
have succeeded, despite concerted Government efforts to prevent
Americans from joining groups like ISIS abroad. In fact, around
40 have even made it back to the United States, and some
individuals have gone back and forth to the conflict zone
multiple times.\138\ One suspect from Florida allegedly trained
with extremists in Syria and returned to the United States for
several months before heading back to the conflict zone; during
that time, he was never on the radar screen of U.S.
authorities.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\ See the ``Americans on the Pathway to Terror: By-the-
Numbers'' sub-section of this report.
\138\ See ``Appendix II: American Foreign Fighter Aspirants and
Recruits'' for the public cases the Task Force reviewed.
\139\ Michael S. Schmidt and Mark Mazzetti, ``Suicide Bomber From
U.S. Came Home Before Attack,'' The New York Times, July 30, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/us/suicide-bomber-from-us-came-home-
before-attack.html?_r=0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We believe it is unacceptable that so many Americans have
been able to make it to the world's most dangerous terrorist
safe haven (and back) without being interdicted. While we
commend the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and
other agencies for a string of successful arrests this year, a
great deal can and must be learned from instances where we
failed, including what was known and when about each suspect
and whether more could have been done to stop them. This may
help reveal any systemic weaknesses in the security
architecture we have built into the U.S. travel system since 9/
11.
Unfortunately, the administration has not called for a
formal Government-wide examination of these cases. Some
agencies have done their own ``after-action'' reviews which
have produced useful conclusions, but there is yet to be a
coordinated and comprehensive interagency investigation into
why each of these Americans slipped through the cracks. Our
Task Force has identified some of the security weaknesses
highlighted by the foreign fighter phenomenon, but only the
Executive branch has the time and resources to do the
comprehensive, deep-dive review that is needed of all of the
recent American foreign fighter cases.
Recommendation.--The administration should launch an
end-to-end review of all cases involving Americans
traveling or attempting to travel to Syria and Iraq to
join Islamist terror groups-taking into consideration
all relevant Classified and Unclassified information--
to determine what lessons can be learned and to prevent
additional Americans from traveling to overseas
terrorist sanctuaries. The final conclusions should be
presented to Congress, along with any relevant
legislative recommendations.
Key Finding 3.--The growing complexity and changing nature
of the foreign fighter phenomenon may be creating unseen gaps
in our defenses, yet it has been years since any large-scale
``stress test'' has been conducted on U.S. Government
protection and prevention programs against terrorist travel.
The last major Government exercise on terrorist travel
occurred in 2009. That year, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) managed an exercise centered on the ``aftermath
of a notional terrorist event outside of the United States''
and how to prevent ``subsequent efforts by the terrorists to
enter the United States and carry out additional
attacks.''\140\ The exercise tested how agencies at all levels
of Government would respond in such a scenario.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, ``National Level Exercise 1009 Fact Sheet,'' 2009,
http://www.fema.gov/txt/media/factsheets/2009/ncp_nle.txt.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But the threat environment has changed. The 2009 exercise
centered on terrorists attempting to enter the country, but as
we have noted, officials today should be just as concerned
about Americans leaving the country to train overseas with
terrorist groups as foreign fighters. Such individuals can
represent a serious security threat to the United States,
particularly upon their return to the country, so preventing
them from joining extremists abroad in the first place should
be a top law enforcement goal.
Recommendation.--The White House should lead a
National-level exercise series designed around the
foreign fighter threat to test all phases of extremist
planning and travel to determine how partners at all
levels of Government--and abroad--are currently
responding to these scenarios. The primary focus of the
exercises should be to identify weaknesses at home and
abroad that may be exploited by terrorists and foreign
fighters seeking to travel to and from the United
States and overseas terrorist sanctuaries.\141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\141\ The Task Force is grateful for the work of the Homeland
Security Advisory Council, which recently put forward a similar
recommendation. See: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland
Security Advisory Council, ``Foreign Fighter Task Force Interim
Report,'' Spring 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/DHS-HSAC-Foreign-Fighter-Task-Force-Interim-Report-May-
2015.pdf.
Key Finding 4.--In addition to Syria and Iraq, ISIS
operatives are urging followers to travel to the group's other
``provinces'' in places like Libya, yet it is unclear to what
extent departments and agencies are shifting diplomatic,
intelligence, law enforcement, policy, and other resources to
keep pace with and track evolving foreign fighter flows to
other emerging safe havens.
ISIS continues to boast to its followers that it has
expanded beyond Syria and Iraq. Indeed, the group now has a
direct presence, affiliates, or groups pledging support in at
least 18 countries or territories, including: Afghanistan,
Algeria, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon,
Nigeria, the Palestinian territories, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Russia (North Caucasus region), Sudan, Syria,
Tunisia, and Yemen.\142\ The ability for extremists to operate
openly in many of these areas is tenuous, but several are
emerging terrorist sanctuaries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\ House Homeland Security Committee, Terror Threat Snapshot:
September 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISIS operatives have urged followers on social media to
head to its other provinces. In one on-line handbook popular
with extremists, the author writes that ``if the Muslim finds
it hard to flee to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria through
Turkey, he can escape to the Islamic State in Libya, or
[Afghanistan/Pakistan], or in Nigeria (under Boko Haram
territory).''\143\ Thousands of foreign fighters appear to be
heeding the call in places like Libya, and others have
reportedly begun to appear in Nigeria.\144\ It is unclear if
there are Westerners in these groups, but the trend is
disturbing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\ SWJ Editors, ``ISIS Publishes Manual on `How to Survive in
the West','' Small Wars Journal, June 9, 2015, http://
smallwarsjournal.com/blog/isis-publishes-manual-on-%E2%80%98how-to-
survive-in-the-west%E2%80%99.
\144\ Moore, ``5,000 Foreign Fighters Flock to Libya as ISIS Call
for Jihadists''; Julia Payne, ``Exclusive: Captured Video Appears to
Show Foreign Fighters in Nigeria's Boko Haram,'' Reuters, May 26, 2015,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/26/us-nigeria-violence-foreign-
idUSKBN0OB1RR20150526.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current U.S. Government efforts to combat the flow of
foreign fighters are heavily focused on keeping fighters from
traveling to and from Syria and Iraq, but as we have seen, the
terror threat environment can change quickly. Radicalized
individuals who were once intent on traveling to Afghanistan or
Somalia are now traveling to Syria, and more may soon begin
traveling to new ISIS outposts. We cannot be caught off-guard
by changes in terror-travel destinations, which is why law
enforcement and the intelligence community must continue to
closely track changes in extremist migration to new terrorist
hot spots.
Recommendation.--The Intelligence Community should
provide Congress with regular updates documenting
foreign fighter flows to other terrorist sanctuaries,
in addition to Syria and Iraq, and in coordination with
interagency partners should provide updates on actions
being taken to prevent extremist migration to those
locations.
Key Finding 5.--Ultimately, severing foreign fighter flows
to any conflict zone depends on eliminating the problem at the
source and preventing the emergence of terrorist sanctuaries.
We find that, in the long run, the only truly effective
method for preventing our citizens from joining terrorist
organizations abroad is to eliminate the sanctuaries in which
those groups thrive. ``We are playing defense over here,'' one
senior official told the Task Force, ``but what we are doing
overseas--the offense--is key.''\145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\ Task Force briefing, July 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ``center of gravity'' of the current foreign fighter
phenomenon is still in Syria and Iraq, and as long as the safe
haven in that region persists, so will the drive of individuals
around the world--including radicalized Americans--to migrate
to it. Indeed, the safe haven enhances the perceived legitimacy
of groups like ISIS, helping to radicalize even more
individuals to its cause.
Terrorist groups thrive in the world's lawless outposts. We
have learned this the hard way. If left unaddressed, failing
states and ungoverned spaces become the playgrounds of
fanatics, who exploit these areas to expand their influence,
solicit recruits, and plot attacks. We have seen this in Syria.
We have seen this in Afghanistan. And we have seen this in the
Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. Without clear
strategies to identify and prevent the emergence of extremist
sanctuaries, America risks those locations becoming new
headquarters of terrorist planning against our homeland.
``Every policy decision we make needs to be seen through
this lens,'' the 9/11 Commission wrote more than a decade ago.
The Commission offered the following warning: ``If, for
example, Iraq becomes a failed state, it will go to the top of
the list of places that are breeding grounds for attacks
against Americans at home. Similarly, if we are paying
insufficient attention to Afghanistan . . . its countryside
could once again offer refuge to al-Qaeda, or its
successor.''\146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\ 9/11 Commission report, chap. 12, http://
govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Ch12.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation.--In the near term, the United States
and its allies must defeat terrorist groups in Syria
and Iraq to keep Westerners from being drawn to the
region where they are further radicalized and trained
by violent extremists. In the long run, the U.S.
Government must heed the advice of the 9/11 Commission
and ``identify and prioritize actual or potential
terrorist sanctuaries'' and develop realistic
strategies to prevent extremists from taking root
within them.
Identification and Prevention
An effective counterterrorism system must be able to
recognize extremist suspects in order to prevent them from
crossing borders, and if they do, authorities must be alerted
to their movements so they can be stopped. Accordingly, the
Task Force categorized four phases critical for stopping
terrorist and foreign fighter travel: (1) Identification, (2)
prevention, (3) detection, and (4) disruption. Information
sharing is a critical pillar of the identification phase. From
State and local police to foreign governments, intelligence
must be disseminated quickly and securely to ensure front-line
operators are able to spot violent extremists. More robust
terrorism watch lists, for instance, have allowed U.S.
authorities to keep thousands of potentially dangerous
individuals with terrorist ties out of the United States since
9/11.
However, preventing individuals from traveling out of the
country to terrorist safe havens remains a difficult task. In
many cases, intelligence agencies and police are unaware of an
American's plan to travel overseas to link up with terrorists
until after he or she has already left. When authorities are
made aware, in many cases it is because of a tip from family,
friends, or community members. Even then, preventing a
suspect's travel can be difficult. The Task Force examined
America's progress in the ``identification and prevention''
phases of terrorist and foreign fighter travel, and we propose
a number of urgent improvements to strengthen our country's
defenses.
WATCHLISTING
The 9/11 Commission found that before the 2001 terrorist
attacks, the United States lacked a single list of suspected
terrorists and did not distribute a similar document or
database to relevant departments and agencies.\147\ This meant
even terrorist known to authorities might be able to evade
screening systems at the border. After 2001, the White House
and Congress mandated the creation an integrated terrorist
watch list and required agencies to better fuse intelligence
information into it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The result is that today America boasts the most
sophisticated watchlisting and screening system in the world.
Authorities have gone to great lengths to integrate
intelligence databases into a centralized clearinghouse of
terrorist suspects, which is then used to compile the terrorist
watch list, known officially as the Terrorist Screening
Database (TSDB). The TSDB is one of our most effective tools
for detecting the movement of extremists. For instance,
agencies like the Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
FBI, and State and local law enforcement rely on the watch list
to identify known or suspected terrorists trying to board
aircraft, obtain visas, enter the country, or engage in other
activities.\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\ ``Terrorist Watchlist,'' U.S. Government Sharing Environment,
http://www.ise.gov/terrorist-watchlist.
Key Finding 6.--Both the 2009 Christmas Day bombing of a
U.S. airliner and the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing led to
extensive improvements in the terrorist watchlisting process.
Yet no independent review has been conducted to assess the
impact of recent changes to the watchlisting process and
whether further changes are warranted in light of the evolving
threat environment.
On Christmas day 2009, Nigerian citizen Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab--known widely as the ``underwear bomber''--
attempted to detonate explosives on Northwest Airlines Flight
253. A subsequent White House review determined that
counterterrorism agencies had information that raised red flags
about Abdulmutallab but failed to connect the dots and place
him on the terrorist watch list.\149\ Doing so may have
prevented him from boarding the aircraft and may have resulted
in additional screening that could have detected his
explosives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\ White House. Summary of the White House Review of the
December 25, 2009 Attempted Terrorist Attack, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/summary_of_wh_re- view_12-25-
09.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, following the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing,
authorities determined that information held by the U.S.
Government about Tamerlan Tsarnaev was not pieced together
comprehensively. A fully consolidated and accurate record for
Tsarnaev in the terrorist watch list might have led authorities
to perform additional screening when he returned from Russia,
where he is alleged to have met with Islamist militants.\150\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ U.S. Congress. Committee on Homeland Security. The Road to
Boston: Counterterrorism Challenges and Lessons from the Boston
Marathon Bombings, March 2014, 29-35. https://homeland.house.gov/files/
documents/Boston-Bombings-Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the
interagency community have made commendable progress in recent
years to close gaps in the watchlisting process, to ensure
critical intelligence information is integrated in near-real-
time to our screening systems, and to make sure data from
disparate sources is combined to better identify extremists.
Multiple revisions to the interagency Watchlisting Guidance
have been made in recent years, resulting in a larger (but more
accurate) terrorist watch list. Improvements have also led to
an array of interagency initiatives to ensure authorities on
the front lines have the timely information they need to stop
terrorist movements.
Nevertheless, no independent review has been conducted of
these changes to the watchlisting and screening process. In
2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended
regular assessments of the watchlisting process were warranted
to ensure the watch list is achieving its intended
outcomes.\151\ Interagency policy reviews have been conducted
of this critical counterterrorism tool, but we believe it is
important for a third-party to ensure security deficiencies
have been fixed and that policies and procedures are keeping
pace with an evolving threat environment--especially the threat
from foreign fighters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\151\ U.S. Government Accountability Office. Report to
Congressional Requesters, Terror Watchlist: Routinely Assessing Impacts
of Agency Actions since the December 25, 2009, Attempted Attack Could
Help Inform Future Efforts, GAO-12-476 (Washington, DC, 2012), http://
www.gao.gov/assets/600/591312.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation.--GAO should conduct an independent
review to determine whether past weaknesses in the
watchlisting process have been reconciled and whether
additional changes are needed to enhance America's
defenses. This includes ensuring that information is
being integrated into the terrorist watch list from all
relevant sources across the Government, that it is
being done in a timely manner, that agencies are
equipped to handle increased demands for information to
improve the watch list, that the right authorities have
the watch list access they need, and that individuals
who should no longer be included on the list are
removed appropriately.
Key Finding 7.--The administration has revised the
administrative ``redress'' process, which allows an individual
who has purchased a plane ticket, been denied boarding, and
sought redress, to contest his or her inclusion on the no-fly
list; however, more work should be done to ensure that judicial
review of such listings appropriately balances due process
rights with National security concerns.
In connection with a number of court cases pending across
the country where individuals challenged their inclusion on the
no-fly list, DHS has made significant changes to the redress
process by which such listings are reviewed. Among other
things, U.S. persons who purchase a ticket, are denied
boarding, and subsequently seek to challenge an alleged no-fly
listing, are now informed as to whether they are on the list
and, if they are on the list, given an opportunity to request
additional information. If the individual seeks additional
information, DHS then provides a second, more detailed
response, which will include the applicable no-fly criterion
and, where possible, additional Unclassified information. This
change allows affected Americans to have access to more
information with which to respond through the administrative
process.
However, issues remain if these matters proceed to courts.
Departments and agencies claim there are major challenges in
the court system with appropriately handling the Classified,
privileged, or sensitive information on which no-fly listings
are often based. Current law does not provide a statutory
mechanism for addressing these issues, and as a result, some
cases may not be able to be decided on the merits. We need a
system that enables judicial review of no-fly list decisions
based on the facts and with respect to individual rights, while
also establishing effective mechanisms for the protection of
Classified or otherwise sensitive information.
Recommendation.--The administration should provide
Congress with a formal plan for reforming the process
for review of no-fly listings which safeguards civil
liberties, due process, and national security in line
with recent court decisions. This plan should include
any legislative changes sought by the administration to
ensure Classified or otherwise sensitive information is
handled appropriately and protected from disclosure
when no-fly listings are challenged in court.
INFORMATION SHARING
It is difficult to overstate how important post-9/11
information sharing has been in combating terrorist threats to
the United States. American lives have been saved and our
country is safer because of tectonic shifts in the level of
cooperation between agencies at home and with foreign partners.
When it comes to disrupting terrorist travel, information
sharing is the backbone of a strong security posture. If one
agency identifies a violent extremist and fails to notify other
partners, the suspect may easily enter our country undetected.
That is why at all levels of government (international,
Federal, State, and local) the exchange of terrorist identities
has become a leading National security objective.
The foreign fighter threat--whether from Americans seeking
to join terrorists abroad or returning home from extremist safe
havens--presents challenges to our information-sharing
environment. The sheer volume of jihadist travelers has made it
difficult for authorities to keep track of individuals who pose
a threat and turn attention away from those who do not. In
response, the administration has taken action to ramp up
information-sharing activities, from improving intelligence
exchanges with our allies to sending more frequent bulletins to
State and local law enforcement.
We believe even more can be done to ensure Federal, State,
and local agencies are quickly exchanging information about
suspects in an environment where radicalization happens far
more quickly than ever before. And we believe more must be done
abroad. Foreign partner information sharing is uneven, leading
to gaps in our collective knowledge of the individuals who have
traveled to dangerous terrorist sanctuaries.
Key Finding 8.--America relies on foreign partner
intelligence information to identify terrorists and foreign
fighters, yet many countries still share the names of suspects
with the United States in a manner that is ad hoc,
intermittent, and often incomplete--a worrying gap in our
defenses against extremist travel.
Foreign fighters can only be stopped from crossing borders
(and prevented from conducting attacks) if authorities are
aware of them. This means countries must share fighter names
with the United States so those individuals can be
appropriately watchlisted. Sharing has improved with our
partners lately, but there are still disturbing weaknesses. For
example, European security services reportedly failed to share
the name of a suspected extremist who returned from Syria and
attempted a mass shooting in August on a train from Amsterdam
to Paris, even though the assailant was on the radar of
European authorities.\152\ If the suspect had attempted instead
to travel to America to conduct the attack, U.S. authorities
likely would not have noticed since the individual was not on
our watch list. That is why information sharing is so
important.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\ ``France Attack Suspect Unknown to U.S. Authorities,'' CNN,
August 25, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2015/08/25/new-day-
savidge-france-supect-american-heroes-latest.- cnn?sr=biob-armfeed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6), which directed U.S. agencies
to work with foreign governments to exchange terrorist
screening information, particularly the names and identifiers
of known or suspected terrorists. The United States has since
signed agreements with more than 40 countries to swap terrorist
watchlist data, including most Visa Waiver Program (VWP)
countries. Although the United States also shares such data
through other channels, HSPD-6 agreements are seen as enhancing
the transparency, frequency, and quality of those exchanges.
However, information-sharing among many of the countries
who have signed HSPD-6 pacts remains inadequate. Some countries
signed agreements years ago, but have never used the mechanism
to share terrorist names with the United States or do so only
infrequently.\153\ Moreover, while some are willing to share
the names of suspected terrorists and foreign fighters, others
are reportedly only willing to share the identities of
convicted terrorists.\154\ This creates potentially disturbing
gaps in our awareness of extremists who may attempt travel to
the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\ GAO also flagged this problem in 2011, but the Task Force
believes it persists. See: U.S. Government Accountability Office.
Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate. Visa Waiver Program: DHS Has Implemented the Electronic
System for Travel Authorization, but Further Steps Needed to Address
Potential Program Risks, GAO-11-335 (Washington, DC, May 2011), http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d11335.pdf.
\154\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some countries are also reluctant to share names of their
own citizens for privacy reasons, even if those individuals are
terror suspects they are tracking. In these cases, foreign
partners will presumably share a name if the suspect tries to
travel to the United States. But in places like Europe where
there are few internal border checkpoints, it is difficult to
see how authorities would know if their citizens were headed to
America. A German suspect could easily drive to Spain, for
instance, to evade German authorities and fly to America
undetected.
It is also unclear to what extent foreign partners are
reporting all of the ``encounters'' they have with terrorists
from our own watch lists that we have warned them about. While
some HSPD-6 countries let U.S. authorities know when they have
run into individuals we have flagged, they are not necessarily
required to do so in real time or to provide details of those
encounters. Moreover, there still appears to be no universal
case management system for foreign partners to report when they
have encountered a suspect from our watch list.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\ Ibid. This concern was first flagged by GAO, but it appears
to have persisted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senior officials have acknowledged to the Task Force that
until recently, the United States has rarely put serious
pressure on our foreign partners to live up to their HSPD-6
agreements. Only with the rise in the foreign fighter threat
did U.S. departments and agencies begin to push foreign
partners to share names more regularly and thoroughly using the
process. Sharing reportedly has improved, but there is clearly
more to be done to increase participation and accountability.
Recommendation.--The Inspectors General of DHS, the
State Department, the FBI, and the Intelligence
Community should conduct a deep-dive review of the U.S.
Government's HSPD-6 information-sharing agreements, the
process for reaching and enforcing agreements,
compliance with such agreements, possible performance
indicators, and related matters to determine if more
can be done to standardize, streamline, and enhance
foreign fighter information sharing with partners. The
review should be provided to Congress.
Recommendation.--DHS, FBI, and the State Department
should provide a Classified report annually to Congress
on HSPD-6 information-sharing agreements and
compliance, by country. The administration should also
provide Congress with any proposals to adjust the
requirements of HSPD-6 information-sharing agreements
and to increase foreign partner compliance.
Recommendation.--GAO should complete its on-going
review of the overall status of information-sharing
agreements required under the VWP and provide Congress
with an overview of any identified weaknesses or
concerns.
Key Finding 9.--There is currently no comprehensive global
database of foreign fighter names. Instead, countries including
the United States rely on a patchwork system for swapping
individual extremist identities. This is an inherently weak
arrangement that increases the odds a foreign fighter will be
able to cross border undetected when traveling to and from a
terrorist sanctuary.
Countries around the globe continue to rely on bilateral
and regional information-sharing agreements to exchange
terrorist watch lists and compare foreign fighter names. The
result is that global awareness of foreign fighter travel is
piecemeal and deeply fragmented. In other words, a foreign
fighter leaving Syria might be kept out of country X but can
travel freely through country Y which has not been made aware
he is a suspect.
The closest the international community has come to
centrally tracking foreign fighters is a through a database
created last year by INTERPOL. The organization's ``foreign
terrorist fighter'' analytic file is available on a membership
basis to all 190 INTERPOL countries, each of which can add to
the database and can screen against it to detect foreign
fighters attempting to enter their territory.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\ Currently around 50 member states have joined the initiative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, only a fraction of INTERPOL countries have
participated in it. Indeed, more than 25,000 foreign fighters
have gone to Syria and Iraq, yet at last count INTERPOL's
database only included around 5,000 names because foreign
partners are reluctant to share.\157\ This has to change--and
quickly. Thousands of these fighters are returning home, and
this database has the potential to become the global
``tripwire'' to detect their movements. Even the few thousand
names already added to the INTERPOL database have been useful
to the United States, as many of them were previously unknown
to us.\158\
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\157\ Information provided to Task Force staff by INTERPOL
Washington in September 2015.
\158\ Task Force briefing with INTERPOL officials in France, May
2015.
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Recommendation.--The United States must work with
international partners to designate INTERPOL as a
central repository for foreign fighter identities. The
administration must strongly urge partners who have
shared foreign fighter data with U.S. authorities to
share the same data, where possible, via INTERPOL
systems with the rest of the international community.
This would enhance U.S. security by ensuring more
individuals of concern are stopped well before they
reach American borders.
Recommendation.--The administration should conduct a
Classified review of the foreign fighter names known to
the United States and determine whether there are any
additional identities that can be added to INTERPOL's
foreign fighter database. More broadly, this review
should also consider whether the process in place for
quickly declassifying information to place in INTERPOL
systems is adequate.
Key Finding 10.--DHS is seeking to more quickly leverage
the Unclassified data it collects to identify high-risk
individuals--including terrorists and foreign fighters--
traveling to, through, and from the United States. To do so,
the Department requires an interim ability to query
Unclassified data in Classified environments.\159\
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\159\ See related finding from the Homeland Security Advisory
Council: ``Foreign Fighter Task Force Interim Report,'' Spring 2015.
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Much of the information the U.S. Government receives from
foreign partners is Classified, like the identities of possible
terrorists. Using that information to screen for suspects must
be done on secure systems. DHS has proposed an interim process
which will allow intelligence analysts to tap Unclassified data
sets directly from Classified systems and detect extremists who
may have entered the country or are attempting to do so.\160\
For example, a DHS analysts might want to search the manifests
of planes bound for the United States for the name of a certain
foreign fighter, but the analyst might not be able to do so
easily if the name was received from a sensitive source
overseas, making it Classified. He or she would be unable to
type a Classified piece of data into the search box unless the
system was on a Classified network.\161\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Privacy Impact for the
DHS Data Framework--Interim Process to Address an Emergent Threat, DHS/
ALL/PIA-051, April 15, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/privacy-pia-dhswide-dataframework-april-2015- .pdf.
\161\ This example is a hypothetical and was not provided by DHS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Task Force believes a temporary data transfer process
should be used to address such challenges but only until the
long-planned DHS data framework is capable of meeting the
mission need. DHS should revert to a model with more privacy
safeguards once the technical capabilities are available. We
understand that access to this data in the Classified domain
will be limited to intelligence analysts, support staff for
intelligence analysts, and CBP personnel conducting targeting
and intelligence analysis. Technical personnel will be
responsible for loading the data onto the Classified domain and
performing system administration functions, but they will not
have access to the actual data after the uploading is complete.
Recommendation.--DHS should expedite efforts to
fully develop the DHS Data Framework so that
information at all levels of classification can be used
for critical counterterrorism purposes by DHS and other
relevant agencies. The Department should report to
Congress on its interim use of this capability,
progress in developing the full framework, and any
additional resources needed to complete the effort.
Key Finding 11.--The DHS Counterterrorism Advisory Board
(CTAB) is the Department's key forum for fusing operations,
intelligence, and policy information at a senior level to
better mitigate terrorist threats; however, the CTAB's charter
has not been authorized by Congress nor does it reflect recent
changes to the threat environment, including the rising threat
of foreign fighters and homegrown terror.
Established in 2010, the CTAB brings together top DHS
officials at the behest of the Secretary of Homeland Security
to share information and coordinate counterterrorism
activities. By many accounts, the CTAB has improved the
Department's ability to adapt to the threat environment and
keep policy responses in sync across the many DHS components.
The CTAB, however, is not currently authorized in law, running
the risk it could fall into disuse or stray from its core
counterterrorism mandate. Moreover, its original charter does
not reflect changes in the threat environment, including the
surge in home-grown extremism and the threat from foreign
fighters.\162\ Authorization in law and updates to the charter
would keep the CTAB on a strong footing so it can be best used
by future DHS Secretaries and their lieutenants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\162\ Homeland Security Advisory Council, ``Foreign Fighter Task
Force Interim Report,'' Spring 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation.--Congress should authorize the
activities of the CTAB, and in line with the
recommendations of the Homeland Security Advisory
Council, ensure that its charter is reviewed and
revised to reflect ``(1) the current threat
environment, (2) any policy changes that have been made
since issuance, and (3) to align DHS CT activities
under the Secretary's Unity of Effort guidance.''\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\ Ibid.
Key Finding 12.--More can be done to incorporate valuable
``financial intelligence'' into counterterrorism screening and
vetting processes. This data can be used to detect previously
unknown extremists and to identify individuals tied to
terrorism attempting to transit the United States, among other
counterterrorism priorities.
Since 9/11, significant barriers to intelligence
information sharing have been reduced or eliminated across the
U.S. Government, allowing authorities to connect the dots to
spot and interdict violent extremists seeking to do our country
harm. Much of this information is leveraged during the travel
screening process to screen passengers so that law enforcement
can catch terrorists and foreign fighters while they are on the
move. The Task Force spoke with a number of officials who have
indicated that more can be done to integrate financial
intelligence into the systems used to screen for terrorist
travel. We support on-going efforts to bolster this type of
information sharing between Federal agencies.
Recommendation.--The administration should
accelerate efforts to better incorporate financial
intelligence into vetting and screening systems and
provide Congress with regular updates on its progress.
Key Finding 13.--State and local fusion centers are
underutilized by Federal law enforcement Nation-wide when it
comes to combating the immediate foreign fighter threat and
terrorist travel generally.
In the wake of 9/11, many States and urban areas around the
country established fusion centers to enhance sharing of
counterterrorism information and criminal intelligence at all
levels of government. The National Network of Fusion Centers
now includes 78 separate centers, many of which bring together
Federal, State, and local law enforcement; emergency
responders; public health professionals; private-sector
representatives; and others. Most of these centers receive
Federal assistance, whether through grant dollars or the
support of Federal intelligence analysts who sit alongside
their State and local counterparts to share information.
With the terror threat becoming more diffuse Nationally,
fusion centers are more important than ever. Federal agencies
are strained by the workload associated with monitoring the
surging number of home-grown extremists, aspiring foreign
fighters, returnees, and other terrorist targets. State and
local partners not only can help lighten the load but are also
able to provide invaluable on-the-ground assistance to mitigate
terror threats.
Cooperation between fusion centers and Federal law
enforcement, including the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces
(JTTFs) has improved considerably in recent years, yet some
centers still report they are underutilized and not made aware
of terrorism-related investigations or activities within their
respective areas of responsibility. For example, when a
watchlisted individual is stopped for a traffic violation or is
detected traveling through a U.S. airport, there is currently
no mechanism to automatically notify the closest fusion center,
even though law enforcement represented in that center may
ultimately be called on to respond. The lack of automatic
coordination also may deprive authorities of key local insights
that could help interdict terror suspects. Similarly, fusion
centers are not automatically notified when an American foreign
fighter suspect returns from an overseas extremist sanctuary.
When fusion centers are used, the benefits are clear. In
one recent case, Federal officials received a tip that
unidentified Americans from a specific state traveled overseas
to fight with Islamist militants.\164\ The fragmentary
intelligence was passed down to the relevant fusion center. In
a matter of weeks, the center pieced together information from
local sources and managed to identify the suspects. They
quickly notified Federal counterterrorism officials, who placed
the suspects on the terrorist watch list to ensure they did not
make it back into America undetected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\ This example was shared with the Task Force in April 2015 by
Homeland Security officials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation.--Federal law enforcement, including
the FBI's JTTFs, should better leverage the National
Network of Fusion Centers for assistance with
terrorist-travel related matters. Stronger
relationships between the two--and co-location where
possible--will further enhance information-sharing and
help Government agencies stop extremists from entering
our country and keep more Americans from leaving to
join terrorist groups.
Recommendation.--Federal authorities should explore
providing notification to fusion centers when there are
hits against the terrorist watch list of individuals
within a given fusion center's area of operations.
Routine notification will give State and local partners
awareness in case they are called on to assist and
would create an additional opportunity for those
partners to connect the dots and provide Federal
authorities any pertinent information they have on
those subjects.
Recommendation.--Federal law enforcement should
regularly notify fusion centers when a ``returnee''
comes back to their area of operations. These
individuals, who return from overseas terrorist
sanctuaries, pose a potential threat to the homeland.
If made aware, fusion centers can serve as a force
multiplier and an additional source of information to
determine whether such individuals are seeking to
recruit others to join extremist groups, are planning
to head back to the conflict zone, or are engaged in
attack plotting.
Key Finding 14.--State and local law enforcement personnel
continue to express concern that they are not provided with
important counterterrorism information, whether because of a
lack of security clearances, insufficient security clearance
levels, or delays in security clearance processing.
State and local law enforcement partners are essential for
deterring, detecting, and disrupting terrorist travel. However,
the Task Force finds there is still frustration among State and
locals about the security clearance process, which is run by
the Federal Government. Some departments with a presence at
fusion centers say they have too few officers--or none--with
security clearances, while others feel hamstrung by the long
delays in security clearance processing.
Security clearance levels are also an issue. Most State and
local law enforcement personnel who are granted security
clearances are approved up to the ``Secret'' level. However,
counterterrorism information is often classified at ``Top
Secret'' and above, making it difficult if not impossible for
those officers to assist in sensitive cases. The Task Force
understands that DHS has recently decided to streamline its
process and make it easier for State and local law enforcement
to be granted higher clearances, where needed--a welcome
development.
Recommendation.--DHS, FBI, and the Director of
National Intelligence's (DNI) Program Manager for the
Information Sharing Environment should: (1) Complete a
thorough review of security clearances held by non-
Federal Fusion Center personnel and all State and local
law enforcement; and (2) provide guidance on expediting
clearances to those populations and ensuring partners
have the appropriate level of access.
Recommendation.--DHS should regularly report to
Congress on its sponsorship of Top Secret clearances
for select State and local law enforcement personnel in
States and major urban areas.
PREVENTION ACTIVITIES
Actually ``preventing'' a known or suspected terrorist from
crossing borders typically comes down to blunt law enforcement
tactics: Interdiction, arrest, and prosecution. If authorities
lack enough evidence to detain a suspect on terror charges,
they will sometimes prevent them from leaving a country by
detaining them on lesser charges, such as immigration
violations or making false statements to investigators.
But the foreign fighter threat has created a different
dynamic. We cannot simply rely on stopping suspects when they
arrive at the airport. Many of the hundreds of American who
have attempted to travel to Syria and Iraq were not known to
law enforcement before they traveled, and some on law
enforcement's radar could not be charged without more
sufficient evidence they were planning to join a foreign
terrorist organization overseas.
As a result, prevention activities are increasingly
important. These include efforts to help communities spot signs
an individual may be seeking to join violent extremists
overseas and to dissuade them from departing the country.
Prevention also requires authorities to be nimble in monitoring
the wide array of suspects on their radar, as a decision to
join a group like ISIS is often made quickly and discretely.
With extremists increasingly engaging Americans using secure
communications, authorities might not be aware of a suspect's
decision to travel to a terrorist hot spot, making it all-the-
more important for communities to look at developing ``off-
ramps'' to radicalization to prevent individuals from falling
victim to extremist recruitment in the first place.
Key Finding 15.--The unprecedented speed at which Americans
are being radicalized by violent extremists is straining
Federal law enforcement's ability to monitor and intercept
suspects before it's too late.
We were told repeatedly throughout our review that never
before have authorities witnessed such a condensed period of
radicalization, i.e., the time between an individual's first
encounter with extremist propaganda to when they are prepared
to act on it. Also, no official could point to another period
where so many Americans have been inspired to travel overseas
to become foreign fighters in a single terror hotspot.
The scope and magnitude of terrorist recruitment world-wide
is taking its toll on all law enforcement, including here in
the United States. Some of our foreign partners have admitted
they do not have adequate coverage on their terrorist suspects
or have been forced to limit their focus to counterterrorism at
the expense of investigating other criminal matters. While the
circumstance are not quite as dire here, the threat environment
certainly has put strain on U.S. authorities, especially at the
FBI. The FBI director now says the agency is investigating ISIS
supporters in all 50 States.\165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\ Julia Payne, ``FBI Investigating ISIS Suspects in All 50
States,'' The Hill, May 26, 2015, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-
briefing-room/233832-fbi-investigating-isis-suspects-in-all-50-states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A diffuse threat environment calls for a distributed
response, which means better engaging State and local law
enforcement across the country. Since 9/11, Federal law
enforcement has brought sheriffs' offices and police
departments into the fold through improved information sharing
and involvement in counterterrorism investigations. But with
the continued surge in the terror threat, closer cooperation
will be needed.
Recommendation.--Federal law enforcement agencies
should rely more on State and local partners to help
manage the high load of counterterrorism cases. Already
police departments in major cities have reportedly
begun to devote more resources to helping Federal
agencies keep tabs on terrorism suspects, whether to
keep them from fleeing to link up with other extremists
overseas or mobilizing at home. Leaders of Federal
departments and agencies must be clear with State and
local partners about how they can best assist in this
new age of terror and should also consider additional
training and enhanced integration to better leverage
law enforcement partners around the country.
Key Finding 16.--The majority of recent disruptions of
aspiring U.S. foreign fighters occurred because of--or were
aided by--warnings to law enforcement, whether from family,
friends, informants, or the general public. Nevertheless, few
initiatives exist Nation-wide to raise community awareness in
order to keep more individuals from being recruited to join
overseas terrorist organizations.
Information from the public is crucial for stopping foreign
fighter flows. ``A lot of cases we've disrupted, it's because
somebody tipped us off,'' explained one senior administration
official who spoke with the Task Force.\166\ The FBI, DHS, and
other agencies have done commendable investigative work to
identify extremists, but without community engagement their
work is considerably more difficult.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\ Task Force briefing, July 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, the administration relies on small
initiatives with few staff, shoestring budgets, and limited
records of success to spread awareness about the threat. The
``Community Awareness Brief'' is the Federal Government's
primary domestic outreach effort to address domestic
radicalization and inform communities about terrorist
recruiting. Officials have compared it to a ``D.A.R.E.
program'' for counterterrorism,\167\ but it has only been
presented in a small number of cities. Usually delivered by a
handful of DHS and NCTC staffers, the brief is sometimes
followed by a Community Resilience Exercise designed to engage
participants in mock scenarios involving the radicalization of
a community member. Unfortunately, resource constraints have
kept these initiatives from being scaled beyond one-off
presentations held intermittently around the country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\ This is a reference to the Drug Abuse Resistance Education
program; comments made by General Frank Taylor during the following
hearing: House Committee on Homeland Security, Countering Violent
Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown
Terror, 114 Cong., 1st sess., Doc. (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 2015), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg94106/html/
CHRG-114hhrg94106.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, departments and agencies have not done enough to
successfully enlist nongovernmental partners in prevention
efforts. Several NGOs, including the Countering Extremism
Project and the World Organization for Resource Development and
Education (WORDE), are involved in this space, but the
administration has done little to help them mature or
accelerate their efforts. Major foundations, which could bring
resources to bear on the problem, have also rarely been
contacted by U.S. authorities on the subject.
Recommendation.--DHS should use the National Network
of Fusion Centers to more widely deploy initiatives
such as the U.S. Government's Community Awareness Brief
and Community Resilience Exercise, designed to increase
local understanding of the foreign fighter threat.
Training fusion center staff around the country to help
conduct these briefings could help to increase
community awareness and buy-in from local community
participants.
Recommendation.--DHS, in consultation with other
departments and agencies, should devise new approaches
for encouraging community members to report suspicious
activity, especially signs an individual is preparing
to travel overseas to join a foreign terrorist
organization. In considering new methods for
engagement, authorities should also rely on lessons
from the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Building
Communities of Trust initiative, recognizing that one
of the major barriers to cooperation in some
communities is distrust of law enforcement.
Key Finding 17.--The Federal Government has failed to
develop clear intervention strategies such as ``off-ramps'' to
radicalization as an alternative to detaining individuals
seeking to travel to fight with extremists overseas.
Countries around the world have developed programs to
address radicalization by intervening before a suspect becomes
violent or enlists with a terrorist group. In some cases, these
programs are also aimed at rehabilitating foreign fighters who
have returned from overseas. Some of these efforts are a step
too far for the United States. For Constitutional and policy
reasons, the U.S. Government should be wary about running its
own ``de-radicalization'' programs for individuals who, in some
cases, may simply be engaging in speech and actions protected
by the First Amendment. Family, friends, and community members
are often far better suited than Government officials to
intervene and prevent individuals from radicalizing to
violence.
But U.S. authorities are still faced with the reality that
every day they are investigating suspects who have been
radicalized by terrorist groups and could suddenly seek to
become fighters on foreign battlefields or commit acts of
terror here at home. The traditional wait-and-see approach is a
blunt and risky one: Suspects are either arrested and
prosecuted--or they are not. In only a handful of recent cases
have Federal authorities sought to intervene earlier to engage
family or community members in dissuading a suspect from
heading overseas to join ISIS or al-Qaeda.
We believe more should be done to develop ``off-ramps'' to
radicalization, particularly as terrorist groups are
increasingly recruiting people under the age of 18. While
recognizing that we cannot just look the other way, our only
choice should not be to incarcerate teenagers on terror charges
when they are preyed upon by on-line extremists. Investigators,
prosecutors, and judges need additional options so they can
tailor their actions to the specifics of each case.
Authorities have made some attempts to pursue alternatives
to prosecution, but they do not appear to be based on any
overarching guidance or best practices. In a handful of cases
for instance, Federal authorities have engaged with parents
when it appears their children might be Syria-bound. In a case
this year, an 18-year-old Minnesota resident accused of
attempting to join ISIS was released to a halfway house while
awaiting trial, instead of being held in jail. There he
received counseling and courses in civic education-but from an
organization with no prior experience dealing with would-be
foreign fighters.\168\ The experiment fell apart when he was
found with a knife hidden in his room. The accused is now back
in jail, though still participating in civics lessons.\169\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\ Katie Zavadski, ``Group With No Jihadi Experience Rehabs ISIS
Recruit,'' The Daily Beast, August 24, 2015, http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/24/judge-orders-isis-recruit-to-
rehab-not-jail.html.
\169\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
So far, these efforts to pursue ``off-ramps'' have been ad
hoc and lack a systematic framework. This is a problem. We
cannot have law enforcement and justice officials developing
intervention strategies on-the-fly out in the field, especially
when they are swamped with counterterrorism cases and ill-
equipped to develop such strategies. Instead, policymakers in
Washington should take the lead in developing baseline policy
and legal guidance for appropriate interventions. This includes
engaging with NGOs, civil rights groups, and civil liberties
advocates to ensure intervention guidance is appropriate and
methods are effective.
The FBI recently announced plans to refer more suspects--
particularly juveniles--to interventions by involving community
leaders, educators, mental health professionals, religious
leaders, parents, and peers, depending on the
circumstances.\170\ In these cases, the FBI will not
necessarily cease its criminal investigation and will remain
alert to suspects who might become dangerous or plan to travel
to join extremists overseas.\171\ We are glad the FBI is taking
additional steps to engage communities on interventions, but
the framework for implementing these efforts remains unclear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\ Devlin Barrett, ``FBI to Seek Counseling, Not Handcuffs, for
Some Islamic State Suspects,'' Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2015,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-to-use-counseling-not-handcuffs-for-
some-islamic-state-suspects-1438812264.
\171\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation.--The administration should take
immediate steps to develop a baseline policy and legal
framework for intervening in cases of potential violent
radicalization, rather than relying on ad hoc
interventions. This guidance should be produced by DHS,
FBI, DOJ, and the NCTC--in consultation with other
departments and agencies and nongovernmental
organizations--distributed to appropriate parties, and
incorporated into field training where applicable. This
guidance must clearly spell out the legal parameters
for interveners, particularly as they could expose
themselves to liability if interventions fail.\172\
Moreover, from this framework, the U.S. Government
should develop a ``playbook'' regarding violent
extremist cases outlining the array of options
available to families, communities, law enforcement,
prosecutors, and judges to dissuade, deter, or disrupt
an individual at different stages along the path to
violent extremism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\ Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, Countering Violent
Extremism in America, report, June 2015, https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/
cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/CVE%20in%20Amer- ica%20.pdf.
Key Finding 18.--Aspiring foreign fighters are increasingly
being radicalized and recruited by extremists overseas via
websites and apps with secure private messaging features. The
result is that law enforcement faces greater difficulty
accessing extremist communications, making it harder to disrupt
violent plots and terrorist travel.
The world is witnessing sweeping changes in extremist
tactics, not least of which is the concept of crowd-sourced
recruiting. As detailed in the ``Threat'' section of this
report, terrorist groups like ISIS seek to identify possible
recruits by issuing a call to arms to their thousands of social
media followers, including on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and
beyond. Then they engage promising radicals via direct message,
communicating with them privately to determine their
willingness to engage in jihad or persuade them to travel
overseas. Finally, terrorist recruiters direct their subjects
to use encrypted apps and hidden websites to prevent monitoring
of their further conversations and plotting.
This last stage is especially concerning. Extremists are
using freely available communications tools to hide illegal
activities, such as funneling young operatives to and from
terrorist safe havens or planning to kill Americans within the
homeland. Even faced with lawful warrants from the courts to
access those communications, some companies are unable to
comply because of built-in security and encryption. In some
cases, technology is creating a virtual safe haven for
terrorists to communicate around the world. The FBI has been
especially vocal in highlighting these challenges as the terror
threat level has risen.\173\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\173\ Joint Statement with Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian
Yates Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC, 114th
Cong. (2015) (testimony of James B. Comey, Director, FBI).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ``going dark'' problem has stirred an important debate
in this country about how technological changes are affecting
privacy and public safety. We are not satisfied these
challenges have been discussed as thoroughly and openly as they
should be. Law enforcement and technology companies seem to be
talking past each other, and no sustained dialogue has been
established on the subject between key parties, including
Congress, law enforcement, and private industry. American
people deserve to see their leaders tackle this subject openly
and through a robust dialogue.
Recommendation.--A sustained and open dialogue and
enhanced cooperation is needed between all relevant
parties--including Congress, law enforcement, and
private industry--to discuss challenges and find
concrete solutions to the ``going dark'' problem, with
the ultimate goals of maintaining cybersecurity,
protecting civil liberties, and ensuring public safety,
especially against terrorist threats to the United
States.
Key Finding 19.--The administration has launched public
counter-messaging efforts at the State Department to push back
against terrorist propaganda overseas, yet more needs to be
done domestically.
Terrorist organizations are recruiting on-line and across
borders at a level we have never seen before. Thousands of
citizens from more than 100 countries have already been drawn
to fight with extremists in Syria and Iraq without ever meeting
an ISIS ``recruiter'' face-to-face. U.S. officials who spoke
with our Task Force say many if not most of the Americans who
have been inspired to join groups like ISIS were radicalized
on-line, not from someone in their communities, and the case
studies we reviewed seem to support that claim.\174\ ``It used
to be the assessment of the [Intelligence Community] that you
could not go all the way down the path to radicalization
without personal contact,'' one official told us. ``But that's
all changed.''\175\ In an age of peer-to-peer radicalization,
the new battlespace is on-line, and the United States must work
openly and aggressively to contest it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\ See the ``Americans on the Pathway to Terror: By-the-
Numbers'' sub-section of this report.
\175\ Task Force briefing, June 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overseas, the State Department has launched a counter-
messaging campaign to challenge terrorist recruitment and
propaganda, especially on social media. The Center for
Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) leads the
effort and says it primarily targets individuals who are ``on
the fence'' about traveling to enlist with extremist groups by
using hard facts to expose their deception and the danger of
enlisting in their ranks. The CSCC has started to engage
foreign partners to counter extremist misinformation using more
organic and credible approaches. Furthermore, the United States
can learn from foreign partner governments which have engaged
in their own counter-messaging efforts.
But the CSCC has a staff of only a few dozen, compared to
the tens of thousands of on-line ISIS followers who amplify the
terrorist group's content. Its efforts have also been pilloried
for being slow, bureaucratic, and ineffective at combating the
viral success of ISIS propaganda.\176\ What is more worrisome
is that State Department officials told the Task Force that
under existing authorities they do not believe they can use the
Center's resources to directly engage with Americans on-
line.\177\ In other words, the State Department can discourage
foreigners from joining ISIS but not dissuade U.S. citizens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\176\ Greg Miller and Scott Higham, ``In a Propaganda War against
ISIS, the U.S. Tried to Play by the Enemy's Rules,'' Washington Post,
May 8, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-
a-propaganda-war-us-tried-to-play-by-the-enemys-rules/2015/05/08/
6eb6b732-e52f-11e4-81ea-0649268f729e_story.html.
\177\ Task Force briefing with CSCC officials, May 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We do not believe counter-messaging is solely or even
primarily the job of the U.S. Government. In fact, tweets and
YouTube videos with the seal of the United States will likely
be discredited by budding extremists. However, the Federal
Government can help set the tone, share best practices from
foreign partners, and most importantly jump-start efforts by
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other private sector
partners to push back against terrorist recruitment and
propaganda within our borders.
Recommendation.--The administration should ramp up
counter-messaging efforts here at home and urgently
develop ways to empower nongovernmental organizations
to contest the propaganda of violent groups seeking to
radicalize and recruit Americans to travel to overseas
terrorist safe havens. As part of this effort, the
administration should also seek to work with non-
traditional partners, including universities, the
private sector, and philanthropic foundations.
Recommendation.--The administration should work more
closely with social media companies-including those who
are not routinely engaged by Government agencies but
whose platforms are often used by extremists\178\--and
urge them to accelerate the removal of violent-
extremist content which violates their terms of
service, whether through tools which make it easier for
users to flag inappropriate material or by devoting
greater internal resources to identifying and removing
offending content and users.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\178\ DHS, the State Department, and other Government agencies
routinely interact with Facebook, Twitter, Google, and other major
social media players. However, other websites that are regularly used
by extremists to share content, such as Ask.fm, reportedly have not
been contacted by U.S. departments and agencies to participate in
dialogue about removing terrorist propaganda.
Key Finding 20.--Unlike many countries, the U.S. Government
has made little use of disaffected extremists to dissuade
others from traveling to fight in terrorist sanctuaries.
The Task Force found a number of our foreign partners have
engaged ``jaded jihadists'' and returnees from the battlefield
to tell their stories and convince others not to travel to
terrorist safe havens. These individuals are likely viewed by
potential extremists as more credible voices than governments.
Therefore, they stand a better chance of dissuading likely or
future jihadists from coming under the influence of groups like
ISIS.
We were disappointed however to find key U.S. departments
and agencies have done little to leverage the stories of
American returnees or family members of those who have fled to
the conflict zone. In fact, one counterterrorism official even
admitted to the Task Force that counter-messaging teams had not
reached out to DOJ or FBI to see if any disaffected extremists
on their radar would tell their stories publicly.\179\ Only
very recently does that appear to have changed, though we are
unaware of any meaningful progress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\179\ Task Force briefing, May 2015.
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Fortunately, the State Department has begun to shift its
content in this direction, launching a series of ISIS defector
YouTube videos.\180\ The videos include footage from interviews
and news stories featuring individuals who were horrified to
witness ISIS oppression up close. But these testimonials have
received relatively little attention when posted from State
Department social media accounts. One such video only received
500 views despite being posted for 2 months; by comparison, a
recent ISIS execution video received tens of thousands of views
within hours of going on-line.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\ For an example, see: U.S. Department of State, ``Daesh
Defectors: `I Was Afraid All the Time' '' YouTube, July 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j7AJfmpFakI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grassroots messaging has a better chance than Government
missives of reaching vulnerable young people, as noted earlier.
Accordingly, U.S. authorities must empower nongovernmental and
non-traditional partners to do this kind of outreach. For
instance, a U.K.-based foundation recently sponsored an ISIS
counter-messaging campaign--#NotAnotherBrother--which showcases
the ``reality of life as a foreign fighter.''\181\ The slick,
privately-produced video has drawn far more attention world-
wide when compared with similar U.S.-Government-produced
content.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\181\ Quilliam Foundation, ``Quilliam Launches
#NotAnotherBrother,'' news release, August 4, 2015, http://
www.quilliamfoundation.org/press/quilliam-launches-notanotherbrother/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation.--The administration should launch a
concerted effort to use the testimonials of disaffected
``former'' foreign fighters, extremists, and their
friends and relatives to counter the narratives that
persuade Americans to travel overseas to fight with
extremist groups. Most importantly, the administration
should help facilitate and distribute these stories
through non-Governmental channels where possible and
empower non-traditional partners to do the same.
Departments and agencies should also work with foreign
partners to get permission to use narratives which they
have produced featuring their own citizens.
Key Finding 21.--Many Western countries have begun to use
passport revocation as a means to keep aspiring foreign
fighters from traveling, but the tool has been little-used by
U.S. authorities.
A number of Western governments have taken direct action to
stop suspects by taking away their means of travel: Passports.
Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and others have
used this tool as a last resort when they think extremists
might take off for the conflict zone but when there is limited
ability to prosecute them in advance. For example, Australian
authorities confiscated the passport of a Musa Cerantonio, a
vocal ISIS recruiter and jihadist preacher, after he reportedly
tried to flee to Syria in June 2014; he made it to the
Philippines before being deported back to Australia.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\ Graeme Wood, ``What ISIS Really Wants,'' The Atlantic,
February 15, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/
what-isis-really-wants/384980/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Government has the ability under the law to revoke
passports on a number of different grounds, including for
National security purposes.\183\ But unlike some foreign
partners, American authorities cannot make this decision
unilaterally. The Supreme Court has ruled that an individual's
right to travel cannot be violated without due process, which
has been interpreted to mean an American passport cannot be
revoked without giving the suspect a chance to contest the
evidence against him or her.\184\ There appear to be few public
cases of passports being revoked on National security grounds,
which could be explained by the fact that National security and
counterterrorism investigations often involve Classified
information. Law enforcement agencies face difficult trade-offs
when deciding whether to use Classified information in court,
as noted elsewhere in this report.
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\183\ Revocation or Limitation of Passports, 22 CFR 51.62 (2014).
\184\ Task Force Briefing with State Department, June 2015. Also
see: Kent v. Dulles (June 16, 1958).
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This does not mean the tool has never been used. The U.S.
State Department revoked the passport of Anwar al-Awlaki, a top
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader, nearly 6 months
before he was killed in a drone strike in Yemen. First though,
the Department sent a cable to its embassy in Yemen directing
that it send a message ``to Mr. [Awlaki] informing him that
there is an important letter for him at post regarding his U.S.
passport.''\185\ Presumably if Awlaki had shown up, he would
have been served with a passport revocation letter and later
been given the opportunity to contest the charges against him.
He never showed, and the passport was revoked.
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\185\ United States, Department of State, Passport Revocation--
Anwar Nasser Aulaqi, http://images.politico.com/global/2012/11/28/
binder1.html.
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Passport revocation is not the only way to make it
difficult for a suspect to travel. America's advanced
watchlisting system, discussed earlier, allows authorities to
flag foreign-fighter suspects in a secure database and to be
notified when any of them attempt to fly out of the country on
their passports. Moreover, with enough evidence, a watchlisted
terror suspect can be upgraded to the no-fly list, which
automatically prevents them from boarding an aircraft.
But if an American has already left the United States for
Syria, adding their name to the watch list may not do much good
in keeping them from getting the rest way to the battlefield.
The majority of Americans who have attempted to fight in Syria
and Iraq managed to leave the country before being stopped by
U.S. law enforcement; only later did many of them come to the
attention of authorities. Many are presumably still able to
travel on their passports if the documents have not been
cancelled, making it easier for them to return to the West. On
the other hand, when an individual's passport is revoked, a
government can alert nearly all other countries via INTERPOL
that the document is no longer valid and should not be
accepted, theoretically constraining a suspect's international
mobility.
The Task Force is concerned about the gap between passport
revocation and watchlisting. The latter is not an equal
substitute for the former. We must assume suspects dead set on
joining a terrorist group in Syria and Iraq could eventually
find a way out of the United States. In those cases, we need to
be able to make it more difficult for them to travel the
remainder of the way to the conflict zone and, ultimately,
prevent them from returning to the West undetected.
Recommendation.--The administration should conduct a
review of its passport revocation policies and
procedures which could be used in cases involving
terrorist travel and foreign fighters and report to
Congress on any changes desired to streamline and
improve the process while protecting due process rights
and civil liberties. This review should consider
similar actions undertaken by foreign partners and also
propose alternatives to passport revocation which could
have a similar effect in slowing or obstructing
terrorist travel across borders.
Detection and Disruption
If terrorists and foreign fighters cannot be deterred from
crossing borders, then the United States must be able to detect
and disrupt them when they do. This requires real-time
counterterrorism information to be used at border checkpoints,
airports, and beyond to spot travelers who have been flagged.
It also requires shrewd analysis of travel patterns and the
identification of suspicious behavior. This is no easy task.
More than half a billion people cross borders into the United
States each year, 330 million of which are non-citizens.\186\
Catching the small number who have ties to terrorism requires
close cooperation at all levels of government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\186\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection. ``Border in Miles: How
Long is the U.S. Border with Canada and Mexico?'' July 30, 2013,
https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/578//border-in-miles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
America failed to adequately integrate counterterrorism
information at the borders before 9/11, a vulnerability which
allowed extremists to travel back-and-forth to the United
States undetected by law enforcement. In fact, the 9/11
Commission concluded 15 of the 19 hijackers were ``potentially
vulnerable to interception by border authorities'' but were not
detected because of ``systemic weaknesses'' in the U.S. border
system.\187\ But extraordinary progress has been made since
then. Law enforcement agencies now conduct National security
checks on virtually every traveler--whether they are a foreign
national applying for a visa or an American returning home--
before they board flights to ensure they do not have ties to
terrorism. Moreover, U.S. border officers are deployed to a
number of countries overseas to detect threats early by pushing
the screening process outward.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\187\ 9/11 Commission report, chap. 12, http://
govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Ch12.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The danger from foreign fighters requires us to reexamine
these systems to keep suspects from slipping through the
cracks. The Task Force found several potential weaknesses in
U.S. detection and disruption efforts. For instance, more could
be done to tackle the challenge of ``broken travel,'' where
extremists switch planes and destinations to avoid law
enforcement detection, and authorities could put in place
measures to weed out violent extremists earlier in the visa
application process.
PRE-TRAVEL PHASE
Pre-travel screening allows authorities to conduct advance
security checks to identify high-risk individuals who might be
connected to violent extremist groups. In some ways, pre-travel
security screening is more important than the physical
screening of a traveler. Most terrorist suspects and foreign
fighters are not carrying weapons or explosive when they fly.
Authorities are more likely to detect them by searching
counterterrorism databases than by searching duffel bags for
illicit materials. We believe additional enhancements can be
made to detect threats in the pre-travel phase and to prevent
extremists from taking advantage of legal travel routes into
our country.
Key Finding 22.--Substantial progress has been made since
9/11 to enhance visa security and conduct advance
counterterrorism reviews of foreign nationals seeking to visit
the United States. The Task Force believes there may be
additional opportunities to expand screening to identify
potential extremists earlier in the process.
To visit the United States, citizens of most countries must
obtain visas, which are issued at overseas embassies and
consulates by the State Department. In 2014, the State
Department granted nearly 10 million visas to foreigners
seeking temporary entry into America (and nearly 500,000
immigrant visas for permanent residence).\188\ This involves
submitting an on-line questionnaire, scheduling an interview at
a U.S. embassy or consulate, providing biographic and biometric
information (such as fingerprints), and awaiting a formal
decision. The process can take anywhere from a few days to a
few weeks.\189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\188\ United States, Department of State, Immigrant and
Nonimmigrant Visas Issued at Foreign Service Posts: Fiscal Years 2010-
2014, http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/
AnnualReports/FY2014AnnualReport/FY14AnnualReport-TableI.pdf.
\189\ Task Force briefing with DHS and State Department, June 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The visa issuance process represents a critical stage for
law enforcement to detect individuals with terrorist ties and
prevent them from entering the United States. Many of the
subjects who have been convicted on terrorism charges in the
United States since
9/11 are foreign-born individuals who traveled to America on
visas--whether on student visas, tourist visas, or for legal
permanent residence. Some had potentially detectable terrorist
connections beforehand, and others committed visa fraud by
providing false information.
All visa applications are screened extensively against
criminal and counterterrorism databases, though this was not
always the case. For a number of years before and after 9/11,
the State Department only screened an applicant's basic
information and to see if he or she matched a name on a
terrorist watch list; as a result, approximately 2 percent of
visa applications were flagged to receive a more extensive
counterterrorism review.\190\ If a visa was approved, it was
not typically screened against classified databases again.
Today the State Department forwards 100 percent of visa
applications to NCTC for deeper, more sophisticated screening
to uncover possible terrorism connections.\191\ The Department
also continuously checks visas against Government databases in
case new information is discovered tying an individual to
terrorist activity.\192\ These improvements have led to the
denial of thousands of U.S. visas due to counterterrorism
concerns, some of which may not otherwise have been
detected.\193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\190\ Ibid.
\191\ Written testimony of CBP Office of Field Operations Acting
Deputy Assistant Commissioner for a House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security hearing titled
``Border Security Oversight, Part III: Border Crossing Cards and B1/B2
Visas,'' 113th Cong. (2013) (testimony of John Wagner).
\192\ Ibid.
\193\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In higher-risk foreign countries, the U.S. Government has
implemented an added defensive measure, the Visa Security
Program (VSP). VSP is run by DHS in 19 countries and aims to do
more in-depth counterterrorism screening to keep violent
extremists from gaining entry into America. At these higher-
threat locations, visa applications undergo a more rigorous
screening process, including an immediate National security
review when their immigration application is submitted on-line,
which allows Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents
to flag concerns with an applicant even before they show up at
the embassy for an interview. The additional time and manpower
of Visa Security Units (VSUs) allows for suspicious applicants
to be vetted more thoroughly. Once DHS has made a determination
on the applicant, it provides the State Department with a
recommendation on the individual's admissibility.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\ Task Force briefing with DHS and the State Department, June
2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VSP runs applications through a system called PATRIOT (Pre-
Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations
Team) well before State Department officers review the
applications. PATRIOT culls through public safety, criminal,
and National security databases and gives analysts in
Washington, DC the opportunity to do a deeper review to ensure
U.S. authorities do not have information on an applicant that
would be reason to deny them entry into the country. When an
application is flagged through the VSP, an officer at the
relevant U.S. overseas post is assigned to it and can do
additional work on-the-ground in the host country to resolve
any concerns.\195\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Task Force believes the VSP is a valuable additional
layer of security. We also recognize the VSP could be expensive
to deploy globally, given that DHS prefers to have an agent on
the ground to conduct follow-on reviews after an application is
initially screened. However, we believe the up-front screening
that occurs as part of the VSP--an immediate and automatic
National security review of each visa application through the
PATRIOT system--does not need to be limited to only the 19
existing VSP countries when there are 225 U.S. visa-issuing
posts world-wide.
Over time, PATRIOT screening could be expanded virtually to
all visa-issuing posts world-wide and provide an extra layer of
security to help State Department officers decide which
individuals should be granted entry into the United States and
which should not. Under the current system, a full
counterterrorism review sometimes does not occur until weeks
after an application is submitted; near-instant security checks
would help give the U.S. Government additional lead time to do
background investigation on applications which get flagged,
offering more opportunities to uncover previously-unknown
terrorist ties. The VSP program has already helped identify new
terrorist tactics and has provided additional information on
known extremists, so we believe finding a way to deploy some
elements globally would yield additional National security
benefits.
Recommendation.--DHS, in conjunction with the
Department of State, should strengthen security
screening of travelers who require a visa by working to
deploy virtual elements of the VSP globally,
specifically through the expanded use of the PATRIOT
screening system. PATRIOT is currently used for remote
screening; however it only supports locations in which
VSP units currently exist. DHS should consider
expanding the use of the system to additional high-risk
embassies and consulates where VSP units may not
currently have a presence.\196\ DHS should also explore
conducting full VSP reviews using more cost-effective
means--particularly by training other U.S. Government
personnel to do the on-the-ground VSP assessments in
countries where DHS has a more limited presence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\196\ Over time, DHS should also examine how to deploy the system
to all countries.
Key Finding 23.--The administration has improved the
security of the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), but continuous
enhancements must be made to keep pace with changing terrorist
tactics and to detect violent extremists before they board
U.S.-bound planes.
Some critics have labeled the VWP the ``Achilles' heel'' of
U.S. security out of fear that foreign fighters from those
countries will be able to slip into the United States
undetected. It is true that most European jihadists who have
fought in Syria are from VWP countries, and although such
residents can get into America with greater ease, they are
still subjected to security checks. Moreover, their home
countries must implement travel security enhancements in order
to participate in the program.
Citizens of VWP countries can travel to the United States
for up to 90 days without having to obtain an entry visa; in
return, U.S. citizens must also be allowed to travel visa-free
to the participating country. VWP countries tend to be
developed economies that are viewed as a low security threat to
America, and the program brings substantial economic benefits
to the United States and participating nations.
In place of a visa, VWP travelers must fill out the
Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), when booking
travel to the United States. This on-line form provides key
information on each traveler to U.S. authorities and is
screened against terrorist watch lists and criminal databases.
Due to the heightened concerns about foreign fighters, DHS
announced in November 2014 that VWP travelers would be required
to submit additional information, including aliases,
citizenships, parents' names, national identification number,
contact information, employment information, and city of
birth.\197\ Additional information makes it easier for law
enforcement to identify terrorists and to expedite legitimate
travel. Moreover, ESTA forms are continuously screened against
the watch list and other security databases to ensure no new
ties to terrorism are detected after an individual has been
approved.\198\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the
Secretary, ``Statement by Secretary Johnson on Security Enhancements to
the Visa Waiver Program,'' news release, November 3, 2014, http://
www.dhs.gov/news/2014/11/03/statement-secretary-johnson-security-
enhancements-visa-waiver-program.
\198\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 113th
Cong. (2013) (testimony of John Wagner).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are currently 38 VWP countries, 30 of which are in
Europe.\199\ To participate, the U.S. Government requires that
countries meet several standards and implement security
improvements, including: (1) Issuing their residents secure,
machine-readable passports; (2) having less than a 3 percent
visa-refusal rate into the United States; (3) reporting lost/
stolen passports; (4) sharing information with U.S. authorities
on travelers (including criminals and known or suspected
terrorists); (5) requiring its residents to fill out an on-line
authorization form, ESTA, before traveling to the United
States; and (6) increasing their own airport security
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\199\ U.S. Department of State, ``Visa Waiver Program,'' http://
travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/visit/visa-waiver-program.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many officials believe the VWP actually enhances rather
than weakens U.S. security against terrorist travel. In
particular, all participating countries are required to
regularly share information that they might not normally
provide, including: Intelligence about terrorists; biographic,
biometric, and criminal data; and information on lost and
stolen passports. This data helps to prevent violent extremists
from entering the United States. DHS also recently announced
VWP countries would soon be required to begin issuing their
citizens fraud-resistant e-passports, to regularly screen
against INTERPOL's Stolen and Lost Travel Document Database,
and to permit additional Federal air marshals on flights from
their countries to the United States.\200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\200\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the
Secretary, ``Statement by Secretary Jeh C. Johnson on Intention to
Implement Security Enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program,'' news
release, August 6, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/08/06/statement-
secretary-jeh-c-johnson-intention-implement-security-enhancements-visa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We believe DHS and the administration have been attentive
to the need for security improvements to the VWP. But given
that the threat environment has changed and continues to
evolve, we strongly urge the Department to remain vigilant and
to consider additional security measures.
Recommendation.--The administration should
continuously explore further changes to the process for
screening visa-free travelers, including additional
security improvements to ESTA. Elsewhere in this
report, the Task Force makes additional recommendations
which might improve the overall security of the VWP and
leverage it to obstruct terrorist and foreign fighter
travel overseas, including those detailed under Key
Findings 8, 29, 30, and 31.
Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security,
in consultation with the Secretary of State, should
enforce VWP eligibility reviews for certain countries
annually rather than every 2 years and should provide
annual intelligence and threat assessments, in
consultation with the DNI, of high-risk VWP countries.
These assessments should include travel vulnerabilities
which may be exploited by terrorists, as well as each
country's overall compliance with VWP obligations. The
foreign fighter threat has shown how quickly a country
deemed ``low-risk'' for terrorist travel can quickly
become a ``high-risk'' source country for violent
extremists.
Recommendation.--DHS should work with Congress to
give the Secretary explicit authority to temporarily
suspend a country's VWP status for failure to share
counterterrorism information. As it currently stands,
the Secretary is not granted explicit authority in the
law to suspend a country's status for failing to pass
along information that is critical for stopping
terrorist movements, even though countries have agreed
to provide such information as a condition of
participation in the program. If the Secretary had
clearer suspension authority it would be a more
credible tool to encourage partners to comply with
security requirements. The Secretary should also
continue to use the current foreign fighter threat as
an opportunity to regularly remind participating VWP
countries of their obligations under the program.
Recommendation.--DHS should explore strengthening
the security of the ESTA application by introducing
mechanisms to instantly verify the data provided by
applicants. Such tools are already standard on many
internet-based forms and sign-ups. Data validation, for
instance, could easily be introduced to confirm an
applicant's email address or mobile phone number
through a confirmation code to be re-entered on the
form. This would give authorities greater confidence in
the information supplied by applicants, particularly
individuals who might be supplying false information.
DHS should also engage with private-sector companies
who provide on-line tools capable of ``deception
detection'' on web-based forms.
Key Finding 24.--U.S. law enforcement and intelligence
agencies remain concerned about terrorists posing as refugees.
Agencies have made improvements to the refugee security
screening process, but more must be done to mitigate potential
vulnerabilities.
Members of terrorist groups like ISIS have publicly bragged
they are working to sneak operatives into the West posing as
refugees, and European officials are worried this is already
the case.\201\ The Task Force recognizes terrorist infiltration
into the United States through the refugee process is less
likely than other routes and more time intensive for
extremists, but these threats must be kept in mind during the
refugee screening process. Such tactics would not be new for
terrorist groups, and more than 4 million people have fled the
conflict zone in Syria, offering extremists ample opportunity
to blend into migrant groups.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\201\ See the ``Border Security'' section of Key Finding 29 in this
report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
America has a proud tradition of welcoming refugees,
especially those fleeing war and violence in their home
countries. However we also must remain vigilant that we do not
inadvertently grant admission into our country to violent
extremists seeking to do our people harm. Fighters belonging to
ISIS's predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq, successfully slipped into
the United States through the refugee resettlement program in
2009, when two terrorist responsible for killing U.S. troops in
Iraq were granted entry and settled in Kentucky. Only later did
the FBI and DHS discover this error and arrest the suspects
after finding their fingerprints matched those found on IEDs in
Iraq.\202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\202\ James Meek, Cindy Galli, and Brian Ross, ``Exclusive: U.S.
May Have Let `Dozens' of Terrorists Into Country As Refugees,'' ABC
News, November 20, 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-
kentucky-us-dozens-terrorists-country-refugees/story?id=20931131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Law enforcement and intelligence officials have expressed
concern publicly and privately to Task Force Members that our
refugee screening process has inherent vulnerabilities,
particularly in war-torn countries where we have little
intelligence on the ground. The lack of information makes it
difficult to conduct high-confidence background checks on
potential refugees.\203\ In other words, we cannot screen
against information we do not have. In these cases, departments
and agencies should establish clear plans to enhance background
reviews and outline how domestic agencies like the FBI will be
involved in mitigating any risks associated with populations of
concern which are granted entry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\ FBI Assistant Director for Counterterrorism Michael Steinbach
made this point in a February hearing before the Committee: House
Committee on Homeland Security, Countering Violent Islamist Extremism:
The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror, 114th
Cong., 1st sess., Hrg. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg94106/html/CHRG-
114hhrg94106.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation.--The administration should provide a
report to Congress highlighting the refugee routes most
vulnerable to terrorist exploitation based on
intelligence, detailing the state of the refugee
vetting process for those countries, and outlining
plans to mitigate any vulnerabilities in the system.
TRAVEL PHASE
America has sought to build out a ``layered'' defense
against terrorist travel and has made considerable improvements
since the early 2000s. Indeed, passengers traveling to, from,
and within the United States are subject to security screening
procedures--some seen and some unseen--at virtually every stage
in their journey. These measures include watch list vetting,
automated targeting to identify high-risk passengers, physical
traveler and baggage screening, Federal air marshal protection,
and other security layers.
In the wake of past security breaches, passengers are now
vetted against counterterrorism databases at multiple stages
throughout their journey, potentially including after they have
booked their ticket, when they check in at the airport, once
the aircraft departs, and--for those headed into the country--
at the border and immigration checkpoint. Continuous checks
allow law enforcement to spot suspicious travel patterns and
ensure real-time intelligence can be fused into the process to
stop terrorist suspects who are on the move.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\204\ Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, House
Committee on Homeland Security, Intelligence Sharing and Terrorist
Travel, 112th Cong., 1st sess., Hrg. (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg73736/html/
CHRG-112hhrg73736.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite improvements, the foreign fighter threat has
stressed the system. Terrorists are changing their tactics, and
authorities are having a harder time tracking them. The Task
Force commends DHS in particular for stepping up efforts to
interdict terrorists and foreign fighters, but we believe
additional steps can be taken to tighten security in the travel
phase.
Key Finding 25.--Aspiring foreign fighters are increasingly
using ``broken travel'' and other evasive tactics, making it
difficult for authorities to detect and disrupt their
movements.
Earlier this year, INTERPOL chief Juergen Stock warned the
U.N. Security Council about ``broken travel,'' explaining that
foreign fighters were increasingly using circuitous routes and
middlemen to get to and from the conflict zone.\205\ For
example, an aspiring American foreign fighter might book a
round-trip ticket from New York to Athens, but skip the return
flight and instead drive through Turkey to get to Syria. This
can make it harder for law enforcement to track suspects. ``It
is a concern,'' explained DHS intelligence chief Frank Taylor
at a committee hearing this year. ``People can book a flight to
an end-destination . . . and go other places.''\206\ U.S.
officials testifying before the committee in February also
emphasized extremists are varying their routes using
combinations of air, land, and sea transportation.\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\205\ Carole Landry, ``Foreign Fighters Switching Tactics to Reach
Syria, Iraq,'' Yahoo News, May 29, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/us-says-
efforts-stop-foreign-fighters-fall-way-163730357.html.
\206\ House Committee on Homeland Security, Countering Violent
Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown
Terror.
\207\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are concerned the international travel system is not
well-suited for detecting broken travel and similar approaches
used by terrorists and foreign fighters. Spotting such tactics
requires close and continuous information sharing between
countries regarding passenger manifests, screening data, and
other information that some do not even routinely collect. The
problem does not appear to have an easy solution, but closer
multilateral information exchanges--at least in cases of known
or suspected terrorists--might help illuminate terror travel
routes and result in better tracking of suspects.
Recommendation.--U.S. authorities must engage with
air carriers and foreign partners to discuss enhancing
air passenger targeting systems, information sharing,
and additional protocols that might make it easier to
spot extremists' broken travel tactics. Federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies should undertake
a concerted effort to ensure all relevant travel data
is being leveraged to uncover extremists' evasive
transit patterns. Other governments, especially in
Europe, can address this challenge by improving
collection of passenger data, as discussed in the
``Overseas Gaps'' section of this report, and sharing
it in counterterrorism cases.
Key Finding 26.--More could be done to give front-line
operators better intelligence reach-back capabilities so DHS
can ``connect the dots'' and uncover previously unidentified
terrorists and foreign fighters using information obtained at
border checkpoints.
DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers currently
have the ability to pass along suspicious information collected
at the borders for analysts to review. However, the process is
not fully automated, and it does not take full advantage of the
Government's array of criminal-intelligence and travel
databases, meaning that important connections could be getting
missed.
For example, an officer might interview a suspicious
passenger in secondary screening and receive a phone number for
the place the passenger is staying while in the country. While
the traveler himself might not pop up on a terrorist watch
list, the phone number might be connected to a known terrorist
facilitator. But even if the CBP officer passed along his
interview data to analysts, existing systems might not be able
to make the terrorism connection. Indeed, CBP still does not
have full, automated access to some sensitive databases or to
certain useful collections of travel data held by other
departments and agencies.
The above scenario is a hypothetical. Nevertheless we
believe it is important for CBP officers to have the ability to
easily and quickly transmit information gained during
inspections to be fully vetted for National security reasons.
This means the agency must have access--or reach-back--to all
relevant Unclassified and Classified systems needed to uncover
previously-unknown terrorism connections, especially when
engaging with high-risk subjects.
Recommendation.--DHS should work with other relevant
agencies to provide Congress with a plan to better
integrate intelligence and law enforcement information
into CBP's counterterrorism screening processes. This
plan should improve CBP's ability to fully vet discrete
pieces of information acquired during inspections. The
Department should also consider co-locating of some of
its vetting personnel with other agencies to facilitate
closer collaboration and information sharing.
Key Finding 27.--U.S. authorities continue to ``push the
border outward'' by deploying homeland security initiatives
overseas, like CBP's Preclearance program. Expanding such
initiatives could help detect threats sooner.
The Task Force commends DHS for working to increase the use
of the Preclearance program at overseas airports with flights
to the United States. In the select locations where it has been
established, the Preclearance program allows overseas-based CBP
officers to screen all passengers and luggage before a flight
takes off for the United States. Officers are able to use the
same authorities they would have if the inspections were
conducted on U.S. soil.
CBP currently has 15 Preclearance locations in six
countries, including Ireland, Aruba, The Bahamas, Bermuda,
Canada, and the United Arab Emirates. However the foreign
fighter threat has shown many other locations to be far more
vulnerable to terrorist travel than those currently covered by
the program. We are pleased that DHS announced plans earlier
this year to seek an expansion of preclearance operations to 10
new airports, including to high-risk terror transit countries
like Turkey.\208\ The Department should keep Congress apprised
of these negotiations and continue to refine its risk-based
methodology for choosing new sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\ ``DHS Announces Intent to Expand Preclearance to 10 New
Airports,'' The Department of Homeland Security, May 29, 2015, http://
www.dhs.gov/news/2015/05/29/dhs-announces-intent-expand-preclearance-
10-new-airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation.--DHS should continue with its
efforts to expand preclearance operations, should
maintain rigorous risk-based selection criteria, and
should provide Congress with a clear and continuing
justification for selecting additional locations.
Key Finding 28.--Federal authorities use the International
Criminal Police Organization's (INTERPOL) databases frequently
for counterterrorism purposes, but only a fraction of U.S.
States have access to INTERPOL's systems. Expansion to more
States could help detect wanted foreign fighters who have
slipped past border security.
INTERPOL oversees systems--including terrorist and criminal
databases and a world-wide database of lost and stolen
passports--that are crucial global tools for combating
terrorist and foreign fighter travel (for more detail, see Key
Finding 31). Currently, all travelers entering and exiting the
United States are screened against these systems. Federal law
enforcement agencies also have worked in recent years to extend
INTERPOL screening beyond the border by giving other Government
partners access to the system.
However, we found that fewer than a quarter of U.S. States
currently have access to INTERPOL systems. Those which do can
use the databases to catch wanted international fugitives
during law enforcement stops or to ensure individuals are not
presenting fraudulent travel documents to get drivers licenses.
These tools could help more State and local agencies identify
violent extremist who may have entered the country undetected
or under a different alias.
Recommendation.--The administration should report to
Congress in its next budget request how it will empower
INTERPOL Washington to work with a broader slate of
state and local partners to expand access to INTERPOL's
systems, especially for counterterrorism purposes.
Recommendation.--The administration should consider
granting State and local law enforcement the ability to
quickly submit INTERPOL notices for wanted subjects in
their jurisdictions. Aspiring foreign fighters often
leave for the conflict zone with little or no notice,
and giving State and local partners the ability to
expedite notices to INTERPOL's 190 member states could
help stop extremists in their tracks on the way to
terrorist safe havens, especially in cases where local
authorities are tipped off to a suspect who was not
previously on Federal law enforcement's radar.
Overseas Gaps
The Task Force's biggest concern is that foreign
governments have not done enough to close conspicuous security
gaps which are susceptible to extremist exploitation. These
weaknesses make it easier for Americans to get to jihadist
battlefields and increase the threat of extremists traveling
undetected and reaching U.S. soil. Many of our foreign partners
remain in a ``pre-9/11'' counterterrorism posture, with
security gaps that mirror our own from 15 years ago. Barriers
between intelligence and police prevent information sharing in
some countries, while in others lax counterterrorism screening
at airports and border crossings makes it easier for extremists
to slip through undetected. Additionally, some countries still
do not even criminalize participation in international
terrorism, making it difficult to jail foreign fighters.
Over the past decade, the U.S. Government has provided
billions of dollars in counterterrorism assistance to foreign
partners, especially to disrupt terrorist travel. For example,
the State Department and DHS have helped other governments
screen passengers against terrorist watch lists and strengthen
border security. Similarly, DOJ has deployed its legal experts
world-wide to advise foreign officials on crafting and
enforcing counterterrorism laws. In many places these efforts
have been successful, but the Task Force is concerned
assistance efforts have been uncoordinated and lack overarching
strategic guidance.
Recognizing overseas gaps, the Obama administration pushed
the U.N. Security Council last year to pass Resolution 2178,
which required U.N. member states to detain and prosecute
foreign fighters crossing their borders.\209\ The resolution
also pressured members to accelerate counterterrorism
information sharing and tighten border controls through more
secure travel documents and suspicious-passenger targeting
systems.\210\ Some countries are making progress, but we
believe many have a long way to go.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\ UN Department of Public Information, ``Security Council
Unanimously Adopts Resolution Condemning Violent Extremism.''
\210\ Ibid.
Key Finding 29.--U.S. defenses against terrorist travel are
weakened by glaring and persistent security gaps in foreign
countries. This includes insufficient intelligence collection,
poor information sharing, lax screening of travelers,
inadequate laws for prosecuting terrorists and foreign
fighters, and weak border security. We are particularly
concerned about gaps in Europe, which has become a major
transit pathway for jihadists.
America cannot stop threats if it cannot see them coming.
In the case of terrorist travel, when foreign governments are
unable to identify extremists within their own borders or do
not share information about them, it increases the odds they
will evade our own security systems. Unfortunately, a number of
our foreign partners have invested too little in border
management and counterterrorism tools, missing critical
opportunities to stop the movement of extremists and increasing
the risk to the rest of the international community.
When assessing overseas gaps, the Task Force focused
primarily on problems in Europe for two reasons. First, most of
the Westerners who have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq--
including the Americans--transited Europe at some point, with
the most common entry point into Syria being Turkey, which
straddles Europe and Asia. Second, thousands of Europeans have
gone to fight with jihadists, and it is easier for them to
travel to the United States on their passports than it is for
citizens on most other continents. Thus, European foreign
fighters represent a somewhat higher terror travel threat to
the United States.
Europe's 26-country Schengen Area is ground zero for the
continent's terrorist travel woes. Members of the area have
abolished border checkpoints and passport controls to allow
anyone inside it to move effortlessly between the many
countries. But in addition to helping tourists, the wide-open
area has become a boon for terrorists. The European Union (EU)
does not have common police or intelligence services, making it
easy for violent extremists and foreign fighters to change
locations and keep authorities from catching onto them. The
assailant behind an attempted terrorist attack in August on a
high-speed train from Amsterdam to Paris--Ayoub El Khazzani--is
the perfect example. He is suspected of having traveled to link
up with extremists in Syria and despite being on several
European countries' watch lists, traveled easily between
France, Belgium, Austria, and Germany before launching his
attack.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\ Lauren Frayer, ``In Spanish Barrio, Residents Recall Train
Attack Suspect Charged in France,'' Los Angeles Times, August 28, 2015,
http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-spain-france-train-attack-
suspect-20150827-story.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jihadists are well-aware of Europe's security loopholes. An
ISIS e-book published this year advises aspiring fighters to
start their travel to Syria in tourist hotspots like Spain and
Greece--``or any European country''--because authorities are
less likely to detect them.\212\ Jihadi John, the masked
British ISIS fighter responsible for gruesome public beheading
videos, reportedly traveled freely through Europe despite being
on a terrorist watch list. Similarly Hayat Boumeddiene, an
associate of the Charlie Hebdo terrorists, was known to French
police but avoided detection by leaving the country, driving to
Spain, and boarding a flight for Turkey. ``I had no difficulty
getting here,'' she bragged from Syria in an ISIS-published
interview.\213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\ Hijrah to the Islamic State, 2015.
\213\ Kim Willsher, ``Islamic State Magazine Interviews Hayat
Boumeddiene,'' The Guardian, February 12, 2015, http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/12/islamic-state-magazine-
interviews-hayat-boumeddiene.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The larger concern is that some European extremists might
be able to make it to the United States undetected once they
have left the battlefield. We have no doubt that European
authorities have failed to identify a sizeable number of their
citizens who have migrated to Syria and Iraq because there are
so many of them and their movements are hard to track in a
place like the Schengen Area, with its lax counterterrorism
policies. As a result, such individuals are probably not on
E.U. or American terrorist watch lists, allowing them to return
to the West under-the-radar.
Many of our foreign partners in Europe, such as the United
Kingdom, have sophisticated efforts in place to stop terrorist
travel, while others are starting to take more serious action.
Terrorist attacks in the streets of Brussels and Paris were a
wake-up call, and European authorities are disrupting plots
every month, some of which have been planned by returning
jihadists. The heightened threat environment has led to a
flurry of E.U.-wide activity to improve security. But we remain
concerned some of our partners are not moving quickly enough,
allowing terrorist and foreign fighter travel to continue in
both directions.
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND INFORMATION SHARING
Much of Europe has slashed defense and intelligence budgets
in the decades since the Cold War ended. Those cuts, combined
with a surge in cases involving terrorists and home-grown
violent extremists, have put serious strain on security
services across the continent. Indeed, the Task Force
consistently heard concerns that a number of our foreign
partners do not have sufficient capabilities needed to identify
and track the rising number of terrorists and home-grown
violent extremists.\214\ This is a real problem. If European
security services cannot identify extremists in the first
place, then they will be unable to share their biographic
information with partners like the United States, and most
importantly, detect them when they travel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\214\ Due to the sensitivities of outlining intelligence and
information-sharing gaps, the Task Force declines to identify specific
partner countries by name, except where noted by public sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A deteriorating threat picture has motivated some countries
to take action. In the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, for
instance, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls declared the
country's ``No. 1 priority, the No. 1 requirement'' would be
``to further reinforce the human and technical resources of
intelligence services''; the government has since announced
plans for an additional 3,000 counterterrorism
professionals.\215\ But this does not solve the problem of
intra-European cooperation, which is essential when terrorist
can so easily move between European countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\ Maya Vidon-White and John Dyer, Special for USA TODAY,
``Europe Shifts Policy in Escalating War on Terror,'' USA Today,
January 25, 2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/01/25/
european-civil-liberties/22117007/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Task Force found barriers to information sharing to be
a problem--within countries, between them, and with the United
States. A number of European governments are stymied by legacy
bureaucratic stovepipes, turf battles, or strict data privacy
laws that prevent collaboration between agencies. Even in major
West European capitals, security agencies are often still not
well-integrated with border authorities and do not freely share
information. We found one top U.S. ally, for instance, did not
regularly include border officials in its National security
policymaking process, despite serious counterterrorism threats
at the country's borders.
E.U. security officials also expressed concern to the Task
Force that continent's intelligence and security services are
not always exchanging information with one another. In the 26-
country Schengen Area, for example, Country X might share its
foreign fighter names with Country Y but not with neighboring
Country Z. This creates a security gap since an individual can
travel freely anywhere inside the area. E.U.-wide watchlists
were supposed to solve this problem, but officials say member
states have been reluctant to place all of their suspects in
those databases.
In short, information about foreign fighters is crossing
borders less quickly than the extremists themselves. Turkey is
an illustrative example. Despite the fact that it is the main
transit point into Syria for Westerners, several European
countries were still hesitant to share their watch lists of
suspected foreign fighters with Turkey, whether for privacy,
security, or political reasons. The result is that the Turkish
government says it is unable to identify and stop many
individuals who might be headed to or from the conflict zone.
U.S. officials have reportedly begun to urge their
counterparts in Europe to share all the data they can with
Turkish authorities. Some progress has been made. In 2011,
Turkey's ``no-entry'' watch list only had 280 names; as of
July, it contained more than 14,000 names from 94 countries,
thanks in large part to information provided by foreign
intelligence and security agencies.\216\ But with the number of
known foreign fighters getting close to 30,000, Turkey is
clearly still missing a substantial number of names, some of
which foreign partners likely possess but may not have shared.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\ Task Force staff meeting with Turkish officials, July 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As far as transatlantic information sharing goes, we
believe counterterrorism exchanges between the United States
and Europe have improved considerably in recent years, but some
of our partners are still not living up to their obligations,
as detailed in Key Finding 8.
TRAVELER SCREENING
We are deeply concerned our European allies are not
conducting sufficient counterterrorism checks at their borders
and airports. Many countries have failed to implement
comprehensive watchlisting and screening procedures or do not
conduct suspicious traveler ``targeting'' to find previously
unidentified extremists based on travel patterns and other
data. These tools are critical tripwires needed to prevent the
cross-border movement of violent extremists.
Most alarming is the failure of European states to screen
their own citizens against terrorist watch lists when they
travel. E.U. rules forbids blanket screening of citizens,
meaning most Europeans are not checked for terror ties when
they fly into and out of the continent.\217\ Border guards are
permitted to vet specific individuals who seem suspicious
against counterterrorism databases, but only on a ``non-
systematic'' bases.\218\ With so many Europeans traveling to
fight in Syria, we believe this is a dangerous weakness, which
could allow extremists to easily make it back home without
being flagged.\219\ By comparison, anyone traveling to and from
the United States, including U.S. citizens, are screened
against counterterrorism databases at multiple points in the
journey, from ticket purchase to takeoff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\217\ Dave Keating, ``EU Leaders to Call for Revision of Schengen
Border Code,'' Politico, February 12, 2015, http://www.politico.eu/
article/eu-leaders-to-call-for-revision-of-schengen-border-code/.
Fortunately, this is not true for non-E.U. persons, who are typically
screened against terrorist and criminal databases when they enter and
exit the European Union.
\218\ Ibid.
\219\ European leaders are aware of this security gap and have put
forward measures to do more checks ``on the basis of a risk
assessment,'' e.g. on individuals traveling from higher-risk locations.
The Task Force believes such half-measures are woefully inadequate and
that all E.U. nationals should be screened against terrorism watch
lists when traveling to and from the continent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are also concerned even more basic screening measures,
such as full passport checks, are not happening at European
airports and external border crossing. Border guards reportedly
screen only 30 percent of E.U. passports for fraud when
citizens depart from or return to the Schengen Area.\220\ Most
of the time they simply do a quick visual inspections before
waiving E.U. citizens past the checkpoint.\221\ This lax
security practice is an open invitation to fraud and a glaring
security loophole which makes it easier for extremists to sneak
into the West on false documents.\222\ European leaders pledged
at the beginning of this year to do more, but a May report
indicated there was no agreement between countries on doing
systematic checks on traveler documents; indeed, only one
country was doing so.\223\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\220\ Adrian Croft and Barbara Lewis, ``EU Leaders Urge Stricter
Border Checks in Counter-terror Drive,'' Reuters UK, February 12, 2015,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/02/12/uk-eu-security-leaders-
idUKKBN0LG01H20150212.
\221\ As a result, the bulk of European passports do not get
checked against INTERPOL's global Stolen and Lost Travel Document
Database, a process which happens for anyone entering or exiting the
United States.
\222\ E.U. officials are reportedly beginning to require more
thorough inspections of E.U. passports in light of security concerns,
but knowledgeable observers have reported to the Task Force that such
changes do not appear to have widely taken effect.
\223\ Foreign Terrorist Fighters--Application of the Schengen
Border Code--Follow-up--Update on Progress on the Preparation of Risk
Indicators, report (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2015),
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/may/eu-council-ff-sbc-risk-
indicators-8741-15.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
European authorities have also failed to develop a system
for collecting data on air passengers flying into and out of
the continent. The combination of airplane manifests and
booking information-known as Passenger Name Record (PNR)
data\224\--would allow border officers to spot suspicious
individuals before they arrive at the airport. U.S. authorities
say such tools have been essential for helping them identify
previously unknown terrorist suspects and for deciding in a
risk-based manner which travelers to send to secondary
screening before they even land.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\224\ Advance Passenger Information (API) data typically includes a
passenger's flight information as well as information received by a
passenger at the time of check-in on government-issued travel
documents, including name and date of birth. Passenger Name Record
(PNR) data is more detailed and is received by authorities earlier; it
includes the information customers provide to airlines when they buy
their tickets, including booking and payment details. This information
is then used by law enforcement to screen passengers and assign risk
profiles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The European Union is currently considering a PNR system
which, like the United States, would require airlines to share
data on passengers entering or exiting the European Union for
counterterrorism purposes. However, the Task Force is worried
such a system will not be approved and fully implemented for
years because of the European Union's slow bureaucratic
movement on the issue.\225\ Currently a handful of E.U. states
have developed their own ``pilot'' PNR systems, but a patchwork
of different national systems is a weak substitute for a
regional system. Without an E.U.-wide capability, more violent
extremists will slip through the cracks. This, in turn, affects
America's security as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\225\ As of this writing, E.U. leaders are still in negotiations
over an E.U.-wide PNR system. The issue has been debated within the
European Parliament since 2011 but has been held up by member states
over data privacy concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The lack of a PNR system is not just a European problem. In
fact, most countries not only lack PNR systems but do not
collect even more basic Advanced Passenger Information (API).
While PNR data is more detailed and can be received by
authorities when a ticket is purchased, API data is what a
passenger submits at check-in, including name, date of birth,
and basic flight information. According to a U.N. report, only
one-fourth of countries in the world collect and screen API
data before flights in order to identify threats, a serious
global gap in efforts to stem terrorist travel.\226\ And only
12 of the United Nations' 193 member states have API systems
which can do passenger risk assessments in near-real-time to
alert border authorities to terror suspects and potential
foreign fighters who may be headed their way.\227\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\226\ ``UN Urges Greater Use of Advance Passenger Information to
Stem Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters,'' U.N. News Center, June 11,
2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51128#.VdPQTbJVikp.
\227\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Turkey, which is not a member of the European Union, has
grappled with many of the same issues. We are pleased to see
Turkish authorities have begun to toughen watchlist screening,
including adding thousands of names to its no-entry list in
recent months and placing ``Risk Analysis Units'' (RAUs) at
airports and bus stations to detect suspicious travelers.
Turkey says these efforts have helped it deport more than 1,300
suspects since the Syrian civil war began, including
individuals who have tried multiple times to enter Turkey on
the way to join ISIS.
The Task Force is concerned however that other countries
may not always be notified by Turkish police when one of their
own citizens is turned away at the Turkish border for
counterterrorism reasons. Notification is important, as it tips
off authorities from the origin country to investigate
suspicious individuals once they return. Moreover, even though
the RAUs are a step in the right direction, some have
questioned whether they are analytically rigorous and whether
the officers doing the manual targeting have the tools to
conduct effective, risk-based searches of passengers.
We are also concerned that Turkey may not be
comprehensively screening all outbound air passengers against
national and international terrorist databases and watch lists,
as well as travelers at locations like seaports and land border
crossings which extremists leaving Syria are increasingly using
to avoid scrutiny. Additionally, Turkey still has not
implemented its own API/PNR systems. Such capabilities are
urgently needed to spot arriving and departing foreign
fighters, especially since Turkey is the main transit country
to the ISIS safe haven. Officials say they are working on one,
but the time line for implementation is unclear. Despite these
areas for improvement, Turkey has come a long way in the past
year and is clearly taking steps to tighten security.
COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS AND PROSECUTIONS
We found a number of foreign partners have been slow to
update their counterterrorism laws to keep pace with the
threat, including several key countries in Europe. Turkey is
the most concerning example. Turkish law does not criminalize
participation in international terrorism; instead it focuses
more narrowly on defining terrorism as a crime against the
Turkish state or its people.\228\ The State Department believes
this ``can be an impediment to operational and legal
cooperation against global terrorist network,'' and with
thousands of foreign fighters transiting Turkey's territory,
the Task Force believes it is indeed an impediment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\228\ ``Country Reports: Europe Overview,'' U.S. Department of
State, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legal inconsistencies on the continent are a systemic
problem. Countries like France have made it a crime to join a
terrorist group abroad. In contrast, some Nordic countries have
not made the law as clear and, therefore, lack the legal tools
to prosecute citizens for attempting to become foreign
fighters.\229\ Sweden, for example, can prosecute individuals
for preparing to commit acts of terrorism but does not
criminalize the act of training with terrorists or waging war
on behalf of a terrorist group.\230\ European officials signed
a pact in May to synchronize their counterterrorism laws in
light of the foreign fighter threat, but it is unclear whether
states will treat the move as merely symbolic or act on it
decisively.\231\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\229\ John Thor Dahleburg, ``European Nations Unify Laws to Prevent
Foreign Fighters,'' Yahoo News, May 19, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/
european-nations-streamline-laws-prevent-foreign-fighters-
135730408.html.
\230\ However, the Swedish government has pledged to tighten its
laws in the coming months to close gaps. See: Simon Johnson and Dominic
Evans, ``Sweden to Tighten Anti-terrorism Laws,'' Reuters UK, August
28, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/08/28/uk-sweden-security-
idUKKCN0QX0QP20150828.
\231\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some countries in the international community have made
legislative improvements since the passage of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 2178, which urged all U.N. member states to
combat foreign fighter travel. Nearly two dozen have updated
their laws to better prosecute aspiring and returning foreign
fighters, and others are working to do the same.\232\ In
Europe, Bulgaria is a noteworthy case. The State Department
warned last year that Bulgaria ``lack[ed] a comprehensive
counterterrorism legal framework,'' but this year the country
put forward major terror-related legislation, citing Resolution
2178.\233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\232\ Task Force briefing with State Department, July 2015.
\233\ Alexandra Farone, ``Bulgaria Justice Ministry Proposes
Criminal Code Changes to Fight Terrorism,'' JURIST, March 10, 2015,
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2015/03/bulgaria-justice-ministry-
proposes-criminal-code-changes-to-fight-terrorism.php.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even with counterterrorism laws on the books, governments
have struggled to prosecute extremists, especially when their
lawyers have limited experience with terrorism crimes. DOJ has
worked to deploy legal experts to some of these countries, such
as in the Balkans, where states are less equipped to prosecute
such cases.\234\ However, in other places the problem is making
litigation ``stick'' on appeal. In Sweden for instance, several
counterterrorism cases were thrown out last year when judges
found the evidence was insufficient to prove suspects would
have carried out their plots had they not been
intercepted.\235\ This is a recurring theme in parts of Europe
where judges are less accustomed to hearing terrorism cases or
where vague laws make it difficult to prosecute them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\234\ DOJ, Attorney General Holder Urges International Effort to
Confront Threat of Syrian Foreign Fighters.
\235\ ``Country Reports: Europe Overview,'' U.S. Department of
State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BORDER SECURITY
We are also worried a weak European border security posture
is increasing the risk of extremists infiltrating the West
undetected. The continent faces an unprecedented immigration
crisis. In fact, Europe is on track to see nearly double the
number of illegal migrants this year than it did in 2014. By
year's end, the United Nations estimates more than 400,000 will
have arrived.\236\ Most are fleeing the conflict in Syria or
instability in North Africa, and they are slipping across land
borders or transiting the Mediterranean by boat to reach
European border states like Greece or Italy. Once in mainland
Europe--and inside the Schengen Area--these refugees can travel
freely to the country of their choice to seek asylum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\236\ Mark Rivett-Carnac, ``U.N.: 850,000 Refugees Are Expected to
Reach Europe During 2015 and 2016,'' Time, September 9, 2015, http://
time.com/4026046/refugees-migrants-europe-united-nations-crisis-greece-
germany/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISIS has boasted for months that it is using migrant boats
as a Trojan Horse to plant operatives into the West,\237\ and
the European Union's border control agency, Frontex, warned
this year it was possible extremists were doing so.\238\ Not
long ago a top E.U. official confirmed there was information
suggesting militants had successfully been smuggled in on these
illegal routes.\239\ Terrorist exploitation of refugee pathways
is not a hypothetical. In May of this year, Italian police
arrested a Moroccan man for helping organize the ISIS-linked
terrorist attack on Tunisia's Bardo Museum, which resulted in
the deaths of more than a dozen Western tourists. The man is
believed to have arrived in Italy on a smuggler's boat.\240\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\237\ Jack Crone, ``ISIS Plotting Trojan Horse Campaign by
Smuggling Militants into Western Europe Disguised as Refugees ,'' Mail
Online, October 06, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2782625/ISIS-plotting-Trojan-Horse-campaign-smuggling-militants-
western-Europe-disguised-refugees.html.
\238\ ``Islamic State Militants `smuggled to Europe'--BBC News,''
BBC News, May 17, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32770390.
\239\ John Thor Dahleburg, ``EU Official: Migrant Boats Also
Carrying IS Fighters,'' The Big Story, July 6, 2015, http://
bigstory.ap.org/article/29599fc513b8443085e63c60fbf11c3c/eu-official-
terrorists-could-cross-mediterranean-europe.
\240\ The Associated Press, ``Tunisia Museum Terror Attack Suspect
Arrested in Italy,'' NY Daily News, May 20, 2015, http://
www.nydailynews.com/news/world/tunisia-museum-terror-attack-suspect-
arrested-italy-article-1.2229062.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, the European countries where migrants land
are not inclined to thoroughly vet them. Under European law,
refugees must stay in the country where they arrive and are
registered. Yet many Mediterranean states are already
overburdened by large migrant populations drawing on social
services and do not want the new arrivals to stay. As a result,
border states have an incentive to ``look the other way'' and
let unregistered migrants make their way into the rest of the
continent to become another country's problem.
``Nobody checked us upon reaching Italy,'' one Syrian
migrant named Muhammad reported. ``No coast guard, no policeman
ever asked if we had papers. Nobody registered us, nobody took
a photo of us, nobody took our fingerprints, no one asked us
who we were.''\241\ The Task Force was disturbed to find such
cases were all-too-common--even the norm--in European border
states overwhelmed by refugee arrivals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\241\ Harald Doornbos and Jenan Moussa, ``Italy Opens the Door to
Disaster,'' Foreign Policy, April 13, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/
2015/04/13/italy-islamic-state-syria-refugees/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some refugees are screened against counterterrorism
databases, but the Task Force was told the majority of arrivals
are not. Extremists who blend in with these asylum-seekers and
make their way onto the continent could easily obtain European
passports within a few short years and have visa-free access to
the United States. While the scenario is not the likeliest
route for terrorist travel, it is certainly possible,
especially since terrorist groups have vowed to exploit
weaknesses in refugee routes.
The refugee quoted above, Muhammed, is now settled in
Germany but warns that others could follow his same path to
commit acts of terror. ``Any ISIS terrorist could have entered
Italy and traveled further into Europe without any problem,''
he explained. ``ISIS members can take their guns and hand
grenades with them, because the Italians even never checked any
of the luggage.''\242\ Italian authorities have taken steps to
mitigate the danger of terrorist exploitation at their borders,
but the system for screening new arrivals is still nowhere near
secure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\242\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Governments throughout the region have criticized
Mediterranean countries for not showing leadership to tackle
the migrant crisis. But Mediterranean states are quick to note
they are overwhelmed by the influx of refugees and need more
assistance from the rest of Europe, arguing border security
should be a shared burden and not just the job of those at the
continent's frontiers. Whatever the case, Europe's halting
response to the crisis at its borders is a golden opportunity
for terrorists and a ticking time-bomb for the West.
------
As noted above, the Task Force focused primarily on
security weaknesses in Europe because of the routes American
foreign fighters have taken to the conflict zone in Syria and
Iraq, as well as how easy it is for potential European
extremists to travel to the United States on their passports.
We do not mean to suggest our European partners are failing to
confront terrorism and the foreign fighter threat overall, but
rather that foundational problems remain and must be addressed
with greater urgency. Many countries face steeper challenges
when it comes to combating terrorist travel, especially in
North Africa and the Middle East. More must be done globally to
shine a light on these security deficiencies and collaborate to
reconcile them.
Recommendation.--The State Department and DHS, in
consultation with the intelligence community, should
produce a regular report card highlighting the progress
of foreign partners in fulfilling their obligations
under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178 on foreign
fighters and underscore areas where partners need
improvement. Such reports should be provided to
Congress in Classified and Unclassified form, with the
latter being made public. Moreover, they should assess
the progress of foreign partners in areas including,
but not limited to, intelligence collection,
information sharing, traveler screening, legal
frameworks, and border security; where possible, these
assessments should also incorporate any similar
insights on foreign partner capacity released by the
U.N.'s Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force
Office.
Recommendation.--The administration must continue
pressing foreign partners, especially in Europe, to end
the patchwork approach to information sharing by
including more terrorist and foreign fighter names in
regional and international terrorist watch lists--
rather than conducting exchanges on a selective,
bilateral basis. We understand there are sometimes
sensitivities to such sharing, but to the furthest
extent possible these partners must move toward
universal situational awareness to combat the growing
and dynamic terrorist threat. Additionally, the
administration should continue its efforts to make sure
foreign governments are sharing appropriate information
with Turkish authorities, who are on the front lines of
the foreign fighter migration.
Recommendation.--The United States must increase
pressure on European partners to begin universally and
systematically screening E.U.-citizen travelers against
terrorist watch lists. Moreover, officials should
encourage states outside of the European Union,
especially Turkey, to screen both inbound and outbound
travelers against national and international
counterterrorism databases to detect possible foreign
fighters--at airports, land border crossings, and sea
ports.
Recommendation.--The European Union must quickly
approve and implement a regional air passenger
targeting system to collect and analyze Passenger Name
Record data for counterterrorism purposes. The United
States should continue to encourage the European Union
to move in this direction and, in the meantime, should
consider how to provide expanded assistance to E.U.
countries looking to develop their own individual PNR
systems, which are a crucial tool for counterterrorism
investigations and uncovering previously unidentified
extremists. DHS and State Department should also
explore tying VWP participation to a country's ability
to conduct PNR vetting.
Recommendation.--U.S. authorities should engage in a
high-level dialogue with the U.N., E.U., and relevant
non-E.U. countries on establishing a better systematic
process for vetting refugees fleeing North Africa and
the conflict in Syria. Regional authorities must be
able to ensure the biographic and biometric information
of migrants is screened against counterterrorism
databases to weed out potential extremists attempting
to infiltrate the West.
Recommendation.--DHS and the State Department should
explore accelerated expansion of their off-the-shelf
interdiction capabilities to high-risk countries. Both
departments currently offer ready-made hardware and
software to help foreign partners conduct watchlisting,
screening, and targeting of terrorists and foreign
fighters, including the State Department's Personal
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System
(PISCES) and CBP's Automated Targeting System Global
(ATS-G). The provision of these tools should be better
coordinated between the two departments, and in the
long run such assistance should be provided consistent
with priorities established under the Foreign Partner
Engagement Plan, a tool the Task Force calls for under
Key Finding 32.
Recommendation.--For countries unwilling to accept
U.S. border screening tools and assistance, DHS and the
State Department should consider releasing ``open-
source'' software based on their watchlisting,
screening, and targeting tools. This software could be
provided to a neutral organization like INTERPOL for
distribution and would offer a more limited set of the
capabilities than the technology provided directly by
the U.S. Government. Even with fewer capabilities, an
open-source platform would give countries a powerful
starting point for developing and deploying their own
terrorist interdiction systems at border checkpoints.
The administration should provide Congress with details
on how it would implement such a program.
Key Finding 30.--Extremists are using fraudulent passports
to travel discretely. However, a third of the international
community--including major source countries of foreign
fighters--still do not issue fraud-resistant ``e-passports,''
and most countries are still unable to validate the
authenticity of ``e-passports.''
It is no secret why passport security is critical in the
fight against terrorist travel. ``For terrorists, travel
documents are as important as weapons,'' the 9/11 Commission
noted in its final report.\243\ Unsurprisingly, a number of
recent foreign fighter suspects have been found using altered
passports, fake passports, and even travel documents belonging
to siblings in order to sneak into Syria or travel home.\244\
Some are even faking their deaths on the battlefield to avoid
scrutiny,\245\ increasing concerns that fighters might try to
come home with a different identity. Responding to concerns,
the United Nations reminded member states last fall that
preventing the forgery of identity papers was a key aspect of
preventing ``the movement of terrorists.''\246\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\243\ The 9/11 Commission Report, http://www.9-11commission.gov/
report/911Report.pdf.
\244\ For instance, see: Tom Rayner, ``Foreign IS Recruits Using
Fake Syrian Passports,'' Sky News, February 25, 2015, http://
news.sky.com/story/1433658/foreign-is-recruits-using-fake-syrian-
passports.
\245\ Dipesh Gadher and Richard Kerbaj, ``Islamic Militants Faking
Deaths to Get Home, Say Security Sources,'' The Australian, June 22,
2014, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/islamic-militants-
faking-deaths-to-get-home-say-security-sources/story-fnb64oi6-12269-
62867588.
\246\ U.N. Department of Public Information, ``Security Council
Unanimously Adopts Resolution Condemning Violent Extremism.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fraud-resistant ``e-passports'' are a useful
counterterrorism tool, and adoption of them has grown world-
wide in recent years, according to the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO). These documents are considered
more secure because they incorporate a passenger's biometric
information, typically via smart card containing the
passenger's face, fingerprint, or iris scan data. However,
having an e-passport is not enough; the country reading it must
be able to confirm it is authentic, too, which is done through
ICAO's ``public key directory'' program. This allows
authorities to validate, for instance, that a traveler's
fingerprint matches the traveler's passport.
The Task Force was disappointed to find many countries
around the world still do not issue e-passports, including key
source countries for foreign fighters. In fact, at least 70
governments--or one-third of the international community--do
not issue their citizens e-passports.\247\ Tunisia is one of
the laggards, which is disturbing considering it is the top
source country for foreign fighters headed to Syria and
Iraq.\248\ Without a secure passport requirement, it is easier
for Tunisian jihadists to fake their identities, disguise their
travel to the conflict zone, or more easily pose as refugees
when trying to enter the West. Other countries of concern which
lack e-passports include Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and more.\249\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\247\ Passport Control Mechanisms: The Most Significant Challenges,
publication, 1st ed., vol. 10 (International Civil Aviation
Organization), http://www.icao.int/publications/journalsreports/2014/
MRTD_Report_Vol10_No1.pdf.
\248\ Tom Shiel, ``Islamic State: Where Do Its Fighters Come
From?,'' The Telegraph, June 8, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/islamic-state/11660487/Islamic-State-one-year-on-Where-do-
its-fighters-come-from.html.
\249\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Perhaps more worrisome is the fact that the majority of
governments in the world cannot definitively read and
authenticate e-passports. This is good news for terrorists and
foreign fighters traveling on fraudulent documents. Fewer than
25 percent of countries participate in the ICAO system that
allows authorities to confirm an e-passport belongs to its
holder. Running the document through the system also confirms
it was issued by a legitimate authority, has not been altered,
and has not been flagged in the lost or stolen passport
system.\250\ But key transit countries for Western foreign
fighters--including Turkey, Greece, and most of the Balkans
states--are not part of the ICAO's program and therefore do not
have a reliable system to spot falsified e-passports.\251\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\250\ Ibid.
\251\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation.--DHS should consider requiring all
VWP countries to develop the means to validate fraud-
resistant e-passports at their borders and airports.
This includes participation in ICAO's ``public key
directory program'' which helps border officers confirm
a passport belongs to the person holding it. VWP
countries will soon be required to issue their citizens
e-passports if they are headed to the United States,
but that does not mean those countries can actually
authenticate such documents at their own border
checkpoints. Requiring our partners to do so would make
it harder for terrorists and foreign fighters to use
fake documents to cross borders--and could keep them
further from our own.
Recommendation.--DHS, in conjunction with the State
Department, should identify other points of leverage to
require or encourage non-VWP countries to issue e-
passports and to develop the means to read them at
their borders and airports, including providing
expanded technical assistance to foreign partners to do
so.
Key Finding 31.--Many countries do not consistently add
information to INTERPOL's databases, and the majority do not
screen against INTERPOL databases in real-time at their borders
and airports. This is a clear gap in global defenses against
terrorist and foreign fighter travel.
In December 2014, American medical student Sam Neher
traveled to Turkey as a tourist and, while on vacation in
Istanbul, his passport was stolen. Neher visited the U.S.
Consulate, reported the incident, and received a temporary ID,
according to a news report.\252\ Little did he know, his
passport made its way into a secretive trade in fraudulent
documents that is thriving in Turkey and Syria. American and
European passports are in high demand because travelers holding
them can access many countries without a visa. According to the
report, Neher's passport wound up in the hands of ISIS in
Syria, a potential tool for the group to send a jihadist
abroad.\253\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\252\ Mike Giglio and Munzer Al-Awad, ``How An American Tourist
Lost His Passport In Istanbul And Was Sucked Into Syria's War,''
BuzzFeed, May 28, 2015, http://www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/stolen-
passports-and-isis-fighters#.qox7z1Myy.
\253\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stolen passports like Neher's are supposed to be reported
to INTERPOL, which maintains a Stolen and Lost Travel Document
Database used to keep terrorists and criminals from traveling
on stolen IDs. But the Task Force found the system is deeply
fragmented. Many governments are inconsistent in reporting
their citizens' missing passports to INTERPOL. Even when they
do, other countries must screen against the database to see
whether a traveler is using the document illegally. Sadly, the
majority of countries in the international community have not
connected INTERPOL systems to their border posts for agents to
screen against them in real-time.\254\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\254\ Task Force staff site visit to INTERPOL Washington, June 30,
2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
INTERPOL is a voluntary international police organization
made up of 190 participating countries, each of which has its
own locally-run office connected to INTERPOL systems, known as
a National Central Bureau (NCB). Like most countries, America's
NCB is based in the Nation's capital and is run by DHS and DOJ,
which manage U.S. access to the organization's extensive
criminal and terrorism databases, as well as its lost and
stolen passport database.
INTERPOL officials have been pushing member countries for
years to use its systems out in the field, especially at border
checkpoints.\255\ The United States began doing so in the mid-
2000s by screening inbound passengers against the police
organization's data. The screening was so useful that U.S.
authorities extended it Nation-wide and began using it to
screen outbound passenger, visa applicants, and more. The
United States now screens more than 400 million people against
INTERPOL's databases annually and gets 35,000 ``hits'' on the
system, helping law enforcement catch wanted criminals and spot
fake passports.\256\ The organization's data has also helped
U.S. law enforcement identify hundreds of previously-unknown
terrorist suspects and foreign fighters, which have been added
to watch lists to ensure they do not enter the United
States.\257\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\255\ In 2012, INTERPOL's chief blasted countries for failing to
use the system. See: Associated Press, ``Interpol Chief: Countries Not
Using Databases,'' Fox News, January 19, 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/
world/2012/01/19/interpol-chief-countries-not-using-databases/.
\256\ Task Force briefing with INTERPOL Washington, June 4, 2015.
\257\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But far too few countries are using these systems at the
border. In fact, INTERPOL officials have lamented that ``only a
handful of countries'' are checking its lost and stolen
passport database before passengers board flights.\258\ By some
estimates, fewer than 25 percent of INTERPOL members have set
up real-time access to its datasets beyond their NCBs.\259\ The
reasons are varied. Some governments lack the resources to
establish connectivity with disparate border posts. Others are
held back by internal policy challenges, where the law
enforcement agencies with access to INTERPOL do not provide it
to the country's immigration agencies. But the result is the
same: Lackluster use of the system allows more criminals and
extremists to travel the world under the radar.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\258\ Elisha Fieldstadt and Becky Bratu, ``Missing Passport
Databases Not Routinely Checked: Interpol--NBC News,'' NBC News, March
14, 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/missing-jet/missing-
passport-databases-not-routinely-checked-interpol-n48261.
\259\ Task Force briefing with INTERPOL Washington, June 4, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
INTERPOL member states are also not consistent in
submitting information to the organization's databases. While
the United States adds stolen passport numbers in near-real-
time to INTERPOL's records, some governments wait days or weeks
before uploading a new batch of lost passport numbers, a window
which could allow terrorists and smugglers to cross borders
with fraudulent IDs. Even some close U.S. allies with
sophisticated security screening have had lapses in their
reporting to the system.\260\ But when reports are made in a
timely manner, it can make all the difference. One of the
suspects arrested in connection with a terrorist attack this
year on tourists in Tunisia was detained in Italy in part
because his mother reported her son's passport missing
immediately after the attack.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\260\ The Task Force heard these concerns from multiple officials
while examining security screening measures in Europe.
\261\ Associated Press, ``Man Arrested in Tunisia Museum Attack
Came to Italy on Migrant Boat,'' Fox News, May 20, 2015, http://
www.foxnews.com/world/2015/05/20/italian-police-make-arrest-in-
connection-with-tunisia-museum-attack/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is especially important for countries close to terrorist
safe havens to use INTERPOL's databases. The Task Force found a
number of countries along foreign fighter routes to and from
the conflict zone have actually improved their use of the
system. Bulgaria, for instance, now screens against the
organization's databases at the borders, which has allowed it
to detect wanted foreign fighters attempting to cross into its
territory. Turkey, however, appears to be inconsistent in its
use of INTERPOL to screen travelers, an issue which the Task
Force hopes the Turkish government will address expeditiously.
Recommendation.--The U.S. Government should make it
a top diplomatic priority to ramp up foreign partner
use of INTERPOL systems, including the regular
provision of information to the organization's
databases, and as a screening mechanism at borders and
ports of entry, especially for counterterrorism
purposes. The State Department should regularly assess
foreign partner use of INTERPOL systems and share its
findings with INTERPOL Washington in order to identify
avenues for promoting and enhancing the utilization of
these systems.
Recommendation.--INTERPOL Washington should be
further empowered to deliver assistance to foreign
partners who are not fully utilizing the system,
whether independently or through a program established
out of INTERPOL's headquarters in France. Specifically,
INTERPOL Washington should focus on transferring its
knowledge, expertise, and systems to high-risk terror-
transit countries. The administration should submit a
proposal to Congress to enable INTERPOL Washington to
deliver this more robust capacity-building assistance
among select member countries, as identified in
consultation with interagency partners and with respect
to a Government-wide Foreign Partner Engagement Plan
(see the recommendation under Key Finding 32).
Recommendation.--DHS should require VWP countries to
screen travelers crossing their borders against all
INTERPOL systems, including the Lost and Stolen
Passport Database and notices of wanted individuals,
including terrorist and foreign fighter suspects.\262\
A number of VWP countries--whose citizens can travel
easily to our country--do not use these tools in real-
time at their borders or airports, a security loophole
which makes it easier for extremists to travel and
increases the chances they could get to the United
States undetected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\262\ The Department recently announced plans to begin requiring
VWP countries to screen against INTERPOL's Stolen and Lost Travel
Document Database. See: ``Statement by Secretary Jeh C. Johnson on
Intention to Implement Security Enhancements to the Visa Waiver
Program,'' news release, August 6, 2015, The Department of Homeland
Security, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/08/06/statement-secretary-jeh-c-
johnson-intention-implement-security-enhancements-visa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation.--In conjunction with the State
Department, DHS and DOJ should identify other forms of
assistance which might be leveraged to require non-VWP
countries to use INTERPOL more comprehensively.
Key Finding 32.--U.S. departments and agencies have spent
billions of dollars to help foreign partners improve their
terror-travel defenses, but there is no strategy to make sure
assistance is coordinated and goes to the highest-risk
countries. The lack of a Government-wide engagement plan
results in greater risk of overlap, waste, and duplication
between programs.
In the years since 9/11, the United States has spent
considerable time and money to help our allies build the
capacity to stop terrorist travel. We have done this by sharing
our expertise and best practices. In some cases we have
provided travel screening equipment and systems directly to our
partners. These efforts have been designed to push our defenses
outward and to stop threats earlier.
Multiple U.S. departments and agencies work with foreign
partners on these issues. The State Department, for instance,
runs the Terrorist Interdiction Program which provides border
control hardware and software--including watchlisting tools--to
other countries. Around 200 border checkpoints around the world
are now tied to the program, which has helped successfully
catch terrorists trying to cross borders.\263\ DHS's Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) provides a similar tool to foreign
partners called Automated Targeting System--Global (ATS-G),
which can be used to conduct passenger risk assessments in
advance of arriving flights to weed out terrorist suspects and
foreign fighters. Agencies also provide their expertise. For
example, DOJ's Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance
and Training (OPDAT) program assists prosecutors and judicial
personnel in foreign countries with strengthening
counterterrorism laws and prosecuting violent extremists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\263\ ``Programs and Initiatives,'' U.S. Department of State,
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#TSI.; ``Terrorist
Interdiction Program (TIP),'' U.S. Department of State, http://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/12676.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Task Force found however that the proliferation of
assistance programs has increased the potential for overlap,
waste, and duplication among agencies. GAO highlighted similar
concerns in 2011. For example, they discovered that seven
different offices or components across the Federal Government
were providing training to foreign officials on how to
recognize fraudulent travel documents.\264\ In one instance,
two U.S. Government agencies in Pakistan even scheduled fraud-
detection training sessions in the same month without knowing
it. One had ample funding but no Pakistani officials had
enrolled in the class; the other had a full student roster but
lacked necessary funding.\265\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\264\ ``Combating Terrorism: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance
Foreign Partners' Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Travel,'' U.S.
Government Accountability Office, June 30, 2011, http://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-11-637.
\265\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are concerned departments and agencies are still not
adequately coordinating their efforts. For instance, the Task
Force spoke to two separate agencies providing counterterrorism
screening systems to foreign partners, yet neither could
readily identify the countries in which the other operated. We
were also unable to find overarching strategic guidance for
coordinating U.S. assistance to combat terrorist travel. One
agency claimed to be using a risk-based priority list, ranking
countries that needed assistance the most because of security
gaps. But those efforts were only begun recently and officials
declined to provide supporting data. More than other types of
aid, the lack of a high-level strategy for terrorist
interdiction assistance is concerning given the urgency of the
problem.
Recommendation.--The administration should produce
an annual Foreign Partner Engagement Plan as part of a
National Strategy to Combat Terror Travel (see Key
Finding 1, where the Task Force calls for the
Strategy). The Plan should be coordinated with all
relevant agencies and must prioritize engagement and
assistance based on--among other criteria--foreign
partner intelligence capabilities, information-sharing,
travel screening, border security, counterterrorism
laws, prosecutorial capacity, and related areas. As
part of the development of the Plan, agencies should
conduct an audit of current initiatives and spending on
terrorist-travel related assistance to foreign partners
to identify areas for adjustment to align with risk-
based priorities. Moreover, the Plan should be provided
in conjunction with the President's Budget submission
to Congress to ensure priorities are aligned with
resource requests.
APPENDIX I: TASK FORCE ACTIVITY
This list includes activities conducted by Members and/or
staff of the Task Force; however, the listing is partial and
does not include all activities, meetings, and other
consultations conducted during the course of the Task Force's
review.
Official Member Briefings
Terrorist Watchlisting and Foreign Fighters (March 2015)
Briefers: National Counterterrorism Center
Foreign Partner Information Sharing and Watchlist Enhancements
(April 2015)
Briefers: Federal Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Screening
Center
Interagency Programs to Counter Domestic Radicalization (April
2015)
Briefers: Department of Homeland Security, Department of
Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National
Counterterrorism Center
Site Visit: National Counterterrorism Center (April 2015)
Briefers: National Counterterrorism Center
Site Visit: Washington Regional Threat Analysis Center (April
2015)
Briefers: Center leadership and State and local law enforcement
Counter-Messaging Terrorist Propaganda (May 2015)
Briefers: Department of State
INTERPOL Efforts to Counter Terrorist and Foreign Fighter
Travel (June 2015)
Briefers: INTERPOL Washington
Preventing Terrorist Exploitation of Visa-Free Travel Routes to
America (June 2015)
Briefers: Department of Homeland Security, Department of State
On-line Counterterrorism Operations (June 2015)\266\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\266\ This briefing was hosted by the Full Committee, rather than
the Task Force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Briefers: Federal Bureau of Investigation
Extremists' Use of ``Dark Space'' (June 2014)\267\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\267\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Briefers: Federal Bureau of Investigation
Immigration Screening and Passport Revocations to Stop
Terrorist Travel (June 2015)
Briefers: Department of Homeland Security, Department of State
Intelligence Information Sharing (June 2015)
Briefers: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Site Visit: Joint Terrorism Task Force--Washington (June 2015)
Briefers: Federal Bureau of Investigation
Homeland Security Advisory Council: Interim Report on Foreign
Fighters (July 2015)
Briefers: Homeland Security Advisory Council
Overseas U.S. Diplomatic Efforts to Obstruct Foreign Fighter
Flows (July 2015)
Briefers: Department of State
Arrest and Prosecution of U.S. Foreign Fighter Suspects (July
2015)
Briefers: Department of Justice
Official Staff Briefings
Department of Defense (1)
Department of Homeland Security (6)
Department of Justice (2)
Department of State (2)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (5)
Government Accountability Office (7)
INTERPOL Washington (2)
National Counterterrorism Center (1)
Other Intelligence Community (3)
Official Member Travel
IRAQ
U.S. Embassy
Meeting with Prime Minister Abadi
Meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Zebari
Meeting with Speaker Jabouri
ISRAEL
U.S. Embassy
Meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu
Meeting with Defense Minister Yaalon
Meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Hanegbi
TURKEY
U.S. Embassy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Interior
Hollings Center for International Dialogue
Istanbul Airport Security Brief
GERMANY
U.S. Embassy
Ministry of Interior
Interior Committee, Bundestag
BELGIUM
U.S. Embassy and Mission to the European Union (European Union)
Meeting with Interior Minister Jambon
E.U. Counterterrorism Officials
NATO Headquarters
Transatlantic Policy Network
FRANCE
U.S. Embassy
French Counterterrorism Officials
INTERPOL
Official Staff Travel
GREECE
U.S. Embassy
Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection
Civil Aviation Authority
Hellenic Coast Guard
Hellenic Police
TURKEY
U.S. Embassy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO
Izmir Port Security
E.U. Counterterrorism Officials
Turkish National Police
ITALY
U.S. Embassy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Interior
Catania Refugee Processing Center
International Organization for Migration
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
Other Task Force Meetings and Consultations
Members and staff also met with State and local
representatives, former Government officials, think tanks,
academics, professional organizations, and other individuals
during the course of the review. Though they are not listed by
name, the Task Force is grateful for the valuable input it
received and the contributions of these individuals and
organizations.
APPENDIX II: AMERICAN FOREIGN FIGHTER ASPIRANTS AND RECRUITS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name Age \268\ Gender State
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abdella Ahmad Tounisi................ 21..................... M...................... IL
Abdi Nur............................. 20..................... M...................... MN
Abdifatah Aden....................... ....................... M...................... OH
Abdirahmaan Muhumed.................. 29..................... M...................... MN
Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud............. 23..................... M...................... OH
Abdirahman Yasin Daud................ 21..................... M...................... MN
Abdullah Ramo Pazara................. ....................... M...................... MO
Abdullahi Yusuf...................... 18..................... M...................... MN
Abdurasul Juraboev................... 23..................... M...................... NY
Adam Dandach......................... 20..................... M...................... CA
Adnan Abdihamid Farah................ 19..................... M...................... MN
Ahmad Abousamra...................... 32..................... M...................... MA
Akba Jihad Jordan.................... 22..................... M...................... NC
Akhror Saidakhmetov.................. 19..................... M...................... NY
Amir Farouq Ibrahim.................. 32..................... M...................... PA
Arafat Nagi.......................... 44..................... M...................... NY
Asher Abid Khan...................... 20..................... M...................... TX
Avin Marsalis Brown.................. 21..................... M...................... NC
Basit Javed.......................... 29..................... M...................... NC
Bilal Abood.......................... 37..................... M...................... TX
Colorado Teenager #1................. 15..................... F...................... CO
Colorado Teenager #2................. 15..................... F...................... CO
Colorado Teenager #3................. 17..................... F...................... CO
Donald Ray Morgan.................... 44..................... M...................... NC
Douglas McArthur McCain.............. 33..................... M...................... CA
Eric Harroun......................... 30..................... M...................... AZ
Guled Ali Omar....................... 20..................... M...................... MN
``H.M.''............................. ....................... M...................... MN
Hamza Naj Ahmed...................... 19..................... M...................... MN
Hanad Abdullahi Mohallim............. 18..................... M...................... MN
Hanad Mustafe Musse.................. 19..................... M...................... MN
Hasan Edmonds........................ 22..................... M...................... IL
Hoda................................. 20..................... F...................... AL
Jaelyn Delshaun Young................ 20..................... F...................... MS
Joshua Van Haften.................... 34..................... M...................... WI
Keonna Thomas........................ 30..................... F...................... PA
Leon Nathan Davis.................... 37..................... M...................... GA
Michael Wolfe........................ 23..................... M...................... TX
Mohamad Saeed Kodaimati.............. 24..................... M...................... CA
Mohamed Abdihamid Farah.............. 21..................... M...................... MN
Mohammad Hamzah Khan................. 19..................... M...................... IL
Mohamud Mohamed Mohamud.............. 20..................... M...................... MN
Moner Abu-Salha...................... 22..................... M...................... FL
Muhammad Oda Dakhlalla............... 22..................... M...................... MS
Muhanad Badawi....................... 24..................... M...................... CA
Nader Elhuzayel...................... 24..................... M...................... CA
Nader Saadeh......................... 20..................... M...................... NJ
Nicholas Teausant.................... 20..................... M...................... CA
Nicole Lynn Mansfield................ 33..................... F...................... MI
Nihad Rosic.......................... 26..................... M...................... NY
``S.R.G.''........................... ....................... M...................... TX
Samuel Rahamin Topaz................. 21..................... M...................... NJ
Shannon Maureen Conley............... 19..................... F...................... CO
Sinh Vinh Ngo Nguyen................. 24..................... M...................... CA
Tairod Nathan Webster Pugh........... 47..................... M...................... NJ
Yusra Ismail......................... 20..................... F...................... MN
Yusuf Jama........................... 21..................... M...................... MN
Zacharia Yusuf Abdurahman............ 19..................... M...................... MN
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\268\ This includes the age of the suspect at arrest, time of death, or other relevant incident. In some cases,
the exact age is an estimate based on publicly-available data.
APPENDIX III: ABBREVIATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abbreviation Definition
------------------------------------------------------------------------
API....................................... Advanced Passenger
Information
AQI....................................... al-Qaeda in Iraq
ATS-G..................................... U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's Automated
Targeting System Global
CBP....................................... U.S. Customs and Border
Protection
CSCC...................................... Center for Strategic
Counterterrorism
Communications
CTAB...................................... Department of Homeland
Security's Counterterrorism
Advisory Board
DHS....................................... Department of Homeland
Security
DNI....................................... Director of National
Intelligence
DOJ....................................... Department of Justice
ESTA...................................... Electronic System for Travel
Authorization
EU........................................ European Union
FBI....................................... Federal Bureau of
Investigation
FEMA...................................... Federal Emergency Management
Agency
GAO....................................... Government Accountability
Office
HSPD-6.................................... Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 6
ICAO...................................... International Civil Aviation
Organization
ICE....................................... Immigration and Customs
Enforcement
ISIS...................................... Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (also Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant)
INTERPOL.................................. International Criminal
Police Organization
JTTF...................................... Federal Bureau of
Investigation's Joint
Terrorism Task Force
NCB....................................... National Central Bureau
NCTC...................................... National Counterterrorism
Center
NGO....................................... Non-Governmental
Organization
OPDAT..................................... The Department of Justice's
Overseas Prosecutorial
Development Assistance and
Training
PATRIOT................................... Pre-Adjudicated Threat
Recognition and
Intelligence Operations
Team
PISCES.................................... Personal Identification
Secure Comparison and
Evaluation System
PNR....................................... Passenger Name Record
RAU....................................... Risk Analysis Unit
TSA....................................... Transportation Security
Administration
TSDB...................................... Terrorist Screening Database
UN........................................ United Nations
VSP....................................... Visa Security Program
VSU....................................... Visa Security Unit
VWP....................................... Visa Waiver Program
WORDE..................................... World Organization for
Resource Development and
Education
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