[House Prints, 115th Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] 115th Congress} { Print 2d Session } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { 115-15 ====================================================================== COMMITTEE PRINT ---------- COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS REFORM [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] December 19, 2018.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE 115th Congress} { Print 2d Session } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { 115-15 ====================================================================== COMMITTEE PRINT ---------- COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS REFORM [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] December 19, 2018.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE *33-612 WASHINGTON : 2019 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- C O N T E N T S Page Introduction..................................................... 3 Report of the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform................................................. 5 The Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform Bill Text............................................... 15 Votes of the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform................................................. 39 Appendix......................................................... 53 Hearings of the Joint Select Committee......................... 55 Introduction............................................... 61 April 17, 2018--Organizational Meeting Followed By Hearing on Opportunities to Significantly Improve the Federal Budget Process........................................... 65 May 9, 2018--Bipartisanship in Budgeting................... 139 May 24, 2018--The Budget Resolution-Content, Timeliness, and Enforcement.......................................... 207 June 27, 2018--Members' Day: How to Significantly Reform the Budget and Appropriations Process.................... 301 July 12, 2018--Opportunities to Improve the Appropriations Process.................................................. 479 Congressional Budget Office Briefing Materials Prepared for the Joint Select Committee....................................... 539 Congressional Research Service Briefing Materials Prepared for the Joint Select Committee................................... 547 H.R. 7191...................................................... 569 Press Release Accompanying the Introduction of H.R. 7191....... 591 115th Congress} { Print 2d Session } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { 115-15 ====================================================================== COMMITTEE PRINT _______ LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS REFORM _______ December 19, 2018.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed _______ INTRODUCTION ---------- Dear Colleague: In the Second Session of the 115th Congress, I was honored to Co-Chair the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform. As members of the U.S. House of Representatives, Article I entrusts in each of us the power of the purse. This is an awesome responsibility that I, and I know each of you, take very seriously. We owe it to the American people to have a process that works, and that was the goal of the Joint Select Committee--to produce recommendations to reform the federal budget and appropriations process. As you know, our Joint Select Committee produced a bipartisan, bicameral consensus package of reforms in advance of our statutory deadline of November 30, 2018. During our markup, amendments were subjected to a supermajority threshold to ensure those that passed reflected a true consensus of the panel. Some amendments passed unanimously. During the final debate on the bill, many members indicated that they had no objection to the package's underlying reforms. However, the bill and report developed over many months of hard work failed to secure the necessary supermajority of votes to pass under our Joint Select Committee's rules. Despite the unfortunate outcome of the Joint Select Committee's work, there is no refuting that the federal budget process is broken. It is vital that Congress continues these efforts to reform the budget and appropriations process this year, next year, and in the years beyond. I have assembled in this Budget Committee print all the relevant materials to this year's work. I urge all members to review this information. In this Committee print, you will find:The report of the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform; The Co-chair's mark, as amended, and voted on, by the Joint Select Committee; The votes of the Joint Select Committee; Hearing transcripts of the Joint Select Committee's five public hearings; Congressional Budget Office briefing materials prepared for the Joint Select Committee; Congressional Research Service briefing materials prepared for the Joint Select Committee; H.R. 7191--a bill introduced in the House by myself and Representative Yarmuth, a Joint Select Committee Member and Ranking Member of the House Budget Committee; and The press release to accompany the introduction of H.R. 7191. It is my sincere hope that this important work will continue in the 116th Congress on a bipartisan and bicameral basis. I believe Members of Congress, Executive Branch officials, outside budget experts and academics, as well as engaged citizens, will find this material useful for future reform efforts. I would like to thank the Members of the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform, our hardworking staffs, particularly Dan Keniry, David Reich, and Mary Popadiuk, as well as the House Rules Committee staff, Bob Weinhagen and Tom Cassidy in the Office of Legislative Counsel, budget experts at the Congressional Research Service and the Congressional Budget Office--particularly Mark Hadley and Teri Gullo--and House Parliamentarian Tom Wickham and his office, for the year of dedication. If you have any questions or would like additional information, please contact Dan Keniry, Staff Director of the House Budget Committee or Mary Popadiuk, General Counsel of the House Budget Committee at (202) 226-7270. Steve Womack Chairman Committee on the Budget REPORT OF THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS REFORM ---------- SUMMARY The Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform (JSCBAPR) was established by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018), Public Law 115-123, which was signed into law on February 9, 2018.\1\ The JSCBAPR was a bipartisan, bicameral panel tasked with considering and recommending legislative language to ``significantly reform the budget and appropriations process.''\2\ The JSCBAPR consisted of 16 members, equally divided between the House and Senate. The Speaker of the House, the Senate Majority Leader, the House Minority Leader, and the Senate Minority Leader each appointed four members to the committee.\3\ House Budget Committee Chairman Steve Womack (AR-3) and House Appropriations Committee Ranking Member Nita Lowey (NY-17) served as co-chairs of this panel. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, P.L. 115-123 (2018). \2\ Id. \3\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- History The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Budget Act) was enacted to establish an overall framework for the fairly decentralized process of making budget decisions in Congress--a process which involves numerous appropriations, authorizations, and revenue measures under the jurisdiction of various congressional committees and enacted on differing schedules. The Budget Act came five decades after centralization of Executive Branch budget decision making in what is now called the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). In part, the Budget Act was a response to Executive Branch challenges to the primacy in budgetary matters that the Constitution grants to Congress, including President Nixon's assertion of power to withhold spending of funds appropriated by Congress. Other factors include recognition of the growing complexity of the federal budget and concern over persistent budget deficits. The 92nd Congress created the Joint Study Committee on Budget Control, which called for procedural reforms to strengthen congressional budgeting. Following the actual impoundment of appropriated funds, Congress acted on the recommendations of the Joint Study Committee and passed the Budget Act in 1974. The Budget Act provides for annual enactment of congressional budget resolutions to help Congress make an overall budget plan and sets targets and limits for budget legislation to be considered during the year. It also established the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to give Congress budget analysis capacity independent of the Executive Branch and created standing Committees on the Budget in the House and Senate to develop the annual budget resolutions and oversee the process. Since that time, Congress has reviewed the budget process periodically and amended the Budget Act on several occasions, including in 1985 and 1990. More recently, concerns about delays and procedural breakdowns in the budget process triggered the creation of the JSCBAPR to assess the current congressional budget and appropriations process and recommend reforms. Procedures of the JSCBAPR The deadline for the JSCBAPR to vote on recommendations, legislative language, and an accompanying report was November 30, 2018.\4\ Approval of the JSCBAPR proposed legislative and report language required the votes of a majority of the committee members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and a majority of the committee members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader.\5\ This voting threshold was intended to ensure that the committee's recommendations and report comprised bipartisan reforms. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ Id. \5\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Had the JSCBAPR approved the recommendations, the legislation and report would have been transmitted to the President, Vice President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Majority and Minority Leaders of each Chamber of Congress.\6\ The following would then have taken place: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the House of Representatives, the legislation would have been introduced and considered under regular order. In the Senate, the legislation would have been introduced on the next session day by the Majority Leader of the Senate or his designee.\7\ The bill would then have been referred to the Committee on the Budget, which would have been required to report the bill without any revision and with a favorable recommendation, with an unfavorable recommendation, or without recommendation no later than seven session days after the bill's introduction. If the Committee on the Budget failed to report the bill within that period, the bill would have been automatically discharged from the committee and placed on the appropriate calendar.\8\ The BBA 2018 also made in order for any Senator to move to proceed to consideration of the bill two days after it was reported or discharged from the Committee on the Budget. Debate on the motion was limited to ten hours, and the support of three-fifths of the Senate was necessary to consider and approve the motion.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ Id. \8\ Id. \9\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- PURPOSE There have been numerous breakdowns in the budget process in recent decades. Fiscal year 1995 was the last time Congress passed a conference report on the budget resolution followed by passage of thirteen separate appropriations bills before the beginning of the new fiscal year.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ Bill Heniff Jr., Congressional Budget Resolutions: Historical Information, Congressional Research Service, November 16, 2015. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Continuing resolutions (CRs) have become the status quo for funding the Federal Government, demonstrating Congress's failure to complete its work on time. CRs create uncertainty for agencies and the American people. In many years, there has been concern that parts of the government would have to shut down due to the failure to enact even stopgap appropriations, and shutdowns of various durations have actually occurred. In the 115th Congress alone, there have been two government shutdowns. Whether it is federal employees being furloughed, national parks shutting down, adverse effects on defense and law enforcement, shutdowns inflict severe damage and uncertainty on the nation's fiscal state. Additionally, multiple JSCBAPR members expressed frustration regarding the lack of legislative tools available for Congress to address national needs or the national debt in a bipartisan manner. COMMITTEE ACTION The JSCBAPR held five public hearings, fulfilling the requirement set forth in the BBA 2018. In addition to these formal, open hearings, the JSCBAPR also held two closed briefings and multiple formal and informal meetings. Hearings April 17, 2018--Opportunities to Significantly Improve the Federal Budget Process During this hearing, members considered the current challenges facing the budget and appropriations process in Congress and discussed possibilities for improvement. Witnesses included: Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Ph.D., President, American Action Forum Martha Coven, J.D., Lecturer and John L. Weinberg/ Goldman Sachs & Co. Visiting Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University May 9, 2018--Bipartisanship in Budgeting During this hearing, members discussed ways to ensure that the budget and appropriations process work effectively and in a bipartisan manner regardless of political dynamics. Witnesses included: G. William Hoagland, Senior Vice President, Bipartisan Policy Center Donald R. Wolfensberger, Fellow, Bipartisan Policy Center; Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Emily Holubowich, Participant, Convergence Building a Better Budget Process Project; Executive Director, Coalition for Health Funding Matthew Owens, Participant, Convergence Building a Better Budget Process Project; Vice President for Federal Relations and Administration, Association of American Universities May 24, 2018--The Budget Resolution--Content, Timeliness, and Enforcement During this hearing, members examined the current purpose and role of the budget resolution and considered possible options, presented by expert witnesses, to bolster the budget resolution's impact and influence in the federal budget and appropriations process. Witnesses included: Maya MacGuineas, President, Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget James C. Capretta, Resident Fellow and Milton Friedman Chair, American Enterprise Institute Bill Dauster, Former Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel, Senate Budget Committee Joseph White, Professor, Department of Political Science and Center for Policy Studies, Case Western Reserve University June 27, 2018--Members' Day During this hearing, members of both chambers of Congress testified before the JSCBAPR on their ideas for improving the budget and appropriations process. Members who testified before the JSCBAPR included: The Honorable Paul D. Ryan, Speaker, House of Representatives The Honorable Nancy D. Pelosi, Democratic Minority Leader, House of Representatives The Honorable Steny H. Hoyer, Democratic Minority Whip, House of Representatives Representative Hal Rogers (KY-05) Representative Pete Visclosky (IN-01) Representative Robert Aderholt (AL-04) Representative David Price (NC-04) Representative Rob Bishop (UT-01) Representative John Carter (TX-31) Representative Devin Nunes (CA-22) Senator Bob Corker (TN) Representative Jim Himes (CT-04) Representative Tom McClintock (CA-04) Representative Jim Renacci (OH-16) Representative Daniel Webster (FL-11) Representative Elizabeth Esty (CT-05) Representative Bill Foster (IL-11) Representative Keith Rothfus (PA-12) Senator Steve Daines (MT) Representative French Hill (AR-02) Representative Bruce Westerman (AR-04) Representative Warren Davidson (OH-08) Representative Pramila Jayapal (WA-07) Representative Roger Marshall (KS-01) Representative Lloyd Smucker (PA-16) Representative John Curtis (UT-03) Representative Ralph Norman (SC-05) Additional statements were submitted for the record by: Representative Virginia Foxx (NC-05) Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (FL-25) Senator Dean Heller (NV) Representative Bradley Byrne (AL-01) Representative Paul Mitchell (MI-10) July 12, 2018--Opportunities to Improve the Appropriations Process During this hearing, members considered the current challenges facing the appropriations process in Congress and discussed possibilities for improvement. Witnesses included: The Honorable Leon Panetta, Former Secretary of Defense, 2011-2013; Chairman, The Panetta Institute for Public Policy The Honorable David Obey, Former Chairman of House Appropriations Committee, 2007-2011 Briefings April 11, 2018--Briefing with the Congressional Research Service Members of the JSCBAPR heard from experts from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) regarding the issues facing the budget and appropriations process, past reform efforts, and potential options for the JSCBAPR to explore. July 17, 2018--Briefing with the Congressional Budget Office and the Congressional Research Service Members of the JSCBAPR heard from experts from CBO and CRS on implementation and potential impacts of reforms considered by the JSCBAPR. Committee Meetings The JSCBAPR held multiple meetings, both formal and informal, since its establishment. These meetings provided a collegial opportunity for JSCBAPR members to discuss reforms to the budget and appropriations process. These meetings also provided the basis for the recommendations made in this report. A listing of the JSCBAPR's informal working sessions follows: March 7, 2018--Initial JSCBAPR organizing meeting August 22, 2018--JSCBAPR working group meeting September 13, 2018--JSCBAPR working group meeting September 26, 2018--JSCBAPR working group meeting RECOMMENDATIONS Biennial Budgeting Over the past few Congresses, there has been increasing support for a biennial budget. Since the first public meeting of the JSCBAPR, biennial budgeting has been viewed as a practical and necessary solution to the continued delays in the current budget and appropriations process. Additionally, the JSCBAPR heard repeatedly from witnesses, as well as from multiple outside organizations across the political spectrum, that biennial budgeting is an excellent starting point for any budget and appropriations reform effort. One of the principal arguments in favor of biennial budgeting is that it will allow for more time in the budget process. Providing a 302(a) allocation for two years to the Appropriations Committees at the beginning of a Congress will allow for a smoother appropriations process. It will also allow the Appropriators additional time to engage in dialogue with the Executive Branch on the Administration's priorities. Another key argument in favor of biennial budgeting is that it will allow for greater certainty in the budget process, particularly for Executive Branch entities. One of the chief complaints heard consistently by members of Congress and the JSCBAPR is that nearly every executive agency and department suffers under a protracted budget negotiation, delayed spending bills, and continuing resolutions. A biennial budget would also provide Congress additional time to conduct oversight on federal agencies and departments. When Appropriators and authorizers have more certainty, they can turn their attention to those entities that they fund and oversee, respectively. This also serves to buttress Congress's constitutional authority and ensures that appropriated funds are being used responsibly and authorized programs are implemented consistently with Congressional intent. Finally, biennial budgeting would free up time in the legislative calendar to enable Congress to not be mired down in annual budget resolution squabbles. Second Session Revision of the Budget Resolution for Scoring Purposes A requirement of a biennial budget resolution would be authority in the second year of a biennium to adjust the budget resolution's spending and revenue levels, committee allocations, and other amounts to reflect an updated baseline used for scoring purposes. Realistic Deadline for Congress to Complete Action on a Biennial Budget One of the challenges identified by the JSCBAPR was that Congress has continually failed to adopt a budget resolution by the statutorily required April 15th deadline. In those years in which Congress has adopted a budget resolution, it has adopted the budget resolution an average of 36 days after the target date.\11\ This deadline does not reflect a realistic timeline. To this end, the JSCBAPR believed that setting a realistic and achievable deadline of May 1st for the first year of the biennium would provide Congress an opportunity to complete its work on time. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ This does not include fiscal year 1999, fiscal year 2003, fiscal year 2005, fiscal year 2007, and fiscal years 2011 through 2015. See Bill Heniff Jr., Congressional Budget Resolutions: Historical Information, Congressional Research Service, November 16, 2015. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Annual Supplemental Budget Submission by the President While JSCBAPR members recognized that Article I entrusts in the Congress the power of the purse, members also had an appreciation that there is critical data that Congress requires from the Executive Branch to begin the budget building process. Specifically, CBO cannot begin constructing its baseline for the upcoming fiscal year without receipt of data, particularly prior-year and current-year spending, that is normally transmitted with the President's budget request. Without receipt of CBO's baseline, Congress generally cannot begin writing its budget resolution. To create additional time for developing the baseline, and therefore, the budget resolution and various appropriations bills, the JSCBAPR believed that the Executive Branch should be required to provide a supplemental budget submission that is separate from the President's policy proposals no later than December 1st of each calendar year. This supplemental budget submission would include: Prior year fiscal data Current year fiscal data Credit re-estimates for the current year This data would allow CBO to begin constructing the baseline, as well as enable the Budget and Appropriations Committees to begin their respective work in writing the budget resolution and appropriations bills earlier in the process. The President would then submit policy proposals later in the process, which would be considered as Congress continues its work on the budget resolution and annual appropriations bills. Encourage the Use of Best Practices in the Appropriations Process The JSCBAPR noted that Congress was more successful this year than in other recent years moving appropriations bills through the process on a timelier basis, with five fiscal year 2019 appropriations measures, including the three largest, signed into law before the start of the fiscal year. One factor in this success appears to have been the strategic combination of individual bills into multi-bill packages for initial consideration by the House and Senate, as well as for the final conference stage. JSCBAPR members recommended that the Appropriations Committees review the record of recent practices for consideration of appropriations bills, identify practices which have been helpful in expediting action and increasing opportunities for member involvement at various stages of consideration, and build those successful practices into their work for future years. JSCBAPR members also recommended that the Appropriations Committees and other committees with responsibilities in this area study the best ways of using the new biennial budget resolution schedule to expedite congressional work on appropriations and other budgetary legislation. Reconstitute Senate Budget Committee JSCBAPR members noted that the Senate Budget Committee should be reconstituted to include the Appropriations and Finance Chairs and Ranking Members and make it comprised of eight members from the majority and seven members from the minority. This would elevate the Senate Budget Committee to be more prominent and foster greater seriousness and bipartisanship to its important work. Add Bipartisan Budget Resolution in the Senate JSCBAPR members noted that the budget process has become exceedingly partisan in recent years. Partisan posturing has contributed to numerous budget and appropriations delays and threats of government shutdowns. Political disagreement on the debt limit has imposed unnecessary costs on our nation's economy. This budget option would have fostered bipartisan work on the Senate Budget Committee. In addition to the other requirements of Section 301 of the Congressional Budget Act, a bipartisan budget resolution would have required to include a target for the ratio of the public debt to the gross domestic product and a multi-year glideslope for achieving it. The glideslope would have included the four primary drivers of deficits: health care spending, tax expenditures, discretionary appropriations, and revenue levels. The glideslope could have also included other economic and policy targets such as employment, income equality, and economic growth. Committee approval of a bipartisan budget resolution required a majority of Democratic members and a majority of Republican members. The Senate Majority and Minority Leaders would then have been empowered to agree on expedited floor consideration including limited debate and amendment votes. To be considered a bipartisan budget, a conferenced budget resolution or House budget resolution must have included the content requirements described above. Upon passage in both chambers, a bipartisan budget resolution would trigger biannual reporting by the Congressional Budget Office. This reporting requirement remained unless displaced by passage of a subsequent bipartisan budget resolution. Senate passage of a reconciliation bill pursuant to a bipartisan budget resolution would have required 15 votes from the minority party. Annual Reconciliation Under a biennial budgeting model, it was the JSCBAPR's view that the annual reconciliation process should be preserved. JSCBAPR's legislative intent was for reconciliation to remain an annual exercise. Reconciliation instructions would have been based on a single fiscal year, consistent with annual appropriations. JSCBAPR's legislative recommendations amended current law to clarify that reconciliation may be used each fiscal year of a biennium. As a result, a budget resolution could provide directives to one or more committees for each fiscal year of a biennium and over a specified period of the budget window; (e.g. five or ten years). Congress should have the ability to consider reconciliation legislation at any point during a biennium and have the use of reconciliation's expedited procedures each fiscal year to legislatively address mandatory spending, revenue, the debt limit, or any combination thereof. A review of the historical use of reconciliation demonstrates its success in significantly reducing the deficit, particularly in the 1980s. The JSCBAPR believed that this practice - the use of annual reconciliation to reduce the deficit - should be encouraged in future Congresses. Require a Joint Budget Committee Hearing on the Fiscal State of the Nation Members of the JSCBAPR believed that members of Congress must have access to nonpartisan information about the many factors contributing to the nation's debt and deficit in order to develop sound fiscal policies and meet our long-debt and deficit reduction goals. To accomplish this, JSCBAPR members recommended the House and Senate Budget Committees should be required to hold a biennial, joint hearing with testimony from the Comptroller General of the United States regarding the audited financial statement of the Executive Branch. This `Fiscal State of the Nation' hearing would have needed to occur at least once during the second session of a Congress after a biennial budget resolution is adopted and would have enabled members to assess the nation's long-term fiscal sustainability. As a joint hearing, the chairs of the Budget Committees should have alternated presiding and hosting the hearing each Congress. The JSCBAPR encouraged the chairs of the Budget Committees to follow House and Senate rules when convening the Fiscal State of the Nation hearing. Therefore, the chairs of the Budget Committees would have been encouraged to make a public announcement of the date, place, and subject matter of the hearing at least seven calendar days before the hearing. All members of Congress would be invited to attend the hearing, and the JSCBAPR strongly encouraged the chairs of the Budget Committees to agree to allow all members to waive onto their respective Budget Committee for the hearing by unanimous consent. A video recording of the Fiscal State of the Nation hearing would have been made publicly available on the Budget Committees' websites. Members of the JSCBAPR also recommended establishing additional forums for all members of Congress to access the information presented in the Fiscal State of the Nation hearing. To accomplish this goal, members of the JSCBAPR encouraged the House and Senate to implement the following recommendations: First, all four party caucuses in the House and Senate would have been encouraged to hold a biennial meeting with the same content presented by the witnesses from the required joint Fiscal State of the Nation hearing held by the Budget Committees. The JSCBAPR also encouraged the caucuses to include in those meetings a briefing from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to educate members on the function and role of CBO in the budget process. Second, the House and Senate should have incorporated content from the Fiscal State of the Nation hearing, and an introductory briefing from CBO, into the official orientation process for all newly-elected members of Congress conducted by the Committee on House Administration and the Secretary of the Senate, respectively. These new member orientations typically take place prior to the new members being sworn in and include briefings on the legislative process, congressional rules, and ethics policies. The JSCBAPR believed this is the ideal forum to present the findings from the most recent Fiscal State of the Nation hearing to new members of the House and Senate and educate them on the critical role of CBO in the budget process. Accordingly, the JSCBAPR urged the Committee on House Administration and the Secretary of the Senate to ensure that these two training opportunities would be provided for all new members. Include Total Combined Outlays and Revenues for Tax Expenditures as an Optional Item in the Budget Resolution JSCBAPR members expressed interest in providing greater transparency regarding tax expenditures because they are a major component of the federal budget. Therefore, JSCBAPR members believed that total combined outlays and revenues for tax expenditures should have been an optional item in the budget resolution's text. THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS REFORM BILL TEXT ---------- The following text is the Co-Chair's Mark, as amended, and voted on by The Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform on November 29, 2018. (Original Signature of Member) 115th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. __ To implement the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform. _______________________________________________________________________ IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Mr. Womack (for himself and Mrs. Lowey) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on _______________ _______________________________________________________________________ A BILL To implement the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Bipartisan Budget and Appropriations Reform Act of 2018''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. TITLE I--BIENNIAL BUDGET RESOLUTIONS Sec. 101. Purposes. Sec. 102. Definitions. Sec. 103. Revision of timetable. Sec. 104. Biennial concurrent resolutions on the budget. Sec. 105. Committee allocations. Sec. 106. Revision of biennial budget. Sec. 107. Additional amendments to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to effectuate biennial budgeting. Sec. 108. Reconciliation process. Sec. 109. Bipartisan budget resolution. Sec. 110. Effective date. TITLE II--OTHER MATTERS Sec. 201. Views and estimates of committees. Sec. 202. Annual supplemental budget submission by the President. Sec. 203. Hearing on the fiscal state of the Nation. Sec. 204. Reform of Senate Budget Committee. TITLE I--BIENNIAL BUDGET RESOLUTIONS SEC. 101. PURPOSES. Paragraph (2) of section 2 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is amended to read as follows: ``(2) to facilitate the determination biennially of the appropriate level of Federal revenues and expenditures by the Congress;''. SEC. 102. DEFINITIONS. Section 3 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 622) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (4), by striking ``for a fiscal year'' each place it appears and inserting ``for a biennium''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(12) The term `direct spending' has the meaning given to such term in section 250(c)(8) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. ``(13) The term `biennium' means any period of 2 consecutive fiscal years beginning with an even-numbered fiscal year. ``(14) The term `budget year' has the meaning given that term in section 250(c)(12) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Control Act of 1985.''. SEC. 103. REVISION OF TIMETABLE. Section 300 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 631) is amended to read as follows: ``timetable ``Sec. 300. The timetable with respect to the congressional budget process for any Congress is as follows: ``First Session On or before: Action to be completed: First Monday in February................ President submits budget. February 15............................. Congressional Budget Office submits report to Budget Committees. March 1................................ Committees submit views and estimates to Budget Committees. April 1................................. Senate Budget Committee reports biennial budget. May 1................................... Congress completes action on the biennial budget. May 15.................................. Appropriation bills may be considered in the House of Representatives. June 10................................. House Appropriations Committee reports last annual appropriation bill. October 1............................... First fiscal year of the biennium begins. ``Second Session On or before: Action to be completed: First Monday in February................ President submits budget. February 15............................. Congressional Budget Office submits report to Budget Committees. June 10................................. House Appropriations Committee reports last annual appropriation bill. October 1............................... Second fiscal year of the biennium begins.''. SEC. 104. BIENNIAL CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS ON THE BUDGET. (a) Contents of Resolution.-- (1) In general.--Section 301(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 632(a)) is amended-- (A) by striking the matter preceding paragraph (1) beginning with ``On or before April 15'' and inserting the following: ``On or before May 1 of each odd- numbered calendar year, the Congress shall complete action on a concurrent resolution on the budget for the biennium beginning on October 1 of that calendar year. The concurrent resolution shall set forth appropriate levels for each fiscal year in the biennium and for at least each fiscal year in the next 2 bienniums for the following--''; (B) in paragraph (6)-- (i) by striking ``for the fiscal year'' and inserting ``for each fiscal year in the biennium''; and (ii) by striking ``and'' at the end; (C) in paragraph (7)-- (i) by striking ``for the fiscal year'' and inserting ``for each fiscal year in the biennium''; and (ii) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; (D) by adding after paragraph (7) the following: ``(8) subtotals of new budget authority and outlays for nondefense discretionary spending; defense discretionary spending; direct spending; and net interest.''; and (E) by adding at the end of the matter following paragraph (8) (as added by subparagraph (D)) the following: ``The concurrent resolution on the budget for a biennium shall include procedures for adjusting spending and revenue levels, committee allocations, and other amounts in the resolution during the second session of a Congress to reflect an updated baseline that will be used for scoring purposes.''. (b) Additional Matters in Concurrent Resolution.--Section 301(b) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 632(b)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``for such fiscal year'' and inserting ``for either fiscal year in such biennium''; (2) in paragraph (8), by striking ``and'' at the end; (3) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (4) by adding at the end the following: ``(10) include total combined outlays and revenues for tax expenditures.''. (c) Hearings and Report.--Section 301(e)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 632(e)) is amended by striking ``fiscal year'' and inserting ``biennium''. (d) Goals for Reducing Unemployment.--Section 301(f) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 632(f)) is amended by striking ``fiscal year'' each place it appears and inserting ``biennium''. (e) Economic Assumptions.--Section 301(g) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 632(g)) is amended by striking ``for a fiscal year'' and inserting ``for a biennium''. (f) Section Heading.--The section heading of section 301 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 632) is amended by striking ``annual adoption of'' and inserting ``adoption of biennial''. SEC. 105. COMMITTEE ALLOCATIONS. Section 302 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 633) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(1)-- (A) by striking ``for that period of fiscal years'' and inserting ``for all fiscal years covered by the resolution''; and (B) by striking ``only for the fiscal year of that resolution'' and inserting ``only for each fiscal year of the biennium''; (2) in subsection (c)-- (A) by striking ``subsection (a)'' and inserting ``subsection (a)(1)''; (B) by striking ``for a fiscal year'' and inserting ``for a budget year''; and (C) by striking ``for that fiscal year'' and inserting ``for that budget year''; (3) in subsection (f)(1)-- (A) by striking ``for a fiscal year''; and (B) by striking ``the first fiscal year'' and inserting ``either fiscal year of the biennium of that resolution''; and (4) in subsection (f)(2)(A), by-- (A) striking ``first fiscal year'' and inserting ``either fiscal year of the biennium of that resolution''; and (B) striking ``the total of fiscal years'' and inserting ``the total of all fiscal years covered by the resolution''. SEC. 106. REVISION OF BIENNIAL BUDGET. Section 304 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 635) is amended to read as follows: ``permissible revisions of concurrent resolutions on the budget ``Sec. 304. At any time after the concurrent resolution on the budget has been agreed to pursuant to section 301 and before the end of the biennium, the two Houses may adopt a concurrent resolution that revises or reaffirms the most recently agreed to concurrent resolution on the budget. Any concurrent resolution that revises or reaffirms the most recently agreed to concurrent resolution on the budget shall be considered under the procedures set forth in section 305.''. SEC. 107. ADDITIONAL AMENDMENTS TO THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT OF 1974 TO EFFECTUATE BIENNIAL BUDGETING. (a) Enforcement of Section 303.--Section 303 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 634) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking ``for a fiscal year'' and inserting ``for a biennium''; and (B) by striking ``the first fiscal year covered by that resolution'' and inserting ``either fiscal year of that biennium''; (2) in subsection (b)(1)(B), by striking ``the fiscal year'' and inserting ``the biennium''; and (3) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraph (1)-- (i) by striking ``for a fiscal year'' and inserting ``for a biennium''; and (ii) by striking ``for that year'' in each instance and inserting ``for each year of that biennium''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``after the year the allocation referred to in that paragraph is made'' and inserting ``after the years the allocations referred to in that paragraph are made''. (b) Section 305.--Subsections (a)(3) and (b)(3) of section 305 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 636) are amended by striking ``for a fiscal year''. (c) Section 311 Point of Order.-- (1) In the house of representatives.--Section 311(a)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 642(a)) is amended-- (A) by striking ``for a fiscal year''; (B) by striking ``the first fiscal year'' each place it appears and inserting ``either of the first two fiscal years covered by such resolution''; and (C) by striking ``that first fiscal year'' and inserting ``either of the first two fiscal years''. (2) In the senate.--Section 311(a)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 642(a)(2)) is amended-- (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``for the first fiscal year'' and inserting ``for either of the first two fiscal years''; and (B) in subparagraph (B)-- (i) by striking ``that first fiscal year'' the first place it appears and inserting ``either of the first two fiscal years''; and (ii) by striking ``that first fiscal year and the ensuing fiscal years'' and inserting ``all fiscal years''. (3) Social security levels.--Section 311(a)(3) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 642(a)(2)) is amended by-- (A) striking ``for the first fiscal year'' and inserting ``for either of the first two fiscal years''; and (B) striking ``that fiscal year and the ensuing fiscal years'' and inserting ``all fiscal years''. SEC. 108. RECONCILIATION PROCESS. Section 310(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 641(a)) is amended-- (1) in the matter before paragraph (1), by striking ``A concurrent'' and all that follows through ``shall'' and inserting ``A concurrent resolution on the budget for a biennium shall, for each fiscal year of the biennium''; (2) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``for such fiscal year'' and inserting ``for each fiscal year of the biennium''; (3) in paragraph (1)(C), by striking ``such fiscal year'' and inserting ``each fiscal year of the biennium''; and (4) in paragraph (1)(D), by striking ``such fiscal year'' and inserting ``each fiscal year of the biennium''. SEC. 109. BIPARTISAN BUDGET RESOLUTION. (a) Definition.--Section 3 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 622), as amended by section 102, is further amended by adding at the end the following: ``(15) The term `bipartisan budget resolution' means a concurrent resolution on the budget for a biennium-- ``(A) ordered reported to the Senate by the Committee on the Budget of the Senate by an affirmative vote of not less than half of the Senators that are members of the majority party in the Senate and not less than half of the Senators that are members of the minority party in the Senate; ``(B) that establishes-- ``(i) a target for the ratio of the public debt to the gross domestic product as of the end of the period covered by the concurrent resolution or a later date; and ``(ii) for each fiscal year covered by the concurrent resolution, targets for-- ``(I) the ratio of the public debt to the gross domestic product; ``(II) the amount of health care spending by the Government; ``(III) the amount of tax expenditures; ``(IV) the amount of discretionary appropriations (as defined in section 250 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 900)); and ``(V) the amount of revenues; and ``(C) which may include other economic or policy targets.''. (b) Consideration of Bipartisan Budget Resolutions.--Section 305 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 636) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(e) Procedures in the Senate for Bipartisan Budget Resolutions.-- ``(1) Other expedited process.--In the Senate, upon the agreement of the majority leader and the minority leader, additional procedures to expedite consideration of a bipartisan budget resolution (which may include limiting the number of amendments upon which the Senate shall vote) shall apply to consideration of the bipartisan budget resolution. The majority leader shall submit a written statement for the Congressional Record reflecting any agreement described in this paragraph. ``(2) Passage.--In the Senate, a bipartisan budget resolution shall be agreed to only upon the affirmative vote of not less than-- ``(A) three-fifths of the Members, duly chosen and sworn; and ``(B) 15 Members that are members of the minority party in the Senate. ``(3) Amendments between the houses and conference reports.--To be considered a bipartisan budget resolution, a conference report or an amendment between the Houses on a concurrent resolution on the budget shall-- ``(A) comply with section 3(15)(B); and ``(B) be agreed to in the Senate by an affirmative vote of not less than-- ``(i) three-fifths of the Members, duly chosen and sworn; and ``(ii) 15 Members that are members of the minority party in the Senate.''. (c) Reconciliation Under Bipartisan Budget Resolutions.--Section 310(e)(2) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 641(e)(2)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)'' before ``Debate''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(B) In the Senate, a reconciliation bill reported under subsection (b) pursuant to reconciliation instructions in a bipartisan budget resolution, a House amendment thereto, and a conference report thereon shall be agreed to only upon the affirmative vote of not less than-- ``(i) a majority of the Members voting, a quorum being present; and ``(ii) 15 Members that are members of the minority party in the Senate.''. (d) Reporting.--Section 202 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 603) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(h) Report on Ratio of the Public Debt to the Gross Domestic Product.--On and after the date on which the first bipartisan budget resolution is agreed to, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office shall submit to Congress semiannual reports on the ratio of the public debt to the gross domestic product, which shall evaluate whether the targets in the most recently agreed to bipartisan budget resolution have been met.''. SEC. 110. EFFECTIVE DATE. This title and the amendments made by this title shall take effect immediately before noon January 3, 2019. TITLE II--OTHER MATTERS SEC. 201. VIEWS AND ESTIMATES OF COMMITTEES. Section 301(d) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 632(d)) is amended to read as follows: ``(d) Views and Estimates of Other Committees.-- ``(1) In general.--Not later than March 1 of the first session of a Congress, or upon the request of the Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives or the Senate, each committee of the House of Representatives and the Senate having legislative jurisdiction shall submit to its respective Committee on the Budget its views and estimates (as determined by the committee making such submission) with respect to the following: ``(A) Any legislation to be considered during that Congress that is a priority for the committee. ``(B) Any legislation within the jurisdiction of the committee that would establish, amend, or reauthorize any Federal program and likely have a significant budgetary impact. ``(2) Additional matters.--Any committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate and any joint committee of the Congress may submit to the appropriate Committees on the Budget its views and estimates with respect to all matters set forth in subsections (a) and (b) which relate to matters within its jurisdiction. ``(3) Joint economic committee.--The Joint Economic Committee shall submit to the Committees on the Budget of both Houses its recommendations as to the fiscal policy appropriate to the goals of the Employment Act of 1946.''. SEC. 202. ANNUAL SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET SUBMISSION BY THE PRESIDENT. Section 1106 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(d) On or before December 1 of each calendar year, the President shall submit to Congress an administrative budget for the fiscal year beginning in the ensuing calendar year, which shall include up-to-date estimates for current year and prior year data and credit reestimates for the current year (as included in the Federal credit supplement of such budget).''. SEC. 203. HEARING ON THE FISCAL STATE OF THE NATION. (a) In General.--Not later than 45 days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) after the date on which the Secretary of the Treasury submits to Congress the audited financial statement required under paragraph (1) of section 331(e) of title 31, United States Code, on a date agreed upon by the chairs of the Committees on the Budget of the House of Representatives and the Senate and the Comptroller General of the United States, the chairs shall conduct a hearing to receive a presentation from the Comptroller General reviewing the findings of the audit required under paragraph (2) of such section and providing, with respect to the information included by the Secretary in the report accompanying such audited financial statement, an analysis of the financial position and condition of the Federal Government, including financial measures (such as the net operating cost, income, budget deficits, or budget surpluses) and sustainability measures (such as the long-term fiscal projection or social insurance projection) described in such report. (b) Effective Date.--The requirement under subsection (a) shall apply with respect to any audited financial statement submitted on or after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 204. REFORM OF SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE. In the Senate, the Committee on the Budget shall be composed of 15 members as follows: (1) Six members who are a member of or caucus with the political party in the majority in the Senate, of which 1 of whom shall be designated as the Chairman by the members of the committee. (2) Five members who are a member of or caucus with the political party in the minority in the Senate, of which 1 of whom shall be designated as the Ranking Member by the members of the committee. (3) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Appropriations. (4) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Finance. VOTES OF THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS REFORM ---------- By unanimous consent, the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform applied a voting rule for the adoption of amendments consistent with the rule required by law for final adoption of the Joint Select Committee's recommendations. Under that rule, passage or adoption required separate majorities of the appointees from each party. 1. An amendment offered by Senator Bennett and Senator Lankford to reform the membership of the Senate Budget Committee. The amendment would reconstitute the membership of the Senate Budget Committee to include 8 members from the majority and 7 members from the minority in addition to the Chairs and Ranking Members of both the Senate Appropriations and Finance Committees. The amendment was agreed to by a roll call vote of 7 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 6 ayes and 1 no of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... X ..... ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... X ..... ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... ..... ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. X ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... X ..... ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... X ..... ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... ..... ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. An amendment offered by Representative Woodall to eliminate functional categories in the budget resolution in lieu of budget authority and outlays for the following categories: nondefense discretionary spending, defense discretionary spending, direct spending, and net interest. The amendment would also require the inclusion of a debt-to-GDP ratio. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 7 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 0 ayes and 7 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 2 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... ..... X ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... X ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... ..... ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... X ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... ..... X ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... X ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. ..... X ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... ..... ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. An amendment offered by Senator Whitehouse, Senator Blunt, and Senator Perdue to establish an optional bipartisan path for the budget resolution in the Senate. The amendment was agreed to by a roll call vote of 7 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 7 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 3 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... X ..... ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... X ..... ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... ..... ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. X ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... X ..... ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... X ..... ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... X ..... ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... ..... ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. An amendment offered by Senator Schatz to include tax expenditures in the list of subtotals reported in the biennial budget. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 3 ayes and 5 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 7 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 4 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ ..... X ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... X ..... ....... Senator Blunt.......................... ..... X ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... ..... ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... ..... X ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. X ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... ..... X ....... Senator Bennet........... X ..... ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... X ..... ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... X ..... ....... Rep. Arrington......................... ..... X ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... X ..... ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. An amendment offered by Senator Perdue to increase the threshold for passing the budget resolution in the Senate from a simple majority (51 votes) to a super majority (60 votes). The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 3 ayes and 4 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 0 ayes and 8 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 5 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ ..... X ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... ..... X ....... Senator Blunt.......................... ..... X ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... X ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... ..... ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... X ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... ..... X ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... X ....... Senator Lankford....................... ..... X ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... ..... X ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. ..... X ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... X ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6. An amendment offered by Senator Perdue to turn 50 hours of debate on the budget resolution in the Senate into 50 hours of consideration. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 7 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 0 ayes and 8 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 6 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... ..... X ....... Senator Blunt.......................... ..... ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... X ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... X ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... ..... X ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... X ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. ..... X ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... X ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7. An amendment offered by Representative Kilmer to prohibit any reconciliation bill that would cause or increase a deficit or reduce a surplus over the period of years covered by the reconciliation instructions in the budget resolution. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 0 ayes and 8 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 8 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 7 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ ..... X ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... X ..... ....... Senator Blunt.......................... ..... X ....... Senator Whitehouse....... X ..... ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... ..... X ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. X ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... ..... X ....... Senator Bennet........... X ..... ....... Rep. Woodall........................... ..... X ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... X ..... ....... Senator Lankford....................... ..... X ....... Senator Schatz........... X ..... ....... Rep. Arrington......................... ..... X ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... ..... X ....... Senator Hirono........... X ..... ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8. An amendment offered by Senator Lankford to include reconciliation directives as a required element in the contents of the budget resolution. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 8 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 0 ayes and 7 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 8 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... ..... X ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... ..... ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... X ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... ..... X ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... X ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. ..... X ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... X ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9. An amendment offered by Senator Lankford to make reconciliation a mandatory element of the budget resolution. The amendment would also establish a new 20 percent limitation on provisions in a reconciliation bill that either increase direct spending or reduce revenues beyond 20 percent of the gross savings in the budget resolution's reconciliation directives. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 6 ayes and 2 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 0 ayes and 7 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 9 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ ..... X ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... ..... X ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... ..... ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... X ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... ..... X ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... X ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... ..... X ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. ..... X ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... X ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10. An amendment offered by Senator Blunt, Senator Whitehouse, and Representative Woodall to maintain annual reconciliation. The amendment was agreed to by a roll call vote of 8 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 8 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 10 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... X ..... ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... X ..... ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. X ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... X ..... ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... X ..... ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... X ..... ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... X ..... ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11. An amendment offered by Representative Sessions to establish a permanent bipartisan, bicameral debt reduction committee. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 7 ayes and 1 no of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 1 aye and 7 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 11 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... ..... X ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... X ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... X ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... ..... X ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... X ....... Senator Lankford....................... ..... X ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... X ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12. An amendment offered by Senator Hirono to authorize the Treasury Secretary to suspend the debt ceiling. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 0 ayes and 7 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 6 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 12 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ ..... X ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... X ..... ....... Senator Blunt.......................... ..... ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... X ..... ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... ..... X ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... ..... X ....... Senator Bennet........... X ..... ....... Rep. Woodall........................... ..... X ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... ..... ....... Senator Lankford....................... ..... X ....... Senator Schatz........... X ..... ....... Rep. Arrington......................... ..... X ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... ..... X ....... Senator Hirono........... X ..... ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13. An amendment offered by Representative Arrington and Senator Lankford to limit and ultimately phase out the use of changes in mandatory programs (CHIMPs). The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 8 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 0 ayes and 6 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 13 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... ..... X ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... X ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... ..... X ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... ..... ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. ..... X ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... X ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14. An amendment offered by Representative Kilmer to require the House and Senate Budget Committees to hold a joint committee hearing on the Fiscal State of the Nation. The amendment was agreed to by a roll call vote of 8 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 6 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 14 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... X ..... ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... X ..... ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... X ..... ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... ..... ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... X ..... ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... X ..... ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15. An amendment offered by Senator Schatz to include total outlays and revenues for tax expenditures as an optional item in the budget resolution. The amendment was agreed to by a roll call vote of 8 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 6 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 15 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... X ..... ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... X ..... ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... X ..... ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... ..... ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... X ..... ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... X ..... ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16. An amendment offered by Senator Perdue to align the fiscal year with the calendar year and incorporate milestones into the funding process connected with penalties. The milestones are based on a percentage of completion of funding bills signed into law (25/50/75/100). The penalties connected with these milestones includes no recess or use of official funds for member travel if these funding milestones are not met. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 8 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 0 ayes and 7 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 16 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... ..... X ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... X ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... ..... X ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... X ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. ..... X ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... X ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17. An amendment offered by Senator Perdue to incorporate milestones into the funding process connected with penalties. The milestones are based on a percentage of completion of funding bills signed into law (25/50/75/ 100). The penalties connected with these milestones includes no recess or use of official funds for member travel if these funding milestones are not met. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 8 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 1 aye and 6 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 17 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... ..... X ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... X ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... ..... X ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... X ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... X ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18. An amendment offered by Senator Ernst and Senator Lankford to establish live quorum calls if the Senate fails to adopt a budget resolution by May 1st or fails to pass all regular appropriations bills by October 1st. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 8 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 1 aye and 6 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 18 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... ..... X ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... X ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... ..... X ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... X ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... X ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19. An amendment offered by Senator Ernst to prohibit the Senate from recessing or adjourning if it fails to pass all regular appropriations bills by October 1st of each year. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 8 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 1 aye and 6 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 19 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... ..... X ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... X ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... ..... X ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... X ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... X ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20. An amendment offered by Senator Ernst to prohibit the Senate from recessing or adjourning if it fails to pass a budget resolution by May 1st of an odd-numbered calendar year. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 8 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 1 aye and 6 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 20 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... ..... X ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... X ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... ..... X ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... X ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... X ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 21. An amendment offered by Senator Ernst to prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds for official travel by a Senator if the Senate fails to adopt a budget resolution by May 1st of each odd-numbered year or all appropriation bills individually or collectively, by October 1st of each year. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 8 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 1 aye and 6 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 21 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... ..... X ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... X ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... ..... X ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... X ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... X ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22. An amendment offered by Representative Arrington, Representative Kilmer, and Senator Ernst to expand the prohibition against adjournment resolutions in the House to include the August recess. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 8 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 2 ayes and 5 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 22 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... ..... X ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... X ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... X ..... ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... X ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... X ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23. An amendment offered by Senator Perdue to align the fiscal year with the calendar year. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 8 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 2 ayes and 5 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 23 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... ..... X ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... X ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... X ..... ....... Senator Bennet........... X ..... ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... X ....... Senator Lankford....................... X ..... ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. ..... X ....... Senator Ernst.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Hirono........... X ..... ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24. An amendment offered by Representative Roybal-Allard on behalf of Representative Yarmuth to repeal the statutory discretionary spending limits. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 1 aye and 7 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 7 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 24 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ ..... X ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... X ..... ....... Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... X ..... ....... Rep. Sessions.......................... ..... X ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. ..... ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... ..... X ....... Senator Bennet........... X ..... ....... Rep. Woodall........................... ..... X ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... X ..... ....... Senator Lankford....................... ..... X ....... Senator Schatz........... X ..... ....... Rep. Arrington......................... ..... X ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... ..... X ....... Senator Hirono........... X ..... ....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25. Vote on the bill as amended and the report as amended. The bill and report as amended was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 1 aye and 7 noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader and of 7 ayes and 0 noes of the Members appointed by the House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 25 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Republicans Aye No Present Democrats Aye No Present ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Co-Chair Womack........................ X ..... ....... Co-Chair Lowey........... ..... ..... X Senator Blunt.......................... X ..... ....... Senator Whitehouse....... ..... ..... X Rep. Sessions.......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Yarmuth............. X ..... ....... Senator Perdue......................... ..... X ....... Senator Bennet........... ..... X ....... Rep. Woodall........................... X ..... ....... Rep. Roybal-Allard....... ..... ..... X Senator Lankford....................... ..... X ....... Senator Schatz........... ..... X ....... Rep. Arrington......................... X ..... ....... Rep. Kilmer.............. X ..... ....... Senator Ernst.......................... ..... X ....... Senator Hirono........... ..... ..... X ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- APPENDIX ---------- This appendix includes five items produced by the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform (JSCBAPR). The first consists of the complete transcripts of the five public hearings held by the JSCBAPR. The second and third items are briefing materials prepared by the Congressional Budget Office and the Congressional Research Service for the JSCBAPR. The fourth is H.R. 7191, a bill introduced by Representative Steve Womack, Chairman of the House Committee on the Budget, and Representative John Yarmuth, the Ranking Member of the House Committee on the Budget. This bill reflects the work of the JSCBAPR and excludes only those recommendations that dealt solely with Senate procedure and the Senate Budget Committee. The final item is the press release that accompanied the introduction of H.R. 7191. Hearing Transcripts Following the creation of the JSCBAPR in February 2018, the Committee held five public hearings, fulfilling the requirement in the BBA 2018.\12\ The JSCBAPR held the following hearings. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ Id. April 17, 2018--Opportunities to Significantly Improve the --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Federal Budget Process May 9, 2018--Bipartisanship in Budgeting May 24, 2018--The Budget Resolution--Content, Timeliness, and Enforcement June 27, 2018--Members' Day July 12, 2018--Opportunities to Improve the Appropriations Process A complete compilation of the transcripts of each of these Hearings follows: HEARINGS OF THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ======================================================================= JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS REFORM ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ HEARINGS HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 17, MAY 9, MAY 24, JUNE 27, AND JULY 12, 2018 __________ Serial No. 115-1 __________ Printed for the use of the Joint Select Committee Available on the Internet: www.govinfo.gov JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS REFORM Republicans Democrats REP. STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas REP. NITA LOWEY, New York Co-Chair Co-Chair SEN. ROY BLUNT, Missouri SEN. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, REP. PETE SESSIONS, Texas Rhode Island SEN. DAVID PERDUE, Georgia REP. JOHN YARMUTH, Kentucky REP. ROB WOODALL, Georgia SEN. MICHAEL BENNET, Colorado SEN. JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma REP. LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, REP. JODEY ARRINGTON, Texas California SEN. JONI ERNST, Iowa SEN. BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii REP. DEREK KILMER, Washington SEN. MAZIE HIRONO, Hawaii C O N T E N T S Page INTRODUCTION..................................................... 61 __________ APRIL 17, 2018 ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING FOLLOWED BY HEARING ON: OPPORTUNITIES TO SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS............... 65 Hon. Steve Womack, Co-Chair, Joint Select Committee.......... 66 Prepared statement of.................................... 68 Hon. Nita M. Lowey, Co-Chair, Joint Select Committee......... 70 Prepared statement of.................................... 71 Martha Coven, J.D., Lecturer and John L. Weinberg/Goldman Sachs & Co. Visiting Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University..... 88 Prepared statement of.................................... 90 Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Ph.D., President, American Action Forum. 95 Prepared statement of.................................... 97 Hon. Lucille Roybal-Allard, Joint Select Committee, statement submitted for the record................................... 126 Hon. Steve Womack, Co-Chair, Joint Select Committee, questions to Ms. Martha Coven submitted for the record..... 127 Ms. Martha Coven's answers to questions submitted for the record................................................. 128 Hon. Steve Womack, Co-Chair, Joint Select Committee, questions to Dr. Douglas Holtz-Eakin submitted for the record..................................................... 131 Dr. Douglas Holtz-Eakin's answers to questions submitted for the record......................................... 132 Hon. David Perdue, Joint Select Committee, questions to Ms. Martha Coven submitted for the record...................... 134 Ms. Martha Coven's answers to questions submitted for the record................................................. 135 Hon. David Perdue, Joint Select Committee, questions to Dr. Douglas Holtz-Eakin submitted for the record............... 137 Dr. Douglas Holtz-Eakin's answers to questions submitted for the record......................................... 138 __________ MAY 9, 2018 BIPARTISANSHIP IN BUDGETING...................................... 139 Hon. Steve Womack, Co-Chair, Joint Select Committee.......... 139 Prepared statement of.................................... 140 Hon. Nita M. Lowey, Co-Chair, Joint Select Committee......... 141 Prepared statement of.................................... 142 G. William Hoagland, Senior Vice President, Bipartisan Policy Center, U.S. Senate Staff 1982-2007........................ 143 Prepared statement of.................................... 146 Donald R. Wolfensberger, Fellow, Bipartisan Policy Center, Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars... 151 Prepared statement of.................................... 154 Supplemental statement of................................ 158 Emily Holubowich, Participant, Convergence Building a Better Budget Process Project; Executive Director, Coalition for Health Funding............................................. 162 Prepared statement of.................................... 164 Addendum to the Testimony of Emily Holubowich............ 167 Matt Owens, Participant, Convergence Building a Better Budget Process Project, Vice President for Federal Relations and Administration, Association of American Universities (AAU). 170 Prepared statement of.................................... 172 Hon. Sheldon Whitehouse, Joint Select Committee.............. 198 Letter submitted for the record.......................... 198 Hon. Sheldon Whitehouse, Joint Select Committee, question to Emily J. Holubowich and M. Matthew Owens submitted for the record..................................................... 204 Emily J. Holubowich and M. Matthew Owens's answer to a question submitted for the record...................... 205 __________ MAY 24, 2018 THE BUDGET RESOLUTION--CONTENT, TIMELINESS, AND ENFORCEMENT...... 207 Hon. Steve Womack, Co-Chair, Joint Select Committee.......... 207 Prepared statement of.................................... 209 Hon. Nita M. Lowey, Co-Chair, Joint Select Committee......... 211 Prepared statement of.................................... 212 Maya MacGuineas, President, Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget............................................. 213 Prepared statement of.................................... 216 James C. Capretta, Resident Fellow, Milton Friedman Chair, American Enterprise Institute.............................. 224 Prepared statement of.................................... 226 Bill Dauster, Former Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel, Senate Budget Committee........................... 236 Prepared statement of.................................... 238 Joseph White, Professor, Department of Political Science and Center for Policy Studies, Case Western Reserve University. 242 Prepared statement of.................................... 244 Congressional Budget Office letter submitted for the record................................................. 275 __________ JUNE 27, 2018 MEMBERS' DAY: HOW TO SIGNIFICANTLY REFORM THE BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS......................................... 301 Hon. Steve Womack, Co-Chair, Joint Select Committee.......... 301 Prepared statement of.................................... 303 Hon. Nita M. Lowey, Co-Chair, Joint Select Committee......... 304 Prepared statement of.................................... 305 Hon. Paul D. Ryan, Speaker of the House of Representatives from the State of Wisconsin................................ 306 Prepared statement of.................................... 310 Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Democratic Minority Leader of the House of Representatives from the State of California............... 316 Prepared statement of.................................... 320 Hon. Steny H. Hoyer, Democratic Whip of the House of Representatives from the State of Maryland................. 324 Prepared statement of.................................... 327 Hon. Bob Corker, United States Senator from the State of Tennessee.................................................. 329 Prepared statement of.................................... 331 Hon. Peter J. Visclosky, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Indiana....................................... 334 Prepared statement of.................................... 336 Hon. Devin Nunes, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of California........................................ 340 Prepared statement of.................................... 342 Hon. Keith J. Rothfus, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Pennsylvania...................................... 344 Prepared statement of.................................... 346 Hon. Lloyd Smucker, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Pennsylvania...................................... 348 Prepared statement of.................................... 350 Hon. Warren Davidson, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Ohio.............................................. 353 Prepared statement of.................................... 355 Hon. J. French Hill, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Arkansas.......................................... 357 Prepared statement of.................................... 359 Hon. James B. Renacci, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Ohio.............................................. 363 Prepared statement of.................................... 365 Hon. Pramila Jayapal, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Washington........................................ 368 Prepared statement of.................................... 371 Hon. David E. Price, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of North Carolina.................................... 373 Prepared statement of.................................... 376 Hon. Steve Daines, United States Senator from the State of Montana.................................................... 382 Prepared statement of.................................... 385 Hon. Robert B. Aderholt, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Alabama....................................... 390 Prepared statement of.................................... 392 Hon. Elizabeth H. Esty, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Connecticut................................... 399 Prepared statement of.................................... 401 Hon. Tom McClintock, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of California........................................ 405 Prepared statement of.................................... 407 Hon. Bill Foster, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Illinois.......................................... 410 Prepared statement of.................................... 412 Hon. Bruce Westerman, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Arkansas.......................................... 414 Prepared statement of.................................... 416 Hon. John Curtis, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Utah.............................................. 421 Prepared statement of.................................... 423 Hon. Jim Himes, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Connecticut............................................. 426 Prepared statement of.................................... 428 Hon. Roger Marshall, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Kansas............................................ 430 Prepared statement of.................................... 432 Hon. Hal Rogers, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Kentucky................................................ 434 Prepared statement of.................................... 436 Hon. Daniel Webster, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Florida........................................... 442 Prepared statement of.................................... 444 Hon. Ralph Norman, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of South Carolina.................................... 446 Prepared statement of.................................... 448 Additional statements submitted for the record: ................................................... Hon. Rob Bishop, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Utah.......................................... 450 Hon. John Carter, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Texas......................................... 459 Hon. Bradley Byrne, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Alabama and Hon. Paul Mitchell, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Michigan.......... 462 Hon. Mario Diaz-Balart, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Florida.............................. 470 Hon. Virginia Foxx, U.S. House of Representatives from the State of North Carolina............................ 473 Hon. Dean Heller, United States Senator from the State of Nevada, submitted a letter for the record.............. 477 __________ JULY 12, 2018 OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS.............. 479 Hon. Steve Womack, Co-Chair, Joint Select Committee.......... 479 Prepared statement of.................................... 481 Hon. Nita M. Lowey, Co-Chair, Joint Select Committee......... 483 Prepared statement of.................................... 484 Hon. Leon E. Panetta, Former Secretary of Defense, 2011-2013; Chairman, The Panetta Institute for Public Policy and Former Secretary of Defense................................ 485 Prepared statement of.................................... 489 Hon. David R. Obey, Former Chairman of House Appropriations Committee, 2007-2011....................................... 498 Prepared statement of.................................... 501 INTRODUCTION ---------- The Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform The Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform (JSCBAPR) was established by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018), which was signed into law on February 9, 2018.\1\ The JSCBAPR is a bipartisan and bicameral panel tasked with considering and recommending legislative language that will ``significantly reform the budget and appropriation process.'' The JSCBAPR is comprised of 16 members, equally divided between the House and Senate. Four members each were appointed by the Speaker of the House, the Senate Majority Leader, the House Minority Leader, and the Senate Minority Leader. House Budget Committee Chairman Steve Womack (R-AR) and House Appropriations Ranking Member Nita Lowey (D-NY) serve as co-chairs of this panel. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, P.L. 115-123 (2018). Members Appointed by the Speaker: Representative Steve Womack (AR-3) Representative Pete Sessions (TX-32) Representative Rob Woodall (GA-7) Representative Jodey Arrington (TX-19) Members Appointed by the House Minority Leader: Representative Nita Lowey (NY-17) Representative John Yarmuth (KY-3) Representative Lucille Roybal-Allard (CA-40) Representative Derek Kilmer (WA-6) Members Appointed by the Senate Majority Leader: Senator Roy Blunt (MO) Senator David Perdue (GA) Senator James Lankford (OK) Senator Joni Ernst (IA) Members Appointed by the Senate Minority Leader: Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (RI) Senator Michael Bennet (CO) Senate Brian Schatz (HI) Senator Mazie Hirono (HI) The deadline for the JSCBAPR to vote on recommendations, legislative language, and an accompanying report was November 30, 2018.\2\ For the JSCBAPR to report recommendations, including legislative language and an accompanying report, it required votes of a majority of the committee members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Majority Leader of the Senate; and a majority of the committee members appointed by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives and the Minority Leader of the Senate.\3\ This voting threshold was intended to ensure that these recommendations and this report are comprised of bipartisan solutions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Id. \3\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Purpose JSCBAPR was created in part because Congress has not followed regular order for the congressional budget and appropriations processes for more than two decades. Fiscal year 1995 was the last time Congress passed a conference report on the budget resolution and thirteen separate appropriations bills before the beginning of the fiscal year.\4\ Congress has continually failed to complete its work before the start of the fiscal year and as a result, continuing resolutions (CRs) have become the norm for funding the federal government. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ Grant A. Driessen, The Federal Budget: Overview and Issues for FY2019 and Beyond, Congressional Research Service, May 21, 2018. Members have also expressed concerns regarding the lack of legislative tools available for Congress to address the national debt in a bipartisan manner. In 2018, the national debt eclipsed $21 trillion and is projected to rise to $34 trillion by 2028 unless Congress acts. The JSCBAPR viewed its purpose through the lens of these challenges: a broken budget process and an unsustainable fiscal trajectory. Hearings Following the creation of the JSCBAPR in February 2018, the Committee held five public hearings, fulfilling the requirement in the BBA 2018.\5\ In addition to these public hearings, the JSCBAPR has also held two closed briefings and multiple formal and informal meetings. The JSCBAPR held the following hearings. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ Id. April 17, 2018--Opportunities to Significantly Improve the --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Federal Budget Process During this hearing, members considered the current challenges facing the budget and appropriations processes in Congress and discussed possibilities for improvement. Witnesses included: Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Ph.D., President, American Action Forum Martha Coven, J.D., Lecturer and John L. Weinberg/ Goldman Sachs & Co. Visiting Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University May 9, 2018--Bipartisanship in Budgeting During this hearing, members discussed ways to ensure that the budget and appropriations processes work in a bipartisan manner and are effective regardless of political dynamics. Witnesses included: G. William Hoagland, Senior Vice President, Bipartisan Policy Center Donald R. Wolfensberger, Fellow, Bipartisan Policy Center; Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Emily Holubowich, Participant, Convergence Building a Better Budget Process Project; Executive Director, Coalition for Health Funding Matt Owens, Participant, Convergence Building a Better Budget Process Project; Vice President for Federal Relations and Administration, Association of American Universities (AAU) May 24, 2018--The Budget Resolution--Content, Timeliness, and Enforcement During this hearing, members examined the current purpose and role of the budget resolution and considered possible options, presented by expert witnesses, to bolster the budget resolution's impact and influence in the federal budget and appropriations processes. Witnesses included: Maya MacGuineas, President, Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget James C. Capretta, Resident Fellow and Milton Friedman Chair, American Enterprise Institute Bill Dauster, Former Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel, Senate Budget Committee Joseph White, Professor, Department of Political Science and Center for Policy Studies, Case Western Reserve University June 27, 2018--Members' Day During this hearing, members of both chambers of Congress testified before the JSCBAPR on their ideas for improving the budget and appropriations processes. Members who testified before the JSCBAPR included: The Honorable Paul D. Ryan, Speaker of the House of Representatives The Honorable Nancy P. Pelosi, Democratic Minority Leader of the House of Representatives The Honorable Steny H. Hoyer, Democratic Whip of the House of Representatives Representative Hal Rogers (KY-05) Representative Pete Visclosky (IN-01) Representative Robert Aderholt (AL-04) Representative David Price (NC-04) Representative Rob Bishop (UT-01) Representative John Carter (TX-31) Representative Devin Nunes (CA-22) Senator Bob Corker (TN) Representative Jim Himes (CT-04) Representative Tom McClintock (CA-04) Representative Jim Renacci (OH-16) Representative Daniel Webster (FL-11) Representative Elizabeth Esty (CT-05) Representative Bill Foster (IL-11) Representative Keith Rothfus (PA-12) Senator Steve Daines (MT) Representative French Hill (AR-02) Representative Bruce Westerman (AR-04) Representative Warren Davidson (OH-08) Representative Pramila Jayapal (WA-07) Representative Roger Marshall (KS-01) Representative Lloyd Smucker (PA-16) Representative John Curtis (UT-03) Representative Ralph Norman (SC-05) Additional statements submitted for the record: Representative Virginia Foxx (NC-05) Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (FL-25) Senator Dean Heller (NV) Representative Bradley Byrne (AL-01) Representative Paul Mitchell (MI-10) July 12, 2018--Opportunities to Improve the Appropriations Process During this hearing, members considered the current challenges facing the appropriations process in Congress and discussed possibilities for improvement. Witnesses included: The Honorable Leon Panetta, Former Secretary of Defense, 2011-2013; Chairman, The Panetta Institute for Public Policy and Former Secretary of Defense The Honorable David Obey, Former Chairman of House Appropriations Committee, 2007-2011 ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING FOLLOWED BY HEARING ON: OPPORTUNITIES TO SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS ---------- TUESDAY, APRIL 17, 2018 House of Representatives, Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform, Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:32 a.m. in Room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Steve Womack and Hon. Nita M. Lowey [co-chairs of the committee] presiding. Present: Representatives Womack, Sessions, Woodall, Arrington, Lowey, Yarmuth, Roybal-Allard, and Kilmer. Senators Blunt, Perdue, Lankford, Ernst, Whitehouse, Bennet, Schatz, and Hirono. Co-Chair Womack. Good morning. The committee will come to order. I want to welcome everyone, and welcome to the first public hearing of the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform. Before we begin our hearing, we will first conduct the organizational meeting. After our administrative business, the co-chair and I intend to recognize members for opening statements. I encourage opening statements at the hearing. In future hearings we hope to minimize them. Finally, we will hear from our distinguished witnesses who have joined us. Before we consider the committee's rules, we would like to designate the committee's staff director. Pursuant to the co- chair's authority under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Dan Keniry, who currently serves as the staff director for the House Budget Committee, will serve as the Joint Select Committee staff director, with the understanding that he will consult with David Reich, counsel to Co-Chair Lowey. We will now consider the committee's rules of procedure. The proposed rules have been shared with all members of the committee. These rules set out the committee's procedures and are consistent with both House rules and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018. If there are any questions, staff are available to answer those queries. The committee will now proceed to the consideration of the committee rules package. My understanding is that we will have no amendments. So I would like to move from the chair to the adoption of the rule. Senator Lankford. Mr. Chairman, can I ask one question, a parliamentary inquiry? Co-Chair Womack. The gentleman will state his inquiry. Senator Lankford. My question was I had raised before just a clarification on what a majority is. The way the actual bill was written is it is unclear whether a majority--it is a majority from each party or a majority total. So that could be 10 people to pass the final product or 12 people. Has that been clarified yet? Co-Chair Womack. Based on guidance that the co-chairs have received, 10 votes total, including a minimum of 5 Republicans and 5 Democrats, are required to report the committee's legislative recommendations and report. Senator Lankford. Thank you. Thanks for putting that on the record. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you. Today's formal hearing record will provide this guidance. Co-Chair Lowey. Mr. Chairman, our staffs have consulted regarding these rules. We are both in agreement. This is a pretty simple, plain vanilla package. The committee will be fundamentally guided by the legislation that set it up, but these rules provide a useful supplement. So I move that the proposed rules be adopted and that the co-chairs be authorized to submit them for printing in the Congressional Record. Co-Chair Womack. Within a timeframe specific? Thirty days? Co-Chair Lowey. Correct. Co-Chair Womack. Okay. Is there any debate on the motion by the co-chair? If not, the question is on the motion offered by the gentlelady from New York. All those in favor, say aye. Those opposed, no. The ayes have it. The rules package is adopted. That concludes the business portion of the meeting. Now we will begin the hearing portion of the meeting, and I yield myself 5 minutes. Established by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, our panel of 16 members is charged with the task of significantly reforming the budget and appropriations process. Prior to this hearing, our panel has met twice to start the conversation and identify the problems. While this Select Committee is comprised of a diversity of political thought, we have clearly shared a common goal from the start. We believe that the current process isn't working, and reform is long overdue. Perhaps the most visible sign of dysfunction is that Congress has not followed regular order for the budget process for more than 20 years. Fiscal 1995 was the last time Congress passed a budget conference agreement followed by all of the separate appropriation bills before the beginning of the fiscal year. Since then it has become commonplace for Congress to rely on short-term funding measures and continuing resolutions in order to avoid government shutdowns, and even those efforts have not always been successful. It is our job to keep the government's lights on. We have failed to do it five times. The most important role given to Congress under the Constitution is the power of the purse. This panel is charged with ensuring we can fulfill this essential duty. It is no mistake that our Constitution begins in Article I by describing the powers and role of the legislative branch, and I believe that any proposals of this panel should affirm the distinct role intended by our Founding Fathers. Congress should always be at the center of deciding budget and spending issues for our nation. While respecting the role of the other two branches of government, any recommendations from this committee should reflect improvements to the congressional process rather than offer prescriptions for specific budgetary outcomes that benefit Republicans or Democrats. Our goal is to ensure a framework that works regardless of what party holds the majority in either Chamber of Congress. And it is my hope that we can come to agreement on recommendations and ultimately develop legislation that significantly reforms the budget and appropriations process. If we can design a better budget process to allow Congress to more effectively put forward its proposals, the budgetary outcomes will ultimately be returned to the American people through the elections. While the Bipartisan Budget Act requires that our panel come up with solutions by November 30, I believe we can and should get agreement on solutions sooner. So in the coming days and weeks, it is important that we quickly and thoughtfully move through our work. As we identify possible solutions, I urge my colleagues to bring up proposals that encourage and incentivize the completion of budget and appropriations work on time. In recent years, there have been four 2-year budget agreements. Our work should build on this trend, developing an overarching framework for Congress and ensuring certainty for funding decisions earlier. I look forward to today's discussion with experts on the advantages and disadvantages of various fixes. Today we will have two esteemed witnesses to help talk us through ideas for solutions. I am pleased to welcome Dr. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, who was appointed as Director of Congressional Budget Office in 2003 and led the agency for nearly 3 years. He served on President George W. Bush's Council of Economic Advisers, and he is currently president of the American Action Forum. Also joining us is Martha Coven, who previously served at the Office of Management and Budget and at the Domestic Policy Council during the Obama administration. Prior to her work in the executive branch, she spent several years at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Currently a lecturer and visiting professor at Princeton University. Thank you. And with that, I yield to the distinguished co-chair, the gentlelady from New York, Mrs. Lowey. [The prepared statement of Co-Chair Womack follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Lowey. And I would like to say thank you and welcome to Co-Chairman Womack, all of our members and witnesses, to the first public meeting of the Joint Select Committee. We all have our discontents with the budget process. Having recently emerged from the marathon negotiations over the 2018 omnibus appropriations package, I would put at the top of my list not enacting spending bills until the fiscal year is half over, our reliance on numerous short-term continuing resolutions, and appropriations getting bogged down by extraneous issues. But the process itself, which has served Congress well in the past, is not the fundamental cause of all these problems. The root cause of our current situation has much more to do with deep policy disagreements, often over issues that shouldn't be part of appropriation bills and a lack of political will. Procedural reforms alone are insufficient. But perhaps an improved process could facilitate reaching and implementing agreements when there is the will to do so. And perhaps changes to the process could help change some norms and expectations about how we function. It is well worth consideration. What kinds of problems should we be tackling? I would like to find a way to reach much earlier agreement on topline totals we need in order to make serious progress on appropriations bills. Among other things, that would make consideration of appropriation bills in the House and Senate much more meaningful as we would be working with common totals and bills more likely to be enacted, rather than leaving all that to the last minute. I would also like to find a better way of handling the debt ceiling, a process that currently serves no useful purpose but invites brinksmanship that menaces our economy. And I would like to find ways to once again make budget resolutions more meaningful and more useful. I look forward to working with my colleagues on this panel and to making progress on the task we have been given. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Co-Chair Lowey follows:] [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. I thank the Co-Chair. We are in the opening statements' portion of this hearing, and we will alternate House and Senate and Republican and Democrat. And with that, I will yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia, Senator Perdue. Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really am honored to be a part of this Select Committee. I don't think there is anything this year that we are going to do that will have a longer-term potential impact on the fiscal nature of our country and our ability to do what we all want to do. We are losing the right to do the right things financially. First of all, my learned opinion after the last 3 years of looking at this very, very closely is that our budget, and I am going to include our funding process in the United States Senate, is totally broken. While our appropriations process in the House indeed does work, I agree with the Co-Chair, Mrs. Lowey, that the lack of will keeps us from doing many things in the Senate. But I will argue this, that the budget process itself is totally broken. April 15 was this past Sunday, 2 days ago. It is a date that, in the Senate, we are supposed to have, by statute, we are supposed to have the budget complete. We haven't even talked about the budget yet this year, and I indeed believe we will not do a budget this year, just like we didn't do a budget last year and we didn't do a budget the year before. In 2015 we did a budget in the Senate. It took $7.5 trillion out of the future expenditures of the federal government. But it was fake, it was partisan, and it only lived for 4 months. It was waived in order to do the grand bargain so that we could fund the government that fall. The next year we deemed a budget so the Republicans could get to reconciliation and do what they wanted to do at 51 votes under the reconciliation law. Then last year we did the same thing. So we attempted healthcare, we attempted taxes all under reconciliation, which is part of the budget process. In my opinion, reading the Budget Act of 1974, that is a bad way to use, that is it is an improper use of the reconciliation rule. But the reality is that results speak for themselves, Mr. Chairman. Our budget process has only funded the government four times by the end of the fiscal year in the last 44 years since the 1974 Budget Act was put in place. Four times. Actually, the federal government has been closed down 20 times in the last 44 years because Congress did not fund the government by the end of a due date, either the fiscal year or the end of a continuing resolution. We are supposed to in the Senate, since 2000, we are supposed to appropriate 12 appropriation bills a year. The truth is we have only averaged 2\1/2\ appropriation bills being put on the floor of the Senate and passed in the Senate over those 44 years, an average of 2\1/2\ out of 12. Mr. Chairman, I would argue that there is no way anybody can argue that this process does not need dramatic revitalization. As a matter of fact, I think it takes a zero- based budget approach to the budget process itself, and that is a clean-page approach. We are indeed in a crisis financially. We just passed $21 trillion. I would argue that we will not solve the debt crisis unless and until we solve this budget process and funding crisis that we have today. In my opinion, other countries have to fund their government on time. And many countries, their constitution says that if you don't fund the government by the end of the current fiscal year, they dissolve that particular government and they form another one. I just believe that we have release valves in our system here that allow us in the Congress to not do our duty. The number one responsibility of the U.S. Congress is to fund the government. Article II very clearly lays out the responsibilities of the executive branch. Nowhere in there, in those itemized responsibilities, is to be involved in the funding of the government or, indeed, providing budgetary advice. The OMB Act of 1921 in many ways, in my view, violates that Article II piece of the Constitution. And so when I look at where we are today, we don't even start this process until we get an executive branch budget. I think that is wrong. I personally believe there is no higher calling right now for the United States Congress than to finally face up to the failure of this Budget Act of 1974, take a clean page approach, and finally, once and for all, develop a politically neutral platform that allows us to fund the government on time without all this drama and without creating crisis for the rest of the world regarding what are we going to do in terms of funding the federal government the next year. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Co-Chair Womack. I thank the gentleman. The Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Whitehouse. Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to you and your Co-Chair, Representative Lowey, for your leadership of this group. I hope that we are able to be effective and to discharge our duties here. I note that we are both Senators and House members, and the Senate and the House have different perspectives and different procedures. And the problem areas are budget and appropriations, and budgeters and appropriators have different procedures and perspectives. I do believe there are some commonalities. I think we can probably agree together that a 2-year budget cycle makes more sense. We could perhaps even agree that a 2-year appropriations cycle, perhaps staggered year to year, might make some sense. We can perhaps agree that the executive branch doesn't need to have a formal role in the budget timeframe and process, that there is plenty of political interaction to take place so that we don't need to boil that into our scheduling. But I would just like to say a few words from my perspective as a Senator who sits on the Senate Budget Committee. I would concur with Senator Perdue that the Senate Budget Committee process is completely broken. It became ineffectual when the Senate went to a 60-vote baseline for virtually everything, and the penalty for violating the Senate budget is 60 votes. A fence that is at the level of the ground is no fence at all. Moreover, the Senate Budget Committee is the mechanism for the delivery of reconciliation, which has been morphed over the years away from its original purpose to become a general partisan delivery system. Both sides, I think, need to stand down on that and redirect the Senate Budget Committee to a budget process. Now, in order to do that, I think there are some baselines that we have to achieve. The first is that we have to create within the Senate Budget Committee at least the possibility of a bipartisan process. Everything about the Senate process right now pushes towards partisanship. We need to create a rule that provides the option of traveling a bipartisan road. If we can get over the hurdle of bipartisanship, then there are some other things we need to consider. If we are going to look at debt and deficit, we have to comply with the mathematics of debt and deficit, which means you have to look at appropriated spending, you have to look at healthcare spending, you have to look at tax spending, and you have to look at revenues. If you are not looking at all of them, you are necessarily mathematically incomplete, and it is virtually impossible to get anything meaningful done. I think everybody who has ever been before the Senate Budget Committee has agreed that debt to GDP is the measure of safety with respect to long-term debt and with respect to regular deficits. So we need to do the basic task of deciding, and I think we can do this, bipartisan fashion, what is a fair and sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio. And then how long is it going to take us to get there? You don't land a plane by driving it straight down to the ground. You have a glide slope. And we need to have a glide slope. And what should that glide slope be? That is something I think we can also agree to. And then what are the warnings that let you know you are off your landing path, that you are not on the glide slope? I think we can install those as well. If we have a bipartisan path that considers all those elements, tracks us towards a sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio, and warns the public when we are off course, I think we will have accomplished a very significant task, and the Senate Budget Committee will once again be somewhat useful. I would close by echoing what Representative Lowey said about the debt ceiling. I see the debt ceiling as like somebody who put a bear trap in their bedroom. And they know they are going to get up in the night, and if they are lucky, their best-case scenario is that they avoid the bear trap. There is no good that comes out of having that bear trap in the bedroom. There is the chance that you step in it. And if you step in it, it is a catastrophe. If we can build through this process some sense of public confidence that we have a track towards a sustainable debt-to- GDP ratio, then perhaps we can undo this completely unhelpful, completely manipulable, and dangerous debt ceiling process that we go through, which appeals to the nature of our very worst angels. So with that, I look forward to working productively with everyone. I do think it is important that we understand that the Senate operates a little differently from the House, and budget folks have different perspectives from appropriators. And we all need to pull together to try to come up with something that can solve this problem. I think it is very doable, and I look forward to joining all my terrific colleagues in doing it. And I thank you both for your leadership. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Senator. Based on order of arrival, the next opening statement will be given by the gentleman from Texas, Representative Arrington. Representative Arrington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Chairman Lowey, for your leadership to take on this daunting task. I am grateful to join my distinguished colleagues in solving what I believe is not a fundamental, but the fundamental problem for Congress, the budget and appropriations process. We all start with one thing in common. We believe that the process is broken, and I believe we are all truly committed to fixing it and doing it in a bipartisan and bicameral fashion, not just for our institutions, respectively, but for the American people, more importantly. Because if there is one area that I think highlights that Congress plays by a different set of rules than the American people, it is certainly the budget process. All someone has to do is review the tape of the past reform efforts, we went over that in painful detail last meeting, and look at the budget outcomes to appreciate the abysmal failure of past reform efforts and the Herculean challenge we have to implement any meaningful reforms in this one. If we don't do something to improve our situation, we will not only fail our frustrated colleagues and ourselves, we will fail our children. As a new member and a new generation policymaker, I am convinced that getting to the right budgetary outcome and the right budgetary process is the challenge of the 21st century. And if we stay on the current trajectory, I believe that it is the biggest threat to our nation's future. I don't think I could overstate that. Whether your priorities include infrastructure and the benefits to our economy in that regard, or the food supply and the Farm Bill safety net that we are working on, I believe that is important to food security, and R&D, as a former Vice Chancellor for research, I know that helps our global competitiveness, the list goes on and on. We all have our list of what we believe are national priorities. I think we would all agree on national defense. But it is all going to be in jeopardy if we, God help us, enter a sovereign debt crisis, not to mention the terrible economic conditions we will thrust on the next generation of Americans if we don't do something. I don't think that an external threat is going to take this country down. And when I say down, I mean lose our exceptionalism. I think it is going to be like most great civilizations, I think our most formidable foe is ourselves. I think it is our inability to govern ourselves, in many ways, but I think this being the greatest example. This inaptitude for self-governance, self-restraint, self-discipline is highlighted, again, I think most prominently in this process. So it seems to me that we are either going to make the sacrifices that other generations have made and muster the courage to put our country's interest ahead of our own political interest, or we are not going to have a choice. The harsh and indiscriminate realities of a sovereign debt crisis will force us to make the changes that we must make. And that is a sad state of affairs, that we know the train is heading for a collision. We know probably, I think collectively, we know what needs to be done. Will we have the courage to do it? Even in this group, even among this committee, will we have the collective courage to do it? Because if we do wait, we will have lost that privilege, that unwritten pledge that we made when we took this office to hand this country better than we found it to our children and grandchildren. What is our mission? I think, Mr. Chairman, we should start with what is our task at hand? And it should be something that we should be able to attain, but something that is aspirational at the same time, and we will have to figure out the balance of the two. But it is simply to ensure a process that results in timely and continuous funding for our government instead of this stopgap shutdown show that we have seen that you guys have described and my friend, Senator Perdue, described in his opening statement. I think the other component, I hope we can get there, I believe we can, is to not just focus on the process, but to ensure that we have the process, mechanisms, and incentives in place for responsible and cost-effective budget outcomes. I hope we can do that. We have to learn from history. We have to learn from our own experiences. But I believe fundamentally, and I hate to say this, but actually I am going to lump myself in this, but Congress as a whole and by nature I don't think has the collective will to do this. We have to find ways to align incentives. And if we do that, I think we will be successful. I will yield back. Co-Chair Womack. I thank the gentleman. Next to the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the Ranking Member on the House Budget Committee, the gentleman, Mr. Yarmuth. Representative Yarmuth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank you and Co-Chair Lowey for getting this process off to a very good start. As I said in one of our initial meetings, I think it is key that we focus on defining the problems we are seeking to fix. And from the tenor and the substance of the opening remarks that I have heard from our members so far, I can see where this is going. This is going to be a situation in which everything will have been said but not everybody has said it. And I think that is actually very encouraging, because I think it shows that this committee is committed to a very serious nonpartisan approach to solving what is a very difficult problem. And I find that very encouraging. I think it has been said several times already that whatever we propose should not be aimed at some kind of a philosophical result or any kind of outcome. And I think that is very positive in the way we ought to approach it. I just have a couple of thoughts that have occurred to me, and having been on the Budget Committee now for almost 10 years, one of the things that I think is very important is that most people when they look at the federal budget think of it as in terms of the context that they see elsewhere, a corporate budget, a personal family budget. And I think this is a mistake. I think a governmental budget is something that is very, very different from a business budget and from a personal family budget. In the government, we have a responsibility for coming up with a budget, but we are not the managers. The managers are the voters. We are also not the customers. The voters are the customers. And we have to figure out what they want us to do. Of course, that is part of our campaigns. But it is a very different perspective when we are trying to figure out what is an appropriate level of spending for which categories when we are not the ones who are actually finally ratifying our choices. And the other thing that concerns me, and Senator Whitehouse mentioned this as well, is that in practice revenues have been totally detached from the budget process. And if you are in a business, as I have been, when you are thinking about what you want to accomplish in your business, other than making money, you think about, first, what you want to accomplish. I was in the newspaper business. I decided on what kind of product I wanted to produce, and then I decided what resources were necessary. If there weren't enough resources, I hired a new sales manager or a new sales representative who would go out and try to generate more income. And I don't think we can view government quite the same way, but we also can't ignore the fact that revenue is a very critical part of what we do. And this process, at least as long as I have been involved in it, has totally ignored revenue as a component of the budget. When we put out an alternative budget last year and the year before that, the Democratic budget actually called for increased revenues, and of course that lead to political challenges from the other side. And I don't expect to hear that in this process. But that, I think, is something that we cannot fail to recognize, that as much as expenditures are important, we have expectations that our managers place on us. They know what they want government to do for them. And we have to figure out not only how to allocate money for those responsibilities, those functions, but we also have to figure out how to generate the revenue as well. So once again I am very encouraged by the tenor of the discussions so far in our prior meetings and today, and I look forward to a very productive process. I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. Next to the State of Iowa and the distinguished Senator, Ms. Ernst. Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Co-Chairman. And I truly am thrilled to have the opportunity to serve on this committee. The most fundamental role of Congress as laid out in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution is to raise revenue and fund the federal government. And, unfortunately, Congress has consistently failed to execute this responsibility in a timely or an effective manner. As noted before, since 1974 Congress has only passed all of its appropriations bills four times. Over the past 20 years we have passed a budget resolution only 11 times. And since 1999 we are averaging five continuing resolutions per year. Five per year. Unsurprisingly, our dysfunctional process has also yielded dysfunctional outcomes, growing deficits and $21 trillion in debt. This ineffectiveness is not only bad governance, it is a threat to our national security. Our reliance on continuing resolutions has a devastating effect on our military. As a result of our continued reliance on continuing resolutions, only 3 of the Army's 31 brigade combat teams are capable of deploying immediately to conflict. During continuing resolutions, the Army has $400 million less per month in their operating accounts. Richard Spencer, the Secretary of the Navy, has said that inefficiencies stemming from continuing resolutions have consulted in $4 billion in waste for the Navy since 2011. Our constituents deserve better than this cycle of governing crisis to crisis, and I look forward to working with my colleagues in a bipartisan manner to put in place reforms to get our budget and appropriations process working again. Again, I am thrilled to have the opportunity to spend this time with my colleagues working towards, again, a bipartisan fix to this very devastating situation. So again, thank you, Mr. Co-Chair. And I will yield. Co-Chair Womack. The gentleman from Colorado, Senator Bennet. Senator Bennet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you and your Co-Chair for such an encouraging start. I appreciate the comments of my colleagues. When I first came to the Senate, I was a little more optimistic than I am today about the ability of Congress to deal with our long-term fiscal challenges. By coming together, I thought we would figure out ways to pay for investments in the future while curbing spending to stay within our means. In other words, I thought there was a bipartisan commitment to do for our kids and grandkids what our grandparents had done for us. Unfortunately, as we have heard today in a bipartisan way, Congress has excelled over and over again taking the path of least resistance. We have had, I think by my count, roughly 39 continuing resolutions since I became a member of the United States Senate. And following recent tax and spending decisions by Congress, we are now on a path to have the largest deficits outside of a recession since World War II. The Congressional Budget Office now projects that even as we are approaching full employment we will have deficits approaching $1 trillion next year and on track to grow every year after that. At some point, the growing gap between spending and revenue will catch up with us if we don't do anything and will certainly catch up with the next generation of Americans. In the meantime, we are grinding down the parts of our government vital to our future--education, innovation, infrastructure, and efforts to reduce child poverty--and we are putting at risk the obligations we have made to our seniors, our veterans, and most vulnerable, including Medicare, Medicare, and Social Security. Mr. Chairman, I am under no illusion that reforming our budget process is a silver bullet to address the toxic levels of partisanship that seem to infect, for no good reason, everything we do around here. And no process reform can produce the political courage needed to take on the tough fiscal challenges that we face. But I do believe this committee can make important bipartisan progress and demonstrate leadership. I hope that we will work in good faith. We have a rare opportunity to do that on this committee. My hope is that all of us will keep an open mind and remain constructive in the face of hard and inevitable differences. Here are a few areas that I think we could think about working together. We might create more predictability for appropriators by putting in place a 2-year cycle for topline discretionary spending levels through so-called biennial budgeting. We will also need to come up with reasonable enforcement mechanisms that are a constructive push for us to act within deadlines. We should consider creating an appropriations process that is more predictable and inclusive, one that encourages bipartisan work, not partisan work, and limits the meaningless showboats that have become an unfortunate tradition around here. Lastly, we should de-weaponize the debt limit. Senator Schatz and I have a bill to eliminate the debt limit entirely since it serves no purpose other than risking default. I am open to considering alternative mechanisms to focus our attention on our actual fiscal problems while eliminating the threat of default once and for all. We should be responsible when we decide revenue and spending levels instead of trying to walk out on a bill when it comes due. I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and all of my colleagues up here to see where we can make progress, to see where we can make a difference. And I hope that we can show the world that even in these troubled times bipartisan progress really is possible. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Womack. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Woodall. Representative Woodall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and our Co-Chairman for our leadership here. I appreciate Speaker Ryan entrusting me with a spot on this committee. My very first vote of significance, Mr. Chairman, that I took in this institution back in 2011, you will remember it, you were a freshman as I was, was the vote for the Budget Control Act that created the last Joint Select Committee that had a chance to make a difference here. And I was so excited. We only had two Republicans in Georgia who supported that bill. I was so excited. I knew I was going to get defeated without question, but I knew I was going to have an opportunity to move the needle for our children and our grandchildren, which is what everybody has been talking about. I can't tell you the disappointment I had when that committee adjourned having agreed on absolutely nothing. Now, we entrusted, the Congress entrusted that committee with looking at the entire budget over a decade-upon-decade-long window, and they couldn't find a thing to do to make anything better for anybody. I would tell you the men and women of that committee I am sure regret that today and found themselves in a political environment that made that difficult. Mr. Chairman, everything I have heard from every member on this committee in the times we have gathered has led me to conclude we are not going to meet that same fate. To my friend from Texas' point, we have big, lofty aspirational goals that I hope that we will achieve. I believe that we can. But we also have those areas of fundamental agreement, as the Senator from Colorado pointed out, that we absolutely can achieve. There are some floors on our success as well. And I recognize that this is an opportunity that many of us came to Congress to be a part of, doing those things that otherwise would be unable to be done. And I want to encourage my colleagues. We talk about our current situation as if we are experiencing something that no generation before us has experienced, as if we are the first ones to overpromise and underdeliver, to cut taxes while promising new benefits. I will remind everyone of the story of Ida May Fuller, the very first woman to ever receive a Social Security pension. Those were our colleagues in 1935 that made those promises on behalf of a nation. And Ida May Fuller worked for 3 years under the Social Security system, paid in just over $24 in her 3 years. Her very first Social Security pension check was for just over $22, and she received that benefit over a lifetime that ultimately paid her almost $23,000 in Social Security benefits. So lest you think that our track record together is not that praiseworthy, I will tell you, we have not made $22 commitments for which we have paid out $22,000 in exchange. This has long been a problem. And much of the burden that is on us today is to solve problems not that we have created, but that previous generations of Members of Congress have created. And I am pleased to be a part of that. I appreciate the discussion of a glide slope forward, that we are not going to be able to get this all done overnight. But I think back to the Social Security amendments of 1983, another big vote that folks thought they would lose their seats over, restored solvency to the Social Security trust fund for decades, raised taxes, reduced benefits in many cases, but took effect far enough out into the future that folks had a chance to plan. I have read the testimony of both of our witnesses. Both suggest that we have process problems, flawed processes produce flawed products, and process problems that lead us to tools that were supposed to be productive and we use them in gimmickry fashions today. I think that much of our job, Mr. Chairman, is to build trust. I have often commented on Chairman Lowey and the trust that she builds on the Appropriations Committee, and we have a chance to do that. I would just close with a cautionary tale, though. I have never served on the United States Senate. I have spent a decade as a chief of staff on the House side, a decade as a member. I don't have any idea the challenges that go on in the United States Senate. But I hear the mention of the debt ceiling over and over again. You know, on the House side, that provides a minority voice opportunity in ways that otherwise the minority has no voice on the House side. Whether you are in the Progressive Caucus or whether you are in the Freedom Caucus, a debt ceiling conversation allows a stop in the process and requires that folks come together. Every single debt ceiling increase, Mr. Chairman, since you and I have come to Congress has resulted in moving the needle for more responsible spending or more responsible governing, every single time. I think we have to think through those challenges that obviously create lots of headaches. But sometimes those headaches are designed to create opportunities. And I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Kilmer. Representative Kilmer. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And I thank both of our Co-Chairs for your leadership on this. In the fall of 2012, I came to freshman orientation. I was elected for the first time. And they had a presentation from the Congressional Research Service to talk about how the budget process works. And after explaining the rules and the timelines in tremendous detail, they then said, ``But it never actually works that way. Let us tell you how it actually works.'' And I understand you have a similar experience teaching at Princeton. I have only served in Congress for 5 years, but I have spent a lot of time over the last few weeks trying to think through the budget process as I prepared to serve on this committee. And I think I have an idea why Congress doesn't follow the 1974 Budget Act, and it is because it would require Congress to make tough choices. And it is a whole lot easier to simply waive the rules. They tell me the last time Congress passed all 12 bills into law before the expiration of the fiscal year was back in the 1990s. And to me what that means is that no one in a position of leadership today feels like they are opening themselves up to any sort of criticism if they stray from the budget rules. Here we are 2 days after the Budget Act says Congress was supposed to have passed a budget resolution, and there is no uproar. There is no downside to having failed the act. It has, in fact, become an expectation that Congress won't follow the budget rules. And that seems like a problem. But I think it also creates an opportunity. If we are able to recommend some reforms and if congressional leaders from both parties support these new budget rules, then hopefully it will create some accountability and some pressure to follow those rules next year when the new Congress is sworn in. And that is not to say that a new budget process will lead to significantly better fiscal outcomes right away. I don't think this committee will be able to balance the budget or put us on a quick path to eliminating our deficit and paying down our debt overnight. But I do think there are very real problems that we can solve, and those are shutdowns, the threat of shutdowns, the persistent use of long-term continuing resolutions to fund the government. And we are going to hear from one of our witnesses today that those are wasteful and inefficient and destabilizing to our economy and unfair to our federal workforce and unfair to our military. And I think we have got to stop playing that record. I think there are a few principles that should guide the work that we are doing as we work toward those goals. First, whatever the budget process we put down on paper, in my view, should reflect the reality of how Congress actually works. I have only served in the post-BCA world where the budget resolution is purely a messaging and political exercise that is, frankly, largely a waste of time in a Congress that has plenty of opportunities for messaging and political efforts. The real budget process that I have seen involves Congress coming together on a bipartisan basis and passing a 2-year budget law and then working within that framework. And it seems like we should decide which of these paths we want to follow and have a process on paper that reflects that. Second, we should empower the independent, nonpartisan budget organizations. Someone needs to call balls and strikes. And we should do everything we can to insulate the CBO from the excessive partisanship that seems to have affected every other part of our legislative system. And, third, we should have a budget that is as honest and as transparent as possible. Congress may need gimmicks to get over the line, but it shouldn't rely on them to make the process work. So as we consider ideas for reform, I think there are a few things that we ought to avoid. First, inducements or incentives to actually be positive and not negative. We have already seen what happens when Congress puts a gun to its head. It ends up pulling the trigger. And I can't think of a single trigger that we could design to force action that wouldn't end up being some faction's preferred policy outcome. On top of that, I think we should create incentives for action, not inaction. Given the option, Congress always seems to want to kick the can and avoid hard choices. And the last thing we need to do is create a process that incentivizes delaying difficult decisions. And I want to close by saying that I approach serving on this committee with genuine hope and excitement that we can make a positive difference. I have had a chance to meet with and talk to many of you who I am serving with on this, and I hope to get to know all of you better as we undertake this work together. I think it is really important. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. I thank you the gentleman; Let's go to Oklahoma now, and the Senator from Oklahoma, and my classmate, James Lankford. Senator Lankford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had folks in Oklahoma that I visited with a couple of weeks ago in a townhall meeting. I tried to describe this process to them, and they said, ``What are your thoughts on the success of this process?'' I said, ``I am in the early optimistic phase of this,'' that we are all together, we are all nodding our heads saying something needs to be done. Ask me again in July how we are doing, because at some point we will move from larger concepts of recognizing problems to having to fight through how do we actually get to a solution on this. The problems are fairly obvious to us. In fact, it has been obvious for decades. As one of our witnesses today will mention, I am sure, today is April the 17th, 2 days past when the budget is required to be done by Congress, yet the Congress hasn't even taken up the budget much less actually passed it. We have clear issues that we continue to face with the deadlines and the structure as it exists. Eighteen of the past 20 years, we have had an omnibus bill. We are not even trying to be able to go through the process. What is interesting is to be able to see the history of this. This is not something new. But the battle over leaving it as is or saying that we need to actually have major changes is something that we have not only seen, but it seems to be every time the solutions seem to be the same, and we are reoccurring those over and over again. For instance, Senator Byrd, who was the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee in the 1990s, made the comment that there is not a need to make a change in the budget process because the Senate always gets its 13, at that time, 13 bills done expeditiously, was his words, and so there is no need to be able to change the budget process. At the same time, the Budget Committee was making bipartisan recommendations to be able to make major changes to the budget process. I would expect that would occur again. There will be individuals that will stand up in this body and say, ``Things are going fine, we are still open, we are still functioning,'' while this body stands up and says, ``No, there are major changes that are needed, this is not working.'' We are going to have to be able to work through that. Most of these issues are not new to us. As I have gone back through the history, as most of the members of this committee have already done as well, and as we walk through as a body together, we have seen some very basic things. Biennial budgeting. Do we need to do this every 2 years? How does the appropriations process work into that? Does the leadership committee need to be able to take the lead on forming the budget, or do we need to have a Budget Committee determine that? The big fight between authorizing and appropriating that only makes sense in Washington, D.C., continues to come up decade after decade after decade in the arguments, but yet we have still not resolved that. How many bills should come to the floor? How should those bills come to the floor? What is the process for the Finance Committee? Do they engage with that in Ways and Means? The oversight committees and the lack of oversight from the appropriations process. I can't tell you what it is in the House right now, but I believe the Senate did exactly zero oversight committees on anything in appropriations last year. With over a trillion dollars in spending, you would think we could work in at least one oversight hearing through that process. The CBO was designed to be a neutral balls-and-strikes arbitrator. It has become a great way to be able to game the system to be able to get done what you want to get done with fun rules like ChIMPs and pension smoothing and whatever rules that may be devised to create a new way to be able to spend money, not to actually be able to get insight and information. CRs, government shutdowns, debt ceilings, all of those things all fall into the chaos of the system. So my hope is that we can take the optimism that we currently have and the recognition that something needs to be done to look back at what has been discussed for decades and to say, how do we break through individuals who will say, ``Everything is working fine because I still have power in the process,'' and everyone else saying, ``No, this process is broken''? Just for the House Members that are here, let me describe the Senate appropriations process that I have the joy to be able serve on the Senate Appropriations Committee. The bills come to the Subcommittee--out of the Subcommittee--and you get the text of it the night before. You can't get it digitally, because if you got it digitally, you could search it. You get the text if you go into a room, much like you are going into a classified setting, to be able to flip through the text of that, and then you vote on it with no amendments the next day in the Subcommittee. And then it comes to the full committee, and you fight off all amendments during the full committee process. And then you never see it again until it shows up in the omnibus bill. By the way, may I mention, when it comes to the full committee and you actually vote on it in the full committee, each bill, you vote on it first, passing it up or down, and then amend it second. The process is broken from the subcommittee process, the budgeting process, all the way through. And I would hope this is something that we can address and should address. With that, I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. To the great State of Hawaii, Senator Schatz. Senator Schatz. I thank the Co-Chairs for their great work. And I want to agree with almost everything that has been said. I have a couple of additional thoughts. I think we should do this on an ongoing basis. We may want to consider doing this during every Congress as a good housekeeping for rules and process issues. It took us decades to get where we are. And although I am optimistic, I am in the early optimistic phases of this process as well, I am not optimistic that we can fix this in a matter of months, and I think we have to be committed over the long run to iterate this. We are in the beginning stages of the NBA playoffs, and the NBA has a Competition Committee that continually considers rule changes and brings those recommendations to the NBA's Board of Governors for their approval. And I think this is a good model for us. The Joint Select Committee should be just the beginning of a regular effort to develop reforms in our processes. In terms of specific proposals, under normal circumstances I wouldn't repeat what was said before, but I want to reiterate my determination to deal with this debt ceiling problem. I see no benefit. I understand what Representative Woodall is talking about in terms of giving the minority rights, but I think that is a broader question about the functioning of the House and Senate. And although there are sometimes some salutary effects, for both parties and both ideological perspectives, I think it is basically a trap for ourselves. A couple of final thoughts. We are talking a lot about budget and appropriations and not a lot about finance and Ways and Means. We are very possibly the only legislative body left on the planet that divides budget, appropriations, and revenue in the way that we do. I don't think it is the main problem, but it is a quite convoluted way to do our business. And the final point I will make is that success in this process depends on goodwill. The House has their Rules Committee in which they establish a rule for a bill, which usually deviates from the normal rules. And in the Senate, just to be clear, the only way the Senate functions and the only way the Senate has ever functioned is if you deviate from what they call the regular order. We need unanimous consent on a daily and sometimes hourly basis to allow the Senate to function, and the only way you get UCs is if you have goodwill. So I want to be cautious about our instinct to establish new rules when, in fact, what we need in the Senate in order for things to function is the waiving of the rules on a regular basis. But the reason that I am hopeful is that this process is the beginning of establishing trust and goodwill, and that is at least what will help on the Senate side. So I yield back. Chairman Womack. I thank the gentleman. To Missouri, the distinguished Senator from Missouri, Roy Blunt. Senator Blunt. Well, thank you, Chairman. And as my friend Mr. Yarmuth pointed out, everybody has said almost everything now, and with great commonality, actually, which is the interesting thing here. The tremendous sense of common purpose and an understanding that what we are doing now is just not working. We are down, essentially, to one bill that not only, as Mrs. Lowey pointed out, is the appropriations bill, but now is more and more the one big legislating bill. And this really has to stop. We are in a situation now where, basically, four members of the Congress, the leaders of the House and the leaders of the Senate, maybe five, maybe possibly six, and a dozen staffers make way too many decisions in way too closed an environment with not nearly enough information. And all these bills always reflect how far afield some of those decisions have wound up in that environment. At least the appropriators in the House and Senate get a chance to have input on the initial bill, and many questions are decided before they get to those four leaders. But bringing this down to one vote, you have one vote on one bill to decide whether you are going to do all the things in that bill and try to weigh that balance. The system was never designed that way. Early on, there was one vote on one bill, but it was a little bill that spent, what did we learn the other day, maybe $5 million was the funding of the government. And that is not the case. The President then has also one decision. He gets a chance to sign that one big bill and keep the government operating or to veto that one bill. This is a foolish position we have gotten ourselves in, and I think everybody understands that. Last week we had 229 years of congressional history in 36 minutes. But it was a pretty good reminder of just how this system worked so well for so long and has stopped working in recent years. Today we have two really extraordinary witnesses who understand this process as well as anybody, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to you and thanks to Congresswoman Lowey for leading this effort. Co-Chair Womack. And finally, to the great State of Texas and the Chairman of the House Rules Committee, Mr. Sessions. Representative Sessions. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Much has been said here today that I completely agree with. I am just going to add my few comments. I am not sure it has all been said yet, but a lot has been said. First of all, let me say this: I think we need to use the word ``common sense.'' I think we need to use the word ``goals.'' And I think we need to use the word ``recommendations.'' I think that there is a cadre of things that we see. We should call them out. We talk about balls and strikes. There are about probably 200 pitches along the way that take place in not only the budgeting process, but the appropriations process, and I think we should delineate those. I think we should have a good idea upfront about, what are our goals? What are our recommendations? What do we look at as common sense? Perhaps we can or cannot come to an idea. The gentleman, Rob Woodall, spoke clearly about, not disagreeing with Mrs. Lowey or others, but about raising the debt ceiling. I think that that should be a huge stop sign. I don't think it should be something that we should blow through and take as pro forma. I think we should expect that that is an important element for us to look at. Once again, I will agree with Mrs. Lowey, but we have to do it. We cannot allow us to default. But we need to look at it, at what is the goal and what is the recommendation that we would receive out of it. I think we should also include, and I intend to be a part of this, making sure that we put some delineation in about cost of noncompliance. A few people have talked about the real cost that happens to the United States Navy since 2011, us not accurately giving the government, in particular Health and Human Services, and in particular the United States military, their money day one. I think it should come as a goal, I think it should come as a recommendation that the largest elements of the United States Government must be funded first. It must be a goal. It must be a recommendation. And we should look at those items on a bipartisan basis, on a bicameral basis, and with, certainly, the President of the United States and Article II of a delineation that we believe would be common sense. And that is, giving someone that has $600 billion worth of responsibility, that you must allow them that opportunity to effectively make plans, do the things that are in the best interest of the country. You can vote for it or against it, but we ought to decide that we are going to do it day one. The other areas, look, I would like to say, sure, we need to fund all the other areas, and we should not drag that on. But the largest items, I think, common sense should prevail. Secondly, I think we should have an idea, and it has been spoken about by our Republican and Democrat colleagues, that I am very pleased to hear, but I think we should call it a pathway to balance. What are we aiming at? We have used the terms, ``can't get there overnight,'' I agree with that. But I think we ought to have an idea about a goal and a recommendation that we follow about how we are going to proceed and not add to it. Lastly, I am going to see if I can push to getting my arms around a look at nonfunded or unfunded liabilities in the future. I think we have got to be driven by facts that we all agree with. Instead of saying, ``Well, we didn't get our work done, maybe the American people did not expect us to do that,'' I think that there has to be some opportunity for us to understand why we are doing what we are doing and that we make tough decisions. I was elected to make tough decisions. We all were. I hope we can use this time to effectively look at goals, recommendations, and common sense. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Co-Chair Womack. I thank the gentleman. In the first hour of this first public hearing, you have heard from 14 of the 16 members of this Joint Select Committee, a very thoughtful opening discussion of the challenges that we face and the opportunities that lie in front of us. I would like now to, again, welcome our witnesses, Dr. Holtz-Eakin and Martha Coven. Thank you for your time today. The committee has received your written statements. They will be made part of the formal hearing record. You will each have 5 minutes to deliver your oral remarks. At this time, I would like to briefly yield to the distinguished Co-Chair, Mrs. Lowey, to welcome our first witness. Co-Chair Lowey. Well, thank you. And it is such an honor for me to introduce Martha Coven, who brings 25 years of experience working on domestic policy and the federal budget, inside and outside of government. She is currently a visiting professor, lecturer at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson's School of Public Affairs. Ms. Coven started her career as a staff member in the House of Representatives, spent several years at the nonprofit Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. She has a BA in economics, a JD from Yale. And we look forward to hearing your testimony. Thank you for being here today. STATEMENTS OF MARTHA COVEN, J.D., LECTURER AND JOHN L. WEINBERG/GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. VISITING PROFESSOR, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY; AND DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN, PH.D., PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ACTION FORUM STATEMENT OF MARTHA COVEN Ms. Coven. Co-Chairs Lowey and Womack and Members of this Joint Select Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. When I arrived at OMB, I had no idea I would soon acquire such skills as how to implement a midyear sequestration, including how to furlough staff; how to prepare to hit the debt ceiling; how to structure exception apportionments under protected continuing resolutions; and how to manage the government during shutdowns. So much wasted energy has gone into tasks like that over the last several years. So I commend the Congress for forming this committee. As a further sign that it is time to rethink things, I found myself earlier this year cutting dozens of pages from my syllabus. Teaching students how Congress assembles and enforces a budget resolution felt quaint, to put it mildly. So my hope is that I have only temporarily lightened my students' load and that by this time next year they will be reading about the well-considered reforms you have produced. Let me begin by offering a few reflections on the existing process. However imperfect a tool the Congressional Budget Act has become, it has left an important legacy. It has created the Congressional Budget Office, a neutral voice telling it straight to members of both parties. And more broadly, as the saying goes, plan beats no plan. And the Budget Act has had a pretty good run. Its framework and complementary measures, like the PAYGO rule, helped guide Presidents and Congresses of both parties to a situation where we fleetingly had budget surpluses. So I would caution you against tearing up the existing rules until you are certain you have a better approach. I will turn now to some specific recommendations for improving the process. So I will start with a caveat. A wise colleague once observed to me that budget rules are much better at enforcing agreements than at forcing them. What we most need, as many of you have said, is for Congress and the President to set responsible fiscal goals and make tough choices. With that said, there are three specific measures I would urge you to consider. My first recommendation is to restructure the appropriations calendar to match the congressional calendar. It has become laughable to imagine that appropriations bills could be done by September 30. Chronic delays in the appropriations process make implementation difficult and get in the way of a shared bipartisan goal of making the most efficient use of whatever funds are appropriated. Your jobs may be done when you finally pass the bills, but for everyone else, the work is just beginning. Delays are frustrating, not only to federal agencies, but also to the many other individuals and institutions across the country whom we ask to carry out activities with those funds, including state and local governments, nonprofits, and private contractors. It is hard to make smart decisions or do good planning if you have to scramble midyear just to get the money out the door. Nothing can fully prevent delays, but two steps would help restore regular order. First, shift the federal fiscal year to the calendar year. Both Congress and the President take office in January, so it makes sense to treat that as the start of the budget year as well. You would have the full year to get your work done, and legislation does tend to get wrapped up in December as jingle bells start to chime. Secondly, at the beginning of each Congress, both Chambers and the President should negotiate aggregate discretionary levels for the next 2 years. You have done this three times already through bipartisan budget acts, but not at predictable times or in standardized ways. My second recommendation is to end the debt ceiling brinksmanship. Indulging in buyer's remorse at the point when Treasury has to pay the bills risks damaging our economy and harming vulnerable citizens. And my third recommendation is to reserve reconciliation for fiscally responsible legislation. Reconciliation should be used for the politically difficult work of deficit reduction, not the politically convenient work of cutting taxes or increasing spending. Let me close by echoing the comments many of you made in encouraging you to approach your tasks in a politically neutral manner. Efforts to stack the deck in a progressive or conservative direction will hamper your ability to carry out your mission. Future Congresses need to retain the flexibility to make decisions about the appropriate levels of revenue and spending to meet the changing economic needs of their time and stay true to the people they represent. You can provide a framework for those decisions, but you can't make decisions for them. To that end, I encourage you to set aside proposals that would establish rigid targets or enforcement mechanisms that aim to steer mandatory spending or revenues in a particular direction or to lock our nation onto a particular fiscal path without knowing what the future holds. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Martha Coven follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Ms. Coven. Our next witness is Doug Holtz-Eakin, who has served in a variety of very important policy positions since 2001. During 2001 and 2002, chief economist for the President's Council of Economic Advisers, where he also served as the senior staff economist. But most notably, from 2003 to 2005 as the sixth Director of the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office. He brings a wealth of experience in the subject matter before this Select Committee, and we are delighted that he has joined us here this morning on this panel. Dr. Holtz-Eakin, the time is yours. STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Chairman Lowey, Chairman Womack, Members of the Committee, thank you for the privilege of being here today. And let me open by simply thanking you for your willingness to serve on this very important committee. I am a long-time observer of this very broken process, and everything I have heard today leaves me in the early optimistic stage as well. I hope I see you again later in a comparably optimistic stage and that your service turns out not to be thankless. There are enormous budget problems. They take the form of both debt trajectory as a threat to this nation and a process that regularly threatens shutdowns of the government, brinksmanship over the debt ceiling, and I think it is important that everyone here recognizes that. I think that it is an important early sign. We know that those problems will not be solved by process reforms alone, that, in fact, there will have to be some very important policy changes as well. But in thinking about the process reforms, there really are two branches, and we have heard both of them today. I would urge you to pick early between radical reforms, clean pages, starting over from scratch, versus modifications of the Budget Act. I am willing to entertain the former, but I think my experience leads me to suggest that on the timetables you have, the latter might be the way to go. I would concur with some previous sentiment that those process reforms should be policy-neutral. This should not be a committee that stacks the deck for a particular set of outcomes, however much I might want one or the other. And in my written testimony I have some suggestions, for example, in reformulating the baseline so that it is truly neutral between tax and spending decisions as you come to terms with the large debt problem. And I guess I would echo what has now been said several times about the importance of building on success. There are things that the Congress and the President have gotten done in recent years, and they have been 2-year agreements on how to fund the appropriations and what the levels of spending will be. Those are, perhaps, a sign that the budget resolution should be a 2-year resolution, that we should have something closer to a biennial budget. It is also true that the President has signed those agreements in every case. Perhaps that is indication that it is time to move from a concurrent resolution to a joint resolution where there is agreement on budgetary totals, appropriations, mandatories, taxes, and the borrowing between the House, the Senate, and the White House, something that doesn't happen right now. I regularly tell people, the U.S. Government does not have a budget. It doesn't have a fiscal policy. It doesn't have any single document that everyone agrees on for how it will add up. Instead, we have budgetary outcomes, usually bad. And it is time to change that record. And so I think building on that success, I think, would be an important thing. There is a lot of talk about different ways to manage internally the enforcement, carrots and sticks on getting things done. And there have been attempts at No Budget, No Pay, No Budget, No Recess, a variety of sticks. I was encouraged to think about carrots in the process of preparing my testimony. I try not to think about vegetables very often, but I did. It is hard. But it seems to me that there are some techniques that would be modeled on, essentially, the Gephardt Rule, which used to provide for deeming the debt limit as being passed when you pass the budget resolution, that would allow Congress to address some votes that are politically toxic, but which are real, like giving yourself a pay raise, which should happen and which is an impossible vote for anyone to take, and that if you pass a budget resolution, there would be a process to expedite those kinds of votes. And I would encourage you to think about those things, because we do need to both fix the budget process, but we also need to fund the government and fund the people who make this government run in a timely and efficient fashion. And so I thank you for the chance to be here today. I would say that I would be happy to aid this process in any way, not just at this hearing, but in the months to come. [The prepared statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Dr. Holtz-Eakin, and Ms. Coven as well, for your prepared testimony here today. We are going to move into the Q&A period. Dr. Holtz-Eakin, you have a thoughtful analysis in your prepared remarks of the pros and cons of making the budget resolution a joint resolution and sending it to the President early in the year. On one hand, it certainly establishes executive branch buy- in early in the process, but on the other hand, could be giving the White House a little more power than they currently have and turn even more authority over to them, even make the congressional budget process worse if, in fact, there is no agreement. So expand on your prepared testimony on these thoughts. Talk about the tradeoffs, if you will. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I think you expanded on it perfectly. I offer it with mixed emotions, quite frankly. Funding the government is a congressional obligation under the Constitution. The power of the purse belongs in the Congress. The Congress is responsive to the voters, and I think there should be a deep commitment to that. But the way we are doing things right now, as I said, doesn't constitute genuine budgeting. There is no place where we require that it all add up and that people sign off on that plan on behalf of the voters. So the argument for going to a joint resolution is to have some vehicle for that buy-in by all parts of the government so that we actually get coherent fiscal policy and don't find ourselves in the position we are today. It could make things worse. It certainly changes the balance of power. You now have a President who has to sign off, and it is one more person who can play brinksmanship, one more person who can hold up the process. And it might, in the end, turn out to produce outcomes that are even worse than right now. I don't know for sure. So I can't give an enthusiastic no reservations endorsement, but I do think we need to be cognizant of the fact that we aren't really doing budgeting. We are doing a subset of it, and not very well. Co-Chair Womack. Ms. Coven, you mentioned in your testimony that delays in getting the final appropriation numbers for an agency in any given year produces a significant impact on the agency's operation. Can't plan, and when they do a lot of contingency planning, a lot of what-ifs, there is a lot of inefficiency in that type of process. As an appropriator, I certainly agree with your testimony. Automatic CRs have been suggested as one way to reduce the potential of this brinksmanship. What impacts would an automatic CR have on the appropriations process and agency operations, in your opinion? Ms. Coven. Well, with all due respect, Mr. Chairman, I think if you passed automatic CR legislation, you may as well disband the appropriations committees. It removes the incentive for there to be that process of carefully looking at the funding levels for each program. I think, further, it creates a risk that we will not have adequate funding. Our funding will go to the wrong places, speaking of inefficiencies, if the government just continues. Circumstances change on the defense side of the equation, on the nondefense side of the equation. We have private market forces that affect where those needs are in veterans' medical care, in housing assistance. So the idea that the default plan is to just continue where the funding had been previously, I think is recipe for greater inefficiency rather than for a better process. Co-Chair Womack. My last question for you is that many state and local governments have procedures in place to ensure that government still functions even if a new budget is not passed. I particularly like what Arkansas does. You know, it has a Revenue Stabilization Act, a form of a balanced budget agreement that forces the legislature to have to look at different components of government from time to time. Are these forms of government guardrails, as it were, appropriate? And if so, is there a model out there that we should look to? Ms. Coven. Well, I don't know the precise model that you are pointing to in Arkansas. I will caution you, I think it is wonderful to set out to provide yourselves with information about where we are heading so that you can judge whether the sum total of the actions that you have taken are pushing you in the right direction. I think if you move to something that is more rigid, like a cap, like a balanced budget requirement, anything like that, you are setting up a situation where you are ignoring the underlying factors, which we know are an aging population and healthcare and revenues and the matters that you have considered, and you are sort of dodging the idea of making thoughtful policy choices, and instead, potentially letting some sort of automatic mechanism, like sequestration, be the solution. I don't think that was very popular here and I don't think it was very popular around the country. So I think it is wonderful to provide yourself with information, and that is one role that budget committees can play, but I would really caution against putting yourselves on some kind of autopilot. Co-Chair Womack. My distinguished Co-Chair, Mrs. Lowey. Co-Chair Lowey. Thank you. And thank you both for your testimony. It is interesting to me that while our two witnesses have different perspectives, you both make the point that budget process reforms should be policy-neutral. And we would hope that reforms should help facilitate good decision-making by Congress. But we should avoid things that try to force particular policy outcomes, such as fixed targets enforced by automatic spending cuts. I would appreciate if either of you would elaborate on that point. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I think there are a couple of reasons why this committee is not the right place to do that policymaking. First of all, you are tasked with the budget and appropriations process, not the fiscal policy of the United States. And so it seems like a bit of an overreach. The second, though, is if there isn't genuine buy-in, not just by your colleagues in the House and Senate, but by the public, inevitably whatever targets, triggers, mechanisms you put in place will be overridden. We have seen this again and again and again, whether it was the SGR mechanism in the docs pay in Medicare. I am old enough to remember Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and fixed deficit targets, which we overrode because we couldn't hit them. People hadn't bought into matching them. As Martha said, you can use these kinds of things to enforce an agreement, but you can't force a policy outcome. And I would urge you to not try. Ms. Coven. I agree with that. The only thing I would add is that you really--and this is really as to what Doug said--you want your reforms to be durable. And as you all know, control of Congress and the Presidency shifts from time to time, and you don't want the first order of business of each new Congress to be to rejigger the rules that the previous one set. So I think establishing policy-neutrals will help make sure that these are lasting reforms. Co-Chair Lowey. I think I will save my other questions and give opportunities to others. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you. Senator Perdue. Senator Perdue. Thank you. And I am so excited by your testimony. I have been through every word of it. Mrs. Coven, there must be something wrong today. You are the Democratic witness today, and I agree with every word you have written here. In all seriousness, you make four recommendations: shift the fiscal year, look at biennial budgeting, get rid of debt ceilings, and use reconciliation, if you are going to use it at all, use it for what it was written for, and that is to reduce the deficit. But the thing I like the most, and we have all said this in different ways, not just the process here of the Select Committee should be politically neutral, but I believe the budgeting and funding process itself, the process, should be a politically neutral platform. And you say: I encourage you to approach this task in a politically neutral manner. Dr. Holtz-Eakin, you say the same thing. Here is my question for both of you. There are a lot of things we can do to change the process, but there are two issues. One is policy and one is outcome. The policy we are talking about. Let's separate the process from the policy in this Select Committee, is my opinion, and look for a politically neutral platform. Senator Hirono said it best, I think, in our first meeting, that her only wish here is that we have a process in which we will never have to use a CR again. I think that is a high calling, and I love it, because I think it is very simple and it ought to be our outcome. The thing that we are trying to do here is fund the government. Would you both help me? You both talked about consequences. You both talked about incentives. But if we have a process and we get to the end of the fiscal year, and let's say it is 12:31 along with the calendar year--Ms. Coven, would you start, and, Dr. Holtz-Eakin, I would love to get your opinion--what can we do to hold ourselves accountable and get that done so that we don't have to deal with, ``What if we don't do it?'' That is where sequestration was born. That is where the Budget Control Act was born. We need a process that functions without all the drama. And by the way, every other country in the world, every company I know of and every state I know of does this without the drama of the U.S. federal government. Would you guys just address how we get there at the end of this process? Ms. Coven. So I will start, I guess. Thank you. And I thought a bit about this, obviously, after being invited to testify. I think the best you can do is look for the natural breakpoints for the U.S. Congress. And December, usually the end of the year is the most natural breakpoint in the action for you. Sometimes it is the end point, because you know a new Congress is taking over. Senator Perdue. Yeah, I agree with that. And it gives us more time during the year, too. Ms. Coven. Right. Senator Perdue. So my question is, if you don't get that done by that date, what happens? And what are the things you would suggest to us to hold us accountable to where we would do it? Ms. Coven. So, I mean, Doug put some of those ideas on the table. You all are adults. You take your responsibility seriously. To me, having something that actually withholds your pay or something else from you, I don't know if that is a road that you want to walk down. My hope is that by rejiggering the calendar so that there is an expectation--and a lot of budget process operates through norms and expectations--that that is enough to get things on course. But if you want to talk about stronger measures, I don't know---- Senator Perdue. Well, I am sorry, I am not looking for stronger measures. But the reality is, if you start January 1, which we do today, you get a document from the White House. When we start, we have 14 weeks for budgeting. In the Senate, you have 16 authorizing committees. And by the way, we haven't authorized in years. The State Department for a while wasn't authorized for 15 years, until 2 years ago. It is a joke. We are the only real entity that still uses an authorizing process. But that is 16 weeks. Another 12 weeks for the appropriations. That is if you do one a week in the Senate, which has really never been done, obviously. Well, that is 42 weeks out of a 52-week calendar. Even if you change the fiscal year, it is not going to happen. So I understand there have to be some structural changes. But, Dr. Holtz-Eakin, help us with it, very quickly, as I want to yield time to the other guys here as well. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I don't have a magic solution on that. I really don't. I mean, if you walk through the mechanics that you just outlined, the first thing that jumps out is maybe there are too many appropriations bills. Maybe 12 is the wrong number. Senator Perdue. Is that what you meant by potentially incrementalizing our way there? Then let's say you do that, you go to biennial, you reduce the number of appropriation bills, you give yourself a better chance. Then the question, major question is, do we still need an authorizing process? I don't have time. I will submit that question to both of you. I would love to get your response on that. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Sure. Senator Perdue. Most every other entity we looked at in the last 3 years has a budgeting process that has efficacy, it has an appropriating process that works. Very few, if any, had an authorizing built in there. Authorizing was part of the budgeting allocation process. Are you familiar with that? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Yeah. Why don't I get back to you in writing? Senator Perdue. Okay. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Whitehouse. Senator Whitehouse. Thank you both for your testimony, not only here but in many other Budget Committee hearings. Is it fair to say that you can't even calculate the deficit in any given year without looking at revenues, appropriated spending, healthcare spending, and tax spending? It is just a mathematical truth, correct? Ms. Coven. Yes. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Yes. Senator Whitehouse. Both witnesses agree that is a mathematical truth. Good. And how broadly accepted is debt-to-GDP ratio as the metric, whatever the number actually is, but as the metric that we should be looking at with respect to a sustainable national debt? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I think that is pretty widely accepted. The footnote on that would be what measure of debt do you want to put, debt of the hands of the public or the total debt. Senator Whitehouse. Correct. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. So I would be a fan of debt in the hands of the public as the economically relevant measure. Senator Whitehouse. Ms. Coven. Ms. Coven. I would agree. But you made an important distinction, which is what the number actually is, and that can vary with the business cycle. So it is not that there even is one number, but as a general measure---- Senator Whitehouse. The conversation should be about debt- to-GDP with those asterisks. Ms. Coven. It is a very useful conversation to have. Senator Whitehouse. Okay. That is good to know. And are we going to be able to fix this in a year or do you need to plan for a glide slope that gets you from where we are to where we need to be? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. It will certainly take many years. And in terms of where you need to be, I think the economically relevant thing is that the U.S. display to global capital markets that debt-to-GDP is on a downward trajectory, even if a tiny slope. But right now it is going straight up. Senator Whitehouse. Let me jump in on that because that is a point that I would like to ask you guys about. Let's say that all that this committee was to secure the passage through Congress of a plan that set a sustainable debt- to-GDP ratio and set a mechanism for a glide slope to get there and some alarms to let you know if you got off course. How do you believe global markets would react to that achievement now? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I don't think they would react at all because I think global markets would view that the way I view it, which is a fairly empty promise since you haven't got political buy-in on the policies that would make it happen. Senator Whitehouse. So you would actually have to start doing it. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Yeah. Senator Whitehouse. Okay. And then how would they react? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. That would be a very good day. Senator Whitehouse. Okay. You have talked about the reconciliation process. In my view, in the Senate it has been hijacked to completely unrelated purposes from dealing with the debt or the deficit. It is a bipartisan sin. We used reconciliation to help pass ObamaCare. The Republicans just used reconciliation to pass massive deficit-creating tax cuts. And make this a response for the record if it is going to take a long time, but I would be interested in what constraints or restrictions you think we might be able to agree on that would actually be effective in limiting reconciliation to its intended purpose now that it has kind of gotten out of control. How do we get it back in the cage? Ms. Coven. Yeah, I want to make one very important distinction, though, which is that, whatever your feelings on this panel may be about ObamaCare, that was not legislation that was scored as adding to the deficit. I think we have seen that more in the tax arena. But it is certainly possible in the entitlement arena. Senator Whitehouse. And as somebody who supported it very energetically, I like it, too. I get all that. But I don't think it was our view that we were doing that as part of a debt and deficit measure. Ms. Coven. That was not the primary purpose, right. Senator Whitehouse. That was designed as a healthcare measure and to help people across the country. And we used this process because it worked, not because we were trying to solve primarily a debt or deficit problem. Ms. Coven. Right. Right. But I think the point, the important thing is that it is more important that reconciliation not be abused and increase the deficit than to set some particular target for how much deficit reduction has to be achieved in order to have that tool. Senator Whitehouse. Exactly. Ms. Coven. The risk is in the negative direction. So what I do is implement something like what used to be the Conrad Rule in both Chambers, which is to say that you can't use it to increase the deficit. Senator Whitehouse. Okay. And if you have any further or more complicated thoughts than that that you want to put in writing for me, I would be interested. Because we do need to solve, I think, the abuse of the reconciliation process in all of this. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. So, briefly, the thing I would just mention for everyone is that reconciliation is really a way to get around the rules of the Senate. Senator Whitehouse. Yeah. Exactly. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. In the end. Senator Whitehouse. And the Senate Budget Committee has become a delivery system for that rule breaking. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. And so, since this is a general entity, I would hesitate to dictate to one Chamber how they are going to run themselves. Senator Whitehouse. I am just asking for recommendations. You are not going to be dictating. Last thing is the debt ceiling. Upside? Downside? Specifically, what does it look like if one day we should fail at passing a needed debt ceiling and went into default? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. U.S. Treasury's are the foundation of the global financial system. Impairing their liquidity even a little bit would be an economic catastrophe. It can't happen. Ms. Coven. And similarly, the programmatic consequences of having to tell the American people, our contractors, everyone else we do business with that we are not sure when we can pay you is--and we had to deal with planning for this a few years ago when we actually got up to it--it is no way to run a railroad. Senator Whitehouse. Thank you both. Thank you to the chairman. Co-Chair Womack. Mr. Arrington of Texas. Representative Arrington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank the panelists for your thoughtful testimony and responses to our questions. As a new Member, I have been surprised by a lot of things, but not the least of which has been the lack of accountability and oversight, which is the governing part of the job I thought was going to take most of my time. I think in my, again, year of service, whether it was on the VA Committee or some other, Agriculture, Authorizing Committee where we have oversight responsibilities, I think the lack of oversight has created a culture that lacks accountability and a focus on results. And so the federal government is not operating effectively in service to its citizens. I can't tell you how many times I have asked the question: So tell me, before we fund or reauthorize your program or make recommendations for such, how is it going? Are you achieving the desired outcomes? Are you off-the-chain great or are you way underperforming? And maybe we need to invest more money in this because it is working so well to serve the veterans or the farmers or what have you. So I believe that we could have a policy-neutral recommendation to have oversight before we actually throw money at something that may not be achieving its desired outcome, whether it is a Republican idea or program or it is a Democrat idea or program. Can you both comment on how in the world we get back to that component of regular order, good business, and as my friend and fellow Texan says, common sense? Ms. Coven. So I absolutely agree with what you are saying. I think we don't take a hard enough look at, particularly, some of the programs that we set in motion and ask ourselves: Do we know it is working? Is it achieving the result that we are asking? The question was raised earlier, I think by Senator Perdue, about what the role for the authorizing committees are. And I think one useful reform coming out of this process could be to step up the expectation that they are the partners with the Appropriations Committee in asking those hard questions. Now, in fairness to the appropriators, those questions do get asked of federal agency witnesses and others who come before them every year to defend their budget request and explain why the administration thinks funding should be increased in one place and cut in another. But the authorizing committees have a lot of scope to do this, to delve more deeply to answer the questions you have asked. And I think their thoughts should have more input into the decisions that are made by appropriators. Representative Arrington. Thank you. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I am going to echo that, and I will do it via a very particular example, which is Chairman Womack recently had me testify in front of an oversight hearing for the Congressional Budget Office. It was the first time I had delivered such testimony, even though I ran it. There were no oversight hearings. The closest that I came to an oversight hearing was the legislative branch appropriations bill when I had to defend CBO's budget request and to explain what it did and how we were going to use that money. I think that's a real problem. And I would echo that a good use of the authorizing committees is to have them be your partners with a much more explicit role for this. And if you have a different calendar, they can go first and then you can appropriate based on the results. Representative Arrington. Senator Whitehouse has gone. Is he here? No, he has left. Well, I want to say that I align my thinking about how we ultimately get at responsible and effective outcomes. I recognize that we may not get there and we may just have a better process, a smoother and more seamless process. I am for that, by the way. So I like the glide slope. I like the targets. I don't know what mechanisms or accountability or pain or shame or carrot or stick that is going to move this seemingly immovable body. So it is discouraging after we got the history of almost 200 years of reforms and then we look and it is $21 trillion in debt. I do think the fixed target and glide slope idea, I think it is a great idea. I just don't know how in the world we are going to change the behavior of the United States Congress. Isn't that the million-dollar question here on anything, whether it is timeliness, whether it is unauthorized to now authorized spending? Whatever it is, isn't the million-dollar question how do we change the behavior of this animal that doesn't seem to want to change? Give us some ideas on that in that regard. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. So this has come up a number of times around the globe. And the essential issue is that there is nothing that you can do in the way of a mechanism that you can't also undo. And so you can't bind yourself to delivering any particular outcome or process or whatever. So in other places, Scandinavia, there are a couple countries who did this, you adopt fixed fiscal rules that bind--the parliament in that case--that they have to adhere to. In our case, that would require amending the Constitution. That is the thing which you cannot change to which you must adhere, and that is a very high bar for changes. Representative Arrington. I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. The gentleman from the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Mr. Yarmuth. Representative Yarmuth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for your testimony. And I am glad to hear you both reject the notion of No Budget, No Pay or No Budget, No Recess. It seems to me that is a recipe for doing shoddy, sloppy work. There is an incentive to do anything to avoid those repercussions rather than to do responsible work. Ms. Coven, I have a question for you. Dr. Holtz-Eakin suggested that we consider a joint budget resolution to get the President more involved in the process earlier. He also suggested that change would have pluses and minuses. What is your view of that potential change and how would you weigh the advantages and disadvantages for that change? Ms. Coven. So I am not a fan of that proposal. And Doug helped to explain some of the pitfalls. Let me just amplify briefly. So, first of all, if you think what we need is more gridlock, that, to me, is the recipe for it. It is hard enough to get an ordinary budget resolution done. As you all have said, they often don't get done. Inviting another party into that negotiation could make it more difficult. Secondly, it is a power shift in two directions, not only shifting some of your Article I power down the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, but also, if we are talking about this resolution being a 51-voter, shifting power away from the minority party in the Senate. And as the saying goes, sometimes you are the windshield, sometimes you are the bug. You don't know which party you are in that situation. So the idea that you would permanently say, ``Well, the minority just doesn't have a voice,'' doesn't make sense to me on something as important as this. And the third thing is that it risks, if it is a bill, which it would be if it were signed into law by the President, becoming a Christmas tree, a mega budget bill, a mega revenue bill that tangles everything up in one big knot. So while I understand and appreciate the notion that you want the Congress and the President to be on the same page, and I have suggested it with regard to caps and appropriations because that is just practical, otherwise the government shuts down, the idea of trying to do the whole ball of wax in one fell swoop seems to me too ambitious and likely to deteriorate the process rather than improve it. Representative Yarmuth. I appreciate that. This morning I woke up to see that Senator Enzi has floated the idea of possibly doing away with the Budget Committee. I don't know if he was talking about in just the Senate. So I am interested in getting your thoughts on that. And also something that occurred to me once, an idea, I have no idea whether it makes any sense or not to even think about it, but the possibility of a Joint Committee to essentially save a step, where the Senate and House developed a budget resolution together. Any thoughts on either of those? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I am not familiar with what possessed Mr. Enzi to suggest getting rid of this committee, so I won't answer that one. In the template that was the Budget Act, the Budget Committee as a coordinating function and as a consolidator and as handling the reconciliation process made perfect sense. Like much of this, it just hasn't worked out so well, so that suggests that some change does make sense. I see no reason why a Joint Committee wouldn't be a good first step. If nothing else, the act of looking at the problems together, identifying the range of solutions together would inform both Chambers in a much more effective fashion than we are getting right now. There is a lot to be said for just knowing what ideas will and will not fly on the other side of the Capitol. Representative Yarmuth. Thank you. Do you have some thoughts, Ms. Coven. Ms. Coven. Just really briefly. The only thing I would say is that I do like the idea that a number of people have expressed, and I think members of this panel, is making sure that the Budget Committee can speak for both Chambers, whether that is a Joint Committee or separate committees, and is well represented in terms of your leadership, the tax-writing committees, the entitlement committees, and so on. So I just think if it remains, it should make sure that it does speak for the Chamber and can provide leadership for the rest of the Chamber. Representative Yarmuth. Thank you very much. I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Ernst. Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I would like to go back and revisit. We have had an interesting conversation about the sticks and the carrots. Because it is wonderful we are going through this process, and I believe it is extremely important that we find a solution that we can adhere to. But I think that many that have served in the Senate and the House before us thought that they also had a process that we could adhere to. And I would argue, I again want to go back and visit some of the sticks, because like No Budget, No Pay or No Budget, No Recess, we have found that--and I am going to push back on the shoddy workmanship, because I would say the omnibus bill that we just had was shoddy workmanship. Four or five people involved in a process. It is thrown together, we vote on it, we go home. You know, everybody is maybe not necessarily happy, but, wow, look, we have a product. We have to do our job. And what we have seemed to find lately in the United States Senate is, especially if you look at our nominations process, which also seems to be hampered, is that when the leader starts threatening to hold over weekends or cancel recesses, all of a sudden we start getting our nominations through the process. So I do think that we should have a discussion. We should not dismiss this just outright. I think that we need to be doing our jobs. But we are humans, and we like to go home on the weekends and we like to see our family at Christmas and Thanksgiving. If those sticks are out there, perhaps we know and we can plan ahead and understand that we need to get our jobs done. Would you please, if you could, maybe make comments about sticks and carrots that have been used in the past, maybe in your experience, that have tended to work or not tended to work? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I don't have a long list of things. Most of the things that have been used have been mechanisms designed to make you hit a particular budgetary target, say, a deficit target or a spending target. And you can override those mechanisms. So they have not been effective at all. By and large, process doesn't produce solutions. There has been some No Budget, No Pay sort of sentiment, and at least my understanding is that is probably not constitutional, so I would suggest not going that route. It is, however, I think constitutional for you not to see your family. So I would echo what Martha said about the empirical regularity with which things get done as you back up against a recess or some other part of the calendar. That does seem to motivate people to get things done. Senator Ernst. Thank you. Ms. Coven. Just one thing to add to that, which is that, as you think about those kinds of mechanisms, make sure that the collateral consequences fall on Congress and not on the American people. Senator Ernst. Exactly. I would agree wholeheartedly with that. It is incumbent upon us to make sure that we get our jobs done. And I would say, just as I stated in my opening comments, that for 44 years only four times have we done our job. So that speaks to, it is wonderful going through a process, making sure we have rules in place to do that, but we have to have the desire to get it done. Otherwise we just find ways around it and we end up with continuing resolutions and omnibus bills. Yes, Dr. Holtz-Eakin. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I want to just echo something that Martha said earlier, which I think is a good thing that you revisit the budget process. There is no reason why you should budget the same way all the time. Budgets should reflect priorities and problems, and these change for the nation, and the process should change with it. And if you make changes, I believe the folks who make those changes, meaning your colleagues and you, will have a buy-in to make them work. And there is more to this than rigid mechanical things. There is pride of craftsmanship and doing one's job well. And if you settle on a new budget process, I think it will, at least for some time, be in and of itself enough to get things moving better. Senator Ernst. Thank you. And I appreciate the time. And, again, I am truly looking forward to this. I think we can find a solution that hopefully we will be able to market and sell to the rest of our colleagues. But it is up to us to get it done and not look for specific loopholes that we can use in the process. So thank you. I yield. Co-Chair Womack. Representative Kilmer. Representative Kilmer. Thanks, Chairman. And thanks again for being with us. I think this conversation around carrots and sticks is actually kind of an important one, in part because it seems like a lot of the sticks that have been used that damage has accrued to the American taxpayer or to the military. And in part because when the sticks accrued to Congress, it finds a way to get around it, right? It waives them. So I think it is worth thinking about, is there more of a positive inducement to get Congress to do the right thing? And I know you have been asked that in various ways. But I would just encourage us, collectively, to think about that down the road. I want to ask about when we get on the eve of a shutdown. The Chairman asked should there be an auto CR. Some have suggested an auto CR minus a percent or some have suggested an auto CR plus a percent. And it seems like the problem is, whichever route you choose, someone will like that route. And it creates an incentive for inaction. I understand that during the Clinton years they said no CR beyond 2 days, and they did 21 of them, but they eventually got there on an agreement. What is the right, what do you think, on the eve of a potential shutdown, what would you recommend as a smarter approach? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. My first recommendation would be for this committee to be so successful that we are not on---- Representative Kilmer. Amen, I am with you. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. That is the fundamental indictment of this era, right? Representative Kilmer. Yeah. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. The second is, I think you should not rely on a mechanism. Mechanisms become someone's preferred policy, whether you anticipate it or not. Mechanisms can be overridden. That happens all the time. So if you are going to have a situation like that, empower someone in the Congress, someone who has been elected to make decisions, to make a decision to keep the government open. And the idea of you handing over all of your hard-earned clout from running for elections and being in the Congress, handing it over to someone else to do whatever they want, is going to really make you not want to do it. Ms. Coven. I agree with that. I think you can't automatic anything in this process. Representative Kilmer. I know that there has been some suggestion of taking OMB out of the budget process. I wanted to get your reaction to that. And if that happened, wouldn't CBO need a whole lot more resources? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I was unaware of that. It is a bad idea. The CBO was created because up until the 1974 Budget Act the only source of budgetary information was the Office of Management and Budget, and prior to that the Bureau of the Budget. It is a good thing for the executive and for the legislature to have their own entities. And, bluntly, competition is a good thing. It is a good thing for CBO to look over to OMB and say, ``Gee, do you think they did a better job of figuring out what is going to happen here?'' and vice versa. So I am inherently skeptical of monopolies and government monopolies who know better than any other. Ms. Coven. I would also add to that that another really important function of OMB, and particularly agency budget offices, is they just have a lot more information about what is going on, because they are operating in the executive branch. So CBO performs a somewhat different function, and it is the ultimate truth-teller, but you also need the agencies and OMB aggregating this information, which they are privy to because they are actually in the day-to-day operational mode. Representative Kilmer. Yeah. You spoke about the importance of CBO as a neutral voice, sort of calling the balls and strikes. Are there measures you think we ought to take to protect the integrity of CBO as an impartial referee in the budget process? Ms. Coven. I think it does a pretty good job. And I would more caution you against tampering with their ability to tell it straight than say that there are major reforms that are needed now. Representative Kilmer. Okay. You know what, I think I am just going to leave it at that. Thank you, Chairman. I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you. Senator Lankford. Senator Lankford. Thank you. I appreciate this. Let me try to pepper you all with a whole series of questions. And first let me push on a little bit what we were already talking about with auto CR. You had mentioned not wanting to have auto anything, and I understand that. We are trying to figure out how to be able to make sure we protect us from having shutdowns. And at the end of the day at some future Congress there is no resolution, how do we keep us going, as you mentioned, hold the American people harmless, put consequences here, to be able to get it done? That has been the conversation about we don't go home, there are automatic quorum calls where we stay in session continuously until we get it finished. But there has to be some kind of process to make sure that the American people are held harmless in this. That is going to require some mechanism in place, policy-neutral or not, some mechanism has to be there. Agree or disagree? That would mean something has to be automatic, I would say. Ms. Coven. Not if it means an automatic CR, no. Senator Lankford. Okay. What would you recommend instead, you get to the end of a budget year? Ms. Coven. I think what we find is Congress pretty quickly figures out that it has created a mess and it cleans it up. And that is a better thing than putting the government on autopilot. Senator Lankford. Okay. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. My suggestion was an automatic decision- making process, kick it to the majority leader of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, just to make it up on the spot. But somebody has to make a decision on what will or will not get funded, and the threat of handing it over to those individuals is what should motivate you to not end up there. Senator Lankford. Okay. Let me bring back up the issue about Budget Committee going away. That is an issue that has been around for several decades at this point. As I go through the notes of this body, in 1993, kicking around budget reforms even at that point, 20 years into the Budget Reform Act, the act of 1974, there was already this conversation that was brewing about leadership establishing the 302(a)'s. And it would be leadership of the House and the Senate being able to work through the process and then bringing that to the body to be able to vote on. And then the body establishes those 302(a)'s. But basically you have got, as the term that was used during that time by Senator Kassebaum, you have got someone with a little more clout in the process to be able to make that decision earlier on. What is your thoughts about a budget, the 302(a)'s being established by a leadership group, voted on by the House and the Senate, obviously the President would have to vote on that as well to be able to make it law, and then to be able to work on from there? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. So I think the key insight is that the budget committees as they are currently constituted can't remain. And the question is, do you want to make them more powerful by putting on them leadership, Ways and Means, Senate Finance, key committees like that, or do you want to make them go away? But they existed the way they do now because there was supposed to be the entire scope of operation, revenues, mandatories, discretionaries. They had that key coordinating function. No one is doing all that so the Budget Committee has no role. Senator Lankford. Right. Martha, do you have a thought on this. Ms. Coven. I agree with that. I would just say that there is some role for oversight of the budget broadly and that it worries me to think that Congress would have no group of people whose task was to be looking at the reports that CBO comes out, to be thinking about the long-term fiscal trajectory, et cetera. Senator Lankford. No, I would agree with that. Currently, our process is leadership decides everything at the end. How do we switch it to where there is a decision at the beginning on what the main number is and get more people involved in oversight throughout the process, rather than no oversight anywhere in the process and try to figure out how to be able to resolve that? Ms. Coven. Right. Senator Lankford. The concept of CBO in some of the scoring issues brought up before, CHIMPs, pension smoothing, payments shifts. Even PAYGO has become just a speed bump of late rather than something that is an actual mechanism. Are there recommendations that you would make to be able to reform some of these processes to make sure that they work? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. So that is an issue that is broader than CBO. There are scorekeepers, the OMB folks, CBO folks, appropriators, Budget Committee staff, minority and majority, who have met regularly for years and years, decades, and agreed upon the budgetary treatment of certain transactions like CHIMPs and a variety of other things. You could legislate that they go away. Other than that, there is nothing else that can you do. Senator Lankford. Is there a gain to having them? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. They are the little grease that is left to get things through. And grease is great until you abuse it. And so the question is, is it being abused? Senator Lankford. Okay. Ms. Coven. There is a stock of them built into the base. So I think you can't just say let's get rid of CHIMPs without acknowledging you are getting rid of billions of dollars of budget authority that is supporting programs that you all have voted for. Senator Lankford. Does that budget authority, does that at the deficits or is that---- Ms. Coven. It is part of the aggregate totals that you provide when you pass an omnibus spending bill. And I just think we need to acknowledge that that is part of the totals that we---- Senator Lankford. Totally agree. Yeah, I totally agree. And that has been my challenge, is if CHIMPs go away, you are not reducing deficit, but you are getting a more accurate number that is out there. And part of the challenge that we have right now is actually getting to the number. We have the number that is budgeted, then you have CHIMPs, then you have OCO, and then you have emergency funding. And everyone just says, no, but just look at this number. But the total aggregate debt is something completely different. And if we are going to go through this process, I think there should be some gain and to try to clean up so we get a number that is actually the number. With that, I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Hirono. Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for testifying. Just before this hearing White House economic advisor Larry Kudlow said, and I quote, ``Never believe CBO,'' end quote, because he claims they don't score tax cuts right. Do you agree? Ms. Coven. I don't agree with that. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I have a lot of disagreement with that, beginning with his misunderstanding the Joint Committee on Taxation is responsible for scoring tax bills. Senator Hirono. Congressman Kilmer asked whether we should move to protect CBO's independence. And, Ms. Coven, you said that you thought they do a pretty good job. But when we start talking about some people wanting them to engage in dynamic scoring and other ways to make whatever programs they are pushing look better, maybe we do need to ensure the independence of CBO, as long as we are looking to them as that independent voice for us. Ms. Coven. I think anything you can do to strengthen that function would be terrific. And it is interesting to see how that discussion played out on dynamic scoring because there is what the Joint Tax Committee said and then there is what lots of other people said. And then there is what a one-pager out of the Treasury Department said. And people are hanging their hats on whatever is convenient. But I agree that protecting the integrity of what they produce and the Joint Tax Committee is really important. Senator Hirono. Do you agree? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I do. I would just hasten to add that in my experience this is a very common occurrence. People are always lobbying for their programs to be fantastic and free, and they want you to say that. And it is business as usual to ignore that and just do the work. Senator Hirono. Well, I like what you said, that competition is good, that we have the executive branch putting out their best explanation of what is going to happen and then we rely on CBO as an independent voice. Well, hope does spring eternal that this Select Committee will be able to come up with a budget reform that is policy- neutral, because the broken process we have hurts real people. And I wanted to ask Ms. Coven, one of our tasks is to explain to the American people why the budget and appropriations process, or lack of process, matters in their everyday lives. And I am sure many people are unaware of the serious challenges that agencies face during shutdowns or CRs. And in particular, I am sure many people don't realize that agencies like Labor, Education, and the others that you oversaw face potential life-and-death concerns when faced with congressional inaction. My question to you is, could you elaborate on the situation or situations you were referring to in your testimony where you had to determine when a situation was so precarious that there is a threat to human life? Ms. Coven. Yes, I would be glad to. And thank you for asking that. So we have a law that has existed I think since the 1800s, I want to say, called the Anti-Deficiency Act, that makes it such that the executive branch cannot expend funds that Congress has not provided. So when the government is operating during a shutdown, one of the tasks that executive branch officials are engaged in is making sure that we do not violate that statute. There are criminal penalties attached, too, if you want to talk about sticks. So we were in a situation during one of the shutdowns where the WIC program, which provides nutritional support for infants and pregnant women and young children, was starting to run out of carryover and contingency funds. And right before the government, thankfully, reopened, we were in the process of trying to make a determination of whether or not, per the terms of the Anti-Deficiency Act, there was an imminent threat to the safety of human life if babies were not going to be able to get nutritional support, consulting with medical experts. These are hours of my life I can't believe I spent and I would love to have back. The idea that that is what we should be engaged in when we are implementing the federal budget is absurd, and it was heartbreaking to go through those discussions with medical experts. Senator Hirono. And that is just one concrete example of our inaction, our inability to do our jobs, how it impacts real life people, literally, in life-or-death situations. Are both of you familiar with the Convergence Center's ``Building a Better Budget Process Report''? Ms. Coven. Yes. Senator Hirono. So would you care to comment, both of you, on the report or any of the recommendations? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I would be happy to get back to you. It would be a long, long answer. I would be happy to provide it. There are a lot of interesting ideas in there. Ms. Coven. I think the one quick thing I would call out is, I do like the idea of sort of standardizing and more regularly presenting to Congress and the public the snapshot of where we stand and where we might be headed. And CBO does lots of products like that. But I think there is some logic to consistently providing information in a form that people start to recognize and can use. Senator Hirono. I think that is really important because of their suggestion that we have a fiscal state of the nation report every 4 years, for example, and a pretty regular performance of portfolio of federal programs reports just to let people know what the heck is happening. I think that is good. And then they also say that we should synchronize the budget cycle with the electoral cycle. That is a pretty straightforward recommendation. Do you have an opinion about that particular recommendation? Ms. Coven. The only thing I would say I think there was some hinting at things that are a little bit more like a joint budget resolution in that document, and I have urged caution on that. I think that is not the best path to walk down. But in terms of synchronizing the calendar, and particularly setting limits on appropriations every 2 years, makes a ton of sense to me. Senator Hirono. Did you want to add to that? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I concur with that. Senator Hirono. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Co-Chair Womack. Mr. Woodall. Representative Woodall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will pick up on the Anti-Deficiency Act. We have talked a lot about the 1974 Budget Act. But prior to the reinterpretation of the Anti-Deficiency Act during the Reagan era we didn't have these kinds of shutdowns, we were kind of on autopilot. Given your experience at OMB, Ms. Coven, you would have said you would not support an autopilot. You don't want to go back to the Carter days where the American people are held harmless and the shutdown is just a word document. You want it to have consequences. Ms. Coven. I want Congress to make choices, yes. Representative Woodall. Right. Thinking about your calendar year idea, of course, we started down this road in 1976, went back in 1986, and moved the fiscal year from July to October. I went back and looked. Just over the past 20 years, it turns out in 11 of those last 20 years, we didn't make it by January 1 either. So you have solved half the problem with that idea. Candidly, I think solving half the problem sometimes is a pretty good start. Knowing of our failure to have those funding decisions resolved even by January 1, you still see the merit of the calendar year vision. Ms. Coven. I do because the delays are shorter, which means the implementation can happen more quickly and the agencies and others who receive federal funds can make better use of them, yes. Representative Woodall. Mr. Holtz-Eakin, when we talked about misusing reconciliation, I appreciate those comments in Ms. Coven's testimony. She quickly corrected the record of ObamaCare being a money saver, which, of course, is exactly what CBO reported. Any time you start taxes in year one and benefits in year five, you tend to create a money saver. We gamed the system there. If we looked out over 20 years, we would have gotten a different number, 30 a different number. You said some of those games, CHIMPs, in response to Senator Lankford's questions, weren't the purview of the CBO to sort out. But given your experience as the scorekeeper, in the same way that process changes can be used, to Mr. Kilmer's point, in favor of or against folks who simply prefer that policy, I found our CBO scores to be that very same way. I can draft the legislation to achieve my goals in ways that pervert CBO's scoring to give me the freedom I need to have my language. What have you learned about how we could address CBO in ways that limit the perversion of some of the scoring games that go on now? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. CBO's job is to identify the federal budget costs of legislation. That is its primary function as a scorer. And it is not supposed to identify the benefits. It identifies the federal budget costs over the budget window specified by the budget committees at that point in time. Sometimes it has been 2 years. Right now it is 10. It has been a lot of things. And for that reason, it is always possible to, quote, game CBO, because they will score the legislation and not the legislation's intent. And you can, by front-loading things and leaving things out of the budget window, give a misleading presentation of the intent of a bill. I don't think you should pretend that you can fix CBO or fix the scoring process to avoid that. You need to provide a lot of information. You can ask CBO, what do the second 10 years look like? You can bring that into the debate on the floor. And the way you stop those things is voting no. Representative Woodall. I find it incongruous to have a conversation about the critical importance of a nonpartisan referee calling the balls and the strikes as they exist and the understanding that I can recraft the rules for CBO to get just about any result I want. At the same time, it seems that the utility of an unbiased scorekeeper is undermined by biased rules. I would also point out, when we no longer even use the CBO's baseline, when we find it not useful, there is some opportunity for change. But let me close with this and ask you if you have counsel. Yes, it is true we do things differently than anybody else does. We have a budget that seems fairly partisan. We have authorizers that do some oversight and not. And we have appropriators who actually get the job done at the end of the day. I think that structure can be politically useful. It allows lots of places to let steam out the system. Yes, we could be more efficient. But I am not sure that efficiency and utility are synonyms. Do you all have thoughts on that as experts in the field? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I think it is a good observation. I mean, I can say honestly that I thought one of my jobs at CBO was to have Congress scream at me and vent their frustration. And that was just part of going to the office, and that was fine, because Congress needs to vent on occasion, but it also needs to get its work down. If you need to do the venting first, good. Ms. Coven. The only thing I would add is that the biggest observation I had, shifting from working in the legislative branch to the executive branch, is that here there are 535 people all up for reelection. In the executive branch there is one person up for reelection at most once. So it makes sense that your process, with 535 people constantly responding to the needs of the American people, is going to be a little bit more complex than it is when one person is making decisions. Representative Woodall. Thank you both. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. Ms. Roybal-Allard. Representative Roybal-Allard. I apologize for being late, but I had another hearing at the same time. Being that I just came out of an appropriations hearing, I am going to ask the question with regards to the appropriations process. One of the things that has always been annoying is to receive a President's budget request that zeroes out funding for a popular program that the administration knows Congress is going to add back to the final appropriations bill. And then this has a ripple effect throughout the budget and appropriations, because in order to fund the program that is so popular something else has to give. And then there is the debate as to what that is going to be. What recommendations do you have to maybe stop this practice, which has been used by both administrations and both parties? And what are your thoughts about how we should look at the duplicative programs or cases where agencies are operating somewhat outside the lanes even if the programs are popular? Because I believe that that contributes to the overall budget delays and problems that we face today. Ms. Coven. So I think this happens in two kinds of circumstances, and one, I think, is legitimate and one isn't. The nonlegitimate use of what you described is when the President fully supports that activity and is just playing games to get the numbers to fit. And I think that is not something that should continue. And, Congress, whatever pressure you can apply to make sure it discontinues, particularly in the agencies. But there is a legitimate use of it, which is if what you are asking the President for is a request that reflects what he or she thinks the best distribution of resources across the country is, it may well be that the President, again, who is not quite as interactive with the voters on a regular basis, is exerting some courage and saying: This isn't working and I am zeroing it out, and I know it is popular, but I think these resources can be spent somewhere else. And I, frankly, think you want a President's budget that makes some of those kinds of choices and shows you where, with the full expertise of the executive branch, where you can make shifts towards better use of resources. Then you all can decide if that is a direction you want to follow or not. But you wouldn't want the President anticipating what your political choices are rather than providing you his or her best judgment. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. So let me echo the second part of that. In my experience in two White Houses, there were a long, long list of programs that the career staff at OMB had identified as candidates for elimination. And so it wasn't so much the political process that was doing it, it was the review process that looked for the effectiveness of programs and whether they were meeting their objectives. And then if they weren't, they should not be there. So I think that is a legitimate thing and that you should respect it. I think the second part of the question was about really oversight, right? If we have got duplicative programs and we have things that are wandering outside their legislative intent, the oversight process should be catching that and reining it in. And if it is not, then that is the call for better oversight. Representative Roybal-Allard. And when I came in, was there a question by Senator Hirono with regards to how we could make the budget more transparent and understandable for the public? Did I hear that? Ms. Coven. I think she was referencing a proposal by the Convergence Group that included this fiscal report, yes. Representative Roybal-Allard. And you are going to be responding in writing to that? Mr. Holtz-Eakin. She asked for our thoughts on the whole Convergence report and I thought it would be more efficient to just get back to her. Representative Roybal-Allard. Okay. All right. Okay, then I will just leave it at that. And it seems to me that there has been a growth also in the number of policy riders that we have been considering in the appropriations bills and that these policy fights are also contributing to delays in the process. Why do you think that is happening? And are there any ideas that you might have as to how we can address this? Ms. Coven. So I think it is happening because you have the must-pass bills. And the remedy lies not necessarily in your committee, the Appropriations Committee, although stricter parameters, keeping those riders out would be terrific, but more in the rest of the Congress making sure that there are other pathways for those legislative priorities to get addressed so the appropriations bills don't get bogged down with them. Representative Roybal-Allard. Okay. I think my time has about run out. Co-Chair Womack. All right. So the gentlelady is yielding back. All right. We have completed the Q&A round. Recognizing that there is only a handful of our members left, I think it would be appropriate, if anybody has a burning question that can elicit a very brief response, I would be more than willing to give that alibi right now to somebody if they wanted to ask something. Senator Perdue. Senator Perdue. I am sorry. I would like to iterate, though, for the record, I would love to ask both these witnesses to provide this back to us, though, as a more in- depth conversation about the Senate's--the budget is a resolution. We pass it with 51 percent of the votes. The authorization is a law. We pass it with 60. The appropriation is a law. We pass it with 60. Once the minority party has a budget resolution crammed down their throat, it is very difficult for them, Republican or Democrat, to come back in the authorizing process and play ball. It is very difficult for them to come back in the appropriation process and play ball. Please give us your thoughts about that three-step process, and talk to us about other countries that you found that have done that. We can't find anybody that does a three-step process. So I think this authorizing issue is one we need to really focus on. We haven't talked about it much today. But in subsequent hearings, I suspect that we will end up going more in-depth. But because of your two backgrounds, I would love to get you on the record relative to that issue. Thank you. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Senator. Mrs. Lowey. Co-Chair Lowey. In conclusion, I think we have all asked many questions, and perhaps we will save some of the other questions or repeat them again for the next time. So I would like to thank you both. As I look back upon the appropriations process, it would seem to me there are two things that are very evident. Number one, when we got a topline number, the 302(b)'s, for each of the committees, no problem. Our staffs worked together. Number two, the only thing that caused some problems was 169 of them, shall we say, what some of us would call poison pills, others might say, oh, this is a very important policy decision. So maybe if the authorizers did their work and the question would be how do we keep those authorizing items away from the appropriations process, we would be better off. And I think, Mr. Holtz-Eakin, you mentioned something about OMB, I think that is what you said, that we should be respecting it and the process. And it really depends on who is there at the time, because I would say I have had totally different experiences. And I don't want to blame it on different parties. But I can remember one head of OMB who used to check in with me three, four times a week. And I don't think I have spoken to this head of OMB in the last 6 months. So how do you keep the politics out of the process? Give us, as appropriators, the information so we can move forward. Because once we get those numbers, and I want to emphasize this again, on Appropriations, the bipartisan work of our 12 subcommittees was so impressive. We got the numbers, we went to work, we got the job done, and then some other policy issues came up that would extend the process. But how do we move it forward so that Democrats and Republicans can do their work? And that is what I see as a major challenge here. But I think it is time for us to close this hearing. So let me thank you both for your excellent testimony and say it is a pleasure for me to work with my co-chair. Thank you. Co-Chair Womack. Always a pleasure and a privilege. Thank you, Dr. Holtz-Eakin and Ms. Coven, for appearing before us today. I want to advise our members that they can submit written questions to be answered later in writing. Those questions and your answers will be made part of the formal hearing record. And any member that wishes to submit a question or any extraneous material may do so within 7 days. And with that, let's go eat. The committee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:44 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] BIPARTISANSHIP IN BUDGETING ---------- WEDNESDAY, MAY 9, 2018 House of Representatives, Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform, Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Steve Womack and Hon. Nita M. Lowey [co-chairs of the committee] presiding. Present: Representatives Womack, Sessions, Woodall, Arrington, Lowey, Yarmuth, Roybal-Allard, and Kilmer. Senators Perdue, Lankford, Ernst, Whitehouse, Bennet, and Hirono. Co-Chair Womack. The committee will come to order. We have a little bit different seating arrangement than we did before. I am up here in a different ZIP Code, you know. And we will see how this goes. Good morning, and welcome to the second public hearing of the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform. The most important role given to Congress under the Constitution is the power of the purse. Our panel is charged with ensuring we can fulfill this essential duty. Today's hearing is appropriately titled ``Bipartisanship in Budgeting'' and reflects the consensus regarding our mission and the goal for any potential recommendations. To be clear, we are not in the business of prescribing specific budget outcomes to benefit Republicans or Democrats. We want to ensure a budget process that works for either party, regardless of who holds the majority. As we continue talking through possible improvements in this committee, it is a pleasure to welcome other perspectives to the ongoing conversation. Today, we are joined by a group who have extensively studied the current process, observed some of the problems with it, and developed their own solutions for making it work. From the Bipartisan Policy Center, we have Bill Hoagland and Don Wolfensberger, both of whom have extensive backgrounds in congressional procedure and history. And representing the findings of the Convergence Building a Better Budget Process Project, we have Emily Holubowich--I hope I have that name correct--and Matt Adams--or Matt Owens. I am sorry. Thank you. And, with that, I yield to my co-chair, Mrs. Lowey, for her brief opening remarks. [The prepared statement of Steve Womack follows:] [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Lowey. And I do want to thank Co-Chair Womack for his collaboration in arranging this hearing. I welcome our witnesses here today to discuss bipartisanship as it relates to the budget process. Our witnesses include Bill Hoagland and Don Wolfensberger, two very experienced former senior congressional staff who are now affiliated with the Bipartisan Policy Center. And I am pleased that we have Emily Holubowich and Matt Owens, two participants from the Building a Better Budget Process Project of the Convergence Center for Policy Resolution. They will talk about the Convergence Center process, which convenes groups of disparate stakeholders to try to arrive at consensus recommendations, as well as the substantive proposals that emerged from their dialogue on the budget process. Thank you all for coming. I look forward to an interesting hearing. [The prepared statement of Nita M. Lowey follows:] [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. In my introductions, I said ``Matt Adams.'' I want the record to reflect that the first baseman of the Washington Nationals is not with us today; it is Matt Owens. I am a big baseball fan, so I don't know how I just came up with that, but thank you. I would now like to welcome our witnesses. Thank you for your time today. The committee has received your written statements, and they will be made part of the formal hearing record. You will each have 5 minutes to deliver your oral remarks. Mr. Hoagland, you can begin when you are ready. The floor is yours, sir. STATEMENTS OF G. WILLIAM HOAGLAND, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, U.S. SENATE STAFF, 1982-2007; DONALD R. WOLFENSBERGER, FELLOW, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, FELLOW, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE RULES COMMITTEE, 1991-1997; EMILY HOLUBOWICH, PARTICIPANT, BUILDING A BETTER BUDGET PROCESS PROJECT, CONVERGENCE CENTER FOR POLICY RESOLUTION; AND MATTHEW OWENS, PARTICIPANT, BUILDING A BETTER BUDGET PROCESS PROJECT, CONVERGENCE CENTER FOR POLICY RESOLUTION STATEMENT OF G. WILLIAM HOAGLAND Mr. Hoagland. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Co-Chairmen Womack and Lowey and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. I have my list of favorite reform options, but today I will focus just on one, and that is the often-discussed-but-never- agreed-to biennial budgeting and appropriation process. The written testimony provides the long history of the congressional efforts in this regard. There are various approaches to biennial budgeting and appropriations. But my own thinking on this has evolved from initially not supporting it to, today, supporting it from a split biennial budget and appropriation process. As early as 1987, a bipartisan agreement between the Congress and President Reagan was reached, setting 2-year caps on discretionary spending. This was followed with similar bipartisan agreements in 1990 and 1997. And the Budget Control Act, as you know, of 2011 set appropriation caps for 10 years, through 2021. But those caps were adjusted by the Bipartisan Budget Acts of 2013, 2015, and, of course, most recently, 2018. And I predict that you will adjust those final 2-year caps again in 2019. In other words, 2-year caps over time periods seem to be what Congress has abided to, and, therefore, institutionalizing what has become standard practice seems like a recommendation this committee could find consensus around. Most recently, in 2016, both the House and Senate Budget Committee chairmen, Mr. Price and Mr. Enzi, advanced biennial budget proposals. Like previous proposals, they proposed that the budget resolution be adopted in the first session, setting forth appropriation allocations for the next 2 fiscal years. But, unlike previous versions, they proposed splitting the 12 appropriation bills into half, 6 appropriations being considered in the first year of the biennium and 6 in the second. Mr. Price's legislation even specified what those six bills would be, and they included Defense and Labor-HHS, so that 75 percent of all appropriations would have been done in that first biennium. The Bipartisan Policy Center issued a brief report in 2015 entitled ``Proposals to Improve the Process,'' authored by two of my former bosses, the late Senator Pete Domenici and Dr. Alice Rivlin. Among other reform items, it recommended that we move to a biennial budget cycle to address the goal of transparency and timeliness. A couple of quick comments addressing the skeptics of biennial budgeting process. Incentives are important for Congress to do its work. On the stick side of the incentives, in the private sector, nonperformance of a contract results in nonpayment. The Domenici-Rivlin biennial budget recommendation concluded that garnishing your pay would not pass constitutional muster, but legislation to prevent all planned congressional recesses until a biennial budget resolution was adopted could. This is consistent with existing statute that makes it out of order to consider any adjournment resolution in the House of Representatives in the month of July that provides for an adjournment of more than three days unless you have completed annual appropriations or a reconciliation bill if ordered. A similar prohibition for all months could apply to both the Senate and House for failure to adopt a conference agreement on a biennial budget. I would make it mandatory, also, that the last appropriation bill considered in a biennium is the legislative branch bill, your funding bill. On the carrot side, once a biennial budget agreement is reached, setting the 2-year appropriation allocations, if it does that, Senate rules could be adopted to eliminate the filibuster on the motion to proceed the consideration of the appropriation bill. This would not jeopardize in any way senators' right to filibuster the underlying legislation but would guarantee at least a debate moving forward on appropriation bills themselves. Finally, one of the reoccurring criticisms of biennial budget has been the argument that making accurate projections two years in advance is difficult. Nothing in a biennial budget process precludes funding of supplemental appropriations if needed for unanticipated and therefore unplanned emergencies. I would argue that 1 off-year supplemental, however, is better than having to do 12 appropriation bills every year. Let me conclude with what so many others have stated before. No process changes will make your decisions any easier. Budgeting is governing, and governing is challenging. But the failure of this committee I don't think is an option. Failing to reach some consensus would once again telegraph to the American public that the Congress was not willing to address its most obvious, fundamental Article I responsibility, and the result would be a further erosion of the confidence in this critical institution. But if this committee could reach agreement, if even on limited changes to the process, it could set the stage for even more fundamental comprehensive changes in the next Congress. Your time is short, and the litany of reform options is long. But I believe one of those bipartisan reform options' time has come, and that is biennial budgeting. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of G. William Hoagland follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you very much, Mr. Hoagland. Mr. Wolfensberger. STATEMENT OF DONALD R. WOLFENSBERGER Mr. Wolfensberger. Thank you very much. And congratulations to you all---- Co-Chair Womack. Just make sure that mic is on. Mr. Wolfensberger. Got it. Co-Chair Womack. There we go. Mr. Wolfensberger. Yeah. I just wanted to congratulate you all on being appointed to this important committee and wish you well in coming to some solution by your November 30th deadline. I have been asked by the staff to give some background on previous bipartisan efforts to reform the Congress. And so, I have not confined mine simply to budgeting, but there is a lot of that in this. And what I have done in my testimony is look at six examples of things that I was involved in through the Rules Committee, through my leaders, Trent Lott and later Jerry Solomon, and, prior to that, John Anderson, my first boss, to try and improve things in the Congress. So I am just briefly going to go through those six examples and talk about briefly what prompted the formation of these bipartisan panels to begin with, how they did, did they succeed or fail, and then what lessons have we learned from previous bipartisan efforts. The first thing that I was involved in, 1969, was--or 1965, I am sorry. I was an intern up here, and my boss, John Anderson--I am from his home district in Illinois--sent me to the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. It was having hearings on congressional reform. So I monitored those hearings, reported back to him, helped prepare his testimony before the panel. He, at the time, wanted a joint committee on government research, as I recall, and that was what my work was on. But the joint committee went through a long litany of hearings that summer of 1965. They finally reported something in 1966, but then it laid dormant for about four years. Why? Well, it seems that the Congress no longer was broken, so there was no need to fix it. Why? A guy name Lyndon Johnson was President, and he was putting through his juggernaut of Great Society legislation. And so things sort of laid dormant there for about 4 years. I returned to the Hill full-time in 1969. And, lo and behold, it came back to life; the recommendations of the joint committee came back to life. Why? Well, there was another guy in town called Dick Nixon, who had some other ideas about how to run government. And so Congress thought it might be a good thing to address the ``imperial presidency'' now. So the recommendations came to life. They were passed. I think you could say that the whole idea behind that joint committee was to modernize Congress, yes, improve its resources, staffing, and so on. But, also, the Democratic study committee was behind a lot of this, and they wanted to really address the problem of conservative committee chairmen there through the seniority system who were blocking a lot of progressive legislation. So one of the things done in that law that was enacted in 1970, the Legislative Reorganization Act, was a committee bill of rights. And the Democrats addressed other issues through their caucus rules changes, such as electing of committee chairmen for the first time. I think that was in 1971 or 1972. So that was my first experience. The next thing, though, came about in 1972 when President Nixon started impounding funds, withholding funds that had been appropriated by Congress. Congress was furious. They appointed a joint study committee, similar to this, to come up with some ideas as to how to address that. What they came up with: a suggestion for a congressional budget process and also an impoundment control regime. So those two things were recommended, but the Democratic leadership decided, first of all, to go with impoundment control. So they put that through the House and the Senate, and then they became stalled in conference committee because one side wanted a two-house approval of impoundments, the other wanted a one-house veto of any Presidential impoundments. When that stalled, they finally came around to what the Republicans had been urging them, which is put the two together, have some balance, have a congressional budget process, impoundment control. That was done, and it went through. And that became, of course, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. The next thing that I was involved with in the 1973-1974 was a select committee, bipartisan, a select committee on committees in the House. And they were tasked with realigning committee jurisdictions. They came up with a proposal. It was very sweeping, comprehensive, but unfortunately it got stalled in the Democratic Caucus. Finally, the Democratic Caucus brought out their own substitute, which left the jurisdictions intact. And, as a result, the Bolling recommendations were doused in favor of, basically, status quo. The next thing that I was involved with, the Beilenson bipartisan task force on budget reform in 1982. That basically went on for about 3 years. Actually, it was renewed in the next Congress. They came up with a set of recommendations. The Rules Committee reported them, but it never came up on the floor. But then, lo and behold, in 1985, we had a debt limit bill that went to conference, and the opportunity was there, and the Beilenson proposals were finally brought in together with the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit control measure, which had sequestration. Well, my time has run out. I did want to talk about the other things. There was a leadership task force on ethics in 1989--Vic Fazio and Lynn Martin. I worked for Lynn Martin at the time. Came up with some recommendations. The big thing that you all may have heard of was they gave up honorary in favor of a congressional pay raise. So that was sort of the carrot with that one. And the other thing was the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 1993-1994. Their recommendations didn't go anywhere because the leadership, Democratic leadership, in the House pulled the plug. They were not behind it. But we can talk a little bit later about what lessons were learned from these various things. It is a mixed bag, obviously, but leadership has a lot to do with--making sure they are behind whatever recommendations do come out. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Donald R. Wolfensberger follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, sir. Ms. Holubowich. STATEMENT OF EMILY HOLUBOWICH Ms. Holubowich. Co-Chair Womack, Co-Chair Lowey, and other members of the Joint Select Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today as a member of the Convergence Building a Better Budget Process Project. It is a distinct honor to be invited to represent my Convergence colleagues. As a senior vice president at CRD Associates, I have advocated on behalf of several health groups through several appropriations cycles. I participated in the Convergence project in my role as executive director of the Coalition for Health Funding, an alliance of 95 national health organizations representing more than 100 million patients and consumers, health professionals, and researchers. In both the Convergence budget project and in my testimony before you today, I am representing the views of myself and not those of the Coalition for Health Funding, my employer, or the health groups I represent. I am not an expert in budget rules and procedure like my colleagues from the Bipartisan Policy Center, but I am an expert in what the Federal budget means to Americans and what happens when the process goes off the rails. As you know, the vast majority of Federal funding for discretionary public health and health research flows from Federal agencies to State and local governments, academic institutions, and nongovernmental organizations in communities across the nation. These entities rely on predictable, stable funding to pursue their missions of protecting and promoting Americans' health. When the Federal budget process breaks down, dysfunction disrupts their operations. New initiatives and new hires are put on hold, procurement cycles lapse, opportunities are lost, and the American people are ultimately hurt. In the Convergence project dialogue, I saw an opportunity to work with others who, despite our differing perspectives, share an interest in making the process work. None of us are naive enough to believe we can perfect the process or that changes can work without the political will to make them work. But even marginal improvements that bring about greater predictability and stability would be welcomed by the communities we represent. So how did our group of strange budget bedfellows find consensus? In 2015, Convergence was funded by the Hewlett Foundation's Madison Initiative, with additional support from the Stuart Family Foundation, to elevate the voice of stakeholders who represent those directly affected by Federal revenue and spending decisions. Convergence staff first conducted more than 100 interviews with myriad stakeholders across sectors, constituencies, and ideologies to solicit their perspectives on the budget process and ultimately invited 24 stakeholders, including my colleague Matt Owens and myself, to participate in the project. For the next 16 months, we met under the guidance of the Convergence staff and a professional facilitator to find common ground and reach consensus. After our first meeting to identify pain points in the current budget process and build camaraderie and trust in sharing our misery, we focused on developing principles that would serve as our true north in guiding our discussions and evaluating our proposals. After several meetings and iterations, we ultimately agreed on nine principles to which a budget process should adhere and that we have submitted to the record. For me, the principle that resonated most is that the process should be neutral or unbiased. As several of you noted during your first hearing and as you noted this morning, Mr. Womack, the process should not be designed to favor a particular policy or outcome or ideology. This principle is essential to any successful process reform and was key to reaching consensus on our proposal. If we had allowed our discussions to veer away from process toward outcomes, I don't believe we would have reached consensus. Without this principle and others, we don't believe your attempts to reform the process will succeed either. During the development of our nine principles for process reform, four themes emerged that informed our thinking and may inform yours. The first theme is that elections drive outcomes. The ultimate incentive for lawmakers to address any issue, including the Federal budget, is whether or not their constituents care about it and the extent to which it influences their vote. The second and third themes are that credible information provided at the right time matters and that effective budget institutions like CBO are crucial to the production of trusted information. The final theme and what I believe the group thinks is most important is that new norms are needed to break bad habits. For any budget process to work, you and your colleagues have to want it to work and see the value in it doing so. As someone who works in public health, I appreciate that behavioral change is hard. If changing people's behaviors was easy, we wouldn't be in the midst of an opioid crisis and an obesity epidemic. It will take concerted effort on the part of you and your colleagues to make lasting changes. I hope my testimony has helped frame the Convergence Budget Process Project and has provided additional context for our proposals. My colleague Matt Owens will now review our five consensus proposals for you. Thank you again for this opportunity to be here today. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Emily Holubowich follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, ma'am. Mr. Owens. STATEMENT OF MATTHEW OWENS Mr. Owens. Thank you to the co-chairs and members of this important panel for the opportunity to testify. I have worked on behalf of research universities for over 20 years, and I have seen the consequences of Federal budget process dysfunction. Student financial aid decisions are held up, important medical research is delayed, and long-term planning is made more complex and time-consuming because Congress does not complete the budget in a timely or predictable manner. This is highly inefficient. It wastes time and institutional and taxpayer resources that would otherwise be used to achieve the teaching, research, and service missions of universities. I chose to participate in the Convergence project for this reason and in the spirit of what people at research universities do every day; they seek to address and solve difficult problems facing the Nation. My employer, the Association of American Universities, supports the Convergence group proposals for these same reasons. Understanding that you have copies of the report, I will briefly highlight our five consensus proposals. The first proposal is what we call the Budget Action Plan. It synchronizes the budget process with the electoral and governing cycles, and it calls on each new Congress to adopt a 2-year budget that is signed into law by the President. The Budget Action Plan has three required elements and one optional provision. First, it sets discretionary spending levels for 2 years. Second, it lifts the debt limit by any shortfall agreed to in the legislation. And, third, it authorizes a lookback report to analyze the impact that enactment of the budget would have on the long-term fiscal outlook. Additionally, the plan allows Congress the option to consider one reconciliation bill per fiscal year. Our second proposal requires the CBO to produce a report that we entitled ``The Fiscal State of the Nation.'' It would be issued during the Presidential election cycle and would outline key information about our Nation's finances, including but not limited to: long-term projections for debt, deficits, interest payments, revenues, and spending; a breakdown of all major revenue sources and tax expenditures; and any estimated shortfalls in long-term spending programs. This report would be widely distributed and provide information in reader-friendly ways to allow non-Washington- insiders to better understand the budget. We believe this report would provide a full picture of the Nation's finances, elevate public discussions about the budget, and help voters make more informed choices at the polls. Our third proposal seeks to reinforce the importance of the long-term effects of budget decisions. We propose that every 4 years the GAO review portfolios of programs that involve long- term or intergenerational commitments. The reviews would cover programs grouped by topics such as retirement security, health coverage, or national security. This information would also be included in the ``Fiscal State of the Nation'' report. Our fourth proposal is to strengthen the Budget Committees. It was irresistible for some in our group to suggest eliminating the committees; however, we agreed that the stature of the committees needs to be restored to help improve their ability to lead the process. We propose that the chairs and ranking members of key fiscal and authorizing committees, or their designees, serve on the Budget Committees. We believe this proposal would ensure that those who are responsible for carrying out the budget would be vested in the process to develop it. Our last proposal calls on Congress to give budget support agencies, such as the CBO and the GAO, the resources necessary to provide credible, high-quality, and independent information. Our proposal includes new responsibilities for these agencies, so it is important that they have adequate resources. These five proposals will not yield a perfect budget process; however, we believe they contain practical and achievable measures that can be developed further to implement a process that facilitates informed, unbiased, and sound decision-making. In closing, I will offer a shared view among our group: namely, no single budget process reform or package of reforms can by themselves remedy the prevailing dysfunction. Process reforms alone cannot force Congress to reach budget deals. Political will is needed. But process matters, and small or large changes can create ownership and buy-in for new expectations and norms for budgeting. Right now, expectations are low and norms are broken. It has been more than 20 years since all appropriations bills were passed prior to the start of the fiscal year. Just 27 percent of Senators have seen the process work, and for House Members it is only 16 percent. As such, we believe our proposals are a strong starting point for your consideration. On behalf of all the Convergence project participants, we wish you success. Your work is critical not only to effective Federal budgeting but also the governance of our Nation. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Matthew Owens follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. We appreciate the opening comments by our witnesses here this morning. We are now going to begin our question-and-answer period. I will begin first. Mr. Hoagland, do you believe the debate over 2-year budgeting has evolved? Is it time? Mr. Hoagland. Absolutely. I go back a long way. When I first arrived to the Congressional Budget Office in 1976, there was discussion about this. In my written testimony, you will see that even this young House Whip called Trent Lott was recommending it back in 1981-1982. Leon Panetta, chairman, all the way through, including his final job at Department of Defense, was recommending it. It has evolved, and I think it-- as I said, it is a direction that is necessary. As I also said, Mr. Chairman, in my opening comments, I originally did not support it, but I see that we basically have gone to the 2-year system, so let's go ahead and institutionalize it through a biennial budget. Co-Chair Womack. What do you think is different, in your view, as we think about both the structure of the budget resolution and the ability of the modern Congress--and I stress the word ``modern'' Congress, ``modern Congress,'' meaning this isn't your grandfather's Congress; I mean, this is a much different time--our ability to handle all of the appropriation bills in one cycle? Mr. Hoagland. Absolutely. Part of my evolution over that period of time when I was staff director of the Senate Budget Committee was that I felt it was the responsibility of the Budget Committee to produce a budget every year. As I watched the evolution of an inability to get appropriation bills done within the timeframe, it was a basis that gave me the thought process to revise my thinking that maybe it is better to do a-- with the time that is limited to all of you, the issue of transparency, the ability to have authorizations work their will, I think it is--you just--your time is just limited more, it seems to me, than in the days when I was up here back working here. I am not here, I am not watching you as closely as when I was here on the Hill, but it does seem to me like your time is much more restrictive than it was when I was working as staff director of the Senate Budget Committee. And that time limitation is what you are really working with. Also, let me just say there is redundancy. It seems to me like you vote on things an awful lot in a redundant way. Let me give you a best example. I have a number of other recommendations besides the biennial budgeting, but one of them is that, if you pass a budget resolution, even a biennial or even an annual, you have voted on increasing the debt limit. In the budget resolution that you adopted earlier last fall, you have a debt limit figure. You have already voted on it. And it does seem to me like you ought to somehow institutionalize the fact that you have voted once, that is enough. Co-Chair Womack. Mr. Wolfensberger, your testimony references congressional turf, ``turf'' with a capital ``T,'' relating to the congressional-executive branch relationship. As you think about episodes of bipartisanship in budgeting, how have Presidents and Congress been involved in either promoting or inhibiting bipartisanship? Mr. Wolfensberger. Yeah, that is a very good question. I think Bill remembers better than I, because he was involved in some of these things. But back in the old days, when you had split control of the White House and the Congress, there were a lot of budget summits, where they would convene the President's top advisers and top leaders and committee folks from Congress would convene out at Andrews Air Force Base and try and, at the last minute, come up with some kind of a resolution. You know, since then, I think that there has been more of a low-key type of negotiation going on, on an ongoing basis, between the executive and the Congress through each appropriations bill, starting with the subcommittee levels. I noticed that Mulvaney, the OMB Director, just sent a letter to Chairman Frelinghuysen flagging some increases in the legislative branch budget that is being looked at for this coming year. And so I think that is kind of interesting to see, you know, how much in advance he is keeping an eye on it. But he is a former chairman of this committee and has a pretty good idea of what goes on in that process. But, you know, I think that the best that we can hope for is that we have more agreements where they come together earlier. And that is the main thing for me, is coming together earlier. Waiting until you are into the new fiscal year already, and you are still kicking the can down the road. So I think that is the key challenge that this committee will face, is how do you go about that, and I think biennial budgeting would help in that regard. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you. Mrs. Lowey. Co-Chair Lowey. Thank you. Mr. Hoagland, you note in your statement that Congress failed to adopt what you would consider to be real budget resolutions in 7 of the last 10 years. You compare that to the previous 34 years, when Congress failed to adopt a budget resolution only 4 times. What do you think accounts for the difference, and why has the budget resolution process apparently fallen apart in the last 10 years or so? Mr. Hoagland. I wish I could answer that question directly. I work for the Bipartisan Policy Center. It was founded by Senator Dole, Senator Howard Baker, Senator George Mitchell, and Senator Tom Daschle. We worked together to find common ground. I don't mean to be critical. I just want to highlight that the partisanship that exists here, I think, complicates our ability. The second thing is, I believe deficits matter. I think we should reduce the deficit. But the tradeoffs here are so great and so difficult that I think that has complicated the decision-making process and forced the delays in making the very, very hard decisions you have to make. Let me also say, Madam Co-Chair, I was careful in what I said. I don't want to offend anybody. But I don't consider the last two budget resolutions to have been real budget resolutions. They were adopted well after they were supposed to be done, and they also were done with one purpose in mind, and that was simply to create the fast-track reconciliation process for consideration of legislation. That is not what--when I began here, that was not what the budget resolution was meant to do. Co-Chair Lowey. I would like to follow up, Mr. Hoagland. I see the benefit of setting budget targets every two years. But as for appropriations, doing annual bills is one of the most powerful oversight tools available to Congress, in my judgment. The main source of delays, from my experience in recent years, has been political disagreements about top-line totals, not the time needed to actually write appropriation bills once those disagreements were settled. And I understand that a substantial majority of States and almost all of the larger States now practice annual budgeting. Should we see that as a caution against moving in the opposite direction at the Federal level? Mr. Hoagland. I think it is 19 States that have biennial budgeting. I think it varies in terms of how they operate. I do not see that the annual appropriation process is working here. I am just simply suggesting, why not look at the two-year process? You will be able to set those caps for two years. And I think there is some efficiency to be gained in, first of all, your ability then to have that second year be the authorization and oversight year. That would take away some of the pressure that is placed upon you. And, in fairness, Madam Co-Chair, it is authorizations first and then appropriations. And I am not suggesting the appropriation process doesn't do a lot of oversight, but it is really the authorization process, to me, that has failed under this system. And this would strengthen--from my perspective, it would strengthen the authorization process. Co-Chair Lowey. Well, I am not sure we can resolve that in the minute I have left. So I disagree on that. But---- Mr. Hoagland. Fine. Co-Chair Lowey.----you are saying in your statement that Congress failed to adopt what you would consider to be real budget resolutions in 7 of the last 10 years. You compare that to the previous 34 years, when Congress failed to adopt a budget resolution only 4 times. What do you think accounts for the difference, and why has the budget resolution process apparently fallen apart in the last 10 years or so? Mr. Hoagland. Because of the increased degree of partisanship up here and the very difficult decisions you have to make as it relates to spending and revenues. Co-Chair Lowey. I thank you for that answer. And I won't have any time to go on, but it seems to me that that is the real problem. And I am not sure that changing the system is going to address the partisanship that, to me, is the core and the base of the system. Mr. Hoagland. Yes, ma'am. Co-Chair Lowey. Thank you. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Perdue. Senator Perdue. I couldn't disagree more. We have been trying to do it with kumbaya and all of that for 44 years. It hadn't worked. We have only funded the government on time 4 times in 44 years since the 1974 budget act. And I have talked to all the people who signed that bill who are still living; we have looked at best practices. This is not something that we are going to tweak around the edges and think that we are going to all of a sudden eliminate partisanship and make this budget process work. First of all, it is not a budget process; it is a funding process. And I want to echo what Senator Hirono has said every time she has spoken in this committee, and that is: Whatever we do in here, we have to, I believe, have a goal of never having another CR, okay, that leads to an omnibus situation. The problem in the Senate is different than the problem in the House. The problem in the Senate--and I want to get to two questions, because you four people have brought up now three recommendations in here that I think are very salient. Number one, I think the biennial budgeting has merit. I think we need to talk about it. I don't think it is a panacea. If we do nothing but that, everything else will fail, period. Number two, I believe that there have to be consequences. Mr. Hoagland, you talked about consequences, and I would like to come back and ask you about that. But I want to emphasize what Senator Hirono was forcing us to think about, and that is this is about funding the Federal Government, not just creating a budget resolution. We created a budget resolution. We did one in 2015. It only lived four months, and it was a way to do the grand bargain. I agree with you, Mr. Hoagland, that we have not done a real budget since I have been in here in three years in the Senate. Senator Enzi, the chairman of the Budget Committee, actually has said publicly he would do away with the Budget Committee unless we make some substantial structural changes. And he has also said publicly that, in the Senate, we probably have produced the last budget that can be done under the current law, and that is that you cannot provide, unless you do all the gimmicks that are out there and the fraudulent things that if somebody in the private domain did they would go to jail, like delaying expenses and accelerating revenue-- without doing all of those things, we will never be able to comply with the balanced budget that we are talking about. I want to talk about over here, though, Ms. Holubowich and Mr. Owens, you mentioned the makeup of the Budget Committee, and I would like to dwell on that just a second. For three years, we have looked at the makeup of Budget Committees and the process. The problem in the Senate is we have a resolution--and it is not a law--that says 51 percent can pass it. That is nothing but a political statement crammed down the throat of the minority. Both sides have done it repeatedly for 44 years. Then you go to an authorization process that is a law. It is 60 votes, has to be signed. And so here is the problem. The minority party gets ignored in the budget, now they come over and are asked to participate in the authorization, they never do, neither side. Then you go to appropriations, same thing. We have only averaged 2\1/2\ appropriation bills being voted on over 44 years, 2\1/2\ out of 12. In the Senate, this thing is broken. Going to biennial alone will not fix that. I believe that consequences have to be considered. The question I have for you is: The makeup of the Budget Committee--we looked at best practices in other countries and States. States have consequences. Nobody goes home until they get a budget done. Other countries have gone away from a three- step process to combining the budget work and the authorization work into one, and the way they do that is what you are suggesting. So would you talk about how you would combine the--totally change the makeup of the Budget Committee to include a representation of ranking members and chairmen of the policy or authorizing committees. Until 2 years ago, we hadn't authorized the State Department in 15 years. The authorizing thing is a fraud. We have not done that for 20 years, maybe, in the way that we should. So if we could combine it, is there a way to address that? I wish we had time to get more into consequences and all that, because I would love to get you to comment on that, Mr. Hoagland. But please be brief, and maybe we will get time to do that. Mr. Owens. Thank you for the question. Our group discussed this in depth multiple times. And, again, where we came out, through a consensus proposal, was to get that buy-in, to have the chair and ranking members of these committees come in representing those priorities, understanding in some cases that may not always be possible in the Senate because you have so many committee assignments, but bring in their designees, and that the bringing those issues, to know an authorization bill is coming forward in that calendar year, to make sure that is reflected in what is developed in that budget. There were all sorts of discussions. We said at one point maybe we ought to eliminate the Budget Committee. We talked about reorganizing all of Congress and decided that was way beyond our scope because of the issues you just identified, Senator. Senator Perdue. Well, we have changed committee jurisdictions repeatedly over the last 100 years. That doesn't scare me. And one of the problems we have, we have 16 authorizing committees in the Senate and 12 appropriating committees, and it looks like a jigsaw puzzle, really, the way the jurisdictions cross, and it is counterproductive. So the question is, how would you deal with things like an NDAA, for example--which is about the only thing we try to really authorize every year? How would you deal with that if you didn't have a formal authorization process but it was done actually at the oversight level, in the Budget Committee, made up of--if you made up the committee of ranking members and chairs of these policy committees? Mr. Owens. You know, I don't believe we went to that level of depth to where you would be---- Senator Perdue. Okay. So you didn't get into those details. I want to go back. Mr. Hoagland, you wanted to make a comment---- Co-Chair Womack. The gentleman's time is up. Senator Perdue. Oh, I am sorry. Mr. Hoagland. The original Budget Committee in the Senate was made up of exactly what you are talking about, which was leadership. Senator Tower was defense. We had Senator Byrd on the appropriation. We had the chairman and the ranking member-- early on. You had buy-in early on. And I would also suggest that you could rotate--say, we have the ag bill coming up for reauthorization. You could rotate in the chairman and ranking member of those committees. If get buy-in early, it seems to me, on the budget resolution, that makes a difference. Senator Perdue. Yeah. I would like to engage--in some of our working groups; I would like to engage with you guys more on those four topics you brought. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for going over. Co-Chair Womack. Let me remind our members up here to leave these distinguished witnesses some opportunity to explain their answers. They do deserve the time to give a good, articulate response to our questions. Mr. Yarmuth. Representative Yarmuth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back to biennial budgeting for just a second. And one of the thoughts I had--I was a co-sponsor of Congressman Ribble's proposal I guess in the last Congress. It may have been two Congresses ago. I have lost track. And one of the things that I was thinking about was that possibly, because the exercise had become, in my experience, pretty much a rhetorical exercise and it was a messaging exercise more so than any serious budgeting operation, that by taking it to a biennial basis you would actually begin to think more seriously about longer-term consequences and longer-term spending. Is that something that you think is an advantage of it possibly, Mr. Hoagland? Mr. Hoagland. I have always listed timeliness, long-term planning, simplification, and transparency. And I consider long-term planning to be an element of the biennial budgeting, yes. Representative Yarmuth. And a corollary, I guess, of that of that question is that--some of the opposition to biennial budgeting is that it is harder to project in a fast-moving world and so forth and it is harder to project income and occurrences. How would you respond to that argument? Mr. Hoagland. I would respond that you are at least setting--right now, you have already started the process of setting along the discretionary side 2 years, so that is a given. Also, I would respond that, as I said in my oral testimony and written testimony, there is nothing to preclude Congress from having a supplemental for emergencies and unexpected in that second year. So I still think it is possible to adjust. Representative Yarmuth. Okay. Thank you. The Convergence recommendations didn't deal with biennial budgeting. You obviously had to have talked about it at one point. What was, I guess, the deliberation there, and why did you decide not to? Ms. Holubowich. Sure. Thank you for that. I think, for us, as we looked--one of our first exercises was to map out the budget process and, with sticky notes, identify what we saw as the pain points, and we realized that they were really front-loaded, that when you have a top line established and there is buy-in and agreement, the appropriations process tends to really flow. So I think, on our part, and part of our discussions, we weren't convinced that the appropriations process was the problem. It was the bottleneck created at the front as you saw, sort of, political documents coming out that just, frankly, weren't really based on reality and then the breakdown of trying to operationalize that by the appropriators and trying to make, for example, really deep cuts in nondefense discretionary spending a reality. And that is where you see bills like Transportation-HUD fall apart on the floor. From my own perspective, I think, from a public health standpoint, as we look at public health preparedness, biennial appropriations, for me, is a problem. You know, we have microbes evolving every day. Just this week, we have 17 new cases of Ebola in the Congo. We have a new Australian virus that is 1,500 years old that is making a resurgence. So setting numbers at the top line for 2 years, I think, makes sense. What we need, though, is that appropriations process to make those course corrections on an annual basis, at least from a public health perspective, to respond to these new threats. And, certainly, emergency supplementals are an option, but, to be honest, you know, in my view, an emergency supplemental should support acute, sort of time-limited, discrete events--an infectious disease, a natural disaster. There are lots of things that are happening that are more systemic and chronic, like, for example, we now have babies born from Zika moms who, as they now become toddlers of moms who were infected with Zika and become school age, they are going to have developmental disabilities, so now do we need to reinvest in those areas. Or with the opioid crisis, we now are seeing resurgence in cocaine-related and meth-related deaths. And so those don't necessarily warrant an emergency supplemental. I think the emergency supplementals, as we know with Zika, are not exactly predictable and stable and they sometimes take way too long. And that whack-a-mole approach to, sort of, supporting public health readiness is not ideal. We would prefer to see those midcourse corrections sort of through an annual review of really what is needed and where we need to reprioritize. Representative Yarmuth. But you could, even under your argument, you could set top-line numbers for 2 years and then appropriate on an annual basis. Ms. Holubowich. Absolutely. And that is where we came out in the Budget Action Plan---- Representative Yarmuth. Right. Ms. Holubowich.--which is, again, reflective of sort of our current reality. Our view would just be, let's try the best we can to move that to the front end of the process at the beginning of a new Congress, so we set that plan in that stage at the outset and allow the appropriations process to flow annually from---- Representative Yarmuth. Thank you. A quick question for Mr. Owens. On a debt ceiling, is there any difference between your proposal, which is to increase the debt ceiling by whatever the budget prescribes, or just eliminating the debt ceiling? Mr. Owens. The way our group discussed it, we sort of left that to the Congress to decide. But it is important that, when you are making the spending decisions, and if it is going to mean there is going to be a shortfall, that that should be acknowledged in the same piece of legislation. Representative Yarmuth. Thank you. I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Ernst. Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Co-Chairman. And thank you, for the witnesses that are here today. Mr. Hoagland, in your testimony, you mentioned the importance of incentives for Congress to get their work done on time. And, as you know, since 1974, Congress has passed all of its appropriations bills just four times, and that is pretty paltry. And in the past 20 years, Congress has passed a budget resolution only 11 times. And, unfortunately, this hasn't stopped Congress from taking a month-long recess right before the start of each fiscal year. And if Congress hasn't passed a budget and regular appropriation bills by August, they shouldn't be able to go on vacation. That is what I think. And can you discuss the impact that this type of reform would have on ensuring that we get our work done on time? Mr. Hoagland. Yes, Senator. Thank you. The bottom line here is that we have looked at exactly what you are talking about, a way that penalizes you for not getting your work done. Senator Domenici and Dr. Rivlin looked at the issue of pay. There may be a way to dock your pay for not getting your work done, as it happens in the private sector. But there are provisions within the existing law that says the House cannot go on recess until you have completed your appropriation bills through the month of July. You cannot take recess. So I see no reason why you can't change the Budget Act to make it apply across the board: no recess unless you have passed either a biennial budget or a budget resolution on time. Now, you waive this, obviously. I don't know how to prevent Congress from waiving the points of order that lie against you for going on recess. But it is easy--it seems to me you have it already in the law that you are not supposed to go on recess. Senator Ernst. Yeah. And I do think that is a great point. And it circles back something I brought up, I believe, in our last meeting as well, but that we have processes in place and we don't follow them. We can put new processes in place---- Mr. Hoagland.----and not follow them. Senator Ernst.----and not follow them. So we have got to get this figured out and find a way for us to get our work done. Because we have a lot of folks that just truly don't have the intestinal fortitude to get it done, and we are failing the American people. Second question. Mr. Hoagland and Mr. Wolfensberger, as congressional staffers, you both witnessed something as rare as a unicorn here in Washington, D.C., which was a budget surplus. And over the past 50 years, the United States has only had a balanced budget four times, 1969, and then from 1998 to 2001, I believe. So, as our deficit approaches $1 trillion, what can we learn from those past Congresses? Mr. Hoagland. Very briefly, and then I would turn it to Don. The bottom line there again was that--I was involved in the 1997 balanced budget agreement that we reached. That was reached in a bipartisan manner, including President Clinton and a Republican-controlled Congress. It meant giving up on revenues, that Republicans had to agree to some revenues. And it also meant that Democrats had to agree to reductions in some entitlement spending. It has to achieve the bipartisan--we also--let's be honest about it. We had a lucky economy that was also helping us reach that balance during that period of time. But it was bipartisan. Senator Ernst. Uh-huh. Thank you. Mr. Wolfensberger. Yeah, I retired in February of 1997, so I missed being on that glory road that Bill was talking about. But, interestingly, I think the balanced budget agreement that you had was in 5 years, and actually it was achieved in 2 years because of a little thing going on out in Silicon Valley. I don't know what it was about, but---- Mr. Hoagland. Yes. Senator Ernst. Very good. Well, I appreciate it very much. I appreciate the input. And just bottom line, we need to figure out what is going to get us to actually do our jobs. So I appreciate it. Thank you to the witnesses today. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Before we go to Senator Bennet, there has been some discussion recently about a previously scheduled Joint Select Committee hearing on May 18. I just wanted to say for the record today, because we have members that are coming and going and staffs that are coming and going, the co-chair and I talked about this last week, and we both have agreed that, due to the funeral of Senator Daniel Akaka and the fact that our Hawaiian members are not going to be here that day, and there are others that have indicated they may not be here that day, that that May 18th hearing is going to be rescheduled. So, for planning purposes, let's go ahead and make sure everybody is on the same page there. Date to be determined, but the Member day will, of course, be rescheduled. Senator Bennet. Senator Bennet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this hearing. Mr. Hoagland, I wanted to start where Senator Ernst ended with you, which was in the 1997 agreement. And you mentioned you got lucky because you had a strong economy. We have a strong economy right now, and we are going to have a trillion- dollar deficit next year. And I wonder whether you could share with the committee what the common elements were that made it possible to reach the kind of agreement that you participated in in 1997 and what is missing today. I mean, you mentioned that Democrats gave on revenue, Republicans gave on entitlements. I don't actually think about it that way, really. I think about the responsibility that people seemed to have--or the consideration that people seemed to give to the next generation of Americans, which we seem not to give to the next generation of Americans. Mr. Hoagland. Yes, thank you, Senator. I will simply say that a critical element of that 1997 agreement--you have to remember, we came off a very tough time. In 1994 and 1995, we had government shutdowns, we had clashes here, we had a long period of discontinuity in all that we were doing. But it turned out that we finally had leadership, and leadership out of the White House, particularly. And I am sure I am getting myself in trouble here by saying this as a Republican. But you need leadership to say that debt does matter, that deficits do matter, and that we should be focusing on those issues. There was consensus up here that deficits mattered. I am not convinced today that, with all due respect to all of you members here, that you consider deficits to be really a situation that is going to impact our future generation. Senator Bennet. I heard testimony earlier today about the importance of having the annual budget so that we could respond to health situations. And it made me think about an opioid crisis which we have barely responded to. We claim that we have responded to it, but we have barely responded to it, and I think because the deficit has robbed us of our imagination to do that. I mean, for the first time since John Glenn went to space, America can't send anybody into space. And I think that is a consequence, also, of our deficit. Mr. Hoagland, I also wondered--I know this is an issue that you care a lot about and have for a long time as a Republican-- whether you could talk about your view of the debt limit, the debt ceiling, and its use as a device for claiming fiscal responsibility. Whether the threat to the sovereign debt of the United States is something that we should appropriately do, or is there some other way that we should--what good could this committee do on that question, Mr. Hoagland? Mr. Hoagland. First of all, I think Congress should find an alternative to the periodic threat of a government shutdown or the brinkmanship over the debt limit to force action. Because my impression is that it really hasn't. Maybe back in 1985, 1986, when we went through Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. That was a debt limit issue. We got Gramm-Rudman-Hollings because it was tacked on to a debt limit increase. Senator Gramm was worried about the debt going up to $2 trillion, and so that--and now we are at $22 trillion or so. So, first of all, in fairness, the Bipartisan Policy Center has a group of six bipartisan individuals, former Members and former executive officials, and we have been working on a proposal. It is no surprise here, it builds upon the old Gephardt rule that, once you pass a budget resolution, it is automatic. In fact, that was something the House used to do. The Senate did not have that Gephardt rule. Or in combination with the McConnell rule, which is that if you do not pass a budget resolution, then the President should submit a suspension request, and then Congress should vote on a possibility of a resolution to approve or disapprove of that suspension. I think it is critical that you try to get this thing out of being the brinkmanship. It has not solved the issues of debt and deficits going forward, and I think it jeopardizes the country's economic future when you have to go through this. Senator Bennet. Well, I appreciate that answer. And I am sure there are other members who feel this way too, that when you develop that proposal we would be very interested to see it. Mr. Hoagland. I would be happy to. Senator Bennet. Thank you, Mr. Hoagland. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Co-Chair Womack. Mr. Arrington. Representative Arrington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank the panelists for your input, insight, and counsel as we deliberate on how we can put some sanity and responsibility into this process. I am a new Member, so don't blame me. No, I am kidding. But my conclusion that I have come to very quickly and I think is painfully obvious to everyone else on the outside: The political will collectively does not exist on the budget outcome piece of this. Now, I do think we can find ways to have a more timely process and add certainty--which I think there are good, fiscally responsible aspects to having certainty and stability and continuity. But I am just very concerned about how in the world--and to my colleague Senator Ernst's comments about incentives. We are looking so desperately for ways to force us to do things that this body politic will not do, that the dynamics just don't exist. And they don't exist with Republicans any more than Democrats, I learned this year. We sent a budget to the Senate, and it was a reconciliation, got it mandatory spending, which is driving the debt--we all know that too--and we couldn't get it out of the Senate. Representative Arrington. So give me a suite of--or us--a list of incentives or accountability measures that we should consider that maybe have not been considered so that we can just take those and begin to noodle on them and debate them among ourselves. And that is for timeliness, efficiency, process-oriented and for the, sort of, responsible outcome orientation. What are those? And if you don't mind, we will start with Mr. Hoagland and just kind of work our way down. Just rattle them off. Mr. Hoagland. Real quickly, I have already stated, I think no budget resolution, no pay, no recess. I think those are the strongest ones. That is on the stick side. On the carrot side, I still believe that if you could pass a budget resolution, a conference agreement, that we should eliminate the filibuster on the motion to proceed on appropriation bills in the Senate. Representative Arrington. Mr. Wolfensberger. Mr. Wolfensberger. Thank you. I am not quite as drastic as no budget, no pay, but I had a compromise that, for every day after October 1 where you have not completed action on your appropriations bills, you put in escrow $100 a day of Members' pay. You get about $400 a day, believe it or not. But that might drive some things. With respect to the comments Mrs. Lowey made about losing control of the process, I have been very sympathetic to the appropriators, even though I support biennial budgeting, but I have been thinking through a process whereby you might do four of the big bills annually and the rest biennially. And I am looking at the four that you would do annually-- because all but one requires an annual authorization--defense, MILCON, vets, foreign ops, and homeland security. Homeland security does not yet require an annual authorization. But those four I think might be worth doing on an annual basis as sort of a compromise. But I know that, in the past, the appropriators have been very successful in defeating biennial budget proposals when they get to the floor. Mr. Dreier had 245 cosponsors for his measure to have biennial budgeting, and when he got to the floor on an amendment that he offered to do that, he only got 201 votes. Some people went south. So it is a very difficult nut to crack, and---- Representative Arrington. Let me keep it moving---- Mr. Wolfensberger. Yeah. Representative Arrington.----if you would. And the question is, what carrots and sticks should we consider to motivate the House and Senate to do the job that everyone in the country does but us? Ms. Holubowich. Well, thank you. We spent a lot of time discussing this. You will notice we did not make recommendations around incentives. In part, we didn't feel like that was our role, and, also, I think we couldn't come to agreement. You know, it wasn't clear that, to Senator Ernst's point, you could do much of anything to force yourselves to make these choices. Ultimately, again, to our theme that elections drive outcomes, I think where we get at this is through the proposal for ``Fiscal State of the Nation,'' in the same way that my organization presents my financials to my members, as corporations share with their shareholders. There is a real disconnect, and it is not their fault, but Americans just simply don't understand what the government is doing or what it is paying for. And they say they want a smaller government, but when you propose cuts, they don't want you to cut anything, and definitely don't raise my taxes. So, I mean, you are in a box where it is hard to make these choices because, I think, the American people just simply don't know what you are doing. So the hope is that the ``Fiscal State of the Nation'' can help elevate the conversation about our Federal Government's budget and sort of bridge that disconnect. Mr. Owens. I would just add briefly, as Emily said, we didn't reach any consensus on this, but we did talk about no budget, no pay. We talked about no budget, no recess. We even talked about no budget, no fundraising. We talked about a lot of different things, that, again, what drives outcomes are elections ultimately. So we couldn't reach consensus, but if there is something this body can adopt that you think will propel you towards action, then you should most certainly consider it. Representative Arrington. Mr. Chairman, I have gone over my time. I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. Mr. Woodall. Representative Woodall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for being here. I value your expertise. I want to pick up where my friend from Texas left off. Lots of ``no budgets, no something'' in the tool of incentives, and yet my Budget Committee chairman in the Senate says we might as well just abolish the Budget Committee because it is not a functional process anyway. My friend Mr. Hoagland says, you know, we have gotten two budgets passed the last two cycles, but I don't consider those real budgets anyway, though they would have met the standard for any ``no budget, no anything.'' I want to explore the notion that maybe it is not that folks aren't doing their jobs, but maybe folks are doing their job. And some folks are sent here to slow a process down as opposed to speed a process up. I think it was Coolidge who said his most important job was vetoing bad legislation, not signing good legislation. A lot of Members of Congress feel the same way. Mr. Hoagland, you talked about the debt ceiling. And everybody has had a similar conversation, of course. I have been here since the big freshman class of 2010. Every single measure that has moved spending and deficits in the right direction--and, for me, the right direction is down--came in the context of a debt ceiling debate--no other measure, only debt ceiling debates. And so I want you to reconcile for me your real desire to see real progress made and my real experience that the only way that progress has been made has been through debt ceiling discussions and your position that we should eliminate those debt ceiling discussions, moving them into the budget discussions. Mr. Hoagland. Congressman, I understand where you are coming from on this. I do not think that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, which was designed to bring the deficit down--when we look back on the history of that, it turned out that that was not successful in that regard. The last exercise you went through in increasing the statutory debt limit had no effect whatsoever on spending, from my perspective. Your adjustment to the caps came later. So I just respectfully disagree. I have not seen where the debt limit has done nothing more than create a crisis, as it relates to the financial markets out there, that we are possibly going to default. And I don't think we ever--I don't think this country ever will default. Representative Woodall. The most constructive deficit reduction measure in my 7 years was the Budget Control Act, pushed by John Boehner and President Obama that set budget caps---- Mr. Hoagland. In 2011. Representative Woodall.----reduced spending, came only in the context of a debt ceiling deal. Mr. Hoagland. But then you adjusted the caps every year thereafter. Representative Woodall. Well, not---- Mr. Hoagland. Not the first year. Representative Woodall. But that is exactly right. And traded off with spending reductions up to or beyond the change in those caps, with the exception of this last cycle. Let me think about the work that you all are doing with reconciliation at Convergence. Part of the Budget Control Act-- again, I think it was the best vote I have taken since I have been here--was creating the joint select committee to bring deficit reduction measures to the floor or tax increase measures to the floor, whatever you wanted to bring to the floor. Thoughtful members, 16 thoughtful members, looking at literally hundreds of trillions of dollars in Federal outlays going out over decades, and found not one penny on which they could agree. I don't actually think our challenge is too many chances at reconciliation. I think our problem is not enough chances at reconciliation. Tell me how, knowing that we have shared concerns about the fiscal direction of the country, how limiting our ability to move a 50-plus-1 deficit reduction measure, limiting those opportunities to once a year, as opposed to currently under Senate rules three times a year, moves us in the right direction. Mr. Owens. I think it was the view of our group that reconciliation, in some ways, has become used basically just to get around and move other types of legislation. And so, as we thought about it and deliberated, we thought the reality is, if you had one per year and it was authorized in that Budget Action Plan, as we call it, it really would focus the discussion up front so everybody knew what they would be debating and what they would be discussing, and you would have two opportunities within a Congress to accomplish what you want to accomplish. Representative Woodall. I credit Reid Ribble on biennial budgeting. Much of his success was because folks knew who he was as an individual, and he would vote for anything that he thought would save his children and his grandchildren some pain and frustration in the future. I would just put on your thought list reconstituting that Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, a bipartisan, bicameral committee much like this one. Anytime we have an idea that may move us in the right direction, I would like to see that come to the floor for that 50-percent-plus-1 to see if we can make a difference. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Lankford. Senator Lankford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here as well. Let me click through a couple of things. There has been some good conversation about finishing elements, as far as how to get Congress to be able to act and move on things. What about things like automatic CRs to try to have something in place so we don't have a government shutdown while Congress is negotiating and finishing things out? Let's just pretend for a moment Congress doesn't get their work done on time. How do we actually get that to move and hold the American people harmless in the process? Mr. Wolfensberger. Let me just dive in first. I think that would be an incentive for inaction. Once you have things on automatic pilot, there is no reason for Members to go forward then on finishing the appropriations. Senator Lankford. Is there a way to be able to design that so that the pressure is put on Congress to be able to finish the task so the American people are held harmless? Mr. Wolfensberger. I commend your imagination to that project, but, you know, I haven't thought of one. Senator Lankford. Yeah. Okay. Mr. Hoagland. Of course, there have been proposals in the past to have an automatic CR, and the Domenici-Rivlin proposal had an automatic CR. But we also talked about it in terms of the context that that CR would start to--the amount of funding would start to come down every month by a certain percentage if you continued to enter that CR. That would create some pressure, it seems to me, to address the issue that there wouldn't be action on doing appropriation bills. Senator Lankford. If we combine that with things like the-- let's say, in the Senate, you have mandatory quorum calls three times a day, so you can't leave; you are there over a weekend. So, while we are in that period, you are here---- Mr. Hoagland. Yes. Senator Lankford.----and you have to be able to work through it, so they are intended to be short-term. Mr. Hoagland. Yes. Senator Lankford. Okay. Ms. Holubowich. Our group spent a lot of time talking about automatic CRs or, you know, a CR-plus-inflation, or we even talked about the idea of a super-sequester, again, as one of those penalties, those sticks. You know, I think, ultimately, we couldn't come to agreement that this would be an effective tool. And I think the fear, certainly on my part, again, as I spoke about public health, is that the default becomes we just don't do it, and we end up in sort of perpetual CR mode. You know, I think we had hoped that, you know, through the Budget Action Plan, again, getting that difficult decision making up front would, you know, minimize the need for CRs further down the road. Senator Lankford. Which I would certainly hope for, by the way. By the way, we are in a mode of perpetual CRs right now. And so, to say that---- Ms. Holubowich. And it is not helpful. Senator Lankford.----if we put some mechanism in place to keep us from having a government shutdown, that is the target for me, is how do we not have government shutdowns, because that is detrimental to the entire Nation. And when you try to weigh a government shutdown versus an automatic short-term CR, I am going to go with an automatic short-term CR every time rather than have a shutdown. But the goal is those are very short and those are very temporary and we stay here until things actually get done. Tell me a little bit about the President's budget. Has that been a useful document or non-useful document for us? It is millions of dollars to create it every year. Ms. Holubowich. Well, we talked about that. One of our exercises was to actually take a step back and pretend we don't have a budget process, we have a Constitution; how would you design it? Matt and I were in the same group, and I was very much, at the time, in a camp that the President's budget is not helpful at all. It is, though. I think if you think about it as a reporting tool, you know, those congressional justifications really get into the weeds. And that is your oversight tool, and that is the reporting back to you on how they are spending the money. Those are critically important. So, again, I think we thought-- -- Senator Lankford. So the information is important but not necessarily the proactive look. Ms. Holubowich. Correct. And I think, again, as part of that Budget Action Plan, bringing the President in on those conversations around the top lines and reconciliation and get agreement up front really helps. That President's budget can then be a symbolic policy document, in the same way our Budget Action Plan would not preclude Congress from doing budget resolutions if they similarly felt they needed to put out a policy statement. Senator Lankford. By the way, I would have no issue with that, bringing the President on board. And so if we do a budget document with leadership, with key members of Senate and House committees, with the leadership of the House and the Senate, creating a document that goes into law, that sets those top- line numbers, gets that established early, gets the President involved early. The President can still make recommendations through the appropriations process to get it, but the President's budget seems to be a distracting document more than it does anything else. It has never, ever become law. But it is a set of ideas. I am glad to be able to have the President and agencies submit ideas, if nothing else. Let me ask you one last question about authorizing and appropriating. What about an idea like--we always get in to this fight of we never authorize in appropriation bills, which is a myth that goes back to 1974, because there has been authorizing in every single one of them on some level. What about combining the work and saying, if something is going to be authorized in an appropriation bill, the authorizing committee has to pass it first? So there is a mechanism to say the authorizing committee, as a committee--it may not go to the whole floor, but it goes to the committee. They pass it as a committee. Then it could be inserted, and the whole body would vote on it then in an appropriation bill to be able to add it. What about a blending of the two to be able to get those committees working together? Mr. Wolfensberger. I think that is more realistic than the present rule, which says you have to have the authorization signed into law before you can appropriate for them. So I think putting the action in the particular house, authorize, at least pass your authorization before you take up the appropriation, that makes good sense to me. Senator Lankford. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Co-Chair Womack. Mr. Kilmer. Representative Kilmer. Thank you, Chairman. And my apologies. I was actually in an Appropriations subcommittee, hearing from some constituents. I want to start by asking the Convergence duo, your proposal had us looking at some of the long-term drivers of debt and deficits once every 4 years. We had bit of a discussion in a committee markup yesterday about the notion of having a fiscal state of the nation address, having the Comptroller General come in. That is a proposal that Mr. Renacci and I have introduced, which would really try to have a joint session that is focused specifically on these long-term fiscal issues. I would love to get your sense of that, if you think that having that type of mechanism in place would create more transparency and maybe put a little political pressure on both houses to try to get something cooking. Mr. Owens. I would just say I think that proposal is very consonant with what our group came up with, this notion of having a deliberate way to look back and look ahead, where we are going with our spending and revenues. Ms. Holubowich. And, importantly, in a way that is accessible to the American public. There is a wealth of information out there that is available through CBO, GAO, Joint Committee on Taxation. It is not accessible to the average American. So our idea was that, through this fiscal state of the nation, CBO is combining and culling all that information and synthesizing it, probably working with a communications firm to help, but to translate that for the American public and to really actively disseminate that. Our goal is not to produce another report that just sits on the shelf and nobody looks at; that it really becomes a part of the electoral process, it is elevated in the debates, it is a part of the conversation, you are referring to it on the stump. And so whoever is delivering that message--I used to work at GAO, so I would be happy to see the Comptroller General do that. But it is certainly consistent with our recommendation. Representative Kilmer. Thank you. You touched on CBO, and I know that part of the report also looks at the independence and maintaining the independence of the CBO. I think that is really important. You want to make sure there is an umpire who is calling legit balls and strikes. Can you talk about some specific measures you think our committee should look at that would maintain that independence of the CBO? Ms. Holubowich. We focused principally on resources for the CBO and the other congressional support agencies, in part because we have expanded their scope of work, so that is very reflective of our proposals. I can also tell you from my experience at GAO--and this was a long time ago, but I worked on the healthcare team. At any one time, we had 200 requests in the queue. It was at least a year until we got to start on a project. That was more than 10 years ago and before the Affordable Care Act, so you can imagine now what the backlog looks like, you know. So I think it is extremely important to make sure you are investing in those institutions. We did not get into the issues around, you know, protecting their credibility. That was not something, I think, we really discussed, but certainly something we think is important. Representative Kilmer. Do any of you have suggestions in that regard? Mr. Hoagland. I have one suggestion, Congressman. That is that we had a major commission that you established; it was the Ryan-Murray Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking. It seems to me that there ought to be a way to formalize the Evidence- Based Policy Commission within the Congressional Budget Office, establishing an organization that really looks at evidence- based in terms of making policy. Representative Kilmer. Thank you for that. I know there has been some conversation already about how do you ensure Congress doesn't just ignore whatever process we come up with. You know, I think some of the conversation has been around, sort of, negative disincentives. Unfortunately, by and large, when Congress has done that, the negative hit has been to the American public. I think sequestration is a good example of that. We have been trying to noodle on whether there is some sort of positive incentives that could push Congress to act, whether that be expediting processes here or something else. I would like to get your impressions, maybe collectively, if you have suggestions on what that might look like. Mr. Owens. Our group did discuss some of those carrots, so to speak. And expediting processes was one of the attractive features. We didn't reach consensus, time and time again, on this one. Because, at the end of the day, what someone saw as a positive someone could easily construe a way that that could be used against them as a negative for their interests. And so that is why we just couldn't reach agreement on this one. Other ideas that we surfaced on more of the carrot or positive side dealt with setting aside, sort of, a pot of money, that if Congress met its deadlines, then they would have a way to expedite expenditures for certain things that they considered a priority. Again, that led to other people saying, eh, that is a disincentive for me, because I would like to see spending go on the down side, not the up side. So, hence, we couldn't reach an agreement. Representative Kilmer. Thanks. Thank you, Chairman. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you. That completes our round. I understand that Senator Whitehouse is on his way back, and so I do want to give him an opportunity to ask questions. So, for the good of the order, is there anybody else here that has a follow-up question that they would like to ask of the panel while we wait on Senator Whitehouse? Mr. Woodall. Representative Woodall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Several folks have made reference to that we are kind of existing in a biannual budgeting world today. But the truth is we are existing in a biennial 302(a) allocation world today, but we are doing none of the other work. Candidly--Mrs. Lowey and I talk about it all the time--the Appropriations Committee is working just fine. They do good work every single year. They are successful every single year once they get a 302(a) number. I don't actually consider that to be the problem. The problem is looking out, whether it is making a national conversation out of a fiscal order of the United States--you tell me which Presidential candidate in the last debate was pressed on his or her plan for deficit reduction. Right? It just wasn't a topic for the American people. So help me to distinguish between where we are, which is a 302(a) world, and where we would all like to be, which is a forward-looking glide path towards deficits going down, fiscal sustainability of entitlement programs, et cetera. Because I don't want to define what we are doing as success. It seems to me to just be enabling the one group that is getting its work done but doing nothing to empower all of the other groups of government that need to begin to get their work done. Can anybody help me with that? Mr. Hoagland? Mr. Hoagland. The establishment of the 302(a)s before we get to the 302(b)s is predicated upon there being a budget resolution. So that is why I keep coming back to at least having a budget resolution that establishes that or doing it, as you had been doing it, external to the budget resolution, passing a law that essentially sets those caps. So I think that you are getting your work done because there is a 302(a). You are getting your work done because there has been an agreement to set that, either through the budget resolution or through statutory legislation. So I agree. I am looking at--I guess you have six markups here in the House this morning, most of those in Appropriations. The difficulty is, of course, you have to deal with my old stomping ground across over here called the United States Senate, and they have 302(a)s too. But if you can't get those bills to the floor in the Senate, you will never get to conference. And so that is why I keep coming back to, if you could pass a budget resolution and then you eliminate and get an agreement on that, what those 302(a)s are, then you eliminate the need for the filibuster on the motion to proceed. Representative Woodall. Though, as you point out, when we have been successful at that, it has not been with real budgets, it has been with faux budgets that have gotten that done, at least over the last couple years. Don, you were working on trying to reorganize committees and making them work better. Mr. Wolfensberger. Well, you know, what the House has that the Senate doesn't is the Rules Committee, which you sit on as well as the Budget Committee. But what they have done there when a budget resolution has not gone through the House and Senate, the same one, is the Rules Committee puts out a special rule saying that the amounts recommended by the Budget Committee shall serve for the 302(a) purposes. But then, if the Budget Committee doesn't report, well, then you go back to something else. I guess we had it once where the leadership decided what they would be. So it is very tricky. But, you know, when you get to the Senate, you don't have those same mechanisms that the House does. Mr. Hoagland. That is right. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Perdue. Senator Perdue. Well, thank you. Just a quick question for anyone who would like to respond on this. In 1965, our mandatory spending was about 34 percent of what we spend as a Federal Government. Last year, it was almost 78 percent. And yet all of this hoopla that we have around the budget and appropriations is around discretionary spending, which is $1.2 trillion, $1.3 trillion. We are going to spend $4.3 trillion this year. I understand we have two trust funds, and they get income, Medicare and Social Security. But, today, out of the $2.2 trillion of tax revenue we get in, we spend almost a trillion dollars of that in mandatory--subsidizing Social Security, subsidizing mandatory, and paying for Medicaid. The question is, how can we really ever get control, long term, of our debt situation unless we deal with the total spending? This is the only entity I have found in the world where the budget process and the funding process only deals with 25 percent of what we spend. Does anybody want to take that on? Mr. Wolfensberger. Well, let me---- Senator Perdue. The question is---- Mr. Wolfensberger. Yeah. Senator Perdue.----should we being looking at all of the expenses, the subsidy expenses, not the parts of Social Security and Medicare that are paid by the trust fund, but the other parts that we are subsidizing into those? Ms. Holubowich. So, if I may, this was one of the issues that we discussed. I think, for Matt and I, we live on the discretionary side, and, in some ways, we thought this is unfair. We have to be reviewed every single year, and there is no commensurate review on the other side of the ledger. So I think part of our recommendation here around the proposal to have the GAO conduct these long-term reviews for multigenerational commitments would set up an opportunity to have that conversation. We spent a lot of time talking through, well, you know, should we be sunsetting these programs? I think there were those in our group who felt very strongly, and I know some of the groups that I work with in my coalition--people rely on these programs. You know, the idea that you could yank out the safety net from under them, you know, because we let a program sunset was very concerning. So the idea here was, have these 4-year reviews by GAO, have them be incorporated in the fiscal state of the nation to elevate that conversation. And that deliverable provides an opportunity for Congress to have that conversation around those issues. Did I capture that? Mr. Owens. Yeah. And if I can just add, respectfully, Senator, I don't think most Americans understand exactly what you put forth. That is not top of mind, understanding the Federal budget. And so that is what is behind our recommendation, especially the fiscal state of the nation. And the reviews that Emily spoke to is, if more Americans are better informed and it is discussed during a Presidential election cycle and Members of Congress are forced to talk about and take questions for that, that political will that is the undercurrent of this entire discussion will become stronger, because more Americans want to see action on this. But, frankly, they don't have the information they need to help encourage you to take certain actions. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Whitehouse. Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you all for being here. As a member of the Senate Budget Committee, my recommendations are focused mostly on the budget side and on the Senate side, not on the appropriations side or the House side. And I would like to ask to put into the record of the proceeding a letter that I have written to the chairs, making some of those recommendations in writing for the Senate Budget Committee. Co-Chair Womack. Without objection. [The information follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Senator Whitehouse. Thank you. I also want to acknowledge the good work and advice of my colleague Senator Perdue in some of the conversations we have had leading up to that. It seems to me that there are some very baseline facts that need to inform any conversation about our long-term debt. And I would like to ask all the witnesses just to kind of go through this like a checklist, because I don't think there is much debate about them. It is commonly accepted, is it not, that the metric by which a sustainable amount of debt would be measured is the debt-to-GDP ratio? Whatever the disagreement might be about what that ratio should be, the metric of debt to GDP is the commonly accepted metric, correct? Mr. Hoagland. Debt held by the public. Senator Whitehouse. Correct. Mr. Hoagland. Not the total debt. Senator Whitehouse. Any further dispute with that? Okay. We got all yeses with that adjustment? The second observation I have is that we are highly unlikely to achieve that debt-to-GDP ratio, whatever we should determine it to be, instantly, which, to me, suggests that there needs to be a glide slope of some period of years that will put us on the path to that. Is there any disagreement that that is simply a necessary part of the analysis of getting to a sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio? Mr. Hoagland. I agree. Senator Whitehouse. All agreed. Mr. Hoagland. I agree completely. But to Senator Perdue's comment, two-thirds of that budget is on automatic pilot, so to speak, that being the Social Security, Medicare, the entitlement programs. The only---- Senator Whitehouse. Well, that is a good lead-in to my next point, which is that, if you are going to calculate deficit in any particular period, you won't mathematically get it right if you don't look at appropriated spending, plus healthcare spending, plus tax spending--and when I say tax spending, I mean the more than we actually collect that goes out the backdoor of the Tax Code in various tax provisions--and then revenues. From a point of view of the mathematics, are those not the four key elements without which you can't actually get to a correct answer? Mr. Hoagland. Correct. Ms. Holubowich. Correct. Senator Whitehouse. Correct. Okay. Good. So the reason I ask what I think are these basic foundational questions is because the present Budget Committee process does not require us to do any of those things. It does not require us to sit down and consider and vote on a sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio. It does not require us to sit down and discuss and vote on a glide slope that gives us a reasonable period of time to get there. And it does not require us to look at those four elements. So, from a process point of view, that is part of the focus of this letter. Another piece of our problem is that, as has been repeatedly pointed out, the budget reconciliation process has been more or less hijacked to provide a fast lane around traditional Senate regular order for particular political priorities of the majority and, indeed, in some cases, deficit- increasing priorities of that present majority. Could I ask each of you to provide for the record your recommendations as to what language we might consider to cabin the budget reconciliation process so that it is redirected back to its original goal, which is to keep our deficits and debt under control? That is going to take too long in my remaining 39 seconds, but would you send that to us in writing so we have your views on that? Ms. Holubowich. Absolutely. Senator Whitehouse. The last thing that I will mention, and it is a corollary of this, is that presently there is no procedural path in the Senate Budget Committee for bipartisan work. I don't think we are going to get this done if we don't have an avenue that encourages us to work in bipartisan fashion. We can trade blows back and forth with majority- driven, jammed-through-with-simple-majorities budgets and reconciliation measures, but ultimately we are going to have to look at this in a bipartisan fashion. And so my urgent concern is that we create a parallel bipartisan budget bypass just in case that bipartisanship can be achieved. You can't mandate bipartisanship, but, by God, you ought to make a way for it if it can happen. Mr. Hoagland, you are energetically signaling. Mr. Hoagland. I don't know if this rule still exists, but under the earlier timeframe, if the budget resolution had not been reported out of the Budget Committee in the Senate by April the 1st, budget resolutions that had been introduced--if you and Senator Perdue had introduced a budget resolution yourself, it would have been automatically discharged and put on the calendar. That is one way of creating a--if the chairman and the ranking member are not getting their work done, that doesn't preclude the two of you from putting together your own resolution and putting it out there. Now, getting it off the calendar is a different issue. But you could still do that under existing rules, as I understand. Senator Whitehouse. There is an opportunity for considerable mischief there, as well as considerable bipartisanship. Co-Chair Womack. Last question. Mr. Arrington, bring us home. Representative Arrington. Well, I want to associate myself with Senator Whitehouse and the whole concept, notion of a glide path and debt-to-GDP targets. We are looking for a bipartisan way to move forward. I don't see any policy orientation, Republican or Democrat, in that. It is just the reality is we have to walk back that ratio to a healthy, responsible level, and then it can be determined what dials to use to get there. I think, ultimately, though, you are going to have to have some consequence if you don't get there. I just don't know that--but it would be a great start, and I support that 100 percent. We have been talking about that. So my question is this super-sequestration, because I would have an idea--I don't know that it would be supported, but--and I ran against sequestration, but I have to tell you, since I have been here, I just think it was wrongly applied. I thought that the idea was good in concept, but it missed 70 percent of the spending. So what is this idea of super-sequestration that you all kicked around? And some of your thoughts around--I just was intrigued, and that was my follow-up. Ms. Holubowich. Sure. You know, so I think where we came out is that ultimately, again, that stick is a failure. And as I have known--full disclosure, I am the founder and co-chair of NDD United campaign. We advocated to raise the caps; we advocated to stop sequestration. We are three for three. Thank you for that. This is more than dollars on a ledger. This funding is impacting people's lives every day. We have spent the last 6 years documenting the impact of this. It is too blunt a tool--I am speaking for myself---- Representative Arrington. Yeah. Ms. Holubowich.----too blunt a tool. It is too dramatic. And it is not the glide path that I think you seek. I would just say, you know, a word of advice, I think, from our process, again, is to focus on process. We had these conversations, and policy and process blur, but when you get toward the outcomes, the energy in the room would shift, the body language would change, and we would bump up against impasse. So I think for you all, focus on the true process, build that foundation that will allow you through proposals like ours--the Budget Action Plan, the long-term reviews--to address the policies and the outcomes. I think you will be more successful. I think that is how we were successful. And if, again, we had focused on what is the appropriate debt-to-GDP ratio, we would not be here today with a set of proposals for you. Representative Arrington. My only concern is I think you make a smoother path right off the cliff. I mean, it won't be as bumpy, we will be able to enjoy the ride a little bit while we are, you know, still intact, and then we crash. And then it is forced upon us, ultimately. So, if you think the blunt instrument of having reasonable walking-back of whether it is the dial of tax on the revenue side or spending, wait until the sovereign debt crisis hits. And you think the blunt instrument of any of these dials being thrust upon us because of our lack of will--then I think that is a much worse scenario to avoid. And I think we have to think in pretty extreme terms to avoid that. And, again, I would put revenue, just to be fair, and the spending cuts, and then I would not negotiate away 70 percent of the budget that is really driving the debt. That is really my---- Ms. Holubowich. Yeah. I think we would see that as outside of the process. I mean, that is the outcome that you are striving for. You know, your charge is really, how do we build a foundation and a framework to allow those conversations to happen? I fear that, if you go down that path in this body, you will not get to creating that foundation. Representative Arrington. You know, I am kind of revealing my--I want to get---- Ms. Holubowich. I agree with you completely. Yeah. Representative Arrington. So, Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take any more of everybody's time, but thank you, panelists, and appreciate the feedback. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Co-Chair Womack. Mr. Hoagland, Mr. Wolfensberger, Ms. Holubowich, Mr. Owens, thank you so much for being with us today. Be advised that members may submit written questions to be answered in writing. Those questions and your answers will be made part of the formal hearing record. Any members who wish to submit questions or any extraneous material for the record may do so within 7 days. And, with that, this committee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] THE BUDGET RESOLUTION--CONTENT, TIMELINESS, AND ENFORCEMENT ---------- THURSDAY, MAY 24, 2018 House of Representatives, Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform, Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:45 a.m., in room HVC-210 Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Steve Womack and Hon. Nita M. Lowey [co-chairs of the committee] presiding. Present: Representatives Womack, Sessions, Woodall, Arrington, Lowey, Yarmuth, Roybal-Allard, and Kilmer. Senators Ernst, Whitehouse, Schatz, and Hirono. Co-Chair Womack. Good morning. The Joint Select Committee will come to order. Welcome to the third public hearing of the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform. The most important role given to Congress under Article I of the Constitution is the power of the purse. Our panel is charged with ensuring we can fulfill this fundamental and essential duty. Long before we began our work, there was bipartisan agreement that the current process for completing this basic function of government needs substantial improvement. And during our hearing so far, we have identified some of the main challenges with the current budget process. Today's discussion will be more focused on the opening piece in the process, the annual budget resolution. As designated by the 1974 Budget Act, the budget resolution was intended to help Congress govern effectively. Unfortunately, the budget resolution, as we know it today, is often associated with government dysfunction and consistently missed statutory deadlines. There even seems to be some confusion from Members in both Chambers on both sides of the aisle about the value of even doing a budget resolution each year. That is regrettable. This apathy was clearly exemplified just 2 weeks ago in the House Budget Committee during our Member's Day hearing, a required forum and formal opportunity for Members to present their budget ideas for fiscal 2019. Aside from members of the Budget Committee, that forum was utilized by one Member. While I was disappointed by the lack of participation, it was a sobering illustration of the budget's need for our select committee to succeed. During today's conversation, I am hopeful that we can start determining ways to make the budget more useful to Members of Congress and encourage engagement in the process. And I also look forward to talking about ways to make the budget resolution more realistic as a governing document, ensuring that it can be effectively enforced. Even though today is about the budget resolution, we cannot ignore the fact that the appropriations process is inextricably linked. The sooner that a budget resolution is passed in final form, the less likely Congress will have to rely on an omnibus or a continuing resolution. However, as both an appropriator and as chairman of the House Budget Committee, I recognize that we must be honest and ask ourselves whether the modern Congress will ever be able to successfully process 12 individual appropriation bills in a single year. This morning, to add to our conversations on this important topic, we welcome several experts who have studied the budget and appropriations process extensively. Joining us for today's discussion, we have the president of the Committee for Responsible Federal Budget, Maya MacGuineas. Jim Capretta is here from the American Enterprise Institute, where he serves as a resident fellow and the Milton Friedman Chair. Jim brings a wealth of experience from his time at OMB and as a Senate Budget Committee staffer. Bill Dauster also joins us today, bringing his unique perspective as a 30-year Senate staffer and the author of a book on budget process law. Finally, offering an outside academic's view, we have Joseph White, a political science professor from Case Western University. Thank you. And, with that, I would yield to the distinguished co- chair, the gentlelady from New York, Mrs. Lowey for her opening remarks. [The prepared statement of Steve Womack follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Lowey. Well, thank you very much. And I would like to welcome everyone to this hearing on the subject of budget resolutions, their content, timeliness, and enforcement. Once again, we have a very good group of witnesses. We have Bill Dauster, who has formerly served as staff director and chief counsel of the Senate Budget Committee and in several other senior staff positions in the Senate and the White House. We have Professor Joe White from Case Western Reserve University, who, throughout his long career, has written, thought, and taught about Federal budget policy and politics, as well as about healthcare policy. And, further, the committee will hear from two other distinguished budget experts. Maya MacGuineas of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget and James Capretta of the American Enterprise Institute. I want to thank you all for coming. I look forward to an interesting hearing, and I am sure you will share with us some very important information on which perhaps we can come up with some suggestions for change. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Nita M. Lowey follows:] [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Mrs. Lowey. I would like to now welcome our witnesses. Thank you for your time today, all of you. The committee has received your written statements. They will be made part of the formal hearing record, and each will have 5 minutes to deliver oral opening remarks. And, Ms. MacGuineas, we are going to begin with you. It is an honor to have you, and I am going to turn the floor over to you. Thank you so much. STATEMENTS OF MAYA MAcGUINEAS, PRESIDENT, COMMITTEE FOR A RESPONSIBLE FEDERAL BUDGET; JAMES C. CAPRETTA, RESIDENT FELLOW AND MILTON FRIEDMAN CHAIR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE; BILL DAUSTER, FORMER DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL, SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE; JOSEPH WHITE, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES, CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY STATEMENT OF MAYA MAcGUINEAS Ms. MacGuineas. Thank you so much. And thank you for inviting me here today. I am really honored to be talking with the committee and appreciate all of you serving on it. And what has been great is it seems like you are off to a very strong start, so that is very encouraging. In our written testimony, we offered 26 different recommendations which follow the five different budget areas for improvement. These things range from changing the budget calendar to standardizing baselines to making it more difficult to waive PAYGO. What I would like to do in my couple minutes of remarks here is focus on three areas, and I am happy to discuss any of the others we submitted as well. And those three include the importance of getting something done. The importance of this committee succeeding at getting something done. Number two, ending crisis-driven budgeting. And number three, developing a process, a neutral process that makes it easier to agree to sound, sustainable budgets. So, to start with it, it is clear that the budget is no longer a statement of the Nation's principles or reflection of a strategic national plan. When the budget even does exist, it tends to be political statements filled with wishful thinking, and it puts all of you as our leaders in the counterproductive position of getting sucked into the partisan battle instead of thoughtful policymaking. This committee is not going to be able to fix how broken our politics are right now or the extent of broken fiscal situation facing the country, but getting something done that both sides see as fair would be helpful as serving as a way to reboot the whole process and will start with a new commitment to actually following the reasonable budget rules. The types of changes could include things you have heard a lot about from other witnesses before from biennial budgeting; changing the fiscal year; using the Fiscal State of the Nation Report, which Congressmen Kilmer and Renacci and Convergence and others have all talked about; changing the makeup of the Budget Committees. But little steps can lead to bigger steps. Second, one of the main problems that I assume you want to solve is the threats of defaults and government shutdowns and how to create dangerous situations in crisis-driven budgeting. So, we encourage the committee to address these land mines by, one, reforming the debt ceiling. By requiring votes to lift the debt ceiling along with the votes for policies that would actually increase the debt. So, for instance, this would have required a debt ceiling vote along with the debt increases that went along with the recent tax cut and spending bills. If you have to recognize the effects of the debt directly, it would create at least more accountability and transparency, and perhaps it would give lawmakers pause before adding to the debt. Another one of the ideas that we support is auto CRs or an expedited procedures to adopt short-term CRs to avoid shutdowns, with the understanding that you don't actually want to be encouraging the use of CRs as a way to budget. Finally, we also encourage allowing more option for bipartisan deficit reducing bills to be considered, which would encourage alternative budgets and/or consideration of broadly supported legislation. I have been interested in what Senator Whitehouse have been talking about on this topic and others, but I think it is really important to create the incentives for the things that we want to get done, bipartisanship, and the things that are harder to get done, deficit reduction. So, finally, perhaps the most important thing you could do is improve the process to encourage consideration of serious fiscal plans to improve our debt situation. No amount of calendar changing, baseline improving, auto-CRing will be sufficient to accomplish a serious fiscal plan and the political will to enact that. So, while we all recognize that budgeting is about tradeoffs and hard choices, one merely needs to look at the current fiscal situation of upcoming trillion dollar deficits, projections of unprecedented debt levels, and interest being the fastest growing part of the debt of the budget to know that this isn't happening in our current budget. And the potential damage could harm our country for decades. So, to address this, we support the adoption of a system of establishing medium-term debt target along with new enforcement mechanisms. And in 2010, our board of experts came up with an idea called a Debt Stabilization Act, whereby there would be a medium-term debt-to-GDP target, annual targets to create a glide path to get there, and the budget resolution would comply with those targets, and both spending caps and PAYGO's would be in place. There would also be an additional trigger mechanism, and I emphasize that my board thought it was really important that trigger mechanism be half revenues, half broad-based spending cuts to really have both sides object to it, and it would be a mechanism that would help have budgets comply with those targets. There are a number of ways to structure these different targets. At the time, we were shooting for a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 percent by 2018. So, we are going to have to wiggle room that a little bit, not quite on track for that. But there are a lot of different ways to make this mechanism work. We would be delighted to work with people figuring out that structure. But, frankly, just moving to a process that includes a fiscal goal as part of the budget process would be a significant improvement from what we currently have. And the time to do this is right because the economy is strong; at the same time, the fiscal situation is precarious. And bipartisanship, which we desperately need, is at a low, but you have the start of a really good working environment here. So, lastly, whatever you do, we encourage you to add to your new process stronger enforcement mechanisms because, right now, if you look at how we try to enforce the budget with spending caps and PAYGO, the holes in that are so large; it really results in them being meaningless. And a budget process that is meaningless undermines the entire faith in our system to do the most important thing that there is for the country, which is to set the thought-out plan for where we want to go. So, again, thank you so much for having me here today. We have a number of recommendations we are pleased to share with you. [The prepared statement of Maya MacGuineas follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Ms. MacGuineas. Mr. Capretta. STATEMENT OF JAMES C. CAPRETTA Mr. Capretta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, also, to Mrs. Lowey. I am very pleased to be here. Thank you for inviting me to participate. I agree that the work of this joint committee is very, very important. It is very timely. And so, I really am pleased that the Congress created this committee and asked you to take a look at these very difficult questions. The Federal Government is running very large annual deficits, and those deficits will grow in the future as the U.S. population ages and health spending continues to grow more rapidly than the economy. The current Federal budget process is not helping Congress grapple with this fundamental challenge. Also, it does not facilitate an orderly and timely decision-making process. Congress wastes too much time on small and irrelevant matters, even as it fails to focus much attention on the issues of real budgetary consequence. There are many aspects that need to change. Today, we are focused on the budget resolution. I am going to make just three recommendations here. Although, I agree that many more things need to be done beyond the three I am talking about today. First, I think the budget resolution should become the vehicle for establishing and amending the statutory caps on discretionary spending. Second, the budget resolution should become the vehicle by which an automatic increase in the debt limit occurs. And, third, and most importantly, the budget resolution should be modified so that it includes a medium- and long-term outlook. So, to the first recommendation on the caps. Obviously, under the Constitution, establishing budgetary policy is a shared responsibility between the executive and legislative branches. This is part of our constitutional structure, which is very important, of course, but one consequence is that we rarely have a budget that is enforced in total across the executive and legislative branches. Something of an exception to this is the caps, which have been in place since 1990, more or less, with a couple of exceptions. These caps, while very much a part of the process today, are not part of the regular budget process in the Congressional Budget Act. They have been enacted on an ad hoc basis. I think the Congressional Budget Resolution should become the vehicle for establishing and amending those caps. Allowing the budget resolution to become the vehicle for this would make the budget resolution a much more serious legislative vehicle than it is today. It would also bring the executive branch into budget negotiations with the Congress earlier in the year, which might help prevent the kind of end of year political standoffs that now regularly occur. There are a number of ways that this could be done. I think the most straightforward is that, as a final resolution made it both through the House and Senate, it would automatically trigger the sending of new legislation to the President for his signature or veto, changing the caps and statute to comply with whatever is in the budget resolution. The President, of course, could either veto or sign it. If he vetoed it, then the Congress could try to override or, and if not overridden, the caps would still apply, at least in a budget resolution sense, to the Congress. The second recommendation is to get rid of the debt limit. I think the debt limit has outlived its usefulness. Congress should get rid of it all together because it really is a self- inflicted wound if we fail to pay our creditors. But if we can't do that, the budget resolution should become the vehicle for automatically raising the debt limit consistent with the budget levels in the budget resolution. This, too, would make the budget resolution a much more serious legislative vehicle. It would make it meaningful as a vote because this would be the vote that would trigger the debt limit being raised or not, and it would bring the executive branch also into the negotiations because of the legal questions associated with the debt limit. Lastly, and most importantly, again, bringing a long-term outlook to the budget resolution. You can see the importance of a long-term outlook by looking backwards. If we had, as a country, made changes in the mid-1990s, as was recommended by two bipartisan panels on budget outcomes and reforms, if we had made those changes 25 years ago, we would be in much better shape than today we are. Similarly, we have to start making decisions now that affect the fiscal outlook of the country in 2030 and 2035. It takes that long to get some of these things right. And so, I know that is a difficult task to ask people who are here to represent the here and now and what is going on in the lives of their constituents now, but attending to that situation is absolutely critical. And the budget resolution really doesn't facilitate that today. So, my testimony covers this in more detail, but one simply way to do this is to bring into the budget resolution an agreed-upon measure of the Federal Government's fiscal outlook going out the next three decades, such as a present value calculation of expected revenue and expected spending, make that a target for reduction over time, and use something like the reconciliation process to bring progress on meeting that goal. Thank you. I will be happy to answer questions. [The prepared statement of James C. Capretta follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Representative Womack. Thank you, sir. Mr. Dauster. STATEMENT OF BILL DAUSTER Mr. Dauster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chair Lowey, members of the committee, thanks for letting me be here today. Let me start by acknowledging the dirty little secret. Okay, maybe it is not so secret. A lot of members hate the budget process. I am here to tell you: It is okay to hate the budget process. It is frustrating. It gets you blamed for failure that you did not cause, and it is full of unnecessary drama. But there are five things, probably more than that, but I will talk about five things that you can do that will help us hate the budget process less. First, don't make it worse. Take the Hippocratic Oath of budget reform: First, do no harm. Don't set yourself up for more frustration and failure. Don't create a system that punishes you when leadership fails to do its job. A good budget process should be like your favorite car. It gets you where you want to go. It doesn't force you to go where you don't want to go. Chairman Womack was right when he said that a good process is not in the business of prescribing specific budget outcomes. A bad budget process is sort of like an overambitious New Year's resolution. You know, those promises that would be nice, but we just can't keep. By February, we are denying we ever made them. Gramm-Rudman was like that. And I would argue the unrealistic budget control caps were as well. So, I would say make changes that are like your favorite car and not like a New Year's resolution. Second, we should use Senator Bennet's term, de-weaponize the debt limit. Senator Whitehouse is exactly right when he said that it is like a bear trap in your bedroom. Many Republicans and Democrats alike agree that now may be a time to end this drama. The Gephardt rule, which automatically changed the debt limit when you adopted a budget resolution, should be applied in both Houses. And if that fails, there is the McConnell rule. That is the rule that you delegate power to the President to suspend the debt limit for a period of time subject to a fast- track resolution of disapproval. Third, a lot of Senators hate the budget process and the budget resolution, in particular, because of vote-a-rama, the all-night vote marathon on amendments that no one has seen before. None of us have liked pulling all-nighters since college, and if we admit it, we didn't like it in college. One problem is that the vote-a-rama is one way that the minority can get its voice heard. But you can solve that by guaranteeing that the minority leader gets a vote on a certain number of amendments. You can haggle over the number, but it has got to be something less than 50. After a certain number, the press stops paying attention anyway, so why torture yourself? Fourth, I like the Convergence Center idea to facilitate a budget action plan at the beginning of a new Congress. The election cycle is the cycle that Congress pays attention to anyway, so you should recognize that reality in the process. I also agree with Chair Lowey, and I would not move to a 2- year appropriations bill. Annual appropriations bills are one of the few ways you guys have to get the Secretary of such and such to answer your telephone call. Fifth, I like the Convergence Center's idea to make the chairs and ranking members of other committees, members of the Budget Committees and for many of the same reasons that Senator Perdue expressed here. As spots open up on the Budget Committees, give the other chairs and rankers a right of first refusal to join you on the Budget Committee. If enough do, it would become a place where deals get done. There are five suggestions. Good luck and Godspeed in your efforts. [The prepared statement of Bill Dauster follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, sir. Mr. White. STATEMENT OF JOSEPH WHITE Mr. White. I hope I am doing this correctly. Distinguished co-chairs and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to share some analysis and ideas with you as you search for useful ways to reform the congressional budget process doing no harm along the way. Many of the sources of complaint about current budgeting and budget resolutions in particular, such as failure to meet deadlines or complete parts of the procedure at all, are due mainly to the intense political conflict of our time. And new processes can't fix that. But I think a bit of good can be done, and it is encouraging to see that there is some agreement among the participants on this panel, the careful statements by the committee leadership, and other efforts, such as the Convergence Project. On one issue I didn't address in my written testimony, I would just like to say that I agree with Mr. Capretta and Mr. Dauster and the Convergence Project that it is time to eliminate the ways that the debt ceiling encourages hostage- taking and brinksmanship full stop. Any further reforms--or if you can do that one, that would be a huge one--but any reform that would be designed to accomplish some set of goals and sort of meet some standards, and these standards should not consist only of beliefs about effects on budget totals as the so much discussion seems to think. So, I would like to emphasize four others. First, budget should serve representative government with democratic accountability. They should make it easier for citizens to see what the government is planning and promising and delivering, and they should be affected by elections. Second, budget processes should help policymakers encourage efficient operation of government programs. Third, Federal budget decisions have some effects on the national economy so the process should encourage debate and attempts to influence those effects. Most important, the basic task of budgeting is to relate preferences about details to preferences about totals. Normal budgeting proceeds in iterations. Totals in details are proposed. If there are mismatches, those are identified, and negotiations search for a combination that is acceptable. The details, such as what is done for national security or who pays how much tax or what healthcare the government guarantees for what cost, are in aggregate at least as important as the economic effects of budget totals. Top-down approaches that set totals without considering the effects on details, therefore, are fundamentally bad budgeting. So, by these standards, I would say there should be budget resolutions because resolutions provide a public statement of the economic policy based on the governing group's beliefs about the effects of spending, revenues and their balance. Resolutions also can trigger reconciliations, significant changes in government priorities. But these kinds of broad policies, broad priorities, or basic economic approach basically reflect elections. They are unlikely to change between elections. And by that logic, resolutions should be biennial, functioning as the U.S. version of what OECD calls a medium-term budget framework. There is no need to do resolutions twice in a Congress. The annual appropriations process, however, provides a review of agency plans that is useful both for encouraging efficiency and making agencies accountable to Congress and the public. Agency activities involve details that can change from year to year, and there are good reasons why most organizations budget in this sense annually. So, I would like to see resolutions passed biennially but set 302a allocations for the appropriations for 2 years with the appropriations remaining annual. I think that fits the purposes of both processes. Now, other witnesses have agreed with some of these recommendations. And there will be a lot more disagreement over my third point. You are receiving today and will surely receive more recommendations that the budget process be focused on estimated consequences for budget totals, even further in the future than the current 10-year terms of resolutions. I tried to explain in my written testimony why that is not a great idea, but just a few points here. One, long-term discretionary spending targets fundamentally ignore details. That is why they eventually break down because you don't really belief in the details that would fit those targets. Two, procedures that claim to budget for the long run are just a subject of manipulation and gimmicks as any other procedures. As you must know from experience with evading the BCA, discretionary caps. Three, the dominant factor in projected long-term spending increases is healthcare programs, but there is no good way to estimate that cost. I provide a chart as an example of that in my testimony. In fact, focusing on long-term Medicare costs misses the point, that we have a national healthcare cost crisis now and not just in government programs. Much more could be said about this topic, but perhaps we can engage about that in the discussion period. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. [The prepared statement of Joseph White follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Mr. White. We appreciate the testimony of each of our witnesses here this morning. I will begin the Q&A with a question for Ms. MacGuineas. Your testimony contains a lot of solid suggestions for Congress to more effectively address long-term debt. In the current budget process, we definitely have, at best, some tension, if not an outright conflict, between budgeting for the short term that leads to an annual appropriations process and then doing something that addresses the long term without it becoming just some fictitious goal in mind that really doesn't carry a lot of merit. Which, if any, of the elements in our current budget process, Ms. MacGuineas, would you keep? Ms. MacGuineas. Well, that is an interesting question, so I think I would shift a lot of the focus on to thinking about the budget more comprehensively. One of the things I don't want to do is sacrifice the long term just to focus on the short term or vice versa. And so, I think I would go to the very root of what budgets are for, which is for tradeoffs, and they admit that they have constraints, and I would hold yourselves responsible for looking at what the glide path for the current projections are on a regular basis. Many times I have actually heard Members of the Congress say, you know, there is two-thirds of the budget that we can't even look at. And, of course, we can, it is not through the appropriations process, but you are responsible for overseeing the portion of mandatory spending and revenues. So, what I would do is I would add in a piece that requires reviews of that, and I would increase more transparency as you figure out how to do the really hard pieces of making changes so those have alignment, which they currently don't. Co-Chair Womack. We have had a lot of discussion in previous hearings about carrots and sticks. What can we do to motivate, incentivize, coerce, shame Congress into actually doing something? Ms. MacGuineas. So, I think there is a couple of things that you want to create the carrots and/or sticks for. One, of course, is getting a budget done. And the second is for improved fiscal outcomes. On getting the budget done, I do find myself kind of liking the simple idea of you shouldn't leave, you shouldn't have a recess until the budget is completed. I know people want carrots, so I figured we can just make that a carrot instead of a stick, which you get recess when you've done the budget. We can just flip it. But I do think in terms of the long term, there are lot of things you can do with the debt ceiling where you replace that with a different form of budget constraints, something that only comes into play when you are spending and revenue programs in the longer term are out of whack. So, you would not have to have debt targets, debt ceilings, other kinds of constraints, unless they are there to remind you that changes need to be made. And avoiding them, I assume, would be a carrot. Co-Chair Womack. Mr. Capretta, some observers have noted the challenge of focusing on medium and long-term fiscal outlooks. At the same time, the unfunded liabilities of the Federal Government, depending on who you ask, are at least in the tens of trillions, if not into the hundreds of trillions of dollars. So, help me understand why in spite of the challenges, Congress should attempt to build in a longer term focus as part of the budget resolution and do so in a politically neutral way? Mr. Capretta. Well, it is quite true that projecting out Federal outcomes, 15, 20, 30, 40 years from now is very difficult to do, but there is little question that the population aging of this country, plus the commitments that have been made in programs relative to the revenue base has left the country with a very, very large gap. And, you know, we can argue about degrees and how much, but it is going to be very, very significant. I would also note that many other countries have adopted some kind of a long-term focus because they understand this problem. Many countries, frankly, advanced economies have taken much more proactive steps than we have to try to get this under control in advance of it occurring because it is, for them, maybe accelerated some because of their demographic questions. So, there is no question that we have a big unfunded liability problem. How are we going to deal with it? If we don't make some changes in the processes that are pushing the Congress to address it, and the President to address it, there is very little reason to do anything. The Congress could drift on for another 10 or 15 years without anybody even realizing how big the problem is and, you know, until it is almost on top of us. And so, I think much more focus needs to be brought to Congress on how big it is and what needs to be done now to try to affect outcomes in 10 and 15 and 20 years. You cannot change this problem with a small, you know, adjustment, and, you know, turn around and expect it to, you know, be implemented right away. You are going to have to do big things, and that means, you know, things that are going to take a long time to phase in. Co-Chair Womack. I am about out of time. I was going to share some of my new Year's resolution with Mr. Dauster, but since I have broken all of them anyway, we will just save that for another day. Mr. Dauster. I broke mine as well. Co-Chair Womack. I do like the comparison, though, to our business and breaking New Year's resolution. Mr. Dauster. Thank you, sir. Co-Chair Womack. Mrs. Lowey. Co-Chair Lowey. For whoever cares to respond regarding budget resolutions. In the past, the budget resolution has been a powerful tool for creating, implementing, and enforcing budget plans, but that only works if there really is actual agreement on a plan. And recently, budget resolutions seem to be becoming more vague with little real purpose other than to launch reconciliation bills and sometimes attempt to show declining deficits on paper. Would any of you like to comment on how budget resolutions can be made more real again? Mr. Dauster. Well, I will start by saying that I do with the Convergence Center idea that it makes sense to set those overall appropriations levels early on in a Congress. And I try to encourage that to happen by making it sort of a disappearing fast track. You get the fast track if you can do that at the beginning of the Congress where it is useful to the appropriators, but you lose that, say, in April or May of the first year. If you don't do it by then, you don't get the fast track reward that you would have otherwise. Mr. Capretta. I would also just suggest that the recommendation I made in my testimony that said that you should tie the statutory caps on discretionary spending, on appropriated spending to the levels that go--that are in a budget resolution and send legislation to the President for signature or veto on those caps, it would make the budget resolution the vehicle by which the annual appropriation caps are set for both the Congress and the President. That would be a real legislative item, and it wouldn't be fictitious. If it was signed, you know, that would be, everybody would be signing on, you know, subject to loopholes and trying to get around it through some practices that need to be stopped. But, you know, caps on discretionary spending have generally, not always, but generally worked over the last 25 years. And if you put them into the budget resolution, the budget resolution becomes more real for both the Congress and the President. Ms. MacGuineas. I would point out that reconciliation is an incredibly powerful tool. And I think that it should be changed back to the original intent so reconciliation can be used for things that improve the deficit situation, not used in other ways. And I also think that budgets should be pushed back to where they are taken seriously, and they are meant to be serious, and not just political documents where the numbers don't add up. And ways to consider doing that is that if you have savings in your budget, you need to put them into reconciliations. You need to direct for them to have reconciliation to move those savings along so that they aren't just put there on paper and never used. And ending the amount of gimmicks that we have on these budgets, so there are heroic assumptions. There are timing changes. There are all sorts of spending that is assumed to bypass the caps, but plugging up those gimmicks would be one important tool in showing that budgets need to be taken seriously. And they are at the point now where they aren't at all. Mr. White. If I may, just a few points. One is that the original purpose of the reconciliation process in the original budget resolution was not simply to reduce deficits. There was disagreement about that. I am not saying that, at this point, given the current situation, I wouldn't support that, but sometimes, for example, you want an expansive fiscal policy, or you might want an expansive fiscal policy. And one of the original ideas was that reconciliation could be used for that. So we shouldn't talk about original intent here. I also think, I think the most ridiculous thing that is being done with reconciliations right now is the use of these $1 billion reconciliation instructions, which are ways to basically get around the Senate filibuster without actually having any fiscal policy or any policy involved. And so, if there is a way to ban these $1 billion reconciliations, I think that would be a good idea. The other thing I would like to emphasize is that it sounds nice to say that there should be agreement between--that the President should sign off on the budget resolution, but the budget resolution process was originally created in part because, you know, President Nixon and the Congress at the time did not agree on basic fiscal policy. And I have a hard time imagining what the budget resolution produced by Speaker Ryan would have been that President Obama would have signed. And so, I think it probably is better to view the budget resolution as something for Congress. Getting the House and Senate to agree is tough enough. Co-Chair Lowey. I misunderstood. I thought, in your last response, you were suggesting that the President get involved. I guess I misunderstood. I can't imagine bringing the President into the budget process now. We have enough trouble when we finish our work, but that is not here nor there. Did I misunderstand you? It seems your first---- Mr. White. No, no, no. I think it is very optimistic to recommend, as the Convergence project does and as other people have, that the budget resolution be some sort of joint resolution that the President signs. I think that is going to be very, very tough. Co-Chair Lowey. Oh, we agree that it would be very, very, very, very tough. Mr. White. It would be great if you could get agreement, but I am not sure you can have a process that forces that. Co-Chair Lowey. Okay. I just wanted to be sure that I didn't misunderstand. Mr. White. Sorry. Co-Chair Lowey. Thank you very much. Co-Chair Womack. Representative Arrington. Representative Arrington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I must say, I find this panel, so far, the most helpful and most practical and most specific in getting at what I hope we can all agree to with specific strategies for a more timely, orderly process. And if we can be aspirational, I would like to get at some ways to improve getting to better outcomes, not necessarily--in a policy-neutral way. I think, let me start with the reconciliation process because it has come up. You say we shouldn't use the reconciliation for these $1 billion--and I agree, actually. I mean, I voted for the tax reform because I think we have got to grow the economy. And I think that is part of it. And I think we are going to more than cover the cost there, but, regardless, I don't think that that is necessarily the intent or a good pattern to enter in to. Why don't we use reconciliation for its intended purpose? And I will open that up to any of you. Why don't we use that for its intended purpose more often given that we are $21 trillion and counting? Mr. Dauster. I think of the reconciliation bill from the Senate standpoint. And from a Senate perspective, reconciliation is a way to get a majority vote on something when the normal rule in the Senate is that you need 60 votes to go to the bathroom. So, it could be, it could be used for a lot more things than it is. But in the end, it ends, as you have said in earlier committee hearings, it often relies on the political will if it isn't there to put together the costly difficult things that you would have to put in the reconciliation. Representative Arrington. So, if that is the way to get at the 70 percent of the spend that we know is one part of the equation here to reduce deficit spending and debt and if we know that there are some really big programs within the mandatory side, why don't we use that reconciliation more often, Ms. MacGuineas? Ms. MacGuineas. Well, I think the problem is that what happens is to use that reconciliation usually means it is going to be one party that uses it, just by passing the 60 in the Senate. And for big fiscal improvements, you are going to need both parties to buy in. There is no way that we are going to get real deals, real progress, real improvements with one party owning all the hard choices. Representative Arrington. We couldn't even get the Republican Party on a simple majority to agree to $204 billion reduction using reconciliation during the tax reform. I don't know how in the world we are going to get--we have people in my party that won't even mention the word Social Security or Medicare when it comes to reconciliation. I mean, there are all kinds of ways to say it to avoid people thinking you are trying to take their Social Security; you know, making it more sustainable for my generation and all that. But I mean, isn't it always going to come back to, will we have the guts to actually take on some things that we know are going to send us into oblivion, into the debt crisis that will wreak havoc on generations to come, blah, blah, blah? I mean, please. Mr. Capretta. If I could just say one thing about reconciliation, which I think has been lost over the years, which is that it was quite true that it is used mainly to get a majority vote in the Senate these days. But in the eighties, because there was split government between--you had a Republican President and a Republican Senate and a Democratic House, it had to be bipartisan, and the theory of the Reagan Administration, why they pushed for reconciliation to be used frequently during that period, was you ended up with one vote where there was some positive thing a Member might be able to say about it as opposed to all the individual items. You could claim: Hey, if we pass this bill, it will reduce the deficit by $300 billion, $400 billion. And that was the impetus to try to put it all together into one package and say Congress was taking a very important step to reduce the deficit. You are never going to get deficit reduction of that magnitude if you try to pass a lot of little individual bills. They all get mired down in political controversy, and every committee wants to be budget-neutral. So that is really the main purpose of reconciliation. Representative Arrington. Each of you have mentioned the debt targets. I am all for that. I think it is policy-neutral, Mr. Chairman, as to how you get at the outcome. But I think having a glide path to something more responsible, how do we put teeth into that to make sure that whatever the strategy, we walk it back to a responsible level? And I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Whitehouse. Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Chairman. I was struck by Chairman Womack's opening statement regarding the disinterest that we all see in the budget resolution. And I think one of the reasons for that is that the question, the budget resolution to what end, hasn't been answered. If the purpose is to create a reconciliation bill that is not even relevant to the fiscal task of the Budget Committee, which it has become recently--and it is hard to get too excited about that unless you are the proponent of the measure that is being driven through the reconciliation process--if you are doing budget resolution without a strategy or a timeline or a goal, it is hard to get excited about that as well. And I appreciate very much Mr. Capretta's focus on a target and getting there over time, because I think that is an important part of any serious budget fiscal process. It is also hard to get excited about a budget resolution where you don't even get the arithmetic right and add the elements that add to the deficit and the debt, which are revenue, appropriated spending, health spending, and tax spending. And if we are not looking at all of them, we are not even getting the arithmetic right. And, finally, if the budget resolution doesn't help the appropriators get their 302s and it doesn't help solve the debt limit problem, again, it is hard to get too excited about it. So, I think that gives us an array of tasks that can make the budget process meaningful again. And I want to particularly focus in my questioning on the debt ceiling because I think you have all been really excellent on that subject. As Bill Dauster was kind enough to point out, I view this as a zero-upside bear trap in the bedroom. Worst-case scenario, you step in the damn thing, and bam, now you have got a hell of a problem on your hands. Best-case scenario, you avoid it, and nothing good has been accomplished. That is not a really good equation. Bill, you have looked at this for some time. You have a lot of experience in the Senate. Can you think of one good thing in your experience that was accomplished in the Senate by virtue of the debt ceiling? Some people say it is an opportunity to, like, give the minority a chance to hold the majority's feet to the fire, demand something. Has that actually ever happened? Mr. Dauster. I am not going to be able to find that example. And, in fact, I think that you are right about, and many of you have expressed the concern with the debt ceiling. We carry around in our pockets little pieces of paper like this that are basically just promises based on the promise that the government is going to do what it says it is going to do in the budget process. Senator Whitehouse. Let the record reflect he is showing a dollar bill. Mr. Dauster. It could have been, though, a Treasury bill, a Treasury bond. If we have pieces of paper like that, we sell them for real money, real things of value in the world. But if we mess up the debt limit, then we have to pay people more in order to borrow from them by giving them little pieces of paper. So, whenever we do debt limit crises, we put in danger the whole system that relies on little pieces of paper like this. Senator Whitehouse. Let me ask you if you could get back to me in a response to a question for the record because I don't think we have the time to really drill into this now. But as I think my House colleagues will be first to recognize, the Senate is a peculiar place, and---- Mr. Dauster. We will stipulate---- Senator Whitehouse. And I think your idea about using the budget process to, quote, ``automatically change the debt limit,'' I think makes a lot of sense. But I think it would be helpful to us if you brought your experience in the Senate, with its procedures and with its parliamentary rules and so forth, to drill down through that automatically changed concept and see what kind of language you might, perhaps, even run by the Parliamentarian, and see how we would actually do that. I think that is a really good concept. And I think one of the things that makes the budget resolution relevant again is if it does move the debt limit so you don't have that bear trap waiting out there for you. But as you know, the Senate is a peculiar place, and if you could drill through to that, that would be, I think, very valuable for all of us. Mr. Dauster. I am happy to do so, sir. Senator Whitehouse. And to go back to Mr. Capretta's statement. You talked about setting a target for debt and deficit reduction over time. My observation has been that the current budget process, at least in the Senate, doesn't do that. There is no point in that process. We are asked to set what the target is. And I think every witness so far has agreed that the target is a debt-to-GDP ratio. Whatever the number is, that is the metric for it. And we are not asked that in the budget process at any point. And given that we are looking at $21 trillion, as Congressman Arrington said, we are not going to do that overnight. So there has to be a glide slope to get there, and presumably, there also has to be warning bells to let us know when we are off course. Is that the general concept that you had in mind about a target and over time? Mr. Capretta. It is generally. I would support that as a way of doing the business. I would also look at, potentially, present value calculation. That would be another way of bringing it down to one number that the public might be able to understand. Just have CBO---- Senator Whitehouse. Or you do both. Mr. Capretta. You could do both. Senator Whitehouse. So, you can't game it so much. Mr. Capretta. Yeah. That is---- Senator Whitehouse. Does everybody agree that debt-to-GDP is the metric that we should be looking at in terms of---- Mr. Dauster. I would quibble on two grounds, if you will forgive me. One is---- Senator Whitehouse. I am out of time, so keep it brief, Bill. I yield back. Mr. Dauster. You should be looking at the rate of change, not just the stock. So, deficits are just as important. Where you are going is important. And why you are going is important. If you had a high debt-to-GDP ratio and you are fighting Hitler, that is okay. But if you are not doing something important, then it is not. Senator Whitehouse. Got it. Co-Chair Womack. Mr. Sessions, Texas. Representative Sessions. Thank you. I want to ask a different question. 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, we went through in this body and in the Senate, a process that essentially was CRs and essentially held discretionary spending flat. It produced a flat budget. It held government to making decisions, in my opinion, based on priorities. It refocused administration agencies, and it made them dig deep, in my opinion. It also caused, on the other side, some indecision about infrastructure decisions that we would make and deferred lots of decisions. So, some, I think, was good. Some, I think was deferred. What do you think? Ms. MacGuineas? Ms. MacGuineas. So, I thought the purpose of the spending caps would have been, would have been most effective if what it had done was pushed lawmakers to replace them with more thoughtful targeted changes to the budget that would have improved the fiscal situation. I thought the caps were the easiest thing to do because you don't have to specify what the savings are, and so it sounds like you are doing a lot work, but you are not picking the policies. There were some savings that were smart. There were some savings that were excessive. Now that we have gotten rid of the caps, and what we should have done is when we busted through those caps, replaced them with savings elsewhere, we no longer have that spending constraint. But we also have the problem where discretionary spending, which really hadn't been the driving problem in the budget before is about to be a big significant problem again. So, I would pick reasonable spending caps along with pay- as-you go rules. Reasonable meaning they are built from policies that you can stick to and you plan to stick to. But this time I would include the full part of the budget, not the part of the budget which at the time was the least, the least of the drivers of the debt. Representative Sessions. A hungry person will gorge themselves. A person that eats consistently may be able to offer some bit of disciplined in their eating and sleeping Ms. MacGuineas. That is right. You want budgeting constraint that is realistic. We want budgets that are realistic, and we want enforcement mechanisms that are realistic. And once we have things that are on paper add up to huge aggressive claims that we are never going to get, the whole process becomes impossible to stick by, and then there is no credibility to it. Representative Sessions. Mr. Capretta. Mr. Capretta. I think that the discretionary caps were useful for trying to drive a lot of productivity improvement in certain ways. I think they became counterproductive to some degree with respect to the defense budget. I think that there is pretty clear evidence that, you know, if you just look at defense over the nineties and to where we are today, given the security questions going on, it seems like it is not going to work to have the levels that were there previously. And so, something was going to have to give. And when you gave on that, you ended up giving on the other side as well. So that, I think, was the basic equation. Discretionary spending isn't necessarily the fundamental problem. There is lots of waste in it. It is very hard to target the waste. I think one idea that should be given more consideration is delegating to the agencies that are running these programs some more incentives to drive productivity improvements in their agencies so that they make the decisions to cut spending so that they can then spend the savings on bigger investments that they can find. So, you know, new models of running the agencies is probably a better answer than just blunt across-the-board cutting. Representative Sessions. I am not trying to give the answer for you, but I was out in Hawaii several years ago and met General Brown, United States Army, who spent a good bit of time trying to convince us that sequester was a difficult issue for the military. And I took 1 minute to suggest to him that I thought that the levels were fine, and we needed to give it to them October the 1st instead of March the 20th. And he got his head around that. So, I am not saying the answer I expected from you, but I think timeliness is the most important aspect to run the government. Sir? Mr. Dauster. I agree with a lot of what you just said and what the other witnesses have said. Make it early so that the appropriators can react to it and the government can react to. Make it rational and achievable, or else people will blow through it. But setting a cap is one of the best ways to get the agency to focus on achieving at savings. Representative Sessions. I think, no matter what the level is, timeframe of efficiency, of giving the government time to effectively take whatever they are is important knowing we probably won't go back, but they have got--meaning how much money, we probably won't take back a lot of money, but giving them time to effectively do it. Sir? Mr. White. If I may, there is a lot that could be said here, but I just want to emphasize that we should not assume that there is a lot of productivity that can be pulled out of our programs. It is not clear to me, for example, that the effect on the Social Security Administration of the kind of budget constraints it has faced is something that could have been solved by greater productivity. So, I think we have to be very careful about making these assumptions in any part of the budget. Representative Sessions. Well, I think you could just look to the VA. That would be exhibit A, to me, with the size. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Co-Chair Womack. Mr. Yarmuth of Kentucky. Representative Yarmuth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all the witnesses. I have found the discussions very interesting, as all our discussions have been interesting. I want to focus a little bit on the issue of long-term budgeting. It seems to me that three of the four witnesses have said we should be doing that, and Mr. White takes a contrary position. I remember several years ago when Tim Geithner was the Secretary of the Treasury, and he came before the committee. And Paul Ryan was then chairman and had all of these 40-, 50-year projections of expenses and so forth and increasing the deficits. And I asked Secretary Geithner, you know, how realistic do you think 40- and 50-year projections in a world that is changing as rapidly as this one is? And he said: I don't think projections outside of 5 years are worth anything. So, would you elaborate, Mr. White, on what your opinion is on the perils of longer term budgeting, and what you think may be a realistic timeframe that is viable and meaningful? Mr. White. Sure. It varies somewhat with the program. And you can do a better long-term focus for a pension program than you can for a healthcare program. Healthcare cost control is simply a year to year problem because the entitlement to healthcare is not simply to the beneficiaries. The reason our care is so expensive is we pay so much for everything we get. In other words, the providers are getting much more money here than in any other country, or the overhead expenses are much more than in any other country. And these are powerful important people who, if you try to reduce their incomes, they will fight you. And you cannot budget in the long run to control the costs that the medical community will generate because there are just no policies that will do that. So, healthcare cost control is a short-term problem. And it is problem for the whole country, not just for the government. And we really need to do much better on that. And that is the most important thing we could do for the long run of the Federal budget. If we got our healthcare costs down to something resembling the most expensive other country in the world, our long-term forecast would look a lot better. So, one, some programs are different from other programs. Social Security is different from Medicare and Medicaid. Beyond that, I think anything more than 2 years is probably a bad idea for discretionary spending because there is no--first of all, there is no good way to do the baseline. What is the baseline from which you start? The CBO baseline is usually, well, increased with inflation, but for some programs, that may be too much, but for a lot, it is too little. The population grows. You are serving more people. And so, I don't think there is any really good way to do long term. And I think that the most important thing you could do about the long term is get better control of the American healthcare system now. Representative Yarmuth. You also, in your written testimony, talk about the point that budgeting should be more about just aggregate totals of spending and revenue, that it has to be more about the policies that are reflected. And I totally agree with that. The American people deserve to know what policies will underlie the allocations that we are making. And I remember so well, Mick Mulvaney coming before the committee earlier this year. And he said: I could have come up with a balanced budget, but we would have been making stuff up. We would have been basically fabricating policy. And in prior Congresses, they have done the same. You arrive at a number, and then you say: Well, details are to be determined. What kind of details in terms of policies in the budget resolution do you think are appropriate? Mr. White. Well, I think that this obviously raises the question of which committees are going to make decisions about details. I think in the past when reconciliation has been used to reduce the deficit, which hasn't happened for a while, but when it did, what actually happened is that the leaders of the committee, such as Senator Dole in particular, told the leadership of the Budget Committee and so on: Hey, I think we can do this much. We have ideas about how we will do this much. I think it is in practice that there should be consultation with the leaders of the authorizing committees about: What do you think you can do this year? How much can you do? No, we need more. And, again, it is iterative. I don't think the budget resolution should specify the policy details. I think that the budget resolution, however, should be based on careful consultation about what details might work, about what totals might work. Finance Committee, what can you do here? Ways and means, what can you do here? And the budget process can push, the Budget Committee can push, and say: Hey, how about some of this? But that is all before the resolutions are adopted. Representative Yarmuth. Thank you. I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Ernst. Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to our witnesses today. It has really--I agree with Congressman Arrington--this has been a very, very helpful discussion and debate this morning. I would like to start just by going back to having the budget as a joint resolution signed into law. And I know, Mr. White, you have expressed great concern there. It would be very difficult. But if the panel could go back and maybe, from your perspective, why would a--because a lot of our witnesses have brought this up in other meetings as well. But from your perspective, what would be a positive to having a joint resolution signed into law, and what might be the negatives of that same proposal? Jim, if you would like to start? Mr. Capretta. Yes. Back to the recommendation I made in my testimony. First of all, the recommendation I made was just to make the budget resolution the vehicle for spinning off a piece of legislation that would go to the President, that would amend the caps on discretionary spending. Mr. Capretta. So, it wouldn't be covering everything that would be going on in the budget resolution. I actually in the past have favored that. That may be a step too far for this committee to take, so let's just focus on the recommendation I had in my testimony today. If you put into the budget resolution the option that, at the end of it, if it was approved by Congress, a separate bill would go to the President, and he could sign or veto it, and it would change the caps on discretionary spending, this would get around the problem of a fake budget resolution, because the resolution would be setting caps that everybody would have to live with. And these would be the real caps. They wouldn't be the fake caps with $40 billion in reductions that nobody planned to actually enact. So that is one very big positive, I think, that this would become a real vehicle for really setting the caps, and it would be the caps that the President would also have to live with. He wouldn't be signing on to anything else. Now, some people have said, well, why do we want to bring the President into the budget. The President is in the budget process. The President, at the end of the day, is going to be in agreement or in disagreement around the total amount of discretionary spending. They will weigh in on that one way or another before the process is out. If you can get agreement on that earlier in the year, you are better off than later. Now, I am not guaranteeing this would lead to agreement right away. This could mean protracted negotiations like everything else. It could go on for months. But it would become a vehicle for trying to get that debate going. And by the way, if the President vetoed it, Congress would just go on like it already does. So, you wouldn't really lose anything by doing this. Senator Ernst. Yes, Joe. Mr. White. If I may, Senator, but that raises the question: What is the period of the caps? If the period of the caps is, say, 5 years, then next time it is time for a budget resolution, hey, we already have some caps. We don't need to enact a resolution to have caps because we already have caps. So, there might be an argument for, if you go to a biennial budget resolution, for having 2-year caps, and I think that would be responsible in terms of relating totals to details. But if the caps are for longer than that, then the argument that it is an incentive to pass a budget resolution no longer becomes true. Senator Ernst. Maya. Ms. MacGuineas. So, I think it is a perfect example of how there are pros and cons in all of these policies, instead of that it is just one simple answer. And I think Doug Holtz-Eakin testified before in a way that made it really clear and helpful. The benefit of is right now the budget doesn't have the force of law. It would be desirable if it did, it would be more meaningful, and it would strengthen the budget in guiding the entire process. The problem is how you feel about giving the President more power than he already has, because Congress should be able to take some of its power. And then I think the real issue is, where do you want those hard choices to come. Should they come at the beginning of the process, which they probably should, which is why I would, if I had to choose, go for a joint budget resolution, but it could make getting the process started much easier. And you want to have a backup plan so that if you can't come to agreement, you can still have revenue and spending levels that you can move forward with. Senator Ernst. Very good. I appreciate that. I have got less than a minute left, but I want to quick ask you, Ms. MacGuineas about, you mentioned mandatory versus the discretionary spending and greater transparency, having a look at mandatory spending at some point during that budgetary cycle. How would you envision that? Ms. MacGuineas. Yeah. Well, I absolutely think that you do need to budget in the longer term, you need to make projections and look at things in the longer term if you are going to make commitments for the longer term, which we do in programs like Social Security and Medicare. And there are a lot of important things that we need to be predicting going forward over the longer term, like things that are driven by demographics. So, the first key is absolutely increased transparency. We have very good work on this from the trustees of Social Security and Medicare, but having other ways that we really put forth the projections that these plans are on. Then the next step would be coming up with actual--if your programs are out of alignment, if we are making promises that we aren't able to keep, which we are doing right now, there would be some action-forcing mechanism where you would start to grapple with those. It would, as we have said throughout this hearing, be policy-neutral. It has nothing do with how you would fix these programs. It would be that we should no longer be able to abdicate the responsibility to look at programs where we are making promises without a plan for how to pay for them, and making changes to them sooner rather than later would beneficial. Senator Ernst. Thank you. I apologize, Chair. I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. Ms. Roybal-Allard. Representative Roybal-Allard. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I want to ask a little bit different kind of question to see whether or not this fits into the equation as to what we are trying to do. You know, it is been mentioned that the congressional budgeting math doesn't match up with reality, that we should be looking at projecting outcomes further out to see what the impact is of our decisions, immediate decisions are, and how it impacts us in the future. And it was also mentioned that we had better get better control of our healthcare system, because that is something that is also contributing to our deficits now and in the future. The thing I am asking about is how we score things, for example, in terms of healthcare, the fact that we cannot score certain policies. And I will use healthcare as an example. For example, prevention, when the information we get says that if we invest in prevention, for every dollar that is saved, we eventually will save $12, sometimes $24. I don't remember the exact number. And so, because it is not scorable, at least that is what we are told all the time, we do more treatment policy rather than prevention policy. And so, I guess my question is, in terms of scoring, is there anything that you think could be done in terms of scoring so that the savings that we could realize, if we were able to invest more in prevention, would become a reality? Because right now every time we want to invest in prevention, we are told: No, we can't do this because it can't be scored and it breaks the budget caps or it goes beyond whatever restraints that we have. So, my question is about the scoring, if something can be done to include long-term savings. Mr. White. If I may, there are two issues here. One is the boundaries between discretionary and mandatory spending. So, if you increase discretionary spending this year, the question is, that runs up against the caps in discretionary spending. And yet, it is budgetarily sort of silly to let the caps stop you from doing that if it, in fact, will save you money on Medicare and Medicaid and so on down the road. And that would require some sort of changes in the rules so that mandatory savings, as scored by CBO, would be allowed as offsets against discretionary spending. You could do that by the rules within the caps. But there is a second issue, which is whether prevention actually saves money. And most of the time, CBO does not score prevention as saving money because most of the time it actually doesn't. The advocates will say it will, but finding data that actually supports that for most prevention measures turns out to be very difficult. And this goes back to Louise Russell's book 30 years ago on: Is prevention cheaper than cure? And prevention may, in fact, help, you may get healthier people from it, but most of the time CBO won't score it because they don't have the evidence to score it. So, there are those two different issues. Representative Roybal-Allard. Ms. MacGuineas, in your testimony you say that Social Security deserves a place in the budget process. And as you know, any time we mention doing anything with Social Security it raises a lot of red flags for a lot of different reasons. So, can you please elaborate a little bit on how you think Social Security should fit into the budget process? And how could we avoid some of the pitfalls that so many see whenever we even talk about Social Security in any way? Ms. MacGuineas. Yeah. Let me first agree and empathize that having a discussion, a national discussion about Social Security, is incredibly difficult because it becomes demagogued immediately, and you quickly move away from what the actuaries tell us to sort of threats of people trying to harm seniors or do this and that. That is about a national discussion. We are not having very good national discussions on a lot of things right now, and we need to change that tone and that tenor and the way that we talk about things. And that is why I do believe things like the trustees of Social Security, CBO, impartial arbiters, are really critical in all of these discussions. The reason I think Social Security needs to be a part of the budget, and, again, policy-neutral, we can fix Social Security all by revenue increases. We can fix it all by spending reductions. We can do it with a combination. It is not about how you fix it. It is that we have made promises that we are unable to pay right now. So, we do want to think about that. But it is also the point that budgets are about resources and how we are going to allocate them. And it is really important that, at some step, and that step should be the budget, we look at all of our resources in total, how they are allocated in the budget pie, and ask ourselves the question: Does that reflect our national priorities? And in most cases, I am sure it probably will, and that is a good thing. But we should not take pieces, big pieces of the budget off and say we are not going to look at them, because budgets can't look at the whole picture unless you understand all our tax dollars, where they are going, what the tradeoffs are. Everything with Social Security is controversial, but this shouldn't be. This is just a basic principle of how one should budget. And, again, it has nothing to do with outcomes. But we should fix the program. It has nothing to do with directing how we should. Representative Roybal-Allard. Okay. Thank you. Co-Chair Womack. Mr. Woodall. Representative Woodall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with Ms. MacGuineas, everything with Social Security is controversial. But I suspect, now that more than half of the Congress got here when I did in 2011, or more recently, not a one of us has been asked a question about the 1983 Social Security amendments. Not a one of us has been grilled over the increase in payroll taxes. Not a one of us has been grilled about the reduction in benefits. To Mr. Capretta's point, we did something that was going to take place 30 years later. We phased it in over a large period of time. And we all knew that, born in 1970, I am not going to get my Social Security benefits until 67 instead of 65. And I am vexed about how, to Mr. Dauster's point, how we get folks to focus that far out on the horizon. But I know it would require a reconstitution of the budget committee process. So many State legislatures, the budget committee, the appropriations committee, same committee. And so, I understand some of the recommendations for getting the President involved. Today it actually is pretty clear to me that we are performing three separate functions. I am doing aspirational goals in a budget to tell my bosses back home what I would do if only I were king for a day, which I am not. Then I do an authorization process to say: Just so you know, we can all work together, and these are all the things we would do for you if we had the money to do it, which we don't. And then I come along once a year and say: This is actually what I am going to fund, but don't forget about the really good authorizations I did for you and the really good budget that I passed for you earlier. And so, I don't think we can reject that political reality that those things play a role. So, I want to focus on appropriations, because that is where the rubber meets the road every year. And I have a letter from the CBO where they talked about how the fiscal year 2017 appropriations were being spent. And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to put this in the record. Co-Chair Womack. Without objection. [The information follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Representative Woodall. What the CBO was asked is: What is that spend rate? Because we really do want to hold folks accountable. I think it was Mr. Dauster who said this is the only way I can get the administration to come back and visit with Congress day in and day out. And what the CBO found in this report--and I apologize if my colleagues don't have a copy of it--is that about half the money did go out in year one, but the other half of the money went out in year two, or year three, or had absolutely no time limit on it whatsoever, just went out whenever. So, my question for each of you in the 2-1/2 minutes I have left is, knowing that the spend rate is different, that folks are spending annual appropriations over many years out into the future, and knowing that that number is actually 50 percent of the money that is going out not in year one, does it change your expectation of what keeps the administration coming back to Congress? I want to stipulate that Article I is who I want to protect. Could I really move to biennial or triennial or some different cycle, given the spend rates that we see in appropriations today? Mr. Dauster. Mr. Dauster. I think that is an argument for annually appropriating, because then you go back and you see are you spending it where it needs to go. And if you aren't, then you can grab some of it back and use it somewhere else. Mr. Woodall. Now, I can only grab it back if I have an appropriate President who is willing to work with me on a rescissions bill. And if I have a President who is willing to work with me on a rescissions bill, then I don't need the club of appropriations to get the agency to come back and visit with me, is my expectation. So, I am thinking this is an adversarial situation that comes up most often. Mr. White. Mr. White. Well, I think what we are talking about here at some level is the difference between budget authority and outlays. And so, when Gramm-Rudman was passed, which focused on outlays, they had to have this massive negotiation among CBO and OMB staff to come up with spend-out rates for every program, project, and activity. Because if you are going to buy an aircraft carrier, it is going to take a very long time to spend the money for an aircraft carrier. And if you are going to build a road, again, you don't spend all the money on the road that year. On the other hand, there are things for which you spend money immediately, or it is sent out this year for next year, like support for education. And so most of what is going on in this situation is just the natural differences among types of programs. And I don't think that that will really have much effect on what you are-- -- Representative Woodall. Well, from an accountability perspective, my experience with the Department of the Navy is they are very interested in what I have to say when we are talking about buying that aircraft carrier. Once we have half an aircraft carrier, they are pretty sure we are going to get that second half down the road. The military contractors are pretty sure they are going to get that second half, too. So, I know we are all worried about what happens with the appropriations cycle. I am just not an appropriator, trying to understand how that mechanics work. Mr. White. Well, I think that they are worried about getting the budget authority in the first place. And if they get the budget authority for the aircraft carrier and they screw it up, then maybe there is a possibility you won't give them another aircraft carrier. Representative Woodall. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. Mr. Kilmer. Representative Kilmer. Thank you, Chairman. And thanks to all of you for being with us. You know, there is a lot of conversation about carrots and sticks. And, Mr. Dauster, I wanted to get a sense from you regarding what sort of positive incentives could be put in place to encourage bipartisanship and sound budgeting. You raised the notion of a fast track, and I am not entirely clear what that looks like. I guess I can see how you could create an incentive in the Senate to act in a bipartisan way if it gets around vote-a-rama and filibusters and all that. But why would a majority in the House be incentivized to go that route when they can do whatever they want with 218 votes? Mr. Dauster. I should say that I pray every morning for humility and sometimes it takes. So, I should say that I am not an expert on House procedures and I shouldn't pretend to be. I want to agree, though, with what you said in an earlier hearing, that often when Congress puts a gun to its head it pulls the trigger. And so, if you are putting in sticks in the progress, you want to make sure that you are willing to accept those sticks. So, I am much more of a carrot person. And I think that from the Senate perspective, the particular carrot that works best is to create an opportunity for a fast track where you are able to move something quicker, with fewer amendments, and get it done. And the cost for that is often you need a supermajority in the committee or a deadline to produce it before X date in order to get the right to use that fast track. Representative Kilmer. If you or others have thoughts about how you could get the House to buy into that approach, I would value it, because we have been trying to think about what carrots might look like. Maya, you have spent a lot of time working on these issues. And I know one of the reasons that you are as vocal on this is that I don't think Congress is going to do anything on this issue unless the American public demands it. And to me, that is part of the appeal of the Fiscal State of the Nation idea, to try to drive some conversation around budget deficits and our Nation's debt. Can you talk about how you see that having some potential value? Ms. MacGuineas. Yeah, I really do. And one of the things that I really like about something like the Fiscal State of the Nation is that it is not hard to do, there is nothing that is hard about it, but it could start this positive process. Because, I agree with you, nothing is going to change unless you all go home and feel like your voters actually want you to make some of these hard choices. And that has to be a stronger sentiment, that they enjoy you giving away lots of things, not paying for them, and fighting with each other. But the public will not make that change on their own. That will ultimately only come from political leadership. And so, we have got a little bit of a catch-22. I think the best thing to do is give people information, give you all, the political leaders, and the President information, and insist that it be shared in a way that this is the effect of our budget. Another idea I was thinking about when I was listening to you all talk is, at the end of the budget cycle we should actually look back and see how much you stuck with your budget and how that played out. But the biggest piece of it is sharing the information in terms of the longer-term issues, what we are facing, what the effect it would have from our political leaders, and then that will create an understanding. CBO, all you have to do is read a CBO document and understand how real this is. But finding a way to share that with voters who are dealing with a lot of things that affect their lives personally will help them be able to support the hard choices that you know you need to make that are hard to make. Representative Kilmer. You also put in your testimony, you called out the value of establishing the discretionary spending allocations earlier in the process. I tend to agree with that because until there is agreement on the 302(a)'s, the appropriations processes kind of churn without real progress. So, can you talk about, maybe elaborate a little bit about why you think that can help reduce some of the friction in the budget process? Ms. MacGuineas. Well, I think one of the most important thing is to end crisis budgeting. Right now, things only get done when there are action-forcing moments, and those things are almost always suboptimal. So, you want to put a way in the process where we know that we are not going to have shutdowns, where these things will move more smoothly, but also they are attached to some of the bigger choices. So, what you want to do, I think, on the appropriations part, is find a way where you know you can set the numbers that appropriators will be able to start doing their work, but not as an excuse not to do the full budget. For instance, right now, when we have 2-year budgets in place, you hear people already saying: Well, we don't need to do a budget. We don't want that to be the outcome. So back to the tradeoffs, like there are with joint resolutions, you want to get those numbers on early and people can make their decisions so that we are not doing the last- minute budgeting, which really leads to poor outcomes. We have many examples of that recently. But we don't want it to be an excuse to drop the rest of the budget process. Representative Kilmer. All right. Thanks, Chairman. It looks like I am out of time. I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Schatz. Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all the testifiers. Great conversation so far. First, a comment about the purpose of this committee on a bipartisan basis. The problem that we are here to try to solve is CRs, shutdowns, debt ceiling, a lack of the regular order on the budget and appropriations process. The problem we are not here to solve is long-term solvency of the Social Security Trust Fund, Medicare, and Medicaid. That is for another day, and that is sort of outside of our ability. I mean, remember that the statute that enables this committee is supposed to provide something to both houses for an up-or- down vote by the end of the calendar year. And so, although all of those conversations are interesting, and I am tempted to engage with you, Ms. MacGuineas, about Social Security, I will resist that temptation. But actually, that illustrates my point, that we want to make sure that we calibrate our ambitions so that what we do is what is possible this year and we don't have an academic discussion that either goes completely sideways by the end of the year or ends up becoming a partisan conversation. If all this committee did was get us on a path towards the regular order, maybe by eliminating the debt ceiling as a weapon, maybe by rationalizing the budget process, that would be a tremendous accomplishment. We don't have to fix the country at this table in the next 6 months. We should just get ourselves on a path to do so. So, along those lines I am going to talk about some small things, what I think are small things. The 1974 Budget Act provides that the President is required to submit a budget by the first Monday in February, and then 6 weeks later the committees are requested to submit their views, and then the Budget Committee is supposed to act by April 15. I guess my question is, at least as long as I remember paying attention to politics in this town, we always ignore or reject the President's budget. And to the degree and extent that this committee is literally about asserting our Article I authorities, our constitutional prerogatives, I guess I am just wondering why we need a President's budget at all. So, it is in certainly direct contradiction from your proposal, which would actually elevate and make meaningful the President's budget, and then we have to make our own, and then it is subject to signature or veto. My view is, if what we really think is the executive proposes and the legislative disposes, why don't we just go ahead and move quicker and take out that one step, because I think from a timing standpoint, in addition to aligning the fiscal and the calendar year, those are just kind of some minor tweaks that would allow us to sort of get to business right away. And I will just go down the line. Ms. MacGuineas. Okay. So, I would say, by all means, the process should start earlier. There is nothing wrong with changing the calendar. There are some good things to be said for the President's budget. One is that it is important to understand from the executive branch the statement of values. And two, there is a lot of good policy work that goes into it. So, if you read the fine print, there are a lot of ideas you can pull out and use that are very helpful. But I think recognizing that the beginning of the real process is Congress' budget makes sense. Senator Schatz. Okay. That is fair. That is fair. So we can still have a process. Ms. MacGuineas. You don't need to wait. Senator Schatz. But there is no reason to start the clock upon receiving the Pres budg. Ms. MacGuineas. I would agree with that. Right. Senator Schatz. Okay. Mr. Capretta, go ahead and disagree with me. Mr. Capretta. Well, that is okay. First of all, a longer- term perspective would show that Presidents' budgets have had, in past times, depending on the political circumstances, a lot of influence. So, 1981 was not 2018. Neither was 1993 or 1997. So sometimes in our history Presidents' budgets have been very consequential, so I would be careful about just saying we don't need this. I would also agree with the point that there is lots of detail that is very important. The appropriators would never agree to get rid of the President's budget, because it is chockfull of detailed information about what is really going on at the account level that they need to then write the appropriation bills. Senator Schatz. Right. But maybe we don't, I am serious, maybe we don't need to call it a budget if it is really not a budget and it is not the basis for our budget. Mr. Capretta. Well, a lot of people would disagree that it is not a budget. But, anyway, I think it depends on the circumstances. Senator Schatz. Mr. Dauster. Mr. Dauster. I am going to bring my recollection of working at the end of the Clinton administration in the White House, and the budget was a useful document to get the rest of the government to pay attention to what the President wanted to be done. The OMB has to organize the government to be reactive to the administration's priorities, and for that purpose alone it is a very useful thing. And I agree with what was said earlier as well. Mr. White. Well, I think, first of all, remember the basic problem is to relate details to totals. And so long as the President doesn't have too many magic asterisks, the President's budget does create a template that does sort of do that and that you can then work off of in other directions. I think that, again, so long as OMB actually has enough staff and isn't doing all sorts of other stuff, it provides a review, a scrubbing of the estimates, which is also useful to the appropriators. Somebody once told me that the National Cancer Institute direct pass-through budget is totally useless because it is too big and you don't know what to do with it. So, the Presidential scrub is useful on appropriations. The President's budget gives a template, if he doesn't lie too much, about fitting totals to details. And the last thing the President's budget does is it gives an ability to pass on blame. So, if the President proposes something and it is unpopular but you sort of want to do it anyway, you say: Hey, it is his idea. And if the President proposes something and it is unpopular and you don't want to do it, then you say: Okay, we are going to go cut something else, and the people we cut will be really angry at us, but then we have the people we saved from the mean old President's budget. So, the President's budget is partly about blame allocation and serves some useful purposes for Congress in that. Senator Schatz. I don't think we need another mechanism for blame allocation. Mr. White. Avoidance, blame avoidance. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Senator. Senator Hirono is on her way back from a vote, so we are going to hold this hearing open for a few more minutes waiting on her re-arrival. I do have a question, though. And while we are waiting on her, if anybody else has a question, we will take those as we can. There has been a lot of discussion about the appropriations piece of this whole process. I have a theory, and I am an appropriator, that once we do appropriations work, once we have 302(a)'s and sub-allocations and we actually complete our appropriations process, the Appropriations Committees, certainly the subcommittees, are finished. They don't do a lot more. At least that has been my experience. Would an appropriations process that would scan longer than an annual process open up the opportunity for more and better oversight? Anybody. Mr. Dauster. I think some of your best oversight is when they have to come in and talk to you about the budget, though. If they don't have to worry about the budget or about being funded, they are going to be less concerned with the oversight. Mr. White. Yeah, I guess the question is, if they have some time to do more work--obviously, most of the work, sorry, is done by the staff, right? It is like being a student. There are these really heavy periods and then these slower periods. And they, unlike you, don't have to go back and talk to the public, and so they have some time which could be used studying and learning more about the agencies, in theory. I am not sure. Biennial appropriations would just get less attention, and I don't think it would give extra time that would really be helpful, my perception from the years I have spent looking at the Appropriations Committee. But really that is more sort of the Members' judgment as to what could be better accomplished. Co-Chair Womack. Mr. Capretta. Mr. Capretta. Yeah. I think that it is possible that not spending so much time on appropriations could free up more time for the Congress to do other things in various ways, not just the appropriations subcommittee. I think the real question is that Congress, I think, needs to spend a lot more time doing oversight work of mandatory spending, too, frankly, that there is lots of detail going on in the mandatory spending side, where the money is going out the door without any annual appropriation, where a little more scrutiny would be helpful. Some of these programs have a big label on it and there are 15 things going on below the surface, and not a lot of Members of Congress, I think, understand that. And so, looking at military pensions and all the things that go on with that, looking at the entitlements in the Veterans Affairs area, looking at even Social Security and, of course, Medicare and Medicaid, they are big programs. They are spending literally hundreds of billions of dollars. More and more oversight of what is really going on in those programs, I think, is most useful. Co-Chair Womack. Maya. Ms. MacGuineas. Yeah, I agree with Jim's point in terms of where the oversight is most lacking. There is actually a lot of good evaluation that goes on of a lot of our discretionary programs. It is not worked into the budget process probably as much as it should be. But where I think we need to be spending more time is both on oversight of the big mandatory programs, and also, thinking--and this is again why I think the long-term is so important--thinking about not just where our resources should be right now, but where they are going to need to be. And when I look at the world in the next 10, 15 years, one thing I am pretty certain of is we don't understand how our economy is going to look, with the future of work, with technology, with AI. These things are changing dramatically. And somewhere in the budget process you also want to be really working in the time and space and thought for evaluating how we want our budget to help the whole country move forward. So, there are a lot of things we need to use extra time for more of, and I would focus on some of these big, big, thorny issues and evaluation of the big programs. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Hirono, welcome back. Senator Hirono. Thank you very much for holding this meeting opening. And I want to thank all of you. As we sit here, be honest with me, all of you, whatever we come up with, unless there is the political will to do it, is for naught, right? So that is the thing. I mean, to me, I would like to lay out some parameters so that we have something to shoot for. It is sort of like the Constitution, there are ideals exemplified in the Constitution. One hopes that we can work toward those ideals. But I just don't know what it is going to take for the political will to actually abide by whatever we come up with. But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't make an attempt. So, I do have a question for you, Mr. Dauster. You have been around for quite a while, and you have been through myriad debates about drafting of and living with budget process reform legislation. And I think you said that you are more of a carrot person than a stick person. So, of all of the various processes and reforms that you have seen enacted during your time on the Hill, which were the most effective in your view, and what made them effective? Mr. Dauster. Thank you, Senator. I agree with your general introduction. You want to try and do the best possible, but no more. The one that I enjoyed the most or I thought was the best change was in 1990. We were coming out of a fixed deficit target regime under Gramm-Rudman, and we changed that to a cap and PAYGO system, where you make the people who do the deed responsible for what they do. And so, I think that was the direction of change that makes the most sense: Make your process punish the people who do the thing that went wrong. Don't punish everybody. Senator Hirono. I think that the PAYGO system--which we try to abide by. I mean, that is one that we usually try to come up with, how we are going to pay for whatever changes we are making. Now, I think, Ms. MacGuineas, and maybe some of the others of you, talked about how transparency is really important and that we don't really spend a lot of time especially educating the public, much less Members of Congress. But we do have many more opportunities to find out what the ramifications of our processes are and our appropriations, et cetera. But where does the public understanding of all of this come into play? And what role could conveying more information to the public play in informing the kinds of actions that Congress takes? Ms. MacGuineas. I do think it is critical--and we have talked a bit about the Fiscal State of the Nation or other approaches like that, which I am a big supporter of--I think it is more critical now than it is ever been. Because, frankly, when you talk about budget process and all the different terms that you all are familiar with, they are not just meaningless to the public, they are alienating. And it is just another example of kind of a language where Congress is using something where your constituents don't understand what you are talking about. And I think it leads to the frustration and just throwing your hands up with Washington: I don't even understand what they are talking about and it makes me feel not a part of the process. So, I think transparency is really important. I also think simplifying the process in ways that it can be conveyed to people is really important. And to your first point, I think everybody agrees, I know I certainly agree, that there are a lot of aspirational things that you want to do on this committee. But the best things that have worked in the past is when members of different parties and different bodies have gotten together and come up with something. So, again, I will kind of end with where I started, which is getting something done is one of the key things. And if you take a small step here it can really lead to something. Senator Hirono. I agree that getting members of both parties to buy in, maybe one of the ways structurally we can encourage that, is for the chairs and the ranking of the authorizing committees to be members of the Budget Committee, because that is not what happens now. Anybody want to respond to that? Mr. Dauster. I definitely think that makes sense. Senators Inouye and Kassebaum were advocates of that back in the day. And it would get more buy-in. The only problem is you have members of the Budget Committee right now who view their membership as a thing of value. That is why I would argue as openings come up---- Senator Hirono. I don't know. Have you talked to Senator Whitehouse recently? Mr. Dauster. As openings come up, and there may be more openings, give the other chairs a first right of refusal to join in and sort of move to a place where you have the chairs and rankers, not all members. Mr. White. I think it is important not to--there are two different things being talked about here, right? One is, what would make the budget process itself get better attention and so on and more buy-in? And the other is what to do about the process of changing the budget process. And I think that quite possibly making up the Budget Committee from chairs of other committees might make sense. But I don't think anything is going to really get the public's attention in a positive way. I think people are always blaming public distrust of government on whatever it is about the government that they don't like. And whether the public actually cares about any of this stuff, or many members of the public, seems quite questionable to me. And for transparency to matter people have to be willing to look. And we can try to propagandize the public by coming up with a statement about our fiscal future, but somebody is going to write that statement. And whoever writes that statement, there might be some arguments about the way they write that statement. So, I would like to provide much more information. I am not sure I would disagree with CBO writing a statement maybe. But I really think that, at least for the current purposes, focusing on what could be done about the budget process would do a little bit of good. This year, sort of along Senator Schatz's lines, that would feel nice, to have something nice happen. Senator Hirono. Well, if we can automatically increase the debt ceiling, that would be a very positive thing as far as I am concerned. But this is why the Fiscal State of the Union may be a really good way to educate. You know, I don't expect the public to understand what is going on, et cetera, but at least you give them a tool that they could look at, not to mention all of us. And I think my time is up. So, thank you. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Senator. Ms. MacGuineas, Mr. Capretta, Mr. Dauster, Mr. White, thank you for appearing before this committee. Very interesting discussion that we have had today. I would like to advise members that they can submit written questions to be answered later in writing. Those questions and your answers will be made part of the formal hearing record. Any member who wishes to submit a question or any extraneous material for the record may do so within 7 days. I think it should be noted that our ability to sit in here today and have the conversations that we are having, those privileges are secured by the hardships and the sacrifices made by people that we will recognize on Monday, Memorial Day. It is my hope, as chairman of this committee, co-chair of this committee, that each and every one of you have a great Memorial Day weekend and reflect on the sacrifices made by the men and women who give us this outstanding privilege. And with that, this hearing is concluded. [Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] MEMBERS' DAY: HOW TO SIGNIFICANTLY REFORM THE BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS ---------- WEDNESDAY, JUNE 27, 2018 House of Representatives, Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform, Washington, D.C. The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:11 a.m., in room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Steve Womack and Hon. Nita M. Lowey [co-chairs of the Committee] presiding. Present: Representatives Womack, Woodall, Arrington, Lowey, Yarmuth, Roybal-Allard, and Kilmer. Senators Perdue, Ernst, Whitehouse, Bennet, and Hirono. Co-Chair Womack. The hearing will come to order. Good morning and welcome to the fourth public hearing of the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform: Members' Day. This select Committee is focused on ensuring Congress can fulfill the most important and essential role described under Article I of the Constitution, the power of the purse. Long before our Committee was formed in February, there was bipartisan agreement throughout the Capitol and across the country that the current process for completing this basic function of government is in need of substantial improvement. That agreement led to bipartisan, bicameral support for the creation of this panel as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018. This Committee of 16 members has already spent a lot of time building consensus on some of the problems and conducted three previous hearings to consider solutions. Today's hearing gives members who know that budget and appropriations reform is necessary the opportunity to participate in this essential work. This hearing is meant to engage all Members of Congress from both sides of the aisle and both ends of the Capitol and solicit their ideas for possible reforms to improve the current process. We believe doing so is key to our continued efforts and eventual success. I am encouraged by the level of interest and participation from those testifying in person and those submitting statements for the Committee's consideration. We are grateful for your input and your ideas. We are particularly excited to welcome some of the House leadership. Speaker Paul Ryan, Democrat Leader Nancy Pelosi, and House Democrat Whip Steny Hoyer. Thank all of you for being here. And thank you to everyone for joining us and offering your valuable perspective. We are eager to hear your ideas. And, with that, I want to yield to my friend and co-chair, the gentlelady from New York, Nita Lowey. [The prepared statement of Steve Womack follows:] [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Lowey. Well, thank you. And welcome to our Members' Day hearing where we will hear from Members of the House and Senate about what should be done to improve the way Congress handles budget and appropriation matters. There is no shortage of complaints about the budget process. Budget resolutions are often adopted late or not at all. Budget rules are routinely waived. All too often, appropriation bills don't get enacted until the fiscal year is well underway, creating major uncertainties and problems, and appropriation bills get encumbered with all sorts of extraneous legislative riders, which contributes to the controversies and delays. Changes to the budget process might help reduce some of these problems, and that is our task here. For example, we need to find a way to get agreement on appropriations top lines early in the year so that the appropriators can get to work filling in the details. We need to find a better way to deal with the debt ceiling, a law that serves no useful purpose but invites brinksmanship that threatens our Nation's credit rating and the health of our economy. And we need to find a way to make our budget resolutions more effective tools for formulating and carrying out budget decisions. But there are also limits on what can be accomplished with rules changes. Flawed rules and procedures aren't the root cause of much of what people complain about in budgeting. Rather, the root cause often lies in deep divisions over policy, combined with misplaced priorities, partisanship, and polarization. We need to find ways of alleviating those as well. It is gratifying and encouraging to see the number of Members participating in this hearing. And we are particularly honored to have with us the Speaker of the House as well as the Democratic leader and the Democratic whip. I look forward to everyone's testimony. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Nita Lowey follows:] [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Ms. Lowey. With several Members testifying today, we have a long morning ahead of us. Therefore, before we begin, I would like to inform Members that we plan to take a brief recess at about 10:30 this morning so that you can check email, make phone calls, and take a comfort break. As a reminder, Members will have 5 minutes to give their oral testimony, and their written statements will be submitted for the record. Additionally, members of the Committee will be permitted to question the witnesses following their statements. But out of consideration for our colleagues' time and to expedite today's proceedings, I would ask that you keep your comments very brief. I would like now to recognize our first witness of the day, the Speaker of the House, Paul Ryan from Wisconsin. We appreciate your time today. It is no surprise to anybody on this panel or those watching that you have an interest in this process, that you, perhaps more than any person on Capitol Hill and, indeed, throughout the Nation, know more about this process and about the budget and appropriations process than virtually anybody. So, your testimony is critical to the outcome that this Committee will achieve sometime later this year. We have received your written statement. It will be part of the formal record. You have 5 minutes to deliver your oral remarks. And the floor is yours, Mr. Speaker, with our thanks for being here. STATEMENT OF THE HON. PAUL D. RYAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN Speaker Ryan. Thank you very much, Chairman. I have never actually had my remarks ever time-limited since I have had this job. So, this is going to be a challenge here. Co-Chair Womack. Yeah. No magic minutes around here. Speaker Ryan. Exactly. So, first of all, it is a wonderful to be here. I can't tell you how excited I am about the fact that this Committee exists. Obviously, I had a big hand in making sure that this occurred. I want to thank you, Co-Chairs Lowey and Womack, for doing this work. I am going to stick with some of my written testimony. Then I am going to go off the cuff. As you know, I chaired the Budget Committee, chaired the Ways and Means Committee. I have spent basically my adult life working within the 1974 Budget Act and the budget process. So, I have a great deal of background in this area. And I think that this panel is so urgent at this time. As things stand, I think we are basically falling well short of our tasks. We continue to fail the taxpayer. Worse, we continue to set ourselves up for failure with the way the budget process works these days. And it is obviously clearly time for a new approach. And I think I can feel comfortable speaking on behalf of Republicans and Democrats in saying that. So, because I have this background, I just want to basically give you a sense of my perspective on this. Whenever, you know, there is a new Speaker, there is hope for a new process. Members clamor for more influence, more input. I experienced that. I came in, not running up the leadership ladder but up the Committee chair ladder, wanting to decentralize power in this place, empowering the Members. I have got to say the way this budget process works effectively is it centralizes power too much in this institution. We do not have a decentralized power structure here. We have a centralized power structure here that is not fair to Members of Congress, their constituents, and the taxpayers. So, the way I look at this, the budget and appropriations process, it starts with good intentions. It has a good foundation. You have a tight timeline. Even under the best circumstances, that tight timeline leaves no room for detours. Invariably what happens now is the process seizes up, and not long after, the whole thing falls apart. And as a clock ticks down, final decisions are kicked up to leadership, and that kicks back to final numbers--a final product that Members find unsatisfactory. And we sit in these rooms, the four corners, so to speak, and look over $1.3 trillion, for example, and make decisions that ought to be made by the Members who spend all of their time on the Committees doing the research, doing the oversight. They are the ones who should be making these decisions. So, we do not have a functional process, and it is--the power is too concentrated. So, I would even say calling this organized chaos is too generous a description. And so, to me, all of these omnibuses and these continuing resolutions, they are a little more than local anesthetics. It is like an anesthesia, but the pain goes away, but the problem doesn't go away. And it just feeds on itself, fueling pessimism on all sides. Members become less engaged. The public becomes more disenchanted. And with each of these stumbles, with each new year, we are handing over more spending decisions to the executive branch. So, I see this as a squandering of our institutional duties of oversight. I see this squandering the talent we have among our Members on the Committees or jurisdiction, like the Appropriations Committee. And more fundamentally, it is an abdication of our critical power of the purse for the legislative branch of government. So, I am one of those people who is--I see the glass of life as half full. I an unapologetic optimist. And I do believe we can solve tough problems, even this one. And that is why I am encouraged at what you are doing here. The reforms that we need I think are bold, but I think they are right in front of us. I think some of the ideas we have been talking about for years, they are ready; they are time to do it. And, you know, the way I look at this thing is we may not be able to change the deadlines, but we can change the calendar. Looking at what we are doing right now and look at the entire appropriations process. How many of you--and I ask Senators here. I see, you know, just a couple. How many of you think the Senate is ever going to again do 12 appropriation bills, separate appropriation bills, 12 conference reports, before the fiscal year? Not going to happen. Let's just get on with acknowledging that and come up with a process so we actually go back to regular order on appropriations. And this is why I ultimately think the best idea of all the ones that we have been looking at--and I have done hearing after hearing after hearing, 8 years at the Budget Committee as either ranking member or Chairman, Ways and Means chair. I think biennial budgeting is the smartest way to go. And I think biennial budgeting has great bipartisan roots. So, it, to me, offers a path to rewriting the process, not just reforming it. It makes budgeting an ongoing process instead of all these demoralizing fits and starts that we have. It brings renewed transparency and accountability, and it sets us up to be better stewards of taxpayer dollars. There are a lot of different proposals I have seen on biennial budgeting. I myself have introduced multiple congresses the Biennial Budgeting and Enhanced Oversight Act. I think the recent--and this really takes a lot of Senate involvement. The recent proposal by Chairman Enzi makes a lot of sense to me. Do six appropriation bills 1 year, six appropriation bills the next year. So, you are appropriating every year, and you are doing it in a workload that is doable. And you have biennial budgeting on top of that with reconciliation instructions. And I think it is not too much to ask for the way the Senate works to do six this year and then six the next year. That, to me, is probably one of the best ideas I have seen. I don't think this violates any partisan issue. This isn't an ideological thing. This is just, how can Congress work better? The way I look at this, if properly implemented, this will empower Members to do a deeper dive on the most troublesome issues, and it will enhance their ability to oversee the executive branch. I think it will reinvigorate Member participation. It will encourage actual conference Committees and actual conference reports on individual appropriation bills. And I think it will also enhance the importance of reconciliation. In 2013, Patty Murray and I got together as budget chair, and she was--as budget chairs, and we put together a 2-year deal. Then John Boehner and President Obama put together a 2- year deal. And then we just recently put together a 2-year cap deal. So, we have sort of demonstrated that we can put together 2-year deals, 2-year spending cap deals that work. But now we want to have, I think, an appropriations process that follows that kind of a track. So, the way I look at these things is take a look at the record we have. I am just going to read from my notes here. Last fall, the House passed all 12 appropriation bills on time. This is the first time the House has done that since 2009. The last time the House and the Senate passed all 12 appropriation bills on time was in 1994. So, 12 percent of the current Members were here for that. I was a think tank staffer at the time. Twelve percent of the people in the House were here the last time we passed all 12 appropriation bills. So, we have an entire generation of people's Representatives have become accustomed to, if not acclimated to, a failed budget process. So, we have basically taken this failed budget process as just the way things work, and there is nothing you can do about it. Let's reject that kind of thinking. Let's reinvigorate a budget process. And I am just simply giving you a suggestion as a person who has observed this process for many, many years. And if this body comes together and presents a plan for reinvigorating the budget process, I really believe we will--we can get buy-in. And I would like to think that the Members of Congress who have known nothing but budget dysfunction would love and welcome the day and the opportunity to actually have a reinvigorated, workable, practical budget process where every Member of Congress has more franchise, more influence, more say-so. And that means the taxpayer is going to be more respected at the end of the day. So, I really believe, as a person who fought to create this Committee in the last omnibus appropriations bill, I think that you have a great opportunity in front of you. I think a lot of these ideas are bipartisan. In the old days, as in, like, 10 years ago, it used to be appropriators against budgeteers or against authorizers. This doesn't have to be to the case. This does not have to be appropriators versus other Committees because the appropriators themselves are losing their ability to effect change. When we do these omnibus appropriation bills, we are taking the pen away from the appropriators and writing these bills with just a few people. By having a biennial process with six bills, the appropriators write those bills. The appropriators go to conference Committee. You have a budget process that is more likely to be adhered to. And so that to me seems like one of the sweet spots we could have with a bipartisan, bicameral compromise to make this budget process work. And I simply submit this for your consideration. And I hope you really come up with something that we can take and be proud of and restore this branch's power of the purse. And, with that, thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Paul Ryan follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. We appreciate your comments this morning, Mr. Speaker. To be respectful of your time, do you have a couple of minutes---- Speaker Ryan. Sure. Co-Chair Womack.----in the event that any of our members would like to ask a question. The chair would recognize anyone that might have a question for the Speaker this morning. Anyone? Senator Bennet. Senator Bennet. Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Thank you. I just would ask for your impression about how-- what has caused the centralization that you described? Why have so many Members of Congress yielded to so few the decisions that are made around here about budgeting and, you know, sort of made themselves props in somebody's else play? Speaker Ryan. Yeah. That is a good question. So, a House guy could easily go beat up the Senate for having cloture and motions to proceed and all of the rest of that. But I will resist the temptation. I think it is easier to push decisions elsewhere and not own the consequences. I think if we have a structure that has a chance of that--see, I think people gave up on thinking the appropriation process works. I think people gave up thinking we are going to do 12 bills. First of all, think of the calendar. You get the President's budget in March. Then you have a statutory deadline by April 15th to pass a budget resolution, which gives you the budget instructions, the 302(a)s, which then the Committee goes and writes the (b)s. And then you may start your appropriations process, hopefully as early as May but probably not until June. And you have got to get 12 appropriation bills done through the House and the Senate conference before September 30. So, the thing backs up, and it just doesn't work. And so most Members just don't think it is going to happen. So, they don't invest themselves into participating in a process that is going to yield results because they just know the calendar just doesn't work. So that is why I believe if you have a biennial budget with the caps already sort of preordained--you know, every 2 years you rewrite those caps; I would encourage annual reconciliation, but you have an appropriations process that can start earlier, and you have half as many bills to do--I believe Members will have more faith and confidence that they can actually get the work done. So, they will actually participate and get involved in actually getting a good product. Because what invariably happens is we do a CR to buy us a little more time. And then we have the appropriators kind of write their bills and move it up. And then it comes to, you know, the Speaker, the minority leader, the majority leader and the minority leader in the Senate. And then we put together some massive bill. That is not a good way to run government. The power is too--I am the person who gets the power. I don't want it. It is too concentrated. It is not how government should work because the person who is the Chairman and ranking member of the Energy and Water Committee are spending time after time in hearings reading GAO reports, listening to inspector generals. They know their jurisdiction better than anybody else. They know how these bills should be written. They know how taxpayer dollars are being guarded or not. And they should write the bills, not somebody who is, you know, juggling every other thing in Congress. That, to me, is the breakdown in the process. And by having the executive branch come to an Appropriations Committee where they know that that Committee is going to be writing their bill, I think the executive branch is going to be far more responsive to the legislative branch and the power of the purse because they know it is not going to be some omnibus. They know it is going to be that person I am looking at across the rostrum is going to be writing my Appropriations bill. I think they are going to make our government far more responsive and accountable if that is the case. Co-Chair Womack. Once again, Speaker, we appreciate you being here. And, again, to be respectful of your time, I know you have other appointments to deal with. Your insight is valuable, and we appreciate the fact that you led on getting this joint select Committee established and charging us with the responsibility of coming to a solution. Do you want to say something very quickly? Ms. Lowey. Co-Chair Lowey. I want to thank you also, Mr. Speaker, because I really think if we can talk through these issues, hopefully, we will make major changes in the process. But I want to emphasize one point again. And I mentioned in my opening statement. In my judgment, the root causes often lie in deep divisions over policy combined with misplaced priorities, partisanship, and polarization. And as an example, I just recently met with Senator Shelby, and it hasn't been completed, but they are working together, swimmingly. No poison pills. They are moving through the process, getting ready to bring the bills to the floor. Now, I agree the process isn't over. But compare that with the House and the process--we all work together, but each of our bills are loaded with poison pills. So, I just put that out there because there is a real contrast now on appropriations the way the Senate is operating, working together. And we all like each other. But our bills in the House are loaded with poison pills. So that is something that we really have to think about. Speaker Ryan. Well, I won't do much of a retort other than I am expecting a big bipartisan vote on the defense appropriation bill this week. We had bipartisan support, not as much as we would have liked on the three appropriation bills we already passed a couple of weeks ago. But you are right. We are going to have differences of opinions on these things. Labor-H is a perfect example. But let's have it on its own. Let's have those fights. Let's have those votes. Let's have those amendments. Let's have those conference Committees. That is the way the process should work. And, again, Ms. Lowey, you are constricting the process. If we just say, ``This isn't going to happen, let's just kick it all upstairs, let's just put it in a big omni and have a bill that is this big that spends this much,'' that is not good government no matter how we disagree on individual riders. Co-Chair Lowey. Perhaps we can talk again another time. Thank you for appearing before us. Speaker Ryan. Thank you. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I am now pleased to welcome our next witness, the distinguished leader of the House minority, gentlelady from California, Nancy Pelosi. Representative Pelosi. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Co-Chair Womack. Welcome, Madam Leader. And we are going to give the floor to you. And then we will be respectful also of your time in potential Q&A. The floor is yours. STATEMENT OF THE HON. NANCY PELOSI, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Representative Pelosi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Madam Chair. Thank you to members of the Committee from both sides of the House. I am very encouraged by the fact that this discussion is taking place. I think it is very important and long overdue. I do believe that a budget should be a statement of our national values. What is important to us as a Nation should be how we allocate our resources and that that budget process that we are engaged in should be something that is respected as we go forward into the appropriations process. I have a different view on some of these subjects than the Speaker because I come here as a long-time appropriator. I heard the perspective of a Ways and Means Committee person, but I do believe that 2 years for the budget, 1 year for the appropriations legislation is the appropriate route to go. It was music to my ears to hear the Speaker say that he didn't think we should have legislation on appropriations bills. Of course, that is what upsets the apple cart and all the smooth workings of the Appropriations Committee. I have always said, left to their own devices, the appropriators, in a bipartisan way, know how to allocate resources, respect each other's points of view, and can come to a balance that is important for the Congress. It is when the legislating on appropriations bills that enters into it, which started in the late 1990s--I don't say that you never should have one piece of legislation on an appropriation bill. You shouldn't have it unless there is bipartisan agreement that, for whatever reason, this engine is leaving the station; in the national interest, we need to move something immediately by a must-pass, must-sign bill. But that is not what is happening in this case. And that, in my tenure on appropriations, which goes way back, was what made the difference between a smooth running of appropriations instituting the budget agreement or not. The Speaker said very eloquently that people on these Committees know their briefs, oversight responsibilities on the Appropriations Committee. And left again to its own devices, I think it could do a very good job. So, a few principles I want to put forth. First, I do believe that when we have sent Members to any of the discussions on budget, we just say go--be agnostic. Just go into that room, put growth in the middle of the table, and say, what will promote growth, create good-paying jobs, and reduce the deficit? Those are our standards. We don't give you any assignment to say do this, do that. Growth, good-paying jobs, reduce the deficit. I do think that we should return in that light to pay-as- you-go budgeting, which Republicans abandoned in favor of creating huge deficits and then using those deficits for another purpose, cutting Medicare--Medicare and Social Security. I will get to that in a moment. Second, we should amend the reconciliation process so it never is used to increase the deficit. So, it is never to increase the deficit in the budget window. And, third, Republicans should do no harm. None of us should do harm to the process. We must pass constitutional amendment--not pass constitutional amendments or implement cap limits on mandatory spending. And they must stop using the budget resolution as a messaging document to call for unspecified and unrealistic spending cuts not included in the reconciliation instruction. I don't want to waste your time. I am being very direct in what I am recommending. We hear people blaming Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security for the record deficits and debt levels, but the driver is simple demographics, not extravagant spending. For example, I think it is important as we go forward that we note the reality of the demographics. We reduce the replacement rate in Social Security when the average retiree benefit is only $1,400 a month. Medicare does not cover vision, dental, or hearing benefits; does not have an out-of-pocket limit. Most of the elderly has a form of supplemental coverage costing around $150 a month. So, it is not about extravagance on that end. Medicaid is by far the least generous initiative in terms of reimbursing providers. The elderly population--now, this is the demographic issue. The elderly population will double between 2010 and 2035. The elderly population increasing from 40 million to 80 million people, from 13 percent of the population to 20 percent of the population. In fact, demographics account for 80 percent of the increase in outlays for these initiatives from fiscal year 2018 to 2028. I am sticking to my notes on some of this in the interest of time--because I could go on. In light of these demographic shifts, we need to work on a bipartisan basis to reduce health spending. We are proud of what we did in the Affordable Care Act, slowing annual Medicare spending program per capita from 2.3 percent in the 5 years prior to the enactment of ACA to a negative 0.3 percent in the year since enactment. We must build on that progress through far stronger reform than those proposed by the Trump administration. We need to allow Medicare part D--we have been trying to do this for years. We need to allow Medicare part D to negotiate lower drug prices, push payments and delivery reform through Medicare and Medicaid innovation center, and work toward paying for value rather than volume of health services. This should not be a partisan debate. Hardworking families across the country cannot afford the skyrocketing cost of healthcare today. When we passed the Affordable Care Act, in terms of budgeting, if everybody loved their healthcare and their health insurance, we still had to do it because of cost: cost to the individual, cost to small business, cost to corporate America, cost to the public sector. We simply could not afford the escalating rate of increase. As I said before, reduce that, but the cost of prescription drug is still the biggest obstacle to levelling all of that. So, to return to responsible budgeting, I encourage Congress to move toward the 2-year budget agreement. I agree with the Speaker on that. Maintain annual appropriations. I agree with Congresswoman Lowey on that. And do not adopt automatic continuing resolutions. Imagine that we had five CRs between last year and when we passed our omnibus. We must make it easier to pass debt limit increases. That shouldn't be taking up time, debate, and leverage. Members have attempted to hold the country's credit hostage to individual demands, risking grave consequences for our economy and our country and our credit rating. Even when we didn't do it, just talking about it lowered our credit rating. We should urge the Senate to adopt the Gephardt rule. The Gephardt rule enabled that just to go through that, as the Constitution says. The full faith and credit of the United States is not in doubt; just have it go through. So, we take that off the table. While some pay lip service to the principle of fiscal responsibility, we have fought to put our fiscal house in order. I am very proud that, in the 1990s, President Clinton put us on a trajectory of job growth. We come back to that, job growth and smaller deficits, despite inheriting a massive deficit. The last four Clinton budgets were in surplus or in balance. President Clinton handed President Bush a projected $5.6 trillion 10-year budget surplus. But when you do away with the pay-as-you-go, that surplus was squandered again with massive tax cuts for the wealthy that did not--two unpaid for wars, not negotiating for Medicare prescription drugs, all of that, according to the CBO, is what added to the deficit. The tax cuts and spending sprees exploded the deficit, plus a new $5 trillion--that is an $11 trillion turnaround. We went from $5 trillion plus on a path to reducing the debt to $5 trillion additional debt. $11 trillion turnaround. We cannot-- this fiscal recklessness cannot continue. Passing a tax scam for the rich--I will express my disagreement with that--has increased the deficit. And it has not--it has increased the deficit, and it is going to be at the expense of Medicare, Medicaid, et cetera. When the President took office, he said the current services projection of deficit over the period for fiscal year 2018 to 2027 was $9.4 trillion. Now, due to the Republican tax bill, the CBO's latest current services projection that they send here is over $2.3 trillion larger. It just can't continue with that to a staggering--the reckless giveaways have exploded the projections for the annual average deficit to 8.4 percent of GDP. The deficit, not the debt, the deficit to 8.4 percent of GDP. So, in this--where we find common ground: 2-year budgeting. What I would advocate as an appropriator, very important, to have 1-year--the annual appropriations bills. What I think is problematic to that is the massive legislation, sometimes in the form of poison pills, that are being placed on these bills. It almost makes us want to make everybody be a member of the Appropriations Committee. It is no use for other Committees to exist because we can just pile it on the Appropriations Committee and in a way, that is not bipartisan. I don't think either party should do it. So, Members of Congress must honor our responsibility to make smart investments, promote growth, create good-paying jobs, reduce the deficit, and do so in a way that keeps the deficit under 3 percent of GDP when the economy is healthy while driving strong, again, sustainable growth. I thank you for your attention to this important issue. I hope that--just looking at this Committee, I think that there is real opportunity for you to do something that will make more efficient, more predictable, more timely the process. But, again, it is all about our values, what is important to us as a Nation. We have sufficient time in our Committees of authorization to debate the policy. That shouldn't be something that is placed--you know, appropriating is policymaking in itself. There is enough going on there. But to use the appropriations process as a vehicle for poison pills and partisan policymaking, it just discredits the responsibility we all have. When I was a little girl, my father was a member of the Appropriations Committee. He would talk in his political speeches in Baltimore about the all-mighty powerful Appropriations Committee. As a very little girl, not even in grade school yet, it would, to me--all-mighty powerful, that was only identified in one way, in a heavenly way. And now it was attributing it to the Appropriations Committee. Let's have the Appropriations Committee retain its power, assume no more, and be responsive to a responsible bipartisan budget resolution. Thank you for the opportunity to share some thoughts with you. Again, it is no use wasting your time. I thought I would get right to some clarity of thinking on my part to propose. [The prepared statement of Nancy Pelosi follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. We truly appreciate your insight here this morning. Does the gentlelady have time for maybe a question or comment or two? Representative Pelosi. Sure. Co-Chair Womack. Does anybody---- Representative Pelosi. If anybody has one. Co-Chair Womack.----on the Committee have a question or wish to make a comment? Hearing none. Representative Pelosi. Thank you. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you very much for your time. Representative Pelosi. Thank you for your good work. And good luck in your deliberations. Hopefully a nice bipartisan advance into the cause will spring from your good work. Thank you so much. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you so much. Representative Pelosi. Thank you. Co-Chair Womack. At this time, we will welcome our next witness. He is the Democrat whip in the House, the gentleman from Maryland, Steny Hoyer. Mr. Hoyer we appreciate the opportunity to hear from you this morning. We will hear your testimony. And then, if time permits, may have a question or two. The floor is yours, sir. STATEMENT OF THE HON. STENY H. HOYER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND Representative Hoyer. Thank you very much for welcoming me, Chairman Womack and Co-Chair Lowey. I appreciate very much this opportunity to share my thoughts with the Joint Select Committee on the Budget and Appropriations Process Reform. In context, I served actively on the Appropriations Committee for 23 years. Obviously, I am on leave for some years now. In the few minutes I have, Mr. Chairman, I want to talk about three important areas where reform ought to occur. The first is congressionally directed spending. Now, this may not sound like some great reform issue to people. But as somebody who served on the Appropriations Committee, I see it as a critically important connection to my district, that I can respond to the needs of my district, which I believe I know as well as any other person and certainly any other person in the executive department. Members of Congress know their districts, as I said, better than anyone of the Federal agencies and better than the Appropriations Committee as a whole. When Republicans came into the House majority in 2011, they made a mistake by eliminating congressionally directed spending through changes in their conference rules. Unfortunately, they also changed the Gephardt rule. My own view, Mr. Chairman, is the debt limit ought to be eliminated. It is a phony issue. It lends itself to gamesmanship and brinksmanship which is harmful to our country and not honest with the American people. They both gave up Congress' constitutional power of the purse to the executive branch and made it more difficult to forge consensus in major legislation. It is true that some Members abused the process in the past. That is why, when Democrats came into the majority 2007, we reformed the process to make it transparent and to hold all Members accountable by showing the public which Member sponsored each item, requiring Members to certify they had no financial interest and published all requests on their websites and blocking for-profit entities from receiving them. This Committee should consider bringing back congressionally directed spending, at a minimum, with the Democrats' successful reforms and others to make it more transport if you thought that was necessary. The second area, Mr. Chairman, I want to address is paying for what Congress buys. The problem is not spending. The problem is not taxing. The problem is paying for what we buy. That is the discipline in the system. And to the extent that we allow ourselves to simply borrow to buy what we want to buy, that discipline disappears. I would suggest to you it also has disappeared in tax cuts. To give a $1.5 trillion headroom is simply to give additional debt credence. If you had to pay for that, if you had to offset it by spending cuts either to mandatory or to discretionary spending, that would be discipline in the system. But we have eliminated the discipline in the system. This Congress ignored the statutory paygo rule, law that Democrats enacted in 2010, and the current House majority replaced the effectively House paygo rule. I would suggest to you, when we were operating under paygo, we balanced the budget. We balanced the budget because, frankly, Republicans limited spending. Clinton wouldn't allow tax cuts, and the economy exploded. Those three things are why we balanced the budget four years in a row. The House Republican alternative to cut--of CutGo only deals with spending which left the door open for this majority to pass a tax law that raised deficits by $1.8 trillion last December and trillions more over the period it has been a House rule. Paygo deals with both spending and revenues in a balanced way. To pretend that it is only spending and not the cut in revenues that put you in the hole is dishonest. This allows Congress full flexibility to make our collective political decisions as to the best mix of policies to offset the cost of any new legislation. Third, any budget process will only be successful if there is the political will to follow it. Pretending the process will solve this problem is a delusion. The current process had been effective when Congress chose to pursue it. If the Budget Committee were allowed to do its job and did it honestly and responsibly and not simply as a political message--no party is immune from passing budgets that are simply and solely political messages without relevance to reality--it would be the legislative branch's loudest voice in setting overall long- term fiscal policy if we would be honest. Too often, in recent years, the Budget Committee has been sidelined, only called upon when the majority decided reconciliation instructions were necessary to force through partisan legislation. Last year's tax law was a perfect example of abusing the budget process by using a tool intended for deficit reduction ironically to be one of the largest deficit increases that I have voted on in my 37 years in the Congress of the United States. Mr. Chairman and Madam Co-Chair, I should note that it is not my assessment of the fiscal impact of that legislation. It is the combined assessment of the Congressional Budget Office and Joint Committee on Taxation. Collectively, we must rely on their status as nonpartisan arbiters in order for any budget process to function as intended. Mr. Chairman, just yesterday, we heard from the CBO that our debt as a share of the economy is set to double over the next three decades. Mr. Chairman and Madam Co-Chair, I have three children. I have three grandchildren, and I have four great-grandchildren. The fiscal policies we have been pursuing are not only fiscally bankrupt; they are morally indefensible. I hope that this Committee will include in its recommendations a restoration of transparent accountable congressionally directed spending that restores Congress' constitutional role and a return to the proven enforcement of paygo. I also hope that, in making recommendations, you also recognize that, at the end of the day, regardless of what changes you make or propose, in order to be effective, Congress has to want to follow whatever process it creates for itself. We have biennial budgeting. We call it the fixes to our structure of saying that we are going to spend at a certain number. And then we say that doesn't work. That is unrealistic. It was good message. It was good pretense. And then we change it. We make a 2-year rule to suspend, sequester, which is a complicated word, which starts with S which stands for stupid. It is up to the majority to see that through, to set the tone, even when it is not convenient. The Speaker said he wanted to consider things one at a time. He thought the Committees had the advantage. Yes. Then bring those bills discretely to the floor, and let them be considered one by one. It is inconvenient, particularly when you don't want to vote on the Labor-Health bill; you don't want to vote on the Defense bill. You package them. You hide them. You dissemble. As you can tell, Mr. Chairman, I feel pretty passionately about this because I think neither side has come to grips with the real problem, and that is we don't follow fiscal discipline. We pretense. We talk. But then it becomes too difficult because life and budgeting is a series of tradeoffs, and we don't like to make tradeoffs because tradeoffs sometimes cost you political capital. You can do all the debate you want about process. But if we don't have the will to do what is right fiscally, our people will not be well served. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Steny Hoyer follows:] [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. I appreciate the comments of the Democrat whip in the House. Are there any members who have a question? I will throw one at the distinguished gentleman from Maryland, and that is, in your discussion, you talked about three things, the third topic, that being the political will. One of the things this Committee has discussed numerous times and is under consideration, the concept of carrots or sticks, whatever it is. What can we do to motivate, influence in a positive way the kind of outcomes that we are looking for versus holding Congress accountable with a series of consequences for failing to do its job? Where is the Democrat whip on the subject of positive reinforcement or some kind of consequence as a means of bringing us to the political will to make these changes? Representative Hoyer. You mean beyond ``atta boy, good job, that was the right thing to do,'' I presume. Co-Chair Womack. Beyond optics. It has got to be beyond optics. Representative Hoyer. I think the paygo is where you get to the rubber meets the road. It is where you--if you want to cut taxes, if you think, you know, we are spending too much and we ought to cut revenues, fine. Cut spending. Don't cut taxes and then never cut spending. We don't cut spending. It is that we have different views of what spending ought to be on. I noted to the majority leader: zero rescissions in defense. Zero. Raise your hand--and I am saying this rhetorically; I don't want to put you on the spot--if you think there is not zero rescissions in $700 billion dollars we give to the defense fund. Of course not. So, you spend--some parties spend it here; some parties spend it here. But we spend it. If you had paygo, if you really had to make choices, they would be tough choices. And we ought to make those tough choices. And the only way you make them is bipartisan way. And we don't do things bipartisan way. When I was, frankly, the majority leader, we passed all 12 appropriation bills seriatim, one at a time, prior to the end of August--excuse me--the end of the July break, or might have been the first week in August. So, I am not sure what you mean the carrots and sticks. But what we ought to do is discipline ourselves and have the will to be honest with the American people, to tell them there is not a free lunch, to tell them: If you want a tax cut of $1.8 trillion, then there is going to be a tradeoff. Something is going to give. It is not going to be we are going to grow the economy, and wonderful things are going to happen. CBO is saying that has not happened. The economy is showing that has not happened. It is not going to happen. It didn't happen in 1981 when I came here. It didn't happen in 2001, in 2003. We were promised great things were going to happen. We had the deepest, worst economy that I have experienced, that anybody in this room has experienced starting in December of 2007. So, what I am saying, Mr. Chairman, is process is terrific. Will and courage are what is needed: to be honest with the American people and with ourselves and say there is no free lunch. We are not going to cut revenues, and all of a sudden, magically we will have the resources necessarily to defend our country, to grow our economy, to feed our people, to make sure that America is all that it can be. That is what I am saying, Mr. Chairman. Co-Chair Womack. I appreciate your comments. Any other questions? Representative Hoyer. Thank you very much. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, sir. Delighted to introduce our next witness, the gentleman from Tennessee, Senator Bob Corker. Sir, it is great to have you in front of the Joint Select Committee this morning. Again, as I said earlier, your written comments will be made part of the record. And we will give you the adequate amount of time to make your case this morning before this Committee, and we appreciate you being here. STATEMENT OF THE HON. BOB CORKER, A UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE Senator Corker. Thank you. Thank you for holding these meetings. And I appreciate what you are doing. I will be very brief. I know we all are a little bit behind schedule. First of all, I came to Washington 11\1/2\ years ago. And one of the focuses was on fiscal issues. And what I have learned is that Democrats and Republicans both like to spend money. They just like to spend it on different things. I became a member of the Budget Committee a few years ago. It has been the biggest waste of time one can possibly imagine. It has nothing to do with the leadership of the Committee. It is that it is nothing but a political tool each side uses. There is no policy put behind the changes. And as I have said to Senator Perdue and others, Senator Whitehouse, we ought to actually do away with the Budget Committee because it performs no useful function as it relates to causing us to be fiscally sound. Secondly, we major in the minors. There is all this talk about appropriations. So, we spend the entire year focusing on 30 percent of what we spend, which, again, is majoring in the minors; 70 percent of the money we spend is on mandatory spending. These are programs that people are counting on, especially during the latter years of their life, and we do nothing whatsoever to ensure that they are going to be fiscally sound. Everything ought to be, in my opinion, on budget, everything, including Social Security, which would cause us to focus on the fact that, in the not-too-distant future, it is going to be fiscally unsound. So, you know, again, there is a lot of talk and a lot of work that goes into appropriations and budgeting each year, but we major in the minors. The appropriations process is, you know, that we have authorizing Committees that have absolute-- almost nothing is authorized. And so, seriously, we ought to consider combining the authorizing functions and the appropriating functions together. It ought to be one. I talk to people on the foreign ops side. I am Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. And there may be a little of hyperbole here, but they tell me they spend about 5 hours putting together over $50 billion worth of spending whereas the authorizing Committee itself spends all year doing hearings. It is totally ridiculous. So, look, I think you have got a big task. I would say, first of all, put everything on budget--everything. Look at combining the operations of both authorizing and appropriating. Do away with the Budget Committee and let a few leaders decide what the caps are going to be over the next couple years and quit using the budget itself as a political tool. Beyond that, I really don't have many comments. [The prepared statement of Bob Corker follows:] [[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. We appreciate the gentleman for his appearance here this morning. Any questions? Senator Whitehouse. If I may. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Whitehouse. Welcome. Senator Whitehouse. Senator Corker joins me on the Budget Committee. So, he knows whereof he speaks. And I wanted to thank him for his work on the Budget Committee. He is one of the reform-minded folks. Before we entirely get rid of the Budget Committee, at least in the Senate, I think we should give it one last chance. And as I have said in my earlier comments and in the proposal that I have shared with the Committee, I think there is a chance to create a bipartisan path that would actually have to be bipartisan in order to be taken that would take into the account the mathematical elements of the budget, all of them, healthcare spending, tax spending, the whole bit, and see if the Budget Committee can work together to get a bipartisan agreement that picks a debt-to-GDP safe point out in the future, figures out how long it will take to get there, creates that glide slope, creates alarm bells for that glide slope, and then, in a bipartisan basis, you know, polices us towards a safe and sustainable landing. If we can do that, then I think we will have done the task that the Budget Committee was originally established to do. Now it is simply a support system for a reconciliation measure that allows a simple majority for a pet political project of the majority party, period, end of story. For that, it is not worth keeping it. But I do think that there is a step between getting rid of the damn thing and its current parlous state where we can give it one last chance to see if it can produce a sensible bipartisan result. And I would like to hear Senator Corker's response to---- Senator Corker. Yeah. I think you may be putting off the inevitable. But I want to say that you and Senator Perdue have done great work together. You have very ideological--you all are vastly different in your view of the world, and yet you all have worked together to come up with some processes that I think could well work. With Senator McCaskill a few years ago, I introduced the CAP Act, which capped spending at a percentage of GDP. And I think you all are looking at something very similar as it relates to total indebtedness. So, I would encourage this Committee to look at the work the two of you are doing. But everything has to be on budget, I think we would have to agree. And the problem is, as you mentioned, we use reconciliation with 50 votes, but it takes 60 votes in the Senate to put policies in place. So, there is never policy follow up to the budget proposals. I mean, just to talk about my side of the aisle, when you do away with ACA but you keep the revenues that ACA is generating, obviously, it is a hoax. And the other side of the aisle does the same thing. So, I hope that you will be very successful in this. This is the greatest threat to our Nation. There has been a lot of talk about the tax issues. And, obviously, from my perspective, it could have been done a little bit better. Then we turned right around and passed a spending bill that raises deficits $2 trillion over the next 10 years, and we don't even talk about it. So, both sides are guilty of huge deficits. Both sides like to spend money, just on different things. But the processes we have will never, as they are now constructed, do the things we want to do as a country. So, thank you all very much, and thank you for your work. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Senator Corker, for your testimony this morning. The next witness I would like to welcome, the ranking member on the Defense Subcommittee of the House, Appropriations Committee, distinguished gentleman from Indiana, Pete Visclosky. Welcome, sir. The floor is yours. Representative Visclosky. Chairman, thank you very much. And I understand my entire statement is entered into the record. Co-Chair Womack. That is correct. STATEMENT OF THE HON. PETER J. VISCLOSKY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA Representative Visclosky. I will begin by taking a dangerous path in answering the question I have not been asked. You asked the minority whip about possible incentives, carrots and sticks, to have Members of Congress abide by some form of discipline. I will suggest to you our incentive is our responsibility to the next generation and have the discipline to make the hard decisions that my parents' generation made for me. The second point I would make is I came here 41 years ago and began my career as a staffer on the Appropriations Committee. At this moment in time, I absolutely agree with Senator Corker. If you would make one change tomorrow, I would get rid of the Budget Act of the 1970s. The fact is you have so few people--and think about your experience--on that Committee who are charged with making the hard decision of raising revenue, the hard decision of the expenditure of those revenues in an effective and an efficient manner that people make assumptions. I am the ranking Democrat on Defense Appropriations. DOD does not run on assumptions. It runs on hard decisions. There is nothing in any rule today in either body that prohibits us from getting our work done. And no rule or law we could create is going to imbue Members of Congress with the political will to act. I do not believe our budget and appropriations process is broken. Instead, it shows what happens when we avoid making decisions in a disciplined fashion. Some would point to the use of a 2-year deal, like multiple bipartisan budget acts of the past half-decade. However, I would argue that moving to a biennial budget does not fix the root cause of our unpredictable funding timelines but simply creates severe risk to good governance as it has become Congress' habit to only pass bipartisan legislation on the eve of a governmental crisis. Our problems do not lessen if we just drag out that process for 2 years instead of 1. Agencies already tell us how hard it is to execute funds when they receive appropriations 5 months late. Let's give them 2 years to drag this process out, and it will simply give agencies more time to fill our request with out-of-cycle demands. Let us take the fiscal year 2018 Defense Appropriations bill as an example. The House of Representatives voted for that bill five times before it became law last March. Representative Visclosky. It was comparatively painless for Members of Congress. However, it wreaked havoc in the Department of Defense. Just one example. The National Guard exercises had to be canceled, which affected over 102,000 service personnel. There is nothing in the current rules that make this happen except an absence of intestinal fortitude. By potentially reducing the required interactions between Congress and the executive agencies by extending the process to 2 years, we also sacrifice, I believe, the most up-to-date and accurate information about how American taxpayers' dollars are spent, relinquishing our specified constitutional responsibility. An example from this year. This year has brought several executive branch trade enforcement changes, including tariffs on steel and aluminum. These actions have resulted in unexpected workloads for agencies. Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees have been in constant contact with those agencies regarding the resources that are now needed to effectively manage these immediate changes. Regardless of what any of your position is on the tariffs, I think we can all agree that effective management of policy changes is key to the daily functioning of our government. Let's change the rules and that is going to solve our problem. We did that in 2010 with the Budget Control Act, and we had sticks. Nobody in their right mind would allow us to shut down the government or have sequestration. And the fact is, on four different occasions since 2010 Congress has set aside that act for 7 out of the last 8 years, because it does not work. We have our defense appropriations bill on the House floor last night and today again. If we do not address that rule change of 2010 between now and October, we have $71 billion that are going to be taken off that budget for the Department next year, so they are writing two different budgets. The rule change certainly solved our problems. I would simply say that the intervening 8 years have proven that absent a commitment to governing in a sober, deliberative, and well-intentioned fashion, this problem is not going to be solved. I believe we can solve the so-called budget problem if we approach the appropriations process in a serious manner, if we finally come together to meaningfully address entitlements that now consume two-thirds of our budget and prevent investment in the future and finally recognize, as my home State of Indiana has done, that a reasonable amount of new revenue is necessary if we are truly going to invest in the future of our children. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Peter J. Visclosky follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. I appreciate the gentleman from Indiana for his testimony here this morning. I am pleased to welcome our next witness. We had scheduled in tandem both Rob Bishop of Utah and Devin Nunes of California. I know Mr. Bishop has got other commitments this morning. So, we are pleased to welcome Representative Nunes from California. Sir, thank you for being here this morning. Representative Nunes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Co-Chair Womack. We will give you the floor for 5 minutes, sir. STATEMENT OF THE HON. DEVIN NUNES, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Representative Nunes. It is great to be here, and I will be brief, but I will make my points. But I want to also add that Mr. Bishop had a Committee hearing that he had to begin at 10 o'clock and he had to be there. That is why he had to leave. But he is strongly in favor of this proposal that I am about to outline for the Committee here. This is something that I offered before the Republican Conference began in the beginning of this Congress, and it actually received 40 percent of the vote within our Conference. I think it failed largely because people get used to sitting on a Budget Committee, sitting on the Appropriations Committee, and they didn't want to make change. And, look, this is a big change that I am proposing here, because it would essentially abolish all the Committees and combine the authorizing Committees and the appropriations Committees. So, on the House side, which is what we would control, it would create 14 appropriating and authorizing Committees. There would be five select Committees. Every Member on the House side would be able to choose two of those Committees. And the Budget Committee would actually--you might like this, Mr. Chairman, being Chairman of the Budget Committee--the Budget Committee would become, I think, fairly powerful. It wouldn't meet very often, but it would be made up of the Committee chairmen and the ranking members, so that there was actually real authority pushing that power down to the authorizing and appropriating Committees. One of the concerns that was raised at the time by some of the Members when we lost that vote 60-40 in our Conference was that a lot of our Members, even though knowing they sit on three authorizing Committees with absolutely no power, some didn't vote for it, because they said: Well, I am in line to be Chairman of whatever authorizing Committee, even though I know you are doing the right thing. So, one of the things that we want to make sure of in this proposal is that, whether you are on the Appropriations Committee or their authorizing Committee, you would keep your seniority and you would fall in line with whatever Committees you fall under. So, there would have to be a fair process put in place for that. I will just close by another example just last night. I chair the Intelligence Committee, and last night in the Defense Appropriations Committee there are several provisions that allow authorizing on the defense appropriations bill that will be on the floor this week. And once again, that will happen, despite the objections from myself and the members of my Committee. So, this is never going to get fixed until we decide to pull it out by the roots and start anew. And I think that all Members, at least on the House side--I can't speak for the Senate side because I have never served in the Senate--but on the House side I think it would really allow Members to actually participate, hold the executive branch accountable, have real power. Because you guys may not admit this publicly, but I will tell you that nobody in the executive branch takes any of us seriously unless you are an appropriator and a senior appropriator. If not, all they do is feed you a line, they know they are going to wait you out, and nothing ever gets done. So sorry for those of you who only serve on authorizing Committees, but nobody really cares if you are here or not. And with that, I will yield back. [The prepared statement of Devin Nunes follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. I thank the gentleman from California for his testimony this morning. Thank you, Devin. Representative Nunes. Thank you. Co-Chair Womack. Our next witness, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Representative Keith Rothfus. Good to have you here, sir. The Committee looks forward to your testimony. And the floor is yours. STATEMENT OF THE HON. KEITH J. ROTHFUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA Representative Rothfus. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Co- Chairwoman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before this Committee, and thank the members of this Committee for this very challenging work that you have ahead of you. Here in Washington we hear so much about how our system is broken and Congress doesn't work, but I don't think we understand how profoundly broken it is. In the over four decades under our current budgeting process, Congress has only passed all 12 appropriation bills on time four times. Think about that. Failing to follow regular order isn't the exception, it is the norm. Due to this chronic failure, we in Congress are forced to vote on massive omnibus packages and continuing resolutions, often with very little time to read them. We are constantly presented a false choice between voting on these cumbersome bills or letting the government shut down. In effect, Members are given 1 vote instead of 12 votes or even hundreds of votes on the opportunity to offer amendments. When we are voting on legislation hundreds of pages long with very little notice, we cannot accurately represent what we see in our districts. This haphazard budgeting process also makes it virtually impossible to actually prioritize spending in any meaningful way while our national debt continues to explode. Further, it seems every time we pass one of these monstrosities, we hear about more provisions that seemingly nobody knew were included. This is absurd and needs to change. Issues should be debated on their merits one at a time. We should have ample time to dissect and read all bills considered. And we should allow for feedback from our districts before taking the vote. It is for these reasons in previous years that I introduced the Pay for Performance Act. This legislation would have withheld pay for either Chamber if they failed to complete all 12 appropriation bills on time. There may be a better way to incentivize these bodies to get their work done. Perhaps no August recess until appropriation bills are done. We need an incentive like this to get our process back in order. Or maybe we need a new process entirely. Either way, a 90 percent failure rate is unacceptable by any metric and we should demand better. Government is going to be funded, we know that. If it is not going to be funded on September 30, it is going to be funded by October 20 or November 18 or December 22 or February 18. This is an act of the will. We know deadlines are coming. Every taxpayer in this country knows that April 15 they have to file something. Even if they have to file an extension, they have to pay taxes too. We know government is going to be funded. There is no reason why we can't get this done by September 30. I sincerely thank everybody for this work that you are undertaking. I encourage you to look at this from different angles. I was just listening to Chairman Nunes and his suggestions. We have 12 appropriations bills that lump different agencies together. Is that the best practice? You need to take a look at that. Should there be more types of bills? We can vote on these things. You take a bill, the one we considered last week where we did--or a couple weeks ago when we did the minibus, or even you look at something like the Labor-HHS, which combines three agencies. Should these be divided further? We also need a process where we can be having discussions about some binary choices and prioritizing. That is what families around this country do around the dinner table. If you have an emergency at home, you might have to put off resealing the driveway so that you know that the lights are going to stay on or the plumbing stays on. We need a mechanism of some sort where if we want to increase funding in one area, we should be able to ask that that could come from another area, and it shouldn't necessarily happen in the same appropriations bill. There may be something I want to propose for an increase in Labor-H, but I would want to pay for it out of another bill. There is no mechanism to do that. So, again, I applaud this Committee for the work that you are undertaking. I encourage you. And I look forward to further interaction with this Committee and I look forward to your reports. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Keith J. Rothfus follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you very much, Representative Rothfus, for your testimony this morning. We are going to stay in Pennsylvania. Our next witness is Representative Lloyd Smucker from Pennsylvania 16. Representative Smucker, we appreciate the opportunity to hear from you this morning. The floor is yours. STATEMENT OF THE HON. LLOYD SMUCKER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA Representative Smucker. Thank you, Chairman Womack and Chairwoman Lowey, Members of the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Reform. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. First, I would like to begin by extending my sincere appreciation for the work of this select Committee. You all have been tasked with accomplishing an incredibly important job, fixing the broken Federal budget process. As a freshman member of the House Budget Committee, I have received quite an education over the last 18 months about how we conduct business here in Congress. We lurch from one CR to the next, an average of four per year. Since our budget process was last overhauled in 1974, the government has been shut down more than 20 times. In fact, the 12 required appropriations bills have passed on time just once in 43 years. Particularly when contrasted with my experience as a business owner and then as a State legislator in Pennsylvania, I think it is fair to say that the wheels have completely come off our annual budgeting process. But you already know that and you know the results: a crushing debt that threatens our security and our economic vitality, a system that is failing the American people, and a rather bleak outlook for our kids and grandkids if we can't change the trajectory. We come here to solve big problems, and it is not too late to place this country on a sound fiscal path. We can do it and we must. I have come to believe that it must start with reforming the process. We must reform the budget process and reform the way Congress works to achieve the results that we need. And I also happen to believe that this commission is our best opportunity in a long time to do so. My purpose today is to share the experience of a commission in the Pennsylvania Legislature that worked, that took on a similar systemic long-term problem and found solutions. In fact, it had worked so well that I thought it was a good model to tackle budget reform and before the establishment of this select Committee had introduced legislation that would have established a similar joint commission. My hope is that sharing how it worked in Pennsylvania will spark a few thoughts or ideas that could be useful to you in your work and your ultimate success. So just a little background. The Committee in Pennsylvania was the Basic Education Funding Commission and it was tasked with determining a new formula to distribute education dollars to 500 districts all across the state. Everyone agreed, similar to what we have here, that the current system was completely broken, but multiple attempts to fix it over a period of 30 years had produced absolutely no results. The Commission was formed, worked for about 16 months, then provided a unanimous recommendation, which was taken up by the legislature, then passed and signed into law by the Governor. As chair of the State Education Committee at that time, I was a member of the Commission and sponsored the final bill. Several things about the Commission were important and may be helpful. The makeup of the Committee was important. It was bipartisan and bicameral. It was an inside Committee like this, three members from each party and each house, including the chairs of the relevant Committees. It also included three members of the executive branch, including the Budget Secretary and the Education Secretary. All of the key decisionmakers were in the room and were included in the process. The process itself was equally important. All deliberations were open and were transparent. And in our case, we held multiple hearings across the State, inviting anyone who wanted to participate to testify and provide input, including experts from other States, educators, and even members of the general public. That not only provided the best thinking available, but also created a loud echo chamber across the State and by and from all stakeholders. Remarkably, the work of the Commission in Pennsylvania spanned two administrations, Republican and Democrat. Members from the executive branch changed midway through the process. Even so, the recommendation was unanimous and was fully endorsed by the new Governor. Sticking to the original purpose of the Commission was also critical. It was tasked with finding a formula, but during hearings received a lot of pressure to increase the scope of its work. We worked really hard to keep the goal narrowly focused on the specific problem that we wanted to fix. While your commission may not be designed in exactly the same way as ours in Pennsylvania, I know it can work and that you can make a difference. I applaud you for your work and believe this is the best opportunity we have to fix the broken Federal budget process and deliver real systemic and meaningful budget reforms. I look forward to the work that you are doing and to supporting you in the best way that we can in the legislature. We share a common goal of wanting to fix the troubled state of our Nation's fiscal health, and that starts with reforming the broken Federal budget process. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Lloyd Smucker follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Representative Smucker, for your testimony this morning. Our next witness is the gentleman from Ohio, Representative Warren Davidson. Representative Davidson, the Committee appreciates the opportunity to hear from you this morning. And with that, the floor is yours. Please engage your microphone. And you have got 5 minutes for testimony. STATEMENT OF THE HON. WARREN DAVIDSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO Representative Davidson. Thank you, Chairman, and thanks to the full Committee. I really appreciate your attention to this. And we are all in the same boat, but you guys are doing the work. I really could spend the whole time talking about how important it is to move past the broken Budget Control Act of 1974 and to do just really basic things, like have a meaningful Gantt chart that shows what can happen in parallel and what can happen sequentially, so that we get our work done on time, as the country should expect us to do. I couldn't emphasize how important it is that we put everything on appropriations, not just some things, and the autopilot has got us headed for a crash. But one of the more meaningful things that I think we could do in reform is to understand how our accounting department works. Essentially, the Congressional Budget Office serves as our accounting department. Each of us doesn't have one of these functions in our office. And, unfortunately, most of the time we don't even, as individual Members, have access to real reports from accounting. They might give us the final summary, but they won't show us the details. And so, I think the Congressional Budget Office should fully embrace our Show Your Work Act, and I ask that you would. I have received some feedback about some concerns and would love to try to address a few of those. For background, the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations was established by this act. So, we have got a process to review things. The CBO has an incredibly important role in providing budget and cost analysis for legislation in Congress. Given the weight of these scores Members of Congress have to use for policy decisions, it should be a top priority that CBO standards are of the highest possible quality so that they may provide the best possible analysis for policymakers. When CBO fails to accurately predict the impact of policies, legislators lack the resources to make educated decisions. Examples include healthcare. Upon passage of the Affordable Care Act, CBO projected 21 million people would be enrolled in the exchanges in 2016. In reality, roughly 10 million people signed up, making for an overshot of 120 percent. In the healthcare debate in 2014, CBO predicted Medicaid expansion would cost $42 billion in 2015. The reality was $68 billion, about 62 percent higher. And most recently on tax reform, projected that the economy would only grow by 0.4 percent extra because of tax reform. We see the results are meaningfully different than that. So, what the legislation does is it requires CBO to publish online all data, models, and processes utilized in their analysis and scoring. It specifies that data and information provided must be sufficient so that individuals outside of CBO can understand, replicate, and reproduce the results found within. Essentially, this is the same thing that academics expect and it would come with some of the same safeguards. CBO should not be allowed to disclose certain datasets. Instead, they would publish a complete list of data variables for that data, including descriptive statistics, averages, standard deviations and correlations, a reference to the statute or rule preventing them from disclosing, for example, personally identifiable information, and the contact information for the individual or entity that has unrestricted access to the data. So, for example, we wouldn't need to know the contents of everyone's tax return or, frankly, the detailed pricing of any one pharmaceutical. We would need to know aggregate data to be able to simulate the model. We might not need to know how an individual company priced their drugs to model prescription drugs, for example. The bill is very important because it would allow the same sorts of review that go on in normal companies. Accounting departments have healthy debates. They have accountability that comes from the board questioning the accounting department. If you ask a leader of a business unit how to steer the business unit, it is unfathomable that the leader of that business unit wouldn't be able to go to the accounting department and get a detailed answer as to why that was the cost model if you tried to apply this to the corporate world. I believe we are owed it, as Members of Congress, individual Members, and I certainly believe that the American people are owed it. And I hope that you can find a way to address the concerns that have been expressed that are valid about how to protect personally identifiable information or proprietary information. But the American people need to know how our accounting department derives their recommendations so that it can be truly respected as the nonpartisan entity that it is. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Warren Davidson follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Representative Davidson, for your testimony this morning. Our next witness is Representative French Hill, my distinguished colleague from Arkansas, a member of the Financial Services Committee. The gentleman from Arkansas is recognized for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF THE HON. J. FRENCH HILL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ARKANSAS Representative Hill. I thank the Chairman. I congratulate the Chairman on a great victory by Arkansas last night in his district. I know he stayed up late watching that game. Co-Chair Womack. Go Pig Sooie. Representative Hill. My best wishes to the ranking member, members of the Committee. Experiencing frustration and dissatisfaction with the actual functioning of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is not new or remotely original. This Committee's shelves are stacked with binders of worthy and not-so-worthy suggestions from four decades of bipartisan complaining. My first exposure to concrete recommendations for wholesale change came from my former boss on Capitol Hill, Senator John Tower of Texas, an original member of the Senate Budget Committee and Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Senator Tower offered his restructuring proposals in his 1991 memoir ``Consequences.'' He argued strongly for a 2-year budget cycle to get off the budgetary treadmill, and he argued that there be less executive branch testimony before authorizing, appropriating, and budget Committees by streamlining that witness approach. In the last two decades, Congress' budgetary muscles have atrophied, rarely completing a budget or passing appropriations measures prior to fiscal year ends. It is really sad how little that has happened since 1974. Gosh, not since 1996, and that is back when Vice President Gore was still inventing the internet. The results. The administrative state has grown unwieldy and more immune to oversight. In Article I, the Congress' appropriation oversight responsibilities are their most fundamental. The debt has grown unabated, with the burden of net interest that is expected to soon reach more than the entire appropriation for defense, and by 2027 reach approximately $1 trillion, the approximate size of today's entire discretionary budget. The government is run from one dysfunctional CR to another, periodically punctuated by an unaccountable omnibus appropriation that pleases no one. All the while, mandatory spending programs grow at three or four times the rate of macroeconomic growth, with little public discussion or oversight and rarely, if any, votes being held for restructuring in the Congress. So, what to do? Let me first endorse fully, Mr. Chairman, the 2-year budget cycle for annual budget resolutions and having a 2-year spending allocation under that resolution. Watching the House move all 12 appropriations bills last summer in a 120-day period made us all realize that our muscles can be strengthened and we can do that, and I commend Senator Shelby's work as well this year. So, I think the 2-year cycle is good. Unauthorized programs. You know, in business, where I spent three decades, this kind of thing just wouldn't even be considered in the real world. Establishing a budget procedure whereby spending is reduced by the amount of excess appropriations for unauthorized programs would be a worthy change. Thus, the Committees--the authorizing Committees would not fund--appropriations Committees would not fund unauthorized or expired programs. Likewise, all authorizing Committees would file their views and estimates, including a list of every program about to expire or that required reauthorization, and use a zero-based budget justification for every program so identified. I have a list of things that I entitle, Mr. Chairman, Stop Kidding Ourselves: Number one, prohibit budget gimmicks. Stop Committees from using one-time shifts in timing or asset sales to offset ongoing spending increases. Permit any Member to offer an amendment to strike emergency spending designation in any measure. Insist that the Congressional Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget baseline budget eliminate their built- in discretionary inflation, automatic extensions of expired programs, and that mandatory spending programs continue at current levels even when trust funds are insolvent. On better transparency, I think every fact sheet by the Budget Committee and the Appropriations Committee for all Members and Senators should propose plainly what the outlay is for the proposed fiscal year compared to the past 5 years of actual outlays, noting the percentage increase and decrease. All Federal insurance and retirement programs, excluding Social Security, ought to be put on accrual budgeting, requiring the Congress to fully budget all the costs in those programs. And finally, Mr. Chairman, I really think that Tom McClintock's Default Prevention Act, which requires the Department of Treasury to continue to borrow to pay the principal and interest on certain obligations if the debt exceeds its statutory limit, is a worthy change that this bicameral Committee ought to recommend. I think it will take off the table the periodic debt ceiling limit that causes our debate to not be as positive as it could be. And finally, a regulatory budget. I hope that you will consider a regulatory budget in addition to a budget resolution. And I thank you for the time to testify. [The prepared statement of J. French Hill follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. I thank the gentleman from Arkansas for his testimony. We are going to hear from one more witness, then we are going to take our promised break, albeit about 15 minutes late. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jim Renacci. Representative Renacci, we are pleased to have you this morning. The floor is yours. STATEMENT OF THE HON. JAMES B. RENACCI, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO Representative Renacci. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the co-chairs of the joint select Committee for holding this hearing and allowing Members of Congress to share their ideas and proposals. Look, I got here 7\1/2\ years ago as a business guy who balances budgets, who makes things work, and who continues to believe we need budgets. The problem is our budgetary system is broken. I have spent a lot of time since being elected here of looking at financial processes, everything from how we can develop a financial statement to how we can develop a process where we can start with a budget. But let's first say you can't even prepare a budget if you don't know where you are at. And one of the biggest problems I said in Washington is most Members of Congress don't really know financially where we are because we don't have a fiscal accounting, we don't have a fiscal financial statement, and we don't have a fiscal address. So, what I am proposing is two bills that actually I think fix the budget process. Number one, you first have to have awareness. I believe it is critical the American people and Congress are aware of the financial system that our country faces. So, I have introduced a bill that would just do that. It is pretty simple. All it does is require the Comptroller General of the General Accounting Office to provide a fiscal state of the Nation address to a joint session of Congress on an annual basis. The presentation would include an analysis of the condition of our country's fiscal status, including our budget deficits, long-term fiscal projections for our social insurance programs. It would be a presentation of our fiscal issues, and it would be public for all Americans. Right now, our country is on the cusp of a national debt crisis. By 2023, the CBO projects that we will spend more paying down our interest than we will on our national defense. By 2028, the debt held by the public as a share of GDP will increase to 96 percent, the largest since 1946. Most Members of Congress don't know that. By the way, I have also said that every Member of Congress should be on the Budget Committee at least one cycle. Most Members of Congress are not aware of that. And as lawmakers, we have a moral responsibility to address these changes and work together to find bipartisan solutions to stave off this pending crisis. A strong first step would be requiring Congress to come together once a year to hear from a nonpartisan Comptroller General what the fiscal state of the country is in order to highlight the crisis that we face and put Members on notice to the public that this is an issue that needs to be addressed. The best way to tackle a problem is to first shine light on the problem. At my request, the Comptroller General has testified before the House Budget Committee in recent years, and I believe that this issue is too important that the full Congress not be made aware of it. Some will say a joint session of Congress is not the right venue for this type of speech. I would highly disagree. I would counter by asking doubters why they believe this isn't an important enough issue to convene a joint session and why they are afraid to set the new precedent. I had almost 200 cosponsors on this bill the first time I dropped it last cycle. This cycle I am close to getting 200 bipartisan Democrats and Republicans who agree to this. We shouldn't be afraid of doing it. Additionally, the legislation was included in the 2016 Budget Committee budget reform white paper, has been endorsed by the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, the AICPA, the Concord Coalition, and the National Taxpayers Union. It is something we should not be afraid of. It is something we should be looking forward to seeing every year so we know where we have to start before we do the budget process. Along with that awareness, I think we need to do a better job at holding ourselves accountable. The second bill I have introduced would make Congress actually abide by the budget that we pass. Since 1974, we waive our budgets. Every time we turn around, it gets waived in budget--in the Committee that-- anyway, it gets waived, and that is a problem. We can't waive the Committee. Too often, the Rules Committee waives budget-related issues, preventing Members of Congress to object to legislation that breaks the budget. If you want to break the budget, that is all well and good. In the business world, you break it all the time. But what you do is you come before management, which is the Congress, and you tell people why. This bill would allow Members of the House to call for a recorded vote on these waivers and put Members on the record whether they wish to waive the budget. As someone who has spent my career in the business world, I believe it is important that we pass a budget and follow the budget. This bipartisan legislation would hold Congress responsible to ourselves and ensure that we actually follow our budget. I commend the work that the Joint Committee is doing in reforming our broken budget process. I believe that these two measures that I discussed today should be considered as part of the broader reforms that are needed to fix the budget process. I want to thank you again for your time. And I yield back. [The prepared statement of James B. Renacci follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. I thank the gentleman from Ohio for his testimony this morning. Our next witness is here, but we have promised our Committee that we are going to take just a few-minute break for a comfort break, check email, make whatever phone calls you need to make. So, at this time, if it pleases the co-chair, I think we will take a break and resume our testimony at 5 till the hour. That would be in about 11 minutes. So, the chair declares this Joint Select Committee on Budget and Process Reform for Members' Day to be in recess for about 10 minutes. [Recess.] Co-Chair Womack. The Joint Select Committee on Budget and Process Reform Members' Day will resume. The co-chair and I do appreciate the cooperation and the participation of our Members of the Committee and those Members that are making presentations here today. We are running just a few minutes late. We do appreciate the patience of our next witness, Ms. Jayapal. And we will proceed now with her testimony and then go straight toward the end, in hopes of getting us back a little bit more on time, although running about 15 minutes late is about on time for Congress, in my opinion, based on my experience. But nonetheless, our next witness is Pramila Jayapal from Washington. And the gentlelady is recognized for 5 minutes in support of her positions on this subject. And the floor yours, Ms. Jayapal. STATEMENT OF THE HON. PRAMILA JAYAPAL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON Representative Jayapal. Thank you so much, Chairman Womack, and thank you to Chairwoman Lowey as well, for holding this hearing and for all your dedicated work. Since I have come to Congress, I have heard a lot of talk about the budget process being broken. And as the vice ranking member of the House Budget Committee under the great leadership of Mr. Yarmuth, I have been able to look at the process up close and consider how we use it. What is obvious is that there is a process on the books that has the promise of being able to be used effectively, but in reality, it has been thwarted time and time again. As a Budget Committee member, I plan to focus my remarks today on the Budget Committee's role. And first I would like to give a little bit of context. The budget resolution process was designed to give Congress a voice in setting fiscal policy. And prior to the enactment of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which established the Budget Committees as well as the Congressional Budget Office, Congress did not have its own source of budgetary information and didn't have a procedure to establish an overall fiscal framework. Rather, the executive branch housed budgetary information and was the only source of a fiscal plan. Congress acted on that plan in a piecemeal fashion, with each Committee reviewing proposals in its jurisdiction. There was no approval of overall levels of revenue, spending, and the resulting deficits and debt. Clearly, that was not a good way to budget. Revenue and spending decisions should not be made in separate silos. Each has an impact on deficits and debt. Changes in one are going to fundamentally require changes in the other, a change in the overall fiscal path, or both. And a perfect example is the recent tax bill. The Republican majority made a decision to cut revenue substantially, even though long-term deficits were already unsustainably high. That was then used to justify calls for even deeper spending cuts. And it had severe consequences for Americans across the country, who are struggling to make ends meet, to pay for healthcare, or even to put food on the table. The good news is that the budget resolution can and has been used to lay out a framework of priorities. Used properly, the budget resolution provides a way to lay out Congress' priorities, both for overall fiscal policy and for distribution across major functions or areas of national need. The reconciliation process provides a path to enact spending cuts or revenue increases included in a budget resolution that might require difficult votes. Major deficit reduction packages that implemented policies assumed in the budget resolution have been enacted, including those during the Clinton administration that led to budget surpluses. The budget resolution should and has set the stage for the Appropriations Committee to do their work. But sadly, the budget resolution has become only a messaging document rather than a governing document. It has incorporated policies that the majority doesn't actually plan to move during the upcoming year. And, for example, in recent years, trillions of dollars of savings are called for in the resolution, but are not included in the reconciliation directives. That is the mechanism to enforce the cuts. It is called reconciliation because the whole point of the process is to reconcile Federal law with the amounts assumed in the budget resolution. Failing to reconcile trillions of dollars in cuts suggests that the cuts are not meant to be real. Likewise, discretionary spending has been put at artificially low levels, even though there is widespread agreement that higher levels will be needed. Much of the savings in both categories has been unspecified, meaning that it is impossible to tell from the budget resolution what Congress' true priorities are. Revenue cuts have been sold as likely to cost nothing, even as the Joint Tax Committee's best estimates show that is not the case. None of this engenders respect or credibility for the process or for those of us who serve in Congress. It is time for all of us to step up and recognize that we can do better. The budget resolution process has a means to define what we want fiscal policy to be and a set of enforcement procedures to help us get there. There may need to be improvements to the process that can help make things move more smoothly, and we should welcome them. But realistically, we can't expect them to fix this. Rather, we need to approach the process with a realistic understanding of what we can do, a willingness to compromise when necessary, and a readiness to accept analysis on what policies will cost and save produced by our own in-house nonpartisan experts. If we don't do that, we have ourselves to blame for not being able to muster the resolve to use the process that we have efficiently. I thank you very much for your work and for your focus on this issue. [The prepared statement of Pramila Jayapal follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. I thank the gentlelady from Washington for her testimony this morning. Our next witness is Representative David Price from the great State of North Carolina. Representative Price, we appreciate you appearing before the Committee this morning. And the floor is yours, sir. STATEMENT OF THE HON. DAVID E. PRICE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA Representative Price. Thank you, Co-Chair Womack and Co- Chair Lowey and other members of the select Committee. I appreciate the chance to testify today, and I will submit the full copy of my text for the record. I have been following the work of this Committee and like much of what I have heard. The possibility of ending debt ceiling brinksmanship, for example, or moving to a calendar year budget cycle. But one of the ideas you are considering has set off alarm bells, and for that reason I would like to take a few minutes to detail my objections to a bad idea, namely, moving to a biennial appropriations process. I first testified about biennial budgeting about 20 years ago before the House Rules Committee, which was considering legislation to transition Congress to biennial appropriations. Then our fiscal situation was quite different. The enactment of comprehensive multiyear budget agreements in 1990, 1993, and 1997, coupled with a growing economy, had produced several years of balanced budgets. In fact, we had been able to pay off $400 billion of the national debt. Since then, we have had two unpaid-for wars, unnecessary but expensive countercyclical response to the Great Recession, massive unpaid-for tax cuts, and now 7 years of extremely partisan and largely dysfunctional congressional budget politics. So, it is understandable that the idea of biennial appropriations would once again hold some appeal as a panacea for Members in search of solutions to our current woes. But this is truly a case in which the remedy would be worse than the disease. Of course, I understand the congressional budget and appropriations process have eroded significantly. The pressures of divided government and a polarized electorate, the increased use of the Senate filibuster, the general subjugation of Congress' constitutional power of the purse to partisan political considerations, all of these factors have greatly delayed the enactment of our annual spending bills and increased our reliance on continuing resolutions and omnibus packages. But biennial budgeting, by which I mean biennial appropriations, would do nothing to address the underlying causes of this dysfunction. It actually might make matters worse by weakening congressional oversight of the executive, jacking even more decisions up to the leadership of both parties, and increasing our reliance on supplemental appropriations bills considered outside the regular order. I want to stress that these same arguments do not apply to a multiyear budget agreement of the sort that served us so well in the 1990s, nor do they apply to a 2-year budget resolution of the sort Congress passed a few months ago. Indeed, our current appropriations work is greatly facilitated by the fact that that is a 2-year plan. But appropriations is another matter. The thorough review of individual agency programs and the determination of new funding levels must have year-to-year flexibility and is distinct from determining budgetary topline numbers. My arguments this morning are directed to the 12 appropriations bills that must be passed under any budget agreement, no matter the duration of that agreement. Now, proponents of biennial appropriations claim that it would free up Congress to conduct oversight in the off-year. That is a supremely ironic claim, for the most careful and effective oversight Congress does is through the annual appropriations process, when an agency's performance and needs are reviewed program by program, line by line. Off-year oversight would be less, not more effective, because it would be further removed from actual funding decisions, reducing Congress' leverage. As the ranking member of the House Appropriations subcommittee on Transportation and Housing, I have seen firsthand the value of annual appropriations bills and how it bolsters congressional oversight. For example, last year the Federal Transit Administration made several administrative and policy changes, procedural changes to the capital investments transit program, the New Starts program. State and local agencies faced considerable uncertainty about how their projects would be reviewed and whether they could count on Federal funding commitments. Members of both sides of the aisle reached out to the Appropriations Committee with their concerns. So, in response, our Committee included several provisions and report language in the fiscal year 2018 omnibus appropriations bill on a bipartisan, bicameral basis, directing FTA to provide grantees with updated project ratings and to administer the program in accordance with the law. What if we had had to wait an additional year to do that? To wait an extra year to enact these policy provisions might have resulted in the failure of several large transit projects across the country. And the ability of the Committee to quickly respond to executive branch action proved decisive. Annual appropriations bill also serves as a way to respond to court rulings that may invalidate or make workable existing policies. They facilitate other policy tweaks that would otherwise fail to garner floor time. These housekeeping items, as we call them, almost always are dealt with on a bipartisan basis and they are vital to ensuring the effective function of government. A biennial appropriations process would also pose special challenges during the second year of the 2-year budget cycle. Just think about this. Under the existing appropriations cycle, Federal agencies typically begin formulating their budgets in the summer of the year before the President submits his budget request to Congress in February. That is a full 14 to 15 months in advance of the start of the actual fiscal year. Now, if you ask agencies to put a budget request for the second year of a 2-year cycle forward, as much as 28 months in advance, that would require a level of planning and foresight that just might not be possible or realistic given the uncertainty of revenue and expenditure projections, the continually evolving challenges of the Federal Government. For example, the Tenant-Based Rental Assistance Program, often referred to as Section 8 vouchers, at the beginning of a cost cycle we receive estimates from HUD regarding renewals. Co-Chair Womack. The gentleman is running out of time. Your time has expired. Representative Price. All right. I will leave the Section 8 example for the record and wrap up, Mr. Chairman. What I am saying, though, pertains to the second year of an appropriations cycle. And I just think we would have more supplemental appropriations bills, more reprogramming, and all the rest. So, in conclusion, the whole purpose of the biennial budget could be undermined by the proliferation of supplementals in the off-year. Perversely, we would have replaced the deliberative and democratic process of appropriations with supplemental bills that are sporadic, rushed, and heavily controlled by leadership. So, I don't think biennial appropriations is any better an idea today than it was 15 or 20 years ago. It would be a mistake to let recent budget disagreements lure us toward a supposed remedy that would actually make appropriations less systematic, less flexible, and less potent. We all know that the process has broken down, but biennial budgeting fixes none of this. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of David E. Price follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony here this morning. I am going to allow the co-chair to make a statement. Mrs. Lowey. Co-Chair Lowey. Thank you very much. I just wanted to comment quickly on your presentation, perhaps because I agree with you 100 percent. And I think you present very carefully crafted arguments, and I know that your testimony will be an important part of the final record that we will review as we are making decisions. So, I just wanted to thank you again for the careful preparation of your presentation. Thank you very much. Co-Chair Womack. I thank the gentlelady. And as is the case with all Members, written statements will be made a part of the official record of this event today. Thank you, Representative Price. Our next witness is the gentleman from Montana, the Senator from Montana, Steve Daines. Mr. Daines will have 5 minutes for his presentation. Co-Chair Womack. The joint select Committee appreciates the time that you have taken to appear before the Members' Day program here this morning, and we will give you the floor, sir. STATEMENT OF THE HON. STEVE DAINES, A UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MONTANA Senator Daines. Co-Chairs Womack and Lowey, thank you for your leadership and for giving us this Members' Day. It gives us an opportunity to share our experience on how to improve the very broken budget and appropriations process. I serve on the Appropriations Committee of the United States Senate. So, my remarks are somewhat framed in my experience of about 3 years in the Senate. I also want to thank Senator Perdue for his commitment to reform the budget process. David and I have been working a lot before the select Committee was put together. I am grateful for it. Thank you for elevating it to this level. Many of the Members currently serving in Congress come from business backgrounds, and I think we can take some of that experience. It is not the only experience that is going to help in this area, of course, but it will help us, I think, to frame a better process going forward. This process is incredibly broken, and so it should be no surprise that a profoundly broken process delivers a very bad result. Having spent 28 years in the private sector, passing a budget is not optional. You must pass a budget. In fact, passing a balanced budget is not optional. You must do that as well, or else you are out of business. $21.1 trillion of debt, $33.8 trillion of debt in 10 years, we have no option but to change the budget and the appropriations process. I just want to jump right into policy. I am going to try to remove the bun and get to the meat here. Let me share four recommendations that I have for this prestigious select Committee. First of all, I would combine the authorizing Committees with the corresponding Appropriations Committee. Consolidate them and then completely dissolve the Budget Committee. By doing this, we can start having real conversations about where to spend and how to spend it. Currently, we have two processes on different tracks that simply don't sync up. Integrating the processes into one Committee will ensure more coordination and better outcomes. The biggest single challenge to doing that will be leadership itself in these Committees. Members stay here for a long time. They get to Committee chairs. That, I think, will be the single greatest barrier that we will face in trying to implement that reform. But I think Senator Perdue and others have shown this incredible spaghetti tangle of authorizing Committees and Appropriations Committees. And then we have this Budget Committee on top of that, and it is no wonder this process produces a bad result. It is very complicated, and it is not unified. I think we could significantly improve this process by dissolving the Budget Committee, bring authorizing and Approps into single Committees that line up with their respective jurisdictions. Number two, the budget should be a law, not a resolution. We need to have an up-or-down vote on the entire budget, one number. One number that includes discretionary and mandatory spending. In today's terms, that means we would be voting on a roughly $4 trillion spending budget, not $1.2 trillion in discretionary. Number three--and I respectfully heard Representative Price and his views on biennial budgeting. I think we need to take a look at, and I will tell you why. I am a subcommittee chair on Approps. I believe that by budgeting over a longer period of time, it can make the process and outcomes more predictable for all stakeholders. This removes some uncertainty for Federal agencies and adds much-needed capacity to the Senate. I don't know if that has been talked about a lot. But one problem we had in the U.S. Senate is floor time. And the appropriations process we have today would consume a lot of that Senate capacity. A biennial budget actually frees up more capacity for the Senate to do the work of the people. You are much more efficient in the House than we are in the Senate. You guys get a lot better gas mileage. Fourth, we need to create incentives to pass a budget. I think we should look at both carrots and sticks. If any of you have served in State legislatures--I have not--but I think 46 out of 50, conservatively, some say 48 out of 50, require a balanced budget. We should look at that for Washington, D.C., as well. But at a minimum, as we see--I know in the State of Montana, they don't get to leave town until the budget is done. And so, there is an incentive to keep members there until they actually get the budget completed. But I think we are going to put something here that compels this organization, this body to do it. I do think by moving forward on some of these ideas, we can fix this. We need to fix it. I know there have been many efforts--you know this--and failed attempts to reform the budget process. I hope it doesn't go down in history as one more failed Committee that came up with recommendations and nothing was done. I sincerely believe this is the number one reform facing Congress. I don't think there is anything more important than what you are doing right here. I think truly this is the most important work we can be doing at the moment. We need to act. No more CRs. No more omnibuses. Failure is not an option. Thank you for holding this session today and allowing me to share my thoughts. [The prepared statement of Steve Daines follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Senator Daines, thank you very much for your testimony this morning. Our next witness hails from the State of Alabama. We are going to provide 5 minutes of testimony from Representative Robert Aderholt. Representative Aderholt, the Committee appreciates your time this morning. Look forward to your testimony. The floor is yours, sir. STATEMENT OF THE HON. ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA Representative Aderholt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to the co-chairs for an opportunity to speak. And also to all the members, thank you for allowing Members to come and address the Committee today. Let me start by saying that I welcome today's discussion and opportunity to engage with members about the ways that we can make rule changes that improves our budget and appropriations process. The fulfillment of Article I, section 9, clause 7 to responsibly oversee spending of public funds is one of the most crucial and necessary tasks that are executed by the Federal Government. Serving now in my 22nd year on the House Appropriations Committee, I have reviewed the process extensively. I have seen it in work over the years as I have served the people of the Congressional District, Fourth Congressional District in Alabama. With the trend of stopgap funding bills and government shutdowns, in this environment, there is a lot that we can do to ensure the American people that they are receiving effective government that they deserve. The work of passing 12 individual appropriation bills through the subcommittee, through the full Appropriations Committee, and then on the floor of each Chamber is a challenging process. It requires consensus and certainly a lot of hard work by a lot of people. The House Appropriations Committee has had dozens of hearings, met with administration officials to hear the budget justification. We have moved through the subcommittee process, the full Committee process with bipartisan agreements on much of the content that is in these funding bills. In recent years, the House has been able to consider and pass bills through this process despite the challenges that we have seen in the Senate. This has caused Congress under the leadership of both Republicans and Democrats to use combined spending packages as a way of forcing funding through the process. However, the status quo is not working, and I think that is what you are hearing from a lot of our colleagues today. The President, as you know, has promised that he will not sign another consolidated 12-bill package. In the House, we are trying to do our part to ensure that the process moves forward, that we have bills to go to conference with the Senate once they have completed their work. To ensure these bills will be considered in a timely manner, I think the--or I would submit that the Senate has got to strongly consider doing away with filibuster rule on appropriation legislation. By eliminating this Senate practice on appropriation bills, the Federal funding can be streamlined, and this institution can get back to upholding our constitutional responsibility. The Senate's responsibility is to the people they represent and to their constitutional duty to fund the Federal Government, not the administrative rules that are governing their body. Even though our Founding Fathers gave the House authority to originate money--bills through the origination clause in the Constitution, the House somehow thinks that now it is in our best interest to take a step back to the Senate internal rules. And what we have found is ourselves prenegotiating House bills with the Senate. I believe the House should continue passing appropriation bills that reflect the will of the people. We should then present each appropriation bill for Senate consideration. And then, as the House, hold out for passage so that the Senate can get to a formal conference. This conference should reflect a bipartisan approach that can reach a majority in each Chamber-- a simple majority and not a super majority. If the majority party wants to filibuster and shut down the government, then that would be their prerogative. This is what I would call, and I think most of us would consider regular order. It has worked for decades upon decades in this institution. But we have gotten away from that, and if we are going to be successful in making Washington work for the people instead of partisan gridlock, it is going to take getting back to regular order or these basics. Let me add that one proposal which I do not think is a good idea is having a 2-year appropriation bill. I am very concerned about the matter of oversight. The annual appropriations process allows for a relatively quick review of how response-- agency in addressing congressional concerns. It allows the entire House and Senate to be involved in the process in contrast to the reprogramming actions, and they do serve a legitimate process. Above all, we must remember that the legislative bodies representing--we are representing our voters. We take money from our voters, from hardworking families. And it is very legitimate that we use both directive and be very diligent in our oversight as we turn that money over to the executive branch. And, with that, I see my time is out, and I yield back. [The prepared statement of Robert Aderholt follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you to the gentleman from Alabama. Representative Lowey, the co-chair. Co-Chair Lowey. I just want to thank the gentleman from Alabama. And on an optimistic note, I am aware that the Senate is moving rather quickly working in a bipartisan way. And I am hoping that at a time near the time they complete their work and we complete the work, the bills can be meshed in a bipartisan way, and the authorizing poison pills that have been attached to the House bill can somehow disappear, and we could all work together and have a good bipartisan process. So, I just want to thank you. Representative Aderholt. Thank you. Thanks for letting me come before the Committee. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Representative Aderholt. Our next witness is a gentlelady from Connecticut, Elizabeth Esty. And the joint select Committee appreciates the opportunity to hear your testimony this morning. And we will open the floor for you for 5 minutes ma'am. STATEMENT OF THE HON. ELIZABETH H. ESTY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Representative Esty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Lowey, for the opportunity to present some views of how I think we can improve the budgeting and appropriations process in this House. In particular, I would like to focus on a broader principle of the breakdown of long-term decision making and planning. I see this with great clarity as the vice ranking member of the Transportation Committee where we have been unable to pass major infrastructure planning. And I think the American people are largely unaware that, unlike States and unlike individuals who have capital budgets, that we do not do that in the U.S. Congress. And so, the normal political pressure to do short-term planning has now become, I believe, significantly aggravated by where we are with deficits and in our budgeting process. So, I would urge the Committee, regardless of what specifics you come up with, that we should be focused on making good long-term, wise decision making for the American people. And I think we have gotten away from that. And I think the budgeting process has now compounded that process. I think there are some things we could look at in doing that capital budget, which I know that we have had previous Members of Congress who advocated for strongly 2-year budgets. But the bottom line should be we need to empower and equip Members of Congress to think about how to make those long-term decisions. The CBO plays an important role there. We have met with them and tried to solicit some ideas about what they could do by limiting them to a 10-year time window to look at and requiring a specific figure rather than ranges. I think we are limiting their ability to inform us. We know, for example, in the field of healthcare, preventive care has the most important benefits, not 10 years out but 20, 30, 40 years out. But they are statutorily prohibited from considering those long-term benefits. When I have asked them directly about what it would take to do that, they say, for one thing, they need statutory permission to do that. But I think they would also be more comfortable if they were allowed to give ranges or confidence levels further out: You know, we have high degree of confidence 10 years out, but in the outer--further out years, we would expect savings. But these are more guesstimates, perhaps. I think that could help inform our debate whereas now they are not allowed to do that whatsoever. So that can be in preventive care. Certainly, that is true for infrastructure where we are just gridlocked. And we will pay for pieces of paper in our offices, but we won't pay for replacements of bridges and roads. The American people don't get why that is happening. And part of that, frankly, is the scoring process makes it hard. It makes it easy to do the piece of paper and really hard to replace the bridge. So, whatever ends up happening, I think we have to look at how the budgeting process can empower and inform Members to be wise, to make those long-term decisions. And the budgeting process should be part of that. We know we have got gridlock on many political disagreements. But I think notions about the value of preventive care and healthcare, about the importance of infrastructure, we all know that. We don't need to go to school for that. So, therefore, we need to a take good hard look at our budgeting and appropriations process to find out what are current impediments to us making wiser decisions. So those were my 2 cents about how we should approach the objectives, not the specifics of how we do it but really the touchstone of what we need to be doing. We all know that is true. The American people can't figure out why we can't get these budgets done. And I believe some of those longstanding practices or those guardrails we set in place have, in fact, have become an impediment to exactly what we thought we are supposed to be doing and certainly what the American people believe we are supposed to be doing. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Elizabeth Esty follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. The joint select Committee appreciates your testimony this morning, Representative Esty. Representative Esty. Thank you. Co-Chair Womack. Our next witness has just entered the room. We are going to ask the gentleman from California if he is prepared. The Committee appreciates the testimony from all the Members. And, Representative McClintock, we are going to give you 5 minutes. The floor is yours. And thank you for being with us this morning. STATEMENT OF THE HON. TOM McCLINTOCK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Representative McClintock. Great. Well, thank you for having me. All spending originates in the House. In a very real sense, the buck starts here. The government cannot spend a single dollar unless the House says it can spend that dollar. The 1974 Budget Act gives the House a very powerful set of tools to control spending and balance the budget. For years, on the House Budget Committee, I have heard it said that the budget is merely an aspirational document offering our vision of the direction the government should take. That is simply not true. The budget is an operational document, the single most important tool that we have to control spending. The problem is we don't use it. I have also heard incessantly that it is the mandatory spending that is to blame, and that is beyond our control. Well, mandatory spending is out of control, but it is a lot easier to change than discretionary spending because the reconciliation bill gets expedited consideration in the Senate; the appropriation bills do not. The budget resolution sets limits on the discretionary spending that is appropriated annually. That is about one-third of our budget. It also limits the mandatory spending. That is set by statute. That is about two-thirds of our budget, and it gives us powerful tools to enforce both sets of limits. The problem is we don't use them. Why? Well, the first problem is on the discretionary side. Those limits are sent to the House Appropriations Committee which cannot exceed them. The House routinely meets this responsibility; the Senate does not because its dysfunctional cloture rule gives the minority the ability to block them. As the deadline approaches and the threat of a government shutdown looms, the appropriation bills are cast aside in favor of stopgap measures that continue the spending trajectory without serious reform. Now, that is easy to fix. Give appropriation bills the same expedited consideration in the Senate that the reconciliation bill already has. The bigger problem is on the mandatory side, and process reform is not going to fix it. The mandatory limits are supposed to be placed in reconciliation instructions that are sent to the House authorizing Committees. Those Committees are then required to make conforming statutory changes. If the Committees fail to act, the Budget Committee can do so directly. Either way, those statutory changes go into a single reconciliation bill that bypasses cloture. But this powerful process is never used. Why? Well, because decisions on reforming mandatory spending, mainly entitlement programs, are the most difficult decisions in our fiscal policy. It is easier not to make them and blame the process. Every year, the House Budget Committee produces a budget that it claims will balance in 10 years, and it lays out proposals on how to do it. But it never places these proposals in the reconciliation instructions that transform them from promise into action. This year's budget is case in point. It promises mandatory spending reforms to balance within 10 years but only places 5 percent of those reforms into reconciliation instructions that will actually change spending. In other words, we are 5 percent serious about balancing the budget and 95 percent unserious. If we were serious about the mandatory reforms, we would put them in the reconciliation instructions and force the statutory changes necessary to make them. We would also include discretionary limits that would begin the trajectory back to balance in this year's spending. The fact is we didn't. With all due respect, that makes this Committee's work largely a fool's errand. The principal problem with the budget process is it requires very hard decisions. Changing the process isn't going to make these decisions any easier. Whatever the process, the decisions are going to get harder and harder every year that we don't make them. Let me close with a warning. The countries that bankrupt themselves aren't around very long. Debt the size that we are now carrying ends up either as a fiscal crisis like those paralyzing Venezuela and our own territory of Puerto Rico or as an economic crisis as the central bank buys up debt at the expense of economic growth as we are seeing in Japan and throughout Europe. Over the past 10 years, while populations increased 26 percent, our revenues have more than kept pace. They have grown 29 percent. But spending has grown 46 percent. In short, it is the spending, stupid. Our job is to control that spending. We have powerful tools to do so, but we have not used them. The fault, Dear Brutus, is not in our stars but in ourselves that we are underlings. [The prepared statement of Tom McClintock follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank the gentleman from California for his testimony this morning. Our next witness is from Illinois, Representative Bill Foster. Sir, we appreciate the opportunity to hear your testimony this morning. I will speak for the entire joint select Committee in thanking you for your testimony. And we will give you 5 minutes. And the floor is yours, sir. STATEMENT OF THE HON. BILL FOSTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS Mr. Foster. Great. Well, good morning. I would like to begin by thanking Co- Chair Womack and Co-Chair Lowey and the other members of the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform for holding this Members' Day. I am here to discuss the debt limit, which I view as the most unnecessary and disastrous risk to financial stability and the economic recovery of the last 8 years. Over the last 6 months, I have discussed this issue with various administration officials and many experts in hearings of the House Financial Services Committee and in private meetings. In the Committee, Secretary Mnuchin responded that he did not support it, the debt limit, as a mechanism for controlling spending and--last year. And in February of this year, he thought that the repeal should be one option discussed in the long term. I agree with that statement, and I hope to advance repeal as one option that this Committee considers. The debt limit is an artificial fig leaf over the fiscal irresponsibility in Congress. It sometimes gets referred to as being like refusing to pay for a meal after you have eaten it. On one hand, the debt limit instructs the administration not to issue debt beyond a certain point. On another hand--on the other hand, Congress slashes revenue without paying for it and increases spending across the board even on projects that do not make sense. The deficits created here inevitably trigger a crisis with the debt limit. As a result of the partisanship that has defined recent sessions of Congress, the debt limit is a self-inflicted risk that is unnecessary and obviously ineffective. Moreover, it creates a default risk that is not market-driven, complicating the calculation of risk and likely distorting pricing. The United States--if the United States ever exceeded the debt limit, results would be catastrophic for our economy and for hardworking Americans. This problem should not be a partisan issue. It is an issue that impacts middle class families in every congressional district and unnecessarily slowed the recovery from the Great Recession. A 2013 Treasury report found that when this Nation approached the debt limit without a clear path to raising it, the average mortgage in the United States increased $100 per month. We need to address our debt limit through the budget process, the Tax Code, and appropriations. We need to address our debt through the budget process, the Tax Code, and the appropriations, and not the artificial debt limit. Our economy should not endure a market-rocking event because of a partisan fight over an arbitrary number that is not related either to economic performance or to GDP. I asked the Federal Reserve Chairman Powell about the size of our debt relative to aggregate household net worth, which, as many have noted, recently exceeded $100 trillion. He agreed that we have to address our debt in the long run but that we are presently not nearing our carrying capacity. Our failure to provide adequate revenue to pay for the programs hardworking Americans need created a serious structural debt problem. Our economy is both rich and productive enough to fulfill our obligations to the most vulnerable. We can afford to ensure that Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are available in perpetuity. And I strongly believe it is a moral imperative that we do so. The debt limit does not provide fiscal discipline but does cause market problems. There is no hypothesized credit limit of the United States of which I am aware. But it is clear that it is greater than the current debt load based on the market appetite for Treasuries and low interest rates. Repeal would allow markets to impose this discipline. We should consider other mechanisms for forcing Congress to have real debates on fiscal policy. These could include changing House rules to provide for the privilege of the House for bipartisan budgets that balance or a queen-of- the-hill process that could provide for votes on either end of the political spectrum and a centrist alternative with bipartisan support. I appreciate the opportunity to the joint--to testify before the joint select Committee, and I am happy to answer any questions. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Bill Foster follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. The Committee appreciates your testimony this morning, Representative Foster. Thank you so much. Our next witness is the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Westerman, representing Arkansas' Fourth district. Bruce, the Committee appreciates the opportunity to hear your testimony this morning. You have 5 minutes, and the time is yours, sir. STATEMENT OF THE HON. BRUCE WESTERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ARKANSAS Mr. Westerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to also thank the joint select Committee for hosting this session to obtain Members' input on the current budget and appropriation's process. As with many of you, I am deeply troubled by current levels of Federal outlays and appreciate the opportunity to share my concerns today. Federal Government spending is out of control, unlike State spending, which is generally limited to the amount of money collected from taxes, Federal spending is permitted to vastly exceed income, and indeed it does. In April, the Congressional Budget Office released its annual budget and economic outlook, the 10-year economic forecast based on projected cost of current legislation. Economists at CBO predict the overall spending will reach $56.6 trillion over the 10-year period from 2018 to 2028, ultimately exceeding 23 percent of GDP. Due to this obscene level of spending, budget deficits will continue growing at ever- increasing rates. Altogether, deficits are likely to average 4.9 percent of GDP, which is significantly greater than the projected average economic growth rate of less than 4 percent. And as the Nation's debt increases, so will interest payments. Annual interest payments are slated to reach $915 billion by 2028. That is 3\1/2\ times what we have spent on our debt in fiscal year 2017. Deficit spending is easy. Balancing a budget is hard. It requires tough decisions that many do not wish to make and decisions that will inevitably upset certain individuals. But at some point, these decisions have to be made. We simply cannot continue spending beyond our means. I believe it is in our Nation's best interest to set priorities now while we have time to evaluate options and process decisions instead of just waiting for the day of reckoning unprepared with no good options when it comes. We owe it to our children and grandchildren and to all those hoping for a bright future in our country. Contrary to the assertions made of some, a plan to balance the budget within the next 10 years would not eliminate Congress' ability to respond to economic changes, natural disasters, or security threats. In fact, balancing the budget within 10 years is achievable even without slashing appropriations to government programs. We must simply just slow the rate at which our spending has been growing and is projected to grow. CBO projects that baseline spending at a year-over-year rate, growth rate of 6 to 7 percent over the 10-year budget period. To balance the budget, we don't have to cut spending. We just have to slow the rate of spending growth instead of growing it at the CBO baseline. We could balance by growing at the same rate as the economy grows, at the same rate as the GDP grows. And I believe we should tie and force ourselves to control the spending growth at the same levels that the economy grows. I think that is a fair shake, and that is what the math proves that it will take to balance a budget. Regardless of how we get to that number, we have to stay below those levels. In a graduate level statistics class, I remember two sayings that the professor made that I think apply to my service in Congress. The first one was he said that figures don't lie, but liars figure. And the second one was that numbers and people are the same; if you torture them long enough, they will tell you anything you want to know. It is time for us to quit torturing the numbers. It is time for us to use commonsense and math and look at the reality that if we continue growing government spending at the rates projected in the CBO baseline, we will never balance the budget. Let's balance the budget while we can with modest growth, not with cuts, but modest growth. It is a 2 to 3 percent range that we are seeing in our economy. We also have to get back to regular order. And I am glad to see that the Senate is finally taking up appropriation bills. I hope we will get all those bills passed in the House. And I think it is the Budget Committee's responsibility to prepare-- or to force as much as we can. And if we can't force it now, we need to put policies in place to force regular order in the House and the Senate so that all these appropriation bills are debated and open in a transparent way and so that we know what we are spending the money on. And we are not including new programs in large omnibus bills. I believe the Committee has the ability to enforce this. And as a member of the House Budget Committee, I will support you in your efforts to do so. And I am here to lend whatever resources or assistance I am able to. With that, I yield back. [The prepared statement of Bruce Westerman follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you very much, Representative Westerman, for your testimony before the joint select Committee this morning. Our next witness comes from Utah, Representative John Curtis. The Committee is delighted to have you in front of them this morning and look forward to your testimony. You have 5 minutes, sir, and the time is yours. STATEMENT OF THE HON. JOHN CURTIS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF UTAH Mr. Curtis. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Womack and Co- Chair Lowey, for holding today's hearings on reforms to Congress' budget and appropriation process. The American people are justifiably frustrated with Congress and our inability to do our most basic job: pass a budget and fund the government. I applaud the work of this joint select Committee for holding this critically important hearing to look at potential reforms to fix our broken budget and appropriation process. I want you to know I find myself thinking about you a lot in this Committee, and I hope you feel me cheering in the background for your success. As a relative newcomer to Congress, many members of this Committee likely don't know who I am, so I would like to take a brief moment to introduce myself. I am John Curtis. I have the great honor of representing Utah's Third Congressional District. Before coming to Congress last November in a special election, I was mayor of Utah's third largest city, Provo, Utah, for 8 years. Like many of you, having served in local or State government, I have had to make hard decisions needed to balance a budget, especially when that involved cutting spending. I am proud to say that as a mayor, we balanced our city's budget every single year, including my first year in 2010 when we were required to close a gap of 8 percent between revenues and expenses. Not only did we do it without raising taxes, but we also increased the level of services given to our residents and, at the same time, improved employee morale. Those who know Utah know that some of Utah's core values are fiscal responsibility and restraint. The Utah values of fiscal responsibility and restraint are best demonstrated by the fact that Utah's State constitution requires, by law, that the State and city government balance their budgets every year. To maintain a balanced budget, we rely on many good policies and restraints on lawmakers. But I am here today to share with you only one of those practices that I believe, if adopted by the Federal Government, could dramatically change the quality of our budgeting process. The idea was born when a former Governor threatened to veto the entire budget if the legislature didn't include her pet project. The idea is not unique to Utah, and it is not revolutionary. In fact, it is almost too simple. In Utah, we call it the baseline budget. At the first of every legislative session, the legislature adopts a baseline budget. This is largely the previous year's budget. Therefore, the default, if we fail to come to agreement, is the continuation of last year's budget. Natural inflation puts pressure on the legislative body to come up with a new budget. But while we do so, we are under no threat of a government shutdown. Think of it as a kinder and gentler continuing resolution. It allows for the important wheels of government to keep churning while we, void of pressure, study and deliberate without throwing hundreds of government responsibilities into a tailspin. I have been in Congress for only 7 months, and I voted on four continuing resolutions, and I have seen two shutdowns. Each time, I felt like a hostage with no option. As Members of Congress, we are given a several hundred-page spending bill often with only a day or two to consider it and told that if we don't vote in support of the legislation, the government will likely shut down. When this happens, there is simply no way to do our jobs as promised back home. By passing a baseline budget or essentially adopting the previous year's budget at the beginning of the legislative session, the State legislature is able to make meaningful adjustments to the spending levels for next year's budget without a threat of a government shutdown if they fail to come to an agreement. Utah is doing a lot of things right, and I believe this baseline budget process is one of many that Congress can learn from States like Utah. I strongly recommend that the select Committee study Utah's baseline budget process and consider recommending that it be adopted in Congress' budgeting and appropriation processes moving forward. Thank you for this opportunity to testify today, and with that, I yield my time. [The prepared statement of John Curtis follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Representative Curtis, for your testimony this morning. I am going to move quickly to our next witness from Connecticut. Representative Jim Himes represents the Fourth District of Connecticut. Representative Himes, the Committee appreciates the chance to hear your testimony this morning on this very important subject. And the floor is yours, sir, for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF THE HON. JIM HIMES, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Mr. Himes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Madam Ranking Member and distinguished members who are here. I would really like to thank you for bringing us together to today discuss an important topic at the heart of our governance, how to budget, how to raise revenue, and how to spend on a rational and fiscally sustainable path. As chair of the New Democrat Coalition, I am proud that our forward-thinking members have been at the forefront of budget reform looking for opportunities to plan for our future in a thoughtful, bipartisan, and rational way, which is the exact opposite of how this process has worked for the 10 years that I have been here. This is a moment of optimism for me, though a small one, because in 10 years, I have finally decided that the number of people who are truly interested in fiscal responsibility in this body can be counted on one hand. My friends on the Republican side of the aisle are absolutely horrified by deficits right up until the moment there is no longer a Democratic President to blame for them. Democrats all too often see spending as the first solution to every problem. Special interests and our constituents have their wish lists, but nobody wants to pay for those wish lists. I am a pessimist because I did see one plan a couple of years ago that was a very tough but fair plan. I am referring, of course, to the Simpson-Bowles budget which came out of the super Committee process. It was really, really tough, but it was fair. It protected the most vulnerable American citizens. It asked everybody to give up some of the sacred cows of their party. Yes, there were slight progressive tax increases, and, yes, there were things like chained CPI, which people on my side of the aisle did not like. That proposal, which was the result of a lot of hard work and political sacrifice, received exactly 33 votes in the United States House of Representatives, less than 10 percent of the membership. That is where we are. That is why I am a pessimist. But I do appreciate the Committee focusing on this. The only question in my mind at this point, having given up on the idea that we are collectively going to take the hard decisions and look at our various constituents and say everybody needs to give something, my fear is that the capital markets will finally impose discipline on the United States Government. So, the question is who is going to finally blow the whistle? Will it be us or will it be the capital markets who finally define for us what it is meant to be unsustainable? Now, I will point out that we have set ourselves up for a real problem here. When I came here 10 years ago, Admiral Mullen said the single largest threat to our national security is the debt. I was warned each and every day that we were going to see spiraling Treasury rates, interest rates going up. We were on the verge of catastrophe. The exact opposite happened. Interest rates stayed low. We continued to spend in a long-term unsustainable pattern. We just got through a process of adding $2 trillion to the deficit over a 10-year period, and yet remarkably the capital markets don't raise a whimper. That will not remain the case. So, we will see. I actually, sadly, though I am not temperamentally pessimistic, believe that it will finally be the capital markets defining for us what sustainability is that forces us to act. In the meantime, I just want to offer three ideas that I think might help the process and at least get us to a more honest process. Number one, first, do no harm. I have seen in 10 years any number of hostage situations associated with the debt ceiling which does absolutely no good in terms of controlling the overall amount of debt or forcing fiscal discipline. Let's get rid of the hand grenade that each party gets to use once every couple of years. It led to downgrades. It led to market insecurity. Let's get rid of it. It does absolutely no good to anybody. Number two, let's put together a process to be honest and level with the American people on the complex nature of the problem and the big steps that we need to solve it. Again, Simpson-Bowles, now a part of distant history and a very painful thing for those of us who voted for it, pointed in the direction of actually making people think about what sacrifice means and who should do that sacrifice. Third, let's plan for the long haul. Let's bring Members together early to look at the far-out horizon, come to a consensus, and develop a plan that can outlast the shifting partisan wins. This could include a shift to biennial budgeting, including tough allocations that genuinely last a full Congress and allow agencies to efficiently plan ahead. Again, I hope that this Committee can shake this place in such a way that we do what we have been elected to do, which is to take the tough choices, to speak truth to the American people, and to preserve not just those programs which have done so much for the American people but to keep the economy competitive and to be worthy of the people who send us here. So, thank you to the Committee, and I yield back my time. [The prepared statement of Jim Himes follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. I appreciate the testimony of Representative Himes this morning. Our next witness from Kansas, Roger Marshall, representing the First District of Kansas. Sir, we appreciate the opportunity to hear your testimony this morning. We are going to give you 5 minutes as soon as we change a name placard. If you would engage that microphone, sir, we are going to give you 5 minutes, and the floor is yours. STATEMENT OF THE HON. ROGER MARSHALL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF KANSAS Representative Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And certainly, I don't need to preach to the choir here and explain to you the challenges before us and the inadequacy of our efforts and results since my time here. First of all, I want to just talk to you about solutions. My first suggestion is to consider separating the budget from the appropriations process. While it feels too much like an excuse I have heard from my own sons, having additional time to complete the annual budgeting and appropriation task would go a long way. While this city seems to live from new cycle to new cycle, I have never seen a company or organization that so often starts a year and continues working without a budget as a basic guide for the rest of their operations. While I don't like to admit that Congress is slower than we should be, there is something to be gained by recognizing this reality. Putting Congress on a 2-year budget cycle, a 2-year budget cycle allows an overarching agreement to be formed that Congress and then the work of Appropriations Committee can happen in a deliberate fashion rather than those two happening on top of each other, many times feeling like it is simultaneous to me. It seems like the budget has very little teeth to it. Next, I would talk about staggering fiscal years for appropriations bills. At first glance, I am not a person that likes to make things more complicated, but we currently are moving from a cliff-to-cliff governance that having all 12 annual appropriations due in a single month creates. When all 12 expire at the same time and Congress gets behind the eight- ball, it is too easy to combine them into a large omnibus that leads us to passing one continuing resolution after another. Next, I would talk a little bit about the increasing involvement with the authorizing Committees. And certainly, I know there are many appropriators in the group and that this suggestion may not be popular, and I salute those people that are doing the best job they can under the circumstances. But the reality is, despite your best efforts to reach Members through Member Days and the appropriation request process, non- committee members have much less involvement in the annual appropriation process. So, we need to look for ways to improve that. And then finally just to touch on entitlement programs once again. Right now, three-fourths of our Federal budget is going towards these entitlement programs, and it seems like we don't have a chance for the budget or appropriations Committees to do anything. Certainly, I understand the entitlement programs are necessary. The retirees in my district count on knowing how much and when social security checks and Medicare benefits will arrive. However, the current treatment of that spending sets up failure, as there is no practical opportunity to edit or adjust the programs, even if working decades into the future. Right now, healthcare expenses are responsible for actually 28 percent of Federal spending. We have to find ways to have tough discussions and take this challenge head on. Much of what needs to be done is outside of the congressional budget process, things like putting consumers back in charge of their healthcare dollars, increasing transparency and supply chains, and freeing private companies to innovate. But structuring our budget process in such a way to provide additional scrutiny into where these mandatory dollars go can help us start to bring the healthcare costs down. Thank you so much for the chance to appear before the Committee. [The prepared statement of Roger Marshall follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Representative Marshall, we appreciate it. The Committee thanks you for your testimony here this morning. Our next witness doesn't need a lot of introduction, been around these parts for a long time. He is authoritative in a lot of subjects regarding budgets and appropriations, having served as the overall Chairman of the appropriations process in the House for 6 years, continues to serve on the Appropriations Committee as a subcommittee chair. And, sir, The Joint Select Committee appreciates the opportunity to hear your testimony this morning. So, at this time, I am going to recognize the gentleman from Somerset, Kentucky, Chairman Hal Rogers. STATEMENT OF THE HON. HAL ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF KENTUCKY Representative Rogers. Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Lowey. Co-Chair Womack. Make sure that mike is on, and the floor is yours. Representative Rogers. Thank you for the opportunity to testify this afternoon. I have been in this body for 38 years, 35 of which has been on the Appropriations Committee. So, I have a little bit of a unique perspective on the process, because of that long period of time. Congress, of course, has the power of the purse and we are obligated to exercise that power, thoughtfully, responsibly, but also regularly. During my tenure as Chairman of the full Committee, my top priority, as was that of Mrs. Lowey, my ranking member, was returning to regular order, so that Members on both sides of the aisle had an opportunity to express the priorities of their congressional districts. Regular order means moving 12 bills through an open and transparent Committee process and then taking the bills to the House floor for discussion and debate in an open atmosphere. In the 6 years that I was privileged to lead the Committee, as a result of that openness, we drafted strong bipartisan bills. I was proud to work with Ranking Member Mrs. Lowey and her predecessor, Norm Dicks, to bring 138 bills to the House floor, 69 of which were ultimately enacted into law. Together, we debated over 2,100 amendments in the course of more than 550 hours on the House floor. The Committee held over 650 budget and oversight hearings, to ensure our tax dollars were being spent wisely. I am pleased and grateful that Chairman Frelinghuysen has continued these important efforts, maintaining a spirit of hard work and collegiality on the Committee. The primary message, Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Lowey, the primary message I would like to convey to you today is that this important task, as time-consuming and politically difficult as it may be, needs to remain an annual exercise for two primary reasons: First, Congress has a responsibility to hold Federal agencies accountable to the American people through the appropriations process. Second, in the dynamic world we live in today, Federal agencies need to be nimble and responsive. Their appropriations should reflect changing priorities and needs, and they need to be able to move expeditiously through reprogramming requests and the like. And that means a constant contact with the appropriators all during the year, not just every other year, not just every year, but every day. On the first point, no matter which party sits in the White House, in our system of checks and balances, the Congress has a duty to ensure the executive branch is responsibly spending Federal resources according to Federal law. And I believe that moving toward a 2-year budget resolution as we have been doing, frankly, the last few years, is a good thing. It gives the Appropriations Committee and the Congress advance notice about what the targets are going to be 2 years from now so that we can plan for that. So, I think a 2-year budget resolution will go a long way to promote regular order and stability, provided it also includes annual appropriations, to give you, as a Member of Congress, the chance to question agency heads and the like frequently, not just once a year but lots of times a year. So, I am grateful for the work all of you are doing on this Select Committee, and I hope your recommendations will move our esteemed body forward. I have noticed, Mr. Chairman, too that since the Senate has been unwilling or unable to take up and pass the appropriations bills that we send over to them, the agencies picked up on that really quickly. When the agency head would come before our appropriating House Committee, they knew that we could not pass through the Congress the bill appropriating for their agency. So, they were very unresponsive to the House appropriators, because they knew we didn't have the whip to crack. And that is true even today. So hopefully, our esteemed colleagues on the other side of the Capitol will come to their senses and allow a majority vote on going to proceed. If they want to filibuster the bill once it gets on the floor, fine and dandy, but moving to proceed on appropriations bills ought to be a majority vote. Neither body should have the authority and power to shut down the government. That is why we are here. So, when the agencies that come before us to try to explain why they want an X amount of dollars and how they are going to use it, we need to be able to scare them, if you will, with the ability to pass these bills through House and Senate and make it law so that they can be responsible to us, as representatives of a lot of people. So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for convening this meeting. Thank you for letting me have a chance to say a word or two. I will be happy to answer questions if you---- [The prepared statement of Hal Rogers follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. I appreciate your testimony. Mr. Rogers, I am going to yield to my distinguished co-chair, Mrs. Lowey. I know she has some comments she would like to make. Co-Chair Lowey. Well first of all, it has been an honor for me to work with you for many years on the Appropriations Committee, and I appreciate your testimony and I feel strongly that appropriations have to be dealt with every year. And certainly, the Foreign Ops subcommittee is a perfect example of changing conditions in the world. On an optimistic note, it is my understanding that in the Senate, they are working together in a bipartisan way and are moving rather quickly and getting the appropriation bills through the process. So, I am always cautiously optimistic that together in a conference we can work together in a bipartisan way and somehow make all those poison pills disappear. So, I want to thank you very much. It has been an honor for me to work with you, and thank you for presenting your views, with which I agree. Thank you. Representative Rogers. Thank you, Madam Chair---- Co-Chair Womack. I know our next witness, Dan Webster, is waiting in the wings. I just wanted to throw out one thing on the table for my friend from Kentucky, and that is, when the Speaker led this morning, his thesis statement was questioning whether or not anybody believed that the Senate was ever going to be able to manage and pass 12 appropriation bills in any given year through the Senate. And so that becomes a basis for a debate and a discussion about that. Now, the good news is when our Joint Select Committee first convened, we were careful not to make it a pick-on-the-Senate program, because half of our members are from the Senate, and they self-ID'd at the time that they were, indeed, part of the problem, that being able to manage 12 appropriation bills and because of Senate rules, there were problems there. Do you think a biennial budget with 12 titles of appropriations every year is doable, given the fact that the Joint Select Committee is not going to have the power necessarily to impose a change. We can only advocate through legislative text some changes, but do you think that getting maybe to the motion to proceed under a simple majority would be the elixir that fixes that side of the problem? Representative Rogers. I think so. I met yesterday and had a good long talk with the Senate Appropriations Chairman, who, as you know, the Senate now has passed a minibus of three bills, which we will be able to conference one of these days, hopefully. But I think the motion to proceed in the Senate should be a majority vote, just to bring it up and get it on the floor, appropriations bills, I would prefer. If they want to do all, that is fine, but especially appropriations bills, which are a different animal. And it is the existentialism. It is whether or not we survive as a government. But I think the motion to proceed should be a majority vote. Let that bill come to the floor; and if they want to filibuster it, hey, make my day. Speak all night, the way it used to be. But I've been here a little while, and the first 25 years on this Committee it worked, not like a clock, but it worked. We passed 12 bills. We went to conference on 12 bills with the Senate. There was give and take. By nature, we had to compromise to polish up a bill to be able to pass with a majority vote. So, I have seen it work, and it works fine until the Senate comes up with that rule that is a monkey wrench in the cogs of government. So, I would hope that that would change. I met yesterday with the President and the cardinals on the House and the Senate Appropriations Committee. And this was one of the main points of conversation that we had. And the President was very strong. That is not even the word for it. He was really strong to the Senators about changing that rule, but we found no sympathy on that side at this point in time. But I think the pressure should build and is building on the Senate to change an archaic rule that is preventing the government from operating. And I don't get too excited about things, but I am excited about this. Co-Chair Womack. That and Kentucky basketball. Representative Rogers. Yes. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you for your testimony. Representative Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Madam, thank all of you for doing this hard chore. And it is good to see my friend from Louisville, Kentucky, who claims to have a good basketball team over there at U of L. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate your testimony. Our next witness is Dan Webster from Florida. The Joint Select Committee Members' Day group here this morning does appreciate the time you are spending with us. We look forward to your testimony. The floor is yours, sir. STATEMENT OF THE HON. DANIEL WEBSTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA Representative Webster. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair, and others who are putting forth their time to listen to this hours of testimony, I am sure. I came to talk about maybe appearance of the process more than just the minute details of the process. I believe that there is mission creep between the Budget Committee, the Appropriation Committee, and in the end the substantive Committees, the authorizers. And if you look at it closely, you will see that the appropriators in many cases do substantive law. They do riders. They do other things, including approving appropriations for nonexistent authorizations which have expired. On the other hand, the Budget Committee bleeds over into substantive law by making assumptions of things that aren't in law right now. And not only that, they also talk about the funding of those, which is the appropriation processes. That is their job, the appropriators. And if you just see, it all kind of bleeds together. And then in the end, the authorizers in many cases set forth numbers, and that is not their prerogative, at least in a peer system. That is the appropriators. The appropriators take whatever is existing in current law, which is policy, and to whatever degree they determine they fund that policy--it could be zero, it could be $10, it could be a billion dollars--as opposed to the authorizers inserting numbers and basically making the appropriators follow suit. So that is what I would like to talk about today. I think the easiest way to get started on the revamp is to get rid of the Budget Committee. That way, at least one of those bleeding over into the others would go away. I think it is redundant in a lot of ways. It is not nearly followed. Some years when we don't do it, we go out and promote the fact we are not doing it because it is really not needed. And other years when we need it, we do it. And it is like it either comes and goes, depending on what is the circumstance, and that is both parties have done that. So, if you got rid of that, then the appropriators would only appropriate. They would appropriate on existing policy, whatever that policy is, and they would do it to the degree they determine and to the amount they determine or don't determine. And then on the other hand, the authorizers would not get to spend money. They could authorize something in let's say a bridge and right of way area and that you can spend money on bridges and right of way, but you don't necessarily put the amount down that you are going to spend. That is the appropriators' job. And so, with that, the reason I would say that is I believe that if we can purify each of those areas--and the easiest one is to just get rid of one, that certainly purifies their motives and other things--I think you end up with a process at least where you are going to be able to participate at whatever level you want to, but what you know you are not going to be able to put money into a program that doesn't exist in the appropriation bill. Nor, by amendment, could you be able to put that--I mean into--you can't put authorized policy in an appropriation bill, nor could you put an appropriation bill-- the appropriators cannot put policy in their particular bill. That is a summation. There are all kinds of details it would have to go through. How do you get what the overall spending levels are? How do you allocate to each of the subs and all that? I didn't go into that. I do have some ideas about that, but I just said if we start by setting it. The other is, I guess maybe the last thing, just we have too many lines on a sheet of paper, all of which claim to be the starting line for the budget or appropriation. And so, the baseline should be one, one baseline only. That way, the Members and public, everyone understands. Appropriators appropriate, the authorizers authorize, and there is one line that you start with. That is what I would is say is the way to simplify the whole process. [The prepared statement of Daniel Webster follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. Thank you very much for your testimony this morning. The Joint Select Committee appreciates your input. Representative Webster. Thank you. Co-Chair Womack. We have one remaining witness, and he is the gentleman from South Carolina five, Representative Ralph Norman. Sir, we again appreciate the chance to hear your comments this morning. We are going to give you 5 minutes, and the floor is yours. STATEMENT OF THE HON. RALPH NORMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA Representative Norman. Thank you, Colonel Womack. I appreciate the time with the Committee. I haven't been here as long as Hal Rogers or Dan Webster or Rob or a lot of you, but I just preface my prepared remarks with I don't think I have yet any--there is no topic that is of more concern to the people in my district than the budget, the deficit, the way we appropriate money, since I have been elected and even before then. So, I would just preface my remarks, this is on the minds of the people. It is on the minds of the people that put us in office. And I am a business guy. I run a development company. But I appreciate you taking the time, and I won't need the 5 minutes. I think we all agree our budget process is broken. The 1974 Congressional Budget Act laid out what our role was and the timeline for passing annual budgets and the 12 annual appropriation bills. The last time Congress passed all 12 appropriation bills was 1997. That is 21 years ago. For six straight years, between fiscal years 2011 and 2016, not one single appropriations bill was passed on time. This isn't a Republican issue. This isn't a Democratic issue. As a business owner, as a developer, if I had not had a budget for 6 years, I would be broke. I would not be up here where I am today, because you would not have the dollars. The company would not have the dollars to exist. So not having a budget process, from a practical sense, does not make sense. I firmly believe our Nation cannot and will not remain solvent if we keep passing trillion-dollar omnibuses and continuing resolutions. My constituents will not allow me to vote for something like that. This is a regular order and we must follow it. And what is amazing is the appropriation bills only cover a third of our Federal spending. I would ask that we try to find solutions, those of you who are on this Committee and those of us as we serve in Congress. The entitlement spending is the biggest driver of our spending problems. And I found pretty quickly up here everybody wants to cut until their ox is gored. And the current budget process does not force lawmakers to confront fiscal and economic reality. Would a biennial budget and appropriations process work better? Would strictly voting on monetary values with no policy riders in appropriations bills alleviate the problem? Last year, we passed all 12 appropriation bills in regular order with amendments, and the Senate did not do anything. I guess I would ask, what can we do to ensure the Senate acts? Would implementing language force them to act better? I don't know. All I would say is it is time for us, those of us elected officials to start making the tough decisions with spending, entitlement reform programs. We have got to start addressing these in a timely manner and go back to basics, which, as a business owner and business owners all across this country I think would agree with. Thank you, Colonel, for your Chairmanship, and thank the Committee with the steps they take that will hopefully solve this problem. [The prepared statement of Ralph Norman follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. I thank the gentleman from South Carolina for his testimony this morning. I will yield to the distinguished co-chair for any last- minute comments. Co-Chair Lowey. Well, I just want to thank my co-chair. It has been a pleasure working with you. I appreciate all those who have submitted testimony and those who were here today. And I look forward to reviewing the information and then coming to some conclusions, which may or may not be implemented. But thank you so much. Co-Chair Womack. I thank the gentlelady. That completes the Committee's business for today. I would like to thank all the Members who shared their views before the Committee. As was stated in the opening remarks, written comments already submitted will be made part of the official record. And in consultation with the co-chair, I seek unanimous consent to allow other members who may wish to input this process that were unable to be here today to have until the close of business on Monday, July 2, for such purposes. Without objection, so ordered. [The prepared statement of Rob Bishop follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [The prepared statement of John Carter follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. And, with that, the Committee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS ---------- THURSDAY, JULY 12, 2018 House of Representatives, Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform, Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Steve Womack and Hon. Nita M. Lowey [co-chairs of the committee] presiding. Present: Representatives Womack, Woodall, Arrington, Lowey, Yarmuth, Roybal-Allard, and Kilmer. Senators Blunt, Perdue, Lankford, Ernst, and Bennet. Co-Chair Womack. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The Joint Select Committee on Budget Process Reform will come to order. I want to welcome you to the fifth public hearing of the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform. The most important role given to Congress under Article I of the Constitution is the power of the purse. Our panel is charged with ensuring we have a working process in order to fulfill this essential duty. During our hearings so far we have identified some of the recurring challenges that need addressing. Those have been extremely productive discussions. I was especially pleased to see the level of engagement from and hear the ideas of Members during our Members Day meeting. While we have discussed the annual budget resolution at length during a previous hearing, today we are going to focus on what is supposed to happen next, and that is the consideration of appropriations bills. Especially in a reform-focused committee like ours we certainly need to be mindful of past processes and let history's successes--and their failures--guide our decisions. And the fact of the matter is that the current process needs improvement. I think both sides of the aisle agree on that. We on this panel are charged with designing a neutral process for the future, one in which Congress can move forward with its budgetary agenda no matter which party holds the majority. Budgetary priorities, outcomes, and results should come from elections. Thus, a properly functioning budget and appropriations process should be neutral to specific outcomes. That being said, as we engage in conversation today I urge members to think about designing a process for the future. I believe we can do that by considering what the modern Congress can handle right now and anticipating the issues future Congresses might need endure. Without question I have tremendous respect for the decades of experience that will come before us today, but I want to challenge us all to think about how that experience can be applied to what future officeholders will face as they try to fund the government on time. To help us think through the current appropriations process, including its link to the annual budget resolution, we are pleased to welcome two incredibly distinguished and experienced witnesses. While both served on the same side of the aisle, their perspectives demonstrate that the issues we are trying to fix transcend party lines. In fact, as I was thinking through the potential witnesses one name quickly stood out in my mind: Leon Panetta. This is an individual whose seasoned career encompasses many positions that are relevant to our deliberations. He served as a congressional staffer, executive branch official, adviser to the mayor of New York, chairman of the House Budget Committee-- his painting hangs in these chambers--White House Chief of Staff, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Director of the CIA, and finally, Secretary of Defense. Given his tremendous background, I knew his presence at this hearing today was vital. Secretary Panetta, it is an honor to have you. Thank you for being here. We are also pleased to welcome David Obey, who served for decades as part of the Wisconsin delegation in Congress. During his tenure he led as both ranking member and chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. Chairman Obey, as an appropriator, I also appreciate you being here today to give us your valuable insight. And with that, I want to yield to my co-chair, Mrs. Lowey, for her brief opening remarks. Mrs. Lowey. [The prepared statement of Steve Womack follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Lowey. Thank you. And welcome to the Joint Select Committee's fifth hearing. Today we have two witnesses with many, many years of experience with the budget and appropriations process and a wealth of knowledge on that subject. Both are good friends. So I am looking forward to hearing your direct, honest testimony. One is David Obey, who served in the House for 42 years as a Representative from Wisconsin. He was a longstanding member of the House Appropriations Committee, served as chairman or ranking minority member of that committee for almost two decades. He has also been involved in many past debates about budget process reform. And our other witness, with whom I also had the privilege of serving, is Leon Panetta, who is another former Member of the House, past chairman of the House Budget Committee. In addition, he has extensive experience at very senior levels of the executive branch, including service as Director of OMB, White House Chief of Staff, Director of the CIA, Secretary of Defense. So today I am delighted that we will hear from them about what could be done to make our budget and appropriations processes work better. In addition to talking about procedural changes that might help, I hope we will get the benefit of their long-term perspective on the polarization and partisanship that is now the fundamental cause of many of our difficulties. I think I will read that sentence again because I really feel that is the cause. So I hope we will get the benefit of their long-term perspective on the polarization and partisanship that is now, in my judgment, the fundamental cause of many of our difficulties. So I look forward to the testimony. I should also mention that, unfortunately, I will need to leave part way through the hearing to attend the first House-Senate conference committee meeting on 2019 appropriation bills. I wish I could stay for all of what should be a very interesting session. And, frankly, just to throw some information into the mix, what is very interesting about this appropriations season is the Senate is operating in a bipartisan way. Every bill they have completed is bipartisan, where last night we completed Labor-HHS with about 50 amendments. So we are operating very differently, and that could be an interesting discussion in itself as to process. Thank you, my co-chair. [The prepared statement of Nita M. Lowey follows:] [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. I thank the distinguished co-chair, the gentlelady from New York. Now I would like to welcome our distinguished witnesses. First, and as I told him when he came in, I didn't know whether to call him chairman, chief, director, Mr. Secretary, so I think I will just say Jimmy's daddy is here to be a witness before this committee. So, Secretary Panetta, thank you so much for being here. It is an honor to have you. And for both gentlemen, your official statements are being made as part of the official record of this proceeding, and we are going to give you 10 minutes each to present your testimony at your pleasure. Sir, the floor is yours. STATEMENTS OF THE HONORABLE LEON PANETTA; AND THE HONORABLE DAVID OBEY STATEMENT OF LEON PANETTA Mr. Panetta. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be able to be here and share my experiences and thoughts with you on the tough task that is in front of you to try to implement important budget reforms that can hopefully improve that process. I am also honored to be here with a dear friend and former colleague of mine, Dave Obey. Dave and I together served on the Budget Committee, but more importantly, in all the other positions I held I had to deal with David when he was chairman of the Appropriations Committee and always found him to be someone who was fully committed to trying to do the right thing for the country. So I am honored to have this opportunity. And I think, you know, both of us obviously will give you a sense of the history that we experienced and what made the process work at the time. In the 50 years of public life that I have had, I have seen Washington at its best and I have seen Washington at its worst. The good news is I have seen Washington work. And I have seen Democrats and Republicans with a willingness to work together on issues. We have always had our political differences. In my first experience in Washington, I was a legislative assistant to Tom Kuchel, who was a Republican from California, minority whip. I served under Everett Dirksen. And at the time there were a lot of Republicans, both conservative and progressive, but they viewed their responsibility in the Senate as working with Democrats, people like Jackson and Magnuson and Dick Russell, Sam Ervin, and a number of others, Fulbright. They worked together on fundamental issues. When I got elected to the Congress, Tip O'Neill was the Speaker, the Democrat's Democrat, but he worked very closely with Bob Michel who was the minority leader. And that was the legacy that I came into as a freshman Member, which was that you work with your ranking members, you work with the other party on the legislation that you have to deal with. And so one of the fundamental messages that I have to stress is the importance of bipartisanship to making this process work. This is a tough process. Budget process is tough. Getting the appropriations bills done is tough. And it is difficult to do even when you are working together. It is almost impossible to do when you try to shove this stuff through the process on your own as one party. The history of the budget process in the period when it worked is the history of bipartisanship. The Budget Act was passed on a bipartisan basis. David and I worked with chairmen of the Budget Committee who worked with their ranking members, Bob Giaimo, Del Latta; on the Senate side, Pete Domenici, Muskie, a number of others, worked together. When I was chairman of the Budget Committee I had the honor of working with Bill Gradison and then with Bill Frenzel, and we worked together. And the result was that we made some significant progress. It was not easy. It was a tough time. Deficits were going up for a lot of reasons. But there were three important steps that were taken that I think ultimately led to a balanced budget. One was the 1990 budget agreement in which we assembled both Republicans and Democrats and representatives of the administration to negotiate an approach to deficit reduction. And we met, we negotiated, we finally went out to Andrews Air Force Base and spent close to 3 or 4 weeks negotiating out there. The agreement at the time was that if the Democrats would come forward with $250 billion in spending savings that the Republicans would be willing to put $250 billion in tax increases on the table. And so we spent a lot of time. It was tough. None of these decisions are easy. But we put together a $500 billion deficit reduction package, a close to $500 billion deficit reduction package. And we had to push it through. It was not easy. But we ultimately pushed it through in a bipartisan vote, an omnibus package. It included a budget resolution, it included reconciliation, and it included appropriations bills. But it was passed, and we did it on a bipartisan basis. The next effort that I think was important, I was OMB Director and worked for Bill Clinton in putting that budget together, and again, $500 billion in deficit reduction. Unfortunately, that wasn't done on a bipartisan basis, and it was tough. It only passed by one vote in the House and in the Senate. And then lastly, the bipartisan effort to put together a balanced budget in 1997. All of that contributed to a balanced budget and a surplus. And then it was the breakdown, I think, in bipartisanship that ultimately turned that all around. The process is broken. It is broken because obviously bipartisanship has broken down. Regular order has broken down. There is a lack of enforcement. There is a lack of the ability to work together and to have to wait for crisis in order to drive the process. I often say democracy is a process that we do through leadership or crisis. The problem in this place is that crisis becomes the driver now more than leadership. And when you operate by crisis you have to wait for something terrible to happen in order to do the right thing, and what you usually wind up doing is kicking the can down the road. And lastly, there has been a misuse of the reconciliation process and the misuse, I think, of the general budget process, which has lost a lot of respect. What are the recommendations to try to fix it? I lay it out in the testimony. I think the idea of a biennial budget is worth looking at. It is not easy. There are problems that you have to work through. But I think the more you can provide additional time to do it and additional time for oversight on ongoing programs, I think that is something to seriously consider. I think a joint budget resolution may make sense, as well, to bring the President into the process. The way this game works is the President presents his budget and then Congress decides to go its own way. There is little communication until you do the appropriations part of it. You really ought to engage in the overall budget discussion with the President early on. So that is worth thinking about. I think you ought to change to a calendar basis just to give yourself more time instead of the fiscal year approach. It is not a cure-all, but at least the additional time would help you. I think you have to show a price to be paid for failure to pass a budget resolution, so that legislation that has a fiscal impact, frankly, should not move unless you have passed a budget. You need to provide a process to increase the debt ceiling so we don't have this crisis. We had the Gephardt Rule, which tied to the budget resolution. I think that is worth looking at. Budget gimmicks, you have to get rid of budget gimmicks, the whole idea of rosy scenarios and magic asterisks, the kind of games that are played. And I have been a part of some of that. I know what those games are. You have got to be able to discipline people so they don't use it. Paygo is a very important enforcement tool. We would not have balanced the budget without paygo in which we said if you are going to come up with spending, if you are going to come up with tax cuts, you have got to pay for them and not increase the deficit. You have got to get back to that. You should do a common baseline between CBO and OMB. Instead of fighting over growth numbers, frankly, you ought to operate on the same consensus numbers from both of them. I think you need some control of emergency funding. It has got out of hand. You need to set up an emergency fund and better controls over how that operates. And I will tell you, even from the OCO perspective on defense, the fact is when you have been in war for a long period of time I don't see why you have to keep going to OCO. It ought to be part of the budget, frankly, for the defense budget. Lastly, some check on mandatory spending. Two-thirds of the budget is mandatory spending. We don't pay enough attention to mandatory programs. And then a 10-year budget projection. I think the most important guidance I can give you is that the best way to pass budget reforms is to do a budget deal and to do a comprehensive budget deal. If you can put those pieces together, then you can pass the reforms as part of that. We did that in the 1990 budget agreement. If you can't do that, and that is probably the case, then this joint committee ought to try on a bipartisan basis then to make recommendations with regards to some key changes. You don't have to do it all, but at least do a few changes to show that this place can operate on a bipartisan basis when it comes to the budget. This is not a game. This is about the fiscal health of this Nation. We are facing a fiscal crisis; 78 percent of GDP is now debt. We are looking at it going to 152 percent of GDP, according to CBO. That is trouble for our economy. It is trouble for resources. It is trouble for the American people and for all of the things we care about. So that is what is at stake here. I know that this committee is given the responsibility to do reforms. I think you have the leadership capability to try to move something that sends a signal to the American people that this place can operate the way it should, with Republicans and Democrats agreeing on tough decisions to be able to govern. That is what democracy should be all about. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Leon Panetta follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Obey. STATEMENT OF DAVID OBEY Mr. Obey. First, let me apologize for my voice this morning. If some of you can't hear what I am saying don't worry about it, you are not going to miss a hell of a lot. I am happy to be here today with Leon Panetta. Co-Chair Womack. Let's make sure that microphone is on. Mr. Obey. That is a little better. Leon is a good friend. He is truly a great American. All you have to do is read his resume to understand that. And if you know him, you know even more so that that is true. We have gone through many battles together, but one difference that separates the two of us is that I am from the Pre-Cambrian Era and Leon is not. He was elected in 1976 after the Budget Act of 1974 was in place, so that is the only process he has ever known. I was elected in 1969 before there was a budget committee. In that time the appropriations process worked reasonably well. We just didn't realize it at the time. At that time the President's budget meant something. There was no talk about it being dead on arrival. The way it worked was fairly simple. The President sent down the budget. The Appropriations Committee held its hearings and produced its bills. The Ways and Means Committee was on a separate track and took whatever actions they thought was appropriate. There was no formal arithmetic discipline. Discipline came from the recognition by the committee and by the party leaders that if the year's work was irresponsible there would be a price to pay in public opinion and at the ballot box. Under that system, from 1960 through 1974, and please remember this, from 1960 through 1974 deficits averaged a little less than 1 percent of GDP. In the worst year the deficit was 2.8 percent. By comparison, in the years after the Budget Reform Act, from 1974 through 2010, the year I retired, deficits averaged 2.9 percent of GDP, three times as high, and in 1 year it hit 9.8 percent. From 1974 on Congress has searched for a magical provision to rein in the deficit, a process provision. Ever since, the budget process has been as chaotic as it has been super complicated. Why? Much of the blame has been dumped by some on the Appropriations Committee. That is the wrong target. The main procedural problem is that the committee with the responsibility to pass the bills that actually determine specific spending decisions has nothing to do with the budget blueprint under which they are required to operate. When you get right down to it, the main job of the Budget Committee is to agree on three macroeconomic numbers: total spending, total revenues, and the level of the deficit. In contrast, the committee that has the responsibility to broker the thousands of program compromises necessary to implement that budget is the Appropriations Committee. So the Budget Committee can fly at 30,000 feet, but the Appropriations Committee and the Ways and Means Committee have to slug it out on the ground level in hand-to-hand combat. That means that if the Budget Committee targets are too optimistic, ideological, or unrealistic the Appropriations Committee cannot get the votes on the floor to implement their product. When I retired in 2010 I was succeeded by Hal Rogers as Appropriations chairman. I watched what happened to him. Each year the Budget Committee would push a highly aggressive budget resolution through the House, but when Hal tried to implement that resolution with actual program-by-program cuts. Members who had voted for the budget resolution would see what the resolution in macroterms actually required in microprogram terms, and Members who had voted for the resolution initially would then say, ``What? You want me to cut what? Are you crazy? Hell, no.'' And the system stalled. So what would I do to change things? That depends on whether you want to do major surgery or a patch job. For instance, 2-year appropriations is a wonderful idea if you want to erode congressional power or weaken Congress' ability to deal with the bureaucracy and bury the Congress in supplementals. Outside of that, it is a terrific idea. If you want to do fundamental change, I would do four things. One is procedural. I would abolish the Budget Committee and return to the practice of using old-fashioned informal political sanctions to impose fiscal responsibility. That would give you more time to focus on the bills that actually spend the money. The Budget Act simply adds one more hurdle that Congress must overcome without adding 3 months more to the calendar. All the budget resolution really is, is an institutional press release if it is not followed up by something else. People will say, ``Oh, my God, you can't do that or the deficit will balloon again.'' I would simply say that the numbers I previously cited demonstrate that the empirical evidence for that view is nonexistent. Deficits are larger now as a percentage of the economy than they were before the Budget Committee was created to prevent it. Second, recognize what history tells us on revenues. Recognize that in the last 50 years the budget has never approached balance when revenues as a percentage of GDP have not neared 20 percent. Third, recognize that we are not just in danger of passing on an uncontrolled budget deficit to our children, we are also in danger of leaving them with an infrastructure deficit, a skilled worker deficit, a science and tech deficit. Recognize that over the past 50 years nondefense appropriations spending has never been less than 3.1 percent of GDP. The budget resolution passed by the House last year called for shrinking that to 1.7 percent of GDP by the end of 10 years. I invite you to decide whether that is either achievable or desirable. The fourth thing I would do is recognize that the main problem is not procedural, it is political. My favorite philosopher is Archy the Cockroach, who said once that what matters is not so much what system you have, what matters is what you do with whatever system you happen to have. I would ask you to learn a lesson from 1994 when I chaired Appropriations the first time. I became chairman midway through the session after Bill Natcher died. In spite of that fact, we finished all appropriation bills before the start of the next fiscal year. That didn't happen because I was such a hotshot chairman. It happened because the very first thing I did when I became chairman was to go to my ranking Republican, Joe McDade. I told Joe that I knew we would never agree on the details of appropriations, but I asked him how he would feel about the committee reporting a bipartisan 302(b) budget allocation. He jumped at the chance. For the first and only time in the history of the Budget Act, that is what we did. It meant that we had agreed on how much money each Appropriation subcommittee would allocate, or would be allocated, but left the details to the subcommittees. Unfortunately, it will be almost impossible to resurrect any degree of bipartisanship because of the way you all are elected. Too many of you come from hugely safe districts. The way your districts are drawn produces little incentive to compromise. That problem is beyond the reach of this committee to correct. But please at least recognize that your basic problem is not the budget process. The budget process is simply one example of how our political system has crippled the legislative system. Meanwhile, if all you really want to do is to put a patch or two on the process, I would recommend one procedural change. Right now the Budget Committee chair and Appropriations Committee chair live in two different political worlds. If you want to make the process more realistic, do one thing. Either make the chairmen of the Appropriations and Ways and Means co-chairmen of the Budget Committee or make the Budget Committee chair rotate between the two. That way the people who are expected to deliver the goods are the people who are actually manufacturing them. [The prepared statement of David Obey follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Co-Chair Womack. I thank the gentleman for his testimony. We will move straight into questions, and I will begin. To both of you, but particularly Secretary Panetta, two things that in reading between the lines of your testimony, there are two things that come to mind to me. One is the word ``discipline,'' having the discipline to do what the process is outlined to produce, and the other one was ``bipartisanship.'' And as Mr. Obey has just testified, that is beyond kind of the control of the Joint Select Committee. But is it possible to get to a solution to the challenges that face the modern day Congress without a discipline to deal with the process the way it has been given to you and without some spirit of bipartisanship, which seems to be very elusive across the spectrum of issues facing the Congress? Mr. Panetta. Well, Mr. Chairman, as stressed by both of our comments, you can't do one without the other. I mean, that is the problem. I think the reality is that bipartisanship and the ability to work together is the key to implementing discipline. If one party alone tries to implement that discipline and doesn't have support across the aisle then it is going to be stopped and blocked and basically will be pushed to a point where it doesn't serve the process that it was designed to implement. Look, there is no question, I mean, your fundamental problem right now is the lack of a willingness to enforce what the Budget Act is all about. And admittedly, the Budget Act and the budget process has never been an easy one to implement because it does represent discipline. As chairman of the Budget Committee, you are never popular because you are establishing priorities. But the nature of the budget process is to establish priorities. It is not about numbers. This is not about just moving numbers around. It is, what are the priorities of this country? That is what is reflected in any budget. And we are not going to achieve any of our priorities if we don't manage our budget, because it is going to eat away at our ability to provide the resources necessary. And, look, the reality is--David touched on this--but the reality is that the budget you are dealing with is now less than a third discretionary and two-thirds mandatory. There is no way you are going to deal with a $20 trillion debt and not be willing to confront the mandatory issue. Now, I understand the politics of that, and I know how tough it is, but if you are being honest with the American people about the need to deal with the deficit, you are not going to deal with the deficit on the discretionary side alone, that is a joke, especially when you are increasing defense. So if you are serious about doing this you have got to deal with all of those areas. That requires discipline. It requires a willingness to take risks. Leadership is about taking risks. And if that willingness to do it, if that courage to do the tough decisions is not there, you can frankly implement all the budget reforms you want, nothing is going to happen in terms of the major problem. So discipline is the key, but you have really got to have bipartisanship and a willingness to work together to make the tough decisions necessary to deal with spending, discretionary, defense, entitlements, and what David talked about, revenues. All of that has to be part of the package. The only successful packages I was a part of in terms of budget agreements included all those elements. If you want to deal with the budget deficit, you have got to deal with all of those elements. But to deal with that, it needs to be bipartisan, and you damn well need to have the cover of the leadership. If the leadership isn't willing to back you up on those kinds of tough decisions, you are not going anywhere. Co-Chair Womack. Mr. Obey, a quick thought? Mr. Obey. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The father of the Budget Act in the House was Dick Bolling from Missouri, who was my mentor. And I talked to him the night before the Budget Act was scheduled on the floor, because we had a lot of controversy with it. And I remember him saying that unless the leadership of both parties played the numbers straight in the budget process so that people had confidence in the integrity of the process, that you could never expect anybody to support the results. And that is what has happened, in my view. You have had all kinds of gimmicks. I mean, my God, when you take a look at the assumptions that were made. I remember one year good old Ed Muskie, we were in conference. We were $400 million away from reaching the target number we needed on the deficit. And so Muskie wanted to take it out of agriculture. And so in the end if you took it out of grain, you antagonize the grain farmers; if you took it out of dairy you antagonize dairy. And so what the committee did was to tell the dairy guys they were going to take it out of grain, they told the grain guys they were going to take it out of dairy, and they passed it by subterfuge. You have got to play straight with the numbers or you are never going to get anybody to support it. Second thing is your substance has to be seen as fair and just for the people you represent. Otis Pike from New York said this during debate: You will never be held in high regard or deemed ethical while you say you can't balance a budget unless a constitutional amendment makes you; while you accept gloriously optimistic economic projections rather than deal with real ones; while you write a Gramm-Rudman bill and then spend days finding ways to get around it; while you let one man make $500 million a year while thousands sleep on the streets. And then the last thing I would note is a statement that Bolling put in the record just prior to the debate on the Budget Act, when he said this: The objective of budget reform should be to make Congress informed about and responsible for its budget actions, not to take away its power to act. Co-Chair Womack. I thank the gentleman. Mrs. Lowey. Co-Chair Lowey. Thank you again for your thoughtful testimony. First of all, to Mr. Obey. Two weeks ago we heard testimony from Speaker Ryan in which he endorsed the idea of biennial appropriations, putting funding bills on a 2-year cycle. You note that you oppose this proposal, as do I. So number one, could you elaborate on why you think switching to biennial appropriations would be a bad idea? And, secondly, for either of you. One of the problems we have been having recently is getting appropriations done, because there is a tendency to drag in all sorts of unrelated legislative issues into the appropriations process. It is hard enough just reaching agreement on funding levels, but when we become the authorizing committee, because the authorizing committees can't do their work, and we try and resolve issues of banking regulation or environmental law or healthcare policy, I just wonder whether all these riders--and I mentioned before that we were in till about 11:30 last night on Labor-HHS, because there were 50 amendments, all kinds of legislative issues. Maybe you can tell me, Chairman Obey, how are these riders handled? I am not even getting into Mr. Panetta's in-depth discussion. But how did you deal with riders in the past? We are becoming the authorizing committee, because the authorizing committee can't do their work, and then we get into all kinds of policy arguments and amendments like the 50 last night. Mr. Obey. Mr. Obey. Well, first of all, with respect to 2-year appropriations, I believe that the Congress is not in any position to give away any of its powers. It has given away far too many through the years. And if you take a look at what happens, if you have a 2- year appropriation, understand, once you pass that appropriation bill the bureaucracy doesn't need you for the rest of that cycle. Under a 1-year appropriation you have always got something that they want. It is called money. And it makes it tough to get away from the Congress if the Congress is going to have you right back up again next year. It is hard on the Congress to have to go through it twice, but it is the way you preserve your power vis-a-vis the bureaucracy, in my view. Secondly, this idea that somehow if you appropriate 1 year you will have all of this time in the second year to do oversight--bull gravy. The fact is that if you do that what happens is that you lose the leverage, you lose the leverage that you have with a 1-year budget. Thirdly, supplementals. Congress already does too much by way of supplementals. We funded the longest war in the history of the country on a supplemental. I mean, it is absurd to even think about adding a process that will make it much more likely that Congress will have to wrestle with supplementals. And then the fourth problem is that if you then add to it the inclination of Members to grab what must be a must-pass bill and attach their favorite authorizing project to it, then you have got a prescription for chaos. So I would say first do no harm. Don't give up the power that the Congress has. Especially in these days, this democracy requires that you hang on to it. Co-Chair Lowey. Well, I thank you very much. Do you have a comment on that, my friend? Mr. Panetta. Just a short comment on it. I think part of the problem is the breakdown in the regular order process that took place. When I was first elected--and David obviously before that--but when I was first elected, the committees meant something. The subcommittees meant something. And, look, we had very diverse Members in the Congress. On the Democratic side we had everybody from Sonny Montgomery to Ron Dellums and a lot of others. And yet, what we did was we operated within the committee process. We had a chance in subcommittee to do hearings, to make amendments, to vote on that legislation. We had a chance in full committee to do hearings and vote on legislation. And the leadership backed up that process. The leadership basically said: We are not going to take up bills unless they go through the regular order process. And you felt as a Member that you had a role to play in terms of legislation. It wasn't being done by the leadership. It wasn't being done by the Rules Committee. It wasn't being done by a group in a dark office someplace. It was done by you. You were part of the process. That is shut down. And so, yes, you are going to get a hell of a lot more riders. Why? Because the authorizing committees aren't doing anything. So they are going to basically put the riders on appropriations bills because they know appropriations bills ultimately have to move. So you are going to get a lot more riders with a breakdown in regular order. And, look, the process right now, appropriations operates on CRs. I mean, I know the work is done in committees. You try to work through these bills. But ultimately everybody knows that we are going to face a cliff out there, and you are going to wait until you face the cliff to basically have to do anything. And so everybody plays the CR game. And that breaks down the process that David talks about where the committees are working on this stuff, doing oversight, doing all the things they have to do. Because you know what is going to happen. You know the game that is going to be played. You wait until the cliff happens. You wait until you have to raise the debt ceiling to push you. And the leadership is going to get together and try to cut a deal in order to make sure the government doesn't collapse. That is the way you operate now. That is a lousy way to govern. Co-Chair Lowey. Just, Mr. Chairman, if I may just---- Co-Chair Womack. Please. Co-Chair Lowey.----repeat a couple of facts before, so we don't get too depressed here. We sometimes have to take the long route to get things done to satisfy everyone's political base. I am not saying whose. But in 2018, for example--obviously we are dealing now with 2019--we ended up with a really good bipartisan omnibus, a really good appropriations bill. I know because I was on the phone every night. We got rid of 169 riders. You could ask, how did those riders get in, in the first place? But that is another story. And then that takes us to last night, where we are here with 50 amendments on the House. Senator Shelby is working in a bipartisan way with Senator Leahy. They are bringing bills to the floor. At some place the charade in the House may be completed, and I have a feeling it is going to end up in a positive bipartisan bill, because it has to. So sometimes you have to go through the machinations, because the authorizers aren't doing their work and they had to bring them into appropriations. And I am not saying, and I welcome, the reason we wanted this hearing, to hear maybe how we could shortcut this. But in the end after everyone has done their press release and we deal with all the poisoned pills, we ended up with a pretty good process. And on each of the subcommittees of which I am a visitor and a part, there really was some good bipartisan discussion. So I won't throw the whole thing out, but it is an interesting process the way it is working now, and it may be a longer, longer process. Co-Chair Womack. I thank the gentlelady. Senator Lankford. Senator Lankford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you being here very much. Mr. Panetta, let me start with you on this. Thanks for the very detailed recommendations that you put in place. I want to continue what Nita was talking about as well on the 2-year cycle. You make a pretty strong case for having a 2-year budget process. Would you have that same case for a 2-year appropriations process, especially with an insight on contracting, CRs, which you mentioned before, lost months when you can actually do contracting? You have been on both sides of this. It gives you a unique perspective. So help me understand where you are coming from on a 2-year budgeting process, 2-year appropriation process. Mr. Panetta. Look, the reality right now is that most of the agreements that are being made are made over a 2-year period to try to give you some relief so you don't have to fight the same wars the second year. Look, the biggest problem--and I have seen it from both sides, obviously from the Hill perspective, but also from being in the administration, particularly as Secretary of Defense-- the worst problem in terms of defense is uncertainty and not knowing what the numbers are going to be and not knowing exactly what is going to be available. And you have weapon systems that are out there that have to be funded. You have troops that have to be paid. You have all kinds of requirements that have to be dealt with. And you are not sure what exactly you are going to get. And particularly when sequestration happened, you had this process of then slashing funding across the board. And at the time I said it is really going to impact on our ability to do maintenance and all the other things that have to be done. So it is the uncertainty in the process. And I think a 2- year process, since in many ways it is now incorporated in the dealmaking that goes through it, I think a 2-year process that lays it out for 2 years--look, on the appropriations side I think Mike Enzi has a good idea of perhaps running six bills one year and six bills the next and allowing some degree of oversight in the offyear. But the fact that you can lay out some degree of certainty with regards to where you are going so that you can do the planning and you can do the kind of decisions that have to be done, I think that is an important thing to consider in this process. Senator Lankford. The connection between reprogramming dollars with appropriations committees and for agencies having to be able to come back for reprogramming authority, is that a sufficient hook to be able to push agency back to appropriators? Mr. Panetta. Yeah. No, it always is. I think that is right. Senator Lankford. Let me ask you, you had an extensive set of paragraphs on budget gimmicks, with a full confession that I occasionally used a couple when I was sitting in the other chair. So talk to me about a little bit of how that actually fixes the process. You talked about ChIMPS, you talked about timing shifts, you talked about the magic asterisk. Are there any of those that are in particular that you say this is a big issue, or it is just deal with all of them? Mr. Panetta. I think you have to deal with all of them, because, look, the nature of the way you do this process is that it requires difficult decisions. And every time that you have to make cuts, every time you have to deal with spending programs it is, instead of going directly at it, if you can find a way around it that is what happens. That is the way we operate. And as I said, I have been part of that. And so I can remember once as OMB Director I had recommended as OMB Director that--it was about $8 billion, and I recommended that on the transportation bill, instead of allowing for people to add new projects to the appropriations bill, that they would have to be authorized by the Transportation Committee. Well, it was somebody named Bob Byrd on the Senate side who did not like that because he was able to pave a lot of West Virginia based on the appropriations bill. And so Bob Byrd called, called the President, and said, ``You know, Mr. President, I am not going to be able to support your budget if you include that provision.'' So the President called me and suddenly I was $8 billion in the hole. And so I told the people at OMB, ``Where can we go to come up with $8 billion?'' And we found some additional savings in different places. But I still got down to I think it was about $3 billion to $4 billion. And finally I looked at my economist and I said, ``Look at that growth number and figure out if maybe a half percent on growth might be added.'' And that took care of the problem. So, yeah, you are in a box, you turn to those gimmicks. The problem is it erodes the system. It erodes the honesty of the process. Sometimes you get to a date, and it is the end of September, and if you can move that payment to the 1st of October you can save money in that year. It is phony, but it is the game that is played. So I think if you are serious, I would look at each of those gimmicks to try to make sure that they are not being used because it is dishonest. It is dishonest. Mr. Obey. If I could just make a point on that, backing up what Leon says about dishonesty. Jim Jones' portrait is hanging here on the wall. He is from the same State that you are and that I was born in, Okmulgee. And he had a big confrontation with President Reagan on the budget in 1981. And when the time was approaching to vote on the budget, at that point Jim Jones thought he had it won because his budget resolution produced a smaller deficit than Ronald Reagan's. So what happened was that over a 10-day period the Reagan administration simply decided that they were going to change some of their economic assumptions. And so then when we returned to town, lo and behold, all of a sudden the low dollar man in terms of the deficit was Ronald Reagan, not Jim Jones, and that is why Jim Jones lost the vote that turned control of the floor and the Congress over to the minority. My point being, that is my basic objection to the Budget Act as it stands. It forces Members of Congress to focus so much on details and gimmicks rather than determining what their basic values are and how they are going to deal with them. And sometimes we function a whole lot better on an informal basis than we do if we have to meet artificial targets that require us to do artificial things. And I would just show you one thing. I have got an old chart which I held up on the House floor during that 1981 debate, and what it showed was the projection. The deficits under Gramm-Rudman I for fiscal year 1985 to 1990, the deficits were projected to go from $172 billion to zero in 1990. Instead, they went from $212 billion to $220 billion. Most of that was simply due to games that were played on economic estimates and assumptions. Co-Chair Womack. Mr. Yarmuth. Representative Yarmuth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to both of you for sharing your experience and wisdom with us. Mr. Obey, I remember well during my first two terms here when you were chairman of Appropriations, and you were during certain seasons the most popular person in the House, because everybody was trying to get their congressionally directed investments, also known as earmarks, approved. We haven't really had much discussion in this joint committee about earmarks. Would you both discuss what impact you think restoring earmarks might have in resolving some of the polarization, the conflicts that we have in the process now? Mr. Obey. Well, I am yes and no on it, because I have been in the middle of that fight for so long. The problem is that Congress ought to have the right to determine where money goes on a district-by-district basis to at least some degree. They shouldn't be able to decide it all, but if I represented my district for 42 years I think I had a hell of a lot better idea of what was needed for different communities than the OMB Director did. The problem is that that is true for 90 percent of the Members, but then you have always got 1 or 2 percent who foul the nest by getting greedy, by getting slippery, or sometimes even sleazy, and it gives the institution a bad name. So I guess what I would say is, in theory, I would like to see earmarks restored because that represents one manifestation of congressional power. But when I see what it does to the institution it is very hard for me to recommend that they restore those, if you can find some way. The other problem you have is when you start to explode the number of earmarks. The Labor-H bill went from zero earmarks to over 4,000 earmarks within a 4- or 5-year period. That eats up an enormous amount of staff time just checking out the project to make sure that somebody isn't pulling a fast one. And so it is a prerogative that the Congress ought to have, but I would rather look elsewhere for preserving the Congress' constitutional authority. Mr. Panetta. I am a supporter of allowing Members to do this, because I think Members are elected to represent their constituents. And if there is a need that your constituency faces, you ought to be able to have the opportunity to go to the key chairman and members of a committee and justify providing funding for that particular effort. I think that is part and parcel of your responsibility as a representative of the people. There are ways to try to check this. I think the reason earmarks became such a target is because they got out of control. Huge numbers were added to certain bills. I think they created real problems. Some of those earmarks were unjustified. That created real problems. But I think if you have a limited number and you have greater transparency in what is included in earmarks so the public knows what is a part of it, I think there is a way to do this. And I have to tell you. From the approach of running this place, from the approach of being in the administration as chief of staff trying to be able to get things done up here, the ability to be able to focus on what somebody needs is a very important incentive to trying to urge that individual to do the right vote. And I think having given that up has really hurt both the leadership and it has hurt the ability of administrations to be able to work their will on the Hill. Representative Yarmuth. I appreciate that. Mr. Obey. I agree with that, too. Let me just one point. One of our problems is we know so many things that ain't so. And the number one project that got Congress into trouble on earmarks was the Bridge to Nowhere. But guess what? Number one, that was not done by the Appropriations Committee, it was done by the authorizing committee. Number two, the money that went to that bridge came out of Alaska's share, it didn't come out of anybody else's. So the Congress took a real beating for stuff that wasn't so. Representative Yarmuth. Thank you very much. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Blunt. Senator Blunt. I am no expert on the Bridge to Nowhere, but I think number three is it actually went somewhere, under the circumstances you mentioned. Not much good said about the Senate. The Senate is designed to be a disappointing institution, and we fulfill that. But I appreciate Co-Chairman Lowey's comments that we have tried this year. We got all of our bills out of the committee by the end of June, moving those bills in packages. We don't have a lot of history here in recent years. Somebody could walk off the field at any moment. But not allowing the appropriations process to become the authorizing process is important. There are times when authorizers and appropriators and everybody else agrees this is a moving vehicle, this is something that needs to be done, this is the moment to do it. And then the other comment that Congresswoman Lowey made is she is leaving here to go to a conference committee. Co-Chair Lowey. It cancelled. Senator Blunt. Now this is a much more unique thing than it would have been a decade ago, the idea of going to a conference committee. And to go back to my other comment, anybody could walk off the field at any moment. And Congresswoman Lowey said the committee meeting was just canceled. But we both voted to go to conference, and we are ready to go to conference. And maybe some experience. Part of the problem is we haven't had a real number since the Budget Control Act. And I think both of you have addressed that in different ways. You have to have some agreed-to number to know how you are starting. So one reason this year might work better than last year is last year we weren't shooting with real bullets until about November, when there is an agreement, okay, here is the real number we are going to use. The whole process, the budget process, the spending process, the entire process is based on we know so much that isn't so, like Congressman Obey just said, we know this is not going to work out this way, makes it really hard to get in and do the work that we need to do. A couple of thoughts. One, I don't think it is coincidental that the real breakdown in the process ended about the same time Members didn't have anything to go home and specifically talk about. What about the idea that Senator Byrd objected to that you can only appropriate things that were authorized, with the transportation caveat? But would that be a way back to where Members had more reasons to talk about what they had voted for than we currently give them? Mr. Panetta. I think it is important. I did it as OMB Director, frankly, I did it as chairman of the Budget Committee, was to really stress the importance of the authorizers to do their job in authorizing particular spending, rather than having the Appropriations Committee have to totally carry that ball and have to deal with unauthorized projects of one kind or another. You know, the problem I see now is, as I said, when I was here every one of these committee rooms was working. There were subcommittees meeting, there were full committees meeting. You know, the committees I served on were having hearings. They were doing markup. They were in business. And, frankly, the chairmen of those committees and the ranking members would not have it any other way. The chairmen of the authorizing committees said: You damn well are not going to move this through appropriation because it is my jurisdiction. That is the way it used to operate, and that has broken down, and I think it has made the problem that much worse. Senator Blunt. I want to get to calendar year. One of your recommendations was we would have more time if we worked on the calendar year rather than the current fiscal year. I would like both of you to comment on that. That is your recommendation. So, Congressman Obey, do you want to start? Would that make this process work any better than where we currently are? Mr. Obey. I don't really care. What I care about is whether or not you can get your work done. Senator Blunt. Right. Mr. Obey. And I just think that if you eliminated the budget, the necessity to pass the budget resolution, if you went back to the old system of simply informal agreements between the leadership and the committees about how much ought to be spent on this, that in that area, you would have a lot more time to deal with appropriations. I think that would be a bigger change. Senator Blunt. So you would buy that extra 3 months by just eliminating the budget process. Mr. Obey. Yeah. And if you want to do it, if you want to do the additional, or if you want to move the date, as well, I don't care. I don't know if it would help or hurt. But I do know that right now we are spending a hell of a lot of time on an institutional press release that doesn't spend a dime. Senator Blunt. Secretary Panetta. Mr. Panetta. You know, I mean, I understand David's point. And, frankly, at that time Appropriations, Ways and Means, I think there was a process that they abided by. But the reality is that you are now operating in a situation where you are facing trillion-dollar deficits. You have got a $20 trillion debt that is going to explode in the outyears, all of the projections say what is going to happen. And I don't think you can do this just simply by Appropriations and Ways and Means because of the tough decisions that are going to be necessary in order to put this back on the right track. That is the problem. Appropriations is not going to do that on their own. They don't deal with mandatory. And Ways and Means is not going to do what they have to do without some kind of mandate from the budget process in terms of reconciliation the way it is supposed to work. So I think the reason you have got to put a better process in place in terms of the budget is to try to deal with the challenges we are facing as a country in terms of trying to ultimately put this country on a better fiscal track over the next 5 to 10 years. You are going to need that kind of budget. I know how appropriations operates on a year-to-year basis. I know how Ways and Means operates on a year-to-year basis. But the bottom line is you are not going to deal with the elements of the budget that have to be dealt with in order to improve our fiscal situation without having at least a committee that looks at the whole picture. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Bennet. Senator Bennet. I guess I would like to start where you ended. First of all, I wonder whether either of you would be willing to run for Congress again, based on your testimony? And while you are considering your answer to that let me ask this question. After 10 years of budget press releases and cliffs and wasting money for the Defense Department and shutting the government down, all in the name of fiscal responsibility, we find ourselves in a place where next year, I guess, we are going to collect about just under 17 percent of our GDP in revenue and we are going to spend almost 21 percent spending as a percentage of GDP. That will provoke, create the largest deficit that we have had as a percentage of GDP in the Nation's history outside of a war or recession. And, Secretary Panetta, you mentioned earlier that the way you see it, it is either management by crisis or by leadership. Leadership is better than crisis. But there is not a lot of leadership around here, and I am really worried about a crisis. And I wonder whether you could both sort of help us understand what the conditions are, the political conditions, you are both politicians, what they need to be for us to actually address this issue, grapple with this issue in a meaningful and responsible way, what the process, Leon, looks like that you are talking about really. I mean, if you were here, what would it look like to drive a budget agreement that dealt not just with discretionary but mandatory spending, as well? And then finally, if you could each just say a word about what it would mean for Members to actually take back some responsibility from leadership. There are a lot of us that have worked here throughout a time when there has not been any opportunity for Members to make decisions about the kind of things you are talking about. So any perspective on any of that I would appreciate. Mr. Panetta. Well, that is the issue that I really struggle with, which is, how can this place get back to governing? And in many ways that is the bottom line. You are elected to govern. You are not elected to come back here and pound your shoe on the table and simply play politics. You are elected to come back here to govern. And governing involves some tough decisions. And the issue is, how can we get back to that? Because I am not so sure, frankly. When I was here, governing was good politics. It made sense for me to come back here and work, even if it was a Republican administration, a Republican President or a Democratic President. If we governed and did what we thought was necessary, found the right consensus, found compromise, got things done, even though my constituents might not always agree with my positions, they knew we were governing and running the country. I am not so sure right now that governing is considered good politics as opposed to stopping the other side from doing what they want to do. You guys are engaged in trench warfare up here. You are in your trenches, and you are fighting this war, and you are throwing grenades at one another, and every once in a while you come out of there. You are worried about somebody shooting you in the back if you try to negotiate something. And so nobody wants to go into no man's land, so you stay in the trenches. How do you get break that? How do you get back to governing? That really requires tough leadership that is going to have to take risks. Look, when David and I were here it was not only the leadership. I mean, look, Tip O'Neill and Bob Michel used to kick the hell out of us if we didn't get the budget resolution done. They backed us up on tough enforcement. Tip used to constantly say, ``When are you getting the budget resolution done? We need it done.'' And they were pushing, they were pushing, and backed it up. And so you need to have that leadership at all levels. We had chairmen, strong chairmen at the time, people like Rostenkowski, people like John Dingell. And let me tell you something, these were not chairman who just kind of sat back and waited to see what the hell the budget was going to give them. They basically used to come to me and say, ``What the hell are you up to? What are you doing?'' And I had to visit every chairman. When I was budget chairman, I visited every chairman to try to make sure that they were informed of what was going to happen, because otherwise that chairman had the power to throw the whole damn thing off track. So because there was leadership at those key levels and all of them wanted--I mean, they thought--it was abhorrent if we didn't pass a budget resolution. I mean, Tip O'Neill, Tom Foley, everybody was on my butt in order to make sure we got it. They cared about that. If that is not there, if that pressure is not there, if everybody sees that you can take shortcuts in the process, it is not going to happen under any circumstance. The other thing, very frankly, is you need a President of the United States who cares about this stuff. I mean, if a President of the United States really cares about this stuff and is willing to convene bipartisan leadership to focus on the tough choices that need to be made and is there to back it up, let me tell you something, then you will see things happen. George Bush made the pledge, ``Read my lips, no new taxes.'' And I remember as Budget chair he asked me to come up and talk to him after he soon got elected. And I said, ``You know, Mr. President, let me tell you something. You are not going to be able to stick by that, because the deficits are going up, and you are going to have to confront that.'' And he said to me, ``Frankly, look, I can't back away from that now, but there will be a point at which we will have to sit down and negotiate an approach.'' And to his credit, it was tough for him. I understand the politics of this stuff. It was tough. But he was willing to go ahead and negotiate, Republicans, Democrats, and that is what led us to the 1990 budget agreement. It took courage. It took courage. You know, he may well have paid a price for that. But you guys are elected to exercise leadership. And I think, unless you bring those ingredients to bear, Members on their own are not going to touch this stuff because it is volatile. You are not going to deal with entitlements. You are not going to deal with raising taxes. You are not going to deal with all of the issues you have to deal with, because it is trouble. Doing that on your own, it would be nuts. But if you knew you had the cover of leadership, and you knew that there were people that were going to protect you in making these tough decisions, then there are Members that are willing to walk that line. But if that is not there, this is tough to do. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Ernst. Mr. Obey. If I could just comment on something Leon said. My problem with all of this is that we are all talking about what we do on the process and in order to solve a political problem. The problem the country is facing is not process, it is political. It is political. It is political. And everything else is just avoidance. You can't deal with the real problem on this committee. Start with districting. I was elected for 42 years from a 52 percent Democratic district. That meant that I had plenty of incentives to try to find independent votes and some Republican votes on a good day, and that is what it took to get elected in a district like that. Today we have got too damn many 72 percent districts rather than 52 percent districts. And as a result there are no incentives to legislate. There are no incentives to compromise. Do you think Joe McDade could do today what he did with me when I got him to agree to a bipartisan 302(b) allocation out of Appropriations? Do you think Joe McDade could do that today without having his head handed to him? Like hell. No way on God's green earth that he could do that. Do you think that I proposing a joint 302(b) allocation back in those days in 1994, do you think I could do that under this atmosphere today? I sincerely doubt it. So you have got the districting problem. And then you have got campaign finance. The major reason I retired--I love this place--but the major reason I retired is that I knew in a 52 percent district I was going to have to spend all of my time being a glorified telemarketer raising dollars, and that is the last damned thing in the world I wanted to do when I came here. And so it is what the political system is doing to everything else. We are not attacking the Medicare. We are not attacking healthcare in a constructive way. Parties are looking for a way to one-up everybody else. And you have got to have some incentives built into the system or it is just a bunch of high-minded talk that isn't going to get us anywhere. So you have got to look beyond the process issues, and then if you could somehow change the political atmosphere process will take care of itself, because Archy the Cockroach is right. What counts is not what system you have, what counts is what you do with whatever kind of system you happen to have. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Ernst. Senator Ernst. Thank you to our witnesses today. It has been really good to hear from both of you. And I appreciate, Secretary, your words on leadership and courage and assuming that risk. And the issue that faces this committee, though, is what do you do in the absence of leadership? So we are tasked with coming up with a plan that will move our Congress forward. And so a number of different discussions have gone on here. You both have laid out different ideas on how we could reform the process if the process is to be reformed. Mr. Obey, you mentioned the incentives. Sometimes those motivating factors can be punitive, as well. And one of the things that we have talked about as far as incentives for Congress to get their work done is to perhaps withhold Members' pay, their recess, travel, until we get a budget in place. Because no matter what process we have in place, I don't care what it is, I am going tell you, and you know this, Members of Congress are always going to find a way around that system. And we will end up with CRs, we will end up with other gimmicks. What do you think about those ideas, no budget, no pay, no budget no recess? Could you both maybe talk a little bit about those ideas? Mr. Obey. What do I think of those ideas? Not much. Senator Ernst. Can you expound? Mr. Obey. I don't really think I need to. I mean, if you are a freshman legislator in the House of Representatives and you come in here, and the institution fails and doesn't produce a product, why should that individual Member pay the price for the idiocy of the institution? I don't think they should. Senator Ernst. Secretary. Mr. Panetta. I know all the thoughts about trying to force doing what is right. This is a cycle we always go through. I remember when I was on the Budget Committee that same kind of politics as now. Republicans didn't want to raise taxes. Democrats didn't want to cut entitlements or spending. And so if people weren't willing to confront those issues, then everybody was thinking: What is the shortcut here? How can we do this without having to really face those tough decisions? And so people were coming up, obviously, with a balanced budget amendment for the Constitution. I mean, Gramm-Rudman was basically the shortcut. I mean, Gramm-Rudman basically said let's just set this path and cut the hell out of everything in order to stick to that path. Well, it is one way to do it, but the problem is Congress never stuck to it. And so we always found a way around it. I think, frankly, the greater key is to, if you come to a decision on this joint committee to establish some changes or reforms, then I think it is absolutely essential for the leadership to require that you abide by those changes. And I think they are the ones that are going to have to push Members to then take the steps necessary to get it done. That is the best way it works, is to have them lean on the people that have to do the right job. And they have ways to basically be able to twist arms. They have to do it every day. And there has to be, I think, peer pressure that basically comes at play here so that everybody is pushing to adhere to it. I think if you establish penalties of one kind or another the problem is that not only will Members feel that that really is overstepping the line in terms of hurting them, but more importantly, what will happen is they will find other shortcuts to trying to get the job done, because then their pay or whatever will be on the line so they will find another shortcut. I think what you want to do is find a way to make sure they stick by the process. Mr. Obey. Let me just say, there is an assumption here, I think, that the leadership is always going to do well. Sometimes the leadership is incredibly ignorant on specific problems facing committees. I will tell you one story. Bill Young, when Bill was chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and I was ranking member, Bill and I were very close. I really loved him. And he came up to me one day, he said, ``I just got to talk to somebody. You have no idea what just happened to me.'' I said, ``What is that?'' He said, ``I was in my office, and the phone rang, and it was Speaker Hastert. And he said, 'Bill, we have got a rebellion on our hands and I need to talk to you about it quick. We need you to come right down here to my office.'" So Bill went down, he walked into the Speaker's office, and the Speaker said, ``Bill, we have got a number of our junior Members here and they are upset with no progress, and they are demanding that we move appropriation bills. How soon can you start moving those damn appropriation bills?'' And Bill looked at him and said, ``Well, Mr. Speaker, first I have to have an allocation.'' And the Speaker said, ``What is an allocation?'' The way this place needs to work, political parties have a very legitimate role to play. But the kind of politics I was taught was that the leaders of both parties would decide the direction they wanted to take their caucuses and their parties nationally. They would decide what direction they wanted to take, and they would put together their ideas on how to do it. Then you bring it into the Congress. And then what the committees are supposed to do is to leaven that product with the knowledge that individual committee members have picked up through years of working to understand this stuff. And there is an advantage if you have got somebody who has been on Labor-H for 12 years and knows, really knows how NIH works. Committees are supposed to be able to know enough to persuade the leadership to modify their product so that it will stand the test of political reality when it hits the newspapers and when it hits the floor. And so you need a balance. You need a balance between strong leadership also needs to be informed leadership, and then also super informed committee members who know enough about these individual programs to know what is a good idea and what isn't. And maybe you ought to modify the Speaker's pet project in order to make it saleable. I am proud of the fact that in the years I was chairman Nancy Pelosi never ordered me to do anything. If she wanted me to do something she would come in and she would be mighty persuasive. But in the end if I said, ``Nancy, I am sorry, but here is why I can't do this,'' she would listen. She might not like it and she might raise hell with me and ask me to change my mind, but she respected my knowledge and I respected her obligations and her knowledge. Senator Ernst. And I appreciate the input. If I could just wrap that up, I do believe that we will find a way around any process if there isn't something that is forcing us because of all the things that you outlined with partisanship and so forth. So I do support having measures in place to force us to do our jobs because, unfortunately, with the dynamic we have right now we are not doing our jobs and we don't have the leadership that compels us to do our jobs. Thank you. Mr. Panetta. I think as long as you are thinking about that, I mean, I think, rather than kind of going after pay or what have you, I think trying to clearly set an approach that says legislation that does have a fiscal impact will go nowhere without a budget being approved. I think you need to turn to the process and what needs to be done, and then the price you pay is that you can't just simply find ways around it, avoiding the necessity for some kind of budget. Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Co-Chair Womack. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Kilmer. Representative Kilmer. Thanks, Chairman. Thanks for being with us. Maybe, Mr. Panetta, I will start with you. I am struck that process changes and enforcement mechanisms only really work when they are implementing and enforcing policies for which there is a bipartisan political consensus, and when there is not that political consensus they break down. So at one of our prior hearings Maya MacGuineas was here and talked about ways you could increase the transparency and awareness of some of the fiscal challenges that you have spoken so eloquently to. One of the suggestions that she spoke to was having some sort of a fiscal State of the Nation address where the GAO or the Comptroller General would come in and actually lay out some of our long-term fiscal challenges. I wanted to get your impression of that. Mr. Panetta. Well, I think those are all good ideas. I think having some kind of summary or some kind of report or message with regards to our fiscal health is important. But, frankly, that is the responsibility of the President of the United States. And we have not really in recent years had Presidents address this country on the fiscal crisis that we are facing, largely because Presidents are like everybody else, that would interrupt their ability to get the money that they want to get for the spending that they want to do. And so there are very few Presidents in recent years who have really spoken clearly to the American people about the kind of crisis we are confronting. And I think the result is that everybody then thinks you can tiptoe past the graveyard, and nobody pays attention to the level of crisis that we are confronting. And one of the reasons we were able to pass the 1990 budget agreement and the 1993 budget agreement was because Ross Perot in his campaign made this an issue. You need to have at a national level somebody who is willing to address the crisis we are confronting. Representative Kilmer. Mr. Obey, I enjoyed reading your testimony and the references to Archy the Cockroach made me go on Amazon and buy ``Raising Hell for Justice.'' So I had already read ``Worthy Fights,'' for what it is worth, Mr. Secretary. I wanted to echo the observations of Chairman Lowey. You have seen this interesting dynamic this year where the Senate has committed to a bipartisan process, agree on 302(b)'s, not having the partisan riders, a very different process than the House. I got an opportunity to think a lot about process reform during our 13th hour of markup last night. I am struck that the Senate hasn't been more successful in finding success because of rules or process, but because they have made a commitment to a bipartisan and consensus bill process. Now, having said that, in your testimony you made reference to reconstituting the Budget Committee so that it more accurately reflects sort of the realities of what is coming out of Ways and Means and of what is coming out of approps. I was hoping you could just speak a bit more about why you think that would improve the budget process. This is for you, Mr. Obey. Mr. Obey. Well, I think there is a very good reason why the Senate appears to be working in a more bipartisan way than the House is on this stuff, and it is called districting. It is the way the lines are drawn. If you are in the Senate you represent the whole mixture of pressures and counterpressures in a State. If you are in a House, and if your legislature has drafted it so that Democrats and the Republicans are super safe, then they don't have any pressure to compromise. In fact, the pressure is just the opposite. If you pull a Joe McDade and try to work out a compromise with Dave Obey, you are going to get skinned by your hard right. And if you are Obey trying to work out a compromise with McDade, the same thing might happen. So, I mean, we can talk all we want about these little issues. They are all around the edge issues as far as I am concerned. What counts in the end is what kind of incentives you have in the system besides human nature. What kind of system do you have built into the system to pressure people to do what is for the good of the order. And the only way you get that is to change, redistricting. I think you also need to counterweight the incredible role of money in this place. And, thirdly, you have got to have a party leadership who is going to pull the main single issue groups in your umbrella into your office and tell them to go to hell, that you are going to do what is right and you need their help to do what is right, and if they want to hit you with their priorities after A, B, and C are done, fine, but until then to hell with you. I mean, until you get that kind of approach from our leaders, until they mean it, and until the involved citizens of this country decide that it is more important to get something done than to have me win all the time, we are just going to be going nowhere. This is a crisis. Yes, the debt and the deficit is a serious problem, but it is not the crisis that we have with the crisis of confidence in the political system right now. That is the real crisis. And I don't see much real work being done on that. Representative Kilmer. Thanks, Chairman. I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. Senator Perdue. Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank both the co-chairs for these outstanding witnesses today. And I so respect their contributions, their careers. And I thank you both for being here today. It has been very fascinating. I have only been in the Senate 3 years. I am on the Budget Committee. I come from a business world where this conversation is alien to me. I mean, we fund things. We do budgets like breathing. You have to. Biennial? I don't know any corporations that do biennial. I know a couple States do. The last 3 years we have been looking at best practices of other countries, States, and companies, and I can't find anybody that has a budget resolution that is not a law, leads to an authorization that really hasn't been done in two decades, and then an appropriation process. I believe, frankly, after looking at this in depth--and I want to get your opinion on two questions very quickly, and I will get to it very quickly--I think this whole process was doomed the day the 1974 Budget Act was enacted. It has never worked. It can't work. It will never work. It has only funded the government on time four times in 44 years. And, Secretary, I think 2 of those years were on your watch in the nineties. There were 2 years in the seventies right after it was enacted. Other than that, we have always used continuing resolutions. As matter of fact, we used 177 continuing resolutions in those 44 years. And actually, and we don't write about this much, but Congress has actually shut the government down 20 times during that period of time. Now, you talk about breeding confidence with the electorate. I am sorry, but that just doesn't do it. So my question is twofold. I think there are two levels of issues here. One is, how do we fund the government on time without all this drama without the use of CRs? That is the primary focus of this committee. But you both bring up the second dimension of this, and that is dealing with this debt crisis. I thank you so much for calling it a crisis because sometimes up here we just kind of skip past the graveyard here on this thing. How do you ever get at the spending issue if you don't really consider all of your expenses? Let me be a little more direct. And I would like, Chairman, you, and, Secretary, both address this, if you will. We spent $4.3 trillion this year in total expenses. About 1.3 of that is discretion. The balance of that is mandatory. By definition, in the Senate the Finance Committee is in charge of Social Security and Medicare, and so in theory you think, well, okay they are in charge of mandatory expenses. But they never really get looked at by the definition of mandatory. So the question is, how in the world should we be thinking about--I don't know any other budget process in the world that doesn't budget its full expenses. And it forces you then to look at the withholding equation on the revenue side, on Social Security, the same thing on the Medicare side. We are told the Medicare trust fund goes to zero now in 8 years. I don't know any other better definition of a crisis than that. Help me understand how we are going to ever solve this if the budget authorization and funding process, appropriation process, only deals with 25, 30 percent of what we spend. And how would you recommend we think about that, Secretary? Mr. Panetta. Well, you can't do it. You can't do it. You are not going to solve the problem facing this country unless you deal with all aspects of the budget. That is the reality. And people have tried to avoid dealing with certain aspects of it. And so the result is that it distorts the process. I mean, the idea that you can--you increase defense, leave mandatories alone, and simply go at it through the discretionary accounts, you know, you are kidding yourself in terms of whether or not that is going to deal with the larger crisis that you are confronting. So it seems to me that if--I mean, if the budget process is going to count for anything, the only justification for the budget process is that it looks at that bigger picture. And that should be the responsibility of the Budget Committee, to look at that bigger picture and where we are headed and then to deal with each of those elements. What are we doing on discretionary spending? What are we doing on defense spending? What are we doing on mandatory spending? I mean, I think mandatories, frankly, ought to be part of the budget process, and looking at the different mandatory programs. How they are being spent? What kind of trouble are they in? How effective are they? Because a lot of this stuff on autopilot has been going on for years without taking the time to really look at the elements of it. So that ought to be part of it. And, very frankly, revenues have to be part of that, as well. There is a revenue part of the budget that is extremely important to the entire picture. You have to look at all of that. And the only way you are going to be able to address the level of crisis that we are now confronting, and it is like a business, you can't run a business and not look at every aspect of your costs in that business. And if you do that you can get the costs down. Tough decisions. You may have to fire people. You may have to do things that cost you money. They are tough decisions. But that is what running a business is all about. Well, the same thing is true here. You want to run the country, you are going to have to make some tough decisions on these issues. And it is the process of avoiding those tough decisions over these last 12 or 15 years that has gotten us into deeper trouble. It is easy to spend money in this place. It is easy to cut taxes in this place. But when you have to pay the piper, when you have got to say what are we doing to the deficit, what are we doing to the taxpayers in this country, then people try to find a way around that responsibility, that accountability. And somehow, unless we get back to that larger process of looking at the larger picture, we are going to continue to try to find ways to get around the responsibilities that we have. Mr. Obey. I guess what I would say is that we need to remember that there is no requirement in a democracy for a happy ending. There just isn't. And we aren't going to have a happy ending unless we recognize that some fundamental things have to change. And I go right back to redistricting. I think it is modestly possible for the Senate in the end to tackle these issues. I think it is highly unlikely that the House will be able to successfully attack these issues so long as you have the same people coming here time after time. It used to be fun to solve problems. I mean, when I chaired the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, and Nita was a member of the subcommittee then, when we went to conference the Senate chair was Bob Kasten from my own State. And before we sat down in conference I sat down with my staff, and the very first question I always asked was, ``What does Bob have to have in the end in order to sign up?'' And we would work from that point. When I became chairman I was naive enough to think, ``Aha, now that I have got the gavel I can do things my way.'' No way. I mean, I discovered that the job of a chairman is to find that point at which you get 218 votes. That is the job of a chairman. And then secondarily, if he can also in the process push his values and his favored programs, that is a bonus. But first you have to get things done. And so until we change the basics I don't see how we get there. I wish I did. I know that political consultants will say never leave them with a downer. I am sorry, I see the downers right now, and I wish I didn't. Senator Perdue. Thank you. Co-Chair Womack. Representative Woodall. Representative Woodall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all both for being here. I was a young staffer during both of your tenures here. I remember just as much color from you, Chairman Obey, on the floor then as you are giving us today. I thank you for that. I stare at your picture, Mr. Secretary, day in and day out on this committee. I appreciate in your opening that you said we actually have a responsibility as a joint committee, not just an opportunity. I have always thought of it as an opportunity, but the truth is we do have a responsibility to get something done. The biggest disappointment of my short congressional career was the supercommittee that had an opportunity to look at every single dollar of government spending, take it directly to the floor to avoid the politics that you all have both talked about, and they couldn't find a single dollar on which they agreed. I wanted to focus on that just for a moment, coming from a regular order appropriations process. Coming from both an Article I and an Article II spot as you do, Mr. Secretary, what do you think about that supercommittee process, where you say we are going to try to bring together some thought leaders and we are going to bypass the regular committee process and send some tough decisions directly to the floor if the authorizers are failing to handle it on their own? Mr. Panetta. Look, I always thought as Budget chairman that it was our responsibility to make those tough decisions. And the fortunate thing is at the time I had the broad support of leadership, the President, and others, to be able to take those steps. I also understand that that may be impossible right now, particularly as far as the House is concerned. I don't think it is impossible in terms of the Senate, but I think it is impossible in terms of the House. And for that reason I was a little bit--I was concerned that when Simpson-Bowles made their recommendations--and the President asked me about that. And I said, ``You ought to endorse what Simpson-Bowles did.'' Because, very frankly, it is bipartisan. Tough decisions were made. I think you might not agree with all the recommendations in it. But I think it is important to endorse the process. And he was concerned about some of the particular recommendations. I understand that. But I think you may have reached the point where you may need to have a Simpson-Bowles-type commission, be able to make recommendations that deal with each of the areas I just talked about, because I don't see that happening otherwise. And, very frankly, unless you have those decisions in place, I am not sure that process alone is going to get you there. Representative Woodall. I look around at particularly the newer Members who are here. They came because of the sense of urgency that you all both describe. And I see lots of Members that would be pleased to cast that deciding vote. If all they had to trade for the future security of the country was the job that they have today, they would happily trade it away. I have always said the happiest folks on Capitol Hill were the Democrats who lost their job over the Affordable Care Act. What a small price to pay for doing something that you thought was going to move the country in the right direction. But thinking about doing big things, 1983 Social Security amendments. No one was poor-mouthing those changes. Raised taxes, reduced benefits, raised ages, did all the tough things, but everybody was on board collectively, and so we all were touting our successes as a body and as a Nation instead of bad- mouthing them. You mentioned, Mr. Secretary, what Ross Perot did to allow the 1993 Reconciliation Act, but as I remember that act, there was not one Republican vote for that on the House side, it was strictly a partisan bill. I go back and look at the budgets that you were able to move through the House. Time and time again not a single Republican vote on the floor of the House. We sometimes talk about the good old days as if they were really pretty good, and the fact is this partisanship has been going on a long time. I value the three-step process, a budget where people can stake out a political vision, an authorizing process where perhaps I am going to overpromise because I don't actually have to come up with the dollars, and an appropriations process that now the rubber meets the road. It lets some political steam off the pot. In the name of process reform we have talked about reducing those steps. Chairman Obey recommended abolishing the Budget Committee in his opening comments. Tell me about how that lets--the potential for letting steam off the pot in a three- step process versus the burning of time that could be used more productively elsewhere. Mr. Obey. Well, I don't see much to recommend the existing system. I mean, the problem you have, just look at Hal Rogers' problem when he took over for me as chairman of the committee. And take a look at the transportation bill which he tried to bring to the floor. I mean, that transportation bill contained the reductions that were necessary in order to meet the targets of the budget resolution or the assumptions of the budget resolution. And what happened to him? He got chewed up alive. I mean, because in my view the Budget Committee overreached. It is easy to do that. If you come up with a bright idea, it is easy if somebody else has to implement it, because you can only squawk about the imperfections of the latter guy's style that were to blame. That is not what the problem is. In my view, the Budget Committee in recent years has overreached because they thought it was more possible--or it was possible to do more than, in fact, was possible. I don't like supercommittees because the whole idea of committees in the first place is to take the people who know the most about a subject and put them to work on it. And usually with supercommittees you have got people who, as I said earlier, they can fly at 30,000 feet, but they don't have to then explain to granny in a nursing home why you are going to have your benefits shaved back this year. So to me what is most important first is to understand. We need a sense of balance. Yes, we have a budget deficit, and that is a serious problem. We also have an infrastructure deficit. We also have an education deficit, if you want to talk about education. I mean, the problem with the Bowles committee is that expectations around here before it was established, people would say, ``Oh, domestic discretionary, they are not the problem. They have already been cut.'' And then each time recommendations came up they cut further in domestic discretionary. So I just don't trust wise ones at the top who don't have to implement whatever reductions you are talking about. To me, I don't like the product that the Ways and Means Committee produced in this Congress, but at least they had a level of knowledge about it that is higher than a lot of people who would have been likely to be appointed to any commission to look at the same problems. Representative Woodall. Mr. Chairman, can I just ask, I know Mr. Obey is speaking with heart as an Article I servant. Could I just ask the Secretary whether or not he is giving us advice today on behalf of Article II or on behalf of Article I? Where does your heart sit, Mr. Secretary, having served at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue? Mr. Panetta. You know, my view is that Article I and Article II both have to work together in order to govern the country. And if the President of the United States thinks that he is going to be able to get this done without a partnership with the Congress and the ability to get it done, then he is wrong, it ain't gonna happen. And if Congress thinks that somehow they can make this process work without the executive branch and working with him, I think that is also a mistake. I think what is missing in particular with these last few years, I mean, look, with Republican administrations that I worked with at the time that I was here, we had a very strong working relationship. I worked very closely with Dick Darman when he was OMB Director. I worked very closely with Jim Baker when he was operating out of the White House. And they would come up and we would sit down and we worked through these issues. And the ability to have that kind of partnership, the ability to have that kind of consultation is what makes our democracy run. And the inability to have that when you try to basically force your way through in a particular way, that is what undermines, I think, the effectiveness of our democracy. So you can make this process work if there is trust. I mean, the biggest problem right now is there is a lack of trust between the branches and between Members and between the people and this institution. There is a lack of trust. And, very frankly, if you don't have trust in our democracy it is not going to work. And somehow we have got to find a way to restore that trust. And the way you do that is by talking to one another, talking with people in authority, respecting who they are, listening to them, and then trying to figure out a way for both of you to be able to get it done. That is the way our Forefathers designed it, and that is the way it is supposed to be. Co-Chair Womack. Mr. Arrington. Representative Arrington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Madam Chairwoman. I agree with Senator Perdue, our panelists have been outstanding. And the thought that reoccurs to me is with the wisdom and intellect and experience of all the folks that we have had come before this committee, if we can't at a minimum improve the process we are in deeper trouble than I even thought as a new Member. And by the way, Mr. Secretary, I really thoroughly enjoy working with your son Jimmy. He is one of those American first guys. He is a dad first. He is a Panetta first. Way before you get to being a Democrat. And I have to say as a new Member, I am encouraged with my cohorts who came to not just move the deck chairs around, but to fundamentally change the game up here for the American people. And so with that, it seems to me that whether you are trying to do what Senator Perdue articulated as our sort of first goal and get predictability and certainty in getting a budget out and funding the government or you are trying to have budget outcomes that somehow improve the position fiscally of this country and chip away at the deficit and debt. Either way, you have to acknowledge, as Chairman Obey mentioned earlier, that we don't have the political will collectively. I would like to think I do. I think everybody would like to raise their hand and say, ``Well, I do.'' But collectively, we know that we don't. Republicans don't. Democrats don't. So can we just start with that assumption, that we don't have the political will? And then and only then can you really get at solving both the process issue and the outcome issue. At least you have an opportunity to. Now, I think you first have to acknowledge, and I agree with Chairman Obey, there are structural issues with campaign finance, gerrymandering, I hate it. We can all kick around ideas how to change that. I would actually think, because we haven't fixed gerrymandering, I am a term limit guy, as well. There are lots of structural reforms to consider that I think would improve the behavior. I think most States, like the great State of Texas, work on a balanced budget because they have a forcing mechanism, the Balanced Budget Amendment to the Constitution. Now absent that, we have to come up with what Senator Ernst suggested in her discussion with you, and that is a forcing mechanism. It is the only way to do it. Let's just acknowledge the nature of the beast is what it is. I am trying to figure out how you can't be so squirrely in the process that whatever enforcement mechanism you put in place that you don't have some rule in the 11th hour where everybody can vote on it, nobody is accountable for it, the American people don't understand what happens, and we just keep on going down that path of destruction, sleepwalking, as they say, off this cliff. I would go back to her question. And you said something, and I am hopeful, because you had at least--something resonated with you in the way of an enforcement. No budget, no pay, no budget, no recess, I don't know if those will work, I am willing to try all of them. But no budget, no spend, no budget, no pass, no legislation, no spend, that has a fiscal impact. So you think that that might work. So we have got an issue, an item on the table for consideration. Would you expound on that? Mr. Panetta. Well, the way it operated was that in order for the authorizing committees to move spending legislation, in order for Appropriations to move their bills, there had to be a budget. And what happened was that as the Budget Committee failed to pass budget resolutions, then they came up with this trigger mechanism to basically assign levels to the Appropriations Committee to operate without a budget, and that bypassed the process. I think it is important to stick to the basic discipline of the process, which is pass a budget, and pass it by a certain date. And if it doesn't pass you are not going to move any legislation that has some kind of fiscal impact. And, frankly, appropriations committees ought not to move forward. Now, I understand the politics, if you are suddenly stuck and you can't do anything, then you find waivers, you find ways around it. I mean, that is the way we govern. But it really does require some degree of discipline. If you are going to establish any process, you have got to have the ability to try to stick to that discipline. And, look, the biggest problem here is none of these decisions that we are talking about are easy, and there isn't a process way to make them easy. They are very tough decisions. And the problem right now is I think most people in this institution would like to be able to somehow move the process without pissing off people. It doesn't work that way. You are going to have to offend people, with the decisions in the budget, with the decisions on discipline, you are going to have to do that. People don't like to take political risk. But I have never seen a leader in this institution--or, frankly, in the Presidency--I have never seen leader who has been able to lead and not take risks. And that is what you are going have to--that is probably the first principle that is going to have to apply here. Representative Arrington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Co-Chair Womack. I thank the gentleman. Thank you, Secretary Panetta, Chairman Obey, for appearing before us today. I want to advise members that they can submit written questions to be answered later in writing. They will be made part of the formal hearing. Any members wishing to submit questions or extraneous material may do so within 7 days. Now, this concludes our fifth public hearing and fulfills the Bipartisan Budget Act statutory requirement for this select complete to conduct at least five such hearings by November 30. While our requirement has been fulfilled, I believe there is value in exploring topics for additional hearings in the future. Looking back, I believe our hearings have been insightful. With each discussion I have been encouraged by the involvement and participation of our members and impressed by and grateful for the advice and testimony brought by the many outside witnesses, including the 25 of our colleagues who participated in Members Day. I am happy to report that bipartisan, bicameral consensus is steadily growing with our group of 16. In fact, a number of our members have already submitted their reform ideas for improving the budget and appropriations process, and I am encouraging all members to submit any ideas in writing to the co-chairs. While the statutory deadline for reporting our recommendations is the 30th of November, I have said from the beginning that the work drafting a proposal should begin sooner rather than later, and that time is now. With that said, starting this month the co-chair and I will begin working informal working sessions. All members are welcome and encouraged to attend. I am hopeful all members will. The mission of this panel is too important not to succeed, and your ideas and feedback garnered through our months of collective work are essential to that goal. So our staffs will be in touch regarding the pending schedule of these informal meetings. Once again to our witnesses this morning, Secretary Panetta, Chairman Obey, thank you so much for your insightful testimony here today. And with that, this hearing stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:11 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] Congressional Budget Office Briefing Materials prepared for the Joint Select Committee ---------- [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] H.R. 7191 ---------- 115th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 7191 To implement reforms to the budget and appropriations process in the House of Representatives. _______________________________________________________________________ IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES November 29, 2018 Mr. Womack (for himself and Mr. Yarmuth) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Budget, and in addition to the Committee on Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned _______________________________________________________________________ A BILL To implement reforms to the budget and appropriations process in the House of Representatives. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Bipartisan Budget and Appropriations Reform Act of 2018''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. TITLE I--BIENNIAL BUDGET RESOLUTIONS Sec. 101. Purposes. Sec. 102. Definitions. Sec. 103. Revision of timetable. Sec. 104. Biennial concurrent resolutions on the budget. Sec. 105. Committee allocations. Sec. 106. Revision of biennial budget. Sec. 107. Additional amendments to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to effectuate biennial budgeting. Sec. 108. Reconciliation process. Sec. 109. Amendments to the Rules of the House of Representatives to effectuate biennial budgeting. Sec. 110. Membership of the Committee on the Budget. Sec. 111. Rulemaking authority. Sec. 112. Effective date. TITLE II--OTHER MATTERS Sec. 201. Views and estimates of committees. Sec. 202. Annual supplemental budget submission by the President. Sec. 203. Hearing on the fiscal state of the Nation. TITLE I--BIENNIAL BUDGET RESOLUTIONS SEC. 101. PURPOSES. Paragraph (2) of section 2 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is amended to read as follows: ``(2) to facilitate the determination biennially of the appropriate level of Federal revenues and expenditures by the Congress;''. SEC. 102. DEFINITIONS. Section 3 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 622) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (4), by striking ``for a fiscal year'' each place it appears and inserting ``for a biennium''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(12) The term `direct spending' has the meaning given to such term in section 250(c)(8) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. ``(13) The term `biennium' means any period of 2 consecutive fiscal years beginning with an even-numbered fiscal year. ``(14) The term `budget year' has the meaning given that term in section 250(c)(12) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Control Act of 1985.''. SEC. 103. REVISION OF TIMETABLE. Section 300 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 631) is amended to read as follows: ``timetable ``Sec. 300. The timetable with respect to the congressional budget process for any Congress is as follows: ``First Session On or before: Action to be completed: First Monday in February................ President submits budget. February 15............................. Congressional Budget Office submits report to Budget Committees. March 1................................ Committees submit views and estimates to Budget Committees. April 1................................. Senate Budget Committee reports biennial budget. May 1................................... Congress completes action on the biennial budget. May 15.................................. Appropriation bills may be considered in the House of Representatives. June 10................................. House Appropriations Committee reports last annual appropriation bill. October 1............................... First fiscal year of the biennium begins. ``Second Session On or before: Action to be completed: First Monday in February................ President submits budget. February 15............................. Congressional Budget Office submits report to Budget Committees. June 10................................. House Appropriations Committee reports last annual appropriation bill. October 1............................... Second fiscal year of the biennium begins.''. SEC. 104. BIENNIAL CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS ON THE BUDGET. (a) Contents of Resolution.-- (1) In general.--Section 301(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 632(a)) is amended-- (A) by striking ``On or before April 15'' and all that follows through ``the following:'' and inserting the following: ``On or before May 1 of each odd- numbered calendar year, the Congress shall complete action on a concurrent resolution on the budget for the biennium beginning on October 1 of that calendar year. The concurrent resolution shall set forth appropriate levels for each fiscal year in the biennium and for at least each fiscal year in the next 2 bienniums for the following--''; (B) in paragraph (6)-- (i) by striking ``for the fiscal year'' and inserting ``for each fiscal year in the biennium''; and (ii) by striking ``and'' at the end; (C) in paragraph (7)-- (i) by striking ``for the fiscal year'' and inserting ``for each fiscal year in the biennium''; and (ii) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; (D) by adding after paragraph (7) the following: ``(8) subtotals of new budget authority and outlays for nondefense discretionary spending; defense discretionary spending; direct spending; and net interest.''; and (E) by adding at the end of the matter following paragraph (8) (as added by subparagraph (D)) the following: ``The concurrent resolution on the budget for a biennium shall include procedures for adjusting spending and revenue levels, committee allocations, and other amounts in the resolution during the second session of a Congress to reflect an updated baseline that will be used for scoring purposes.''. (b) Additional Matters in Concurrent Resolution.--Section 301(b) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 632(b)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``for such fiscal year'' and inserting ``for either fiscal year in such biennium''; (2) in paragraph (8), by striking ``and'' at the end; (3) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (4) by adding at the end the following: ``(10) include total combined outlays and revenues for tax expenditures.''. (c) Hearings and Report.--Section 301(e)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 632(e)) is amended by striking ``fiscal year'' and inserting ``biennium''. (d) Goals for Reducing Unemployment.--Section 301(f) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 632(f)) is amended by striking ``fiscal year'' each place it appears and inserting ``biennium''. (e) Economic Assumptions.--Section 301(g)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 632(g)(1)) is amended by striking ``for a fiscal year'' and inserting ``for a biennium''. (f) Section Heading.--The section heading of section 301 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 632) is amended by striking ``annual adoption of'' and inserting ``adoption of biennial''. SEC. 105. COMMITTEE ALLOCATIONS. Section 302 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 633) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(1)-- (A) by striking ``for that period of fiscal years'' and inserting ``for all fiscal years covered by the resolution''; and (B) by striking ``only for the fiscal year of that resolution'' and inserting ``only for each fiscal year of the biennium''; (2) in subsection (c)-- (A) by striking ``subsection (a)'' and inserting ``subsection (a)(1)''; (B) by striking ``for a fiscal year'' and inserting ``for a budget year''; and (C) by striking ``for that fiscal year'' and inserting ``for that budget year''; (3) in subsection (f)(1)-- (A) by striking ``for a fiscal year''; and (B) by striking ``the first fiscal year'' and inserting ``either fiscal year of the biennium of that resolution''; and (4) in subsection (f)(2)(A), by-- (A) striking ``the first fiscal year'' and inserting ``either fiscal year of the biennium of that resolution''; and (B) striking ``the total of fiscal years'' and inserting ``the total of all fiscal years covered by the resolution''. SEC. 106. REVISION OF BIENNIAL BUDGET. Section 304 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 635) is amended to read as follows: ``permissible revisions of concurrent resolutions on the budget ``Sec. 304. At any time after the concurrent resolution on the budget has been agreed to pursuant to section 301 and before the end of the biennium, the two Houses may adopt a concurrent resolution that revises or reaffirms the most recently agreed to concurrent resolution on the budget. Any concurrent resolution that revises or reaffirms the most recently agreed to concurrent resolution on the budget shall be considered under the procedures set forth in section 305.''. SEC. 107. ADDITIONAL AMENDMENTS TO THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT OF 1974 TO EFFECTUATE BIENNIAL BUDGETING. (a) Enforcement of Section 303.--Section 303 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 634) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking ``for a fiscal year'' and inserting ``for a biennium''; and (B) by striking ``the first fiscal year covered by that resolution'' and inserting ``either fiscal year of that biennium''; (2) in subsection (b)(1)(B), by striking ``the fiscal year'' and inserting ``the biennium''; and (3) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraph (1)-- (i) by striking ``for a fiscal year'' and inserting ``for a biennium''; and (ii) by striking ``for that year'' each place it appears and inserting ``for each year of that biennium''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``after the year the allocation referred to in that paragraph is made'' and inserting ``after the years the allocations referred to in that paragraph are made''. (b) Section 305.--Subsections (a)(3) and (b)(3) of section 305 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 636) are amended by striking ``for a fiscal year''. (c) Section 311 Point of Order.-- (1) In the house of representatives.--Section 311(a)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 642(a)) is amended-- (A) by striking ``for a fiscal year''; (B) by striking ``the first fiscal year'' each place it appears and inserting ``either of the first two fiscal years covered by such resolution''; and (C) by striking ``that first fiscal year'' and inserting ``either of the first two fiscal years''. (2) In the senate.--Section 311(a)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 642(a)(2)) is amended-- (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``for the first fiscal year'' and inserting ``for either of the first two fiscal years''; and (B) in subparagraph (B)-- (i) by striking ``that first fiscal year'' the first place it appears and inserting ``either of the first two fiscal years''; and (ii) by striking ``that first fiscal year and the ensuing fiscal years'' and inserting ``all fiscal years''. (3) Social security levels.--Section 311(a)(3) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 642(a)(2)) is amended by-- (A) striking ``for the first fiscal year'' and inserting ``for either of the first two fiscal years''; and (B) striking ``that fiscal year and the ensuing fiscal years'' and inserting ``all fiscal years''. SEC. 108. RECONCILIATION PROCESS. Section 310(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 641(a)) is amended-- (1) in the matter before paragraph (1), by striking ``A concurrent'' and all that follows through ``shall'' and inserting ``A concurrent resolution on the budget for a biennium shall, for each fiscal year of the biennium''; (2) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``for such fiscal year'' and inserting ``for each fiscal year of the biennium''; (3) in paragraph (1)(C), by striking ``such fiscal year'' and inserting ``each fiscal year of the biennium''; and (4) in paragraph (1)(D), by striking ``such fiscal year'' and inserting ``each fiscal year of the biennium''. SEC. 109. AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO EFFECTUATE BIENNIAL BUDGETING. (a) Clause 4(a)(4) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended by striking ``any allocations'' and inserting ``its allocations for the budget year'' and by striking ``fiscal year'' and inserting ``biennium''. (b) Clause 4(b)(2) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended by striking ``for each fiscal year''. (c) Clause 4(b) of rule X is amended by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (5), by striking the period and inserting ``; and'' at the end of subparagraph (6), and by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(7) use the second session of each Congress to study issues with long-term budgetary and economic implications.''. (d) Clause 4(f) of rule X is amended-- (1) by striking ``fiscal year'' the first place it appears and inserting ``biennium''; (2) by striking ``that fiscal year'' and inserting ``each fiscal year in such ensuing biennium''; and (3) in subparagraph (1) by striking ``six weeks after the submission of the budget by the President'' and inserting ``March 1''. (e) Clause 3(d)(1)(A) of rule XIII is amended by striking ``five'' both places it appears and inserting ``six''. SEC. 110. MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET. (a) Clause 5(a)(2) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended-- (1) by striking subdivisions (B) and (C); and (2) in subdivision (A), by striking ``(A)'' and by redesignating items (i), (ii), and (iii) as subdivisions (A), (B), and (C), respectively. (b) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect immediately before noon, January 3, 2019. SEC. 111. RULEMAKING AUTHORITY. Sections 109 and 110 are enacted by the Congress-- (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of Representatives, and as such they shall be considered as part of the rules of the House and such rules shall supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and (2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of the House to change such rules at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of the House. SEC. 112. EFFECTIVE DATE. This title and the amendments made by this title shall take effect immediately before noon January 3, 2019. TITLE II--OTHER MATTERS SEC. 201. VIEWS AND ESTIMATES OF COMMITTEES. Section 301(d) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 632(d)) is amended to read as follows: ``(d) Views and Estimates of Other Committees.-- ``(1) In general.--Not later than March 1 of the first session of a Congress, or upon the request of the Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives or the Senate, each committee of the House of Representatives and the Senate having legislative jurisdiction shall submit to its respective Committee on the Budget its views and estimates (as determined by the committee making such submission) with respect to the following: ``(A) Any legislation to be considered during that Congress that is a priority for the committee. ``(B) Any legislation within the jurisdiction of the committee that would establish, amend, or reauthorize any Federal program and likely have a significant budgetary impact. ``(2) Additional matters.--Any committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate and any joint committee of the Congress may submit to the appropriate Committees on the Budget its views and estimates with respect to all matters set forth in subsections (a) and (b) which relate to matters within its jurisdiction. ``(3) Joint economic committee.--The Joint Economic Committee shall submit to the Committees on the Budget of both Houses its recommendations as to the fiscal policy appropriate to the goals of the Employment Act of 1946.''. SEC. 202. ANNUAL SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET SUBMISSION BY THE PRESIDENT. Section 1106 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(d) On or before December 1 of each calendar year, the President shall submit to Congress an administrative budget for the fiscal year beginning in the ensuing calendar year, which shall include up-to-date estimates for current year and prior year data and credit reestimates for the current year (as included in the Federal credit supplement of such budget).''. SEC. 203. HEARING ON THE FISCAL STATE OF THE NATION. (a) In General.--Not later than 45 days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) after the date on which the Secretary of the Treasury submits to Congress the audited financial statement required under paragraph (1) of section 331(e) of title 31, United States Code, on a date agreed upon by the chairs of the Committees on the Budget of the House of Representatives and the Senate and the Comptroller General of the United States, the chairs shall conduct a hearing to receive a presentation from the Comptroller General reviewing the findings of the audit required under paragraph (2) of such section and providing, with respect to the information included by the Secretary in the report accompanying such audited financial statement, an analysis of the financial position and condition of the Federal Government, including financial measures (such as the net operating cost, income, budget deficits, or budget surpluses) and sustainability measures (such as the long-term fiscal projection or social insurance projection) described in such report. (b) Effective Date.--The requirement under subsection (a) shall apply with respect to any audited financial statement submitted on or after the date of the enactment of this Act. Press Release Accompanying the Introduction of H.R. 7191 ---------- [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]