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PUTIN'S ASYMMETRIC ASSAULT
ON DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA AND
EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
__________
A MINORITY STAFF REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Fifteenth Congress
Second Session
January 10, 2018
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Executive Summary................................................ 1
Chapter 1: Putin's Rise and Motivations.......................... 7
Ascent to the Top............................................ 8
Return of the Security Services.............................. 10
The Kremlin's Paranoid Pathology............................. 13
Chapter 2: Manipulation and Repression Inside Russia............. 15
Influencing Ideology, Politics, and Culture.................. 17
Controlling the Public Narrative............................. 24
Corrupting Economic Activity................................. 31
Chapter 3: Old Active Measures and Modern Malign Influence
Operations..................................................... 35
A Brief History of Soviet Active Measures.................... 37
Modern Malign Influence Operations........................... 37
The Kremlin's Disinformation Platforms....................... 40
Chapter 4: Weaponization of Civil Society, Ideology, Culture,
Crime, and Energy.............................................. 47
The Role of State Foundations, GONGOs, NGOs, and Think Tanks. 47
The Kremlin's Cultivation of Political Extremes.............. 50
The Use of the Russian Orthodox Church....................... 53
The Nationalization of Organized Crime....................... 54
The Export of Corruption..................................... 57
The Leveraging of Energy Supplies for Influence.............. 58
Chapter 5: Kremlin Interference in Semi-Consolidated Democracies
and Transitional Governments................................... 65
Ukraine...................................................... 67
Georgia...................................................... 73
Montenegro................................................... 77
Serbia....................................................... 81
Bulgaria..................................................... 89
Hungary...................................................... 94
Chapter 6: Kremlin Interference in Consolidated Democracies...... 99
Baltic States: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia................ 100
Nordic States: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.......... 109
The Netherlands.............................................. 113
United Kingdom............................................... 116
France....................................................... 121
Germany...................................................... 127
Spain........................................................ 133
Italy........................................................ 137
Chapter 7: Multilateral & U.S. Efforts to Counter the Kremlin's
Asymmetric Arsenal............................................. 141
Collective Defenses Against Disinformation and Cyber Attacks. 141
European Energy Diversification and Integration.............. 144
EU and U.S. Efforts to Sanction Malicious Actors............. 145
U.S. Efforts to Create Alternative and Accurate Quality
Programming................................................ 148
Assessing the State Department's Global Engagement Center.... 149
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations....................... 153
(iii)
Appendices
Appendix A: 1999 Apartment Building Bombings..................... 165
Appendix B: Alleged Political Assassinations..................... 171
Appendix C: Russian Government's Olympic Cheating Scheme......... 175
Appendix D: Russia's Security Services and Cyber Hackers......... 181
Appendix E: Attacks and Harassment Against Human Rights Activists
and Journalists in Russia...................................... 187
Appendix F: Flawed Elections in the Russian Federation Since 1999 191
Appendix G: Harsh Treatment of LGBT Individuals and Women in the
Russian Federation............................................. 193
Appendix H: Disinformation Narratives, Themes, and Techniques.... 195
Appendix I: Letter from Senator Cardin to European Ambassadors... 199
----------
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, January 10, 2018
Dear Colleagues: For years, Vladimir Putin's government has
engaged in a relentless assault to undermine democracy and the
rule of law in Europe and the United States. Mr. Putin's
Kremlin employs an asymmetric arsenal that includes military
invasions, cyberattacks, disinformation, support for fringe
political groups, and the weaponization of energy resources,
organized crime, and corruption. The Kremlin has refined the
use of these tools over time and these attacks have intensified
in scale and complexity across Europe. If the United States
fails to work with urgency to address this complex and growing
threat, the regime in Moscow will become further emboldened. It
will continue to develop and refine its arsenal to use on
democracies around the world, including against U.S. elections
in 2018 and 2020.
Following attacks like Pearl Harbor and 9/11, U.S.
presidents have rallied the country and the world to address
the challenges facing the nation. Yet the current President of
the United States has barely acknowledged the threat posed by
Mr. Putin's repeated attacks on democratic governments and
institutions, let alone exercised the kind of leadership
history has shown is necessary to effectively counter this kind
of aggression. Never before in American history has so clear a
threat to national security been so clearly ignored by a U.S.
president.
The threat posed by Mr. Putin's meddling existed before the
current U.S. Administration, and may well extend beyond it.
Yet, as this report will demonstrate, the Russian government's
malign influence operations can be deterred. Several countries
in Europe took notice of the Kremlin's efforts to interfere in
the 2016 U.S. election and realized the danger posed to their
democracies. They have taken steps to build resilience against
Mr. Putin's aggression and interference, and the range of
effective measures implemented by European countries provide
valuable lessons for the United States.
To that end, this report recommends a series of actions
that the United States should take across government, civil
society, and the private sector--and in cooperation with our
allies--to push back against the Kremlin's aggression and
establish a set of long-term norms that can neutralize such
efforts to undermine democracy. Yet it must be noted that
without leadership from the President, any attempt to marshal
such a response will be inherently weakened at the outset.
(v)
In addition, it is important to draw a distinction between
Mr. Putin's corrupt regime and the people of Russia. Many
Russian citizens strive for a transparent, accountable
government that operates under the democratic rule of law, and
we hold hope for better relations in the future with a Russian
government that reflects these demands. In the meantime, the
United States must work with our allies to build defenses
against Mr. Putin's asymmetric arsenal, and strengthen
international norms and values to deter such behavior by Russia
or any other country.
The events discussed in this report are illustrative, not
exhaustive, and cover a period ending on December 31, 2017.
There are several important geographic areas that remain beyond
the scope of this report, including the Russian government's
role in the Syria conflict, its complicated relationship with
Turkey, or its involvement in places like Central Asia and
Latin America. The Russian government's use of corruption and
money laundering also merit additional examination by relevant
committees in Congress, as well as the Executive Branch. Given
the ongoing investigations by the Senate Intelligence and
Judiciary Committees, this report does not delve into Russia's
interference in the 2016 U.S. election. Furthermore, U.S.
election infrastructure, electrical grids, and information
systems are outside the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and therefore beyond the scope of the
recommendations in this report, but certainly warrant further
study.
Finally, there must be a bipartisan sense of urgency so the
United States immediately begins taking the steps necessary to
fortify and protect our democracy from Mr. Putin's malicious
meddling. There is a long bipartisan tradition in Congress in
support of firm policies to counter Russian government
aggression and abuse against its own citizens, our allies, and
universal values. This report seeks to continue that tradition.
Sincerely,
Benjamin L. Cardin,
Ranking Member
.
PUTIN'S ASYMMETRIC ASSAULT ON
DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA AND EUROPE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
----------
Executive Summary
----------
Nearly 20 years ago, Vladimir Putin gained and solidified
power by exploiting blackmail, fears of terrorism, and war.
Since then, he has combined military adventurism and aggression
abroad with propaganda and political repression at home, to
persuade a domestic audience that he is restoring Russia to
greatness and a respected position on the world stage. All the
while, he has empowered the state security services and
employed them to consolidate his hold on the levers of
political, social, and economic power, which he has used to
make himself and a circle of loyalists extraordinarily wealthy.
Democracies like the United States and those in Europe
present three distinct challenges to Mr. Putin. First, the
sanctions they have collectively placed on his regime for its
illegal occupation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine
threaten the ill-gotten wealth of his loyalists and hamper
their extravagant lifestyles. Second, Mr. Putin sees successful
democracies, especially those along Russia's periphery, as
threats to his regime because they present an attractive
alternative to his corrupt and criminal rule. Third,
democracies with transparent governments, the rule of law, a
free media, and engaged citizens are naturally more resilient
to the spread of corruption beyond Russia's borders, thereby
limiting the opportunities for the further enrichment of Putin
and his chosen elite.
Mr. Putin has thus made it a priority of his regime to
attack the democracies of Europe and the United States and
undermine the transatlantic alliance upon which Europe's peace
and prosperity have depended upon for over 70 years. He has
used the security services, the media, public and private
companies, organized criminal groups, and social and religious
organizations to spread malicious disinformation, interfere in
elections, fuel corruption, threaten energy security, and more.
At their most extreme, the Russian government's security
services have been used to harass and even assassinate
political enemies at home and abroad; cheat at the Olympic
Games; and protect and exploit cybercriminals in Russia who
attack American businesses and steal the financial information
of American consumers. Mr. Putin resorts to the use of these
asymmetric tools to achieve his goals because he is operating
from a position of weakness--hobbled by a faltering economy, a
substandard military, and few followers on the world stage.
The tactics that Putin has deployed to undermine
democracies abroad were developed at home, and over nearly two
decades he has used them against the Russian people with
increased impunity. The result has been hundreds of billions of
dollars stolen and spirited away abroad, all while independent
media and civil society, elections, political parties, and
cultural institutions have been manipulated and suppressed,
significantly hindering effective domestic opposition to
Putin's regime.
While consolidating his grip on power at home, Mr. Putin
oversaw an opportunistic expansion of malign influence
operations abroad, targeting vulnerable states on Russia's
periphery, as well as countries in Western institutions like
the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). The Kremlin has substantially increased
its investments in propaganda outlets beyond Russia's borders,
funded and supported nongovernmental organizations and
political parties that advanced Mr. Putin's anti-EU and anti-
NATO agenda, nationalized mafia groups to help launder money
and commit other crimes for the state abroad, and used its
near-monopoly over energy supplies in some countries to exert
influence and spread corruption.
In semi-consolidated democracies and transitional
governments on Russia's periphery, the Kremlin most
aggressively targets states that seek to integrate with the EU
and NATO or present an opportunity to weaken those institutions
from within. For example, as Georgia and Ukraine moved closer
to these institutions, the Russian government attacked them
with cyberwarfare, disinformation campaigns, and military
force. When the Kremlin's attempt to politically influence
Montenegro's election failed, its security services allegedly
tried to launch a coup. In Serbia, the Kremlin exploits
cultural connections and leverages its near monopoly on energy
supplies to attempt to slow down or derail the country's
Western integration efforts. And though they are in the EU and
NATO, countries like Hungary and Bulgaria face acute challenges
from the Russian government, which exerts significant influence
in politics, business, and the energy sector. Despite some
efforts to counter Russian malign influence, these countries
remain significantly vulnerable to the Kremlin's corrupt
agenda.
In consolidated democracies within the EU and NATO, the
Russian government seeks to undermine support for sanctions
against Russia, interfere in elections through overt or covert
support of sympathetic political parties and the spread of
disinformation, and sow discord and confusion by exacerbating
existing social and political divisions through disinformation
and cultivated ideological groups. This group of countries has
developed several effective countermeasures that both deter
Russian government behavior and build societal resilience. As
it crafts its response, the United States should look to these
lessons learned:
The United Kingdom has made a point to publicly chastise
the Russian government for its meddling in democracies,
and moved to strengthen cybersecurity and electoral
processes.
Germany pre-empted Kremlin interference in its national
election with a strong warning of consequences, an
agreement among political parties not to use bots or
paid trolls, and close cyber cooperation between the
government and political campaigns.
Spain has led Europe in cracking down on Russia-based
organized crime groups that use the country as an
operational base and node for money laundering and
other crimes.
France has fostered strong cooperation between government,
political, and media actors to blunt the impact of the
Kremlin's cyber-hacking and smear campaigns.
The Nordic states have largely adopted a ``whole of
society'' approach against Mr. Putin's malign influence
operations, involving the government, civil society,
the media, and the private sector, with an emphasis on
teaching critical thinking and media literacy.
The Baltic states have kept their publics well-informed of
the malicious activities of Russia's security services,
strengthened defenses against cyberattacks and
disinformation, and diversified energy supplies to
reduce dependence on Russia.
While the countries of Europe have each had unique
responses to the Kremlin's aggression, they have also begun to
use regional institutions to knit together their efforts and
develop best practices. NATO and the EU have launched centers
focused on strategic communications and cyber defense, and
Finland's government hosts a joint EU/NATO center for
countering hybrid threats. A number of independent think tanks
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also launched
regional disinformation monitoring and fact-checking
operations, and European governments are supporting regional
programs to strengthen independent journalism and media
literacy. Some of these initiatives are relatively new, but
several have already begun to bear fruit and warrant continued
investment and broader expansion. Through the adoption of the
Third Energy Package, which promotes energy diversification and
integration, as well as a growing resistance to the Nord Stream
2 pipeline, many European countries are reducing their
dependence on Russian energy supplies, though much remains to
be done.
Despite the clear assaults on our democracy and our allies
in Europe, the U.S. government still does not have a coherent,
comprehensive, and coordinated approach to the Kremlin's malign
influence operations, either abroad or at home. Although the
U.S. government has for years had a patchwork of offices and
programs supporting independent journalism, cyber security, and
the countering of disinformation, the lack of presidential
leadership in addressing the threat Putin poses has hampered a
strong U.S. response. In early 2017, Congress provided the
State Department's Global Engagement Center the resources and
mandate to address Kremlin disinformation campaigns, but
operations have been stymied by the Department's hiring freeze
and unnecessarily long delays by its senior leadership in
transferring authorized funds to the office. While many mid-
level and some senior-level officials throughout the State
Department and U.S. government are cognizant of the threat
posed by Mr. Putin's asymmetric arsenal, the U.S. President
continues to deny that any such threat exists, creating a
leadership vacuum in our own government and among our European
partners and allies.
key recommendations
The recommendations below are based on a review of Mr.
Putin's efforts to undermine democracy in Europe and effective
responses to date. By implementing these recommendations, the
United States can better defend against and deter the Kremlin's
malign influence operations, and strengthen international norms
and values to prevent such behavior by Russia and other states.
A more comprehensive list of recommendations can be found in
Chapter Eight.
1. Assert Presidential Leadership and Launch a National
Response: President Trump has been negligent in
acknowledging and responding to the threat to U.S.
national security posed by Mr. Putin's meddling. The
President should immediately declare that it is U.S.
policy to counter and deter all forms of Russian hybrid
threats against the United States and around the world.
The President should establish a high-level inter-
agency fusion cell, modeled on the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), to coordinate all
elements of U.S. policy and programming in response to
the Russian government's malign influence operations.
And the President should present to Congress a
comprehensive national strategy to counter these grave
national security threats and work with the Congress
and our allies to get this strategy implemented and
funded.
2. Support Democratic Institution Building and Values Abroad
and with a Stronger Congressional Voice: Democracies
with transparent governments, the rule of law, a free
media, and engaged citizens are naturally more
resilient to Mr. Putin's asymmetric arsenal. The U.S.
government should provide assistance, in concert with
allies in Europe, to build democratic institutions
within the European and Eurasian states most vulnerable
to Russian government interference. Using the funding
authorization outlined in the Countering America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act as policy guidance,
the U.S. government should increase this spending in
Europe and Eurasia to at least $250 million over the
next two fiscal years. To reinforce these efforts, the
U.S. government should demonstrate clear and sustained
diplomatic leadership in support of individual human
rights that form the backbone of democratic systems.
Members in the U.S. Congress have a responsibility to
show U.S. leadership on values by making democracy and
human rights a central part of their agendas. They
should conduct committee hearings and use other
platforms and opportunities to publicly advance these
issues.
3. Expose and Freeze Kremlin-Linked Dirty Money: Corruption
provides the motivation and the means for many of the
Kremlin's malign influence operations. The U.S.
Treasury Department should make public any intelligence
related to Mr. Putin's personal corruption and wealth
stored abroad, and take steps with our European allies
to cut off Mr. Putin and his inner circle from the
international financial system. The U.S. government
should also expose corrupt and criminal activities
associated with Russia's state-owned energy sector.
Furthermore, it should robustly implement the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and the
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act,
which allow for sanctions against corrupt actors in
Russia and abroad. In addition, the U.S. government
should issue yearly reports that assign tiered
classifications based on objective third-party
corruption indicators, as well as governmental efforts
to combat corruption.
4. Subject State Hybrid Threat Actors to an Escalatory
Sanctions Regime: The Kremlin and other regimes hostile
to democracy must know that there will be consequences
for their actions. The U.S. government should designate
countries that employ malign influence operations to
assault democracies as State Hybrid Threat Actors.
Countries that are designated as such would fall under
a preemptive and escalatory sanctions regime that would
be applied whenever the state uses asymmetric weapons
like cyberattacks to interfere with a democratic
election or disrupt a country's critical
infrastructure. The U.S. government should work with
the EU to ensure that these sanctions are coordinated
and effective.
5. Publicize the Kremlin's Global Malign Influence Efforts:
Exposing and publicizing the nature of the threat of
Russian malign influence activities, as the U.S.
intelligence community did in January 2017, can be an
action-forcing event that not only boosts public
awareness, but also drives effective responses from the
private sector, especially social media platforms, as
well as civil society and independent media, who can
use the information to pursue their own investigations.
The U.S. government should produce yearly public
reports that detail the Russian government's malign
influence operations in the United States and around
the world.
6. Build an International Coalition to Counter Hybrid Threats:
The United States is stronger and more effective when
we work with our partners and allies abroad. The U.S.
government should lead an international effort of like-
minded democracies to build awareness of and resilience
to the Kremlin's malign influence operations.
Specifically, the President should convene an annual
global summit on hybrid threats, modeled on the Global
Coalition to Counter ISIL or the Countering Violent
Extremism (CVE) summits that have taken place since
2015. Civil society and the private sector should
participate in the summits and follow-on activities.
7. Uncover Foreign Funding that Erodes Democracy: Foreign
illicit money corrupts the political, social, and
economic systems of democracies. The United States and
European countries must make it more difficult for
foreign actors to use financial resources to interfere
in democratic systems, specifically by passing
legislation to require full disclosure of shell company
owners and improve transparency for funding of
political parties, campaigns, and advocacy groups.
8. Build Global Cyber Defenses and Norms: The United States
and our European allies remain woefully vulnerable to
cyberattacks, which are a preferred asymmetric weapon
of state hybrid threat actors. The U.S. government and
NATO should lead a coalition of countries committed to
mutual defense against cyberattacks, to include the
establishment of rapid reaction teams to defend allies
under attack. The U.S. government should also call a
special meeting of the NATO heads of state to review
the extent of Russian government-sponsored cyberattacks
among member states and develop formal guidelines on
how the Alliance will consider such attacks in the
context of NATO's Article 5 collective defense
provision. Furthermore, the U.S. government should lead
an effort to establish an international treaty on the
use of cyber tools in peace time, modeled on
international arms control treaties.
9. Hold Social Media Companies Accountable: Social media
platforms are a key conduit of disinformation campaigns
that undermine democracies. U.S. and European
governments should mandate that social media companies
make public the sources of funding for political
advertisements, along the same lines as TV channels and
print media. Social media companies should conduct
comprehensive audits on how their platforms may have
been used by Kremlin-linked entities to influence
elections occurring over the past several years, and
should establish civil society advisory councils to
provide input and warnings about emerging
disinformation trends and government suppression. In
addition, they should work with philanthropies,
governments, and civil society to promote media
literacy and reduce the presence of disinformation on
their platforms.
10. Reduce European Dependence on Russian Energy Sources:
Payments to state-owned Russian energy companies fund
the Kremlin's military aggression abroad, as well as
overt and covert activities that undermine democratic
institutions and social cohesion in Europe and the
United States. The U.S. government should use its trade
and development agencies to support strategically
important energy diversification and integration
projects in Europe. In addition, the U.S. government
should continue to oppose the construction of Nord
Stream 2, a project which significantly undermines the
long-term energy security of Europe and the economic
prospects of Ukraine.
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Chapter 1: Putin's Rise and Motivations
----------
A Russian interior minister once remarked that ``we are on
the eve of a revolution'' and ``to avert a revolution, we need
a small victorious war'' to ``distract the attention of the
masses.'' \1\ While he made the comment in 1903, the year
before the Russian Empire entered a disastrous war with
Imperial Japan, he could also have been speaking before Russian
forces invaded Chechnya in 1999, Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in
2014, or Syria in 2015. Those conflicts reflect a nearly
twenty-year pattern of the Kremlin prosecuting similar
`'small'' wars to achieve internal political objectives,
revealing a direct link between the Russian government's
external aggression and its internal oppression.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Simon Montefiore, The Romanovs, Alfred A. Knopf, at 514
(2016). When he made the remark, Vyacheslav Plehve, Tsar Nicholas's
interior minister, had just put down a strike in Odessa. He had also
turned the Ohkrana, the nickname for the Security Bureau, into ``the
world's most sophisticated secret police.'' Ibid. at 510. Lenin adopted
the Ohkrana's methods when he formed the Cheka, predecessor of Stalin's
NKVD, which became the KGB and, in its current incarnation, the FSB.
Ben Fischer, Okhrana: The Paris Operations of the Russian Imperial
Police, Diane Publishing, at 10 (1999).
\2\ See Statement of Daniel B. Baer, The European Union as a
Partner Against Russian Aggression: Sanctions, Security, Democratic
Institutions and the Way Forward, Hearing before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Apr. 4, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Vladimir Putin's Kremlin has used a sophisticated
combination of propaganda and suppression to keep the Russian
public supportive of wars abroad and distracted from the
regime's criminality and corruption at home. Putin's
overarching domestic objectives are to preserve his power and
increase his net worth, and he appears to have calculated that
his regime can best do so by inflating his approval ratings
with aggressive behavior abroad.\3\ While the first-order
effect of Putin's survival methodology poses a serious threat
to global peace and stability, it has also created a profound
series of second-order effects that threaten to corrode
democratic institutions and open economies around the world,
including here in the United States. It is not enough to sell
the necessity of Russia's foreign interventions to only a
domestic audience and to delegitimize or silence any Russian
voices that rise in opposition. For Putin to succeed, he also
requires a divided opposition abroad.
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\3\ Putin's net worth is estimated at between $40 billion and $200
billion (at the low end, making him the wealthiest person in Europe
and, at the high end, in the world) and, as some believe, is held
partly by a group of proxies. Samantha Karas, ``Vladimir Putin Net
Worth 2017: Russia's Leader May Be One of the Richest Men in the
World,'' International Business Times, Feb. 15, 2017; Organized Crime
and Corruption Reporting Project and Novaya Gazeta, Putin and the
Proxies, https://www.occrp.org/en/putinandtheproxies, Oct. 24, 2017.
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To that end, the Kremlin has honed its arsenal of malign
influence operations at home and taken it global. And while the
methods used may differ across countries, the goals are the
same: sow distrust and confusion, promote radical voices on
divisive political issues, and gain economic leverage, all
while eroding support for the democratic process and rules-
based institutions created in the aftermath of the Second World
War. These efforts are largely led by the government's security
services and buttressed by state-owned enterprises, Kremlin-
aligned oligarchs, and Russian criminal groups that have
effectively been nationalized by the state. The length and
intensity of these operations emanate out in geographic
concentric circles: they began in Russia, expanded to its
periphery, then into the rest of Europe, and finally to the
United States. The United States must now assume that the
Kremlin will deploy in America the more dangerous tactics used
successfully in Russia's periphery and the rest of Europe. This
includes, for example, support for extremist and far-right
groups that oppose democratic ideals, as well as attempts to
co-opt politicians through economic corruption.
Putin's regime appears intent on using almost any means
possible to undermine the democratic institutions and
transatlantic alliances that have underwritten peace and
prosperity in Europe for the past 70-plus years. To understand
the nature of this threat, it is important to first look at who
is responsible for it, their motivations, and what they are
willing and capable of doing to achieve their objectives. To
that end, the rest of this chapter will detail how Putin rose
to power by exploiting blackmail, the fear of terrorism, and
war, and subsequently used the security services to consolidate
political and economic power. The motivations and methods
behind Putin's rise help explain how he views the role of the
security services and his willingness to use them to do the
regime's dirty work, including assaulting democratic
institutions and values in Europe and the United States.
ASCENT TO THE TOP
In 1999, Russian president Boris Yeltsin faced a problem.
His second presidential term would end the following year, and
his political rivals appeared positioned to take power.
Russians at the time were not happy with Yeltsin's tenure:
hyperinflation, austerity, debt, and a disastrous privatization
scheme combined to decrease GDP by over 40 percent between 1990
and 1998, a collapse that was twice as large and lasted three
times longer than the Great Depression in the United States.\4\
The health and mortality crises that resulted from this
economic disaster are estimated to have caused at least three
million ``excess deaths.'' \5\ Yeltsin's approval ratings had
also cratered amid allegations of rampant corruption, which
also touched his family members. He needed a successor who
could protect him and his family after he left office, but no
one in his inner circle was nearly popular enough to secure
victory.\6\ He finally settled on a relatively unknown
bureaucrat to serve as his sixth prime minister in less than a
year and a half: Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, who was then
director of the Federal Security Service (or FSB, the KGB's
successor). Why Putin? In the words of one Russia expert, ``it
was like spin the bottle, and the bottle stopped spinning at
Putin.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Robert English, ``Russia, Trump, and a New Detente,'' Foreign
Affairs, Mar. 10, 2017.
\5\ Ibid.
\6\ Mikhail Zygar, All the Kremlin's Men, PublicAffairs, at 9
(2016).
\7\ Eleanor Clift, ``Blame This Drunken Bear for Vladimir Putin,''
The Daily Beast, Apr. 22, 2014 (quoting Russian expert Strobe
Talbott).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Putin had also shown that he was willing to protect Yeltsin
and his family. In 1999, Russia's prosecutor general, Yury
Skuratov, was conducting an investigation into high-level
corruption in the Kremlin, including among Yeltsin's family
members.\8\ As Skuratov was pursuing his investigation,
Yeltsin's chief of staff summoned him to the Kremlin and showed
him a grainy videotape that purported to show him with two
prostitutes in a hotel room. Skuratov submitted his
resignation, though he later insisted that the tape was a
fabrication.\9\ But the resignation had to be approved by the
upper chamber of Russia's parliament, the Federation Council,
which insisted that Skuratov testify first. The day before his
scheduled testimony, the sex tape was played on a television
station after reportedly being personally delivered by
Putin.\10\ When showing the tape on TV did not prove enough to
push the Federation Council into action, Putin went on TV
himself and told the Russian public that the man in the tape
was indeed Skuratov.\11\ A former KGB general, Oleg Kalugin,
maintains that the whole episode ``was a special FSB operation
to discredit an official with the help of a video featuring a
person who resembled the prosecutor-general.'' \12\ The
`'special operation'' succeeded, and Yeltsin chose Putin to
succeed him.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Sharon LaFraniere, ``Yeltsin Linked to Bribe Scheme,'' The
Washington Post, Sept. 8, 1999. A Swiss construction company, Mabetex,
which had won renovation contracts at the Kremlin, was found to have
spent between $10-15 million on bribes for Russian officials, including
President Yeltsin and his two daughters. Ibid.
\9\ Julia Ioffe, ``How State-Sponsored Blackmail Works in Russia,''
The Atlantic, Jan. 11, 2017; ``World: Europe Kremlin Corruption
Battle,'' BBC News, Apr. 2, 1999.
\10\ Julia Ioffe, ``How State-Sponsored Blackmail Works in
Russia,'' The Atlantic, Jan. 11, 2017. The tape was ``rumored to have
been delivered personally to the head of RTR by `a man who looked like
the head of the FSB,' who at the time was none other than Vladimir
Putin.'' Ibid.
\11\ Ibid. The tape was also reportedly authenticated by Yuri
Chaika, who succeeded Skuratov as Russia's prosecutor general. Andrew
E. Kramer, ``The Master of `Kompromat' Believed to Be Behind Trump
Jr.'s Meeting,'' The New York Times, July 17, 2017.
\12\ Anastasia Kirilenk & Claire Bigg, ``Ex-KGB Agent Kalugin:
Putin Was `Only a Major,' '' Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty, Mar. 31
2015.
\13\ Celestine Bohlen, ``Yeltsin Resigns, Naming Putin as Acting
President To Run in March Election,'' The New York Times, Jan. 1,
2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Putin's confirmation vote for prime minister was called
during Parliament's August recess, when legislators were
distracted by upcoming parliamentary elections in four
months.\14\ There was not much debate about Putin's promise to
`'strengthen the executive vertical of power'' or to do away
with direct elections of regional governors.\15\ The leader of
the centrist group Regions of Russia, Oleg Morozov, reflected
the overall mood of the legislature when he said, ``I don't
think we should torment ourselves with this decision . . . .
We should vote, forget about it, and get on with business. We
all have things to do.'' \16\ Some in parliament were said to
have supported Putin ``mainly because he will be yet another
`technical' prime minister'' and would have ``no real political
role.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Vladimir Kura-Murza, ``The August Vote That Changed Russia's
History,'' World Affairs, Aug. 16, 2017.
\15\ Ibid.
\16\ Ibid.
\17\ Floriana Fossato, ``Russia: Duma Approves Putin as Prime
Minister,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Aug. 9, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A poll taken at the same time of the confirmation vote
showed that just two percent of Russia's population favored
Putin for the presidency.\18\ But it did not take long for
Putin to seize on an opportunity--though a tragic one--to
increase his public profile and strengthen his position to
succeed Yeltsin. In early September 1999, less than three weeks
after Putin was installed as prime minister, a series of large
bombs destroyed apartment buildings in Dagestan, Volgodonsk,
and Moscow, killing hundreds of people as they slept.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ International Republican Institute, Russia Presidential Pre-
Election Assessment Report, at 7 (Mar. 20, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prime Minister Putin reacted fiercely and promised to hunt
down the terrorists and even ``wipe them out in the outhouse,''
if that was where they chose to hide.\19\ Despite no clear
evidence or claims of responsibility linking the bombings to
``Chechen terrorists,'' within days of the last explosion,
Russian warplanes started a bombing campaign in Chechnya that
the Russian defense minister claimed would ``eliminate the
bandits,'' and within a week, Russian troops crossed Chechnya's
border. \20\ As the war progressed, so did Putin's popularity,
and the number of voters who said they would choose him for
president increased sharply: from just two percent in August
1999 (before the bombings), to 21 percent in October, then
nearly doubling to 40 percent in November, and reaching 55
percent in December.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Sergei Karpov, ``Putin Vows to Annihilate `Terrorists' after
Suicide Bombings,'' Reuters, Dec. 31, 2013.
\20\ David Satter, The Less You Know, the Better You Sleep:
Russia's Road to Terror and Dictatorship under Yeltsin and Putin, Yale
University Press, at 11 (2016); Ruslan Musayev, ``Russia Prepared for
Ground War Against Chechnya,'' Associated Press, Sept. 27, 1999.
\21\ International Republican Institute, Russia Presidential Pre-
Election Assessment Report, at 7 (Mar. 20, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet even though Russian authorities said that there was a
``Chechen trail'' leading to the bombings, no Chechen claimed
responsibility.\22\ In February 2000, the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee asked then Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright if she believed that ``the Russian government is
justified when it accuses Chechen groups as responsible for the
bombings.'' Secretary Albright responded: ``We have not seen
evidence that ties the bombings to Chechnya.'' \23\ To this
day, no credible source has ever claimed credit for the
bombings and no credible evidence has been presented by the
Russian authorities linking Chechen terrorists, or anyone else,
to the Moscow bombings (for more information on the 1999
apartment building bombings, see Appendix A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Satter, The Less You Know, the Better You Sleep, at 2 (citing
Ilyas Akhmadov & Miriam Lansky, The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won
and Lost, Palgrave Macmillan, at 162 (2010)).
\23\ Responses of Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to
Additional Questions Submitted by Senator Jesse Helms, 2000 Foreign
Policy Overview and the President's Fiscal Year 2001 Foreign Affairs
Budget Request, Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Feb. 8, 2000, S. Hrg. 106-599 at 70.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
RETURN OF THE SECURITY SERVICES
On December 31, 1999, President Yeltsin resigned, making
Putin acting president and pushing forward the date of the
presidential election from June to March--effectively cutting
the remaining campaign period in half. With the advantage of
incumbency, a short campaign period, a large amount of monetary
support from business interests (the average check from
oligarchs to the campaign was about $10 million), and rising
popularity from the prosecution of the war in Chechnya, Putin
won the presidency at the ballot box with 53 percent of the
vote.\24\ For his first act as president, he guaranteed Yeltsin
immunity from prosecution.\25\ He was now the most powerful man
in Russia; yet even before his election, he had already been
hard at work extending his influence throughout the government.
Yeltsin would recall later in his memoirs that, after he
appointed Putin as prime minister, ``[he] turned to me and
requested absolute power . . . to coordinate all power
structures.'' \26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Zygar, All the Kremlin's Men, at 11; Michael Wines, ``Putin
Wins Russia Vote in First Round, But His Majority Is Less Than
Expected,'' The New York Times, Mar. 27, 2000.
\25\ Statement of David Satter, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute,
Russia: Rebuilding the Iron Curtain, Hearing before the U.S. House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 17, 2007.
\26\ Amy Knight, ``Finally, We Know About the Moscow Bombings,''
The New York Review of Books, Nov. 22, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And so he did. Putin eliminated independent centers of
power by redistributing resources from oligarchs to security
officers, absorbing oligarch-controlled media empires, and
neutering regional power centers that did not respect Moscow's
orders.\27\ He began to install former colleagues into
positions of power, drawing from his contacts both in the
security services and from his time working in the mayor's
office in St. Petersburg in the 1990s.\28\ By 2004, former
security services personnel reportedly occupied all of the top
federal ministerial posts and 70 percent of senior regional
posts.\29\ A 2006 analysis by the director of the Center for
the Study of Elites at the Russian Academy of Sciences
estimated that those with backgrounds affiliated with the
military or security services composed 78 percent of Russia's
leading political figures.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Minchenko Consulting Communication Group (Russia), Vladimir
Putin's Big Government and the ``Politburo 2.0.,'' Jan. 14, 2016.
\28\ Satter, The Less You Know, The Better You Sleep, at 79;
Damien Sharkov, `` `Putin Involved in Drug Smuggling Ring', Says Ex-KGB
Officer,'' Newsweek, Mar. 3, 2015.
\29\ Satter, The Less You Know, The Better You Sleep, at 79.
\30\ Peter Finn, ``In Russia, A Secretive Force Widens,'' The
Washington Post, Dec. 12, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some experts maintain that there is no precise ``vertical
of power'' in the Russian government, with everything
controlled by one man. Rather, they describe Russian power as
``a conglomerate of clans and groups that compete with one
another over resources,'' with Putin acting as a powerful
arbiter and moderator who has the last word.\31\ His power
comes from his office, his relations with the elites, his high
approval ratings among the public, as well as his control over
much of the energy sector and major state-owned banks and,
especially, the security services.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Minchenko Consulting, Vladimir Putin's Big Government and the
``Politburo 2.0.''
\32\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Putin's power increased, so did that of the security
services, which, according to independent journalists Andrei
Soldatov and Irina Borogan, Putin invited ``to take their place
at the head table of power and prestige in Russia'' as he
``opened the door to many dozens of security service agents to
move up in the main institutions of the country.'' \33\
Russia's security services are aggressive, well-funded by the
state, and operate without any legislative oversight. They
conduct not just espionage, but also ``active measures aimed at
subverting and destabilizing European governments, operations
in support of Russian economic interests, and attacks on
political enemies.'' \34\ Some analysts assert that the
security services are divided internally, compete in
bureaucratic turf wars, and make intelligence products of
questionable quality. Nonetheless, they are extremely active
and, since returning to the presidency in 2012, Putin has
``unleashed increasingly powerful intelligence agencies in
campaigns of domestic repression and external
destabilization.'' \35\ Similar to his predecessors, Putin
believes that he can best hold together Russia, with its
variety of ethnicities and disparate regions, by using the
security services to concentrate economic resources and
political power.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Andrei Soldatov & Irina Borogan, The New Nobility: The
Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the
KGB, PublicAffairs, at 241 (2010).
\34\ Mark Galeotti, ``Putin's Hydra: Inside Russia's Intelligence
Services,'' European Council on Foreign Relations, at 1 (May 2016).
\35\ Ibid.
\36\ ``Take Care of Russia,'' The Economist, Oct. 22, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most powerful of Russia's four main intelligence
agencies is the FSB, which reports to Putin indirectly through
the head of the Presidential Administration (the executive
office of the president) and directly through informal channels
built on long-standing relationships.\37\ The FSB's mindset is
described as `'shaped by Soviet and Tsarist history: it is
suspicious, inward looking, and clannish.'' \38\ While its
predecessor, the KGB, was controlled by the Soviet Politburo,
the FSB is a `'self-contained, closed system'' that is
``personally overseen by Putin.'' \39\ The FSB also controls
the Investigative Committee, Russia's equivalent to the FBI,
meaning that no prosecutor's office has independent oversight
over it and the courts defer to it when making judgements. To
monitor the private and public sector, all large Russian firms
and institutions reportedly have FSB officers assigned to them,
a practice carried over from the Soviet Union.\40\ According to
scholars of the FSB, ``Putin's offer to the generation of
security service veterans was a chance to move to the top
echelons of power. Their reach now extends from television to
university faculties, from banks to government ministries, but
they are not always visible as men in epaulets . . . . Many
officers, supposedly retired, were put in place as active
agents in business, media, and the public sector while still
subordinated to the FSB.'' \41\ And, according to Vladimir
Kara-Murza, the twice-poisoned Russian opposition activist, the
FSB ``doesn't just rule Russia, it owns it.'' \42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Galeotti, ``Putin's Hydra: Inside Russia's Intelligence
Services,'' at 12.
\38\ Soldatov & Borogan, The New Nobility: The Restoration of
Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB, at 242.
\39\ ``Wheels Within Wheels: How Mr. Putin Keeps the Country Under
Control,'' The Economist, 22 Oct. 2016.
\40\ Ibid.
\41\ Andrei Soldatov & Irina Borogan, The New Nobility: The
Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the
KGB, PublicAffairs, at 27, 28 (2010).
\42\ Committee Staff Discussion with Vladimir Kara-Murza.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The security services have grown accustomed to operating
with impunity inside Russia's borders. More alarmingly, over
the past decade they have applied this mentality beyond
Russia's borders with measurable success. They have been
accused of assassinating Putin's political opponents abroad
(see Appendix B), conspiring to cheat doping standards to win
more Olympic medals (see Appendix C), and protecting
cybercriminals who steal credit card and online account
information from U.S. consumers (see Appendix D).
THE KREMLIN'S PARANOID PATHOLOGY
Despite the Kremlin's increasingly aggressive tactics
beyond Russia's borders, the United States and its partners and
allies should not conflate the Russian people with the Russian
regime. The Russian people have the same hopes and aspirations
as any other country's citizens: a government that is
accountable to the people for providing safe streets and good
jobs, schools, and hospitals. But they are ruled by a regime
that has a very different set of priorities, focused primarily
on the maintenance of Putin's power and wealth. Free, fair, and
open elections are a threat to his grip on power and to the
enormous wealth he has stolen from Russia's people. If Putin
can demonstrate to the Russian people that elections everywhere
are tainted and fraudulent, that liberal democracy is a
dysfunctional and dying form of government, then their own
system of `'sovereign democracy''--authoritarianism secured by
corruption, apathy, and an iron fist--does not look so bad
after all. As the National Intelligence Council put it, Putin's
``amalgam of authoritarianism, corruption, and nationalism
represents an alternative to Western liberalism . . . [which]
is synonymous with disorder and moral decay, and pro-democracy
movements and electoral experiments are Western plots to weaken
traditional bulwarks of order and the Russian state.'' \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ National Intelligence Council, Global Trends: Paradox of
Progress at 125 (Jan. 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In dealing with Putin and his regime, the United States and
its partners and allies should not assume that they are working
with a government that is operating with the best interests of
its country in mind. Rather, according to a former British
ambassador to Moscow, Putin's ``overriding aim appears to be to
retain power for himself and his associates. He has no
perceptible exit strategy.'' \44\ Furthermore, Putin's regime
and most of the Russian people view the history of the late
20th century and early 21st century in a starkly different
light than most of the West does. The historical narrative
popular in Russia paints this period as one of repeated
attempts by the West to undermine and humiliate Russia. In
reality, the perceived aggression of the United States and the
West against Russia allows Putin to ignore his domestic
failures and present himself as the leader of a wartime nation:
a ``Fortress Russia.'' This narrative repeatedly flogs core
themes like enemy encirclement, conspiracy, and struggle, and
portrays the United States, NATO, and Europe as conspiring to
encircle Russia and make it subservient to the West.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Sir Roderic Lyne, Former British Ambassador to the Russian
Federation, Memorandum to the UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee,
Nov. 22, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As part of this supposed conspiracy, the EU goes after
former Soviet lands like Ukraine, and Western spies use civil
society groups to meddle in and interfere with Russian
affairs.\45\ A good example of this narrative at work was
Putin's remarks after terrorists attacked a school in Beslan,
Russia, in 2004, killing hundreds, many of whom were children.
Putin's response ignored the failure of his own security
services, and pointed the finger outward, declaring ``we live
in a time that follows the collapse of a vast and great state,
a state that, unfortunately, proved unable to survive in a
rapidly changing world . . . . Some would like to tear from us
a `juicy piece of pie.' Others help them.'' \46\ Putin's
reaction to that tragic event demonstrates the reasoning behind
analysts' observations that he embodies a ``combustible
combination of grievance and insecurity'' and that ``Russian
belligerence is not a sign of resurgence, but of a chronic,
debilitating weakness.'' \47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Monitor 360, Master Narrative Country Report: Russia (Feb.
2012).
\46\ Mikhail Zygar, All the Kremlin's Men, PublicAffairs, at 79
(2016).
\47\ William Burns, ``How We Fool Ourselves on Russia,'' The New
York Times, Jan. 7, 2017; ``The Threat from Russia,'' The Economist,
Oct. 22, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite Russia's weakness, however, Putin's regime has
developed a formidable set of tools to exert influence abroad.
According to a study by The Jamestown Foundation, these tools
include ``capturing important sectors of local economies,
subverting vulnerable political systems, corrupting national
leaders, penetrating key security institutions, undermining
national and territorial unity, conducting propaganda
offensives through a spectrum of media and social outlets, and
deploying a host of other tools to weaken obstinate governments
that resist Moscow.'' \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Janusz Bugajski & Margarita Assenova, Eurasian Disunion:
Russia's Vulnerable Flanks, The Jamestown Foundation, at 6 (June
2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the foreign policy front, Vladimir Putin's fortunes
improved in 2015. His military intervention in Syria
reestablished Russia as a geopolitical player in the Middle
East. In 2016, the UK voted to leave the European Union and the
United States elected Donald Trump, who had warmly praised
Putin's leadership. Pro-Russia candidates won elections in
Bulgaria and Moldova. But as Western democracies woke up to the
Kremlin's interference efforts to destabilize democratic
processes and international institutions, the pendulum has
begun to swing back in defense of democracy. Emmanuel Macron
won a resounding victory in France's presidential elections
last spring against a field of candidates with pro-Russian
sympathies. In Germany, Putin's critic Angela Merkel won a
plurality of votes in the September elections. And countries
throughout Europe, increasingly vigilant, are dedicating
increased resources and coordinating efforts to counter Russian
malign influence.
Nonetheless, the United States and Europe can and should
expect Putin to continue to use all the tools at his disposal
to assault democratic institutions and progress around the
world, just as he has done so successfully inside Russia over
nearly two decades.
----------
Chapter 2: Manipulation and
Repression Inside Russia
----------
Many of the tactics that Vladimir Putin's Kremlin has
deployed abroad to undermine democracy were first used
domestically, and their brazenness and brutality have grown
over time. To effectively understand and respond to the Russian
government's malign influence operations around the world,
then, requires starting at the Kremlin's own gates. Within
Russia, Putin's regime has harassed and killed whistleblowers
and human rights activists; crafted laws to hamstring
democratic institutions; honed and amplified anti-Western
propaganda; curbed media that deviate from a pro-government
line; beefed up internal security agencies to surveil and
harass human rights activists and journalists; directed
judicial prosecutions and verdicts; cultivated the loyalties of
oligarchs through corrupt handouts; and ordered violent
crackdowns against protesters and purported enemies. This
laundry list reflects not just governance tactics in the
abstract, but tangible, regrettable impacts on lives and
prosperity. Some cases in point: an estimated $24 billion
dollars has been amassed by Putin's inner circle through the
pilfering of state resources.\49\ At least 28 journalists have
been killed for their reporting inside Russia since Putin took
office in December 1999.\50\ The pro-Putin United Russia
party's hold on seats in the Russian Duma grew to 76 percent in
the 2016 elections, and the number of seats currently held by
liberal opposition has been reduced to zero.\51\ This chapter
illustrates in more detail the Kremlin's manipulation and
repression within its own borders, later deployed or mimicked
abroad, in three areas: ideological, political, and cultural
influence; controlling the public narrative; and corrupting
economic activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, Putin
and the Proxies, https://www.occrp.org/en/putinandtheproxies, Oct. 24,
2017.
\50\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``58 Journalists Killed in
Russia/Motive Confirmed,'' https://cpj.org/killed/europe/russia
(visited Dec. 5, 2017).
\51\ Andrew Osborn & Maria Tsvetkova, ``Putin Firms Control With
Big Win For Russia's Ruling Party,'' Reuters, Sept. 17, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In October 2014, Putin's then-first deputy chief of staff,
Vyacheslav Volodin, famously quipped that ``there is no Russia
today if there is no Putin.'' \52\ The statement encapsulated a
consolidation of power in Russia over nearly 15 years into a
``highly centralized, authoritarian political system dominated
by President Vladimir Putin.'' \53\ By equating Putin with the
Russian state, Volodin's assertion--just months after Russia's
invasion of Crimea that brought on international sanctions--
linked the fate of the Russian people with Putin's own. For
Putin and his advisors, the move to co-opt the identity of an
entire nation was no doubt fueled by his soaring popularity
among Russians--from a `'slumping'' 61 percent prior to the
Sochi Winter Olympics in February 2014 to above 80 percent in
the months after.\54\ Yet Volodin's statement also marked a
break from the Kremlin's attempts to maintain a semblance of
democratic institutions and processes--it revealed that these
institutions and processes, which became increasingly
subordinated to the needs and interests of Putin's ruling
clique, now existed only to prop it up.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ `` `No Putin, No Russia,' Says Kremlin Deputy Chief of
Staff,'' The Moscow Times, Oct. 23, 2014.
\53\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2015: Russia, at 1.
\54\ Michael Birnbaum, ``How to Understand Putin's Jaw-droppingly
High Approval Ratings,'' The Washington Post, Mar. 6, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Volodin's predecessor as first deputy chief of staff,
Vladislav Surkov, had been credited with developing a policy of
`'sovereign democracy,'' an oxymoronic term explained by writer
Masha Lipman as a ``Kremlin coinage that conveys two messages:
first, that Russia's regime is democratic and, second, that
this claim must be accepted, period. Any attempt at
verification will be regarded as unfriendly and as meddling in
Russia's domestic affairs.'' \55\ As described in a 2016
profile, Surkov maneuvered through a complex Russian political
system to implement this vision, ``cultivating fake opposition
parties and funding pro-Kremlin youth groups. He personally
curated what was allowed on to Russia's television screens, and
was seen as the architect of `post-truth politics' where facts
are relative, a version of which some have suggested has now
taken hold in the west.'' \56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ Masha Lipman, ``Putin's `Sovereign Democracy,' '' The
Washington Post, July 15, 2006.
\56\ Shaun Walker, ``Kremlin Puppet Master's Leaked Emails Are
Price of Return to Political Frontline,'' The Guardian, Oct. 26, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin's concept of a `'sovereign democracy'' was
intended to serve not just as a mechanism for domestic
governance in Russia, but also as a model to other countries.
The more that Russia's sovereign democratic model could appeal
to and be replicated elsewhere as ``a style of government that
corresponds with the needs and interests of the power elites,''
the more Russia would be able to extend its diplomatic reach
and provide a counterpoint to the democratic principles that
the United States has long championed.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ David Clark, ``Putin Is Exporting `Sovereign Democracy' To New
EM Allies,'' The Financial Times, Dec. 20, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The trajectory of Russia's `'sovereign democracy''
experiment has unfolded along a spectrum ranging from deft
manipulation to outright oppression of the media, civil
society, elections, political parties, and cultural activities.
All the while, the Kremlin's sustained and global effort to
undermine human rights and the governments, alliances, and
multilateral institutions that champion them has sought to
reduce outside scrutiny of the anti-democratic abuses that are
core to its `'sovereign democratic'' system. And similar to
Putin's capitalizing on the 1999 apartment bombings to
galvanize his own standing (see Chapter 1 and Appendix A), he
has used other hardships befalling the Russian people as
justification for tightening his grip on power. Such
punctuating moments include the Kursk submarine disaster in
2000, which prefaced a crackdown on media critical of the
government's response; the 2004 terrorist siege of a school in
Beslan, after which Putin moved to replace a system of
popularly-elected regional governors with centrally-appointed
ones; and international sanctions resulting from the 2014
Russian military invasion of Ukraine, upon which Putin has
amplified the narrative of Russia as a besieged fortress
requiring his strong hand to defend.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ The Russian navy submarine Kursk sank in the Barents Sea on
August 12, 2000 after multiple explosions onboard, resulting in the
deaths of 118 Russian seamen. In the aftermath of the disaster, reports
revealed that 23 crewmen had survived the initial explosion, but likely
died several hours later in an escape compartment that filled with
water, raising questions of whether the individuals could have been
rescued in the interim. Government officials first claimed that the
sinking was caused by a collision with a Western submarine, disputing
assertions that faulty onboard equipment led to the disaster, and
initially rejected foreign offers of assistance with the rescue effort.
See ``What Really Happened to Russia's `Unsinkable' Sub,'' The
Guardian, Aug. 4, 2001. In 2004, a group of Chechen rebels besieged a
school in Beslan, North Ossetia, taking more than 1,000 individuals
hostage, many of whom were children. Russian security services stormed
the facility in an operation to end the standoff, during which
approximately 330 individuals were killed. The European Court of Human
Rights recently ruled in a complaint case brought by 409 Russian
nationals that their government failed to prevent, and then overreacted
in responding to, the attack, leading to inordinate loss of life. See
European Court of Human Rights, ``Serious Failings in the Response of
the Russian Authorities to the Beslan Attack,'' Apr. 13, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another key opportunity he seized was to bring a face-
saving close to the conflict in Chechnya--a major element of
the Putin founding narrative, as discussed in Chapter 1--by
supporting strongman Ramzan Kadyrov's effort to stamp out
rivals in Chechnya who were fueling the insurgency against
Moscow and effectively establish his own fiefdom in the Chechen
republic.\59\ Observers have noted that the brutal Kadyrov is
``essentially employed by Putin to stop Chechens from killing
Russians, but he has also been linked to a long list of
killings'' and human rights abuses in the North Caucasus region
and elsewhere in the country.\60\ Moscow has provided subsidies
to cover an estimated 81 percent of the Chechen Republic's
budget.\61\ In exchange, Putin relies on Kadyrov and his
security services to keep a lid on the Chechen conflict,
deploys them as needed for hybrid operations in Ukraine and
Syria, and uses the threat of terrorism in Chechnya as
justification for restricting civic freedoms throughout the
country.\62\ The outsized power Putin has afforded to internal
security services (in both Moscow and Grozny) has proven useful
to him, but has also placed the Kremlin atop a figurative tiger
that it must ride in an inherently corrupt, brittle system
fraught with risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, ``Is Chechnya Taking Over Russia?''
The New York Times, Aug. 17, 2017.
\60\ Oliver Bullough, ``Putin's Closest Ally--And His Biggest
Liability,'' The Guardian, Sept. 23, 2015. In December 2017, Kadyrov
was sanctioned by the U.S. government for gross violations of human
rights under the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act. U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
``Publication of Magnitsky Act Sanctions Regulations; Magnitsky Act-
Related Designations,'' Dec. 20, 2017.
\61\ Anna Arutunyan, ``Why Putin Won't Get Tough on Kadyrov,''
European Council on Foreign Relations, Apr. 25, 2017.
\62\ Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, ``Is Chechnya Taking Over Russia?''
The New York Times, Aug. 17, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFLUENCING IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND CULTURE
Independent Civil Society
Soviet-era dissidents who monitored and exposed state
repression provided the main blueprint for a modern-day
independent and activist civil society in Russia. And much like
their Soviet predecessors, Putin's Kremlin has suppressed
independent civil society and human rights activists through a
variety of means, including legal restrictions and
administrative burdens, the creation of government-sponsored
civil society groups to counter independent organizations, and
violent attacks.
Russia's restrictive legal framework for civil society was
designed and refined over many years. In December 2005, the
Duma passed amendments that increased scrutiny and bureaucratic
reporting requirements of NGO finances and operations, used
vaguely defined provisions to prohibit foreign NGO programming,
barred foreign nationals or those deemed ``undesirable'' from
founding NGOs inside the country, and prohibited any NGO deemed
a threat to Russian national interests.\63\ Surkov argued that
the amendments were a needed defense against the specter of
Western countries and organizations set on fomenting regime
change in Russia. In 2012, after Putin's re-election to the
presidency, the Kremlin shepherded through new legislation that
further tightened the operating climate for NGOs: any group
receiving foreign funding and engaged in political activities
had to self-report as a ``foreign agent''--a Soviet-era term
used to describe spies and traitors.\64\ Observers widely saw
the foreign agent law as an attempt to stigmatize and deny
funding to NGOs working on human rights and democracy.\65\ In
May 2014, the law was amended to enable Russia's Justice
Ministry to directly register groups as foreign agents without
their consent, and authorities have since expanded the
definition of ``political activities'' to include possible
aspects of NGO work and fined or closed organizations for
violations of the law.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ Katherin Machalek, ``Factsheet: Russia's NGO Laws'' in
Contending With Putin's Russia: A Call for U.S. Leadership, at 10-13,
Freedom House, Feb. 6, 2013; ``Russian Duma Passes Controversial NGO
Bill,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Dec. 23, 2005.
\64\ Ibid. This term connotes a different meaning than the Foreign
Agents Registration Act in U.S. law, in which it is defined in part as
``any person who acts as an agent, representative, employee, or
servant, or any person who acts in any other capacity at the order,
request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal or
of a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly
supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or
in major part by a foreign principal'' and which, most significantly,
does not constrain activities of the agent but merely requires
registration. 22 U.S.C. Sec. 611(c).
\65\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2012: Russia, at 25.
\66\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2016: Russia, at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia's restrictive NGO laws have had a significant
effect. Human Rights Watch reported in September 2017 that
``Russia's Justice Ministry has designated 158 groups as
`foreign agents,' courts have levied staggering fines on many
groups for failing to comply with the law, and about 30 groups
have shut down rather than wear the `foreign agent' label.''
\67\ Other laws--relating to extremism, anti-terrorism, libel,
and public gatherings--have also been selectively utilized by
Russian officials to repress independent NGOs and human rights
activists, among other targets. The hostile environment for
domestic NGOs also fueled a blowback against foreign entities
who sought to support them. The United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), which for two decades had
supported democracy and rule of law promotion in Russia, as
well as health and education, announced in October 2012 that it
would shut down its mission amidst pressure from the
Kremlin.\68\ USAID was not alone: by December of that year, the
International Republican Institute (IRI) announced it was
closing its office on orders from the Russian government, and
the National Democratic Institute (NDI) closed its office in
Russia and moved its staff out of the country.\69\ In January
2015, the Chicago-based MacArthur Foundation announced it was
closing its Moscow office after the Duma asked the Justice
Ministry to investigate whether a select group of
organizations, including MacArthur as well as the U.S.-based
Open Society Foundations (OSF) and Freedom House, should be
declared ``undesirable'' and banned from the country.\70\ By
June 2017, the Russian government had listed OSF, NDI, IRI, and
eight other organizations as ``undesirable.'' \71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ Human Rights Watch, ``Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups,''
Sept. 8, 2017.
\68\ Arshad Mohammed, ``USAID Mission In Russia To Close Following
Moscow Decision,'' Reuters, Sept. 18, 2012.
\69\ ``U.S. Pro-Democracy Groups Pulling Out Of Russia,'' Reuters,
Dec. 14, 2012; National Democratic Institute, Russia: Overview, https:/
/www.ndi.org/eurasia/russia (visited Dec. 11, 2017).
\70\ Alec Luhn, ``American Ngo to Withdraw From Russia After Being
Put on `Patriotic Stop List,' '' The Guardian, Jul 22, 2015.
\71\ The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, Civic Freedom
Monitor: Russia, http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.html,
(updated Sept. 8, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legal and administrative tactics used during Putin's tenure
to create headwinds against the work of independent civil
society organizations have not only muted criticism of his own
regime at home and abroad, but have afforded other governments
a roadmap to similarly deflect criticism. Research by Human
Rights First published in February 2016 cites at least fourteen
countries where Russia has provided a ``bad example'' that may
have inspired other governments to introduce or pass
restrictive NGO laws; this includes countries like Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan traditionally viewed by Russia as within its
geographic sphere of influence, as well as countries further
afield such as Ethiopia, Cambodia, Egypt, and Ecuador.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Melissa Hooper & Grigory Frolov, Russia's Bad Example, Free
Russia Foundation, Human Rights First, Feb. 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin has also sought to co-opt civil society by
``devot[ing] massive resources to the creation and activities
of state-sponsored and state-controlled NGOs.'' \73\ Commonly
referred to as ``GONGOs'' (Government Organized Non-
Governmental Organizations), such groups are used to toe a
government-friendly line or to promote alternative narratives
to counter the work of legitimate Russian and international
human rights NGOs. As one former U.S. ambassador to the OSCE
described it, ``GONGOs are nothing more than the real-world
equivalent of the Internet troll armies that insecure,
authoritarian, repressive regimes have unleashed on Twitter.
They use essentially the same tactics as their online
counterparts--creating noise and confusion, flooding the space,
using vulgarity, intimidating those with dissenting views, and
crowding out legitimate voices.'' \74\ An expert from the
National Endowment for Democracy has noted that ``Russia sinks
extensive resources into GONGOs in countries on its periphery
and beyond,'' where it can ``eagerly exploit'' the relatively
free operating space for civil society to maximize their
impact.\75\ He also notes that, similar to Russia, ``leading
authoritarian governments have established a wide constellation
of regime-friendly GONGOs, including think tanks and policy
institutes, that operate at home and abroad.'' \76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Statement of Michael McFaul, Senior Associate, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Russia: Rebuilding the Iron Curtain,
Hearing before the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 17,
2007. McFaul became U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation in 2012.
\74\ Ambassador Daniel B. Baer, U.S. Permanent Representative to
the OSCE, ``Mind the GONGOs: How Government Organized NGOs Troll
Europe's Largest Human Rights Conference,'' U.S. Mission to the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Sept. 30, 2016.
\75\ Christopher Walker, ``Dealing with the Authoritarian
Resurgence,'' Authoritarianism Goes Global, Larry Diamond et al. eds.
at 226 (2016).
\76\ Ibid. at 218.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin has also focused on cultivating youth activism
to serve its own purposes. In 2005, after youth activists
fueled protests in Ukraine that ultimately toppled the
government, Surkov sought a buffer against such upheaval in
Russia. Seizing on the anxieties of a nascent youth group in
St. Petersburg, he helped develop it into the Nashi (``Ours'')
youth organization and recruited participants, particularly
from Russia's poorer regions, who could be readily mobilized as
a counter-force to pro-democracy demonstrations.\77\ The
group's first summit was held at a Kremlin-owned facility
outside Moscow and included pro-Kremlin activists.\78\ Within
months, Nashi held a rally in Moscow in which thousands of
activists were bussed in to celebrate Russia's World War II
victory over Germany.\79\ Nashi and its projects were funded by
both the state and pro-Kremlin oligarchs and focused on pro-
Putin gatherings and the political ``training'' of youth in
summer camp-style gatherings, which included posters demeaning
Kremlin critics and human rights activists as liars and
Nazis.\80\ More recently, a ``military-patriotic movement'' of
11- to 18-year-olds known as Yunarmiya (``Youth Army'') has
been promulgated in schools across Russia, a project of Russian
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu endorsed by Putin and enjoying
sponsorship from four state-owned banks.\81\ Its ranks swelled
from 100 members in 2016 to more than 30,000 a year later, and
Yunarmiya was prominently featured in the Kremlin's annual
World War II Victory Day parade in May 2017--just weeks after a
large number of Russian youth turned out at opposition-
organized anti-corruption protests around the country.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ Eva Hartog, ``A Kremlin Youth Movement Goes Rogue,'' The
Moscow Times, Apr. 8, 2016.
\78\ Mikhail Zygar, All the Kremlin's Men, PublicAffairs at 98
(2016).
\79\ Ibid. at 99.
\80\ Julia Ioffe, ``Russia's Nationalist Summer Camp,'' The New
Yorker, Aug. 16, 2010; Eva Hartog, ``A Kremlin Youth Movement Goes
Rogue,'' The Moscow Times, Apr. 8, 2016.
\81\ Ilnur Sharafiyev, ``Making Real Men Out of Schoolchildren,''
Meduza, Oct. 6, 2017.
\82\ Daniel Schearf, ``Putin's Youth Army Debuts on Red Square for
`Victory Day,' '' Voice of America, May 8, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the Kremlin has created a climate where physical
attacks against civil society activists, as well as political
opponents and independent journalists, occur regularly and
often with impunity (see Appendix E). While such attacks are
not exclusively part of the Russian `'sovereign democracy''
toolkit, the impunity with which they have been perpetrated in
Russia has provided comforting company to other authoritarian
governments who use similar tactics.
Political Processes, Parties, and Opposition
Russia's `'sovereign democracy'' relies on democratic
structures, albeit largely hollow ones, to give a sheen of
legitimacy to a regime that puts its own interests before those
of its citizens. Under Putin's leadership, the Russian
government has undermined political processes, parties, and
opposition that present a meaningful check on the Kremlin's
power.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ Statement of Michael McFaul, Senior Associate, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Russia: Rebuilding the Iron Curtain,
Hearing before the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 17,
2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Putin and his allies have neutered political competition by
creating rubber-stamp opposition parties and harassing
legitimate opposition. For example, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the
founder of the Russian oil company Yukos, was imprisoned for
more than a decade on a spate of charges deemed to be
politically motivated.\84\ His prosecution could be broadly
interpreted as a signal to other powerful oligarchs that
supporting independent or anti-Putin parties carries great risk
to one's personal wealth and well-being. Genuine opposition
party candidates have also been blocked from registering or
participating in elections.\85\ At the same time, parties
invented by the Kremlin to take away votes from the real
opposition have received resources and support from the state
and the private sector. Yet when these co-opted parties have
asserted a degree of independence, they have had their
leadership and resources gutted.\86\ More recently, opposition
activists attempting to join forces through the Khodorkovsky-
supported Open Russia platform have been blocked from using
hotels and conference facilities to hold gatherings, and some
have even had their homes raided.\87\ And the Kremlin appears
set on quashing the 2018 electoral aspirations of anti-
corruption activist and presidential hopeful Alexey Navalny, as
the Central Election Commission declared him ineligible to run
because of an embezzlement conviction, which international
observers and his supporters allege was politically
motivated.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ Tom Parfitt, ``Mikhail Khodorkovsky Sentenced to 14 years in
Prison,'' The Guardian, Dec. 30, 2010; David M. Herszenhorn & Steven
Lee Myers, ``Freed Abruptly by Putin, Khodorkovsky Arrives in
Germany,'' The New York Times, Dec. 20, 2013.
\85\ Statement of Michael McFaul, Senior Associate, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Russia: Rebuilding the Iron Curtain,
Hearing before the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 17,
2007.
\86\ Ibid.
\87\ ``Russian Law Enforcement Raid Homes of Khodorkovsky's Open
Russia Employees,'' The Moscow Times, Oct. 5, 2017; Anna Liesowska,
``Online Democracy Group Open Russia Refused Entry to Major Hotels,''
The Siberian Times, Mar. 27, 2015.
\88\ Vladimir Soldatkin & Andrew Osborn, ``Putin Critic Navalny
Barred from Russian Presidential Election,'' Reuters, Dec. 25, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Putin has also sought to centralize institutional power in
Moscow and weaken the parliament as a check on presidential
authority. Early in his first term, he undermined the authority
of elected regional governors by creating seven supra-regional
districts, to which he appointed mainly former generals and KGB
officers.\89\ By acquiring greater control over media
resources, he achieved electoral victories for a growing swath
of United Russia candidates and thereby reduced parliamentary
autonomy.\90\ In 2004, Putin ``radically restructured'' the
Russian political system by eliminating the election of
regional governors by popular vote in favor of centrally-
directed appointments, characterizing this significant power
grab as an effort to forge ``national cohesion'' in the wake of
the terrorist attack at a school in Beslan in North
Ossetia.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ Statement of Michael McFaul, Senior Associate, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Russia: Rebuilding the Iron Curtain,
Hearing before the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 17,
2007.
\90\ Peter Baker, ``Putin Moves to Centralize Authority,'' The
Washington Post, Sept. 14, 2004.
\91\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The erosion of democratic processes in Russia's elections
has directly corresponded to Putin's efforts to secure a
mandate and tighten his grip on power (see Appendix F for a
summary of flawed elections in Russia since 1999). Around the
most recent presidential election in 2012, in which Putin
returned to power amidst credible allegations of fraud, tens of
thousands of Russian citizens joined large-scale demonstrations
in Moscow in late 2011 and early 2012, chanting ``Russia
without Putin!''\92\ The Kremlin's response ranged from
coalescing support to cracking down on criticism. Throngs of
pro-government supporters were bussed in to participate in
campaign rallies expressing support for Putin in a ``battle''
for Russia that painted any opposition as traitorous.\93\
Following the protests that tarnished Putin's inauguration, the
government fast-tracked passage of a law that increased
administrative penalties by a factor of one hundred for
unsanctioned protests and other violations of the law on public
assembly.\94\ Working through the Investigative Committee, a
beefed-up internal security service that then-President Dmitry
Medvedev established in 2011 and which reports directly to the
president, the Kremlin carried out smear campaigns and
discredited opposition figures through dubious charges and
flawed legal proceedings.\95\ The backlash against political
competition reached alarming levels in February 2015, when
opposition leader Boris Nemtsov was murdered just steps from
the Kremlin.\96\ Nemtsov was to participate two days later in a
protest he organized against the Kremlin's economic
mismanagement and interference in Ukraine. He was also planning
to release a report on Russia's role in Ukraine.\97\ Observers
alleged that the demonization in pro-government media of
opposition figures as traitors had contributed to his
death.\98\ In June 2017, a Russian court convicted five Chechen
men of Nemtsov's killing. While the verdict was welcomed by the
United States and other governments, Nemtsov's supporters
charged that the masterminds behind the killing remained at
large, and Nemtsov's family has called for Ramzan Kadyrov to be
interrogated in the case.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ Ellen Barry & Michael Schwirtz, ``After Election, Putin Faces
Challenges to Legitimacy,'' The New York Times, Mar. 5, 2012.
\93\ Marc Bennetts, ``How Putin Tried and Failed To Crush Dissent
in Russia,'' Newsweek, Feb. 26, 2016.
\94\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2012: Russia, at 24.
\95\ Nastassia Astrasheuskaya & Steve Gutterman, ``Putin Foe
Charged, Russian Opposition Fear KGB Tactics,'' Reuters, July 31,
2012.
\96\ ``Russian Opposition Politician Boris Nemtsov Shot Dead,''
BBC, Feb. 28, 2015.
\97\ Alec Lunh, ``Boris Nemtsov Report on Ukraine to be Released by
Dead Politician's Allies,'' The Guardian, May 12, 2015.
\98\ ``Russian Opposition: Critics or Traitors?'' Al Jazeera, Mar.
2, 2015.
\99\ Ivan Nechepurenko, ``5 Who Killed Boris Nemtsov, Putin Foe,
Sentenced in Russia,'' The New York Times, July 13, 2017; ``Nemtsov's
Daughter Requests Questioning Of Kadyrov,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, Apr. 28, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notably, despite this hostile climate, large-scale
opposition protests have continued each year on the anniversary
of Nemtsov's death. In addition, presidential hopeful Alexey
Navalny spearheaded several anti-corruption protests in cities
across Russia in 2017. Using social media, Navalny's Anti-
Corruption Fund has broadly circulated the results of its
investigative work into alleged corruption by Prime Minister
Dmitry Medvedev and other high-ranking officials. At least
1,750 Russian citizens were detained after June 2017 anti-
corruption protests, according to the Russian monitoring group
OVD-Info.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ Marc Bennetts, ```There Are Better Things Than Turnips:'
Navalny Plans Putin Birthday Protests,'' The Guardian, Oct. 5, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cultural Forces and Religious Institutions
Under Putin, the Kremlin has engaged and boosted cultural
forces and religious institutions inside Russia to provide an
additional bulwark against the democratic values and actors it
paints as anathema to the country's interests. One prominent
example is the strong ties that Putin and his inner circle have
forged with the Russian Orthodox Church and its
affiliates.\101\ The Russian Orthodox Church enjoys special
recognition under Russian law, while in contrast, laws such as
the 2006 NGO laws and the 2016 ``Yarovaya'' package of
counterterrorism laws have enabled pressure against non-Russian
Orthodox religious entities through cumbersome registration
processes and administrative constraints, restrictions on
proselytizing, and expanded surveillance.\102\ Additionally,
the U.S. State Department has reported that the Russian state
has provided security and official vehicles to the Russian
Orthodox patriarch (but not to other religious leaders) and
noted reports that the Russian Orthodox Church has been a
``primary beneficiary'' of presidential grants ostensibly
designed to reduce NGO dependence on foreign funding.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\ See Chapter 4 for more information on the Russian Orthodox
Church's role in promoting Kremlin objectives abroad.
\102\ U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom
Report for 2006, Russia; U.S. Department of State, International
Religious Freedom Report for 2016: Russia, at 1.
\103\ U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom
Report for 2016: Russia, at 23-24; U.S. Department of State, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Russia, at 53 (citing
report published in the Moscow Times.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In return for the state's favor, the Russian Orthodox
Church has promoted Putin and the state's policies at multiple
turns. A former editor of the official journal of the Moscow
Patriarchate (the seat of the Russian Orthodox Church and its
affiliated churches outside the country) told The New York
Times in 2016 that ``The [Russian Orthodox] church has become
an instrument of the Russian state. It is used to extend and
legitimize the interests of the Kremlin.'' \104\ This is
noteworthy given Putin's roots in the KGB--the tip of the
Soviet spear in restricting religious activity during the
Communist era--and it reflects a careful cultivation of his
identity as a man of faith and a defender of the Orthodox
faithful. The image of Putin as defender of traditional
religious and cultural values has also been leveraged by the
Kremlin ``as both an ideology and a source of influence
abroad.'' \105\ In projecting itself as ``the natural ally of
those who pine for a more secure, illiberal world free from the
tradition-crushing rush of globalization, multiculturalism and
women's and gay rights,'' the Russian government has been able
to mobilize some Orthodox actors in places like Moldova and
Montenegro to vigorously oppose integration with the West.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\ Andrew Higgins, ``In Expanding Russian Influence, Faith
Combines With Firepower,'' The New York Times, Sept. 13, 2016.
\105\ Simon Shuster, ``Russia's President Putin Casts Himself as
Protector of the Faith,'' TIME, Sept. 12, 2016.
\106\ Andrew Higgins, ``In Expanding Russian Influence, Faith
Combines With Firepower,'' The New York Times, Sept. 13, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin's cultivation of the Russian Orthodox Church
intensified following the massive 2011-12 street protests
opposing Putin's return to the presidency. Patriarch Kirill,
who assumed leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2009,
endorsed Putin's long rule as a ``miracle of God'' on February
8, 2012, weeks before the presidential election. He praised
Putin for ``correcting [the] crooked twist'' of Russia's
tumultuous democratic transition in the 1990s, and derided
Putin's opponents as materialistic and a threat to Russia.\107\
Eleven days later, members of the rock group Pussy Riot
performed a protest song, ``Virgin Mary, Redeem Us of Putin''
in Moscow's Cathedral of Christ the Savior. In a high-profile
and widely criticized prosecution, three Pussy Riot members
were later sentenced to two years' imprisonment for
``hooliganism motivated by religious hatred.'' \108\ In a
December 2012 speech, Putin invoked traditional and spiritual
values as the antidote to Russian decline and criticized
foreign influences, defining Russia's democracy as ``the power
of the Russian people with their traditions'' and ``absolutely
not the realization of standards imposed on us from outside.''
\109\ And in January 2013, Putin signed a law criminalizing
``insulting religious believers' feelings'' which enabled fines
and prison time of up to three years.\110\ The Kremlin's
fueling of culture wars has also provided context for the
passage of laws criminalizing ``gay propaganda'' and
decriminalizing first instances of domestic violence.\111\ The
effects of these laws on the security of LGBT persons and women
in Russia is discussed in more detail in Appendix G.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ Gleb Bryanski, ``Russian Patriarch Calls Putin Era `Miracle
Of God,' '' Reuters, Feb. 8, 2012.
\108\ U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom
Report for 2012, Russia, at 9.
\109\ Ellen Barry, ``Russia's History Should Guide Its Future,
Putin Says,'' The New York Times, Dec. 12, 2012.
\110\ Carl Schreck, ``Holy Slight: How Russia Prosecutes For
`Insulting Religious Feelings,' '' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
Aug. 15, 2017.
\111\ Lucian Kim, ``Russian President Signs Law to Decriminalize
Domestic Violence,'' National Public Radio, Feb. 16, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONTROLLING THE PUBLIC NARRATIVE
Media Capture
Throughout Putin's tenure in Russia, the Kremlin has
pressured independent media outlets to prevent them from being
a meaningful check on his power. From the early days of Putin's
first term, the U.S. State Department noted the threats to
editorial independence posed by an increasing concentration of
media ownership in Russia and news organizations' heavy
reliance on financial sponsors or federal and local government
support to operate.\112\ Print media required the services of
state-owned printing and distribution companies, while
broadcast media relied on the government for access to airwaves
and accreditation to cover news. Kremlin favoritism, then,
played heavily in determining which outlets survived.
Conversely, media outlets that criticized President Putin or
his actions risked retaliation.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2001, Russia.
\113\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2001, Russia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A seminal moment in the Kremlin's efforts to capture the
media in Russia came after the August 2000 Kursk submarine
disaster that killed 118 Russian seamen. Questions swirled
about how much the government knew about the accident and
whether it had done enough to mitigate it.\114\ Putin, who had
been vacationing in Sochi when the Kursk disaster unfolded and
did not speak about it until days later, held a town hall with
families of the dead, in which several relatives excoriated him
for incompetence. Despite Kremlin efforts to limit media access
to one Russian state broadcaster and to heavily edit the
footage that was aired, international and Russian print media
released details of the meeting and interviews with family
members that cast Putin's young government in a harsh
light.\115\ In a secretly taped record of the meeting by a
journalist from Kommersant, a national Russian newspaper, Putin
fumed that national television channels were lying about the
Kursk events and accused them of destroying the Russian
military through their corruption and efforts to discredit the
government.\116\ The independent channel NTV, founded by
oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky, had swiftly challenged the
government's explanation of the Kursk tragedy and criticized
its refusal of foreign assistance for the first five days
following the initial explosion.\117\ (NTV had also aired a
piece in 1999 asserting an FSB role in the failed apartment
bombing in Ryazan, after which the Kremlin informed Gusinsky he
had ``crossed the line.'' In 2000, Gusinsky was briefly jailed,
exiled, and pressured to sell his stake in NTV to the state
energy company Gazprom.) \118\ In October 2000, a critical one-
hour TV special aired about the Kursk disaster on ORT, a public
television channel partly owned by oligarch Boris Berezovsky,
who had helped to execute the smooth transfer of power from
Yeltsin to Putin a year earlier but subsequently fell out of
favor with the Kremlin and announced his opposition.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\ Michael Wines, `` `None of Us Can Get Out' Kursk Sailor
Wrote,'' The New York Times, Oct. 27, 2000.
\115\ Ian Traynor, ``Putin Faces Families' Fury,'' The Guardian,
Aug. 22, 2000.
\116\ Arkady Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia: The Journey from
Gorbachev's Freedom to Putin's War, Atlantic Books, at 277-78 (2015).
\117\ See Jonathan Steele, ``Fury Over Putin's Secrets and Lies,''
The Guardian, Aug. 21, 2000.
\118\ Robert Coalson, ``Ten Years Ago, Russia's Independent NTV,
The Talk Of The Nation, Fell Silent,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
Apr. 14, 2011. NTV was founded by opposition oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky
and was known for its popular satirical puppet show called Kukly
(``Dolls'') that lampooned Putin and other politicians.
\119\ Inna Denisova & Robert Coalson, ``Kursk Anniversary:
Submarine Disaster Was Putin's `First Lie,' '' Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, Aug. 12, 2015; ``Oligarch Who Angered Putin: Rise and Fall of
Boris Berezovsky,'' CNN, Mar. 25, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin took steps thereafter to further rein in both
NTV and ORT, and then other media outlets over which it lacked
effective or editorial control. Beyond targeting its patron
Gusinsky, the Kremlin began after Kursk to target NTV's
investigative journalists and editorial infrastructure. A
popular NTV presenter was questioned by prosecutors early in
2001, and the phone line of NTV managing director Evgeniy
Kiselev was reportedly tapped.\120\ Gazprom undertook a
``corporate coup'' of the channel in an early morning office
raid in April 2001, installing a new editorial staff.\121\ NTV
was subsequently transformed into largely an entertainment
channel, focused on ``pulp crime reporting and low-brow action
series instead of critical political coverage.'' \122\
Meanwhile, the Kremlin reportedly delivered a message to
Berezovsky after the Kursk disaster that he would no longer be
permitted to control ORT's editorial policy; Berezovsky
subsequently sold his stake in ORT to oligarch Roman
Abramovich, who asserted years later in UK court proceedings
that Putin and his chief of staff had directed him to make the
purchase.\123\ ORT was subsequently transformed into Perviy
Kanal (``Channel One''), which has become Russia's largest
state-controlled national television network.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia, at 281.
\121\ Ibid. at 280-81.
\122\ ``Takeover Not Celebrated,'' The Moscow Times, Apr. 14,
2011.
\123\ Zygar, All the Kremlin's Men, at 29.
\124\ Joshua Yaffa, ``Putin's Master of Ceremonies,'' The New
Yorker, Feb. 5, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin's early efforts to neutralize independent or
critical national media and consolidate state ownership of
media outlets had a chilling effect on the development of
independent journalism in the country, and both official and
unofficial pressure have continued against TV, print, and
online media outlets that challenge the Kremlin line. Since
Putin's return to the presidency in 2012, a spate of firings,
resignations, and closures among numerous media outlets suggest
that the Kremlin under Putin has no intention of reversing its
longstanding trend of controlling the media space. For example,
a high-ranking executive and editor of the Kommersant-Vlast
news magazine was fired in late 2011 after publishing
allegations of fraud in the parliamentary elections that year
and a photo of a ballot with an expletive regarding Putin
written on it.\125\ RIA-Novosti, Russia's state-run
international news agency, was liquidated in December 2013 on a
decree from Putin and refashioned into Russiya Segodnya
(``Russia Today'') under the helm of an unabashedly pro-Kremlin
commentator, Dmitry Kiselev.\126\ In 2014, opposition channel
Dozhd (``Rain'') was dropped from several cable providers and
evicted from its Moscow studio space.\127\ The U.S. State
Department has noted that `'significant government pressure''
continues on Russian independent media, limiting coverage of
Ukraine, Syria, elections, and other sensitive topics and
prompting ``widespread'' self-censorship.\128\ Meanwhile,
state-controlled media regularly slander opposition views as
traitorous or foreign, which has engendered ``a climate
intolerant of dissent'' in which a spate of violent attacks and
criminal prosecutions of journalists have occurred (see
Appendix E).\129\ Most recently, on November 25, 2017, Putin
signed a bill enabling Russian authorities to list and
scrutinize media outlets as ``foreign agents''and requiring
their content to be branded as such as well as their foreign
funding sources to be disclosed.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ Michael Schwirtz, ``2 Leaders in Russian Media Are Fired
After Election Articles,'' The New York Times, Dec. 13, 2011.
\126\ Daniel Sandford, ``Russian News Agency RIA Novosti Closed
Down,'' BBC News, Dec. 9, 2013; Rossiya Segodnya, which translates to
``Russia Today,'' is distinct from RT, the international television
network supported by the Russian government. Dmitry Kiselev is
unrelated to Evgeniy Kiselev, mentioned previously in this section.
\127\ Benyumov, ``How Russia's Independent Media Was Dismantled
Piece by Piece,'' The Guardian, May 25, 2016.
\128\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2016: Russia, at 23.
\129\ Ibid.
\130\ ``Russia's Putin Signs Foreign Agents Media Law,'' Reuters,
Nov. 25, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disinformation and Propaganda
The use of disinformation and propaganda has long been a
hallmark of the Kremlin's toolbox to manipulate its own
citizens. The historical precedent for these tactics stem from
the Soviet era, when the government routinely utilized
propaganda to `'suppress any suggestion of the unpleasant and
reassure the viewer that life in the communist empire was
peaceful and optimistic.'' \131\ While propaganda inside Russia
has long cast aspersions on the Western democratic model as a
counterpoint to Russia's own, the Kremlin's use of
disinformation and propaganda under Putin has not sought simply
to keep a lid on unpleasantness at home, but rather to whip up
anxieties and generate fevered sentiment in support of its
policies and actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\ Joshua Yaffa, ``Dmitry Kiselev Is Redefining the Art of
Russian Propaganda,'' New Republic, July 1, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To implement its propaganda, Putin's deputies reportedly
summon chief editors on a regular basis to coordinate the
Kremlin line on various news and policy items and distribute it
throughout mainstream media outlets in Moscow.\132\ Driving the
narrative often requires media partners who have ``created
myths and explained reality'' in the production of news as well
as entertainment--often blurring lines between the two to
ensure that media content fuels enthusiasm for the Kremlin's
overall narrative.\133\ Russian journalist Arkady Ostrovsky
quotes one such partner at the helm of leading Russian
television channel Perviy Kanal, Konstantin Ernst on this
imperative: ``Our task number two is to inform the country
about what is going on. Today the main task of television is to
mobilize the country.'' \134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\ Bill Powell, ``Pushing The Kremlin Line,'' Newsweek, May 20,
2014.
\133\ Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia, at 297.
\134\ Ibid. at 297.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Propaganda under Putin has played up examples of Western
failures in an attempt to undermine the credibility of a
Western-style alternative system of government to Russia's
corrupt, authoritarian state. Founder of independent television
outlet Dozhd, Mikhail Zygar, summarizes it this way:
Russian television doesn't suggest that Russian leaders
are any better or less corrupt, or more honest and
just, than Western leaders. Rather, it says that
everything is the same everywhere. All the world's
politicians are corrupt--just look at the revelations
in the Panama Papers. Everywhere, human rights are
being violated--just look at what American cops do to
black people. All athletes dope. All elections are
falsified. Democracy doesn't exist anywhere, so give it
up.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\135\ Mikhail Zygar, ``Why Putin Prefers Trump,'' Politico, July
27, 2016.
Ginning up cynicism among the Russian population about
democratic nations also provides a convenient brush with which
to tar Russia's democratic opposition at home. As Ostrovsky
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
notes:
In the weeks before his death, [opposition leader Boris
Nemtsov] was demonized on television,'' to great
effect. In Moscow street protests at that time, ``hate
banners carrying his image were hung on building
facades with the words `Fifth column--aliens among us'
. . . [marchers] carried signs proclaiming PUTIN AND
KADYROV PREVENT MAIDAN IN RUSSIA alongside photographs
of Nemtsov identifying him as `the organizer of
Maidan.' '' This climate led Nemtsov to assert in an
interview hours before his death that Russia was
turning into a ``fascist state'' with ``propaganda
modeled on Nazi Germany's.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\ Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia, at 2; the name
``Maidan,'' a borrowed word in the Russian and Ukrainian languages that
refers to an open public space or town square, has been frequently used
to refer to popular protests and street revolutions in the former
Soviet space.
Putin's propaganda machine has asserted a ``moral
superiority'' over the West, bolstered by a focus on
traditional values of the state and the Russian Orthodox
Church.\137\ This was especially useful at home as the 2011-
2012 protests against Putin's return to the presidency gained
steam, particularly among a relatively secular and urban middle
class, forcing the Kremlin to appeal to its ``core
paternalistic and traditionalist electorate.'' \138\ As such,
state-sponsored media outlets have displayed an unforgiving
tone for members of Russian society who buck traditional or
religious mores. In April 2012, for example, the popular, pro-
Kremlin ``News of the Week'' presenter Dmitry Kiselev said that
gays and lesbians `'should be prohibited from donating blood,
sperm, and in the case of a road accident, their hearts should
be either buried or cremated as unsuitable for the prolongation
of life.'' \139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\ Chapter 4 for more information on the Russian Orthodox
Church's role in promoting traditional values abroad.
\138\ Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia, at 312.
\139\ Joshua Yaffa, ``Dmitry Kiselev Is Redefining the Art of
Russian Propaganda,'' New Republic, July 1, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
State-sponsored media have also doctored the Kremlin's
image to help justify Russian military incursions into Georgia,
Ukraine, and Syria to the Russian population. During the 2008
invasion of Georgia, Ostrovsky notes that ``television channels
were part of the military operation, waging an essential
propaganda campaign, spreading disinformation and demonizing
the country Russia was about to attack.'' \140\ Russian
television inflated figures of civilian deaths and refugees in
South Ossetia by the thousands. Alleging genocide, the picture
that media painted was of the Kremlin ``fighting not a tiny,
poor country that used to be its vassal but a dangerous and
powerful aggressor backed by the imperialist West.'' \141\ Six
years later, these tactics would be taken to new extremes
during the so-called Euromaidan protests in Ukraine in which
pro-European protesters railed against the pro-Russian
government in Kiev, and the subsequent illegal Russian
occupation of Crimea in 2014. Russian media painted the
Euromaidan protesters as a collection of ``neo-Nazis, anti-
Semites, and radicals'' staging an American-sponsored coup in
Kiev.\142\ ``Pass this Oscar to the Russian Channel and to
Dmitry Kiselev for the lies and nonsense you are telling people
about Maidan,'' one protester said to a Russian state
television broadcaster reporting from the Kyiv square, handing
him a small statue.\143\ The Kremlin's portrayal of its
September 2015 involvement in the Syria conflict followed a
similar pattern--a carefully-constructed narrative of Putin as
the responsible and humanitarian actor who was intervening to
stop U.S.-generated chaos in the Middle East.\144\ State-
sponsored media painted it as a successful fight against ISIS,
though facts on the ground indicated that Russian bombs were in
fact targeting the Syrian opposition to Bashar al-Assad.\145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\ Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia, at 298.
\141\ Ibid. at 298-99.
\142\ Ibid. at 315.
\143\ A.O. ``Russia's Chief Propagandist,'' The Economist, Dec.
10, 2013.
\144\ Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia, at 324.
\145\ Zygar, All the Kremlin's Men, at 337.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russian security services have long collected compromising
material known as ``kompromat'' on their own citizens and
disseminated it through friendly, pro-Kremlin media. This
tactic was instrumental in Putin's 1999 rise to power (see
Chapter 1) and has continued to be deployed brazenly during his
tenure to smear opposition activists. For example, the Nashi
youth group, with Kremlin support, was reportedly behind the
release of a 2010 video reel showing Victor Shenderovich, a
prominent satirist and popular host of a television show that
lampooned Russian officials, having sex with a woman suspected
to be a Kremlin ``honey trap.'' \146\ The scandal prompted the
release of information from other liberal media and opposition
figures who said they had been entrapped by the same
woman.\147\ In 2016, grainy footage aired on pro-Kremlin
channel NTV showing former Prime Minister and head of the
PARNAS liberal opposition party, Mikhail Kasyanov, and another
Russian opposition activist, Natalia Pelevina, in bed in a room
together and exchanging criticisms about other members of the
opposition.\148\ Pelevina claimed that the video must have been
compiled at Putin's direction to ``destroy'' Kasyanov, whose
party was contending upcoming parliamentary elections,
describing it as spliced together from perhaps six months'
worth of secret footage and edited for maximum effect.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\ Julia Ioffe, ``Bears in a Honey Trap,'' Foreign Policy, Apr.
28, 2010.
\147\ Ibid.
\148\ Susan Ormiston, ``Sex Tape Scandal Was Work of Putin, Says
Russian Political Activist Exposed in Video,'' CBC News, Apr. 9, 2016.
\149\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fake news and internet trolling have been used by the
Kremlin against Russian citizens and were ramped up
considerably after the 2011-2012 anti-Putin protests, according
to investigative reporting by The New York Times. Set on
reining in social media and online platforms, which were used
by the opposition to disseminate electoral fraud allegations
and mobilize protesters, the Kremlin used software to monitor
public sentiment online and flooded social media with its own
content, ``paying fashion and fitness bloggers to place pro-
Kremlin material among innocuous posts about shoes and diets.''
\150\ Representatives of Alexey Navalny's Anti-Corruption Fund
lamented to a New York Times journalist about the ``atmosphere
of hate'' and the proliferation of pro-Kremlin hashtags that
permeated Russia's Internet space after the protests, which
clouded their messages with ``so much garbage from trolls''
that they became less effective.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ Adrian Chen, ``The Agency,'' The New York Times, June 2,
2015.
\151\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Efforts to crack down on free expression online and via
social media also picked up renewed steam after Putin's return
to the presidency. For example, a 2014 law enabled Russian
authorities to block websites deemed extremist or a threat to
public order without a court order, resulting in the blockage
of three major opposition news sites and activist Alexey
Navalny's blog.\152\ Later that year, in September, Putin
signed a law requiring non-Russian companies to store all
domestic data on servers within the Russian Federation,
ostensibly for data protection, but many observers saw it as an
effort to tighten control over email and social media
networks.\153\ When the law took effect in 2015, some foreign
companies refused to immediately comply. In response, Russian
authorities ordered internet service providers in the country
to block LinkedIn for non-compliance and threatened to shut
down Facebook in 2018 if it did not comply.\154\ Russian
security services also ratcheted up influence over widely used
Russian social media platform VKontakte--which has a broad user
base in Russia as well as in Ukraine and other parts of the
former Soviet space--pressuring its chief executive to reveal
information on Euromaidan protesters in Ukraine and anti-
corruption activists in Russia. Upon refusal, the CEO was
fired, leaving the company in the control of Kremlin-friendly
oligarchs.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\ ``Russia Censors Media By Blocking Websites and Popular
Blog,'' The Guardian, Mar. 14, 2014.
\153\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2014: Russia, at 33; Alexei Anishchuk, ``Russia Passes
Law to Force Websites onto Russian Servers,'' Reuters, July 4, 2014;
Glenn Kates, ``Russia's `Cheburashka' Internet? Probably Not, But Here
Are Some Other Options,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 6,
2014.
\154\ Ilya Khrennikov, ``Russia Threatens to Shut Facebook Over
Local Data Storage Laws,'' Bloomberg Technology, Sept. 26, 2017.
\155\ Andrei Soldatov & Irina Borogan, The Red Web: The Kremlin's
War on the Internet, PublicAffairs, at 291-294 Sept. 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the Kremlin has, though at times clumsily,
sought greater control of the internet space inside Russia as
another way to surveil and restrict potential threats to its
power. In the late 1990s, during Putin's FSB tenure, the
government reportedly took steps to reinvigorate a Soviet-era
surveillance mechanism called the System of Operative Search
Measures (SORM) for the internet era. This SORM-2 aimed to
intercept email, internet traffic, mobile calls, and voice-over
internet protocols.\156\ The new system required Russian
Internet service providers to ``install a device on their
lines, a black box that would connect the internet provider to
the FSB. It would allow the FSB to silently and effortlessly
eavesdrop on emails, which had become the main method of
communication on the internet by 1998.'' \157\ Despite initial
resistance from some service providers when news of the plan
was leaked, ultimately most companies complied with its
provisions.\158\ Observers have noted that SORM-2 also expanded
Kremlin capacity to surveil financial transactions, providing
Putin ``with a complete view of what the Russian political and
economic elite was doing with its money.''\159\ According to an
investigation by the Associated Press, the Kremlin has also
directed state-sponsored hackers to infiltrate the email
accounts of political opponents, dozens of journalists, and at
least one hundred civil society figures inside Russia--a signal
of tactics it would later use against international targets.
Its domestic target list includes Mikhail Khodorkovsky, members
of Pussy Riot, and Alexey Navalny.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\ Andrei Soldatov & Irina Borogan, ``Inside the Red Web:
Russia's Back Door Onto the Internet--Extract,'' The Guardian, Sept.
8, 2015.
\157\ Ibid.
\158\ Jen Tracy, ``Who Reads Your E-mail?,'' Moscow Times, Mar.
16, 1999.
\159\ Samuel A. Greene, ``Book Review: Andrei Soldatov & Irina
Borogan's `The Red Web,' '' Open Democracy, Sep. 8, 2015.
\160\ Raphael Satter et al., ``Russia Hackers Pursued Putin Foes,
Not Just US Democrats,'' Associated Press, Nov. 2, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CORRUPTING ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
When news of the so-called ``Panama Papers'' broke in 2016,
shining a light on corruption networks around the globe, a
Russian cellist named Sergey Rodulgin found himself center
stage. The documents alleged that Rodulgin, an old friend of
Putin's, was tied to offshore companies valued at $2 billion
that are suspected fronts for stashing pilfered wealth.\161\
The documents allegedly showed that Rodulgin directly holds as
much as $100 million in assets--a surprising figure for a
professional cellist.\162\ When pressed to respond to the
papers, both Putin and Rodulgin attributed the latter's wealth
to his successful philanthropic efforts collecting donations
from Russian businessmen for the purchase of fine rare
instruments for Russian students' use. ``There's nothing to
catch me out on here,'' said Rodulgin. ``I am indeed rich; I am
rich with the talent of Russia.'' \163\ In fact, the estimated
$24 billion that Putin's inner circle of friends and family
controls is mostly drawn from business with state-controlled
companies, particularly in the oil and gas sector.\164\ An
October 2017 report, jointly compiled by the Organized Crime
and Corruption Project (the investigative network which helped
to bring the Panama Papers to light) and Russian newspaper
Novaya Gazeta, details the wealth of several members of Putin's
inner circle and notes that, ``Though they hold enormous
assets, they stay out of the public eye, seem largely unaware
of their own companies, and are at pains to explain the origins
of their wealth,'' suggesting these individuals are ``proxies''
for holding resources that Putin may have amassed.\165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\ Shaun Walker, ``Russian Cellist Says Funds Revealed in Panama
Papers Came From Donations,'' The Guardian, Apr. 10, 2016.
\162\ Ibid.
\163\ Ibid.
\164\ The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, Putin
and the Proxies, https://www.occrp.org/en/putinandtheproxies, Oct. 24,
2017.
\165\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The wealth that Putin may have accumulated for himself is
the tip of a larger iceberg of crony capitalism in Russia that
``has turned loyalists into billionaires whose influence over
strategic sectors of the economy has in turn helped [Putin]
maintain his iron-fisted grip on power.''\166\ This political-
economic ecosystem is distinct from the Yeltsin era, when many
oligarchs independently built fortunes out of the chaos of the
Soviet Union's collapse and thus represented potential
political threats to the government. The Russian population,
beset by the economic tumult of the 1990s, grew to resent the
entrepreneurial oligarchs and their individual gains, often
made through unscrupulous means.\167\ As Putin took power, he
seized on this resentment to assert the importance of the state
over the individual. The new class of ``bureaucrat-
entrepreneurs'' that emerged, former Soviet apparatchiks drawn
disproportionately from the ranks of the security services,
were rewarded with ``complete power over any individual'' and a
helping of corrupt profits as long as they served state
interests and remained loyal to the top of this pyramid
scheme--Putin himself.\168\ As Putin gained, so too did his
loyalists, helping to reinforce the system and deter jealous
challengers to his rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\ Steven Lee Myers et al., ``Private Bank Fuels Fortunes of
Putin's Inner Circle,'' The New York Times, Sept. 27, 2014.
\167\ Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia, at 307.
\168\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many of these insiders trace their relationships with Putin
back to a cooperative he joined in the mid-1990s with seven
other owners of modest vacation homes a few hours outside of
St. Petersburg, which they named Ozero (``Lake''). Putin
carefully cultivated and relied on these bonds during his rise
to power. He helped one such individual, Yury Kovalchuk, to
take ownership in the early 1990s of a small firm, Bank
Rossiya, whose shareholders included other members of the Ozero
cooperative (see Chapter 4 for more on the Ozero cooperative
and Bank Rossiya).\169\ With Kremlin help to steer lucrative
customers its way, obtain state-owned enterprises at bargain-
basement prices, and obscure its financial holdings through
murky transactions and shell companies, Bank Rossiya grew
exponentially, and along the way also amassed significant media
holdings that helped the Kremlin influence public
perceptions.\170\ Putin has similarly relied on other
longstanding friends, such as his former judo sparring partner
Arkady Rotenberg, who controls shadow companies that allegedly
made huge payments into Putin's business network, including a
loan to an offshore company controlled by Bank Rossiya with no
apparent repayment schedule.\171\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\ Jake Bernstein et al., ``All Putin's Men: Secret Records
Reveal Money Network Tied to Russian Leader,'' The Panama Papers, Apr.
3, 2016.
\170\ Steven Lee Myers et al., ``Private Bank Fuels Fortunes of
Putin's Inner Circle,'' The New York Times, Sept. 27, 2014.
\171\ Jake Bernstein et al., ``All Putin's Men: Secret Records
Reveal Money Network Tied to Russian Leader,'' The Panama Papers, Apr.
3, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A number of these insiders have become the targets of
international sanctions after the Russian invasion and illegal
annexation of Crimea in 2014. Powerful Russian government
operators have also been the target of U.S. sanctions under the
Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, which
requires the United States government to sanction Russian
officials connected to the violent death in detention of lawyer
and whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky, as well as other officials
who are gross violators of human rights in Russia.\172\ As of
the end of 2017, the U.S. government had sanctioned a total of
49 individuals under the Russia-related Magnitsky Act and 569
individuals or entities under existing Ukraine-related
sanctions.\173\ The Ukraine-related sanctions list in
particular reads like a who's-who of Putin insiders: Arkady
Rotenberg, Putin's childhood friend, along with Rotenberg's
brother Boris and nephew Roman; Yury Kovalchuk, Vladimir
Yakunin, and Andrei Fursenko of the Ozero cooperative and
Kovalchuk's nephew Kirill Kovalchuk; Kremlin insiders Vladislav
Surkov and Vyacheslav Volodin; Rosneft chairman and head of the
Kremlin's `'siloviki'' faction of security officials-turned-
politicians Igor Sechin; billionaire businessman Gennady
Timchenko; and even Aleksandr Dugin, whose philosophy of
``Eurasianism'' pushes for Russia to extend an ultra-
nationalist, neo-fascist worldview across the globe.\174\ Putin
sought to play off the sanctions as a mere annoyance and soften
the blow through directing kickbacks to those impacted, for
example by shifting valuable state contracts to Bank Rossiya
weeks after it was sanctioned.\175\ The Duma also passed a law
affording tax privileges to sanctioned individuals.\176\ But
the combination of sanctions and low oil prices have
nevertheless been a drag on the Russian economy in recent
years. As The New York Times noted, this has reduced ``the
country's most privileged players . . . to fighting over slices
of a smaller economic pie, seeking an advantage over rivals
through the courts and law enforcement officials who are widely
seen as vulnerable to corruption.'' \177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\ Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, P.L. 112-
208, Title IV, Enacted Dec. 14, 2012 (originally introduced by Senator
Ben Cardin as S. 1039, May 19, 2011).
\173\ U.S. Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets
Control,``Sanctions List Search,'' https://
sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov (search results under Program ``MAGNIT''
and the four Ukraine-related Executive Orders, as of Dec. 21, 2017).
\174\ Ibid.; James Carli, ``Aleksandr Dugin: The Russian Mystic
Behind America's Weird Far-Right,'' Huffington Post, Sept. 7, 2017.
\175\ Steven Lee Myers et al., ``Private Bank Fuels Fortunes of
Putin's Inner Circle,'' The New York Times, Sept. 27, 2014.
\176\ ``Putin Signs Law Granting Sanctions-Hit Russians Tax
Breaks,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Apr. 4, 2017.
\177\ Andrew E. Kramer, ``In Russia, a Bribery Case Lifts the Veil
on Kremlin Intrigue,'' The New York Times, Oct. 21, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The increasing exposure of Putin's network has helped to
fuel demand for more transparency and questions over the
assumed inviolability of Putin's leadership. A 50-minute video
released by Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation in March 2017
alleging lavish luxury holdings by Prime Minister Dmitry
Medvedev has generated millions of views on YouTube and was
seen as instrumental in bringing thousands of Russians to the
streets in protests during the year.\178\ Moreover, the
prospect of consequences--whether inside Russia or abroad--for
the Putin regime's graft and abuses is helping to chip away at
the culture of impunity that has stymied hopes in Russia for a
just, secure society governed by the rule of law. In testimony
to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee nearly two years
prior to his murder, opposition leader Boris Nemtsov described
the Magnitsky Act as ``the most pro-Russian law in the history
of any foreign parliament'' for its capacity to end impunity
against ``crooks and abusers.'' \179\ Indeed, since the Act's
passage in 2012, the U.S. Congress has subsequently passed a
global version of the sanctions that was signed into law in
2016, and by the end of 2017 the U.S. government had sanctioned
one Russian individual, Artem Chayka, under this law for
significant corruption.\180\ Meanwhile, parliaments in Estonia,
the United Kingdom, and Canada have passed legislation similar
to the U.S. Magnitsky laws.\181\ Vice Chairman of the Open
Russia democratic opposition platform Vladimir Kara-Murza has
urged more expansive application of U.S. and European targeted
individual sanctions, noting that while the task of building a
more just Russia lies with the country's own citizens,
outsiders should not ``enable Mr. Putin and his kleptocrats by
providing safe harbor for their illicit gains.'' \182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\178\ David Filipov, ``Russia Dismisses Sweeping Corruption
Allegations Against Medvedev,'' The Washington Post, Mar. 5, 2017.
\179\ Statement of Boris Nemtsov, Co-Chairman, Republican Party of
Russia, A Dangerous Slide Backwards: Russia's Deteriorating Human
Rights Situation, Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, June 13, 2013.
\180\ Matthew Pennington, ``U.S. Levies Sanctions Against Myanmar
General, Dozen Others,'' Associated Press, Dec. 21, 2017.
\181\ The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, P.L.
114-328, Subtitle F, Title XII, Enacted Dec. 23, 2016 (originally
introduced by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin as S.284, Jan. 28, 2015);
``The US Global Magnitsky Act'' Human Rights Watch, Sept. 13, 2017;
Mike Blanchfield, ``Canada Passes Magnitsky Human Rights Law, Sparking
Russian Threats,'' The Canadian Press, Oct. 18, 2017.
\182\ Vladimir Kara-Murza, ``Answering the Kremlin's Challenge,''
World Affairs Journal (2017).
----------
Chapter 3: Old Active Measures and
Modern Malign Influence Operations
----------
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES
The FBI and CIA were involved in the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy in 1963. The United States and Israel
organized an attack on Mecca in 1979. U.S. government
scientists created the AIDS virus as a biological weapon in
1983. All of these bogus stories, and many more, were concocted
and disseminated by Soviet propagandists during the Cold
War.\183\ Some are even still repeated today. For example, in a
June 2017 interview, Putin referenced the JFK assassination
theory to accuse U.S. intelligence agencies of conducting false
flag operations and blaming them on the Russian secret
services, saying that ``[t]here is a theory that Kennedy's
assassination was arranged by the United States special
services. If this theory is correct, and one cannot rule it
out, so what can be easier in today's context, being able to
rely on the entire technical capabilities available to special
services, than to organize some kind of attacks in the
appropriate manner while making a reference to Russia in the
process.'' \184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\ Fletcher Schoen & Christopher Lamb, Deception,
Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group
Made a Major Difference, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at
4, 20, 34 (June 2012).
\184\ Vladimir Putin, Interview with Megyn Kelly, NBC, June 5,
2017, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54688.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the technological tools have evolved, Russia's use of
disinformation is not a new phenomenon--as one Russian military
intelligence textbook says, ``Psychological warfare has existed
as long as man himself.'' \185\ During the Cold War, ``active
measures,'' or disinformation and malign influence operations,
were ``well integrated into Soviet policy and involved
virtually every element of the Soviet party and state
structure, not only the KGB.'' \186\ Russian specialists in
active measures used official newspapers and radio stations,
embassies, and foreign communist parties to create and
distribute false stories. Each state organ would use their own
capabilities in coordinated campaigns: the KGB was responsible
for ``black propaganda''--creating forgeries and spreading
rumors; the International Information Department was
responsible for ``white propaganda''--broadcasting the stories
through official media organizations; and the International
Department was responsible for ``gray propaganda''--
disseminating the stories through international front
organizations.\187\ And they were intently focused on their
target audience: as one Soviet disinformation practitioner put
it, ``every disinformation message must at least partially
correspond to reality or generally accepted views.'' \188\
Active measures also sought to take advantage of pre-existing
fissures to further polarize the West. As Colonel Rolf
Wagenbreth, long-time head of active measures operations for
the East German Stasi, reportedly said, ``A powerful adversary
can only be defeated through . . . . sophisticated,
methodical, careful, and shrewd effort to exploit even the
smallest `cracks' between our enemies . . . and within their
elites.'' \189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\185\ Alexey Kovalev & Matthew Bodner, ``The Secrets of Russia's
Propaganda War, Revealed,'' The Moscow Times, Mar. 1, 2017.
\186\ Thomas Boghardt, ``Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS
Disinformation Campaign,'' Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 53, No. 4, at
1-2 (Dec. 2009).
\187\ Ibid. at 3.
\188\ Ibid. at 2.
\189\ Statement of Thomas Rid, Professor, Department of War
Studies, King's College London, Disinformation: A Primer in Russian
Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, Hearing before the U.S.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Mar. 30, 2017, at 2 (citing
Gunther Bohnsack, Herbert Brehmer, Auftrag Irrefuhrung, Carlsen, at 16
(1992)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Opinions on the effectiveness of Soviet active measures
varied among U.S. national security experts. During the Reagan
Administration, Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger
and Deputy CIA Director Robert Gates argued that the operations
were ``deleterious but generally not decisive,'' although,
according to Gates, who cited the Dutch decision on deployment
of intermediate range nuclear weapons and Spain's referendum on
NATO participation, ``in a close election or legislative
battle, they can make the difference.'' \190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\190\ Schoen & Lamb, Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic
Communications, at 104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Soviet bloc disinformation operations were not a rare
occurrence: more than 10,000 were carried out over the course
of the Cold War.\191\ In the 1970s, Yuri Andropov, then head of
the KGB, created active measures courses for operatives, and
the KGB had up to 15,000 officers working on psychological and
disinformation warfare at the height of the Cold War.\192\ The
CIA estimated that the Soviet Union spent more than $4 billion
a year on active measures operations in the 1980s
(approximately $8.5 billion in 2017 dollars). And then, as now
with the Kremlin, ``the highest level of the Soviet
government'' approved the themes of active measures
operations.\193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\ Statement of Thomas Rid, Disinformation: A Primer in Russian
Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, at 2.
\192\ ``The Fog Of Wars: Adventures Abroad Boost Public Support at
Home,'' The Economist, Oct. 22, 2016.
\193\ ``Soviet Active Measures in the United States, 1986-87;
Prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,'' reprinted in the
Congressional Record, 133 Cong. Rec. H34262 (Dec. 9, 1987) (statement
of Rep. C.W. Bill Young).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active measures campaigns in the 1980s focused on
influencing the arms control and disarmament movements, for
example, by promoting the European peace movement in countries
that were scheduled to base U.S. intermediate-range nuclear
forces. That campaign made use of the West German Communist
Party, the Dutch Communist Party, the Belgian National Action
Committee for Peace and Development, the World Peace Council,
and the International Union of Students, among others.\194\ In
addition to political parties and peace organizations, the
Soviet Union also used the Russian Orthodox Church and an
affiliate of the Soviet-backed Christian Peace Conference to
influence American churches, religious organizations, and
religious leaders.\195\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\ Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency,
``Soviet Strategy to Derail US INF Deployment,'' Feb. 1983.
\195\ ``Soviet Active Measures in the United States, 1986-87;
Prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,'' reprinted in the
Congressional Record, 133 Cong. Rec. H34262.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Soviet active measures also attempted to influence
elections in the West during the Cold War, though without much
success. Efforts to defeat Chancellor Helmut Kohl in West
Germany's 1983 election included ``a massive propaganda
campaign of interference,'' according to the German government
at the time. That same year, KGB agents in the United States
were ordered ``to acquire contacts on the staff of all possible
presidential candidates and in both party headquarters . . .
[and] to popularize the slogan `Reagan Means War!' '' \196\ The
KGB's efforts notwithstanding, Reagan won 49 of 50 states in
the 1984 election. Disinformation campaigns also smeared FBI
director J. Edgar Hoover and Senator Henry ``Scoop'' Jackson,
both implacable anti-communists, with rumors to the media about
their sexual orientation--a tactic that would resurface many
decades later during the 2017 French presidential
campaign.\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\196\ Andrew Weiss, ``Vladimir Putin's Political Meddling Revives
Old KGB Tactics,'' The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 17, 2017.
\197\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MODERN MALIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS
Today, the Kremlin's malign influence operations employ
state and non-state resources to achieve their ends, including
the security services, television stations and pseudo news
agencies, social media and internet trolls, public and private
companies, organized crime groups, think tanks and special
foundations, and social and religious groups.\198\ These
efforts have ``weaponized'' four spheres of activity:
traditional and social media, ideology and culture, crime and
corruption, and energy. Disinformation campaigns are used to
discredit politicians and democratic institutions like
elections and independent media.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\ Last year, the European Parliament passed a resolution
recognizing the wide range of tools and instruments that Russia uses to
disseminate disinformation and propaganda. See European Parliament
Resolution, ``EU Strategic Communication to Counteract Anti-EU
Propaganda by Third Parties,'' 2016/2030(INI), Nov. 23, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cultural, religious, and political organizations are used
to repeat the Kremlin's narrative of the day and disrupt social
cohesion.
Corruption is used to influence politicians and infiltrate
decision-making bodies.
And energy resources are used to cajole and coerce
vulnerable foreign governments. The Kremlin coordinates these
multi-platform efforts from within the Presidential
Administration, which controls the FSB and the Foreign
Intelligence Service (SVR), among many other agencies, and is
described by observers as ``perhaps the most important single
organ within Russia's highly de-institutionalized state.''
\199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\199\ Mark Galeotti, Controlling Chaos: How Russia Manages its
Political War in Europe, European Council on Foreign Relations, at 1
(Aug. 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the Russian government supplies many of the resources
for these efforts, Kremlin-linked oligarchs are also believed
to help fund malign influence operations in Europe.\200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\200\ Committee Staff Discussion with Russian Human Rights
Activists, May 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the Kremlin's efforts attempt to exploit the
advantages of democratic societies. As the former president of
Estonia put it, ``[W]hat they do to us we cannot do to them
Liberal democracies with a free press and free and fair
elections are at an asymmetric disadvantage . . . the tools of
their democratic and free speech can be used against them.''
\201\ The Russian government's work to destabilize European
governments often start with attempts to build influence and
exploit divisions at the local level. According to the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\201\ Sheera Frenkel, ``The New Handbook for Cyberwar Is Being
Written By Russia,'' BuzzFeed News, Mar. 19, 2017 (citing former
Estonian President Toomas Hendrick Ilves).
Russia's influence campaign is built on longstanding
practices. Moscow has been opportunistic in its efforts
to strengthen Russian influence in Europe and Eurasia
by developing affiliations with and deepening financial
or political connections to like-minded political
parties and Non-governmental Organizations. Moscow
appears to use monetary support in combination with
other tools of Russian statecraft, including propaganda
in local media, direct lobbying by the Russian
Government, economic pressure, and military
intimidation.\202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\202\ Director of National Intelligence, Assessment on Funding of
Political Parties and Nongovernmental Organizations by the Russian
Federation, pursuant to the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2016,
(P.L. No. 114-113).
The U.S. State Department reports that the Kremlin's
efforts to influence elections and referendums in Europe
include ``overt and covert support for far left and right
political parties, funding front groups and NGOs, and making
small, low-profile investments in key economic sectors to build
political influence over time,'' and that its tactics ``focus
on exploiting internal discord in an effort to break centrist
consensus on the importance of core institutions.'' \203\ An
analysis by the German Marshall Fund's Alliance for Securing
Democracy found that the Russian government has used
cyberattacks, disinformation, and financial influence campaigns
to meddle in the internal affairs of at least 27 European and
North American countries since 2004.\204\ As one Russian expert
puts it, the Russian government's methods to pursue its goals
abroad are ``largely determined by the correlation between the
strength of the countries' national institutions and their
vulnerability to Russian influence.'' \205\ Whereas in what
Russia considers its ``near abroad,'' composed of the former
Soviet Union countries, the Kremlin's goal is to exert control
over pliant governments or weaken pro-Western leaders, in the
rest of Europe it primarily seeks to undermine NATO and the EU,
while amplifying existing political and social discord.\206\
The Kremlin also acts with more boldness in its near abroad
than it does in NATO and EU states. But it still deploys its
full range of malign influence tools throughout the rest of
Europe and, increasingly, beyond Europe's borders. These
operations require relatively small investments, but history
has shown that they can have outsized results, if conditions
permit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\ U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on Efforts by
the Russian Federation to Undermine Elections in Europe and Eurasia,
Pursuant to the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act
of 2017 (P.L. 115-44), Nov. 7, 2017.
\204\ Oren Dorell, ``Alleged Russian Political Meddling Documented
in 27 Countries Since 2004,'' USA Today, Sept. 7, 2017. The countries
included Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States.
\205\ Mark Galeotti, Controlling Chaos: How Russia Manages Its
Political War in Europe, European Council on Foreign Relations, Sept.
1, 2017.
\206\ Alina Polyakova et al. The Kremlin's Trojan Horses, Atlantic
Council, at 4 (Nov. 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
New technologies, updated policy priorities, and a
resurgent brashness in the Kremlin and among its oligarch
allies have converged to enable an expanded range of
disinformation operations in Europe. According to a resolution
adopted by the European Parliament in November 2016, have the
goal of ``distorting truths, provoking doubt, dividing Member
states, engineering a strategic split between the European
Union and its North American partners and paralyzing the
decision-making process, discrediting the EU institutions and
transatlantic partnerships'' and ``undermining and eroding the
European narrative.'' \207\ Whereas the Kremlin's propaganda
inside of Russia glorifies the regime, outside of Russia, it
aims to exploit discontent and grievances. Notably, the
Kremlin's disinformation operations do not necessarily try to
convince foreign audiences that the Russian point of view is
the correct one. Rather, they seek to confuse and distort
events that threaten Russia's image (including historical
events), undercut international consensus on Russia's behavior
at home and abroad, and present Russia as a responsible and
indispensable global power. Challenging others' facts is
simpler than the propaganda advanced by the Soviet Union--it is
much harder to convince people that the harvest doubled in
their local area than it is to plant doubt about what is
happening thousands of miles away.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\207\ ``European Parliament Resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU
Strategic Communication to Counteract Propaganda against it by Third
Parties,'' 2016/2030(INI), Nov. 23, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Nimmo of the Center for European Policy Analysis has
characterized the Kremlin's propaganda efforts as four simple
tactics: dismiss the critic, distort the facts, distract from
the main issue, and dismay the audience.\208\ At their core,
the Kremlin's disinformation operations seek to challenge the
concept of objective truth. As the CEO of the U.S. Broadcasting
Board of Governors (BBG), John Lansing, put it, Kremlin
messaging is ``really almost beyond a false narrative. It's
more of a strategy to establish that there is no such thing as
an empirical fact. Facts are really what is being challenged
around the world.'' \209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\ Edward Lucas and Ben Nimmo, Information Warfare: What Is It
and How to Win It? Center for European Policy Analysis (Nov. 2015).
\209\ Rachel Oswald, ``Reality Rocked: Info Wars Heat Up Between
U.S. and Russia,'' CQ, June 12, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Putin and the Kremlin, the truth is not objective fact;
the truth is whatever will advance the interests of the current
regime. Today, that means whatever will delegitimize Western
democracies and distract negative attention away from the
Russian government. It means subverting the notion of
verifiable facts and casting doubt on the veracity of all
information, regardless of the source--as Lansing also put it,
``If everything is a lie, then the biggest liar wins.'' \210\
Sometimes, it means going so far as using an image from a
computer game as evidence of U.S. misdeeds, as Russia's Defense
Ministry did in November 2017 when it posted a screenshot from
a promotional video of a computer game called ``AC-130 Gunship
Simulator: Special Ops Squadron'' on social media and claimed
that it was ``irrefutable proof that the US provides cover for
ISIS combat troops, using them for promoting American interests
in the Middle East.'' \211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\210\ Testimony of John Lansing, CEO and Director of the
Broadcasting Board of Governors, The Scourge of Russian Disinformation,
Hearing Before the Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Sept. 14, 2017, at 3.
\211\ ``Computer Game as `Irrefutable Proof','' EU vs. Disinfo,
Nov. 15, 2017. The image also appeared on a government-sponsored TV
station, presented as a news story. The ``EU versus Disinformation''
campaign is an anti-disinformation effort run by the European External
Action Service East StratCom Task Force, created in response to the
EU's calls to challenge Russia's ongoing disinformation campaigns. See
Chapter 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin's disinformation operations rapidly deliver a
high volume of stories, creating, in the words of two RAND
Corporation researchers, a ``firehose of falsehood.'' \212\
They note that direct and systematic efforts to counter these
operations are made difficult by the vast array of mechanisms
and platforms that the Kremlin employs.\213\ What's more,
disproving a false story takes far more time and effort than
creating one does, and, as the false story was the first one to
be seen by audiences (and possibly repeatedly across multiple
platforms), it may have already made a strong impression. In
the meantime, while the fact-checkers are busy disproving one
story, the Kremlin's propagandists can put out ten more. As the
RAND scholars note, ``don't expect to counter the firehose of
falsehood with the squirt gun of truth.'' \214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\ Christopher Paul & Miriam Matthews, The Russian ``Firehose of
Falsehood'' Propaganda Model, Rand Corporation, at 9 (2016).
\213\ Ibid.
\214\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That being said, there are some methods of countering
propaganda that can reduce the effectiveness of false stories,
including being warned upon initial exposure that the story may
be false, repeated exposure to a refutation, and seeing
corrections that provide a complete alternative story, which
can fill the gap created by the removal of the false facts. The
RAND analysts also recommend not just countering the actual
propaganda, but its intended effects. For example, if the
Kremlin is trying to undercut support for a strong NATO
response to Russian aggression, then the West should promote
narratives that strengthen support for NATO and promote
solidarity with NATO members facing threats from Russia.\215\
Such a response is far more complicated, however, when Russian
disinformation is not just intended to promote Putin or Russian
policies, but rather to exacerbate existing divides on hot-
button social and political issues like race, religion,
immigration, and more.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\ Ibid. at 10 (2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE KREMLIN'S DISINFORMATION PLATFORMS
The Kremlin employs an array of media platforms and tools
to craft and amplify its narratives. The Russian government's
main external propaganda outlets are RT, which focuses on
television news programming, and Sputnik, a radio and internet
news network. RT and Sputnik target a diverse audience: both
far-right and far-left elements of Western societies,
environmentalists, civil rights activists, and minorities.
While the stated purpose of these state-owned media
networks is to provide an alternative, Russian view of the
world (in Putin's words, to ``break the monopoly of Anglo-Saxon
global information streams''), they appear to be more focused
on popularizing conspiracy theories and defaming the West, and
seek to foster the impression ``that everyone is lying and that
there are no unequivocal facts or truths.'' \216\ Part of RT
and Sputnik's appeal--and an explanation for their apparent
success--is their high production value and sensational
content. According to a 2016 study by the RAND Corporation, RT
and Sputnik are ``more like a blend of infotainment and
disinformation than fact-checked journalism, though their
formats intentionally take the appearance of proper news
programs.'' \217\ Russian media reports have even gone so far
as conducting fake interviews with actors that are paid to
pretend they are victims of Ukrainian government
aggression.\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\ Vladimir Putin, Interview with Margarita Simonyan, RT, June
12, 2013; Stefan Meister and Jana Pugleirin, Perception and
Exploitation: Russia's Non-Military Influence in Europe, German
Council on Foreign Relations, (Oct. 2015).
\217\ Paul and Matthews, The Russian ``Firehose of Falsehood''
Propaganda Model, 3Rand Corporation, at 5, 2016.
\218\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
RT was launched in 2005 and currently reports in six
languages: Arabic, English, French, German, Russian, and
Spanish. The U.S. State Department reports that the Russian
government spends an estimated $1.4 billion per year on
disseminating its messaging through various media platforms at
home and abroad.\219\ In 2016, over $300 million went to RT
alone.\220\ As a Russian human rights activist put it, the
Europeans who see RT as an ``alternative'' are similar to the
left-wing audience--both in Europe and the United States--in
the 1970s and 1980s who held favorable views of the Soviet
Union.\221\ Former Secretary of State John Kerry has referred
to RT as a ``propaganda bullhorn,'' and RT regularly gives
controversial European political figures a platform on its
shows and gives disproportionate coverage to the more extreme
factions of the European Parliament.\222\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\219\ U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on Media
Organizations Controlled and Funded by the Government of the Russian
Federation (Nov. 7, 2017).
\220\ ``RT's 2016 Budget Announced, Down from 2015, MSM Too Stumped
to Spin?'' RT, May 4, 2016; ``About RT,'' RT, https://www.rt.com/
about-us/, (visited Dec. 6, 2017).
\221\ Committee Staff Discussion with Russian Human Rights
Activists.
\222\ Brett LoGuirato, ``John Kerry Just Gave Russia A Final
Warning,'' Business Insider, Apr. 24, 2014; Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, Assessment on Funding of Political Parties and
Nongovernmental Organizations by the Russian Federation, Report to
Congress Pursuant to the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2016
(P.L. No. 114-113). According to a report from the U.S. Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, RT's editor-in-chief, Margarita
Simonyan, has close ties to several top officials in the Russian
government, including the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential
Administration, Aleksey Gromov, who is one of RT's founders and now
reportedly manages political TV coverage in Russia. Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, Assessing Russian Activities and
Intentions in Recent US Elections'': The Analytic Process and Cyber
Incident Attribution, at 9 (Jan. 2017) (``DNI Assessment'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
RT claims to reach between 500 million and 700 million
viewers in over 100 countries. However, according to data
compiled by the BBG, this likely overstates the viewership, as
it represents the number of households in which RT is
available, and not the number of households that actually watch
RT.\223\ As of 2017, RT attracted about 22.5 million Facebook
followers, and it deftly drives traffic to its platforms with
human interest stories, cat videos, and pseudo conspiracy
theories (like op-eds about whether the earth is round or
flat).\224\ A 2015 analysis found that only one percent of
videos on RT's YouTube channel were political in nature, while
its most popular videos were of natural disasters, accidents,
and crime.\225\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\223\ BBG Data on Russian International Broadcasting Reach, IBB
Office of Policy and Research, Broadcasting Board of Governors, June
2017. For example, BBG data showed that RT and Sputnik combined only
have a total weekly reach of 2.8 percent of Moldova's population, 1.3
percent of Belarus's, and 5.3 percent of Serbia's.
\224\ ``Comparing Russian and American Government `Propaganda',''
Meduza, Sept 14, 2017. (Meduza is a Russian online newspaper); Sam
Gerrans, ``YouTube and the Art of Investigation,'' RT, Sept. 27, 2015.
\225\ Katie Zavadski, ``Putin's Propaganda TV Lies About Its
Popularity,'' The Daily Beast, Sept. 17, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Moscow Times found that when RT reporters strayed from
its implicit editorial line, they were told ``this is not our
angle.'' \226\ Former staff report that RT's editorial line
comes from the top down, and managers, not editors, choose what
will be covered and how. For example, when foreign staff
disagreed with the way that RT was covering Ukraine, they were
taken off the assignment and Ukraine-related coverage was
handled by Russian staff.\227\ And those Russian staff are
mostly ``apathetic or apolitical, with no prior experience in
journalism''--their primary qualification is fluency in
English, gained from either linguistic training or being the
``children of Russian diplomats.'' \228\ All of which reveals
that, while RT may have a large budget and growing reach, it
also has several fundamental institutional flaws which limit
its ability to operate as a professional news organization. In
the words of one former employee, ``a combination of apathy, a
lack of professionalism and a dearth of real talent keep RT
from being more effective than it currently is.'' \229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\226\ Matthew Bodner et al., ``Welcome to The Machine: Inside the
Secretive World of RT,'' The Moscow Times, June 1, 2017.
\227\ Ibid.
\228\ Ibid.
\229\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sputnik is a state-owned network of media platforms
launched in November 2014 and includes social media, news, and
radio content; in June 2017, it began operating an FM radio
station in Washington, D.C.\230\ With an annual budget of $69
million, the network operates in 31 different languages and
attracts about 4.5 million Facebook followers.\231\ Like RT,
Sputnik consistently promotes anti-West narratives that
undermine support for democracy. A study by the Center for
European Policy Analysis found that Sputnik ``grant[s]
disproportionate coverage to protest, anti-establishment and
pro-Russian [members of the European Parliament from Central
and Eastern Europe]; that it does so systematically; and that
even when it quotes mainstream politicians, it chooses comments
that fit the wider narrative of a corrupt, decadent and
Russophobic West . . . making `wide use of the protest
potential' of the legislature to promote the Kremlin's chosen
messages of disinformation.'' \232\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\230\ Max Greenwood, ``Russian Radio Takes Over Local DC station,''
The Hill, June 30, 2017.
\231\ ``Comparing Russian and American government `propaganda',''
Meduza, Sept 14, 2017.
\232\ Ben Nimmo, Propaganda in a New Orbit: Information Warfare
Initiative Paper No. 2, Center for European Policy Analysis, at 6
(Jan. 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sputnik is also often used to ``ping pong'' a suspect story
from lesser-known news sites and into more mainstream press
outlets.\233\ One well-known example was the purported police
cover-up of the ``Lisa'' rape case in Germany. After initially
circulating on Facebook, the story was picked up by Channel
One, a Russian government-controlled news channel, and then
covered by RT and Sputnik, which argued the case was not an
isolated incident. The following week, protests broke out,
despite the fact the allegations had since been recanted and
the police investigation had debunked them.\234\ Sputnik also
reportedly orders its foreign journalists to pursue discredited
conspiracy theories--it asked one American correspondent to
explore possible connections between the death of Democratic
National Committee staffer Seth Rich and the leak of internal
DNC documents to WikiLeaks, in an attempt to cast doubt on the
U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) assessment that
Russian-backed hackers were behind the leak.\235\ And during
the French presidential elections, Sputnik reported on
unfounded rumors about the sexual preferences of the pro-EU
candidate, Emmanuel Macron.\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\233\ ``Ping ponging'' is a technique to raise the profile of a
story through complementary websites, with the goal of getting the
mainstream media to pick it up. See Appendix H.
\234\ Jim Rutenberg, ``RT, Sputnik and Russia's New Theory of
War,'' The New York Times, Sept. 13, 2017.
\235\ Andrew Feinberg, ``My Life at a Russian Propaganda Network,''
Politico, Aug. 21, 2017.
\236\ ``Ex-French Economy Minister Macron could be `US Agent'
Lobbying Banks' Interests,'' Sputnik, Feb. 4, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of the DNI assessment that RT serves as the
Kremlin's ``principal propaganda outlet,'' and along with
Sputnik form Russia's `'state-run propaganda machine'' that
served as platforms for the Kremlin's efforts to influence the
2016 U.S. election, RT and Sputnik encountered significant
pushback in the United States in late 2017.\237\ In November,
RT complied with an order from the U.S. Department of Justice--
which found that it was engaged in ``political activities''
that were ``for or in the interests of'' a foreign principal--
to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act
(FARA).\238\ Registration requires RT to disclose more of its
financial information to the U.S. government.\239\ A month
earlier, Twitter announced that it would no longer allow paid
advertisements from RT and Sputnik on its platform, citing the
DNI findings and the company's ongoing review of how its
platform was used in the 2016 election.\240\ In November 2017,
Eric Schmidt, the Executive Chairman of Google's parent
company, reportedly said that the company was working on
``deranking'' results from RT and Sputnik from its Google News
product.\241\ However, according to a Google announcement RT
and Sputnik's sites would not be specifically targeted, but
rather the company ``adjusted [their] signals to help surface
more authoritative pages and demote low-quality content,''
giving less weight to relevance and more weight to
authoritativeness.\242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\237\ DNI Assessment at 3.
\238\ Devlin Barrett and David Filipov, ``RT Files Paperwork With
Justice Department To Register As Foreign Agent,'' The Washington Post,
Nov. 13, 2017; Josh Gerstein, ``DOJ Told RT To Register As Foreign
Agent Partly Because Of Alleged 2016 Election Interference,'' Politico,
Dec. 21, 2017; Letter from U.S. Department of Justice to RTTV America,
Aug. 17, 2017.
\239\ See Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. Sec. 612;
Megan Wilson, ``Seven Things to Know About RT's Foreign Agent
Registration,'' The Hill, Sept. 14, 2017.
\240\ Twitter Public Policy Company Announcement: ``RT and Sputnik
Advertising,'' Oct. 26, 2017.
\241\ Alex Hern, ``Google Plans to `De-Rank' Russia Today and
Sputnik to Combat Misinformation,'' The Guardian, Nov. 21, 2017 (citing
Schmidt's remarks at the Halifax International Security Forum, Nov. 18,
2017).
\242\ ``Our Latest Quality Improvements for Search,'' Google
Official Blog, Apr. 25, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond RT and Sputnik, the Russian government uses a
variety of additional tools to amplify and reinforce its
disinformation campaigns.\243\ Internet ``trolls'' are one such
tool--individuals who try to derail online debates and amplify
the anti-West narratives propagated by RT and Sputnik. These
trolls use thousands of fake social media accounts on Facebook,
Twitter, and other platforms to attack articles or individuals
that are critical of Putin and Kremlin policies, spread
conspiracy theories and pro-Kremlin messages, attack opponents
of Putin's regime, and drown out constructive debate.\244\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\243\ The Kremlin wants its propaganda to reach its audiences
first, and it wants to reach them repeatedly. Experimental psychology
has shown that first impressions are quite resilient, with individuals
more likely to accept the first information they receive on a topic
(the ``illusory truth effect'') and favor that information when
confronted with conflicting messages. Furthermore, repeated exposure to
a statement increases the likelihood that someone will accept that it
is true--especially when they are less interested in the topic--and
makes them process it less carefully in discriminating weak arguments
from strong ones. Christopher Paul & Miriam Matthews, The Russian
``Firehose of Falsehood'' Propaganda Model,'' Rand Corporation, at 4
(2016).
\244\ Stefan Meister & Jama Puglierin, Perception and Exploitation:
Russia's Non-Military Influence in Europe, German Council on Foreign
Relations, at 4 (Sept.-Oct. 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to a New York Times investigation, in 2015
hundreds of young Russians were employed at a ``troll farm'' in
St. Petersburg known as the Internet Research Agency (IRA),
where many worked 12-hour shifts in departments focused on
different social media platforms.\245\ The organization was
organized in a kind of vertically-integrated supply chain for
internet news. An NBC interview of a former worker at the IRA,
Vitaly Bespalov, revealed that workers were highly
compartmentalized and used to amplify each other's work: the
third floor held bloggers writing posts to undermine Ukraine
and promote Russia, on the first floor writers composed news
articles that referred back to the blog posts created on the
third floor, and then commenters on the third and fourth floors
posted remarks about the stories under fake Ukrainian
identities. Meanwhile, the marketing team worked to package all
of the misinformation into viral-ready social media
formats.\246\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\245\ Adrian Chen, ``The Agency,'' The New York Times, June 2,
2015.
\246\ Ben Popken & Kelly Cobiella, ``Russian Troll Describes Work
in the Infamous Misinformation Factory,'' NBC News, Nov. 16, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the beginning of each shift, workers were reportedly
given a list of opinions to promulgate and themes to address,
all related to current events. Over a two-shift period, a
worker would be expected to publish 5 political posts, 10
nonpolitical posts (to establish credibility), and 150 to 200
comments on other workers' posts.\247\ For their labor, they
made between $800 to $1,000 a month, an attractive wage for
recent graduates new to the work force.\248\ The professional
trolls were also provided ``politology'' classes that taught
them the Russian position on the latest news.\249\ Russian
media outlets have reported that the IRA was bankrolled by a
close Putin associate, Evgeny Prigozhin, a wealthy restaurateur
known as the ``Kremlin's Chef,'' whose network of companies
have received a number of lucrative government contracts, and
who was sanctioned by the Obama Administration in December 2016
for contributing to the conflict in Ukraine.\250\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\247\ Adrian Chen, ``The Agency,'' The New York Times, June 2,
2015.
\248\ ``The Notorious Kremlin-linked `Troll Farm' and the Russians
Trying to Take it Down,'' The Washington Post, Oct. 8, 2017.
\249\ Adrian Chen, ``The Agency,'' The New York Times, June 2,
2015.
\250\ David Filipov, ``The Notorious Kremlin-linked `Troll Farm'
and the Russians Trying to Take it Down,'' The Washington Post, Oct.
8, 2017; Thomas Grove and Paul Sonne, ``U.S. Imposes Sanctions on
Russian Restaurateur With Ties to Putin,'' The Wall Street Journal,
Dec. 20, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to one former employee, IRA staff on the
``foreign desk'' were responsible for meddling in other
countries' elections.\251\ In the run up to the 2016 U.S.
presidential election, for example, foreign desk staff were
reportedly trained on ``the nuances of American social polemics
on tax issues, LGBT rights, the gun debate, and more . . .
their job was to incite [Americans] further and try to `rock
the boat.' ''\252\ The employee noted that ``our goal wasn't to
turn the Americans toward Russia. Our task was to set Americans
against their own government: to provoke unrest and
discontent.'' \253\ Based on conversations with Facebook
officials, it appears that Kremlin-backed trolls pursued a
similar strategy in the lead up to the 2017 French presidential
election, and likely before Germany's national election the
same year.\254\ The IRA also apparently had a separate
``Facebook desk'' that fought back against the social network's
efforts to delete fake accounts that the IRA had developed into
sophisticated profiles.\255\ In addition, in the United States,
Russian-backed social media accounts linked to the IRA paid for
advertisements to promote disinformation and encouraged
protests and rallies on both sides of socially divisive issues,
such as promoting a protest in Baltimore while posing as part
of the Black Lives Matter movement.\256\ While the IRA has
reportedly been inactive since December 2016, a company known
as Glavset is a reported successor, and other related
companies, including Teka and the Federal News Agency, may be
carrying out similar work.\257\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\251\ ``An Ex St. Petersburg `Troll' Speaks Out: Russian
Independent TV Network Interviews Former Troll At The Internet Research
Agency,'' Meduza, Oct. 15, 2017.
\252\ Ibid.
\253\ Ibid.
\254\ Committee Staff Discussion with Facebook.
\255\ ``An Ex St. Petersburg `Troll' Speaks Out: Russian
Independent TV Network Interviews Former Troll at the Internet Research
Agency,'' Meduza, Oct. 15, 2017.
\256\ Luke Broadwater, ``Second Russia-Linked Effort Promoted
Protests During Trial of Freddie Gray Officers,'' The Baltimore Sun,
Oct. 12, 2016.
\257\ Diana Pilipenko, ``Facebook Must `Follow The Money' to
Uncover Extent Of Russian Meddling,'' The Guardian, Oct. 9, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many of the fake accounts used to amplify misinformation
are bots, or automated social media accounts. Bot networks can
be created or purchased wholesale fairly cheaply on the dark
web, a part of the internet accessed with special software that
gives users and operators anonymity, and thus is often used as
a marketplace for illicit goods and services.\258\ According to
one report, they can be purchased for as little as $45 for
1,000 bots with new, unverified accounts, and up to $100 for
500 phone-verified accounts (which have a unique phone number
attached to them).\259\ Through automation, bots can spread
disinformation at high speed and in great numbers, quickly
amplifying a false story's reach and profile and making it
trend on social media platforms. For example, during the French
presidential election, bots were used to spread memes, gifs,
and disinformation stories about Emmanuel Macron. Bots have
also been used to attack perceived critics of the Kremlin by
flooding their accounts with retweets and followers, clogging
the target's account and possibly resulting in temporary
suspension from the platform for suspicious activity.\260\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\258\ Andy Greenberg, ``Hacker Lexicon: What is the Dark Web?''
Wired, Nov. 19, 2014.
\259\ Joseph Cox, ``I Bought a Russian Bot Army for Under $100,''
The Daily Beast, Sept. 13, 2017.
\260\ ``The Surprising New Strategy of Pro-Russia Bots,'' BBC
Trending (BBC News Blog), Sept. 12,2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kremlin-aligned hackers, supported by trolls, bot networks,
and friendly propaganda outlets, have also used ``doxing'' to
great effect. Doxing occurs when hackers break into a network,
steal proprietary, secret, or incriminating information, and
then leak it for public consumption.\261\ For example, hackers
that have been linked to Russian security services attacked the
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) after it published a report
that revealed Russian sports doping, and then released the
private medical information of American athletes.\262\ During
the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign, both the
Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the campaign manager of
the Democratic presidential candidate were victims of doxing by
the same Kremlin-backed hackers who attacked WADA in 2016,
France's TV5Monde in 2015, and Ukraine's election commission in
2014.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\261\ Bruce Schneier, ``How Long Until Hackers Start Faking Leaked
Documents?'' The Atlantic, Sept. 13, 2016.
\262\ Andy Greenberg, ``Russian Hackers Get Bolder in Anti-Doping
Agency Attack,'' Wired, Sept. 14, 2016; see Appendix C.
\263\ FireEye iSight Intelligence, APT28: At The Center of The
Storm, Russia Strategically Evolves Its Cyber Operations, at 4-5 (Jan
2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A new tactic is planting fake documents among the authentic
ones leaked as part of a doxing operation--the Macron campaign
alleged that this happened when it was attacked (though in
addition to the fake documents planted by the hackers, the
campaign had also created several false email accounts and
loaded them with fake documents to confuse the hackers and slow
them down).\264\ Similarly, hackers have previously placed
child pornography on the computers of Kremlin critics living
abroad, and then alerted the local police. If the hackers are
sophisticated enough, it is extremely difficult to discover the
source of the intrusion, or even whether an intrusion has taken
place. As the head of one cybersecurity company told The New
York Times, ``to use a technical term, you are completely
screwed. If something like this is sponsored by the Russian
government, or any government or anyone with sufficient skill,
you are not going to be successful [in salvaging your
reputation]. It is terrible.'' \265\ It is not hard to imagine
similar attacks being carried out on Western politicians who
have taken a strong position against Putin's regime, and the
subsequent consequences for their campaigns, careers, and
legacies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\264\ Adam Nossiter et al., ``Hackers Came, but the French Were
Prepared,'' The New York Times, May 9, 2017.
\265\ Andrew Higgins, ``Foes of Russia Say Child Pornography Is
Planted to Ruin Them,'' The New York Times, Dec. 9, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combining all of these tools together, the Kremlin can
ensure that its disinformation operations are seen early,
often, and widely. Furthermore, disinformation efforts can now
take advantage of increasingly powerful analytics that identify
``customer sentiment,'' allowing them to target the most
susceptible and vulnerable audiences. In the case of the United
States, Kremlin-backed propagandists and internet trolls sought
not just to promote the Kremlin's narratives, but also to
advance divisive narratives that further erode social cohesion.
In the words of Germany's intelligence chief, the aim is simply
to delegitimize the democratic process, ``no matter whom they
help get ahead.'' \266\ Such efforts are both harder to detect
than traditional propaganda and, arguably, more dangerous to
the target society.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\266\ Esther King, ``Russian Hackers Targeting Germany:
Intelligence Chief,'' Politico, Nov. 29, 2016.
----------
Chapter 4: Weaponization of Civil Society,
Ideology, Culture, Crime, and Energy
----------
Pushing fake news stories with Internet trolls and slickly
produced infotainment has proved an effective tool for
promoting the Russian government's objectives in Europe, and
one it can deploy from a distance. But the Kremlin also
benefits from having ideological boots on the ground. The
Soviets supposedly referred to extreme left activists and
politicians in the West as ``useful idiots''--people who the
former Soviet Union could count on to agitate against its
democratic enemies. Today, the Kremlin applies a far less
restrictive ideological filter to its useful idiots, and has
also embraced and cultivated a menagerie of right wing,
nationalist groups in Europe and further abroad.
These agents of influence abroad can be separated into
three distinct tiers, according to an April 2016 study by
Chatham House, a UK think tank:
1. Major state federal agencies, large state-affiliated
grant-making foundations, and private charities
linked to Russian oligarchs;
2. Trusted implementing partners and local associates like
youth groups, think tanks, associations of
compatriots, veterans' groups, and smaller
foundations that are funded by the state
foundations, presidential grants, or large
companies loyal to the Kremlin; and
3. Groups that share the Kremlin's agenda and regional
vision but operate outside of official cooperation
channels--these groups often promote an ``ultra-
radical and neo-imperial vocabulary'' and run youth
paramilitary camps.\267\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\267\ Orysia Lutsevych, Agents of the Russian World: Proxy Groups
in the Contested Neighbourhood, Chatham House, at 10 (Apr. 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE ROLE OF STATE FOUNDATIONS, GONGOS, NGOS, AND THINK TANKS
The Kremlin funds, directly or indirectly, a number of
government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs),
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and think tanks
throughout Russia and Europe. These groups carry out a number
of functions, from disseminating pro-Kremlin views to seeking
to influence elections abroad.
Following a series of ``color revolutions'' in former
Soviet Union republics like Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, in 2006 the
Russian government established the World Coordination Council
of Russian Compatriots, which is responsible for coordinating
the activities of Russian organizations abroad and their
communications with the Kremlin.\268\ Some GONGOs that receive
and disburse funds from the Kremlin, such as the Russkiy Mir
Foundation and Rossotrudnichestvo, established in 2007 and
2008, are headquartered in Russia but have branches throughout
the EU, and are led by senior Russian political figures like
the foreign minister or the chair of the foreign affairs
committee of the upper house of the parliament.\269\ Kremlin-
linked oligarchs also sit on the boards of many of the
GONGOs.\270\ Based on conservative estimates from publicly
available data, the Kremlin spends about $130 million a year
through foundations like Rossotrudnichestvo and the Gorchakov
fund, and, in 2015, channeled another $103 million in
presidential grants to NGOs; after including support from state
enterprises and private companies, however, actual funding
levels may be much higher.\271\ Most of the Russian
government's funding is focused on post-Soviet `'swing states''
like Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia, but Kremlin-
supported groups also operate in the Baltic states and the
Balkans, especially Serbia and Bulgaria.\272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\268\ Vladislava Vojtiskova et al., The Bear in Sheep's Clothing:
Russia's Government-Funded Organisations in the EU, Wilfried Martens
Centre for European Studies, at 34 (July 2016).
\269\ Ibid.
\270\ Ibid. at 11.
\271\ Orysia Lutsevych, Agents of the Russian World: Proxy Groups
in the Contested Neighbourhood, Chatham House, at 11 (Apr. 2016).
\272\ Ibid. at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some Russian government-funded groups are used to gain
sympathy for the Kremlin's narrative in academic circles
abroad. One example is the Valdai Discussion Club, a Russian
government-funded think tank, which is based in Russia but has
branches in the EU.\273\ Some analysts assert that the Kremlin
uses Valdai to co-opt Western experts and academics, who Lilia
Shevtsova of the Brookings Institution believes then ``pull
their punches when writing about Putin. Experts who go want to
be close to power and are afraid of losing their access. Some
might believe they can use Valdai as a platform for criticism,
but in reality their mere presence at the event means they are
already helping legitimize the Kremlin.'' \274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\273\ Vladislava Vojtiskova et al., The Bear in Sheep's Clothing,
at 11.
\274\ Peter Pomerantsev & Micahel Weiss, The Menace of Unreality:
How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money, Institute
of Modern Russia, at 21 (Nov. 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Kremlin-funded think tanks have allegedly attempted
to influence elections abroad. The Russian Institute for
Strategic Research (RISS) is a Kremlin think tank based in
Moscow that has offices throughout the country, including a
Baltic Regional Information-Analytical Center in the exclave of
Kaliningrad (the Baltic states are a particular focus for the
Kremlin's malign influence operations).\275\ RISS, which was
established by Putin and is mostly staffed with ex-intelligence
officers, has been accused by Kremlin opponents of seeking to
prevent Montenegro's accession to NATO, dissuade Sweden from
enhancing its ties with the alliance, and influence a national
election in Bulgaria (see Chapter 5).\276\ According to current
and former U.S. officials, RISS also reportedly developed a
plan to `'swing the 2016 U.S. presidential election to Donald
Trump and undermine voters' faith in the American electoral
system.'' \277\ However, more than a few scholars and
independent journalists doubt the efficacy of RISS, with one
commenting that ``these guys (average age: 70) couldn't have
possibly game-planned making a sandwich, let alone rigging [the
U.S. election].'' \278\ Such opinions are likely based on some
of RISS's other work, such as a study which reportedly claimed
that condoms were one of the factors spreading HIV in
Russia.\279\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\275\ Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, ``About,'' https://
en.riss.ru/about (visited Dec. 15, 2017).
\276\ Ivan Nechepurenko, ``Kremlin Group Employing Ex-Spies Is
Viewed Abroad as Propaganda Mill,'' The New York Times, Apr. 20, 2017;
Neil MacFarquhar, ``A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False
Stories,'' The New York Times, Aug. 28, 2016.
\277\ Ned Parker et al., ``Putin-Linked Think Tank Drew Up Plan to
Sway 2016 US Election-Documents,'' Reuters, Apr. 19, 2017.
\278\ Ivan Nechepurenko, ``Kremlin Group Employing Ex-Spies Is
Viewed Abroad as Propaganda Mill,'' The New York Times, Apr. 20, 2017.
\279\ ``Kremlin Experts Blame Condoms for Russian HIV Epidemic,''
The Moscow Times, May 31, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other think tanks and GONGOs in Europe that promote the
Kremlin's narrative have opaque funding structures that hide
potential sources of support. A 2017 report published by the
Swedish Defense Research Agency noted that ``much of the
funding that these GONGOs receive from commercial entities
would not happen if there were not a clear understanding that
these think tanks are closely connected to the political
leadership'' and ``contributing to activities that do enjoy the
trust and patronage of the political leadership could give both
enterprises and individual businessmen advantages . . . . In a
political system where economic and political activity are
intrinsically linked, the fact that business finances a think
tank does not mean that it is therefore more independent of the
political leadership.'' \280\ One such example of a privately
funded think tank is the Dialogue of Civilizations Research
Institute, which opened in Berlin in 2016, and was co-founded
and financed by Vladimir Yakunin, a longtime Putin associate
and former head of Russian Railways (who the United States
sanctioned for his role in Russia's illegal annexation of
Crimea).\281\ The Institute's goal, according to a report by
the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, is to
coordinate a worldwide network of Russian think tanks.\282\ One
German newspaper reportedly described it as an ``instrument of
Moscow's hybrid warfare'' whose primary purpose is to create an
``alternative civilization to the American.'' \283\ The
Institute denies any connections to the Kremlin, but does not
make its funding transparent, and Yakunin is reported to be
investing about $28 million in the Institute over five years,
in addition to funding from other Russian businessmen.\284\
Such opaque funding is a hallmark of many Kremlin-linked NGOs
and think tanks. An Atlantic Council report explains why these
financial streams are so difficult to trace:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\280\ Carolina Vendil Pallin & Susanne Oxenstierna, Russian Think
Tanks and Soft Power, Swedish Defense Research Agency, at 17-18 (Aug.
2017).
\281\ Ben Knight, ``Putin Associate Opens Russia-Friendly Think
Tank in Berlin,'' Deutsche Welle, Jul. 1, 2016; U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, ``Ukraine-Related
Designations,'' Mar. 20, 2014. The Institute emerged out of the World
Public Forum Dialogue of Civilizations, headquartered in Vienna.
``History,'' Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute, https://doc-
research.org/en/about-us/ (visited Dec. 18, 2017). It has a branch in
Moscow, and plans expansions in China.
\282\ Vladislava Vojtiskova et al., The Bear in Sheep's Clothing,
at 12, 41, 42.
\283\ Ben Knight, ``Putin Associate Opens Russia-Friendly Think
Tank in Berlin,'' Deutsche Welle, Jul. 1, 2016.
\284\ Ibid.
The [Kremlin's] web of political networks is hidden and
non-transparent by design, making it purposefully
difficult to expose. Traceable financial links would
inevitably make Moscow's enterprise less effective:
when ostensibly independent political figures call for
closer relations with Russia, the removal of sanctions,
or criticize the EU and NATO, it legitimizes the
Kremlin's worldview. It is far less effective, from the
Kremlin's point of view, to have such statements come
from individuals or organizations known to be on the
Kremlin's payroll.\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\285\ Alina Polyakova et al., The Kremlin's Trojan Horses,
Atlantic Council, at 4 (Nov. 2016).
THE KREMLIN'S CULTIVATION OF POLITICAL EXTREMES
The Kremlin has also adopted a new practice in cultivating
relationships with some of the more mainstream far-right
parties in Europe, by establishing ``cooperation agreements''
between the dominant United Russia party and parties in Austria
(Freedom Party), Hungary (Jobbik), Italy (Northern League),
France (National Front), and Germany (AfD). These cooperation
agreements include plans for regular meetings and
``collaboration where suitable on economic, business and
political projects.'' \286\ Kremlin-linked banks, funds, and
oligarchs even lent nearly $13 million in 2014 to France's far-
right National Front party to finance its election
campaign.\287\ And the German newspaper Bild reported that the
Russian government clandestinely funded the AfD ahead of 2017
parliamentary elections--perhaps without the AfD's knowledge--
by using middlemen to sell it gold at below-market prices.\288\
In addition to monetary resources, the Kremlin has reportedly
also offered organizational, political, and media expertise and
assistance to far-right European parties.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\ Alison Smale, ``Austria's Far Right Signs a Cooperation Pact
with Putin's Party,'' Dec. 19, 2016.
\287\ Marine Turchi, ``How a Russian Bank Gave France's Far-Right
Front National Party 9mln Euros,'' Mediapart, Nov. 24, 2014; Suzanne
Daley & Maia de la Baume, ``French Far Right Gets Helping Hand With
Russian Loan,'' The New York Times, Dec. 1, 2014.
\288\ Andrew Rettman, ``Illicit Russian Money Poses Threat to EU
Democracy,'' EUobserver, Apr. 21, 2017.
\289\ Congressional Research Service, ``Russian Influence on
Politics and Elections in Europe,'' June 27, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Different Kremlin narratives attract different groups from
left and right. Scholars Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss
describe how ``European right-nationalists are seduced by the
[Kremlin's] anti-EU message; members of the far-left are
brought in by tales of fighting US hegemony; [and] U.S.
religious conservatives are convinced by the Kremlin's stance
against homosexuality.'' \290\ The Congressional Research
Service reports that many of the far-right European parties
linked to the Kremlin are ``anti-establishment and anti-EU, and
they often share some combination of extreme nationalism; a
commitment to `law and order' and traditional family values;
and anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, or anti-Islamic sentiments.''
\291\ Far-right gatherings are also sponsored by Kremlin-linked
oligarchs like Vladimir Yakunin and Konstantin Malofeev who,
according to the EUobserver, a Brussels-based online newspaper,
have organized conferences that included ``delegates from
Germany's neo-Nazi NPD party, Bulgaria's far-right Ataka party,
the far-left KKK party in Greece, and the pro-Kremlin Latvian
Russian Union party.'' \292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\290\ Peter Pomerantsev & Micahel Weiss, The Menace of Unreality:
How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money, Institute of
Modern Russia, at 19 (Nov. 2014).
\291\ Congressional Research Service, Russia: Background and U.S.
Policy, at 29 (Aug. 21, 2017).
\292\ Andrew Rettman, ``Illicit Russian Money Poses Threat to EU
Democracy,'' EUobserver, Apr. 21, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another such conference took place in March 2015, when the
leaders of some of Europe's most controversial and fringe
right-wing political organizations--as well as some from
similar groups in the United States--met in St. Petersburg for
the first International Russian Conservative Forum. The event
was organized by Russia's nationalistic Rodina (``Motherland'')
party, and its objective was clearly stated: to unite European
and Russian conservative forces ``in the context of European
sanctions against Russia and the United States' pressure on
European countries and Russia.'' \293\ Speakers reportedly
urged white Christians to reproduce, referred to gays as
perverts, and said that murdered Russian opposition activists
were resting in hell.\294\ They also decried same-sex marriage,
globalization, radical Islam, immigration, and New York
financiers, while consistently praising Russia's President
Vladimir Putin for upholding and protecting conservative and
masculine values. A British nationalist speaker showed a
picture of a shirtless Putin riding a bear, and declared:
``Obama and America, they are like females. They are feminized
men. But you have been blessed by a man who is a man, and we
envy that.'' \295\ James Taylor, an American who runs a white
nationalist website, spoke at the event, where he called the
United States ``the greatest enemy of tradition everywhere.''
\296\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\293\ Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber, ``Russian, European Far-Right
Parties Converge in St. Petersburg,'' The Moscow Times, Mar. 22, 2015.
\294\ Ibid.
\295\ Neil MacFarquhar, ``Right-Wing Groups Find a Haven, for a
Day, in Russia,'' The New York Times, Mar. 22, 2015.
\296\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the United States, many extreme right-wing groups,
including white nationalists, look up to Putin--a self-
proclaimed champion of tradition and conservative values. At a
protest in Charlottesville, Virginia, against the removal of a
statue of Confederate general Robert E. Lee, white nationalists
repeatedly chanted ``Russia is our friend.'' \297\ Andrew
Anglin, the publisher of the Daily Stormer, the world's biggest
neo-Nazi website, apparently spent much of 2015 and 2016
running his website from inside of Russia, from where his
content was promoted by a suspected Russian bot network.\298\
In addition, the Kremlin has cultivated ties with organizations
that promote gun rights and oppose same-sex marriage. For
example, Kremlin-linked officials have also cultivated ties
with groups in the United States like the National Rifle
Association (NRA). Alexander Torshin, a former senator in
Putin's United Russia party who allegedly helped launder money
through Spain for Russian mobsters, developed a relationship
with David Keene when the latter was the NRA's President.\299\
In 2015, the NRA sent a delegation to Moscow to meet with
Dmitry Rogozin, a Putin ally and deputy prime minister who fell
under U.S. sanctions in 2014 for his role in the crisis in
Ukraine.\300\ U.S. evangelicals, including Franklin Graham,
have also supported Putin's suppression of LGBT rights in
Russia, saying that Putin ``has taken a stand to protect his
nation's children from the damaging effects of any gay and
lesbian agenda.'' \301\ Brian Brown, who runs the World Council
of Families (WCF), a group that opposes same-sex marriage and
abortion rights, testified to the Duma before it adopted
several anti-gay laws.\302\ The WCF planned to hold its annual
conference in Moscow in 2014, but cancelled it because of the
difficulties presented by new U.S. sanctions legislation
related to the crisis in Ukraine, which also hit a member of
the WCF's planning committee, Vladimir Yakunin.\303\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\297\ Tom Porter, ``Charlottesville's Alt-Right Leaders Have a
Passion for Vladimir Putin,'' Newsweek, Aug. 16, 2017; Laura Vozzella,
``White Nationalist Richard Spencer Leads Torch-Bearing Protesters
Defending Lee Statue,'' The Washington Post, May 14, 2017.
\298\ See Luke O'Brien, ``The Making of an American Nazi,'' The
Atlantic, Dec. 2017.
\299\ Estaban Duarte et al., ``Mobster or Central Banker? Spanish
Cops Allege This Russian Both,'' Bloomberg, Aug. 9, 2016; Rosalind
Helderman & Tom Hamburger, ``Guns and Religion: How American
Conservatives Grew Closer to Putin's Russia,'' The Washington Post,
Apr. 30, 2017.
\300\ Tim Mak, ``Top Trump Ally Met with Putin's Deputy in
Moscow,'' The Daily Beast, Mar. 7, 2017; U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, ``Issuance of a New
Ukraine-Related Executive Order; Ukraine-related Designations,'' Mar.
17, 2014.
\301\ Steve Benen, ``Franklin Graham Sees Putin with Moral High
Ground,'' MSNBC, Mar. 19, 2014.
\302\ Southern Poverty Law Center, ``Brian Brown Named President of
Anti-LGBT World Congress of Families,'' June 2, 2016; Rosalind
Helderman & Tom Hamburger, ``Guns and Religion: How American
Conservatives Grew Closer to Putin's Russia,'' The Washington Post,
Apr. 30, 2017.
\303\ Southern Poverty Law Center, ``World Congress of Families
Suspends Russia Conference,'' Mar. 25, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin's illegal annexation of Crimea and military
incursion into eastern Ukraine also affected the rhetoric and
focus of its disparate ideological boots on the ground. A year-
long study by a Hungarian think tank found that since the
beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, far right and extremist
organizations that had ``previously predominantly focused on
ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities as their main enemies,
redirect[ed] their attention to geopolitical issues. They are
not only agitating against NATO and the EU, but also share a
particular sympathy towards Vladimir Putin's Russia, which they
regard as an ideological and political model.'' \304\ These
groups also benefit from their voices being amplified by
Kremlin-linked media networks that peddle in fake news and
conspiracy theories. Furthermore, the small size and limited
influence of fringe parties and paramilitary groups make it
easy for the Kremlin to infiltrate, purchase, and control them.
The report also noted that in Central and Eastern Europe, the
Kremlin has sought to exploit ``the bitter memories of past
territorial disputes, nationalist-secessionist tendencies, and
the haunting spectres of chauvinist ideologies promising to
make these nations great again.'' \305\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\304\ Peter Kreko et al., Political Capital, From Russia with Hate:
The Activity of Pro-Russian Extremist Groups in Central-Eastern Europe,
at 47 (Apr. 2017).
\305\ Ibid. at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unlike in Soviet times, the Kremlin no longer limits its
support to just one end of the ideological spectrum. In
addition to right-wing groups, it still maintains strong ties
with former and current communist parties--Ukraine's Ministry
of Justice in 2014 sought to ban the country's Communist Party,
which was believed to be acting on behalf of the Kremlin.\306\
Some European left and far-left parties have also adopted more
friendly views toward Russia, including Spain's Podemos party,
Greece's Syriza Party (which has led the government since
2015), Bulgaria's Socialist Party, and Moldova's Socialist
Party, with candidates from the latter two winning presidential
elections in November 2016.\307\ According to NATO officials,
Russian intelligence agencies also reportedly provide covert
support to European environmental groups to campaign against
fracking for natural gas, thereby keeping the EU more dependent
on Russian supplies.\309\ A study by the Wilfried Martens
Centre for European Studies reports that the Russian government
has invested $95 million in NGOs that seek to persuade EU
governments to end shale gas exploration.\309\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\306\ Peter Pomerantsev & Micahel Weiss, The Menace of Unreality:
How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money, Institute
of Modern Russia, at 19-20 (Nov. 2014).
\307\ ``In the Kremlin's Pocket,'' The Economist, Feb. 12,, 2015;
Cynthia Kroet, ``The New Putin Coalition,'' Politico, Nov. 21, 2016.
\308\ Sam Jones et al., ``NATO Claims Moscow Funding Anti-Fracking
Groups,'' Financial Times, June 19, 2014.
\309\ Vladislava Vojtiskova et al., The Bear in Sheep's Clothing,
at 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE USE OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
Just as the Kremlin has strengthened its relationship with
the Russian Orthodox Church and used it to bolster its standing
at home, the Russian Orthodox Church also serves as its proxy
abroad, and the two institutions have several overlapping
foreign policy objectives. According to the former editor of
the official journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, ``the church
has become an instrument of the Russian state. It is used to
extend and legitimize the interests of the Kremlin.'' \310\ In
a letter to Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, the Russian
Orthodox Church's Patriarch, Kirill, wrote: ``During your
service as foreign minister, the cooperation between the
Russian foreign policy department and the Moscow Patriarchate
has considerably broadened. Through joint efforts we have
managed to make a contribution to the gathering and
consolidation of the Russian World.'' \311\ Scholar Robert
Blitt notes that ``the Russian government, in an effort to
restore its lost role as a global superpower, has recruited the
Church as a primary instrument for rallying together a dubious
assortment of states and religious representatives to support a
new international order. This new order is premised on the
rejection of universal human rights and the revival of
relativism, two principles that serve the Church well.'' \312\
Blitt also notes that the Russian government has linked
national security with `'spiritual security,'' and that
``abroad, the government benefits from the [Russian Orthodox
Church]'s efforts as a willing partner in reinforcing Russia's
'spiritual security,' which in turn boosts the channels
available to it for the projection of Russian power abroad.''
\313\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\310\ Andrew Higgins, ``In Expanding Russian Influence, Faith
Combines with Firepower,'' The New York Times, Sept. 13, 2016.
\311\ Letter from Patriarch Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and All
Russia, Russian Orthodox Church, to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov, Mar. 22, 2010.
\312\ Robert Blitt, Russia's Orthodox Foreign Policy: the Growing
Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Shaping Russia's Policies
Abroad, 33 U. PA. J. Int'l L., at 379 (2011).
\313\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2003, the Russian Orthodox Church and Russia's Ministry
of Foreign Affairs established a working group that has, in the
words of Foreign Minister Lavrov, allowed them to work
``together realizing a whole array of foreign policy and
international activity thrusts.'' \314\ The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs has also used Kirill to promote a relativistic view of
human rights at the United Nations, arranging for him to give a
speech in 2008 (before he was Patriarch) at the UN Human Rights
Council, where he bemoaned that ``there is a strong influence
of feministic views and homosexual attitudes in the formulation
of rules, recommendations and programs in human rights
advocacy.'' \315\ According to a report by Chatham House, in
Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia, Orthodox parent committees,
modelled on similar Russian Orthodox committees, have launched
attacks on LGBT and feminist groups.\316\ These committees
``claim that gender equality is a Western construct intended to
spread homosexuality in Eastern Europe, blaming the United
States and the EU for the decay of `moral health' in the
respective societies.'' \317\ The Russian Orthodox Church also
enjoys strong financial backing from Kremlin-linked oligarchs
Konstantin Malofeev and Vladimir Yakunin, who are both under
U.S. sanctions.\318\ In Bulgaria and Romania, the Kremlin even
allegedly co-opted Orthodox priests to lead anti-fracking
protests.\319\ In Moldova, senior priests have worked to halt
the country's integration with Europe (leading anti-homosexual
protests and even claiming that new biometric passports for the
EU were `'satanic'' because they had a 13-digit number), and
priests in Montenegro led efforts to block the country from
joining NATO.\320\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\314\ Ibid. at 381.
\315\ Metropolitan Kirill, Chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate
DECR, Address on the Panel Discussion on Human Rights and Intercultural
Dialogue at the 7th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, Mar. 22,
2008.
\316\ Orysia Lutsevych, Agents of the Russian World: Proxy Groups
in the Contested Neighbourhood, Chatham House, at 26 (Apr. 2016).
\317\ Ibid. at 26.
\318\ Ibid. at 25-26; Gabriela Baczynska & Tom Heneghan, ``How the
Russian Orthodox Church Answers Putin's Prayers in Ukraine,'' Reuters,
Oct. 6, 2014; U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets
Control, ``Ukraine-related Designations,'' Mar. 20, 2014; U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
``Issuance of a New Ukraine-related Executive Order and General
License; Ukraine-related Designations,'' Dec. 19, 2014.
\319\ Sam Jones et al., ``NATO Claims Moscow Funding Anti-Fracking
Groups,'' Financial Times, June 19, 2014.
\320\ Andrew Higgins, ``In Expanding Russian Influence, Faith
Combines with Firepower,'' The New York Times, Sept. 13, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE NATIONALIZATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME
During his time in St. Petersburg in the 1990s, Putin
allegedly collaborated with two major organized crime groups to
assert control over the city's gambling operations, helped
launder money and facilitated travel for known mafia figures,
had a company run by a crime syndicate provide security for his
Ozero (``Lake'') house cooperative, and helped that criminal
organization gain a monopoly over St. Petersburg's fuel
deliveries.\321\ According to a report by scholar Ilya
Zaslavskiy, the latter operation would teach Putin useful
skills that he could later use at the national level, including
``monopolization of the downstream energy market, management of
the city's oil and gas assets through nominal front men and
offshore accounts, and the use of ex-Stasi and other Warsaw
Pact operatives in energy schemes across Europe.'' \322\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\321\ Brian Whitmore, ``Putinfellas,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, May 3, 2016 (citing Karen Dawisha, Putin's Kleptocracy: Who
Owns Russia? Simon & Schuster, Sept. 2015).
\322\ Ilya Zaslavskiy, Corruption Pipeline: the Threat of Nord
Stream 2 to EU Security and Democracy, Free Russia, at 4 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From the Kremlin, Putin has allegedly continued to use
Russian-based organized crime groups to pursue his interests
both at home and abroad, including to smuggle arms, assassinate
political opponents, earn ``black cash'' for off-the-books
operations, conduct cyberattacks, and support separatist
movements in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.\323\ Euan Grant, an
expert in transnational crime, told The Moscow Times that
Russians linked to organized crime groups have formed a large
quasi-intelligence agency for the Kremlin, acting as
``political Trojan horses'' that use their money to ``undermine
morale, compromise officials and weaken Western resolve.''
\324\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\323\ Mark Galeotti, Crimintern: How the Kremlin Uses Russia's
Criminal Networks in Europe, European Council on Foreign Relations, at
1 (Apr. 2017); Brian Whitmore, ``Putinfellas,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, May 3, 2016.
\324\ Peter Hobson, ``How Europe Became a Russian Gangster
Playground,'' The Moscow Times, May 12, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2016, a judge investigating Russian mafia operations in
Spain issued international arrest warrants for several current
and former Russian government officials with alleged
connections to a money laundering operation run by a Russia-
based crime group in Spain. Spanish prosecutors also alleged
that a senior member of the Duma, Vladislav Reznik, helped the
head of the Russian crime syndicate in Spain, Gennady Petrov,
get his allies into senior positions in the Russian government
in exchange for assets in Spain.\325\ Spanish investigators
tapping Petrov's phones heard him speak with a deputy prime
minister and five other cabinet ministers, as well as various
legislators, including Reznik, a founder and vice president of
Putin's United Russia party and head of the Duma's finance
committee.\326\ Reznik and Petrov regularly socialized and did
business together, sharing a private jet and the same
secretary, lawyer, and financial adviser in Spain.\327\ Reznik
was also a member of the board of directors of Bank Rossiya,
which fell under U.S. sanctions in 2014 for its role in Ukraine
and was described by the U.S. Treasury Department as ``the
personal bank for senior officials of the Russian Federation.''
\328\ And from 1998-99, Petrov was reportedly a co-owner of
Bank Rossiya, along with several men belonging to Putin's Ozero
cooperative of dacha owners (the Panama Papers also revealed
that Bank Rossiya transferred at least $1 billion to Putin's
friend, the musician Sergei Roldugin).\329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\325\ Ibid. The arrest warrants were later thrown out, reportedly
because some of the named individuals were cooperating with the
investigation.
\326\ Ibid.
\327\ Ibid.
\328\ Ibid.; U.S. Department of the Treasury, ``Treasury Sanctions
Russian Officials, Members of the Russian Leadership's Inner Circle,
and an Entity for Involvement in the Situation in Ukraine,'' Mar. 20,
2014.
\329\ Alec Luhn & Luke Harding, ``Spain Issues Arrest Warrants for
Russian Officials Close to Putin,'' The Guardian, May 4, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are also multiple historical links between Putin and
Petrov's gang in St. Petersburg. The gang was then led by
Vladimir Barsukov and started out in St. Petersburg in the
early 1990s, the same time that Putin served as the city's
deputy mayor. In addition to illicit activities, the gang was
allegedly involved in real estate, banking, and energy,
including the Petersburg Fuel Company (PTK), which, thanks to a
decision involving Putin, won a contract in 1995 to be the sole
supplier of gasoline in St. Petersburg.\330\ It is worth noting
that, according to an investigation by Newsweek, the then-
owner of PTK was Vladimir Smirnov (also a member of the Ozero
cooperative), who partnered with Barsukov for the gasoline
business. Smirnov also once led the Russian operations of the
St. Petersburg Real Estate Holding Company (SPAG), of which
Putin was an advisory board member until his inauguration as
president.\331\ In 1999, U.S. and European intelligence
agencies began to suspect that SPAG was involved in a money
laundering scheme in Lichtenstein for Russian organized crime
gangs and Colombian drug traffickers, including the Cali
cocaine cartel (though SPAG denies wrongdoing and no charges
were ever filed).\332\ Furthermore, Barsukov was also
reportedly a board member of a SPAG subsidiary.\333\ Alexander
Litvinenko, the former spy who Putin allegedly ordered the
assassination of (see Appendix B for more information), and
another former KGB agent, Yuri Shvets, had compiled a report on
Barsukov and the Tambov gang in 2006, and found that, as deputy
mayor, Putin had provided political protection for criminal
activity related to Barsukov's gang in St. Petersburg.\334\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\330\ Sebastian Rotella, ``A Gangster Place in the Sun: How Spain's
Fight Against the Mob revealed Russian Power Networks,'' ProPublica,
Nov. 10, 2017.
\331\ Mark Hosenball, ``A Stain on Mr. Clean,'' Newsweek, Sept. 2,
2001.
\332\ Ibid.
\333\ Ibid.; United Kingdom House of Commons, The Litvinenko
Inquiry: Report into the Death of Alexander Litvinenko, at 112 (Mar.
2015).
\334\ Damien Sharkov, `` `Putin Involved in Drug Smuggling Ring,'
Says Ex-KGB Officer,'' Newsweek, Mar. 13, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russian security expert Mark Galeotti of the European
Council on Foreign Relations, estimates that Russian-based
organized crime is now responsible for one-third of Europe's
heroin supply, a large portion of the trafficking of non-
European people, and most illegal weapons imports.\335\
Galeotti reports that Russian-based crime groups in Europe
largely operate with (and behind) indigenous European
gangs.\336\ They are not fighting for territory anymore, but
working as ``brokers and facilitators'' for regional and
international criminal activities and supply chains. One
supposedly retired Russian criminal told Galeotti in 2016 that
``we have the best of both worlds: from Russia we have strength
and safety, and in Europe we have wealth and comfort.'' \337\
And, according to a Western counter-intelligence officer, the
strength and safety that these groups enjoy in Russia are what
give the Kremlin power over them.\338\ Galeotti asserts that,
under Putin's rule, connections between Russia-based organized
crime groups and Russian intelligence services, including the
FSB, have grown substantially. Their interconnectedness now
goes well beyond the institutionalization of corruption and the
growing grey area between legal and illegal activity. In
effect, during Putin's rule the state has nationalized
organized crime: the underworld now serves the ``upperworld.''
\339\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\335\ Mark Galeotti, Crimintern: How the Kremlin Uses Russia's
Criminal Networks in Europe, European Council on Foreign Relations, at
1 (Apr. 2017).
\336\ Ibid.
\337\ Ibid. at 1-2.
\338\ Ibid. at 3.
\339\ Ibid. at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE EXPORT OF CORRUPTION
The Kremlin has also exported economic corruption to its
periphery and throughout Europe. Anton Shekhovtsov, a scholar
who studies the Kremlin's links with far-right and extremist
groups, believes that the Kremlin even prefers using corruption
over cultivating such groups, saying that ``Russia would rather
destroy the EU through corruption . . . than through the
support of anti-EU forces.'' \340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\340\ Andrew Rettman, ``Illicit Russian Money Poses Threat to EU
Democracy,'' EUobserver, Apr. 21, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the report ``Stage Hands: How Western Enablers
Facilitate Kleptocracy,'' journalist and author Oliver Bullough
describes how Western countries are used by corrupt officials
to protect their ill-gotten gains:
In Stage One, the kleptocrat secures his newly acquired
assets by getting his money and company ownership
offshore. This successfully insulates him against
unexpected political changes at home. In Stage Two, the
kleptocrat secures himself and his children by
physically moving his family offshore. This insulates
those closest to him against the consequences of the
misgovernment that made him rich, while providing both
them and him with a more amenable environment in which
to spend his wealth. In Stage Three, the kleptocrat
secures his reputation by building a network among
influential people in Western countries. In simple
terms, the goal of Stage Three is to make sure that a
Google search returns more news stories about good
deeds than about allegations of corruption and
loutishness.\341\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\341\ Oliver Bullough, Stage Hands: How Western Enablers Facilitate
Kleptocracy, Hudson Institute, at 2 (May 2016).
The scale of how much illicit money has moved out of Russia
is staggering. A report by Global Financial Integrity that
tracked illicit financial flows from developing countries found
that, between 2004 and 2013, over $1 trillion left Russia,
averaging over $100 billion a year.\342\ Several recent
investigations have uncovered how that illicit money flows out
of Russia. An exhaustive investigation by the Organized Crime
and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) tracked over $20
billion in illicit money that travelled from 19 Russian banks
to 5,140 companies with accounts at 732 banks in 96 countries,
including nearly every country in the EU.\343\ The
International Committee of Investigative Journalists' (ICIJ)
Panama Papers probes have traced $2 billion in illicit funds
linked to Vladimir Putin that were moved abroad using a Cypriot
bank and a Swiss law firm.\344\ Investigations of Deutsche Bank
have found that it assisted Russian clients covertly transfer
$10 billion to other jurisdictions.\345\ In 2015, Deutsche Bank
reported that $1.5 billion entered the UK each month without
being recorded in official statistics, and that half of that
money comes from Russia.\346\ Hermitage Capital's investigation
of the Klyuev organized crime group found that it used EU banks
to launder portions of the $230 million the group stole through
fraudulent tax refunds.\347\ Of that amount, some $39 million
ended up in Germany, $33 million in France, and $30 million in
Britain, where it was reportedly spent on yachts, private jets,
designer dresses, and boarding school fees.\348\ All of this
illicit money is reportedly a boon for real estate agents,
lawyers, and luxury service providers in the West.\349\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\342\ Dev Kar and Joseph Spanjers, ``Illicit Financial Flows from
Developing Countries: 2004-2013,'' Global Financial Integrity, at 8
(Dec. 2015).
\343\ Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, The Russian
Laundromat Exposed, Mar. 20, 2017.
\344\ Jake Bernstein, et al., International Committee of
Investigative Journalists, ``All Putin's Men: Secret Records Reveal
Money Network Tied to Russian Leader,'' Apr. 3, 2016.
\345\ Ed Caesar, ``Deutsche Bank's $10-Billion Scandal,'' The New
Yorker, Aug. 29, 2016.
\346\ Peter Hobson, ``How Europe Became a Russian Gangster
Playground,'' The Moscow Times, May 12, 2016.
\347\ Neil Buckley & Richard Milne, ``French Probe Danske Bank Link
to Alleged Russian Fraud,'' Financial Times, Oct. 12, 2017; Russian
Untouchables, ``Attack On Hermitage, $230 Million Tax Theft,'' June 23,
2012.
\348\ Neil Buckley, ``Magnitsky Fraud Cash Laundered Through
Britain, MPs Hear,'' Financial Times, May 3, 2016; Neil Buckley &
Richard Milne, ``French Probe Danske Bank Link to Alleged Russian
Fraud,'' Financial Times, Oct. 12, 2017.
\349\ Peter Hobson, ``How Europe Became a Russian Gangster
Playground,'' The Moscow Times, May 12, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recent years have seen some progress in cracking down on
Russian organized crime in Europe, especially Spain, and
uncovering illicit money flowing out of Russia. But the size of
the problem still far outweighs the response, particularly in
prime destinations for illicit funds like Britain and the
United States, where corrupt Russian government officials and
criminals can easily hide and protect the assets they have
stolen from the Russian people. In the United States, current
law allows the true owners of shell corporations to remain
anonymous and hidden from public sight. In addition, opaque
bank accounts held by law firms are used to launder illicit
funds into the country to purchase real estate and other
assets, making the United States an attractive conduit and
destination for the ill-gotten gains of corrupt Russian
officials and other bad actors around the world.\350\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\350\ Rachel Louise Ensign & Serena Ng, ``Law Firms' Accounts Pose
Money-Laundering Risk,'' The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 26, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE LEVERAGING OF ENERGY SUPPLIES FOR INFLUENCE
Russia's use of energy to influence politics in Europe is
part of the Kremlin's ``energy superpower'' strategy, coined by
Igor Shuvalov when he was Putin's chief economic aide. As
Putin's sherpa to the 2005 G8 summit, Shuvalov developed a new
energy policy approach for Russia and proposed that the Kremlin
make the European countries an offer at the upcoming G8 summit:
Moscow would take care of ensuring a flow of fuel
sufficient to supply every house in Europe, and in
return Europe would show friendship, understanding, and
loyalty, as Silvio Berlusconi had. The concept appealed
very much to Putin. It allowed him to demonstrate a
new, more pragmatic approach to relations with Europe.
He did not want to talk to European leaders about human
rights, freedom of speech, or Chechnya. He was tired of
hearing only criticism. The only way to silence the
liberals was to steer the conversation toward business
matters. Putin appointed Shuvalov as his chief economic
negotiator, whereupon the latter began to represent
Russia in the G8, in the WTO, at Davos, and in talks
with the European Union. His strategic aim was
essentially to convert Russian oil and gas into
political influence and make Putin the energy emperor
of Europe.\351\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\351\ Zygar, All the Kremlin's Men, at 118-19 (emphasis added).
The past decade-plus has seen Putin and the Kremlin pursue
this ``energy superpower'' strategy with extreme vigor, not
only using energy supplies as leverage, but also accumulating
large stakes in energy infrastructure throughout Europe.
Control of supplies and infrastructure has also allowed the
Kremlin to extend influence over local businessmen and
politicians, and exercise undue political influence over the
countries of Europe, especially those on its periphery.
Central and Eastern European countries are dependent on
Russia for approximately 75 percent of their gas imports and,
by some estimates, pay 10 to 30 percent more for their gas
imports than countries in Western Europe.\352\ According to
Heather Conley, a senior vice president at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a U.S. think tank,
this ``provides additional graft to deepen a country's energy
dependency on Russia and make it vulnerable to political
manipulation.'' \353\ Serbia provides a telling example of how
such a situation might play out. The country is reliant on
Russia for its natural gas imports, and its state-owned gas
company, Srbijagas, has in recent years accumulated debts of
over $1 billion, leading Russia to pressure Serbia in 2014 by
reducing gas deliveries by 30 percent. Dusan Bajatovic, the
director of Srbijagas, is also the deputy chairman of the pro-
Russian Socialist Party of Serbia, and serves in parliament,
where he is on the Committee on Finance, State Budget, and
Control of Public Spending. Russia is reported to have relied
on Bajatovic as ``a guarantor of the matters agreed [to] in
[the] South Stream project''--a now-defunct pipeline project on
which Serbia has already lost some $30 million. Despite
Serbia's debts and dependency on the Kremlin's gas supplies,
Bajatovic insists that his country still ``benefits from
contracts with Russia.'' \354\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\352\ Statement of Heather Conley, Senior Vice President for
Europe, Eurasia and the Arctic, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, The Modus Operandi and Toolbox of Russia and Other Autocracies
for Undermining Democracies Throughout the World, Hearing before the
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and
Terrorism, at 3, Mar. 15, 2017.
\353\ Ibid.
\354\ Heather Conley et al., The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding
Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, at 7 (Oct. 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin also has a long track record of using energy
resources and investments to funnel state resources into the
pockets of Putin's friends and allies (``privatizing profit and
nationalizing losses''), while at the same time maintaining or
increasing its leverage and influence over the countries of
Europe, which are largely dependent on Russia for natural gas
supplies. While 90 percent of Europe's oil imports arrive by
sea, most of its natural gas imports come via pipeline,
limiting the flexibility of European countries to change
suppliers or supply routes.\355\ Furthermore, European
countries' ambitious carbon dioxide reduction targets mean that
they are likely to become increasingly reliant on natural gas.
While natural gas accounted for about 23 percent of the EU's
energy consumption in 2015, that figure is expected to grow to
30 percent by 2030, and 70 percent of the natural gas consumed
in the EU is imported.\356\ In 2014, the EU imported 40 percent
of its natural gas and 30 percent of its oil from Russia
(Norway accounted for 35 percent of the EU's natural gas
imports and 12 percent of oil imports).\357\ Several of the
EU's member states rely on Russia for all of their natural gas
imports: Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Slovakia, and
Slovenia (and Latvia uses natural gas for approximately 40
percent of its primary energy needs). Germany and Italy get
nearly 40 percent of their gas imports from Russia, and
Germany's decision to phase out nuclear power plants by 2020,
as well as some EU members' potential prohibitions on shale gas
development, could result in a greater need for natural gas
imports in the EU.\358\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\355\ Michael Ratner et al., Europe's Energy Security: Options and
Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification, Congressional
Research Service, at 5 (Nov. 2015).
\356\ Ibid.
\357\ Ibid.
\358\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to their roles as energy suppliers, Russian
energy companies have large ownership stakes in European energy
infrastructure such as pipelines, distribution, and storage
facilities. A 2014 study commissioned by members of the
European parliament found that Gazprom, Russia's state-owned
natural gas company, controls large amounts of shares--
sometimes even majority stakes--in energy trading,
distribution, pipeline, and storage facilities in several
Central and Eastern European countries. Gazprom also owns large
stakes in storage facilities in Western Europe, including in
Germany, Austria, and the UK.\359\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\359\ Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung,European Natural
Gas Infrastructure: The Role of Gazprom in European Natural Gas
Supplies, at VI (Spring 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The placement of and control over energy pipelines provides
the Russian government with a key source of leverage. Pipeline
routes are chosen to exert maximum influence over the countries
they are going through, as well as the countries that they
circumvent. According to a Berlin Policy Journal article by
Ilya Zaslavskiy, ``these projects serve a purpose beyond mere
economic gain: they are primarily driven by the Kremlin for
political expediency, with Russian leadership sacrificing
efficiency and commercial viability for the sake of
international political partnerships and the economic security
of President Vladimir Putin's inner circle. This approach gives
the Russian regime a political and economic tool which is
powerful and unavailable to its Western counterparts.'' \360\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\360\ Ilya Zaslavskiy, ``Putin's Art of the Deal,'' Berlin Policy
Journal, May 18, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, the proposed Turkish Stream pipeline is not
economically expedient, as the Blue Stream and Trans-Balkan
pipelines already give Russia excess export capacity to Turkey.
However, in addition to providing lavish contracts to Putin's
inner circle and further cementing ties with Turkey's President
Recep Erdogan, the new pipeline will give the Kremlin more
leverage over Ukraine by further reducing its role in
transiting Gazprom's gas to Europe and Turkey.\361\ Gazprom
also uses long-term contracts (LTCs) that prohibit buyers from
selling its gas to third parties, allowing it to implement
``take-or-pay'' clauses that require the buyer to purchase a
set amount or pay a penalty, instead of more flexible contracts
that would be based on fluctuating pricing and demand.\362\
According to an Atlantic Council report, ``many countries that
were heavily depending on Gazprom's gas were thus given a de
facto choice: compromise with Russia on sensitive political and
economic issues and receive favorable LTCs, or defy the Kremlin
and pay high gas prices for years to come.'' \363\ Such
practices led the European Commission to open an antitrust
investigation of Gazprom in 2012, looking at its activities in
eight EU countries.\364\ In 2015, the European Commission
formally charged Gazprom for illegally partitioning EU gas
markets, denying access to gas pipelines by third parties, and
unlawful pricing, all of which could strengthen the Kremlin's
political and economic stranglehold over Central and Eastern
European countries.\365\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\361\ Ibid.
\362\ Ilya Zaslavskiy, The Kremlin's Gas Games in Europe:
Implications for Policy Makers, Atlantic Council, at 2 (May 2017).
\363\ Ibid.
\364\ European Commission, ``Commission Opens Proceedings against
Gazprom,'' (Antitrust Case No. 39816), Sept. 4, 2012.
\365\ European Commission, ``Commission Sends Statement of
Objections to Gazprom for Alleged Abuse of Dominance on Central and
Eastern European Gas Supply Markets,'' (Antitrust Case No. 39816), Apr.
22, 2015; Nicholas Hirst, ``Commission Charges Gazprom,'' Politico
Europe, Apr. 22, 2015. In March 2017, the Commission provisionally
accepted concessions by Gazprom, which the Commission said will address
competition its concerns and better integrate European markets.
European Commission, ``Commission Invites Comments on Gazprom
Commitments Concerning Central and Eastern European Gas Markets,'' Mar.
13, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Nord Stream pipelines provide another example of Russia
forgoing economic logic in the name of political expediency.
Nord Stream 1 (NS1), which went into service in 2011, is a 760-
mile sub-sea natural gas pipeline that connects Germany to
Russia via the Baltic Sea.\366\ According to some analysts, NS1
has been an economic disaster for Russia: transit costs are
equal to or greater than the cost of transporting gas across
Ukraine, and capacity increases have been minimal as gas
transited through NS1 is just diverted from pipelines that
cross Ukraine (before NS1 opened, as much as 80 percent of
Europe's gas imports from Russia were transported through
Ukraine).\367\ As a result, Ukraine's transit revenue has
declined from approximately $4 billion in 2013, to some $3
billion in 2014, and an expected $2 billion in 2015.\368\
Gazprom has treated the pipeline as ``a stranded investment
which never makes the promised return on capital,'' in the
words of one analyst. But NS1 has given the Kremlin increased
leverage over Ukraine and entangled Germany as a principal hub
for Russian gas in Europe. NS1 has also advanced the Russian
government's goal to ``divide and conquer'' the EU with its
energy supplies.\369\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\366\ Nord Stream, ``The Pipeline,'' https://www.nord-stream.com/
the-project/pipeline (visited Dec. 19, 2017).
\367\ Ilya Zaslavskiy, ``Putin's Art of the Deal,'' Berlin Policy
Journal, May 18, 2017; Jon Henley, ``Is Europe's Gas Supply Threatened
by the Ukraine Crisis?'' The Guardian, March 3, 2014.
\368\ Vladimir Socor, ``Nordstream Two in Ukrainian Perspective,''
Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, Sep. 21, 2015.
\369\ Ilya Zaslavskiy, ``Putin's Art of the Deal,'' Berlin Policy
Journal, May 18, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even though NS1 only runs at about 50 percent capacity, the
Kremlin has assiduously pursued the construction of Nord Stream
2 (NS2), which it aims to put into service by 2019 and would
double the capacity of NS1 by laying two new pipelines parallel
to the original pair.\370\ The $11 billion project would also
give Gazprom a stronger `'strategic foothold'' in Germany,
which would become the main hub for transit and storage of
Russian gas exports to Europe.\371\ The geopolitical rationale
for the Kremlin is clear: if both the Turkish Stream and NS2
pipelines are built, the Russian government would have the
transport capacity to fully divert all Russian gas supplies
that currently transit Ukraine, thereby depriving the
government of Ukraine of billions of dollars in transit fees
that are essential to its budget.\372\ An analysis published by
the Atlantic Council in May 2017 concluded that NS2 ``is a
politically motivated project that presents a major challenge
to European law and EU principles, and jeopardizes the security
interests of the United States and its EU allies.'' \373\ The
U.S. State Department's former special envoy for international
energy affairs said in 2016 that NS2 would put an ``economic
boot'' on the necks of governments in the Balkans and Eastern
Europe.\374\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\370\ Zaslavskiy, The Kremlin's Gas Games in Europe, at 6-7.
\371\ Ibid. at 2.
\372\ Ibid. at 6-7.
\373\ Ibid. at 1.
\374\ Anca Gurzu & Joseph Schatz, ``Great Northern Gas War: Gazprom
Project Worries the US and Divides Europe,'' Politico, Feb. 17, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the project's current structure, Gazprom will be the
sole shareholder of the NS2 project company, though five
European energy firms--Engie (France), OMV (Austria), Shell
(Britain and the Netherlands), and Uniper and Wintershall
(Germany)--have committed to providing long-term financing for
50 percent of the project's total costs.\375\ As of November
2017, the European Commission was proposing to extend to
offshore pipelines rules that govern internal energy markets,
which would lead to more stringent regulation of the
project.\376\ Proposals to enhance the EU's regulatory
oversight of NS2 led Russian Prime Minister Medvedev to
complain that the EU was attempting to complicate the project's
implementation or force Russia to abandon it.\377\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\375\ ``New EU Amendment on Gas Pipelines Regulations Could Affect
Nord Stream 2,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 8, 2017.
\376\ ``EU Plans Rule Change to Snag Russian Pipeline,'' Reuters,
Nov. 4, 2017.
\377\ ``Medvedev Says EU Trying to Force Russia to Abort Nord
Stream 2 Pipeline Project,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 14,
2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the threat this project poses to governments in
Ukraine and the Balkans, as well as the Kremlin's history of
leveraging energy supplies for political purposes, several U.S.
government officials have come out in clear opposition to NS2.
In February 2017, the Director of the State Department's Bureau
of Energy Resources office for Europe, the Western Hemisphere,
and Africa told a conference in Croatia that NS2 was ``a
national security threat.'' \378\ The State Department's
Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, A. Wess
Mitchell, has stated that Moscow's construction of NS2 and the
Turkish Stream pipeline, if completed, would ``bypass Ukraine
as a transit country, heighten the vulnerability of Poland and
the Balkans, and deepen European dependence on the Russian gas
monopoly.'' \379\ And Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John
McCarrick, from the Department's Bureau of Energy Resources,
has noted that construction of NS2 ``would concentrate 75 to 80
percent of Russian gas imports to the EU through a single
route, thereby creating a potential choke point that would
significantly increase Europe's vulnerability to supply
disruption, whether intentional or accidental.'' \380\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\378\ Dariusz Kalan, ``Nord Stream 2 `a Security Threat'--US
Official,'' Interfax Global Energy, Feb. 17, 2017.
\379\ Statement of A. Wess Mitchell, Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, European Energy Security: U.S.
Interests and Coercive Russian Diplomacy, Hearing before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Europe and
Regional Security Cooperation, Dec. 12, 2017, at 2.
\380\ Statement of John McCarrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, Bureau of Energy Resources, European Energy Security: U.S.
Interests and Coercive Russian Diplomacy, Hearing before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Europe and
Regional Security Cooperation, Dec. 12, 2017, at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Energy supply disruption is a tactic that the Kremlin has
repeatedly used to pursue its political objectives in Europe. A
report by the Swedish Defense Research Agency showed that
between 1992 and 2006, Russia imposed 55 energy cutoffs.\381\
Though Russian officials claimed the cutoffs were for technical
reasons, analysts note that they ``almost always coincided with
political interests, such as influencing elections or energy
deals in Central and Eastern Europe.'' \382\ In addition, the
Russian government has been suspected of sponsoring
cyberattacks on energy infrastructure throughout Europe,
especially in Ukraine and the Baltic states.\383\ Cybersecurity
experts have linked Russian-backed hackers to multiple attacks
in Ukraine, including one that crippled much of the country's
power grid in December 2016.\384\ Some experts have said that
Russia has used Ukraine as a training ground for cyberattacks
on energy infrastructure.\385\ Such attacks on the United
States are also possible, as a hacking group known as
Dragonfly, which is reportedly linked to the Russian
government, has reportedly hacked into dozens of companies that
supply power to the U.S. electricity grid.\386\ These efforts
are in line with a Russian military doctrine known as Strategic
Operations to Destroy Critical Infrastructure Targets (SODCIT).
General Martin Dempsey, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, has said that the doctrine ``calls for escalating to
deescalate. That's a very dangerous doctrine. And they are
developing capabilities that could allow them to do that.''
\387\ Given the tremendous potential damage of such attacks on
energy grids in both Europe and the United States, stronger
cyber defense efforts in the United States and more robust
cooperation between U.S. and European governments is of the
utmost necessity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\381\ Robert L. Larsson, Nord Stream, Sweden and Baltic Sea
Security, Swedish Defense Research Agency, at 80, (Mar. 2007). At
least 20 occurred during Putin's tenure. Ibid.
\382\ Peter Pomerantsev & Micahel Weiss, The Menace of Unreality:
How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money, Institute
of Modern Russia, at 22 (Nov. 2014).
\383\ ``Dragonfly: Western Energy Sector Targeted By Sophisticated
Attack Group,'' Symantec, Oct. 20, 2017; Suspected Russia-Backed
Hackers Target Baltic Energy Networks, Reuters, May 11, 2017.
\384\ Andy Greenberg, ``How an Entire Nation Became Russia's Test
Lab for Cyberwar,'' Wired, June 20, 2017.
\385\ Ibid.
\386\ ``Dragonfly: Western Energy Sector Targeted By Sophisticated
Attack Group,'' Symantec, Oct. 20, 2017; Kevin Collier, ``Electricity
Providers Targeted In Massive Hack,'' BuzzFeed News, Sept. 6, 2017.
\387\ Martin Dempsey, Interview with Peter Feaver, Duke University,
Apr. 11, 2016.
----------
Chapter 5: Kremlin Interference in
Semi-Consolidated Democracies
and Transitional Governments
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\388\ The countries in this chapter are defined as `'semi-
consolidated democracies'' or ``transitional or hybrid regimes'' by the
Freedom House Nations in Transit study, which ranks and measures the
progress toward or backsliding from democracy of 29 countries from
Central Europe to Central Asia. The ranking is determined by an
assessment of a country's national democratic governance, electoral
process, civil society, independent media, local democratic governance,
judicial framework and independence, and corruption. Countries
classified as semi-consolidated democracies are defined as ``electoral
democracies that meet relatively high standards for the selection of
national leaders but exhibit weaknesses in their defense of political
rights and civil liberties,'' while transitional or hybrid regimes are
``typically electoral democracies where democratic institutions are
fragile, and substantial challenges to the protection of political
rights and civil liberties exist.'' Freedom House, Nations in Transit
2017: The False Promise of Populism, at 22 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
The former states of the Soviet Union, as well as the
former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
remain perhaps the most vulnerable to Russian aggression.
Geographically, the countries in Russia's ``backyard'' have
populations that are most receptive to Kremlin propaganda, and,
in some cases, have their own Russian-speaking populations.
They are also the most vulnerable to interference due to weak
governing institutions, justice systems that allow for higher
levels of corruption, and underdeveloped or beleaguered
independent media and civil society.
The Russian tactics of interference follow two main trends
in this region. First, Russia aggressively targets countries
that have taken tangible steps to integrate with western
institutions like the EU or NATO in order to impede integration
processes. Georgia, Ukraine, and Montenegro are the most recent
cases in a long history of Russian aggression along the
periphery that stretches back generations--and as they have
drawn closer to NATO and the EU, they have been the focus of
arguably the most brazen Kremlin efforts to keep them from
sliding across the finish line. Montenegro's accession to NATO
in 2017 is an anomaly within this group, where, despite an
onslaught of Russian pressure to deter it, the country was able
to become a full member of the alliance.
Second, Russian interference in places like Serbia is less
visibly aggressive and focuses more on cultivating sympathetic
elements of society to deter government efforts to integrate
with the West. In addition to disinformation and the co-opting
of political forces, Russia employs energy resources as a
weapon to gain leverage in these countries. The Kremlin also
targets NATO and EU members where corruption or vulnerabilities
in the rule of law provide openings to erode their bonds to
European values and institutions. This includes undermining
their support for EU sanctions on Russia or NATO exercises on
the continent. These tactics are most acute in Bulgaria and
Hungary. Hungary represents a case where the government has
enabled space for Kremlin interference to shore up its own
political strength, which is largely based on anti-migrant and
anti-European integration policies.
Finally, the country examples in the following two chapters
are not an exhaustive compilation of Russian government
interference throughout Europe, but an illustrative list of
examples from recent years. The examples provide important
lessons about tried and true Kremlin interference tools, as
well as best practices to neutralize them. President Putin and
the Russian government are not master strategists, nor are they
always successful in their assaults on democracies. But a few
notable qualities make the Russian Federation a considerable
opponent: scale, persistence, and adaptability. The United
States and our allies, then, must also develop a more nimble,
adaptable toolkit to deter and defend against continued
meddling by the Kremlin.
UKRAINE
Perhaps more than any other country, Ukraine has borne the
brunt of Russian hybrid aggression in all of its forms--a
lethal blend of conventional military assaults, assassinations,
disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and the weaponization
of energy and corruption. Russian government action on all of
these fronts spiked after the Euromaidan protests of 2014
brought President Petro Poroshenko to power, and they have
continued at an intense tempo in the years since. Ukraine has
also been the target and testing ground for Russian
cyberattacks that have crossed into direct strikes on physical
infrastructure, such as its electricity grid.\389\ As with
Georgia, the goal of Russia's interference appears to be to
weaken Ukraine to the point that it becomes a failed state,
rendering it incapable of joining Western institutions in the
future and presenting the Russian people with another example
of the ``consequences'' of democratization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\389\ Kim Zetter, ``Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of
Ukraine's Power Grid,'' Wired, Mar. 3, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Russian military assault on Ukraine has been well
documented since the illegal occupation of Crimea and support
for separatists in Donbas began in 2014.\390\ This chapter will
focus on those other elements of the Russian government's
asymmetric arsenal at play in Ukraine, namely its use of
cyberattacks, disinformation, and corruption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\390\ The congressionally supported provision of lethal assistance
to the Ukrainian military is long overdue and will hopefully increase
the battlefield cost for Russian forces active in the country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Putin's interference in Ukraine's internal affairs was on
full display in the 2004 presidential election between pro-
Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych and a pro-Western
candidate, Viktor Yuschenko. Yanukovych's campaign was
supported by a large cadre of Russian political strategists,
and just three days before the election, Putin attended a
parade in Kiev where he stood alongside Yanukovych.\391\
Putin's interference created an unprecedented situation where
``Yuschenko's main rival in the elections was not Yanukovych,
in fact, but Putin, who carried on as if it were his own
personal campaign.'' \392\ And Russia's secret services
allegedly performed darker acts to assist Yanukovych. Most
disturbingly, FSB agents were reportedly involved in the
poisoning of Yuschenko in September 2004 with TCDD, the most
toxic form of dioxin, which nearly killed him and left his face
permanently disfigured.\393\ And according to Ukraine expert
Taras Kuzio, alleged FSB-hired operatives also planted a car
bomb--large enough to destroy every building within a 500-meter
radius--near Yuschenko's campaign offices.\394\ But in spite of
Putin's best efforts, the Ukrainian people came to the streets
to protect the ballot box, culminating in the Orange Revolution
and the elevation of Yuschenko to the presidency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\391\ Zygar, All the Kremlin's Men, at 89-90.
\392\ Ibid. at 91.
\393\ Taras Kuzio, Russian Policy Toward Ukraine During Elections,
13 Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 491, at
497-499, 512-513 (Sept. 2005).
\394\ Ibid. at 498.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yanukovych would later assume power in February 2010, and
in 2014, as Ukraine sought to finalize an Association Agreement
with the European Union, a key step in the EU accession
process, Yanukovych backtracked on the deal in response to
pressure from Moscow.\395\ The Ukrainian people rose up in a
``Revolution of Dignity'' in Kiev, which ousted Yanukovych, but
also emboldened Russian forces to invade Crimea and eastern
Ukraine under the pretext that Russian-speaking compatriots
faced threats from Ukrainian nationalists. Using techniques
honed during the invasion of Georgia, Russia expertly combined
all the elements of hybrid warfare in its assault on Ukraine--
conventional and unconventional forces, cyberattacks, and
propaganda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\395\ Will Englund & Kathy Lally, ``Ukraine, Under Pressure from
Russia, Puts Brakes on E.U. Deal,'' The Washington Post, Nov. 21, 2013;
James Marson, et al. ``Ukraine President Viktor Yanukovych Driven From
Power,'' The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 23, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, Russia continues to illegally occupy Crimea and
maintains an active military presence in eastern Ukraine in
support of separatists there. In that context, Ukraine seems to
have emerged as Russia's favorite laboratory for all forms of
hybrid war.
Cyberattacks have been a primary tool of Russia's hybrid
warfare operations in Ukraine. Virtually every sector of its
society and economy--media, finance, transportation, military,
politics, and energy--has been the repeated target of pro-
Kremlin hackers over the past three years.\396\ According to
Kenneth Geers, an ambassador to the NATO Cooperative Cyber
Defense Center of Excellence: ``The gloves are off. This is a
place where you can do your worst without retaliation or
prosecution . . . Ukraine is not France or Germany. A lot of
Americans can`t find it on a map, so you can practice there.''
\397\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\396\ Andy Greenberg, ``How an Entire Nation Became Russia's Test
Lab for Cyberwar,'' Wired, June 20, 2017.
\397\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And the Kremlin has not wasted any opportunity to test and
refine its cyber warfare skills. CyberBerkut, a pro-Russian
group with ties to the hackers that breached the Clinton
campaign and DNC in 2016, attacked Ukraine's Central Election
Commission website in 2014 to falsely show that ultra-right
presidential candidate Dmytro Yarosh was the winner.\398\ The
extent of attacks on Ukrainian institutions quickly widened to
include the ministries of infrastructure, defense, and finance
as well as the country's pension fund, treasury, and seaport
authority.\399\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\398\ Ibid.
\399\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russian cyberattacks in Ukraine have graduated from simply
exfiltrating data and taking down websites to attacks on
physical infrastructure. On at least two occasions, in December
2015 and December 2016, hackers have attacked Ukraine's
electricity distribution system, putting thousands of citizens
in the dark for extended periods of time.\400\ Cyber experts
say that the sophistication of the attacks show a marked
evolution. According to Marina Krotofil, an industrial control
systems security researcher for Honeywell: ``In 2015 they were
like a group of brutal street fighters. In 2016, they were
ninjas.'' \401\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\400\ Ibid. Kim Zetter, ``Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of
Ukraine's Power Grid,'' Wired, Mar. 3, 2016.
\401\ Andy Greenberg, ``How an Entire Nation Became Russia's Test
Lab for Cyberwar,'' Wired, June 20, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States has sought to provide support to
Ukrainian cyber defense efforts, but challenges remain. In the
aftermath of the attacks on Ukraine's energy grid, U.S.
officials from the Department of Energy, Department of Homeland
Security, FBI, and the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation deployed to assist Ukrainian authorities in
assessing the attack.\402\ In 2017, USAID started a project in
Ukraine to help the country build its cyber defenses, but given
the scale and consistency of the Kremlin-directed barrage of
cyberattacks, these assistance efforts pale in comparison to
the threat.\403\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\402\ Ibid.
\403\ U.S. Department of State, Congressional Notification of
Programs to Counter Russian Influence, Jan.19, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the Kremlin has made Ukraine the front line in its
battle against Western institutions, Ukrainian civil society
organizations have developed cutting-edge innovations to
counter Russian disinformation. In March 2014, the Kyiv Mohyla
School of Journalism helped establish StopFake.org--a fact-
checking website that works to refute Russian disinformation
and promote media literacy, which has expanded to produce a
weekly TV show and podcasts. StopFake's show has debunked
Russian propaganda that said the Islamic State terrorist group
had opened a training camp in Ukraine and that Ukrainian
nationalists had crucified Russian-speaking children.\404\
StopFake has become one of the most internationally recognized
organizations for successfully countering Russian
disinformation.\405\ Another program conducted by a U.S.-based
organization helped train more than 15,000 Ukrainians on how to
critically read and share information.\406\ Over the course of
the program, the number of trainees who cross-checked the news
they consumed rose by 22 percent.\407\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\404\ Andrew E. Kramer, ``To Battle Fake News, Ukrainian Show
Features Nothing But Lies,'' The New York Times, Feb, 26, 2017.
\405\ See, e.g., ``2017 Democracy Dinner Explores the Global
Threat of Disinformation,'' National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs, Nov. 2, 2017.
\406\ Tara Susman-Pena & Katya Vogt, ``Ukrainians' Self-defense
against Disinformation: What We Learned from Learn to Discern,'' IREX,
June 12, 2017.
\407\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Ukrainian government has also sought to push back
against disinformation, though with uneven results. In May
2017, President Poroshenko ordered Ukrainian service providers
to block access to Russian websites including the social
networking site VK (formerly VKontakte), Odnoklassniki, search
engine Yandex, and the email service Mail.ru, prompting freedom
of speech concerns from groups like Human Rights Watch.\408\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\408\ ``Ukraine's Poroshenko to Block Russian Social Networks,''
BBC News, May 16, 2017; Human Rights Watch, ``Ukraine: Revoke Ban on
Dozens of Russian Web Companies,'' May 16, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ukraine's most significant vulnerability to the Kremlin's
influence operations is corruption (Ukraine ranks 131 out of
167 countries on Transparency International's 2016 Corruption
Perceptions Index).\409\ Since Ukraine's independence, the
Russian government has used corruption as a tool to weaken the
development of the country's fragile democratic institutions.
While many political figures in Ukraine have been mired in
corruption scandals, the scale that apparently took place
during the Yanukovych regime was striking--in order to maintain
power, Ukrainian watchdogs asserted that he paid $2 billion in
bribes, which amounted to $1.4 million for every day that he
was in office. Election commissioners who guaranteed his
party's good fortunes at the polls were especially well
compensated.\410\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\409\ Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index
2016, Jan. 25, 2017.
\410\ Maxim Tucker, ``Ukraine's Fallen Leader Victor Yanukovych
`Paid Bribes of $2 billion` or $1.4 Million for Every Day He was
President,'' The Guardian, May 31, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Corruption is now seen in many circles as a threat to
Ukraine's national security, and the country's civil society
and the current government have developed several important
anti-corruption measures, building the resilience of their
institutions to defend against malign Russian government
influence. Ukrainian civil society has established the Anti-
Corruption Action Center (AntAC), which has courageously
uncovered cases of high-level corruption despite mounting
pressure by the authorities.\411\ And under substantial
pressure from donors, the Ukrainian government has also taken
important reform steps: it removed a controversial Prosecutor
General who was accused of protecting corrupt actors in the
country; it introduced transparency measures like an e-
declaration system for public officials to report their assets,
and it established investigatory bodies like the National Anti-
Corruption Bureau (NABU). But few high-level prosecutions have
taken place, calling into question the government's political
will to pursue genuine reform.\412\ Moreover, institutions like
NABU have come under increased pressure. In December 2017, the
General Prosecutor's office was accused of unmasking a NABU
investigation and some NABU officials were arrested. In
response, the U.S. State Department said, ``These actions . . .
undermine public trust and risk eroding international support
for Ukraine.'' \413\ Until Ukrainian institutions, especially
the judiciary, prove capable of prosecuting senior level
officials from the former and current regime, the country will
remain severely exposed and vulnerable to the Kremlin's
interference in their country's affairs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\411\ Josh Cohen, ``Something is Very Wrong in Kyiv,'' The Atlantic
Council Blog, May 18, 2017.
\412\ Hrant Kostanyan, ``Ukraine's Unimplemented Anti-Corruption
Reform,'' Center for European Policy Studies, Feb.10, 2017.
\413\ Matthias Williams & Natalia Zinets, ``Ukraine Tries to Fend
Off Critics as West Cranks Up Pressure on Corruption,'' Reuters, Dec.
6, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The military conflict in Ukraine grinds on and the Russian
government's asymmetric arsenal seeks to damage Ukraine in
other ways. But despite the overwhelming pressure from its more
powerful neighbor, Ukraine has proven remarkably resilient with
help from friends in the international community. Ukraine is
ground zero for Russian government aggression and deserves
continued support. This support, however, is a two-way street.
Oksana Syroyid, a deputy speaker of Ukraine's Parliament
Ukraine said in 2017 that Ukraine had become a testing ground
``for a lot of Russia's evil strategies,'' and that
``unfortunately, we have to put up with this. Ukraine's
experience can be used by Europe and America to understand the
real Russian threat.''\414\ The deputy speaker is right--
despite the significant challenges remaining in Ukraine, the
country has many valuable lessons learned since 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\414\ Andrew E. Kramer, ``To Battle Fake News, Ukrainian Show
Features Nothing But Lies,'' The New York Times, Feb. 26, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Ukraine is the main laboratory for Russian aggression
abroad, it is also generating some of the most effective
responses, through collaborations between the Ukrainian
government and civil society, along with partners in the
international community. The United States should proactively
work with Ukraine to document and disseminate these lessons to
other democracies facing the asymmetric arsenal.
Lessons Learned
Cybersecurity Cooperation Can Reap Benefits for the United
States: The Russian cyber assault on Ukraine has been
relentless and multi-faceted since 2014. Ukraine is
where the Russian government experiments and sees what
can work. The United States and others in the
international community have taken steps to help
Ukraine build its defenses, but this cooperation can
also offer insight into how the Russian government
conducts these operations and thus provide a forecast
for the types of attacks we will see in the future.
Cooperation with Ukraine to counter these threats is a
critically important element of building the United
States' defenses.
Countering Disinformation Begins with Awareness: Civil
society organizations like StopFake have led the way in
developing innovative techniques to dispel lies in the
media, which has in turn helped to build resilience and
skepticism within the Ukrainian population. This
critical thinking ability is the first step towards
blunting the effect of lies from Moscow. NGOs in
vulnerable countries should look to StopFake as a
model, not only for the effectiveness of its
techniques, but the courage of its staff.
Civil Society Matters: Since the 2014 Euromaidan
demonstrations, civil society organizations in Ukraine
have played a key watchdog role in holding the
government accountable and calling for reform. This
pressure from the Ukrainian people, channeled through
these groups has led to concrete reforms, particularly
in building anti-corruption institutions. International
efforts to support civil society in Ukraine are
critical; even though they have grown in strength and
effectiveness, these groups still face pressure from
anti-reform elements in the country.
Corruption is Russia's Best Weapon in Ukraine: The best
defense against the Russian government's asymmetric
arsenal in Ukraine, and indeed across Europe, is the
existence of durable democratic institutions that are
less susceptible to corruption. While the Ukrainian
government has established credible anti-corruption
institutions, resistance to genuine reform remains very
strong and Ukraine has yet to embark on significant
efforts to prosecute some of the country's most
egregious corrupt actors. Until Ukraine shows the
political will to confront corruption, the country will
remain dangerously vulnerable to Russian aggression.
High Level U.S. Engagement is Key: The Obama
Administration, primarily through former Vice President
Joe Biden's personal engagement, was instrumental in
pressuring the Ukrainian government to reform despite
the attendant political difficulties in making such
decisions. This approach garnered results, but
sustainable progress can only come with consistent
engagement and pressure from the United States.
Sanctions Pressure Has Been Insufficient: U.S. and EU
sanctions have not resulted in the implementation of
the Minsk Agreements nor the return of Crimea to
Ukrainian control.\415\ The Russian government appears
to have been able to resist this pressure because the
cost imposed by sanctions has been manageable. In order
to achieve the desired outcomes of the Minsk Agreements
and return Crimea to Ukrainian control, the U.S.
government should significantly increase pressure and
use the mandates and authorities outlined in the
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA) to ramp up sanctions on pro-Kremlin entities,
in concert with the European Union.\416\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\415\ The Minsk Agreements were negotiated by Germany, France,
Russia, and Ukraine in talks in Minsk, Belarus in February 2015, under
auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE). They are comprised of a 13-point plan for resolving the
conflict in eastern Ukraine, including a ceasefire and the withdrawal
of heavy weapons from the front lines, to be monitored by the OSCE. The
Agreements were concluded after the collapse of a ceasefire previously
negotiated in Minsk (``the Minsk Protocol'') in September 2014; the
terms have yet to be fulfilled.
\416\ Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, P.L.
115-44, Enacted Aug. 2, 2017 (originally introduced by Senator Ben
Cardin as the Counteracting Russian Hostilities Act of 2017, S. 94,
January 11, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GEORGIA
The 2008 invasion of Georgia is a stark example of how
Russia exerts power--by taking territory inside another
country. After years of rising tensions, Russian troops
supported separatists in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions
in August 2008, resulting in the Russian government's
recognition of their independence. The conflict also represents
the first time that cyberattacks were used alongside a military
invasion--an innovation that the Russian government was to hone
with the invasion of Ukrainian territory six years later. Since
2008, Russian government propaganda and Russian support for
political parties and civil society groups remains a
significant problem in Georgia as pro-democratic forces in the
country seek to deepen integration with the west.
Leading up to August 2008, tensions had been growing in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, regions that had been contested
since Georgia's independence in 1991. South Ossetian
separatists shelled Georgian villages in early August, which
led to the deployment of the Georgian military to the
area.\417\ The Russian military responded by pushing the
Georgian troops out of South Ossetia with a heavy assault of
tanks.\418\ It soon became clear that the Russian attack was
not limited to just conventional military means, but was much
more comprehensive in scope.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\417\ Jim Nichol, ``Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008: Context
and Implications for U.S. Interests,'' Congressional Research Service,
at 5, Mar. 3, 2009.
\418\ Anne Barnard et al., ``Russians Push Past Separatist Area to
Assault Central Georgia,'' The New York Times, Aug. 10, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the seemingly sudden escalation into a hot war, the
Georgian government accused the Russian government of preparing
the hybrid battlefield a month before the invasion. As early as
July 20, the Georgian government experienced distributed denial
of service (DDoS) attacks and President Mikhail Saakashvili's
website was forced to shut down for 24 hours.\419\ As Russian
troops entered Georgian territory on August 8, the websites of
the Georgian president, the parliament, the ministries of
defense and foreign affairs, the national bank, and several
news outlets were hit with cyberattacks.\420\ The Georgian
government accused the Russian government of conducting these
attacks, which the Kremlin denied.\421\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\419\ Swedish Defense Research Agency, Emerging Cyber Threats and
Russian Views on Information Warfare and Information Operations, at 44
(Mar. 2010); John Markoff, ``Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks,'' The
New York Times, Aug. 13, 2008.
\420\ Swedish Defense Research Agency, Emerging Cyber Threats and
Russian Views on Information Warfare and Information Operations, at 44;
``Georgia: Russia `Conducting Cyber War,`'' The Telegraph, Aug. 11,
2008.
\421\ Joseph Menn, ``Expert: Cyber-Attacks On Georgia Websites Tied
to Mob, Russian Government, LA Times, Aug. 13, 2008; ``Georgia: Russia
`Conducting Cyber War,` '' The Telegraph, Aug. 11, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Sulmeyer, a senior Pentagon official in charge of
cyber policy during the Obama Administration, said that
Russia's invasion was ``one of the first times you`ve seen
conventional ground operations married with cyber activity. It
showed not just an understanding that these techniques could be
useful in combined ops but that the Russians were willing to do
them. These guys implemented.'' \422\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\422\ Evan Osnos et al., ``Trump, Putin, and the New Cold War: What
Lay Behind Russia's Interference in the 2016 Election--And What Lies
Ahead?,'' The New Yorker, Mar. 6, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The governments of Estonia and Poland quickly mobilized to
assist the Georgian government to get back online, with the
Estonians sharing experience from the attack on their cyber
infrastructure the year before (see Chapter 6).\423\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\423\ Swedish Defense Research Agency, Emerging Cyber Threats and
Russian Views on Information Warfare and Information Operations, at 44-
45 (March 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Saakashvili came to power in the wake of the Rose
Revolution in 2003 and he quickly sought to establish stronger
ties with Western institutions, drawing Putin's ire. At an
April 2008 summit in Bucharest, NATO pledged to review the
possibility of offering a Membership Action Plan to
Georgia.\424\ Putin responded to the statement by saying that
expansion of NATO to Russia's borders ``would be taken in
Russia as a direct threat to the security of our
country.''\425\ While not the only factor in Russia's 2008
invasion, Georgia's active steps to deepen ties with NATO
appears to have been a critical element of Russia's decision to
invade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\424\ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ``Bucharest Summit
Declaration,'' Apr. 3, 2008.
\425\ Michael Evans, ``Vladimir Putin Tells Summit He Wants
Security and Friendship,'' The Times, July 24, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The short war would presage future Russian hybrid warfare
in Europe, meant to resist NATO and EU enlargement and the
consolidation of democracy on the continent. Today, Russia
recognizes the ``independence'' of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
and, with the support of separatist forces, continues to
station troops in the two breakaway regions.\426\ Moscow has
also entered into treaties of partnership and strategic
alliance with the two regions, further solidifying the frozen
conflict.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\426\ ``Russia Recognizes Abkhazia, South Ossetia,'' Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, Aug. 26, 2008; Damien Sharkov, ``Russian Troops
Launch 3,000-Strong Drill In `Occupied` Georgian Region,'' Newsweek,
June 13, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The timing of the war in Georgia coincided with a political
transition in the United States from the Bush to Obama
Administrations. The outgoing Bush Administration seemed
reluctant to impose sanctions on Russia for its aggression in
the waning days of its term. The incoming Obama Administration
sought a reset with Russia, which also precluded significant
coercive measures to respond to the Kremlin's aggression.
Despite the lack of a more aggressive response to Russian
actions, both administrations did invest significantly in
building governing institutions in Georgia and its integration
into NATO structures.\427\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\427\ U.S. Department of State, ``U.S. Relations with Georgia Fact
Sheet,'' Nov. 28, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond its military assaults on Georgian territory, the
Russian government also supports a variety of pro-Kremlin
political parties, NGOs, and propaganda efforts in the country.
For example, Obiektivi TV, a media outlet, reportedly relied on
Russian funding in its support of the ultra-nationalistic
Alliance of Patriots political party.\428\ Obiektivi's
xenophobic, homophobic, and anti-western narrative helped the
Alliance of Patriots clear the threshold to enter parliament
during the October 2016 election.\429\ Russian propaganda in
Georgia borders on the bizarre. For example, Russian propaganda
asserts that the United States uses the ``Richard Lugar Public
Health Research Center'' to carry out biological tests on the
Georgian population.\430\ According to the Georgian government,
several pro-Russian groups are active in the country, including
the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies and Russkiy Mir
Foundation, two well-known institutions that the Kremlin uses
to exert its influence abroad (see Chapter 4).\431\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\428\ IREX, Media Sustainability Index 2017: The Development of
Sustainable Independent Media in Europe and Eurasia, at 154 (2017).
\429\ Ibid.
\430\ Embassy of Georgia, Information Provided in Response to
Questions from U.S. Senator Ben Cardin, Aug. 29, 2017.
\431\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite these ongoing pressures, Georgia completed an
Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Area with the EU in June 2014, both important steps in the
integration process.\432\ In addition, the country was granted
visa-free travel by the EU in December 2015.\433\ And at NATO's
2014 summit in Wales, the Alliance approved a Substantial NATO-
Georgia Package (SNGP), which includes ``defense capacity
building, training, exercises, strengthened liaison, and
opportunities to develop interoperability with Allied forces.''
\434\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\432\ European Commission, ``Trade Policy, Countries and Regions:
Georgia,'' http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/
countries/georgia (visited Dec. 31, 2017); European Commission, ``EU-
Georgia Association Agreement Fully Enters Into Force,'' July 1, 2016.
\433\ European Commission, ``Commission Progress Report: Georgia
Meets Criteria for Visa Liberalisation,'' Dec. 18, 2015.
\434\ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ``Relations with
Georgia,'' Aug. 23, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cooperation in this area was given a significant boost at
the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, where Allied leaders endorsed a
Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP), including defense
capacity building, training, exercises, strengthened liaison,
and opportunities to develop interoperability with Allied
forces. These measures aim to strengthen Georgia's ability to
defend itself as well as to advance its preparations towards
NATO membership.
The United States has also provided substantial assistance
to Georgia since the Russian invasion in 2008, though the Trump
Administration has requested sharp cuts in funding. Georgia
received $47.5 million through the Assistance to Europe,
Eurasia, and Central Asia Account in FY16; for FY18, the
Administration requested only $28 million.\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\435\ The Senate Appropriations Committee has approved $63 million
for Georgia in this account for FY2018. Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2018, S. 1780, S.
Rept. 115-153, at 51. The legislation awaits consideration by the full
Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lessons Learned
Hybrid War is Here to Stay: The Georgia war was the first
instance in which cyberattacks occurred alongside a
military strike. These tools would be replicated and
refined six years later in Ukraine. The Georgia case
has and should continue to be very instructive for
other states, like the Baltics, that are vulnerable to
similar attacks by the Russian government.
The Asymmetric Arsenal is Flexible: After using military
aggression in Georgia, the Russian government
maintained pressure and influence by using
disinformation, support for NGOs, and interference in
political affairs. While difficult to measure, the
Russian government is able to exert considerable
influence in Georgia using these different avenues.
Western Commitment is Key: The United States and the EU
have provided significant assistance and political
support to Georgia in the years since the 2008 war in
order to bolster democratic institutions and protect
against Russian government aggression. This support has
been essential in helping to prevent renewed Russian
military aggression, but has not been sufficient in
helping Georgia to confront the full range of Russian
interference techniques.
MONTENEGRO
Russian malign influence in Montenegro has long been
present and intensified in 2016 in an effort to derail the
country's NATO bid. This renewed focus included propaganda,
support for NGOs and political parties, and culminated in an
alleged Russian effort to overthrow the government following
the 2016 parliamentary election. While Russia was strongly
opposed to Montenegro's desire to join NATO, it did not resort
to the conventional military tactics used in Ukraine and
Georgia, but instead relied on a hybrid mix of disinformation
and threat of force to send the same message that integration
with the West was unacceptable.
That threat of force came in the form of an alleged coup
plot, which was hatched sometime in mid-2016 when former
Russian intelligence officers Eduard Shishmakov (who also used
the alias Shirakov) and Vladimir Popov went to Serbia and met
with anti-western Serbian nationalist Aleksandar Sindjelic,
where they reportedly discussed a plan to overthrow the
Montenegrin government following parliamentary elections that
October.\436\ According to Senate testimony by Damon Wilson of
the Atlantic Council, Sindjelic was the leader of a Serbian
paramilitary group called the ``Serbian Wolves,'' which sent
fighters to support separatists in Eastern Ukraine--where
Sindjelic reportedly first met Shishmakov and Popov.\437\ The
plot was simple, and, if successful, would have been
devastating. First, Montenegro's pro-Russian Democratic Front
(DF) political party would stage a rally in front of the
Montenegrin parliament on Election Day. Then a broader group of
coup plotters, dressed as policemen but with blue ribbons on
their shoulders to differentiate them from actual officers,
would open fire on the crowd, storm the parliament, and capture
or kill Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic.\438\
Following the meeting, Sindjelic reportedly paid =130,000 to
Mirko Velimirovic, a Montenegrin, to organize logistics and buy
50 rifles and three boxes of ammunition.\439\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\ ``Kremlin Rejects Claims Russia Had Role in Montenegro Coup
Plot,'' The Guardian, Feb. 20, 2017; Ben Farmer, ``Reconstruction: The
Full Incredible Story Behind Russia's Deadly Plot to Stop Montenegro
Embracing the West,'' The Telegraph, Feb. 18, 2017.
\437\ Testimony by Damon Wilson, Vice President of the Atlantic
Council, Attempted Coup in Montenegro and Malign Russian Influence in
Europe, Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services,
July 13, 2017, at 1.
\438\ Ben Farmer, ``Reconstruction: The Full Incredible Story
behind Russia's Deadly Plot to Stop Montenegro Embracing the West,''
The Telegraph, Feb. 18, 2017.
\439\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But the plot would not come to pass. Days before the
election, Velimirovic turned himself in to police and exposed
the conspiracy. Montenegrin security forces swept up the
plotters, but reports have suggested that Shishmakov and Popov
escaped and were among a group of individuals detained by the
Serbian authorities shortly after the October election.\440\
But after a visit to Serbia by the head of Russia's Security
Council (and former FSB director), Nikolai Patrushev,
Shishmakov and Popov were reportedly released and allowed to
return to Russia.\441\ The Russian government denies any role
in the attempted coup plot.\442\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\440\ Julian Borger et al., ``Serbia Deports Russians Suspected of
Plotting Montenegro Coup,'' The Guardian, Nov. 11, 2016.
\441\ Ibid.
\442\ ``Russia Says It Won't Extradite Suspect In Montenegro
Alleged Coup Attempt,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 1, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The purpose of the coup plot was to create such discord in
Montenegro that its NATO bid, or any prospects for integration
with Europe, would be disrupted. Russia sought to destabilize
Montenegro in the same way that it had Georgia and Ukraine,
seeking to render it incapable of integration with Western
democracies. This coup attempt, however, was not a one-off
event, but the culmination of a sustained propaganda and
interference campaign to persuade the Montenegrin people to
oppose NATO membership.
Following Montenegro's announcement of its intention to
join NATO, the Russian government spoke out forcefully against
the bid in the hopes of swaying public opinion. The Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that ``to launch NATO
accession talks with Montenegro [is] an openly confrontationist
move which is fraught with additional destabilizing
consequences for the system of Euro-Atlantic security,'' and
said the move ``directly affects the interests of the Russian
Federation and forces us to respond accordingly.'' \443\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\443\ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
``Comment by the Information and Press Department on Invitation for
Montenegro to Start Talks on Joining NATO,'' Dec. 2, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That response would come in short order. Soon after
Montenegro announced its intention to join NATO, Russia
unleashed a propaganda campaign that included support for pro-
Russian political parties and the cultivation of anti-NATO
civil society groups.\444\ The Democratic Front (DF) political
party, believed to have received millions of dollars in Russian
support, has grown from being a marginal force into
Montenegro's main opposition party.\445\ Sergei Zheleznyak, a
former Deputy Speaker of the Russian Duma, reportedly traveled
to Montenegro to work with members of the Democratic
Front.\446\ On one such visit, he allegedly sought to advance
the idea of neutrality for Montenegro, calling it the ``Balkans
Switzerland'' and encouraged DF activists to use it as a
messaging tool to push back against NATO membership.\447\ The
DF was very active throughout the debate on NATO, which
sometimes resulted in violence. For example, activists from the
DF were behind a demonstration in October 2015 which led to
clashes with police.\448\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\444\ Statement of Vesko Garcevic, Professor of the Practice of
International Relations, The Frederick Pardee School of Global Studies,
Boston University, Russian Interference in European Elections, Hearing
before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, June 28, 2017,
at 5.
\445\ Ben Farmer, ``Reconstruction: The Full Incredible Story
Behind Russia's Deadly Plot to Stop Montenegro Embracing the West,''
The Telegraph, Feb. 18, 2017.
\446\ Garcevic, Russian Interference in European Elections, at 5.
\447\ Ibid.
\448\ Janusz Bugajski & Margarita Assenova, ``Eurasian Disunion:
Russia's Vulnerable Flanks,'' The Jamestown Foundation, June 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Propaganda also flowed freely through Sputnik and the pro-
Russia web portals inf4.net, and Russia reportedly directed
resources to the non-governmental organizations ``NO to War, NO
to NATO'' and the ``Montenegrin Movement for Neutrality'' to
push back publicly against NATO accession.\449\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\449\ Garcevc, Russian Interference in European Elections, at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Montenegrin government called for elections in October
2016 in order to bolster its case that the public supported
Montenegro's membership in NATO. As Mr. Wilson of the Atlantic
Council testified, ``in the run up to this election it was
pretty remarkable to see street signs, billboards all across
the country, [all part of an] anti-NATO campaign. So the plan
was to defeat the pro-NATO forces in this election through
using the Orthodox Church, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the
telecommunications company and the media empire, this small
country of 600,000 was flooded with resources to tip the
balance.''
Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic, who was the main backer of
NATO, emerged victorious with 41 percent of the vote, which he
heralded as an indication of public support for NATO
membership.\450\ It was not until days after the election that
the foiling of the coup plot was made public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\450\ Congressional Research Service, ``Russian Influence on
Politics and Elections in Europe,'' June 27, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In May 2017, Montenegro's chief prosecutor formally
indicted 14 individuals for allegedly plotting to overthrow the
government. They include the two alleged Russian
``masterminds'' of the coup, Shishmakov and Popov, who are
being tried in absentia.\451\ During the trial, witnesses have
also testified that Chechen Republic President Ramzan Kadyrov
had a role in the alleged conspiracy. Mr. Sindjelic testified
that Shishmakov told him Kadyrov received a large amount of
money to bribe a mufti in Montenegro to form a parliamentary
coalition with the DF.\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\451\ Ibid.; Ben Farmer, ``Reconstruction: The Full Incredible
Story behind Russia's Deadly Plot to Stop Montenegro Embracing the
West,'' The Telegraph, Feb. 18, 2017.
\452\ Alec Luhn & Ben Farmer, ``Chechnya Leader Accused of
Involvement in Montenegro Coup,'' The Telegraph, Nov. 29, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. officials have also weighed in on the Kremlin's
complicity in the coup attempt. In a June 2017 Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearing, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State Hoyt Yee said that there were:
Russian or Russian-supported actors who tried to
undermine the elections and probably undermine the
government, if not actually overthrow the government or
even assassinate the prime minister. This is, I think,
consistent with where we`ve seen Russia trying to
interfere in elections around the world, around Europe,
including our own country. It's consistent with
Russia's attempts to prevent countries of the Western
Balkans from joining NATO, from integrating further
with Euro-Atlantic institutions.\453\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\453\ Testimony of Hoyt Brian Yee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Southeast Europe:
Strengthening Democracy and Countering Malign Foreign Influence,
Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 14,
2017.
And in testimony before the Senate Armed Serviced Committee
in July 2017, Montenegro's Ambassador said that the ``Special
Chief Prosecutor, in charge of the case, has publicly stated
that the evidence in this case is (I quote) `undisputable` and
`iron clad.' '' \454\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\454\ Statement of Nebojsa Kaluderovic, Ambassador of Montenegro to
the United States, Attempted Coup in Montenegro and Malign Russian
Influence in Europe, Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed
Services, July 13, 2017, at 1. At the time of this writing, the trial
of the alleged coup plotters was ongoing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the enormous pressure from Russia described in this
chapter, Montenegro formally joined NATO on June 5, 2017.
Montenegro's NATO membership at this time has outsized
importance, as it shows other NATO aspirants that it is
possible to stand up to Russian government pressure and
propaganda efforts and integrate with the West. This case
should be kept in mind as the international community looks to
engage another tier of vulnerable countries with aspirations to
integrate further with the West. Russia should never get a veto
over the decisions of NATO, and the Alliance should be willing
to accept any country which meets the membership requirements
and has support from its citizenry.
Lessons Learned
NATO Membership Matters: Montenegro pursued NATO membership
at great risk and after having to implement far
reaching reforms. Its determination to join the
alliance is a testament to NATO's seminal importance in
the world today. The leading countries in NATO,
including the United States, should recognize the
commitment made by our most vulnerable allies to the
alliance and continuously reciprocate by reiterating
the United States' commitment to the importance of
NATO, particularly Article 5.
Russia's Asymmetric Arsenal Now Includes the Alleged Use of
Violence Outside of the Former Soviet Space:
Montenegrin authorities were fortunate to uncover the
coup plot before it occurred, but evidence presented at
the trial shows that the plotters were very close to
succeeding. The Montenegro case shows how far the
Russian government was willing to go in order to stop a
country's membership in the Alliance--it should serve
as a wake-up call for other NATO and EU aspirants,
especially in the Balkans.
The NATO Reform Process Can Itself Build Resilience: In a
July 2017 statement before the Senate Armed Services
Committee regarding the coup attempt, Montenegrin
Ambassador to the United States Nebojsa Kaludjerovic
said, ``it was thanks to those [NATO] reforms aimed at
strengthening the capacity and independence of
institutions to uphold the rule of law that helped
those very institutions to tackle such a challenge we
are talking about today that would have put to test
much more established democracies than ours.''\455\
NATO should take heed and require a series of reforms
by aspirant countries directly focused on building
resiliency against threats from the Russian
government's asymmetric arsenal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\455\ Ibid.
Montenegro Must Remain Vigilant: Now that Montenegro has
joined NATO, heavy-handed and overtly violent tactics
by Russia are less likely, but Moscow could continue to
exert pressure and influence in ways similar to those
seen in countries like Bulgaria. The international
community should not rest on its laurels now that
Montenegro is a NATO member, but should actively help
the government to bolster its defenses against other
soft power tools in Russia's asymmetric arsenal.
SERBIA
Russian malign influence in the Republic of Serbia
manifests itself through cultural ties, propaganda, energy, and
an expanding defense relationship. Moscow also highlights deep
roots between the countries through the Orthodox Church and a
shared Slavic culture. This narrative has been carefully
cultivated over the years such that Russian government
disinformation campaigns find very fertile ground among the
population of Serbia.\456\ Despite its close relationship with
Moscow, the government of Serbia has made clear that its top
priority is joining the European Union. Serbia's desire to
maintain good relations with both the EU and Russia is
reflective of public opinion, but may not be sustainable, as
deeper integration may mean adopting EU decisions that run
counter to Russian interests.\457\ Therefore, closer ties
between Serbia and the EU could result in a significant surge
in Russian malign influence in the country. The government of
Serbia has done little to prepare for this eventuality and has
taken few discernable actions to defend against Russian malign
influence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\456\ Forty-two percent of Serbian citizens see Russia as Serbia's
most supportive partner, compared to 14 percent for the EU and 12
percent for China. Public Opinion Survey of 1,050 Serbian Adults, Sept.
2017 (unpublished).
\457\ While 49 percent of Serbian citizens supported joining the EU
in September 2017, that number drops to only 28 percemt if joining the
EU meant `'spoiling Serbia's relationship with Russia.'' Public Opinion
Survey of 1,050 Serbian Adults, Sept. 2017 (unpublished).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Serbian government officials' differing opinions on EU
integration reflect a tension within the broader society
itself. In remarks at the Serbian Economic Summit in Belgrade
in October 2017, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hoyt
Brian Yee said that those countries who wished to join the
European Union ``must very clearly demonstrate this desire.''
Referring to Serbia's long-standing relationship with Moscow,
he said, ``You cannot sit on two chairs at the same time,
especially if they are that far away.''\458\ The mixed reaction
from the Serbian government to Yee's remarks reflected the
point that Yee was trying to make. Tanja Miscevic, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs negotiator on Serbia's EU Accession bid,
said that Yee's statement was taken out of context and that he
understood that Serbia's ``clear foreign political strategic
orientation'' was towards the EU.\459\ Serbia's Defense
Minister Aleksandar Vulin, on the other hand, lashed out and
said, ``This is not a statement made by a friend or a man
respecting Serbia, our policy, and our right to make our own
decisions.'' He also said that Serbia will choose its course
regardless of what the ``great powers'' want.\460\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\458\ ``Serbian Defense Minister Denounces U.S. Official's
`Unfriendly` Remarks,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty, Oct. 24,
2017.
\459\ Ibid.
\460\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Serbia has made significant progress in talks with the EU,
having opened 12 out of the 35 ``chapters'' required for EU
membership.\461\ It also has the closest ties to Russia of any
of the prospective candidates. And as it continues to make
progress towards integration with Europe, there are signs that
Moscow plans to increase pressure on the Balkan country to
prevent this outcome. As Serbia's EU bid becomes more serious,
Belgrade would be well served to examine the tools used by
Russia laid out throughout this report and work closely with
the EU to build its defenses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\461\ ``EU Opens New Negotiation Chapters With Montenegro,
Serbia,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty, Dec. 11, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The government of the Republic of Serbia has dedicated
substantial resources and political capital towards joining the
EU.\462\ But unfortunately, it has taken little action to
defend itself from anti-EU Russian government propaganda that
circulates throughout the country with little resistance.
According to the U.S. State Department, the ``number of media
outlets and NGOs taking pro-Russian stands has grown from a
dozen to over a hundred in recent years, and the free content
offered by Russian state outlets such as Sputnik make them the
most quoted foreign sources in the Serbian press.'' \463\ For
example, Sputnik articles in recent years have falsely claimed
that Kosovar Albanians planned pogroms against Kosovar Serbs
with the blessing of the West and that the West is fomenting
instability in the Balkans to create a pretext for
invasion.\464\ This propaganda appears to have had an impact.
Since Sputnik was launched in Serbia in January 2015, Russia's
favorability numbers among Serbians have increased from 47.8
percent to 60 percent in June 2017.\465\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\462\ See, e.g., Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
EU Integration Process of the Republic of Serbia, http://
www.mfa.gov.rs/en/themes/public-consultation-on-the-eu-strategy-for-
the-adriatic-and-ionian-region (visited Dec. 19, 2017).
\463\ U.S. Department of State, Background Information on Serbia
provided to Committee Staff, June 30, 2017.
\464\ Andrew Rettman, ``Western Balkans: EU Blindspot on Russian
Propaganda,'' EUobserver, December 10, 2015.
\465\ Public Opinion Survey of 1,050 Serbian Adults, Sept. 2017
(unpublished).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most EU aspirants adopt the foreign policy directives of
the European Union as a way to show commitment to solidarity
even before they join. For example, Montenegro has adopted a
top foreign policy priority of the EU--the sanctions regime on
Russia--even though it is not a member. Once in the EU,
countries are expected to adopt the foreign policies of the
block on agreed-upon issues. Serbia has not signed onto the
EU's Russia sanctions, and, given its relationship with Russia,
it is difficult to see Belgrade agreeing to such measures in
the foreseeable future. This tension with the EU on a central
foreign policy priority for Brussels makes a challenging
situation for Serbia even more difficult.
A similar dynamic is playing out next door in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, where parts of the government have expressed a
desire to join NATO.\466\ In order to move forward, however,
all three constituent ethnicities represented in the Bosnian
presidency--the Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs--would have to
agree on Bosnia's NATO bid and make the commensurate reforms.
Bosnia's Republika Srpska (RS), or Serbian Republic, is one of
two largely autonomous constitutional entities in Bosnia. It is
majority Serb and maintains close relations with Moscow. An RS
objection to joining NATO would collapse any deal. Although the
central government in Sarajevo has expressed support for
Bosnia's implementation of a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP),
the parliament in RS passed a non-binding resolution in October
2017 opposing Bosnia's potential membership in the military
alliance.\467\ In recent years, Russia has intensified its
relationship with RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, which could
prove useful in hampering Bosnia's NATO bid. Though Dodik is
not the head of Bosnia's government, Vladimir Putin has met
with him on multiple occasions, despite not meeting the central
government in Sarajevo--a breach of diplomatic protocol that
makes clear that he is Russia's preferred interlocutor.\468\
The Russian government has also publicly expressed its support
for a 2017 independence referendum in RS, which the
Constitutional Court found violated the rights of non-Serbs in
the country.\469\ If Bosnia were to make significant progress
towards NATO, Russia could exert influence in RS to hamper
forward progress. The media space is already prepared for that
possibility, as RS media outlets rely on anti-NATO and anti-EU
content from Sputnik's Belgrade outlet.\470\ Russian influence
in Banja Luka, the de facto capital of RS, is pervasive--
downtown kiosks are filled with t-shirts, coffee mugs, and
other memorabilia praising the Russian Federation and Vladimir
Putin.\471\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\466\ ``Bosnia Making Military Progress in NATO Bid--Alliance
General,'' Reuters, Nov. 14, 2017.
\467\ ``Bosnian Serbs Pass Non-Binding Resolution against NATO
Membership,'' Associated Press, Oct. 18, 2017.
\468\ Danijel Kovacevic, ``Putin-Dodik Comradeship Causes
Uncertainty for Bosnia,'' BIRN/Balkan Insight, June 8, 2017.
\469\ Milivoje Pantovic et al., ``Russia Lends Full Backing to
Bosnian Serb Referendum,'' Balkan Insight, Sept. 20, 2016.
\470\ John Cappello, ``Russian Information Operations in the
Western Balkans,'' Real Clear Defense, Feb. 1, 2017.
\471\ Observed during Committee Staff Visit to Banja Luka, July
2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Serbia continues to work through chapters in its EU
accession talks, Russia has employed several of the
interference tools seen in this report, especially propaganda
and disinformation. For example, according to Stratfor
Worldview, the Russian state newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta
prints Nedeljnik, a widely read weekly magazine, in Moscow
before delivering it to Serbia.\472\ According to the Financial
Times, Sputnik provides online stories and news bulletins to
20 radio stations across Serbia free of charge.\473\ More than
100 media outlets and NGOs in Serbia can be considered pro-
Russian, a number that has spiked considerably in recent
years.\474\ The response from the West has been sparse, but
there are signs of competition in the information space. The
BBC has announced plans to reengage in Serbia in 2018, seven
years after it closed its Serbian language service. The service
will be funded at around 600,000 annually and will
employ 20 local staff.\475\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\472\ ``Russia Stirs up the Hornet's Nest,'' Stratfor Worldview,
Mar. 28, 2017.
\473\ Andrew Byrne, ``Kremlin Backed Media Adds to Western Fears in
Balkans'' Financial Times, March 19, 2017. In conversations with U.S.
officials and civil society groups during a visit to Belgrade in 2017,
Committee staff were told Serbian outlets pick up content from Sputnik
and other Russian outlets because it is free; however, Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty also provides free content that is objective and
does not contain the same Russian propaganda messages.
\474\ .U.S. Department of State, Background Information on Belgrade
provided to Committee Staff, June 30, 2017.
\475\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Press freedom has also declined sharply in recent years in
Serbia. Freedom House reported in 2017 that ``press freedom has
eroded under the SNS-led administration of Prime Minister [now
President] Vucic. Independent and investigative journalists
face frequent harassment, including by government officials and
in pro-government media. Physical attacks against journalists
take place each year, and death threats and other intimidation
targeting media workers are a serious concern.'' \476\ If
Serbia's journalists are not able to conduct investigations
without threat of censorship, violence, or intimidation, the
ability of the country to significantly counter Russian
propaganda may not be possible. The government of Serbia has an
important role to play in fostering an environment where press
freedom can thrive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\476\ Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2017: Serbia (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia also exerts considerable influence through Serbia's
energy sector. In 2014, Russia provided 40 percent of the
natural gas consumed in Serbia, and, in December 2017, Serbia's
state-owned natural gas company, Srbijagas, announced that it
would increase imports from Gazprom by 33 percent in 2018.\477\
Russia's energy dominance also extends to Serbia's domestic
oil, where Gazprom has majority ownership of the national oil
company.\478\ While the cancellation of the South Stream
project (see Chapter 4) caught Serbia and other countries in
the region by surprise, there are indications that Serbia could
be invited to participate in its replacement, Turkish Stream,
Russia's proposed pipeline deal with Turkey.\479\ While the EU
and United States are working with Belgrade to diversify its
energy resources through projects like the Bulgaria-Serbia
Interconnector, Serbia's viable short-term diversification
options remain limited.\480\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\477\ Janusz Bugajski and Margarita Assenova, ``Eurasian Disunion:
Russia's Vulnerable Flanks,'' The Jamestown Foundation, June 2016, at
242; ``Gazprom to Increase by 33% Natgas Exports to Serbia in 2018,''
SeeNews, Dec. 20, 2017.
\478\ U.S. Department of State, Background Information on Belgrade
provided to Committee Staff, June 30, 2017.
\479\ Andrew Roth, ``In Diplomatic Defeat, Putin Diverts Pipeline
to Turkey,'' The New York Times, Dec. 1, 2014; Vincent L. Morelli,
``Serbia: Background and U.S. Relations,'' Congressional Research
Service, Oct. 16, 2017.
\480\ In January 2017, Serbia and Bulgaria signed a memorandum of
understanding to establish a natural gas line between the cities of
Sofia and Nis, contributing to regional efforts to diversify energy
supplies away from Moscow. ``Bulgaria, Serbia Agree to Work on Pipeline
to Cut Reliance on Russian Gas,'' Reuters, Jan. 19, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia is able to engage with the citizens of Serbia
through cultural institutions, including the Orthodox Church,
civil society associations, and under the guise of humanitarian
assistance. Leonid Reshetnikov, a retired lieutenant general in
the Russian intelligence service SVR and then director of the
Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, spoke at a 2015
conference in Serbia entitled ``Balkan Dialogue--Russia's Soft
Power in Serbia.'' Reshetnikov has been described by former
senior government officials in the Balkans as ``a propaganda
fist'' and ``the right hand of Mr. Putin'' in their
countries.\481\ He commented on the roots of the orthodox bond
between Serbia and Russia:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\481\ Joe Parkinson & Georgi Kantchev, ``Document: Russia Uses
Rigged Polls, Fake News to Sway Foreign Elections,'' The Wall Street
Journal, Mar. 23, 2017. In addition, Reshetnikov was sanctioned by the
United States in December 2016 for his role in a bank that financed the
government of Syria's Bashar al-Assad. Ibid.
[W]e have forgotten that we are a civilization that is
an alternative to the Anglo-Saxon civilization. Our
mission is to carry our civilization into the world and
to propose our view. Our soft power is to be loyal to
the principles of the Orthodox civilization. That is
the idea we should have in mind when we talk about the
influence of Russia. Why do Serbs and Russians so
easily find a common language? Because we have the same
root, we easily find a common language with the
Serbs.\482\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\482\ The Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies, Eyes Wide Shut:
Strengthening of Russian Soft Power in Serbia: Goals, Instruments, and
Effects, May 2016 (citing ``Soft Power'' of Russia in Serbia--
Possibilities and Perspectives, NSPM [Nova Srpska Politicka Misao],
Dec. 15, 2014 (in Serbian)).
A core element of the Russian government narrative on its
relationship with Serbia rests on its common heritage in the
Orthodox Church. Church leadership in Russia and Serbia amplify
traditional conservative messages that frequently carry anti-EU
or anti-western tones, often focused on gay rights. These ties
between the churches are cultivated by senior political
leaders--Russian officials emphasize these ties on visits to
Serbia, often making time to meet with Serbian Orthodox Church
leaders.\483\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\483\ See Ibid. at 71-73.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies (CEAS) has documented
51 pro-Kremlin associations and student organizations active in
Serbia.\484\ Among the most influential, according to CEAS, is
SNP Nashi, a group modeled on the Russian pro-Kremlin youth
organization Nashi (see Chapter 2).\485\ SNP Nashi was created
in 2006 and sought to build closer ties with Moscow, while
opposing Serbia's membership in the EU. The group's leadership
has led efforts against pro-western voices in Serbia and has
been sued for creating a list of ``the 30 biggest Serb
haters.''\486\ Similar organizations include the Patriotic
Front, which has reportedly facilitated paramilitary training
for Serbian children in Siberia, and the Serbian Patriotic
Movement Zavetnici, which includes many student members and has
advocated against Kosovo independence as well as Serbia's
proposed EU membership.\487\ In the southern city of Nis, the
Russian government established a Russian-Serbian Humanitarian
Center (RSHC) in 2012, ostensibly to help Serbia improve its
emergency response capabilities and respond to natural
disasters.\488\ U.S. officials, however, have questioned the
center's true purpose. The former Commander of U.S. Army forces
in Europe, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges noted his skepticism
about Russian intentions in Nis, which is close to U.S.
military personnel stationed across the border in Kosovo,
saying, ``I don`t believe it's a humanitarian center. That's
the facade, but that's not what it's for.'' \489\ In June 2017,
testifying before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Deputy Assistant Secretary Yee stressed that if Serbia ``allows
Russia to create some kind of a special center for espionage or
other nefarious activities, it will lose control over part of
its territory.'' \490\ The Russian government has requested
diplomatic status for their staff at the facility, a request
that Serbia has not yet honored.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\484\ Ibid. at 82-99.
\485\ Ibid. at 84. For more on Nashi, see Chapter 2.
\486\ Ibid.
\487\ Ibid. at 88-89.
\488\ Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center, ``About,'' http://
en.ihc.rs/about (visited Dec. 19, 2017).
\489\ ``US General: Russian Center in Serbia is Not Humanitarian,''
In Serbia Today, Nov. 16, 2017. Lt. Gen. Hodges retired in December
2017.
\490\ Statement of Hoyt Brian Yee, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Southeast Europe: Strengthening Democracy and Countering Malign Foreign
Influence, Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, June 14, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security cooperation presents Russia with another powerful
inroad into Serbia's government and society. The narrative that
Russia is Serbia's protector on the world stage has a
particular resonance with Serbia's population. A 2017 public
opinion survey by the Belgrade-based Demostat research center
found that 41 percent perceive Russia as Serbia's greatest
friend.\491\ The Russian government takes a hard line against
recognition of Kosovo's statehood and blocking resolutions at
the UN on the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. Serbian President
Aleksandar Vucic frequently meets with President Putin, and as
recently as December 2017 called upon Russia to play a more
active role in negotiations on Serbia's relationship with
Kosovo.\492\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\491\ Filip Rudic, ``Serbians Support Military Neutrality, Research
Says,'' Balkan Insight, Sept. 5, 2017.
\492\ Filip Rudic, ``Serbia Seeks Russia Role in Kosovo Talks,''
Balkan Insight, Dec. 20, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This theme also plays out in the defense relationship
between Russia and Serbia. In the last year, Serbia signed a
major arms deal with Russia and sent a member of its Defense
Attache team in Moscow to observe a Russian military exercise
in Crimea.\493\ In October 2017, Russia provided six MiG-29
jets, and reportedly agreed to provide 30 T-72 tanks and 30
BRDM-2 patrol combat vehicles to Serbia, all at no charge.
President Vucic reportedly said that Serbia is also negotiating
the purchase of the S-300 air defense system from Russia, a
deal which could trigger recently adopted U.S. law which
mandates sanctions on any significant transaction with the
Russian military or intelligence sectors.\494\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\493\ U.S. Department of State, Background Information on Serbia
provided to Committee Staff, June 30, 2017.
\494\ ``Serbia Takes Delivery of First of Six MiG-29 Fighters from
Russia,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Oct. 2, 2017; Countering
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, P.L. No. 115-44, Sec. 231
(Enacted Aug. 2, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite close military ties with Russia, Serbia also seeks
to maintain security cooperation with NATO and the United
States. According to the Congressional Research Service, Serbia
participates in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program,
including through joint exercises and training
opportunities.\495\ According to John Cappello, a former Acting
Defense Attache at the U.S. Embassy, Serbia held around 125
military-to-military exchanges with the United States in 2016,
compared to only four with Russia.\496\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\495\ Vincent L. Morelli, ``Serbia: Background and U.S.
Relations,'' Congressional Research Service, Oct. 16, 2017.
\496\ Kaitlin Lavinder, ``Russia Ramps Up Media and Military
Influence in the Balkans,'' The Cipher Brief, Oct. 13, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Russian government's asymmetric arsenal in Serbia is
multi-faceted and very effective at maintaining public support
for a strong relationship with Moscow. This has been achieved
with little counter-messaging efforts on the part of the
European Union and the United States. Given Serbia's central
role and influence in the Balkans, any strategy to counter
malign influence should start with Belgrade. Since the Russian
government could significantly ramp up its malign influence
efforts beyond current levels in the event that Serbia made
clear strides towards joining the European Union, the
international community should prepare for this eventuality by
incorporating some of the best lessons learned from other
countries across Europe.
Lessons Learned
More Domestic Leadership is Needed to Defend Against
Kremlin Interference: Serbia is an important country in
the region, given its geographical centrality and
complicated recent history during the breakup of
Yugoslavia. As its leaders navigate a challenging
political environment, there is no doubt that Serbia
faces pressure in trying to `'sit on two chairs.'' But
leadership matters, and if Serbia wants to join the EU,
it needs to take steps to counter the Russian
asymmetric arsenal. Without any significant defense,
Russian propaganda will continue to have an impact on
public opinion in Serbia.
The United States Must Reengage with Resources: U.S.
assistance to Serbia has been on a downward trajectory
in recent years. According to the Congressional
Research Service, the United States provided $22.9
million in FY2014, $14.2 million in FY2015, and $16.8
million in FY2016. For FY2017, the Obama Administration
requested approximately $23 million. The FY2018 budget
from the Trump Administration requested $12.1
million.\497\ In light of substantial assistance
increases authorized in the 2017 Countering America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, USAID missions
across the region must reorient towards a more robust
effort to counter Russian malign influence.\498\ For
years, these missions have been on a glide path to wind
down operations with insufficient focus on the threat
posed by Russian malign influence. The challenge faced
by the United States and its allies across the Balkans
and throughout Europe requires a reorientation of
assistance. In approaching this reality, the United
States must reverse years of thinking about shrinking
its footprint, and instead work towards an expansive
and entrepreneurial approach that makes long-term
investments in building resiliency and strengthening
democratic institutions, including their ability to
counter disinformation. The United States should also
continue to support Serbia's efforts to become more
energy independent, and work with the EU on
comprehensive efforts across the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\497\ Morelli, ``Serbia: Background and U.S. Relations,'' U.S.
Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2018 (May
23, 2017).
\498\ Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, P.L.
No. 115-44, Sec. 254 (Enacted Aug. 2, 2017).
U.S. Officials Need to Show Up: In addition to aid,
countries like Serbia also need senior level and
consistent U.S. diplomatic engagement. The United
States must send a clear message that it is willing to
spend the time and effort necessary to support those
who want a democratic future in Europe. High-level
attention by the United States has been noticeably
diminished in the region since the fall of Slobodan
Milosevic, more than 17 years ago. Russian engagement
with Serbia's leadership stands in stark contrast to
that of the United States. President Vucic has met with
President Putin at least twelve times since 2012.\499\
The last U.S. President to visit Belgrade was Jimmy
Carter in 1980.\500\ To fill this void, senior U.S.
officials, including members of Congress, should
regularly travel to the region and host high profile
visitors to Washington. The United States needs to send
a clear message that it is back and ready to work
seriously in cooperation with host countries and allies
across Europe to defend against malign influence and
help countries complete the integration process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\499\ U.S. Department of State, Background Information on Belgrade
provided to Committee Staff, June 30, 2017.
\500\ U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian,
Presidential and Secretaries Travel Abroad: Jimmy Carter (1980).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BULGARIA
Russia exerts influence in Bulgaria through its dominant
role in the economy, primarily in the energy sector, as well as
propaganda, relationships with political parties, cultural
ties, and a relationship with a Bulgarian military that
continues to rely on Soviet-era equipment. Bulgaria's
longstanding historical relationship with Russia makes it
unique among the other EU and NATO countries, requiring
continued vigilance on the nature and effect of Russian
influence on the country.
From a bird's eye view of downtown Sofia, Bulgaria's
capital city, one can see the second biggest Orthodox Church in
the Balkan Peninsula, the St. Alexander Nevsky Cathedral. Named
after a Russian prince, the cathedral is meant to honor the
memory of Russian soldiers killed during the Russo-Turkish War
of 1877-1878. Yards away stands a monument honoring Russian
Tsar Alexander II, who led the effort to liberate Bulgaria from
the Ottoman Empire. Alexander is sitting on a horse, facing the
Bulgarian parliament building, an imposing reminder to the
country's legislators of how the country gained its
independence.
These iconic buildings on Sofia's skyline are a telling
perspective on Bulgaria's history and current position. Among
the group of countries profiled in this report, Bulgaria has
perhaps the most longstanding historical ties to Russia. During
the Cold War, Bulgarian leaders like Todor Zhivkov sought to
make Bulgaria the 16th Soviet Republic.\501\ Today, the
Bulgarian Socialist Party maintains good relations with Moscow
and its leader, Kornelia Ninova, has called for EU sanctions on
Russia (which Bulgaria is required to implement as an EU
member) to be lifted.\502\ The pro-Kremlin Ataka party has
called for a closer relationship with Russia and has stridently
opposed the European Union through a xenophobic, far-right
agenda. Ataka's leader, Volen Siderov, opened his party's 2014
election campaign at an event in Moscow, where he criticized
the `'sodomite NATO.'' \503\ While public support for the party
has diminished in recent years, its messaging continues to
resonate with elements of the electorate. At the same time, the
government of Prime Minister Boyko Borisov has taken measures
to push back against Russian influence, such as in September
2015, when he denied overflight rights to Russian aircraft in
support of its mission in Syria.\504\ The apparent disconnect
between Bulgarian society and government--a broad affinity for
Russia among the population combined with a strong EU and NATO
partner in the Bulgarian government--argues for deeper U.S.
engagement across all sectors of Bulgarian society.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\501\ Heather A. Conley et al., Center for Strategic &
International Studies, The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian
Influence in Central and Eastern Europe, at 43 (Oct. 2016).
\502\ Ibid.
\503\ John R. Haines, ``The Suffocating Symbiosis: Russia Seeks
Trojan Horses Inside Fractious Bulgaria's Political Corral,'' Foreign
Policy Research Institute, Aug. 5, 2016.
\504\ ``Russia Says Bulgaria's Refusal of Flyovers to Syria Is a
U.S. Plot,'' Los Angeles Times, Sept. 8, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the history of Bulgaria's relationship with Russia is
rooted in its military liberation from Ottoman rule, the modern
manifestation of Moscow's influence is more focused on soft
power, energy economics, and political and cultural influence.
Bulgarian public opinion polls clearly reflect an affinity
for Russia. In its recent Trends 2017 Survey, the think tank
GLOBSEC found that 70 percent of Bulgarians had a favorable
opinion of Vladimir Putin, the highest of any EU country.\505\
Bulgaria joined NATO in 2004, but public support for the
Alliance is tepid. When asked about Article 5 of the NATO
charter--which considers an attack on one member as an attack
on all--less than half of Bulgarian respondents said that they
would support coming to the aid of a NATO ally under
attack.\506\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\505\ GLOBSEC Policy Institute, GLOBSEC Trends 2017: Mixed Messages
and Signs of Hope from Central and Eastern Europe, at 20 (Jan. 8,
2017).
\506\ Ibid. at 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A report by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), a U.S. think tank, has characterized Russia's
outsized role in the Bulgarian economy as ``bordering on state
capture'' and asserts that ``the Kremlin uses a complex and
opaque network of colluding officials within the governing
apparatus and business community'' to advance its
interests.\507\ Nowhere is Russian government dominance more
apparent than in the energy sector. Bulgaria is almost
completely dependent on Russia for oil and natural gas--90
percent of Bulgaria's natural gas is imported from Russia and
the country completely depends on Moscow to supply nuclear fuel
for its two reactors, which generate 35 percent of the
country's electricity.\508\ The CSIS report also argues that
Moscow's ability to influence the policy making process in
Bulgaria is considerable. During debate on the South Stream
pipeline in the Bulgarian parliament, MPs introduced amendments
which would have circumvented EU energy law. Gazprom also
reportedly sent an official letter to the Bulgarian Energy
Holding company, which provided advice on changes to the
Bulgarian energy law in Gazprom's interests.\509\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\507\ Ibid.
\508\ U.S. Department of State, Background Information on Bulgaria
provided to Committee Staff, Feb. 9, 2017.
\509\ The Kremlin Playbook, at 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia canceled the Gazprom-led South Stream project in
2014 after it attracted significant pushback from other
countries, which in turn enabled Bulgaria to support the EU-
backed Southern Gas Corridor.\510\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\510\ Stanley Reed & James Kanter, ``Putin's Surprise Call to Scrap
South Stream Gas Pipeline Leaves Europe Reeling,'' The New York Times,
Dec. 2, 2014; Radislov Dikov, Bulgaria Becomes Part of Southern Gas
Infrastructure, Radio Bulgaria, Mar. 21, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Societal challenges also create openings for Russian
influence. Bulgaria is one of the poorest countries in Europe--
it has experienced slow economic growth and many of its young
people are leaving for Western Europe.\511\ The population is
aging and likely more inclined towards nostalgia for Bulgaria's
warm relations with Moscow during the Cold War. The migrant
crisis also provides an opening for anti-Europe propaganda, one
that political parties like Ataka have been eager to exploit.
In 2014, its leader warned that, ``Bulgaria was melting away
without a war'' as ``abortion, emigration, homosexuality, and
permanent economic crisis destroyed the population.''\512\ The
Russian government, through the Russkiy Mir Foundation,
supports organizations outside Russia ``in partnership with the
Russian Orthodox Church . . . to promote Russian language and
Russian culture.'' \513\ Russkiy Mir operates six ``Russia
Centers'' in Bulgaria focused on cultural and educational
programs in addition to Russian-language instruction.\514\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\511\ Ivan Krastev, ``Britain's Gain is Eastern Europe's Brain
Drain,'' The Guardian, Mar. 24, 2015.
\512\ John R. Haines, ``The Suffocating Symbiosis: Russia Seeks
Trojan Horses Inside Fractious Bulgaria's Political Corral,'' Foreign
Policy Research Institute, Aug. 5, 2016.
\513\ Ibid. The Foundation is a joint project of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science, and has a
stated purpose of ``promoting the Russian language, as Russia's
national heritage and a significant aspect of Russian and world
culture, and supporting Russian language teaching programs abroad.''
Russkiy Mir Foundation, ``About Russkiy Mir Foundation,'' https://
russkiymir.ru/en/fund/index.php (visited Dec. 31, 2017).
\514\ See Russkiy Mir Foundation, ``Russian Centers of the Russkiy
Mir Foundation,'' https://russkiymir.ru/en/rucenter (visited Dec. 31,
2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia reportedly sought to exploit Bulgarian politics
during the 2016 presidential election using techniques seen
elsewhere across Europe.\515\ Prior to the 2016 presidential
election, Leonid Reshetnikov, then director of the Russian
Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS), visited Bulgaria, where
he reportedly provided the Socialist Party with ``a secret
strategy document proposing a road to victory at the ballot
box'' with recommendations to ``plant fake news and promote
exaggerated polling data.'' \516\ The document also urged the
Socialist Party to adopt a platform that aligned with Kremlin
interests: end sanctions on Russia, criticize NATO, and
encourage Brexit.\517\ Reshetnikov told the Bulgarian and
Russian media that he met with the head of the Socialist party,
but he denies providing the dossier.\518\ Later that year,
Rumen Radev, the Bulgarian Socialist Party candidate, would go
on to win the presidency with 59 percent of the vote, though
how much of its success was due to following the reported RISS
plan is impossible to determine.\519\ And despite the alleged
Russian support and initial concerns about Radev's candidacy,
since becoming President, his expressions of strong support for
NATO and the EU indicate an intention to maintain the status
quo with these institutions.\520\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\515\ Parkinson & Katchev, ``Document: Russia Uses Rigged Polls,
Fake News to Sway Foreign Elections,'' The Wall Street Journal, Mar.
23, 2017.
\516\ Joe Parkinson & Georgi Kantchev, ``Document: Russia Uses
Rigged Polls, Fake News to Sway Foreign Elections,'' The Wall Street
Journal, Mar. 23, 2017.
\517\ Ibid.
\518\ Ibid.
\519\ Tsvetelia Tsolova & Angel Krasimirov, ``Russia-Friendly
Political Novice Wins Bulgaria Presidential Election: Exit Polls,''
Reuters, Nov. 12, 2016.
\520\ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ``Joint Press Point with
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of the
Republic of Bulgaria, Rumen Radev,'' Jan. 31, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin has also reportedly interfered in more recent
Bulgarian national elections. Prior to the 2017 parliamentary
elections, Bulgarian analysts asserted that upwards of 300
Bulgarian websites were dedicated to advancing pro-Russian
propaganda.\521\ A 2017 report by the Human and Social Studies
Foundation, a Bulgarian think tank, asserts that domestically-
generated pro-Russian propaganda is used as a tool to advance
domestic political goals.\522\ For example, Bulgarian national
Stefan Proynov runs a small troll farm in the village of
Pliska.\523\ According to the Russian investigative website
Coda:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\521\ Committee Staff Interview of Project Members Examining
Russian Disinformation, Sofia University, Sofia, Bulgaria, Feb. 23,
2017.
\522\ ``Anti-Democratic Propaganda in Bulgaria,'' Human and Social
Studies Foundation, 2017.
\523\ Michael Colborne, ``Made in Bulgaria: Pro-Russian
Propaganda,'' Coda, May 9, 2017
Proynov's mission runs on vengeance--specifically,
against the generally pro-European, center-right, GERB
party of Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, who won re-
election last month. Proynov claims that in 2011, GERB,
then Bulgaria's ruling party, and the police cooked up
criminal charges against him (for the illegal
possession of antiquities, weapons and narcotics) to
silence his criticism of their policies.\524\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\524\ Ibid.
This mutually beneficial propaganda loop is in some
respects more powerful and more difficult to counter than
Moscow-generated propaganda on its own.
Despite the lukewarm support for NATO within the general
population, Bulgaria should be lauded for its active role in
the Alliance. It deployed troops and suffered casualties in the
NATO-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.\525\ According to
the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Department of Defense is
funding increased exercises and training at four joint U.S.-
Bulgarian military facilities.\526\ In September 2016, the
United States and Bulgaria conducted a NATO Joint Enhanced Air
Policing (EAP) Mission, the first of its kind in the
country.\527\ And in 2017, Bulgaria co-hosted the Saber
Guardian exercise, the largest U.S. and NATO exercise in Europe
of the year.\528\ Bulgaria's active role in NATO, however,
remains somewhat hampered by the country's continued reliance
on Russian-made military equipment, a legacy of the Warsaw
Pact. In particular, Bulgarian government officials have
expressed concern about the country's Soviet-era air defense
systems as well as ongoing maintenance of equipment across the
armed forces.\529\ In light of the Counteracting America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) that mandates
sanctions on those who conduct significant transactions with
the Russian defense and intelligence sectors, the Bulgarian
government should be working with urgency to diminish its
reliance on Russian arms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\525\ U.S. Department of State, Background Information on Bulgaria
for Committee Staff, Feb. 9, 2017.
\526\ Ibid.
\527\ Ibid.
\528\ Eric Schmitt, ``U.S. Troops Train in Eastern Europe to Echoes
of the Cold War,'' The New York Times, Aug. 6, 2017.
\529\ Nick Thorpe, ``Bulgaria's Military Warned of Soviet-Era
`Catastrophe,`'' BBC News, Oct. 14, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lessons Learned
Despite Pressure, Bulgaria Remains Resilient: In November
2006, former Russian Ambassador to the EU, Vladimir
Chizhov, said that ``Bulgaria is in a good position to
become our special partner, a sort of a Trojan horse in
the EU.'' \530\ More than 10 years later, this
prediction has not come to pass, as Bulgarian citizens
continue to support membership in the EU and the
country is an active participant in NATO.\531\ Bulgaria
has chosen a pro-Western path and while it has had to
manage pressure from Moscow, especially in the energy
sector, it has proven resilient on important issues
like security cooperation with the West and support for
EU sanctions on Russia. As described above however,
significant vulnerabilities to the Russian asymmetric
arsenal do persist and would benefit from additional
assistance and engagement from Bulgaria's democratic
allies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\530\ John R. Haines, The Suffocating Symbiosis: Russia Seeks
Trojan Horses Inside Fractious Bulgaria's Political Corral, Foreign
Policy Research Institute, Aug. 5, 2016 (citing a November 2006
interview with Kapital, a Bulgarian language weekly business
newspaper).
\531\ In a public opinion poll conducted by the European Commission
in 2016, 49 percent of Bulgarian citizens expressed trust in the EU, a
rate higher than several other countries across Western Europe.
European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication, Standard
Eurobarometer 86: Public opinion in the European Union, Nov. 2016, at
93.
Diminished U.S. Assistance has Consequences: The United
States provided more than $600 million in assistance
for political and economic reforms in Bulgaria from
1990 to 2007, but this assistance was largely
discontinued when the country joined the EU.\532\ These
aid programs gave the United States the ability to
engage with broad swaths of Bulgarian society on the
merits of democratic values and the rule of law.
Without this programming, the United States' ability to
engage on these issues has been significantly hampered
while Russian propaganda and malign influence has
thrived. While the U.S. Embassy has sought to continue
to engage with limited resources, the diplomatic
challenge in countering Russian malign influence
remains considerable. With the dedication of more
diplomatic attention and resources--particularly on
energy diversification, addressing corruption, and
building up the democratic rule of law--the United
States will be in a position to help leaders within the
Bulgarian government and civil society counter Russia's
asymmetric arsenal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\532\ Congressional Research Service, ``Background on Bulgaria for
the Nomination of Eric S. Rubin to be United States Ambassador to the
Republic of Bulgaria,'' Oct. 2, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HUNGARY
In Hungary, the Russian government's asymmetric arsenal
includes support for extreme political parties and
organizations within the country, propaganda, and the use of
corruption. The Russian government also enjoys a warm
relationship with the country's Prime Minister, Viktor Orban.
Despite Hungary's proud history of resistance to Moscow during
the Cold War and its membership in the European Union and NATO,
Orban has increasingly sought to deepen ties with Russia in
recent years, calling into question the government's commitment
to the principles which underlie these international
institutions.
Within the EU and NATO, Prime Minister Orban is perhaps the
most supportive leader of Vladimir Putin, his style of
leadership, and his worldview. The platform of his party,
Fidesz, includes an ``Eastern Opening'' foreign approach
focused on an accommodating relationship with Moscow.\533\
Orban has reportedly said on several occasions that Hungary has
shot itself in the foot by supporting sanctions against Russia,
and that Moscow should be praised for opposing ``Western
attempts of isolation, regime change.'' \534\ So while many
citizens may remember with great pride the Hungarian Uprising
of 1956 against the Soviets, today's government in Budapest is
closer now to Moscow than at any time since the fall of the
Berlin Wall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\533\ Lorant Gyori & Peter Kreko, ``Russian Disinformation and
Extremism in Hungary,'' The Warsaw Institute Review, Oct. 16, 2017.
\534\ Lorant Gyori et al., Political Capital (Hungarian Think
Tank), Does Russia Interfere in Czech, Austrian and Hungarian
Elections?, at 12 (2017) (translated from Hungarian, citing Orban's
comments in August 2014, available at http://mandiner.hu/cikk/
20140815--orban--az--oroszorszag--elleni--szankciokkal--labon--lottuk--
magunkat, and his speech at the Lamfalussy Lectures Conference, Jan.
23, 2017, available at http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/orban-viktor-
beszede-lamfalussy-lectures-szakmai-konferencian/).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given Orban's positive orientation towards Moscow, his
government has taken no discernable steps to stop or even
discourage Russian malign influence, and appears to applaud the
anti-EU, anti-U.S., and anti-migrant Russian propaganda because
it aligns with the themes that Orban promotes. Instead of
defending Hungary against Russian malign interference, Orba1n
appears to have welcomed it. Russia has exploited this
relatively unimpeded access by flooding Hungary with pro-
Kremlin and anti-western propaganda and reportedly providing
support to far-right political parties and fringe militant
groups.
For example, in December 2017 Hungarian prosecutors charged
Hungarian businessman and Jobbik party politician Bela Kovacs
with spying on EU institutions on behalf of Russia.\535\ Kovacs
joined the Jobbik party, which has espoused anti-Semitic and
racist views, in 2005 and helped turn around its financial
prospects.\536\ In 2010, he was elected to the European
Parliament. Kovacs has denied the charges and no date has been
set for his trial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\535\ Marton Dunai & Gergely Szakacs, ``Hungary Charges Jobbik MEP
with Spying on EU for Russia,'' Reuters, Dec. 6, 2017.
\536\ Andrew Higgins, ``Intent on Unsettling E.U., Russia Taps Foot
Soldiers from the Fringe,'' The New York Times, Dec. 24, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russian intelligence also appears to be cultivating
relationships with far-right groups in Hungary. In October
2016, the police raided the house of Istvan Gyorkos, the leader
of a fringe neo-Nazi group called the Hungarian National Front,
to search for illegal weapons. A shootout ensued, and a police
officer was killed.\537\ The New York Times reported that in
the investigation that followed, Hungarian intelligence
officials told a parliamentary committee that Gyorkos gathered
regularly with Russian intelligence officers to conduct mock
combat exercises in the area around his house.\538\ The
Hungarian online news portal Index also reported that Gyorkos
had been meeting with Russian intelligence officers for
years.\539\ Hungarian security officials believe that the
Russian intelligence sector's main goal in cultivating Gyorkos
was to gain control of Hidfo (the Bridgehead), a website that
was controlled by his Hungarian National Front and had a
significant following among extremists in the country.\540\
Following its efforts to cultivate a relationship with Gyorkos,
Russian intelligence was reportedly successful in commandeering
the site and moving its server to Russia where it has been used
as a platform to broadcast propaganda targeting the West and
the United States.\541\ For example, the website circulated a
fake U.S. Department of Homeland Security assessment that the
2016 U.S. election was not a victim of cyberattacks.\542\ It
also issued false reports that Austria sought to lift sanctions
against Russia and that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
had sought to make European nations vassals of Washington.\543\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\537\ Ibid.
\538\ Ibid.
\539\ Lili Bayer, ``Moscow Spooks Return to Hungary, Raising NATO
Hackles,'' Politico, July 19, 2017.
\540\ Andrew Higgins, ``Intent on Unsettling E.U., Russia Taps Foot
Soldiers from the Fringe,'' The New York Times, Dec. 24, 2016.
\541\ Ibid.
\542\ Ibid.; Lili Bayer, ``Moscow Spooks Return to Hungary, Raising
NATO Hackles,'' Politico, July 19, 2017.
\543\ Andrew Higgins, ``Intent on Unsettling E.U., Russia Taps Foot
Soldiers from the Fringe,'' The New York Times, Dec. 24, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russian government propaganda also finds fertile ground in
Hungary's domestic media landscape. Content by Sputnik and RT
is widely referenced by pro-government news sources in
Hungary.\544\ The pro-government daily newspaper Magyar Idok
(The Hungarian Times) has published pieces by the Strategic
Culture website, a well-known Russian propaganda outlet.\545\
The Russian propaganda site New Eastern Outlook has also been
reportedly referenced by pro-Fidesz websites like 888.hu and
Magyar Hirlap (Hungarian Gazette).\546\ There does not appear
to be discernable effort by the government to counter this
disinformation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\544\ Lili Bayer, ``Fidesz-Friendly Media Peddling Russian
Propaganda,'' The Budapest Beacon, Nov. 17, 2016.
\545\ Ibid.
\546\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A lack of transparency in the political process has also
allowed for increased corruption, another opening that Russia
can exploit. In 2016, Jozsef Peter Martin, the executive
director of Transparency International in Hungary, said that
``a centralised form of corruption has been developed and
systematically pursued in Hungary.''\547\ He also directly
criticized the government and asserted that ``turning public
funds into private wealth using legal instruments is an
important element of corruption in Hungary.''\548\ In 2014,
Russia directly benefitted from this lack of transparency with
the Paks nuclear deal, in which the Russian nuclear operator
Rosatom was awarded a sole source contract to construct two
plants, and the Hungarian parliament subsequently passed
legislation which would keep details related to the deal
classified for 30 years.\549\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\547\ Transparency International: Hungary, ``Corruption Perceptions
Index: 2015.''
\548\ Ibid.
\549\ Budapest Times, ``Paks Data to Be Classified for 30 Years,''
The Budapest Times, Mar. 6, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since returning to power in 2010, Orban has embraced the
concept of ``illiberal democracy'' modeled on the `'sovereign
democracy'' advanced by Vladislav Surkov in Russia.\550\ As
Orban deepens relations with Russia abroad, he has steadily
eroded the democratic process at home, where Hungary's
political opposition has been marginalized and civil society
watchdogs have a diminished voice.\551\ Without the critical
scrutiny provided by political opposition or civil society,
Russian malign influence is able to spread with little
resistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\550\ Zoltan Simon, ``Orban Says He Seeks to End Liberal Democracy
in Hungary,'' Bloomberg, July 28, 2014.
\551\ Daniel Hegedus, ``Nations in Transit 2017 Hungary Chapter,''
Freedom House, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hungarian public does not seem to share Orban's
affinity for Russia or his antagonism toward western
institutions. According to a survey by the think tank GLOBSEC,
79 percent of Hungarians want to stay in the EU and 61 percent
think the union is a good thing.\552\ A resounding 81 percent
of Hungarians believe that NATO is important for their safety
and 71 percent believe that liberal democracy is the best
political system for Hungary, as opposed to an autocracy.\553\
However, 45 percent of Hungarians hold a favorable view of
Orban, a number nearly matched by Vladimir Putin, who was seen
sympathetically by 44 percent of Hungarians.\554\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\552\ GLOBSEC Policy Institute, GLOBSEC Trends 2017: Mixed Messages
and Signs of Hope from Central and Eastern Europe, at 13 (Jan. 8,
2017).
\553\ Ibid. at 20.
\554\ Ibid. at 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The international community, working through existing
watchdog efforts like the EU East StratCom Task Force, should
aggressively uncover and publicize the scope and scale of
Russian influence in Hungary.\555\ Orban appears to have cast
his lot with Moscow, but the Hungarian people chose a western
path after the fall of communism and continue to embrace those
values. With parliamentary elections due in the spring of 2018,
the international community should proactively seek to build
resilience within the Hungarian population so that they are
made fully aware of the level of Russian interference in the
affairs of the country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\555\ See European Union External Action Service, ``Questions and
Answers about the East StratCom Task Force,'' https://eeas.europa.eu/
headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2116/-questions-and-answers-about-
the-east-stratcom-task-force--en (visited Dec. 14, 2017); see also
Chapter 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lessons Learned
Opposing the Asymmetric Arsenal without a Government
Partner is Difficult, But not Impossible: As the United
States and its allies look to build resilience to
Russian interference in Europe, they will unfortunately
not find a partner in the Hungarian government.
Regardless, the international community should increase
support for transparency and anti-corruption efforts in
the country--the denial of U.S. visas for six Hungarian
officials suspected of corruption in 2014, for example,
was an effective step that should be replicated when
possible.\556\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\556\ Rick Lyman, ``U.S. Denial of Visas for 6 in Hungary Strains
Ties,'' The New York Times, Oct. 20, 2014.
----------
Chapter 6: Kremlin Interference in
Consolidated Democracies \557\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\557\ The countries in this chapter are defined as ``consolidated
democracies,'' a term drawn from the Freedom House Nations in Transit
study, which ranks and measures the progress toward or backsliding from
democracy of 29 countries from Central Europe to Central Asia. The
ranking is determined by an assessment of a country's national
democratic governance, electoral process, civil society, independent
media, local democratic governance, judicial framework and
independence, and corruption. Countries receiving the consolidated
democracy classification are defined as ones that ``embody the best
policies and practices of liberal democracy, but may face challenges--
often associated with corruption--that contribute to a slightly lower
score.'' Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2017: The False Promise of
Populism, at 22 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
Countries with long-standing membership in the European
Union or NATO are increasingly aware of the nature and scope of
Russian government threats to their populations and democratic
processes, and have developed a series of strong responses to
deter and defend against Kremlin interference. Geographically,
these countries are further away from the eastern flanks of
NATO and the EU, and are generally less susceptible to Russian
cultural, political, or linguistic influences, yet many remain
vulnerable to Russian government threats to their energy
security. While these countries benefit from healthy democratic
political systems and vibrant independent media and civil
societies, the bonds within these systems have come under
increasing strain as societal frustrations have grown over
economic inequalities and the pressures of migration. These
societal tensions have been a focus for exploitation by the
Russian government.
The Russian tactics of interference follow two main trends
in this region. First, Russia seeks to exacerbate divisions
within countries that have membership in Western institutions
like NATO and the EU, but where corruption or vulnerabilities
in the rule of law provide openings to erode their bonds to
European values and institutions. This includes undermining
their support for EU sanctions on Russia or NATO exercises on
the continent. A primary goal is to sow discord and confusion--
since more frontal attacks by the Kremlin against these states
are likely to invite unacceptable blowback for the Russian
government.
Second, Russia seeks to exacerbate divisions in
consolidated democracies who are seen as the flagbearers for
European values and institutions, and thus staunchly opposed to
the Russian government's agenda to undermine those values and
institutions. And in its attempts to weaken the democratic
systems of these nations, the Kremlin amplifies their perceived
weaknesses and problems to countries on Russia's periphery, in
an attempt to show that consolidated democracy is not a goal
worth pursuing.
BALTIC STATES: LATVIA, LITHUANIA, AND ESTONIA
The Russian government has sought to influence the Baltic
countries through military intimidation, energy dependence,
trade relations, business links, cultural ties, corruption,
disinformation, and cyberattacks. As in Ukraine, the Kremlin
has used the Baltics as a laboratory for its malign influence
activities, especially in deploying hackers to engage in
cyberwarfare.
Because of their relatively small size, large Russian-
speaking populations in Latvia and Estonia, and geographic
proximity to Russia, the Baltic countries are subject to more
intensive pressure from the Kremlin than other EU countries.
Lithuania's Ambassador to the United States testified to the
U.S. Senate that, in addition to aggressive intelligence
operations and cyberattacks on members of parliament, the
Kremlin has also ``used supply of energy resources, investment
in strategically important sectors of economy and trade
relations as a tool to influence domestic and foreign policy of
Lithuania.'' \558\ Latvia's head intelligence agency has said
that Russia is responsible for ``the most significant security
threats in the Baltic sea region,'' \559\ and Lithuania's
government has called Russia ``a major source of threats posed
to the national security of the Republic of Lithuania.'' \560\
In addition, all three presidents of the Baltic states have
also taken strong and public positions against the Kremlin's
disinformation campaigns and supported building resiliency
against them.\561\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\558\ Statement of Rolandas Krisciunas, Ambassador of the Republic
of Lithuania, Russian Policies & Intentions Toward Specific European
Countries, Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Mar.
7, 2017, at 8.
\559\ The Constitution Protection Bureau of the Republic of Latvia,
Annual Public Report 2016, at 1 (Mar. 2017). The Constitution
Protection Bureau (SAB) is one of three state security institutions of
the Republic of Latvia, and is responsible for foreign intelligence and
counter-intelligence. Ibid.
\560\ State Security Department and Ministry of National Defense of
Lithuania, National Security Threat Assessment 2017, at 2.
\561\ Eriks Selga & Benjamin Rasmussen. ``Defending the West from
Russian Disinformation: The Role of Leadership'' Foreign Policy
Research Institute, Nov. 13, 2017
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin has long used the Baltic states as a testing
ground for its asymmetric arsenal. One infamous incident
occurred on a morning in late April 2007, when the government
of Estonia decided to move a six-and-a-half-foot statue of a
Soviet soldier out of the center of its capital, Tallinn, to
another part of town. Removing the statue, placed there during
Soviet occupation in 1947, was a controversial act--protests by
ethnic Russians and violence the night before had damaged
property, injured dozens, and left one person dead. Russia's
Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, called the move
``blasphemous.'' Other Russian officials declared that removing
the statue was glorifying Nazism, and both the Duma and the
Federation Council called on Putin to sanction Estonia or cut
off bilateral relations.\562\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\562\ Steven Lee Myers, ``Russia Rebukes Estonia for Moving Soviet
Statue,'' The New York Times, Apr. 27, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What happened next was described by Estonia's then-
president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, as ``the first time a nation-
state had been targeted using digital means for political
objectives.'' \563\ The Internet servers of the country's
government, security, banking, and media institutions were hit
by distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks for two
straight weeks, causing many of their websites to go down.\564\
Ilves believes the attack was coordinated by the Kremlin and
executed by organized criminal groups, ``a public-private
partnership'' with ``a state actor that paid mafiosos.'' \565\
As a senior former Pentagon official told The New Yorker, the
attack showed that ``Russia was going to react in a new but
aggressive way to perceived political slights.'' \566\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\563\ Statement of Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Former President of
Estonia, The Modus Operandi and Toolbox of Russia and Other Autocracies
for Undermining Democracies Throughout the World, Hearing before the
U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, Mar. 15,
2017, at 3.
\564\ Evan Osnos et al., ``Trump, Putin, and the New Cold War,''
The New Yorker, Mar. 6, 2016.
\565\ Ibid.
\566\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin's disinformation operations in the Baltics,
especially in Latvia and Estonia, are mostly aimed at the
countries' Russian-speaking populations (which constitute
nearly 27 percent of the population in Latvia and 25 percent in
Estonia, compared to just under 6 percent in Lithuania).\567\
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian government's
disinformation campaigns in the 1990s were largely directed at
post-communist states like Poland and the Baltics. While
serving as Estonia's ambassador to the United States in the
first half of the 1990s, Ilves recalled having to respond to
Western diplomats who showed him false news stories about his
country. At the time, he said, Russian government
disinformation was ``primarily an exercise in providing new
democracies extra work to debunk invented news.'' \568\ While a
factor, these measures did not have much of an impact in
societies accustomed to questioning the veracity of Soviet
propaganda efforts, and their half-hearted nature reflects the
sclerotic state of the Russian security services at the time.
But over the past decade, the Kremlin has supercharged its
disinformation operations in the Baltics. Those efforts, which
also include the use of internet trolls and NGOs, seek to
portray the countries ``as failures--blighted by emigration and
poverty--and run by a sinister elite of Western puppets with
ill-disguised fascist sympathies.'' \569\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\567\ Tomas Cizik, ``Russia Tailors Its Information Warfare to
Specific Countries,'' European Security Journal, Nov. 6, 2017.
\568\ Statement of Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Former President of
Estonia, The Modus Operandi and Toolbox of Russia and Other Autocracies
for Undermining Democracies Throughout the World, Hearing before the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, Mar. 15, 2017, at
5.
\569\ Edward Lucas, The Coming Storm: Baltic Sea Security Report,
Center for European Policy Analysis, at 11 (June 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the Baltic states, the Kremlin's influence operations in
the region appear to seek several objectives:
Divide the populations along ethnic lines to establish and
maintain control over the local Russian diaspora, which
can be used as a tool of influence.
Create mistrust among the general population toward their
own governments by portraying them as ethnocratic
regimes that are overseeing the rebirth of fascism.
Undermine Western values and democracy and promote populism
and radicalism, especially by emphasizing the West's
degradation while playing up Russia's growing
prosperity.
Weaken or paralyze the alliances Baltic states belong to,
like NATO and the EU, especially by portraying their
governments as puppets of those supranational
organizations that are being used to provoke Russia
into military conflict.
Ridicule or marginalize the culture, history, traditions,
and achievements of the Baltic states, to weaken the
will of local populations to defend their countries in
the event of a military conflict with Russia.
Multiple studies have found that Russian-speaking
populations in the Baltics have absorbed the narratives that
the Kremlin's propaganda machines have concocted. For example,
during the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, the majority
of ethnic Russians in Estonia were more likely to believe
reports from Russian media than Estonian and foreign media. A
similar result occurred during the conflict between Russia and
Ukraine, with ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia believing
the narrative put forth by Russian media and subsequently
holding Kiev, not Moscow, responsible for the conflict.\570\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\570\ Vladislava Vojtiskova et al., The Bear in Sheep's Clothing:
Russia's Government-Funded Organisations in the EU, Wilfried Martens
Centre for European Studies, at 63 (July 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pro-Russian narratives are also promoted by Kremlin-linked
groups throughout the Baltic states. A 2014 report commissioned
by the Swedish Defense Research Agency found that a large
number of organizations that are directly or indirectly
governed by the Russian federal government are helping to
implement a strategy that aims to undermine ``the self-
confidence of the Baltic states as independent political
entities'' and interfere in their domestic political
affairs.\571\ The study also concluded that these efforts were
all ``reinforced by systematic Russian attempts--through
political, media and cultural outlets--to portray the Baltic
states as `fascist', not least in terms of their treatment of
their Russian minorities . . . . As a whole, the Russian
strategy can be considered as aiming at destabilizing the
Baltic states.'' \572\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\571\ Mike Winnerstig Tools of Destablization: Russian Soft Power
and Non-military Influence in the Baltic States, Swedish Defense
Research Agency, at 4 (Dec. 2014).
\572\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The head of the Latvian security service also reported that
there is a clear link between organizations that promote the
Kremlin's narrative and Russian-funded NGOs.\573\ According to
the Baltic Centre for Investigative Journalism, also known as
re:Baltica, more than 40 NGOs in the Baltics have received
grants from large Russian GONGOs (government-controlled NGOs)
over the past several years, though the figure could be much
higher as NGOs are not required to publish financial reports in
every Baltic country.\574\ Furthermore, nearly 70 percent of
those grant recipients are linked to pro-Kremlin political
parties in the Baltics.\575\ Disbursing grants to NGOs is an
important element of Russia's ``compatriots policy,'' which the
Kremlin has stated involves ``always defend[ing] [the interests
of Russians and Russian-speakers abroad] using political,
diplomatic, and legal means.'' \576\ The director of Estonia's
domestic intelligence service has noted that ``the Russian
population or the Russian-speaking minority is a target for the
so-called compatriots policy, the goal of which has been the
establishment of organized groups linked to Russia capable of
influencing another country's sovereign decisions.'' \577\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\573\ Ibid. at 61
\574\ Sanita Jemberga et al., ``Money From Russia: Kremlin's
Millions,'' re:Balitca, Aug. 27, 2015. For more on Russia's use of
GONGOs, see Chapter 2.
\575\ Ibid.
\576\ Heather A. Conley et al., The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding
Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe, Center for Strategic &
International Studies, at 51 (Oct. 2016).
\577\ Michael Weiss, ``The Estonian Spymasters: Tallin's
Revolutionary Approach to Stopping Russian Spies,'' Foreign Affairs,
June 3, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin allegedly uses its embassies in the Baltics to
disburse funding to NGOs that promote its narrative. According
to the Lithuanian ambassador to the United States, the
``Russian Embassy in Lithuania directly controls, coordinates,
and finances [the] activities [of a] variety of pro-Russian
organizations, clubs and groups ranging from political protests
to cultural events.'' \578\ Yet sometimes the culture of
corruption among the Russian government bureaucracy can hamper
the Kremlin's disinformation efforts, with embassy officials
reportedly taking kickbacks from organizations that receive
grants. For example, in 2016, the Russian embassy in Estonia
disbursed $30,000 in grant money for the publication of the
Baltiysky Mir journal. However, no issue was published in 2016,
and Estonia's lead security agency notes that ``the best way to
receive grants [from the Russian embassy] is to share them with
Russian officials and diplomats.'' \579\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\578\ Statement of Rolandas Krisciunas, Ambassador of the Republic
of Lithuania, Russian Policies & Intentions Toward Specific European
Countries, Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Mar.
7, 2017, at 10.
\579\ Estonian Internal Security Service, Estonian Internal
Security Service Annual Review 2016, at 8 (Apr. 17, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estonia's government also reports that ``[t]he Kremlin
constantly supports and funds people who promote anti-Estonian
propaganda narratives at events held by international
organizations'' such as the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, where Estonian ``activists,'' whose travel
was paid for by the Russian government, complained about
government suppression of the ethnic Russian minority in
Estonia.\580\ And in one example from 2015, a skinhead from St.
Petersburg ``was sent to Estonia to be captured on film as a
`local Nazi activist''' at a WWII battle memorial, and
``Kremlin-controlled media was eager to pick this up as an
example of events in Estonia.'' \581\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\580\ Ibid. at 7.
\581\ Ibid. at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kremlin disinformation operations have also targeted NATO
exercises, especially after NATO established four multinational
battlegroups led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and
the United States, known as the Enhanced Forward Presence
(EFP), to deter Russian military aggression in the Baltics and
Poland. Pro-Kremlin media outlets falsely reported that German
troops raped a 13-year-old Lithuanian girl just two days after
the soldiers arrived to participate in NATO's EFP
exercise.\582\ Because of its similarity to a fake story pushed
in German media, it became known as the ``Lithuania Lisa''
case.\583\ Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, NATO's Assistant Secretary
General for Emerging Security Challenges, noted that it was ``a
clear example of information manipulation with a sense of
weaponization, because it really was supposed to affect the
perception about the presence of German troops as the [EFP]
framework nation in Lithuania. It was supposed to affect
morale; it was supposed to affect everything--the operational
functioning.'' \584\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\582\ 582 Statement of Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Former President of
Estonia, The Modus Operandi and Toolbox of Russia and Other Autocracies
for Undermining Democracies Throughout the World, Hearing before the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, Mar. 15, 2017, at
6.
\583\ See Damien McGuinness, ``Russia Steps into Berlin `Rape'
Storm Claiming German Cover-Up,'' BBC News, Jan. 27, 2016; infra,
section on Germany.
\584\ Teri Schultz, ``Why the `Fake Rape' Story Against German NATO
Forces Fell Flat in Lithuania,'' Deutsche Welle, Feb. 23, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Before another NATO exercise, hackers infiltrated the
Lithuanian military's website and replaced the statement
announcing the exercise with a fake one proclaiming that it was
part of a plan for Lithuania to annex Kaliningrad, a small
Russian exclave to the west. The head of Lithuania's National
Cyber Security Center noted that the announcement was obviously
fake and quickly taken down, but still spread through online
networks and colored discussions about NATO. He summarized the
effectiveness of such disinformation operations when he told a
reporter that ``I don't believe in aliens, but if you see
enough articles about aliens visiting Earth, you start to think
`Who knows, maybe the government is hiding something.' '' \585\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\585\ Andrew Higgins, ``Foes of Russia Say Child Pornography Is
Planted to Ruin Them,'' The New York Times, Dec. 9, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As elsewhere in Europe and beyond, an extensive network of
social media bots spread Kremlin disinformation narratives.
According to a report by the NATO Strategic Communications
Centre of Excellence, bot-generated messages are targeted at
different audiences: those aimed at the West emphasize how much
smaller Russian exercises are than NATO ones, while those
targeting domestic audiences rarely mention Russian military
exercises.\586\ In addition, approximately 70 percent of all
Russian messages about NATO in the Baltics and Poland are
created by Russian-language bots. NATO's report also found that
Twitter was less effective at removing Russian-language
material generated by bots than messages in English, but did
note improvement in the platform's policing of content and
urged continued pressure to ensure further improvements.\587\
NATO's analysts also noted that ``increased interest by Twitter
and other social media companies in tackling state-sponsored
trolls and bots may offer an explanation for the low levels of
activity in the current observation window.'' \588\ That
conclusion underscores the point that social media companies
have not only great responsibility, but also strong potential
to successfully counter Kremlin disinformation operations (and
fake news in general).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\586\ NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence,
Robotrolling 2017, Issue 2, at 2, 4 (Nov. 8, 2017).
\587\ Ibid. at 2.
\588\ Ibid. at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Baltic states have all taken concerted actions against
Russian state-sponsored propaganda outlets, with methods
ranging from outright censorship to public disregard. Since
2014, Latvia and Lithuania have placed restrictions on several
Russian television channels, including three-to six-month bans
on one station owned by a Russian state broadcaster, because of
what government authorities deemed to be dangerous and
unbalanced reporting on the situation in Ukraine, incitement of
discord and unrest, and warmongering.\589\ In March 2016,
Latvia's local domain registry suspended Sputnik's domestic
website (Sputniknews.lv) a few weeks after it was established,
with a Foreign Ministry spokesman declaring that ``we don't
regard Sputnik as a credible media source but as something
else: a propaganda tool.'' \590\ Sputnik responded by placing
its content under a .com domain and accusing Latvia of
attacking media freedom.\591\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\589\ Congressional Research Service, ``European Efforts to Counter
Russian Influence Operations,''July 24, 2017.
\590\ ``Latvia Blocks Russian Sputnik Site as Kremlin `Propaganda
Tool','' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Mar. 30, 2016.
\591\ Alex Spence, ``Russia Accusses Latvia of `Blatant Censorship'
After Sputnik News Site is Shut Down,'' Politico, Mar. 30, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Estonian government, while not censoring the activities
of Kremlin-sponsored media outlets, has publicly stated that it
does not recognize Sputnik as an independent media outlet and
therefore its officials will not grant the organization any
interviews. Estonia also established three Russian-language TV
channels to provide alternate sources of news to its large
Russian-speaking population; a poll from 2016 showed that the
stations had captured about 20 percent of that audience.\592\
The Baltic states also have educational awareness programs that
aim to counter the influence of Kremlin disinformation, such as
a national information influence identification and analysis
ecosystem project in Lithuania, which quickly noticed the fake
story about the alleged rape of a teenage girl by a German
soldier during a NATO exercise and worked to immediately debunk
it.\593\ Latvia's ministries of defense and education have also
paired up to improve their country's school curriculum to
emphasize critical thinking skills and media literacy.\594\
Furthermore, the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence (BCME),
based in Latvia, serves as a hub for professional Russian-
language journalism in the Baltics as well as the countries of
the Eastern Partnership. The BCME also supports media literacy
programs and research to better understand audiences that are
most susceptible to propaganda.\595\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\592\ ``US Challenges Kremlin with New Russian TV Channel,'' Daily
Mail, Feb. 27, 2017.
\593\ Statement of Rolandas Krisciunas, Ambassador of the Republic
of Lithuania, Russian Policies & Intentions Toward Specific European
Countries, Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Mar.
7, 2017, at 6.
\594\ Reid Standish, ``Russia's Neighbors Respond to Putin's
`Hybrid War,' '' Foreign Policy, Oct. 12, 2017.
\595\ ``Baltic Centre for Media Excellence,'' European Endowment
for Democracy, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to counter-disinformation efforts by the state
and the media, a network of hundreds of concerned citizens has
sprung up in the Baltics (starting in Lithuania but later
spreading to Latvia and Estonia, and even Finland) to fight
against Kremlin-linked internet trolls. Styling themselves
``elves,'' they push back against false comments on Facebook
and on Lithuanian news websites, working not to promote their
own propaganda but only to, in the words of their founder,
``expose the bullshit.'' The elves have even taken their
activities onto the street, counter-demonstrating at pro-
Kremlin events, draped in EU and U.S. flags and wearing large
smiles--thereby making it that much more difficult for Kremlin
propagandists to get their desired photos and videos of
`'spontaneous'' anti-Western protests.\596\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\596\ Michael Weiss, ``The Baltic Elves Taking on Pro-Russian
Trolls,'' The Daily Beast, Mar. 20, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estonia has the best Russian counterintelligence program in
Europe, according to journalist Edward Lucas, author of
Deception: Spies, Lies, and How Russia Dupes the West. As then
Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves told Foreign Affairs in
2014: ``We caught four moles in the last five years. That means
one of two things. Either we're the only country in the EU with
a mole problem, or we're the only country in the EU doing
anything about it.'' \597\ Estonia has adopted a ``zero
tolerance'' approach to illegal activities by Russian
intelligence operatives and does not downplay their capture or
trade them back to Russia. Instead, it prosecutes them to the
maximum extent of the law and publicizes an annual report that
reviews major cases and publicly names organizations and
individuals that are suspected of working with the Russian
intelligence services.\598\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\597\ Michael Weiss, ``The Estonian Spymasters: Tallin's
Revolutionary Approach to Stopping Russian Spies,'' Foreign Affairs,
June 3, 2014.
\598\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estonia's intelligence service, known as Kapo, publishes
annual reviews that detail activities by Russian intelligence
services and the government's responses (as do Latvia and
Lithuania).\599\ Perhaps the most egregious case it documented
in recent years was the incursion into sovereign Estonian
territory and the alleged kidnapping of an Estonian Kapo
officer by Russian security operatives in 2014.\600\ The
officer had been investigating cross-border cigarette smuggling
by Russian smugglers, and some assert that he was kidnapped
because he had threatened the FSB's lucrative collaboration
with criminal traffickers.\601\ Smugglers have also reportedly
been recruited by the security services as spies and informants
to assist the Kremlin's efforts to destabilize Estonia. Similar
to the recruiting method the FSB uses with hackers, traffickers
are reportedly threatened with jail time if they refuse to
cooperate with Russia's security services.\602\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\599\ ``Annual Reviews,'' Kaitsepolitseiamet, https://www.kapo.ee/
en/content/annual-reviews.html (visited on Dec. 31, 2017)
\600\ Andrew Higgins, ``Tensions Surge in Estonia Amid a Russian
Replay of Cold War Tactics,'' The New York Times, Oct. 5, 2014.
\601\ Ibid.
\602\ Holger Roonemaa, ``These Cigarette Smugglers Are On The
Frontlines Of Russia's Spy Wars,'' BuzzFeed News, Sept. 13, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These comprehensive intelligence reports also help to
inform the general public as well as civil society and
journalists, who can use the information pursue their own
investigations. For example, re:Baltica reporters used a clue
from Kapo's 2014 report to trace the ownership of three Baltic
Russian-language news sites, collectively known as Baltnews,
through a chain of holding companies that ultimately linked
them to Russia's state-sponsored propaganda network.\603\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\603\ Inga Springe & Sanita Jemberga, ``Sputnik's Unknown
Brother,'' re:Balitca, Apr. 6, 2017,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kapo's reports also make clear the intentions and
capabilities of the Kremlin's influence operations, especially
when it comes to economic corruption, and how that knowledge
informs its own work. For example, in its 2016 report, the
agency noted that ``Because of the link between Russian power
structures, criminal circles and corruption, we especially
focus on corruption that may strengthen Russia's hold on our
state. We have noted attempts by the Kremlin to use business
contacts and business influence in shaping Estonia's policy.
Relevant in this context is the business continuity and supply
security of energy, where the role of corruption can secretly
and considerably influence the country's energy independence.''
\604\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\604\ Estonian Internal Security Service, Estonian Internal
Security Service Annual Review 2016, at 35 (Apr. 17, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Baltic states have thus made it a priority to reduce
their historical dependence on energy supplies from Russia.
After independence, their legacy gas infrastructure was only
connected to countries of the former Soviet Union, not Europe.
Russia's state-owned Gazprom and other Russian gas companies
held large stakes--up to 50 percent--in Baltic states' natural
gas companies, though new EU regulatory requirements led
Gazprom to start selling its shares in those companies in 2014.
To diversify its supplies, Lithuania opened an LNG
regasification terminal in 2014, which has also allowed it to
negotiate much better prices for its purchases from Russia (in
2013 Gazprom charged Lithuania $460-$490 per 1,000 cubic
meters, compared to an average of $370-$380 for the EU).\605\
At the opening ceremony of the terminal, Lithuania's president
remarked, ``Nobody else, from now on, will be able to dictate
to us the price of gas, or to buy our political will.'' \606\
There is also the potential for Lithuania to export some of the
LNG it has imported and regasified to its Baltic neighbors,
though such infrastructure is not in place yet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\605\ Aija Krutaine & Andrius Sytas, ``Baltics Can Keep Lights On
If Russia Turns Off the Gas,'' Reuters, May 7, 2014.
\606\ Georgi Kantchev, ``With U.S. Gas, Europe Seeks Escape From
Russia's Energy Grip,'' The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 25, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As one of the most connected countries in the world,
Estonia has long been a leader in the realm of internet
innovation and cyber security. In 2004, Estonia proposed a NATO
cyber defense center, which was established in Tallinn in 2008
and consists of six branches focused on technology, strategy,
operations, law, education and training, and support.\607\
Estonia is also working to strengthen the security of its
online voting system by overhauling its software and adding new
anti-tampering features that will help guard against potential
hacking attacks directed by the Kremlin or other malicious
actors.\608\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\607\ NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, ``About
Us,'' https://ccdcoe.org (visited Dec. 31, 2017).
\608\ Ott Ummelas, ``World's Most High-Tech Voting System to Get
New Hacking Defenses,'' Bloomberg Politics, July 18, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are clearly on the front
line of the Kremlin's malign influence operations, and have
suffered from some of the most egregious cyberattacks and
disinformation campaigns yet seen in Russia's near abroad. As
members of NATO and the EU that share borders both with Russia
and its exclave of Kaliningrad, and which collectively host
large Russian-speaking populations, the Baltic states are both
primary targets and uniquely susceptible to Russian active
measures campaigns. The United States should therefore make it
a high priority to study the experiences of the Baltics and
apply lessons learned to its own defenses and those of allies
and partners around Europe, as well as increase support to the
Baltics, in both word and deed, to further deter Kremlin
aggression.
Lessons Learned
Public Reporting of Intelligence Findings is Effective:
Exposing and publicizing the nature of the threat of
Russian malign influence activities can be an action-
forcing event that not only boosts public awareness,
but also drives effective responses from the private
sector, especially social media platforms, as well as
civil society and independent media, who can use the
information to pursue their own investigations.
Strong Cyber Defenses are Critical: Estonia was one of the
first states to experience cyberwar operations, and the
Baltic states are under constant threat from Russia-
based hackers. Strong cyber defenses are therefore key
to building resilience against the Kremlin's influence
operations. The United States can assist the Baltic
states to improve their cyber defenses against
malicious hacking by Kremlin-sponsored entities. One
method would be to work with the EU to train and
support emergency cyber response teams that can be
immediately deployed to assist allies that are under
cyberattack from malicious state or non-state actors.
The United States can also learn from Estonia's
experience in dealing with cyberattacks on critical
infrastructure targets, including the energy grid and
electoral systems.
Cultural Exports & Exchanges Can Enhance Resilience: To
assist the Baltics, Lithuania's ambassador to the
United States believes that more American popular
culture in Lithuania would help neutralize the
Kremlin's active measures. Voice of America and Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty programs are increasingly
well-known in the Baltics, and combining popular
entertainment programming with respected and
independent news reporting would further their reach
and influence. Lithuania's ambassador has also called
for more and better-funded cultural exchange programs,
including study abroad and journalist training. These
measures should be supported by the U.S.
government.\609\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\609\ Statement of Rolandas Krisciunas, Ambassador of the Republic
of Lithuania, Russian Policies & Intentions Toward Specific European
Countries, Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Mar.
7, 2017, at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NORDIC STATES: DENMARK, FINLAND, NORWAY, AND SWEDEN
When it comes to asserting that the West is in a state of
moral decline, a favorite target of the Kremlin's propaganda
machine are the Nordic states of Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and
Norway--all members of the EU, and the latter two also members
of NATO. For example, in 2017, one of Russia's largest TV
stations broadcast a story that claimed Denmark's government
had permitted the opening of an animal brothel in Copenhagen.
The story, which included an image of a dog dressed up as a
street prostitute, evolved in classic ``ping pong'' fashion,
moving from a fringe online publication before being picked up
in periphery countries like Belarus and Georgia and several
marginal Russian media outlets. Ironically, this false report
had first been published as just that--the original source was
a satirical French website that posted the story as
parody.\610\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\610\ ``No, Denmark is Not Legalising Sexual Abuse of Animals,'' EU
vs. Disinfo, Sept. 9, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But when it comes to exhibiting strong immunity against
Russian malign influence operations, the Nordic states are also
exemplary. Several factors contribute to their resilience.
First, Russia's favorability ratings among the populations of
the Nordic countries are lower than anywhere else in the
EU.\611\ In addition, the Nordic states have extraordinary
educational systems that emphasize critical thinking skills, as
well as relatively high levels of interpersonal trust and
extremely low levels of corruption (of the 176 countries ranked
in Transparency International's 2016 corruption index, all four
Nordic countries ranked within the six least corrupt
countries).\612\ While correlation does not prove causation, it
would not be surprising if the absence of Russian corrupt
influences, as well as strong critical thinking skills that
inoculate against the effects of disinformation, are major
contributing factors to the low opinion of Russia held among
Nordic populations. In addition, the Nordic states have dealt
with Moscow's aggression for decades, and their populations
arguably have a built-in skepticism of and resistance to the
Kremlin's disinformation campaigns and other malign influence
operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\611\ ``How EU Members View Russia,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, https://www.rferl.org/a/28200070.html (visited Dec. 31, 2017)
(citing Special Eurobarometer 451--Future of Europe, Oct. 2016).
\612\ Esteban Ortiz-Ospina & Max Roser, ``Trust,'' Our World in
Data, https://ourworldindata.org/trust#note-2 (visited Dec. 31, 2017);
Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, (Jan.
25, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Due to these factors, the Kremlin's traditional propaganda
operations have had very little success in the Nordic
countries. Sputnik closed its Danish, Finnish, Swedish, and
Norwegian language services in 2016. Some analysts attributed
the withdrawal to economic conditions in Russia, while others
attributed it to the poor performance of outlets, which had
poor command of the Nordic languages and found that conspiracy
theories and attacks on European values did not have much
traction among Nordic audiences.\613\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\613\ European External Action Service, ``Disinformation Digest,''
Mar. 18, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the disappearance of traditional propaganda outlets,
internet trolls are now the primary pro-Russia disinformation
actors in Nordic countries, and they primarily focus on
individual targets. Russia-affiliated activists have gone to
great lengths to intimidate journalists who report on Russia,
especially those carrying out investigations on the trolls
themselves, like Finnish reporter Jessikka Aro, who ``has been
peppered with abusive emails, vilified as a drug dealer on
social media sites and mocked as a delusional bimbo in a music
video posted on YouTube.'' \614\ The head of Norway's national
police has also accused Russia's intelligence services of
targeting Norwegian individuals, especially those with dual
citizenship or family members in Russia.\615\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\614\ Andrew Higgins, ``Effort to Expose Russia's `Troll Army'
Draws Vicious Retaliation,'' The New York Times, May 30, 2016.
\615\ Thomas Nilsen, ``Norway's PST Says Russian Intelligence
Targets Individuals,'' The Independent Barents Observer, Feb. 3, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Finland, which shares an 830-mile border with Russia,
Russian disinformation campaigns intensified in 2012, when
Kremlin-linked media outlets used doctored photos to accuse
Finnish authorities of child abduction in custody battles
between Finnish-Russian couples.\616\ And in the lead up to its
2015 parliamentary elections, several Twitter accounts, all
with official-sounding names that appeared to be linked to
Finland's parliament, began tweeting about popular political
topics.\617\ Initially, the tweets contained content that was
considered reasonable and contributed to mainstream discussion,
which earned the accounts a relatively large following among
people who reportedly thought they were official parliament
accounts. Then, just before the election, the accounts took a
sharp turn and began tweeting misinformation and fringe
viewpoints in an attempt to ``muddy the waters,'' according to
Finnish government officials. The officials noted that the
attempt was somewhat clumsy and did not accomplish its aims,
however they also pointed out that ``genuine clumsiness should
not lead to complacency.'' \618\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\616\ Reid Standish, ``Why is Finland Able to Fend off Putin's
Information War?'' Foreign Policy, Mar. 1, 2017.
\617\ Committee Staff Discussion with Finnish Government Officials,
2017.
\618\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In that vein, Finnish government officials report that the
country is strengthening its ``whole-of-society preparedness
system . . . to take into account the new hybrid challenges,''
including by focusing on media literacy skills.\619\ With the
Ukraine crisis and refugee and migrant issues in mind, the
government recently recruited two U.S. experts from Harvard and
MIT to work with over 100 Finnish officials on how to best
counter disinformation campaigns. Jed Willard from Harvard
emphasized to participants that the focus should not be on the
Kremlin's narrative, but the Finnish narrative--that ``the best
way to respond . . . is with a positive Finnish story.'' \620\
Finland has also recognized the challenge of providing
immigrant populations, who may not speak the national language,
with news outlets in their native language that can serve as
alternatives to outlets from their countries of origin. To that
end, in May 2013, Finland's state-owned television station,
Yle, began a daily Russian-language TV news broadcast to offer
a Finnish perspective to its Russian-speaking minority of
approximately 70,000 people.\621\ Yle has a reported viewership
of about 200,000 for its five-minute broadcast, which can also
be seen in Russia.\622\ Finland has also led the establishment
of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid
Threats, based in Helsinki, which will serve as think tank and
fusion center for EU and NATO efforts across several lines of
effort, including disinformation (see Chapter 7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\619\ Embassy of Finland, Information Provided in Response to
Questions from U.S. Senator Ben Cardin, Sept. 20, 2017.
\620\ ``US Experts Gird Finnish Officials for Information War,''
Yle News, Jan. 22, 2016.
\621\ Yle Uutiset, ``Yle's Russian Service: A Quarter-Century of
News and Controversy,'' Oct. 10, 2015.
\622\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Nordic states continue to raise their populations'
awareness of and resiliency to Kremlin disinformation
campaigns. In advance of a military exercise in Sweden, which
also included the other Nordic states, the Baltics, and the
United States, the defense ministries of Sweden and Denmark
released a joint statement announcing their intention to team
up to deter Russian government cyberattacks and disinformation
operations.\623\ And Sweden, which will hold elections in 2018,
has begun ramping up its defenses against disinformation
operations through its Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
(MSB). The agency has picked up on fake news stories that push
narratives claiming that Sweden is a war zone and the rape
capital of Europe, and that it has banned Christmas lights and
the eating of bacon on trains.\624\ Echoing the U.S. experts
hired by Finland, the head of MSB's global analysis and
monitoring section, Mikael Tofvesson, has emphasized that the
MSB's strategy is not to fight fire with fire, noting that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\623\ Morgan Chalfant, ``Denmark, Sweden Team Up to Counter Russian
`Fake News,' '' The Hill, Aug. 31, 2017.
\624\ Emma Lofgren, ``How Sweden's Getting Ready for the Election-
Year Information War,'' The Local, Nov. 7, 2017.
``It's like mudwrestling a pig. You'll both get dirty,
but the pig will think it's quite nice. This plays into
their hands, whereas for us getting dirty is just a
pain. Instead, we have to try to stay clean and focus
on the part of our society that has to work: democracy
and freedom of expression, to make sure that giving the
citizens correct information becomes our best form of
resistance.'' \625\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\625\ Ibid.
Sweden has also introduced curriculum into its primary
schools to teach ``digital competence,'' including how to
differentiate between reliable and unreliable sources.\626\
Even Bamse the Bear, one of Sweden's most popular cartoon
characters, has been recruited to help children learn about the
dangers of fake news and the need to cross check sources of
information.\627\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\626\ Lee Roden, ``Swedish Kids to Learn Computer Coding and How to
Spot Fake News in Primary school,'' The Local, Mar. 13, 2017.
\627\ Lee Roden, ``Why This Swedish Comic Hero Is Going To Teach
Kids About Fake News,'' The Local, Jan. 16, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Denmark is also working to counter the Russian government's
malign influence operations, with the country's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs noting that ``the threat [from the Kremlin]
against Denmark and Europe is significantly different and more
serious than at any other time following the fall of the Berlin
Wall'' and disinformation campaigns aimed at the public
illustrate ``how elements of domestic and foreign policy are
inextricably linked and require close cooperation across
various Danish authorities.'' \628\ To that end, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs has recently established a new unit
dedicated to countering pro-Kremlin disinformation
campaigns.\629\ The unit will also lead an interagency task
force that includes the Ministry of Defense and the
intelligence services. Denmark is also actively promoting cyber
defense cooperation among the EU, UN, and NATO, and has begun
training its soldiers that participate in NATO exercises like
Enhanced Forward Presence on disinformation threats.\630\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\628\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Foreign and Security
Policy Strategy, 2017-2018, at 14, 15 (June 2017).
\629\ Ibid. at 16; Embassy of Denmark, Information Provided in
Response to Questions from U.S. Senator Ben Cardin, Sept. 14, 2017.
\630\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Foreign and Security
Policy Strategy 2017-2018, at 15; ``Denmark to Educate Soldiers in
Combatting Disinformation,'' EU v.Disinfo, July 25, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Nordic societies also function with extremely low
levels of corruption, and their people have high trust in both
their government and fellow citizens--all significant factors
in their relative immunity to the Kremlin's efforts. Yet the
Nordic states have also clearly recognized the new nature of
the hybrid threats they face from the Russian government and
other malicious actors, and have taken admirable and effective
steps to address these threats not just in their own countries,
but also among their allies and partners around in the EU and
NATO. The United States government should work closely with the
Nordic states both to assist with their efforts and to learn
how their actions and methods might be applied to build
resiliency here in the United States.
Lessons Learned
Disinformation is Ineffective Against a Well-Educated
Citizenry: By essentially inoculating the population
against fake news, education efforts have the greatest
long-term potential to neutralize the effects of the
Kremlin's disinformation operations, especially when
combined with an ``all of the above'' approach that
includes monitoring and reporting fake news, promoting
alternative positive narratives, and supporting
independent media and investigative journalism.
Furthermore, this approach tackles the problem at the
root; Kremlin-backed disinformation stories are just an
outgrowth of the rise of false stories on the
internet--even if the Kremlin were to order an end to
all of its disinformation operations tomorrow, the
problem of fake news stories would still exist. The
Kremlin's internet trolls did not invent fake news, but
they recognized and exploited it, using new
technologies to have far greater reach than past
efforts.
THE NETHERLANDS
The Kremlin has launched multiple disinformation campaigns
in the Netherlands and made attempts to interfere in its
elections, and the Dutch government has taken several steps to
build both national and regional resilience.
As with the Baltics, the Dutch government has adopted a
very visible and public approach to exposing Russian government
interference efforts, with the security services producing
annual reports which describe both the broad scope and specific
activities of those efforts. The Dutch General Intelligence and
Security Service noted in 2016 that ``the Russian intelligence
services have their sights firmly set on the Netherlands'' and
that ``Russia's espionage activities seek to influence
decision-making processes, perceptions and public opinion ...
[and] the dissemination of disinformation and propaganda plays
an important role.'' \631\ The Dutch Military Intelligence and
Security Service reports that the Kremlin's propaganda portrays
Russia's engagement in various theaters as humanitarian and de-
escalating, while Western actions are depicted as anti-Russian,
hysterical, hypocritical, and escalating.\632\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\631\ Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations,
General Intelligence Security Service, Annual Report 2016, at 7.
\632\ Netherlands Military Intelligence and Security Service,
Annual Report 2016 (translated from Dutch).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In April 2016, the Netherlands held a referendum on whether
to approve a trade agreement between the EU and Ukraine. A
left-wing member of the Dutch parliament, Harry von Bommel,
recruited a ``Ukrainian team'' to campaign against the
agreement. The team used public meetings, television
appearances, and social media to portray the Ukrainian
government as a ``bloodthirsty kleptocracy.'' \633\ Notably,
the most active members of the team were from Russia or
separatist areas of Ukraine.\634\ Other campaigners, including
one from the Forum for Democracy (a research group turned
political party that won two seats in its first election in
2017 and often promotes the Kremlin's narrative on issues),
retweeted a false report that Ukrainian soldiers crucified a
three year-old Russian-speaking boy.\635\ That piece of
propaganda got its start on Russia's primary state-controlled
TV station and was based on an interview with a Russian actress
posing as a Ukrainian witness.\636\ And a false video created
by the Internet Research Agency, the troll factory in St.
Petersburg, purported to show a group of Ukrainian volunteer
soldiers burning a Dutch flag and threatening to launch
terrorist attacks against the Netherlands if they voted against
the referendum.\637\ In addition, many of the themes,
headlines, and photographs used by the ``no'' campaign were
reportedly borrowed from RT and Sputnik.\638\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\633\ Andrew Higgins, ``Fake News, Fake Ukrainians: How a Group of
Russians Tilted a Dutch Vote,'' The New York Times, Feb. 16, 2017.
\634\ Ibid.
\635\ Dutch News, ``Support for Government Parties Slips in New
Poll of Polls, FvD Rises,'' Dutch News, Nov. 8, 2017; Andrew Higgins,
``Fake News, Fake Ukrainians: How a Group of Russians Tilted a Dutch
Vote,'' The New York Times, Feb. 16, 2017.
\636\ Andrew Higgins, ``Fake News, Fake Ukrainians: How a Group of
Russians Tilted a Dutch Vote,'' The New York Times, Feb. 16, 2017.
\637\ Ibid.
\638\ Anne Applebaum, ``The Dutch Just Showed the World How Russia
Influences Western European Elections,'' The Washington Post, '' Apr.
8, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ultimately, the referendum saw a relatively low turnout of
32 percent of the Dutch population, with about two-thirds of
those voting against the agreement.\639\ One Ukrainian foreign
ministry official cited a poll which reported that 59 percent
of those voting ``no'' said that their perception of Ukraine as
corrupt was an important motivation for their vote; 19 percent
believed that Ukraine was responsible for the shooting down of
Malaysia Air Flight 17 (a common and proven false theme of
Russian propaganda), which killed 298 people, including 193
Dutch citizens; and 34 percent thought that the agreement would
guarantee Ukraine's accession to the EU (the latter two points
are demonstrably false).\640\ While anti-establishment
sentiments and increasing voter skepticism of the EU were
viewed as important reasons for the referendum's outcome, the
potential effect of the disinformation campaign, not just on
voters' choices but also on their understanding of Ukraine,
cannot be ignored.\641\ When it perceives its interests are at
stake, the Kremlin can be expected to carry out similar
disinformation efforts during other referendums in Europe and
beyond.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\639\ Ibid.
\640\ Ibid.
\641\ James McAuley, ``Dutch Voters Reject Trade Deal Out of Anger
Against EU,'' The Washington Post, Apr. 6, 2016; ``Netherlands Rejects
EU-Ukraine Partnership Deal,'' BBC News, Apr. 7, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Netherlands has since worked to strengthen the
integrity of its electoral process and systems, especially
after the Kremlin's attack on the 2016 U.S. presidential
election. The Dutch National Coordinator for Security and
Counterterrorism described in its annual report how the Dutch
government, after noting the hack of the Democratic National
Committee in 2016, sought to enhance digital resilience before
and during their country's March 2017 election by raising
awareness among political parties and organizations.\642\
Nonetheless, some Dutch organizations and platforms were
subject to distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks,
including websites that helped voters compare the platforms of
different political parties.\643\ Following rumors that
election software was potentially vulnerable to cyberattacks
and that Russian hackers could view the Dutch elections as
``good practice'' before the French and German elections, the
month before the election the Minister of Interior and Kingdom
Relations decided to switch to paper ballots only and count all
votes by hand.\644\ According to the U.S. State Department, the
Netherlands also requested U.S. government assistance for its
March 2017 general election.\645\ The election appears to have
occurred without any voting issues, and some observers noted
that disinformation did not appear to play a large role during
the campaign period, with fake news stories posted to Facebook
and Twitter being quickly debunked by commentators.\646\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\642\ Netherlands Ministry of Security and Justice, National
Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, Cyber Security
Assessment Netherlands 2017, at 7 (Aug. 2017).
\643\ Ibid. at 12.
\644\ Thessa Lageman, ``Russian Hackers Use Dutch Polls as
Practice,'' Deutsche Welle, Oct. 3, 2017; Ministry of Security and
Justice, National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, Cyber
Security Assessment Netherlands 2017, at 35.
\645\ U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on Efforts by
the Russian Federation to Undermine Elections in Europe and Eurasia,
at 3 (Nov. 7, 2017).
\646\ Thomas Escritt, ``Dutch Will Hand Count Ballots Due to
Hacking Fears,'' Reuters, Feb. 1, 2017; Peter Teffer, ``Fake News or
Hacking Absent in Dutch Election Campaign,'' EUobserver, Mar. 15,
2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Like other countries in Europe, the Netherlands is also
supporting independent Russian-language journalism. For
example, Netherlands-based Free Press Unlimited Foundation
manages a $1.4 million government grant to help develop a
regional platform for Russian-language media organizations to
exchange news items (see Chapter 7).\647\ When announcing the
program, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bert Koenders, noted
that the Dutch government was explicitly supporting independent
media and not counterpropaganda, saying ``misinformation from
Moscow is a threat to media diversity in all countries in which
Russian is spoken. However, counterpropaganda is ineffective
and goes against our democratic principles. We wish to support
the work of independent media initiatives without dictating
what they should write or broadcast.'' \648\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\647\ Government of the Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
``The Netherlands to Support Independent Russian-Language Media,'' Nov.
19, 2015.
\648\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lessons Learned
The Kremlin's Disinformation Campaigns are Selective and
Opportunistic: While disinformation appears to have
been an important factor in the 2016 referendum on the
EU-Ukraine trade agreement, it did not seem to play a
role in the 2017 parliamentary election. That suggests
that concerted disinformation campaigns are not simply
launched at every opportunity, but targeted and scaled
depending on the expected success of their efforts.
Threat Awareness and Quick Adaptability are Effective
Resilience Measures: The Dutch government's efforts to
help raise awareness of and respond to potential cyber
threats during the 2017 election period, especially by
switching to paper ballots, protected the validity of
the election and likely deterred efforts to interfere.
UNITED KINGDOM
The Russian government has sought to influence democracy in
the United Kingdom through disinformation, cyber hacking, and
corruption. While a complete picture of the scope and nature of
Kremlin interference in the UK's June 2016 referendum is still
emerging, Prime Minister Theresa May and the UK government have
condemned the Kremlin's active measures, and various UK
government entities,\649\ including the Electoral Commission
and parliamentarians, have launched investigations into
different aspects of possible Russian government meddling.\650\
The UK government also worked to harden cyber defenses,
particularly before the June 2017 election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\649\ Rowena Mason, ``Theresa May Accuses Russia of Interfering in
Elections and Fake News,'' The Guardian, Nov. 14, 2017.
\650\ Jeremy Kahn, ``UK Proves Russian Social Media Influence in
Brexit Vote, Bloomberg Politics, Nov. 2, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The June 2016 referendum in which British voters opted for
their country to leave the EU, famously dubbed ``Brexit,'' was
a watershed moment for Western countries grappling with a
resurgent wave of populism and nationalism in their political
systems. Headlines the morning after the vote reflected the
world's--and many Britons'--shock. The Washington Post assessed
it in stark terms: ``British voters have defied the will of
their leaders, foreign allies and much of the political
establishment by opting to rupture this country's primary
connection to Europe in a stunning result that will radiate
economic and political uncertainty across the globe.'' \651\
What was missing, however, in the morning-after news roundup
was discussion of the Russian government and what role it may
have played in helping to influence British voters' decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\651\ Griff Witte et al., ``In Stunning Decision, Britain Votes to
Leave the E.U.,'' The Washington Post, Jun. 24, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, the picture of potential Russian meddling in the
June referendum vote has only begun to come into sharper focus
as subsequent elections around the world revealed common
elements--false or inflammatory stories circulated by bots and
trolls, allegations of cyber hacking, stories in Russian state-
sponsored media outlets playing up fears of migration and
globalization, and allegations of corrupt foreign influence on
political parties and candidates--that suggested a possible
Russian hand. The Kremlin has long aimed to undermine European
integration and the EU, in addition to its aims to sow
confusion and undermine confidence in democratic processes
themselves, making Brexit a potentially appealing target.
The allegations that have emerged of Russian interference
prior to the Brexit referendum are all the more stunning given
the innate resilience within British society to the Kremlin's
anti-democratic agenda.\652\ A brief viewing of the lively
sessions in Britain's House of Commons is a reminder of the
country's traditions of popular representation, robust debate,
and transparent governance. Nevertheless, analysts have cited
pockets within the UK political system that are relatively more
vulnerable to Russian influence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\652\ Neil Barnett, The Kremlin's Trojan Horses: Russian Influence
in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, The Atlantic Council, at 18
(2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
British campaign finance laws generally focus on
restricting expenditures by political parties more than
limiting donations, though foreign donors are not considered
``permissible donors'' under UK law.\653\ However, the
beneficial owners of non-British companies that are
incorporated in the EU and carry out business in the UK are
immaterial under the law; this opacity may have enabled
Russian-related money to be directed with insufficient scrutiny
to various UK political actors.\654\ Investigative journalists
have also raised questions about the sources of sudden and
possibly illicit wealth that may have been directed to support
the Brexit ``Leave'' campaign; the UK Electoral Commission has
subsequently begun to investigate.\655\ Meanwhile, experts have
pointed to the role of the far-right UK Independence Party
(UKIP) and its leader, Nigel Farage, in fanning anti-EU
sentiment, criticism of the European sanctions on Russia, and
flattering assessments of Russian President Putin as well as
far left wing views as conducive to alignment with Russia's
anti-EU and NATO-skeptic positions.\656\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\653\ The Political Parties, Elections and Referendum Act 2000, c.
41, Sec. 54 (UK).
\654\ Ibid.; Barnett, The Kremlin's Trojan Horses: Russian
Influence in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, at 18.
\655\ Alastair Sloan & Iain Campbell, ``How Did Arron Banks Afford
Brexit?'' Open Democracy UK, Oct. 19, 2017; Holly Watt, ``Electoral
Commission to Investigate Arron Banks' Brexit Donations,'' The
Guardian, Nov. 1, 2017.
\656\ Barnett, The Kremlin's Trojan Horses: Russian Influence in
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, at 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More broadly, there are concerns about vulnerabilities to
Russian government influence on various UK actors, including
political parties, civil society, and think-tanks, through
extensive Russian financial ties and possibly illicit financial
activity.\657\ While unrecorded inflows of cash may not
necessarily be illicit, market research done in 2015 by
Deutsche Bank confirmed through balance of payments data ``the
popular belief that Russian money has flooded into the UK in
recent years,'' particularly into the real estate market, and
that a ``considerable chunk'' of unrecorded inflows into the
country are the result of Russian capital flight.\658\ In March
2015, UK Metropolitan Police noted that a total value of 180
million British pounds in properties in the UK had been put
under investigation as possibly purchased with corrupt proceeds
by secretive offshore companies, in arrangements akin to
``putting money in a Swiss bank,'' according to one
investigator.\659\ Documents gathered and released to numerous
media outlets in March 2017 by the Organized Crime and
Corruption Reporting Project and Russian newspaper Novaya
Gazeta detailed a ``global laundromat'' scheme involving an
estimated 500 Russian oligarchs, bankers, or individuals with
connections to the FSB who moved at least $20 billion in stolen
or illicit money out of Russia from 2010-2014.\660\ The
documents showed that British banks processed nearly $740
million of this allegedly laundered money, drawing questions
about the lack of scrutiny applied to suspicious money
transfers and the anonymity afforded under UK law to the
beneficial owners of British-registered companies.\661\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\657\ Ibid. at 20-23.
\658\ Deutsche Bank Markets Research, ``Dark Matter: The Hidden
Capital Flows that Drive G-10 Exchange Rates,'' Mar. 2015.
\659\ Robert Booth, ``UK Properties Held by Offshore Firms Used in
Global Corruption, Say Police,'' The Guardian, Mar. 3, 2015.
\660\ Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, The Russian
Laundromat, Aug. 22, 2014; Luke Harding et al., ``British Banks Handled
Vast Sums of Laundered Russian Money,'' The Guardian, Mar. 20, 2017.
\661\ Luke Harding et al., ``British Banks Handled Vast Sums of
Laundered Russian Money,'' The Guardian, Mar. 20, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With regard to cyberspace, in February 2017 the head of the
UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), Ciaran Martin,
asserted that the Russian government had stepped up its online
aggression against Western countries.\662\ He cited 188 major
cyberattacks over a three-month period against the UK
government, most of which were reportedly attributable to
Russian and Chinese actors; the NCSC reportedly blocked 34,450
attacks over a six-month period against UK entities more
broadly (although not all of these attacks are necessarily
attributable to the Russian government).\663\ In a November
2017 public speech, he indicated that Russian interference over
the past year ``included attacks on the UK media,
telecommunications and energy sectors.'' \664\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\662\ Richard Kerbaj, ``Russia Steps Up Cyber-Attacks on UK,'' The
Times, Feb. 12, 2017.
\663\ Pierluigi Paganini, ``Britain's Security Has Been Threatened
by 188 Major Cyber Attacks in the Last Three Months, According to the
Head of the National Cyber Security Centre,'' Security Affairs, Feb.
13, 2017.
\664\ United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre, ``Cyber
Security: Fixing the Present So We Can Worry About the Future,'' Nov.
15, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Russian government has also apparently sought to seize
on populist sentiments and economic frustrations, exploiting
the UK's generally open marketplace for free speech and
political competition by introducing fake or misleading news.
Officially, the Russian government asserted its neutrality on
the question of the Brexit referendum, but its English-language
media outlets RT and Sputnik covered the referendum campaign
extensively and offered `'systematically one-sided coverage''
supporting a British departure from the European Union and
frequently broadcasted statements from UKIP head Farage.\665\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\665\ Ben Nimmo, ``Putin's Media are Pushing Britain for the
Brexit,'' The Interpreter, Feb. 12, 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation, Tweet, https://twitter.com/mfa--russia/
status/748231648936869888, June 29, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reporting in November 2017 on cached material from Twitter
accounts tied to the Internet Research Agency, the Russia-based
troll farm that generated false stories around the 2016 U.S.
elections, CNN alleged that numerous accounts had also blasted
out pro-Brexit messages before the UK referendum.\666\ Two
researchers from the University of Edinburgh ultimately
asserted that more than 400 of the Internet Research Agency
Twitter accounts that had been active in the U.S. election had
also been actively posting about Brexit.\667\ Meanwhile,
research conducted by a joint team of experts from the
University of California at Berkeley and Swansea University in
Wales reportedly identified 150,000 Twitter accounts with
various Russian ties that disseminated messages about Brexit
before the referendum--interestingly, a combination of messages
both supporting and criticizing Britain's membership in the
European Union, which may signal that the broader aim was to
magnify societal discord.\668\ In contrast, however, Twitter
representatives reported in November 2017 that the company
found only six Tweets on its platform--all generated by RT,
which spent roughly $1,000 to promote them--constituting
Russian-sponsored misinformation during the Brexit campaign;
the parliamentarian chairing the select committee to whom the
information was reported called the Twitter report a
``completely inadequate'' response that was overly narrow in
scope.\669\ In addition, Facebook reports that the accounts
they ``attribute to the Internet Research Agency ran three ads
that delivered to the UK during the relevant electoral period.
Those ads delivered around 200 total impressions and were
associated with a total spend of $0.97 USD.'' \670\ However, in
limiting their investigation to just the Internet Research
Agency, Facebook missed that it is only one troll farm which
``has existed within a larger disinformation ecosystem in St.
Petersburg,'' including Glavset, an alleged successor of the
Internet Research Agency, and the Federal News Agency, a
reported propaganda ``media farm,'' according to Russian
investigative journalists.\671\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\666\ Donie O'Sullivan, ``Russian Trolls Pushed Pro-Brexit Spin on
Day of Referendum,'' CNN, Nov. 10, 2017.
\667\ Karla Adam & William Booth, ``Rising Alarm in Britain Over
Russian Meddling in Brexit Vote,'' The Washington Post, Nov. 17, 2017.
\668\ Ibid.
\669\ Alex Hern, ``Twitter's Response to Brexit Interference
Inquiry Inadequate, MP Says,'' The Guardian, Dec. 14, 2017.
\670\ Email from Facebook Official to Committee Staff.
\671\ Diana Pilipenko, ``Facebook must `follow the money' to
uncover extent of Russian meddling,'' The Guardian, Oct. 9, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the deepening realization of the threat of Russian
government interference, the UK government has stepped up its
scrutiny of possible Russian intrusions into its democratic
system and heightened its responses, from which helpful lessons
can be drawn.
Lessons Learned
Consolidating and Enhancing Cyber Security Can Preempt
Disclosure of Hacked Material: In 2016, the UK
established the NCSC as a ``one-stop shop'' for
cybersecurity within its government to protect critical
services from cyberattacks, manage major incidents, and
pursue technological improvements to bolster Internet
security.\672\ The UK government also recently
announced a $2.3 billion increase in spending on
cybersecurity to counter emerging threats and ``hostile
foreign actors.'' Some observers suggest this funding
increase is linked to growing concerns about Russian
activity.\673\ Prior to the UK's general election in
June 2017, the NCSC contacted political party leaders
and offered to help strengthen their network security
in light of the potential for hostile foreign state
action against the UK political system.\674\ British
officials stated after the poll that there was ``no
successful Russian cyber intervention'' into the
election process seen and asserted that systems were in
place to protect against electoral fraud at all levels,
though it is unclear the extent to which the lack of
meddling may have also been due to a shift in the
Kremlin's approach.\675\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\672\ National Cyber Security Centre of the United Kingdom
Government Communications Headquarters, Annual Review (2017).
\673\ Henry Ridgwell, ``Britain Invests Billions in Cybersecurity
in Face of Russian Threat,'' Voice of America, Nov. 4, 2016; Jamie
Grierson, ``UK Hit by 188 High-Level Cyber-Attacks in Three Months,''
The Guardian, Feb. 12, 2017.
\674\ William James & Robin Pomeroy, ``UK Political Parties Warned
of Russian Hacking Threat,'' Reuters, Mar. 12, 2017; Richard Kerbaj,
``Russia Steps Up Cyber-Attacks on UK,'' The Times, Feb. 12, 2017.
\675\ Paul Shinkman, ``British Say Election Was Free of Russian
Meddling,'' U.S. News & World Report, June 16, 2017.
A Diverse, Visible Response by Government and Parliamentary
Actors Helps Raise Awareness of the Threat: Growing
revelations of possible Russian government interference
into the Brexit referendum and UK democracy were met
with a sharp warning from Prime Minister May in an
address in November 2017 in which she told the Kremlin,
``We know what you are doing . . . and you will not
succeed,'' and described Russian state actions as
``threatening the international order.'' \676\ In mid-
November 2017, Prime Minister May suggested that a
prominent intelligence and security parliamentary
committee would be re-formed soon to investigate
Russian meddling in the British election, a development
called for by senior parliamentarians from both the
Labour and Conservative parties. Meanwhile, the
Commons' Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport Select
Committee opened an inquiry in January 2017 to
investigate the scope and role of disinformation and
propaganda in Britain.\677\ As mentioned earlier, the
Electoral Commission opened investigations into
possible campaign finance violations and the source of
funding for the Brexit ``Leave'' campaign. On the
corruption front, in May 2016 the United Kingdom hosted
an anti-corruption summit in which 43 governments and
six international organizations participated, resulting
in a Global Declaration Against Corruption and 648
commitments by participating states and entities to
strengthen various aspects of transparency and
accountability for corruption.\678\ The government of
Former Prime Minister David Cameron announced at the
summit, among other steps, the launch of ``the UK's
public central register of company beneficial ownership
information for all companies incorporated in the UK''
as well as for ``foreign companies who already own or
buy property in the UK, or who bid on UK central
government contracts.'' \679\ The United Kingdom in
April 2017 also passed into law the Criminal Finances
Act, which strengthens provisions against tax evasion
and includes a section modeled after the U.S. Global
Magnitsky Rule of Law and Accountability Act enabling
the freezing of assets of foreign officials who have
committed gross human rights violations.\680\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\676\ David Kirkpatrick, ``British Cybersecurity Chief Warns of
Russian Hacking,'' The New York Times, Nov. 14, 2017.
\677\ Robert Booth & Alex Hern, ``Intelligence Watchdog Urged to
Look at Russian Influence on Brexit Vote,'' The Guardian, Nov. 15,
2017; United Kingdom House of Commons Select Committee Digital,
Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ```Fake News' Inquiry Launched,''
Jan. 30, 2017.
\678\ Transparency International, 3 Things We've Learned Since the
Anti-Corrutpion Summit in London 2016, Sept. 19, 2017.
\679\ Anti-Corruption Summit London 2016, United Kingdom Country
Statement, at 1, May 12, 2016.
\680\ UK Parliament, Summary of the Criminal Finances Act of 2017,
https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2016-17/criminalfinances.html
(visited Dec. 30, 2017); ``Magnitsky Bill Turns UK into `Hostile
Environment' for Kleptocrats,'' BBC, Feb. 21, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRANCE
The Russian government has sought to influence democracy in
France through the use of cyberattacks, disinformation, and
cultural and political influence. Despite relatively strong
historical, political, and cultural ties to Russia compared to
other European powers, France and its new president Emmanuel
Macron--himself a target of cyber hacking and disinformation--
are emerging as strong voices against Russian government
interference and have played a leading role in Europe to resist
Kremlin meddling.
Barely three weeks after he was elected with nearly twice
the votes of his far-right, pro-Kremlin challenger Marine Le
Pen, French President Emmanuel Macron stood next to Russian
President Vladimir Putin for a press conference at
Versailles.\681\ An exhibition inside the Palace was
celebrating the 1717 visit to Paris of Russian tsar Peter the
Great, a figure to whom Russia's modern-day strongman is often
compared.\682\ But that day it was Macron, after being asked
why certain Russian media outlets were not given access to his
campaign, who projected a forceful stance. ``I will yield
nothing on this. Nothing, madam. So let's set things straight .
. . Russia Today and Sputnik did not act as news outlets and
journalists, but they acted as organs of influence, of
propaganda, and of deceptive propaganda. It's that simple.''
\683\ Reports disseminated by these outlets and on pro-Kremlin
social media had variously decried Macron as a puppet of U.S.
political and business leaders, alleged he held an offshore
account in the Bahamas to evade taxes, and fueled rumors of an
extra-marital gay relationship, which Macron publicly
denied.\684\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\681\ Gregor Aisch, et al., ``How France Voted,'' The New York
Times, May 7, 2017; Nicholas Vinocur, ``Macron, Standing by Putin,
Calls RT and Sputnik `Agents of Influence,''' Politico, May 29, 2017.
\682\ Nicholas Vinocur, ``Macron and the Czar at Versailles,''
Politico, May 29, 2017.
\683\ James McAuley, ``French President Macron Blasts Russian
State-Owned Media as `Propaganda,''' The Washington Post, May 29,
2017.
\684\ Andrew Osborn & Richard Balmforth, ``Macron Camp Bars Russian
News Outlets, Angers Moscow,'' Reuters, Apr. 27, 2017; Charles Bremmer,
``Websites Pump Out Fake News Minutes After Offshore Claims,'' The
Times, May 5, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For his part, Putin used the press conference to dismiss
the notion of Russian government meddling in the French
election, claiming Macron ``did not show any interest [in
discussing it] and I even less.'' \685\ But investigations by
government and non-government researchers have pointed to a
myriad of Russian malign influence tools that were deployed in
France prior to its 2017 election. The French response was
multi-faceted and quick, animated by a desire to avoid falling
victim to meddling similar to what was seen in the Brexit
referendum and U.S. presidential election in 2016.\686\ And if,
as it appeared, the Kremlin's goal was to undermine Macron's
candidacy, then the French response successfully stymied that
goal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\685\ James McAuley, ``French President Macron Blasts Russian
State-Owned Media as `Propaganda,''' The Washington Post, May 29,
2017.
\686\ James McAuley, ``French President Macron Blasts Russian
State-Owned Media as `Propaganda,' '' The Washington Post, May 29,
2017; Committee Staff Discussion with French Foreign Ministry
Officials, Nov. 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In recent years, the French government's posture has become
increasingly critical toward Russian aggression in Ukraine and
Syria. Macron's predecessor Francois Hollande in 2014 stopped
delivery of two French warships ordered by the Kremlin and, in
2016, suggested Russian complicity in war crimes in Aleppo--an
allegation that prompted Putin to cancel a planned official
visit to Paris.\687\ The French Foreign Ministry has also
maintained that EU sanctions on the Russian Federation must
remain in place until the Minsk Agreements are fully
implemented.\688\ Among Western European powers, however,
broader French society provides relatively fertile ground for
Russian influence. The country has a long historical
relationship with Russia, as evidenced by Franco-Russian ties
that exist in political parties, universities, think tanks, and
journalist circles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\687\ Michael Stothard, et al., ``France Suspends Delivery Of
Mistral Warship to Russia,'' Financial Times, Nov. 25, 2015; Kim
Willsher & Alec Luhn, ``Vladimir Putin Cancels Paris Visit Amid Syria
Row,'' The Guardian, Oct. 11, 2016.
\688\ ``France Says Russia Sanctions to Remain in Place,''
Associated Press, Mar. 9, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pro-Kremlin sentiment has been demonstrated by actors
across the French political spectrum, especially on the far
right, far left, and center right. The Front National (FN),
Marine Le Pen's Eurosceptic and ultra-nationalist party, has
staunchly defended Russian actions in Ukraine and Syria,
calling for ``balanced'' relations between Russia and the
Western powers, particularly against an Islamist ``menace.''
\689\ FN publicly acknowledged it took a loan of nine million
euros from the First Czech-Russian Bank in Moscow, reportedly
owned by pro-Kremlin oligarchs, after French banks refused to
loan money to the party because of its historically anti-
Semitic and extremist positions.\690\ In the month prior to the
first round of the 2017 presidential election, Le Pen traveled
to Moscow to meet with Putin and endorse the lifting of
European sanctions on Russia, while Putin told the assembled
press that Russia did not seek to ``influence'' the French poll
but simply ``reserve the right to talk to all of the country's
political forces.'' \691\ Far-left and Communist parties in
France have been sympathetic to the Russian government, based
on skepticism toward Europe and a shared penchant for
statism.\692\ Meanwhile, some center-right elements in France
have viewed Russia through the prism of business and industry
interests--during the 2016 campaign, Republican party candidate
Francois Fillon cautioned against a European hard line on
sanctions and a military build-up along NATO's eastern flank,
and dismissed assertions by U.S. government officials of
Russian meddling in the French poll as ``fantasies.'' \693\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\689\ Vivienne Walt, ``Why France's Marine Le Pen is Doubling Down
on Russia Support,'' TIME, Jan. 9, 2017.
\690\ Ibid.; Anne-Claude Martin, ``National Front's Russian Loans
Cause Uproar in European Parliament,'' EURACTIV.fr, Dec. 5, 2014;
Sanita Jemberga, et al, ``How Le Pen's Party Brokered Russian Loans,''
EUobserver, May 3, 2017.
\691\ ``Le Pen Meets Putin Ahead of French Presidential Election,''
France 24, Mar. 24, 2017.
\692\ Alina Polyakova et al., The Kremlin's Trojan Horses,
Atlantic Council, at 7-8 (Nov. 15, 2016).
\693\ John Irish, ``Russia Not Interfering in French Elections,
Says Candidate Fillon,'' Reuters, Mar. 31, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin has also cultivated ties with French civil
society and religious actors it can exploit to influence French
policies in Russia's favor. For example, Vladimir Yakunin, the
former head of Russian Railways who is under U.S. sanctions, is
the co-president of Association Dialogue Franco-Russe in Paris,
which, in the wake of European sanctions on Russia, has
advocated for ``normal'' ties between France and Russia to be
promptly re-established.\694\ The Paris-based Institute for
Democracy and Cooperation is led by a former Duma deputy,
Natalia Narochnitskaya, and according to one expert ``toes a
blatantly pro-Kremlin line,'' with its representatives
regularly appearing on Russian state-controlled media.\695\ The
Russian Orthodox Church has a significant presence in France
and recently completed construction on a new church and
community center near the Eiffel Tower--seen as a visible
display of Russian might in the heart of Europe and part of the
Kremlin's attempts to influence France's 200,000-strong Russian
diaspora.\696\ The facility has been accorded diplomatic status
and the community center's activities are opaque, amidst
concerns held by some government and civil society
interlocutors in Paris that the space could be used to house
Russian intelligence activities.\697\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\694\ Association Dialogue Franco-Russe, ``Board, Vladimir
Yakunin,'' http://dialoguefrancorusse.com/en/association-uk/board/557-
vladimir-yakunin.html (visited Dec. 30, 2017); U.S. Department of the
Treasury, ``Treasury Sanctions Russian Officials, Members Of The
Russian Leadership's Inner Circle, And An Entity For Involvement In The
Situation In Ukraine,'' Mar. 20, 2014; Association Dialogue Franco-
Russe, ``The Franco-Russian Dialogue is in Favor of the Imminent
Resumption of Normal Cooperation with Russia,'' Mar. 29, 2016.
\695\ Natalya Kanevskaya, ``How The Kremlin Wields Its Soft Power
In France,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 24, 2014.
\696\ Antoine Blua, ``Russian `Spiritual Centre' Set to Open in the
Heart of Paris,'' The Guardian, Oct. 19, 2016.
\697\ Antoine Blua, ``Russia Unveils Cultural, Orthodox Jewel On
The Seine,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Oct. 17, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Against this backdrop of carefully fostered cultural, media
and political ties, the Kremlin ramped up the use of additional
information warfare tools to seize on anti-European sentiment
around the 2017 French presidential election and discredit
Macron in particular. For example, a study released in April by
a UK-based firm noted that nearly one in four website links
shared by French social media users before the French election
``come from sources which challenge traditional media
narratives.'' \698\ In April, a Macron campaign spokesman said
that ``2,000 to 3,000 attempts have been made to hack the
campaign, including denial-of-service attacks that briefly shut
down Macron's website and more sophisticated efforts to burrow
into email accounts of individual campaign workers.'' \699\
Research by a private cybersecurity firm indicated that the
Macron campaign was a target of APT28, the same Russian
government-linked hackers behind the World Anti-Doping Agency
(WADA) and DNC doxing attacks.\700\ Just days before the runoff
vote, hacked emails and documents from Emmanuel Macron's
campaign were leaked online. The hack was first announced by an
alt-right activist in the United States, whose tweet promoting
the leak was reportedly spread with the help of bots and a
network of alt-right activists before being picked up by
Wikileaks, which ultimately published a searchable archive of
tens of thousands of emails and documents hacked from the
Macron campaign.\701\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\698\ The Role and Impact of Non-Traditional Publishers in the 2017
French Presidential Election, Bakamo, 2017; Andrew Rettman, ``Russia-
Linked Fake News Floods French Social Media,'' EUobserver, Apr. 20,
2017.
\699\ Rick Noack, ``Cyberattack on French Presidential Front-Runner
Bears Russian `Fingerprints', Research Group Says,'' The Washington
Post, Apr. 25, 2017.
\700\ John Leyden, ``Kremlin-Backed DNC Hackers Going After French
Presidential Hopeful Macron,'' The Register, Apr. 25, 2017.
\701\ ``Macron Leaks: The Anatomy of a Hack,'' BBC News, May 9,
2017; ``Wikileaks Publishes Searchable Archive of Macron Campaign
Emails,'' Reuters, July 31, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indications of Russian state-sponsored cyberattacks against
French entities date back to before the 2017 presidential
election, starkly illustrated by the massive cyberattack
against French global broadcaster TV5Monde in 2015. In a swift
assault, 12 of the network's channels suddenly went dark on the
night of April 9. Within nine hours, an on-site technical team
was able to identify and disable the malicious server (a more
protracted delay to return to the airwaves could have resulted
in the cancellation of contracts by satellite carriers,
endangering the company). While messages posted on the
company's Twitter and Facebook pages at the onset of the attack
alleged to be from a group calling itself the ``Cyber
Caliphate'' that espoused the Islamic State, French officials
who investigated the attack subsequently linked it to
APT28.\702\ The seeming aim of the attack--not to disable, but
to destroy--suggested that it may have been ``an attempt to
test forms of cyber weaponry as part of an increasingly
aggressive posture,'' and the company's profits and staff were
hampered for months until the extent of the breach could be
addressed and more rigorous security protocols put into
place.\703\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\702\ Sam Jones, ``Russia Mobilises an Elite Band of Cyber
Warriors,'' Financial Times, Feb. 23, 2017.
\703\ Gordon Corera, ``How France's TV5 Was Almost Destroyed By
`Russian Hackers','' BBC, Oct. 20, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On May 9, Admiral Mike Rogers, Director of the U.S.
National Security Agency and Commander of the U.S. Cyber
Command acknowledged in a hearing before the Senate Armed
Services Committee that Washington had become ``aware of
Russian activity'' to hack French election-related
infrastructure in the months prior to the French election and
had signaled this to French counterparts, with an offer to
assist in building resilience.\704\ The broader response that
the French government pursued to counter Russian election
meddling reflected engagement and cooperation with not only
other governments but also media and political parties, and
provides a helpful, comprehensive model from which the United
States and other countries can draw.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\704\ Testimony of Admiral Michael S. Rodgers, Commander of the
U.S. Cyber Command, United States Cyber Command, Hearing before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, May 9, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lessons Learned
Swift Engagement with Political Parties and on Electoral
Infrastructure Can Blunt Effects of Meddling: In
response to what French authorities viewed as possible
Russian efforts to hack the digital infrastructure of
political campaigns, France's main cybersecurity
agency, the French Network and Information Security
Agency (ANSSI), warned all political parties about the
Russian cyber threat in the fall of 2016.\705\ ANSSI
subsequently offered cybersecurity awareness-raising
and training seminars for all French political parties
ahead of French elections this past spring; all parties
participated except for Front National, which
declined.\706\ ANSSI itself, created in 2007 after the
emergence of massive denial-of-service attacks in
Estonia which that government had attributed to
Russian-backed hackers, was the focus of increased
French government investment--with a 93 percent jump in
its budget between 2010 and 2014.\707\ And France's
2015 National Digital Security Strategy identified
spreading disinformation and propaganda ``an attack on
defence and national security'' to be met with a
response.\708\ In advance of June 2017 parliamentary
elections, the French government also discontinued
electronic voting by French citizens abroad.\709\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\705\ Mehdi Chebil, ``France Takes Steps to Prevent an Election
Hack Attack,'' France24, Jan. 16, 2017.
\706\ Laura Daniels, ``How Russia Hacked the French Election,''
Politico, Apr. 23, 2017.
\707\ Nicholas Vinocur, ``France At Risk of Being Next Election
Hacking Victim,'' Politico, Jan. 5, 2017.
\708\ Office of the Prime Minister of France, French National
Digital Security Strategy 2015, at 20.
\709\ ``France Drops Electronic Voting for Citizens Abroad Over
Cybersecurity Fears,'' Reuters, Mar. 6, 2017. The French government had
previously allowed its citizens abroad to vote electronically in
legislative elections, but not presidential elections.
Direct Diplomatic Engagement Clearly Pointing to Malicious
Actors and the Consequences of Their Actions Can Act as
a Deterrent: In a February speech to the French
parliament, then Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault
stated that France ``will not accept any interference
whatsoever in our electoral process, no more from
Russia than from any other state. This is a question of
our democracy, our sovereignty, our national
independence.'' \710\ Ayrault's warning included a
pledge to carry out retaliatory measures against any
such interference.\711\ French government officials
reiterated this warning privately to Russian officials
in France, which may have prompted overt Russian
interference in the campaign and comments on specific
candidates to apparently subside.\712\ Since then, the
Macron Administration has stressed the importance of
boosting international cooperation to prevent and
respond to cyberattacks.\713\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\710\ ``France Warns Russia Against Meddling in Election,''
Reuters, Feb. 15, 2017.
\711\ Ibid.
\712\ Committee staff discussion with French foreign ministry
officials, Nov. 2017.
\713\ Press Statement, ``Cybersecurity: Attacks Against Private and
Public Actors,'' Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French
Republic, May 15, 2017.
Encouraging Vigilance by Non-Government Actors and
Collective Discipline in Media, the Private Sector, and
Civil Society is a Critical Ingredient in an Effective
Response: Subsequent to the dump of hacked material
from the Macron campaign less than 48 hours before the
runoff vote, the French electoral commission issued an
instruction to news media in France not to publish the
contents of the leaked information or risk criminal
charges.\714\ For its part, the media effectively
complied with the government ban, but also took steps
on its own to exercise collective discipline and
increase its scrutiny of information before publication
to avoid spreading fake news. Mainstream news
organizations increased their fact-checking efforts as
signs of Russian disinformation emerged.\715\ Le
Monde's Decodex project, for example, enabled a suite
of fact-checking products based on a database of more
than 600 websites, both French and international, which
its fact checkers had identified as unreliable because
the site could not be verified as legitimate or was
deemed to manipulate information.\716\ Perhaps drawing
from lessons learned in the 2016 U.S. election,
Facebook stated publicly in April 2017 that it had
suspended 30,000 accounts for promoting propaganda or
election-related spam before the French poll, though
subsequent press reporting on private meetings between
company officials and congressional staff indicate the
number of accounts ultimately suspended could have been
as many as 70,000.\717\ This reporting also cited
evidence connecting Russian intelligence to
approximately two dozen fake Facebook accounts that
were used to conduct surveillance specifically on
Macron campaign staff, which the company
deactivated.\718\ The Macron campaign, mindful it was a
hacking target, also took defensive steps to furnish
false logins and information in response to spear-
phishing emails; while hackers ultimately were able to
break into campaign materials, the effort may have
helped to delay the release of the information until
late in the campaign, at which point it gained limited
traction with a forewarned, and vigilant, French
audience.\719\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\714\ Lizzie Dearden, ``Emmanuel Macron Hacked Emails: French Media
Ordered by Electoral Commission Not to Publish Content of Messages,''
The Independent, May 6, 2017.
\715\ Dana Priest & Michael Birnbaum, ``Europe Has Been Working to
Expose Russian Meddling for Years,'' The Washington Post, June 25,
2017.
\716\ Jessica Davies, ``Le Monde Identifies 600 Unreliable Websites
in Fake-News Crackdown,'' Digiday, Jan. 25, 2017.
\717\ Eric Auchard & Joseph Menn, ``Facebook cracks down on 30,000
fake accounts in France,'' Reuters, Apr. 13, 2017; Joseph Menn,
``Russia Used Facebook to Try to Spy on Macron Campaign--Sources,''
Reuters, July 27, 2017.
\718\ Ibid.
\719\ Rachel Donadio, ``Why the Macron Hacking Attack Landed With a
Thud in France,'' The New York Times, May 8, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GERMANY
The Russian government has sought to influence democracy in
Germany through energy ties, cultural and political influence,
disinformation, and cyberattacks. The German government and its
Chancellor Angela Merkel are regarded as indispensable leaders
in sustaining a united, democratic Europe. This has
particularly been the case since the Russian military
aggression into Ukraine in 2014. Nevertheless, historical
business and political ties between Russia and some camps in
Germany, as well as relationships forged in the energy sector,
have presented opportunities for the Kremlin to attempt to
meddle.
A 2007 meeting between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and
Russian President Vladimir Putin at the latter's summer
residence in Sochi, Russia--in which Putin let his black
Labrador into the room to approach Merkel, who has a fear of
dogs--has been widely hailed as a sign of Putin's cunning
statecraft.\720\ But Merkel's assessment of the situation in an
interview later dismissed the Russian leader's power play: ``I
understand why he has to do this--to prove he's a man,'' she
told a group of reporters. ``He's afraid of his own weakness.
Russia has nothing, no successful politics or economy. All they
have is this.'' \721\ Indeed, Merkel has proven to be a
formidable obstacle to Putin in achieving his goals to
undermine a democratic Europe, particularly in the leading
diplomatic role Merkel and Germany have played in projecting a
united--and firm--European response to the Russian invasion of
Ukraine and the imposition of EU sanctions. Ten years after the
infamous dog incident, Merkel held firm in a tense May 2017
meeting on EU sanctions imposed against Russia for its
annexation of Crimea and support for Ukrainian separatists, and
raised concerns about human rights abuses inside Russia and the
Kremlin's election meddling abroad.\722\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\720\ Tim Hume, ``Vladimir Putin: I Didn't Mean to Scare Angela
Merkel with My Dog,'' CNN, Jan. 12, 2016.
\721\ Thomas Johnson, ``Merkel Appears to Roll Her Eyes at Putin,
and the Internet Can't Get Enough,'' The Washington Post, July 7,
2017.
\722\ Patrick Donahue & Ilya Arkhipov, ``In Tense Encounter, Merkel
Tells Putin Sanctions Must Remain,'' Bloomberg, May 2, 2017; Andreas
Rinke & Denis Pinchuk, ``Putin, Merkel Struggle to Move Past
Differences in Tense Meeting,'' Reuters, May 2, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even before the Ukraine conflict, however, the Russian
government has used energy politics as a key lever of influence
in Germany. In 2005, former chancellor Gerhard Schroder became
the chairman of the shareholders' committee of Nord Stream AG,
a consortium led by Gazprom to bring Russian gas to Germany
under the Baltic Sea via two pipelines.\723\ The first was
inaugurated in 2011, but completion of the second, dubbed Nord
Stream 2, has faced considerable obstacles from European Union
members and littoral states who fear it will increase European
reliance on Russian gas and undermine stability in Ukraine,
which currently receives transit payments for the gas that runs
through its territory to Europe.\724\ In September 2017, the
Russian state-controlled oil company Rosneft named Schroder its
board chairman.\725\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\723\ Nord Stream, ``Who We Are,'' https://www.nord-stream.com/
about-us/ (visited Dec. 31, 2017); ``Former German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroder Nominated to Russia's Rosneft Board,'' Deutsche Welle, Aug.
12, 2017.
\724\ ``U.S. Diplomat Says Nord Stream 2 Pipeline Probably Won't Be
Built,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 29, 2017; ``Denmark
Passes Law to Block Nord Stream 2,'' Newsbase, Dec. 7, 2017; Statement
of Dr. Constanze Stelzenmuller, ``The Impact of Russian Interference on
Germany's 2017 Elections,'' Russian Intervention in European Elections,
Hearing before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, June
28, 2017. For more on Nord Stream 2, see Chapter 4.
\725\ Rosneft, ``Corporate Governance; Board of Directors,''
https://www.rosneft.com/governance/board (visited Dec. 31, 2017);
Geoffrey Smith, ``Vladimir Putin Just Gave Ex-German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder A Plum Oil Job,'' Fortune, Sept. 29, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Meanwhile, Russia has also cultivated ties with both
extreme ends of the political spectrum in Germany. The
Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, which ascended to third
place in the September 2017 elections and is the first far-
right party to enter the Bundestag since World War II, has
reportedly sought close ties with Russian state-backed
media.\726\ It has reportedly also forged alliances between its
youth wing and leaders of United Russia's Yunarmiya (Young
Guard) and former Nashi youth movement, and courted ethnic
Russian voters in Germany.\727\ The German newspaper Bild
alleged that Russia had directed funds to the AfD ahead of the
September elections through the sale of gold to the AfD via
middlemen at under-market values, a scenario through which the
party may not have realized it was being subsidized with
Russian cash.\728\ Both the AfD and the Kremlin have fervently
denied any such financial ties.\729\ Meanwhile, the far-left
Die Linke party has proven sympathetic ground for the Kremlin's
interests, with party leaders positing that the Ukraine
conflict is the result of American actions and traveling to the
separatist ``Donetsk People's Republic'' in eastern Ukraine to
express solidarity and provide humanitarian relief.\730\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\726\ Simon Shuster, ``How Russian Voters Fueled the Rise of
Germany's Far-Right,'' TIME, Sept. 25, 2017.
\727\ Melanie Amann & Pavel Lokshin, ``German Populists Forge Ties
with Russia,'' Spiegel Online, Apr. 27, 2016.
\728\ Andrew Rettman, ``Illicit Russian Money Poses Threat to EU
Democracy,'' EUobserver, Apr. 21, 2017.
\729\ Simon Shuster, ``How Russian Voters Fueled the Rise of
Germany's Far-Right,'' TIME, Sept. 25, 2017.
\730\ Alina Polyakova et al., The Kremlin's Trojan Horses,
Atlantic Council, at 15 (Nov. 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Civil society and popular movements have also been used as
influence tools to promote a pro-Kremlin worldview. For
example, the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute,
founded in 2016 in Berlin and financed by Putin ally Vladimir
Yakunin, with reported investments from other Russian
businessmen, sponsors research and events with the reported aim
to make Russia's world view ``popular.'' \731\ The Patriotic
Europeans Against the Islamization of the West movement in
Germany has displayed Russian flags and pro-Kremlin slogans at
its protests decrying Germany's hospitality to migrants and
refugees, which have also been broadcast live on RT's German
language channel, RT Deutsch.\732\ A few German media outlets
also reported in the run-up to the September 2017 election on
concerns that increasingly popular `'systema clubs''
established throughout the country to teach a martial art form
used by Russian special security services were potentially
being used to recruit new agents for the Russian state.\733\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\731\ Ben Knight, ``Putin Associate Opens Russia-Friendly Think
Tank in Berlin,'' Deutsche Welle, July 1, 2016.
\732\ Roman Goncharenko, ``In Dresden, Russian Flags of Protest
Against Islam and Merkel,'' Deutsche Welle, Nov. 22, 2015; Alina
Polyakova et al., The Kremlin's Trojan Horses, at 16.
\733\ Andrew Rettman, ``Fight Club: Russian Spies Seek EU
Recruits,'' EUobserver, May 23, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, as Merkel's Germany has led the defense of
transatlantic values that underlie open, democratic societies,
playing on fears of migrants has become a durable theme of
Russian disinformation and political influence in an effort to
undermine the German government's standing with its own
population. A well-known example of this is the ``Lisa case''
of January 2016, a fabricated story initiated on a Russian
state-run television broadcaster and circulated widely on
social media of a 13 year-old Russian-German girl who was
kidnapped and sexually assaulted by ``Southern-looking,''
presumably Muslim, migrants.\734\ Police interviewed the
alleged victim and quickly determined the story to be false,
but even Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov joined the fray
in publicly highlighting the case and suggesting an official
cover-up.\735\ The case sparked protests by thousands of
Russian-German citizens who decried Germany's acceptance of
migrants.\736\ Ironically, the Lisa case was essentially a
victim of its own success, as it piqued awareness in German
society of Russian-sponsored disinformation and helped
contribute to a healthy skepticism of fake news as Germany
entered a hotly contested election season.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\734\ Damien McGuinness, ``Russia Steps into Berlin `Rape' Storm
Claiming German Cover-Up,'' BBC, Jan. 27, 2016; Ben Knight, ``Teenage
Girl Admits Making Up Migrant Rape Claim That Outraged Germany,'' The
Guardian, Jan. 31, 2016.
\735\ Damien McGuinness, ``Russia Steps into Berlin `Rape' Storm
Claiming German Cover-Up,'' BBC, Jan. 27, 2016.
\736\ Statement of Melissa Hooper, Director of Human Rights and
Civil Society, Human Rights First, The Scourge of Russian
Disinformation, Hearing before the U.S. Commission on Security and
Cooperating in Europe, Sept. 14, 2017, at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The use of bots and trolls in the 2016 German election
appears to have been less extensive than in the recent
elections in France and the United States and the Brexit
referendum in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, social media
analyses by U.S. and European-based researchers suggested that
prior to the German election, pro-Kremlin and primarily
Russian-language ``bot'' accounts on Twitter combined
commercial and pornographic posts and retweets with pro-AfD
content, concerns about electoral fraud, and attacks on Russian
anti-corruption campaigner Alexey Navalny--though it was
unclear who was managing or directing these sporadic
posts.\737\ A purported Russian hacker told BuzzFeed News that
he and thirty other hackers were amplifying non-official, pro-
AfD content prior to the poll; the party itself had stated it
would not use Twitter bots as part of its campaign.\738\
Meanwhile, Russian state-sponsored media outlets RT and Sputnik
crafted and pushed out stories carefully framed to undermine
Merkel and her party. RT ran positive articles on the AfD and
amplified German nationalists who railed on the country's
perceived failures in European integration and counter-
terrorism, while Sputnik put out stories that played up Russian
and German interests allegedly being undermined by Europe and
the United States, as well as the countries' mutual hardships
during the Second World War.\739\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\737\ ``#ElectionWatch: Russian Botnet Boosts German Far-Right
Posts,'' Digital Forensic Research Lab, Sept. 21, 2017; Anne Applebaum
et al., `Make Germany Great Again:' Kremlin, Alt-Right, and
International Influences in the 2017 German Elections, Institute for
Strategic Dialogue and LSE Institute for Global Affairs, at 13.
\738\ Henk Van Ess & Jane Lytvynenko, ``This Russian Hacker Says
His Twitter Bots Are Spreading Messages to Help Germany's Far Right
Party In The Election,'' BuzzFeed News, Sept. 24, 2017.
\739\ Donald N. Jensen, ``Moscow's New Strategy in Berlin,'' Center
for European Policy Analysis, Oct. 4, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Germany's domestic intelligence agency also alleged that
Kremlin-linked hackers were behind a 2015 hack of the lower
house of the Bundestag that exfiltrated thousands of documents,
and were responsible for subsequent hacks of Merkel's Christian
Democratic Union party and other political foundations and
organizations affiliated with it.\740\ The head of German
domestic intelligence said in comments to reporters that the
attacks were part of a campaign directed by Russia to
``generate information that can be used for disinformation or
for influencing operations . . .. Whether they do it or not is
a political decision . . . that I assume will be made in the
Kremlin.'' \741\ German officials determined that the attacks
had been likely carried out by APT28, the hacker group also
known as Fancy Bear that has been linked to the Russian
government, and which was connected to several high-profile
cyberattacks in the United States, France, Ukraine, and
elsewhere.\742\ Interestingly, by the September 24 election in
Germany, a data dump of hacked information similar to those in
the United States and France did not take place--perhaps out of
concern for Merkel's reaction in the event that she won the
election.\743\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\740\ Andrea Shalal, ``Germany Challenges Russia Over Alleged
Cyberattacks,'' Reuters, May 4, 2017.
\741\ Ibid.
\742\ FireEye iSight Intelligence, APT28: At the Center of The
Storm, Russia Strategically Evolves Its Cyber Operations, at 4 (Jan.
2017).
\743\ Michael Schwirtz, ``German Election Mystery: Why No Russian
Meddling?'' The New York Times, Sept. 21, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In meetings with Committee staff in the months before the
German election, most German interlocutors seemed sanguine that
Russia would not interfere in a significant way, but political
party representatives did express growing apprehension about
their lack of preparation for a Russian attack. But time and
the experience of other countries had afforded the German
government, political parties, and the media the opportunity to
build defenses against Russian meddling before election day.
These defenses included a mix of government and non-government
steps to boost resilience, from which the United States and
others can draw important lessons.
Lessons Learned
Disincentivizing the Sharing of Disinformation Must be
Balanced with Freedom of Expression Concerns: In late
2016, with the encouragement of the Interior Ministry,
all German political parties except for the AfD agreed
not to use bots or paid trolls in their campaigning,
while Chancellor Merkel warned in a major address of
the threat of fake news and disinformation tactics and
signaled a willingness to explore increased government
regulation of this space.\744\ The Interior Ministry
also proposed the creation of a ``Center of Defense
Against Misinformation,'' noting that Russian-Germans
and people of Turkish origins are especially
susceptible to disinformation and recommending ``an
intensification of political education work'' with
those groups.\745\ In June 2017, the German parliament
passed legislation that enabled fines of up to =50
million for social media companies that failed to
remove obviously illegal content within 24 hours, or
that failed to assess likely false content and remove
it within seven days. While the law increased
incentives for social media companies like YouTube,
Facebook, and Twitter to police the content on their
platforms, critics of the law called it a concerning
legal model that possibly infringes on free speech and
places too much power in the hands of companies to curb
content simply to avoid fines.\746\ The government also
relied on Germany's already relatively stringent laws
on defamation and hate speech that promotes violence
against minorities.\747\ Facebook reported that it
increased its efforts throughout the German
parliamentary election campaign period, providing
candidates with cybersecurity training, working
directly with the Federal Office for Information
Security (BSI) national cybersecurity office, and
removing tens of thousands of fake accounts.\748\ While
German government, business, and civil society actors
have deployed ``vigorous action'' against the causes
and effects of information manipulation and
dissemination, some experts have noted difficulties
enforcing strengthened legal regimes and the risk they
pose to freedom of expression, and have urged that the
German government couple its monitoring and oversight
of online propaganda with increasing media literacy
among the population.\749\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\744\ Jefferson Chase, ``Experts Say Laws Not Enough as Germany
Fights Bots and Fake News,'' Deutsche Welle, Nov. 25, 2016.
\745\ ``Germany Plans Creation of `Center Of Defense' Against Fake
News, Report Says,'' Deutsche Welle, Dec. 23, 2016.
\746\ Carla Bleiker & Kate Brady, ``Bundestag Passes Law to Fine
Social Media Companies for not Deleting Hate Speech,'' Deutsche Welle,
June 30, 2017.
\747\ Thorsten Severin & Emma Thomasson,``German Parliament Backs
Plan to Fine Social Media Over Hate Speech,'' Reuters, June 30, 2017.
\748\ Richard Allan, Vice President for Public Policy EMEA,
Facebook Ireland,``Update on German Elections,'' Facebook blog post,
Sept. 27, 2017, https://de.newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/09/update-zu-den-
wahlen (visited Dec. 30, 2017).
\749\ Lisa-Maria N. Neudert, Computational Propaganda in Germany: A
Cautionary Tale, University of Oxford, at 23 (June 2017).
Prioritize Cybersecurity Rapid-Response Capacity and
Information Sharing German efforts to bolster cyber
capabilities included adopting a new cyber security
strategy in November 2016 that outlines a plan to
confront a range of emerging cyber threats, including
the kind of threats many analysts have attributed to
Russia. Under this new cyber strategy, overseen by the
BSI, rapid reaction cyber teams have been created
across the government to respond quickly to cyber
threats against government institutions and critical
infrastructure.\750\ The German government has also
created a new ``Cyber Command'' within its armed
forces, staffed by about 13,500 military and other
personnel.\751\ A 2015 information technology security
law established minimum standards for companies to
protect critical cyber infrastructure and requires them
to inform authorities about any critical incidents, in
response to which BSI analyzes the threat and informs
other companies who may be at risk of a similar
attack.\752\ BSI also advises parliamentary groups on
how to protect themselves, and German political
campaigns have agreed not to exploit any information
that was the result of cyber hacking.\753\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\750\ German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Cyber Security
Strategy for Germany, Nov. 2016.
\751\ ``German Army Launches New Cyber Command,'' Deutsche Welle,
Apr. 1, 2017.
\752\ Janosch Delcker,``Germany's Cybersecurity Chief on Hacking,
Russia and Problems Hiring Experts,'' Politico EU, Mar. 20, 2017; Act
to Enhance the Security of Information Technology Systems (IT Security
Act) (Gesetz zur Erhohung der Sicherheit informationstechnischer
Systeme), German Federal Law Gazette 2015, Part I, No. 31, 1324, July
25, 2015.
\753\ Delcker, ``Germany's Cybersecurity Chief on Hacking, Russia
and Problems Hiring Experts,'' Politico EU; Michael Schwirtz, ``German
Election Mystery: Why No Russian Meddling?'' The New York Times, Sept.
21, 2017.
Direct Diplomatic Warnings Can Deter Kremlin Aggression: In
their tense May 2017 meeting, Chancellor Merkel
publicly warned that there would be ``decisive
measures'' taken against any attempts to interfere in
the German election through cyberattacks or
disinformation. She pointed to the hybrid warfare
techniques as a hallmark of Russian military doctrine,
but also underscored that she was ``not anxious'' about
possible Russian interference.\754\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\754\ Roland Oliphant, `` `There's No Proof': Putin Denies Hacking
Elections as Angela Merkel Visits for Summit on `Problematic'
Differences,'' The Telegraph, May 2, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPAIN
In Spain, the authorities have grappled with the pernicious
activities of Russian-based criminal organizations for decades.
Their efforts have revealed direct ties between the Russian
mafia and senior members of Putin's regime, as well as links
between Putin himself and entities that have allegedly engaged
in money laundering in Europe. Russia-based criminal
organizations have reportedly been active in Catalonia for
years, building their influence in politics and business and
working to exploit rivalries between regional and national law
enforcement entities. There is also an increasing body of
evidence that Kremlin-run news outlets like RT and Sputnik,
reinforced by bots and fake social media accounts, carried out
a disinformation campaign during Catalonia's independence
referendum in October 2016.
According to an extensive report by Sebastian Rotella
published in ProPublica, a nonprofit investigative journalism
organization, the Russian mafia landed in Spain in the late
1990s, when a high-ranking figure from St. Petersburg's
notorious Tambov gang, Gennady Petrov, made his home on the
island of Mallorca, from where he ran a worldwide network of
the gang's businesses, including cobalt and cigarette smuggling
through Finland, money laundering operations in Germany,
Belgium, Cyprus, and the Czech Republic, and an embezzlement
scheme in Germany that stole more than $100 million and
resulted in thousands of shipyard workers losing their
jobs.\755\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\755\ Sebastian Rotella, ``A Gangster Place in the Sun: How Spain's
Fight Against the Mob revealed Russian Power Networks,'' ProPublica,
Nov. 10, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spanish law enforcement grew curious about the source of
Petrov's wealth--he had reportedly amassed $50 million in Spain
alone--and began to monitor his phone calls.\756\ They found
that Petrov had active ties to senior officials throughout the
Russian government.\757\ He reportedly plotted with a senior
justice ministry official in Moscow, who promised to intimidate
a shipbuilder who was behind schedule in building a yacht for
Petrov. A few days later, the shipbuilder was back on
schedule.\758\ And in a conversation with his son, Petrov
boasted of meeting with Russia's then defense minister, Anatoly
Serdiukov, with whom he reportedly made deals involving real
estate, airplanes, and energy investments (Serdiukov was sacked
by Putin in 2012 during an anti-corruption campaign, and
granted amnesty in 2014).\759\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\756\ Ibid.
\757\ Ibid.
\758\ Ibid.
\759\ Ibid.; Jason Bush & Baczynska, ``Russia Grants Amnesty to
Former Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov--Report,'' Reuters, Mar. 6,
2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spanish prosecutors met with Alexander Litvinenko--the
former Russian spy who some suspect was assassinated on orders
from Putin--in June 2006 and persuaded him to testify against
Russian mobsters in Spain about information he had from his
time in Russia's intelligence services.\760\ But Litvinenko's
killers got to him before he could testify at trial. Jose
Grinda Gonzalez, Spain's leading law enforcement expert on
Russian organized crime, told reporters, ``We had accepted the
idea that the world of the Russian mafia was like that. But
it's true that the case made other people think this gentleman
had told the truth, because now he was dead.'' \761\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\760\ An inquiry by the UK's House of Commons concluded that order
to kill Litvinenko was likely approved by Putin. United Kingdom House
of Commons, The Litvinenko Inquiry: Report into the Death of Alexander
Litvinenko, at 244 (Mar. 2015); see Appendix B; Sebastian Rotella, ``A
Gangster Place in the Sun: How Spain's Fight Against the Mob revealed
Russian Power Networks,'' ProPublica, Nov. 10, 2017.
\761\ Sebastian Rotella, ``A Gangster Place in the Sun: How Spain's
Fight Against the Mob revealed Russian Power Networks,'' ProPublica,
Nov. 10, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Through their investigations of Petrov's gang, Spanish law
enforcement authorities found enough evidence linking the
criminal organization to Russian government officials that they
named over a dozen of them in the indictments, including the
former defense minister.\762\ Petrov was arrested in 2008 in a
massive crackdown on Russian organized crime that eventually
resulted in pretrial indictments against 27 suspects on charges
of criminal association and money laundering.\763\ Vladislav
Reznik, a senior Duma member and leader of Putin's United
Russia party, is among the accused, and the indictment alleges
that he operated at ``the highest levels of power in Russia on
behalf of Mr. Petrov and his organization.'' \764\ Petrov's
trial is set to begin in February 2018, though he is unlikely
to attend: he disappeared to Russia on bond in 2012 and the
Russian government has not taken any action to return him to
Spain.\765\ But the Petrov case has led to more progress in
Spain's fight against Russian organized crime: in 2009, while
pursuing a lead from the case, Spanish police entered the
office of a lawyer suspected of money laundering, only to see
him grab a document from his desk, crumple it up, and begin to
eat it.\766\ The document, after being forcibly spat out, led
investigators to a new group of alleged money launderers in
Barcelona who have suspected ties to Kremlin-linked organized
crime.\767\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\762\ While mentioned in court documents, the officials were not
actually charged. Ibid.
\763\ Ibid.
\764\ Ibid.
\765\ Ibid.
\766\ Ibid.
\767\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The suspected money laundering ring in Barcelona is
indicative of long-running efforts by Russian organized crime
groups to set up shop in Catalonia. Russian mobsters have
reportedly been active in Catalonia for years, building
influence among politicians and businesspeople and seeking to
exploit the rivalry between regional and national law-
enforcement agencies.\768\ According to ProPublica,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\768\ Sebastian Rotella, ``A Gangster Place in the Sun: How Spain's
Fight Against the Mob revealed Russian Power Networks,'' ProPublica,
Nov. 10, 2017.
Suspected underworld figures also surfaced as
representatives of a major Russian oil company, Lukoil,
that was proposing to join with a Spanish firm to open
150 gasoline stations in [Barcelona]. The deal
ultimately fell through, but information from Spanish
and Russian law enforcement cited in court documents
suggested that organized crime figures with ties to
both Lukoil and the Russian spy agencies planned to use
the deal to launder illicit funds.\769\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\769\ Ibid.
And in 2013, the Catalan regional government appointed
Xavier Crespo, a former mayor belonging to the Convergence and
Union (CiU) party, to the post of security secretary, which
controls the Catalan police.\770\ However, the appointment was
rescinded when intelligence services based in Madrid presented
evidence that Crespo was involved in money laundering, and in
2014 he was indicted for accepting bribes from Petrov.\771\ The
CiU also allegedly received funds laundered by Russian crime
syndicates through Catalonian banks and shell companies.\772\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\770\ Martin Arostegui, ``Officials: Russia Seeking to Exploit
Catalonia Secessionist Movement,'' VOA News, Nov. 24, 2017.
\771\ Ibid.
\772\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A faction of the CiU joined with two leftist parties to
form the coalition that held the referendum on October 1, 2017
for Catalonia's independence from Spain. The referendum was
driven by decades-long domestic political, cultural, and
economic issues, but it also presented Moscow with an
opportunity to promote an outcome that would weaken a major EU
state. And there is now an increasingly large body of evidence
showing that the Kremlin, at least through its state-run media
outlets, directed a significant disinformation campaign
targeting the referendum. The U.S. State Department reported
that:
Russian state news outlets, such as Sputnik, published
a number of articles in the run up to the poll that
highlighted alleged corruption within the Spanish
government and driving an overarching anti-EU narrative
in support of the secessionist movement. These Russian
news agencies, as well as Russian users on Twitter,
also repeatedly promoted the views of Julian Assange,
the founder of WikiLeaks, who has taken to social media
to call for Spanish authorities to respect the upcoming
vote in Catalonia. Spanish newspapers have also
reported that Russian bots attempted to flood social
media with controversial posts in support of Catalonian
independence prior to the referendum.\773\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\773\ U.S. Department of State, ``Report to Congress on Efforts by
the Russian Federation to Undermine Elections in Europe and Eurasia,''
Pursuant to the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act
of 2017 (P.L. 115-44), Nov. 7, 2017.
One analysis looked at more than five million social media
messages on Catalonia posted between September 29 and October
5, and found that 30 percent of the messages came from
anonymous accounts that exclusively post content from RT and
Sputnik, while 25 percent came from bots and 10 percent from
the official accounts of the two propaganda platforms.\774\
Another analysis found that, just before the referendum took
place, pro-Kremlin Twitter accounts increased their mentions of
the Catalan crisis by 2,000 percent.\775\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\774\ Itxu Diaz, ``Venezuela and Russia Teamed Up to Push Pro-
Catalan Fake News,'' The Daily Beast, Nov. 28, 2017.
\775\ David Alandete, ``Pro-Russian Networks See 2,000% Increase in
Activity in Favor of Catalan Referendum,'' El Pais, Oct. 1, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin's interests in Catalonia's referendum were
likely varied. First, Moscow has recently favored independence
and secessionist movements that occur beyond Russia's borders
and weaken the EU. For example, before Brexit, Kremlin-linked
disinformation campaigns were pro-Scottish independence. But
after the UK decided not to be in the EU, and many voters in
Scotland indicated a desire to stay in the EU, the Kremlin
changed its stance to anti-Scottish independence.\776\ And as
Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy told reporters, after
noting that over half of the fake profiles involved in
spreading fake news came from Russia, ``What is clear is that
there are people who may be interested in things not going well
in Europe.'' \777\ But there were also other, darker motives
likely at work. According to Spanish intelligence analysts,
Russian companies would look to fill the vacuum created by the
exit of Catalan and Spanish companies that left because of
instability.\778\ In addition, the Kremlin could `'see an
independent Catalonia as a possible base from which to
penetrate other parts of Europe, where their business
activities are restricted by sanctions enforced by the United
States and the European Union.'' \779\
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\776\ Chris Green, ``Russia `Set to U-turn on Support for Scottish
Independence,'' The Scotsman, May 11, 2017.
\777\ William Booth & Michael Birnbaum, ``British and Spanish
Leaders Say Russian Trolls Meddled in Their Elections,'' The Washington
Post, Nov. 14, 2017.
\778\ Martin Arostegui, ``Officials: Russia Seeking to Exploit
Catalonia Secessionist Movement,'' VOA News, Nov. 24, 2017.
\779\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the referendum did not result in Catalonia's
independence from Spain, it showed that Spain is a growing
target of the Kremlin's malign influence operations. Spain can
strengthen its resiliency by studying the experiences of and
cooperating with other similarly-targeted European countries,
and the U.S. government should take steps to help shore-up
ongoing efforts.
Lessons Learned
Aggressive Investigations of Money Laundering Can Reduce
the Kremlin's Influence: Spain's investigations and
prosecutions are targeting and removing bad actors who
have spread corruption throughout Europe and likely
here in the United States. The U.S. government has
assisted with these investigations, and should continue
to do so to the greatest extent possible. Furthermore,
the U.S. government should establish a task force
dedicated to investigating money laundering by Russian
entities, and should also designate Russia as a
jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern, which
would subject Russian financial institutions to
additional reporting requirements. Spanish authorities
should also be commended and used as an example for the
complicated and courageous work that its law
enforcement officials are carrying out against Russia-
based organized criminal organizations.
The Kremlin Will Pursue Targets of Opportunity: As shown in
other elections and referendums among Western
democracies, the Kremlin's disinformation operations
will not pass up on opportunities to sow chaos and
confusion in an attempt to undermine the democratic
process and weaken European institutions. The United
States and its partners and allies, as well as the
private sector and civil society, must proactively
identify potential next targets and launch efforts to
build resiliency against Kremlin influence operations
well in advance of elections and referendums.
ITALY
In recent years, Italy has seen a resurgence of anti-
establishment, populist parties that have garnered appeal among
the population and achieved some electoral success. Some of
these parties are strong advocates of pro-Kremlin foreign
policies, and have extensively used fake news and conspiracy
theories in their media campaigns, often drawn from Russian
state-owned media outlets. With national elections coming up in
2018, Italy could be a target for electoral interference by the
Kremlin, which will likely seek to promote parties that are
against renewing EU sanctions for Russia's aggression in
Ukraine.
The Five Star Movement (M5S), which was formed in 2009 and
surged to popularity in recent years with its anti-
establishment message, seeks to end sanctions on Russia and
normalize relations with the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar
al-Assad, and recognizes the annexation of Crimea, opposes
Italian participation in NATO exercises, and has called for a
referendum on Italy's inclusion in the Eurozone.\780\ The
chairman of M5S's foreign affairs committee, Manlio Di Stefano,
has stated that NATO is secretly preparing a ``final assault''
on Russia and that ``there's a limit'' to the alliance that
Italy and the United States forged in the aftermath of World
War II.\781\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\780\ Alberto Nardelli & Craig Silverman, ``Italy's Most Popular
Political Party Is Leading Europe in Fake News and Kremlin
Propaganda,'' BuzzFeed News, Nov. 29, 2016; Jason Horowitz, ``With
Italy No Longer in U.S. Focus, Russia Swoops to Fill the Void,'' The
New York Times, May 29, 2017.
\781\ Jason Horowitz, ``With Italy No Longer in U.S. Focus, Russia
Swoops to Fill the Void,'' The New York Times, May 29, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During a failed 2016 constitutional referendum, M5S used a
`'sprawling network of websites and social media accounts that
[were] spreading fake news, conspiracy theories, and pro-
Kremlin stories to millions of people,'' according to an
analysis by BuzzFeed News. A video created by RT and promoted
by M5S's network claimed to show thousands of people protesting
against the referendum, when in fact they were at a rally that
was supporting the referendum (RT later claimed that this was
due to a production error). And one M5S parliament member
promoted a conspiracy theory on Facebook that asserted Italy's
government had colluded with the media to report that an
earthquake which hit the country was not as powerful as it
actually was, thereby allowing the government to reduce
payments for damage.\782\ A former M5S communications advisor
has said that spreading conspiracy theories is not just a
tactic of the party, but ``akin to a policy.'' \783\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\782\ Alberto Nardelli & Craig Silverman, ``Italy's Most Popular
Political Party Is Leading Europe in Fake News and Kremlin
Propaganda,'' BuzzFeed News, Nov. 29, 2016.
\783\ Jason Horowitz, ``In Italian Schools, Reading, Writing, and
Recognizing Fake News,'' The New York Times, Oct. 18, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin has also worked to establish formal political
ties and influence with extremist Italian political parties.
For example, the United Russia party and the Northern League, a
radical right-wing populist party, signed a cooperation
agreement in 2017, where they agreed to develop ties in the
Council of Europe and the OSCE, as well as promote business
links between their countries.\784\ Some observers also suspect
that the Northern League may have received funds from the
Kremlin's security services.\785\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\784\ Max Seddon & James Politi, ``Putin's Party Signs Deal with
Italy's Far-Right Lega Nord,'' Financial Times, Mar. 6, 2017.
\785\ Peter Foster & Matthew Holehouse, ``Russia Accused of
Clandestine Funding of European Parties as US Conducts Major Review of
Vladimir Putin's Strategy,'' The Telegraph, Jan. 16, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While there is no known evidence of M5S receiving funding
from Kremlin-linked sources, one Italian national security
official told Business Insider that ``I think some of our
political parties are vulnerable to infiltration. They don't
have the experience, the anti-bodies, to fend off such
formidable intelligence services.'' \786\ Estonia's ambassador
to Italy, Celia Kuningas-Saagpakk, who in a previous role
monitored the Kremlin's malign influence operations in Ukraine
and elsewhere, noted to the The New York Times, that the
Russian government ``has invested a lot in influencing public
opinion in [Italy].'' \787\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\786\ Jason Horowitz, ``With Italy No Longer in U.S. Focus, Russia
Swoops to Fill the Void,'' The New York Times, May 29, 2017; Sebastian
Rotella, ``Russia is Engaged in a Full-Scale Shadow War in Europe,''
Business Insider, Apr. 20, 2017.
\787\ Jason Horowitz, ``With Italy No Longer in U.S. Focus, Russia
Swoops to Fill the Void,'' The New York Times, May 29, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
State-owned Russian energy firms also exert influence
through Italian energy firms such as ENI, which is currently a
partner of Gazprom in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline (see Chapter
4).\788\ At the request of Gazprom, though unbeknownst to its
attendees, an ENI subsidiary reportedly sponsored a foreign
policy conference at a think tank in Italy, where ``it was
stressed that Russia could be an important ally for the EU.''
\789\ It is worth noting that Russia is Italy's biggest
supplier of natural gas, and Italian oil major ENI's policy is
to give priority to its relationship with Gazprom over Algerian
suppliers. ENI has also signed a strategic partnership
agreement with Gazprom, and pledged to cooperate with Gazprom
both on the now-cancelled South Stream pipeline and the under-
consideration Nord Stream 2 pipeline.\790\
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\788\ Warsaw Institute, ``Italians with Gazprom Again,'' Russia
Monitor, Sept. 1, 2017.
\789\ Vladislava Vojtiskova et al., The Bear in Sheep's Clothing:
Russia's Government-Funded Organisations in the EU, Wilfried Martens
Centre for European Studies, at 25 (July 2016).
\790\ Angelantonio Rosato, ``A Marriage of Convenience? The Future
of Italy-Russia Relations,'' European Council on Foreign Relations,
July 15, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the 2016 referendum, Italy's government has begun to
take actions to better inoculate its population against fake
news and disinformation campaigns. The president of Italy's
Chamber of Deputies, Laura Boldrini, has spearheaded a project
with Italy's Ministry of Education to train students at 8,000
high schools across the country on how to verify news stories
and recognize fake news and conspiracy theories that they see
on social media platforms. Facebook is reportedly contributing
to the initiative by promoting it with targeted ads aimed at
high-school-age users in Italy.\791\ The program should help to
mitigate fake news stories that originate both at home and from
abroad, and should be studied by other countries as they
develop their own school curriculums to counter fake news.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\791\ Jason Horowitz, ``In Italian Schools, Reading, Writing, and
Recognizing Fake News,'' The New York Times, Oct. 18, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the now-confirmed U.S. Ambassador to Italy,
Lewis Eisenberg, Italy is aware of the Kremlin's tactics in
Italy and the country `'shares our concerns about Russian
aggression in Europe, including Russian disinformation
campaigns and malign influence activities.'' During his Senate
confirmation hearing, Eisenberg told the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that he will ``work to strengthen our
coordination with Italian partners, across relevant agencies,
to detect and counter these activities that seek to undermine
democratic institutions and principles'' and to ``make U.S.-
Italian cooperation on this issue a priority, particularly in
advance of Italian national elections that are likely to take
place in 2018.'' \792\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\792\ Responses to Additional Questions for the Record, Lewis M.
Eisenberg, Nominee for Ambassador to Italy & San Marino, Nomination of
Lewis M. Eisenberg to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America to the Italian Republic, Hearing
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 20, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. government must follow through on these
commitments and help Italy secure its democratic process
against foreign interference. Italy is an essential NATO ally
and a key member of the EU, which will vote in 2018 on whether
to uphold sanctions related to the Russian government's
activities in Ukraine.\793\ Italy has at times been skeptical
of imposing and strengthening EU sanctions on Russia, and in
2015 delayed a sanctions renewal decision, arguing that more
discussion was needed.\794\ In the Veneto region of Italy, a
local assembly controlled by the Northern League adopted a
resolution in 2016 to call for Italy to end the sanctions on
Russia, arguing that counter-sanctions are damaging the
Venetian economy (the region also voted in late 2017 in favor
of greater autonomy from Rome).\795\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\793\ Connor Murphy, ``EU Extends Russia Sanctions through January
2018,'' Politico, June 28, 2017.
\794\ James Kanter, ``Italy Delays E.U.'s Renewal of Sanctions
Against Russia,'' The New York Times, Dec. 14, 2015.
\795\ Angelantonio Rosato, ``A Marriage of Convenience? The Future
of Italy-Russia Relations,'' European Council on Foreign Relations,
July 15, 2016. ``Northern Italy Regions Overwhelmingly Vote for Greater
Autonomy,'' The Guardian, Oct. 22, 2017. Italy's exports to Russia did
fall significantly after the sanctions were implemented, dropping
around 40 percent in the first half of 2015. European Parliament,
Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, Russia's
and the EU's Sanctions: Economic and Trade Effects, Compliance, and the
Way Forward, at 9 (Oct. 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lessons Learned
Italy May be a Target of Opportunity for the Kremlin: Given
the opportunity to promote an outcome that could weaken
the EU's united stance on sanctions, the Russian
government could seek to interfere in Italy's elections
in early 2018. Along with other important elections
around Europe, the United States and our partners and
allies must maintain the highest levels of cooperation
and vigilance to ensure that our electoral processes
remain free from undue foreign influence.
Disinformation Comes From Domestic Sources Too: The Kremlin
is not the only source of disinformation and conspiracy
theories that seek to undermine European institutions
like the EU and NATO. Domestic political parties,
especially populist ones, can also make effective use
of the same tactics that the Kremlin employs. As Italy
also shows, educating the population on media literacy
and how to discern fake news can be one of the most
important steps toward strengthening the resilience of
the democratic process.
----------
Chapter 7: Multilateral & U.S. Efforts to
Counter the Kremlin's Asymmetric Arsenal
----------
In addition to the measures that individual states have
taken to build resiliency against malign influence operations
within their own borders (see Chapters 5 and 6), many
countries, especially those that belong to the EU and NATO,
have also launched or joined multilateral efforts. These
efforts include building collective defenses against
disinformation and cyberattacks, improving cross-border
cooperation on energy diversification, applying sanctions on
malicious actors, and more. Although the United States
participates in some of these multilateral efforts and has
taken a few steps on its own to address Russian government
hybrid warfare, its response lags far behind what is necessary
to defend against and deter the threat.
COLLECTIVE DEFENSES AGAINST
DISINFORMATION AND CYBER ATTACKS
Over the past several years, European governments and
institutions have recognized that Russia's disinformation
operations are a challenge that requires increased attention
and resources. In response, they have launched several
multilateral and regional initiatives to improve Europe's
resilience, with varying levels of success. One of the first
such organizations was the NATO Strategic Communications Center
of Excellence, established by seven NATO member states in July
of 2014, and headquartered in Riga, Latvia. The Center provides
analysis, advice, and support to the NATO alliance, including
research into identifying the early signs of hybrid warfare and
the study of Russia's disinformation operations in
Ukraine.\796\ The EU's External Action Service, which works
under the EU's foreign affairs chief, launched a similar
operation in 2015, known as the EU East StratCom Task Force.
The Task Force uses a wide volunteer base from around the EU
and elsewhere to collect examples of pro-Kremlin disinformation
and analyze and publicize them in a searchable database.\797\
While the Task Force has only about a dozen full-time
employees, its volunteer network has over 400 experts from more
than 30 countries. It publishes news and analysis on the
website EU vs. Disinfo, and is responsible for communicating EU
policies toward the Eastern Partnership countries of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.\798\ To
promote a positive narrative of the EU, the Task Force
constructs simple messages meant to resonate in each country
about the benefits of cooperation with the EU. The Task Force
has a very broad mandate, but relatively little funding.\799\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\796\ NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, ``About
Us,'' https://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-us (visited Dec. 14, 2017).
\797\ EU vs. Disinfo, ``Disinformation Cases,'' https://
euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-cases (visited Dec. 14, 2017).
\798\ European Union External Action Service, ``Questions and
Answers about the East StratCom Task Force,'' https://eeas.europa.eu/
headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2116/-questions-and-answers-about-
the-east-stratcom-task-force--en (visited Dec. 14, 2017).
\799\ The head of the EU's External Action Service, Federica
Mogherini, has come under fire from scores of analysts and academics
for keeping the team ``absurdly understaffed'' and underfunded. See
European Values, Open Letter from European Security Experts to Federica
Mogherini, Mar. 20, 2017, http://www.europeanvalues.net/mogherini/. One
EU official told Politico that Mogherini ``is considered to be soft on
Russia compared to others in the Commission, or what some Eastern
countries would like. Officials who work on these issues get no support
from her.'' Ryan Heath, ``Federica Mogherini `Soft' on Disinformation,
Critics Say,'' Politico, Mar. 22, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To combine the efforts of both EU and NATO countries and
broaden the scope beyond disinformation, Finland launched the
European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in
Helsinki in July 2017. Currently comprised of 12 EU and NATO
countries, including the United States, it uses research and
training to improve participants' readiness to respond to
cyberattacks, disinformation, and propaganda.\800\ Finland
started the Center after it experienced Russian attempts to use
social media to interfere in it 2015 elections.\801\ After the
election, the Finnish government ordered all of its ministries
to imagine worst-case scenarios of foreign interference, which
they compiled into a report and shared with EU and NATO
partners.\802\ The report led to the creation of the Center,
which has three work strands, also known as ``communities of
interest'': (1) hybrid influencing, led by the UK; (2)
terrorism and radicalism; and (3) vulnerabilities and
resilience, led by Finland.\803\ The Center's officials also
hope to work with Google, Facebook, and other social media
companies to track online content and identify threats.\804\
NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, based in
Tallinn, Estonia, also focuses on helping member states secure
their cyber infrastructure. The Center draws on experts with
military, government, and private industry experience from 20
nations to provide training and expertise to NATO nations and
partners.\805\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\800\ European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats,
``About Us,'' https://www.hybridcoe.fi/about-us (visited Dec. 15,
2017).
\801\ See Chapter 6, Finland.
\802\ Committee Staff Discussion with Finnish Government Officials.
\803\ European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats,
``About Us,'' https://www.hybridcoe.fi/about-us (visited Dec. 15,
2017). As of publication, there was no designated country lead for the
work strand on terrorism and radicalism.
\804\ Committee Staff Discussion with Finnish Government Officials.
\805\ NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, ``About
Cyber Defence Centre,'' https://www.ccdcoe.org/about-us.html (visited
Dec. 15, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although these initiatives were conceived and launched on
an ad hoc basis, collectively they form a network of
institutions that address overlapping threats and
vulnerabilities facing Europe and its allies, including the
United States.
A number of NGOs and think tanks have also launched their
own regionally focused programs to counter disinformation. One
of the first such operations was the Kremlin Watch Monitor,
launched by the European Values Think Tank in 2015 and
headquartered in Prague. With the support of private and public
donors, including several European governments, this initiative
focuses on fact checking and analysis of Russian government-
backed disinformation. It also provides regular monitoring
reports and policy recommendations, publishes case studies,
conducts trainings, and convenes practitioners and policymakers
in both open and closed forums.\806\ A similar effort, the
Information Warfare Initiative, is run by the Center for
European Policy Analysis (CEPA), an American think tank with
offices in Europe. The program monitors the content and
techniques of Russian disinformation in Belarus, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. In addition to
monitoring, the initiative works to help policymakers develop
strategies to counter disinformation.\807\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\806\ European Values, ``Kremlin Watch, What We Do,'' http://
www.europeanvalues.net/kremlinwatch/what-we/ (visited Dec. 31, 2017).
\807\ Center for European Policy Analysis, ``Information Warfare
Initiative,'' http://infowar.cepa.org/About (visited Dec. 15, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
European countries have also begun to develop multilateral
efforts to produce and support accurate, independent Russian-
language media that can serve as an alternative to Kremlin
propaganda for Russian-speaking audiences. In response to a
2015 report by the European Endowment for Democracy, European
governments are working to develop a Russian-language regional
news hub and a multimedia distribution platform, as well as
other initiatives.\808\ For example, the Netherlands and Poland
are supporting the development of an independent Russian-
language regional news agency.\809\ In addition, the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is developing a blueprint for a
``content factory'' to help Central and Eastern European
countries create Russian-language entertainment programs.\810\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\808\ European Endowment for Democracy, ``Bringing Plurality &
Balance to Russian Language Media--Final Recommendations,'' https://
www.democracyendowment.eu/news/bringing-plurality-1/ (visited Dec. 15,
2017).
\809\ Andrew Rettman, ``Dutch-Polish `Content Factory' to Counter
Russian Propaganda,'' EUobserver, July 21, 2015.
\810\ Government Accountability Office, U.S. Government Takes a
Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformation Overseas, at 62
(May 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
European governments' joint efforts to promote
investigative journalism have already proven effective. One
positive example is the Russian Language News Exchange Program,
launched in 2016 with support from the government of the
Netherlands and other European governments and institutions.
The program supports and trains journalists in the EU Eastern
Partnership countries on Russia's periphery. In 2016, the
program's participants produced and exchanged more than 500
stories, and each story produced by the exchange garnered at
least one million views across multiple platforms. Analysts
attribute the program's strong success to its focus on unique
local reporting rather than covering the international stories
that dominate Russian disinformation.\811\ The program,
currently funded through 2019, should be continued and expanded
in future years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\811\ Nina Jankowicz, Assessing the Western Response to Russian
Disinformation in Europe: How Can We Do Better?, at 11 (2016-2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, efforts to improve media literacy on Russia's
periphery have also shown a large return on investment. For
example, the Learn to Discern Program, funded by the Canadian
government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016.
The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in `'safe, informed media
consumption techniques,'' including avoiding emotional
manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech,
verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and
debunking news, photos, and videos. In a survey, 89 percent of
participants reported using their new skills and 91 percent
reported sharing their new skills with an average of six people
each, reaching 90,000 Ukrainians in total. Furthermore, 54
percent of the 2.3 million Ukrainians who viewed the program's
information campaign in its first two weeks reported a need for
greater skills in discerning disinformation.\812\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\812\ IREX, ``Learn to Discern,'' https://www.irex.org/project/
learn-discern (visited Dec. 15, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EUROPEAN ENERGY DIVERSIFICATION AND INTEGRATION
While Europe has been slow to recognize and respond to the
Kremlin's weaponization of energy, some countries have begun
taking steps to mitigate their dependence on Russian energy
supplies and therefore reduce the Kremlin's influence. The EU
has traditionally had little, if any, influence over the energy
policies of its member states. Since energy policy in European
countries is set by national governments, with each EU member
state making its own decisions regarding energy mix, suppliers,
and contracts, the Kremlin has been able to pursue and
implement its ``divide and conquer'' strategy by dealing with
states on a bilateral basis. Over the past decade, however, EU
member states, concerned about reliance on Russian energy and
facing pressure to combat climate change, have begun to
gradually increase cooperation and work toward developing a
unified EU energy policy. In March 2015, the EU's member state
governments endorsed a European Commission proposal for a
``European Energy Union.'' Among other things, the proposal
focuses on energy security and solidarity, and an integrated
European energy market.\813\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\813\ See European Commission, Energy Strategy and Energy Union,
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union
(visited Dec. 31, 2017); Michael Ratner et al., Europe's Energy
Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification,
Congressional Research Service, at 7 (Nov. 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several European countries have also come out in strong
opposition to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which could make
Europe more dependent on Russian energy supplies and would
significantly diminish Ukrainian government revenues collected
from pipeline transit fees in its territory. In the summer of
2016, the leaders of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania wrote
to the European Commission president about their concerns that
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline (NS2) could create ``destabilizing
geopolitical consequences'' and ``pose certain risks for energy
security,'' especially by increasing Central and Eastern
European countries' reliance on Russian gas supplies.\814\ And
in late November 2017, the Danish government passed a law that
would allow it to block NS2 for security or foreign policy
reasons (the pipeline requires approval from Denmark, Sweden,
and Finland, as it would traverse their territories).\815\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\814\ Andrew Rettman, ``Eastern EU Leaders to Warn Juncker on Nord
Stream II,'' EUobserver, Mar. 17, 2016.
\815\ Erik Matzen & Stine Jacobsen, ``Denmark Passes Law That Could
Ban Russian Pipeline from Going Through its Waters,'' Reuters, Nov.
30, 2017; Henry Roy et al., ``Gazprom to Receive Funding for Nord
Stream 2 Pipeline,'' Financial Times, Apr. 24, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The EU has also supported several projects to improve
energy integration and reduce reliance on Russian energy
supplies. These infrastructure projects, especially cross-
border ones, are known as ``Projects of Common Interest,'' and
are supported by an EU fund that aims to boost energy,
transport, and digital infrastructure.\816\ One project, the
development of a liquid natural gas (LNG) terminal in Croatia,
would provide new opportunities for energy supply
diversification throughout the Balkans.\817\ Similar LNG
terminals in Lithuania and Poland have had transformational
effects in reducing dependence on Russian pipelines for natural
gas supplies.\818\ LNG terminals allow for the development of
spot markets for natural gas, ensuring that market forces keep
prices in check, and reduce the Kremlin's bargaining power by
increasing supplier options. After it built an LNG import
terminal, Lithuania was able to leverage a fair market price
for its natural gas imports from Russia, ending years of paying
the highest rates for gas in Europe. Lithuania's president
summarized the benefits of new sources of LNG upon the first
delivery of U.S. LNG to her country in 2017: ``U.S. gas imports
to Lithuania and other European countries is a game changer in
the European gas market. This is an opportunity for Europe to
end its addiction to Russian gas and ensure a secure,
competitive and diversified supply.'' \819\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\816\ European Commission, ``Funding for Projects of Common
Interest,'' https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/
projects-common-interest/funding-projects-common-interest (visited Dec.
15, 2017).
\817\ European Commission, ``EU Invests in Energy Security and
Diversification in Central and South Eastern Europe,'' https://
ec.europa.eu/info/news/eu-invests-energy-security-and-diversification-
central-and-south-eastern-europe-2017-dec-18--en (visited Jan. 4,
2018).
\818\ Robbie Gramer, ``First U.S. Natural Gas Shipped to Poland,''
Foreign Policy, June 8, 2017.
\819\ Agnia Grigas, ``U.S. Natural Gas Arrives in Lithuania,''
Foreign Affairs, Sep. 12, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The EU has also made market liberalization and integration
a key part of its energy strategy, launching the ``Third Energy
Package'' in 2011 to work towards a single EU gas and
electricity market. The Package included key provisions on
``unbundling,'' or separating the activities of energy
transmission from production and supply interests.
Subsequently, the EU concluded that Gazprom had to unbundle its
plans for the South Stream pipeline, leading Gazprom to
effectively cancel the project.\820\ A smart grid development
between Slovenia and Croatia, as well as the development of
improved Romania-Bulgaria electricity interconnections will
also have positive effects. In northern Europe, several ongoing
developments will also reduce dependence on Gazprom, including:
a gas pipeline from Norway to Poland, via Denmark (Baltic
Pipe); a Poland-Lithuania gas interconnector project; the
construction of a Finland-Estonia gas pipeline; upgrades to
make the Estonia-Latvia gas interconnector bi-directional;
Baltic state participation in the ``Nordpool'' wholesale market
for electricity; and plans for all Baltic states to
desynchronize from the Russia-Belarus electricity grid and
integrate into the European energy grid. All of these
developments show the importance of improving intra-EU
connectivity and moving away from monopoly suppliers and
companies, especially state-driven monopoly suppliers, which
bring along with them entrenched oligarchies and other bad
actors.\821\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\820\ ``South Stream Bilateral Deals Breach EU Law, Commission
Says,'' EURACTIV.com, Dec. 4, 2013.
\821\ U.S. Department of State, Information Provided to Committee
Staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EU AND U.S. EFFORTS TO SANCTION MALICIOUS ACTORS
The Russian government's malign influence and hybrid
warfare operations have led to a strong sanctions regime
jointly implemented by Europe and the United States. Many of
these sanctions were put in place as a consequence for Russia's
illegal annexation of Ukraine's Crimea and its support for
separatists in eastern Ukraine. Other sanctions, especially
those unilaterally implemented by the United States, punish
malicious actors who are engaged in cyberattacks, human rights
violations, or significant acts of corruption.
The EU's sanctions require the unanimous agreement of all
28 EU member states to implement, and unanimity is required to
extend the sanctions every six months.\822\ The EU's sanctions
against Russia fall in to three categories:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\822\ Kristin Archick et al., EU Sanctions on Russia Related to the
Ukraine Conflict, Congressional Research Service, at 1 (Sept. 2017).
1. Restrictive measures on individuals and entities in Russia
and Ukraine believed to be involved in the annexation
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of Crimea and efforts to destabilize eastern Ukraine;
2. Economic sanctions targeting Russia's finance, defense, and
energy sectors; and
3. Restrictions on trade, investment, and tourism services
with the occupied Crimea region.\823\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\823\ Ibid.
In early 2014, shortly after Russia's annexation of Crimea,
U.S. and EU sanctions mostly focused on visa bans and asset
freezes, but under pressure from the U.S. Congress, the Obama
Administration applied additional sectoral sanctions in July
2014.\824\ After intelligence sources indicated that
separatists using a Russian-supplied missile shot down Malaysia
Airlines Flight MH17 over Ukraine, the EU also expanded its
sanctions list and added sectoral sanctions.\825\ The EU has
tied the removal of sanctions on Russia with the full
implementation of the Minsk peace agreements for Ukraine, and
appears to be committed to maintaining the sanctions until
then.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\824\ Ibid.; U.S. Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets
Control, ``Directives 1 and 2 Issued Pursuant to Executive Order 13662
(Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation
in Ukraine),'' July 16, 2014.
\825\ Julian Borger et al., ``EU Announces Further Sanctions on
Russia After Downing of MH17,'' The Guardian, July 22, 2017; European
Council of the European Union, ``EU Restrictive Measures in Response to
the Crisis in Ukraine,'' http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/
sanctions/ukraine-crisis (visited Jan. 4, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. sanctions on Russia for Ukraine-related and cyber-
related matters were codified into law in August 2017 with the
passage (by a vote of 98-2 in the Senate and 419-3 in the House
of Representatives) and signing of the Countering America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017, also known as
CAATSA.\826\ The law codified Russia-related sanctions imposed
by executive orders under the Obama Administration, and the
cyber-related sanctions designating both the FSB and the GRU
(Russia's military intelligence agency) as institutions
threatening U.S. cybersecurity.\827\ CAATSA enlarged the scope
of the sanctions to prohibit a range of cyber-related
activities conducted on behalf of the Russian government that
undermine the cybersecurity of any U.S. or foreign person.\828\
In addition, CAATSA mandated sanctions on U.S. or foreign
persons that engage in significant transactions with persons
related to Russia's defense or intelligence sectors.\829\
Furthermore, CAATSA targets corruption inside Russia by
mandating sanctions on people who make or facilitate
investments of at least $10 million that contribute to the
privatization of Russian state-owned assets ``in a manner that
unjustly benefits'' government officials, relatives, or
associates.\830\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\826\ Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA), P.L. 115-44, Enacted Aug. 2, 2017 (originally introduced by
Senator Ben Cardin as the Counteracting Russian Hostilities Act of
2017, S. 94, Jan.11, 2017).
\827\ Executive Order 13757, ``Taking Additional Steps to Address
the National Emergency with Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-
Enabled Activities,'' (Annex), Dec. 29, 2016.
\828\ CAATSA, P.L. 115-44, Sec. 224.
\829\ Ibid. Sec. 231.
\830\ Ibid. Sec. 233.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond CAATSA, the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law
Accountability Act and the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act also allow, respectively, for the
sanctioning of Russian individuals who are complicit in human
rights abuses or corruption (see Chapter 2).\831\ Canada and
some European countries, notably the United Kingdom, Lithuania,
and Estonia, have also passed similar Global Magnitsky Act
legislation to sanction human rights abusers and corrupt
actors.\832\
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\831\ Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, P.L. 112-
208, Title IV (enacted Dec. 14, 2012); The Global Magnitsky Human
Rights Accountability Act, P.L. 114-328, Subtitle F, Title XII (enacted
Dec. 23, 2016).
\832\ Stratfor, ``Russia Won't Sit Still for Additional U.S.
Sanctions,'' Dec. 28, 2017.
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While it is difficult to differentiate the economic impact
of sanctions from the drop in oil prices and other
macroeconomic effects, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
estimated in 2015 that U.S. and EU sanctions and Russia's
retaliatory ban on agricultural imports reduced GDP in Russia
over the short term by up to 1.5 percent.\833\ Over the medium
term, IMF models suggest that sanctions could reduce output by
up to 9 percent, as lower capital accumulation and reduced
technology transfers further weaken productivity growth.\834\
Economists from the U.S. State Department calculated that,
relative to non-sanctioned firms, the average sanctioned
company in Russia saw decreases of one-third of its operating
revenue, over one-half of its asset value, and about one-third
of its employees. Their research also suggested that lower oil
prices had a larger impact on Russia's overall economy than
sanctions.\835\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\833\ International Monetary Fund, Russian Federation: Staff Report
for the 2015 Article IV Consultation, at 5 (Aug. 2015).
\834\ Ibid.
\835\ Daniel Ahn & Rodney Ludema, ``Measuring Smartness:
Understanding the Economic Impact of Targeted Sanctions,'' Office of
the Chief Economist, U.S. Department of State, Working Paper 2017-01,
Dec. 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even though Mr. Putin has complained that sanctions are
`'severely harming Russia,'' when it comes to accessing
international financial markets, the sanctions mostly affect
state-owned companies and do not prohibit the government from
selling bonds to Western investors. Furthermore, the Russian
government can ease sanctioned firms' access to financing by
lending them money raised from bond sales in international
capital markets.\836\ The U.S. Treasury Department is required
to report in early 2018 on the possible effects on Russia's
economy of sanctions on sovereign debt, which could have the
potential to foreclose external sources of funds. While the
head of Russia's central bank believes that ``there won't be
any seriously negative consequences'' from such sanctions,
economists have warned that such sanctions ``may totally stop
other foreign investors, not the U.S. investors only, from
buying the new government debt, fiercely pushing up borrowing
costs for Russia.''\837\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\836\ Max Seddon & Elaine Moore, ``Russia Plans First Bond Issuance
Since Sanctions,'' Financial Times, Feb. 7, 2016.
\837\ Andre Tartar & Anna Andrianova, ``Bond Sanctions Could Hurt
Russia More Than It's Letting On,'' Bloomberg Markets, Nov. 27, 2017;
Andrew Biryukov & Natasha Doff, ``Russia Says Its Debt Markets Can
Withstand the Shock of Sanctions,'' Bloomberg, Nov. 16, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. EFFORTS TO CREATE ALTERNATIVE
AND ACCURATE QUALITY PROGRAMMING
The U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) seeks to
``inform, engage, and connect people around the world in
support of freedom and democracy,'' and it has pursued that
goal with several efforts throughout Russian-speaking parts of
the world.\838\ The BBG's regional strategy for Russia is to
confront anti-American propaganda and misinformation in Russian
media, demonstrate the value and role of free media, and
counter the Kremlin's narrative. The BBG operates Voice of
America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), the
only alternative to Russian-owned or supported media outlets in
many former Soviet Union countries.\839\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\838\ Broadcasting Board of Governors, ``Mission,'' https://
www.bbg.gov/who-we-are/mission (visited Jan. 4, 2018).
\839\ Government Accountability Office, U.S. Government Takes a
Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformation Overseas, at 32
(May 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In October 2014, RFE/RL, in cooperation with VOA, launched
a 30-minute daily show called Current Time, to provide
Russian-speaking audiences with objective reporting and
analysis of important events in the region and the United
States (its motto: ``be truthful, be credible, be
interesting'').\840\ The show has been successful, and in
October 2016, building on the Current Time brand, RFE/RL and
VOA launched a 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week Russian-language
news network, which broadcasts in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia, as well as several
countries in Central Asia.\841\ Current Time also produces an
hour-long Russian-language newscast about the United States,
which provides in-depth interviews with high-profile figures,
features about life in America (for example a 26-part series on
the life of the Russian diaspora in America), and the
perspectives of American officials and subject experts on
current events, including simultaneous interpretation of high-
profile U.S. political and breaking news events.\842\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\840\ In November 2017, as retaliation for the U.S. Department of
Justice's request that RT register under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act (FARA), the Duma passed a law that allows Russia's
Ministry of Justice to add foreign media outlets to Russia's registry
of foreign agents, so long as the organizations are based outside of
Russia and receive funds from abroad. Shortly thereafter, Russia's
Ministry of Justice sent a letter to Current Time threatening to
restrict its activities because it `'shows the signs of performing the
function of a foreign agent.'' Russian officials also suggested that
VOA, CNN, and Germany's Deutsche Welle could face similar treatment.
``Russia's Justice Ministry Warns the U.S.-Government-Funded Media
Outlet `Current Time' That Will Be Treated As A Foreign Agent,''
Meduza, Nov. 15, 2017; ``Russia's Federation Council Passes `Foreign
Agents' Media Bill,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 22, 2017.
\841\ Current Time TV, https://www.currenttime.tv/p/6018.html
(visited Dec. 31, 2017). Current Time also includes programs on fact-
checking, culture, and entertainment.
\842\ Committee Staff Discussion with VOA Officials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a sign of its influence, Russian state media has labeled
Current Time's reporting part of a ``U.S. information war'' and
a threat to Russia's national security. RFE/RL officials note
that with just twice as much funding (the current budget is
about $22 million) they could produce four times as much
content, allowing for around-the-clock breaking news coverage
and original programming.
RFE/RL and VOA also produce other regionally-focused
programming, such as Crimea Realities, a weekly show that
features news and stories on life in Crimea under increasingly
authoritarian governance; Schemes, a weekly investigative news
program that reports on corruption throughout Ukraine; and See
Both Sides, a weekly show that explores the differences in how
media in different regions--especially Russian state-owned
media--cover the same news stories.\843\ BBG has also
contracted with PBS to bring almost 400 hours of U.S. public
media programming to Estonia, Lithuania, and Ukraine.\844\
Bringing more high-quality U.S. educational and entertainment
content to broadcasters in Russia's periphery can help displace
Russian television content, which is licensed for next-to-
nothing but often comes with obligations to also broadcast
Kremlin-sponsored ``news'' programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\843\ Josh Lederman, ``US-Funded News Channel in Russian Offers
Kremlin Alternative,'' Associated Press, Feb. 8, 2017; ``RFE/RL's
Ukrainian Service: Radio Svoboda,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
https://pressroom.rferl.org/p/6139.html (visited Jan. 4, 2017).
\844\ Statement of Benjamin G. Ziff, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Putin's Invasion of Ukraine and the Propaganda that Threatens Europe,
Hearing before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Europe and Regional
Security Cooperation, Nov. 3, 2015, at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to TV programming, RFE/RL and VOA create
Russian-language video content for social media and mobile
platforms, mostly aimed at youth, and operate a fact-checking
website, Polygraph.info.\845\ Polygraph focuses on fact-
checking statements on relations between Russia and the West,
however, the website is only in English, severely limiting its
ability to reach Russian-speaking audiences in Europe.\846\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\845\ Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of State and
Broadcasting Board of Governors, ``Inspection of Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty,'' at 4 (May 2014); Government Accountability Office,
U.S. Government Takes a Country-Specific Approach to Addressing
Disinformation Overseas, at 16 (May 2017).
\846\ Government Accountability Office, U.S. Government Takes a
Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformation Overseas, at 16
(May 2017).; Polygraph.info, ``About,'' https://www.polygraph.info/p/
5981.html (visited Dec. 15, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASSESSING THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER
In contrast to many European countries, especially the
Baltic and Nordic states, the U.S. government still lacks a
coherent, public strategy to counter the Kremlin's
disinformation operations abroad and at home. Instead, it has a
patchwork of offices and programs tasked with mitigating the
effects of Kremlin disinformation operations.\847\ At the
direction of the U.S. Congress, the central hub for these
activities is the Global Engagement Center (GEC), within the
State Department.\848\ In December 2016, Congress expanded the
GEC's mandate from countering terrorist communications to
include ``foreign state and non-state propaganda and
disinformation efforts'' that target the U.S. and its
interests.\849\ However, a lack of urgency and self-imposed
constraints by the current State Department leadership has left
the effort in limbo.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\847\ These efforts include monitoring, fact-checking, promoting
objective news content, and providing training and grants to improve
skills in media literacy and investigative journalism. The National
Endowment for Democracy (NED), for example, has increased support for
media literacy programs in the Baltics and Eastern Europe that address
Russian disinformation.
\848\ The GEC is tasked with coordinating counter-disinformation
efforts across the U.S. government and includes personnel from the
Department of Defense, Department of Treasury, Central Intelligence
Agency, National Security Agency, National Counterterrorism Center, and
the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
\849\ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, P.L.
114-328, Section 1287, Enacted Dec. 23, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Launched in March 2016, the GEC is the latest in a line of
State Department attempts to coordinate interagency counter-
messaging efforts.\850\ Recognizing the severity of the
disinformation threat and the additional resources needed to
counter it, Congress increased the GEC's budget by nearly
three-fold by enabling the State Department to request up to
$60 million a year from the Department of Defense (DoD), and
gave the GEC new hiring and grant-making authorities. GEC
officials planned to use about half of those new funds on
countering Kremlin disinformation, and a quarter of the new
funds to increase the organization's data science capability
(currently the GEC works across four lines of effort: messaging
partnerships, content planning, government coordination, and
data analysis). But Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was slow
to approve the additional funding, with one of his top aides
reportedly concerned that the extra money would anger
Moscow.\851\ After coming under pressure from Congress,
Tillerson eventually approved $40 million, but inexplicably
rejected another $20 million that could have been used to
counter Russian disinformation.\852\ The GEC was also hamstrung
by the Department's hiring freeze, kept in place by Tillerson,
which prevented the hiring of new personnel to meet the
office's expanded mandate and mission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\850\ The GEC's state-sponsored propaganda mandate includes Russia,
China, North Korea, and Iran, with different teams dedicated to each.
\851\ Nahal Toosi, ``Tillerson Spurns $80 Million to Counter ISIS,
Russian Propaganda,'' Politico, Aug. 2, 2017.
\852\ Nahal Toosi, ``Tillerson Moves Toward Accepting Funding for
Fighting Russian propaganda,'' Politico, Aug. 31, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the State Department, the GEC reports to the Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, a position
for which the Trump Administration waited nearly eight months
to announce a nominee. As of publication of this report in
January 2018, the Administration has yet to fill the Special
Envoy and Coordinator of the GEC, suggesting that the
Administration does not consider the GEC's new mission of
countering foreign state propaganda a priority. The
Administration's lackadaisical approach to staffing these
positions and providing leadership to U.S. efforts to fight
Kremlin disinformation stands in sharp contrast to the
accelerating nature of the threat. As one GEC official put it,
``every week we spend on process is a week the Russians are
spending on operations.'' \853\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\853\ Committee Staff Discussion with GEC Officials (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The GEC has a critical role to play in closing the gaps in
the U.S. government's efforts to counter the Kremlin's
disinformation operations. New funding and grant-making
authorities delegated to the GEC should be used to support
existing, effective organizations in Russia's periphery engaged
in monitoring disinformation, promoting media literacy, and
producing objective news content and investigative journalism.
These organizations would benefit greatly from additional
funding that would enable them to expand operations and reach
larger audiences. To ensure that the GEC is fulfilling its
objectives and funds are used as intended, Congress must be
vigilant in monitoring the GEC's progress and effectiveness if
the United States is to achieve the level of engagement needed
to counter foreign state propaganda and disinformation.
In addition to the GEC, the State Department and USAID
support a number of other assistance programs that can help
build resilience in democratic institutions, to include
projects to monitor and counter disinformation, promote
independent media and investigative journalism, and strengthen
civil society and civic education. State Department officials
overseas closely monitor local media stories and distribute
them throughout the Department and U.S. embassies.\854\ The
U.S. government conducts or commissions polls of foreign
audiences to get a read on their perceptions of Russian media,
as well as their reactions to different types of messages. The
State Department and the Department of Defense's European
Command (EUCOM) have launched a joint effort called the Russian
Information Group (RIG), which grew out of a small social media
group called the Ukraine Task Force that the State Department
set up to counter Russian disinformation in Ukraine in 2014.
RIG seeks to support a ``credible counter-Russian voice in the
region,'' according to a former senior State Department
official.\855\ In testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, the head of EUCOM, General Curtis Scaparrotti, noted
that the RIG ``has to be reinforced, it has to be financed,
they have to have the authorities that they need to lead that
forward.'' \856\ Finally, State Department exchange programs,
such as the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP),
can be highly effective counter measures to Russian state media
disinformation campaigns. IVLP brings media professionals to
the United States and trains them on investigative journalism
skills and the role of a free press in democracies.\857\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\854\ Two offices in the State Department conduct audience research
around the world to inform public diplomacy messaging efforts: The
Office of Opinion Research, located within the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, and the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources,
located within the Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy
and Public Affairs. The Department of State also launched a Russian-
language Twitter feed in 2015 to enable U.S. diplomats to share
official statements directly with Russian-speaking audiences (some
analysts report that this Twitter account only appeals to a very
limited audience). Government Accountability Office, U.S. Government
Takes a Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformation
Overseas, (May 2017).
\855\ Rick Stengel, ``What Hillary Knew About Putin's Propaganda
Machine,'' Politico, Nov. 15, 2017.
\856\ Testimony of General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander, U.S.
European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, U.S.
Department of Defense, United States European Command, Hearing before
the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Mar. 23, 2017.
\857\ U.S. Department of State, ``IVLP,'' https://eca.state.gov/
ivlp (visited Jan. 4, 2018). Although beyond the scope of this report,
the U.S. has made considerable investments in enhancing the military
capabilities of our partners in Europe to deter Russia since 2014. For
2018, the U.S. is seeking a $1.4 billion increase, to $4.8 billion, for
the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). As part of EDI, the U.S.
deploys on average 7,000 servicemembers to Europe. The U.S. also plays
a leading role in NATO's ``Enhanced Forward Presence'' which deploys
multi-national battlegroups to Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland.
As of May 9, 2017, 4,530 troops from 15 countries participate in the
EFP effort. U.S. European Command Public Affairs Office ``2018 European
Deterrence Initiative (EDI) Fact Sheet,'' Oct. 2, 2017; NATO Enhanced
Forward Presence Factsheet, May 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To their credit, mid-level officials at the State
Department have given some thought to crafting a ``multi-
faceted approach to push back against the Russian
[government's] malign influence.'' In congressional testimony,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs,
Hoyt Yee, outlined the State Department's approach to
combatting Kremlin propaganda, which includes ``amplifying our
messages, correcting false statements, and engaging decision
makers,'' to support independent media and investigative
journalists with small grants.\858\ In its December 2017
National Security Strategy, the White House admitted that the
United States has done too little to deter Putin's assaults,
noting, ``U.S. efforts to counter the exploitation of
information by rivals have been tepid and fragmented. U.S.
efforts have lacked a sustained focus and have been hampered by
the lack of properly trained professionals.'' \859\ While
recognizing these shortcomings is an important first step, the
Administration has unfortunately failed to put forward a plan
to rectify them. Notably, the Strategy states only that ``the
United States and Europe will work together to counter Russian
subversion and aggression.'' \860\ Yet coordination is only one
piece of the aggressive strategy that the United States needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\858\ Testimony by Hoyt Yee, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, The Balkans:
Threats to Peace and Stability, Hearing before the U.S. House of
Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and
Emerging Threats, May 17, 2017, at 3.
\859\ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United
States of America, at 35 (Dec. 2017).
\860\ Ibid. at 48.
----------
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations
----------
The Russian government, under Putin's leadership, has shown
that it is both capable of and willing to assault democratic
and transatlantic institutions and alliances. These assaults
take many forms, including the use of disinformation,
cyberattacks, military invasions, alleged political
assassinations, threats to energy security, election
interference, and other subversive tactics that fuel
corruption, employ organized crime, and exploit both far-right
and far-left ideologies to sow discord and create confusion.
Putin also seeks to repress the exercise of human rights and
political participation both at home and abroad, to promote a
climate more conducive to the Russian government's corrupt and
anti-democratic behavior.
There are multiple lines of effort across the West--at the
local, national, and supranational level--working to counter
the Kremlin's malign influence operations and build resiliency
in democratic institutions. The United Kingdom's leadership has
made resolute, public statements that Russian meddling is
unacceptable and will be countered. The French government has
worked with independent media and political parties to expose
and blunt the dissemination of fake news. The German government
has bolstered domestic cybersecurity capacities, particularly
after the 2015 hack of the Bundestag. Estonia has strengthened
counterintelligence capabilities and exposed the intelligence
operations of its eastern neighbor. The Lithuanian government
has made progress in diversifying its supplies of natural gas,
and all the Baltic governments have worked to integrate their
electricity grids to reduce dependence on Soviet-era electrical
infrastructure. The Nordic countries have built resiliency
across all elements of society, especially in their education
systems. And the Spanish government has investigated, exposed,
and cut off significant money laundering operations by Russia-
based organized crime groups.
In the disinformation sphere, current multilateral efforts
run the gamut from monitoring and fact-checking to promoting
investigative journalism and media literacy. Monitoring and
fact-checking initiatives are a necessary and logical first
step--the problem has to be identified and understood before it
can be addressed. And as the Kremlin continues to change its
methods and tactics in response to growing awareness and
adaptation by its targets, it will be necessary to continue
existing monitoring efforts to inform responses.
However, monitoring and countering propaganda alone will
never be sufficient. While a whole-of-government approach is
necessary to identify the threat and sound the trumpet, a
whole-of-society approach is necessary to neutralize it. The
EU, NATO, and member states' ministries of defense, foreign
affairs, and interior may develop tactical responses to the
threat of disinformation, but it will ultimately be the
education ministries, civil society, and independent news
organizations that are most effective in inoculating their
societies against fake news.
In addition, no single country or institution has yet
stepped forward to be the leader in coordinating efforts to
build resilience against the Kremlin's asymmetric arsenal and
identifying and filling any gaps. The U.S. government has a
unique capacity to lead the formulation and implementation of a
grand strategy with individual countries and multilateral
groups in Europe, like NATO and the EU, to counter and deter
hybrid threats emanating from the Kremlin. While the Global
Engagement Center (GEC) has begun outreach to allies in Europe,
the U.S. government appears not to have a strategic plan to
comprehensively counter Russian government influence and
interference, including but not limited to disinformation.
There are several institutions in Europe working on countering
disinformation that could benefit from additional U.S.
engagement, and U.S. leadership and coordination among donors
could also help maximize the effectiveness of existing
assistance.
Yet despite the growing intensity of Russian government
interference operations, President Trump has largely ignored
this threat to democracy in the United States and Europe. The
Trump Administration has also proposed cuts to assistance
across Europe that could help counter the Kremlin's malign
influence, especially in the areas of good governance, anti-
corruption, and independent media efforts. President Trump is
squandering an opportunity to lead America's allies and
partners to build a collective defense against the Kremlin's
global assault on democratic institutions and values. But it is
not too late.
By implementing the recommendations below, the United
States can better deter and defend against the Kremlin's use of
its asymmetric arsenal, while also strengthening international
norms and values to blunt the effects of malign influence
operations by any state actor, including Russia.
1. Assert Presidential Leadership and Launch a National
Response: President Trump has been negligent in acknowledging
and responding to the threat to U.S. national security posed by
Putin's meddling.
a. Declare the Policy: The President should immediately
declare that it is U.S. policy to counter and deter all
forms of the Kremlin's hybrid threats against the
United States and around the world. This policy should
be a visibly prominent component of the
administration's agenda--policymakers should discuss
these issues publicly and regularly raise the threat
posed by the Russian government in their diplomatic
interactions. The President should also present to
Congress a comprehensive national strategy to counter
these grave national security threats and work with the
Congress and our allies to get this strategy
implemented and funded.
b. Establish an Inter-Agency Fusion Cell: The President should
establish a high-level inter-agency fusion cell,
modeled on the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC),
to coordinate all elements of U.S. policy and
programming in response to the Russian government's
malign influence operations. This fusion cell should
include representatives from the FBI, CIA, and
Departments of Homeland Security, State, Defense, and
Treasury and it should immediately produce a strategy,
plan, and robust budget that coordinates all current
and projected government programming to counter Russian
government interference and malign influence.
c. Build U.S. Expertise: The U.S. government should increase
funding for programs administered by the State
Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau that aim
to educate and develop Europe and Eurasia experts in
the United States. Programming and training at the
State Department's Foreign Service Institute should
also be expanded to include courses on the Russian
government's malign influence activities. Such courses
should also be accessible to relevant officials from
other U.S. agencies represented on the inter-agency
fusion cell described above.
d. Increase Funding to Counter Disinformation: The U.S.
government should increase the funding dedicated to
countering Russian disinformation, working primarily
though partners in vulnerable countries. The GEC should
also accept all funding from the Defense Department
made available through congressional appropriations and
use it to increase the capacity of existing
organizations in Russia's periphery that are engaged in
monitoring disinformation, promoting media literacy,
and producing objective news content and investigative
journalism with local impact. Grants should also
provide multi-year funding to allow these organizations
to formulate and implement long-term strategic plans.
The BBG should expand funding for sophisticated
Russian-language VOA programming like Current Time and
find more creative ways to bring high-quality U.S.
educational and entertainment programming to media
markets vulnerable to Kremlin propaganda.
2. Support Democratic Institution Building and Values
Abroad, and with a Stronger Congressional Voice: The executive
and legislative branches have a responsibility to show
leadership on universal values of democracy and human rights. A
lack of U.S. leadership risks undermining or endangering
democratic activists and human rights defenders around the
world--including within Russia--who are working to advance
these values in their own societies. It also risks weakening
democratic institutions, including independent media and civil
society, that are critical actors in overcoming disinformation,
shining a light on corruption and abuses, and building
resiliency against Kremlin attempts to divide and weaken
democratic societies. Furthermore, democracies with transparent
governments, the rule of law, a free media, and engaged
citizens are naturally more resilient to Putin's asymmetric
arsenal.
a. Increase Assistance: The U.S. government should provide
democracy and governance assistance, in concert with
allies in Europe, to build resilience in democratic
institutions among those European and Eurasian states
most vulnerable to Russian government interference.
Using the funding authorization outlined in CAATSA as
policy guidance, the U.S. government should increase
this spending in Europe and Eurasia to at least $250
million over the next two fiscal years.
b. Clear Messaging: To reinforce these efforts, the U.S.
government should demonstrate clear and sustained
diplomatic leadership in support of the individual
human rights that form the backbone of democratic
systems. U.S. and European government officials at the
highest levels should message clearly and regularly in
support of universal principles of human rights and
accountable governance in Europe and Eurasia, and, in
particular, speak out regularly regarding Russian
government abuses against its own citizens. These
messages should be delivered through public statements
as well as in private, high-level diplomatic
engagements. U.S. and European officials should also
utilize the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations Human Rights
Council, and other multilateral fora to deliver these
messages and to hold the Russian government and other
governments in Europe and Eurasia accountable to their
international human rights obligations and commitments.
c. Legislative Branch Leadership: Members in the U.S. Congress
have a responsibility to show U.S. leadership on values
by making democracy and human rights a central part of
their agendas. They should conduct committee hearings
and use their platforms to publicly advance these
issues. This would include using the Senate
confirmation process to elicit commitments from
nominees on democracy and human rights. Congress should
also institutionalize platforms for regular dialogue
with parliaments across Europe and Eurasia on issues of
democracy and human rights, to include multilateral
bodies such as the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, as well
as bilateral parliamentary engagements. Members of
Congress should also regularly visit countries in the
region to further solidify transatlantic bonds; such
visits should include engagement with civil society.
d. Leverage Legacy Enterprise Foundations: The U.S. government
established a series of enterprise funds across Central
and Eastern Europe which exhibited varying degrees of
success and spun off into legacy foundations that
provide grants to civil society actors and independent
media across the region. The U.S. government should
require those foundations to strategically focus their
investments on efforts to counter the Russian
government's malign influence. In particular, tens of
millions of dollars associated with the U.S. Russia
Foundation have been dormant for years due to
``congressional holds'' by the House Foreign Affairs
Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The
issues associated with those holds should be resolved
so those funds can be unlocked and used to counter
Russian government aggression.
e. Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes in
Russia: The U.S. government and its European partners
should maintain a lifeline of support to non-
governmental organizations and independent media
outlets in Russia that are promoting respect for human
rights, transparency, and accountability in their
country, and follow these entities' lead in determining
the contours of such support. This work is not meant to
interfere in the affairs of another country, but simply
supports those values enshrined in the Helsinki Final
Act, to which Russia is a signatory.
f. People to People Exchanges: The U.S. State Department
should, to the extent possible, seek to expand programs
and opportunities that increase interaction between
American and Russian citizens, as well as other
European countries, and should work to ensure that such
people-to-people ties are not used as grounds for
persecution of Russian citizens by their government. It
should also increase cultural exchanges, especially
study abroad semesters, Fulbright scholarships,
International Visitor Leadership Program exchanges,
Peace Corps, and other programs that increase
interaction between Americans and citizens that live in
the countries on Russia's periphery or that are
particularly vulnerable to Russian malign influence.
g. Strengthen Use of International Monitoring and
Accountability Mechanisms: The OSCE's Moscow Mechanism,
invoked by a group of OSCE participating States or
requested by the state in question itself, can enable a
mission of experts to investigate and facilitate
resolution to questions related to human rights in a
particular OSCE participating State. Since it was
agreed to in 1991, the Moscow Mechanism has been used
seven times--both with and without the cooperation of
the state in question. This mechanism should be
activated more frequently and used to the fullest
extent possible, and with respect to Russia, to respond
to demands from within that country for scrutiny of the
Kremlin's domestic human rights record and providing
specific recommendations for remedying abuses.
3. Expose and Freeze Kremlin-Linked Dirty Money: Corruption
provides the motivation and the means for many of the Kremlin's
malign influence operations. Under President Putin, the Kremlin
has nationalized organized crime and cybercrime, and now uses
Russia-based organized crime groups and cybercriminals for
operational purposes abroad. The United States remains a prime
destination for illicit financial flows from Russia, especially
through the purchase of real estate and luxury goods by
anonymous shell companies. The U.S. capability to
constructively assist countries in the region remains weak due
to an inadequate number of U.S. embassy personnel focused on
these issues.
a. Expose High-Level Individual Corruption: The Treasury
Department should make public any intelligence related
to Putin's personal corruption and wealth stored
abroad, and take steps with European allies to cut off
Putin and his inner circle from the international
financial system.
b. Expose Energy Sector Corruption: The U.S. government should
also expose corrupt and criminal activities associated
with Russia's state-owned energy sector.
c. Impose Sanctions: The U.S. government should implement the
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and
the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions
Act (CAATSA) provisions, which allow for sanctions
against corrupt actors in Russia and abroad.
d. Russia Financial Task Force: The U.S. Treasury Department
should form a high-level unit within its Office of
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen) that is
tasked solely with investigating and prosecuting
Russian-linked illicit financial flows. The unit should
also place liaison officers in select U.S. embassies
throughout Europe, and the U.S. government should
encourage our European partners to set up similar
units.
e. Corruption Reporting: The U.S. government should issue
yearly reports that assign tiered classifications based
on objective third-party corruption indicators, as well
as governmental efforts to combat corruption.
4. Subject State Hybrid Threat Actors to an Escalatory
Sanctions Regime: The Kremlin and other regimes hostile to
democracy must know that there will be consequences for their
actions.
a. Create a New Designation: The U.S. government should
designate countries that employ malign influence
operations to assault democracies as State Hybrid
Threat Actors.
b. Establish an Escalatory Sanctions Regime: Countries that
are designated as such would fall under a preemptive
and escalatory sanctions regime that would be applied
whenever the state uses asymmetric weapons like
cyberattacks to interfere with a democratic election or
disrupt a country's vital infrastructure. Existing
sanctions included within the CAATSA legislation can be
used to target those involved with cyberattacks.
c. Coordinate sanctions with the EU: The U.S. government
should work with the EU to ensure that these sanctions
are coordinated and effective.
5. Publicize the Kremlin's Global Malign Influence Efforts:
Exposing and publicizing the nature of the threat of Russian
malign influence activities, as the Baltic states regularly do
and the U.S. intelligence community did in January 2017, can be
an action-forcing event that not only boosts public awareness,
but also drives effective responses from the private sector,
especially social media platforms, as well as civil society and
independent media, who can use the information to pursue their
own investigations.
a. Issue Public Malign Influence Reporting: The Director of
National Intelligence should produce yearly public
reports that detail the Russian government's malign
influence operations in the United States. The
Department of State should similarly produce annual
reports on those operations around the world.
b. Declassify Assassination Intelligence: The Director of
National Intelligence should also update and consider
declassifying its report to Congress on the use of
political assassinations as a form of statecraft by the
Russian government.
c. Establish Independent Commissions to Investigate Election
Meddling: The U.S. Congress should pass pending
legislation to create an independent, nonpartisan
commission to comprehensively investigate Russian
government interference in the 2016 U.S. election.
Countries across Europe that have held elections over
the past two years should also consider comprehensive
governmental or independent investigations into the
nature and scope of Russian government interference.
6. Build an International Coalition to Counter Hybrid
Threats: The United States is stronger and more effective when
we work with our partners and allies abroad.
a. Build the Coalition: The U.S. government should lead an
international effort of like-minded democracies to
build awareness of and resilience to the Kremlin's
malign influence operations. Specifically, the
President should convene an annual global summit on
hybrid threats, modeled on the Global Coalition to
Counter ISIL or the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
summits that have taken place since 2015. Civil society
and the private sector should participate in the
summits and follow-on activities.
b. Harness the OSCE: The OSCE should be a central forum for
exposing Russian government attacks on democracy and
directly challenging its actions. As part of her Senate
confirmation hearing, the nominee for U.S. Ambassador
to the OSCE should commit to using every tool and forum
to advance this goal, working with like-minded
countries in the organization. The U.S. should also
expand its extra-budgetary support to OSCE projects
aimed at building resilience to external threats to
democratic institutions and processes in OSCE
participating states.
c. Share Successful Techniques: The State Department and USAID
should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the most
successful efforts to counter Russian government
interference in all of its forms and partner with
relevant governments, aid agencies, and NGOs to ensure
that these lessons are shared with the most vulnerable
countries in Europe and Eurasia. For example, based on
constructive measures taken during the recent French
and German election periods, the United States could
work closely with their Ministries of Foreign Affairs,
the French Agence Francaise de Developpement (AFD) and
the German Gesellschaft fur Internationale
Zusammenarbeit (GiZ) to implement specific joint
programs in vulnerable democracies on cyber defense,
media training, and other areas.
d. Participate in Centers of Excellence: The U.S. government
should provide funding and seconded U.S. government
employees for the Finnish Hybrid Center of Excellence
and NATO Centers of Excellence related to strategic
communication, cyber security, and energy independence.
e. Deploy FBI Investigators to Key Embassies in Vulnerable
European Countries: The U.S. Department of Justice
should deploy FBI investigators to vulnerable countries
in Europe with a mandate to address Russian government
and oligarchic efforts to corrupt economies, societies,
and governments. Countries across the region contend
with corruption, but some U.S. embassies across the
region lack the capacity to fully assist and coordinate
with these anti-corruption efforts at a diplomatic
level. These positions should be on par with Defense
Attaches from the Pentagon and prioritized as such.
f. Promote Passage of Magnitsky Laws Abroad: The 2012 Sergei
Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act calls on the
U.S. government to engage in diplomatic efforts to
lobby other governments to pass similar laws. The U.S.
government should report to Congress on their efforts
to persuade countries in Europe and Eurasia to pass
legislation modeled after the U.S. Magnitsky Laws (both
the Russia-specific and the Global Magnitsky Human
Rights Accountability laws) that enable targeted,
individual sanctions against gross violators of human
rights and perpetrators of significant acts of
corruption. Furthermore, these laws must be strongly
implemented by the U.S. executive branch.
7. Uncover Foreign Funding that Erodes Democracy: Foreign
illicit money corrupts the political, social, and economic
systems of democracies.
a. Pass Legislation on Campaign Finance Transparency and Shell
Companies: The United States and European countries
must make it more difficult for foreign actors to use
financial resources to interfere in democratic systems,
specifically by passing legislation to require full
disclosure of shell company owners and improve
transparency for funding of political parties,
campaigns, and advocacy groups.
8. Build Global Cyber Defenses and Norms: The United States
and our European allies remain woefully vulnerable to
cyberattacks, which are a preferred asymmetric weapon of state
hybrid threat actors. While the threat posed by cyberattacks
from state and non-state actors has grown, the international
community has not developed rules of the road which could
establish norms that govern behavior over the long term.
Moreover, the United States and its allies have not defined the
contours of cyberattacks in the context of NATO's Article 5. In
addition to the strategic-level discussion on cyber threats,
the U.S. government does not have an institution capable of
robustly engaging and assisting non-governmental entities under
pressure from cyberattacks. The administration has tools, like
the CAATSA legislation, which authorized sanctions on those who
conduct cyberattacks on democratic institutions. It has yet to
exercise these authorities, despite the existence of clear
sanctions targets.
a. Establish a Cyber Alliance: The U.S. government and NATO
should lead a coalition of countries committed to
mutual defense against cyberattacks, to include the
establishment of rapid reaction teams to defend allies
under attack.
b. Discuss Article 5: The U.S. government should also call a
special meeting of the NATO heads of state to review
the extent of Russian government-sponsored cyberattacks
among member states and develop formal guidelines on
how the Alliance will consider such attacks in the
context of NATO's Article 5 mutual protection
provision.
c. Negotiate an International Treaty: The U.S. government
should lead an effort to establish an international
treaty on the use of cyber tools in peace time, modeled
on international arms control treaties.
d. Implement Existing Cyber-related Sanctions: The
administration should fully implement Section 224 of
CAATSA, which mandates sanctions on individuals acting
on behalf of the Russian government who undermine the
cybersecurity of any government or democratic
institution. The administration should also work to
build support in Europe for a similar package of EU
cyber sanctions.
e. Increase Transatlantic Cooperation on Combatting
Cybercrime: The U.S. government should work with
European partners to raise the priority of
investigating and prosecuting Russia-based organized
crime groups and cybercriminals, who should be viewed
not just as criminal threats, but as threats to
national security. Agencies should increase information
sharing between intelligence and law enforcement
entities, and increase the targeting of criminal
assets.
9. Hold Social Media Companies Accountable: Social media
platforms are a key conduit of disinformation that undermines
democracies.
a. Make Political Advertising on Social Media Transparent:
U.S. and European governments should mandate that
social media companies make public the sources of
funding for political advertisements, along the same
lines as TV channels and print media.
b. Conduct Audits on Election Period Interference: European
governments should also increase pressure on and
cooperation with social media companies to determine
the extent of Russian-linked disinformation operations
using fake accounts in recent elections and referendums
around the continent. Social media companies should
conduct comprehensive audits on how their platforms may
have been used by Kremlin-linked entities to influence
elections occurring over the past several years.
c. Convene Civil Society Advisory Councils: Social media
companies should also establish civil society advisory
councils to provide input and warnings about emerging
disinformation trends. Leaders from the United States
and Europe in government, the private sector, and civil
society must work to promote a culture where citizens
are armed with critical thinking skills. To that end,
philanthropic organizations should embark on an
initiative to work with educational organizations and
social media companies to develop a curriculum on media
literacy and critical thinking skills that could be
offered free of charge to the public. These tools
should also be amplified for the broader public through
a large scale media campaign.
d. Block Malicious Inauthentic and/or Automated Accounts:
While accounting for freedom of speech concerns, social
media companies should redouble efforts to prevent,
detect, and delete such accounts, especially those that
are primarily used to promote false news stories.
10. Reduce European Dependence on Russian Energy Sources:
Europe is overly dependent on Gazprom, a Russian state-owned
company, for its natural gas supplies. Payments to Gazprom from
European states fund military aggression abroad, as well as
overt and covert activities that undermine democratic
institutions and social cohesion in Europe. The Russian
government uses the near monopoly of its state-owned natural
gas companies over European gas supplies as leverage in
political and economic negotiations with European transshipment
countries, especially Ukraine and the Balkans.
a. Promote Energy Diversification: OPIC and USTDA should help
to finance strategically important energy
diversification projects in Europe. This includes
supporting new pipeline projects such as the Trans
Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the Trans Anatolian Natural
Gas Pipeline (TANAP), as well as the construction of
more liquid natural gas (LNG) regasification terminals
to facilitate the import of LNG from non-Russian
sources. The U.S. should also support efforts that
promote renewable energy options.
b. Support a Single EU Energy Market: The U.S. government,
through OPIC, USTDA, and other assistance mechanisms,
should also support strategic infrastructure projects
that support the realization of a single EU gas and
electricity market. The U.S. government should also
assist EU governments with implementation of the EU's
Third Energy Package, which seeks to establish a single
energy market.
c. Oppose Nord Stream 2: The U.S. should continue to oppose
Nord Stream 2. The U.S. government should encourage the
European Commission and Parliament to sponsor an
independent inquiry into the energy security and
geopolitical implications of Nord Stream 2 and its
infrastructure in Russia and host countries. The U.S.
Departments of Energy and State should assist the
independent inquiry in whatever way possible.
=======================================================================
APPENDICES
=======================================================================
----------
Appendix A: 1999 Apartment Building Bombings
----------
In early September 1999, less than three weeks after Putin
was installed as Prime Minister, a large truck bomb destroyed a
five-story apartment building in the Russian republic of
Dagestan, killing 64 people.\1\ A second, far more powerful
bomb was found in a truck near a military hospital in the city,
but was defused just 12 minutes before it was timed to explode,
saving the city's center from being leveled.\2\ As the bombings
occurred in an ethnically diverse republic thousands of
kilometers from Moscow, public outrage in the capital was
limited. But five days after the bombing in Dagestan, a bomb
struck an apartment building in Moscow, killing 100 and
injuring nearly 700.\3\ The Moscow unit of the FSB revealed
that evidence from the scene showed traces of TNT and a potent
military explosive called hexogen (a substantial investigation
of the crime scene was never carried out because the
authorities razed the building just days after the blast and
discarded its remnants at the municipal dump).\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ David Satter, The Less You Know, The Better You Sleep: Russia's
Road to Terror and Dictatorship under Yeltsin and Putin, Yale
University Press, at 7 (2016); Scott Anderson, ``None Dare Call it a
Conspiracy,'' GQ, Mar. 30, 2017.
\2\ Satter, The Less You Know, The Better You Sleep, at 7.
\3\ Ibid.
\4\ Scott Anderson, ``None Dare Call it a Conspiracy,'' GQ, Mar.
30, 2017; Satter, The Less You Know, the Better You Sleep, at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Just four days later, another bomb went off in Moscow at 5
a.m., destroying a nine-story apartment building and killing
124 sleeping residents.\5\ Later that morning, the speaker of
Russia's lower house of parliament, the Duma, Gennady
Seleznyov, announced that an apartment building had blown up in
the city of Volgodonsk.\6\ But the bombing in Volgodonsk did
not happen until three days after his announcement, when an
apartment block was attacked in the city, again at 5 a.m.,
killing 18 people and injuring nearly 90.\7\ When a Duma member
later asked Seleznyov on the Parliament floor to ``please
explain, how come you told us on Monday about the blast that
occurred on Thursday?'' his microphone was cut off and the Duma
voted to revoke his speaking privileges for one month.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Satter, The Less You Know, The Better You Sleep, at 7.
\6\ Ibid.
\7\ Ibid.
\8\ Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Remarks before the Russian Duma, Sept.
17, 1999, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lf9r3DEY5UA (translated from
Russian). Some observers suggest that someone in the chain of command
of the FSB botched the planned sequence of the bombings and gave the
news to Seleznyov in the wrong order. Mikhail Trepashkin, a former FSB
agent and lawyer who investigated the bombings, claims that Seleznyov
was given an erroneous report by an FSB officer. Scott Anderson, ``None
Dare Call it a Conspirary,'' GQ, Mar. 30, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Terrified residents began to spend the night outdoors
rather than risk being blown up while sleeping in their
apartments.\9\ Less than a week later, on September 22, a
resident in the city of Ryazan, about 120 miles southeast of
Moscow, called the police to report suspicious men going in and
out of his apartment building. Police investigated and
discovered what appeared to be a large bomb in the building's
basement. The head of the local bomb squad disconnected a
military-grade detonator and timer and analyzed the sacks of
white powder they were connected to, which reportedly tested
positive for hexogen.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Satter, The Less You Know, the Better You Sleep, at 8.
\10\ Ibid. at 9-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two men matching the witnesses' descriptions were arrested;
but both were found to be in possession of FSB identification,
and the Moscow FSB ordered the Ryazan police to release
them.\11\ At the Kremlin, FSB director Nikolai Patrushev (now
head of Russia's influential Security Council) announced that
the whole thing was a training exercise, that the sacks of
white powder were in fact only sugar, and that while similar
exercises had taken place in other cities around Russia, only
the citizens of Ryazan had been vigilant enough to detect the
sucrose threat.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Ibid. at 10.
\12\ Amy Knight, ``Finally, We Know About the Moscow Bombings,''
The New York Review of Books, Nov. 22, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Putin blamed the bombings on Chechen terrorists and
immediately ordered Russia's armed forces to retaliate.\13\ Yet
while Russian authorities said that there was a ``Chechen
trail'' leading to the bombings, no Chechen claimed
responsibility.\14\ In response to questions from the U.S.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 2000, then
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote that ``We have not
seen evidence that ties the bombings to Chechnya.'' \15\ A
State Department cable from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow relays
how a former member of Russia's intelligence services told a
U.S. diplomat that the FSB ``does indeed have a specially
trained team of men whose mission is to carry out this type of
urban warfare,'' and that the actual story of what happened in
Ryazan would never come out, because ``the truth would destroy
the country.'' \16\ The report of the British government's
public inquiry into the murder of former FSB agent Alexander
Litvinenko refers to the theory in Litvinenko's book that ``the
bombings had been the work of the FSB, designed to provide a
justification for war in Chechnya and, ultimately, to boost Mr.
Putin's political prospects.'' \17\ The inquiry's chairman, Sir
Robert Owen, wrote that the book was ``the product of careful
research'' and referred to the view that the book had
``credibly investigated'' the issue and ``piled up the evidence
pointing a very damaging finger at the FSB and its involvement
in those explosions.'' \18\ In addition, U.S. Senators John
McCain and Marco Rubio, who both serve on the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, have gone on the record pointing to
evidence that alleges the involvement of the Russian security
services in the bombings, with Rubio referring to ``open source
and other'' reporting.\19\ The CIA, however, has not released
any of its potential records relating to the bombings, stating
that to do so would reveal ``very specific aspects of the
Agency's intelligence interest, or lack thereof, in the Russian
bombings.'' \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Scott Anderson, ``None Dare Call it a Conspiracy,'' GQ, Mar.
30, 2017.
\14\ Satter, The Less You Know, the Better You Sleep, at 2 (citing
Ilyas Akhmadov & Miriam Lansky, The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won
and Lost, Palgrave Macmillan at 162 (2010)).
\15\ U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2000 Foreign
Policy Overview and the President's Fiscal Year 2001 Foreign Affairs
Budget Request (Feb. and Mar. 2000).
\16\ U.S. Department of State Cable, Released via Freedom of
Information Act to David Satter, Case No. F-2016-08858.
\17\ United Kingdom House of Commons, The Litvinenko Inquiry:
Report into the Death of Alexander Litvinenko, at 57 (Jan. 2016).
\18\ Ibid.
\19\ Senator John McCain, Press Release, ``McCain Decries `New
Authoritarianism in Russia,' '' Nov. 4, 2003. McCain said that ``there
remain credible allegations that Russia's FSB had a hand in carrying
out these attacks.'' Ibid. Senator Rubio said in January 2017 that
``there's [an] incredible body of reporting, open source and other,
that this was all--all those bombings were part of a black flag
operation on the part of the FSB.'' Remarks of Marco Rubio, Nomination
of Rex Tillerson to be Secretary of State, Hearing before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Jan. 11, 2017.
\20\ David Satter, ``The Mystery of Russia's 1999 Apartment
Bombings Lingers--the CIA Could Clear It Up,'' National Review, Feb.
2, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attempts to investigate the Ryazan incident and the
bombings were stonewalled by Russian officials or stymied by
opponents in the Duma. Due to uniform opposition from pro-Putin
deputies, several efforts in the Duma to investigate the Ryazan
incident failed.\21\ Instead, a group of deputies and civilian
activists created a public commission to investigate, led by
Sergei Kovalev, a Soviet-era dissident who served for a time as
Yeltsin's human rights advisor (he resigned after accusing
Yeltsin of abandoning democratic principles). \22\ In 2003, one
of the Duma deputies and ``most active'' members on the
commission, Sergei Yushkenov, was shot dead in front of his
apartment building.\23\ Another member of the commission, Yuri
Shchekochikhin, died from a mysterious illness three months
later, likely from thallium poisoning, just before he was
scheduled to fly to the United States to meet with
investigators from the FBI. \24\ Others investigating the
bombings, including former FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko and
journalist Anna Politkovskaya, were also murdered.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Satter, The Less You Know, the Better You Sleep, at 21, 25;
``Duma Vote Kills Query on Ryazan,'' The Moscow Times, Apr. 4, 2000.
\22\ Satter, The Less You Know, the Better You Sleep, at 25;
Sergei Kovalev, ``A Letter of Resignation,'' The New York Review of
Books, Feb. 29, 1996.
\23\ Satter, The Less You Know, the Better You Sleep, at 25, 31,
126-27; ``Russian MP's death sparks storm,'' BBC News, Apr. 18, 2003.
Russian authorities convicted Mikhail Kodanyov, the leader of a rival
member of Yushkenov's Liberal Russia party, with ordering the
assassination. Prosecutors argued that Kodanyov ordered the murder
because he wanted to take control of Liberal Russia's finances.
Kodanyov maintained his innocence throughout the trial. Carl Schrek,
``4 Convicted for Yushenkov Murder,'' The Moscow Times, Mar. 19, 2004.
\24\ Satter, The Less You Know, the Better You Sleep, at 31;
Jullian, O'Halloran, ``Russia's Poisoning `Without a Poison,' '' BBC
News, Feb. 6, 2007.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/file_on_4/6324241.stm;
``September 1999 Russian apartment bombings timeline,'' CBC, Sept. 4,
1999.
\25\ Satter, The Less You Know, the Better You Sleep, at 36, 121,
127. After the 2003 trial, three years before she was assassinated,
Politkovskaya said of the court proceedings that ``This investigation
hasn't answered the main question: Who ordered the apartment blasts in
Moscow and Volgodonsk. The accusations raised by some politicians that
the FSB may have been behind the explosions have never been seriously
considered by this investigation and have never been investigated at
all. And it is quite clear that it will never happen. It remains up to
independent journalists and a very small circle of independent
politicians to continue to dig up this tragic riddle. The last
politician in Russia who sincerely raised these hard questions was
Sergei Yushenkov. But he was killed.'' David Holley, ``Separatists Tied
to '99 Bombings,'' Los Angeles Times, May 1, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russian authorities held two trials in relation to the
bombings. The first trial started in May 2001, and accused five
men from the Karachai-Cherkessian Republic (about 250 miles
west of Chechnya) of preparing explosives and sending them to
Moscow ``in bags similar to those used to carry sugar produced
by a sugar refiner in Karachai-Cherkessian Republic.'' \26\ The
trial was held 750 miles south of Moscow and closed to the
public, including the press. The men were convicted of plotting
terrorist attacks across Russia in 1999, but due to the lack of
evidence, the trial investigators dropped the charges that the
men were involved in the Moscow and Volgodonsk bombings.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ ``Five Men Charged with Apartment Bombings in moscow,''
Strana.ru, May 11, 2001.
\27\ Oksana Yablokova & Navi Abdullaev, ``Five Men Convicted for
Terrorist Plots,'' The Moscow Times, Nov. 15, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second trial, which occurred in 2003 and was also
closed to the public, charged two other Karachai-Cherkessian
men, one of whom said that it was the CIA, not the FSB, that
was involved in the Volgodonsk bombing.\28\ While he admitted
his involvement in the Volgodonsk bombing, he said that he was
given heavy narcotics, and he has maintained that he was not
involved with the two Moscow bombings.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ ``Terrorist Adam Dekkushev Blames CIA for Preparations of
Explosions in Volgodonsk,'' Kommersant, Dec. 19, 2003 (translated from
Russian).
\29\ Amy Knight, Orders to Kill: The Putin Regime and Political
Murder, St. Martin's Press (2017); ``Terror Convict Asks Court to
Reject $900,000 Claim,'' RIA Novosti, Mar. 3, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two sisters who lost their mother in one of the Moscow
bombings hired a lawyer and former FSB agent, Mikhail
Trepashkin, to represent them at the second trial.\30\
Trepashkin was also an investigator on Kovalev's
commission.\31\ According to the U.S. State Department, Russian
authorities arrested Trepashkin one month after he published
claims that the FSB was involved in the bombings and just one
week before he was scheduled to represent the sisters in court
and present related evidence. He was convicted of disclosing
state secrets (Trepashkin maintains that FSB agents planted
classified documents in his home during a search) and sentenced
to four years in prison.\32\ With two members of the public
commission dead, others threatened, and Trepashkin imprisoned
and his life possibly at risk, its investigation stalled.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Satter, The Less You Know, the Better You Sleep, at 29-30.
\31\ Ibid.
\32\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor, 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia (Mar.
2008). While imprisoned, Trepashkin complained of improper medical care
for severe asthma, which resulted in his transfer to a harsher general
prison regime. The European Court of Human Rights ruled in 2007 that
the Russian government violated the European Convention on Human Rights
due to his poor prison conditions. Ibid. As of September 2017,
Trepashkin was representing plaintiffs demanding compensation from the
Russian government for its use of disproportionate force in ending the
Beslan siege in 2004. ``Beslan siege: Russia `Will Comply' with
Critical Ruling,'' BBC, Sept. 20, 2017; Scott Anderson, ``None Dare
Call it a Conspiracy,'' GQ, Mar. 30, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Russian public continued to push for investigations and
in 2009, a few dozen protestors held a demonstration demanding
a new investigation into the bombings. During the protests
against Putin in 2011 and 2012, some demonstrators carried
signs referencing the attacks.\33\ A public opinion poll
conducted in September 2013 found that only 31 percent of
Russians thought that any involvement of the special services
in the explosions should be excluded.\34\ Another poll
conducted in 2015 found that only about 6 percent of Russians
had clarity about who was behind the 1999 bombings.\35\ To this
day, no credible source has ever claimed credit for the
bombings and no credible evidence has been presented by the
Russian authorities linking Chechen terrorists, or anyone else,
to the Moscow bombings. As the public polling results show,
there is still considerable doubt among the Russian public
about who was responsible for the 1999 apartment building
bombings, suggesting that further investigation into the matter
is still required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ ``Russian Protesters Demand Investigation of 1999 Apartment
Bombings,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty, Sept. 10, 2009;
Satter, The Less You Know, the Better You Sleep, at 38.
\34\ Press Release, Levada Center, ``Russians About Terrorist
Attacks,'' Sept. 30, 2013, https://www.levada.ru/2013/09/30/
rossiyane_o_teraktah/ (translated from Russian).
\35\ Press Release, Levada Center, ``The Tragedy in Beslan and the
Apartment Bombings in Autumn 1999,'' Sept. 4, 2015 (translated from
Russian).
----------
Appendix B: Alleged Political Assassinations
----------
More than two dozen politicians, journalists, activists,
and other critics of Mr. Putin's regime have died under
mysterious or suspicious circumstances in Russia during his
time in power.\1\ A number of individuals, including vocal
Putin critics, investigative journalists, and others in the
Kremlin's crosshairs, have died beyond Russia's borders, often
under similar mysterious circumstances. Many observers suspect
that these deaths were at the hands or direction of the Russian
security services. Such actions are officially allowed under a
Russian law passed by the Duma in July 2006 that permits the
assassination of ``enemies of the Russian regime'' who live
abroad.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Oren Dorell, ``Mysterious Rash on Russian Deaths Casts
Suspicion on Vladimir Putin,'' USA Today, May 4, 2017; Committee to
Protect Journalists, ``58 Journalists Killed in Russia/Motive
Confirmed,'' https://cpj.org/killed/europe/russia/ (visited Dec. 5,
2017).
\2\ Terrence McCoy, ``With His Dying Words, Poisoned Spy Alexander
Litvinenko Named Putin as His Killer,'' The Washington Post, Jan. 28,
2015; Steven Eke, ``Russia Law on Killing `Extremists' Abroad,'' BBC
News, Nov. 27, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most infamous case in recent memory was that of
Alexander Litvinenko, a career FSB officer. In the early 1990s,
he investigated the Tambov group, an Uzbek criminal
organization based in St. Petersburg that he found was
smuggling heroin from Afghanistan to Western Europe via
Uzbekistan and St. Petersburg. His investigation led him to
believe that there was ``widespread collusion between the
Tambov group and KGB officials, including both Vladimir Putin
and Nikolai Patrushev.'' \3\ He was also allegedly ordered to
kill Mikhail Trepashkin (see Appendix A) after the recently
resigned FSB investigator brought a lawsuit against the FSB's
leadership and filed complaints that went all the way up to the
director, Vladimir Putin. Litvinenko refused to carry out the
order, became disenchanted with his assignment on a hit team,
and held a press conference with four other colleagues, as well
as Mr. Trepashkin, where they exposed the assassination plots
they had been ordered to carry out.\4\ After the press
conference, Litvinenko was fired from the FSB (Putin was then
still FSB director), and he fled to the UK, where he was
granted asylum and, eventually, British citizenship.\5\ He
began to investigate the 1999 apartment building bombings and
wrote a book, Blowing up Russia: Terror from Within, which
accused the FSB of being behind the attacks on the apartment
buildings.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ United Kingdom House of Commons, The Litvinenko Inquiry: Report
into the Death of Alexander Litvinenko, at 15 (Jan. 2016).
\4\ Ibid. at 21.
\5\ ``Alexander Livtvinenko: Profile of Murdered Russian Spy,'' BBC
News, Jan. 21, 2016; Griff Witte & Michael Birnbaum, ``Putin
Implicated in Fatal Poisoning of Former KGB Officer at London Hotel,''
The Washington Post, Jan. 21, 2016.
\6\ Ibid.; see Appendix A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In November 2006, while reportedly investigating the death
of Russian investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya as well
as Spanish links to the Russian mafia, Litvinenko met two
former FSB colleagues, Andrei Lugovoi and Dmitri Kovtun, for
tea in London. Later that day he fell ill, his organs began to
fail, and he died within a few weeks, killed by a rare
radioactive isotope: Polonium-210.\7\ An investigation by the
British authorities found that Lugovoi and Kovtun had poisoned
Litvinenko. However, the Russian government refused to
extradite Lugovoi, which led to a deterioration in bilateral
relations, with the UK cutting off links to the Russian
security services and diplomatic personnel being expelled by
both sides (Putin would later award a state medal to Lugovoi,
who is now a member of the Russian Duma).\8\ That deterioration
of relations made the British government reluctant to accede to
the coroner's request for a public inquiry into Litvinenko's
death.\9\ In 2015, however, the British government began a
public inquiry, which one year later concluded that ``the FSB
operation to kill Mr. Litvinenko was probably approved by [then
FSB director] Mr. Patrushev and also by President Putin.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Ibid. A British physicist who testified at the public inquiry
into Litvinenko's death said that the polonium's poisonous effects
would have to have been tested in advance to know the proper dosage to
kill. He noted two unexplained deaths in Russia that occurred before
Litvinenko's and with similar symptoms: the Chechen warlord Lecha
Islamov and the one-time Putin associate Roman Tsepov, who both died in
2004. ``Plutonium that killed Alexander Litvinenko Came from Russian
Plant, UK Court Told,'' Financial Times, Mar. 11, 2015.
\8\ ``Alexander Litvinenko: Profile of Murdered Russian Spy,'' BBC,
Jan. 21, 2016; ``Russia's Putin Honors Suspect in Litvinenko
Poisoning,'' Reuters, Mar. 9, 2015.
\9\ Michael Holden, ``Britain Says Ties with Russia Played Part in
Litvinenko Ruling,'' Reuters, Jul. 19, 2013.
\10\ United Kingdom House of Commons, The Litvinenko Inquiry, at
244.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the decade between Litvinenko's death and the publishing
of the results of the public inquiry, a number of potential
``enemies of the Russian regime'' died in Britain under
mysterious circumstances. With decades of practice and the
investment of considerable state resources, the Russian
security services have reportedly developed techniques that a
former Scotland Yard counterterrorism official characterized as
``disguising murder'' by staging suicides and using chemical
and biological agents that leave no trace.\11\ A former KGB
lieutenant colonel told The New York Times that ``The
government is using the special services to liquidate its
enemies. It was not just Litvinenko, but many others we don't
know about, classified as accidents or maybe semi-accidents.''
\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Heidi Blake et al., ``From Russia with Blood,'' BuzzFeed News,
June 15, 2017.
\12\ Andrew Kramer, ``More of Kremlin's Opponents Are Ending Up
Dead,'' The New York Times, Aug. 20, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One possible target was Alexander Perepilichnyy, a Russian
financier who had reportedly helped Russian authorities engage
in a $230 million tax fraud scheme that was exposed by Sergei
Magnitsky, a Moscow lawyer for the British hedge fund Hermitage
Capital Management.\13\ After Magnitsky exposed the extent of
the tax fraud--the largest in Russian history--he was arrested
and charged with the crime himself, then tortured and killed in
prison by his captors. Magnitsky's death reportedly led
Perepilichnyy to turn against his bosses and cooperate with
investigations--he fled to Britain and turned over evidence to
Swiss prosecutors.\14\ In 2012, on the same day he returned
from a short trip to Paris, he collapsed while jogging and died
from what police said was a heart attack.\15\ Perepilichnyy's
death occurred shortly before he was apparently due to provide
additional evidence to Swiss authorities in a ``confrontation''
setting with Vladlen Stepanov, the husband of a senior tax
official who was a key player in the tax fraud that Magnitsky
had uncovered.\16\ Because Perepilichnyy had received numerous
threats, shortly before his death he had applied for several
life insurance policies that required medical checks, the
results of which gave him a clean bill of health and did not
reveal any heart problems. After his death, one of the
insurance companies ordered a new round of tests on his body
and an expert in plant toxicology subsequently found that his
stomach had traces of gelsemium, a rare Chinese flowering plant
that, when ingested, triggers cardiac arrest. It is also ``a
known weapon of assassination by Chinese and Russian contract
killers,'' according to a lawyer for the insurance company.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Alan Cowell, ``Another Russian Emigre Dies Mysteriously, But
It's a Different Britain,'' The New York Times, Sept. 16, 2016;
``Alexander Perepilichnyy Death: Russian May Have Talked to UK Spies,''
BBC News, Jan. 13, 2016; The founder of Hermitage Capital Management,
Bill Browder, alleges that $30 million of the $230 million stolen in
the tax fraud flowed into Britain. U.S. government investigators traced
over $7.5 million of the stolen funds to a British bank account tied to
a Moscow-based investment. ``U.S. Traces US $7.5 Million from Russian
Fraud Scheme Uncovered by Magnitsky,'' Organized Crime and Corruption
Reporting Project, Apr. 17, 2017, https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/6342-
u-s-traces-us-7-5-million-from-russian-fraud-scheme-uncovered-by-
magnitsky; Neil Buckley, ``Magnitsky Fraud Cash Laundered Through
Britain, MPs Hear,'' Financial Times, May 3, 2016.
\14\ Mike Eckel, ``U.S. Settles Magnitsky-Linked Money Laundering
Case on Eve of Trial,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 13, 2017;
Jeffrey Stern, ``An Enemy of the Kremlin Dies in London: Who Killed
Alexander Perepilichny?'' The Atlantic, Jan./Feb., 2017.
\15\ Alan Cowell, ``Another Russian Emigre Dies Mysteriously, but
it's a Different Britain,'' The New York Times, Sept. 16, 2016;
``Alexander Perepilichny Death: Russian May Have Talked to UK Spies,''
BBC News, Jan. 13, 2016.
\16\ See United Kingdom Courts and Tribunal Judiciary, Inquest Into
the Death of Alexander Perepilichny, Day 4 (Questioning of Russ
Whitworth, Legal and General), June 8, 2017.
\17\ Jeffrey Stern, ``An Enemy of the Kremlin Dies in London,'' The
Atlantic, Jan./Feb. 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A high-profile Russian also died under mysterious
circumstances in Washington, D.C. in 2015. Mikhail Lesin,
founder of the Russian state-owned television network RT and
formerly a close adviser to Putin, was found dead in his hotel
room in Dupont Circle with ``blunt force injuries of the head,
neck, torso, upper extremities, and lower extremities.'' \18\ A
nearly year-long investigation by D.C. police, the U.S.
Attorney's Office for D.C., and the FBI concluded that ``Lesin
entered his hotel room on the morning of Wednesday, Nov. 4th,
2015, after days of excessive consumption of alcohol and
sustained the injuries that resulted in his death while alone
in his hotel room.'' \19\ Lesin died the day before he was
reportedly going to meet with officials from the U.S.
Department of Justice about RT's operations.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ District of Columbia Office of the Chief Medical Examiner,
``Joint Statement from the District of Columbia's Office of the Chief
Medical Examiner and the Metropolitan Police Department,'' Mar. 10,
2016. The manner of death was undetermined.
\19\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``Investigation into the Death of
Mikhail Lesin Has Closed,'' Oct. 28, 2016. According to the D.C. police
report of the incident, on November 4, a hotel security guard checked
in on a `'stumbling drunk'' Lesin in his room at 2:23 p.m. and asked
him if he needed medical help, to which Lesin responded ``nyet.'' At
8:16 p.m., another guard found Lesin face down on the floor of his
hotel room, breathing but unresponsive. The next day, at 11:30 a.m., a
security guard went to Lesin's room to remind him to check out and
found him still face down on the floor. The guard called 911 and Lesin
was pronounced dead at the scene. Peter Hermann, ``Police Report on
2015 Death of Russian Political Aide Details Days of Drinking,'' The
Washington Post, Dec. 4, 2017.
\20\ Jason Leopold et al., ``Everyone Thinks He Was Whacked,''
BuzzFeed News, Jul. 28, 2017. In recent years, members of Congress had
called for Lesin to be investigated for money laundering and sanctioned
for human rights abuses. In July 2014, Senator Roger Wicker asked the
Department of Justice to look into whether Lesin had violated the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and anti-money laundering statutes,
citing Lesin's acquisition of a luxury real estate empire throughout
Europe and the United States, including over $28 million in southern
California alone. Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and James
McGovern wrote to President Obama in March 2014 requesting that Lesin
be sanctioned under the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act
for having ``personally threatened the then-owner of NTV television,
Vladimir Gunsinky, while Gusinky was being held at the Butyrskaya
Prison in Moscow, demanding that he transfer control of his media
outlets (which had been critical of the government) to the state-owned
company Gazprom in return for dropping the charges.'' Under the terms
reportedly proposed by Lesin, Gusinky was offered the option of selling
NTV to Gazprom for $300 million (far below its value) and a debt write-
off, or sharing ``a cell with prisoners infected with AIDS and TB.''
Letter from Senator Roger Wicker, to Attorney General Eric Holder, Jul.
29, 2014; Letter from Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen to President Obama,
Mar. 14, 2014; Arkady Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia: The Journey
from Gorbachev's Freedom to Putin's War, Atlantic Books, at 275 (2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some U.S. national security officials are now reportedly
concerned that Russia's security services will start ``doing
here what they do with some regularity in London.'' \21\ The
warning echoes a much earlier one, given in 2004 after two
Russian agents killed a former president of Chechnya in Qatar,
using explosives smuggled in a diplomatic pouch. In a telephone
interview with The New York Times, a Chechen separatist leader
said the killing `'showed that Russia under Mr. Putin had
reverted to the darkest tactics of its Soviet past'' and that
``if the international community does not give proper attention
to what happened in Qatar,'' he said, ``I am absolutely sure
that these methods may be tried again in other countries,
including Western countries.'' \22\ It is not inconceivable
that the Kremlin could use its security services in the United
States as it has elsewhere. The trail of mysterious deaths, all
of which happened to people who possessed information that the
Kremlin did not want made public, should not be ignored by
Western countries on the assumption that they are safe from
these extreme measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Jason Leopold et al., ``Everyone Thinks He Was Whacked,''
BuzzFeed News, Jul. 28, 2017.
\22\ Steven Myers, ``Qatar Court Convicts 2 Russians in Top
Chechen's Death,'' The New York Times, Jul. 1, 2004.
----------
Appendix C: Russian Government's
Olympic Cheating Scheme
----------
At two World Championships, in 2011 and 2013, and at the
Olympics in 2012, Russian athlete Maria Savinova beat American
sprinter Alysia Montano for a spot on the medal stand.\1\
However, investigations now show that Savinova's performance
had been enhanced by a doping program directed by the Russian
government. Other American athletes were also cheated, like
Chaunte Lowe, who competed in the 2008 Olympic high jump, and
moved from sixth place to third when, in 2016, the top three
finishers--two Russians and one Ukrainian--were disqualified,
eight years after they had stood on the podium and accepted
their medals. Montano and Lowe are just two of many American
athletes who the Russian state has cheated out of Olympic
glory. Ms. Lowe believes she was robbed not just of the glory
of the medal stand, but of the financial opportunity it would
have brought: companies, looking to sponsor her, lost interest
after she failed to medal, and, after her husband was laid off
from his job in 2008, they lost their house to foreclosure.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Chris Perez, ``US Olympian Wants Medal She Had Stolen by
Russian Dopers,'' New York Post, Nov. 9, 2015.
\2\ Rebecca Ruiz, ``Olympics History Rewritten: New Doping Tests
Topple the Podium,'' The New York Times, Nov. 21, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2014, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), an
independent international agency that sets anti-doping
standards, launched an investigation into Russian doping after
a German TV station aired a documentary titled ``The Secrets of
Doping: How Russia Makes its Winners.'' The documentary
``alleged doping practices; corrupt practices around sample
collection and results management; and other ineffective
administration of anti-doping processes that implicate Russia,
. . . the accredited laboratory based in Moscow and the Russian
Anti-Doping Agency (RUSADA).'' \3\ The WADA report, released in
November 2015, mentions secret recordings of Savinova which
`'show that [she] has an in-depth knowledge of doping regimes,
dosages, physiological effects of doping and new [performance-
enhancing drugs].'' \4\ The report recommended a lifetime ban
for Savinova and detailed the role of the FSB in the doping
operation: it had set up extensive surveillance in Russia's
main anti-doping laboratory in Moscow and had a significant
presence at the testing laboratory in the Russian city of
Sochi.\5\ As one laboratory worker told WADA investigators,
``[in Sochi] we had some guys pretending to be engineers in the
lab but actually they were from the federal security service.''
\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ World Anti-Doping Agency, The Independent Commission Report #1
(Nov. 9, 2015).
\4\ Ibid. at 262.
\5\ Ibid.
\6\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After a disappointing performance by Russian athletes at
the 2010 Winter Olympics, and having spent over $50 billion on
infrastructure for the 2014 games in Sochi (with up to $30
billion of that allegedly stolen by businessmen and officials
close to Putin, according to a report authored by murdered
opposition leader Boris Nemtsov), Putin needed good results to
prove to the Russian people that they needed his `'strong hand
at the helm.'' \7\ For the Olympic Games in Sochi, therefore,
it was not enough for the Russian athletes to have been doping
in the months leading up to the competition--they would also
take performance-enhancing drugs during the games.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Alissa de Carbonnel, ``Billions Stolen in Sochi Olympics
Preparations--Russian opposition,'' Reuters, May 30, 2013; Bo
Petersson & Karina Vamling, The Sochi Predicament: Contexts,
Characteristics, and Challenges of the Olympic Winter Games in 2014,
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, at 22 (2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the testing lab in Sochi, photographs show how the FSB
drilled a hole through the wall of the official urine sample
collection room and concealed it behind a faux-wood cabinet.
The hole led to a storage space that Russian anti-doping
officials had converted into a hidden laboratory. From there,
the urine samples were passed to an FSB officer, who took them
to a nearby building, where he unsealed the supposedly tamper-
proof bottles and returned them with the caps loosened. The
bottles were then emptied and filled with clean urine that had
been collected from the athletes before the Olympics. Up to 100
urine samples of Russian athletes were removed in this way,
allowing them to continue to use performance-enhancing drugs
throughout the 2014 Winter Olympics. Of the 33 medals Russia
won during the 2014 Olympics, 11 were awarded to athletes whose
names appear on a spreadsheet detailing the Russian
government's doping operation.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Rebecca Ruiz et al., ``Russian Doctor Explains How He Helped
Beat Doping Tests at the Sochi Olympics,'' The New York Times, May 13,
2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In December 2016, WADA released a second independent report
that found that ``[a]n institutional conspiracy existed across
summer and winter sports athletes who participated with Russian
officials within the Ministry of Sport and its infrastructure .
. . along with the FSB for the purposes of manipulating doping
controls. The summer and winter sports athletes were not acting
individually but within an organised infrastructure.'' Over
1,000 Russian athletes competing in the Olympics and
Paralympics had been involved in the conspiracy.\9\ In an
interview for the 2016 documentary Icarus, the former head of
Russia's anti-doping laboratory, Grigory Rodchenkov, estimated
that of the 154 Russian medalists in the 2008 and 2012
Olympics, at least 70 cheated with performance enhancing drugs.
He confirmed that Russia had ``a state-wide systematic doping
system in place to cheat the Olympics'' and that Putin was
aware of the program.\10\ In remarks that were later retracted
by the Russian government, the acting head of Russia's anti-
doping agency admitted in 2016 that doping among Russian
athletes was ``an institutional conspiracy.'' \11\ Despite the
tremendous amount of forensic evidence proving the conclusions
of the WADA investigations, as well as the resulting decision
by the IOC to ban Russia's official participation in the 2018
Winter Olympics, Putin has steadfastly denied the existence of
a state-sanctioned doping system.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Professor Richard H. McLaren, The Independent Person 2nd
Report, at 1, 5. (Dec. 2016).
\10\ Icarus, Bryan Fogel, Director (2017).
\11\ Rebecca Ruiz, ``Russians No Longer Dispute Olympic Doping
Operation,'' The New York Times, Dec. 27, 2016.
\12\ Marissa Payne, ``Vladimir Putin Says `Current Russian Anti-
Doping System Has Failed,' '' The Washington Post, Mar. 1, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The scale of Russia's cheating in the 2014 Winter Olympics
led 17 of the world's leading anti-doping agencies to request
that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) ban Russia from
the 2018 Winter Olympics, noting that ``a country's sport
leaders and organizations should not be given credentials to
the Olympics when they intentionally violate the rules and rob
clean athletes.'' \13\ In December 2017, Russia became ``the
first country in sporting history to be banned from sending
athletes to an Olympic games for doping,'' when the IOC
declared that athletes could not compete under the Russian
flag, Russian officials could not attend the games, and
Russia's uniform, flag, and anthem also could not appear
anywhere at the 2018 games.\14\ In response, Putin implied the
ban was tied to his still-unannounced reelection campaign,
saying ``When will the Olympics take place? February, isn't it?
And when is the presidential election? March. I suspect that
all of this is done to create conditions on someone's behalf to
provoke sport fans' and athletes' anger that the state
allegedly had something to do with it.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ 13 Sean Ingle, ``Anti-Doping Agencies Call on IOC to Ban
Russia from 2018 Winter Olympics,'' The Guardian, Sept. 14, 2017.
\14\ Murad Ahmed and Max Seddon, ``Russia Banned from Winter
Olympics,'' Financial Times, Dec. 5, 2017; Press Release,
International Olympic Committee, IOC Suspends Rusian NOC and Creates a
Path for Clean Individual Athletes to Compete in Pyeongchang 2018 Under
the Olympic Flag, Dec. 5. 2017.
\15\ Neil MacFarquhar, ``Russia Won't Keep Athletes Home, Putin
Says After Olympic Ban,'' The New York Times, Dec. 6, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin may have also ordered retribution against WADA
and U.S. athletes, among others. Approximately ten months after
the release of the first report, a group of hackers associated
with Russia's military intelligence, commonly known as Fancy
Bear or APT28, broke into WADA's databases.\16\ The hackers
released medical information about several U.S. athletes,
including gymnast Simone Biles and tennis players Venus and
Serena Williams.\17\ Shortly thereafter, the same group of
hackers stole emails from WADA officials and released selected
conversations about Americans and other athletes.\18\ In April
2017, Fancy Bear hackers reportedly breached the International
Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), which had voted to
ban Russia from all international track and field events.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Andy Greenberg, ``Russian Hackers Get Bolder in Anti-Doping
Agency Attack,'' Wired, Sept. 14, 2016. Fancy Bear/APT28 were also
behind hacks that targeted the Democratic National Committee and the
Clinton campaign in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Ibid.
\17\ Ibid.
\18\ Sean Ingle, ``Fancy Bears Hack Again With Attack on Senior
Anti-Doping Officials,'' The Guardian, Nov. 25, 2016.
\19\ Thomas Fox-Brewster, ``Russia's Fancy Bear Hackers are
Stealing Athlete Drug Data Again,'' Forbes, Apr. 3, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After blowing the whistle on the scope of the Russian
doping program, the former head of Russia's anti-doping lab,
Dr. Rodchenkov now appears to be a Kremlin target. Rodchenkov
fled to the United States after resigning from his post in the
wake of the second WADA report, where he is reportedly
cooperating with federal investigators and the IOC. His
whereabouts in the United States are unknown and the Russian
government has announced that he will be arrested if he ever
returns to Russia.\20\ Rodchenkov's application for asylum in
the United States is now complicated by the fact that Russian
authorities charged him with drug trafficking (drug traffickers
are not eligible for political asylum under U.S. law).\21\ The
charge and accompanying arrest warrant were announced on the
same day that Rodchenkov had an asylum interview with U.S.
immigration officials, leading his lawyer, a former federal
prosecutor, to believe that Russian law enforcement authorities
may have been tipped off, stating ``that is a coincidence too
remarkable to believe. It seems fairly clear they were trying
to influence the immigration process.'' \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Oleg Matsnev, ``Russian Court Order Arrest of Doping Whistle-
Blower Who Fled,'' The New York Times, Sept. 28, 2017.
\21\ ``WADA Informant Rodchenkov Faces Drug Trafficking Charges in
Russia,'' RT, Dec. 12, 2017.
\22\ Michael Isikoff, ``As Putin Seethes Over Olympic Ban, Doping
Whistleblower Fears For His Life,'' Yahoo News, Dec. 26, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Putin has asserted, on live television, that Rodchenkov is
``under the control of American special services'' and asked
``what are they doing with him there? Are they giving him some
kind of substances so that he says what's required?'' \23\
According to the Icarus documentary and statements by
Rodchenkov's lawyer, U.S. officials reportedly believe that
Russian agents in the United States may be looking for
Rodchenkov, and that ``there may be a credible threat to his
life.'' \24\ Before he fled, Rodchenkov said that friends
inside the Russian government warned him that the Kremlin was
planning his `'suicide.'' \25\ Rodchenkov's lawyer believes
that Russian officials are seeking to prevent him from
providing further evidence and testimony regarding Russia's
Olympic cheating, and asserts that Russian authorities ``are
lobbying U.S. government officials behind closed doors for his
extradition back to Russia'' and ``if they succeeded, Dr.
Rodchenkov would face death and torture at their hands.'' \26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Des Bieler, ``Vladimir Putin Suggests U.S. is Manipulating Key
Whistleblower on Russian Doping,'' The Washington Post, Dec. 14, 2017.
\24\ Icarus, Bryan Fogel, Director (2017); Michael Isikoff, ``As
Putin seethes over Olympic ban, doping whistleblower fears for his
life,'' Yahoo News, Dec. 26, 2017.
\25\ Grigory Rodchenkov, ``Russia's Olympic Cheating, Unpunished,''
The New York Times, Sept. 22, 2017.
\26\ Statement by Jim Walden, ``Stop Russia's Retaliation Toward a
Whistle-blower,'' Walden Macht & Haran LLP, Dec. 26, 2017, available
at https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1GdkmE4Uwjyt--75BrHodpOTN6-
ADtnEF3?usp=sharing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Russian officials involved in the doping scandal did
not live long enough to tell their role in it. One former head
of RUSADA, Nikita Kamaev, was fired from his post in the
aftermath of the first WADA report. Around that time, Kamaev
approached a newspaper with an offer to ``write a book about
the true story of sport pharmacology and doping in Russia since
1987 while being a young scientist working in a secret lab in
the USSR Institute of Sports Medicine,'' saying that he had
``the information and facts that have never been published.''
\27\ Such a book might have invalidated hundreds of Olympic
medals won by Russian athletes over decades if it could prove
their participation in a state-sponsored doping program. Just a
couple of months later, Kamaev was found dead from ``a massive
heart attack,'' even though colleagues said he had seemed
healthy and never complained about his heart.\28\ A few weeks
earlier, the founding chairman of RUSADA, Vyacheslav Sinev,
also died unexpectedly of ``unknown causes.'' \29\ The current
head of RUSADA, Yuri Ganus, has expressed doubts that both men
died of natural causes, saying, ``it's clear that two people
could not just die like this . . . . I understand that there
was a situation, and the entire anti-doping organization was
disqualified, and in this regard, this is an extraordinary
fact.'' \30\ While Kamaev was fired by Putin and lost his life
shortly thereafter, his superior, Vitaly Mutko, the Minister of
Sport who oversaw the entire doping conspiracy, was promoted to
Deputy Prime Minister.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ ``Late Russian Anti-Doping Agency Boss Was Set to Expose True
Story,'' Reuters, Feb. 20, 2017.
\28\ ``Russia Anti-Doping Ex-Chief Nikita Kamaev Dies,'' BBC News,
Feb. 15, 2016.
\29\ Andrew Kramer, ``Nikita Kamayev, Ex-Head of Russian Antidoping
Agency, Dies,'' The New York Times, Feb. 15, 2016; Michael Isikoff,
``As Putin Seethes Over Olympic Ban, Doping Whistleblower Fears For His
Life,'' Yahoo News, Dec. 26, 2017.
\30\ ``Members of the RUSADA Leadership Died `Not Just So,' ''
Pravada, Sept. 20, 2017 (translated from Russian).
\31\ Rebecca Ruiz, ``Russia Sports Minister Promoted to Deputy
Prime Minister,'' The New York Times, Oct. 19, 2016.
----------
Appendix D: Russia's Security
Services and Cyber Hackers
----------
Russia's security services have worked with and provided
protection to criminal hackers for decades, and, according to
some experts, those same hackers are now responsible for nearly
all of the theft of credit card information from U.S.
consumers.\1\ Despite a wealth of evidence, Putin has long
denied any connection between Russia's security services and
cyberattacks on foreign institutions, including the retaliatory
hacks of WADA and the IAAF mentioned in Appendix C, which
cybersecurity experts traced to hackers sponsored by the
Russian government.\2\ Various investigations have uncovered
extensive proof that Russia's security services ``maintain a
sophisticated alliance with unofficial hackers,'' who are often
offered a choice when facing charges for cybercrimes: go to
prison, or work for the FSB.\3\ Some scholars also believe that
groups of unofficial, ``patriotic hackers'' are guided not by
the security services, but by the Presidential Administration
itself.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Interview with Cybersecurity Expert, Sept. 2017; Kara Flook,
``Russia and the Cyber Threat,'' Critical Threats, May 13, 2009,
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russia-and-the-cyber-threat#--
ftnref18. In 2016, more than 15 million U.S. consumers lost more than
$16 billion due to identity theft or credit card fraud. Al Pascual et
al., ``2017 Identity Fraud: Securing the Connected Life,'' Javelin,
Feb. 1, 2017.
\2\ ``APT28: At the Center of the Storm,'' FireEye, Jan. 11, 2017,
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/01/apt28--at--the--
center.html; ``Fancy Bears: IAAF hacked and fears athletes' information
compromised,'' BBC, Apr. 3, 2017.
\3\ Andrei Soldatov & Irina Borogan, The New Nobility: The
Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the
KGB, PublicAffairs, at 227 (2010); ``APT28: At the Center of the
Storm,'' FireEye, Jan. 11, 2017. https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-
research/2017/01/apt28--at--the--center.html; Kara Flook, ``Russia and
the Cyber Threat,'' Critical Threats, May 13, 2009.
\4\ Andrei Soldatov & Irina Borogan, The New Nobility: The
Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the
KGB, PublicAffairs, at 223 (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of Russia's oldest and most sophisticated cybercrime
groups is known as the Russian Business Network (RBN). Before
it went underground in 2007, RBN was a global hub that provided
Internet services and was ``linked to 60 percent of all
cybercrime.'' \5\ RBN is still involved in the full gamut of
cybercrimes, including extortion, credit card theft, drug
sales, weapons smuggling, human trafficking, prostitution, and
child pornography.\6\ Verisign, a major internet security
company, has referred to the RBN as ``the baddest of the bad,''
and many researchers describe RBN ``as having the best malware,
the best organization.'' \7\ RBN is also rumored to have
connections to powerful politicians in St. Petersburg and
possibly now Moscow. In addition, one of its members is
reportedly a former lieutenant colonel in the FSB.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Kara Flook, ``Russia and the Cyber Threat,'' Critical Threats,
May 13, 2009.
\6\ Interview with Cybersecurity Expert, Sept. 2017.
\7\ ``A Walk on the Dark Side,'' The Economist, Aug. 30, 2007;
Richard Stiennon, ``Is Russia Poised to Retaliate Against Sanctions
With Cyber Attacks?'' Security Current, Aug. 7, 2014, https://
www.securitycurrent.com/en/writers/richard-stiennon/is-russia-poised-
to-retaliate-against-sanctions-with-cyber-attacks.
\8\ Kara Flook, ``Russia and the Cyber Threat,'' Critical Threats,
May 13, 2009. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russia-and-the-
cyber-threat#--ftnref13
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cybersecurity experts have blamed Putin's government and
the FSB for giving protection to the RBN,\9\ who, according to
Verisign, ``feel they are strongly politically protected. They
pay a huge amount of people.'' \10\ Some analysts assert that
the FSB's protection comes with a quid pro quo--when tasked,
the RBN is expected to carry out the FSB's orders. In 2014, as
the United States was considering sanctions against the Russian
government for its illegal annexation of Crimea, one expert's
sources told him there were indications that ``the Kremlin will
unleash the RBN if [U.S.] sanctions pass a certain threshold.''
\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Brian Krebs, ``Wishing an (Un)Happy Birthday to the Storm
Worm,'' The Washington Post, Jan. 17, 2008.
\10\ ``A Walk on the Dark Side,'' The Economist, Aug. 30, 2007.
\11\ Richard Stiennon, ``Is Russia Poised to Retaliate Against
Sanctions With Cyber Attacks?'' Security Current, Aug. 7, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, FSB officials
and hackers worked together to steal data from approximately
500 million Yahoo accounts--a cybercrime that cost the American
company hundreds of millions of dollars.\12\ Instead of working
with U.S. officials to target the hackers, the FSB officials--
who belonged to a unit that is the FBI's liaison on cybercrime
in Russia--worked with the hackers to target U.S.
officials.\13\ They used the stolen account information to
target Russian journalists critical of the Kremlin as well as
American diplomatic officials, and gained access to the content
of at least 6,500 accounts.\14\ The case was just one of many
that showed how Russian intelligence agencies ``piggyback'' on
hackers' criminal operations as ``a form of cheap intelligence
gathering.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers
and Their Criminal Conspirators for Hacking Yahoo and Million of Email
Accounts (Mar. 2017); Ingrid Lunden, ``After Data Breaches, Verizon
Knocks $350M Off Yahoo Sale, Now Valued at $4.48B,'' Tech Crunch, Feb.
21, 2017.
\13\ Aruna Viswanatha & Robert McMillan, ``Two Russian Spies
Charged in Massive Yahoo Hack,'' The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 15,
2017.
\14\ Ibid.
\15\ Michael Schwirtz, ``U.S. Accuses Russian Email Spammer of Vast
Network of Fraud,'' The New York Times, Apr. 10, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FSB also reportedly received piggyback rides from
Evgeniy Bogachev, whom the FBI calls the ``most wanted
cybercriminal in the world,'' and who was sanctioned by the
U.S. Treasury Department in December 2016 for engaging in
`'significant malicious cyber-enabled misappropriation of
financial information for private financial gain.'' \16\
Despite his most-wanted status in the United States and several
other countries, Bogachev is living openly in a Russian resort
town on the Black Sea, from where he reportedly works ``under
the supervision of a special unit of the FSB.'' \17\ U.S. law
enforcement has accused Bogachev of running a network of up to
a million virus-infected computers, across multiple countries,
which he has used to steal hundreds of millions of dollars.\18\
Cybersecurity investigators noticed in 2011 that infected
computers controlled by his network were being mined for
information related to political events. For example, after the
U.S. government agreed to arm Syrian opposition groups,
computers in Turkey that were part of Bogachev's zombie network
began to receive search requests for terms like ``arms
delivery'' and ``Russian mercenary.'' \19\ Later, searches
related to Ukraine sought information on government security
officials and even looked for documents that had the English
phrase ``Department of Defense.'' Given the stark difference
from standard criminal searches on computers controlled by
Bogachev and those searches, analysts believe that the purpose
was espionage, and were likely a result of cooperation with
Russian intelligence services.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Michael Schwirtz, ``U.S. Accuses Russian Email Spammer of Vast
Network of Fraud,'' The New York Times, Apr. 10, 2017; Press Release,
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Two Individuals for
Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities, Dec. 29, 2016.
\17\ Ibid.
\18\ Ibid.
\19\ Ibid.
\20\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bogachev also sold malware on the dark web, which often
functions as an underground marketplace for cyber criminals.
The New York Times has reported that some of the Russian hacker
forums on the dark web explicitly state what kinds of
cybercrime--such as bank fraud, drug sales, and
counterfeiting--are permitted, with the sole exception that no
targets can be in Russia or post-Soviet states. The rule among
Russian hackers is ``Don't work in the .RU'' (.RU is the top-
level country domain for Russia, meaning firms and banks in the
country are off-limits), and breaking that rule results in a
lifetime ban from many of the Russian hacker dark web
forums.\21\ One forum, for example, offered classes on how to
steal credit cards, with ``the strict rule that course
participants do not target Russian credit cards.'' \22\ The FBI
has found that, instead of closing down these forums, the FSB
has infiltrated them. FBI agents have even seen a Russian
hacker they were investigating give a copy of his passport to a
suspected Russian intelligence agent, implying that the state
was likely either recruiting or protecting the hacker.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ ``America's Hunt for Russian Hackers: How FBI Agents Tracked
Down Four of the World's Biggest Cyber-Criminals and Brought Them to
Trial in the U.S.,'' Meduza, Sept. 19, 2017, https://meduza.io/en/
feature/2017/09/19/america-s-hunt-for-russian-hackers; Michael
Schwirtz, ``U.S. Accuses Russian Email Spammer of Vast Network of
Fraud,'' The New York Times, Apr. 10, 2017.
\22\ John Simpson, ``Russian Hackers Offer Courses in Credit-Card
Theft on the Dark Web,''The Times, Jul. 19, 2017.
\23\ Michael Schwirtz and Joseph Goldstein, ``Russian Espionage
Piggybacks on a Cybercriminal's Hacking,'' The New York Times, Mar. 12,
2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another notorious Russian hacker operating under the
protection of the security services was Roman Seleznev, who
targeted small businesses in U.S. cities like Washington, D.C.,
going after pizzerias, burrito shops, and bakeries. After U.S.
law enforcement agents went to Moscow to present the FSB with
evidence of Seleznev's crimes, his online presence vanished,
suggesting that FSB officials had warned Seleznev that
Americans were tracking him. U.S. prosecutors then concluded
that ``further coordination with the Russian government would
jeopardize efforts to prosecute this case.'' \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Goldman, Adam & Matt Apuzzo. ``U.S. Faces Tall Hurdles in
Detaining or Deterring Russian Hackers.'' The New York Times, Dec. 15,
2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A few years later, Seleznev re-emerged with the launch of a
website that U.S. officials say ``reinvented the stolen credit
card market'' and offered millions of stolen credit card
numbers that could be searched and selected by customers based
on credit card company and financial institution. Seleznev was
careful to travel only to countries without extradition
treaties with the United States, but State Department diplomats
convinced officials in the Maldives, where he was vacationing,
to detain and transfer him to U.S. custody. Russia's foreign
ministry labeled the arrest an ``abduction,'' though the
Russian government's true cause for alarm might have been for
different reasons; in intercepted emails, Seleznev reportedly
claimed that the FSB knew about his identity and activities and
was giving him protection.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ ``America's Hunt for Russian Hackers: How FBI Agents Tracked
Down Four of the World's Biggest Cyber-Criminals and Brought Them to
Trial in the U.S.,'' Meduza, Sept. 19, 2017, https://meduza.io/en/
feature/2017/09/19/america-s-hunt-for-russian-hackers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. authorities found that Seleznev, while under the
protection of Russia's security services, had breached point-
of-sale systems (typically a cash register with a debit/credit
card reader) at more than 500 U.S. businesses and had stolen
millions of credit card numbers between 2009 and 2013, which he
then bundled and sold on the dark web to buyers who used the
card information for fraudulent purchases.\26\ Another Russian
hacker who stole credit card numbers, Dmitry Dokuchaev,
reportedly had his prosecution in Russia for credit card fraud
dismissed after he agreed to work for the FSB.\27\ According to
the U.S. Department of Justice, as an FSB officer Dokuchaev
allegedly ``protected, directed, facilitated, and paid criminal
hackers'' responsible for the breach of Yahoo customer data,
which was also used to obtain credit card account
information.\28\ One expert asserts that hackers from Russia
and Eastern Europe are now responsible for nearly 100 percent
of all theft of consumers' payment card information at U.S.
vendors' point-of-sale systems, and that 90 percent of that
theft could be prevented by stopping only about 200 people, who
are mostly hackers who got their start with the RBN in the late
1990s and act as force multipliers.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``Russian Cyber-Criminal Sentenced
to 27 Years in Prison for Hacking and Credit Card Fraud,'' Apr. 21,
2017. In April 2017, Seleznev was sentenced to 27 years in prison.
Ibid.
\27\ Andrew Kramer, ``Hacker is a Villain to the United States, for
Different Reasons,'' The New York Times, Mar. 15, 2017.
\28\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``U.S. Charges Russian FSB
Officers and Their Criminal Conspirators for Hacking Yahoo and Millions
of Email Accounts,'' Mar. 15, 2017.
\29\ Interview with Cybersecurity Expert, Sept. 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hackers from Russia and Eastern Europe often target point-
of-sale systems at small U.S. businesses, such as restaurants,
retailers, and car washes. And the buyers of that stolen
information are mostly here in the United States.\30\ Once
hackers steal the credit card information from these vendors,
they bundle it together with other stolen cards and sell or
auction them off on underground websites. For example, police
in New England spearheaded an investigation that found that 40
car washes across the country had been hacked at their point-
of-sale systems, resulting in the theft of ``countless''
customer credit and debit cards. The information from those
cards were then sold to U.S. buyers, who used it to re-encode
gift cards and make fraudulent purchases of several thousands
of dollars at stores such as Target. According to one of the
detectives leading the case, all of the suspects using the
fraudulent gift cards ``are Blood gang members. And they're
starting to work smarter, not harder.'' \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Selena Larson, ``Cybercriminals Can Take a Class on Stealing
Credit Cards,'' CNN Tech, Jul. 19, 2017.
\31\ ``Card Wash: Card Breaches at Car Washes,'' Krebs on Security,
June 23, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. law enforcement officials and cybersecurity experts
across the board have seen a large uptick in American street
gangs using fraudulent purchases to fund their activities.
According to the chief of the New York Police Department,
``these gang members are tech-savvy.'' \32\ As in the case
above, stolen credit cards are used to buy gift cards and big-
ticket items like large-screen televisions and iPads, which are
then sold and the profits are used to fund weapon and drug
purchases. In New York City in 2016, hundreds of gang members
were arrested in possession of stolen credit card information,
something that officials say ``almost never happened'' just
five years ago, with ``gangs using credit card fraud to finance
their violent activity [becoming] more of a trend over the last
five years.'' \33\ In one case, 35 people affiliated with a
Brooklyn street gang were ``arrested for allegedly financing
violent crimes with elaborate credit card fraud schemes.'' \35\
The suspects reportedly purchased more than 750 credit card
numbers from the dark web and used them to make purchases
ranging from American Girl dolls to guns.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Jonathan Dienst & David Paredes, ``Violent Drug Gangs
Increasingly turn to Credit Card Theft as Big Moneymaker,'' NBC New
York, Feb. 7, 2017.
\33\ Ibid.; Ida Siegal, ``Brooklyn Gang Members Used Fake Credit
Cards to Buy American Girl Dolls, Guns: Officials,'' NBC New York,
Dec. 13, 2016.
\34\ Ibid.
\35\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cyber hacking facilitated by Russian security services
enables a host of illicit activity and inflicts cascading harm
on U.S. consumers and businesses. The FSB provides hackers with
immunity from domestic prosecution in exchange for the
occasional use of their computer networks and hacking expertise
for espionage or information operations. Under this protection,
the Russian hackers' criminal activities include stealing the
banking information of U.S. consumers with complete impunity
and posting it for sale on the dark web. That information is
increasingly purchased by U.S. street gangs, who use it to make
fraudulent purchases that are, in turn, used to fund gang and
other criminal activities. This sequence shows that the cyber
hacking activities of the FSB, carried out with Putin's
knowledge and approval and often in concert with criminal
hackers, are harming the financial and physical security of
Americans in the United States.
----------
Appendix E: Attacks and Harassment
Against Human Rights Activists
and
Journalists Inside Russia
----------
Human rights activists and independent journalists inside
the Russian Federation have often become the victims of violent
attacks and harassment on account of their work. While a state
role in individual attacks is not always visible, the general
impunity with which these attacks have occurred reflect the
government's failure to uphold the rule of law and ensure
justice for victims. This climate of impunity perpetuates an
environment hospitable to further attacks.
For example, in July 2009, Natalia Estemirova, a well-known
researcher with the Russian human rights group Memorial, who
had worked extensively on documenting human rights abuses in
the North Caucasus, was kidnapped by assailants in front of her
home in Chechnya and her murdered body was later found in
neighboring Ingushetia.\1\ Authorities later claimed they
killed the perpetrator in a shootout, but Estemirova's family
and associates have long questioned the evidence supporting the
official version of events.\2\ No individuals have been
convicted in connection with her killing. In February 2012,
Memorial activist Philip Kostenko was beaten by two unknown
assailants in a park, suffering a concussion and a broken leg,
and was reportedly pressured by police while en route to the
hospital to sign a document pledging not to file a police
report.\3\ In March 2016, two employees of the Committee for
the Prevention of Torture, traveling with foreign journalists
on a monitoring trip through Russia's North Caucasus, were
hospitalized after being beaten by masked men wielding baseball
bats, who later set their bus on fire.\4\ The head of the
Committee, Igor Kalyapin, was attacked a week later in the
Chechen capital of Grozny, where local authorities investigated
but never filed charges.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Russian Activist Natalia Estemirova Found Dead,'' The
Telegraph, July 15, 2009.
\2\ Eline Gordts, ``Russia's Investigation of Opposition Murders
Does Not Bode Well For Nemtsov Case,'' Huffington Post, Mar. 6, 2015.
\3\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2012: Russia, at 4.
\4\ ``Russia: Journalists, Activists Attacked in North Caucasus,''
Human Rights Watch, Mar. 9, 2016.
\5\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2016: Russia, at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), a U.S.-based
NGO that analyzes attacks on the press globally, cites at least
58 journalists killed in connection with their work in Russia
since 1992.\6\ The murder in 2006 of Novaya Gazeta reporter
Anna Politkovskaya is particularly emblematic of the threats
that journalists in Russia face. Politkovskaya had written
extensively on state corruption and human rights abuses in
Chechnya, and before her death, had zeroed in on the torture
and killings perpetrated by then Chechen prime minister Ramzan
Kadyrov and his ``Kadyrovtsy'' personal security force. She had
also written extensively on possible FSB connections with
purported Chechen terrorists.\7\ Politkovskaya had reportedly
been threatened directly by Kadyrov when she interviewed him in
2005, and before that was allegedly poisoned on a plane ride to
cover the Beslan terror attacks in North Ossetia in 2004 and
detained by security forces during a 2002 visit to Chechnya.\8\
After she was murdered in the lobby of her apartment building
on October 7, 2006, The New York Times noted that Putin
`'sought to play down Ms. Politkovskaya's influence'' by
describing her reporting as ``extremely insignificant for
political life in Russia'' and saying her death had caused more
harm than her publications.\9\ The investigation into her
murder proceeded slowly, with a series of arrests, releases,
and retrials. Eight years after her death, five Chechen men
were convicted of killing Politkovskaya, with two receiving
life sentences.\10\ A Moscow police officer pleaded guilty in
2012 to providing the murder weapon and surveilling the victim
before her death, receiving a reduced sentence in exchange for
cooperating with authorities. Nevertheless, many observers
alleged that the government's investigation of the murder
stopped short of identifying--or punishing--the masterminds,
and relatives of both Politkovskaya and the Chechen defendants
criticized the trial as bogus.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``58 Journalists Killed in
Russia/Motive Confirmed,'' https://cpj.org/killed/europe/russia
(visited Dec. 5, 2017).
\7\ Scott Anderson, ``None Dare Call It a Conspiracy,'' GQ, Mar.
30, 2017; Claire Bigg, ``Politkovskaya Investigating Chechen Torture At
Time of Death,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Oct. 9, 2006.
\8\ Ben Roazen, ``The Great Cost of Journalism in Vladimir Putin's
Russia,'' GQ, Jan. 13, 2017; Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Anna
Politkovskaya,'' https://cpj.org/data/people/anna-politkovskaya
(visited Dec. 12, 2017).
\9\ Andrew Roth, ``Prison for 5 in Murder of Journalists,'' The New
York Times, June 9, 2014.
\10\ Sergei L. Loiko, ``Five Sentenced In Slaying of Russian
Journalist Anna Politkovskaya,'' Los Angeles Times, June 9, 2014.
Bizarrely, one of the suspected Chechen gunmen was shot in the leg in
2013 on a Moscow street, in what his lawyer alleged was an attempt to
silence him. ``Russia: Chechen Man on Trial in Killing Of Journalist Is
Shot on Moscow Street,'' Reuters, Aug. 16, 2013.
\11\ Sergei L. Loiko, ``Five Sentenced In Slaying of Russian
Journalist Anna Politkovskaya,'' Los Angeles Times, June 9, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional examples of violent attacks against journalists
in Russia include that of Mikhail Beketov, the editor of a
local newspaper in the Moscow suburb of Khimki, who was
brutally attacked in 2008 by unknown assailants who left him
with a crushed skull and broken hands and legs; Beketov was
left in a coma and required a tracheotomy to breathe which left
extensive scarring in his throat.\12\ Prior to the attack,
Beketov had accused the Khimki mayor of corruption in his
decision to build a highway through a forested area of the
city, and he had been targeted for harassment before, including
his car being set on fire and the killing of his dog.\13\ Two
years after the attack, no perpetrators had been arrested--
rather, it was Beketov who was convicted of libel and ordered
to pay damages to the Khimki mayor, though the verdict was
later overturned. Beketov died in 2013 of choking that led to
heart failure, which his colleagues asserted was directly
related to the serious injuries he sustained in the Khimki
attack.\14\ In April 2017, veteran investigative journalist and
co-founder of the Novy Peterburg newspaper, Nikolai
Andrushchenko, died six weeks after he had been badly beaten by
unknown assailants. His colleagues alleged the attack was
related to his coverage of public corruption.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Mikhail Beketov,'' https:/
/cpj.org/killed/2013/mikhail-beketov.php (visited Dec. 12, 2017).
\13\ ``Russian Khimki Forest Journalist Mikhail Beketov Dies,'' BBC
News, Apr. 9, 2013.
\14\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Mikhail Beketov,'' https:/
/cpj.org/killed/2013/mikhail-beketov.php (visited Dec. 12, 2017).
\15\ Jon Sharman, ``Russian Journalist and Putin Critic Dies After
Being Beaten Up by Strangers,'' The Independent, Apr. 19, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond violent attacks, criminal prosecutions have also
been used to silence activists and Kremlin critics. In recent
years, such prosecutions have targeted bloggers, filmmakers,
and social media activists to signal that dissent is as risky
online or in artistic contexts as it is over the air or in
print. For example, blogger Alexey Kungurov was convicted in
December 2016 of inciting terrorism and sentenced to two years
in a penal colony.\16\ His arrest came after he posted a piece
that criticized the Russian military's actions in Syria.\17\
Ukrainian filmmaker Oleg Sentsov, who had peacefully protested
the Russian annexation of his native Crimea, was detained by
Russian authorities in the occupied territory of Ukraine and
transferred to Russia for trial on a range of terrorism-related
charges. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment in August
2015.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ PEN America, ``Alexey Kungurov,'' https://pen.org/advocacy-
case/alexey-kungurov (visited Dec. 12, 2017).
\17\ Ibid.
\18\ Sophia Kishkovsky, ``Russia Gives Ukrainian Filmmaker Oleg
Sentsov a 20-Year Sentence,'' The New York Times, Aug. 25, 2015.
----------
Appendix F: Flawed Elections in the
Russian Federation Since 1999
----------
The conduct of democratic elections inside the Russian
Federation has steadily deteriorated since Vladimir Putin came
to power in 1999, as documented by repeated international
election observation missions to the country. Coupled with the
Russian government's growing efforts to suppress dissent
broadly, the right of Russian citizens to choose their own
government in free and fair elections has been increasingly
stifled. After the upheaval of the 1990s and the beginning of
the country's post-Communist transition, observers from the
OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) described the December 1999 Duma elections as
`'significant progress for the consolidation of democracy in
the Russian Federation'' and noted a ``competitive and
pluralistic'' process.\1\ Barely three months later, after
President Yeltsin had resigned and handed the reigns to Putin
as acting president, the ODIHR observation mission expressed
concerns over improper campaigning by state and regional
officials and the limited field of candidates.\2\ By 2003,
ODIHR noted the Duma elections ``failed to meet many OSCE and
Council of Europe (COE) commitments for democratic elections''
and called into question ``Russia's fundamental willingness to
meet European and international standards for democratic
elections.'' \3\ The assessment of the 2004 presidential
election was equally bleak, finding that ``a vibrant political
discourse and meaningful pluralism were lacking'' and citing
problems with the secrecy of the ballot and the biased role of
the state-controlled media.\4\ There was no ODIHR assessment
for the 2007 Duma elections, in which the United Russia party
won a two-thirds constitutional majority, because the 70 would-
be observers were denied visas, leaving them with insufficient
time for meaningful election observation and leading ODIHR to
scrap its mission.\5\ Similarly, ODIHR said it could not
observe the 2008 presidential election in Russia because of
``limitations'' placed by the government on the planned
observer mission.\6\ The U.S. State Department cited the
Russian government's ``unprecedented restrictions'' on ODIHR
and noted that international observers who did witness the poll
deemed it unfair, given frequent abuses of administrative
resources, a heavily biased media environment, and restrictive
changes to the election code.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The International Election Observation Mission--Russian
Federation, 19 December 1999 Election of Deputies to the State Duma
(Parliament), Preliminary Statement, Dec. 20, 1999 at 1.
\2\ The International Election Observation Mission--Russian
Federation, 26 March 2000 Election of President, Statement of
Preliminary Findings & Conclusions, Mar. 27, 2000 at 1.
\3\ The International Election Observation Mission--Russian
Federation, 7 December 2003 State Duma Elections, Statement of
Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Dec. 8, 2003 at 1.
\4\ The International Election Observation Mission--Russian
Federation, 14 March 2004 Presidential Election in the Russian
Federation, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Mar. 15,
2004 at 7-8.
\5\ ``Election Observers Unwelcome,'' Spiegel Online, Nov. 16,
2007.
\6\ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, ``OSCE/
ODIHR Regrets that Restrictions Force Cancellation of Election
Observation Mission to Russian Federation,'' Feb. 7, 2008.
\7\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2008: Russia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The COE, the only outside body to field observers in the
2008 presidential election, heavily critiqued the election and
lamented the absence of ODIHR observers. The COE called the
2008 poll ``more of a plebiscite'' than a genuine democratic
exercise, citing the Kremlin's deliberate exclusion of the lone
democratic challenger Mikhail Kasyanov, a former Prime Minister
dismissed by Putin in 2004; the uneven media access favoring
candidate (and Putin's preferred successor) Dmitry Medvedev;
and the pressure placed by regional and local officials on
public sector workers to vote for Medvedev.\8\ While ODIHR has
since conducted election observation missions in Russia, the
OSCE has assessed that ``the convergence of the State and the
governing party'' in elections fails to reflect genuine
choice.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Luke Harding, ``Russia Election Not Free or Fair, Say
Observers,'' The Guardian, Mar. 3, 2008.
\9\ The International Election Observation Mission--Russian
Federation, 4 December 2011 State Duma Elections, Statement of
Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Dec. 5, 2011 at 1.
----------
Appendix G: Harsh Treatment
of LGBT Individuals and Women
in the Russian Federation
----------
President Putin has fueled culture wars to draw a
distinction between Russian ``traditional values'' and the
purported decadence and corruption of the West. The results
have been particularly acute in the state's treatment of
private and domestic life, including of lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT) individuals and women. A series of anti-
LGBT laws introduced at regional levels in Russia in 2003 and
2006 and at the federal level in 2013 essentially prohibit the
public mention of homosexuality, including ``promoting non-
traditional sexual relationships among minors'' and drawing a
`'social equivalence between traditional and non-traditional
sexual relationships.'' \1\ Russia's anti-LGBT law also
inspired copycat legislation that has been adopted or is
pending in Lithuania, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova, and
that was introduced but ultimately withdrawn or failed in
Latvia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Kazakhstan.\2\ In 2017, the
European Court of Human Rights ruled that Russia's ``gay
propaganda'' law, as it has often been called, was
discriminatory and violated free expression.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sewell Chan, ``Russia's `Gay Propaganda' Laws Are Illegal,
European Court Rules,'' The New York Times, June 20, 2017.
\2\ Human Rights First, ``Spread of Russian-Style Propaganda Laws:
Fact Sheet'' July 11, 2016.
\3\ European Court of Human Rights, ``Legislation in Russia Banning
the Promotion of Homosexuality Breaches Freedom of Expression and is
Discriminatory, June 20, 2017. Sewell Chan, ``Russia's `Gay Propaganda'
Laws Are Illegal, European Court Rules,'' The New York Times, June 20,
2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the years since its passage, the gay propaganda law has
fueled violent recriminations against LGBT activists in Russia.
The Russian LGBT Network, an NGO, used Russian government data
to calculate that 22 percent of all hate crimes in 2015 were
directed at LGBT persons.\4\ Press reports after the passage of
the gay propaganda law cited harrowing examples of ``homophobic
vigilantism'' in which ``emboldened'' right-wing groups would
lure LGBT individuals to trick meetings via social media and
then attack or humiliate them on camera.\5\ One Russian LGBT
activist noted that, of 20 such incidents his organization had
tracked, only four were investigated and just one resulted in a
court case.\6\ More recently, reports emerged in early 2017 of
a systematic campaign to round up and repress gay men in
Chechnya, allegedly at the instruction of the powerful speaker
of the Chechen parliament.\7\ Some NGOs estimate that as many
as 200 individuals were detained in the campaign and subjected
to various forms of torture, threatened with exposure to their
families and honor killings, and pressured to give up the names
of other gay men.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Russian LGBT Network, ``22% of Hate Crimes In Russia Are
Committed Against LGBT,'' https://www.lgbtnet.org/en/content/22-hate-
crimes-russia-are-committed-against-lgbt (visited Dec. 31, 2017).
\5\ Alec Luhn, ``Russian Anti-Gay Law Prompts Rise in Homophobic
Violence,'' The Guardian, Sept. 1, 2013.
\6\ Ibid.
\7\ Human Rights Watch, They Have Long Arms and They Can Find Me:
Anti-Gay Purge by Local Authorities in Russia's Chechen Republic, at
1, 16, 19 (May 2017).
\8\ Interviews by Committee Staff with U.S. NGOs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The politicization of traditional family values in Russia
has also influenced the state's policies regarding the
treatment of Russian women. According to Russian government
statistics from 2013, Russian women are victims of crime in the
home at disproportionately high rates, while 97 percent of
domestic violence cases do not reach court.\9\ Against this
bleak backdrop, the parliamentarian who introduced the original
2013 gay propaganda law also introduced a law in 2017 dubbed
the `'slapping law'' to reduce punishments for spousal abuse to
a misdemeanor and administrative offense.\10\ The law was
adopted by a vote of 380 to 3 in the Duma and signed by
President Putin in February 2017, decriminalizing a first
instance of domestic violence if the victim is not seriously
injured; some observers have noted its passage was hastened by
support from the Russian Orthodox Church.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2016: Russia, at 56.
\10\ Sadie Levy Gale, ``Russian Politician Behind Anti-Gay Law
Wants to Decriminalise Domestic Violence,'' Independent, July 28, 2016.
\11\ Tom Balmforth, ``Russian Duma Approves Bill to Soften Penalty
for Domestic Violence,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty, Jan.
27, 2017; Claire Sebastian & Antonia Mortensen, ``Putin Signs Law
Reducing Punishment for Domestic Battery,'' CNN, Feb. 7, 2017.
----------
Appendix H: Disinformation Narratives,
Themes, and Techniques
----------
The Kremlin promotes a variety of anti-Western and pro-
Russian ``master narratives'' across its propaganda platforms,
both within Russia and abroad. Russian government propagandists
subscribe to these narratives and follow them to craft and
frame disinformation campaigns that advance the Kremlin's
positions and interests. One study commissioned in 2012
identified several master narratives employed by Kremlin
propagandists, including:
Savior of Europe: Russia has been Europe's savior for over
200 years, ever since Alexander II stopped Napoleon's
armies from dominating Europe in 1812. Russia also
saved Europe from the Nazis, and Western nations tend
to minimize this achievement. Russia should proudly
assert its people's heroism to get the recognition it
deserves and be admired as a great power.
Eurasian Bridge: Russia was founded as a great civilization
that acted as a bridge between East and West. The
collapse of the Soviet Union, which went from the
Baltic Sea to the Bering Strait, created a vacuum in a
region that it is Russia's destiny to shape and lead.
Russia has to advance its cultural, economic, and
diplomatic relationships to forge a new regional union
that can rival the other global powers.
Catching Up with Rivals: In the 1990s, Russia tried to
emulate the unfettered capitalism of the West, causing
it to fall from its status as a global economic and
cultural leader. Putin and Medvedev returned Russia to
the path of prosperity and moved to modernize the
economy beyond natural resources by harnessing the
entrepreneurship and innovation of the Russian people.
Russia must continue to follow this path toward a
modern economy to remain strong and catch up to the
other global powers.
Fortress Russia: For centuries, Russia has been attacked on
all fronts by imperial powers seeking to expand their
borders, from Japanese fleets in the east to Nazi
armies in the west. Now the United States, NATO, and
Europe are conspiring to surround Russia and keep it
from becoming an equal power. But Russia has and always
will defend itself and will continue to hold its ground
against aggressors that seek to weaken it.
Good Tsar: Russia is at its best under the leadership of
strong leaders like Peter the Great that bring order
and stability. Western puppets like Boris Yeltsin were
weak and let Russia descend into chaos during the
1990s. But after Putin came to power, order and
stability returned. The Russian people should place
their trust in the Kremlin and be wary of its critics,
who seek to return Russia to chaos.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Monitor 360, Master Narrative Country Report Russia (Feb.
2012). Government Accountability Office, U.S. Government Takes a
Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformation Overseas, at 63
(May 2017).
Within these master narratives there are numerous prominent
themes, which are adaptable to current events. A GAO analysis
of over 2,000 Russian disinformation stories in Europe from
November 2015 to December 2016 identified several commonly used
narratives.\2\ The examples below show that some of these
narratives are explicitly pro-Russia, while others do not
mention Russia at all:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Government Accountability Office, U.S. Government Takes a
Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformation Overseas, at 67
(May 2017).
Western entities are Russophobic: The West banned Russian
athletes from the 2016 Olympic as part of its hybrid
war against Russia, and the United States and NATO are
preparing to destroy Russia after successfully causing
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Russia is a victim of the West, and Western media are anti-
Russian or purposely spread disinformation and
propaganda: Media in the West falsely accuse the
Russian government of spreading disinformation,
supplying the missile that shot down Malaysian Airlines
Flight 17, killing civilians in Syria, and murdering
Alexander Litvinenko. The West is also trying to
provoke Russia into starting a new war and falsely
blames Russia for acts of aggression.
Russia is the world's protector: Russian soldiers came to
the aid of Crimea's Russian-speaking people when they
were threatened by Ukrainian soldiers, and by annexing
the peninsula Russia saved Crimea from war. In Syria,
Russia's military intervention made terrorists agree to
a truce.
Some Western entities support Russia or Russia's positions:
One in three Europeans consider Crimea a part of Russia
and some European countries recognize Crimea as part of
Russia. The U.S. media revered the outcomes of Russia's
military intervention in Syria.
Russia's boundaries are not accurately reflected on maps,
and Russia owns additional lands: Ukraine has always
been a part of Russia and the Baltic countries and
Belarus are also part of Russia.
Russia has not violated international agreements or
international law: Russia did not annex Crimea--Crimea
was returned to its native land as the result of a
referendum. Russian military aircraft did not break any
rules when they buzzed the U.S. warship Donald Cook.
Western entities are trying to destabilize other regions of
the world: The United States led a violent coup against
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, created ISIS,
and orchestrated the migrant crisis in Europe.
The Ukrainian government is illegitimate and violent: The
Ukrainian government came to power through a coup and
is illegitimate, and Nazis lead the Ukrainian
government, which supports fascist policies and ideas.
EU and/or European governments are unable to manage the
migration crisis or are manipulating the crisis for
other purposes: EU member states cannot protect their
citizens from violent migrants, who are altering
European culture. The EU is taking advantage of the
migrant crisis to create an occupation army that will
be authorized to take control of national borders
without the permission of member states.
The West's values are evil, decadent, etc.: The European
Parliament promotes the gay movement in Europe and is
trying to eliminate male and female gender identities.
The sexual abuse of minors is a state-sponsored
national tradition in Norway and the country's
institution for the protection of children's rights
supports this system.
The EU and/or European governments are American puppets:
The EU was created by the United States to take away
sovereignty from European member states, and Germany
facilitates U.S. hegemony over Europe.
Techniques
Russian government disinformation uses a wide variety of
misleading propaganda techniques to persuade and convince
audiences of its preferred narratives. The Center for European
Policy Analysis has identified over 20 techniques commonly used
by the Kremlin to spread disinformation.\3\ Often, several of
these techniques will be used in combination for a single
article or story that promotes the Kremlin's narrative on a
particular event. These techniques include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Center for European Policy Analysis, ``Techniques,'' http://
infowar.cepa.org/Techniques (visited Dec. 31, 2017).
Ping pong: uses complementary websites to raise the profile
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of a story and get mainstream media to pick it up.
Misleading title: uses facts or statements in a story that
may be correct, but the title is misleading.
Zero proof: provides no sources or proof to validate a
story's facts or statements.
False visuals: similar to false facts, but uses doctored
visual productions to give extra weight to false facts
or narratives.
Totum pro parte or ``the whole for a part'': for example,
using the opinion of just one academic or expert to
portray the official position of a government.
Altering the quotation, source, or context: facts and
statements reported from other sources are different
than the original. For example, a statement will be
attributed to a different person than who actually said
it or a quote is placed out of context to change its
meaning.
Loaded words or metaphors: obscures the facts behind an
event by substituting accurate words with more abstract
ones, for example saying that someone ``died
mysteriously'' rather than ``was poisoned.'' The
Western press has also aided the Kremlin's narrative by
using terms like ``little green men'' instead of
``Russian troops'' in Crimea, thereby maintaining a
seed of doubt as to who they really were.
Ridiculing, discrediting, and diminution: uses ad hominem
attacks and mockery to sideline facts and statements
that run counter to the Kremlin's narratives.
Whataboutism: makes false equivalencies between two
disconnected events to support the Kremlin's policies
and promote its narrative. For example, comparing the
annexation of Crimea to the invasion of Iraq.
Conspiracy theories: use rumors and myths to anger,
frighten, or disgust an audience. Examples include
stories like ``Latvia wants to send its Russian
population to concentration camps,'' or ``The United
States created the Zika virus.'' Another version
reverses the technique, by labeling factual stories as
conspiracies.
Joining the bandwagon: casts a certain view as being that
of the majority of people, thereby giving it more
credibility.
Drowning facts with emotion: a form of the ``appeal to
emotion'' fallacy, which drowns out facts by portraying
a story in such a way as to maximize its emotional
impact. The fake story of a Russian girl being sexually
assaulted by Muslim immigrants in Germany is a good
example, where, even though the story was proven to be
false and widely discredited, it so inflamed people's
emotions that they were distracted from the story's
absence of facts.
----------
Appendix I: Letter from Senator Cardin
to European Ambassadors
----------
The following letter requesting information on the
Russian government's malign influence operations was
sent to more than 40 ambassadors in Washington, D.C.
who represent various European countries. Responses to
this letter helped to inform the findings of this
report.
June 13, 2017
Dear Ambassador, The U.S. intelligence community has
assessed that the Russian government engaged in an influence
campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential election,
including sponsoring and exploiting cyber intrusions and
creating and spreading disinformation. As you know, there are
several investigations underway to determine the scope and
impact of this interference in our democratic process.
However, the Russian government's recent actions were not
the first time it has sought to interfere in the elections of
other states. Over many years, the Russian government has
developed, refined, and deployed its toolkit for malign
influence in Europe and elsewhere. We believe that these
efforts, which seek to erode citizens' confidence in the
credibility of democratic institutions, pose a grave threat to
the national security interests of the United States and our
allies and partners around the world.
The United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee
minority staff, as part of our oversight responsibilities, is
conducting a study of the Russian government's malign influence
operations throughout Europe and other key countries around the
world. To better understand the scope of this threat, we
respectfully request any relevant information from your
government.
Specifically, we are interested in information related to
any of the following activities:
Acquisitions made in your state in economic sectors such as
energy, finance, infrastructure, media, and real estate
by individuals or entities controlled, financed or
affiliated with the Russian government, and who are
known to or alleged to have engaged in corrupt
practices.
Dissemination of disinformation with the intent to
influence and confuse the public debate on issues of
national importance in your state, including attempts
to libel or compromise leading political figures, civil
society activists, and others who the Kremlin may have
deemed a threat to its interests, by individuals or
entities controlled, financed or affiliated with the
Russian government.
Expansion of media organizations into your state's media
markets, including TV, radio, and the internet by
individuals or entities controlled, financed or
affiliated with the Russian government.
Funding, organizational assistance, or other support of any
political parties, civil society groups, or other non-
governmental organizations in your state by individuals
or entities controlled, financed or affiliated with the
Russian government.
Attempts to infiltrate the computer systems of the
government, political parties, civil society groups,
non-governmental organizations, or private enterprises
in your state by individuals or entities controlled,
financed or affiliated with the Russian government,
especially with the intent to steal and disseminate
information to influence public debate.
Any other information that may be relevant or helpful to
our study.
Finally, we are also interested in learning about any
counter-measures that your country has taken to prevent or
respond to these malign influence activities.
We greatly appreciate your assistance in gathering this
information, which will help inform our study and shape our
recommendations for a strong, coordinated response with our
allies and partners.
Sincerely,
Benjamin L. Cardin,
Ranking Member.
[all]