[JPRT, 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ANNUAL REPORT
2021
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ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.cecc.gov
2021 ANNUAL REPORT
44-458 PDF
______
2022
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
ANNUAL REPORT
2021
=======================================================================
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.cecc.gov
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate
House
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon, Chair JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts,
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California Co-Chair
ANGUS KING, Maine THOMAS SUOZZI, New York
JON OSSOFF, Georgia TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
MARCO RUBIO, Florida RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
TOM COTTON, Arkansas CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
STEVE DAINES, Montana BRIAN MAST, Florida
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
MICHELLE STEEL, California
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
To Be Appointed
Matt Squeri, Staff Director
Todd Stein, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Section I. Executive Summary..................................... 1
a. Statement From the Chairs................................. 1
b. Overview.................................................. 3
c. Key Findings.............................................. 8
d. Political Prisoner Cases of Concern....................... 26
e. General Recommendations to Congress and the Administration 34
Section II. Human Rights......................................... 43
Chapter 1--Freedom of Expression............................. 43
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 43
b. Party Control of the Media.............................. 46
c. U.K. Ofcom Revokes CGTN Broadcast License............... 47
d. Harassment and Criminal Detention of Citizen Journalists 48
e. Foreign Journalists and ``The Grim Reality of Reporting
from China Today''....................................... 49
f. Cases of Detained Foreign Journalists and Chinese
Nationals Working with Foreign Media Outlets During 2021
Reporting Year........................................... 51
g. Using Chinese Law to Punish Free Speech and Other
Challenges to Freedom of Expression...................... 51
h. Selected Internet and Social Media Developments......... 53
Chapter 2--Worker Rights..................................... 61
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 61
b. Introduction............................................ 63
c. Absence of Independent Trade Unions..................... 63
d. Continued Suppression of Labor Advocacy................. 63
e. Worker Strikes and Protests............................. 64
f. Social Insurance........................................ 65
g. Migrant Workers and Youth Face High Unemployment as
Overall Unemployment Stabilizes.......................... 66
h. Employment Relationships................................ 66
i. Work Safety and Industrial Accidents.................... 67
j. Occupational Health..................................... 68
Chapter 3--Criminal Justice.................................. 74
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 74
b. Introduction............................................ 77
c. Extrajudicial Detention................................. 77
d. Abuse of Criminal Provisions............................ 79
e. Prolonged Pretrial Detention............................ 81
f. Denial of Counsel and Family Visits..................... 81
g. Denial of Effective Legal Representation................ 82
h. Torture and Abuse....................................... 82
i. Physical Harm........................................... 83
j. Death in Custody........................................ 83
k. Suppression of Reporting on Torture..................... 84
l. Infliction of Psychological Harm........................ 84
m. Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location....... 84
n. The Death Penalty....................................... 85
o. Legal Developments Affecting Minors..................... 85
Chapter 4--Freedom of Religion............................... 93
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 93
b. Introduction............................................ 96
c. International and Chinese Law on Religious Freedom...... 96
d. Regulations and Policies Pertaining to Religious Freedom 97
e. Widespread Violations of Religious Freedom.............. 98
f. Buddhism (Non-Tibetan), Taoism, and Chinese Folk
Religion................................................. 98
g. Islam................................................... 99
h. Christianity--Catholic.................................. 101
i. Status of the Sino-Vatican Agreement.................... 101
j. Christianity--Protestant................................ 103
k. Falun Gong.............................................. 104
l. Other Religious Communities............................. 105
Chapter 5--Ethnic Minority Rights............................ 115
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 115
b. Party and State Policy Toward Ethnic Minorities......... 117
c. Crackdown on Hui Religion and Culture................... 117
d. Protests in the IMAR Over Policy to Reduce Mongolian
Language Instruction in Schools.......................... 117
e. NPCSC Commission's Decision on Language Regulations..... 120
Chapter 6--Population Control................................ 125
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 125
b. Introduction............................................ 127
c. International Standards and China's Coercive Population
Policies................................................. 127
d. Demographic Concerns.................................... 128
e. Coercive Policies Remained, but Unevenly Enforced....... 129
f. Emphasis on ``Quality Population'' Discriminates Against
Certain Groups........................................... 130
g. Human Rights and Humanitarian Concerns.................. 130
Chapter 7--Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally.. 137
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 137
b. Overseas Harassment and Intimidation.................... 140
c. Chilling of Free Speech Through Informal Economic
Coercion and Intimidation................................ 141
d. Informal Economic Coercion: Distinct From Traditional
Sanctions and Tariffs.................................... 141
e. Increasing Use of Formal Sanctions Against Individuals
and Institutions Overseas................................ 143
f. Extraterritorial Application of the Hong Kong National
Security Law............................................. 144
g. Impeding UN Human Rights Bodies and Redefining Global
Human Rights Norms....................................... 145
Chapter 8--Status of Women................................... 150
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 150
b. Introduction............................................ 152
c. Political Participation and the Right to Participate in
Public Life.............................................. 152
d. Discrimination.......................................... 153
e. Gender-Based Violence................................... 153
f. Landmark #MeToo Case Highlights Challenges in Seeking
Redress for Sexual Harassment............................ 156
Chapter 9--Human Trafficking................................. 162
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 162
b. Defining Human Trafficking.............................. 164
c. Trends and Developments................................. 164
d. Forced Labor Onboard Chinese-Flagged Distant-Water
Fishing Vessels.......................................... 165
e. Government Policies and the Risk of Human Trafficking... 166
f. Anti-Trafficking Efforts................................ 168
Chapter 10--North Korean Refugees in China................... 176
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 176
b. Introduction............................................ 178
c. Border Conditions and Forced Repatriation of Refugees... 178
d. Foreign Aid Work........................................ 179
e. Trafficking of North Korean Women....................... 180
f. Forced Labor by North Korean Women Inside China......... 180
g. Children of North Korean and Chinese Parents............ 180
Chapter 11--Public Health.................................... 183
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 183
b. COVID-19 Pandemic....................................... 186
c. Repressing Public Health Advocacy....................... 191
Chapter 12--The Environment and Climate Change............... 199
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 199
b. Introduction............................................ 201
c. The Environment and the Right to Health................. 201
d. Carbon Emissions and the 2022 Olympics.................. 203
e. Suppression of Environmental Advocates and Protests..... 203
f. Transparency and Enforcement............................ 204
Chapter 13--Business and Human Rights........................ 210
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 210
b. Introduction............................................ 213
c. Corporate Involvement in Mass Atrocities in the XUAR.... 213
d. Commercial Firms' Role in Government Data Collection and
Surveillance Across China................................ 216
e. Role of Commercial Firms in Government Censorship....... 217
f. Corporate Censorship and Xinjiang Cotton................ 218
g. Worker Exploitation, Corporate Supply Chains, and
Limited Legal Right to Freedom of Association............ 219
Section III. Development of the Rule of Law...................... 228
Chapter 14--Civil Society.................................... 228
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 228
b. Introduction............................................ 231
c. Comprehensive Campaign to Crack Down on ``Illegal Social
Organizations'' and Eliminate Their ``Breeding Grounds''. 231
d. Foreign NGO Activity in China........................... 232
e. Government Suppression of Civil Society................. 233
f. Shrinking Civic Space................................... 234
g. Status of LGBTQ Persons................................. 235
Chapter 15--Institutions of Democratic Governance............ 243
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 243
b. Introduction............................................ 245
c. Party's Centenary and Continued Expansive Control....... 245
d. Intra-Party Governance.................................. 247
e. Lack of Genuine Political Participation................. 248
f. Amendment of the PRC Organic Law of the National
People's Congress........................................ 248
g. Technology-Based Social Control: Surveillance, Data
Collection, and Big Data................................. 249
h. Social and Development Policies......................... 250
Chapter 16--Access to Justice................................ 259
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 259
b. Introduction............................................ 261
c. Political Control Over the Judiciary.................... 261
d. Persecution of Human Rights Lawyers and Advocates....... 262
e. Citizen Petitioning..................................... 263
f. Citizens' Access to the Court System.................... 263
g. Legal Aid............................................... 263
h. Promulgation and Implications of the New Civil Code..... 264
i. Judicial Transparency................................... 265
j. Renewed Emphasis on Mediation........................... 265
Section IV. Xinjiang............................................. 270
a. Finding & Recommendations............................... 270
b. Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity in the XUAR........ 273
c. Officials Signal Continuation of Harsh Policies in the
XUAR..................................................... 274
d. Authorities Block Information About Conditions in the
XUAR..................................................... 274
e. Reports Reveal Abuses, Harsh Conditions in Mass
Internment Camps......................................... 275
f. High Rates of Imprisonment, Lengthy Prison Terms for
Ethnic Minorities in the XUAR............................ 276
g. Uyghurs Targeted for Forced Organ Removal............... 278
h. Forced Labor Involving Turkic and Muslim XUAR Residents. 278
i. Persecution of Ethnic Minority Women in the XUAR: Rape,
``Homestay'' Programs and Population Control............. 279
j. Women Subjected to Forced Sterilizations, IUD
Insertions, and Abortions................................ 280
k. Forcible Displacement of Ethnic Minority Children....... 281
l. Repressive Surveillance Technology and Security Measures 282
m. Freedom of Religion..................................... 283
Section V. Tibet................................................. 294
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 294
b. Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government
and the Dalai Lama or His Representatives................ 296
c. Tibetan Self-Immolation................................. 296
d. Religious Freedom for Tibetans.......................... 296
e. The Dalai Lama and Reincarnation........................ 298
f. The 11th Panchen Lama................................... 300
g. The Seventh Tibet Work Forum............................ 300
h. Reports of Mass Labor Training and Transfer Programs in
the Tibet Autonomous Region.............................. 301
i. Control of Expression and the Free Flow of Information.. 301
j. Language and Cultural Rights............................ 302
k. Development Policy in Tibetan Areas..................... 303
Section VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau.................. 312
a. Findings & Recommendations.............................. 312
b. Hong Kong............................................... 314
c. Hong Kong's Autonomy: Legal Framework and China's
Position................................................. 314
d. Official Actions Affecting Hong Kong's Autonomy......... 314
e. Arrest of Pro-Democracy Advocates....................... 316
f. Detention of Hong Kong Residents in Mainland China...... 318
g. Authorities' Attempts to Curb Civic Engagement.......... 320
h. Restrictions on Information and Media Freedom........... 322
i. Pressure on the Education Sector........................ 324
j. Macau................................................... 325
Section VII. Additional Views of Commission Members.............. 334
?
VII
--------------------
The Commission's Executive Branch members have participated in
and supported the work of the Commission. The content of
this Annual Report, including its findings, views, legal
determinations, and recommendations, does not necessarily
reflect the views of individual Executive Branch members
or the policies of the Administration.
The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 16 to
0.
Voted to adopt: Senators Merkley, Feinstein, King, Ossoff,
Rubio, Lankford, Cotton, and Daines; and Representatives McGovern,
Suozzi, Malinowski, Wexton, Smith, Mast, Hartzler, and Steel.
Not voting: Representative Tlaib.
Executive Summary
Executive Summary
I. Executive Summary
Statement From the Chairs
On July 1, 2021, Chinese President and Communist Party General
Secretary Xi Jinping commemorated the 100th anniversary of
the Chinese Communist Party with a pugnacious speech
touting ``the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,''
promoting China as a ``new model for human advancement,''
and threatening that any country challenging China would
be met by a ``great wall of steel.'' This Party-led
governance model aims to achieve high-functioning
authoritarianism in complete disregard of the human
spirit. The Party mobilizes the government to silence any
threats to its rule by systematically repressing
internationally recognized human rights. Globally, the
extensive use of economic coercion, strident ``Wolf
Warrior'' diplomacy, and other efforts to amplify the
official narratives give the lie to assurances in Xi's
July 1 speech that the Chinese government does not seek to
bully others.
This year marked another anniversary: the 20th year of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China's assiduous
documentation of human rights and the rule of law in
China. This report surveys a bleak landscape. In addition
to detailing the genocide being perpetrated in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the crushing of Hong
Kong's autonomy, the Commission has over the past year
examined the Chinese government and Communist Party's
violations of China's Constitution and domestic laws as
well as numerous international human rights standards.
Commission research also continues to record in its
Political Prisoner Database more cases of political and
religious imprisonment in China, deaths of political
prisoners, and routine torture of detainees. The report
also highlights myriad ways the people of China speak out,
resist authoritarianism, and advocate for change. From the
ongoing #MeToo movement to delivery drivers organizing on
social media to Tibetan monks practicing their faith, the
people continue to stand up to government repression.
The Commission plays an important role in building a
bipartisan response to these abuses, and this report
outlines practical recommendations for congressional and
executive consideration that we hope will serve as a
roadmap for action--together with allies and partners
around the globe--to stand up for the victims of human
rights abuses. In the 116th Congress, the Commission's
efforts advanced numerous legislative initiatives
promoting human rights in China that were signed into law,
including the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, the Hong
Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, the Protect Hong Kong
Act, the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, and the Tibetan Policy
and Support Act. In the 117th Congress, we plan to build
on this work and advance legislation related to the
repression of ethnic minorities, providing humanitarian
safe haven for those fleeing persecution in China, and
countering the Chinese government's economic coercion.
The swift passage and enactment of the Uyghur Forced Labor
Prevention Act will send an especially critical signal.
This bipartisan legislation ensures that products tainted
by the forced labor of oppressed minorities in China are
not imported into the United States. American supply
chains and businesses cannot be complicit in modern
slavery. American consumers must not be put in the
position of inadvertently purchasing the products of slave
labor.
We believe the United States can be a force for good, both in
our foreign policy and in setting an example by living up
to universally recognized human rights standards at home.
Just as we will not shy away from calling out the Chinese
government and Communist Party's gross violations of these
standards, we condemn the rise of anti-Asian hate crimes,
including both verbal and physical abuse encouraged by
xenophobic and racist rhetoric. We strive to be mindful in
our own use of language to ensure that we do not abet
discrimination, and we encourage our colleagues to do the
same. Our criticism is not of the people of China, whom we
stand with regardless of ethnic, religious, or other
identity in their quest for fundamental human rights and
dignity.
The Commission's task is to shine a light on the abuses
described in this report and help foster collective
action. Ultimately, we strive to lift up the human spirit
in the face of those who would crush it. Few symbols
better represent the spirit of global community than the
Olympic Games. Tragically, the next Winter Olympic Games
are scheduled to begin in Beijing in February in the
shadow of some of the world's most egregious human rights
abuses. This report should serve as a call to action and a
message that the time for business as usual is over.
Sincerely,
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4458.004
Senator Jeffrey A. Merkley Representative James P. McGovern
Chair Co-ChairF 113
Executive Summary
Executive Summary
Overview
As Beijing prepares to host the 2022 Winter Olympic Games,
propaganda cannot divert the world's gaze from the horrors
the Chinese government and Communist Party perpetrate
against
the Chinese people. In 2021, the U.S. State Department
called the treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minority
groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) by
its name: genocide. The members of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China (Commission) unanimously
share this judgment and the view that the Chinese
government's systematic violations of human rights and
failure to fulfill its obligations under international
treaties pose a challenge to the rules-based international
order, requiring a consistent and coordinated response
from the United States and its allies and partners.
Despite the concerted denial of access to the XUAR for
independent human rights monitors and restrictions on
journalists reporting in the region, the Commission found
abundant evidence that Chinese authorities had committed
genocide as outlined by the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Among other
abuses, the Chinese government expanded the footprint of
its system of mass internment camps and prisons, in which
numerous deaths occurred, and systematically separated
ethnic minority children from their families to be placed
in state-run orphanages and boarding schools. The scale
and nature of the persecution left no doubt about the
government's intent to destroy ethnic minority groups and
their way of life in the XUAR.
Many of the most egregious abuses in the XUAR targeted women.
Disturbing reports emerged of the rape of ethnic minority
women by mass internment camp officials and government
employees of intrusive homestay programs. Acts of sexual
violence further extended to an increase in forced
sterilizations, intrauterine device insertions, and
abortions intended to forcibly restrict births among
ethnic minority women. Alarmingly, coercive measures
employed against these populations led to a proportional
drop in birth rates in the XUAR larger than in any other
location in the world since 1950. This decline stood in
stark contrast to government attempts to address a rapidly
aging population and shrinking workforce by encouraging
higher birth rates nationally, including through a new
``three-child policy'' announced in May 2021. The Party's
emphasis on the need to ``improve the quality'' of the
population raised concerns that these disparate population
control policies amounted to eugenics.
The repression of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other ethnic
minorities also relied on the pervasive and systematic use
of forced labor, often under the guise of ``poverty
alleviation'' programs that move individuals both inside
and outside the XUAR. The prevalence of forced labor in a
wide range of industries including cotton harvesting,
solar panel production, apparel, electronics, and personal
protective equipment implicated supply chains around the
world. Some international businesses, seeking to avoid the
reputational damage of complicity in crimes against
humanity and recognizing the impossibility of performing
reliable audits, took steps to distance their brands from
association with production in the XUAR. The U.S.
Government, which since 2017 has listed China as one of
the worst human trafficking offenders in the world,
implemented a series of bans on the import of products
linked to forced labor.
This past year, fears that national security legislation the
Chinese government unilaterally imposed on Hong Kong in
June 2020 would further crush Hong Kong's autonomy and
destroy the ``one country, two systems'' model became
reality. The security law's vague provisions were used to
arrest more than a hundred people for political speech,
assembly, and civic engagement. Demonstrating the sweeping
extraterritorial reach of the law, the Chinese government
invoked it to issue an arrest warrant for an American
citizen and to investigate whether to bring charges
against Danish politicians who assisted a pro-democracy
campaigner in fleeing Hong Kong for Denmark.
The assault on Hong Kong's freedoms reached an unprecedented
level. The Hong Kong government took a series of steps to
deprive pro-democracy voices of the opportunity to compete
in elections, including rewriting the rules for selecting
Hong Kong's Chief Executive and Legislative Council,
disqualifying nominees for office, and postponing
elections. Pressure on independent media also escalated,
epitomized not only by the raid and subsequent closure of
the pro-democracy newspaper Apple Daily but also the
overhaul of the city's public broadcaster, prosecution of
a journalist who investigated allegations of police
misconduct, and the adoption of policies to constrain the
ability of independent journalists to operate freely.
In mainland China, authorities abandoned any pretense that the
Chinese government respects religious beliefs and
practices or ethnic minority cultures in its years-long
campaign of ``sinicization'' requiring greater conformity
with officially sanctioned interpretations of Chinese
culture. In the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region,
authorities required a substantial reduction in the use of
Mongolian-language instruction in schools in favor of
Mandarin Chinese, leading to large-scale protests. For the
first time, authorities appointed an official of Han
Chinese ethnicity with no background in ethnic affairs to
head the State Ethnic Affairs Commission.
Threats to religious freedom continued as officials demolished
places of worship, denied participation in pilgrimages,
intimidated parents and children to deter participation in
religious gatherings, and forced some to renounce their
beliefs. COVID-19 precautions were used as a pretext to
prohibit religious activities, and religious believers
continued to be arrested, with credible reports of torture
in detention. Efforts to suppress Uyghurs and other
Muslims in the XUAR included harsh treatment of Hui
Muslims, the third-largest ethnic minority in China, and
extended to Muslims elsewhere in China.
Tibetans remained another major target of cultural and
religious repression. Contrary to Tibetan Buddhist
practice and teachings, the Chinese government continued
to insist on its own authority to select the next
reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and
labeled him a security threat, punishing Tibetans for
expressing reverence for him. It has been over 11 years
since the Chinese government last conducted negotiations
with the Dalai Lama's representatives. Chinese authorities
enforced heavy restrictions on communications into and out
of Tibetan areas, treating particularly harshly those who
corresponded with Tibetans living outside China. In one
notable instance, following the January 2021 death in
custody of a Tibetan monk, authorities cracked down on the
local community for sharing news of his death on social
media.
The Chinese government took dramatic new steps in its bullying
of critics globally. This campaign targeting governments,
corporations, research institutions, academics,
journalists, and others sought to chill the expression of
political views on a range of issues. After leading
researchers exposed evidence related to atrocities in the
XUAR, the Chinese government subjected them to various
forms of intimidation and harassment, including sanctions,
threats against family members still in China, lawsuits,
and the spread of defamatory materials on major social
media platforms.
In response to actions highlighting human rights abuses in the
XUAR and Hong Kong, the Chinese government sanctioned the
Commission and two of its members, organizations that
support civil society inside mainland China and Hong Kong,
and a range of government officials, think tanks,
businesses, and private citizens from the United States,
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. The
Chinese government also used ``hostage diplomacy'' to
intimidate other governments, exemplified by the detention
and March 2021 closed trial of two Canadian citizens on
spurious charges.
The Chinese government continued to employ one of its most
powerful tools for stifling free expression and shaping
discussion of Chinese government actions in the United
States and elsewhere: economic coercion. This pressure
leverages the attraction of the Chinese market as well as
the global economy's deep ties to supply chains in China
to punish critics and reward self-censorship. In recent
years, the Chinese government levied import restrictions
on products from countries with which China has bilateral
tensions, including Norway, Australia, the Philippines,
and South Korea. The Chinese government also repeatedly
took or threatened to take economic measures against
countries considering restrictions on the Chinese
telecommunications national champion Huawei and against
companies that sought to protect their supply chains from
being tainted by the products of forced labor in the XUAR.
China's economic development at home and promotion of its Belt
and Road Initiative abroad continued to negatively impact
the environment and public health. Most notably, the
construction of coal-fired power plants led to an increase
in carbon emissions and exacerbated air and water
pollution.
The Chinese government's technology-based authoritarianism
underpins the most pervasive surveillance state the world
has ever seen. Authorities embraced technologies such as
artificial intelligence, blockchain, and cloud computing
as part of the high-functioning authoritarianism the
Chinese government seeks to promote around the world.
These technologies also offer the government and Party an
unprecedented degree of control, enabled by the collection
of massive amounts of data from cell phones, DNA, security
cameras, and more. China, projected to have 540 million
surveillance cameras in use in 2021, continued to export
these systems globally, enabling other authoritarian
states.
The Chinese government and Communist Party intensified efforts
to control the media domestically and the China narrative
globally, tightening oversight and management of
journalism in China and censoring content they found
threatening or simply inconsistent with official views.
For the third year in a row, the Reporters Without Borders
Press Freedom Index ranked China 177th out of 180
countries, following its effective expulsion of more than
20 foreign journalists since August 2019. Both foreign
reporters who remain and domestic reporters face
persistent campaigns to discredit them, physical
obstruction, exit bans, and even assault. Long-time
observers of Chinese journalism now see little hope of
reviving the investigative journalism that previously
scored important scoops on public health emergencies,
government corruption, and the environment. Citizen
journalists who have taken up the slack were sentenced for
reporting on topics deemed sensitive by the Chinese
government and Communist Party.
The harm caused by the Chinese government and Communist
Party's active suppression and distortion of information
around COVID-19 and its spread has been incalculable in
terms of loss of life, economic opportunity, and trust in
the government's ability to manage crises. Chinese
authorities' obstruction of a full and transparent
investigation into the initial outbreak by the World
Health Organization severely impeded efforts to determine
the origins of the pandemic, imperiling public health
globally by making it more difficult to prevent future
pandemics.
The space for civil society, already tightly restricted,
narrowed even further. New limitations impeded the
activities of non-governmental organizations, rights
advocates, and citizens seeking redress for losses
suffered during the COVID-19 outbreak as a result of
government censorship and other rights violations. A
crackdown on ``illegal social organizations'' marked a
particularly severe stifling of civil society. The
repression of civil society may also be a factor in the
decline in the number of documented worker strikes for the
third consecutive year, in local officials in Shanghai and
Chengdu pressuring organizers of LGBTQ Pride activities
and intimidating LGBTQ social venues, and in a substantial
number of women's rights advocates reporting curtailment
of their online activity following a coordinated campaign
of harassment. Chinese workers remained unable to organize
or join independent trade unions, and faced punishment if
they attempted to do so, as seen in the detention of a
delivery driver who attempted to organize workers in the
gig economy.
While women in China continued to face discrimination and
harassment, a new Civil Code that became effective in
January 2021 codified, for the first time, the kinds of
conduct that constitute sexual harassment. Nonetheless,
indefinite delays in one of China's most prominent #MeToo
cases may lead to fewer sexual harassment victims deciding
to come forward. Moreover, several high-
profile cases demonstrated the vulnerability of women to
severe domestic violence and sparked public outrage and a
call for better law enforcement and accountability for
domestic violence perpetrators. In political life, women
continued to be excluded from positions of power, with no
women serving on the Politburo Standing Committee, only
one woman serving on the 25-member Communist Party Central
Committee Political Bureau, and few women serving at
senior levels of county, municipal, or provincial
governments.
As the Party marked its 100-year anniversary in 2021, it
launched a series of ideological initiatives to reinforce
central leadership, demanded obedience from private
enterprise, and undertook a widespread campaign to remove
``illegal'' and ``inappropriate'' books from schools and
destroy religious books and media. Among other steps taken
to require loyalty, the National People's Congress amended
its own governing law to further formalize its
subservience to the Party, and the Supreme People's Court
required ``Xi Jinping Thought'' to ``penetrate every
lesson'' in training for judges and candidates for
judicial positions.
Despite official rhetoric touting ``rule-based governance,''
the Chinese government and Communist Party exercised
political control using ill-defined criminal charges to
suppress human rights advocacy and detain ethnic
minorities, critics, and citizens who sought redress for
damages caused by official actions. Arbitrary and
extralegal detention continued unabated. The coordinated
crackdown on human rights lawyers and advocates that began
in mid-2015 now constitutes what a Chinese law expert
called ``a permanent, ongoing process.''
The violations of human rights, failure to uphold Chinese law,
and contravention of international standards documented in
this report illustrate the limitations of the Chinese
government's model of governance in meeting the needs of
the Chinese people and in respecting fundamental rights
both in China and globally. This trampling of the human
spirit calls for the building of coalitions to reject
authoritarianism and provide alternatives that fulfill the
aspirations of all people. Only by working together can
defenders of freedom achieve a better future.
Executive Summary
Executive Summary
Key Findings
Freedom of Expression
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary and
President Xi Jinping stressed the importance of
influencing global public opinion this past year in
advance of the Party's centenary in July 2021 and in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Party and
government leveraged an international media
infrastructure to spread positive propaganda about the
Party and reduce criticism of senior officials. News and
research reports this past year also examined the
widespread dissemination of government and Party
propaganda and disinformation via social media platforms
within China and internationally, including content
related to COVID-19.
Party control of China Global Television Network
(CGTN)--a satellite arm of China's Party- and state-run
broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV)--and the
lack of independent editorial responsibility over CGTN's
material were central to the decision in February 2021
by the Office of Communications (Ofcom), the United
Kingdom television regulator, to revoke CGTN's license-
holder permission to broadcast in the U.K.
Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom
Index continued to rank China among the worst countries
for press freedom in the world--177 out of 180 for the
third year in a row. Chinese laws and regulations
restrict the space in which domestic journalists and
media outlets may report the news, overseen by a system
of censorship implemented by various Party and
government agencies. The Cyberspace Administration of
China has a leading role in regulatory efforts; this
past year, it revised provisions on social media use
that targeted citizen journalists and ``self-media,''
the proliferation of which the government has labeled
``chaotic.''
The government has expelled--or effectively
expelled through visa renewal denials and harassment--at
least 20 foreign journalists since August 2019. Those
who remain, according to a BBC reporter, face ``the grim
reality of reporting from China,'' which includes
official harassment, physical obstruction, surveillance,
and discrediting.
Chinese authorities continued to arbitrarily
detain, and in some cases try and sentence, Chinese
citizens for speech and expression protected by
international human rights standards. In December 2020,
authorities in Shanghai municipality sentenced citizen
journalist Zhang Zhan to four years in prison because of
her video reports in February 2020 from Wuhan
municipality, Hubei province, the epicenter of the
COVID-19 outbreak. In another case, as part of a
nationwide crackdown that started in 2019, authorities
reportedly detained dozens of teenagers and individuals
in their twenties in connection with the website Esu
Wiki, on which a photo had been posted of Xi Mingze,
daughter of Xi Jinping. Authorities sentenced 24 of them
to prison terms, the longest of which was the 14-year
sentence given to Niu Tengyu.
The international non-governmental organization
Freedom House ranked China as the ``worst abuser of
internet freedom for the sixth consecutive year'' in its
2020 internet freedom assessment. This past year, the
Chinese government counteracted the rising popularity of
audio files and audio-only platforms that had created
openings for speech and cross-border conversation.
China's first-ever five-year plan (2020-2025) for the
``rule of law'' likely will entail even more regulatory
measures in information technology, which an observer
suggested may be aimed at positioning China as a leading
voice in international digital law rulemaking.
Worker Rights
Chinese authorities continued to restrict the
ability of civil society organizations to work on labor
issues, by means such as detaining and harassing labor
advocates across China. Examples include labor advocate
Chai Xiaoming, who attempted to organize a trade union
in 2018 and was tried for ``inciting subversion of state
power'' in August 2020, and delivery worker and labor
advocate Chen Guojiang, who conducted online advocacy
highlighting the working conditions of delivery workers
and was detained in February 2021. In addition,
authorities continued to surveil and harass blogger and
citizen journalist Lu Yuyu after he was released in June
2020.
The Hong Kong-based non-governmental organization
China Labour Bulletin (CLB), which compiles data on
worker actions collected from traditional news sources
and social media, documented 800 strikes and other labor
actions in 2020. CLB estimates that they are able to
document between 5 and 10 percent of total worker
actions. Protests across China against wage arrears
included employees of YouWin Education, workers in
factories producing masks, and delivery workers. In
addition, thousands of factory workers protested as part
of a pay dispute with Pegatron, an electronics
manufacturing company.
The Chinese Communist Party-led All-China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) remains the only
trade union organization permitted under Chinese law,
and workers are not allowed to establish independent
unions. In a joint submission to the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Federation for Human Rights and China Labor Watch said
that local unions under the ACFTU ``are often unaware of
labor violations, strikes, and accidents that have
occurred within their respective jurisdictions, and they
are reluctant to provide assistance to workers.''
Criminal Justice
The criminal justice system remained a political
instrument used for maintaining social order in
furtherance of the Chinese Communist Party's coercive
rule. The government punishes criminal acts, but it also
targets individuals who pursue universal human rights,
particularly when they independently organize or
challenge the Party's authority.
Government officials used extrajudicial and
extralegal means--such as mass internment camps, ``black
jails,'' and psychiatric hospitals--to detain members of
ethnic minorities, political dissidents, and people who
sought redress for damages caused by official actions.
Arbitrary detention did not abate despite
official rhetoric promoting ``rule-based governance.''
Authorities labeled rights advocates and dissidents as
criminals, using provisions such as ``endangering state
security'' and other vaguely defined offenses. Also, the
government is increasingly arbitrarily detaining foreign
citizens in an effort to exert diplomatic pressure on
their countries.
Legally recognized forms of detention--such as
``retention in custody'' and ``residential surveillance
at a designated location''--may lend a veneer of
legality but were often arbitrarily applied and used by
officials as cover for secret detentions. Reports
emerged this past year indicating that officials had
tortured individuals while holding them in these forms
of detention.
There also was evidence suggesting that
authorities had used the criminal justice system for
political purposes. In one case, authorities sentenced a
financier to death for non-violent crimes and executed
him within one month, during which two stages of
judicial review allegedly were completed--one by the
provincial high court and one by the Supreme People's
Court. While the exact reason behind the speedy
execution was unclear, the Party's disciplinary
commission issued a memorandum saying that the execution
could set an example of the consequences of rejecting
the Party's leadership.
Freedom of Religion
In the 2021 reporting year, the Chinese
government further intensified a sweeping campaign to
``sinicize'' religion as directed by President and
Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping. The main
imperative of the campaign, wrote one expert, ``is to
homogenize Chinese Culture to make all parts conform to
a Party-led nationalism and to use the full force of the
state to control any dissenting voices.''
Building upon the Regulations on Religious
Affairs (2018) and the Measures on the Administration of
Religious Groups (2020), the National Religious Affairs
Administration implemented new Measures for the
Administration of Religious Personnel, effective May 1,
2021. The new measures include plans to establish a
database of clergy that records their basic information,
rewards and punishments, travel for religious work, and
religious activities. They require clergy to promote the
``sinicization of religion'' and to ``adhere to the
principle of independence and self-management of
religion,'' meaning religious personnel in China must
resist ``domination'' or ``infiltration'' by ``foreign
forces,'' reject unauthorized appointments to leadership
positions made by foreign religious groups or
institutions, and reject domestic or overseas donations
that violate national regulations.
Chinese authorities used the coronavirus disease
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic as a pretext to shut down
religious sites and restrict religious activities,
including online activities, even after other normal
activities in society had resumed.
Authorities in several provinces demolished or
altered Buddhist, Taoist, and Chinese folk religious
temples, sometimes beating local believers who resisted,
and destroyed Buddhist literature and punished
publishers.
The Sino-Vatican agreement on the appointment of
bishops signed in September 2018, and renewed in 2020,
has led to the Holy See's approval of seven Chinese
government-appointed bishops and the joint approval of
five bishops as of July 1, 2021. In spite of the
agreement, the contents of which remain secret,
authorities subjected unregistered (``underground'')
Catholic clergy to detention, surveillance, and removal
from active ministry for resisting pressure to sign an
agreement of separation (i.e., ``independence'') from
the Holy See and register with the government.
Authorities also continued either to demolish church
buildings or to ``sinicize'' them by removing crosses
and other religious symbols, and canceled religious
activities and pilgrimages under the pretext of COVID-19
precautions.
As in previous years, authorities continued to
detain Falun Gong practitioners and subject them to
harsh treatment, with at least 622 practitioners
sentenced for criminal ``cult'' offenses in 2020,
according to Falun Gong news outlet Minghui. Minghui
also reported that Chinese authorities continued to
torture and mistreat practitioners, and that such abuse,
sometimes occurring over several years, caused or
contributed to the deaths of dozens of practitioners in
2020 and 2021.
In addition to committing human rights violations
against Uyghurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, Chinese authorities, in the name of
``sinicizing Islam,'' expanded their suppression of
Muslim groups throughout China to include the Hui,
Utsul, and Dongxiang Muslims. Violations included
demolishing or altering mosques, or placing surveillance
cameras inside them; closing Islamic schools; and
restricting Islamic preaching, clothing, and Arabic
script.
Authorities subjected registered Protestant
churches to human rights violations similar to those
committed against other religious groups and continued
to raid and shut down religious gatherings, demolish or
alter church buildings, and detain, prosecute, and
sentence leaders of unregistered ``house churches.''
Authorities sentenced one Christian online bookseller to
seven years in prison.
Authorities continued to use Article 300 of the
PRC Criminal Law, which forbids ``organizing and using a
cult to undermine implementation of the law,'' to
persecute members of spiritual groups deemed to be
illegal or to be ``cults'' (xiejiao), including the
Church of Almighty God, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the
Association of Disciples.
Ethnic Minority Rights
During this reporting year, the Chinese Communist
Party and government carried out efforts to solidify
their control over the cultural and religious identity
of the country's ethnic minority groups, in
contravention of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law
and international law. Authorities passed regulations in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and the
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) promoting
``ethnic unity,'' a year after authorities passed
similar regulations in the Tibet Autonomous Region
(TAR), in what observers criticized as moves aimed at
eradicating ethnic minority cultures. The Chinese
Communist Party and government, led by President and
Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, carried out policies
to further the ``sinicization'' of religions practiced
by ethnic minority groups, including Islam and Tibetan
Buddhism.
Officials in areas with large Hui populations
continued to implement policies and restrictions
limiting Hui Muslims' ability to practice their religion
and culture. Authorities demolished mosques serving Hui
communities, placed Hui scholars and religious leaders
under detention and surveillance, closed Arabic-language
schools serving Hui students, and ordered the removal of
religious inscriptions written in Arabic on Hui Muslims'
homes and businesses. There is evidence that authorities
have begun using mass surveillance technologies and
systems first implemented in the XUAR in other areas of
the country with sizable Hui populations.
In August 2020, authorities in the IMAR announced
that schools throughout the region that previously
offered instruction in the Mongolian language would be
required, beginning in September, to implement a policy
substantially reducing the amount of Mongolian-language
instruction in elementary and secondary school classes
and replacing it with Mandarin Chinese. Under the new
policy, authorities would, using a phased approach,
begin requiring teachers to use Mandarin Chinese to
teach history, politics, and literature.
Security authorities responded harshly to those
who expressed opposition to the new language policy in
the IMAR, including through detaining and beating
protesters, issuing ``wanted'' notices on social media
for protesters, and visiting the homes of parents to
pressure them to sign pledges committing them to send
their children to school. By mid-September 2020, many
Mongol parents in the IMAR had begun sending their
children back to school because of the threat of
punishment by authorities.
Population Control
Central government authorities rejected calls to
end birth restrictions, even though experts raised
demographic, economic, and human rights concerns about
China's population control policies. In the past, the
Chinese government and Communist Party's enforcement of
birth limitation policies included forced abortion and
sterilization. The Chinese government maintained a birth
limit policy and announced a new three-child policy in
May 2021. Experts urged the Chinese government to
implement policies, including financial incentives and
other forms of assistance, to encourage couples to have
children. They said that if not adequately addressed,
China's decades-long birth limit policies and resultant
demographic challenges could undermine China's economy
and political stability.
New research found that beginning in 2015, and
increasingly since 2017, Chinese authorities have used
draconian population control measures targeting Uyghurs
and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR), including detention in mass
internment camps, the threat of internment, forced
abortions and infanticide in hospital maternity wards,
forced sterilizations, and heavy fines. Such measures
resulted in ``precipitous'' birth rate declines of 48.74
percent in the XUAR as a whole from 2017 to 2019, and
over 56 percent in one year (2017 to 2018) in counties
with an indigenous population of 90 percent or greater.
The Chinese government's restrictive population
control policies have exacerbated China's sex ratio
imbalance, which media reports linked to the trafficking
of foreign women in China for purposes of forced
marriage and commercial sexual exploitation.
Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally
During and prior to the Commission's 2021
reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist
Party, as well as individuals and entities acting with
their encouragement or at their direction, conducted a
global campaign to silence criticism or chill the
expression of political views considered unacceptable by
the Party on a range of issues, including events in Hong
Kong, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), and
Taiwan.
The effects of this campaign fell heavily on
Uyghurs living outside China who chose to speak out
about abuses in the XUAR. Uyghurs in the United States
and elsewhere reported threats and intimidation as well
as threats to family members still inside China.
During this reporting period, the Commission
noted increased efforts by the Party and government to
harass and intimidate researchers, journalists, and
think tanks overseas, especially those working on issues
related to the XUAR.
The Party and government continued to use
informal, undeclared forms of extraterritorial economic
coercion and intimidation to silence international
criticism of its actions and avoid accountability for
human rights violations, particularly the ongoing
genocide in the XUAR. This economic coercion included
undeclared economic sanctions against countries or
individual foreign industries; threats to restrict
foreign businesses' or institutions' access to China;
and the use of state-controlled media outlets to signal
to individuals, businesses, and institutions inside
China which foreign targets merit retaliation.
The Commission also observed increasing use of
formal sanctions by the Chinese government to punish
criticism of China, particularly criticism of Chinese
government policies in the XUAR and Hong Kong. Among
those China formally sanctioned during this reporting
period were the Commission and two of its members.
China's new National Security Law for Hong Kong--
passed by the National People's Congress in June 2020--
contains an extraterritorial provision potentially
criminalizing speech pertaining to Hong Kong, Tibetan
areas of China, or the XUAR by persons outside Hong
Kong. Following the law's passage, Hong Kong authorities
issued a warrant for the arrest of a U.S. citizen for
his support of pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong.
During this reporting period, the Chinese
government and Communist Party continued a longstanding
global campaign to discredit universal rights in
international institutions, particularly by impeding or
redirecting the work of United Nations human rights
bodies, in what Human Rights Watch described in 2017 as
``a systematic attempt to subvert the ability of the UN
human rights system to confront abuses in China and
beyond.'' These activities seek to reshape international
consensus around human rights in ways that diminish the
power of the individual to seek redress from the state.
During and immediately prior to this reporting
period, the Commission noted the use or threat of
economic coercion against countries considering
restrictions on Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei.
Countries that responded to concerns regarding potential
violations of privacy and free expression rights and
surveillance vulnerabilities facilitated by the use of
Huawei internet equipment and infrastructure in their 5G
networks were met with threats of economic retaliation
by Chinese government officials, or pressure from their
own business communities prompted by the fear of
retaliation.
Status of Women
Despite numerous policies, laws, and regulations
aimed at promoting gender equality and eliminating
gender-based discrimination, women in China continue to
face forced abortion, sterilization, and serious
discrimination in many domains, including employment,
wages, education, and through the nonenforcement of laws
and regulations intended to protect women's rights and
interests. Some commentators expected that the already
widespread problem of pregnancy-based workplace
discrimination was poised to worsen after the
government's announcement of its new three-child policy
in May 2021.
According to the List of Issues the UN Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women sent
to the Chinese government in March 2021 in advance of
its upcoming review, women in China ``remain seriously
underrepresented in legislative bodies, decision-making
positions and public institutions at both the central
and local levels.''
The Chinese Communist Party and government
tightened control over feminists and others advocating
for women's rights to freedom of expression and peaceful
assembly and association. Little physical space remained
for feminists to organize and protest during the
reporting year, so their online presence and community
became increasingly important. Many prominent feminists,
however, were attacked online during the spring of 2021,
and several popular social media platforms shut down
their accounts. The Party and government likely played a
role, either directly or indirectly, in this move to
silence feminists' voices online.
Although the Chinese government continues to take
measures aimed at improving the implementation of the
PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law--such as the Supreme
People's Court's release of 10 new ``typical cases''
warranting personal safety protection orders--protection
orders are rarely issued and domestic violence remains a
severe problem. Several high-profile cases highlighted
the severity of the problem of domestic violence, and
new research published in early 2021 relating to divorce
courts' handling of domestic violence claims underscored
the failure of the legal system and law enforcement
authorities to protect women's rights and interests.
Some observers in China have expressed concern that the
new PRC Civil Code's provision that requires couples
seeking a divorce to first go through a 30-day
``cooling-off period'' could make the situation for
women in abusive marriages even more precarious.
Sexual harassment is widespread in China, and it
was only with the recent adoption of the PRC Civil Code
(effective January 1, 2021) that a specific definition
of sexual harassment was codified, detailing the kinds
of conduct that could be considered sexual harassment,
creating liability for perpetrators, and obligating
employers to institute measures to prevent and stop
workplace sexual harassment. The challenges facing
victims of sexual harassment who seek redress through
the legal system were highlighted in the landmark #MeToo
case brought by Zhou Xiaoxuan (also known as Xianzi), a
former college intern at CCTV, against a popular CCTV
host, Zhu Jun.
Reports of gender-based violence against ethnic
minority women in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR) continued to emerge during the reporting year.
Uyghur and other Turkic Muslim women who were formerly
detained in mass internment camps in the XUAR have
reported being subjected to coercive birth control
measures, including forced implantation of intrauterine
devices (IUDs), forced sterilization, and forced
abortion. The former detainees also described beatings,
systematic rape, and other forms of abuse and torture.
Human Trafficking
Chinese government-sponsored forced labor is a
form of human trafficking under the UN Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol). A
March 2021 Jamestown Foundation report showed how
authorities carried out forced labor programs not only
for the economic benefit of participating companies, but
also for the purpose of diluting the cultural and
religious practices of ethnic minority residents of the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), as well as
reducing their population density.
Since 2017, the U.S. State Department has listed
the Chinese government as one of the worst human
trafficking offenders in the world. This year, for the
second consecutive year, China was also listed as 1 of
11 countries that had a ``government policy or pattern''
of human trafficking.
In June 2021, 12 UN human rights experts
expressed concern over ``credible information'' that
indicated that ``specific ethnic, linguistic or
religious minorities held in detention'' in China were
targeted for forced organ removal.
Government policies that contributed to the risk
of human trafficking included the following:
Government poverty alleviation programs;................
``Xinjiang Aid'' programs;..............................
Restrictions on movement imposed by the household
registration system;......................................
Chinese workers' limited right to freedom of
association;..............................................
Population control policies;............................
Repatriation of North Korean refugees in China to the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and................
Hong Kong government policies toward migrant domestic
workers...................................................
North Korean Refugees in China
During the Commission's 2021 reporting year, the
Chinese government continued to detain North Korean
refugees in China and attempt to forcibly repatriate
them to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK), where they face severe punishment, including
torture, imprisonment, forced labor, and even execution.
The forced repatriation of North Korean refugees
violates China's obligations under international human
rights and refugee law, and may amount to ``aiding and
abetting crimes against humanity.''
The majority of North Korean refugees escape to
South Korea via China and Southeast Asian countries.
During the past year, however, border controls resulting
from the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically reduced the flow
of migrants to China, and onward to third countries. The
South Korean government reported that about 229 North
Korean refugees escaped to South Korea in 2020, a 78
percent drop from 2019, and a 92 percent drop from the
2009 peak.
South Korean missionaries and organizations have
played a crucial role in assisting and facilitating the
movement of North Korean refugees in China. Chinese
authorities' crackdown on and expulsion of South Korean
missionaries in recent years have undermined refugee
rescue work carried out by the missionaries.
The majority of North Korean refugees leaving the
DPRK are women. The Chinese government's refusal to
recognize these women as refugees denies them legal
protection and exposes them to the risk of being
trafficked within China. The Chinese government may also
be complicit in the forced labor of women sent by the
DPRK government to work in China.
Many children born to Chinese fathers and North
Korean mothers remain deprived of basic rights to
education and other public services, owing to their lack
of legal resident status in China, which constitutes a
violation of the PRC Nationality Law and the Convention
on the Rights of the Child.
Public Health
The Chinese government and Communist Party's
public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic exposed
authorities' reliance on entrenched patterns of
authoritarian control, not only through ``cover-up and
inaction'' at the time of the outbreak but also through
ongoing ``secrecy and top-down control'' over scientific
research and information sharing. Researchers this past
year also documented the government and Party's
widespread promotion of propaganda and misinformation in
China and globally in an attempt to shape a positive
narrative about the Party's and government's response to
the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as to promote
misinformation about the origins of SARS-CoV-2.
Authorities have harassed, detained, and in
several cases prosecuted individuals who attempted to
document the COVID-19 outbreak or advocate for victims
of COVID-19. In December 2020, Shanghai municipality
authorities sentenced citizen journalist Zhang Zhan to
four years in prison for her efforts to document COVID-
19 in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province, the epicenter
of the outbreak. In May 2021, a court in Beijing
municipality tried two anti-censorship advocates, Cai
Wei and Chen Mei, in connection with archiving news
reports about the COVID-19 outbreak and epidemic in
China.
Health officials in China reportedly began to
vaccinate select groups using domestically produced
COVID-19 vaccines in China in July 2020 under an
emergency use program, while the vaccines were still
undergoing clinical trials. As of June 2021, 622 million
people had been at least partially vaccinated in China,
covering about 45 percent of the country's population.
Numerous factors may have contributed to low vaccination
rates, including the lack of publicly available
information in China about COVID-19 vaccines, the
distribution of the vaccines while they were still in
experimental trials, and inequitable access to
vaccinations.
Although the Chinese government rejected calls
for an independent, international investigation of the
origins of SARS-CoV-2, a joint study with the World
Health Organization (WHO) took place in January and
February 2021. The government and Party obstructed the
joint study during negotiations over its mandate, terms
of reference, and timing; restricted access afforded the
international experts while they were in China; and
influenced findings in the final report of March 2021.
The WHO Director-General, multiple governments, and
international experts called for further investigation
of the origins, including a rigorous examination of the
hypothesis that the origins are linked to a lab incident
in China. Moreover, the WHO Director-General in July
2021 noted that there had been a premature push to
discount the lab theory. In July, the Chinese government
categorically rejected the WHO's proposal for a second-
phase study that entails laboratory and market audits in
Wuhan.
The Communist Party's and Chinese government's
crackdown on civil society engagement in public health
advocacy, as well as on rights defenders and
journalists, begun in 2013, indirectly weakened the
official response to the COVID-19 outbreak, resulting in
serious consequences ``not just for China, but for the
world,'' according to three longtime civil society
advocates in a November 2020 article for the Diplomat.
This past year, authorities detained lawyer Chang
Weiping and two advocates for vaccine safety, He Fangmei
and Hua Xiuzhen. Cheng Yuan, Liu Dazhi, and Wu
Gejianxiong of Changsha Funeng--a non-governmental
organization in Hunan province working to counter
discrimination against persons with health conditions--
remained in detention for alleged ``subversion of state
power'' for a second year although a closed-door trial
reportedly took place in September 2020.
The Environment and Climate Change
During the Commission's 2021 reporting year,
Chinese citizens continued to face problems of water
pollution and water scarcity. In its 2020 National
Environmental and Ecological Quality Report, the PRC
Ministry of Ecology and Environment found that 83.4
percent of tested surface water and 13.6 percent of
tested groundwater in China was fit for human
consumption. Nine provinces and municipalities in China
suffer from water scarcity. In addition, the
construction of dams along major rivers in China may
have a negative impact on countries downstream.
China continues to experience high levels of air
pollutants, contributing to negative health effects
including premature death. For example, exposure to air
pollution in Beijing and Shanghai municipalities
reportedly resulted in approximately 49,000 premature
deaths in the first half of 2020.
Although the official ``Olympic and Paralympic
Winter Games Beijing 2022 Carbon Management Plan'' lists
measures to reduce and offset carbon emissions among its
main objectives, doubts remain as to whether measures to
reduce air pollution will be sufficient to reduce the
risk to Olympic athletes' health, including from
pollutants such as carbon, methane, and sulfur.
Chinese citizens continued to raise concerns
about the environment through street-level protests and
other forms of public advocacy at the risk of being
persecuted. Individuals detained for environmental
advocacy during the 2021 reporting year included Li
Genshan, Zhang Baoqi, and Niu Haibo. In addition,
authorities briefly detained teenage advocate Howey Ou
Hongyi after she staged a Global Climate Strike in
Shanghai municipality.
Business and Human Rights
Chinese and international businesses continue to
be at risk of complicity in--and of profiting from--the
Chinese government and Communist Party's increased use
of forced labor to suppress ethnic minorities in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). As part of
their efforts to dilute the population of Uyghurs in the
XUAR, authorities systematically forced predominantly
Muslim ethnic minority individuals, including Uyghurs
and others, to engage in forced labor, both in the XUAR
and in other parts of China. Reports of forced labor in
cotton harvesting, solar panel production, and personal
protective equipment production, as well as
manufacturing in general, mean that the supply chains of
many major brands may now be tainted with forced labor.
Firms cannot rely on factory audits to ensure that their
supply chains are free of forced labor in the XUAR;
several due diligence organizations, labor experts, and
U.S. Government agencies pointed to numerous problems
with audits conducted in the XUAR.
Chinese government restrictions on freedom of
expression increased this past year, and companies were
both targets and enablers of Chinese government
censorship. During this reporting year, the Chinese
messaging app WeChat censored content related to the
COVID-19 pandemic; local governments and Party
organizations hired private companies to help monitor
and censor online public commentary; Apple removed apps
from its app store that covered sensitive topics such as
the Dalai Lama, Tiananmen Square, and Taiwan; and the
Party and government threatened corporations with the
loss of revenue or other forms of punishment if they
voiced their support for addressing forced labor and
other human rights violations in the XUAR. Following the
backlash against Western brands who expressed concern
over cotton produced in the XUAR, Chinese and
international companies, including Anta Sports, Asics,
FILA, Kelme, Li Ning, Muji, and Peak, publicly affirmed
their continued use of cotton produced in the XUAR.
Chinese companies continued to assist in the
surveillance efforts of the government and Party.
Reporting from IPVM and international media implicated
Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Bresee, Dahua,
DeepGlint, Hikvision, Huawei, Kingsoft, Maiyuesoft,
Megvii, SenseTime, Uniview, and Vikor in the production
of technology that can be used for profiling Uyghurs and
targeting other marginalized communities in China. The
Intercept found that Oracle provided surveillance
technologies to public security bureaus throughout
China.
The lack of protection of Chinese workers under
Chinese law and a lack of enforcement of the rights of
Chinese workers allowed for continued abusive practices
toward workers in the supply chains of Chinese and
international companies. The Commission observed reports
of the existence of International Labour Organization
(ILO) indicators of forced labor in the supply chains of
Aldi, Apple, BYD (which sold masks to the state of
California), Chicco, Costco, Fisher-Price, Lidl, Tomy,
and Wuling Motors. While corporations continue to rely
on audits to vet factories in their supply chains,
reporting by the South China Morning Post and Sourcing
Journal found that fraudulent practices continued to
make factory audits in China unreliable.
Civil Society
The Chinese Communist Party and government became
increasingly repressive during this reporting year, and
thus the space for civil society, already tightly
restricted, narrowed even further. The Party's focus on
total control over Chinese society intensified in light
of the Party's 100th anniversary, which was marked on
July 1, 2021.
The Ministry of Civil Affairs, together with 21
other Party and state ministries and departments, issued
a new policy aimed at eliminating the tactics and
remaining space that unregistered civil society
organizations use to operate and survive. In conjunction
with the March 2021 announcement of the policy in an
order titled ``Circular on Eliminating the Breeding
Grounds for Illegal Social Organizations and Cleansing
the Ecological Space for Social Organizations,'' the
government launched a related campaign, scheduled to
conclude before the July 1 Party centenary, that
targeted five types of ``illegal social organizations.''
Chinese civil society groups faced additional
constraints from the government's implementation of the
PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities in Mainland China and the Hong
Kong National Security Law, which threatened to obstruct
the ability of Hong Kong-based international non-
governmental organizations to support rights-related
programs and advocacy in mainland China.
The government and Party continued to arbitrarily
detain Chinese citizens who engaged in the peaceful
exercise of their rights pursuant to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other international
human rights standards. The government and Party
intimidated and harassed other civil society advocates,
including the teen climate activist Ou Hongyi (also
known as Howey Ou), who left China for Europe in January
2021.
Chinese government and Communist Party officials
closed organizations and halted activities they had
previously tolerated, signaling a greater tightening of
civic space. For example, in August 2020, pressure and
intimidation from local authorities led to the closure
of ShanghaiPRIDE, the longest running gay pride festival
and event platform in China. Civic space also decreased
as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Civic space for women's rights advocacy further
narrowed this year. In April 2021, a substantial number
of feminist activists were effectively denied their main
remaining platform in China when Weibo closed their
accounts, likely with direct or tacit support from
Chinese officials.
The lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
questioning (LGBTQ) community in China continued to face
many challenges--including persistent stigma, widespread
discrimination, harassment, and inequities in property
rights. Chinese government authorities increased
restrictions on LGBTQ advocacy and organizing, as they
have done with other advocacy groups. Chinese law
neither recognizes same-sex marriage nor otherwise
protects same-sex relationships.
Chinese law does not protect sexual and gender
minorities, and a growing number of lawsuits brought by
LGBTQ individuals claiming employment discrimination
have been filed to raise public awareness and push for
change. Despite the narrowing of civil society space in
China generally, during this reporting year, LGBTQ legal
advocacy organizations held trainings for lawyers, and a
non-profit foundation was created to provide legal aid
to LGBTQ individuals. In early 2021, LGBTQ advocates
expressed concern that a new rule targeting ``self-
publishing'' online could lead to self-censorship and
impact the ability to organize online for LGBTQ rights.
LGBTQ individuals continued to be subjected to ``
`conversion therapy,' and other forced, involuntary or
otherwise coercive or abusive treatments,'' which the UN
Committee against Torture recommended that China ban in
a non-binding report.
Institutions of Democratic Governance
The Chinese Communist Party's efforts to extend
control over all sectors of society violate citizens'
right to fully participate in public affairs. As the
Party's dominance permeates
society, the space for institutions of democratic
governance diminishes, thereby weakening citizens'
ability to hold authorities accountable for human rights
violations.
In anticipation of its centenary, the Party
further strengthened its members' political alignment
with Party General Secretary Xi Jinping by launching a
series of political campaigns with the aim of removing
disloyal members from the Party and from political-legal
bodies such as the judiciary and procuratorate. For
example, the police force, generally regarded as a
government body, is overtly being politicized as Xi
Jinping conferred on it a new flag with a design
symbolizing the Party's leadership.
The Communist Party Central Committee Political
Bureau issued regulations governing the operations of
the Party Central Committee. The rules required the
Committee, which is one of the two highest political
bodies in China, to protect Xi Jinping's position as the
core leader, despite the Committee's constitutional duty
to appoint the General Secretary, a position currently
held by Xi.
The Party declared that it had eliminated
absolute poverty as part of its centenary goal of
building a moderately prosperous society. Said
declaration, however, does not address poverty and
widening income disparity relative to China's overall
economic status. Furthermore, centrally imposed economic
development plans aiming to alleviate poverty have had
negative effects particularly in ethnic minority
communities, where environmental damage and forced
relocations have harmed their way of life and rendered
some homeless.
Access to Justice
To the extent that citizens rely on courts to
protect their rights against state encroachment,
political pressure on the court system undermines their
ability to access justice. The Chinese Communist Party
goes beyond mere influence and expressly requires
absolute loyalty and obedience from the courts.
Five years after the nationwide, coordinated
crackdown on human rights lawyers and advocates,
authorities continued to persecute them by such means as
imprisonment, detention, and revocation of law licenses.
The Supreme People's Court required judges and
candidates for judicial positions to undergo training
that emphasizes political ideology and loyalty.
Requiring that Party General Secretary Xi Jinping's
ideology ``penetrate every lesson,'' the training goes
beyond legal skills to include areas such as public
opinion manipulation and strategies to mobilize the
masses.
Central authorities' proposal to further expand
legal aid services will not necessarily increase
citizens' ability to access justice. For example,
citizens from Wuhan municipality, Hubei province, faced
harassment, and the court rejected their filings
alleging that the government mishandled the COVID-19
outbreak.
Xinjiang
In 2021, the U.S. State Department found that
China had committed genocide and crimes against humanity
against Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority
groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).
The State Department found that acts constituting
genocide and crimes against humanity included arbitrary
detention, forced abortion and forced sterilization,
rape, torture, forced labor, and the violation of
freedom of religion, expression, and movement.
Parliamentarians in the United Kingdom, Canada, the
Netherlands, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic have also
determined that Chinese authorities committed genocide
in the XUAR. Independent experts on international law
also found that authorities had committed genocide and
crimes against humanity against Turkic and Muslim
peoples in the XUAR.
International researchers and journalists found
evidence during this reporting year that authorities
continued to expand detention facilities, including mass
internment camps, and built new camps and other
detention facilities in recent years, including as
recently as January 2020. Reports published this past
year indicated that XUAR officials continued to sentence
many Turkic and Muslim individuals to prison, often
following their detention in a mass internment camp.
Observers noted that the recent expansion and
construction of prisons, the transfer of prisoners to
locations outside the XUAR, and the phenomenon of
deferred sentences indicate that the scale of
imprisonment in the past several years has been so great
that it has overwhelmed the existing prison
infrastructure in the XUAR.
Officials carried out some of the most egregious
acts of persecution of ethnic minorities in the XUAR
against women. According to survivor and witness
testimony, as well as researchers' analysis of official
documents and other sources, ethnic
minority women in the XUAR have been subjected to rape
and sexual abuse in mass internment camps and as a
result of intrusive state-mandated homestay programs.
Researchers' analyses of population statistics
and other documents published by the Chinese government
showed that an increase in forced sterilization,
intrauterine device (IUD) insertions, and abortions
among ethnic minority women, together with an increased
rate of detention among ethnic minority populations, led
to significant decreases in natural population growth
among ethnic minority communities. According to a report
published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
proportionally, birth rates may have dropped more in the
XUAR than in any other location in the world since 1950
between 2017 and 2019--a decline ``more than double the
rate
of decline in Cambodia at the height of the Khmer Rouge
genocide.''
Reports published during the past year described
authorities' systematic separation of ethnic minority
children in the XUAR from their families and their
forcible placement in state-run orphanages, welfare
centers, and boarding schools. This forcible
displacement of children has been carried out in
violation of the PRC Law on the Protection of Minors and
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. According to international media reports, many of
the children placed in these facilities had at least one
parent in detention.
Tibet
The Commission did not observe any interest or
progress on the part of Chinese Communist Party and
government officials in resuming formal negotiations
with the Dalai Lama's representatives. The last round of
negotiations, the ninth, was held in January 2010.
The Party and government continued to restrict,
and seek to control, the religious practices of
Tibetans. Officials in Tibetan areas of China continued
to enforce restrictions on religious observance or
expressions of faith, including by prohibiting
individuals from participating in religious events or
celebrating holidays.
The Party and government continued to assert
control over the processes of selection and recognition
of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnated teachers, including the
Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama and Tibetan Buddhist leaders
outside China maintained that the decision to
reincarnate, or not, belongs only to the individual in
question and members of the Tibetan Buddhist religious
community.
For the first year since 2010, the Commission did
not observe any reports of Tibetan self-immolations. A
previously
unreported self-immolation brought the number of Tibetan
self-immolations since 2009 reportedly focusing on
political or religious issues to 151. Shurmo self-
immolated in a September 2015 protest and died the same
day in the hospital.
In August 2020, top Communist Party leadership
convened the Seventh Tibet Work Forum in Beijing
municipality. Communist Party leaders attended the two-
day symposium, where in an address Party General
Secretary and President Xi Jinping said that the Party's
policies on Tibet were ``completely correct'' and called
for the continued ``sinicization'' of Tibetan Buddhism
and increased efforts to shape public opinion to support
Party policy on ``ethnic unity.''
In contravention of international human rights
standards, security officials continued to punish
residents of Tibetan areas of China for the exercise of
their protected rights, including expression of
religious belief, protest against or criticism of
government or Party policies, and free speech. Notable
cases this past year included those of songwriter Khadro
Tseten, sentenced to seven years in prison for writing a
song praising the Dalai Lama; Rinchen Tsultrim, a Bon
monk imprisoned for his online writing about Tibetan
culture and politics; and Tenzin Nyima (or Tame), a 19-
year-old Tibetan Buddhist monk who died in January 2021
after severe mistreatment in official custody.
Developments in Hong Kong and Macau
Despite repeatedly professing to uphold the ``one
country, two systems'' model, central authorities
continued to disregard and effectively nullify Hong
Kong's high degree of autonomy, such as by unilaterally
passing election reforms for the selection of the Chief
Executive and Legislative Council members without any
meaningful participation by Hong Kong residents. Among
other changes, one election reform reconstituted the
election committee by diluting or eliminating seats that
traditionally favor the pro-democracy camp.
Hong Kong authorities continued to enforce the
National Security Law (NSL), resulting in over a hundred
arrests, the majority of which were for peaceful
assembly or engaging in political activities. In January
2021, for example, police arrested more than 50 pro-
democracy advocates in connection with their
organization of, or participation in, the July 2020
primary election, which was in practice an informal
opinion poll designed to improve coordination among pro-
democracy candidates to increase the chance of attaining
a majority in the Legislative Council. The Hong Kong
government, however, alleged that the arrestees had
endangered national security.
The Hong Kong government repressed the media,
such as by raiding a pro-democracy newspaper and
detaining its founder, and by overhauling the governance
of the city's public broadcaster and prosecuting one of
its journalists in connection with her investigation
into allegations of police misconduct. The Hong Kong
Police Force also revised its operational guidelines and
adopted a narrower definition of ``journalist,'' which
had the effect of excluding many independent journalists
from restricted areas and exposing them to potential
criminal liability.
The Hong Kong government exercised unprecedented
supervision and suppression of internet activity under
the authorities of the NSL. On January 13, 2021, the
Hong Kong Broadband Network blocked public access to
HKChronicles, a website promoting pro-democracy
viewpoints. On January 28, 2021, the Hong Kong Internet
Registration Corporation Limited, a company designated
by the government to administer internet domain name
registration, enacted a revised ``acceptable use''
policy that enables it to reject website registration
requests that may ``promote any illegal activity.'' On
February 12, 2021, internet service providers blocked
access in Hong Kong to the Taiwan Transitional Justice
Commission website. Additionally, major technology
companies including Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and
Google have stopped reviewing requests for user data
from Hong Kong authorities.
As obligated by the NSL, the Hong Kong government
must promote ``national security education in schools
and universities.'' The government implemented a
national security-
focused curriculum and regulated speech in schools,
prohibiting students from singing a protest anthem or
expressing political demands. It also instituted a
review process for liberal studies textbooks, resulting
in the deletion or modification of content concerning
the 1989 Tiananmen protests, separation of powers, and
the demand for universal suffrage.
Executive Summary
Executive Summary
Political Prisoner Cases of Concern
Members of Congress and the Administration are encouraged to
consult the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD)
for credible and up-to-date information on individual
prisoners or groups of prisoners. The Cases of Concern in
the Commission's 2021 Annual Report highlight a small
number of individuals whom Chinese authorities have
detained or sentenced for peacefully exercising their
internationally recognized human rights. Members of
Congress and the Administration are encouraged to advocate
for these individuals in meetings with Chinese government
and Communist Party officials. For more information on
these cases and other cases raised in the Annual Report,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name PPD Record No. Case Summary (as of July 2021)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sun Qian Date of Detention: February 19, 2017
2021-00391 Place of Detention: Beijing
Municipality No. 1 PSB Detention
Center
Charge(s): Organizing or using a cult
to undermine implementation of the law
Status: Sentenced to 8 years
Context: Police detained Sun Qian, a
Canadian citizen, health technology
company executive, and Falun Gong
practitioner, in a February 2017 raid
on her Beijing home. In the raid,
police seized Falun Gong materials.
Following a September 2018 trial, the
Chaoyang District People's Court
sentenced her on June 30, 2020, to 8
years in prison in connection with her
practice of Falun Gong.
Additional Information: Authorities
prevented Sun from obtaining legal
counsel of her choice by pressuring
her lawyers to withdraw from the case,
and abused her in custody by shackling
her for extended periods and pepper
spraying her. Upon sentencing, Sun
allegedly renounced her Canadian
citizenship under duress.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tashpolat Teyip Date of Detention: March 2017
2019-00064 Place of Detention: Unknown location in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR)
Charge(s): Separatism, possibly bribery
Status: Unclear; possibly sentenced to
death with two-year reprieve
Context: Xinjiang University president
Tashpolat Teyip disappeared in Beijing
municipality as he prepared to fly to
Germany to attend a conference. A
Uyghur geographer who received
international acclaim for his
environmental research, authorities
accused Teyip of being a
``separatist,'' together with 5 other
Uyghur intellectuals. Authorities
reportedly cracked down on Teyip for
being ``two-faced,'' a term Chinese
officials use to refer to ethnic
minority cadres who pretend to support
the Chinese Communist Party. A student
of Teyip said his custom of beginning
public statements with a Uyghur
greeting may have prompted authorities
to target him.
Additional Information: In a January 3,
2020, press conference, however, XUAR
authorities said that Urumqi police
had detained Teyip in May 2018 on
suspicion of accepting bribes, and
that his case had gone to trial before
the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court
in June 2019. His current status is
unclear.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Li Yuhan Date of Detention: October 9, 2017
2017-00361 Place of Detention: Shenyang Municipal
No. 1 PSB Detention Center, Liaoning
province
Charge(s): Picking quarrels and
provoking trouble, fraud
Status: Formally arrested, awaiting
trial
Context: A lawyer, Li previously
represented rights lawyer Wang Yu,
whom authorities detained in a
crackdown on human rights legal
professionals that began in mid-2015.
Additional Information: Li suffers from
various health conditions including
heart disease, hypertension, and
hyperthyroidism. Staff at the
detention center reportedly urinated
on her food, denied her hot water for
showering, denied her medical
treatment, and threatened that they
would beat her to death. In March
2018, Li went on a hunger strike to
protest mistreatment, which prompted
detention center officials to force-
feed her. Detention center officials
have blocked her lawyer from meeting
her since January 2020, citing the
COVID-19 pandemic.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yu Wensheng Date of Detention: January 19, 2018
2014-00387 Place of Detention: Xuzhou Municipal
PSB Detention Center, Jiangsu province
Charge(s): Inciting subversion of state
power
Status: Sentenced to 4 years
Context: On January 18, 2018, rights
lawyer Yu Wensheng published an open
letter calling for democratic reforms
to China's Constitution, including
subordinating the Communist Party to
constitutional and legal oversight.
The next day, Beijing police detained
him outside his home. Later that month
authorities sent him to Xuzhou, where
he was placed under ``residential
surveillance at a designated
location.'' In May 2019, his wife
received a phone call informing her
that Yu had been tried several days
prior, though neither she nor Yu's
lawyers were notified beforehand. The
court sentenced Yu over a year later,
in June 2020.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Erkin Tursun Date of Detention: March 2018
2019-00190 Place of Detention: Ghulja (Yining)
city, Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous
Prefecture, XUAR
Charge(s): ``Harboring criminal[s]'',
``inciting national enmity and
discrimination''
Status: Sentenced to 19 years and 10
months
Context: In March 2018, Ghulja county
police detained Erkin Tursun, a Uyghur
television producer and journalist for
a state broadcaster, later
transferring him to the custody of
Ghulja city authorities. His detention
was reportedly related to an award-
winning program he produced in 2017
that covered poverty among Uyghur
children. In November 2019, the
Chinese government told the UN Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances that Tursun had been
sentenced in May 2018 to 19 years and
10 months' imprisonment for
``harboring criminal[s] and inciting
national enmity and discrimination.''
Additional Information: In late 2017,
Ghulja authorities detained Tursun's
wife Gulnar Telet and held her at a
mass internment camp (exact location
unknown). She may have been released
in 2019.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Renagul Gheni Date of Detention: Unknown date in 2018
2021-00393 Place of Detention: Cherchen (Qiemo)
county, Bayangol (Bayinguoleng) Mongol
Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR
Charge(s): Unknown
Status: Sentenced to 17 years
Context: After Uyghur painter and art
teacher Renagul Gheni's sister lost
touch with her in 2018, she later
learned that authorities detained
Renagul on an unknown date the same
year and held her in a mass internment
camp. Her sister reported that
authorities later sentenced Renagul to
17 years in prison for praying at
their father's funeral and possessing
a Quran.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wang Yi Date of Detention: December 9, 2018
2018-00615 Place of Detention: Jintang Prison,
Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province
Charge(s): Inciting subversion of state
power, illegal business activity
Status: Sentenced to 9 years
Context: Authorities detained Early
Rain Covenant Church pastor and
founder Wang Yi one day before
officially banning the unregistered
Protestant church located in Chengdu
municipality, Sichuan. Wang's
detention took place amid a broad
crackdown on unregistered churches in
China. Authorities refused to allow
the lawyer hired by Wang's family to
represent him at his December 2019
trial and sentencing. Reports this
past year described his deteriorating
health and said that his cellmates
kept him under surveillance.
Additional Information: In addition to
Wang, authorities detained at least
100 Early Rain members beginning in
December 2018. Among those whom
authorities released, many remained
under surveillance, including Wang's
wife Jiang Rong. Church members
reported that while in detention they
were force-fed unknown medication and
coerced to confess or to falsely
accuse Wang and other church leaders
of wrongdoing.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Khadro Tseten Date of Detention: April 26, 2019
2020-00165 Place of Detention: Rebgong (Tongren)
county, Malho (Huangnan) Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Qinghai
province
Charge(s): Subversion of state power,
leaking state secrets
Status: Sentenced to 7 years
Context: Authorities in Tsekhog (Zeku)
county, Malho TAP, detained three
Tibetans in April 2019 for their
involvement in making or sharing
online a song praising the Dalai Lama.
In 2020, an unidentified court
sentenced lyricist Khadro Tseten to 7
years in prison and singer Tsego to 3
years, but reportedly released the
third person, an unidentified woman
who shared the song on WeChat. Khadro
Tseten and Tsego were reportedly held
in Rebgong county after sentencing.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rinchen Tsultrim Date of Detention: August 1, 2019
2020-00311 Place of Detention: Mianyang Prison,
Sichuan province
Charge(s): Inciting separatism
Status: Sentenced to 4 years or 4
years, 6 months
Context: In August 2019, police in
Ngaba (Aba) county, Ngaba (Aba)
Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous
Prefecture, Sichuan, detained Rinchen
Tsultrim, a monk at Nangzhig
Monastery, in connection with posts he
made on WeChat about political and
religious issues in Tibet. In March
2020, the Ngaba State Security Bureau
revealed that he was under
investigation for ``inciting
separatism.'' In March 2021,
authorities told Rinchen Tsultrim's
family that he had been sentenced;
sources variously reported a prison
sentence of 4 years, or 4 years and 6
months.
Additional Information: Prior to his
detention, local authorities warned
and briefly detained Rinchen Tsultrim
after he shared information in WeChat
groups and mailed books within Tibet
that he had received from abroad.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Niu Tengyu Date of Detention: August 22, 2019
2021-00062 Place of Detention: Sihui Prison,
Zhaoqing municipality, Guangdong
province
Charge(s): Picking quarrels and
provoking trouble; infringing on
citizens' personal information;
illegal business activity
Status: Sentenced to 14 years
Context: In August 2019, public
security officials took into custody
20-year-old coder Niu Tengyu and held
him in Maoming municipality,
Guangdong, as part of a major
crackdown on users of the internet
site Esu Wiki on which personal
information of two relatives of Party
General Secretary Xi Jinping allegedly
had been published. The court
sentenced Niu to serve a total of 14
years in prison and fined him 130,000
yuan.
Additional Information: From December
10, 2019 to January 22, 2020,
authorities held Niu under
``residential surveillance at a
designated location'' to investigate
him on a charge of endangering state
security. Authorities tortured Niu,
including use of the ``tiger bench,''
hanging him by his arms, burning his
genitals, pouring saline solution over
his injuries, and causing permanent
injury to his right hand.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joshua Wong Chi-fung Date of Detention: November 23, 2020
2021-00009 Place of Detention: Shek Pik Prison,
Hong Kong, SAR
Charge(s): Unauthorized assembly;
conspiracy to commit subversion
Status: Sentenced to 13.5 months,
awaiting further trial
Context: Hong Kong authorities have
detained Joshua Wong Chi-fung multiple
times since 2014 based on at least six
sets of factual allegations related to
his activism. In one such detention,
Wong was remanded to custody on
November 23, 2020, after pleading
guilty to the charges of organizing,
inciting others to take part in, and
knowingly taking part in an
unauthorized assembly. The charges
were related to a protest that took
place near the police headquarters in
June 2019. On December 2, 2020, the
West Kowloon Magistrates' Courts
sentenced Wong to 13.5 months in
prison. While in prison, Wong was
arrested by police in January 2021 for
``conspiracy to commit subversion,''
citing his participation in the non-
binding primary election held in July
2020, in which pro-democracy
activists tried to improve
coordination among themselves in the
upcoming Legislative Council election,
thereby gaining a majority there.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zhang Zhan Date of Detention: May 19, 2020
2020-00175 Place of Detention: Shanghai Women's
Prison
Charge(s): Picking quarrels and
provoking trouble
Status: Sentenced to 4 years
Context: On May 14, 2020, unknown
individuals ``disappeared'' citizen
journalist Zhang Zhan in Wuhan
municipality, Hubei province, the
epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak, in
connection with her efforts to
document the epidemic on WeChat,
Twitter, YouTube, and other social
media platforms. The Pudong New
District People's Court in Shanghai
municipality tried and sentenced Zhang
on December 28, 2020.
Additional Information: After the
trial, her then-Plawyer Zhang Keke
said that Zhang had gone on a hunger
strike and appeared to have ``lost a
significant amount of weight and was
almost unrecognizable from even just a
few weeks before.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jimmy Lai Chee-ying Date of Detention: February 28, 2020
2020-00323 Place of Detention: Stanley Prison
Charge(s): Collusion with a foreign
country or with external elements to
endanger national security; conspiracy
to defraud
Status: Sentenced to 14 months,
awaiting further trial
Context: Since February 2020, Hong Kong
authorities have detained Jimmy Lai
Chee-ying based on at least five sets
of factual allegations related to his
activism. Separately on February 28
and April 18, 2020, police arrested
Lai on charges of ``unauthorized
assemblies'' that took place in August
and October 2019, releasing him on
bail on the same day on both
occasions. In April 2021, the West
Kowloon Magistrates' Courts convicted
Lai, sentencing him to 14 months in
prison. On June 11, 2020, police
arrested Lai on charges of
participating in and inciting others
to participate in unauthorized
assembly relating to a vigil on June
4, 2020, that commemorated the 1989
Tiananmen protests. On August 10,
2020, Hong Kong police took Jimmy Lai
Chee-ying into custody on suspicion of
``conspiracy to defraud'' and
``collusion with a foreign country or
with external elements to endanger
national security'' under the National
Security Law (NSL). Lai is the founder
of Apple Daily, which media sources
have described as a pro-democracy
publication. On the same day, police
also detained nine other individuals,
including Lai's two sons and other
democracy advocates and newspaper
executives. While in prison, Lai was
arrested in February 2021 on
allegations that he had helped 12
political activists escape from Hong
Kong to Taiwan.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Li Genshan Date of Detention: September 9, 2020
2020-00248 Place of Detention: Zhongwei
municipality, Ningxia Hui Autonomous
Region
Charge(s): Picking quarrels and
provoking trouble, extortion,
illegally hunting or killing precious
wildlife
Status: Formally arrested, awaiting
trial
Context: Zhongwei police criminally
detained environmental advocate Li
Genshan on September 9, 2020,
alongside two fellow volunteers, in
connection with their advocacy work.
By the end of the month, police had
detained 14 individuals in total as
part of the case, and formally charged
eight of them, including Li. Li and
several of those detained were
volunteers with the Zhongwei Mongolian
Gazelle Patrol Team, which sought to
protect local wildlife. Li and other
members of the patrol team had
previously reported corporations for
environmental destruction and local
forestry police for allegedly
protecting poachers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carol Ng Man-yee Date of Detention: January 6, 2021
2021-00489 Place of Detention: Lo Wu Correctional
Institution, Hong Kong, SAR
Charge(s): Subversion
Status: Formally arrested, awaiting
trial
Context: On January 6, 2021, in an
operation involving over 1,000
officers, Hong Kong police arrested 53
individuals on suspicion of violating
the National Security Law. The arrests
were connected to their involvement in
a non-binding primary election held in
July 2020, which aimed at securing a
majority in the Legislative Council by
improving coordination among
candidates in the pro-democracy camp.
On January 7, police arrested two
other individuals who were serving
time for prior convictions, bringing
the total number of arrestees to 55.
Carol Ng was among those detained on
January 6. She quit the Labour Party
and resigned as the chairperson of the
Hong Kong Confederation of Trade
Unions shortly after she was formally
charged with ``subversion'' in March.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chen Guojiang Date of Detention: February 25, 2021
2021-00061 Place of Detention: Chaoyang District
PSB Detention Center, Beijing
Charge(s): Picking quarrels and
provoking trouble
Status: Formally arrested, awaiting
trial
Context: Shortly before delivery worker
and labor advocate Chen Guojiang's
detention, he called for work
stoppages by delivery workers to
protest delivery platforms'
withholding of New Year bonuses from
drivers. Since 2019, Chen has posted
videos to social media highlighting
the precarious working conditions of
delivery workers, and he ran multiple
WeChat discussion groups with
membership totaling over 14,000
delivery workers.
Additional Information: After a
previous call for a work stoppage,
authorities detained Chen for 26 days
in October 2019.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Executive Summary
Executive Summary
General Recommendations to Congress
and the Administration
The Commission makes the following recommendations for
Administration and congressional action, recognizing that
a shared commitment to the rule of law and international
standards of human rights is the foundation on which
international security, democratic governance, and
prosperity are built.
End Forced Labor Imports. Global supply chains remain
at significant risk of containing goods made with forced
labor, particularly with the expansion of the Chinese
government's ``labor transfer'' programs in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Congress must take a
zero-tolerance approach to the importation of goods
suspected to be made with forced labor. Congress should
pass the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (S. 65/H.R.
1155), which prohibits goods made with forced labor in the
XUAR, or by entities using forced labor transferred from
the XUAR, from entering the U.S. market. In addition, the
Administration should:
Continue to issue Withhold Release Orders (WROs)
through U.S. Customs and Border Protection pursuant to
19 CFR Sec. 12.42(e) targeting companies complicit in
the use of forced labor, including those companies using
forced labor in the mining and production of
polysilicon, a key component in the manufacturing of
solar panels;
Increase appropriations for U.S. Customs and Border
Protection to enforce the prohibition on importation of
goods produced with forced labor, including through
expanding the existing forensic verification-of-origin
testing technology, which can identify trace amounts of
cotton and other products and link it to the XUAR;
Sanction individuals engaged in significant labor
trafficking under section 111 of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), as amended (22 U.S.C.
7108); and
Issue a report on the U.S. Government's procurement
process and forced labor with the aim of excluding any
companies engaged in the production of goods using the
forced labor of ethnic minorities or other persecuted
groups in China.
Stop Atrocity Crimes. The Administration, building on
its determination that genocide is occurring in the XUAR,
should work with Congress to hold Chinese officials and
other entities accountable for genocide and crimes against
humanity, including by providing legal and technical
assistance to groups documenting
horrific human rights abuses and by supporting victims
seeking damages for human trafficking and atrocity crimes.
In addition, the Administration should:
Continue to use available sanctions authorities,
including those provided by the Global Magnitsky Human
Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of
Public Law No. 114-328; 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2656 note) and
the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act (22 U.S.C. 6901
note);
Issue new export regulations defining the human
rights and national security interests prohibiting the
sale of emerging technologies including facial
recognition systems, machine learning, and biometric and
artificial intelligence technology, particularly those
used for mass surveillance and social control;
Expand the Commerce Department's Entity List of
companies assisting the Chinese government in committing
atrocities and other severe human rights abuses in the
XUAR;
Coordinate with allies and partners to advocate for
the creation of a mandate for a United Nations special
rapporteur on the XUAR, or other mechanisms to address
the Chinese government's egregious human rights abuses,
and the formation of a UN Commission of Inquiry on the
XUAR; and
Request an open debate or, at the very least, an
Arria-
formula briefing on the XUAR at the UN Security Council.
Support Victims of Persecution. As long as the
Chinese government's human rights abuses continue
unabated, Congress and the Administration should ramp up
efforts to protect those fleeing persecution, prioritizing
steps to:
Remove barriers to Hong Kong residents in receiving
U.S. visas, particularly those attempting to exit Hong
Kong for fear of political persecution, and extend
Priority 2 refugee status to these individuals;
Extend Priority 2 refugee status to Uyghurs and
other Muslim ethnic minorities and expand use of the T-
visa provided for in the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. Chapter 78) to assist in
investigations of both labor trafficking and sexual
violence against women in the XUAR;
Engage with countries with significant populations
of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities fleeing
persecution to press those countries to refrain from
deporting ethnic minorities to the People's Republic of
China, to protect ethnic minorities from intimidation by
Chinese authorities, and to protect their freedoms of
assembly and expression; and
Ensure that sufficient funding and authorities are
available for psychological and medical support for
victims of genocide and crimes against humanity,
particularly in countries of first asylum, through
programs authorized by the Torture Victim Protection Act
(Public Law No. 102-256).
Support the People of Hong Kong. The Administration
should work with allies and partners at the UN and other
multilateral organizations on statements and other
actions, including additional sanctions required by the
Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (Public Law No.
116-76), related to the Hong Kong government's dismantling
of Hong Kong's autonomy and rights protections and the
Chinese government's violation of the 1984 Sino-British
Joint Declaration, an international treaty. In addition:
The Administration should continue to prohibit sales
of police equipment and crowd-control technology to the
Hong Kong police, as provided by Public Law No. 116-77,
and Congress should pass legislation to extend this ban
permanently unless the President certifies that Hong
Kong is again sufficiently autonomous to justify special
treatment under U.S. law;
The Administration should implement sanctions
against financial institutions as well as individuals
determined to be ``involved in the erosion of certain
obligations of China with respect to Hong Kong'' as
stipulated in the Hong Kong Autonomy Act of 2020;
The Administration should use newly appropriated
funding to support non-governmental organizations
working to promote the rule of law, human rights, civil
society development, and democratic freedoms in Hong
Kong; and
Members of Congress should work with fellow
parliamentarians on draft laws modeled after the Hong
Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (Public Law No. 116-
76) and the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law No. 116-
149).
Leverage the 2022 Olympics to Demand Human Rights
Improvements. The Administration and Members of Congress
should publicly characterize the Chinese government's
egregious human rights abuses, including genocide, and the
flouting of international standards as a betrayal of the
Olympic Charter and spirit. The International Olympic
Committee (IOC), the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee
(USOPC), and corporate sponsors and broadcasters of the
Olympics should be pressed to use their leverage to
address human rights abuses in China, including those
surrounding the Olympic Games. Specifically, the
Administration and Congress should:
Call on the IOC to postpone and reassign the 2022
Winter Olympics if the Chinese government does not end
its atrocities in the XUAR, undertake demonstrable
improvements in human rights throughout the country, and
restore autonomy to Hong Kong;
Urge The Olympic Partner (TOP) Programme corporate
sponsors, consistent with the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, to publicize their human
rights due diligence regarding the 2022 Beijing Olympics
and take public steps to distance their brands from the
2022 Winter Olympics;
Ask the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee to
protect American athletes from having to wear or consume
products made with forced labor and to educate its
officials and athletes about human rights conditions in
China, the risk of censorship and surveillance of U.S.
athletes during the Olympic Games, and the use of forced
labor in the production of Olympic uniforms, gear, and
souvenirs;
Ask NBCUniversal whether it will give global prime-
time coverage during the Olympics to stories about
genocide, crimes against humanity, and other gross human
rights abuses committed by the Chinese government; and
Create a strategy to coordinate with other
governments on a diplomatic boycott and other measures
to counter Chinese government propaganda efforts around
the 2022 Winter Olympics if the IOC refuses to postpone
or move the Games from Beijing.
Limit Malign Influence Operations. The economic
coercion and malign political influence operations
conducted by the Chinese government and Communist Party--
part of an increasing global threat posed by authoritarian
governments' attempts to stifle basic freedoms and make
the world safe for their repressive forms of
governance--pose significant challenges to the United
States and countries around the world. To address these
challenges, the Administration and Congress should work
together to:
Establish an interagency ``China Censorship Monitor
and Action Group'' to address the impacts of censorship
and intimidation of American citizens, legal residents,
and companies, and consider expanding such a group
globally with allies and partners;
Develop a multi-stakeholder action plan and code of
conduct with universities, foundations, think tanks,
film production companies, publishers, non-governmental
organizations, and state and local governments so that
their interactions with foreign governments or entities
uphold standards of academic freedom, corporate ethics,
and human rights;
Require U.S. colleges and universities to publicly
report all foreign gifts, contracts, and in-kind
contributions that exceed $50,000 in any single year;
Condition certain Federal assistance to U.S.
universities,
colleges, and school districts upon their making public
their contracts or agreements establishing Confucius
Institutes or Confucius Classrooms and on their having
clear provisions protecting academic freedom and the
civil rights of their Chinese employees and teachers,
and granting full managerial authority to the college,
university, or school district;
Increase appropriations to expand Chinese language
curriculum development and instruction in American high
schools and colleges;
Require U.S. think tanks and other non-governmental
organizations to disclose foreign grants and gifts as
part of their tax filings to maintain non-profit status;
and
Update and expand the requirements of the Foreign
Agents Registration Act (FARA) to cover individuals and
other entities lobbying on behalf of foreign
governments, entities, or organizations working on
educational or scientific pursuits in order to address
their efforts to acquire technologies banned under U.S.
export controls and their efforts to limit academic
freedom by acting through organizations like the Chinese
Students and Scholars Association and Confucius
Institutes.
Defend Values While Not Abetting Anti-Asian
Discrimination or Chinese Propaganda. The Administration
and Congress should create public messaging strategies
that communicate clearly to both domestic and
international audiences the nature and scope of the
Chinese government and Communist Party's challenges to
international law and universal human rights standards.
These strategies must clearly differentiate the peoples
and cultures of China from the Chinese government and
Communist Party. The Party has sought to exploit protests
in the United States, such as those against anti-Asian
discrimination, as well as xenophobic rhetoric, to further
its objectives. Poorly designed and communicated U.S.
efforts regarding Chinese government policies can fuel
propaganda that references instances of intolerance or
harassment of people of Chinese descent and other Asian
American and Pacific Islander communities, which can
frustrate our ability to craft a domestic consensus for a
China policy grounded in the principles of human rights
and the rule of law. U.S. officials should always be clear
that they stand for human rights and the rule of law, and
against discrimination and intolerance of any kind. In
addition, the Administration and Congress should work
together to:
Instruct the Department of Justice and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to protect U.S. citizens and
residents of Asian and Chinese descent, and Chinese
nationals living or studying in the United States, from
undue foreign interference and surveillance and ensure
that their civil rights are safeguarded, including
freedom from coercion or intimidation, freedom of
expression, and the freedom of religion; and
Extend to any U.S. citizen a private right of action
to pursue civil litigation for wrongful employment
termination or demotion for expressing opinions critical
of the Chinese government or Communist Party or for
supporting human rights in the People's Republic of
China.
Address Digital Authoritarianism. The Chinese
government is developing technology and utilizing
artificial intelligence (AI) in an effort to expand mass
surveillance and social control of its citizens while
exporting this technology globally in an effort to
undermine democratic institutions. The Administration
should work with Congress and like-minded allies and
partners to strengthen the current multi-stakeholder
internet governance structure and, where appropriate, to:
Develop a set of global principles for the use of
AI-driven biometric surveillance to ensure that this
emerging technology protects privacy and human rights;
Launch a digital infrastructure initiative that uses
the bipartisan BUILD Act (Public Law No. 116-342) to
make information and communications technology a greater
priority for overseas development assistance;
Champion, with allies and partners, high-standard
internet governance principles that support the freedom
of expression and the protection of user privacy; and
Expand and focus foreign assistance projects on
internet freedom and media literacy to help users
circumvent China's ``Great Firewall,'' provide digital
security training for civil society advocates, and
identify and counter foreign government propaganda
efforts.
Condition Access to U.S. Capital Markets. Congress
should ask the relevant executive branch departments and
agencies to identify and list Chinese companies and
entities that have provided material support or technical
capabilities that violate U.S. laws and facilitate human
rights abuses in China, including in the XUAR and Tibetan
areas of the People's Republic of China. In addition,
Congress should require the Securities and Exchange
Commission to strengthen disclosure and auditing
requirements for any listed Chinese companies in U.S.
capital markets to ensure that American retirement and
investment dollars do not fund companies with links to the
Chinese government's security apparatus or other
malevolent behavior that undermines U.S. interests, or to
genocide.
CFIUS Expansion. Congress should amend the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (Public Law No.
115-232, sec. 1701 et seq.) to trigger a Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) review of
any foreign company seeking to acquire U.S. assets
controlling biometric information of Americans or
technology to more efficiently collect and process
biometric information. In addition, in coordination with
the Department of Justice, CFIUS should report for FARA
registration any lobbying firm or other entity accepting
funding from a Chinese entity linked to the Chinese
government or Communist Party for the purpose of acquiring
U.S. companies or technology.
Protect Tibetan Identity, Religion, Language, and
Culture. The Administration should use the tools available
in the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020 (Public Law
No. 116-260, sec. 341 et seq.) to help protect Tibetan
culture and identity and Tibet's religious and linguistic
diversity from efforts to dilute or destroy them,
including through sustained diplomatic efforts to curtail
interference in the selection of Tibetan religious leaders
and a future 15th Dalai Lama. Members of Congress and
Administration officials should interact regularly with
the leaders of the Central Tibetan Administration and with
parliamentarians globally to build international
coalitions to protect Tibetan human rights.
Gain Access to Tibet. The Administration should
implement the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (Public Law
No. 115-330) by issuing robust annual reports, and
sanctions for officials responsible for closing off access
to Tibetan areas to diplomats, journalists, academics, and
tourists. Members of Congress should encourage
parliamentarian colleagues globally to pass legislation
seeking greater access to Tibet.
Develop a Whole-of-Government Human Rights Strategy.
The Administration should issue a policy directive to
develop a comprehensive strategy embedding human rights,
the rule of law, and democratic governance and development
goals into the critical mission strategies of all U.S.
Government entities interacting with the Chinese
government, both bilaterally and through international
organizations, and start an interagency process for
implementation to be led by the Under Secretary of State
for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights and the
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor.
Strengthen International Organizations. The
Administration should compete for influence with the
Chinese government in international organizations where
rules are being formulated for the international
community, including the International Telecommunication
Union, the International Labour Organization, Interpol,
the World Intellectual Property Organization, and the
World Health Organization (WHO). In particular, the
Administration should coordinate with like-minded allies
and partners to strengthen common positions on internet
freedom, human rights norms, and human rights violations
and raise these issues repeatedly with Chinese government
officials at the UN and other international bodies,
including the Human Rights Council, and during reviews of
State Parties' compliance with relevant treaties, such as
the Committee against Torture (CAT). In addition, the
Administration and Congress should work together to:
Promote representation by leading democracies at UN
standards setting and human rights bodies, particularly
by coordinating with like-minded countries to advance
candidates for leadership positions and support robust
staffing at all levels of the organizations;
Establish an annual report on the Chinese
government's malign influence operations in
international organizations that details any actions
that undermine the principles and purpose of the UN and
its various agencies, particularly those related to
human rights, internet governance, law enforcement,
global health, environmental protection, the development
of norms on artificial intelligence and biometric
surveillance, labor, standards setting, and freedom of
navigation; and
Support the WHO's efforts to conduct a transparent
and credible investigation into the origins of SARS-CoV-
2, including a forensic investigation of relevant
laboratories in Wuhan, and strengthen the International
Health Regulations (IHR) to make clearer the obligations
of member states and the consequences for those that
fail to provide timely and transparent information about
infectious disease outbreaks, including by creating a
regular periodic review for compliance of member states
with the IHR.
Develop Creative Human Rights Programming. The
Administration and Members of Congress should publicly and
more broadly support Chinese legal reformers, civil
society, independent journalists, human rights defenders,
and labor, religious freedom, and democracy advocates, and
provide material and other means of support for them. The
Administration should work with Congress to:
Authorize and appropriate funds for capacity-
building initiatives for rights and rule-of-law
advocates in settings outside China, given growing
restrictions on the funding of civil society
organizations inside China and in Hong Kong;
Support educational and cultural exchange programs,
particularly those not in areas that are sensitive for
military and security reasons, in order to preserve
these exchanges as a valuable resource and to maintain
positive influence channels with the Chinese people; and
Develop creative public messaging and programs that
prioritize the rights violations that affect the largest
numbers of Chinese citizens--workers, families,
religious believers, internet users, women, and rural
residents.
Create a Special Advisor for Political Prisoners. The
Administration should consider creating the position of
Special Advisor for Political Prisoners within the State
Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
and create a diplomatic strategy to gain the release of
political and religious prisoners, including unjustly
detained American citizens and long-term permanent
residents of the United States abroad. The Special Advisor
can also serve as a resource to former political prisoners
seeking guidance on their travels abroad. The
Administration should also work to end the Chinese
government's unacceptable use of ``exit bans.''
Advocate for Political Prisoners. Members of Congress
and Administration officials at the highest levels should
raise specific political prisoner cases in meetings with
Chinese government officials. Experience demonstrates that
consistently raising individual prisoner cases and the
larger human rights issues they represent can result in
improved treatment in detention, lighter sentences or, in
some cases, release from custody, detention, or
imprisonment. Members of Congress are encouraged to
consult the Commission's Political Prisoner Database for
reliable information on cases of political and religious
detention in China, and to ``adopt'' individual prisoners
and advocate on their behalf through the Tom Lantos Human
Rights Commission's Defending Freedoms Project.
Support Allies Facing Economic Coercion. The Chinese
government has used the threat and execution of trade
restrictions and predatory infrastructure loans as
leverage to punish countries critical of its human rights
record or to pressure countries to change policies viewed
as harmful to Chinese interests. The Administration should
build a global coalition against China's coercion, to
reduce vulnerability to economic pressure and impose costs
on the Chinese government for this type of action. The
Administration should provide to Congress a strategy for
reducing the threat of trade restriction actions or other
economic coercion to include:
Plans to work in concert with allies and partners at
the World Trade Organization or other international
financial institutions to challenge boycotts and trade
restrictions that undermine the integrity of the rules-
based global economic order;
Legal authorities needed to create a global reserve
fund to assist companies, industries, and municipalities
affected by targeted economic coercion;
Identification of trade barriers that need to be
revised either to impose retaliatory tariffs on Chinese
imports as part of joint action with allies and partners
or to buy products targeted by the Chinese government
for trade restriction actions; and
A plan to deploy expert economic response teams to
assist countries facing economic coercion or challenges
related to debt, human rights, or environmental
protection as a result of Belt and Road Initiative
projects.
Executive Summary
The Commission's mandate is to monitor the behavior of the
People's Republic of China against international human
rights standards. It is the state that incurs obligations
under international law, and thus it is the government
that bears responsibility thereunder for the private
activities of persons or entities, including parties.
Given the Party's increasingly tight control of the
Chinese political system, there is decreasing practical
difference between party and government when discussing
the wielding of power in China. As a matter of monitoring
human rights, the Commission must be clear in its
reporting both that the Party exercises power over the
government and that the government bears the obligation to
uphold such rights.
The Commission faces a similar challenge in characterizing Xi
Jinping. His power derives from his position as General
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and as Chairman
of the Central Military Commission. Xi Jinping also has
the title of ``zhuxi,'' a largely ceremonial post that
carries little power but one that makes him head of state.
While the U.S. Government translates this title as
``President,'' some Commissioners view it as inaccurate or
inappropriate to use this title.
This Annual Report seeks to reflect the Party-state dynamics
by listing the Party as the primary actor in cases where
it is appropriate to do so. Descriptions of the Party,
government, and their leadership do not reflect judgments
of the Commission regarding the legitimacy of these
entities and individuals. The Commission will continue to
evaluate characterizations of the aforementioned
leadership dynamics in future annual reports to conform to
standards of accuracy, relevance, and consistency with
common practice among the community of interest.
Freedom of Expression
Freedom of Expression
II. Human Rights
Freedom of Expression
Findings
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary and
President Xi Jinping stressed the importance of
influencing global public opinion this past year in
advance of the Party's centenary in July 2021 and in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Party and
government leveraged an international media
infrastructure to spread positive propaganda about the
Party and reduce criticism of senior officials. News and
research reports this past year also examined the
widespread dissemination of government and Party
propaganda and disinformation via social media platforms
within China and internationally, including content
related to COVID-19.
Party control of China Global Television Network
(CGTN)--a satellite arm of China's Party- and state-run
broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV)--and the
lack of independent editorial responsibility over CGTN's
material were central to the decision in February 2021
by the Office of Communications (Ofcom), the United
Kingdom television regulator, to revoke CGTN's license-
holder permission to broadcast in the U.K.
Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom
Index continued to rank China among the worst countries
for press freedom in the world--177 out of 180 for the
third year in a row. Chinese laws and regulations
restrict the space in which domestic journalists and
media outlets may report the news, overseen by a system
of censorship implemented by various Party and
government agencies. The Cyberspace Administration of
China has a leading role in regulatory efforts; this
past year, it revised provisions on social media use
that targeted citizen journalists and ``self-media,''
the proliferation of which the government has labeled
``chaotic.''
The government has expelled--or effectively
expelled through visa renewal denials and harassment--at
least 20 foreign journalists since August 2019. Those
who remain, according to a BBC reporter, face ``the grim
reality of reporting from China,'' which includes
official harassment, physical obstruction, surveillance,
and discrediting.
Chinese authorities continued to arbitrarily
detain, and in some cases try and sentence, Chinese
citizens for speech and expression protected by
international human rights standards. In December 2020,
authorities in Shanghai municipality sentenced citizen
journalist Zhang Zhan to four years in prison because of
her video reports in February 2020 from Wuhan
municipality, Hubei province, the epicenter of the
COVID-19 outbreak. In another case, as part of a
nationwide crackdown that started in 2019, authorities
reportedly detained dozens of teenagers and individuals
in their twenties in connection with the website Esu
Wiki, on which a photo had been posted of Xi Mingze,
daughter of Xi Jinping. Authorities sentenced 24 of them
to prison terms, the longest of which was the 14-year
sentence given to Niu Tengyu.
The international non-governmental organization
Freedom House ranked China as the ``worst abuser of
internet freedom for the sixth consecutive year'' in its
2020 internet freedom assessment. This past year, the
Chinese government counteracted the rising popularity of
audio files and audio-only platforms that had created
openings for speech and cross-border conversation.
China's first-ever five-year plan (2020-2025) for the
``rule of law'' likely will entail even more regulatory
measures in information technology, which an observer
suggested may be aimed at positioning China as a leading
voice in international digital law rulemaking.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are
encouraged to:
Give greater public expression, including at the
highest levels of the U.S. Government, to the issue of
press freedom in China, condemning the harassment and
detention of both domestic and foreign journalists; the
denial, threat of denial, or delay of visas for foreign
journalists; and the censorship of foreign media
websites. Consistently link press freedom to U.S.
interests, noting that censorship and restrictions on
journalists and media websites prevent the free flow of
information on issues of public concern, including
public health and environmental crises, and food safety,
and act as trade barriers for foreign companies
attempting to access the Chinese market.
Call on the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to
make public the ``assurances'' on human rights it
received from Chinese authorities as regards its role as
host of the Winter Olympics in Beijing in February 2022.
Given the Chinese government's lack of compliance with
its stated promises regarding free press when it hosted
the Summer 2008 Olympics, and urge that the IOC work
with international journalist associations to establish
an independent mechanism to monitor journalists' in-
country and online access during the Games, and give
real-time reports to the public on rights violations and
censorship.
Increase media literacy of U.S. citizens with regard
to Chinese state-sponsored propaganda, censorship, and
disinformation, including greater support and funding to
graduate-level area studies programs and language study.
Provide forums for scholars, civil society advocates,
and journalists to discuss and disseminate ``best
practices'' in Chinese media literacy, including
developing online tools that protect the digital
communications of students and scholars, and activists
and journalists.
Urge Chinese officials to end the unlawful detention
and official harassment of Chinese rights advocates,
lawyers, and journalists subjected to reprisal for
exercising their right to freedom of expression. Call on
officials to release or confirm the release of
individuals detained or imprisoned for exercising
freedom of expression, such as Cai Wei, Chen Jieren,
Chen Mei, Chen Qiushi, Ding Jiaxi, Fang Bin, Geng
Xiaonan, Huang Qi, Ke Chengbing, Li Xinde, Niu Tengyu,
Wei Zhili, Xu Zhiyong, Zhang Zhan, Yang Zhengjun, and
other political prisoners mentioned in this Report and
documented in the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database.
Freedom of Expression
Freedom of Expression
Freedom of Expression
Party Control of the Media
AMPLIFYING THE PARTY'S STORY INTERNATIONALLY
In the months before the Chinese Communist Party's centenary
in July 2021 and following a period of more than one year
during which the Chinese government expelled (or
effectively expelled) approximately 18 foreign
journalists,\1\ Chinese officials and Party- and state-run
media outlets endorsed the late American journalist Edgar
Snow (1905-1972) as a model foreign journalist.\2\ Little
was known internationally about the Party when Snow wrote
about Mao Zedong and the Party in his 1937 book Red Star
Over China, and the book's positive portrayals have been
ascribed to the significant editorial input of Snow's
Party liaisons and Mao himself.\3\ State media's multiple
references to Edgar Snow nearly 85 years after Red Star's
publication correspond to what Freedom House media expert
Sarah Cook has described as the Chinese leadership's
strategic focus on ``influenc[ing] public debate and media
coverage about China outside of the country . . ..'' \4\ A
June 2020 report from the International Federation of
Journalists (IFJ) adds to Cook's research, documenting the
Chinese government's efforts for at least a decade to
influence the news about China through worldwide outreach
to journalist associations and media outlets, content
produced solely by or jointly with official Chinese
outlets, study tours and training in China for members of
national journalist associations, and the building of an
external media infrastructure.\5\ In a follow-on study
from May 2021 that looked at China's efforts to produce a
worldwide story favorable to China about the COVID-19
pandemic, IFJ reported various ways in which this external
media infrastructure had been activated.\6\ Sinopsis, a
Prague-based project that analyzes political developments
in China, previously reported on the Chinese government's
outreach since 2014 to foreign media outlets and
journalists in order to generate favorable publicity in
the countries participating in China's Belt and Road
Initiative.\7\ News and research reports this past year
examined the widespread dissemination of government and
Party propaganda and disinformation via social media
platforms within China and internationally, including
content related to COVID-19.\8\
Party General Secretary and Chinese President Xi Jinping's May
2021 speech to the Party Central Committee Political
Bureau (Politburo) addressed international communications
efforts, briefly mentioning stratagems that have been in
place since the 18th Party Congress in October 2012 to
present the Party's perspective on Chinese development.\9\
He urged redoubling the work to ``strengthen the Chinese
Communist Party's propaganda and its interpretation to
make foreign peoples aware of the Chinese Communist
Party's genuine struggle to achieve happiness and
prosperity for the Chinese people, and to understand that
the Chinese Communist Party is capable, Marxism is
effective, and socialism with Chinese characteristics is
good.'' \10\ Xi spoke of making use of high-level experts,
international forums, and mainstream foreign media outlets
as a platform and channel for such international
communications.\11\ Yet he omitted discussion of press
freedom or the responsibility of journalists to report
news accurately in the interests of the Chinese people and
international community.\12\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.K. Ofcom Revokes CGTN Broadcast License
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Party control of China Global Television Network (CGTN)--a satellite
arm of China's Party- and state-run broadcaster China Central
Television (CCTV) \13\--and the resulting lack of independent editorial
responsibility over CGTN's material were central to the decision in
February 2021 by the Office of Communications (Ofcom), the United
Kingdom television regulator, to revoke CGTN's license-holder
permission to broadcast in the U.K.\14\ Ofcom's action was prompted by
formal complaints that CGTN had aired forced confessions in politically
motivated cases.\15\ Ofcom rejected a subsequent application to
transfer the license to the China Global Television Network Corporation
(CGTNC) on the basis that ``. . . we consider that CGTNC would be
disqualified from holding a licence, as it is controlled by a body
which is ultimately controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.'' \16\
In March 2021, Ofcom also fined CGTN for airing the confessions of Gui
Minhai, a Swedish national, and Simon Cheng Man Kit, a Hong Kong
resident who had worked at the British consulate in Hong Kong.\17\ With
French broadcast regulations less restrictive, however, CGTN broadcasts
continued to be accessible to U.K. viewers,\18\ including broadcasts
that contained allegedly coerced statements.\19\ In March, for example,
CGTN Francais broadcast an interview with a young Uyghur girl in China--
who was allegedly interviewed under duress and reportedly without
obtaining her guardian's consent--during which the broadcast accused
her Australia-based father of abandonment.\20\ [For more information
about the plight of the Uyghur community in China, see Section IV--
Xinjiang.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
REINFORCING PARTY GUIDANCE OVER NEWS MEDIA PLATFORMS
AND JOURNALISTS
Reporters Without Borders' 2021 World Press Freedom Index
ranked China the fourth worst country in the world for
press freedom (177 out of 180) for the third year in a
row.\21\ Article 35 of China's Constitution guarantees
that Chinese citizens ``enjoy . . . freedom of the
press,'' along with other expression-related rights,\22\
yet Chinese laws and regulations restrict the space in
which domestic journalists and media outlets may exercise
those freedoms.\23\ The Chinese Communist Party
historically designated the news media as its
``mouthpiece,'' providing the Party's version of the news
and ``guiding'' public opinion.\24\ While a period of
looser restrictions in the 1990s and 2000s in China saw
the rise of more market-oriented news outlets \25\ and
influential investigative journalism,\26\ Xi Jinping's
ascension to Communist Party General Secretary and Chinese
President in October 2012 and March 2013, respectively,
saw a renewed focus on journalists' ideological alignment
with and loyalty to Party principles \27\ articulated in
Xi's 2016 comment that the media ``must be surnamed
Party.'' \28\
This past year, Chinese authorities continued to take
regulatory measures to restrict social media accounts that
provide news and public information.\29\ Newly amended
provisions for social media account users, released in
January 2021 by the Cyberspace Administration of
China,\30\ purportedly aim to curtail the spread of false
information.\31\ Yet the provisions target the
proliferation of citizen journalism \32\ and ``self-
media'' (zi meiti) \33\--the latter of which state media
has described as ``chaotic'' \34\--by requiring that users
of independent social media accounts that publish news or
public information have the relevant certification to
allow them to report on the news.\35\ David Bandurski,
director of the Hong Kong-based China Media Project,
observed that ``[c]leansing the `self-media' space,
restraining sensitive information and dissenting views, is
not sufficient on its own. The way must be cleared for the
dominance of CCP-led public opinion.'' \36\ Domestic
journalists' use of social media has long been a focus of
regulation; in 2014, news regulators placed restrictions
on journalists' and news organizations' use of social
media accounts, attempting to rein in journalists' use of
these accounts to publish reports and articles that had
been censored or would have been censored by news
organizations.\37\ In January 2021, the National Press and
Publication Administration added a review of journalist
social media usage between December 2, 2019, and January
1, 2021, to journalists' annual press certification.\38\
The review thus created a basis to refuse certification to
journalists who had used personal social media accounts
for alleged unauthorized news reporting; it also
``effectively extended official editorial controls from
journalists' places of employment to their personal
accounts,'' according to experts.\39\
Official editorial controls in the form of censorship
directives from the Cyberspace Administration of China,
the Central Propaganda Department, and government entities
\40\ restrict coverage to ``authoritative'' content, such
as information circulated by the state media agency
Xinhua.\41\ Leaked directives from the past year, made
available and translated by the U.S.-based web portal
China Digital Times, demonstrate political sensitivities
and a will to control issues that might foster criticism
of the Party and government, such as the handling of the
COVID-19 outbreak, economic recovery, implementation of
rural policies that have led to home demolitions, and the
U.S. presidential election.\42\
Harassment and Criminal Detention of Citizen Journalists
China continued to detain the highest number of journalists in
the world in 2020, according to the international advocacy
group Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).\43\ Many of
the detained Chinese journalists on CPJ's list are
considered ``citizen journalists'' in that some are non-
professional or former journalists who document
developments outside of the state- and Party-run news
system.\44\ Citizen journalists in China have challenged
official narratives \45\ and censorship by monitoring and
reporting on the conditions of ethnic minority groups,\46\
religious belief,\47\ labor protests, occupational
health,\48\ and rights defense activities.\49\ Some new
and ongoing cases of concern from the Commission's 2021
reporting year include the following:
For reporting on COVID-19.\50\ Authorities in
Shanghai municipality sentenced Zhang Zhan on December
28, 2020,
to four years in prison for ``picking quarrels and
provoking
trouble'' in connection with videos she took in February
2020, which showed conditions in the COVID-19 epicenter
of Wuhan municipality, Hubei province.\51\ Other cases
of individuals detained for reporting on COVID-19
include Fang Bin, who was held in incommunicado
detention, likely in Wuhan; \52\ Chen Qiushi, who was
restricted to his parents' home and environs in Qingdao
municipality, Shandong province; \53\ and Chen Mei and
Cai Wei, who were tried on May 11, 2021, by the Chaoyang
District People's Court in Beijing municipality on the
charge of ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble.''
\54\
For reporting on anticorruption. On January 7,
2021, the Pizhou Municipal People's Court in Xuzhou
municipality, Jiangsu province, sentenced Li Xinde to
five years in prison and his son, Li Chao, to one year
in prison on the charge of ``illegal business
activity,'' in connection with Li Xinde's watchdog
journalism website China Public Opinion Supervision
Net.\55\
For reporting on a variety of rights defense
activities. Despite a need for medical parole due to
advanced liver disease and other serious health
conditions,\56\ Huang Qi, founder of the human rights
monitoring website 64 Tianwang,\57\ continued to serve a
12-year sentence in Bazhong Prison in Bazhong
municipality, Sichuan province, on the charges of
``stealing, spying, purchasing, and illegally providing
state secrets for overseas entities'' and
``intentionally disclosing state secrets.'' \58\ Wei
Zhili, Ke Chengbing, and Yang Zhengjun of the website
iLabour have been in pretrial detention since early 2019
on the charge of ``picking quarrels and provoking
trouble.'' \59\ Authorities harassed labor rights
monitor Lu Yuyu following his release from prison in
Yunnan province in June 2020, and forced him to leave
Guangdong province, where he had been residing.\60\
Foreign Journalists and ``The Grim Reality of Reporting
from China Today''
The Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (FCCC) 2020 annual
work survey and other reports during this past year
highlighted the challenges facing independent foreign
journalists and media outlets in providing accurate
information on China from within China.\61\ In spite of
these challenges, international correspondents, with their
media outlets, were recognized for outstanding reporting
on China this past year, including several recipients of
and finalists for the Pulitzer Prize in Journalism.\62\ In
addition to an unprecedented number of journalist
expulsions in 2020, the FCCC documented visa restrictions
and denials, digital and human surveillance of foreign
correspondents, intimidation of Chinese nationals who work
as news assistants for foreign media outlets, harassment
of interviewees, and restrictions on access to areas where
some ethnic minority groups reside.\63\
Forced departures. Starting with the effective
expulsion of a Wall Street Journal reporter from China
in August 2019,\64\ the government has expelled or
effectively expelled through visa controls \65\ and
harassment more than 20 foreign journalists.\66\ COVID-
19 was cited as the reason for denial of entry or access
for some reporters.\67\ The Chinese government also
justified some visa non-renewals for U.S. citizens as a
retaliatory response to the treatment of Chinese
journalists in the United States.\68\ In some cases,
foreign journalists pointed to worsening bilateral
tensions with China as a factor in their departures,\69\
such as the September 2020 departures of Australian
journalists Bill Birtles and Mike Smith.\70\ John
Sudworth, a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
reporter in China, departed China in March 2021 in
connection with threats and harassment for his
reporting, including coverage of the government's
treatment of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim
ethnic minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR).\71\ Veteran correspondents raised
concerns that there may be fewer investigative reports
from China \72\ and even an information ``vacuum'' as a
result of these forced departures and assignments in
China being curtailed by lack of work visas.\73\
Discrediting. Officials aggressively discredited
foreign media organizations, reports, and individual
journalists this past year.\74\ At a daily press
conference in March 2021, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
spokesperson Wang Wenbin rejected the findings of the
FCCC's 2020 working conditions survey by denying the
legitimacy of the FCCC as an organization.\75\
Government spokespersons accused the BBC of publishing
``fake news'' following a BBC report on the sexual abuse
of Uyghur women in the XUAR.\76\ Individual journalists
were targeted for harassment,\77\ including Vicky
Xiuzhong Xu, a Chinese national based in Australia who
has reported on rights abuses in the XUAR.\78\
Banning broadcasts. Not long after the U.K.
government revoked the broadcasting license of China
Global Television Network (CGTN), China's official
broadcaster abroad, in February 2021, the Chinese
government retaliated by banning BBC television
broadcasts within China on the premise that BBC reports
on repression in the XUAR violated broadcast rules on
content.\79\ (The BBC website and newscasts, however,
were inaccessible in China for many years because of
official censorship.\80\)
Obstruction and assault. John Sudworth of the BBC
reported instances of being physically obstructed--by
officials and unidentified individuals--while on
assignment covering the COVID-19 pandemic \81\ and the
treatment of Uyghurs in the XUAR,\82\ both issues that
government and Party deem politically sensitive. Local
authorities in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
briefly detained and assaulted a Los Angeles Times
correspondent in September 2020 while she was reporting
on a policy change that diminished the use of Mongolian
language in primary and tertiary education.\83\
Hong Kong. Press freedom deteriorated
dramatically this past year, largely in connection with
the new Hong Kong National Security Law, which puts
journalists at risk of criminal sanction regardless of
the factual accuracy of their reporting.\84\ The status
of foreign journalists and media outlets in Hong Kong,
which was a longtime beacon of press freedom in Asia,
also worsened.\85\ The Hong Kong government refused to
renew work visas of at least two foreign journalists
\86\ and delayed visas in other cases.\87\ The New York
Times moved its digital edition operations from Hong
Kong to Seoul, South Korea, as a result of the changed
conditions.\88\ [For information on the prosecution of
Apple Daily publisher Jimmy Lai and Hong Kong
journalists and the intimidation of the public
broadcaster RTHK, see the press freedom section in
Section VII--Developments in Hong Kong and Macau.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cases of Detained Foreign Journalists and Chinese Nationals Working with
Foreign Media Outlets During 2021 Reporting Year
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
CGTN announcer Cheng Lei. Cheng, an Australian citizen who was
primarily a business anchor for the Party-run broadcaster CGTN for
eight years, was detained by authorities in China in August 2020.\89\
In February 2021, authorities formally arrested her on suspicion of
``stealing, spying, purchasing, and illegally supplying state secrets
for overseas entities.'' \90\ Her detention took place in the broader
context of deteriorating relations between China and Australia.\91\
Bloomberg news assistant Haze Fan. In December 2020,
authorities detained Haze Fan, a Chinese national who worked for
Bloomberg News, for alleged national security crimes.\92\ Fan
reportedly was a close friend of detained Australian reporter Cheng
Lei.\93\
Voice of America intern Tian Chuang. To underscore security
threats on China's National Security Education Day, in mid-April 2021,
state and Party media reported on the detention in 2020 of a journalism
student from Hebei province named Tian Chuang, who reportedly had
interned for Voice of America.\94\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using Chinese Law to Punish Free Speech and Other Challenges
to Freedom of Expression
International standards on freedom of expression address
concerns that governments may place excessive restrictions
on speech. Article 19 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights \95\--and its reiteration in a
2011 report by the then-Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression--allows countries to impose certain
restrictions or limitations on freedom of expression, if
such restrictions are provided by law and are necessary
for the purpose of respecting the ``rights or reputations
of others'' or protecting national security, public order,
public health, or morals.\96\ In April 2020, as the COVID-
19 pandemic was spreading around the world, the UN Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression reiterated free speech
principles, noting that ``legality, necessity and
proportionality apply across the board; they are not
simply discarded in the context of efforts to address the
public health threat of COVID-19.'' \97\
Chinese authorities continued to arbitrarily detain, and in
some cases, try and sentence Chinese citizens for speech
and expression protected by international human rights
standards. A Chinese internet user with an online presence
under the Twitter handle @SpeechFreedomCN built a Google
spreadsheet that documented more than 2,000 cases of
detention for alleged speech crimes from July 2013 through
June 2021,\98\ ranging from short-term administrative
detentions of 2 to 15 days \99\ to an 18-year sentence for
businessman Ren Zhiqiang.\100\ The speech for which
authorities detained these individuals ranged from
insulting traffic police,\101\ to support for an exiled
businessman,\102\ to criticism of the Party,\103\ among
other content.\104\ The internet user @SpeechFreedomCN
found 660 cases of individuals detained between January 1,
2020, and June 5, 2021, for expressing opinions or sharing
information about COVID-19.\105\ Similarly, in the case of
legal advocate Xu Zhiyong--detained by authorities in
February 2020 after he tweeted criticism of Xi Jinping's
handling of COVID-19 and weeks after he participated in a
private meeting to discuss civil society \106\--the UN
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention opined in March 2021
that,
The Working Group cannot help but notice that Mr. Xu's
political views and convictions are clearly at the
centre of the present case[ . . . ]. Indeed, his human
rights advocacy appears to be the sole reason for his
arrest and detention.\107\
With the broad shift to remote education due to the COVID-19
pandemic this past year, China studies academics outside
China raised concerns about the possible criminal
sanctions that their students in China might face if the
students' written work or online participation included
discussion of topics or themes the Chinese government
deems politically sensitive.\108\ The Party and its
history were especially sensitive in the months before the
centenary of the Party's founding; in April 2021, the
Cybersecurity Administration of China established a
hotline for individuals to report instances of
``historical nihilism'' \109\ and in May authorized the
deletion of more than 2 million social media posts alleged
to ``harm'' official history.\110\ The New York-based non-
governmental organization Scholars at Risk reported in its
2020 annual report on academic freedom throughout the
world that Chinese authorities
detained a Japanese scholar for about two months in China
for allegedly collecting historical materials.\111\ The
scholar, an expert in 20th-century Chinese history, was in
China at the invitation of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences.\112\ [For more information on repression this
past year of foreign academics and researchers, see
Section II--Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and
Globally and Section IV--Xinjiang.]
In addition to the cases already mentioned in this chapter and
other sections of the 2021 Annual Report, other notable
speech cases reported this past year included the
following:
In September 2020, public security officials in
Haidian district, Beijing municipality, criminally
detained wife and husband Geng Xiaonan and Qin Zhen,
owners of a publishing firm, on suspicion of ``illegal
business activity.'' \113\ Xu Zhangrun, a prominent
Party critic and recently fired Tsinghua University law
professor whom authorities detained from July 7 to 12,
2020,\114\ for allegedly ``consorting with
prostitutes,'' \115\ claimed that authorities had
detained the couple for Geng's public support of Xu
after his detention.\116\ Geng had stated that the
official allegation against Xu was ``just the kind of
vile slander that they use against someone they want to
silence . . ..'' \117\ In February 2021, the Haidian
District People's Court sentenced Geng to three years in
prison, and sentenced Qin to two years and six months in
prison, suspended for three years.\118\
In a nationwide crackdown starting in 2019,
authorities reportedly detained dozens of teenagers and
individuals in their twenties in connection with the
website Esu Wiki,\119\ on which a photo had been posted
of Xi Mingze, daughter of Chinese President and Party
General Secretary Xi Jinping.\120\ Authorities sentenced
24 of them to prison terms, the longest of which was a
14-year sentence given to Niu Tengyu,\121\ a coder who
had provided technical support to the website.\122\ Niu
reported that public security officials subjected him to
severe torture, including sexual abuse, while in
detention.\123\
Selected Internet and Social Media Developments
According to the China Internet Network Information Center
(CNNIC), there were 989 million internet users in China as
of December 2020,\124\ 986 million of whom accessed the
internet from mobile phones.\125\ As of March 2021,
WeChat, a Chinese instant messaging platform, reportedly
had more than 1.2 billion monthly active users throughout
the world.\126\ Sina Weibo, a domestic microblogging
platform similar to Twitter, reportedly reached 530
million monthly active users worldwide in March 2021,\127\
of whom 230 million are registered in China.\128\ The
international non-governmental organization Freedom House
ranked China as the ``worst abuser of internet freedom for
the sixth consecutive year'' in its 2020 internet freedom
assessment.\129\
This past year, the Chinese government counteracted the rising
popularity of audio files and audio-only platforms that
had created openings for speech and cross-border
conversation, by requiring the removal of applications
(apps) from app stores. In June 2020, Apple removed the
apps for two podcasts with content that Chinese
authorities deemed to be politically sensitive.\130\ Apple
also blocked and removed Signal, an encrypted chat and
messaging app that was popular among rights defenders,
from its mobile store in China in March 2021.\131\ On
February 8, 2021, authorities blocked access to the
Clubhouse app \132\ not long after Clubhouse users from
several countries reportedly held discussions about the
Chinese government's repressive measures against Uyghurs
and other ethnic minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region.\133\ The Tuber browser app, which
allowed limited access to U.S. social media sites like
YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, appeared and was removed
the same day from app stores in October 2020.\134\ [For
more information on the role of Apple and Chinese
companies in implementing censorship on behalf of the
government and Party, see Section II--Business and Human
Rights.]
INTERNET GOVERNANCE IN CHINA AND INTERNATIONALLY
A February 2021 essay in the Party's theoretical journal
Seeking Truth by the head of the Cyberspace Administration
of China, Zhuang Rongwen, emphasized the Party's
leadership over cybersecurity and information space by
citing Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping's
statements regarding strict adherence to the Party's
management of the internet.\135\ Zhuang also highlighted
the Party's ambition to shape global internet governance
norms \136\ and promote a concept of cyber sovereignty,
which a China cybersecurity expert defined as ``the state
hold[ing] ultimate authority in the digital space.'' \137\
In March 2021, the National People's Congress adopted the
14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social
Development and the Outline of Long-Term Goals for 2035
(14th Five-Year Plan),\138\ which gives priority to
scientific and technological innovation and self-
reliance.\139\ State media outlet Xinhua reported that the
14th Five-Year Plan proposes ``to promote the
establishment of a global internet governance system that
is multilateral, democratic and transparent . . .,'' \140\
a plan that implies a limited role for non-governmental
stakeholders like industry and civil society
organizations.\141\ One observer suggested, moreover, that
China's first-ever five-year plan (2020-2025) for the
``rule of law'' likely will entail even more regulatory
measures in information technology,\142\ and potentially
positions China as a leading voice in international
digital law rulemaking.\143\ [For more information on
legal developments regarding data privacy and
surveillance, see Section III--Institutions of Democratic
Governance.]
THE TURN AGAINST BIG TECH
Chinese authorities launched a campaign against Chinese
information technology companies with antitrust and other
regulations in fall 2020. In November, the State
Administration for Market Regulation published guidelines
that addressed anti-competitive behavior in the internet
sector,\144\ compelling compliance from companies on
conduct ranging from monopolistic practices \145\ to a
failure to adhere to Party policy aims.\146\ The campaign
reportedly stems from government and Party concern over
the increasing power and influence of e-commerce and
technology companies,\147\ including the expansion of
these companies into finance and banking,\148\ and their
access to users' private data.\149\ One of the most
visible targets of the government's campaign was Alibaba,
which authorities fined US$2.8 billion in April 2021, for
allegedly violating antitrust regulations \150\ after
canceling the initial public offering of its affiliate Ant
Group in November 2020.\151\ News reports, moreover,
linked Alibaba founder and former CEO Jack Ma's criticism
of China's financial regulatory sector in October 2020 to
his months' long ``disappearance'' from the public at the
end of 2020.\152\
Freedom of Expression
Freedom of Expression
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Expression
\1\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Track, Trace, Expel:
Reporting on China Amid a Pandemic, March 2021, 1-2.
\2\ ``Edgar Snow's Story,'' Edgar Snow Memorial Foundation, accessed May
31, 2021; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on January 4, 2021,'' January 4,
2021; ``China Welcomes Foreign Journalists Like Edgar Snow: Wang Yi,''
CGTN, March 7, 2021; `` `Who Is CPC?': Edgar Snow, the First Western
Journalist to Introduce Red China to the World,'' Global Times, April
16, 2021; Mary Hui, ``A US Journalist Who Dined with Mao Is Beijing's
Ideal for Who Should Cover China,'' Quartz, April 15, 2021.
\3\ Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China. (London: V. Gollancz, 1937); Julia
Lovell, Maoism: A Global History (New York: Vintage Books, 2019), 76-77.
See also Sarah Cook, ``China's Global Media Footprint: Democratic
Responses to Expanding Authoritarian Influence,'' National Endowment for
Democracy, International Forum for Democratic Studies, February 2021.
\4\ Sarah Cook, ``China's Global Media Footprint: Democratic Responses
to Expanding Authoritarian Influence,'' National Endowment for
Democracy, International Forum for Democratic Studies, February 2021.
\5\ International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), ``The China Story:
Reshaping the World's Media,'' June 2020, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8. The IFJ
research report was co-authored by Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin.
\6\ International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), ``The COVID-19 Story:
Unmasking China's Global Strategy,'' May 2021, 2-3.
\7\ Nadege Rolland, ``Mapping the Footprint of Belt and Road Influence
Operations,'' Sinopsis, August 12, 2019.
\8\ Louisa Lim, Julia Bergin, and Johan Lidberg, ``The COVID-19 Story:
Unmasking China's Global Strategy,'' International Federation of
Journalists (IFJ), May 2021; Raymond Zhong, Paul Mozur, and Aaron
Krolik, New York Times, and Jeff Kao, ProPublica, ``Leaked Documents
Show How China's Army of Paid Internet Trolls Helped Censor the
Coronavirus,'' New York Times and ProPublica, December 19, 2020; Vanessa
Molter and Graham Webster, ``Virality Project (China): Coronavirus
Conspiracy Claims,'' Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies,
Stanford University, March 17, 2020; Carly Miller, Vanessa Molter,
Isabella Garcia-Camargo, Renee DiResta, ``Sockpuppets Spin COVID Yarns:
An Analysis of PRC-Attributed June 2020 Twitter Takedown,'' Stanford
Internet Observatory, Cyber Policy Center, June 17, 2020. See also Erika
Kinetz, ``Army of Fake Fans Boosts China's Messaging on Twitter,''
Associated Press, May 28, 2021.
\9\ ``Xi Jinping zai Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhiju disanshi ci jiti
xuexi shi qiangdiao jiaqiang he gaijin guoji chuanbo gongzuo zhanshi
zhenshi liti quanmian de Zhongguo'' [At the 30th study session of the
Party Central Committee Political Bureau, Xi Jinping stressed
strengthening and improving international communications to show the
true, three-dimensional and comprehensive China], Xinhua, June 1, 2021;
``Xi Focus: Xi Stresses Improving China's International Communication
Capacity,'' Xinhua, June 1, 2021.
\10\ ``Xi Jinping zai Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhiju disanshi ci jiti
xuexi shi qiangdiao jiaqiang he gaijin guoji chuanbo gongzuo zhanshi
zhenshi liti quanmian de Zhongguo'' [At the 30th study session of the
Party Central Committee Political Bureau, Xi Jinping stressed
strengthening and improving international communications to show the
true, three-dimensional and comprehensive China], Xinhua, June 1, 2021.
\11\ ``Xi Jinping zai Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhiju disanshi ci jiti
xuexi shi qiangdiao jiaqiang he gaijin guoji chuanbo gongzuo zhanshi
zhenshi liti quanmian de Zhongguo'' [At the 30th study session of the
Party Central Committee Political Bureau, Xi Jinping stressed
strengthening and improving international communications to show the
true, three-dimensional and comprehensive China], Xinhua, June 1, 2021;
``Xi Focus: Xi Stresses Improving China's International Communication
Capacity,'' Xinhua, June 1, 2021. See also Javier C. Hernandez, ``
`We're Almost Extinct': China's Investigative Journalists Are Silenced
Under Xi,'' New York Times, July 12, 2019.
\12\ See, e.g., ``Finding Credible News: What Makes Journalism
Reliable?,'' McKillop Library, Salve Regina University, accessed June
30, 2021; UNESCO, ``World Press Freedom Day 2021 Information as a Public
Good,'' November 24, 2020, accessed May 31, 2021, 3, 5.
\13\ Renee Diresta, Carly Miller, Vanessa Molter, John Pomfret, and
Glenn Tiffert, ``Telling China's Story: The Chinese Communist Party's
Campaign to Shape Global Narratives,'' Stanford Internet Observatory
Cyber Policy Center and Hoover Institution, 2020, 9.
\14\ Ofcom, ``Decision--China Global Television Network,'' February 4,
2021; Ian Burrell, ``War of the Airwaves,'' Index on Censorship 50, no.
1, April 26, 2021, 103-04.
\15\ Patricia Nilsson, ``China's CGTN Found in Serious Breach of UK
Broadcasting Rules,'' Financial Times, July 6, 2020; Sarah Cook, Freedom
House, ``Beijing's Global Megaphone: The Expansion of Chinese Communist
Party Media Influence Since 2017,'' January 2020, chap. 3.
\16\ Ofcom, ``Decision--China Global Television Network,'' February 4,
2021.
\17\ Patricia Nilsson, ``Chinese State Broadcaster CGTN Fined
225,000 by UK Regulator,'' Financial Times, March 8, 2021.
\18\ Patricia Nilsson, ``Chinese State Broadcaster Regains Right to
Broadcast in the UK,'' Financial Times, April 9, 2021.
\19\ Safeguard Defenders, ``CGTN Under Pressure in France after Multiple
Complaints,'' April 6, 2021.
\20\ Safeguard Defenders, ``CGTN Under Pressure in France after Multiple
Complaints,'' April 6, 2021.
\21\ Reporters Without Borders, ``China'' in World Press Freedom Index
2021, accessed May 1, 2021.
\22\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982 (amended
March 11, 2018),
art. 35.
\23\ Laney Zhang, ``China'' in Limits on Freedom of Expression, Law
Library of Congress, June 2019, 20-22.
\24\ ``Zhuanfang meiti yanjiu xuezhe Lin Mulian tan Zhongguo chong su
shijie meiti'' [Exclusive interview with journalism scholar Louisa Lim
regarding China's reshaping of world media], Voice of America, June 7,
2021; Yu Zhu, ``Dangmei xing dang yu zhengzhijia banbao Xi Jinping
xinwen sixiang chulu'' [Party media is surnamed Party and politicians
run newspapers, Xi Jinping's news thought released], Duowei, June 14,
2018; David Bandurski, ``Mirror, Mirror on the Wall,'' China Media
Project, February 22, 2016; Zhu Jidong, ``Lun xin shidai jianchi
zhengzhijia banbao de zhongyaoxing'' [In the new era, adhering to the
importance of politicians running the newspapers], Xinwen Aihaozhe,
December 7, 2018, reprinted in People's Daily, December 10, 2018.
\25\ David Bandurski, ``The Spider Reweaves the Web,'' China Media
Project, March 5, 2021.
\26\ David Bandurski and Martin Hala, eds., Investigative Journalism in
China: Eight Cases in Chinese Watchdog Journalism (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
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a Cage: An Interview with Chang Ping, Former News Director of Southern
Weekend, Part One,'' China Change, February 23, 2021; Chang Ping and
Yaxue Cao, ``Freedom in a Cage: An Interview with Chang Ping, Former
News Director of Southern Weekend, Part Two,'' China Change, February
23, 2021.
\27\ ``Xi Jinping Asks for `Absolute Loyalty' from State Media,''
Associated Press, reprinted in Guardian, February 19, 2016. See also
Javier C. Hernandez, `` `We're Almost Extinct': China's Investigative
Journalists Are Silenced Under Xi,'' New York Times, July 15, 2019.
\28\ ``Xi Jinping de xinwen yulun guan'' [Xi Jinping's view on news and
public opinion], People's Daily, February 25, 2016; ``Xi Jinping Asks
for `Absolute Loyalty' from Chinese State Media,'' Associated Press,
reprinted in Guardian, November 28, 2017.
\29\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Defending Human Rights in the
Time of COVID-19'': Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders in China (2020), March 29, 2021; David Bandurski, ``The Spider
Reweaves the Web,'' China Media Project, March 5, 2021; ``China's
Political Discourse: January 2021: A Wartime State,'' China Media
Project, reprinted in Sinocism, March 2, 2021.
\30\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Hulian Wang Yonghu Gongzhong
Zhanghao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Guiding [Internet User Public Account
Information Service Management Provisions], January 22, 2021, effective
February 22, 2021, art. 9. For an unofficial English translation, see
Internet User Public Account Information Services Management Provisions,
China Law Translate (blog), January 25, 2021.
\31\ Yu Junjie, ``Guojia Wangxin Ban chutai gongzhong zhonghao guanli
xin gui jianzhi xujia xinxi, liuliang zaojia'' [Cyberspace
Administration of China issues new regulations to manage public
accounts, targeted at fake news and fake online traffic], Xinhua,
January 23, 2021.
\32\ Rita Liao, ``New Rule Reins in China's Flourishing Self-Publishing
Space,'' TechCrunch, February 1, 2021. See also ``China's Political
Discourse: January 2021: A Wartime State,'' China Media Project,
reprinted in Sinocism, March 2, 2021.
\33\ Freedom House, ``China's Information Isolation, New Censorship
Rules, Transnational Repression (February 2021),'' China Media Bulletin
151, February 2021.
\34\ Zhu Guoliang and Zhang Lina, ``Zi meiti luanxiang shengji: yizai
zaoyao feng busi, jianguan nan zai na'' [The chaos of self-media is on
the rise: rumors repeated over and over cannot be contained, what are
the challenges in supervising [it]], China Comment, reprinted in Xinhua,
September 1, 2020; ``China's `Anti-Fan' Culture on the Rise,'' Global
Times, January 13, 2020.
\35\ Josh Ye and Tracy Qu, ``China's Internet Watchdog Intensifies
Campaign against Independent Content Creators, Says Regulators Must Have
`Teeth,' '' South China Morning Post, February 2, 2021; David Bandurski,
``The Spider Reweaves the Web,'' China Media Project, March 5, 2021.
\36\ David Bandurski, ``The Spider Reweaves the Web,'' China Media
Project, March 5, 2021.
\37\ ``China's Media Regulator Places New Restrictions on Journalists
and News Organizations,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
November 5, 2014.
\38\ National Press and Publication Administration, ``Guojia Xinwen
Chuban Shu guanyu kaizhan 2020 niandu xinwen jizhe zheng hejian gongzuo
de tongzhi'' [Circular from the National Press and Publication
Administration regarding implementation of work on the 2020 year-end
journalists' certification], January 12, 2021, secs. 4.2, 6.2; ``Rules
Target Journalists on Social Media,'' China Media Project, January 22,
2021.
\39\ Angeli Datt and Sarah Cook, ``The CCP Is Retooling Its Censorship
System at a Brisk Pace in 2021,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation,
April 23, 2021.
\40\ See, e.g., Raymond Zhong, Paul Mozur, Jeff Kao, and Aaron Krolik,
``No `Negative' News: How China Censored the Coronavirus,'' New York
Times, January 13, 2021; ``Ministry of Truth,'' in China Digital Space,
accessed May 24, 2021.
\41\ See, e.g., ``Minitrue: U.S. Presidential Election,'' China Digital
Times, November 4, 2020; ``Minitrue Diary, February 24, 2020: Panchen
Lama, Gui Minhai, COVID, Xu Guang, NPC,'' China Digital Times, November
18, 2020.
\42\ ``The Virus of Lies: 2020's Top Ten Ministry of Truth Directives
(Translation),'' China Digital Times, December 24, 2020.
\43\ Elana Beiser, Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Record Number of
Journalists Jailed Worldwide,'' December 15, 2020; Committee to Protect
Journalists, ``47 Journalists Imprisoned in China in 2020,'' accessed
March 21, 2021.
\44\ Ed Holt, ``Q&A: If China Had a Free Press COVID-19 Pandemic `May
Not Have Been So Severe,' '' Inter Press Service, May 26, 2021.
\45\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``Beijing's Global Megaphone: The
Expansion of Chinese Communist Party Media Influence Since 2017,''
January 2020.
\46\ Anne-Marie Brady, `` `We Are All Part of the Same Family': China's
Ethnic Propaganda,'' Journal of Current China Affairs 41, no. 4
(December 1, 2012).
\47\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Release Liu Feiyue and
Decriminalize Human Rights Activism,'' January 29, 2019; Lin Yijiang,
``Dozens of Bitter Winter Reporters Arrested,'' Bitter Winter, December
27, 2018.
\48\ China Citizens Movement, `` `Xin Shengdai' san ming bianji bei jiya
yu yi nian lushi huijian wu wang'' [Three editors of ``New Generation''
detained for more than one year, no hope for meeting with lawyers],
March 21, 2020.
\49\ Eva Pils, ``From Independent Lawyer Groups to Civic Opposition: The
Case of China's New Citizen Movement,'' Asian-Pacific Law & Policy
Journal 19, no. 1 (May 1, 2017): 145.
\50\ Rui Di, ``Duandianxing zhiyuanzhe yin wanjiu xinguan yiqing jiyi
mianlin chufa'' [Terminus volunteers face punishment for saving the
memory of the new coronavirus epidemic], Radio France Internationale,
November 10, 2020.
\51\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhuming renquan hanweizhe, gongmin jizhe
Zhang Zhan nushi yin baodao Wuhan yiqing jin huoxing 4 nian'' [Prominent
rights defender and citizen journalist Ms. Zhang Zhan sentenced today to
4 years in prison for reporting on the Wuhan epidemic], December 28,
2020; Vivian Wang, ``Chinese Citizen Journalist Sentenced to 4 Years for
Covid Reporting,'' New York Times, January 14, 2021.
\52\ ``Concerns Grow for `Disappeared' Wuhan Citizen Journalist,'' Radio
Free Asia, March 9, 2021. For more information on Fang Bin, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2020-00140.
\53\ Guo Rui, ``Missing Chinese Citizen Journalist Chen Qiushi with
Parents under Close Watch,'' South China Morning Post, September 24,
2020. For more information on Chen Qiushi, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2020-00052.
\54\ Yaqiu Wang, ``Silenced in China: The Archivists,'' Tortoise Media,
reprinted in Human Rights Watch, July 22, 2020; Rights Defense Network,
`` `Duandianxing' wangzhan Chen Mei, Cai Wei yijing yijiao zhi Chaoyang
Jianchayuan'' [``Terminus'' website's Chen Mei and Cai Wei cases already
sent to Chaoyang Procuratorate], August 16, 2020; `` `Duandianxing' an
jijiang kaishen Chen Mei, Cai Wei jiashu yu `haizi wu zui, pan yi tian
buxing' '' [``Terminus'' case goes to trial shortly, families of Chen
Mei and Cai Wei say, ``our children are innocent, even a one-day
sentence is wrong''], Radio Free Asia, May 10, 2021. For more
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2020-00203 on Chen Mei and 2020-00204 on Cai Wei.
\55\ Rights Defense Network, `` `Zhongguo Yulun Jiandu Wang'
chuangbanren Li Xinde bei yi `feifa jingying zui' panxing 5 nian''
[``China Public Opinion Supervision Net'' founder Li Xinde sentenced to
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to Protect Journalists, List of Journalists Imprisoned, ``Li Xinde,''
accessed January 13, 2021; Chang Meng, ``Fake Journalists,'' Global
Times, December 19, 2012. A 2012 article in the Party-run media outlet
Global Times described ``Public Opinion Supervision'' as ``a whistle-
blowing website.'' For more information, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database records 2021-00004 on Li Xinde and 2021-00006 on Li
Chao.
\56\ Amnesty International, ``Health Fears for Prisoner of Conscience,''
ASA 17/3107/2020 China, September 24, 2020. For more information on
Huang Qi, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2004-
04053.
\57\ UN Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
Opinion No. 22/2018 concerning Liu Feiyue and Huang Qi (China), A/HRC/
WGAD/2018/22, June 27, 2018, para. 5.
\58\ International Federation for Human Rights, ``China: Huang Qi
Sentenced to 12 Years in Prison,'' August 21, 2019.
\59\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Ke Chengbing, Wei Zhili, Yang
Zhengjun,'' accessed May 31, 2021. For more information, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2019-00127 on Wei
Zhili, 2019-00128 on Ke Chengbing, and 2019-00129 on Yang Zhengjun.
\60\ Lu Yuyu, ``Zaijian, Guangzhou!'' [Goodbye, Guangzhou!], Matters,
March 10, 2021. For an English translation, see ``Translation: `Goodbye,
Guangzhou!' by Lu Yuyu,'' China Digital Times, March 11, 2021. Committee
to Protect Journalists, ``Chinese Police Repeatedly Harass Journalist Lu
Yuyu Since His Release from Prison,'' March 9, 2021. For more
information on Lu Yuyu, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
record 2016-00177.
\61\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Track, Trace, Expel:
Reporting on China Amid a Pandemic, March 2021, 1.
\62\ ``2021 Journalism Awards: A China Reportage Reading List,'' China
Digital Times, June 11, 2021.
\63\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Track, Trace, Expel:
Reporting on China Amid a Pandemic, March 2021.
\64\ Charles Hutzler, ``Wall Street Journal Reporter Forced to Leave
China,'' Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2019. See also Reporters
Without Borders, ``When Will China Stop Harassing Foreign Reporters?,''
January 29, 2019.
\65\ ``MOFA Briefings Highlight Tense Media Relations,'' China Media
Project, May 13, 2021.
\66\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Track, Trace, Expel:
Reporting on China Amid a Pandemic, March 2021; Keith B. Richburg,
``China Feels It No Longer Needs the Foreign Media. But It Still Can't
Hide.,'' Asialink, University of Melbourne, October 14, 2020; ``China
Delays Approving Press Credentials for Foreign Reporters in Media
Standoff,'' Wall Street Journal, September 7, 2020.
\67\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Track, Trace, Expel:
Reporting on China Amid a Pandemic, March 2021, 4-6.
\68\ Daniel Ten Kate, ``China Delays Credentials for Journalists with
U.S. Media Outlets,'' Bloomberg, September 7, 2020.
\69\ William Yang, ``Ian Johnson on American Journalist Expulsions: `Now
We Lack Facts' on China,'' Deutsche Welle, July 31, 2020.
\70\ Rod McGuirk, ``Envoy: China Not Discriminating against Foreign
Journalists,'' Associated Press, April 21, 2021.
\71\ ``BBC China Correspondent John Sudworth Moves to Taiwan after
Threats,'' BBC, March 31, 2020.
\72\ William Yang, ``Ian Johnson on American Journalist Expulsions: `Now
We Lack Facts' on China,'' Deutsche Welle, July 31, 2020; William Yang,
``Why Are Foreign Journalists Fleeing China?,'' Deutsche Welle, April 1,
2021.
\73\ Louisa Lim and Graeme Smith, ``Let's Get This Party Started:
China's Global Propaganda Push,'' May 10, 2021, Little Red Podcast
(podcast), 32:43-33:05. See also Stephen Butler, Committee to Protect
Journalists, ``Prospects Bleak for Recovery of US Media Presence in
China,'' July 20, 2020.
\74\ ``China Welcomes Foreign Journalists Like Edgar Snow: Wang Yi,''
CGTN, March 7, 2021; Fan Lingzhi, ``Guojia anquan jiguan pilu: jingwai
fanhua didui shili lalong neidi xuesheng neimu'' [National security
agencies reveal: behind the scenes of overseas anti-China enemy powers
roping in domestic students], Global Times, reprinted in Xinhua, April
15, 2021.
\75\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang
Wenbin's Regular Press Conference on March 2, 2021,'' March 2, 2021.
\76\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang
Wenbin's Regular Press Conference on February 3, 2021,'' February 3,
2021.
\77\ ``BBC China Correspondent John Sudworth Moves to Taiwan after
Threats,'' BBC, March 31, 2020.
\78\ Joyce Huang, ``China's Propaganda against Foreign Media
Increases,'' Voice of America, April 9, 2021. See also Jennifer Feller
and Susan Chenery, ``From `Perfect Chinese Daughter' to Communist Party
Critic, Why Vicky Xu Is Exposing China to Scrutiny,'' Australian
Broadcasting Corporation, March 9, 2020.
\79\ ``China Pulls BBC World News Off the Air for Serious Content
Violation,'' Xinhua, February 12, 2021; ``British Regulators Fine
Chinese `Propaganda' Channel,'' Deutsche Welle, March 8, 2021.
\80\ ``BBC's Website Is Being Blocked Across China,'' BBC, October 15,
2014.
\81\ John Sudworth, ``Covid: Wuhan Scientist Would `Welcome' Visit
Probing Lab Leak Theory,'' BBC, December 21, 2020.
\82\ John Sudworth, ``China's Pressure and Propaganda--The Reality of
Reporting Xinjiang,'' BBC, January 15, 2021.
\83\ ``US Paper Says Reporter Was Held in China's Inner Mongolia,''
Associated Press, September 4, 2020; Alice Su, ``China Cracks Down on
Inner Mongolian Minority Fighting for Its Mother Tongue,'' Los Angeles
Times, September 3, 2020.
\84\ Lydia Wong and Thomas E. Kellogg, ``Hong Kong's National Security
Law: A Human Rights and Rule of Law Analysis,'' Center for Asian Law,
Georgetown Law, February 2021, 18, 51.
\85\ Michael M. Grynbaum, ``New York Times Will Move Part of Hong Kong
Office to Seoul,'' New York Times, July 14, 2020; Foreign
Correspondents' Club, Hong Kong, ``FCC Opposes Hong Kong Police
Accreditation Process for Journalists,'' September 23, 2020; Shibani
Mahtani, Theodora Yu, and Timothy McLaughlin, ``With Protests Muzzled,
Hong Kong Takes Aim at the Press,'' Washington Post, November 14, 2020.
\86\ ``Hong Kong Expels New York Times Correspondent Amid Ongoing Media
War,'' Radio Free Asia, July 16, 2020; ``Concerns for Media as Foreign
Journalist Denied Visa in Hong Kong,'' Al Jazeera, August 27, 2020.
\87\ Sarah Kim, ``Why the New York Times Is Moving Its Hub to Seoul,''
Korea JoongAng Daily, October 28, 2020.
\88\ Michael M. Grynbaum, ``New York Times Will Move Part of Hong Kong
Office to Seoul,'' New York Times, July 14, 2020; Sarah Kim, ``Why The
New York Times Is Moving Its Hub to Seoul,'' Korea JoongAng Daily,
October 28, 2020.
\89\ ``US Paper Says Reporter Was Held in China's Inner Mongolia,''
Associated Press, September 4, 2020; Bill Birtles, ``Cheng Lei,
Australian Anchor for China's Government-Run English News Channel CGTN,
Detained in Beijing,'' Australian Broadcasting Corporation, August 31,
2020.
\90\ Senator the Hon Marise Payne, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Australia, ``Statement on Ms Cheng Lei,'' February 8, 2021.
\91\ Chris Buckley, ``China Detains Australian Host for Chinese State
TV,'' New York Times, August 31, 2020; Rod McGuirk, ``Envoy: China Not
Discriminating against Foreign Journalists,'' Associated Press, April
21, 2021.
\92\ ``Haze Fan, Bloomberg News Assistant, Charged with Jeopardizing
National Security,'' China Digital Times, December 11, 2020.
\93\ ``China Confirms Journalist Cheng Lei Is Accused of Leaking State
Secrets,'' The Standard, February 8, 2021.
\94\ Fan Lingzhi, ``Guojia anquan jiguan pilu: jingwai fanhua didui
shili lalong neidi xuesheng neimu'' [National security agencies reveal:
inside story on overseas anti-Chinese hostile forces roping in domestic
college students], Global Times, reprinted in Xinhua, April 15, 2021;
Xiao Jinbo and Fu Jingying, ``Fangzhi jingwai youhai xinxi guhuo
qingnian xuesheng yao jinshen bianbie'' [To prevent being misled by
harmful overseas information, young students must carefully distinguish
truth from falsehood], People's Daily, April 16, 2021; ``Da xuesheng she
`dianfu' zengren Meiguo zhi Yin shixi jizhe'' [College student suspected
of ``subversion'' was an intern journalist at Voice of America], Sing
Tao Daily, April 17, 2021.
\95\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into
force March 23, 1976, art. 19; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of
December 10, 1948, art. 19.
\96\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into
force March 23, 1976, art. 19(3); UN Human Rights Council, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, A/HRC/17/27, May 16,
2011, para. 24.
\97\ UN Human Rights Council, Disease Pandemics and the Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
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\98\ ``Zhongguo jinnian wenzi yu shijian pandian'' [List of imprisonment
in recent years in China due to speech], Google Docs, accessed June 5,
2021; Li Yuan, ``China Persecutes Those Who Question `Heroes.' A Sleuth
Keeps Track.,'' New York Times, February 26, 2021.
\99\ See, e.g., ``Zhongguo jinnian wenzi yu shijian pandian'' [List of
imprisonment in recent years in China due to speech], Google Docs,
accessed June 5, 2021, case nos. 1997, 2004, 2010.
\100\ ``Zhongguo jinnian wenzi yu shijian pandian'' [List of
imprisonment in recent years in China due to speech], Google Docs,
accessed June 5, 2021, case no. 1947.
\101\ See, e.g., ``Zhongguo jinnian wenzi yu shijian pandian'' [List of
imprisonment in recent years in China due to speech], Google Docs,
accessed June 5, 2021, case nos. 1905, 1908.
\102\ See, e.g., ``Zhongguo jinnian wenzi yu shijian pandian'' [List of
imprisonment in recent years in China due to speech], Google Docs,
accessed June 5, 2021, case nos. 1949-1961. These cases are associated
with speech about exiled businessman Guo Wengui.
\103\ ``Zhongguo jinnian wenzi yu shijian pandian'' [List of
imprisonment in recent years in China due to speech], Google Docs,
accessed June 5, 2021, case no. 1945.
\104\ Li Yuan, ``China Persecutes Those Who Question `Heroes.' A Sleuth
Keeps Track.,'' New York Times, February 26, 2021; ``With a Google
Spreadsheet, a Web Sleuth Tracks the Comments That Get People Jailed in
China,'' Quartz, March 31, 2021.
\105\ ``Zhongguo jinnian wenzi yu shijian pandian'' [List of
imprisonment in recent years in China due to speech], Google Docs,
accessed June 5, 2021, Wuhan Feiyan Zhuanti (spreadsheet).
\106\ Emily Feng, ``Rights Activist Xu Zhiyong Arrested in China Amid
Crackdown on Dissent,'' NPR, February 17, 2020.
\107\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, Advance Edited Version, A/HRC/WGAD/2020/82, March 2, 2021,
para. 74.
\108\ Yojana Sharma, ``China's Threats to Academic Freedom Rise at Home,
Abroad,'' University World News, November 20, 2020. See also Dimitar D.
Gueorguiev, Xiaobo Lu, Kerry Ratigan, Meg Rithmire, and Rory Truex,
``How to Teach China This Fall,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, August 20,
2020; Sheena Greitens, Rebecca E. Karl, Thomas Kellogg, Aynne Kokas, and
Neysun A. Mahboubi, ``The Future of China Studies in the U.S.,''
ChinaFile, Asia Society, August 27, 2020; Matthieu Burnay, Harriet
Evans, Perry Keller, Eva Pils, Tim Pringle, and Sophia Woodman,
``Internet Access Deal Allows Chinese Government Censorship in Our UK
University (Virtual) Classrooms,'' USS Briefs at Medium, no. 104,
October 31, 2020; Andrew Nathan, Rory Truex, Eva Pils, Teng Biao,
Benjamin Liebman, Jerome A. Cohen, and Katherine Wilhelm, ``Ethical
Dilemmas of the China Scholar'' [webcast], U.S.-Asia Law Institute, New
York University School of Law, March 25, 2021.
\109\ Cyberspace Administration of China, ``Jubao wangshang lishi
xuwuzhuyi cuowu yanlun qing dao `12377'--jubao zhongxin `she lishi
xuwuzhuyi you hai xinxi jubao zhuanqu' shang xian'' [Report online
historical nihilism incorrect speech, please call ``12377''--reporting
center for ``suspected historical nihilism and harmful information
special areas'' now online], April 9, 2021; ``Zhonggong Wangxinban
kaiting rexian jubao `lishi xuwu' yanlun yanjin huaiyi Zhonggong lishi''
[Party's CAC opens hotline to report expressions of ``historical
nihilism,'' strictly forbidden to doubt Party history], Voice of
America, April 12, 2021.
\110\ Jun Mai, ``China Deletes 2 Million Online Posts for `Historical
Nihilism' as Communist Party Centenary Nears,'' South China Morning
Post, May 11, 2021.
\111\ Scholars at Risk, Free to Think 2020, Report of the Scholars at
Risk Academic Freedom Monitoring Freedom Project, November 2020, 84
\112\ Scholars at Risk, Free to Think 2020, Report of the Scholars at
Risk Academic Freedom Monitoring Freedom Project, November 2020, 84.
\113\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhuming meiti ren Geng Xiaonan nushi ji
zhangfu dou zao jingfang daizou xian chuyu qiangpo shizong zhuangtai''
[Prominent publishers Ms. Geng Xiaonan and her husband were both taken
into custody by police, their current status is forced disappearance],
September 10, 2020; Guo Rui, ``China Detains Publisher Who Voiced
Support for Communist Party Critic Xu Zhangrun,'' South China Morning
Post, September 10, 2020.
\114\ Geremie R. Barme, ``Xu Zhangrun & China's Former People,'' China
Heritage, July 13, 2020.
\115\ Chun Han Wong, ``China Releases Detained Professor Who Criticized
Xi Jinping, Friends Say,'' Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2020.
\116\ Xu Zhangrun, ``A Letter to China's Dictators: On the Detention &
Incarceration of Geng Xiaonan,'' trans. Geremie R. Barme in ``Geng
Xiaonan, a `Chinese Decembrist,' and Professor Xu Zhangrun,'' China
Heritage, September 10, 2020.
\117\ Chris Buckley, ``Seized by the Police, an Outspoken Chinese
Professor Sees Fears Come True,'' New York Times, July 8, 2020.
\118\ ``China Jails Publisher Geng Xiaonan, Who Spoke in Support of
Dissident Xu Zhangrun,'' Radio Free Asia, February 9, 2021.
\119\ ``In China, 24 Members of a Subculture Website Sentenced, the Main
`Culprit' Gets 14 Years in Prison,'' China Change, February 3, 2021.
\120\ ``Court in China's Guangdong Jails 24 Over Posts on Xi Jinping's
Family,'' Radio Free Asia, January 27, 2021.
\121\ ``In China, 24 Members of a Subculture Website Sentenced, the Main
`Culprit' Gets 14 Years in Prison,'' China Change, February 3, 2021.
\122\ ``In China, 24 Members of a Subculture Website Sentenced, the Main
`Culprit' Gets 14 Years in Prison,'' China Change, February 3, 2021.
\123\ ``In China, 24 Members of a Subculture Website Sentenced, the Main
`Culprit' Gets 14 Years in Prison,'' China Change, February 3, 2021;
``Chinese Rights Lawyers Incommunicado after Filing Torture Complaint,''
Radio Free Asia, March 9, 2021.
\124\ China Internet Network Information Center, ``The 47th Statistical
Report on China's Internet Development,'' February 2021.
\125\ China Internet Network Information Center, ``The 47th Statistical
Report on China's Internet Development,'' February 2021.
\126\ ``What You Should Know about WeChat in 2021,'' China Internet
Watch, March 24, 2021.
\127\ ``Statistics: Weibo Monthly Active Users (MAU) & DAU,'' China
Internet Watch, May 11, 2021.
\128\ Lai Lin Thomala, ``Sina Weibo's Daily Active User Number in China
Q1 2018-Q1 2021,'' Statista, June 2, 2021.
\129\ Freedom House, ``China'' in Freedom on the Net, accessed May 31,
2021.
\130\ Alex Hern, ``Apple Removes Two Podcast Apps from China Store after
Censorship Demands,'' Guardian, June 12, 2020.
\131\ Paul Mozur, ``China Appears to Have Blocked Signal, the Encrypted
Chat App.,'' New York Times, March 16, 2021. See also Jack Nicas,
Raymond Zhong, and Daisuke Wakabayashi, ``Censorship, Surveillance and
Profits: A Hard Bargain for Apple in China,'' New York Times, May 17,
2021.
\132\ Darrell Etherington and Rita Liao, ``Clubhouse Is Now Blocked in
China after a Brief Uncensored Period,'' TechCrunch, February 8, 2021.
\133\ Amy Chang Chien and Amy Qin, ``In China, an App Offered Space for
Debate. Then the Censors Came.,'' New York Times, February 8, 2021.
\134\ Manye Koetse, ``Tuber App That Promised Access to Blocked Sites in
China Gone Within a Day,'' What's On Weibo, October 10, 2020.
\135\ Zhuang Rongwen, ``Wangluo qiangguo jianshe de sixiang wuqi he
xingdong zhinan--xuexi `Xi Jinping guanyu wangluo qiangguo lunshu
zhaibian' '' [Ideological weapons and action plan in the construction of
a strong cyber nation--study ``Xi Jinping's selected sayings on strong
cyber nations''], Seeking Truth, February 1, 2021.
\136\ Zhuang Rongwen, ``Wangluo qiangguo jianshe de sixiang wuqi he
xingdong zhinan--xuexi `Xi Jinping guanyu wangluo qiangguo lunshu
zhaibian' '' [Ideological weapons and action plan in the construction of
a strong cyber nation--study ``Xi Jinping's selected sayings on strong
cyber nations''], Seeking Truth, February 1, 2021.
\137\ Rogier Creemers, ``China's Approach to Cyber Sovereignty,'' Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung, 2020, 3.
\138\ ``Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guomin Jingji He Shehui Fazhan Dishisi
ge Wu Nian Guihua he 2035 Nian Yuanjing Mubiao Gangyao'' [14th Five-Year
Plan for National Economic and Social Development and the Outline of
Long-Term Goals for 2035], Xinhua, March 12, 2021; ``Dishisan ju Quanguo
Renmin Daibiao Dahui di si ci huiyi guanyu guomin jingji he shehui
fazhan dishisi ge wu nian guihua he 2035 nian yuanjing mubiao gangyao de
jueyi'' [Resolution by the 13th National People's Congress fourth
meeting with regard to the 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and
Social Development and the Outline of Long-Term Goals for 2035], Xinhua,
March 11, 2021.
\139\ Nis Grunberg and Vincent Brussee, ``China's 14th Five-Year Plan--
Strengthening the Domestic Base to Become a Superpower,'' MERICS China
Monitor, April 9, 2021.
\140\ ``Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guomin Jingji He Shehui Fazhan Dishisi
Wu Nian Guihua he 2035 Nian Yuanjing Mubiao Gangyao'' [14th Five-Year
Plan for National Economic and Social Development and the Outline of
Long-Term Goals for 2035], Xinhua, March 12, 2021; ``China to Push
Establishment of Multilateral Global Internet Governance System,''
Xinhua, March 5, 2021; Chen Huaping, `` `Shisi Wu' shiqi wangluo anquan
jianshe jiedu yu jianxing'' [Interpretation and practice of internet
security during the ``14th Five-Year Plan'' period], Anquan Neican, May
18, 2021.
\141\ Mark Montgomery and Theo Lebryk, ``China's Dystopian `New IP' Plan
Shows Need for Renewed US Commitment to Internet Governance,'' Just
Security, April 13, 2021.
\142\ ``Fazhi Shehui Jianshe Shishi Gangyao (2020-2025 Nian)''
[Implementing Plan for Creating Rule of Law Society (2020-2025)],
December 7, 2020, sec. 6(22-24). For an unofficial English translation,
see ``Implementation Outline for the Establishment of a Rule of Law-
Based Society (2020-2025),'' China Law Translate (blog), December 7,
2020, sec. 6(22-24).
\143\ Holly Chik and Guo Rui, ``China Makes New Laws to Regulate Hi-Tech
Sector a Major Priority for Next Five Years,'' South China Morning Post,
January 12, 2021.
\144\ Ryan McMorrow, Nian Liu, and Mercedes Ruehl, ``China Draws Up
First Antitrust Rules to Curb Power of Tech Companies,'' Financial
Times, November 10, 2020.
\145\ Paul Mozur, Cecilia Kang, Adam Satariano, and David McCabe, ``A
Global Tipping Point for Reining In Tech Has Arrived,'' New York Times,
April 30, 2021.
\146\ ``Xi Focus: Xi Stresses Promoting Healthy Development of Private
Sector,'' Xinhua, September 16, 2020.
\147\ Yaqiu Wang, ``China's Big Tech Crackdown Is Not a Model for the
U.S.,'' opinion, MSNBC, March 17, 2021.
\148\ Paul Mozur, Cecilia Kang, Adam Satariano, and David McCabe, ``A
Global Tipping Point for Reining In Tech Has Arrived,'' New York Times,
April 30, 2021.
\149\ Lingling Wei, ``China's New Power Play: More Control of Tech
Companies' Troves of Data,'' Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2021.
\150\ Raymond Zhong, ``China Fines Alibaba $2.8 Billion in Landmark
Antitrust Case,'' New York Times, April 9, 2021.
\151\ Paul Mozur, Cecilia Kang, Adam Satariano, and David McCabe, ``A
Global Tipping Point for Reining in Tech Has Arrived,'' New York Times,
April 30, 2021.
\152\ Jing Yang, ``Jack Ma, Alibaba's Billionaire Co-Founder, Resurfaces
after Months of Lying Low,'' Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2021;
Heather Zeiger, ``Chinese Entrepreneur Jack Ma Missing after Criticizing
the Party,'' Mind Matters, January 11, 2021.
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Findings
Chinese authorities continued to restrict the
ability of civil society organizations to work on labor
issues, by means such as detaining and harassing labor
advocates across China. Examples include labor advocate
Chai Xiaoming, who attempted to organize a trade union
in 2018 and was tried for ``inciting subversion of state
power'' in August 2020, and delivery worker and labor
advocate Chen Guojiang, who conducted online advocacy
highlighting the working conditions of delivery workers
and was detained in February 2021. In addition,
authorities continued to surveil and harass blogger and
citizen journalist Lu Yuyu after he was released in June
2020.
The Hong Kong-based non-governmental organization
(NGO) China Labour Bulletin (CLB), which compiles data
on worker actions collected from traditional news
sources and social media, documented 800 strikes and
other labor actions in 2020. CLB estimates that they are
able to document between 5 and 10 percent of total
worker actions. Protests across China against wage
arrears included employees of YouWin Education, workers
in factories producing masks, and delivery workers. In
addition, thousands of factory workers protested as part
of a pay dispute with Pegatron, an electronics
manufacturing company.
The Chinese Communist Party-led All-China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) remains the only
trade union organization permitted under Chinese law,
and workers are not allowed to establish independent
unions. In a joint submission to the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Federation for Human Rights and China Labor Watch said
that local unions under the ACFTU ``are often unaware of
labor violations, strikes, and accidents that have
occurred within their respective jurisdictions, and they
are reluctant to provide assistance to workers.''
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are
encouraged to:
In meetings with Chinese officials, raise the trial
of labor advocate Chai Xiaoming; the detention of
delivery worker and labor advocate Chen Guojiang; and
the harassment of blogger and citizen journalist Lu
Yuyu.
Call on the Chinese government to respect
internationally recognized rights to freedom of
association and collective bargaining and allow workers
to organize and establish independent labor unions.
Raise concern in all appropriate trade negotiations and
bilateral and multilateral dialogues about the Chinese
Communist Party's role in collective bargaining and
elections of trade union representatives, emphasizing
that wage rates should be determined by free bargaining
between labor and management.
Call on the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to
ensure that all official sponsors, including Chinese
companies, comply with internationally recognized rights
to freedom of association and collective bargaining.
Consider specifically requesting that the IOC conduct an
investigation of labor abuses involving Chinese
companies and their affiliates that have supply chains
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, as well as
Alibaba Group and other companies that benefit from
workers in the informal economy sector.
Promote and support bilateral and multilateral
exchanges among government officials, academics, legal
experts, and civil society groups to focus on labor
issues such as freedom of expression, collective
bargaining, employment discrimination,
occupational health and safety, and wage arrears. Seek
opportunities to support capacity-building programs to
strengthen Chinese labor and legal aid organizations
defending the rights of workers.
When appropriate, integrate meaningful civil society
participation into bilateral and multilateral dialogues,
meetings, and exchanges. Invite international unions and
labor NGOs and domestic civil society groups from all
participating countries to observe relevant government-
to-government dialogues.
Encourage compliance with fundamental International
Labour Organization (ILO) conventions. Request that the
ILO increase its monitoring of core labor standards in
China, including freedom of association and the right to
organize.
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Introduction
In this section, the Commission examines the Chinese
government and Communist Party's suppression of the
internationally recognized rights of Chinese workers, as
well as the status and working conditions of Chinese
workers. While this chapter does not examine in detail
Chinese government-sponsored forced labor, an examination
of forced labor can be found in other sections of this
report. [For information on forced labor, see Section II--
Human Trafficking, Section II--Business and Human Rights,
Section IV--Xinjiang, and Section V--Tibet.]
Absence of Independent Trade Unions
The Chinese government and Communist Party's laws and
practices continue to contravene international worker
rights standards, including the right to create or join
independent trade unions.\1\ The Party-led All-China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) remains the only trade
union organization permitted under Chinese law.\2\ Outside
the ACFTU, workers are unable to create or join
independent trade unions.\3\ Workers and others that do
seek to create trade unions--even within the ACFTU--have
faced retaliation such as detention and disappearance.\4\
In addition, observers have critiqued the response of the
ACFTU to violations of the rights of Chinese workers.\5\
In a joint submission to the UN Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Federation
for Human Rights and China Labor Watch said that local
unions under the ACFTU ``are often unaware of labor
violations, strikes, and accidents that have occurred
within their respective jurisdictions, and they are
reluctant to provide assistance to workers.'' \6\
Continued Suppression of Labor Advocacy
During the Commission's 2021 reporting year, Chinese
authorities continued to restrict the ability of civil
society organizations to work on labor issues, by means
such as detaining and harassing labor advocates across
China. After a series of nationwide and coordinated
crackdowns beginning in 2015,\7\ and a subsequent
crackdown in 2018 and 2019,\8\ Chinese labor non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) have been less
active,\9\ and authorities continued to detain some labor
advocates.\10\ Labor advocates disappeared or held in
detention this past year include the following:
Chai Xiaoming. In August 2020, the Nanjing
Intermediate People's Court in Nanjing municipality,
Jiangsu province, reportedly tried Chai Xiaoming, former
editor of Red Reference (Hongse Cankao), on the charge
of ``inciting subversion of state power,'' in a closed
proceeding.\11\ Chai has been an advocate for the rights
of factory workers who tried to organize a trade union
at Shenzhen Jasic (Jiashi) Technology Co. Ltd. (Jasic)
in 2018.\12\
Chen Guojiang. In February 2021, police in
Chaoyang district, Beijing municipality, detained
delivery worker and labor advocate Chen Guojiang, also
known as Mengzhu or Xiong Yan, after he conducted online
advocacy highlighting the working conditions of delivery
workers and called for a work stoppage to protest
against companies' withholding of driver bonuses.\13\
Authorities detained Chen on suspicion of ``picking
quarrels and provoking trouble'' and formally arrested
him prior to April 2.\14\
In addition, while authorities released blogger and citizen
journalist Lu Yuyu from prison in June 2020 upon
completion of a four-year sentence, police subsequently
surveilled and harassed him.\15\ In March 2021, security
personnel forced him to leave Guangzhou municipality,
Guangdong province, where he lived, and asked him to
deactivate his Twitter account.\16\ Lu's prison sentence
was connected with his work documenting protests in China,
including wage disputes.\17\
Worker Strikes and Protests
The Chinese government does not publicly report on the number
of worker strikes and protests, making it difficult to
obtain comprehensive information on worker actions.\18\
China Labour Bulletin (CLB), which compiles data on worker
actions collected from traditional news sources and social
media, documented 800 strikes and other labor actions in
2020, compared to 1,385 strikes and other labor actions in
2019, and 1,706 strikes and other labor actions in
2018.\19\ CLB estimates that they are able to document
approximately 5 to 10 percent of total worker actions, and
cautions against drawing firm conclusions from year-to-
year comparisons.\20\ The majority of the labor actions
documented by CLB were small in scale: in 2020, 629
incidents (78.6 percent) involved 100 people or fewer, and
only 11 (1.4 percent) involved over 1,000 people.\21\
During this reporting year, wage arrears in China
continued to be a significant source of worker unrest.\22\
In 2020, 660 of the strikes and other labor actions that
CLB was able to document (82.5 percent) involved wage
arrears.\23\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total number
Year Manufacturing Construction Transportation Services Other documented
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2020 10.9% 44.8% 19.5% 18% 6.9% 800
(87) (358) (156) (144) (55)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2019 13.8% 42.8% 12.3% 23.0% 8.0% 1,385
(191) (593) (171) (319) (111)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2018 15.4% 44.8% 15.9% 16.8% 7.1% 1,706
(263) (764) (272) (286) (121)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 21.1% 41.4% 9.2% 20.7% 7.6% 1,258
(265) (521) (116) (261) (95)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: China Labour Bulletin. Note that the percentages indicate the percentage of total worker actions
documented that year.\24\
While Chinese law does not explicitly prohibit Chinese workers
from striking, authorities have accused Chinese workers
who participated in legitimate strikes and worker
demonstrations of violating laws that prohibit the
disturbance of public order.\25\ Examples of strikes and
worker actions this past year include the following:
Beijing municipality. Reporting from Caixin, a
commercial media outlet known for its investigative
reports, CLB, and the South China Morning Post found
that beginning in February 2020, staff began to protest
wage arrears from the company YouWin Education
(YouWin).\26\ In October 2020, more than 1,000
protesters--both former staff and customers of YouWin--
protested in Beijing municipality against wage arrears
and the failure to return tuition fees.\27\ According to
Caixin, some of the wage arrears have remained unpaid
since the summer of 2019.\28\
Henan province. In July 2020, CLB reported that
workers in factories of the Shengguang Group in Henan
province protested wage arrears after the factories,
which produced face masks, suddenly closed.\29\
According to CLB, the individuals in charge of the
factory disappeared before paying their staff.\30\ In
2020, CLB found 8 cases of protests related to wage
arrears in factories producing masks throughout
China.\31\
Shanghai municipality. In December 2020, Radio
Free Asia (RFA) reported that thousands of temporary
workers protested as part of a pay dispute with a
factory in Shanghai municipality owned by electronics
manufacturing company Pegatron.\32\ Pegatron had planned
on sending workers from its Shanghai factory to a
facility in Kunshan municipality, Jiangsu province.\33\
Workers who refused the transfer would have their
contracts terminated and part of their remuneration
packages forfeited.\34\ According to RFA, protesters and
police clashed before managers agreed to let workers
maintain their benefits.\35\
Multiple locations in China. Throughout the
reporting year, CLB reported that delivery workers
across China protested against wage arrears.\36\ In
early 2021, a food delivery worker for the Alibaba food
delivery website Ele.me set himself on fire after the
company withheld his wages when he tried to switch to a
new delivery company.\37\ A September 2020 article on
food delivery workers in the Chinese magazine Renwu
highlighted the problems drivers face, such as
decreasing wages, delivery times, traffic accidents, and
even death.\38\
Social Insurance
The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that
China has a labor force of approximately 771.25 million
workers,\39\ and based on government statistics, less than
half of these individuals have social insurance coverage.
According to the PRC Social Insurance Law, workers are
entitled to five forms of social insurance: basic pension
insurance, basic health insurance, work-related injury
insurance, unemployment insurance, and maternity
insurance.\40\ Under the law, employers and workers are
required to contribute to basic pension, health, and
unemployment insurance; in addition, employers are
required to contribute to work-related injury and
maternity insurance on behalf of workers.\41\ According to
the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), the
number of people covered by work-related injury insurance
increased by 12.91 million in 2020 to a total of 267.7
million.\42\ NBS reported that work-related injury
insurance coverage increased for migrant workers by 3.18
million people to 89.34 million out of 285.6 million total
migrant workers in China.\43\ Unemployment and maternity
insurance numbers increased to 216.89 million and 235.46
million respectively, for all workers.\44\ According to
NBS, at the end of 2020, 2.7 million people were receiving
unemployment insurance payments.\45\
In 2020, Chinese social insurance funds recorded a deficit for
the first time, reportedly because of a temporary
reduction in policy premiums paid for by companies during
the COVID-19 pandemic.\46\ Observers warn that this, along
with China's decreasing working-age population and
increasing number of retirees, could be a sign of the
potential instability of the current social insurance
system in China.\47\
Migrant Workers and Youth Face High Unemployment
as Overall Unemployment Stabilizes
The National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) reported that
the overall unemployment situation had stabilized in 2020,
with the surveyed urban unemployment rate at 5.2 percent
in December, the same as in December 2019.\48\ Experts
warn, however, that the official unemployment rate
significantly undercounts migrant workers and does not
include most rural residents and self-employed
individuals.\49\ According to NBS, 11.86 million new jobs
were created in urban areas in 2020, 1.66 million fewer
than the previous year, but higher than the official
target of 9 million.\50\ The national job market was
reportedly weaker in the fourth quarter of 2020 than a
year earlier, with the number of job offers falling by 17
percent and the number of job applicants falling by 7
percent.\51\ Migrant workers reportedly bore the brunt of
job losses in China in 2020, with the number of migrant
workers dropping by more than five million in 2020, the
first reported annual decrease.\52\ Jobs available to
migrant workers tended to offer low pay, long working
hours, and dangerous working conditions, such as in
facilities producing face masks.\53\ In addition, the
unemployment rate for people aged 16 to 24 was 13.1
percent in February 2021, the same rate as in the first
quarter of 2020, during the height of the COVID-19
epidemic in China.\54\ The unemployment rate rose to 13.8
percent in May 2021,\55\ reflecting the pressure young
people faced in competing for jobs.
Employment Relationships
This past year, several categories of workers were unable to
benefit fully from protections provided under Chinese
law.\56\ The PRC Labor Law and PRC Labor Contract Law only
apply to workers who have an ``employment relationship''
(laodong guanxi) with their employers.\57\ Categories of
workers who do not have an ``employment relationship''
with their employers include dispatch and contract
workers, student interns, and workers above the retirement
age.\58\
DISPATCH LABOR AND CONTRACT LABOR
The Commission continued to observe reports of dispatch labor
and contract worker abuse during this reporting year, in
violation of domestic laws and regulations.\59\ Firms have
long used dispatch labor--workers hired through
subcontracting agencies--to cut costs, and some firms have
replaced dispatch labor with contract labor to further
reduce the employee relationship and costs.\60\ In one
example of dispatch labor abuse, China Labor Watch and
Radio Free Asia reported in December 2020 that a Pegatron
factory in Kunshan municipality, Jiangsu province, did not
pay in full the bonuses promised to dispatch workers.\61\
The PRC Labor Contract Law requires that dispatch workers
be paid the same as full-time workers doing similar work
and that they only perform work on a temporary, auxiliary,
or substitute basis.\62\
INTERN LABOR
During this reporting year, reports continued to emerge of
labor abuses involving vocational school students working
at school-
arranged ``internships.'' In one example, China Labor
Watch and the Financial Times reported that workers and
student interns at Pegatron, a supplier of Apple, faced
restricted movement, withheld wages, and threats.\63\
Student interns worked in the factory despite regulations
against students performing factory work unrelated to
their studies.\64\ Furthermore, based on documents and
interviews with former Apple employees, the Information, a
digital media company that provides news reporting on the
technology industry, revealed in December 2020 that Apple
waited 3 years to end its partnership with Suyin
Electronics after the supplier was found to be employing
underage workers.\65\ According to a former Apple employee
interviewed by the Information, despite the breach of
Chinese labor laws, Apple was reluctant to shift orders to
new suppliers because doing so would have created delays
and increased costs.\66\
WORKERS ABOVE THE RETIREMENT AGE
As the number of individuals in China over 60 continued to
increase,\67\ Chinese workers above the legal retirement
age continued to lack certain legal protections afforded
to other workers under Chinese law. The PRC Labor Contract
Law and its implementing regulations provide that workers'
labor contracts are to be terminated once they reach the
retirement age or begin receiving pensions.\68\ The
inability of workers above the retirement age to establish
a formal employment relationship with their employers
leaves them without the protections provided for in
Chinese labor laws in cases of work-related injury, unpaid
overtime, and other labor issues.\69\ Although in March
2021 the Chinese government announced that it would raise
the retirement age,\70\ workers above the new age would
continue to lack the same protections as workers below the
retirement age.\71\
Work Safety and Industrial Accidents
During this reporting year, government data showed a continued
decline in workplace deaths, although inadequate safety
equipment and training continued to be a significant
problem.\72\ According to the National Bureau of
Statistics of China, 27,412 people died in workplace
accidents in 2020,\73\ compared to 29,519 deaths the
previous year.\74\ In 2020, there were 225 officially
reported coal mining deaths,\75\ a decrease from 316 in
2019.\76\ A November 2020 coal mining accident in Leiyang
city, Hengyang municipality, Hunan province, which
resulted in the deaths of 13 people, was the second coal
mining accident in the city within 40 days and led
officials to suspend production at all of the city's coal
mines.\77\ The accident was one of several major coal
mining accidents reported in China in 2020.\78\ China
Labour Bulletin noted that officials had made few efforts
to create a work culture in the coal mining industry that
prioritizes safety, and coal mine accidents remained
common.\79\ In December 2020, the Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security, together with seven other
government agencies, jointly issued a five-year plan aimed
at preventing work-related injuries, including a reduction
of about 20 percent in key industries and a reduction in
the incidence of pneumoconiosis.\80\
Management of Chinese companies and factories often did not
provide adequate safety equipment or required safety
training, and government oversight was often limited. In a
December 2020 report, China Labor Watch (CLW) detailed
disturbing conditions in two toy factories in Dongguan
city, Guangdong province, that make toys for Mattel,
Chicco, Fisher-Price, and Tomy, including inadequate pre-
job safety training and inadequate safety equipment.\81\
Investigators observed workers at the factories who had
sustained work-related injuries for which they received no
or inadequate treatment, and an investigator burned her
own hands because of a lack of training at Chang'an
Mattel.\82\
Occupational Health
Although the Chinese government reported a decrease in the
number of occupational disease cases, significant concerns
remained. In late 2019, the Chinese government announced a
new plan expanding work-related injury insurance in
industries in which there is a high risk for
pneumoconiosis, and requiring local government departments
to assess the risks of the disease and provide information
about employers in relevant industries.\83\
Pneumoconiosis, a group of lung diseases caused by the
inhalation of dust that can occur during mining and
construction, is the most prevalent type of officially
reported occupational disease in China.\84\ According to
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
``[T]hese conditions are entirely man-made, and can be
avoided through appropriate dust control.'' \85\ The
Chinese NGO Love Save Pneumoconiosis reported in March
2021 that migrant workers suffering from pneumoconiosis
had an average monthly per capita income of 393 yuan
(US$61) in 2020, far below the average of 4,072 yuan
(US$630) for migrant workers in China.\86\ The group
estimated that only 3.5 percent of workers with
pneumoconiosis had work injury insurance, and said three
out of four workers with the disease did not sign labor
contracts, which are required for workers seeking to claim
work injury insurance.\87\ According to the state-funded
media outlet the Paper, it is especially difficult for
workers with a rural household registration (hukou) who
are suffering from pneumoconiosis to obtain documentation
that they contracted the disease at the workplace, and to
obtain work-related injury insurance.\88\ In November
2020, official news outlet Legal Daily reported that
workers still faced challenges in obtaining work-related
injury insurance payments in advance, with workers having
to wait up to five years to receive payment for treatment
of their injuries.\89\
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes to Section II--Worker Rights
\1\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN
General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 23(4);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by
UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 19, 1966, entry
into force March 23, 1976, art. 22(1); United Nations Treaty Collection,
Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, accessed February 25, 2021. China has signed but not ratified
the ICCPR. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of
December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 8; FIDH and
China Labor Watch, ``Submission to the United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,'' December 18, 2020,
7.
\2\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa [PRC Trade Union Law], passed
April 3, 1992, amended August 27, 2009, arts. 9-11; Freedom House,
``China,'' in Freedom in the World: Democracy Under Siege, 2021; China
Labour Bulletin, ``Holding China's Trade Unions to Account,'' February
17, 2020; International Labour Organization, Interim Report--Report No.
392, Case No. 3184 (China), Complaint date February 15, 2016, October
2020, para. 481.
\3\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa [PRC Trade Union Law], passed
April 3, 1992, amended August 27, 2009, arts. 9-11; International Labour
Organization, Interim Report--Report No. 392, Case No. 3184 (China),
Complaint date February 15, 2016, October 2020, para. 485; FIDH and
China Labor Watch, ``Submission to the United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,'' December 18, 2020,
7.
\4\ International Labour Organization, Interim Report--Report No. 392,
Case No. 3184 (China), Complaint date February 15, 2016, October 2020,
paras. 451(f), 481; FIDH and China Labor Watch, ``Submission to the
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 68th
Session,'' December 18, 2020, 7.
\5\ FIDH and China Labor Watch, ``Submission to the United Nations
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,''
December 18, 2020, 7; China Labour Bulletin, ``The Changing Face of
Worker Protest in Northeast China,'' August 17, 2020; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Trade Union Officials Seek to Deflect Responsibility after
Truck Driver Suicide,'' June 11, 2021.
\6\ FIDH and China Labor Watch, ``Submission to the United Nations
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,''
December 18, 2020, 7.
\7\ See, e.g., Kevin Lin, ``State Repression in the Jasic Aftermath:
From Punishment to Preemption,'' Made in China Journal 4, no. 1
(January-March 2019): 16-19.
\8\ Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions et al., ``Statement of `18-
19 Chinese Labor Rights Mass Crackdown' from Various Circles in Hong
Kong,'' reprinted in China Labor Crackdown Concern Group, August 7,
2019; China Labor Crackdown Concern Group, ``One Year, One Hundred
Arrested, What You Need to Know about China's Labor Crackdown,'' July
27, 2019.
\9\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Workers' Rights and Labour Relations in
China,'' August 13, 2020.
\10\ See, e.g., ``Zhenya Shenzhen Jiashi gongyun de yanxu Beida ji
zuopai laoshi Chai Xiaoming mimi shenpan'' [The suppression of the
Shenzhen Jasic workers' movement continues, Beijing University extreme
leftist teacher Chai Xiaoming secretly tried], Radio Free Asia, August
18, 2020; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Immediately Release
Frontline Delivery Worker Chen Guojiang,'' March 18, 2021; Guo Rui,
``China Arrests Girlfriend of Detained Legal Activist Xu Zhiyong on
Subversion Charge,'' South China Morning Post, March 15, 2021.
\11\ ``Zhenya Shenzhen Jiashi gongyun de yanxu Beida ji zuopai laoshi
Chai Xiaoming mimi shenpan'' [The suppression of the Shenzhen Jasic
workers' movement continues, Beijing University extreme leftist teacher
Chai Xiaoming secretly tried], Radio Free Asia, August 18, 2020;
``China: State Repression Against Left Activists Escalates,''
Chinaworker.info, November 6, 2020.
\12\ ``China: State Repression Against Left Activists Escalates,''
Chinaworker.info, November 6, 2020; ``Zhenya Shenzhen Jiashi gongyun de
yanxu Beida ji zuopai laoshi Chai Xiaoming mimi shenpan'' [The
suppression of the Shenzhen Jasic workers' movement continues, Beijing
University extreme leftist teacher Chai Xiaoming secretly tried], Radio
Free Asia, August 18, 2020; Sue-Lin Wong and Christian Shepherd,
``China's Student Activists Cast Rare Light on Brewing Labor Unrest,''
Reuters, August 14, 2018. For more information on Jasic employees'
attempts to organize a union in 2018, and authorities' subsequent
crackdown on employees and worker rights' advocates, see CECC, 2019
Annual Report, November 18, 2019, 61-62. For more information on Chai
Xiaoming, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2019-
00126.
\13\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Immediately Release
Frontline Delivery Worker Chen Guojiang,'' March 18, 2021; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Food Delivery Worker Activist Accused of `Picking Quarrels,'
'' March 25, 2021; Emily Feng, ``He Tried to Organize Workers in China's
Gig Economy. Now He Faces 5 Years in Jail.,'' NPR, April 13, 2021.
\14\ Rights Defense Network, ``Beijing Waimai Qishi Lianmeng `Mengzhu',
waimai xiaoge weiquanzhe Chen Tianhe (Chen Guojiang) de anqing tongbao:
yi bei zhengshi daibu'' [Case report of Chen Tianhe (Chen Guojiang), the
`Leader' of Beijing's Food Delivery Riders League and the rights
defender of food delivery guys: [he has] already been formally
arrested], April 5, 2021. For more information on Chen Guojiang, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2021-00061.
\15\ Chun Han Wong, `` `Their Goal Is to Make You Feel Helpless': In
Xi's China, Little Room for Dissent,'' Wall Street Journal, November 27,
2020; Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Chinese Police Repeatedly
Harass Journalist Lu Yuyu Since His Release from Prison,'' March 9,
2021.
\16\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Chinese Police Repeatedly
Harass Journalist Lu Yuyu Since His Release from Prison,'' March 9,
2021.
\17\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Chinese Police Repeatedly
Harass Journalist Lu Yuyu Since His Release from Prison,'' March 9,
2021. For more information on Lu Yuyu, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2016-00177.
\18\ See, e.g., China Labour Bulletin, ``An Introduction to China Labour
Bulletin's Strike Map,'' January 10, 2020; Freedom House, ``China,'' in
Freedom in the World: A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy, 2020.
\19\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map,'' accessed June 7, 2021.
\20\ China Labour Bulletin, ``An Introduction to China Labour Bulletin's
Strike Map,'' January 10, 2020.
\21\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map,'' accessed June 7, 2021; China
Labour Bulletin, ``The State of Labour Relations in China, 2019,''
January 13, 2020.
\22\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map,'' accessed June 7, 2021; China
Labour Bulletin, ``The State of Labour Relations in China, 2019,''
January 13, 2020.
\23\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map,'' accessed June 7, 2021.
\24\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map,'' accessed June 7, 2021.
\25\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Workers' Rights and Labour Relations in
China,'' August 13, 2020; International Labour Organization, ``Interim
Report--Report No 392: Case No. 3184 (China),'' October 2020; FIDH and
China Labor Watch, ``Submission to the United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,'' December 18, 2020,
7. See also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI)
of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 8(1)(d)l;
United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accessed
June 8, 2021. China signed and ratified the ICESCR on October 27, 1997
and March 27, 2001, respectively.
\26\ Ding Jie and Su Huixian, ``Yousheng Jiaoyu baolei'' [YouWin
Education collapses], Caixin, October 26, 2020; China Labour Bulletin,
``Private Education Companies Are a New Focus of Worker Protests in
China,'' November 9, 2020; Frank Tang, ``China's Uneven Virus Recovery
Stirs Protest in Beijing,'' South China Morning Post, October 19, 2020.
\27\ Ding Jie and Su Huixian, ``Yousheng Jiaoyu baolei'' [YouWin
Education collapses], Caixin, October 26, 2020; China Labour Bulletin,
``Private Education Companies Are a New Focus of Worker Protests in
China,'' November 9, 2020; Frank Tang, ``China's Uneven Virus Recovery
Stirs Protest in Beijing,'' South China Morning Post, October 19, 2020.
\28\ Ding Jie and Su Huixian, ``Yousheng Jiaoyu baolei'' [YouWin
Education collapses], Caixin, October 26, 2020.
\29\ China Labour Bulletin, ``China's Mask Production Goes from Boom to
Bust Leaving Workers Out of a Job,'' July 6, 2020.
\30\ China Labour Bulletin, ``China's Mask Production Goes from Boom to
Bust Leaving Workers Out of a Job,'' July 6, 2020.
\31\ China Labour Bulletin, ``China's Mask Production Goes from Boom to
Bust Leaving Workers Out of a Job,'' July 6, 2020.
\32\ ``Thousands of Apple Supplier Workers Turn Out in Shanghai Pay
Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, December 21, 2020.
\33\ ``Thousands of Apple Supplier Workers Turn Out in Shanghai Pay
Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, December 21, 2020.
\34\ ``Thousands of Apple Supplier Workers Turn Out in Shanghai Pay
Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, December 21, 2020.
\35\ ``Thousands of Apple Supplier Workers Turn Out in Shanghai Pay
Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, December 21, 2020; China Labour Bulletin,
``Temporary Workers Stage Mass Protests at Electronics Factories in
China and India,'' December 22, 2020.
\36\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map,'' accessed June 7, 2021.
\37\ Yuan Yang and Ryan McMorrow, ``Chinese Courier Sets Fire to Himself
in Protest over Unpaid Alibaba Wages,'' Financial Times, January 12,
2021; Alice Su, ``Why a Takeout Deliveryman in China Set Himself on
Fire,'' Los Angeles Times, February 8, 2021.
\38\ Renwu (@renwumag1980), ``Waimai jishou, kun zai xitong li''
[Delivery drivers, stuck in the system], WeChat, September 8, 2020. See
also China Labour Bulletin, ``Single's Day Reveals Harsh Reality of
China's Express Delivery Industry,'' November 30, 2020.
\39\ ``Labor Force, Total--China,'' World Bank, DataBank, accessed June
16, 2021.
\40\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shehui Baoxian Fa [PRC Social Insurance
Law], passed October 28, 2010, effective July 1, 2011, art. 2. For
information on workers' low levels of social insurance coverage in
previous reporting years, see CECC, 2020 Annual Report, December 2020,
74; CECC, 2019 Annual Report, November 18, 2019, 65-66; CECC, 2018
Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 90.
\41\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shehui Baoxian Fa [PRC Social Insurance
Law], passed October 28, 2010, effective July 11, 2011, arts. 10, 23,
33, 44, 53. See also Gidon Gautel and Zoey Zhang, ``Social Insurance in
China: Some Exemptions for Foreigners in China,'' Dezan Shira and
Associates, China Briefing News, February 1, 2021.
\42\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical Communique of
the People's Republic of China on the 2020 National Economic and Social
Development,'' February 28, 2021.
\43\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical Communique of
the People's Republic of China on the 2020 National Economic and Social
Development,'' February 28, 2021.
\44\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical Communique of
the People's Republic of China on the 2020 National Economic and Social
Development,'' February 28, 2021.
\45\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical Communique of
the People's Republic of China on the 2020 National Economic and Social
Development,'' February 28, 2021.
\46\ Cheng Siwei and Guo Yingzhe, ``China's Social Insurance Funds
Report First Deficit on Record,'' Caixin, March 8, 2021; Ministry of
Finance, ``Report on the Execution of the Central and Local Budgets for
2020 and on the Draft Central and Local Budgets for 2021,'' March 5,
2021.
\47\ See, e.g., Cheng Siwei and Guo Yingzhe, ``China's Social Insurance
Funds Report First Deficit on Record,'' Caixin, March 8, 2021; Michael
Lelyveld, ``China's Pension Funds Face Rising Risk,'' Radio Free Asia,
March 12, 2021; ``China to Raise Retirement Age to Offset Funding
Shortfall,'' Voice of America, March 17, 2021.
\48\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2020 nian guomin jingji
wending huifu zhuyao mubiao wancheng hao yu yuqi'' [National economy
stabilized in 2020, achievement of primary targets better than
expected], January 18, 2021.
\49\ Brian Peach and Sidney Leng, ``China Unemployment Rate: How Is It
Measured and Why Is It Important?,'' South China Morning Post, November
17, 2020; Eamon Barrett, ``The Mystery of China's Unemployment Rate,''
Fortune, May 24, 2020; China Labour Bulletin, ``China's Official Youth
Unemployment Rate Hits 13.8 Percent in April,'' May 15, 2020.
\50\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical Communique of
the People's Republic of China on the 2020 National Economic and Social
Development,'' February 28, 2021; National Bureau of Statistics of
China, ``2020 nian guomin jingji wending huifu zhuyao mubiao wancheng
hao yu yuqi'' [National economy stabilized in 2020, achievement of
primary targets better than expected], January 18, 2021.
\51\ Sidney Leng, ``China Jobs Market Still Seen as Weak, Unstable Even
as Unemployment Rate Returns to Pre-coronavirus Level,'' South China
Morning Post, January 20, 2021.
\52\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Workers Hit Hardest by Job Losses
in 2020,'' January 19, 2021; National Bureau of Statistics of China,
``2020 nian guomin jingji wending huifu zhuyao mubiao wancheng hao yu
yuqi'' [National economy stabilized in 2020, achievement of primary
targets better than expected], January 18, 2021.
\53\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Workers Hit Hardest by Job Losses
in 2020,'' January 19, 2021.
\54\ Evelyn Cheng, ``China's Young People Struggle to Find Jobs as
Unemployment Rate Holds at 13.1 percent,'' CNBC, March 15, 2021;
National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``1-2 yuefen guomin jingji
baochi huifu xing zengzhang'' [In January and February national economy
maintained recovery-type growth], March 15, 2021.
\55\ ``China's Falling Unemployment Masks a Lack of Jobs for the
Young,'' Bloomberg, June 20, 2021; National Bureau of Statistics of
China, ``5 yuefen guomin jingji baochi wending huifu'' [National economy
sustained stable recovery in May], June 16, 2021.
\56\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [PRC Labor Law], passed July
5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, amended December 29, 2018, art. 2;
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa [PRC Labor Contract Law],
passed June 29, 2007, effective January 1, 2008, amended December 28,
2012, art. 2.
\57\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [PRC Labor Law], passed July
5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, amended December 29, 2018, art. 2;
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa [PRC Labor Contract Law],
passed June 29, 2007, effective January 1, 2008, amended December 28,
2012, art. 2.
\58\ See, e.g., Ron Brown, ``Chinese `Workers without Benefits,' ''
Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 15, no. 1 (2016): 21.
\59\ See, e.g., ``Thousands of Apple Supplier Workers Turn Out in
Shanghai Pay Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, December 21, 2020; Wayne Ma,
``Apple Turned Blind Eye to Supplier Breaches of Chinese Labor Laws,''
The Information, December 9, 2020.
\60\ Wayne Ma, ``Apple Turned Blind Eye to Supplier Breaches of Chinese
Labor Laws,'' The Information, December 9, 2020; ``Laowu waibao yonggong
moshi de falu fengxian fenxi yu yingdui jianyi'' [Legal analysis and
recommendations for the contract labor model], Mondaq, December 1, 2020.
See also Zixi Liu and Jianghuafeng Zhu, ``Why Workers' Turnover Is So
High: Managed Flexibility and the Intermediary Chain of China's Migrant
Labor Market,'' Journal of Chinese Sociology 7 (June 2020).
\61\ China Labor Watch, ``Apple Supplier Pegatron Workers in Kunshan
Stage Protest Over Owed Wages,'' December 31, 2020; ``Thousands of Apple
Supplier Workers Turn Out in Shanghai Pay Protest,'' Radio Free Asia,
December 21, 2020.
\62\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa [PRC Labor Contract
Law], passed June 29, 2007, effective January 1, 2008, amended December
28, 2012, arts. 63, 66; Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security,
Laowu Paiqian Zanxing Guiding [Interim Provisions for Dispatch Labor],
passed January 24, 2014, effective March 1, 2014, art. 4.
\63\ Yuan Yang, ``Apple Supplier Pegatron Found Using Illegal Student
Labour in China,'' Financial Times, November 9, 2020; China Labor Watch,
``Improvement or Just Public Relations? China Labor Watch Challenges
Apple's Statement on Pegatron,'' November 9, 2020. Restricted movement,
withheld wages, and threats are all indicators of forced labor according
to the International Labour Organization. International Labour
Organization, ``ILO Indicators of Forced Labor,'' October 1, 2012, 1, 2.
\64\ Yuan Yang, ``Apple Supplier Pegatron Found Using Illegal Student
Labour in China,'' Financial Times, November 9, 2020; China Labor Watch,
``Improvement or Just Public Relations? China Labor Watch Challenges
Apple's Statement on Pegatron,'' November 9, 2020.
\65\ Wayne Ma, ``Apple Took Three Years to Cut Ties with Supplier That
Used Underage Labor,'' The Information, December 31, 2020.
\66\ Wayne Ma, ``Apple Took Three Years to Cut Ties with Supplier That
Used Underage Labor,'' The Information, December 31, 2020.
\67\ See, e.g., He Huifeng, ``Plan to Lift Retirement Age Stokes `Fear'
in Rapidly Greying China,'' South China Morning Post, March 30, 2021.
\68\ State Council, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa Shishi
Tiaoli [PRC Labor Contract Law Implementing Regulations], issued and
effective September 18, 2008, art. 21; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong
Hetong Fa [PRC Labor Contract Law], passed June 29, 2007, effective
January 1, 2008, art. 44(2). The PRC Labor Contract Law provides that if
a worker receives a pension, his or her labor contract terminates
(zhongzhi), but the implementing regulations require that contracts be
terminated for all workers upon reaching the legal retirement age.
\69\ Mu Xuan, ``Yiqing qijian bei citui `tuixiu dagongzu' qisu
suochang'' [Dismissed during the epidemic, ``retired workers'' sue for
compensation], Pingyang News, July 9, 2020; ``Tuixiu `zai jiuye,' yinfa
zu lei bing kuaile zhe'' [Retirees ``returning to work,'' grey-haired
people are both tired and happy], People's Daily, October 22, 2020;
China Labour Bulletin, ``Tracking the Ever-Present Danger for Workers on
the Streets of China,'' December 20, 2018.
\70\ He Huifeng, ``Plan to Lift Retirement Age Stokes `Fear' in Rapidly
Greying China,'' South China Morning Post, March 30, 2021; ``China to
Raise Retirement Age Gradually,'' CGTN, March 17, 2021.
\71\ Mu Xuan, ``Yiqing qijian bei citui `tuixiu dagongzu' qisu
suochang'' [Dismissed during the epidemic, ``retired workers'' sue for
compensation], Pingyang News, July 9, 2020; China Labour Bulletin,
``Tracking the Ever-Present Danger for Workers on the Streets of
China,'' December 20, 2018.
\72\ China Labor Watch et al., ``Workers in Misery: An Investigation
into Two Toy Factories,'' December 3, 2020, 5-6, 8, 45, 71, 75.
\73\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical Communique of
the People's Republic of China on the 2020 National Economic and Social
Development,'' February 28, 2021.
\74\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical Communique of
the People's Republic of China on the 2020 National Economic and Social
Development,'' February 28, 2020.
\75\ Liu Xiacun, ``Guojia Kuangshan Anjian Ju: 2020 nian quanguo
meikuang wu zhong teda wasi shigu'' [National Mine Safety Supervision
Bureau: No major gas accidents in coal mines nationwide in 2020],
Xinhua, January 8, 2021. See also China Labour Bulletin, ``China
Trumpets New Coal Mine Safety Achievements in 2020,'' January 13, 2021.
\76\ Wu Xiaojuan, ``Meikuang bai wan dun siwang lu chuang xin di (hangye
guancha)'' [Death rate at million-ton coal mines hits new low (industry
observation)], China Energy News, reprinted in People's Daily, January
13, 2020.
\77\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Coal Mining City Suspends Production After
Second Accident in 40 Days,'' December 3, 2020; Ding Baichuan, ``2020
nian quanguo meikuang shigu tedian ji yuanyin fenxi'' [Analysis of the
characteristics and causes of coal mine accidents nationwide in 2020],
China Coal Mining News, January 26, 2021.
\78\ Ding Baichuan, ``2020 nian quanguo meikuang shigu tedian ji yuanyin
fenxi'' [Analysis of the characteristics and causes of coal mine
accidents nationwide in 2020], China Coal Mining News, January 26, 2021.
\79\ China Labour Bulletin, ``China Trumpets New Coal Mine Safety
Achievements in 2020,'' January 13, 2021.
\80\ Jiang Lin, ``Woguo jiang tuidong wunian nei gongshang shigu fasheng
lu mingxian xiajiang'' [China will promote a significant decline in the
rate of work-related accidents within five years], Xinhua, January 22,
2021; Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security et al., ``Renli
Ziyuan Shehui Baozhangbu Gongye he Xinxihuabu Caizhengbu Zhufang
Chengxiang Jianshebu Jiaotong Yunshubu Guojia Weisheng Jiankang
Weiyuanhui Yingjibu Zhonghua Quanguo Zonggonghui guanyu yinfa Gongshang
Yufang Wu Nian Xingdong Jihua (2021-2025) de tongzhi'' [Ministry of
Human Resources and Social Security, Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Housing and
Urban-Rural Development, Ministry of Transportation, National Health
Commission Emergency Department, and All-China Federation of Trade
Unions Notice on Issuing the Five-Year Action Plan for Work Injury
Prevention (2021-2025)], December 18, 2020.
\81\ China Labor Watch et al., ``Workers in Misery: An Investigation
into Two Toy Factories,'' December 3, 2020, 4-6, 8, 45, 71, 75.
\82\ China Labor Watch et al., ``Workers in Misery: An Investigation
into Two Toy Factories,'' December 3, 2020, 6, 73.
\83\ Wu Wei, ``Chenfeibing zhongdian hangye zhigong jiang quanmian naru
gongshang baoxian'' [Employees in key industries affected by
pneumoconiosis will be fully included in work injury insurance], Beijing
News, December 10, 2019; China Labour Bulletin, ``Government Vows to
Protect Workers as Protests over Pneumoconiosis Grow,'' December 10,
2019; Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and National
Health Commission, Renli Ziyuan Shehui Baozhangbu Guojia Weisheng
Jiankangwei guanyu Zuohao Chenfeibing Zhongdian Hangye Gongshang Baoxian
Youguan Gongzuo de Tongzhi [Circular on Properly Implementing Work
Injury Insurance in Key Pneumoconiosis Industries], December 2, 2019.
\84\ Mimi Lau, ``Dying for China's Economic Miracle: Migrant Workers
Ravaged by Lung Disease, Fighting to Pay for Their Funerals,'' South
China Morning Post, October 10, 2018; National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, ``Pneumoconiosis,'' October 13, 2011.
\85\ National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, ``Pneumoconiosis,'' October 13, 2011.
\86\ Sidney Leng, ``China's 6 Million `Black Lung' Workers Living on
Just US$61 a Month, with Most Struggling to Survive,'' South China
Morning Post, March 5, 2021; National Bureau of Statistics of China,
``Statistical Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2020
National Economic and Social Development,'' February 28, 2021. According
to the South China Morning Post, the nongovernmental organization Love
Save Pneumoconiosis estimated that about six million Chinese workers
suffer from pneumoconiosis.
\87\ Sidney Leng, ``China's 6 Million `Black Lung' Workers Living on
Just US$61 a Month, with Most Struggling to Survive,'' South China
Morning Post, March 5, 2021.
\88\ Yuan Xiangqin, ``Chenfei bing nongmin yao dedao jiuzhi you duo
nan?'' [How difficult is it for rural workers with pneumoconiosis to
obtain treatment?], The Paper, November 7, 2020.
\89\ Feng Haining, ``Gongshang xianxing zhifu hai xu falu zhicheng''
[Advance payment for work-related injuries still needs legal support],
Legal Daily, November 11, 2020.
Criminal Justice
Criminal Justice
Criminal Justice
Findings
The criminal justice system remained a political
instrument used for maintaining social order in
furtherance of the Chinese Communist Party's coercive
rule. The government punishes criminal acts, but it also
targets individuals who pursue universal human rights,
particularly when they independently organize or
challenge the Party's authority.
Government officials used extrajudicial and
extralegal means--such as mass internment camps, ``black
jails,'' and psychiatric hospitals--to detain members of
ethnic minorities, political dissidents, and people who
sought redress for damages caused by official actions.
Arbitrary detention did not abate despite
official rhetoric promoting ``rule-based governance.''
Authorities labeled rights advocates and dissidents as
criminals, using provisions such as ``endangering state
security'' and other vaguely defined offenses. Also, the
government is increasingly arbitrarily detaining foreign
citizens in an effort to exert diplomatic pressure on
their countries.
Legally recognized forms of detention--such as
``retention in custody'' and ``residential surveillance
at a designated location''--may lend a veneer of
legality but were often arbitrarily applied and used by
officials as cover for secret detentions. Reports
emerged this past year indicating that officials had
tortured individuals while holding them in these forms
of detention.
There also was evidence suggesting that
authorities had used the criminal justice system for
political purposes. In one case, authorities sentenced a
financier to death for non-violent crimes and executed
him within 1 month, during which two stages of judicial
review allegedly were completed--one by the provincial
high court and one by the Supreme People's Court. While
the exact reason behind the speedy execution was
unclear, the Party's disciplinary commission issued a
memorandum saying that the execution could set an
example of the consequences of rejecting the Party's
leadership.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are
encouraged to:
Publicly advocate for political prisoners. Chinese
officials have deprived individuals of liberty on
unsubstantiated criminal charges and for apparent
political reasons. Experience demonstrates that
consistently and prominently raising individual prisoner
cases--and the larger human rights issues they
represent--can result in improved treatment in
detention, lighter sentences or, in some cases, release
from custody, detention, or imprisonment. Specific cases
of prisoners can be found in this section and other
sections in this report. For additional cases, refer to
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
Prioritize an end to arbitrary detention through
diplomatic engagement. The Administration should urge
Chinese officials to end all forms of arbitrary
detention and raise this issue in all bilateral
discussions and in multilateral institutions of which
the U.S. and China are members. The Administration
should create public diplomacy campaigns and support
media efforts to raise global awareness of the detention
of political and religious prisoners in ``black jails,''
psychiatric institutions, compulsory drug detoxification
centers, police and state security detention centers,
and mass internment camps in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region. In addition, the Administration
should consider funding non-governmental projects that
assist individuals with submissions to the UN Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention, in order to provide
actionable information to the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights and other UN human rights mechanisms, and
to accumulate evidence on Chinese officials complicit in
the arbitrary detention of political and religious
prisoners.
Take the necessary steps to ensure that U.S.
businesses are not complicit in PRC abuses of police
power. The Administration and Members of Congress should
take the necessary steps to prohibit the export of U.S.
surveillance technologies and equipment to the Chinese
police. Members of Congress should hold public hearings
and private meetings with companies from their districts
to raise awareness of the risk of complicity in human
rights abuses and privacy violations that U.S. companies
working in China face. Topics of meetings could include
complicity in the use of artificial intelligence
technology and surveillance equipment to monitor human
rights advocates, religious believers, and ethnic
minority groups in China.
Engage with reform-minded governments and non-
governmental actors. The Administration and Members of
Congress should continue, and where appropriate expand,
support for programs involving U.S. entities engaging
with reform-minded Chinese individuals and organizations
that draw on comparative experience to improve the
criminal justice process. For example, the experience of
the United States and other jurisdictions can inform
individuals and institutions in China that are working
toward reducing reliance on confessions, enhancing the
role of witnesses at trial, and creating more reliable
procedures for reviewing death penalty cases.
Voice support for human rights advocates in China.
Members of Congress and Administration officials,
especially the President, should regularly meet with
Chinese civil society and democracy advocates and human
rights defenders, as well as other targets of Chinese
government repression. The Administration and Members of
Congress should discuss the importance of protection for
such individuals with their Chinese counterparts in a
wide range of bilateral and multilateral discussions.
Stress to the Chinese government the need for
greater transparency in its use of the death penalty.
The Administration and Members of Congress should urge
Chinese officials to disclose the number and
circumstances of executions. The Administration and
Members of Congress should also urge the Chinese
government to ban explicitly, in national legislation,
the harvesting of organs from live and executed
prisoners, to include prisoners of conscience and
prisoners from ethnic and religious minorities.
Criminal Justice
Criminal Justice
Criminal Justice
Introduction
During the Commission's 2021 reporting year, Chinese
government and Communist Party officials continued to use
the criminal justice system and various other forms of
detention to arbitrarily detain individuals. As of
February 2021, the human rights monitoring group Rights
Defense Network documented 1,104 cases of active
detention, which the group estimated to be a small
fraction of the total number of political and religious
prisoners in China.\1\ In reviewing China's administration
of justice in 2020, a scholar observed the standardization
of abusive procedures, such as total isolation and torture
of detainees in politically sensitive cases, the scope of
which has expanded due to the diminishing space for speech
and civil society activities.\2\
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention considers a
detention arbitrary if--1) it has no legal basis, 2) it is
used to suppress the exercise of universal human rights,
3) the detainee's due process rights are violated, 4)
asylum seekers or refugees are subjected to prolonged
detention, or 5) the detention is discriminatory on
grounds such as religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation,
or political opinion.\3\ Arbitrary detention violates
international human rights standards \4\ and China's
Constitution, which prohibits unlawful deprivation or
restriction of a person's liberty.\5\ All forms of
arbitrary detention are prohibited under international
law, including ``detention within the framework of
criminal justice, administrative detention, detention in
the context of migration and detention in the health-care
settings.'' \6\
Extrajudicial Detention
Chinese authorities used the following forms of extrajudicial
detention this past year to arbitrarily detain
individuals:
ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE
Reports of enforced disappearance continued to emerge this
past year.\7\ ``Enforced disappearance'' is any form of
deprivation of a person's liberty carried out by the
government or with its acquiescence, followed by a refusal
to acknowledge the detention or to disclose the detainee's
whereabouts.\8\ In one case, rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng's
whereabouts have remained unknown since public security
officials took him into custody in 2017.\9\ Gao's
disappearance came after he wrote a book detailing his
experience of being tortured and his outlook on
democratization in China.\10\
Enforced disappearance not only violates the victim's rights,
it also inflicts upon his or her family members mental
anguish amounting to torture.\11\ In January 2021, Gao's
wife Geng He reported that Gao's elder sister committed
suicide in May 2020 on her third attempt due to depression
caused by Gao's situation.\12\ Geng herself likewise
expressed intense worries over Gao's health.\13\
BLACK JAILS
The informal term ``black jail'' refers to buildings such as
hotels and training centers that government officials or
their agents use to detain people.\14\ These extralegal
detention facilities operate under different names,
including ``assistance and service center'' or ``legal
education center.'' \15\ Their existence and use have no
legal basis, and people detained at such sites--many of
whom are petitioners \16\ and Falun Gong practitioners
\17\--do not know when they will be released and do not
have any procedural protection.\18\
In one example, five government bodies in Aluke'erqin Banner,
Chifeng municipality, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region,
jointly issued a notice telling parents that those who
resisted the government's fall 2020 reduction of Mongolian
language education in schools would be placed in ``legal
education training,'' \19\ which victims refer to as being
sent to a ``black jail.'' \20\ The PRC Legislation Law,
however, prohibits any mandatory measure or punishment
that deprives or restricts citizens' liberty unless such
measure or punishment has been passed by the National
People's Congress.\21\ The Southern Mongolian Human Rights
Information Center characterized the education policy as
being part of a cultural genocide campaign, the
enforcement of which led to an estimated 8,000 to 10,000
people being placed in some form of police custody between
August and October 2020.\22\ [For more information on the
new language policy in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region, see Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights.]
PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES
Forcibly committing individuals without mental illness to
psychiatric facilities (bei jingshenbing) for acts such as
expressing political opinions or grievances against the
government continued during this past year,\23\ despite
domestic legal provisions prohibiting such abuse.\24\ In
particular, the UN Principles for the Protection of
Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental
Health Care provide that a ``determination that a person
has a mental illness shall be made in accordance with
internationally accepted medical standards'' and must not
be based on ``political . . . or any other reason not
directly relevant to mental health status.'' \25\
The Chinese human rights organization Civil Rights &
Livelihood Watch (CRLW) observed that bei jingshenbing had
not abated, although the number of reports of abuse had
decreased due to censorship.\26\ In its annual report,
CRLW detailed a case in which authorities detained Ou
Biaofeng in December 2020 and criminally charged him with
``inciting subversion of state power'' after he retweeted
two video clips in which bei jingshenbing victim Dong
Yaoqiong clarified that she in fact was not mentally
ill.\27\ Authorities detained Dong in July 2018 and
committed her to a psychiatric hospital in Hunan province
after she live-streamed herself throwing black ink on a
poster of President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping
on Twitter,\28\ a platform banned in China.\29\ Following
Ou's detention, authorities in February 2021 committed
Dong for a third time to a psychiatric facility.\30\
ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION
Chinese authorities continued to suppress freedoms such as
speech,\31\ press,\32\ and assembly \33\ through
administrative detention, which is among several types of
administrative penalties authorized by the PRC Public
Security Administration Punishment Law and the PRC
Administrative Penalty Law,\34\ and which is referenced in
about 90 domestic laws and regulations.\35\ Some political
detainees are subjected to further criminal detention and
prosecution after completion of administrative
detention.\36\
In January 2021, the NPC Standing Committee amended the PRC
Administrative Penalty Law, adding a number of provisions,
some of which concern procedural protection, such as
requiring government agencies to make audio or written
records and to disclose the legal basis and procedures
used during the course of enforcing the law.\37\ With an
effective date of July 2021, the amendment's impact on
human rights practices is still unknown.\38\
RETENTION IN CUSTODY
The PRC Supervision Law (Supervision Law),\39\ authorizes the
National Supervisory Commission (NSC) to investigate
suspected official misconduct \40\ using methods including
``retention in custody'' (liuzhi),\41\ an extrajudicial
form of detention that allows NSC officials to hold
individuals without legal representation and denies them
the right to be tried.\42\ [For information on reports of
torture used in retention in custody, see subsection
``Torture and Abuse'' below.]
MASS INTERNMENT CAMPS
Authorities continued to operate a system of extrajudicial
mass internment camps in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region in which they have arbitrarily detained up to 1.8
million individuals from predominantly Muslim ethnic
minority groups, including Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui,
and others.\43\ As of February 2021, the U.S. Secretary of
State and Canada's parliament determined that the Chinese
government was committing genocide against Muslim
minorities in China.\44\ [For more information on
arbitrary detention in China's mass internment camps, see
Section IV--Xinjiang.]
Abuse of Criminal Provisions
As ``law-based governance'' remained a theme in official
rhetoric,\45\ Chinese authorities continued to suppress
the exercise of universal human rights through the use of
criminal charges. Commonly applied criminal offenses
include--
Crimes of endangering state security,\46\ a
category of 12 offenses that carry a maximum life
sentence and that have been lodged against government
critics and rights lawyers; \47\
Picking quarrels and provoking trouble,\48\ often
considered a catch-all offense and encompassing internet
activities,\49\ which carries a sentence of up to 10
years in prison, and which has been used against anyone
the government deems to be a troublemaker; \50\
Extortion,\51\ carrying a term of over 10 years'
imprisonment depending on the amount of money involved,
and which has been applied to individuals who petition
the government for redress of grievances; \52\
Illegal business activity,\53\ carrying a maximum
sentence of over five years, which has been used in
cases involving religious and political publications;
\54\ and
Organizing and using a cult to undermine
implementation of the law,\55\ with sentences ranging
from under three years to life imprisonment, typically
used to prosecute individuals considered to be ``cult
members,'' such as Falun Gong practitioners,\56\ and in
connection with which lawyers are prohibited from
contesting the government's cult designation in the
course of defending the accused.\57\
Cases of note from this past year in which authorities alleged
other criminal offenses include--
Former state-owned enterprise official Ren
Zhiqiang, who was sentenced to 18 years in prison on
September 22, 2020, for ``corruption,'' ``bribe
acceptance,'' ``embezzlement of public funds,'' and
``abuse of office,'' \58\ after he criticized Party
General Secretary Xi Jinping; \59\ and
Hong Kong democracy advocate Andy Li, who was
sentenced to seven months in prison for ``illegal border
crossing,'' after China's coast guard intercepted in the
South China Sea the speedboat that Li and 11 others were
using to travel to Taiwan, reportedly to seek asylum
relating to their political activities in 2019.\60\
FOREIGN INDIVIDUALS DETAINED UNDER STATE SECURITY CHARGES
This past year, the Chinese government continued to
arbitrarily detain foreign individuals as one of several
pressure tactics against foreign governments, the use of
which has sharply escalated since 2018, as observed by the
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).\61\ In a
report published in August 2020, ASPI noted that this type
of arbitrary detention often involves ``enforced
disappearances, unusual trial delays, harsh punishments,
prolonged interrogations and lack of transparency to
maximise the effects of coercion.'' \62\ Furthermore,
Chinese authorities are ``known to reinstate Chinese
citizenship to detainees to prevent them from being
repatriated . . ..'' \63\ Recent examples include the
following:
Chinese authorities detained reporter Cheng Lei,
an Australian citizen of Chinese descent, in August 2020
for ``illegally providing state secrets and intelligence
to overseas entities.'' \64\ The non-governmental
organization Safeguard Defenders identified this case as
an example of ``hostage diplomacy,'' noting Australia's
critical stance on China.\65\
In March 2021, Canadian citizens Michael Kovrig
and Michael Spavor were tried in closed proceedings--
also on the charge of ``illegally providing state
secrets and intelligence to overseas entities''--more
than two years after their detention in December
2018.\66\ Their detentions are ``widely viewed as an act
of retaliation against Canada for the arrest of Meng
Wanzhou, an executive at the Chinese tech giant
Huawei,'' according to a Human Rights Watch
researcher.\67\
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found
that the detention of U.S. citizen Kai Li was arbitrary
because Chinese authorities failed to promptly inform
him of the charges against him, denied him the right to
seek judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention,
and deprived him of the right to legal counsel.\68\ In
2018, a court in Shanghai municipality sentenced Li to
10 years in prison for allegedly collecting ``state
secrets'' on behalf of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.\69\ The judge presiding over the appeal
reportedly admitted to not having any real control over
the outcome of the case; the Working Group concluded
that this lack of judicial independence violated Li's
right to a fair hearing and the presumption of
innocence.\70\
[Please refer to other chapters in this annual report for additional
specific examples of abuse of the criminal law.]
Prolonged Pretrial Detention
Reports continued to emerge indicating that Chinese
authorities subjected political prisoners to prolonged
pretrial detention, a violation of the right to a speedy
trial under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.\71\ The PRC Criminal Procedure Law
requires that a decision to formally arrest an individual
must be made within 37 days after the initial
detention.\72\ Thereafter, absent special circumstances,
the procuratorate has one month to indict an individual,
and the court is required to complete trial and sentencing
within two months after receiving the case from the
procuratorate.\73\ In practice, however, the length of
pretrial detention experienced by political prisoners
often far exceeds the legal limits.\74\
The human rights organization Frontline Defenders observed
that ``[m]ost of the defenders convicted in the mainland
have been kept under prolonged pretrial detention, often
without access to their family and legal counsel of their
choice.'' \75\ In one example, rights lawyer Li Yuhan
remained in pretrial detention for over three years after
her initial detention in October 2017.\76\ The United
States and the European Union have called for her release
and expressed concern about her deteriorating health.\77\
Denial of Counsel and Family Visits
The Commission observed cases in which Chinese authorities
denied detainees the right to counsel and family visits,
in violation of international law.\78\ While domestic
legal provisions permit counsel and family visits, they do
not describe such visits as rights.\79\ In particular, the
PRC Criminal Procedure Law does not provide for family
visits per se but permits visitation only if the family
member is acting as a defense representative.\80\ The law
likewise circumscribes counsel visits during the
investigation phase of a case if it involves state
security, requiring prior permission by relevant
authorities.\81\
In one example, in June 2020, the Public Security Bureau of
Linyi municipality in Shandong province denied lawyer Ma
Wei's application to meet with detained legal advocate Xu
Zhiyong on grounds that the case involved state security,
citing Article 39 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law.\82\
Authorities detained Xu and several other democracy
advocates after they met in Xiamen municipality, Fujian
province, in December 2019.\83\ Human rights lawyer Ding
Jiaxi, who was among those detained, also was denied
counsel visit.\84\ Xu's family discovered that neither
Xu's nor Ding's name was registered in the detention
center's computer system, prompting speculation that they
were either registered under aliases or not at all.\85\
Ding's wife said this practice was tantamount to
disappearance.\86\
Other representative examples include--
Officials at Shaya Prison in Aksu prefecture,
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, permitted Zhang
Haitao to meet with his family only three times over a
five-year period.\87\ Zhang is serving a 19-year
sentence on state security charges in connection with
his advocacy for ethnic minority rights.\88\
Qianjiang Prison officials in Hubei province
denied Qin Yongmin the right to family visits for over
six months despite monthly requests.\89\ Qin is the
founder of the China Democracy Party and is serving a
13-year sentence for ``subversion.'' \90\
Human rights lawyer Yu Wensheng, who is serving a
four-year sentence for ``inciting subversion'' after
publishing an essay promoting constitutional reform, was
not permitted to meet with his wife for over three
years.\91\
Denial of Effective Legal Representation
Reports show that Chinese authorities denied criminal
defendants their right to effective legal assistance by a
representative of their own choosing, especially in
political cases.\92\ In one example, Cheng Yuan, Liu
Dazhi, and Wu Gejianxiong, whom authorities previously
held in prolonged pretrial detention on state security
charges, were reportedly tried in a closed hearing on an
unknown date apparently without legal representation of
their own choosing, a violation of international law.\93\
The three defendants belonged to a group that promoted
government transparency and advocated for the rights of
persons with disabilities.\94\ In July 2020, Wu
Gejianxiong's father Wu Youshui, a lawyer who was
representing his son in the case, wrote that authorities
told his co-counsel that the three defendants had
terminated all six lawyers working on the case on the same
day.\95\ Wu Youshui expressed doubt that the decision to
terminate his representation was made voluntarily.\96\
Torture and Abuse
Reports indicate that the practice of torture and abuse of
detainees continued in China, a violation of the Chinese
government's international human rights obligations as a
State Party to the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT).\97\
Physical Harm
In one report of torture, National Supervisory Commission
officials in Changzhou municipality, Jiangsu province,
detained Yang Meng for 156 days in 2018 under ``retention
in custody,'' \98\ which is a form of detention designed
to hold Party members who are under investigation for
misconduct such as corruption.\99\ Authorities detained
Yang, a Chinese Communist Party member and retired
government worker, after he made multiple reports of
collusion between local officials and pharmaceutical
companies.\100\ When Yang was on trial on corruption
charges, he testified that interrogators applied irritants
to his eyes, beat and insulted him, limited his drinking
water, and restricted bathroom usage.\101\ Yang also
testified that he was unable to stand up after having been
ordered to sit in an interrogation chair for 18 hours a
day over a 140-day period.\102\ Such torture resulted in
blindness in one eye, deafness in one ear, and permanent
injury to his right leg.\103\ Yang and his legal
representative made multiple requests for medical
treatment for his injuries but were ignored.\104\
Authorities reportedly also tortured Niu Tengyu, who was
detained in connection with the leakage of information on
Xi Jinping's relatives.\105\ According to Niu's mother,
because Niu initially refused to confess, officials hung
him up by his handcuffs in a dark room and whipped him for
one to two hours until he lost consciousness, after which
they dropped hot wax onto him.\106\ The abuse caused Niu
to lose one finger.\107\ Niu eventually pleaded guilty,
and a court in Guangdong province sentenced him to 14
years in prison.\108\
In February 2021, the BBC published an article detailing
``evidence of an organised system of mass rape, sexual
abuse and torture'' based on statements of former
detainees and a guard from mass internment camps in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.\109\ Rape is torture
and systematic rape constitutes a crime against
humanity.\110\ [For more information on the torture of
detainees in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, see
Section IV--Xinjiang.]
In June 2021, 12 UN independent experts reported that they had
received credible information that ``[f]orced organ
harvesting in China appears to be targeting specific
ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities held in
detention . . ..'' \111\ UN experts had raised the issue
of organ harvesting previously, but the Chinese
government's failure to disclose relevant data presented
``obstacles to the successful identification and
protection of victims of trafficking and effective
investigation and prosecution of traffickers.'' \112\
Death in Custody
In January 2021, ethnic Kazakh Akikat Kaliolla, who lived in
Kazakhstan, reported that his father, Qaliolla Tursyn, had
died in custody, possibly in Wusu Prison in Ili (Yili)
Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region.\113\ Kaliolla said that authorities detained his
father in March 2018 and subjected him to prolonged
shackling and severe beatings after his father made
complaints against local government officials for having
set up extralegal detention facilities that they used to
hold people for periods lasting from three months to over
three years.\114\ Kaliolla's mother and brothers
disappeared in August 2020, which he believed was
government officials' attempt to force them to admit that
the father had died of natural causes.\115\
Suppression of Reporting on Torture
Chinese authorities have punished individuals who disseminated
information about incidents of torture. For example--
In October 2020, police in Baoji municipality,
Shaanxi province, took lawyer Chang Weiping into custody
six days after he shared a video retelling his
experience of being tortured during his incommunicado
detention earlier that year.\116\
In January 2021, the Bureau of Justice in
Chaoyang district, Beijing municipality, suspended
lawyer Zhou Ze's license for a year on grounds that he
``used improper methods to affect lawful case handling''
because he posted video footage of an official abusing a
criminal defendant.\117\
In February 2021, police took Li Qiaochu into
custody in Beijing municipality, one day after she
exposed detained legal scholar Xu Zhiyong's experience
of being tightly tied to an interrogation chair and
deprived of adequate food and water by detention center
officials.\118\
Infliction of Psychological Harm
Chinese authorities have used threats of harm and caused
actual harm to a person's family members to exert pressure
on individuals they intend to target. For instance,
detained lawyer Yu Wensheng told his wife that public
security officials had threatened to detain her and to
harm his child when he was detained under ``residential
surveillance at a designated location.'' \119\
In another example, Rushan Abbas, a U.S.-based Uyghur and
American citizen, reported in December 2020 that Chinese
authorities had sentenced her sister Gulshan Abbas to 20
years in prison in March 2019 on terrorism-related
charges.\120\ Rushan Abbas believed that her sister's
detention was retaliation by Chinese authorities for her
advocacy work in the United States.\121\ Gulshan Abbas
disappeared in September 2018, soon after Rushan Abbas
participated in a panel discussing the mass internment of
Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.\122\
Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location
Chinese authorities continued to abuse a form of detention
known as ``residential surveillance at a designated
location'' (RSDL), which the PRC Criminal Procedure Law
reserves for situations where the detainee does not have a
permanent residence or if the case involves state security
or terrorism.\123\ The law does not provide for the right
to family visits, requiring only that the family be
notified of the fact of the detention within 24 hours if
possible; it also does not require the disclosure of the
detention location.\124\ The law further subjects counsel
visits to approval by the investigation unit.\125\ A group
of UN experts observed that ``these conditions of
detention are analogous to incommunicado and secret
detention and tantamount to enforced disappearance.'' Such
conditions heighten the risk of torture and abuse.\126\
Reports show that torture and abuse have taken place during
RSDL. In the case of legal scholar Xu Zhiyong, police
deprived him of sleep over a 10-day period and tied him to
an interrogation chair so tightly that he had difficulty
breathing.\127\ In the case of constitutionalism proponent
Chen Jianfang, authorities likewise subjected her to sleep
deprivation, causing her to lose the sense of time.\128\
Chen met with her lawyer for the first time in March 2021,
nearly two years after her initial detention; previously,
Chen's whereabouts remained undisclosed to her
lawyer.\129\
Authorities also enforced RSDL in cases that did not involve
state security or terrorism, contrary to the requirements
under the PRC Criminal Procedure Law.\130\ In two separate
cases, concerning labor rights advocate Ling Haobo and
press freedom defenders Chen Mei and Cai Wei, public
security officials placed them under RSDL even though they
were accused of ``picking quarrels and provoking
trouble.'' \131\
The Death Penalty
The Chinese government continued to classify statistics
relating to the use of the death penalty as a ``state
secret.'' \132\ Despite official claims that this
punishment is reserved for a small number of crimes and
only the most serious offenders,\133\ human rights group
Amnesty International estimated that the Chinese
government ``executed and sentenced to death thousands of
people, remaining the world's leading executioner.'' \134\
In a case involving non-violent and primarily economic crimes,
Chinese authorities imposed the death penalty and carried
out execution within a month.\135\ On January 5, 2021, the
Tianjin Municipality No. 2 Intermediate People's Court
sentenced financier Lai Xiaomin to death on charges of
``receiving bribes,'' ``corruption,'' and ``bigamy.''
\136\ Both his appeal and approval of the death sentence
by the Supreme People's Court were completed before
January 29, when he was executed.\137\ While the reason
behind the speedy execution is unclear,\138\ the Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National
Supervisory Commission issued a memorandum on January 18
criticizing Lai for rejecting the Chinese Communist
Party's leadership and disregarding Party discipline. The
two offices also called for Party building in the
financial sector, appealing to the principle of
``punishing a very few to educate and save the majority.''
\139\
Legal Developments Affecting Minors
This past year, the National People's Congress Standing
Committee (NPCSC) and the Supreme People's Court (SPC)
issued legal documents containing provisions affecting
procedure and responsibility in cases involving minors.
Among the changes made to the PRC Criminal Law was a
provision added by the NPCSC that moves the minimum age
for criminal liability from 14 to 12 for homicide and
intentional injury to another person causing serious harm,
or using especially cruel means.\140\
The amendment also established a ``specialized corrective
education'' system for persons under 16 years old who are
not receiving criminal punishment.\141\ Simultaneously,
the NPCSC amended the PRC Juvenile Delinquency Prevention
Law, which describes the ``specialized corrective
education'' system in more detail.\142\ The law requires
province-level governments to designate at least one
``specialized school'' at a ``specialized facility'' to
hold juveniles who commit criminal acts but are not
receiving criminal punishment because of their age.\143\
The law further requires that ``corrective work'' be
carried out by public security and judicial administration
departments.\144\
In January 2021, the SPC issued an interpretation of the PRC
Criminal Procedure Law containing 40 articles describing
procedures for cases involving minors.\145\ In the
interpretation, the SPC established a trial organization
dedicated to handling cases involving offenders or victims
who are minors.\146\ The interpretation generally exempts
victims or witnesses who are minors from making in-person
court appearances during trial.\147\ In addition, courts
are required to assist minor victims who have financial
difficulties in applying for legal assistance. Courts are
also required to work with government agencies and civil
society groups to provide psychological, financial, legal,
and education assistance to minor victims of sexual
assault or violence, and their families.\148\
Criminal Justice
Criminal Justice
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes to Section II--Criminal Justice
\1\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhongguo dalu zaiya zhengzhifan,
liangxinfan yuedu baogao (2021 nian 2 yue 28 ri) di 65 qi (gong 1104
ren) (yi)'' [Report of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience
detained in China (February 28, 2021) Issue No. 65 (Total 1,104 persons)
(I)], February 28, 2021.
\2\ Chen Yu-Jie, ``Human Rights in the Chinese Administration of
Justice: Formalizing Ideology in the Political and Legal System and
Institutionalizing and Normalizing Human Rights Abuses,'' trans.
Siodhbhra Parkin, China Human Rights Report 2020, Taiwan Foundation for
Democracy, 2021, 8, 14, 28.
\3\ See, e.g., UN Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
at its 78th session, (19-27 April 2017), A/HRC/WGAD/2017/5, July 28,
2017.
\4\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN
General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 9;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into
force March 23, 1976, art. 9.
\5\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982 (amended
March 11, 2018),
art. 37.
\6\ UN Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
Deliberation No. 11 on Prevention of Arbitrary Deprivation of Liberty in
the Context of Public Health Emergencies, May 8, 2020, para. 7.
\7\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Shanghai yimiao shouhai
shouhaizhe Tan Hua de muqin Hua Xiuzhen wei nu'er weiquan zao dangju
pohai tuixiu daiyu bei feifa boduo yi zao qiangpo shizong 7 tian'' [Hua
Xiuzhen, mother of Shanghai vaccine victim Tan Hua, defends rights for
daughter but persecuted by the government, retirement benefits
unlawfully stripped, involuntarily disappeared for 7 days], January 19,
2021.
\8\ International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance, adopted by the General Assembly resolution 47/
133, December 18, 1992, art. 2.
\9\ ``Gao Zhisheng shizong zheng sannian qizi huyu Meiguo jiuren'' [Gao
Zhisheng has disappeared for three full years, wife asks the U.S. to
save him], Radio Free Asia, August 14, 2020.
\10\ ``Gao Zhisheng shizong zheng sannian qizi huyu Meiguo jiuren'' [Gao
Zhisheng has disappeared for three full years, wife asks the U.S. to
save him], Radio Free Asia, August 14, 2020.
\11\ UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, Interpretation of Torture
in the Light of the Practice and Jurisprudence of International Bodies,
25.
\12\ ``Gao Zhisheng jiejie juewang zisha shengqian huo zai kongju
zhong'' [Gao Zhisheng's elder sister committed suicide due to
hopelessness, she lived in fear before her death], Radio Free Asia,
January 4, 2021.
\13\ ``Gao Zhisheng jiejie juewang zisha shengqian huo zai kongju
zhong'' [Gao Zhisheng's elder sister committed suicide due to
hopelessness, she lived in fear before her death], Radio Free Asia,
January 4, 2021.
\14\ ``Zhongguo hei jianyu daguan'' [Overview of Black Jails in China],
Radio Free Asia, May 7, 2019.
\15\ ``Zhongguo hei jianyu daguan'' [Overview of Black Jails in China],
Radio Free Asia, May 7, 2019.
\16\ See, e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Gedi fangmin bei
weiwen qingkuang (liu)'' [Status of petitioners from different locations
being subjected to stability maintenance (6)], March 4, 2021.
\17\ See, e.g., ``Hebei Xingtai shi fazhi jiaoyu zhongxin jinqi dui
Falun Gong xueyuan de pohai'' [Recent persecution of Falun Gong
practitioners at the legal education center in Xingtai municipality,
Hebei], Minghui, August 31, 2020.
\18\ ``Zhongguo hei jianyu daguan'' [Overview of Black Jails in China],
Radio Free Asia, May 7, 2019.
\19\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Southern
Mongolia Turns to Police State as Full-blown Cultural Genocide
Unfolds,'' September 14, 2020.
\20\ Massimo Introvigne, ``Neimenggu: 5000 ren beibu, Zhonggong
jiazhuang `tuoxie' '' [Inner Mongolia: 5,000 people detained, Chinese
Communist Party pretends to compromise], Bitter Winter, September 17,
2020.
\21\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa [PRC Legislation Law], passed
March 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000, amended March 15, 2015, arts. 8,
9.
\22\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Southern
Mongolia Turns to Police State as Full-blown Cultural Genocide
Unfolds,'' September 14, 2020; Southern Mongolian Human Rights
Information Center, ``Activists Face Imprisonment and Police Stations in
Schools,'' October 18, 2020.
\23\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2020 Zhongguo jingshen jiankang
yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong baogao'' [2020 annual report on
mental health and human rights (forcible psychiatric commitment)
situation in China], March 3, 2021.
\24\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingshen Weisheng Fa [PRC Mental Health
Law], passed October 26, 2012, effective May 1, 2013, arts. 27, 29, 30,
32, 75(5), 78(1); Supreme People's Procuratorate, Renmin Jianchayuan
Qiangzhi Yiliao Zhixing Jiancha Banfa (Shixing) [Measures on the
Inspection of Implementation of Compulsory Medical Treatment by People's
Procuratorates (Trial)], issued May 13, 2016, effective June 2, 2016,
arts. 9, 12.
\25\ Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and
for the Improvement of Mental Health Care, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 46/119 of December 17, 1991, principle 4(1), (2).
\26\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2020 Zhongguo jingshen jiankang
yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong baogao'' [2020 annual report on
mental health and human rights (forcible psychiatric commitment)
situation in China], March 3, 2021.
\27\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2020 Zhongguo jingshen jiankang
yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong baogao'' [2020 annual report on
mental health and human rights (forcible psychiatric commitment)
situation in China], March 3, 2021.
\28\ Rights Defense Network, `` `Pomo nu' Dong Yaoqiong shipin kongsu
`bei jingshenbing' hou jingkuang suihou ji bei xiaoyin'' [``Ink splash
girl'' Dong Yaoqing disappears after issuing an accusatory video
detailing her situation after ``being forcibly committed to a
psychiatric hospital''], December 2, 2020.
\29\ Kurt Wagner and Peter Martin, ``Twitter Locks Out Chinese Embassy
in U.S. Over Post on Uighurs,'' Bloomberg, January 20, 2021.
\30\ See, e.g, `` `Pomo nuhai' Dong Yaoqiong disan du ru jingshen
bingyuan'' [``Ink splash girl'' Dong Yaoqiong committed to psychiatric
hospital for the third time], Radio Free Asia, February 9, 2021.
\31\ See, e.g., ``Zhongguo yancha `weifa buliang xinxi' duoren beiju''
[China strictly censors ``unlawful and harmful messages,'' many people
detained], Radio Free Asia, August 3, 2020.
\32\ ``Zeng renzhi Niuyue Shibao zuojia Du Bin she xunxin zishi bei
juliu'' [Previously employed by New York Times, writer Du Bin detained
on suspicion of picking quarrels and provoking trouble], Radio Free
Asia, December 18, 2020.
\33\ Tang Huiyun, ``Xianggang kangzhengzhe Wang popo bei ruanjin
Zhongguo yinian qinshu beipo canyu `aiguo zhilu' ji xie huiguoshu''
[Hong Kong protester Grandma Wong subjected to soft detention in China
for a year, personally recounts experience of being forced to go on a
``patriotic tour'' and write a repentance letter], Voice of America,
October 18, 2020.
\34\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhi'an Guanli Chufa Fa [PRC Public
Security Administration Punishment Law], passed August 28, 2005, amended
October 26, 2012, effective January 1, 2013, art. 10; Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xingzheng Chufa Fa [PRC Administrative Penalty Law], passed
March 17, 1996, amended January 22, 2021, effective July 15, 2021, art.
9.
\35\ Ministry of Public Security, Weifan Gong'an Xingzheng Guanli
Xingwei de Mingcheng ji Qi Shiyong Yijian [Opinion on the Titles and
Applicable Laws for Public Security Administrative Violations], issued
August 6, 2020.
\36\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Ningxia Ma Wanjun lushi yinyan
huozui bei xingzheng juliu hou zhuan xingshi juliu'' [Lawyer Ma Wanjun
of Ningxia transferred to criminal detention after being
administratively detained due to his speech], July 6, 2020; ``Hunan
dangju kuasheng weiwen Ou Biaofeng chujing kanyou'' [Hunan government
goes beyond province borders to maintain stability, Ou Biaofeng's
situation is worrying], Radio Free Asia, December 16, 2020; Civil Rights
& Livelihood Watch, ``2020 Zhongguo jingshen jiankang yu renquan (bei
jingshenbing) nianzhong baogao'' [2020 annual report on mental health
and human rights (forcible psychiatric commitment) situation in China],
March 3, 2021.
\37\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Chufa Fa [PRC Administrative
Penalty Law], passed March 17, 1996, amended January 22, 2021, effective
July 15, 2021, arts. 39, 47.
\38\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Chufa Fa [PRC Administrative
Penalty Law], passed March 17, 1996, amended January 22, 2021, effective
July 15, 2021, arts. 39, 47.
\39\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa [PRC Supervision Law], passed
and effective March 20, 2018.
\40\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa [PRC Supervision Law], passed
and effective March 20, 2018, art. 3.
\41\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa [PRC Supervision Law], passed
and effective March 20, 2018, art. 22; CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October
10, 2018, 103.
\42\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa [PRC Supervision Law], passed
and effective March 20, 2018; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI)
of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 14(d);
Safeguard Defenders, ``Submission to Select UN Special Procedures on
China's National Supervision Commission and Its Detention Tool Liuzhi,''
August 21, 2019, para. 41; Gordon Watts, ``Mystery Deepens over Ex-
Interpol Chief Meng,'' Asia Times, January 21, 2020.
\43\ Roseanne Gerin, ``Uyghur Camp Inmates Detail `Crimes Against
Humanity' in New Amnesty Report,'' Radio Free Asia, June 10, 2021. See
also Emma Graham-Harrison, ``China Has Built 380 Internment Camps in
Xinjiang, Study Finds,'' Guardian, April 2, 2021.
\44\ Paula Newton and Ben Westcott, ``Canada's Parliament Says China
Committed Genocide against Muslim Minorities,'' CNN, February 23, 2021.
\45\ ``Xi Focus: Xi's Article on Promoting Law-based Governance to Be
Published,'' Xinhua, November 15, 2020.
\46\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July
1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, effective
March 1, 2021, arts. 102-5, 107-12.
\47\ See, e.g., ``Liaowangzhe 1: Chongqing minying qiyejia Li Huaiqing
yin shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan zui bei panchu 20 nian jianjin''
[Sentry Guard 1: Chongqing entrepreneur Li Huaiqing sentenced to 20
years in prison for inciting subversion of state power], reprinted in
China Digital Times, November 21, 2020; Rights Defense Network,
``Guangxi renquan lushi Chen Jiahong shexian shandong dianfu guojia
zhengquan an kaiting jin yinian zhijin weipan'' [Nearly 1 year has
passed since lawyer Chen Jiahong of Guangxi was tried for suspicion of
inciting subversion of state power, judgment still not issued], June 25,
2021.
\48\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July
1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, effective
March 1, 2021, art. 293.
\49\ Jeremy Daum, ``Updated: Quick Note on `Picking Quarrels,' '' China
Law Translate (blog), August 1, 2014; ``Wuyi shuo: Daodi shenme shi
xunxin zishi zui?'' [Wuyi speaks: What exactly is the crime of picking
quarrels and provoking trouble?], Falu--Jiangtang, reprinted in China
Digital Times, December 29, 2020; Supreme People's Court and Supreme
People's Procuratorate, Guanyu banli liyong xinxi wangluo shishi feibang
deng xingshi anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi [Interpretation
on Some Questions Regarding Applicable Law When Handling Uses of
Information Networks to Commit Defamation and Other Such Criminal
Cases], passed September 2, 2013, effective September 10, 2013.
\50\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Gongmin jizhe Zhang Zhan
beikong xunxin zishi an jiang yu 2020 nian 12 yue 28 ri zai Shanghai
Pudong Xinqu Fayuan kaiting shenli'' [Citizen journalist Zhang Zhan
accused of picking quarrels and provoking trouble will be tried by the
Shanghai Pudong New District People's Court on December 28, 2020],
December 16, 2020.
\51\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July
1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, effective
March 1, 2021, art. 274.
\52\ Rights Defense Network, ``Jianzheng dangxia sifa! Heilongjiang
sheng shangfang bei panxing bufen anli'' [Witness the current justice
system! Partial list of cases of petitioners from Heilongjiang province
being sentenced], December 22, 2020.
\53\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July
1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, effective
March 1, 2021, art. 225.
\54\ ``Beikong `feifa jingying' Geng Xiaonan an jiang yu chunjie qian
kaiting'' [Geng Xiaonan, accused of ``illegal business operations,''
will have court hearing before the spring festival], Voice of America,
February 9, 2021; ``Chuanbo Shengjing goucheng `feifa jingying' zui
Zhonggong dangju longduan Shengjing chuban fahang'' [Distributing the
Bible becomes ``illegal business activity,'' Chinese Communist Party and
government monopolize publication and distribution of the Bible], Voice
of America, December 11, 2020.
\55\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July
1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, effective
March 1, 2021, art. 300.
\56\ Xunyang Wei Shi [pseud.] ``Jiujiang san ming nanzi chuanbo `Falun
Gong' huoxing'' [Three males in Jiujiang were sentenced for promoting
``Falun Gong''], Zhongguo Fan Xiejiao (China Anti-Cult Network],
reprinted in Jiujiang Political Legal Web (Jiujiang Zhengfa Wang],
January 27, 2021.
\57\ Ministry of Justice, Lushi Zhiye Guanli Banfa [Measures on Managing
Lawyers' Practice of Law], issued July 18, 2008, amended September 18,
2016, effective November 1, 2016, art. 39(3).
\58\ ``Tanwu, shouhui, nuoyong gongkuan, lanyong zhiquan, qiekan guoqi
lingdao Ren Zhiqiang de tanfu mianmu'' [Corruption, bribe acceptance,
embezzlement of public funds, and abuse of office, let's take a look at
the real face of state-own enterprise leader Ren Zhiqiang], Beijing
Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, October 11, 2020.
\59\ Chris Buckley, ``China's `Big Cannon' Blasted Xi. Now He's Been
Jailed for 18 Years.,'' New York Times, February 8, 2021.
\60\ ``10 ming Gang ren she feifa yuejing an bei panqiu qige yue dao san
nian liang ming weichengnian beigao bubei qisu'' [10 Hong Kongers
sentenced to seven months to three years for illegal border crossing,
two minor defendants were not indicted], BBC, December 30, 2020.
\61\ Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, ``Opinion: There Is Nothing Diplomatic
about Hostage Diplomacy,'' The Star, March 10, 2021; Fergus Hanson,
Emilia Currey, and Tracy Beattie, Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
``The Chinese Communist Party's Coercive Diplomacy,'' Policy Brief,
Report No. 36/2020.
\62\ Fergus Hanson, Emilia Currey, and Tracy Beattie, Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, ``The Chinese Communist Party's Coercive
Diplomacy,'' Policy Brief, Report No. 36/2020.
\63\ Fergus Hanson, Emilia Currey, and Tracy Beattie, Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, ``The Chinese Communist Party's Coercive
Diplomacy,'' Policy Brief, Report No. 36/2020.
\64\ Chen Yu-Jie, ``Human Rights in the Chinese Administration of
Justice: Formalizing Ideology in the Political and Legal System and
Institutionalizing and Normalizing Human Rights Abuses,'' trans.
Siodhbhra Parkin, China Human Rights Report 2020, Taiwan Foundation for
Democracy, 2021, 16.
\65\ Safeguard Defenders, ``Australian Journalist Falls Victim to
China's Hostage Diplomacy,'' September 1, 2020.
\66\ ``Michael Kovrig: China Begins Espionage Trial behind Closed
Doors,'' BBC, March 22, 2021.
\67\ Wang Yaqiu, ``China's Disregard for the Rule of Law Strikes Too
Close to Home,'' Maclean's, August 27, 2019.
\68\ Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinions Adopted by the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at Its Eighty-ninth Session, 23-27
November 2020, Opinion No. 78/2020 Concerning Kai Li (China), A/HRC/
WGAD/2020/78, January 18, 2021, paras. 39, 43, 50, 51, 53,
54, 67.
\69\ Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinions Adopted by the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at Its Eighty-ninth Session, 23-27
November 2020, Opinion No. 78/2020 Concerning Kai Li (China), A/HRC/
WGAD/2020/78, January 18, 2021, para. 12.
\70\ Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinions Adopted by the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at Its Eighty-ninth Session, 23-27
November 2020, Opinion No. 78/2020 Concerning Kai Li (China), A/HRC/
WGAD/2020/78, January 18, 2021, para. 63.
\71\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into
force March 23, 1976, art. 14(3)(c).
\72\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal Procedure
Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 2018, art.
91.
\73\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal Procedure
Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 2018, arts.
172, 208.
\74\ See, e.g., Spokesperson for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of
the European Union, ``China: Statement by the Spokesperson on the
Detention of Human Rights Lawyer Li Yuhan,'' December 21, 2020.
\75\ Frontline Defenders, ``China Returns to the Human Rights Council
after a Year of Relentless Crackdown,'' January 5, 2021.
\76\ Spokesperson for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the
European Union, ``China: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Detention
of Human Rights Lawyer Li Yuhan,'' December 21, 2020.
\77\ Morgan Ortagus, Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, ``The
United States Calls for Wang Quanzhang's Freedom of Movement and Release
of Activists,'' April 20, 2020; Spokesperson for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy of the European Union, ``China: Statement by the
Spokesperson on the Detention of Human Rights Lawyer Li Yuhan,''
December 21, 2020.
\78\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into
force March 23, 1976, art. 14(3)(b); United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Mandela Rules), adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2015/20, A/C.3/70/L.3, September 29, 2015,
rules 58, 61; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 43/173 of December 9, 1988, principles
18, 19.
\79\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Kanshousuo Tiaoli [PRC Public Security
Detention Center Regulations], issued and effective March 17, 1990, art.
28, 32; Kanshousuo Liusuo Zhixing Xingfa Zuifan Guanli Banfa [Management
Measures for Carrying Out Punishment in Public Security Detention
Centers], passed August 20, 2013, effective November 23, 2013, arts. 45,
46; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jianyu Fa [PRC Prison Law], passed and
effective December 29, 1994, art. 48; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi
Susong Fa [PRC Criminal Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and
effective October 26, 2018, arts. 38, 39, 293.
\80\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal Procedure
Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 2018, arts.
33(3), 39.
\81\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal Procedure
Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 2018, art.
39.
\82\ ``Beibu jin bannian jinjian lushi Xu Zhiyong Ding Jiaxi kanshousuo
renjian zhengfa'' [Denied counsel visit nearly half a year into
detention; Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi disappeared in public security
detention center], Radio Free Asia, July 9, 2020.
\83\ ``Beibu jin bannian jinjian lushi Xu Zhiyong Ding Jiaxi kanshousuo
renjian zhengfa'' [Denied counsel visit nearly half a year into
detention; Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi disappeared in public security
detention center], Radio Free Asia, July 9, 2020.
\84\ ``Beibu jin bannian jinjian lushi Xu Zhiyong Ding Jiaxi kanshousuo
renjian zhengfa'' [Denied counsel visit nearly half a year into
detention; Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi disappeared in public security
detention center], Radio Free Asia, July 9, 2020.
\85\ ``Beibu jin bannian jinjian lushi Xu Zhiyong Ding Jiaxi kanshousuo
renjian zhengfa'' [Denied counsel visit nearly half a year into
detention; Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi disappeared in public security
detention center], Radio Free Asia, July 9, 2020.
\86\ ``Beibu jin bannian jinjian lushi Xu Zhiyong Ding Jiaxi kanshousuo
renjian zhengfa'' [Denied counsel visit nearly half a year into
detention; Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi disappeared in public security
detention center], Radio Free Asia, July 9, 2020.
\87\ ``Xinjiang liangxinfan Zhang Haitao ruyu wu nian jing jian jiaren
san ci'' [Xinjiang prisoner of conscience Zhang Haitao met with family
three times in the past five years in prison], Radio Free Asia, July 29,
2020.
\88\ ``Xinjiang liangxinfan Zhang Haitao ruyu wu nian jing jian jiaren
san ci'' [Xinjiang prisoner of conscience Zhang Haitao met with family
three times in the past five years in prison], Radio Free Asia, July 29,
2020.
\89\ ``Qin Yongmin jiashu tanjian zao ju jiashu yu bannian cai
shoudao,'' [Qin Yongmin denied family visit, received letter from family
over half a year late], Radio Free Asia, August 4, 2020.
\90\ ``Qin Yongmin jiashu tanjian zao ju jiashu yu bannian cai
shoudao,'' [Qin Yongmin denied family visit, received letter from family
over half a year late], Radio Free Asia, August 4, 2020.
\91\ William Yang, ``Guanya sannian shouci huijian Yu Wensheng qi:
Xinteng ta zaofeng de kunan'' [Yu Wensheng met with his wife for the
first time after three years of detention, wife: I worry about the
suffering he is experiencing], Deutsche Welle, January 16, 2021.
\92\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into
force March 23, 1976, art. 14.
\93\ ``Changsha Funeng san junzi bei jiya 20 ge yue Meiguo shizhang
zhihan dunchu Zhongguo fangren'' [Three gentlemen of Changsha Funeng
detained for 20 months; U.S. mayor writes to urge for their release],
Radio Free Asia, February 15, 2021; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI)
of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 14.
\94\ `` `Changsha Funeng' chengyuan zao jiya shiqi ge yue dangju shen er
bupan'' [``Changsha Funeng'' members detained for 17 months, government
tried them but has not issued a judgment], Radio Free Asia, December 31,
2020.
\95\ Rights Defense Network, ``Wu Youshui: Shi shei, touzoule wo erzi de
bianhuqian?!'' [Wu Youshui: Who is it that took away my son's right of
defense?!], July 29, 2020.
\96\ Rights Defense Network, ``Wu Youshui: Shi shei, touzoule wo erzi de
bianhuqian?!'' [Wu Youshui: Who is it that took away my son's right of
defense?!], July 29, 2020.
\97\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution
39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987; United
Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT), accessed March 10, 2021. China signed the CAT on December 12,
1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988.
\98\ ``Zhongguo xinxun bigong yangben anjian baoguang: Jiangsu yaojian
guanyuan jubao qiye weifa fancheng beigao'' [Sample case of confession
by torture in China exposed: Government worker with Jiangsu Medical
Products Bureau reported company violation but became a defendant
himself], Radio Free Asia, September 9, 2020.
\99\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa [PRC Supervision Law], passed
and effective March 20, 2018, art. 22.
\100\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Yang Meng an: Xinxun bigong de
yangben'' [The case of Yang Meng: An example of confession by torture],
September 9, 2020; ``Zhongguo xinxun bigong yangben anjian baoguang:
Jiangsu yaojian guanyuan jubao qiye weifa fancheng beigao'' [Sample case
of confession by torture in China exposed: Government worker with
Jiangsu Medical Products Bureau reported company violation but became a
defendant himself], Radio Free Asia, September 9, 2020.
\101\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Yang Meng an: Xinxun bigong de
yangben'' [The case of Yang Meng: An example of confession by torture],
September 9, 2020; ``Zhongguo xinxun bigong yangben anjian baoguang:
Jiangsu yaojian guanyuan jubao qiye weifa fancheng beigao'' [Sample case
of confession by torture in China exposed: Government worker with
Jiangsu Medical Products Bureau reported company violation but became a
defendant himself], Radio Free Asia, September 9, 2020.
\102\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Yang Meng an: Xinxun bigong de
yangben'' [The case of Yang Meng: An example of confession by torture],
September 9, 2020; ``Zhongguo xinxun bigong yangben anjian baoguang:
Jiangsu yaojian guanyuan jubao qiye weifa fancheng beigao'' [Sample case
of confession by torture in China exposed: Government worker with
Jiangsu Medical Products Bureau reported company violation but became a
defendant himself], Radio Free Asia, September 9, 2020.
\103\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Yang Meng an: Xinxun bigong de
yangben'' [The case of Yang Meng: An example of confession by torture],
September 9, 2020; ``Zhongguo xinxun bigong yangben anjian baoguang:
Jiangsu yaojian guanyuan jubao qiye weifa fancheng beigao'' [Sample case
of confession by torture in China exposed: Government worker with
Jiangsu Medical Products Bureau reported company violation but became a
defendant himself], Radio Free Asia, September 9, 2020.
\104\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Yang Meng an: Xinxun bigong de
yangben'' [The case of Yang Meng: An example of confession by torture],
September 9, 2020; ``Zhongguo xinxun bigong yangben anjian baoguang:
Jiangsu yaojian guanyuan jubao qiye weifa fancheng beigao'' [Sample case
of confession by torture in China exposed: Government worker with
Jiangsu Medical Products Bureau reported company violation but became a
defendant himself], Radio Free Asia, September 9, 2020.
\105\ ``Bei kong xielu Xi Jinping nu'er xinxi Niu Tengyu beipan
zhongxing'' [Accused of leaking information on Xi Jinping's daughter,
Niu Tengyu given heavy sentence], Radio France Internationale, April 24,
2021.
\106\ ``Bei kong xielu Xi Jinping nu'er xinxi Niu Tengyu beipan
zhongxing'' [Accused of leaking information on Xi Jinping's daughter,
Niu Tengyu given heavy sentence], Radio France Internationale, April 24,
2021.
\107\ ``Xi Mingze gezi xielu an er shen xuanpan, Niu Tengyu 14 nian
xingqi bubian'' [Second instance decision announced in the case of Xi
Mingze's personal information leakage, 14 year sentence of Niu Tengyu
stays], Voice of America, April 25, 2021.
\108\ ``Bei kong xielu Xi Jinping nu'er xinxi Niu Tengyu beipan
zhongxing'' [Accused of leaking information on Xi Jinping's daughter,
Niu Tengyu given heavy sentence], Radio France Internationale, April 24,
2021.
\109\ Matthew Hill, David Campanale, and Joel Gunter, `` `Their Goal Is
to Destroy Everyone': Uighur Camp Detainees Allege Systematic Rape,''
BBC, February 2, 2021.
\110\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution
39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987; Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court of July 17, 1998, entry into force July 1
2002, art. 7(1); United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal
Matters, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, accessed May
30, 2020; UN Commission on Human Rights, Torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, E/CN.4/RES/1998/38, April
17, 1998, para. 22.
\111\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``China: UN
Human Rights Experts Alarmed by `Organ Harvesting' Allegations,'' June
14, 2021.
\112\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``China: UN
Human Rights Experts Alarmed by `Organ Harvesting' Allegations,'' June
14, 2021.
\113\ ``Xinjiang Hasake ren jubao hei jianyu siwang jiashu zhiyi dangju
miekou'' [Kazakh in Xinjiang died after filing complaints about black
jails, family member suspects the government had silenced him], Radio
Free Asia, January 7, 2021.
\114\ ``Xinjiang Hasake ren jubao hei jianyu siwang jiashu zhiyi dangju
miekou'' [Kazakh in Xinjiang died after filing complaints about black
jails, family member suspects the government had silenced him], Radio
Free Asia, January 7, 2021.
\115\ ``Xinjiang Hasake ren jubao hei jianyu siwang jiashu zhiyi dangju
miekou'' [Kazakh in Xinjiang died after filing complaints about black
jails, family member suspects the government had silenced him], Radio
Free Asia, January 7, 2021.
\116\ Amnesty International, ``China: Lawyer Shares Allegations of
Torture, Detained: Chang Weiping,'' Index no. ASA 17/3333/2020, November
16, 2020.
\117\ ``Beijing dangju jiaju daya weiquan lushi zaiyou 3 ren bei
diaoxiao zhizhao'' [Beijing government intensifies persecution against
rights lawyers, three more individuals have their licenses revoked],
Radio France Internationale, February 6, 2021; Tan Mintao, ``Lujia
Xinsheng: Zhou Ze lushi gongbu xingxun bigong ni bei tingye yi nian, yin
lujie zongnu'' [Newcomer to the legal world: Proposal to suspend license
of lawyer Zhou Ze for exposing torture, angers legal professionals],
reprinted in China Digital Times, December 22, 2020; ``Anjian xianchang:
Zhou Ze lushi: Wo weishenme pilu Lu Xiansan an xingxun bigong luxiang''
[At the Scene: Lawyer Zhou Ze: Why did I disclose the interrogation by
torture footage in the Lu Xiansan case], reprinted in China Digital
Times, January 4, 2021.
\118\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``The Chinese Government Must End
Reprisal against Li Qiaochu for Exposing Torture,'' February 24, 2021.
\119\ ``Guanya san nian shouci huijian Yu Wensheng qi: Xinteng ta
zaofeng de kunan'' [Yu Wensheng met with his wife for the first time
after three years of detention, wife: I worry about the suffering he is
experiencing], Deutsche Welle, January 16, 2021.
\120\ Joshua Lipes, ``Gulshan Abbas, Sister of Uyghur Activist in Exile,
Confirmed Jailed After Missing for 27 Months,'' Radio Free Asia,
December 30, 2020.
\121\ Joshua Lipes, ``Gulshan Abbas, Sister of Uyghur Activist in Exile,
Confirmed Jailed After Missing for 27 Months,'' Radio Free Asia,
December 30, 2020.
\122\ Joshua Lipes, ``Gulshan Abbas, Sister of Uyghur Activist in Exile,
Confirmed Jailed After Missing for 27 Months,'' Radio Free Asia,
December 30, 2020.
\123\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26,
2018, art. 75.
\124\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26,
2018, art. 75.
\125\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26,
2018, art. 39.
\126\ UN Human Rights Council, ``Mandates of the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention; the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the Special
Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association; the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health; the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights
defenders; the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and
lawyers; the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy; the Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; and the Special
Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment,'' OL CHN 15/2018, August 24, 2018.
\127\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``The Chinese Government Must End
Reprisal against Li Qiaochu for Exposing Torture,'' February 24, 2021;
Rights Defense Network, ``2021 nian 1 yue 21 ri lushi shouci huijian Xu
Zhiyong qingkuang tongbao'' [Situation report on first meeting between
Xu Zhiyong and his lawyer on January 21, 2021], January 21, 2021.
\128\ Rights Defense Network, ``Shanghai Chen Jianfang an zuixin
qingkuang (2021 nian 3 yue 2 ri) [Current situation of Chen Jianfang
from Shanghai], March 2, 2021.
\129\ Rights Defense Network, ``Shanghai Chen Jianfang an zuixin
qingkuang (2021 nian 3 yue 2 ri) [Current situation of Chen Jianfang
from Shanghai], March 2, 2021.
\130\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26,
2018, art. 75.
\131\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Ling Haobo,'' accessed September
24, 2020; Rights Defense Network, `` `Duandianxing' wangzhan an Chen Mei
huo jiangyu 7 yue zhong xiaxun bei qisu'' [Chen Mei of ``Terminus''
website may be indicted in mid to late July], July 6, 2020.
\132\ Amnesty International, ``Death Sentences and Executions 2020,''
April 21, 2021.
\133\ Zhou Qiang, ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu jiaqiang xingshi shenpan
gongzuo qingkuang de baogao,'' [Supreme People's Court report on the
situation of strengthening criminal trial work], October 23, 2019, sec.
1(2).
\134\ Amnesty International, ``Death Sentences and Executions 2020,''
April 21, 2021.
\135\ ``Huarong Gongsi yuan dongshizhang Lai Xiaomin bei zhixing
sixing'' [Lai Xiaomin, former director of China Huarong Asset
Management, has been executed], Xinhua, January 29, 2021.
\136\ ``Huarong Gongsi yuan dongshizhang Lai Xiaomin bei zhixing
sixing'' [Lai Xiaomin, former director of China Huarong Asset
Management, has been executed], Xinhua, January 29, 2021.
\137\ ``Huarong Gongsi yuan dongshizhang Lai Xiaomin bei zhixing
sixing'' [Lai Xiaomin, former director of China Huarong Asset
Management, has been executed], Xinhua, January 29, 2021.
\138\ Gu Li, ``Lai Xiaomin jin bei zhixing sixing Xi Jinping weihe
jicongcong yao ta ming?'' [Lai Xiaomin was executed today; Why is Xi
Jinping in such a hurry to take his life?], Radio France Internationale,
January 29, 2021.
\139\ Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National
Supervision Commission, ``Lai Xiaomin an yi'an cugai gongsuo qishi''
[Using Lai Xiaomin's case as an insight to hasten reform], January 18,
2021.
\140\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa Xiuzheng'an (Shiyi) [PRC
Criminal Law Amendment (11)], passed December 26, 2020, effective March
1, 2021, sec. 1.
\141\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa Xiuzheng'an (Shiyi) [PRC
Criminal Law Amendment (11)], passed December 26, 2020, effective March
1, 2021, sec. 1.
\142\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yufang Weichengnianren Fanzui Fa [PRC
Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Law], passed June 28, 1999, amended
December 26, 2020.
\143\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yufang Weichengnianren Fanzui Fa [PRC
Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Law], passed June 28, 1999, amended
December 26, 2020, art. 45.
\144\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yufang Weichengnianren Fanzui Fa [PRC
Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Law], passed June 28, 1999, amended
December 26, 2020, art. 45.
\145\ Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong ``Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Xinshi Susong Fa'' de Jieshi [Supreme People's Court Interpretation of
the Application of the ``PRC Criminal Procedure Law''], December 7,
2020, effective March 1, 2021, arts. 546-586.
\146\ Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong ``Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Xinshi Susong Fa'' de Jieshi [Supreme People's Court Interpretation of
the Application of the ``PRC Criminal Procedure Law''], December 7,
2020, effective March 1, 2021, art. 550.
\147\ Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong ``Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Xinshi Susong Fa'' de Jieshi [Supreme People's Court Interpretation of
the Application of the ``PRC Criminal Procedure Law''], December 7,
2020, effective March 1, 2021, art. 558.
\148\ Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong ``Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Xinshi Susong Fa'' de Jieshi [Supreme People's Court Interpretation of
the Application of the ``PRC Criminal Procedure Law''], December 7,
2020, effective March 1, 2021, art. 548.
Freedom of Religion
Freedom of Religion
Freedom of Religion
Findings
In the 2021 reporting year, the Chinese
government further intensified a sweeping campaign to
``sinicize'' religion as directed by President and
Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping. The main
imperative of the campaign, wrote one expert, ``is to
homogenize Chinese Culture to make all parts conform to
a Party-led nationalism and to use the full force of the
state to control any dissenting voices.''
Building upon the Regulations on Religious
Affairs (2018) and the Measures on the Administration of
Religious Groups (2020), the National Religious Affairs
Administration implemented new Measures for the
Administration of Religious Personnel, effective May 1,
2021. The new measures include plans to establish a
database of clergy that records their basic information,
rewards and punishments, travel for religious work, and
religious activities. They require clergy to promote the
``sinicization of religion'' and to ``adhere to the
principle of independence and self-management of
religion,'' meaning religious personnel in China must
resist ``domination'' or ``infiltration'' by ``foreign
forces,'' reject unauthorized appointments to leadership
positions made by foreign religious groups or
institutions, and reject domestic or overseas donations
that violate national regulations.
Chinese authorities used the coronavirus disease
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic as a pretext to shut down
religious sites and restrict religious activities,
including online activities, even after other normal
activities in society had resumed.
Authorities in several provinces demolished or
altered Buddhist, Taoist, and Chinese folk religious
temples, sometimes beating local believers who resisted,
and destroyed Buddhist literature and punished
publishers.
The Sino-Vatican agreement on the appointment of
bishops signed in September 2018, and renewed in 2020,
has led to the Holy See's approval of seven Chinese
government-appointed bishops and the joint approval of
five bishops as of July 1, 2021. In spite of the
agreement, the contents of which remain secret,
authorities subjected unregistered (``underground'')
Catholic clergy to detention, surveillance, and removal
from active ministry for resisting pressure to sign an
agreement of separation (i.e., ``independence'') from
the Holy See and register with the government.
Authorities also continued either to demolish church
buildings or to ``sinicize'' them by removing crosses
and other religious symbols, and canceled religious
activities and pilgrimages under the pretext of COVID-19
precautions.
As in previous years, authorities continued to
detain Falun Gong practitioners and subject them to
harsh treatment, with at least 622 practitioners
sentenced for criminal ``cult'' offenses in 2020,
according to Falun Gong news outlet Minghui. Minghui
also reported that Chinese authorities continued to
torture and mistreat practitioners, and that such abuse,
sometimes occurring over several years, caused or
contributed to the deaths of dozens of practitioners in
2020 and 2021.
In addition to committing human rights violations
against Uyghurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, Chinese authorities, in the name of
``sinicizing Islam,'' expanded their suppression of
Muslim groups throughout China to include the Hui,
Utsul, and Dongxiang Muslims. Violations included
demolishing or altering mosques, or placing surveillance
cameras inside them; closing Islamic schools; and
restricting Islamic preaching, clothing, and Arabic
script.
Authorities subjected registered Protestant
churches to human rights violations similar to those
committed against other religious groups and continued
to raid and shut down religious gatherings, demolish or
alter church buildings, and detain, prosecute, and
sentence leaders of unregistered ``house churches.''
Authorities sentenced one Christian online bookseller to
seven years in prison.
Authorities continued to use Article 300 of the
PRC Criminal Law, which forbids ``organizing and using a
cult to undermine implementation of the law,'' to
persecute members of spiritual groups deemed to be
illegal or to be ``cults'' (xiejiao), including the
Church of Almighty God, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the
Association of Disciples.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are
encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to guarantee freedom
of religion to all citizens in accordance with its
international human rights obligations. Stress to
Chinese authorities that freedom of religion includes
the right to freely adopt religious beliefs and engage
in religious practices without government interference.
Stress to the Chinese government that the right to
freedom of religion includes the right of Buddhists and
Taoists to carry out activities in temples and to select
monastic teachers independent of state control; the
right of Catholics to be led by clergy who are selected,
and who conduct their ministry, in accordance with the
standards called for by Catholic beliefs; the right of
Falun Gong practitioners to freely practice Falun Gong
inside China; the right of Muslims to freely preach,
undertake overseas pilgrimages, select and train
religious leaders, and wear clothing with religious
significance; the right of Protestants to exercise their
faith free from state control over doctrine and worship,
and free from harassment, detention, and other abuses
for public and private manifestations of their faith,
including the display of crosses; and the right of
members of other religious communities to be free from
state control and harassment.
Call for the release of Chinese citizens confined,
detained, or imprisoned for peacefully pursuing their
religious beliefs, as well as those confined, detained,
or imprisoned in connection with their association with
those citizens. The Administration should use existing
laws to hold accountable Chinese government officials
and others complicit in religious freedom restrictions,
including the sanctions available in the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Public Law
No. 114-328) and the International Religious Freedom Act
of 1998 (Public Law No. 105-292). Ensure that conditions
related to religious freedom are taken into account when
negotiating trade agreements.
Call on the Chinese government to fully implement
accepted recommendations from the November 2018 session
of the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic
Review, including taking necessary measures to ensure
that rights to freedom of religion, religious culture,
and expression are fully observed and protected;
cooperating with the UN human rights system,
specifically UN special procedures and mandate holders;
facilitating a visit to China by the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights; taking steps to ensure
that lawyers working to advance religious rights can
practice their profession freely, and promptly
investigating allegations of violence and intimidation
impeding their work; and considering possible revisions
to legislation and administrative rules to provide
better protection of freedom of religion.
Work with Vatican officials to publicly address
increased repression of Catholics in China, offer
technical assistance to protect Vatican diplomatic
communications from Chinese cyberattacks, and offer
diplomatic assistance, as appropriate, to
reevaluate the 2018 Sino-Vatican agreement on the
appointment of bishops, and advocate for the publication
of the original agreement and any negotiated revisions
in order to transparently evaluate the Chinese
government's compliance.
Call on the Chinese government to abolish Article
300 of the PRC Criminal Law, which criminalizes
``organizing and using a cult to undermine
implementation of the law,'' and Article 27 of the PRC
Public Security Administration Punishment Law, which
provides for detention or fines for organizing or
inciting others to engage in ``cult activities'' and for
using a ``cult'' or the ``guise of religion'' to
``disturb social order'' or to harm others' health.