[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 86 (Thursday, June 30, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: June 30, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 1995
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the
Senate will now proceed to the consideration of H.R. 4506, which the
clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (H.R. 4506) making appropriations for energy and
water development for the fiscal year ending September 30,
1995 and for other purposes.
The Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported
from the Committee on Appropriations with amendments; as follows:
(The parts of the bill intended to be stricken are shown in boldface
brackets, and the parts of the bill intended to be inserted are shown
in italic.)
H.R. 4506
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the
following sums are appropriated, out of any money in the
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1995, and for other purposes, namely:
TITLE I
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE--CIVIL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Corps of Engineers--Civil
The following appropriations shall be expended under the
direction of the Secretary of the Army and the supervision of
the Chief of Engineers for authorized civil functions of the
Department of the Army pertaining to rivers and harbors,
flood control, beach erosion, and related purposes.
general investigations
For expenses necessary for the collection and study of
basic information pertaining to river and harbor, flood
control, shore protection, and related projects, restudy of
authorized projects, miscellaneous investigations, and, when
authorized by laws, surveys and detailed studies and plans
and specifications of projects prior to construction,
[$179,062,000] $181,199,000, to remain available until
expended, of which funds are provided for the following
projects in the amounts specified:
[Los Angeles County Water Conservation and Supply,
California, $700,000;
[Norco Bluffs, California, $400,000;
[Indianapolis, White River, Central Waterfront, Indiana,
$4,000,000;
[Ohio River Greenway, Indiana, $900,000;
[Lake George, Hobart, Indiana, $260,000;
[Little Calumet River Basin (Cady Marsh Ditch), Indiana,
$150,000;
[Kentucky Lock and Dam, Kentucky, $2,000,000;
[Hazard, Kentucky, $500,000;
[Mussers Dam, Pennsylvania, $200,000;
[Hartsville, Trousdale County, Tennessee, $95,000;
[West Virginia Comprehensive, West Virginia, $350,000; and
[West Virginia Port Development, West Virginia, $800,000]
Red River Navigation Study, Arkansas, $500,000;
Indianapolis, White River, Central Waterfront, Indiana,
$4,000,000;
Little Calumet River Basin (Cady Marsh Ditch), Indiana,
$150,000;
Kentucky Lock and Dam, Kentucky, $2,000,000;
Hazard, Kentucky, $500,000;
Hartsville, Trousdale County, Tennessee, $95,000;
West Virginia Comprehensive, West Virginia, $350,000; and
West Virginia Port Development, West Virginia, $800,000.
construction, general
For the prosecution of river and harbor, flood control,
shore protection, and related projects authorized by laws;
and detailed studies, and plans and specifications, of
projects (including those for development with participation
or under consideration for participation by States, local
governments, or private groups) authorized or made eligible
for selection by law (but such studies shall not constitute a
commitment of the Government to construction),
[$1,023,595,000] $977,660,000, to remain available until
expended, of which such sums as are necessary pursuant to
Public Law 99-662 shall be derived from the Inland Waterways
Trust Fund, for one-half of the costs of construction and
rehabilitation of inland waterways projects, including
rehabilitation costs for the Lock and Dam 25, Mississippi
River, Illinois and Missouri, and GIWW-Brazos River
Floodgates, Texas, projects, and of which funds are provided
for the following projects in the amounts specified:
[Red River Emergency Bank Protection, Arkansas and
Louisiana, $6,000,000;
[Red River below Denison Dam Levee and Bank Stabilization,
Arkansas and Louisiana, $1,500,000;
[West Sacramento, California, $500,000;
[Sacramento River Flood Control Project (Glenn-Colusa
Irrigation District), California, $400,000;
[Sacramento River Flood Control Project (Deficiency
Correction), California, $3,700,000;
[San Timoteo Creek (Santa Ana River Mainstem), California,
$5,000,000;
[Central and Southern Florida, Florida, $11,315,000;
[Kissimmee River, Florida, $9,000,000;
[Casino Beach, Illinois, $1,000,000;
[Des Moines Recreational River and Greenbelt, Iowa,
$4,000,000;
[Harlan (Levisa and Tug Forks of the Big Sandy River and
Upper Cumberland River), Kentucky, $20,000,000;
[Middlesborough (Levisa and Tug Forks of the Big Sandy
River and Upper Cumberland River), Kentucky, $1,200,000;
[Williamsburg (Levisa and Tug Forks of the Big Sandy River
and Upper Cumberland River), Kentucky, $3,000,000;
[Pike County (Levisa and Tug Forks of the Big Sandy River
and Upper Cumberland River), Kentucky, $5,000,000;
[Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity (Jefferson Parish),
Louisiana, $800,000;
[Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity (Hurricane Protection),
Louisiana, $12,500,000;
[Ste. Genevieve, Missouri, $3,000,000;
[Hackensack Meadowlands Area, New Jersey, $2,500,000;
[Ramapo River at Oakland, New Jersey, $600,000;
[Salem River, New Jersey, $1,000,000;
[Carolina Beach and Vicinity, North Carolina, $2,800,000;
[Fort Fisher and Vicinity, North Carolina, $900,000;
[Broad Top Region, Pennsylvania, $1,000,000;
[Lackawanna River, Olyphant, Pennsylvania, $1,100,000;
[Lackawanna River, Scranton, Pennsylvania, $1,000,000;
[South Central Pennsylvania Environmental Restoration
Infrastructure and Resource Protection Development Pilot
Program, Pennsylvania, $7,000,000;
[Wallisville, Lake, Texas, $1,000,000;
[Richmond Filtration Plant, Virginia, $2,000,000; and
[Southern West Virginia Environmental Restoration
Infrastructure and Resource Protection Development Pilot
Program, West Virginia, $1,500,000]
Red River Emergency Bank Protection, Arkansas and
Louisiana, $6,000,000;
Red River below Denison Dam Levee and Bank Stabilization,
Arkansas and Louisiana, $1,500,000;
West Sacramento, California, $500,000;
Sacramento River Flood Control Project (Glenn-Colusa
Irrigation District), California, $400,000;
Sacramento River Flood Control Project (Deficiency
Correction), California, $3,700,000;
San Timoteo Creek (Santa Ana River Mainstem), California,
$5,000,000;
Kissimmee River, Florida, $3,000,000;
Savannah Harbor Deepening, Georgia (Reimbursement),
$11,585,000, of which $2,083,000 is for a cost-shared
Savannah River recreation enhancement and public access
project along 900 linear feet of shoreline in the City of
Savannah;
Casino Beach, Illinois, $1,000,000;
Des Moines Recreational River and Greenbelt, Iowa,
$2,000,000;
Harlan (Levisa and Tug Forks of the Big Sandy River and
Upper Cumberland River), Kentucky, $20,000,000;
Middlesborough (Levisa and Tug Forks of the Big Sandy River
and Upper Cumberland River), Kentucky, $1,200,000;
Williamsburg (Levisa and Tug Forks of the Big Sandy River
and Upper Cumberland River), Kentucky, $3,000,000;
Pike County (Levisa and Tug Forks of the Big Sandy River
and Upper Cumberland River), Kentucky, $5,000,000;
Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity (Jefferson Parish),
Louisiana, $800,000;
Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity (Hurricane Protection),
Louisiana, $12,500,000;
Ouachita River Levees, Louisiana, $4,500,000;
Ste. Genevieve, Missouri, $3,000,000;
Ramapo River at Oakland, New Jersey, $600,000;
Broad Top Region, Pennsylvania, $1,000,000;
Lackawanna River, Olyphant, Pennsylvania, $1,100,000;
Lackawanna River, Scranton, Pennsylvania, $1,000,000;
South Central Pennsylvania Environmental Restoration
Infrastructure and Resource Protection Development Pilot
Program, Pennsylvania, $2,000,000;
Wallisville Lake, Texas, $1,000,000;
Richmond Filtration Plant, Virginia, $2,000,000;
Southern West Virginia Environmental Restoration
Infrastructure and Resource Protection Development Pilot
Program, West Virginia, $1,500,000;
Hatfield Bottom (Levisa and Tug Fork of the Big Sandy River
and Upper Cumberland River), West Virginia, $500,000; and
Upper Mingo (Levisa and Tug Fork of the Big Sandy River and
Upper Cumberland River), West Virginia, $250,000:
Provided, That of the offsetting collections credited to this
account, $71,000 are permanently canceled.
Flood Control, Mississippi River and Tributaries, Arkansas, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee
For expenses necessary for prosecuting work of flood
control, and rescue work, repair, restoration, or maintenance
of flood control projects threatened or destroyed by flood,
as authorized by law (33 U.S.C. 702a, 702g-1), [$334,138,000]
$328,138,000, to remain available until expended, [of which
$3,000,000 is provided for the Eastern Arkansas Region,
Arkansas, project] and of which funds are provided for the
following projects in the amounts specified:
Eastern Arkansas Region, Arkansas, $3,000,000;
Yazoo Basin, Mississippi, Upper Yazoo Projects, Belzoni
Bridge Removal, $640,000; and
Tiptonville, Tennessee, Levee Extension, Mississippi River
Levees, $1,000,000.
Operation and Maintenance, General
For expenses necessary for the preservation, operation,
maintenance, and care of existing river and harbor, flood
control, and related works, including such sums as may be
necessary for the maintenance of harbor channels provided by
a State, municipality or other public agency, outside of
harbor lines, and serving essential needs of general commerce
and navigation; surveys and charting of northern and
northwestern lakes and connecting waters; clearing and
straightening channels; and removal of obstructions to
navigation, [$1,646,535,000] $1,631,434,000, to remain
available until expended, of which such sums as become
available in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund, pursuant to
Public Law 99-662, may be derived from that fund, and of
which $37,000,000 shall be for construction, operation, and
maintenance of outdoor recreation facilities, to be derived
from the special account established by the Land and Water
Conservation Act of 1965, as amended (16 U.S.C. 460l), and of
which funds are provided for the following projects in the
amounts specified:
[Tucson Diversion Channel, Arizona, $2,500,000;
[Jeffersonville-Clarksville, Indiana, $750,000;
[McAlpine Lock and Dam (Ohio River Locks and Dams),
Kentucky, $1,000,000; and
[Raystown Lake, Pennsylvania, $5,330,000]
Tucson Diversion Channel, Arizona, $2,500,000; and
John H. Kerr Reservoir, Virginia and North Carolina
(Mosquito Control), $40,000:
Provided, That not to exceed $7,000,000 shall be available
for obligation for national emergency preparedness programs:
Provided further, That of the offsetting collections credited
to this account, $1,000 are permanently canceled: Provided
further, That the Secretary of the Army is directed during
fiscal year 1995 to maintain a minimum conservation pool
level of 475.5 at Wister Lake in Oklahoma.
Regulatory Program
For expenses necessary for administration of laws
pertaining to regulation of navigable waters and wetlands,
$101,000,000, to remain available until expended.
Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies
For expenses necessary for emergency flood control,
hurricane, and shore protection activities, as authorized by
section 5 of the Flood Control Act approved August 18, 1941,
as amended, $14,979,000, to remain available until expended:
Provided, That of the offsetting collections credited to this
account, $5,000 are permanently canceled.
Oil Spill Research
For expenses necessary to carry out the purposes of the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund, pursuant to title VII of the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, [$625,000] $900,000, to be derived
from the Fund and to remain available until expended.
General Expenses
For expenses necessary for general administration and
related functions in the Office of the Chief of Engineers and
offices of the Division Engineers; activities of the Coastal
Engineering Research Board, the Humphreys Engineer Center
Support Activity, and the Water Resources Support Center,
[$152,500,000] $156,255,000, to remain available until
expended: Provided, That not to exceed [$56,480,000]
$59,280,000 of the funds provided in this Act shall be
available for general administration and related functions in
the Office of the Chief of Engineers: [Provided further, That
no part of any other appropriation provided in title I of
this Act shall be available to fund the activities of the
Office of the Chief of Engineers or the Division Offices]
Provided further, That no part of any other appropriation
provided in title I of this Act shall be available to fund
the activities of the Office of the Chief of Engineers or the
executive direction and management activities of the Division
Offices, except that activities conducted under the authority
of 33 U.S.C. 702a and 702g-1 will be funded by the Flood
Control, Mississippi River and Tributaries account.
Permanent Appropriations
Amounts otherwise available for obligation in fiscal year
1995 are reduced by $4,000.
Rivers and Harbors Contributed Funds
Amounts otherwise available for obligation in fiscal year
1995 are reduced by $16,000.
Administrative Provisions
During the current fiscal year the revolving fund, Corps of
Engineers, shall be available for purchase (not to exceed 100
for replacement only) and hire of passenger motor vehicles.
GENERAL PROVISION
Corps of Engineers--Civil
Sec. 101. In fiscal year 1995, the Secretary shall
advertise for competitive bid at least 7,500,000 cubic yards
of the hopper dredge volume accomplished with Government-
owned dredges in fiscal year 1992.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the
Secretary is authorized to use the dredge fleet of the Corps
of Engineers to undertake projects when industry does not
perform as required by the contract specifications or when
the bids are more than 25 percent in excess of what the
Secretary determines to be a fair and reasonable estimated
cost of a well equipped contractor doing the work or to
respond to emergency requirements.
TITLE II
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Central Utah Project
central utah project completion account
For the purpose of carrying out provisions of the Central
Utah Project Completion Act, Public Law 102-575 (106 Stat.
4605), $38,972,000, to remain available until expended, of
which $22,839,000 shall be to carry out the activities
authorized under title II of the Act and for feasibility
studies of alternatives to the Uintah and Upalco Units, and
of which $16,133,000 shall be deposited into the Utah
Reclamation Mitigation and Conservation Account: Provided,
That of the amounts deposited into the Account, $5,000,000
shall be considered the Federal Contribution authorized by
paragraph 402(b)(2) of the Act and $11,133,000 shall be
available to the Utah Reclamation Mitigation and Conservation
Commission to carry out the activities authorized under title
III of the Act.
In addition, for necessary expenses incurred in carrying
out responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior under
the Act, $1,191,000, to remain available until expended.
Bureau of Reclamation
For carrying out the functions of the Bureau of Reclamation
as provided in the Federal reclamation laws (Act of June 17,
1902, 32 Stat. 388, and Acts amendatory thereof or
supplementary thereto) and other Acts applicable to that
Bureau as follows:
general investigations
For engineering and economic investigations of proposed
Federal reclamation projects and studies of water
conservation and development plans and activities preliminary
to the reconstruction, rehabilitation and betterment,
financial adjustment, or extension of existing projects, to
remain available until expended, [$14,190,000] $14,340,000:
Provided, That, of the total appropriated, the amount for
program activities which can be financed by the reclamation
fund shall be derived from that fund: Provided further, That
funds contributed by non-Federal entities for purposes
similar to this appropriation shall be available for
expenditure for the purposes for which contributed as though
specifically appropriated for said purposes, and such amounts
shall remain available until expended.
construction program
(including transfer of funds)
For construction and rehabilitation of projects and parts
thereof (including power transmission facilities for Bureau
of Reclamation use) and for other related activities as
authorized by law, to remain available until expended,
[$432,727,000] $425,727,000 of which $23,272,000 shall be
available for transfer to the Upper Colorado River Basin Fund
authorized by section 5 of the Act of April 11, 1956 (43
U.S.C. 620d), and $153,793,000 shall be available for
transfer to the Lower Colorado River Basin Development Fund
authorized by section 403 of the Act of September 30, 1968
(43 U.S.C. 1543), and such amounts as may be necessary shall
be considered as though advanced to the Colorado River Dam
Fund for the Boulder Canyon Project as authorized by the Act
of December 21, 1928, as amended: Provided, That of the total
appropriated, the amount for program activities which can be
financed by the reclamation fund shall be derived from that
fund: Provided further, That transfers to the Upper Colorado
River Basin Fund and Lower Colorado River Basin Development
Fund may be increased or decreased by transfers within the
overall appropriation under this heading: Provided further,
That funds contributed by non-Federal entities for purposes
similar to this appropriation shall be available for
expenditure for the purposes for which contributed as though
specifically appropriated for said purposes, and such funds
shall remain available until expended: Provided further, That
no part of the funds herein approved shall be available for
construction or operation of facilities to prevent waters of
Lake Powell from entering any national monument: Provided
further, That all costs of the safety of dams modification
work at Coolidge Dam, San Carlos Irrigation Project, Arizona,
performed under the authority of the Reclamation Safety of
Dams Act of 1978 (43 U.S.C. 506), as amended, are in addition
to the amount authorized in section 5 of said Act.
operation and maintenance
For operation and maintenance of reclamation projects or
parts thereof and other facilities, as authorized by law; and
for a soil and moisture conservation program on lands under
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Reclamation, pursuant to
law, to remain available until expended, [$286,521,000]
$282,165,000: Provided, That of the total appropriated, the
amount for program activities which can be financed by the
reclamation fund shall be derived from that fund, and the
amount for program activities which can be derived from the
special fee account established pursuant to the Act of
December 22, 1987 (16 U.S.C. 460l-6a, as amended), may be
derived from that fund: Provided further, That of the total
appropriated, such amounts as may be required for replacement
work on the Boulder Canyon Project which would require
readvances to the Colorado River Dam Fund shall be readvanced
to the Colorado River Dam Fund pursuant to section 5 of the
Boulder Canyon Project Adjustment Act of July 19, 1940 (43
U.S.C. 618d), and such readvances since October 1, 1984, and
in the future shall bear interest at the rate determined
pursuant to section 104(a)(5) of Public Law 98-381: Provided
further, That funds advanced by water users for operation and
maintenance of reclamation projects or parts thereof shall be
deposited to the credit of this appropriation and may be
expended for the same purpose and in the same manner as sums
appropriated herein may be expended, and such advances shall
remain available until expended: Provided further, That
revenues in the Upper Colorado River Basin Fund shall be
available for performing examination of existing structures
on participating projects of the Colorado River Storage
Project.
bureau of reclamation loans program account
For the cost of direct loans and/or grants, [$9,000,000]
$6,000,000, to remain available until expended, as authorized
by the Small Reclamation Projects Act of August 6, 1956, as
amended (43 U.S.C. 422a-422l): Provided, That such costs,
including the cost of modifying such loans, shall be as
defined in section 502 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974: Provided further, That these funds are available to
subsidize gross obligations for the principal amount of
direct loans not to exceed [$23,000,000] $20,000,000.
In addition, for administrative expenses necessary to carry
out the program for direct loans and/or grants, $600,000:
Provided, That of the total sums appropriated, the amount of
program activities which can be financed by the reclamation
fund shall be derived from the fund.
central valley project restoration fund
For carrying out the programs, projects, plans, and habitat
restoration, improvement, and acquisition provisions of the
Central Valley Project Improvement Act, to remain available
until expended, such sums as may be assessed and collected in
the Central Valley Project Restoration Fund pursuant to
sections 3407(d), 3404(c)(3), 3405(f) and 3406(c)(1) of
Public Law 102-575: Provided, That the Bureau of Reclamation
is directed to levy additional mitigation and restoration
payments totaling $37,232,000 (October 1992 price levels), as
authorized by section 3407(d) of Public Law 102-575.
general administrative expenses
For necessary expenses of general administration and
related functions in the office of the Commissioner, the
Denver office, and offices in the five regions of the Bureau
of Reclamation, $54,034,000, of which $1,400,000 shall remain
available until expended, the total amount to be derived from
the reclamation fund and to be nonreimbursable pursuant to
the Act of April 19, 1945 (43 U.S.C. 377): Provided, That no
part of any other appropriation in this Act shall be
available for activities or functions budgeted for the
current fiscal year as general administrative expenses.
emergency fund
For an additional amount for the ``Emergency fund'', as
authorized by the Act of June 26, 1948 (43 U.S.C. 502), as
amended, to remain available until expended for the purposes
specified in said Act, $1,000,000, to be derived from the
reclamation fund.
special funds
(transfer of funds)
Sums herein referred to as being derived from the
reclamation fund or special fee account are appropriated from
the special funds in the Treasury created by the Act of June
17, 1902 (43 U.S.C. 391) or the Act of December 22, 1987 (16
U.S.C. 460l-6a, as amended), respectively. Such sums shall be
transferred, upon request of the Secretary, to be merged with
and expended under the heads herein specified; and the
unexpended balances of sums transferred for expenditure under
the head ``General Administrative Expenses'' shall revert and
be credited to the reclamation fund.
working capital fund
Of the offsetting collections credited to this account,
$863,000 are permanently canceled due to reduced GSA rental
charges and $1,848,000 are permanently canceled due to
efficiencies in the procurement process.
administrative provisions
Appropriations for the Bureau of Reclamation shall be
available for purchase of not to exceed 9 passenger motor
vehicles for replacement only.
TITLE III
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Energy Supply, Research and Development Activities
For expenses of the Department of Energy activities
including the purchase, construction and acquisition of plant
and capital equipment and other expenses incidental thereto
necessary for energy supply, research and development
activities, and other activities in carrying out the purposes
of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7101,
et seq.), including the acquisition or condemnation of any
real property or any facility or for plant or facility
acquisition, construction, or expansion; purchase of
passenger motor vehicles (not to exceed 25, of which 19 are
for replacement only), [$3,302,170,000] $3,329,728,000, to
remain available until expended: Provided, That the Secretary
of Energy may transfer available amounts appropriated for use
by the Department of Energy under title III of previously
enacted Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts into
the Isotope Production and Distribution Program Fund, in
order to continue isotope production and distribution
activities: Provided further, That the authority to use these
amounts appropriated is effective from the date of enactment
of this Act.
Uranium Supply and Enrichment Activities
For expenses of the Department of Energy in connection with
operating expenses; the purchase, construction, and
acquisition of plant and capital equipment and other expenses
incidental thereto necessary for residual uranium supply and
enrichment activities in carrying out the purposes of the
Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7101, et
seq.) and the Energy Policy Act (Public Law 102-486, section
901), including the acquisition or condemnation of any real
property or any facility or for plant or facility
acquisition, construction, or expansion; purchase of
electricity as necessary; purchase of passenger motor
vehicles (not to exceed 11 for replacement only),
$73,210,000, to remain available until expended: Provided,
That revenues received by the Department for residual uranium
enrichment activities and estimated to total $9,900,000 in
fiscal year 1995, shall be retained and used for the specific
purpose of offsetting costs incurred by the Department for
such activities notwithstanding the provisions of section
3302(b) of title 31, United States Code: Provided further,
That the sum herein appropriated shall be reduced as revenues
are received during fiscal year 1995 so as to result in a
final fiscal year 1995 appropriation estimated at not more
than $63,310,000.
Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund
For necessary expenses in carrying out uranium enrichment
facility decontamination and decommissioning, remedial
actions and other activities of title II of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 and title X, subtitle A of the Energy Policy Act
of 1992, $301,327,000 to be derived from the fund, to remain
available until expended: Provided, That at least $41,700,000
of amounts derived from the fund for such expenses shall be
expended in accordance with title X, subtitle A of the Energy
Policy Act of 1992.
General Science and Research Activities
For expenses of the Department of Energy activities
including the purchase, construction and acquisition of plant
and capital equipment and other expenses incidental thereto
necessary for general science and research activities in
carrying out the purposes of the Department of Energy
Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7101, et seq.), including the
acquisition or condemnation of any real property or facility
or for plant or facility acquisition, construction, or
expansion; purchase of passenger motor vehicles (not to
exceed 12 for replacement only), [$989,031,000] $973,632,000,
to remain available until expended: Provided, That none of
the funds made available under this section for Department of
Energy facilities may be obligated or expended for food,
beverages, receptions, parties, country club fees, plants or
flowers pursuant to any cost-reimbursable contract: Provided
further, That of the amounts previously appropriated to
orderly terminate the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC)
project in the Energy and Water Development Appropriations
Act, 1994, amounts not to exceed $65,000,000 shall be
available as a one-time contribution to the completion, with
modification, of partially completed facilities at the
project site if the Secretary determines such one-time
contribution (i) will assist the maximization of the value of
the investment made in the facilities and (ii) is in
furtherance of a settlement of the claims that the State of
Texas has asserted against the United States in connection
with the termination of the SSC project: Provided further,
That no such amounts shall be made available as a
contribution to operating expenses of such facilities.
Nuclear Waste Disposal Fund
For the nuclear waste disposal activities to carry out the
purposes of Public Law 97-425, as amended, including the
acquisition of real property or facility construction or
expansion, [$304,800,000] $402,800,000, to remain available
until expended, to be derived from the Nuclear Waste Fund. To
the extent that balances in the fund are not sufficient to
cover amounts available for obligation in the account, the
Secretary shall exercise her authority pursuant to section
302(e)(5) of said Act to issue obligations to the Secretary
of the Treasury: Provided, That of the amount herein
appropriated, within available funds, not to exceed
[$6,000,000] $5,500,000 may be provided to the State of
Nevada, for the sole purpose of conduct of its scientific
oversight responsibilities pursuant to the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982, Public Law 97-425, as amended: Provided
further, That of the amount herein appropriated, not more
than [$8,500,000] $7,000,000 may be provided to affected
local governments, as defined in the Act, to conduct
appropriate activities pursuant to the Act: Provided further,
That the distribution of the funds herein provided among the
affected units of local government shall be determined by the
Department of Energy and made available to the State and
affected units of local government by direct payment:
Provided further, That within ninety days of the completion
of each Federal fiscal year, each State or local entity shall
provide certification to the Department of Energy, that all
funds expended from such payments have been expended for
activities as defined in Public Law 97-425, as amended.
Failure to provide such certification shall cause such entity
to be prohibited from any further funding provided for
similar activities: Provided further, That none of the funds
herein appropriated may be used directly or indirectly to
influence legislative action on any matter pending before
Congress or a State legislature or for any lobbying activity
as provided in section 1913 of title 18, United States Code:
Provided further, That none of the funds herein appropriated
may be used for litigation expenses: Provided further, That
none of the funds herein appropriated may be used to support
multistate efforts or other coalition building activities
inconsistent with the restrictions contained in this Act.
[Isotope Production and Distribution Program Fund
[For Department of Energy expenses for isotope production
and distribution activities, $11,600,000, to remain available
until expended.]
Atomic Energy Defense Activities
Weapons Activities
For Department of Energy expenses, including the purchase,
construction and acquisition of plant and capital equipment
and other incidental expenses necessary for atomic energy
defense weapons activities in carrying out the purposes of
the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7101, et
seq.), including the acquisition or condemnation of any real
property or any facility or for plant or facility
acquisition, construction, or expansion; and the purchase of
passenger motor vehicles (not to exceed 104, of which 103 are
for replacement only, including 22 police-type vehicles),
[$3,201,369,000 to remain available until expended, of which
$20,765,000 shall be available only for program activities at
the University of Rochester, Rochester, New York; and
$8,750,000 shall be available only for program activities at
the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, District of
Columbia] $3,251,268,000, to remain available until expended.
Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management
For Department of Energy expenses, including the purchase,
construction and acquisition of plant and capital equipment
and other incidental expenses necessary for atomic energy
defense environmental restoration and waste management
activities in carrying out the purposes of the Department of
Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7101, et seq.), including
the acquisition or condemnation of any real property or any
facility or for plant or facility acquisition, construction,
or expansion; and the purchase of passenger motor vehicles
(not to exceed 87 of which 67 are for replacement only
including 6 police-type vehicles), [$5,128,211,000]
$5,083,691,000, to remain available until expended[:
Provided, That funds previously made available under this
head in the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act,
1992, to assist the State of New Mexico and affected local
governments in mitigating the impacts of the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant are available for any authorized purposes under
this head].
Materials Support and Other Defense Programs
For Department of Energy expenses, including the purchase,
construction and acquisition of plant and capital equipment
and other incidental expenses necessary for atomic energy
defense materials support, and other defense activities in
carrying out the purposes of the Department of Energy
Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7101, et seq.), including the
acquisition or condemnation of any real property or any
facility or for plant or facility acquisition, construction,
or expansion, [$1,842,204,000] $1,865,910,000, to remain
available until expended.
Defense Nuclear Waste Disposal
For nuclear waste disposal activities to carry out the
purposes of Public Law 97-425, as amended, including the
acquisition of real property or facility construction or
expansion, $129,430,000, to remain available until expended,
all of which shall be used in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the Nuclear Waste Fund appropriation of the
Department of Energy contained in this title.
Departmental Administration
For salaries and expenses of the Department of Energy
necessary for Departmental Administration and other
activities in carrying out the purposes of the Department of
Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7101, et seq.), including
the hire of passenger motor vehicles and official reception
and representation expenses (not to exceed $35,000),
$407,312,000, to remain available until expended, plus such
additional amounts as necessary to cover increases in the
estimated amount of cost of work for others notwithstanding
the provisions of the Anti-Deficiency Act (31 U.S.C. 1511, et
seq.): Provided, That such increases in cost of work are
offset by revenue increases of the same or greater amount, to
remain available until expended: Provided further, That
moneys received by the Department for miscellaneous revenues
estimated to total $161,490,000 in fiscal year 1995 may be
retained and used for operating expenses within this account,
and may remain available until expended, as authorized by
section 201 of Public Law 95-238, notwithstanding the
provisions of section 3302 of title 31, United States Code:
Provided further, That the sum herein appropriated shall be
reduced by the amount of miscellaneous revenues received
during fiscal year 1995 so as to result in a final fiscal
year 1995 appropriation estimated at not more than
$245,822,000.
Office of the Inspector General
For necessary expenses of the Office of the Inspector
General in carrying out the provisions of the Inspector
General Act of 1978, as amended, $26,465,000, to remain
available until expended.
Power Marketing Administrations
Operation and Maintenance, Alaska Power Administration
For necessary expenses of operation and maintenance of
projects in Alaska and of marketing electric power and
energy, $6,494,000, to remain available until expended.
Bonneville Power Administration Fund
Expenditures from the Bonneville Power Administration Fund,
established pursuant to Public Law 93-454, are approved for
the purchase, operation and maintenance of two rotary-wing
aircraft for replacement only, and for official reception and
representation expenses in an amount not to exceed $3,000.
During fiscal year 1995, no new direct loan obligations may
be made.
[Amounts otherwise available for obligation in fiscal year
1995 are reduced by $485,000.]
Operation and Maintenance, Southeastern Power Administration
For necessary expenses of operation and maintenance of
power transmission facilities and of marketing electric power
and energy pursuant to the provisions of section 5 of the
Flood Control Act of 1944 (16 U.S.C. 825s), as applied to the
southeastern power area, $22,431,000, to remain available
until expended.
Operation and Maintenance, Southwestern Power Administration
For necessary expenses of operation and maintenance of
power transmission facilities and of marketing electric power
and energy, and for construction and acquisition of
transmission lines, substations and appurtenant facilities,
and for administrative expenses, including official reception
and representation expenses in an amount not to exceed $1,500
connected therewith, in carrying out the provisions of
section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 (16 U.S.C. 825s),
as applied to the southwestern power area, $21,316,000, to
remain available until expended; in addition, notwithstanding
the provisions of 31 U.S.C. 3302, not to exceed $3,935,000 in
reimbursements, to remain available until expended.
Construction, Rehabilitation, Operation and Maintenance, Western Area
Power Administration
(including transfer of funds)
For carrying out the functions authorized by title III,
section 302(a)(1)(E) of the Act of August 4, 1977 (42 U.S.C.
7101, et seq.), and other related activities including
conservation and renewable resources programs as authorized,
including official reception and representation expenses in
an amount not to exceed $1,500, [$224,085,000] $222,285,000,
to remain available until expended, of which $202,512,000
shall be derived from the Department of the Interior
Reclamation Fund: Provided, That of the amount herein
appropriated, within available funds, $5,135,000 is for
deposit into the Utah Reclamation Mitigation and Conservation
Account pursuant to title IV of the Reclamation Projects
Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992: Provided further,
That the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to transfer
from the Colorado River Dam Fund to the Western Area Power
Administration $7,472,000, to carry out the power marketing
and transmission activities of the Boulder Canyon project as
provided in section 104(a)(4) of the Hoover Power Plant Act
of 1984, to remain available until expended.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
salaries and expenses
For necessary expenses of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission to carry out the provisions of the Department of
Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7101, et seq.), including
services as authorized by 5 U.S.C. 3109, including the hire
of passenger motor vehicles; official reception and
representation expenses (not to exceed $3,000); $166,173,000,
to remain available until expended: Provided, That
notwithstanding any other provision of law, not to exceed
$166,173,000 of revenues from fees and annual charges, and
other services and collections in fiscal year 1995, shall be
retained and used for necessary expenses in this account, and
shall remain available until expended: Provided further, That
the sum herein appropriated shall be reduced as revenues are
received during fiscal year 1995, so as to result in a final
fiscal year 1995 appropriation estimated at not more than $0.
TITLE IV
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
APPALACHIAN REGIONAL COMMISSION
For expenses necessary to carry out the programs authorized
by the Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965, as
amended, notwithstanding section 405 of said Act, and for
necessary expenses for the Federal Co-Chairman and the
alternate on the Appalachian Regional Commission and for
payment of the Federal share of the administrative expenses
of the Commission, including services as authorized by
section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, and hire of
passenger motor vehicles, to remain available until expended,
[$187,000,000] $287,000,000.
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
Salaries and Expenses
For necessary expenses of the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board in carrying out activities authorized by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by Public Law 100-456,
section 1441, $17,933,000, to remain available until
expended.
DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMMISSION
Salaries and Expenses
For expenses necessary to carry out the functions of the
United States member of the Delaware River Basin Commission,
as authorized by law (75 Stat. 716), $343,000.
Contribution to Delaware River Basin Commission
For payment of the United States share of the current
expenses of the Delaware River Basin Commission, as
authorized by law (75 Stat. 706, 707), $478,000.
INTERSTATE COMMISSION ON THE POTOMAC RIVER BASIN
Contribution to Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin
To enable the Secretary of the Treasury to pay in advance
to the Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin the
Federal contribution toward the expenses of the Commission
during the current fiscal year in the administration of its
business in the conservancy district established pursuant to
the Act of July 11, 1940 (54 Stat. 748), as amended by the
Act of September 25, 1970 (Public Law 91-407), $511,000.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Salaries and Expenses
(including transfer of funds)
For necessary expenses of the Commission in carrying out
the purposes of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as
amended, and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
including the employment of aliens; services authorized by
section 3109 of title 5, United States Code; publication and
dissemination of atomic information; purchase, repair, and
cleaning of uniforms, official representation expenses (not
to exceed $20,000); reimbursements to the General Services
Administration for security guard services; hire of passenger
motor vehicles and aircraft, [$540,501,000] $535,501,000, to
remain available until expended, of which $22,000,000 shall
be derived from the Nuclear Waste Fund: Provided, That from
this appropriation, transfer of sums may be made to other
agencies of the Government for the performance of the work
for which this appropriation is made, and in such cases the
sums so transferred may be merged with the appropriation to
which transferred: Provided further, That moneys received by
the Commission for the cooperative nuclear safety research
program, services rendered to foreign governments and
international organizations, and the material and information
access authorization programs, including criminal history
checks under section 149 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, may be retained and used for salaries and expenses
associated with those activities, notwithstanding the
provisions of section 3302 of title 31, United States Code,
and shall remain available until expended: Provided further,
That revenues from licensing fees, inspection services, and
other services and collections estimated at [$518,501,000]
$513,501,000 in fiscal year 1995 shall be retained and used
for necessary salaries and expenses in this account,
notwithstanding the provisions of section 3302 of title 31,
United States Code, and shall remain available until
expended: Provided further, That the sum herein appropriated
shall be reduced by the amount of revenues received during
fiscal year 1995 from licensing fees, inspection services and
other services and collections, excluding those moneys
received for the cooperative nuclear safety research program,
services rendered to foreign governments and international
organizations, and the material and information access
authorization programs, so as to result in a final fiscal
year 1995 appropriation estimated at not more than
$22,000,000.
Office of Inspector General
(including transfer of funds)
For necessary expenses of the Office of Inspector General
in carrying out the provisions of the Inspector General Act
of 1978, as amended, including services authorized by section
3109 of title 5, United States Code, $5,080,000, to remain
available until expended; and in addition, an amount not to
exceed 5 percent of this sum may be transferred from Salaries
and Expenses, Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Provided, That
notice of such transfers shall be given to the Committees on
Appropriations of the House and Senate: Provided further,
That from this appropriation, transfers of sums may be made
to other agencies of the Government for the performance of
the work for which this appropriation is made, and in such
cases the sums so transferred may be merged with the
appropriation to which transferred: Provided further, That
revenues from licensing fees, inspection services, and other
services and collections shall be retained and used for
necessary salaries and expenses in this account,
notwithstanding the provisions of section 3302 of title 31,
United States Code, and shall remain available until
expended: Provided further, That the sum herein appropriated
shall be reduced by the amount of revenues received during
fiscal year 1995 from licensing fees, inspection services,
and other services and collections, so as to result in a
final fiscal year 1995 appropriation estimated at not more
than $0.
NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD
Salaries and Expenses
(including transfer of funds)
For necessary expenses of the Nuclear Waste Technical
Review Board, as authorized by Public Law 100-203, section
5051, $2,664,000, to be transferred from the Nuclear Waste
Fund and to remain available until expended.
OFFICE OF THE NUCLEAR WASTE NEGOTIATOR
Salaries and Expenses
For necessary expenses of the office of the Nuclear Waste
Negotiator in carrying out activities authorized by the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended by Public Law
102-486, section 802, $1,000,000 to be derived from the
Nuclear Waste Fund and to remain available until expended.
SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMMISSION
Salaries and Expenses
For expenses necessary to carry out the functions of the
United States member of the Susquehanna River Basin
Commission as authorized by law (84 Stat. 1541), $318,000.
Contribution to Susquehanna River Basin Commission
For payment of the United States share of the current
expenses of the Susquehanna River Basin Commission, as
authorized by law (84 Stat. 1530, 1531), $288,000.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Tennessee Valley Authority Fund
For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, as amended (16 U.S.C.
ch. 12A), including purchase, hire, maintenance, and
operation of aircraft, and purchase and hire of passenger
motor vehicles, [$136,856,000] $142,873,000, to remain
available until expended.
TITLE V--GENERAL PROVISIONS
purchase of american-made equipment and products
Sec. 501. (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the
Congress that, to the greatest extent practicable, all
equipment and products purchased with funds made available in
this Act should be American-made.
(b) Notice Requirement.--In providing financial assistance
to, or entering into any contract with, any entity using
funds made available in this Act, the head of each Federal
agency, to the greatest extent practicable, shall provide to
such entity a notice describing the statement made in
subsection (a) by the Congress.
This Act may be cited as the ``Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act, 1995''.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the majority
leader.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, Members of the Senate, the Senate will
now consider the energy and water appropriations bill. As I stated last
evening, it is my intention that we complete action on that bill this
morning. So far, very few Senators have indicated an intention to offer
amendments, and those Senators who intend to do so must be present
promptly to offer their amendments. We must complete action on this
bill in order to resume consideration of the Department of Defense
authorization bill. As I indicated last evening, we will remain in
session this week until we complete action on these two bills. As soon
as we finish the DOD authorization bill, the Senate will adjourn for
the Independence Day recess. But we will stay in session however long
it takes to complete action on the Department of Defense authorization
bill. My hope is that we can do it by a reasonable hour tomorrow, but
if not we will simply stay here until we finish it.
However it is important--indeed it is imperative--that those Senators
who intend to offer amendments to the energy and water appropriations
bill come to the Senate floor immediately to be in a position to do so,
because we are going to proceed promptly with this bill, as I have now
stated on several occasions so Senators are plainly on notice in that
regard.
Mr. President, I thank my colleagues. I note the presence of the
managers, the distinguished Senators from Louisiana and Oregon, and I
therefore yield the floor.
Mr. HATFIELD. Will the majority leader yield for a question?
Mr. MITCHELL. Certainly, yes.
Mr. HATFIELD. Would the leader give us a little guidance as to how
long would be a reasonable period to wait for amendments to be offered
before we might ask for third reading?
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, my hope is that Senators have heard this
and are hopefully in the process of alerting their staffs to notify the
staffs of the Senators from Oregon and Louisiana. I do not wish at this
time to impose a time deadline, but I think there is a real sense of
urgency. Senators are on notice if they are not going to come to the
Senate floor to offer their amendments we are going to proceed to
complete action on the bill.
Mr. HATFIELD. If I might just comment, I would take note of the fact
that only the managers and the majority leader are presently on the
floor.
Mr. MITCHELL. Not an uncommon event.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, will the distinguished majority leader
yield?
Mr. MITCHELL. Certainly, yes.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I believe the distinguished majority leader said
something similar to what he has just said yesterday.
Mr. MITCHELL. That is correct.
Mr. JOHNSTON. So Senators have twice been put on notice.
Mr. MITCHELL. That is correct.
Mr. JOHNSTON. And solicited to come with their amendments.
Mr. MITCHELL. Right.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, does the leader concur with me that if
Senators do have an amendment and do want protection, that they should
see the floor managers? At this point the only amendment we know
about--and I tell this to Senators--is a Kerry amendment, which I
assume he will put in. He has been alerted to the fact we are starting
at 9 today. So I would assume he will be here after very short opening
statements.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, what I will do, if that is the only
amendment that has been specifically noted, I will direct the floor
staff to contact Senator Kerry's office to notify him of what has been
said and what the plans are so he will understand that it is imperative
he be present promptly to offer his amendment.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I take it any time agreements we can enter to dispose
of amendments, the majority leader would concur in? May we seek those
freely?
Mr. MITCHELL. Not only concur but encourage.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I thank the leader.
Mr. MITCHELL. I thank my colleague.
Mr. JOHNSTON addressed the Chair.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the Senator
from Louisiana.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, we, again, are on the floor and I say
again, because this is an annual event with my friend and colleague
from Oregon, Senator Hatfield, on handling the energy and water
appropriations bill. I guess we are probably the longest running
twosome in the Appropriations Committee, I having chaired on and off
for a number of years, and Senator Hatfield having chaired on and off
for a number of years and having rotated as ranking minority members.
Again, Mr. President, it is a relationship that is greatly to be
desired among Senators: Productive, pleasant, and always, I think, the
kind of relationship that Senators seek and glory in when it is
present.
Senator Hatfield and I are pleased to present the energy and water
appropriations bill again today. Our total obligational authority is
$20.5 billion. We are $143,000 over the President's estimate and $157
million more than the House-passed bill, but we are within our 302(b)
allocation.
Mr. President, this has been a particularly difficult year for the
energy and water appropriations bill. I say that because our bill had
greater cuts in our 602(b) allocation, proportionately, than any other
appropriations subcommittee. There are 13 appropriations subcommittees
and we had the largest cuts of all.
We are $1.3 billion under last year's nominal spending levels in BA--
that is, in budget authority--and $1.5 billion below last year's
nominal spending levels in budget outlays. So it was very, very
difficult to meet the needs of the Nation in the areas of energy and
water.
I might say here on the floor, as I have said in committee and as I
have repeated over and over again, I think we made a real mistake in
adopting the Exon Grassley amendment because it is beginning to impinge
on the muscle and fiber and bone of the infrastructure of this country
in our subcommittee and in other subcommittees, because that amendment
goes to that very small percentage of spending which is discretionary
spending and which is largely infrastructure-type spending to meet the
new priorities, to meet the new vision of the country.
All of us know that the real spending in this country is in
entitlements. Senator Bob Kerrey, of Nebraska, is chairman of a new
entitlement commission. I hope they can find a way to cut entitlement
spending because that is where the money is.
In discretionary spending, such as energy and water--such as
protecting people from the ravages of floods, such as protecting them
from rivers flooding and hurricanes, building water projects and
providing the infrastructure in California, for example, to restore the
salmon runs--all of that kind of spending is severely cut, $1.5 billion
less than last year.
We have had, I believe it was, 1,200 separate requests from Senators
to include items in this bill. To say that we could even meet a
majority of those requests, of course, is impossible. We are not
meeting the needs of the Nation in this bill.
Mr. President, I am pleased to present to the Senate, the energy and
water development appropriation bill for the fiscal year beginning on
October 1, 1994, and ending on September 30, 1995. This bill, H.R.
4506, passed the House of Representatives on June 14, 1994, by a vote
of 393 yeas to 29 nays. The Subcommittee on Energy and Water
Development marked up this bill on June 23, 1994, and the full
committee marked it up and reported this bill the same day, June 23,
1994.
Before summarizing the principal aspects of this year's appropriation
bill, I want to take a moment to especially thank the chairman of our
full Committee on Appropriations, the distinguished President pro
tempore and our leader for all the hard work confronting us in moving
these appropriation bills through the subcommittee, the full committee
and now to the Senate. I commend the chairman in leading us to this
point.
Mr. President, as usual, I want to thank the distinguished Senator
from Oregon, [Mr. Hatfield], who is a former chairman of the full
committee and the ranking minority member of the committee for his
cooperation, teamwork, and leadership. He is an outstanding minority
member as he was an outstanding chairman.
purpose of the bill
The bill supplies funds for water resources development programs and
related activities, of the Department of the Army, Civil Functions--
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Civil Works Program in title I; for the
Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation in title II; for the
Department of Energy's energy research activities--except for fossil
fuel programs and certain conservation and regulatory functions--
including atomic energy defense activities in title III; and for
related independent agencies and commissions, including the Appalachian
Regional Commission and Appalachian regional development programs, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Tennessee Valley Authority in
title IV.
summary of recommendations
Mr. President, the fiscal year 1995 budget estimates for the bill
total $20,512,750,000 in new budget obligations authority. The
recommendation of the committee provides $20,512,893,000. This amount
is $143,000 over the President's budget estimate and $157,271,000 more
than the House-passed bill.
Mr. President, I will briefly summarize the major recommendations
provided in the bill. All the details and figures are, of course,
included in the committee report, 103-291, accompanying the bill, which
has been available since last Friday, June 24, 1994.
title i, army corps of engineers
First under title I of the bill which provides appropriations for the
Department of the Army Civil Works Program, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, we are recommending a total amount of new budget authority
of $3,391,565,000, which is $60,869,000 below the House and $77.7
million over the budget estimate.
The committee has had a large number of requests for various water
development projects including many requests for new construction
starts. However, due to the limited budgetary resources, the committee
could not provide funding for each and every project requested. The
committee recommendation does not include a small number of new
construction starts and has deferred without prejudice the largest of
the projects eligible for initiation of construction. Because of the
importance of some of these projects to the economic well-being of the
Nation, the committee will continue to monitor each project's progress
to insure that it is ready to proceed to construction when resources
become available. I should caution, however, that due to the cost to
construct a number of these projects, budgetary support from the
executive branch will be critical in making the decision to proceed.
title ii, department of the interior
For title II, Department of the Interior Bureau of Reclamation, we
recommend a total in new budget authority of $869.4 million, which is
$47.4 million over the budget estimate and $14.2 million under the
House.
title iii, department of energy
Under title III, Department of Energy, the committee provides a total
of $15.9 billion. This amount includes $3.3 billion for energy supply,
research, and development activities; $63.3 million for uranium supply
and enrichment activities; $301.3 million for uranium enrichment
decontamination and decommissioning fund, $973.6 million for general
science and research activities, $402.8 million for Nuclear Waste
Disposal Fund, and $6.2 billion for environmental restoration and waste
management--defense and nondefense.
For the atomic energy defense activities, there is a total of $10.3
billion, comprised of $3.2 billion for weapons activities; $5.1 billion
for defense environmental restoration and waste management; $1.86 for
materials support and other defense programs and $129.4 million for
defense nuclear waste disposal.
For Departmental Administration $407.3 million is recommended offset
with anticipated miscellaneous revenues of $161.5 million for a new
appropriation of $245.8 million. A total of $272.5 million is
recommended in the bill for the power marketing administrations and
$166,173,000 is for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [FERC]
offset 100 percent by revenues.
A net appropriation of $272 million is provided for solar programs,
including photovoltaics, wind, and biomass and for all solar
renewables, $373 million, an increase of over $25 million compared to
1994.
For nuclear energy programs, $308 million is recommended, which is
about $30 million less than the current level. The major programs
provided for include funds to continue the integral fast reactor and a
phase shutdown which will complete the research program, as opposed to
an immediate termination. The sum of $12 million is included for the
gas turbine modular helium reactor, also known as the gas reactor, or
HTGR. The amount recommended for the IFR Program is $98 million.
For the magnetic fusion program, we are recommending $362.5 million,
which is $10 million less than the budget. The main issue here is
called the TPX or the tokamak physics experiment at Princeton
University. The House included a new start for this program.
Construction of TPX would be in the range of $800 million to $1
billion, and probably a like amount to operate it over the life of its
years. It is on the critical path to what we call ITER, the
international tokamak experiment. It is necessary to do ITER or
something like ITER to get to the commercialization of fusion. ITER
will probably cost $10 billion and another $10 billion to operate, for
$20 billion overall. If $2 billion is added for TPX, the program is
about $22 billion. Now, it is an international tokamak. If it is built
in this country, the estimates are that the United States' share would
be 60 to 70 percent. If it were built in Japan, the United States would
have to pay at least 25 percent. So that the 64-dollar question is--
``Is America willing to sign a mortgage for TPX for almost $2 billion,
including operation.
title iv, regulatory and other independent agencies
A total of $475.4 million for various regulatory and independent
agencies of the Federal Government is included in the bill. Major
programs include the Appalachian Regional Commission, $287 million;
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, $535.5 million; and for the Tennessee
Valley Authority, $142.9 million. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
amount of $535.5 million is offset by licensing fees.
The 602(b) allocation for the bill is $20.513 billion in new budget
obligational authority and $20.943 billion in outlays. The bill before
the Senate contains $20.525 billion in budget authority and $20.889
billion in outlays. So there is no room to add to the bill.
Let me give a few highlights.
First of all, the biggest science endeavor that this country faces in
the future, or at least one of the biggest--perhaps the space station
competes in size, I have not compared the two--is nuclear fusion.
Fusion offers the hope to the country of limitless energy, relatively
clean and with a fuel which is inexhaustible. However, it is also
extremely expensive.
The way we would get from here to commercialization is, first, to do
what we call the TPX, the tokamak physics experiment at Princeton,
which will cost somewhere in the neighborhood of $800 million to build,
perhaps over time, over a decade or so, maybe another $1 billion to
operate.
Following on as a second iteration is what we call the ITER, the
international tokamak experiment. ITER is likely to cost $10 billion to
build and $10 billion to operate. ITER should bring us what we call
break even--that is, more energy out than goes in--and it should be
that which proves the feasibility of fusion energy.
Fusion energy is greatly debated, Mr. President. I believe the
evidence is fairly clear that it will work, that we can get more energy
out than we put in. The big unanswered question is whether it could be
made to work on an economically feasible basis. If it can, it may
produce commercial amounts of energy by the year 2050; in other words,
more than half a century from now, we may be able to get this limitless
energy, this energy from limitless sources in the middle of the next
century sometime. So it is a very big question to go into.
In the committee language, we kept the team at Princeton together for
TPX, but we said we should not enter into this endeavor, the
international physics experiment, ITER--$20 billion in scope, TPX which
itself could be, including operations money, $2 billion--without a
national debate, without the Congress having been involved and without
the President having signed on.
This Senator led the fight on the SSC, the superconducting super
collider, and after 10 years and $2 billion, we finally decided--the
House did--that we could no longer pursue the SSC. I think it was a
great mistake and a terrible loss to the country. Nevertheless, that
was the will of the Congress and that is what we have done. With
termination expenses, that will probably be in the neighborhood of $3
billion down the drain.
We are determined on this committee not to have that happen on
fusion. If we are going to go into fusion--and I believe we should; I
believe this great country ought to pursue this limitless source of
energy--then we ought to do so only after national debate, to have the
budget cutters come here and talk about why we should not do it, have a
debate, have a vote and then abide by decisions and not get into this
thing incrementally. The TPX has never been authorized. It has never
had that debate. Let us not get another $2 billion into a project and
then say we cannot afford it.
For that reason, in our bill we provided that we would keep the team
together at Princeton but that we would not make a decision on a start
of construction of TPX until and unless the Congress and the President
had signed on to this endeavor for fusion.
In other words, you should not do TPX unless you also decide to do
ITER, ITER being an international Tokamak experiment. If we build it in
this country, we would probably have to pay from 60 to 70 percent of
the cost, or if we built it in Japan, pick a figure--maybe 25 percent,
and 25 percent of $20 billion is still a lot of money, particularly to
build a Tokamak reactor in another country.
So we need to think about those things as a country. I am for TPX but
not now, not until it is authorized, not until the President and the
Congress go into this with their eyes wide open.
Now, another big project, Mr. President, is the advanced neutron
source at Oak Ridge, TN. The advanced neutron source is clearly a very
useful reactor. It would examine the structure of metals and other
materials. It would also cost $3 billion.
Now, in the case of the advanced neutron source, the House had a new
start, committing us to the $3 billion. We said, and we believe, that
the advanced neutron source is not yet ready. The environmental impact
statement has yet to be completed, the site specific environmental
impact statement. They have not yet made a decision as to the kind of
fuel, the degree of enrichment that they would use in this reactor, a
very fundamental choice involving what is a new reactor.
Mr. President, we believe that we should commit the same amount of
money as the House to the advanced neutron source but that they should
complete those studies, complete the EIS, make those fundamental
determinations of fuel enrichment and the structure of the machine and
then make a decision--again, an eyes-wide-open decision. It is not as
expensive, of course, as fusion, but believe me at a time when spending
this year is down $1.5 billion in this bill below last year, and next
year with the Exon-Grassley amendment, it will take an even further
hit.
To start a new project like the advanced neutron source, which will
probably peak out at somewhere between, well, perhaps $800 million in 1
year it would require, taking from other programs is something you
should not enter into lightly and certainly not prematurely. For that
reason we believe that was premature this year.
Now, Mr. President, we underfunded a lot of programs that we would
like to be able to fund more. In solar energy, we would like to have
had an even greater increase than we had. We have a $25 million
increase in solar energy over last year which, considering the budget
stringencies of this year, is heroic. We had a $15 million cut in our
nuclear programs, which are getting more and more modest, but some
spending in this area is absolutely essential.
All in all, Mr. President, this is a bill that is very sparse and
that demands and needs much more money than it has.
Mr. President, I expect an amendment on what we call the IFR, the
integral fast reactor from Senator Kerry today. There may or may not be
an amendment by Senator Harkin. And we hope to have the bill finished
by noon. Those are the directions given us by the majority leader. So I
ask all Senators to come to the floor and let us know if they have
amendments.
I yield the floor.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I would like to thank Senator Johnston,
first of all, for his introductory remarks and the explanation and
description of the bill we have now before us, the energy and water
development bill for fiscal 1995.
Chairman Johnston, let me say, has done an outstanding job again this
year in developing the Committee's bill that we have before us, and I
am very pleased to be associated with his effort. It has been truly
bipartisan throughout.
Mr. President, the subcommittee's work was more difficult this year
than ever before. We say that each year because it is true each year.
And if you put it into a 5-year context, you can certainly understand
then the drastic changes that have occurred and are occurring at this
time. Our 602(b) allocation was $20.513 billion in budget authority,
which was $1.176 billion below the current year's enactment level of
$21.689 billion. Unfortunately, the lack of resources that this
committee was provided means that we have made some very drastic cuts
in programs that are very worthy and very important to this country.
Chairman Johnston and I have worked many years on both the
Appropriations Committee and on the Energy and Natural Resources
Committee which, as you know, is the authorizing committee. We have
mutual interests in developing our policies which will provide for the
long-term energy security of the United States. Although we sometimes
disagree on what the Nation's energy priorities should be, we respect
each other's views and understand the reasoning behind our respective
positions.
Ultimately, I believe that the dynamics and bipartisan nature of the
Energy and Water Development Subcommittee have tended to narrow the
swing of the energy policy pendulum from one extreme to the other,
whether it be nuclear, solar, and renewable technologies, or atomic
energy defense activities.
In the end and over the years, the subcommittee's recommendations
have been guided by prudence, reason and fiscal awareness. This
constancy of purpose on the subcommittee's part has been of tremendous
benefit I believe to the Nation.
Although the chairman has presented the highlights of the bill
earlier, I wish to mention a few areas in which I have particular and
special interest.
First, the committee has recommended a total of $369 million for
solar and renewable energy programs under its jurisdiction. While this
is about $40 million below the President's request, it is $22 million
above the current funding level.
I know that many Members of the Senate share my concern that the full
amount requested by the administration has not been provided for these
popular and very important programs. While I am disappointed with the
lack of available resources for the solar and renewable programs, I
also believe that this should be viewed in a historic context. The
committee's recommendation of $369 million represents a 257 percent
increase in the solar and renewable budgets over the last 5 years. From
anyone's perspective, this represents a significant commitment on the
part of the subcommittee to support the development of these particular
technologies.
The committee's proposals regarding atomic energy defense activities
also should be viewed historically to appreciate fully the change in
the U.S. nuclear weapons policy since the end of the cold war. The
total amount provided in this bill for atomic weapons activities is
$10.33 billion. Approximately half of this amount, $5.084 million is
for environmental restoration and waste management activities at the
Department of Energy's nuclear weapons production facilities, and
$5.246 billion is for weapons-related activities.
In other words, it is about a 50-50 split.
Comparing these funding levels of the fiscal year 1990
appropriations, we find that our nuclear weapons priorities have
changed significantly. During this 5-year period, environmental
restoration and waste management funds have increased by 306 percent,
while the weapons activities and nuclear materials support programs
have declined by about 34 percent.
And even this 34-percent decline does not tell the full story if we
acknowledge that significant weapons resources are now directed to
technology transfer activities with private industry, nonproliferation,
nuclear safeguards and security, and other nontraditional nuclear
weapons programs.
The bill also contains $50 million, under the Materials Support and
Other Defense Programs appropriation account, for fissile materials
control and disposition activities. This represents a $41 million
increase over the President's request. I think it is important for
every Member of the Senate to understand that the committee is
providing these funds for activities relating to research and
evaluation of reactor and accelerator technologies for plutonium
disposition and tritium production.
While I agree we must investigate all possible options for plutonium
disposition and storage, I am concerned that we may be heading down
this path a little too quickly. I am especially disturbed by the
proposals which would have us embrace existing light water reactors to
burn plutonium and generate electricity for commercial consumption. In
my view this obscures the line between nuclear weapons activities and
commercial power generation, and has significant implications on
national security and worldwide nonproliferation policies. We should
take care to ensure that any decision we make on plutonium disposition
does not further encourage the development of a global plutonium
economy.
Finally, Mr. President, I want to mention the funding provided in the
bill for salmon recovery activities in the Columbia River Basin. We
have provided $38.3 million for the Corps of Engineers to continue its
activities under the Columbia River Juvenile Fish Mitigation Program to
increase fish bypass efficiency on the Columbia and Snake Rivers.
The committee report provides additional direction for the corps to
investigate new bypass technologies including surface flow facilities,
sound and light guidance systems, and other devices.
An additional $9 million has been provided under the Lower Snake
River Fish and Wildlife Compensation Program for fish hatchery
construction projects in the Snake River Basin. These projects include
adult trapping and juvenile acclimation facilities in various streams,
and water treatment facilities for the Lookingglass fish hatchery. I am
pleased to say that these represent the first funds appropriated
specifically for hatchery projects to assist in rebuilding depleted
salmon stocks in the Columbia Basin. Once again, the Energy and Water
Subcommittee is taking the lead in providing initial and crucial funds
for salmon recovery efforts.
Also, the committee has provided the $5.6 million requested by the
administration for the Bureau of Reclamation's salmon recovery
activities.
Mr. President, I am compelled to emphasize that salmon recovery
activities encompass a wide range of activities dealing with the
hydroelectric system, hatchery reforms, habitat enhancement, and
changes in salmon harvest. The recent release of the Snake River Salmon
Recovery Team's final recommendations, together with the Northwest
Power Planning Council's Strategy for Salmon, now provides us with two
regionally developed, complementary plans to recover the species.
Let me also emphasize that the rate payers of the Pacific Northwest
will, in addition to these figures and funds, provide $350 million this
year for further salmon mitigation; and that over 50 percent of these
funds that I have just enumerated will be repaid to the Federal
Treasury by the rate payers under the Bonneville Power Administration.
Mr. President, just to give you some indication, in the last 10 years
the rate payers of the Pacific Northwest have paid over $1 billion--
over $1 billion--for salmon mitigation and recovery. So no one can say
that the regional resource is not being tapped as far as salmon
recovery and salmon mitigation.
These two plans that we now have for recovery provide a broad
prescription of activities which deal with all four major areas of
reform.
Both documents indicate that the recovery process will be slow and
painful--there are no quick fixes or free lunches. While there
certainly are measures which should be taken sooner rather than later,
we need to develop a common sense strategy based on science and public
input that directs our scarce resources to those areas which will
provide the most immediate protection for the remaining depleted stocks
and best prospects for rebuilding them.
Again, I want to thank Senator Johnston for his assistance in
providing the salmon recovery funds included in the bill, and surely
will look to him again in future years when funding requirements
inevitably will increase further.
I think we have to understand that point as well; that these will be
increases in the outlying years, and we must meet those needs.
I also want to thank Senator Byrd, the chairman of the full
Appropriations Committee, who has the great responsibility of
shepherding 13 separate appropriations bills through the subcommittee
process, the full committee process, to get them passed on the floor,
into conference, back into the respective Chambers for approval of the
conference reports, and down to the White House for signature. This is
no mean undertaking, and Senator Byrd has done this with great skill
over the years, as he has done all of his work with great skill in the
committee.
Finally, I want to thank the staff of the Energy and Water
Development Subcommittee for their assistance in putting this bill
together. Senator Johnston has already indicated that we have a long
tenure of partnership in giving leadership to the subcommittee, which I
treasure. But we also have been blessed with a very outstanding staff,
who have great seniority in time and in service to this subcommittee.
I want to especially recognize Proctor Jones, David Gwaltney, Gloria
Butland, Mark Walker, and Dorothy Pastis, who have all worked for many
weeks on this bill. And their efforts should not go unnoticed.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. JOHNSTON addressed the Chair.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the Senator
from Louisiana [Mr. Johnston].
Order of Procedure
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
committee amendments be agreed to en bloc, and that the bill, as thus
amended, be regarded for purpose of amendment as original text;
provided that no point of order shall have been considered to have been
waived by agreeing to this request.
Mr. HATFIELD. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes.
Mr. HATFIELD. Reserving the right to object, and I will not, Mr.
President, may I say to the chairman of the committee, Mr. Johnston,
that I have just had a request by Senator Stevens to set aside the
committee amendment on page 32.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I will certainly do that. I say to my
colleague that this would be considered original text under my request
for the purpose of further amendment. So it would be amendable by
Senator Stevens to accomplish whatever he wishes to accomplish.
Mr. HATFIELD. I do not have the background as to his request. But
that has been sent to me at this moment by telephone. I request that of
the chairman; if he might exclude that from his unanimous-consent
request.
Mr. JOHNSTON. All right. In view of the request, Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the committee amendments be agreed to en bloc,
except for the committee amendment on page 32, line 15; and that the
bill, as amended, be regarded for the purpose of amendment as original
text; provided that no point of order shall have been considered to
have been waived by agreeing to this request.
Mr. HATFIELD. I thank the Senator.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I might say that I have now received
word that Senator Harkin will have an amendment that will transfer $33
million from the nuclear weapons program to renewable energy; that he
will have a second amendment that will strike $275 million from the
Nuclear Weapons Program; that Senator Wellstone has asked to reserve
two relevant amendments; that Senator Lautenberg has two amendments
which he believes to be cleared. And other than that Kerry amendment,
which will be shortly offered, we have no word of any other amendments.
Mr. President, with respect to the Kerry amendment, it is our
intention to have opening statements and then, thereafter, to seek a
time agreement, but we will not do so at this time.
I yield the floor.
Mr. CRAIG addressed the Chair.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Idaho [Mr. Craig]
is recognized.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I want to take a brief moment at the
beginning of the debate on this important appropriation bill to thank
the chairman and ranking member for their work on behalf of the Pacific
Northwest and my State of Idaho, and the cooperative relationship we
have been able to maintain as we have worked with these very important
issues.
My colleague from Oregon has mentioned very key appropriations on the
Snake and Columbia River systems to deal with an issue in the Pacific
Northwest that is absolutely key and must be resolved, and that is the
endangered species of salmon in the Snake and Columbia system and the
mitigation plan to try to save those important species.
That plan, while it is important, must be balanced with the economy
of the Pacific Northwest and intermountain area. Of course, the Senator
from Oregon and this Senator knows how key the hydro production on the
Snake and Columbia is, the transportation systems that have been
developed that are now a critical link to the economy of that region,
and the areas within the bill that deal with fish mitigation and dam
modification are all part of an ongoing responsibility that I think the
Federal Government has to share with us in the cost of providing for an
environment in which the salmon can live and can continue to grow and
develop. That is part of this bill, it is an important part.
The Senator from Oregon has been extremely sensitive to making sure
that we continue to resolve this issue and that the Federal Government
be a partner with us in the Pacific Northwest in the resolution of this
particular problem. I must also say that with the Department of the
Interior, the Bureau of Reclamation, and all of the kinds of issues
that are in part here, and also the Department of Energy with its
national laboratory in my State, this is a key appropriation of funds
not only critical to jobs, but very important science programs that are
charting a future for this country's energy. This committee has been
extremely sensitive to that.
Senator Johnston is well known for his knowledge in those areas and
his advocacy of them, and I appreciate the relationship we have as this
budget has been developed in the work we do on the Energy and Natural
Resources Committee together.
In the next few moments, we will begin debate on an amendment that I
hope the Senators will listen very carefully to and weigh its
consideration as it relates to our future, not only in nuclear energy
as a safe, clean energy source for our country, but the dedication this
country has had to resolving nuclear problems around the world, and
especially the proliferation of plutonium and the responsibility we
have signed off on--to be a world leader in resolving this problem and
the development of the technology that can ultimately burn these wastes
and these risks and put them in a state that future generations will
know are safe and secure. That is our responsibility as a Senate, and
this Government has so charged us. This legislation reflects those
responsibilities, and I hope we can, in large part, pass it.
I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, if I can respond briefly to the Senator
from Idaho, I appreciate his comments relating to the committee's work.
His efforts have been certainly a part of the product we bring here
today, because the Senator from Idaho [Mr. Craig], has been most
attentive to the problems facing us in the region, whether it is power
generation or salmon mitigation, or whatever it may be. If we did not
have the broad-based support of this body, our committee's work would
be much more difficult. Because of the leadership of the Senator from
Idaho in helping to bring attention and to focus on these problems, it
has been very helpful. I thank him at this time.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. McCAIN. I object.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Objection is heard.
The clerk will continue calling the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk continued calling the roll.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Akaka). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, a few moments before the quorum call was
put into place, the Senator from Idaho asked Senators to listen
carefully to this debate, because it is about the future, the future of
nuclear power, and about the interests of the United States with
respect to the control of plutonium.
I think that in so stating, the Senator has framed, in one sense, the
reality of what this debate is about and, in another sense, the
illusion of what it is about. And I ask my colleagues indeed to listen
carefully and to weigh carefully the truth, the reality of what is at
stake in this debate.
Those who want to keep what is known as the advanced liquid metal
reactor alive will assert arguments that I respectfully submit simply
do not stand up under scientific inquiry or under sound proliferation
or fiscal analysis. And I ask my colleagues to weigh carefully the
balance of what studies and who makes the arguments for the illusion
and what studies and who makes the arguments for the reality. And there
is not one Senator here who is not capable of distinguishing between
the interests behind the illusion and the interests that assert the
reality.
The reality of the ALMR, the advanced liquid metal reactor, is that
it is a waste and that it is a danger, that it is fiscally
irresponsible, scientifically irresponsible, and irresponsible with
respect to arms control and nuclear waste. And every single independent
study--independent study--confirms what I have just said: OTA, National
Academy of Sciences, GAO, and so forth.
Now let me frame this debate, if I may, by reading a letter from the
President of the United States sent to me yesterday. I will just read
the first paragraph which is relevant.
Thank you for your letter supporting our decision to
terminate the Department of Energy's advanced liquid metal
reactor program, including the integral fast reactor project.
I want to assure you that this administration does not
support the IFR and will oppose any efforts to continue the
funding for this reactor project. The IFR has no foreseeable
commercial value and its continuation would undercut our
international nuclear weapons nonproliferation efforts.
And that is signed by the President of the United States.
In addition, the Secretary of Energy, Hazel O'Leary, has taken a
courageous position and put very squarely before the Senate what is at
stake here.
I quote from her letter of June 27:
In summary, terminating the Integral Fast Reactor program
in FY 1995 would save taxpayers $2.9 billion between 1995 and
2010. If we take the direction that has been outlined in the
budget amendment submitted on June 17, 1994, and your
Integral Fast Reactor termination bill recommending
redirection of the assets of the facility * * * we would save
$1.3 billion in taxpayer money from FY 1995-2010. This is the
Administration's preferred option.
No further testing of the Integral Fast Reactor concept is
required to prove the technical feasibility of actinide
recycle and burning in a fast spectrum reactor, such as the
Experimental Breeder Reactor in Idaho. The basic physics and
chemistry of this technology are established.
The principal concerns that led me to withdraw my support
for this program are the inconsistencies with our
nonproliferation objectives and the high cost of further
development.
Now, Mr. President, here is the President of the United States and
the Secretary of Energy saying clearly, ``Senate, Congress, do not
continue this program.''
Now, who is here on the floor asking to continue it? Understandably--
and I do not begrudge them and I understand it--the Senators from
Idaho, where you have a breeder reactor program, and the Senators from
Illinois, where you have the research.
The question is squarely before the U.S. Senate: Do we have the
courage and the foresight to be willing to cut a program that every
single analysis has deemed a waste, which the President does not want,
which the Secretary of Energy does not want, and which so clearly
threatens the proliferation concerns of this country?
I ask my colleagues to weigh very carefully how, in the midst of the
Korean crisis, where we are summoning the international community to
come together in an effort to try to preach nonproliferation, we can
turn around and engage ourselves in a program that embraces the
potential for that proliferation.
This kind of irresponsible effort for fundamental pork barrel
purposes undercuts every single effort of the United States in the
international community.
Mr. President, let me show my colleagues a little of the background
of this program.
Unbelievably, this program really began in 1948. This program has now
become more expensive than the Clinch River breeder reactor that we
killed. The program, incredibly, was attempted to be killed by one of
the cosponsors of this amendment today, Senator Bumpers.
Senator Bumpers had the foresight to try to kill this back in 1982.
We have spent, beginning in 1948, $297 million; this was 1948 to 1967.
In 1968, $112 million; 1969, $132 million; 1970, $144 million. On you
go through the 1970's. It climbs, $234 million, $353 million, $568
million, $612 million. You get into the 1980's and we get into $614
million, $546 million; 1984 it began to go down a little, $304 million.
Now we are in the $136, $142 million range.
The National Academy of Sciences, OTA, independent research,
Department of Energy, and the President of the United States have all
come to the conclusion we do not have anything to show for that. We do
not have anything to show for that incredible investment except running
up against the barrier of nonproliferation efforts, an extraordinary
amount of increased potential waste as we pursue a technology that not
only puts more plutonium into circulation, but increases the amount of
waste, the actinides that you then have to have in a repository and
hold for literally thousands of years for it to be eliminated.
My colleagues are going to come to the floor and say you can
eliminate all of that because this technology is going to chew it all
up. Wrong. Wrong. The National Academy of Sciences tells you: Wrong and
unnecessary. That is the most important thing I ask colleagues to focus
on. When we come to the floor of the Senate and we are asked to make a
judgment about a program--you may have the most incredibly highfalutin,
wonderful program of creative technology, but it could be absolutely
unnecessary because you have a far simpler, more readily available,
safer technology at your hands. And that is precisely what we have.
You do not need to develop a separate reprocessing capacity to burn
fuel or to chew up plutonium because we have at our disposal means of
getting rid of the plutonium and of controlling the plutonium better
with the existing technology.
Let me just frame this a little bit for some of those who have not
had the time to read all the faxes that have been circulated on it or
understand all the technology. It is not half as complicated as it
sounds, because if it were that complicated I am sure I would not be
here debating it. It is not that complicated.
I also want to ask colleagues to look at the fact that every major
publication in the country from the Post to the Times, Philadelphia out
to the Far West, the South--there is not one editorial that I have read
that said keep this going. They all label it a waste, and they have
singled this as one of the most important opportunities for the U.S.
Senate to eliminate waste. For those who come to the floor with all
these line item vetoes and balanced budget amendments and all these
techniques to control spending--here is the technique to control
spending. Vote to cut this program.
We all know how hard it is to cut, how few programs have ever been
eliminated. If ever there was a golden opportunity for reality to begin
to set in, here it is. I share with my colleagues some of the public
opinion on this.
The Washington Post:
The Wrong Reactor. Killing the ALMR appropriation would
make it a little easier for the United States to restrain the
proliferation of nuclear weapons in a world that has too many
of them.
The Hartford Courant, Connecticut:
End The Research On Breeder Reactor. Scientists have raised
serious doubts about the breeder's ability to reduce the
nuclear waste, to burn plutonium efficiently, to make more
fuel.
The Oregonian:
Give up nuclear breeder dream. The time has come for
America to abandon the 1970's dream of developing an advanced
light metal reactor. Continuing financial support for this
technology makes no sense from an energy development point of
view.
St. Louis Post Dispatch, the Philadelphia Inquirer:
It's back. The Senate meets the Clinch River monster.
Like Freddie Kreuger, the breeder has made a nightmare
issue come back. The Clinton administration wants to end this
program. The House is virtually certain to vote it down again
so its prospects of survival depend once again on the Senate
which kept it alive by voting for it last year.
The San Francisco Chronicle:
Saying no to nuclear pork.
The Morning Sentinel; the Bangor Daily News; the Buffalo News and on.
The Los Angeles Times:
The broad understanding about this is this is pork. It is
dangerous pork because it threatens the nonproliferation
policy of this country.
What are we talking about? We are talking about a whole new form of a
nuclear reactor.
This is not a vote for or against nuclear power and it should not be
confused as that. I support light water reactor technology. I support
the advanced light water technology that is proposed in this bill. And
I hope we will indeed develop more contained and even safer second-
generation technology. But that technology is based on a once-through
fuel cycle, where you take uranium as your major fuel source, burn it,
and then when you have waste, when the fuel is spent, as we say, that
waste is deposited and you put in more uranium. Out of that waste you
could reprocess, and through chemical additives you can extract
plutonium. The extraction of plutonium reduces it to a very, very small
amount of plutonium, and the plutonium obviously is the bomb-capable
material, taking about 15 pounds to make a bomb.
What this reactor does is create a reprocessing technique that is not
dependent on the uranium, but separates and reuses plutonium. It does
so with the technology that can very easily be used as breeder
technology. I will later point out how the National Academy of Sciences
and others fear the potential for this particular design to provide
breeder technology in other parts of the world.
We know, all of us, how difficult it is to make this kind of choice.
But I respectfully submit that the realities of this particular program
are such that, hopefully, colleagues will decide that we have no
choice. I have pointed out the close to $89 billion history of
expenditure which has left us not even with a technology at this point
in time, let alone the problems with the threat with which it leaves
us. But let me share with my colleagues the projections for this
program if we do not cut it off today. This is what it is going to cost
over the next 15 years if we pour the money into it that is currently
in the mark that comes to us from the committee.
This is the termination line, this red line going across, about $0.3
billion for termination funding.
If, on the other hand, we proceed forward--and I want to emphasize
not just proceed forward with the 4 years of expenditure within the
bill which will take you to a certain point in the technology, but if
you have spent that money and you want to go to the point where you are
really putting this technology on line, you are looking at, going out
to the year 2010, a $3.2 billion expenditure just to begin to prove
whether or not this is indeed truly feasible. As Secretary O'Leary has
said, that is the difference of $2.9 billion, between continuing it and
terminating it.
I will say something later about that. My colleagues are going to try
to make the argument that it is more expensive to terminate than not
to.
That is such an extraordinary argument, given the history of the U.S.
Senate, and we can go into that in a little while. I know they are
going to say it is more expensive to terminate it, and I will show how,
in fact, that is not true.
I just ask any colleague here, as a matter of common sense, what
program, where you have an option between terminating it and not ever
going on with the program or paying for it in a so-called termination
payout--you tell me which is cheaper. There is not a program in the
history of the Senate that has not been cheaper just to end it.
Mr. President, you have the Secretary, the OMB, and all of your
neutral--and I emphasize neutral--observers telling the U.S. Senate
that there is an enormous cost to the continuation of this program.
I know that some of my colleagues are going to say, ``OK, it's
expensive. But even if it's expensive, probably we ought to fund
scientific research because that is a good long-term investment.''
In this case, it is not a good investment because it is never a good
investment to research into something that is a bad idea. The
technology here, even if successful, No. 1, is just not needed. We do
not need this. And, No. 2, it is dangerous. It is dangerous for the
very reasons that the President and Secretary O'Leary have set out: It
threatens the nonproliferation protocol.
I want to make it clear again--and I want to emphasize this--it is
not just dangerous for anything to do with nuclear power, et cetera.
That is not what is the argument here. It is only dangerous because of
the questions that I have raised with respect to proliferation, to the
breeder reactor and, I might add, to the additional waste that this new
technology creates. But the prime reason for Senators being concerned
about this truly remains this question of proliferation.
I also would like to emphasize--and I think it is important to
emphasize this--that the President has asked the Senate not to fund
this program because he and all of the national security team have made
the judgment that this threatens their capacity to make a clean-hands
argument, a legitimate argument to other countries about proliferation.
I think any Senator would say if, indeed, you can create more
plutonium through this, and there is a risk of breeder reactor
capacity, then that technology, being out in the marketplace,
represents more possibilities for rogue nations to begin to pursue that
technology. It is clearly not in the United States interest to do that.
Let me share with my colleagues a letter from Senator Glenn. I think
there is no Member of the Senate who has spent more time on
nonproliferation issues or who has been more on the cutting edge of
holding Pakistan and other countries accountable. He writes a letter to
colleagues. Senator Glenn says:
I urge you to support the Kerry-Gregg-Bumpers amendment.
Events on the Korean peninsula have made all of us more aware
than ever of the dangers of plutonium. The Korean crisis
underscores the importance of U.S. efforts to steer countries
away from programs that produce plutonium by reprocessing and
breeding. But if the United States is itself pursuing breeder
and reprocessing technologies, its credibility in these
nonproliferation efforts will be greatly diminished.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Senator
Glenn, from the Secretary of Energy, and from the President be printed
in the Record.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC, June 30, 1994.
Dear Colleague: When the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Bill comes to the floor, Senators Kerry,
Gregg, and Bumpers will offer an amendment to terminate the
Department of Energy's Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR)
and actinide recycling programs. As a Senator concerned with
stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, I urge you to support
the Kerry-Gregg-Bumpers amendment.
Events on the Korean peninsula have made all of us more
aware than ever of the dangers of plutonium. The Korean
crisis underscores the importance of U.S. efforts to steer
countries away from programs that produce plutonium by
``reprocessing'' and ``breeding.'' (``Reprocessing'' refers
to the extraction of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel;
``breeder reactors'' are reactors that produce more plutonium
than they consume.)
But if the United States is itself pursuing breeder and
reprocessing technologies, its credibility in these
nonproliferation efforts will be greatly diminished. Largely
for this reason, Secretary O'Leary decided to terminate
funding for the ALMR system. According to the Secretary, U.S.
pursuit of plutonium production technologies:
``* * * could provide an excuse for rogue nations to oppose
international efforts to end their plutonium separation
efforts * * * continued support of the IFR would make it
difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to help
lead the world toward reducing the threat of plutonium
proliferation.''
In addition to undermining U.S. non-proliferation policy,
the ALMR system represents a proliferant technology. Recent
studies by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) have confirmed the
warnings of ALMR opponents during last year's floor debate--
that the ALMR could be used by a proliferator to produce
material that is directly usable in a nuclear weapon, and
that it can be readily converted into a breeder reactor even
if it is not originally designed as one.
Finally the ALMR cannot be justified as an option for
disposition of plutonium from nuclear weapons. The
comprehensive NAS study on this subject found the ALMR
inferior to other options because of the technological
uncertainties, long time frame, and high costs that would be
required.
In short, the ALMR does not enhance U.S. nonproliferation
efforts; it is a proliferation risk. I urge you to vote for
the Kerry-Gregg-Bumpers amendment to terminate this unneeded
program.
Best regards
Sincerely,
John Glenn,
Chairman.
____
The Secretary of Energy,
Washington, DC, June 27, 1994.
Hon. John F. Kerry,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Kerry: At your request, we have reviewed the
letter dated June 23, 1994, regarding the Integral Fast
Reactor/Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor program that was
circulated by Senators Simon, Moseley-Braun, Craig, and
Kempthorne. The Administration remains firmly opposed to the
program's continuation.
In summary, terminating the Integral Fast Reactor program
in FY 1995 would save taxpayers $2.9 billion between FY 1995-
2010. If we take the direction that has been outlined in the
budget amendment submitted on June 17, 1994, and your
Integral Fast Reactor termination bill recommending
redirection of the assets of the facility to work on
nonproliferation and environmental cleanup, we would save
$1.3 billion in taxpayer money from FY 1995-2010. This is the
Administration's preferred option.
No further testing of the Integral Fast Reactor concept is
required to prove the technical feasibility of actinide
recycle and burning in a fast spectrum reactor, such as the
Experimental Breeder Reactor in Idaho. The basis physics and
chemistry of this technology are established.
The principal concerns that led me to withdraw my support
for this program are its inconsistencies with our
nonproliferation objectives and the high cost of further
development. Research on the Integral Fast Reactor system is
inconsistent with the Administration's nonproliferation
policy, because the United States does not encourage the
civil use of plutonium and does not engage in plutonium
reprocessing for nuclear power purposes. Because it is based
on plutonium reprocessing and recycle, continued development
of Integral Fast Reactor would undercut our efforts to
discourage other countries from plutonium reprocessing and
recycle.
I also support termination on the grounds that the Integral
Fast Reactor has little commercial potential in the
marketplace. There is no foreseeable prospect that it would
be economically competitive with the next generation of light
water reactors currently being developed with Department of
Energy support. But, continuation of the program in FY 1995
and beyond would be extremely costly. We disagree with the
information contained in the letter mentioned before that a
savings would not be achieved if termination of the Integral
Fast Reactor began in FY 1995. The Department estimates that
it would cost $4.2 billion, including $1 billion of industry
cost-sharing to complete development of the Integral Fast
Reactor. The Department believes it makes little sense to
spend such a large sum.
Termination of the program beginning FY 1995 would require
approximately $0.3 billion between FY 1995-1998. Thus, if the
program is terminated, with no follow on missions, $2.9
billion would be saved between FY 1995-2010.
The Department supports redirecting the scientific,
personnel and technological assets of the laboratory
currently preforming research on the Integral Fast Reactor to
higher priority missions. These missions, which are fully
described in a budget amendment, submitted to Congress on
June 17, 1994, would cost $1.9 billion between FY 1995-2010.
Thus, redirecting the Laboratory to perform critical work
would save $1.3 billion between FY 1995-2010. This is totally
consistent with the legislation (S. 1859) introduced by you
and Senators Bumpers and Gregg, which urged that personnel
assigned to Integral Fast Reactor be reassigned to other
activities of the Department such as nuclear nonproliferation
and environmental cleanup.
For these reasons, I believe that the Integral Fast Reactor
program, including actinide recycle and development of the
advanced liquid metal reactor, should be terminated in FY
1995. The Administration support redirecting the people and
facilities associated with the Integral Fast Reactor to
higher priority projects. Redirection is consistent with the
bill introduced by yourself and Senators Bumpers and Gregg.
These activities are proposed in the Administration's budget
amendment submitted by the President on June 17, 1994. We
would urge congressional support for this approach.
Sincerely,
Hazel R. O'Leary.
____
The White House,
Washington, DC, June 29, 1994.
Hon. John F. Kerry,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear John: Thank you for your letter supporting our
decision to terminate the Department of Energy's (DOE)
advanced liquid metal reactor (ALMR) program, including the
Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) project. I want to assure you
that this Administration does not support the IFR and will
oppose any efforts to continue the funding for this reactor
project. The IFR has no foreseeable commercial value and its
continuation would undercut our international nuclear weapons
nonproliferation efforts.
In an effort to redirect the ALMR's dedicated and talented
workforce at the Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois and
Idaho, the Department of Energy, at under Secretary O'Leary's
direction, recently completed a proposal to restructure its
nuclear research program and focus on areas that support the
Administration's nuclear policy goals. On June 17, 1994, I
asked Congress to consider an amendment to DOE's FY 1995
budget request, which implements this restructuring effort.
The new research areas include high priority energy projects,
such as the development of novel technology to address our
important nonproliferation objectives, research into the safe
decommissioning of nuclear facilities, and fuel cycle safety
studies. By shifting to these higher priority research
programs. DOE will be able to make productive use of the
technical staff at the Argonne National Laboratory to achieve
the Administration's policy goals.
Thank you for your letter of support.
Sincerely,
Bill.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the New York Times on Sunday wrote the
following:
Financing the integral fast reactor would send the wrong
signal to Japan and others who are planning to produce more
plutonium to fuel nuclear power plants. Besides sabotaging
U.S. nonproliferation policy, further research into the ALMR
will put information on plutonium separation into the public
domain.
So, Mr. President, proponents will argue that the U.S. will be
discriminating in sharing this technology, but I tell you, the record
of that is not good. In the past, technology has spread to rogue
nations. North Korea reportedly acquired its advanced European
reprocessing technology that was used in a facility in Belgium, and its
operating reactor is known to be a clone of a British production
reactor.
So here we are, staring in the face of the fact that we have the
potential of war on the Korean peninsula over people pushing the
envelope of nuclear reprocessing, and we know they got their technology
from the British or Belgium, and here we are pursuing a technology
which everybody knows will move across the pages of scientific
publications and ultimately into the marketplace as people buy it and
use it.
Much of the ALMR reprocessing technology is going to be described in
open scientific literature because the contract calls for it to be. At
least one of the contracts on pyroprocessing establishes the right of
the contractors to publish the detailed results of their R&D work. So
here you have the R&D work that is going to be put out into the public
domain as a matter of contractual right.
Further, Mr. President, the ALMR facilities themselves are going to
make plutonium more available to those wishing to acquire it for bonds.
Here we get to one of the central arguments. Proponents say that it
is more proliferation resistant to alternative reprocessing technology,
but I would caution my colleagues that that is not the measurement, No.
1. The meaningful comparison is to compare the ALMR technology with the
current light water reactor technology, the once-through fuel
technology which we currently use to produce electricity in our
reactors. Under this comparison, the ALMR clearly increases
proliferation risks.
I have talked about a National Academy of Sciences study. I would
like to quote from that study so my colleagues are aware of precisely
what the National Academy of Sciences has said:
Possession of such a facility would still offer a State the
technology needed to produce separated plutonium for weapons
should it choose to do so openly.
I talked about new studies. Last year, we had this debate on the
floor of the Senate and my colleague from Louisiana, and others, stood
up and said, ``No, no, this is not a breeder; it can't do this, it
can't do that.''
There have been a series of new studies in the last year. I think it
is three, to be precise. Three studies. Not one of those studies does
anything except confirm what I said last year and refute what the
Senator from Louisiana asserted.
This technology will not recycle the spent fuel from nuclear reactors
and the plutonium from weapons, and each of the independent studies has
come out which refutes the notion that they might. It is almost
shocking, if not hard to believe, that notwithstanding every
independent study, there is not one independent study suggesting to the
contrary.
The National Academy of Sciences published a study saying that the
ALMR is a bad idea for weapons plutonium disposition. My colleagues are
going to try to assert that it is a good idea for disposition, but the
neutral, independent National Academy of Sciences says, no, it is a bad
idea.
The GAO published a study saying that the ALMR is a bad idea for
commercial spent fuel disposition, and the OTA has published a study
agreeing with both of these studies and claiming that the ALMR could
easily become a breeder reactor producing more plutonium than it
consumes.
These are the only--I repeat, the only--objective studies conducted
in the last year, and they all came out against the technology. I think
we would all be well served to heed the independent entities that are
supposed to provide us with advice of this nature.
Let me just point to this list. These are the independent studies.
The DOE says no; GAO, no; OTA, no; NAS, no; Lawrence Livermore Labs,
no; Rand Corp., no; the NRC Committee on International Security and
Arms Control, no.
This is a formidable array of independent studies suggesting that the
Senate should not fund this program, that it is dangerous, that it is a
waste, that it is a combination of the two, and even other reasons why
we should not pursue this program.
Now, further, on the question of weapons plutonium, the National
Academy of Sciences did a very thorough study of just the weapons
plutonium as distinguished from commercial waste, and they concluded
unequivocally that the ALMR was far less desirable than two other
technologies for disposal. And this is why I make the argument, Mr.
President, that this is not necessary. Even if you were to accept the
arguments of the proponents that this is somehow a terrific idea, you
still have to weigh their notion of terrific against less expensive
alternatives and currently available technology.
The fact is that in a neutral analysis of that you come out and you
say to yourself, well, we do not really need to do this because we can
dispose of this fuel faster and safer using one of two other methods.
And those two other methods are to mix the spent fuel, to mix the
plutonium with the current fuels, uranium, et cetera, and when you mix
it up adequately, the reprocessing is so complicated and expensive, as
we found ourselves, that you have effectively eliminated it from use
and danger.
The second means is through vitrification, glassification, creating
glass logs and then you put it in a repository. And every one of the
independent entities that analyzed this have said those are the
preferred routes. They are available today. They do not create more
waste as does the IFR, and they are safe and they are cheaper.
Now, the vitrification technology and the MOX technology as they are
known, are not something that we have to spend another $8 billion to
pursue. I might add, even if you wound up with this technology and you
wanted to go ahead, you are talking about billions of dollars to be
able to spend just to get this into place compared to the costs of the
current disposition.
Mr. President, the National Academy of Sciences said to us that there
is a clear and present danger from the presence of weapons plutonium
and that therefore the most important quality in the solution of it is
speed, the speed with which we can get rid of it, the speed with which
you make that plutonium unusable. Well, the ALMR would in fact take a
great deal longer than either vitrification or MOX, the two other
technologies.
The proposed ALMR system would not start the disposition campaign of
plutonium until after the completion of the vitrification. In other
words, if you have available plutonium, you can begin today immediately
to do the glassification, and the period of time it takes in the
predisposition would take you up until about the year 2005, and then
you begin the actual disposition. And that is because of the handling
and so forth.
In terms of mixing with MOX, it would also take you to about the year
2004, and then the period for disposition because of the time it takes
to dispose and go through the half life, et cetera, would take you up
to the year 2035. But you would not even begin the preparation for
disposition on the current rate of the ALMR until about the year 2015,
and it takes you way out to the year 2045, which is considerably longer
to deal with the problem that the National Academy of Sciences said is
a clear and present danger and one that you ought to deal with
immediately.
Now, Mr. President, there are other reasons why this is wasteful and
dangerous, but I am going to wait until my colleagues have articulated
some of their views as to why we ought to proceed forward. I would
simply say to colleagues that if they will take a moment to peruse the
literature which they have been given, the copies of the studies, the
copies of the editorials, the President's letter, Hazel O'Leary's
letters, and other sources, the conclusion is really inescapable, that
there is no legitimate justification for proceeding forward with this.
It is not a legitimate form of future research. It is not needed. It
represents dangers. There are extraordinary costs attendant to it, far
in excess of what is necessary to deal with the current waste. And
perhaps most important of all, it is clearly making more plutonium
available in the waste stream and in the production stream, which is
always dangerous, in addition to the technology which can be
transferred into breeder capacity, therefore representing an escalation
of the potential for plutonium problems and proliferation problems in
the future. This is not wise, and it is certainly not necessary
measured against other available technologies and means of proceeding
forward.
So I will await further arguments, and at this point in time I yield
the floor.
Mr. JOHNSTON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana is recognized.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, my friend from Massachusetts makes a
very good recitation of arguments on the people who are against the
IFR. I will not engage in listing all the people who are for the IFR.
We could go through the same litany of listing who is for. That should
not determine what we do here.
Suffice it to say, I will quote only from one editorial, which I
think sums up the argument against IFR, from the Chicago Tribune. They
said:
The administration's rationale on the fast reactor is based
at best more on nuclear politics and fuzzy thinking than on
good science. At worst it's another sign of the
administration's hostility toward nuclear energy.
Now, you can dismiss that editorial just as we dismissed the other
editorials that have been talked about here. Today's debate is a pretty
good indication of the fact that if you ask the wrong questions you
will get the wrong answers.
Now, this is a very simple, in my view a very clear, issue in which
the overwhelming, the overwhelming side should say to complete the
studies on the IFR.
Therein lies the first question: What are we trying to do here? Are
we trying to build an integral fast reactor? The answer is no. All we
are trying to do is complete the studies while we make a decision among
the many options, which I will deal with soon, about plutonium.
The administration, Mr. President, has not made a decision on how to
dispose of plutonium. They have not. All they have are a number of
options as to which they have no decision, and so far as I know, they
do not have even an inclination.
Mr. President, my friend from Massachusetts put up a list of people
who say they are all against the IFR, listing prominently the National
Academy of Sciences. Not so, Mr. President. Not so. There are only two
studies that I know of of the National Academy of Sciences. We not only
have those studies but we have held hearings. We have the luxury on the
Energy Committee of holding hearings and bringing forth the experts to
testify about what their studies are and what their opinions are.
One is the Panofsky study, a very distinguished scientist, Pefe
Panofsky from Stanford, who was the chairman of the Management and
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium Study dated 1994. Dr. Panofsky
came before our committee and testified. What he said was that there
are short-term and long-term options for the disposal of plutonium. The
short-term options are what we call the dirty option; that is, you mix
it with reactor fuel, or with waste from Hanford and you store it away.
I will deal with those options soon. As a short-term option, the IFR is
not a particularly good--well, it is not good, and his report so
states. As a long-term option, it is. The long-term option is to burn
up the plutonium. Quoting from page 185 of the Panofsky study, the
long-term disposition, he says:
The ALMR, for example, is a pyro-processing approach
intended to significantly reduce the costs, wastes, and
proliferation risks of reprocessing. In this integrated
reprocessing approach, plutonium is never fully separated in
a form that could be used directly in nuclear weapons,
thereby reducing safeguards concerns.
He goes on to say that:
If operated in a once-through mold, however ALMR--
Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor--
could be used to transform weapons plutonium into spent fuel.
The capital costs of these ALMR concepts are generally higher
than those of the light water reactor, however, and they are
much less close to being licensed in the United States.
What he is saying is that the ALMR, the Advanced Liquid Metal
Reactor, or we call it the IFR, is not close to being licensed. It is a
long-term solution. But it burns up the plutonium.
The other National Academy of Sciences study on Nuclear Power
Technical and Institutional Options for the future states this about
the long-term ALMR. It says:
The committee believes that the LMR should have the highest
priority for long-term nuclear technology development.
The National Academy of Sciences said it should have the highest
priority.
Mr. President, this is a quotation. I have the studies here. I invite
my colleagues to come see it.
If you ask the National Academy of Sciences what is the best short-
term solution, they will tell you indeed that it is not the IFR. If you
ask them what is the long-term solution, they will say the IFR has the
highest priority.
So what is the question here before us today? The question here is
whether to preserve the option for the IFR. Should we build an IFR, Mr.
President? I do not have the slightest idea. And nobody can until these
studies are completed. At the completion of those studies, we can weigh
it against the other options; not until we complete the studies.
What does it cost us to complete the studies, Mr. President? These
are the figures from the Department of Energy. The original DOE request
was $83.8 million; an additional DOE request was $33.2 million, or a
total of $117 million. We are talking fiscal year 1995. This is the DOE
position of terminating the IFR.
Under our option under what the committee has proposed, we have a
total of $113.8 million, and indeed if you get the Japanese cost-
sharing, that is reduced further by $15 million, for a net cost of
$98.8 million. So that you save some $18.2 million with the approach
that the committee has taken in FY 1995.
Let me repeat that, Mr. President. You save money in fiscal year
1995, some $18.2 million; that is, assuming Japanese cost-sharing, and
there is every indication that they will cost share. Without the cost-
sharing, you still have $3.2 million for fiscal year 1995. That is to
complete the study phase.
If you want the 4-year funding profile, this is a 4-year profile to
complete the program, the immediate termination, the Kerry position,
would cost you $344.3 million; the phased termination costs with the
Japanese contribution would cost you $327.8 million; the bottom line is
a cost savings of $16.5 million to complete the studies.
Mr. President, that sounds counterintuitive. The reason that it costs
more to terminate than to complete the studies is, first of all, that
the termination costs involve continuing to operate the reactor and
using this spent fuel in the reactor which adds additional costs. In
addition to that, the Department of Energy had additional, I guess what
you might call, pork to satisfy Illinois.
So, Mr. President, let me make it clear, and I hope my colleague from
Massachusetts will admit the fact that it costs less money to pursue
the option we propose than to terminate the program now. Let me repeat
that. It costs less money to pursue the option from the Appropriations
Committee which will give us a look at the option than it does to
immediately terminate the program.
Mr. President, what is involved in plutonium? Why this special
concern with plutonium? The reason is, Mr. President, of course
plutonium is a poison and is long-lived. Frankly, that is not the
biggest reason. Uranium is long-lived, as is arsenic, for example,
which has no half life. It just goes on forever. The problem of dealing
with and storing plutonium is not particularly a formidable scientific
challenge. I mean it is a challenge, no doubt. But it is one where Dr.
Panofsky said we are not so much worried about dealing with the
plutonium on the short-term basis for example in the tanks at Hanford
using known scientific technology. We can deal with that. The problem
is that plutonium has a proliferation problem. It has a proliferation
problem that uranium does not have.
The reason is, first of all, that it takes less of it to make a bomb.
Ten pounds of plutonium will make a bomb, whereas it takes some 30
pounds of uranium 235. So a lesser quantity of it will make a bomb as,
indeed, we are finding out in North Korea where small amounts of
plutonium might give them one or two bombs right now according to
published reports.
Second, it is more easily separable than is uranium 235. You can
blend uranium 235 with uranium 238 which occurs naturally and is not
fissionable. And you cannot then separate that without going to an
enormous amount of expense which no terrorist in the world and
virtually no Third World country could do. Uranium enrichment
requirements which you require for uranium are formidable indeed.
On the other hand, Mr. President, plutonium can be chemically
separated. There are some 26 countries in the world including North
Korea that have what we call the PUREX process where you simply take
the plutonium and spent fuel rods, mix it with acid and other things
that will in effect leech out the pure plutonium, and you can have your
plutonium for a bomb. A terrorist cannot do it. But Third World
countries like North Korea presently have the ability to do that.
So it is because of that that we look to a long-term solution. There
are now in this country in plutonium bombs about 100 tons of plutonium.
There are probably 250 tons of plutonium worldwide. Remember, only 10
pounds can make a bomb. So if you have 250 tons of this stuff
worldwide, it is a very big threat.
It is also a big problem, Mr. President, because in its pure form--
and people say it is so highly reactive and poisonous--but the fact of
the matter is, in its pure form, as in the bomb form, the pits, made
out of pure plutonium, you can put it in your pocket and walk out of
the factory with it. That is one of the big problems. It emits what
they call alpha rays, which if you ingest it, it can kill you, and will
kill you in sufficient amounts. You can hold it in your hand, and the
alpha rays do not penetrate the skin or do not penetrate a piece of
paper. So it is a material that can be handled like this glass of
water. You can put it under your overcoat and walk out of the building
and go make a bomb. That is the problem with plutonium.
Mr. President, we have what we call short-term and long-term
solutions. My friend from Massachusetts talked about one of the short-
term solutions. We have extensive hearing records on these solutions,
Mr. President.
The first is to take the plutonium and put it in existing light water
reactors in Palo Verde, AZ. There are certain advantages to doing so.
There are only three of these reactors in the country that can use
this. What you do is take the plutonium and mix it with uranium fuel.
The problem with using that reactor in Arizona is that it is a private
company. It would assume significant licensing and security burdens.
Frankly, the Department of Energy has not explored this with Palo
Verde. It is an option, but they have not explored it, I think, for the
very reasons I have said. There is a resistance to using private
reactors to burn up fuel.
The second is to use the uncompleted nuclear reactors in Washington,
what we call the WPPSS reactor. This is the so-called Isaiah project,
Mr. President. I do not see my friend from Oregon on the floor, but I
can tell you that he is absolutely apoplectic about the idea of even
considering completing the WPPSS project in the State of Washington and
using that to burn up the fuel.
That Isaiah project, Mr. President, is not even being pursued as an
option by the Department of Energy. We had the Department of Energy up
and asked them, ``What are the options you are going to pursue? Isaiah
is one of them. Are you keeping the Isaiah reactor in shape where you
can use it?'' They said, ``No.'' I said, ``Well, is it an option or
not? Are you using it as an option?'' They said, ``Well, it is an
option, but we are not going to fund the option.'' I am sure that met
with great approval by the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield].
Nevertheless, it is one of the options, and you can treat it as
seriously as you wish, but I can tell you that the Department of Energy
is not funding that. They have not talked to them in Arizona.
The third is to use the Candu reactor in Canada. We have not talked
to Canada either, Mr. President. They have not agreed to use their
reactors to burn weapons-grade plutonium. It would involve transporting
large amounts of weapons plutonium or reactor plutonium out of the
country. You can say, well, that is a great option, but the Canadians
have not agreed to it. I do not know of anybody in this country that is
pushing it. So treat that one as seriously as you like, Mr. President.
The fourth is the modular helium reactor, which may be a very good
option, again, in the long term. It can actually burn up the plutonium.
These first three reactor options really just dirty up the plutonium,
make it difficult to separate. But you could separate it by the Purex
process. Again, 26 countries have that Purex process, including North
Korea. It makes it proliferation-proof in the sense that you cannot put
it in your pocket and carry it out of the building. It is not as good
as the IFR, which can actually burn up the plutonium.
The modular helium reactor is in the very early stages. There is $12
million to pursue that option in this bill. That is not a lot. It is a
long way down the line. There are some international interests in it.
The Russians have some particular interest in the modular helium
reactor as a long-term solution. But we are a long way away from that,
and it would cost a lot of money.
The next option is this option, the integral fast reactor. It has
advantages that nothing else has. It will actually burn up the fuel. It
will actually take the plutonium and not just dirty it up --which would
require the Purex process to again separate it--it would actually
consume the plutonium. That is the great advantage of IFR. It also has
the great advantage of reducing the amount of waste, reducing the space
you would need to dispose of the waste.
There are still other options, Mr. President. You can indefinitely
store the nuclear warheads. We store some of those down at Barksdale
Field in my hometown. I do not think people indefinitely want to have
these nuclear warheads where somebody could break in and cart off a
nuclear warhead or a pit to a nuclear warhead. I do not think that is a
serious option.
Another is to vitrify with high-level waste and bury it in the
repository. That is, mix it with glass. I saw a chart of my friend from
Massachusetts that said we can start doing that in 1995. Not so, Mr.
President. We do not have a single plant in this country that can
vitrify. There are as yet tremendous problems in vitrifying using
plutonium, because the science of where you get to a critical mass and
the storage of plutonium in a vitrified form is not known; it is way
down the line. Nevertheless, Mr. President, this is a short-term
solution. We have not agreed or decided, as a country, which option to
use. This is only a temporary option. It would still be possible to go
in and retrieve those vitrified logs and extract the plutonium and make
bombs out of those. Maybe that is the solution that the country will
come to. The Department of Energy has not made that decision.
You can see what the advantages and disadvantages are. You have to
store it in a nuclear waste dump, and it can be reprocessed to extract
the plutonium from it. Or you could drop it down in deep bore holes in
the Earth's crust. If you cannot do that with fuel rods, you certainly
could not do it with plutonium.
You could dispose of it under the sea bed. Scientists tell us that is
a serious solution and it could be done. I do not think the American
people would put up with the idea of disposing of these things--what
they do is they have these little screw things that would get down to
the silt in the bottom of the ocean and screw themselves down into the
silt. Scientists say it is serious. I do not think it is serious. I do
not think anyone likes the idea of putting all that plutonium in the
ocean.
Or you could detonate the warheads underground. Again that is a
nonstarter.
Launch it into space. That is good except at what cost? And what
happens if they fall back to Earth as too many of our rockets do.
Or you could dilute it in the ocean, literally. Scientists tell us
you can do that, just dilute it. The ocean is big. I do not think we
want to take the chance of having all that plutonium in our oceans and
fish ingesting it.
As you can see, Mr. President, most of these options are not options
at all. There are serious options here, some of which are not being
seriously pursued by the Department of Energy. And clearly as a long-
term solution the integral fast reactor is really the best solution, if
it works, if it can be done in a cost effective way. But we do not know
that until we pursue the option.
Now, what did the National Academy of Science say. They say the long-
term steps will be needed to reduce the proliferation risks posed by
the entire global stock--that is about 250 tons--of plutonium
particularly as the radioactivity of spent fuel decays.
To further refine these concepts, research on fission options for the
near total elimination of plutonium should continue at the conceptual
level.
(Mrs. MURRAY assumed the chair.)
Mr. JOHNSTON. Remember, Madam President, the IFR is the only one that
eliminates the plutonium. All the others dilute it in poisonous fuel,
which makes it more difficult to deal with it to be sure, but this is
the only one that eliminates it.
Research and development should be undertaken immediately to resolve
the outstanding uncertainties facing each of the options. There are
tremendous uncertainties as to the costs, as to the practicality. All
of these things are uncertain--uncertainties. That is why at no cost to
the taxpayer, using the Department of Energy's fission, we should
complete the 4-year research program to ripen this option along with
these other options.
These options, Madam President, are not without risk. Each one has
some risk. But this option, the IFR, the integral fast reactor, or the
advanced liquid metal reactor, as others would call it, is the only one
that eliminates the plutonium. Indeed it takes a long time to do so,
but it does eliminate the plutonium. And in the process of burning the
plutonium in the reactor it is never in a form that can be easily dealt
with by terrorists. That is it will be in an irradiated form, just as
the fuel rods from light water reactors can be chemically processed
using that purex. Nevertheless, it would be very difficult during the
process of burning these up to take them away.
As the National Academy of Science says, plutonium is never fully
separated--this is the IFR process--in a form that could be used
directly in nuclear weapons thereby reducing safeguard concerns.
The National Academy of Science is recognizing that using the IFR,
and during this period in which you are burning up and eliminating the
plutonium, that you never have the plutonium in a form where the
terrorists can take it away. I mean they could not transport it, in
effect.
The Department of Energy says it is highly diversion resistant.
The Office of Technology Assessment says compared with other older
technologies that have been used to reprocess and separate spent
reactor fuel and to separate plutonium, the ALMR system--that is this
system--may offer more proliferation advantages because of technical
barriers that could be designed into the system.
The point of all these, and I think it is accepted, and I do not
think this would be argued to the contrary, is that the IFR is
proliferation resistant, more so than the other options.
Now, Madam President, how does this thing work and how does it
differ? This is a little bit of a complicated chart, but it compares
light water reactor plants, the existing plants, with the ALWR in the
light water plant.
You mine uranium and fabricate fuel; you put it in the light water
reactor. This is a traditional nuclear reactor. You generate your
electricity. The spent fuel comes out and you store it in Yucca
Mountain, or wherever, or in the spent fuel pools, in the meantime.
With the advanced liquid metal reactor, you can actually take the
spent fuel from the light water reactor and put it in a reprocessing
plant. You can also take the plutonium from nuclear weapons. Remember
we have about 100 tons in this country of plutonium from nuclear
weapons, or 250 tons worldwide. You can take those and put it then in
your advanced liquid metal reactor and generate electricity. Then you
put it back in your IFR plant where it burns. Once-through, it burns up
about 25 percent of the plutonium.
You bring it back in your recycle plant where you remix the fuel,
leaving it in a form that is not proliferation friendly, always being
proliferation resistant. You put it right back into your advanced
liquid metal reactor until all the plutonium is gone.
The plutonium is gone, and that is why we call it a long-term
solution.
Now, Madam President, I am not here saying that we ought to build the
IFR or the advanced liquid metal reactor. I am saying that we ought, at
no cost to the taxpayer, look at this option and compare it to the
other options because these other options, Madam President, have
downsides, too.
You know, it is very easy to say we do not want to do the IFR; we
want to do something else. You say, what else do you want to do? They
say, one of the options is the WPPSS reactor up in Washington. You say,
good. What do you have to do to make that come about? First of all, we
have to maintain that reactor by putting some money into it. Are you
maintaining it? No. Do you lose that option by not maintaining it? Yes.
So, they say anything but IFR. But when you ask them what is the
solution they have none. That is why, at no cost to the taxpayer, we
ought to get a look-see and complete the 4-year research term.
Now, Madam President, let me deal quickly with one or two other red
herrings here. First of all, that is the son of Clinch River, and this
is a breeder reactor. Any reactor, Madam President, breeds a certain
amount of plutonium. A regular light water reactor breeds plutonium or
makes plutonium. I mean you start off with U-235 and U-238, and you end
up with a lot of fission products and some plutonium which can be
separated out using PUREX. To be sure it is not terribly efficient like
with most light water reactors, but it can be done.
Now, indeed, this reactor as well as most any other reactors can be
reconfigured to breed plutonium. But according to the Department of
Energy, in a question asked by Senator Bumpers in writing to the
Department of Energy, they say it would take some $60 million and some
3-plus years to convert this reactor to a breeder reactor.
It is not now a breeder reactor. It is not a son of Clinch River. I
mean, it is different from Clinch River. Clinch River used an oxide
fuel. This uses a metal fuel. Clinch River was not passively safe. This
is passively safe, proliferation resistant. Clinch River had primary
components in multiple vaults. This uses a single vault. Clinch River
breeds plutonium. This burns plutonium.
Advanced nuclear physicist and Nobel Prize winner Hans Bethe said:
Some members of your committee, I am told, believe that the
IFR is a repackaging of the defunct Clinch River breeder.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
Madam President, my friend from Massachusetts and I can stay up here
all day and say, ``Yes, it is,'' ``No, it isn't.'' The Nobel Prize
winner Hans Bethe says, ``Nothing could be further from the truth''
that this is the son of Clinch River, that this is a breeder reactor.
It is not.
The Department of Energy, which, to be sure, opposes the IFR, says 3
years and $60 million. As I said in the debate last time, Madam
President, you could make an airplane out of a speedboat, and that is
no reason not to say do not buy the speedboat to go fishing just
because you can make an airplane out of it. Or you could make a silk
purse out of a sow's ear, given enough time and enough money.
But, Madam President, we are talking $60 million and 3 years plus. So
the idea that somehow this will be regarded as the son of Clinch River
and as a new breeder reactor is just not so. It is just not true. To be
sure, it will have the capability, with modifications, as will any
other reactor in the country, with greater or lesser efficiency, to
breed plutonium. But it is neither intended nor capable of doing that.
And, as the Nobel Prize winning laureate Hans Bethe says, ``Nothing
could be further from the truth.''
Madam President, I hope we will take a look at this; that we will
complete this research program.
If I could put up that 4-year cost just one more time. Really, the
key to this argument is this: It is a research program to preserve the
option to finish the design of this project which, in the finishing of
the research, we will be able to answer these tough questions. It costs
less money to finish the research program than to terminate it, using
the Department of Energy's figures. Until the Department of Energy can
give us some justification of what option they have chosen, they should
not foreclose what the National Academy of Sciences says is the best
long-term option.
Is it likely that we would ever build the reactor? I do not know,
Madam President. You cannot make that judgment until you finish the
program. But to say we are going to shoot it into space, or we are
going to dilute it in the ocean, or we are going to sink it on the
ocean floor, or we are going to use some technology like vitrification,
which we do not now have, to foreclose this option when we do not have
that option, does not make any sense. Or to say we are going to send it
to Canada when we have not even talked to the Canadians, or we are
going to go to Palo Verde, when we have not even talked to the Arizona
Public Service Co.
You talk about the antinukes; they would come unglued if you tried to
use a civilian reactor for the purpose of burning plutonium. And the
WPPSS reactor, they are not even funding the possibility and they lose
that possibility in the so-called WPPSS reactor, the so-called Isaiah
project, by failing the funding. They say it is an option, on the one
hand, and they foreclose the option, on the other hand.
That is why, Madam President, this solution, at no cost to the
taxpayer to finish a 4-year research program, is the only prudent thing
for this country to do.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
Mr. SIMON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. SIMON. Madam President, I strongly concur with my colleague from
Louisiana, and I say this as one who has generally voted antinuclear. I
voted against the Price-Anderson limit on liability because I do not
think there should be this exemption from liability for the nuclear
industry. Had there not been that limitation on liability, we would not
have had the kind of developments that we had.
I have also learned over the years that there is no Member of the
U.S. Congress, House or Senate, who knows as much in the scientific
area as Senator Bennett Johnston from Louisiana. If you want a good
argument against term limits, Bennett Johnston of Louisiana is the
argument, because it takes a huge amount of time to develop that kind
of expertise.
Now, it has been said that the President of the United States is
opposed to it and the administration has gone on record against it.
I could read you a letter from a year ago, where the President of the
United States was for it. What happened in the meantime? Is there any
scientific development in the meantime? None that I am aware of.
I think what happened is a political decision was made, and I
understand that. We all understand political decisions. A political
decision was made because some of the people who are antinuclear, just
as a reflex action, went to work on the White House and the decision
was made that we are going to try and satisfy them.
The Secretary of Energy has come out against it. But let me tell you
that the personnel, the scientific personnel in the Department of
Energy, are overwhelmingly for this development.
Those of us who are interested in seeing that we have nuclear energy
that does not have weapons-grade plutonium ought to be very, very much
for this. The Presiding Officer right now, Senator Murray from the
State of Washington--a fresh, new face who is adding luster to this
body--has the second largest accumulation of weapons-grade plutonium in
her State, 11 tons. Only Colorado, with 12.9 tons, has more. The people
of Washington have a great stake in this.
As my colleague from Louisiana pointed out, we are not talking about
the Clinch River breeder reactor.
Then what about the cost factor? You see the things here. You heard
my colleague from Massachusetts read a letter from the Secretary of
Energy, for whom I have a high regard, who said it is going to cost
$2.7 billion if we carry this out to commercialization. That is the
commercializing of it. That is a decision that will be made if this is
successful. We do not know for sure if it is going to be successful.
But, presumably, the commercialization is going to be paid by
commercial interests.
But let us listen to the same Secretary of Energy--this is on March 9
of this year--over in the House Energy and Power Subcommittee.
Representative Crapo asked:
Also, it is my understanding that there is termination
money in the budget for this project. I have been advised
that the amount of money that it will take to terminate this
research exceeds, or at least equals, the amount of money it
will take to complete the research. Do you have an
understanding in that regard?
Secretary O'Leary: ``That is correct.''
Then, come over to the Senate. On March 23, the distinguished junior
Senator from Idaho asked the Secretary: ``Is it true that the decision
to terminate the IFR program is not based on budgetary savings?''
Secretary O'Leary: ``Not in the near time; you're absolutely
correct.''
We are not talking about dollars being saved here. We are talking
about whether we should proceed with research so we can develop nuclear
energy that cannot be converted to nuclear weapons. That is what the
fight is all about. And I think it just absolutely does not make sense
at all for us not to move ahead on this.
I ask unanimous consent to have an article from Business Week printed
at this point in the Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From Business Week, Mar. 22, 1993]
A Big-Science Cut that Could Drown Us in Nuclear Waste
While the science community is feeling rather good,
overall, about President Clinton's technology agenda, there's
one curious slight: Funding for the Integral Fast Reactor
(IFR) has been dropped. Many scientists think the decision is
shortsighted. In fact, a recent study by the National Academy
of Sciences tagged the IFR as the No. 1 priority in nuclear-
reactor science.
The IFR program was originally launched by Argonne National
Laboratory to develop a safer nuclear-power plant. But it
evolved into something far more important. The reactor could
burn the spent nuclear fuel from traditional nuclear plants--
waste that will otherwise pose a radioactive threat for
thousands of years. Moreover, the IFR should be able to burn
the radioactive plutonium recovered from dismantled nuclear
weapons. Tons of this nasty stuff have already piled up at a
remote site near Amarillo, Tex.--with lots more to come.
Without the IFR, this weapons-grade plutonium may have to be
guarded night and day for centuries.
Mr. SIMON. Business Week: March 22, ``A Big-Science Cut That Could
Drown Us in Nuclear Waste.''
This says if we cut this, we have nuclear waste problems.
While the science community is feeling rather good,
overall, about President Clinton's technology agenda, there's
one curious slight: Funding for the Integral Fast Reactor
(IFR) has been dropped. Many scientists think the decision is
shortsighted. In fact, a recent study by the National Academy
of Sciences tagged the IFR as the No. 1 priority in nuclear-
reactor science.
The Livermore National Labs have been quoted here. Listen to what
they have to say.
In summary, using IFR high transuranic plutonium would add
significant difficulties to a proliferation of the Nation's
nuclear weapons program as compared to using weapons grade or
reactor grade plutonium.
The House Appropriations Committee on Energy and Water used this
language in their report. It is not simply the Senate committee that
unanimously, and I underscore unanimously, voted this out. Listen to
what the House committee said:
The committee has significant reservation over the
elimination of the advanced liquid metal reactor. The
committee considers the research conducted to be vital to
maintain a nuclear option for future generations.
What do the scientists at Argonne say? What will happen? In terms of
fuel, a thousand megawatt light water reactor uses 20 tons per year.
The IFR, 1,000 megawatt, will use 1,500 pounds; less than 5 percent.
Waste, nuclear waste--what are we talking about? Light water reactor,
20 tons per year. IFR, if it works--and we cannot be sure--1,500 pounds
per year.
Plutonium waste: Light water reactor, 1,000 megawatts, 500 pounds per
year; integral fast reactor, zero.
If we are interested in doing what we can to reduce weapons
proliferation and to solve this problem of nuclear waste, I think we
ought to be moving ahead with the integral fast reactor. And I think
the evidence is overwhelming.
Candidly, I got into this because Argonne, an Illinois facility, was
involved. And I went in, frankly, with no commitment to them to support
it. I went in very, very reluctantly. I have become convinced this is
something essential to the future of the Nation.
Let me also mention that just this month the Department of Energy
made a report. My colleague from Louisiana will be interested in this.
Just this month the Department of Energy made a report on the Seawolf.
What does it say we are going to do with the residue from the Seawolf?
They have a little map in here. It shows it all going out to Idaho.
They are going to use the integral fast reactor. The Department of
Energy says that is the way we take care of the fuel from this.
The evidence is just overwhelming that we ought to be moving in this
direction. I hope we will do the right thing, the logical thing, and
continue this program. If we do the political thing I, frankly--I do
not know where the political side is on this for Members. But I know
where the right thing is. If you look at how we stop the potential of
producing weapons grade plutonium, there is no question on that. I
think that is something that is important to our children, to the
pages, to future generations.
I strongly support the comments of Senator Johnston and urge that the
Kerry amendment be defeated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.
Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Madam President, we have been told here today on
the floor, and in private conversations before today, that the decision
the Senate is about to make is principally about nonproliferation,
about technology options, and about our nuclear future. But that
premise is wrong.
Although the Senate has heard a thoughtful and well-presented set of
arguments for terminating the IFR project operated by Argonne National
Laboratory, these arguments are all based on the same faulty premise
that the Senate is, today, deciding whether or not to commercialize the
advanced liquid metal reactor/integral fast reactor technology. That is
not the issue.
Although a letter, Madam President, circulated by the administration
and referred to by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, makes
that case, the fact is the Senate is not deciding whether to build a
commercial-type prototype for the period of fiscal years 1995-2010.
Rather, the Senate has before it two much more limited questions. I
would like for a moment to pick up the debate where the distinguished
Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Johnston] left off in that regard.
The limited questions are, first, whether to complete ALMR/IFR
technology research which has been underway since 1984 and has only 2
more years to go before it is finished and the test reactor is shut
down in any event; and, second, whether it is cheaper to finish the
project now or to terminate it prematurely.
As the administration's own figures state flatly and clearly, it is
now less expensive to complete this research than it is to arbitrarily
shut it down prematurely. Those are the only questions, the real
questions before the Senate today.
At this juncture, we must decide only whether to terminate research
that is 80 percent complete, when doing so costs more money instead of
saving money. Premature termination of this project will cost $344
million between 1995 and 1998. Finishing research, on the other hand--
that is defeating this amendment and letting the IFR research program
go forward--will cost $327 million over the same time period. So
finishing the research, as Senator Johnston has eloquently pointed out
with his charts, actually saves taxpayers $16.5 million over 4 years. A
vote to kill this research program today is a vote to spend more money,
not less.
In testimony before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee
on the 1st of March, the then-Acting Director of Nuclear Programs in
DOE stated:
Funding [for the ALMR/IFR program] comes out the same
either way, given the participation [from the Japanese] that
we are expecting.
That has been confirmed by Secretary O'Leary before the House Energy
and Power Subcommittee this year. It is now less costly to complete
this experiment than it is to kill it. The Japanese want to help pay to
complete the research. They have committed to provide some $60 million
through fiscal year 1998 to do so. However, if we cancel the
experiment, we will bear the total costs alone. In fact, if we do not
do the research, not only would we wind up paying to prematurely shut
this down by ourselves, but the Japanese will go forward with the
technology on their own--with or without us. They make that point very
clearly in a letter to my distinguished colleague from Louisiana.
I ask unanimous consent to have this printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Power Reactor and Nuclear
Fuel Development Corp.,
June 17, 1994.
Hon. Bennett Johnston,
Committee on Appropriations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington DC.
Dear Senator Johnston, In response to your inquiry, I would
be pleased to provide you with information on the status of
PNC's views about actinide recycling R&D activities. We have
three cooperative agreements with the Department of Energy
[DOE] in the areas of fast breeder reactors, waste management
activities, and safeguards. In general, we would like to
enhance our cooperative R&D activities with the DOE since we
believe that, through joint efforts in areas of mutual
interest, each country can further its own research agenda
and conserve limited budget resources as well.
In this regard, we did make a specific offer earlier this
year to contribute to a multi-year, R&D program on actinide
recycling and the IFR directed by the Argonne National
Laboratory [ANL]. If realized, this would have marked the
first commitment by a corporation affiliated with the
Japanese Government such as our (although several Japanese
private entities have supported certain projects in this
area). We came very close to reaching a final agreement with
the DOE.
Our tentative assumption for this cooperative project was
approximately $60 million over five years, subject of course
to the approval of the budgetary authorities in Japan.
However, the project was abruptly terminated by the DOE in
January of this year when funding wasn't identified in the
Administration's request for FY 1995 budget. We were
therefore forced to cease cooperative discussions with the
DOE and no longer secure financial resources for this
cooperative project in coming years.
Meanwhile, we are starting on our own to carry out R&D in
the field of actinide recycling. A new long-term plan for
nuclear energy, under the auspices of the Atomic Energy
Commission of Japan, will include specific reference to the
importance of carrying out R&D on advanced reactors,
including those for recycling actinides. It requires
technologies which are still in the initial stage of
research, but we are committed to proceed with R&D in the
long-term in order to make tangible progress.
We remain interested in working with the DOE in this field,
although its recent actions don't provide a stable, credible
basis on which to proceed at this point. If Congress were to
restore the program for the next fiscal year, we would
reconsider our options about participating in a joint
program.
We appreciate your interest and leadership on these issues
and hope our two Governments can continue to cooperate on
nuclear energy and other advanced technologies in the future.
Sincerely,
Takao Ishiwatari,
President.
Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. I will not read the letter. I believe Senator
Johnston has already referenced the letter, talking about the lack of
participation in the shutdown costs from the Japanese. But this is a
serious budgetary mistake, for us to move in the direction the Senator
from Massachusetts suggests.
Madam President, I am surprised that at a time of real budget crisis,
when we are having such difficulty finding money to meet important
domestic priorities, such as more police on the streets, health care
reform and welfare reform, we are contemplating dumping a billion
dollars of tax money into the trash. Let there be no mistake about it
at all, that is precisely what we would be doing if we vote to kill
this program today.
We have already spent roughly $800 million on this research. We will
spend roughly another $330 million whether we terminate the research
before it is finished, or whether we carry out research to its
completion. Either way, we are going to spend a total of a billion
dollars.
Ending the ALMR/IFR Program now saves absolutely nothing. It simply
wastes money and, worst still, it wastes a decade worth of research. We
are here debating this on the floor now because, quite frankly, I think
an artificial decision point has been created.
The real decision on the ALMR/IFR is in 1998, consistent with the
time-line outline in the Energy Policy Act of 1992. That act directs
the Secretary of Energy to assess ALMR/IFR technology when, and only
when, adequate scientific data exists to make a well-informed
conclusion.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that a relative page of this
act be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Energy Policy Act of 1992
SEC. 2122. PROGRAM, GOALS, AND PLAN.
(a) Program Direction.--The Secretary shall conduct a
program to encourage the deployment of advanced nuclear
reactor technologies that to the maximum extent practicable--
(1) are cost effective in comparison to alternative sources
of commercial electric power of comparable availability and
reliability, taking into consideration life cycle
environmental costs;
(2) facilitate the design, licensing, construction, and
operation of a nuclear powerplant using a standardized
design;
(3) exhibit enhanced safety features; and
(4) incorporate features that advance the objectives of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.
(b) Program Goals.--The goals of the program established
under subsection (a) shall include--
(1) for the near-term--
(A) to facilitate the completion, by September 30, 1996,
for certification by the Commission, of standardized advanced
light water reactor technology designs that the Secretary
determines have the characteristics described in subsection
(a) (1) through (4);
(B) to facilitate the completion of submissions, by
September 30, 1996, for preliminary design approvals by the
Commission of standardized designs for the modular high-
temperature gas-cooled reactor technology and the liquid
metal reactor technology; and
(C) to evaluate by September 30, 1996, actinide burn
technology to determine if it can reduce the volume of long-
lived fission byproducts;
(2) for the mid-term--
(A) to facilitate increased efficiency of enhanced safety,
advanced light water reactors to produce electric power at
the lowest cost to the customer;
(B) to develop advanced reactor concepts that are passively
safe and environmentally acceptable; and
(C) to complete necessary research and development on high-
temperature gas-cooled reactor technology and liquid metal
reactor technology to support the selection, by September 30,
1998, of one or both of those technologies as appropriate for
prototype demonstration; and
(3) for the long-term, to complete research and development
and demonstration to support the design of advanced reactor
technologies capable of providing electric power to a utility
grid as soon as practicable but no later than the year 2010.
(c) Program Plan.--Within 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall prepare and submit
to the Congress a 5-year program plan to guide the activities
under this section. The program plan shall include schedule
milestones, Federal funding requirements, and non-Federal
cost sharing requirements. In preparing the program plan, the
Secretary shall take into consideration--
(1) the need for, and the potential for future adoption by
electric utilities or other entities of, advanced nuclear
reactor technologies that are available, under development,
or have the potential for being developed, for the generation
of energy from nuclear fission;
Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Madam President, I am not going to hide the fact--
and Senator Simon, I think, has spoken eloquently about the fact that
there are jobs involved. These are jobs of highly skilled scientists
with hundreds of years of cumulative experience. Five hundred
Illinoisans and 900-plus some Idahoans accepted the invitation of this
Government to perform this research. These scientists have had to
commit their entire careers to long-term, Government-sponsored research
projects. They make those commitments for decades at a time, totally
dependent on our orderly establishment of research priorities.
But Government science policy has been far from orderly these days,
Madam President. In fact, it has been chaotic and, I would suggest,
disruptive. We are faced now with playing political games with people's
careers and people's families.
Look at the space station, for example; look at the SSC. When we make
a commitment to these long-term projects, we ought to at least not move
precipitously to end those commitments unless there are absolute,
compelling budgetary reasons that force us to do otherwise.
An article in last year's Washington Post written after the demise of
the SSC makes the point very well and I want to quote from that:
To one * * * family * * * and their two young daughters,
their news from Washington seemed a cruel twist * * *. They
cannot understand why * * * lawmakers were never committed to
the project.
One scientist employed at the SSC said, ``They don't care
up there* * * they don't seem to understand how they've been
jerking around the citizens down here.''
Another made the point that, ``* * * the Government asked
the scientists and computer experts and engineers to come
work on this * * *. We were invited * * *. Next time will
everybody come? Will anybody listen? The Government has
really blown its credibility.''
Well, Madam President, we might just blow it again and, in this case,
we do not have the compelling budgetary justification that drove the
SSC decision. What must the American scientific community think of
Congress? What must the American people think of the Congress, now that
we have just spent $1 billion of their tax money for absolutely nothing
if this amendment is successful?
Such poor policy decisions end up discouraging scientists and eager
students from entering Government research, and I think that is the
real danger that is done here.
At some point, we are going to have to stop such disruptive and
herky-jerky turnaround science policy. The Government signed a
contract, the Government made a commitment to Illinois and Idaho
scientists and, Madam President, perhaps--just perhaps--it is time for
the Government to keep its word.
I have further concerns about the process in which this decision was
made. The Energy Policy Act of 1992, which underwent intense debate and
scrutiny, calls for final evaluation of the Actinide Recycle Program in
1996 and for a final decision to proceed with prototype construction in
1998.
Instead, the administration made a major energy policy decision
behind closed doors, slipped it into the budget without consulting
Congress and without fully obtaining the views of the scientific
community. That is one of the reasons, I submit, for the battle of the
network editorials that we are seeing on the floor. We do not yet have
the conclusive scientific evidence and data that the law originally
contemplated for evaluating the efficacy of this program.
Opponents of completing the IFR experiments cite a mosaic of reports
conducted on the ALMR/IFR. They argue these reports appear to show
consensus within the scientific community against this experiment. The
problem is that the reports that are being referenced evaluate the
ALMR/IFR technology solely for plutonium disposal, or solely for waste
disposal, but not in the context of its primary purpose, which is to
provide a future energy source.
It is like the old story about the blindfolded men who confront an
elephant from different prospectives. One guessed it was a tree,
another guessed it was a snake. These reports come from the ALMR/IFR
from different directions but do not address what it was fundamentally
designed to do. We must look at this project as a sum of its parts.
The ALMR/IFR was designed to produce energy. It just so happens it
can burn plutonium and nuclear waste as well. A 1992 National Research
Council report on future options looked at the ALMR/IFR in this context
and concludes:
The LMR should have the highest priority for long-term
nuclear technology deployment.
A recent report from the Office of Technology Assessment also points
out the following:
The development of this technology needs to be considered
in the context of plutonium disposition policy objectives--as
well as overall policy objectives.
Although the 1994 National Academy of Sciences report concludes the
ALMR/IFR should not be deployed solely for plutonium disposition in the
short-term, the report does, in fact, go on to say that in the context
of future nuclear energy options, ALMR/IFR technology, and I quote,
``offers the possibility of pursuing the elimination approach in the
long term, not only for weapons plutonium, but also for the much larger
quantities of civilian sector plutonium.''
Further, the OTA report clearly emphasizes the need to complete this
research, and I quote:
Because of the nature of any research project in which both
problems and opportunities have yet to be discovered, it is
difficult to evaluate the suitability and potential [of the
ALMR/IFR] for any specific goal. Such a research project will
change and adapt in response to data gathered during its
development.
I digress for a moment from the quote. That is precisely what
research is about--change and adaptation.
Thus, the OTA analysis reflects that uncertainty.
And then the report goes on to say:
OTA cannot provide conclusive results regarding its
potential for newly identified uses other than power
production.
So, Madam President, if money then is not a factor, and as we have
already demonstrated, we are going to lose money in the process, why
not let us finish this research?
IFR opponents go on to say that the 1994 National Academy of Sciences
report rejects ALMR/IFR technology. But let us put that report in
perspective. The premise of the report was to assess the quickest,
cheapest way to deweaponize plutonium from dismantled weapons into a
form useless for a proliferator, into a form like spent fuel.
Given the dangers posed by that material, I certainly agree that we
need to do that. And to do that, the NAS report recommends that: One,
we use plutonium as fuel in existing reactors or, two, mix plutonium
with radioactive waste, glassify it and bury it, and that will take
care of it in the short-term. However, not only would burning plutonium
through existing reactors in the U.S. require relicensing and expensive
facility construction, but the denatured plutonium could still be
reprocessed back into weapons-grade plutonium.
Further, glassifying--the proposal that was discussed a moment ago--
glassifying plutonium would not only require a place for storage at a
time when we are running out of storage room, but as its radioactivity
decays over time, it, too, can be reprocessed back into bombs.
The NAS report recognizes this fact, concluding that:
While the spent fuel standard is the appropriate goal for
excess weapons plutonium disposition, further steps should be
taken to reduce the proliferation risks posed by all of the
world's plutonium stocks, including plutonium in spent fuel *
* * this broad question is beyond the scope of this study.
The only way to destroy plutonium forever is by burning it in fast
reactors like the IFR. As there is disagreement within the scientific
community, there is disagreement within this administration as well.
And there have been many flip-flops of position as, again, the senior
Senator from Illinois pointed out, on this technology over the past 2
years.
This year, the administration says the ALMR/IFR is a proliferator,
but last year, responding to a question posed by my colleague from
Idaho, the Department of Energy stated:
Because the ALMR/IFR pyroprocessing is incapable of
producing a pure plutonium product, subsequent reprocessing
using the aqueous process, is necessary.
Therefore, we believe the risk of proliferation is not any greater
than that associated with current power reactors.
This fact, Madam President, has since been further confirmed by a
recent Lawrence Livermore study, a summary of which I would like also
to submit for the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) Fuel Cycle--Some Implications of Using
IFR High-Transuranic Plutonium [``HITRU PU''] In a Proliferant Nuclear
Weapon Program
(By Donald L. Goldman, Defense Technologies Engineering Division,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory)
Purpose of the study
To assess the usefulness, relative to weapons-and reactor-
grade plutonium, of Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) processed
metallic fissile material (``HITRU Pu'') in a nuclear
proliferant nation's program.
Definitions and Abbreviations
Weapons-grade plutonium=``w-g Pu''.
99+% pure plutonium.
94% Pu239.
May contain -1% gallium.
Reactor-grade plutonium=``r-g Pu''.
99+% pure plutonium.
50-60% Pu239.
From spent LWR fuel via aqueous processing after cooling
for 2 years or more.
High Transuranic plutonium=``HITRU Pu''.
65-70% plutonium plus a large fraction of mixed
transuranics
30-40% Pu239.
From (FR low-temperature pyro-processing.
High Explosives=``HE''.
International nuclear fuel cycle evaluation definitions--IAEA, Vienna
(1980)
Proliferation.--Misuse by a government of nuclear fuel
cycle facilities, know how, or materials to assist in the
acquisition, manufacture or storage of a nuclear weapon.
Diversion.--All activities needed to implement a decision,
whether by national government or sub-national group, to
misuse nuclear fuel cycle facilities or nuclear materials in
order to attempt the manufacture of nuclear weapons or for
other purposes.
Major fissile materials properties of concern to the
weapons engineer are:
Thermal power (watts generated per unit mass).
Radiation output (neutrons and photons leaving the fissile
material).
Metallurgical stability (constancy of its dimensions and
properties).
Chemical stability (constancy of its chemical makeup).
A proliferant using HITRU Pu for nuclear weapons faces
issues and concerns that use of weapons- or reactor-grade Pu
would avoid:
High heat output from the HITRU Pu means having to avoid
excessively high internal temperatures, making issues of HE
and pit material design and selection, and possibly limiting
allowed operational (i.e., air) temperatures.
High radiation output from HITRU Pu can lead to:
Potentially lethal personnel exposures during manufacturing
and use, forcing development of remote capabilities and
hindering the weapon's usefulness; and potentially damaging
material and component exposures during the weapon's
stockpile life.
Metal properties from 18 material scenarios were examined
for their impact on the heat and radiation design issues.
Each material scenario is defined in terms of fuel
management processing and the cooling period prior to
processing.
ANL calculated the output material properties assuming LWR
feed-stock:
2 fuel management cases: Once-thru and recycled to
equilibrium.
3 processing cases: the IFR baseline; 2 possible off-normal
uranium-removal approaches.
3 cooling periods before pyro-processing: 1, 10, and 30
years.
Heat: Temperatures reached by the pit and the HE are of
crucial concern to the weapon engineer.
Pit: Dimensional and density stability.
High explosive: melting and self-initiation (``cook-off'').
These temperatures were calculated for some simple
geometries.
Conclusion: heat output from HITRU Pu will be a major
problem for the proliferant designer.
HITRU Pu heat output will complicate and may even preclude
the design of simple nuclear devices, due to its effect on HE
and Pu components.
HITRU Pu self-heating will create density and dimensional
stability design issues.
HITRU Pu heat can cause HE to self-detonate or melt,
severely impacting the design process. Allowable outside air
temperature will likely be limited.
The HITRU Pu from the 2 off-normal processing cases studied
create more heat than the baseline process.
Use of either weapons- or reactor-grade Pu would largely
avoid these problems.
Radiation: the neutron and photon outputs from HITRU Pu
would create issues regarding: Personnel safety, materials
and components, weapon utility.
Manually fabricating pits for a proliferant's stockpile
would result in unacceptable personnel exposures.
For example, making a pit in the U.S. required about 22
hours of close-in body exposure (at--\1/2\ meter) and about 8
hours of hands-on contact by the principal workers.
Using unshielded dose rates for the best-case HITRU Pu from
the IFR (30 year cooling), these times would result in: About
10\3\ Rem whole-body exposure (well above the 100% lethal
dose), about 10\4\-10\5\ Rem hand exposure (not shieldable).
These levels are incapacitating and lethal. Designing
processes to deal with them would significantly complicate a
proliferant's development and development programs and
production activities.
High radiation levels within a HITRU Pu nuclear weapon
could also affect and constrain other material selections and
components designs.
Over time, high photon and neutron fluxes negatively impact
materials and electronics behaviors.
Conclusion: Very high potential radiation exposures from
IFR HITRU Pu will add major complexities in developing a
proliferant weapons fabrication and handling capacity.
HITRU Pu neutron outputs per gram are in general 3-4 orders
of magnitude higher than weapons-grade or reactor-grade Pu.
The neutron multiplication of the weapons will raise this
even more.
Gamma radiation is similarly higher.
So, remote fabrication and assembly facilities will be
needed, from receipt of the metal ingot, through plutonium
part fabrication and pit assembly, to installation into a
weapon or storage container.
And, very high radiation levels outside a weapon using
HITRU Pu will preclude close exposures for more than brief
periods.
Final conclusions: Based on our assumptions regarding a
proliferant nation's nuclear program:
To base a nuclear weapon stockpile on HITRU Pu, significant
additional and unique challenges would have to be overcome by
the proliferant's nuclear weapon R&D program:
Design and use of remote fabrication and assembly
facilities.
Selection and use of heat-insensitive materials and
components or invention of new, unproven design approaches.
Selection and design of radiation-insensitive components.
Constraints on the use of the nuclear weapons made with
HITRU Pu would include:
Dealing with the need for either exposing personnel to high
radiation or remotely handling it.
Limiting the outside temperatures that the warhead sees.
In summary, using IFR HITRU Pu would add significant
difficulties to a proliferant nation's nuclear weapon
program, as compared to using weapons-grade or reactor-grade
plutonium.
Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. This year the administration says completing ALMR/
IFR research sends bad signals to the world, but last year they said:
If the United States wished to play a major role in
deterring proliferation and enforcing the international
safeguard regime, it is important we maintain the technical
leadership in the development of nuclear power and continue
to make advances in proliferation-resistant technologies.
Madam President, that is what this project is about.
In one of the most remarkable moves of all, Madam President,
Secretary O'Leary this year awarded the general manager--and this is
almost a funny story--the general manager of the ALMR/IFR program a
gold medal and $10,000 for his work on this technology, and the
Secretary at the time described the ALMR/IFR as having ``improved
safety, more efficient use of fuel, and less radioactive waste.'' So
why would the administration award someone $10,000 and a gold medal for
a program that they then turn around and want to kill, Madam President?
Because there are those in the administration who believe this
technology has promise, and there are those in the Senate who believe
this technology has promise.
There will be some today who will tell you this is an issue about
nuclear proliferation. I submit that anyone with common sense who has
watched the proliferation policy in this country over the past 15 years
knows we are not going to influence other nations from aspiring to or
rejecting reprocessing.
For example, opposition by previous administrations had a minimal
effect on reprocessing policies of major nuclear nations. France went
ahead and did what it was going to do; England did what they were going
to do; Japan did what they were going to do. Their argument is that
they seek energy independence that we in the United States already
enjoy. So the idea that we can whipsaw other nations by shutting down
our research capacity really does not make a whole lot of sense and,
frankly, borders on arrogance.
I know the scare tactic and the specter of North Korea has been
raised here, and that is a concern for every American. But regrettably,
North Korea just may have chosen to reprocess its spent fuel into
something more dangerous than new fuel.
The IFR does not produce weapons-grade plutonium. That is a red
herring in this whole debate. Proliferation, therefore, is not a
problem that arises with IFR research or IFR technology. Proliferation,
Madam President, is a problem with existing light water reactors and
PUREX reprocessing. Today's reactors produce plutonium that then can be
reprocessed into bombs. Plutonium proliferation is going to be a
serious problem, and it is a serious problem whether we complete the
ALMR/IFR research or not. Regrettably, this problem is not going to go
away overnight. Therefore, if the moral high ground is to be taken
here--and I wish to associate myself with Senator Simon's remarks in
this regard--it ought to be taken by those willing to provide an
alternative to PUREX reprocessing, for example. PUREX is readily
accessible to other nations. They have it. They can get it. It is out
there. PUREX can separate plutonium for civilian energy use or for
bombs. ALMR/IFR technology, however, keeps power production completely
separated from weapons production. That is kind of an important point
here, that we are talking about power production and not weapons
production. ALMR/IFR technologies, nations seeking to reprocess will in
fact choose PUREX. With ALMR/IFR technology, there would be no
legitimate excuse for nations to obtain PUREX capability.
In closing, I would like to say this is a modest investment for a
research project that holds great promise for the future. I know that
many of my colleagues are intrigued by the promise of this technology.
I know that many would like to see whether we can actually recycle
nuclear waste into energy, or burn the plutonium from bombs. That is
what we hope this research is going to give us the capacity to do. That
is all we are asking for today, to take a look, to finish the research.
And just think, Madam President, it is not going to cost us money. In
fact, if anything, it is going to keep us from blowing an awful lot of
money.
I think it is worth investing 2 more years in an experiment that can
solve a waste storage problem, a 100,000-year waste storage problem--in
fact, someone made the comment earlier today that the only thing on the
planet that is even remotely that old are the pyramids, and we could
not even keep those from being robbed--especially since we are now at
the point when carrying the experiment to its conclusion and
terminating this project will cost the same amount.
Madam President, is it not worth going forward rather than hoping
that future generations will not have to worry about buried plutonium
and nuclear waste escaping from some underground storage site into the
environment? That is what is at issue here. Do we not have a
responsibility to develop promising technology that may deal with the
disposal of our nuclear waste and plutonium? Do we not have an
obligation to go forward and finish this experiment, as authorized
under the act, until we are absolutely sure that this is a dead end and
that this research does not have the promise that we today think it
does?
Madam President, I think we do have an obligation to continue this
project, to continue the ALMR/IFR research. I think that it holds great
promise for the future.
I wish to submit also for the Record--we were talking about
editorials. There are a number of editorials that I would like to
submit for the Record as well since we are going to battle over
newspaper opinions: The Chicago Tribune: ``Fighting to Save Good
Nuclear Science;'' the Wall Street Journal: ``Nuclear-Plant Design
Nears Crucial Test;'' the Christian Science Monitor: ``Keep Funds for
Nuclear Research;'' the Chicago Tribune again: ``Don't Foreclose This
Nuclear Option;'' the Chicago Tribune again: ``Argonne Nuclear Research
is Vital;'' Crains Business: ``Argonne Cuts Make No Sense.''
There are others, Madam President. I will just submit them for the
Record. I think there are 15 here, 15 different editorials. Science
News, ``Nuclear Leftovers: Waste Not, Want Not.'' Here is another one
from Madison, GA. ``Integral Fast Reactor Could Have Advantage.''
I ask unanimous consent to have these editorials printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed
in the Record, as follows:
[From the Chicago Tribune, June 24, 1994]
Fighting to Save Good Nuclear Science
Sen. Paul Simon doesn't often square off with the Clinton
administration, but he's doing just that to try to prevent it
from prematurely and myopically closing off a possible source
of future energy.
As he did last year, the Illinois Democrat is preparing to
lead a fight to restore funding for research on a new type of
nuclear reactor, after the House recently voted to kill it.
Unlike last year, however, Simon faces the opposition of the
administration and Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary, who
decided this year to oppose work on the Integral Fast Reactor
at Argonne National Laboratory in suburban Lemont.
While it is trying to discourage plutonium use around the
world and limit illicit nuclear arms production, O'Leary
argues, the United States shouldn't be doing anything to even
``give the appearance of continuing the use of civilian
plutonium production.''
While nonproliferation is a worthy goal, the
administration's rationale on the fast reactor is based, at
best, more on anti-nuclear politics and fuzzy thinking than
on good science. At worst, it's another sign of the
administration's hostility toward nuclear energy.
Although nuclear reactors provide a fifth of America's
electricity, growth has been stymied by concerns over safety
and waste disposal. Each conventional reactor burns just 1
percent of its uranium fuel, leaving radioactive waste and
about 500 pounds of plutonium a year. Combined with plutonium
from dismantled nuclear weapons, the world's stockpile is
growing, and only a small amount in the wrong hands could be
used to build nuclear bombs.
In contrast, Argonne's fast reactor is designed to consume
99 percent of its fuel, leaving virtually no plutonium
behind. Furthermore, it can burn waste from other nuclear
plants or from nuclear warheads, thus extending the uranium
supply for decades. And it can do so safely, without
polluting the air or producing material easily converted into
nuclear arms.
Since other nations, like nuclear-dependent Japan and
France, aren't likely to shut down their reactors anytime
soon, the Clinton position is politically unrealistic and
Argonne's reactor may offer the best long-term solution to
reducing nuclear proliferation. The full system is ready to
be tested, and it will cost just as much to test and put on
the shelf as to shut down.
So this isn't a budget problem. It's a chance to test
technology that may solve nuclear proliferation and waste
dilemmas. The Senate should follow Simon's leadership and
restore funds for the fast reactor.
____
[From the Wall Street Journal, May 25, 1993]
Nuclear-Plant Design Nears Crucial Test
(By Michael W. Miller)
Argonne, IL.--At their sprawling facility here southwest of
Chicago, Argonne National Laboratory researchers cluster
around a glass-walled ``glove box.''
A technician pushes his hands into heavy rubber gloves
mounted in twin portholes and reaches through the walls of
the 12-foot-high chamber. Much as a fast-food worker readies
frozen french fries for a dip in the fryer, the technician
begins placing chopped-up pieces of metal rod into a mesh
basket.
Uncle Sam has spent $700 million and nearly a decade on
this project, the integral fast reactor, and for many the
design represents the future of nuclear energy. But the
project's own future is now in doubt.
The integral fast reactor is designed to recycle its own
nuclear fuel. That means it would produce drastically less
nuclear waste than the current generation of commercial nukes
churns out. In theory, it could even get rid of the most
dangerous elements from the nuclear waste of conventional
nuclear plants, helping ameliorate a growing waste-disposal
problem.
It also appears to offer a potential means of disposing of
plutonium from dismantled nuclear bombs and missiles. Its
supports say tests have provided that the sodium-cooled
reactor is immune to the types of mishaps that befell
Chernobyl or Three Mile Island.
While all the parts have worked in engineering-scale
demonstrations, only the prototype reactor being built by
about 300 workers in Idaho can prove if the integral concept
is practical.
Yet the technical hurdles may be far less difficult to
clear than the political ones. President Clinton initially
sought to halt all funding for the project. Only after
generating some heat of their own did local politicians
manage to win $22 million in fiscal 1994 funds for limited
further research. Deleted, though, from next year's proposed
budget are outlays to operate the prototype plant, and
without its completion, researchers won't know if the reactor
actually works.
A Tragedy
``For this nation's energy future, termination of this
project just before it will be proved or disproved is a
tragedy,'' contends Charles E. Till, associate director for
engineering research at Argonne National Laboratory and head
of the project.
Still, skeptics abound. It has been nearly two decades
since ground was broken for a new U.S. nuclear plant. ``Are
they talking about turning seawater into gold, too?'' says
Robert Pollard, a nuclear safety engineer who quit the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 17 years ago and is now with
the Union of Concerned Scientists. With the integral fast
reactor, ``you've got a bunch of people who haven't produced
anything useful in 30 years trying to save their jobs.'' he
adds.
Despite the budget setback, jittery Argonne scientists and
engineers continue preparing for what they have imagined
would be the payoff for the years of design studies and lab
work performed on small-scale demonstration devices. Even as
the fine-tuning experiments continue, a test reactor is being
transformed into the prototype reactor, mainly by converting
a fuel-recycling facility.
The Idaho site should be operable as an integral fast
reactor late this year. But because the Energy Department is
moving to shut the test reactor, it appears there will be
funds enough just to try the recycling process as an
experimental method to eliminate the nuclear waste left in
the plant, rather than as an integrated operation.
Meanwhile, at the lab here, researchers begin yet another
experimental run-through of the electrorefining technique
central to the integral fast reactor's recycling process.
The basket of metal rods, in its chamber filled with inert
gases, holds morsels of uranium-zirconium allow, about to be
immersed in a vessel of salts and heated to 930 degrees
Fahrenheit. Suspended at the end of a positively charged
anode and hit with a heavy surge of electricity, the 10
kilograms of metal chunks in the basket will dissolve. The
metal ions will migrate through the molten salts, then
collect in a foot-long cylinder of spidery strands at the
base of a negatively charged electrical pole known as a
cathode.
Nuclear ``Ash''
If this were ``hot'' fuel taken from a working plant, the
pieces of rod would also contain fission material. Such
material is the nuclear ``ash'' of unwanted isotopes that
build up in the fuel rods and impede the reaction, eventually
requiring the fuel to be replaced. The electrorefining would
leave that unwanted fission material either on the anode or
in the salts.
However, in this experiment, the researchers are using
nonradioactive depleted uranium to permit easier handling.
``The chemistry is the same,'' says chemical engineer Eddie
Gay, gazing through the glass like a proud father outside a
hospital nursery. ``This works.'' In the recycling system,
the metallic mixture that emerges from the electrorefining
procedure is further purified by high-tech crucibles known as
cathode processors, leaving ingots of pure nuclear fuel that
can be cast into new fuel rods.
Conventional nuclear power plants have to pull their fuel
rods periodically because of the buildup of fission material.
Even though 95% of the potential energy is left inside such
rods, however, the absence of a reprocessing facility for
existing fuel rods in the U.S., or even a place to bury them,
means that the highly radioactive spent rods have been
sitting for decades in holding pools near nuclear power
plants around the country.
But the integral fast reactor has drawn fire because it is
a ``breeder'' reactor, which creates more fuel than it burns.
The fuel created is deadly plutonium, and the U.S. decided a
decade ago not to pursue the design.
other countries
Other countries have fewer qualms about using breeder
reactors or about reprocessing fuel. In France and the United
Kingdom, for instance, chemical reprocessing of nuclear waste
strips out the fission material, allowing the fuel to be
reused. But the process isolates the plutonium that also
forms during nuclear fission, creating a hazard that's very
hard to dispose of and, because plutonium is easily
convertible to weapons material, poses proliferation hazards.
In the integral fast reactor's recycling process, the
plutonium and other long-lived ``actinides'' that form during
the reaction aren't stripped out during reprocessing.
Instead, those elements accompany the uranium through the
various steps and back into the recycled fuel rods, to be
burned up in the reactor.
Nevertheless, the reactor's foes see the project as just a
repackaged version of the breeder technology, dubbed the
Clinch River program, discarded a decade ago. ``Given the
absence of economic justification for the (reactor) as a
generation technology, proponents of the project are now
advancing a waste-management mission'' for it, wrote 22
members of the House Science, Space and Technology Committee
recently to Chairman George E. Brown. But that mission
``poses the same economic, environmental and nuclear
proliferation problems that killed the original breeder
reactor program,'' the lawmakers contend.
Its designers, understandably, think differently. Dr.
Robert Holtz, standing next to a full-scale processor whose
design and construction he has overseen for several years,
declares it ``a terrible waste'' if the project is allowed to
die. ``To throw this option away seems,'' he begins before
pausing to search for a scientist's malediction, ``not very
intelligent.''
____
[From the Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 1, 1993]
Keep Funds for Nuclear Research
An audible gasp filled the chamber when President Clinton
announced in his address to a joint session of Congress that
``we're eliminating programs that are no longer needed, such
as nuclear-power research and development.''
His judgment may be premature. Today, Charles Till of
Argonne National Laboratory testifies before a House
Appropriations subcommittee. His team is developing the
advanced Integral Fast Reactor (IFR), a design that
proponents say will solve many of the problems associated
with commercial nuclear reactors.
Japanese utilities have committed $46 million to the
project through 1996. Southern California Edison will also
put up $2 million next year, and other West Coast utilities
are interested.
Advocates say the design is superior to current reactors in
several respects. Among them:
Safety: The fuel is engineered so that if it overheats, its
swelling alone stops the chain reaction. This ``passively
safe'' approach was validated in a 1986 test that tried to
force an IFR prototype to undergo a Three-Mile-Island-type
accident.
Efficiency: The IFR's fuel can be reprocessed. Light-water
reactors supplying half the world's energy needs would
exhaust uranium reserves in just 30 years; IFRs would extend
them to 2,000 years.
Security: The fuel reprocessing system is simple, compact,
and can be used on site; it cannot isolate bomb-grade
materials.
Environmental impact: By reprocessing fuel, the IFR
eliminates the most dangerous, long-lived part of nuclear
waste. Its only discards would be nuclear ``ash,'' which
after 300 years would be no more radioactive than the
original ore.
The Energy Department has invested $700 million in the IFR
since 1984. All facets of the technology have been
demonstrated individually. Till's team needs $120 million a
year for a three-year, full-scale demonstration. Having come
this far, it is a waste not to move to full-scale testing. If
the technology fails to prove itself, eliminate the program.
If it succeeds, however, the potential payoff is too great to
ignore.
____
[From the Chicago Tribune, Feb. 27, 1993]
Don't Foreclose This Nuclear Option
President Clinton's economic program, as he conceded this
week, can be improved significantly by including more cuts in
government spending. To do that, every federal program and
expenditure must be put on the budget-cutters' block,
including those for basic scientific research.
Before any of those hit the floor, however, the White House
and Congress, with the help of scientific leaders, need to
agree on rational, national priorities. Money ought to go to
projects that serve the national interest and have been
judged through peer review to be the most worthy.
The goal must be to invest in research that will expand the
frontiers of knowledge and keep the nation on the edge of
technological innovation, while shunning port-barrel projects
aimed at creating jobs in favored congressional districts of
subsidizing clout-heavy industries.
But it is not evident that Clinton has followed these
principles in proposing to phase out funding for research on
advanced nuclear reactors.
The proposed cancellation would wipe out 500 high-wage
jobs--about a third of the total--at Argonne National
Laboratory near Lemont and another 1,000 in Idaho. More
troubling than that, however, is that it would kill a project
that is developing revolutionary technology that could
produce safe, environmentally sound nuclear power for the
21st Century and beyond.
America needs to pursue greater energy efficiency and the
potential of renewable fuels, but it is folly to believe that
giant windmill farms or fields of solar panels will power the
U.S. economy in the foreseeable future.
Nuclear energy now generates about a fifth of the nation's
electrical power, and most analysts believe it can play a
significant role in the energy mix for decades to come, if
some problems are solved.
Commercial reactor companies have designed advanced light-
water reactors, which will be safer than today's models and
could be available before the end of the decade. But they
still will burn a small percentage of uranium as fuel and
leave the bulk as highly radioactive waste that must be
safely stored.
After $700 million and seven years of work, Argonne
researchers are close to demonstrating a safe reactor that
burns nearly all of its fuel. Furthermore, it can recycle and
burn most of the nuclear wastes, or those from existing
commercial plants or weapons facilities. And it does this
without polluting the air.
A National Academy of Sciences study last year said it
should be the nation's top long-term nuclear research
priority. The Japanese, apparently in agreement, have pledged
$46 million over seven years to the project.
With the end of the Cold War, there are major savings to be
made in the government's nuclear programs, especially for
weapons and uranium enrichment. But it would be shortsighted
and foolish to abandon a promising investment in a viable
future energy technology.
____
[From the Chicago Tribune, Sept. 19, 1993]
Argonne Nuclear Research Is Vital
With an eye more on deficit reduction and antinuclear
sentiment than on the future, the U.S. House voted
overwhelmingly last June to kill funding for research on a
new type of nuclear reactor.
The decision to end work on the Integral Fast Reactor at
Argonne National Laboratory was more than penny wise and
pound foolish; it was totally irresponsible. Scientists have
spent $700 million since 1984 developing the revolutionary
technology, and they had hoped to show next month that it
works.
The Senate soon will have a chance to intervene. Rather
than toss out a promising technology just before it can be
tested, it should restore funding. The cost to taxpayers
would be small compared with the potential benefits they and
their children can reap later from a secure abundant energy
source.
Today's commercial reactors are cooled by water and use
uranium as their primary fuel. By contrast, Argonne's sodium-
cooled reactor burns either spent fuel from existing nuclear
plants or plutonium to produce electricity. It can be set up
to burn more radioactive material than it produces or to
produce waste that can be reprocessed and recycled as fuel.
Despite its potential to dispose of spent nuclear fuel,
burn plutonium from dismantled warheads and provide an
inexhaustible energy source, House opponents argue that the
new reactor would be too expensive.
Utilities, they say, are more interested in a new
generation of light-water reactors being developed for use by
the end of the decade, In addition, they warn, the greater
use of plutonium would increase the risk of nuclear arms
proliferation.
True, utilities want a near-term nuclear option of new,
smaller light-water reactors. But in the next 15-50 years,
perhaps sooner, the nation might want to have another nuclear
choice--one that can produce electricity safely for centuries
with less and more manageable waste than current technology.
To shut down the Argonne program now without completing
tests, as the House has voted, would take five years and cost
$406 million. To demonstrate that it works and have it
available for possible future use would take five years and
cost $445 million a $39 million difference.
Actually, the Integral Fast Reactor could come in handy
fairly quickly. It could be used to reduce spent fuel that is
accumulating at nuclear plants. It could provide a market for
plutonium being released from weapons in Russia and the
United States. As for a proliferation threat, the reactor's
fuel reprocessing doesn't produce weapons-grad plutonium.
Some lawmakers may not believe that nuclear power will play
a role in America's energy future, but few scientists agree.
For $39 million, a new technology can be demonstrated and
preserved as a long term option. It's a small price to pay:
the Senate should ante up.
____
[From Crain's Chicago Business, Mar. 8, 1993]
Argonne Cuts Make No Sense
In the spirit of shared sacrifice, we're not of a mind to
get parochial by nit-picking every Clinton budget cut that
might hurt Illinois. But the administration's proposal to end
funding for a critical nuclear research project at Argonne
National Laboratory makes no sense for the nation, much less
Illinois.
Argonne's integral fast reactor program (IFR) holds the
promise of providing centuries of safe, reliable nuclear
power. The program is developing a meltdown-proof reactor
that burns its own waste, and experiments are under way to
see if it can burn wastes from existing commercial reactors
and weapons programs. What's more, since IFR burns all the
energy in natural uranium, it can provide electricity for
centuries; existing reactors use less than 1% of uranium's
energy.
While commercial application is still about 20 years away,
a full demonstration of IFR's technology will take place this
year. But the Clinton administration wants to cut $200
million out of IFR's fiscal 1994 funding and wants to zero
out the program by 1998. That would save $1.2 billion, but
what's really at work here is this administration's
disturbingly simplistic anti-nuclear power mentality. Does
the Clinton-Gore crowd really believe the nation's future
power needs can be met--and concerns over global warming
dealt with--only through conservation and solar windmills?
We're concerned about the 500 local Argonne jobs that would
be cut here. But the shame would be to kill this promising
technology.
____
[From the Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 24, 1993]
Save Argonne Nuke Research
No sooner do we say that innovation has a partner in
Washington than the Clinton administration goes and cancels
research at Argonne National Laboratory that could lead to
the next generation of safe nuclear reactors.
Yes, we'll be accused of favoring government spending cuts,
as long as they don't affect the Chicago area. And we'll
plead guilty to not wanting to see 500 Chicago area Argonne
workers laid off.
But our concern isn't pork barrel politics. Argonne
researchers are on the trail of a technology that addresses
the major knock put on nuclear power--safety. After an
investment of seven years and $700 million, the results are
encouraging.
Abandoning the effort would delight those who, as an
article of faith, dislike nuclear power. But slamming the
door on discovery, especially at a place like Argonne, where
commercialization of new technologies is a way of life, is
unreasonable.
____
[From the Chicago Tribune, May 31, 1993]
Facts, Not Polemics, In Nuclear Debate
Barrington.--Once again, the high-pitched whining of a
special interest group with an ax to grind is heard. This
time it was Dr. Michael McCally (Voice, May 11), of
Physicians for Social Responsibility, knocking a nuclear
power generating technology that holds great promise for
reducing stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium.
I'm talking about the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) that is
being developed by Argonne National Laboratory. At best, his
rebuttal to a prior letter by George Martin on the subject
is, as Dr. McCally put it, ``misleading.'' At worst, his
remarks are a gross misinterpretation of the facts as they
relate to IFR technology.
He says this type of reactor will produce ``vast''
quantities of waste. According to Argonne National
Laboratory, this reactor reduces the amount of waste
drastically. The waste from a 1,000-MW IFR plant operated for
an entire year would not quite fill a common file cabinet.
Moreover, the waste that is produced has radioactive
components that have half-lives of hundreds of years, instead
of tens of thousands of years. It also will burn the spent
fuel from our current generation of nuclear plants. Is that
so undesirable? Furthermore, plutonium and uranium from
dismantled nuclear weapons can fuel this reactor, perhaps its
greatest benefit.
While it is true that the IFR has the ability to make more
fuel than it consumes, and hence the ``breeder'' reactor
label, it will not produce more pollution or more plutonium
for weapons. First of all, the IFR will incorporate a fuel
recycling/processing technique called pyroprocessing, which
is much different than the process Dr. McCally so caustically
refers to in his letter. The new process is much more
economical, energy-efficient and environmentally friendly.
The plutonium the process produces is also not the pure
stock required for weapons production. Yes, it is possible to
make something that explodes from fuel-grade plutonium, but
it has been proven to be more theoretical than practical. If
a country wanted to start a clandestine nuclear weapons
program, the risk of its plans being exposed by stealing or
diverting fuel-grade plutonium would preclude any attempt.
Anti-plutonium polemics begin to sound like gibberish when
a few facts like these come to light. It takes a wealthy,
technically adept country to produce any kind of mass-
destruction weapon. It is beyond reason to think even the
most evil, demented government would apply the vast resources
it would require to an unproven theoretical bomb-making
process. One needs only to look at Iraq's recently destroyed
weapons program to see the validity of that statement.
It is unfortunate that Dr. McCally has so little grasp of
the facts or an understanding of the technology. The bankrupt
logic of the anti-nuclear crowd's rhetoric is getting very
tiresome. It would be refreshing to see such groups expending
some energy developing solutions to the world's problems
rather than tearing down the efforts of those who are really
trying. The IFR has the potential to actually do something
constructive with the most destructive devices ever built. It
can reduce the amount of nuclear waste already here while
producing energy to power industry, provide light where there
is darkness, and promote peaceful economic development
throughout the country and the world. Physicians for Social
Responsibility, heal thyselves first.
____
[From Business Week, Mar. 22, 1993]
A Big-Science Cut That Could Drown Us In Nuclear Waste
While the science community is feeling rather good,
overall, about President Clinton's technology agenda, there's
one curious slight: Funding for the Integral Fast Reactor
(IFR) has been dropped. Many scientists think the decision is
shortsighted. In fact, a recent study by the National Academy
of Sciences tagged the IFR as the No. 1 priority in nuclear-
reactor science.
The IFR program was originally launched by Argonne National
Laboratory to develop a safer nuclear-power plant. But it
evolved into something far more important: The reactor could
burn the spent nuclear fuel from traditional nuclear plants--
waste that will otherwise pose a radioactive threat for
thousands of years. Moreover, the IFR should be able to burn
the radioactive plutonium recovered from dismantled nuclear
weapons. Tons of this nasty stuff have already piled up at a
remote site near Amarillo, Tex.--with lots more to come.
Without the IFR, this weapons-grade plutonium may have to be
guarded night and day for centuries.
____
Nuclear Leftovers: Waste Not, Want Not
Legal and safety disputes have logjammed federal programs
to create repositories for the permanent internment of long-
lived radioactive wastes. What's a nuclear power plant owner
or bomb maker to do while debate over the placement of these
``hot'' discards drags on?
Consider squashing or `'burning'' wastes, suggest
researchers at two Department of Energy (DOE) facilities.
On Feb. 22, technicians began flattening wastes at DOE's
Rocky Flats plant, a former nuclear-weapons facility outside
Golden, Colo. Conceptually similar to a kitchen compactor,
Rocky Flats' 44-ton trash smasher drives a piston with 2,200
tons of compaction force down upon 35-gallon drums containing
plastic, glass, and metal wastes. Resulting ``pucks'' may
take up as little as one-fifth of the waste's initial volume.
That's a dramatic reduction for a plant like Rocky Flats,
which has enough plutonium-laced wastes to fill 3,000 55-
gallon drums.
``[This] supercompactor could save the taxpayers millions
of dollars in future disposal costs by reducing the total
volume of waste,'' notes Bob Nelson, who manages DOE's Rocky
Flats Office.
Argonne (Ill.) National Laboratory is exploring a higher
tech solution: recycling long-lived wastes as fuel for a new
breed of ``inherently safe'' reactors (SN: 1/26/85, p.60). In
a reactor, some neutrons liberated by fissioning uranium are
absorbed by other uranium atoms, transmuting them into
heavier elements known as actinides. Because today's
commercial reactors cannot ``burn'' actinides efficiently,
these heavy elements accumulate as long-lived wastes--
isotopes with half-lives measured in thousands to millions of
years. But in Argonne's experimental Integral Fast Reactor
(IFR), ``we can effectively destroy them,'' notes IFR project
manager Yoon I. Chang.
Having demonstrated a technology for extracting actinides
from IFR wastes, Chang says, his team must not prove that
recycled actinides will fission efficiently. Late last month,
they launched a two-year experiment to test just that by
placing a small quantity of the actinides americium and
neptunium into a fuel bundle that they inserted in an IFR-
type reactor core.
If successful, says Charles E. Till, also at Argonne, this
experiment ``will be the equivalent of burning nuclear
garbage.'' Though his team has thus far demonstrated the
ability to recycle actinides from IFR fuels only, Chang says
a spin-off program is under way to adapt this technology to
the efficient extraction of actinides from commercial reactor
wastes.
____
[From Burrelle's, Apr. 8, 1993]
Integral Fast Reactor Could Have Advantage
When he made his address to Congress President Clinton
caused considerable consternation when he announced that he
planned to eliminate programs that are no longer needed,
``such as nuclear-power research and development.''
In testimony before a House Appropriations Committee
Charles Till of Argonne National Laboratory, said that his
team is developing the advanced integral Fast Reactor, a
design that proponents say will solve many of the problems
associated with commercial nuclear reactors.
Japanese utilities have committed $446 million to the
project through 1996. Southern California Edison will also
put up $2 million next year, and other West Coast utilities
are interested.
The president's judgment, then, sounds premature.
Advocates say the design is superior to current reactors in
several respects. Among them:
Safety: The fuel is engineered so that if it overheats, its
swelling alone stops the chain reaction. This ``passively
safe'' approach was validated in a 1986 test that tried to
force an IFR prototype to undergo a Three-Mile Island type
accident.
Efficiency: The IFR's fuel can be reprocessed. Light-water
reactors supplying half the world's energy needs would
exhaust uranium reserves in just 90 years; IFR's would extend
them to 2,000 years.
Security: The fuel reprocessing system is simple, compact,
and can be used on site, it cannot isolate bomb-grade
materials.
Environmental impact: By reprocessing fuel, the IFR
eliminates the most dangerous, long lived part of nuclear
waste. Its only discards would be nuclear ``ash'', which
after 300 years would be no more radioactive than the
original ore.
The Energy Department has invested $700 million in the IFR
since 1984. All facets of the technology have been
demonstrated individually. Till's team needs $120 million a
year for a three-year, full-scale demonstration. Having come
this far, it is a waste not to move to full-scale testing. If
the technology fails to prove itself, eliminate the program.
If it succeeds, however, the potential payoff is too great to
ignore.
____
[From the Naperville Sun, Apr. 30, 1993]
A Different Nuclear Threat
The Department of Energy (DOE) is apparently expending very
little energy thinking about the nation's future in terms of
energy, environment or national security.
It is DOE's serious proposal to slash the advanced nuclear
reactor research at Argonne National Laboratory; eliminating
160 jobs at the Lemont lab and another 750 at Argonne's Idaho
facility.
If this were only about jobs, we would have a complaint
because the economic impact could reach some 1,200 jobs in
this area. And this after the feds saw fit to curtail the
future of Batavia's Fermi Lab in a highly political decision
several years ago to build the Superconducting Super Collider
in Texas.
But this is not about jobs, this is about the future.
Advanced nuclear research at Argonne is developing an
Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) program as a highest priority.
In simplest terms, the IFR burns its own nuclear waste to
the nth degree. This produces cheaper power and eliminates
most of the waste that poses a major disposal problem.
Further, the waste that is left needs far less storage time
to become as safe as the original fuel.
It has been tested and found far more efficient than
today's reactors, far safer, and no hazard in terms of air
pollution. Argonne is in fact, now working to develop a
reactor at its Idaho facility that would burn waste from both
the present commercial reactors and from weapons programs.
The reactor is scheduled to be ready for commercial
development in five years.
About 20 percent of the nation's power is currently
generated by nuclear plants. There is currently no other
long-term option to supply energy the nation needs to grow.
The Argonne IFR program promises an approach to that growth
in a way that is safe, sane and eliminates our addiction to
foreign oil--which has proved an obstacle to a safe and sane
foreign policy.
And make no mistake, the proposed DOE cutback is not a
budget-cutting priority. Overall the department is planning
to spend more on civilian programs by 16 percent than it has
appropriated this year. Argonne is seeking $128 million of
that $8.04 billion budget, only $2 million more than it takes
to carry on the helium reserves storage in Texas, a program
that outlived its mission years ago.
Argonne's program has been endorsed by the National Academy
of Science, supported with funding by a California utility
through the Electric Power Research Institute, and by the
Japanese utility companies to a promised $46 million.
It has not been endorsed by the U.S. Department of Energy
for reasons that appear in a class with helium reserves--
lighter than air, but smack of an anti-nuclear policy by the
current administration.
____
[From the Regional News, Apr. 8, 1993]
Cut Consequences
The proposed funding elimination for research on the
Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) at Argonne National Laboratory is
a step in the wrong direction. The loss of 500 direct and
1,250 other jobs related to Argonne National Laboratory's
largest research project would have a negative impact on the
communities surrounding the laboratory. In addition, the $700
million already spent on research for this project during the
past 10 years would be lost. But this proposed cut is
puzzling for other reasons as well.
The IFR addresses each of what has been described as the
three ``Es'' of funding criteria for federal research:
energy, environment and economic development. These issues
are important to our nation's future and have been touted by
the Clinton administration as being high on the list of our
national agenda. A closer examination of these issues
illustrates why the ``ripple effects'' of discontinued IFR
research would be felt beyond Cook, DuPage and Will counties
in the immediate future--it would be felt by our entire
nation for possibly generations to come.
Energy: Nuclear reactors generate 80 percent of northern
Illinois' electricity. Nuclear power reduces our dependence
on foreign oil and mitigates costly pollution controls for
power generated by fossil fuels. One IFR would supply
electricity to 750,000 people while greatly reducing the
volume of raw materials. The IFR system would use virtually
all of the uranium's energy, as opposed to less than 1
percent used with current technology. The greater efficiency
alone is worth investing in IFR research. The IFR would be
ready for commercial operations by the year 2010.
Environment: The IFR has been successfully tested against
conditions simulating the Chernobyl and Three Mile
situations. The IFR would reduce the life of hazardous
nuclear waste from hundreds of thousands of years to 200 to
300 years. The volume and hazardous waste would also be
reduced to about the size of a filing cabinet per year. Its
ability to dispose of existing nuclear waste and the
plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons is being tested.
Our nation's concern for the environment suggests that the
ability to safely recycle hazardous nuclear waste should be
among our highest research priorities.
Economic development: Futurists are unanimous on the
subject of technology--the nations with it will be the haves,
while those without it will be the have-nots. Our ability to
compete globally will depend on commercial applications of
technology such as the IFR. Japan has invested heavily in IFR
technology and will be positioned to take over should the
United States abandon this effort.
Failing to invest in IFR technology would relegate the
United States to ``second fiddle'' status in yet another
international market sector. Purchasing IFR technology that
was once within our grasp from other countries would be a
bitter pill to swallow indeed.
Heading into the 21st century, the United States can be
either a leader or laggard in the ownership and application
of IFR technology and the resultant energy, environmental and
economic development benefits it would provide. Let us hope
the current administration chooses to keep us technologically
competitive by continuing to fund IFR research.
____
[From the Palos Citizen, Apr. 29, 1993]
Importance of Research Funds for Argonne Lab
``This country, as well as the world-at-large, is in danger
of losing an extremely important project if funding is not
restored to Argonne National Labs for its Integral Fast
Reactor (IFR) program,'' said Congressman William O.
Lipinski.
The IFR program uses revolutionary technology which offers
safe, economically promising and environmentally sound
solutions to many of the concerns raised about nuclear power.
The IFR's advantages include:
Passive, Walk-Away Safety. The IFR technology is much safer
than current reactor designs. Its inherent passive safety
characteristics were demonstrated in 1986 in a landmark
series of tests at Argonne's IFR prototype reactor in Idaho,
where simulations of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyltype
accidents resulted in immediate and harmless system shutdown
without any damage to the reactor or the environment and with
no risk of radioactive release.
Dramatically Reduced Waste-Disposal Problems. The IFR
technology permits radioactive recycling, which reduces the
lifetime of high-level nuclear waste from millions of years
to a few hundred years. The IFR can recycle its own
radioactive by-products as well as waste generated by current
reactors or even excess plutonium available due to nuclear
disarmament, providing solutions for the long-term high-level
nuclear waste disposal program.
Nearly Inexhaustible Fuel Supply. The IFR has the
capability to generate more fuel than it consumes, thereby
providing a nearly inexhaustible fuel supply and allowing
nuclear power to supply America's energy needs for centuries.
Argonne National Labs is the only place in the world where
this type of research is being performed. This is
significant. Even if the U.S. were to decide not to increase
its source of energy from nuclear power, other countries do
rely substantially on it. Thus, creating a good deal of
waste. France derives 80 percent of its electricity from
nuclear power, Japan 45 percent, European countries 40-50
percent and increasing. They need our technology. Better that
we sell it to them than find ourselves buying the technology
from them in the future.
``The citizens of Illinois, America, and the world need to
rally around this project to ensure a safer future in nuclear
power,'' declared Lipinski.
____
[From Burrelle's, Apr. 29, 1993]
Argonne Produces Fuel Rods Using Nuclear Waste
An experiment now underway at Argonne National Laboratory's
Idaho site is likely to show that the volume of waste from
commercial nuclear power plants can be reduced three-fold,
and the length of time the waste must be stored can be
reduced from 10,000 years to no more than 200 or 300 years.
Argonne scientists have produced fuel rods for the Integral
Fast Reactor using long-lived radioactive elements found in
nuclear waste, said Yoon Chang, manager for Argonne's
Integral Fast Reactor project, speaking to a meeting of the
American Chemical Society in Denver.
``The experiment is the equivalent of burning nuclear
garbage,'' Chang said. ``In the Integral Fast Reactor, we can
turn that garbage into energy.''
The conversion of waste to fuel is part of Argonne's
Integral Fast Reactor project. The Integral Fast Reactor can
be designed not only to consume its own fuel but also to be
inherently safe--it can shut itself off if it malfunctions.
In a report last year, the National Academy of Sciences said
the Integral Fast Reactor should have the nation's highest
priority for technology development.
The new fuel rods are made of uranium, zirconium and
plutonium and contain americium and neptunium, two of the
radioactive elements left after nuclear fuel is burned.
The elements used in the experiments are some of the
longer-lived elements in nuclear waste--they retain high
levels of radioactivity for thousands of years. Separating
these elements from the shorter-lived fission products may
simplify the waste disposal process.
The elements, called actinides, are separated from the fuel
rods in a recycling process developed at Argonne. First,
bundles of fuel rods are chopped into small pieces. These
pieces go into an electrorefiner, where most of the uranium,
plutonium and other long-lived transuranic materials are
separated from the short-lived fission products, which cannot
be reused as fuel. Next, a cathode processor further
separates the metal. A casting furnace then forms the
recycled materials into new fuel rods.
Argonne is located in Illinois 25 miles southwest of
Chicago. Argonne-West, the laboratory's satellite research
facility, is located 35 miles west of Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Argonne is operated by the University of Chicago for the U.S.
Department of Energy.
____
The Danger Is Not Going Nuclear
If President Clinton intends to lift this nation out of
economic depression and guarantee a better standard of living
for future generations, then he has to go nuclear. This is
not a question of ``opinion''; it is a matter of scientific
fact. It is a fact that economic prosperity is inextricably
linked to the use of the most advanced, most energydense
technologies, for only such technologies can increase overall
economic productivity and thus foster the process of economic
growth.
Specifically, this means that U.S. economic growth requires
the development of the next generation of nuclear reactors:
(1) standardized, ``inherently safe'' designs for light water
reactors that are preapproved and can be built and operating
within 5 or 6 years; (2) modular reactor designs that can be
mass produced, such as the HTGR (high-temperature gas-cooled
reactor), which is ideal for export and which has the
advantage of higher heat available for industrial processing;
(3) reactors like the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) at Argonne
National Laboratory, which will burn spent fuel, including
actinides, thus reducing the amount of high level nuclear
waste; and (4) a well-funded program to achieve controlled
thermonuclear fusion, which includes funding all alternative
concept fusion methods (plasma focus, light ion beams, and so
on) plus research in the new field of solid-state fusion.
The President's ``Vision of Change for America,'' released
Feb. 17, 1993, ignores this basic reality of physical economy
and instead proposes the elimination of ``research and
development funding support and related facility funding for
nuclear reactors that have no commercial or other identified
application.'' His State of the Union address was even more
blunt; there the President said that his budget would
eliminate ``programs that are no longer needed, such as
nuclear power research and development.''
Whatever is the President's intention, the proposed cuts in
the budget include the HTGR and the IFR, both of which have
commercial and other applications in a sane world. The
problem is indeed one of vision: Does the administration
foresee a nation taking the technological lead and
developing a second Atoms for Peace program, by pioneering
the next-generation nuclear technology for worldwide
export? Or is its vision one of a postindustrial society?
inherently malthusian renewables
Windmills, solar panels, geothermal sources, and biomass
are energy sources alluring only to those who never had to
struggle (or even think about struggling) through life 100 or
more years ago--or life today in a Third World country. Would
any woman who has to spend several hours a day collecting
twigs to light a fire to cook diner--or who has to watch a
child die because there is no refrigeration to preserve
medicines and vaccines--reject the advantages of modern
electricity?
The energy deficit worldwide staggers the imagination. In
the United States, the lack of investment in nuclear and coal
power plant construction for baseload electricity supply has
left the Eastern third of the nation on the edge of power
shortages. By the turn of the century, the nation will be
about 100 GW (gigawatts, or 100 billion watts) short of
electric-generating capacity, the equivalent of 100
conventional nuclear power plants.
The situation is worse in the rest of the world, where lack
of investment has led to electricity availability only during
a few short hours per day in countries like Argentina and
Colombia. In Eastern Europe, about 100 GW of electric-
generating capacity is needed to rescue a situation where
economic catastrophe threatens war and chaos. For the poorest
nations of Africa and Asia, there is not even enough energy
for the barest necessities, never mind development.
The universal form of energy that can be used for heating,
cooling, cooking, lighting, industry, agriculture, and
transportation is electricity. The most efficient, clean way
to produce electric power today is with nuclear technology.
The amount of energy produced per unit land area and per man-
hour of labor by nuclear power cannot be matched by any other
technology, including coal, which requires enormous resources
for mining and transportation. To bring the poor nations up
to a standard of living and life expectancy equivalent to
that of Western Europe requires the availability of minimally
1 GW of electricial-generating capacity per million
population.
The so-called renewables are inherently diffuse energy
sources with limited uses. Even with enormous improvements in
efficienty, they will always, by nature, be too inefficient
to power an industrial society and support a growing world
population at a standard of living appropriate for human
beings in the 21st century. The leaders of the
environmentalist lobby who attack nuclear power and
propagandize for ``renewables'' know this limitation and are
pleased with it. They want a return to a smaller,
postindustrial world, even if that means reducing the world
population by starvation and disease.
The danger of not going nuclear is that the proliferation
of inherently Malthusian energy sources will bring certain
death to millions of people.
And so, Madam President, I just submit that premature termination of
this experiment is wrong-headed. The administration is just wrong on
this one. And I believe that we have made an investment. It does not
make sense for us to be penny-wise and pound-foolish, although I
daresay I do not think we are being penny-wise here. This is promising
technology. We will lose money by terminating it prematurely. Let us
see it to its conclusion, its natural conclusion, and then decide where
this technology takes us as we go into the next century.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. I would like to thank the chairman for his leadership
on this issue and for his understanding of this issue. I would also
like to acknowledge and thank our partners, the Senators from Illinois,
Senator Simon and Senator Moseley-Braun, along with my colleague from
Idaho. We formed a good, bipartisan team on this whole issue.
I have a great deal of respect for the Senator from Massachusetts,
but I have to say that I take strong exception, and I am very
disappointed with his characterization of this as being an
irresponsible effort.
There is a problem here that has to be solved, and to label those who
are trying to find a solution as irresponsible I think is
irresponsible.
It has been referenced the number of States that have spent nuclear
fuel that is stored in those States, 39 States, whether it is
commercial or naval fuel or fuel from university projects.
Madam President, I do not have to remind you about this problem.
You have over 2,300 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel that is parked
in your State. You have 11 metric tons in addition to that that is
weapons-grade plutonium; Connecticut, over 2,000 metric tons parked in
their State; New Hampshire. It is all over the country. Perhaps if some
of your weapons-grade plutonium were parked in Massachusetts, then
there would be a different attitude and approach on this issue.
But I say to the Senator from Massachusetts it is his problem, too.
It is every Senator's problem to deal with this. It has been referenced
that it is ironic and it is unbelievable that in the midst of this
North Korean crisis we would even consider dealing with this thing
called the integral fast reactor. Where are they getting their
plutonium, Madam President? You probably received the same briefing I
have: The assertion being that country which wants to become a nuclear
threat to the Free World is getting it from the spent fuel of the
graphite reactor, and they are using the PUREX process. It is already
in place. That is where the plutonium would come from.
So why in the world do they continue this argument that the IFR is
simply designed to create more plutonium? Ladies and gentleman, we have
more plutonium than we know what to do with. We have a surplus of
weapons-grade plutonium throughout the world. While it is surplus, do
not ever forget that it is lethal.
Last month I had the opportunity, as a member of the Armed Services
Committee, to go with Senator Sam Nunn and other Members to Russia to
meet with our counterparts as they begin to put together democracy in
that nation that we hope will succeed. In those meetings we talked
about things such as the START treaties, and the fact that as a result
of the START treaties each country will have over 50 metric tons of
weapons-grade plutonium that will come about as we dismantle our
nuclear warheads.
Is that not a positive step forward, the dismantling of nuclear
warheads? Of course it is. But what are you going to do with the
weapons-grade plutonium? Because in these meetings we also talked about
the organized crime that is now running rampant in Russia. We talked
about the fact that our Federal Bureau of Investigation wants to set up
an office now in Russia because of this security problem. You know the
terrorists would love to have this weapons-grade plutonium.
Senator Exon--who was a part of this delegation--and I met with the
minister of atomic energy for Russia, Viktor Mikhailov. We had a
wonderful discussion with this man who is in charge of the spent fuel
in Russia. He said they are pursuing solutions to this. But he said,
``It is a real problem. It is a real problem with the weapons-grade
plutonium because we do not know what to do with it. Sure, we are going
to try to store it. But it is a security problem.'' As he said, in a
matter of weeks you can retrieve that from storage and you can
reassemble a bomb, a nuclear bomb. Remember, both countries will now
have a surplus of 100 metric tons. It only takes 15 pounds to make an
atomic bomb; 15 pounds, and we have 100 metric tons between the United
States and Russia.
So I asked Viktor Mikhailov, ``Are you pursuing the fast reactor
technology?'' He said, ``Of course we are because that is part of the
solution.'' He said, ``But it is very sad that the United States is
turning its back on this technology.'' He said, ``We are working with
Japan and France because this is part of the solution.'' I said, ``May
I quote you on the floor of the U.S. Senate that you would encourage
this Government, this administration, this Congress to continue our
efforts on the fast reactor, and then to share that technology so that
we can make it a safer world?'' And with great enthusiasm he said,
``Yes, definitely.'' So we are irresponsible for pursuing this type of
technology?
If I were a citizen listening to this debate today, watching it on C-
SPAN, I would think that we were talking about two different things.
Because those that are trying to support this amendment are saying one
thing, and they are quoting the National Academy of Sciences. And those
that are against this amendment are saying another thing, and they are
quoting the National Academy of Sciences. It is as though we are not
engaging in a real dialog in talking about this issue; the National
Academy of Sciences.
I spoke to Dr. Panofsky, the author of the National Academy of
Sciences study, yesterday on the telephone. I was not speaking to an
antagonist. He is not against the IFR. Yet that is how it would be
characterized.
I also spoke to Dr. Michael May, who is a member of the National
Academy of Sciences, the team that dealt with this whole question that
is being pointed to as saying IFR is bad. That is not what he said.
Here is a letter that he sent to me.
I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Center for International Security and Arms Control,
Stanford University,
Stanford, CA, May 16, 1994.
Senator Dirk Kempthorne,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Kempthorne: Thank you for your phone call and
your interest in the report of the Committee on International
Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences
on the management and disposition of excess weapons
plutonium. This letter is to clarify the position taken by
the report with regards to the integral Fast Reactor (IFR)
project.
The Committee did not recommend termination of the IFR
project. In fact, the report did not mention the project by
name. It did refer to the integral reprocessing approach,
noting in part that, in that approach, ``plutonium is never
fully separated in a form that could be used directly in
nuclear weapons, thereby reducing safeguards concerns.'' (p.
185). The Committee did not recommend this approach or any
other approach involving new or advanced reactors for long-
term disposition of excess weapons plutonium, because putting
the plutonium into a form as resistant to theft or diversion
as plutonium in spent fuel can be done more cheaply and
expeditiously by other methods, while eliminating the excess
weapons plutonium entirely makes little sense unless all the
plutonium in the world is also eliminated, an extremely
costly and time-consuming endeavor, and one not compatible
with the continuation of nuclear power.
With regards to total plutonium inventories, while the
Committee was not charged with and did not conduct a
comprehensive examination of the proliferation risks of
civilian nuclear fuel cycles, it recommended that ``further
steps . . . be taken to reduce the proliferation risks posed
by all of the world's plutonium stocks, military and
civilian, separated and unseparated. . . . Studies [of the
future of nuclear electricity generation] should have as one
important focus minimizing the risk of nuclear proliferation,
and should consider nuclear systems as a whole, from the
mining of uranium through to the disposal of waste . . .''
(p. 228-9) The IFR approach, while not mentioned specifically
fits within such systems.
While I am not personally an expert on nuclear reactor
systems, I have been favorably impressed by the IFR approach
and, based on what I know, believe the program should be
continued.
I hope this letter answers your question and would be glad
to be further help in the matter as needed.
Sincerely yours,
Michael M. May,
Co-Director.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. He said:
The committee did not recommend termination of the IFR
project. In fact, the report did not mention the project by
name. It did refer to the integral reprocessing approach,
noting in part that, in that approach, ``plutonium is never
fully separated in a form that could be used directory in
nuclear weapons, thereby reducing safeguards concerns.''
Then this member of the National Academy of Sciences team went on to
say:
I have been favorably impressed by the IFR approach and,
based on what I know, believe the program should be
continued.
So I am not characterizing what the National Academy of Sciences
report is all about. I am simply reading a letter from a member that
helped write that report who says he is favorably impressed with the
IFR and he thinks it should continue.
This idea that because the IFR, which is a plutonium burner, can be
converted to a breeder, therefore we should not pursue this, you have
heard different analogies. But Madam President, that is like saying
that we should not build airplanes because they can be used for war,
they can be equipped with an arsenal ignoring the fact of what
commercial aviation means to the world, ignoring the fact that those
airplanes transport patients that need medical help.
So let us not just focus on the fact that, yes, if you want to spend
the money, if you want to spend all of that time, you could probably
convert this to become breeders. But you do not need to, Madam
President. We have more plutonium than we know what to do with.
Then it was stated by the Senator from Massachusetts ``we don't need
it.'' I just talked about the START treaties. The State of Texas is
concerned about this. Pantex has entered into an agreement with the
Department of Energy that says that they will only receive the weapons-
grade plutonium from the dismantling of these nuclear warheads for 3
more years. That is it, 3 more years. Yet, we are going to have a
supply as a result of the START treaties through the end of the
century. Where are you going to put it?
At a recent Armed Services Committee hearing, Madam President, I
spoke with the Secretary of Energy. I said, ``We talk about spent fuel
at Savannah River, spent fuel at Hanford, spent fuel at Idaho, surplus
plutonium at Pantex, the fact that we have 50 metric tons of weapons-
grade plutonium that will be surplus as a result of the START treaties.
Where are we going to put all of this?'' The Secretary of Energy said,
and I quote: ``Well, sir. I am not certain where I am going to put it
yet.''
I saw a report that was just released last week on all of the DOE
spent fuel and suggested options of what they might do with it. You
probably cannot see that Madam President, but that shows different
States. One of the solutions is just to dump it in these different
States. It is not a solution.
Madam President, the idea that we are just going to dump it in these
States is not a solution.
I do not believe that the solution is just to stick it in the sand. I
do not believe the solution is to bury it under the feet of our
children and our grandchildren, because that is not the American way.
We meet our challenges head on. That solution is sticking our head in
the sand. Is it the responsible thing to do to simply say that because
we cannot come up with a solution, we are going to leave it for future
generations, for the young people of this Nation to deal with it and,
hopefully, they will have a little more courage? I do not think so.
The American way is to use our technology and our means to find a
solution. That is what the integral fast reactor is. Why should we turn
our back when we are 2 years from the answer as to whether or not this
is a viable option that allows us to, finally, for the first time as a
nation, begin having a solution to the nuclear waste problem.
Mr. BUMPERS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] is
recognized.
Mr. BUMPERS. Madam President, this is an issue I became involved in
when I first came to the Senate, and that has now been almost 20 years
ago.
In 1978, I began my efforts to kill the Clinch River breeder reactor
down in Tennessee. I started off with a few votes, and each year I got
a few more votes. As I began to get closer to winning, and as the costs
had gone from $300 million to $8 billion, the Department of Energy
began to frantically dig a big hole in the ground. That is what they
always do. They get bulldozers out and start digging big holes in the
ground. When they think they are about to lose, then they say: ``Oh, we
have gone too far now; you cannot stop this project now. We have
already invested too much money in it.''
I remarked to some of my friends in the Cloakroom a while ago that
the American people have a 14 percent confidence level in the U.S.
Congress. That is tragic. It is tragic for us as individuals, and it is
tragic for the political process and the country. Much of what they are
upset about is not legitimate, and some of the things they ought to be
upset about, they are not.
One of the things they ought to be upset about is the advanced liquid
metal reactor. Congress reminds me of Charlie Brown. Every fall when
the football season starts, Lucy says, ``Charlie, I am going to hold
the ball for you, and I want you to kick it.'' Charlie says, ``No, I am
not going to do it, because you will do just like you did last year;
you will pull the ball out just as I get there, and I will take a
terrible spill.'' And Lucy reassures Charlie that, no, this year she is
not going to do that. This year she is really going to hold the ball so
he can kick it. And every year, old Charlie falls for it, and every
year he takes a spill, as she pulls the ball away from him just as he
gets there.
The administrations of Ronald Reagan and George Bush continued to
pull the ball away from Congress on the super collider, and the space
station, the B-1 bomber, the B-2 bomber, and Congress just kept falling
for it. Every year there was a new rationale for each and every
boondoggle. We have a $4 trillion debt to prove it. I could not believe
the House voted yesterday to continue the space station program. The
President, to his credit, has done a very effective job in lobbying
Congress on the space station. President Clinton was committed to the
super collider, but he could not save it last year. And this year, I
have a whole host of things which I will be offering in the
appropriations process to try to cut spending.
Congress simply cannot bring itself to deal with these issues, except
on a parochial basis--the promise of jobs in States where jobs would be
lost. So the Clinch River breeder, even with Howard Baker as the
majority leader, from Tennessee, where it was going to be built, went
down to defeat, but not before spending over $1 billion.
Now we are back at the same old stand with a slightly different kind
of reactor called a liquid metal reactor. I wish I were as well versed
technically on this issue as the proponent of the liquid metal reactor,
Senator Johnston of Louisiana. I never even had high school chemistry.
But not having high school chemistry does not keep me from
understanding Economics 103A. And Economics 103A says we are headed for
an expenditure, which over the next 35 years, if you compound the
interest on the cost, is going to run close to $6.5 billion.
What is another one of those ``Lucy'' promises this year? Well, now
you are told the international community is going to contribute; the
private sector is going to contribute; and if we do not go forward with
this, our word is no good. How will we ever convince our partners in
other countries--the Japanese, notably--and the domestic power
industry, that our word is good if we stop now? Well, we would be doing
them a big favor if we stop now, because, despite what you hear to the
contrary, there are no foreign or private contributions. Nobody is
committed. You could not pick a better time to keep your word.
I have heard figures all over the place this morning about what it is
going to cost to terminate this project, and what it would cost to go
ahead with it. These figures are not something I conjured up in the
middle of the night. I do not know where you get better figures than
the Department of Energy. Neither they nor the President want the
project. But here is what it is going to cost in constant dollars--$3.4
billion--if we go ahead with the liquid metal reactor program. Here is
what it would cost to terminate, if the Senate does its duty today.
Three hundred million dollars; less than 10 percent of what the total
cost of it will be if we complete this project.
Mr. SIMON. Will my colleague yield?
Mr. BUMPERS. Yes.
Mr. SIMON. If I can just quote from Secretary O'Leary's testimony in
the House Energy and Power Subcommittee. Representative Crapo says:
I have been advised that the amount of money that it will
take to terminate this research exceeds, or at least equals,
the amount of money it will take to complete the research. Do
you have an understanding in that regard?
Secretary O'Leary: ``That is correct.''
I just point out to my friend from Arkansas that I think the more
recent letter just does not make sense, because it counts
commercialization.
Mr. BUMPERS. Madam President, I will read a letter that Senator Kerry
and I received from Hazel O'Leary about 30 minutes ago.
It reads as follows:
Dear Senator Kerrey: In response to your request, the
Department of Energy has not signed any new agreement with
the government of Japan or the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel
Development Corporation of Japan that provides for financial
contributions to the Integral Fast Reactor program.
Therefore, based on Department of Energy budgetary evidence
from fiscal year 1995 to 1998, the cost to terminate the
Integral Fast Reactor program will be $27 million less than
continuing the program.
This letter is 30 minutes old.
Madam President, we are not just talking about what it is going to
take to continue this program. Admittedly, the difference in cost of
termination and continuing over the next 4 years is small. We are
talking about what it is going to cost over the 35-year life of the
project, and that difference is: $300 million versus $6\1/2\ billion,
counting the interest on the money we will borrow.
There is another thing that I might point out, and that is we have
not built a nuclear power plant in this country since 1976, 18 long
years. And do you know why we have not? Because the American people do
not want them. We have 109 nuclear power plants in this country right
now, which, incidentally, could burn up this 100 tons of plutonium we
are trying to deal with. I am going to come back to that in just a
moment. But the people in this country, particularly after Chernobyl,
but even before that, said no more nuclear power until you can convince
us that our children are safe.
We have not been able to come up with a light water reactor or any
other kind of reactor design that would assure the people of this
country that they are not in danger. So we have not built them.
Back to the double whammy which I started out to talk about a while
ago. You get a chance to once again say to the American people we are
serious about cutting the deficit; we are not going to go forward with
a highly questionable project and take $6\1/2\ billion of your money to
do it. How could you benefit more politically, because that is the name
of the game around here, than to go home and say not only are we going
to not breed more plutonium and make the world less safe, we are not
going to breed plutonium and we are going to save you $6\1/2\ billion
at the same time.
Third, why is it we want to go against the Department of Energy and
the President's foreign policy. It is all wrong.
(Mr. PRYOR assumed the chair.)
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I am one of the 42 percent of the people
of this country who do not disapprove of the President's foreign
policy. Oh, I know it is very difficult for people in this country to
approve a foreign policy of the President unless he is willing to send
troops everywhere there happens to be a dispute to show that we are the
big man on the block.
I was as concerned and I remain as concerned about Korea as any spot
on the face of the Earth. But I will say this: Things are looking a lot
better in Korea. And do you know why? Not because we bombed their
nuclear facilities but because we talked to them, and now they say,
``We are going to let you inspect our facilities.'' And there is
something else that nobody ever dreamed would happen, a summit between
the North and South Korean leaders scheduled for July 27.
So once again a little patience and a little talking, at least for
the time being, appears to have been a good approach on the part of the
President.
Why does not someone write that story that that is turning out as a
very successful policy of this President?
We debated Haiti all day yesterday. I voted against the amendment of
the Senator from New Hampshire because I do not think the Congress
generally has any business telling the President what he can do and
cannot do in implementing foreign policy. But some people will never be
happy until we send troops to Haiti. The same people who are clamoring
to send troops to Haiti, will, when it bogs down and American bodies
start coming back in body bags, say he messed it up; he is not doing
what I intended. He did it all wrong.
I have been here 20 years and I have seen that happen time and time
again.
You have another crowd around here that wants to go into Bosnia,
whether the United Nations and our partners in the United Nations like
it or not. Do you know where Bosnia is? It is in Europe. It is not on
our border north or south.
We have an interest. We have an interest in solving the problems
there and stopping that war. But I can tell you even though I voted
against going to Iraq, at that particular time, I consistently
applauded George Bush for getting the United Nations to approve it and
only going when we had the United Nations on board, and they all went
and they all fought. That is the way it ought to be done.
When Bill Clinton was trying to get all of our United Nations
neighbors to start bombing the Serb positions around Sarajevo, every
one of them said no thank you.
It is in their backyards, not ours.
But now the guns are fairly silent in what used to be Yugoslavia. It
just may be that a little patience has paid off.
With regard to Korea, I would have been prepared at some point
because that is a renegade society, to consider military action. And
even though things are looking good there, Kim Il-song is the same old
Kim Il-song that we have been dealing with now for over 40 years. I
just hold my breath and hope things turn out right.
All I am saying is that in Bosnia and in Korea, so far, patience and
talking has paid off.
If you start down the road building this liquid metal reactor and
processing and reprocessing plutonium, of which we have 100 tons,
instead of disposing of it right now, either by vitrification or
burning it up in light water reactors, which can be done, what do you
say to the Koreans? What do you say to the rest of the world? We have
the moral high ground. When you vote against the Kerry-Gregg-Bumpers
amendment, you are saying: We do not like the high ground. We like
plutonium, lots of it. Why? Why would you want to give up a very strong
moral position that we now occupy by saying we are going to flood this
world with more plutonium and just hope to God someone does not steal
it and make a bomb out of it?
Mr. President, I was able to kill the Clinch River breeder reactor in
1983 but since 1986, we have already spent $1.4 billion and are headed
for $6.5 billion over 35 years on an LMR.
Last year, the House, to its eternal credit, voted overwhelmingly to
kill this project, 272 to 146. The Senate voted the other way--53 to 45
against the Kerry-Bumpers-Gregg amendment last year. So what happened
when we went to conference with the House? Well, the House committee
receded to the Senate and $100 million more went down the tube.
Mr. President, I do not deny that we may be able to build this
reactor. I do not know that we can, but I think it may be possible to
build the integral fast reactor. But I do not think it is going to be
feasible economically to use these reactors, because they are not going
to be competitive, for 40 to 60 years given expected uranium prices.
The National Academy of Sciences, on whom we depend for our most
really reliable scientific information, says that the liquid metal
reactor cannot possibly be economical until 2025, at the earliest. That
is 31 years from now.
When it comes to breeding, I have heard so many claims this morning,
let me quote some other scientists.
The Senator from Louisiana says this is going to eat up plutonium; we
are going to get rid of the plutonium by using it to fuel an integral
fast reactor. And, again, I am not going to deny that that might be
possible, Mr. President. But I do know one thing. If you wrap a uranium
blanket around an IFR reactor, you can breed up to 20 to 30 percent
more plutonium than you will consume.
Now, my friend from Idaho and other supporters of this will say,
``Yeah, that's fine, but to turn an IFR into a breeder is very
difficult and time-consuming.''
Well, even your own Dr. Charles Till, of Argonne Laboratories, said
before the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, ``It is not a
tremendous change to make it a breeder and it would probably only take
a few weeks to do it.''
We always change the missions of government programs to keep them
going. Do you remember when we were going to build the B-2--and they
were going to cost $500 million each--because it was stealthy and it
could evade Russian radar and drop its bombs in a nuclear war? And now
the Russians are becoming a part of NATO, they are becoming a part of
the space station, they have dropped communism. They represent no
threat to this Nation right now. The B-2 was intended to drop bombs on
the Russians and we are going to have a debate later today or tomorrow
about building an additional 20 B-2 bombers to drop bombs, not nuclear
bombs, just drop bombs anywhere, not just on Russia. It is now touted
as a conventional bomber.
We can think up more reasons to continue wasteful programs than
anybody in the world. Every time one falls flat, somebody comes up with
another rationale to spend the taxpayers' money. And the liquid metal
reactor is no different.
Everybody here knows that the reason we started building the liquid
metal reactor to begin with was for military purposes, to make
plutonium so we could build more bombs. But now, now that we are
dismantling thousands of nuclear warheads, we say, ``Well, we are going
to use it to generate electricity.''
We have not even found a way to permanently store spent fuel rods
from light water reactors but we want to make more plutonium. In a
General Electric advertisement--and they are hot for this thing--they
promote the fact in their advertising that the LMR is a potential
breeder of plutonium. And, according to the Office of Technology
Assessment--which, along with the National Academy of Sciences, are the
two scientific groups we depend on most in the U.S. Senate--``It would
be difficult or impossible to design a reactor core that could be
guaranteed to not work as a plutonium breeder.''
Let me say that in ordinary English. The Office of Technology
Assessment says it would be impossible, virtually impossible, to design
a reactor core that did not breed plutonium. What more does anybody
want?
IFR fuel is less pure than the fuel that would have been generated by
the Clinch River breeder. But the plutonium from an integral fast
reactor is much closer to weapons grade material than spent fuel from
light water reactors by a margin of 20 to 1.
One of the first international trips I took after I came to the U.S.
Senate was to visit the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. I
spent 2 days with them briefing me about how they monitor nuclear
plants and determine whether there has been any theft or diversion of
material.
They have cameras in these plants, and they have an accounting
procedure: How much did you have? How much do you have now? And what is
the difference and what happened to it? It is not all that complicated.
But there was some fuel missing in Korea and that is what we were
concerned about. Many scientists believe there is enough material in
Korea's nuclear complex that has probably been diverted to make one or
two bombs. That is the IAEA's sole purpose for existing, to track
fissionable material.
We have 100 tons of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons. 100
tons is a lot. One way of getting rid of it is to vitrify it, that is
make a glass rod of it. And, you can use it in a light water reactor.
Second, if we decide to use it in the existing 109 nuclear
powerplants of this country, it would take 25 years to dispose of the
entire amount. But if you stored it until you can build an LMR, 30 to
40 years hence, you would have 30 to 40 years in which the possibility,
indeed the threat, of diversion and theft grows. And, in addition to
that, how do we say to France and Japan that we wish you would quit
processing plutonium, when we are doing it?
The Office of Technology Assessment, again, says that advanced liquid
metal reactor technology is less appropriate than near-term technology.
Let me say one more time, the Department of Energy says, if you want
to get rid of this plutonium, you can mix it with uranium and dispose
of it within 25 years in light water reactors. Why would we not do
that?
Now if I may, in closing, address a question to my good friend and
distinguished colleague, the chairman of my committee, the Senator from
Louisiana.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes, Mr. President.
(Mr. ROBB assumed the chair.)
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, on a separate matter, I discovered this
morning that this bill takes $65 million from funds we had appropriated
last year for closing down the superconducting super collider in Texas
and put it into what was described in the bill as a one-time
contribution to some remnant of the SSC.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, the Department of Energy has had ongoing
negotiations with the State of Texas about the termination costs of the
SSC. The State of Texas has huge claims, as you can imagine, because
they have floated some one-half billion dollar's worth of bonds and
there are claims under a memorandum of understanding which are quite
ambiguous, but also the claims resulting from that are quite huge with
respect to what they are claiming for termination costs.
Along the line, there had been extensive negotiations with the
Department of Energy as to how they might settle that. And, really, the
State of Texas--the principal thing they would like is to be able to
make something useful out of the site down there. So as part of a
settlement, and as to minimize the loss and to maximize the use of the
facilities down there, they have proposed that you take what we call
the LINAC, the linear accelerator, which is the first step of speeding
up protons that were going to be injected into that big ring--the LINAC
is mostly complete--they want to convert that LINAC into a medical
facility which will have the ability to treat cancer. What the protons
can actually do, the ions, is go through the skin into the body where
you do not have to cut open the body but you can actually go in and
excise a tumor without ever opening the skin. We have one of these
facilities in Loma Linda, CA. It is, they tell me, the preferred way to
treat prostrate cancer. I suggest, if any of my colleagues gets this,
they should explore particularly the one at Loma Linda.
In any event, they want to do that using money already appropriated
that is a carryover from prior years. It is a one-time expense
recommended by the Department of Energy and as part of a settlement
with the State of Texas. I think it is prudent to do so. It maximizes
the utility of the LINAC, which is already in place. Texas will share
the cost of building the facility and will bear the full cost of
operation of the facility. I think it is a prudent thing to do. It
involves no additional spending authority. If we did not do this, we
might have to settle this thing in court, which would take some years
and could be much more expensive.
Mr. BUMPERS. Let me say to my colleague, on April 12 of this year,
the Department of Energy said that the remaining termination costs on
the superconducting super collider were $568 million. Are we proposing
to take $65 million of that?
Mr. JOHNSTON. No, no. The $65 million previously appropriated to SSC
remains with SSC. It is being transferred over to convert the LINAC,
the linear accelerator. It has nothing to do with IFR. The linear
accelerator, which is the first step of starting the protons, you
know--we were going to put them around the ring in the SSC. The first
step is the linear accelerator, and we are going to convert that for
medical purposes. It has nothing whatsoever to do with IFR.
Mr. BUMPERS. Let me ask this simple question, if the Senator can give
me a bottom-line figure. If the Kerry amendment fails, how much money
is in the bill to continue the liquid metal reactor research?
Mr. JOHNSTON. I have a chart on that. It is $98 million.
Mr. BUMPERS. As I understand it, funds provided for SSC termination
and LINAC have nothing to do with funds provided for the LMR.
Mr. JOHNSTON. No. The IFR and the LINAC, in Texas, are totally
separate. They have absolutely nothing to do with one another.
Here is what the Department of Energy wants to do. They want the
original request of $83.8 million.
Mr. BUMPERS. Will my colleague turn that chart around just a little?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes. The Department of Energy's original request is
$83.8 million. They have an additional request of $33.2 million, which
is for--I would call it sort of pork, to help the people in the area
and keep them employed. So they have asked for $117 million.
Our phased termination option, which is 4 years, is $113.8 million.
If the Japanese cost share--and that is not for sure. I have a lot of
correspondence here from the Japanese where they would indicate--they
were ready to close the deal earlier. Now they said they would
reconsider. But they would contribute $15 million. The net cost this
year would be $98.8. That is for fiscal year 1995.
So this is the comparison in cost of what the DOE was requesting and
what we want to do with the Japanese contribution. In other words, it
costs $18.2 million less to do what we wanted to do than what the
Department of Energy wanted to do. Or, over a 4-year period it will
cost $344.3 million under the Kerry amendment, and with our phased
termination cost it will cost $327.8 million. That includes the
Japanese contribution.
Again, that may not come in, but we think it will. This is really not
a question of cost between the Kerry amendment and our amendment. It is
a question of whether you complete the research.
If I may, it sounds counter-intuitive that you can do the two for
virtually the same amount of money. The reason is that EBR-II, which is
the experimental breeder reactor II, which is being operated at the
present time, has liquid sodium in it, and under the immediate
termination, as under the Kerry amendment, you must continue to operate
that. You cannot shut it down or turn it off as you can with a regular
light water reactor; otherwise the liquid sodium would freeze up. So
you have to continue to operate it under the Kerry termination. The
real difference is under both of these, you continue to operate EBR-II.
Under ours you continue to do the experiments during the 4-year
termination phase. Under the Kerry amendment you do not do the
experiments.
All we are asking is that we complete the scientific program while
you continue to operate for the 4 years of the phased-down termination
under our option. It is not a question of cost. We show that we save
$16.5 million over the life of this thing if we get the Japanese
contribution. If you say the Japanese do not contribute, it may cost--I
think the figure is $25 million. In either event, it is not a question
of cost. We are not asking you do this to save the $16 million, and I
do not believe Senator Kerry is saying to stop it because it costs $25
million because the Japanese may not contribute. That is not the
question.
The question is whether you want the research. I believe, if I
interpret Senator Kerry correctly, he is saying you would be tempted to
build the reactor if you finish the research.
Not so. What we are saying is let us find the research, let us
complete the research to explore the option because we have not yet
picked another option. And if I may ask on the question of options, my
friend from Arkansas did, in fact, talk about one of the options, which
is to take plutonium from weapons and burn it in civilian reactors. Is
my friend from Arkansas saying he would prefer that option?
Understanding you are taking weapons grade plutonium and putting it in
civilian reactors, which do not have the safeguards and do not have all
the guards around it that you do at EBR-II or that you would at the
single integral fast reactor, has the Senator from Arkansas settled on
that option?
Mr. BUMPERS. I did not say that. I am just quoting from the
Department of Energy and the Office of Technology Assessment.
Mr. KERRY. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. BUMPERS. I will be happy to yield.
Mr. KERRY. I believe what the Senator was referring to--and it is the
same option we discussed earlier--it is the MOX option. It is the
combination of mixing the plutonium and uranium, and that gives you the
potential, at that point, to burn. It is different from using pure
plutonium in some form. There has never been a discussion of that.
Mr. JOHNSTON. If the Senator will yield, it depends on what kind of
mix oxide. If you are poisoning it, in effect, with spent fuel or with
waste from Hanford, that is one kind of fuel that you could conceivably
use. That makes it awfully difficult to transport and handle. The other
kind is a mix oxide where you have uranium and plutonium which can be
easily handled and is not proliferation proof, and that is the problem.
Mr. KERRY. It is not really the problem, if I could just say, because
in point of fact the Senate has now been presented with a sort of
cloudy image of these different fuels and what the choices really are
and whether or not we have made an option.
The fact is the National Academy of Sciences, as the Senator from
Louisiana well knows, has given a very clear direction and is
absolutely firm about these options. And in fact, Dr. Panofsky, who was
quoted earlier by the Senator as somehow leaving the door open for this
technology, does not leave the door open for this, only in terms of
operational choices.
I think the Senator has a chart there, and in the chart, he has a
quote about the research that was advocated from the National Academy
of Sciences. Maybe he could go back to that chart, because I thought
there was a very important distinction that that draws which the
Senator did not draw, and of which the Senate ought to be aware.
Mr. BUMPERS. While the Senator is looking for that chart, if I can
get back into this debate to answer the question that was just asked--
``Am I suggesting that we use this plutonium in light water
reactors?''--I did not suggest any specific remedy. But the National
Academy of Sciences listed this as an option for the disposition of
weapons-grade plutonium.
Mr. JOHNSTON. It can be done.
Mr. BUMPERS. Let me continue:
According to a recent report prepared by the National
Academy of Sciences, the two most promising alternatives for
plutonium disposition are, No. 1, fabrication and use as fuel
in existing light water reactors and, No. 2, vitrification.
The Department of Energy follows that by saying that you can take the
100 metric tons of warhead plutonium and mix it with uranium and burn
the full amount--that is, the 100 tons--in existing light water
reactors in 25 years.
Mr. JOHNSTON. If the Senator will yield, there are two problems with
that. First, you can surely burn it in existing reactors. They have to
be reconfigured. Earlier I pointed out where these reactors might be.
The problem is a MOX fuel mixing plutonium and uranium is not
proliferationproof. It is when it comes out the other end but not when
it goes in.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, storing 100 tons for more than 30 years
is even more dangerous. You can start to burn this plutonium now. You
cannot start burning this plutonium under the Senator's plan until this
design and capability is proven, and that could be 30 to 35 years from
now, if ever.
Mr. JOHNSTON. The Senator points out properly that this is not a
quick solution and, indeed, none--see, the Department of Energy has not
settled on a solution either. This business of using----
Mr. KERRY. If the Senator will yield.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Vitrification--if I can finish--we do not have a
vitrification facility in this country, nor do we know the limits of
critical mass using the vitrification with plutonium--a real problem on
disposal of fuels. If I may just point out on this quotation--you can
prove most anything with quotations--if you look at that quotation, the
sentence before and the sentence after puts it in quite a different
context. The sentence before says, as part of that future referring to
IFR:
They may offer the possibility of pursuing the elimination
approach in the long-term, not only for weapons plutonium but
also for the much larger quantities of civilian sector
plutonium.
They go on to say--and they quote this--then they say:
In saying this, the committee does not intend to recommend
either for or against the development and deployment of
advanced reactors for commercial electricity production which
is beyond the scope of its charge.
And the other National Academy of Sciences study, by a different
panel which includes the present head of the Nuclear Energy Office in
the Department of Energy, the present one says:
The committee believes that the LMR should have the highest
priority for long-term nuclear technology development.
Should have the highest priority.
Again I quote:
The problems of proliferation and physical security posed
by the various technologies----
Mr. BUMPERS. Let me interrupt. Is the Senator on page 2?
Mr. JOHNSTON. I am on page 197.
Mr. BUMPERS. I am sorry, we are reading from different reports.
Mr. JOHNSTON. This is the Nuclear Power Technical and Institutional
Options for the Future by the Research Council of the National Academy
of Sciences:
The problems of proliferation and physical security posed
by the various technologies are different and require
continued attention. Special attention will need to be paid
to the LMR.
None of these talks about being an early option. I am not saying when
you finish this 4-year study that you will be able to deal with the
problem of plutonium proliferation. Unquestionably, that is not true.
Nor is it true that you would be able to pursue any of these other
options.
But we have not decided on any of these other options, and I would
like to know what anybody proposes as an option, because each one of
these options, using the CANDU reactors in Canada, using Palo Verde in
Arizona, using the WPPSS reactor in Washington, all have proliferation
problems that the IFR does not have, and they have practical problems,
like how do you keep this plutonium safeguarded as it is going in its
MOX state?
Mr. KERRY. I would----
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, may I say to Senator Kerry, I want to
yield the floor, and I want to terminate my part of this debate, if you
will allow me to make some final observations.
First, I want to make the observation that the Senator from Louisiana
is reading from a report that is older than the most current.
Mr. JOHNSTON. 1992. I read from both, one is 1994, the Panofsky
report, where we had the hearing--I think the Senator was there for at
least part of the time.
Mr. BUMPERS. If I may just read from the 1994 report which is about
as hot off the press as anything you will get from the National Academy
of Sciences on this subject, here is what they say:
Safeguarded storage. First, we recommend the United States
and Russia pursue a reciprocal regime of secured,
internationally monitored, storage of fissile material with
the aim of insuring that the inventory in storage can be
withdrawn only for nonweapons purposes.
No. 3, and I am reading from page 2 of the executive summary:
Long-term plutonium disposition.
That is what brought us to this colloquy and this debate right now.
We recommend that the United States and Russia pursue long-
term plutonium disposition options that, one, minimize the
time during which the plutonium is stored in forms readily
usable for nuclear weapons; two, preserve material safeguards
and security during the disposition process, seeking to
maintain the same high standards of security and accounting
applied to stored nuclear weapons.
The report proceeds to discuss other matters. But No. 1 on their list
is to minimize the time during which this 100 tons of plutonium in the
world today is stored in forms readily usable for nuclear weapons.
Now, just to pursue that a moment, they go on to say that the two
most promising things that we ought to be doing to dispose of plutonium
is either to vitrify it and store it or burn it in light water
reactors. The NAS does not recommend the use of liquid metal reactors
for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium.
I yield the floor.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
Louisiana [Mr. Johnston].
Mr. JOHNSTON. Just briefly to respond to that, that is clearly what
they said at the National Academy of Sciences. Speaking of the short-
term problem, what they are saying is that you need on a short-term
basis to get this plutonium out of the form that can be put in
someone's pocket and spirited out of the factory or out of the
safeguard place. Clearly that is so.
What the National Academy of Sciences said in the same report
speaking of the long-term steps is that:
Long-term steps will be needed to reduce the proliferation
risks posed by the entire global stock of plutonium,
particularly as the radioactivity of spent fuel decays.
To further refine these concepts, research on fission
options for the near-total elimination of plutonium should
continue at the conceptual level.
Now, this is what the IFR is continuing--total elimination. The IFR,
or the LMR--they call it by either thing--is the only one that totally
eliminates plutonium. It is true that MOX fuel mixing uranium and
plutonium will irradiate the fuel and it makes it difficult to handle
then and on the short-term basis is relatively proliferation proof.
However, using the PUREX process, which is a chemical process, using
hydrochloric acid--you can separate it. North Korea has the PUREX
process. You can take it out of these fuel rods. You can take it out of
the vitrified or glassified rods and get your plutonium again. You
cannot do that with spent fuel from uranium mines. That is a much more
complicated process.
That is why the National Academy of Sciences, while saying exactly
what the Senator said, also said that you need to refine these
concepts. ``Research on fission options for the near-total elimination
of plutonium should continue at the conceptual level,'' which is
precisely what we are saying--continue the research for the 4 years.
You see, our program is a termination program for EBR-II, which is
the reactor. We say terminate it in 4 years. The Senator says terminate
it in 4 years. The difference is he says do not do the research which
gives you conceptual research on options for the near-total
elimination. He says do not do that, no cost. Now, that escapes me--why
you would not want to do the research to find the answer to this in the
same length of time. You end up with EBR-II, the reactor, terminated in
4 years and it does not cost any money and why would you not want to
find the answer to that question? The National Academy of Sciences says
you ought to do it.
Mr. KERRY. If the Senator will yield.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I will yield for a question.
Mr. KERRY. I am sure he would agree with me, because he said it
previously, that it is only at no cost if the Japanese agree.
Mr. JOHNSTON. If the Japanese agree, I think we make--we save $15
million. If the Japanese do not agree, I think it costs $26 million
over 4 years.
Mr. KERRY. Let us come back and phrase the question the way I did. It
is only at no cost on two counts: First, if your expected expenditures
pan out, which I will show momentarily has never happened and even now
is not, and, second, if the Japanese contribute. If the Japanese do not
contribute, the taxpayers are out the money. Is that not accurate?
Mr. JOHNSTON. The Japanese what?
Mr. KERRY. If the Japanese do not contribute, the American taxpayer
is going to have to ante up.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I believe that is correct. And I think the figure is--
--
Mr. KERRY. Here is a letter hot off the press as of 30 minutes ago,
as the Senator from Arkansas said, saying that we have not signed any
new agreement with the Government of Japan.
Therefore, based on Department of Energy budgetary
estimates from fiscal year 1995 to 1999, the cost to
terminate the integral fast reactor will be $20 million less
than continuing the program.
So for hours now all of you folks have been saying here it is less
expensive to continue, and here straight off the press from the
Department of Energy is, No. 1, a statement the Japanese are not
contributing and, No. 2, a very clear statement that it is more
expensive to continue the program.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Not for fiscal year 1995. For fiscal year 1995, without
the Japanese cost sharing, you save $3.2 million.
Mr. KERRY. That is not for termination, that 33.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes. Both of these are terminations. Our program is a
termination of what we call EBR----
Mr. KERRY. The $33 million is for other projects that Argonne is
going to pursue. The $33 million is for other projects Argonne will
pursue.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Twelve of the 33 I am advised are for additional
projects.
Mr. KERRY. No, the whole $33 million is for other projects that
Argonne will pursue. But you see, all of this is skirting around what
is really at issue here. It really does not come to grips with the
choice. And I wish to go back, if I may, if I could ask the Senator
respectfully to go back to the quote he had a moment ago about
conceptual. He was quoting from the report. Let me just take--this is
the 1994 report. The 1994 report says point blank:
Advanced reactors should not be specifically developed or
deployed for transforming weapons plutonium into spent fuel
because that aim can be achieved more rapidly, less
expensively, and more surely using existing revolutionary
reactor types.
So here is the Academy saying point blank----
Mr. SIMON. Will my colleague yield?
Mr. KERRY. Let me just finish. Point blank, do not do this for the
very reason that all of you have asserted is a good rationale for doing
this.
Now, you go further than that and the next page----
Mr. JOHNSTON. Wait.
Mr. KERRY. Let me just finish. On page 161 of the report--I mean we
have had very little time to rebut about four or five speakers. I just
want to put a little bit of this information into perspective.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Wait a minute. The Senator was asking me a question,
did they say the quoted language, and the answer to that, if that is a
question, is yes. But I say to the Senator, respectfully, if you put it
in context, it comes to a different conclusion because the sentence
before says, ``As part of that future''----
Mr. KERRY. I am willing to read the whole paragraph in because it
goes to this question of conceptual. They are, indeed, advocating
conceptual research. But what you have and what is being funded goes
way beyond conceptual research. It is operational funding.
Mr. JOHNSTON. No, no, it is not.
Mr. KERRY. It absolutely is. It is moving toward the construction of
a prototype.
Mr. JOHNSTON. It absolutely is not.
Mr. KERRY. This is where----
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, let me make this clear because about
this there is no doubt and no question. It is our bill. I would not
mislead the Senate or I would not mislead my friend from Massachusetts.
Mr. CRAIG. Will the Senator from Louisiana yield?
Mr. JOHNSTON. What we propose is the completion of a 4-year research
program at the end of which you will have terminated EBR-II, which is
the experimental breeder reactor up in Idaho. We are testing the fuel
and we are doing the design work. There is no new start. There is no
construction. There is no leading to--it is in effect conceptual work.
Mr. KERRY. I agree with the Senator there is no new start
construction, but there is a huge gap here and I am going to wait. I
know the Senator from Idaho has not spoken yet. I wish to come back.
But I intend to show how in fact this argument about civilian
plutonium, military plutonium disposition, et cetera, simply does not
stand up. And I am happy to wait to do that.
Mr. JOHNSTON. All right. I wish to yield to my friend from Idaho, but
I wish to say, first of all, with respect to the National Academy of
Sciences, what they are saying is you should not specifically develop
or deploy. That means the building of a reactor specifically for the
purpose of elimination of weapons plutonium. They go on to say that it
has attractive options for the elimination of plutonium but that should
be pursued only as part of a program that might generate electricity as
well and that it is too soon to tell whether that is the proper option.
Mr. KERRY. If I could say to my friend--and this is a good dialog and
it is important-- if we turn to the next page, page 161, of the very
same report, it says the following:
Commercial reactors of the types currently operating in the
United States, known as light water reactors, offer the
technical possibility of transforming excess weapons
plutonium into spent fuel within a few decades. Such a
plutonium disposition campaign could probably begin within
roughly a decade paced by the need to provide a plutonium
fuel fabrication capability and a variety of institutional
issues, including licensing and public acceptance. Once
started, the campaign could be completed within 20 to 40
years paced by the number of reactors participating * * *.
and so forth.
As the Senator well knows, we are on a light water reactor
development program--advanced reactor. That is the current technology
in the United States. There is no reason given that capacity within
light water technology to do any of this in the liquid metal technology
except for the rationale that has been proposed by Senators, which is
to use up weapons-grade plutonium. Having shown that you do not need to
do that, let me just point out one very quickly----
Mr. JOHNSTON. If the Senator will----
Mr. KERRY. Let me finish this one point.
Dr. Panofsky, who has been quoted here, said very clearly at the
press conference releasing the report, he described the results of the
study saying that the panel had started with a horse race of more than
a dozen horses, and it shot all but three of them: vitrifaction, MOX,
and deep bore holes. In other words, Dr. Panofsky himself said at the
press conference announcing this report that as far as an option for
plutonium disposition, ALMR was not even in the horse race.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for an inquiry?
Order of Procedure
Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes. Mr. President, the Senator is inquiring about a
time agreement. I was just getting ready to see if we could get a time
agreement with maybe an hour equally divided.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, this amendment has already been debated
for more than 3 hours. We are entering the fourth hour of debate on
this amendment.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I will agree to whatever time agreement the Senator
from Massachusetts will. I think the Senator from Idaho has not spoken
yet. What would the Senator from Massachusetts suggest?
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I have a couple of other Senators who have
asked for time, I am told. So I think we would need to reserve 45
minutes on this side.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Could we not do it in an hour?
Mr. KERRY. If I may say, there are a lot of debates that take place
on the floor. We spent hours on Haiti yesterday. I am happy to
accommodate. But if I have a couple of Senators who tell me they need
10 or 15 minutes, I think asking for 45 minutes, given the money at
stake and the nature of the issue measured against a lot of other hours
in the Senate, is not that tough.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, one thing I have learned in the Senate
is every Senator believes that his issue is the most important and his
words are the most important. I know other Senators feel that way on
other issues. It is something we have to contend with.
I feel we are now entering the fourth hour of debate trying very hard
to complete action on this bill. Would the Senator from Louisiana be
agreeable to having an hour with 40 minutes for Senator Kerry?
Mr. JOHNSTON. We have other speakers as well. I would be willing to
cut our side short as well.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me say to the distinguished majority
leader, I know he wants to move on. We all want to move on. I do not
think I have ever delayed the Senate. I would like to try to come to an
agreement. I do not have a problem. I am just trying to protect a
couple of Senators who are not here. I can do it in less time. I am
certainly not asserting that my words are going to make that kind of
difference here. But I want to protect those who are not here.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I would agree to whatever equal division
the Senator from Massachusetts agree to, if an hour and a half is the
best he can do.
Mr. KERRY. I would be happy to try to yield it back if we can get
some word they are not coming to the floor. All I want to is do is make
sure they have that ability. I will yield it back. I will make that
statement.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Let us make an attempt to yield back. If the
distinguished majority leader will accept it, we will go with 1\1/2\
hours. I think we can yield back.
Mr. MITCHELL. Could we have the amendment offered? I think that would
be a useful step. Then if the best we can do is an hour, let us take
1\1/2\ hours. But every Senator here knows that come about 6 or 7
o'clock this evening, I am going to be besieged by requests from
Senators about when we can leave, and when are we going to be through
with the evening, when are we going to be through with the week? We
have to make some progress here and get this bill passed.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I say to the distinguished majority leader I have been
asking for a time agreement since shortly after 9 o'clock this morning.
Mr. MITCHELL. An hour and half, after offering the amendment?
Mr. KERRY. I am happy to do that.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the
Kerry amendment is offered, there be 1\1/2\ hours of debate after which
there would be a vote on or in relation to the Kerry amendment, and
further request there be no second-degree amendments in order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending
committee amendments be set aside for the purpose of offering an
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 2127
(Purpose: To provide for the termination of the Advanced Liquid Metal
Reactor/Integral Fast Reactor [ALMR/IFR] Program)
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the amendment is at the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Massachussetts [Mr. Kerry], for himself,
Mr. Gregg, Mr. Bumpers, and Mr. Lautenberg, proposes an
amendment numbered 2127.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 40, between lines 21 and 22, insert the following:
SEC. 502. TERMINATION OF ADVANCED LIQUID METAL REACTOR
PROGRAM.
(a) Termination.--Except as provided in subsection (b),
funds appropriated under this Act may not be obligated or
expended for purposes of the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor/
Integral Fast Reactor (ALM/IFR) program.
(b) Termination Costs.--Funds appropriated under this Act
for the advanced Liquid Metal Reactor/Integral Fast reactor
(ALMR/IFR) program may be obligated and expended for that
program only for payment of the costs associated with the
immediate termination of the program, beginning in FY 1995.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I believe the Senator from Idaho seeks
recognition.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kerrey). Who yields time on the amendment?
Does the Senator from Louisiana yield time?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes. I yield 15 minutes to the distinguished Senator
from Idaho.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho is recognized.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, thank you.
Let me also thank the Senator from Massachusetts for propounding his
amendment. We have an amendment on the floor to debate.
Let me say to both the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator
from Arkansas, who have debated their position most clearly this
morning, that frankly not much has changed, not much has changed from a
year ago when this Senate engaged in a very similar debate on this
issue.
The Senator from Massachusetts will cite new scientific evidence that
would cause this issue to be debated differently. But I would suggest
that there is every bit the countering evidence scientifically as
presented by the Senator from Louisiana that, in my opinion, holds
sway, and, if not that, at least balance in this argument.
But let me tell you that while the arguments of the Senator from
Louisiana or this Senator from Idaho or the Senator from Massachusetts
have probably not changed from a year ago, Mr. President, something has
changed, that is, the position of the Department of Energy and this
administration on the issue of funding for the completion of the
scientific project known as IFR.
That is why we are here today in large part, because a year ago when
the Department of Energy was asked the profound questions which the
Senator from Massachusetts put before us this morning--they being, risk
of major proliferation, technology has no use, and that this was a
major deficit increase--here is what the Secretary of Energy said a
year ago.
She says: ``It has strong economic potential'' and ``could save
billions of dollars over 60 years by recycling actinides, which are
isotopes of uranium.
The Secretary of Energy said: ``Offers major environmental health and
waste management benefits.'' And there she was talking about the
question of the ongoing storage of spent nuclear fuels of this country
and no method by which to effectively reduce their radioactivity long
term.
She also said at that time: ``Would use a process that is
proliferation resistant.''
Might I suggest, Mr. President, that the old statement ``what a
difference a year makes,'' in this debate has made the difference, with
the Secretary of Energy. How can this be a nonproliferator last year,
and yet the Senator from Massachusetts stands on the floor today and
says that it is a proliferator this year? I do not blame Senators for
being frustrated or confused because of the bantering back and forth as
to which is good science or which is bad science, which report says
this and which report says that. Those arguments have not changed, but
Secretary O'Leary has changed her position. Why?
Well, the Senator from Massachusetts said that it is a deficit issue.
Doggone it, it is not a deficit issue anymore, and the Senator from
Massachusetts knows that. We are terminating the EBR terminator reactor
in Idaho right now. That is going to cost hundreds of millions of
dollars to terminate. But in the process of doing that, we are
completing a research program as to how to establish an integral fast
reactor that burns plutonium.
That is what we are talking about today. Will the Japanese
participate? Has the Senator from Massachusetts found a slight window
in which he can argue some kind of deficit reduction? And is that based
on whether the Japanese will or will not participate in this project?
Because I will tell you, the Secretary of Energy has worked overtime
trying to get them out of the project. Yet, they still hang on. I want
to quote from a letter and then add it by unanimous consent to the
Record, Mr. President. It is dated June 17, 1994. This is from the
president of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation
of Japan. This is what he writes to our chairman of the Energy and
Natural Resources Committee, Bennett Johnston:
We remain interested in working with DOE in this field,
although its recent actions don't provide a stable, credible
base on which to proceed at this point.
And that is what we are about today.
If Congress were to restore the program for the next fiscal year, we
would consider our options about participating in the joint program.
I ask unanimous consent that that be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel
Development Corporation,
Tokyo, Japan, June 17, 1994.
Hon. Bennett Johnston,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Washington DC.
Dear Senator Johnston: In response to your inquiry, I would
be pleased to provide you with information on the status of
PNC's views about actinide recycling R&D activities. We have
three cooperative agreements with the Department of Energy
(DOE) in the areas of fast breeder reactors, waste management
activities, and safeguards. In general, we would like to
enhance our cooperative R&D activities with the DOE since we
believe that, through joint efforts in areas of mutual
interest, each country can further its own research agenda
and conserve limited budget resources as well.
In this regard, we did make a specific offer earlier this
year to contribute to a multi-year, R&D program on actinide
recycling and the IFR directed by the Argonne National
Laboratory (ANL). If realized, this would have marked the
first commitment by a corporation affiliated with the
Japanese Government such as ours (although several Japanese
private entities have supported certain projects in this
area). We cam very close to reaching a final agreement with
the DOE.
Our tentative assumption for this cooperative project was
approximately $60 million over five years, subject of course
to the approval of the budgetary authorities in Japan.
However, the project was abruptly terminated by the DOE in
January of this year when funding wasn't identified in the
Administration's request for FY 1995 budget. We were
therefore forced to cease cooperative discussions with the
DOE and no longer secure financial resources for this
cooperative project in coming years.
Meanwhile, we are starting on our own to carry out R&D in
the field of actinide recycling. A new long-term plan for
nuclear energy, under the auspices of the Atomic Energy
Commission of Japan, will include specific reference to the
importance of carrying out R&D on advanced reactors,
including those for recycling actinides. It requires
technologies which are still in the initial stage of
research, but we are committed to proceed with R&D in the
long term in order to make tangible progress.
We remain interested in working with the DOE in this field,
although its recent actions don't provide a stable, credible
basis on which to proceed at this point. If congress were to
restore the program for the next fiscal year, we would
reconsider our options about participating in a joint
program.
We appreciate your interest and leadership on these issues
and hope our two Governments can continue to cooperate on
nuclear energy and other advanced technologies in the future.
Sincerely,
Takao Ishiwatari,
President.
Mr. CRAIG. Why would Japan be interested? Why do they want to
continue to work with all of us in the development of this program?
Well, Mr. President, it is obvious why they want to do it. They, like a
lot of other countries around the world, are frustrated. They are
frustrated over their light water reactor program because it produces
plutonium. And they must recycle that through the processes of PUREX,
as has been described today. And they, like France and like England and
like the United States and like Russia, would like to operate a reactor
that does not produce plutonium. The IFR is that reactor design. You
cannot deny it. That is what our scientists tell us. That is reality.
That is what we are here debating today.
So you see, I am about as frustrated as these Japanese are that we
have a Secretary that one year says that this is a good idea and this
is an economically right idea and an environmentally sound idea and
this is a nonproliferating idea, and all of a sudden, she finally fills
her offices with assistant secretaries that are profoundly antinuclear,
and her mind changes. Doggone it, that is what has happened. The
economics have not changed, the science has not changed, but the
politics have changed.
The 900 employees in Idaho and 500 employees in Illinois who have
done their level best to make this one of the finest science programs
we have, that have always stayed in budget, that are on time and on
line, cannot understand why, if the science was good a year ago, why it
is not good today. But the politics have changed. The politics have
changed.
Business Week magazine is not a very political publication. While
they are willing to credit this President with some of his technology
agendas, they are saying: Mr. President, on this one you are making a
mistake, and your Secretary is profoundly wrong. They are suggesting--
and the Senator from Illinois has put this quote in the Record, so I
will not ask that it be printed--that we do not now have a long-term
proposal for the shortening of the radioactive life of our nuclear
waste materials in this country.
The Senator from Massachusetts today talks about time and money, and
that is what we should be talking about. Today, thanks to this Senate,
we are working to establish a long-term solution to spent commercial
nuclear fuel. We have said to the State of Nevada that we do not care
what your politics are, we are going to store it there if we can. That
is a Government position, a Government policy. And we have chosen Yucca
Mountain, and we are going to spend well over $6 billion to get a piece
of paper that says that this area is geologically sound enough to store
nuclear waste or it is not. That is only a piece of paper, Mr.
President. And then once we have the paper, and if it says yes, we will
build a facility that may cost $4 or $5 billion, and we can fill that
facility overnight.
Here is why we can fill the facility. It is because the Senator from
Massachusetts, in his State today, has 2,021 casks of spent nuclear
waste fuel. He has 431 metric tons. Fifteen percent of the power that
lights the lights of Massachusetts is generated by nuclear power. Every
day when you throw a light switch, you generate a little waste. That is
in Massachusetts.
In Arkansas, 33 percent of their power is generated through nuclear,
and they have 1,188 casks. It goes on and on. When a Senator stands on
this floor, as did my colleague from Arkansas, and talks about
morality, long term and short term, the moral thing to do is to fund
the IFR, because that is the long-term solution. The Senator from
Massachusetts is absolutely right--this will not be built tomorrow if
the science and research proves out. It cannot be built tomorrow, and
we are not prepared to do that.
For this Secretary to suggest that this is a $2.7 billion project,
just is flat wrong, and she knows it. She is playing politics.
This Senate and this Congress have never said they are going to fund
the development of this reactor design. No. The Senator, who is the
chairman of the Energy Committee and the chairman of the appropriations
portion, is right when he says that this will be terminated in about
2\1/2\ years and he states the costs--and they are accurate.
Nobody has said anything, nobody has told the 900 people in Idaho
they are going to stay on to the year 2000 and build a new reactor if
it were to be built there. They know once their work is done, EBR-II
comes down, based on the policy established by this Congress a year
ago.
That is the reality of this debate. You should be debating it on
politics. There is nothing wrong with that debate. But do not debate it
on economics. Do not debate it on science, and do not debate it on the
deficit.
The Senator from Illinois and I stood on this floor many times
debating balanced budgets, and I think the Senator from Massachusetts
made reference to the balance budget and line-item veto today. That did
not pass me by. I knew what he was saying.
When we debate balanced budgets, we talk about reducing the deficit.
We talk about saving money. But one thing that we do when we save money
is we also learn not to waste money.
We have spent $800 million on this project. We are a few million away
from the design completion that sets this on the shelf and gives these
young people an option for their future to know that we can produce
electricity, that we can burn spent nuclear fuels, and that we will not
proliferate.
The Ambassador from Russia wants this program and hopes we will
continue it. The Japanese want it. The French want it. The British want
it.
Why do we not want it? Why should we not be the world leader in this
technology? We always have been.
I know this President is struggling with his foreign policy. This is
good foreign policy. This is the best there is. When the world turns to
the United States and looks at our science and says, ``That is the
right science and you are leading us into the future, and that is what
we want,'' that is good foreign policy.
Hazel O'Leary should not be practicing foreign policy down at DOE. A
lot of the nations of our world want this now, because they do not want
to proliferate. They do not want to have to go through the PUREX
process of the light water reactor. They want something that will burn
it. Why do we not work with them and finish this project and give it to
them?
That is good politics. It is good economics. It is sound. That has
been the argument in the past. That is the argument today.
That is why I think clearly the committee of authorization did the
appropriate thing when they recommended funding of this project.
We have heard a debate about how do you get rid of the spent
materials now? How do you get rid of weapons-grade plutonium now? Mix
it with uranium? Make a MOX-fuel burn in light water reactors, and you
have solved the problem.
How can you solve a problem when the light water reactor of average
size produces 500 pounds of plutonium every year and creates a very
large waste stream?
I suggest to the Senator from Massachusetts that that is only the
short-term problem about getting the weapons-grade plutonium off the
street and getting it mixed so that it cannot be reconfigured, but it
does not solve that problem.
Short term and long term--this Nation has been known for its
farsightedness. I would not like to think that we are shortsighted on
our future.
We must handle our nuclear waste or the lights will go out in
Massachusetts because the American people will simply say, ``Congress
of the United States, you have not been responsible in handling nuclear
waste. We do not want any more reactors. We ask you to shut down the
ones you have.''
That would be a tragic day because we know that nuclear energy is
clean. We know that it does not pollute the air. We know that it does
not damage the ozone. We know that it is a tremendous producer of
energy in a clean sense, and our only problem is that we cannot come to
political terms on how to handle the waste stream. So we in a very
unpolitical way are letting it build up around the Nation because what
we are talking about in Massachusetts is dry storage and it is sitting
on top of the ground out there.
Idaho does not generate, but we are willing to help you solve the
problem because we have the experts who know how to do it, and we want
to help the rest of these States, this Nation, and the world bring
about the science that will produce the reactor ultimately that will
get to where we want to get.
That is why this quote from Business Week is accurate. That is why
the Secretary of Energy is just simply wrong.
While I do not agree with her on a lot of things, I disagree with her
politics on this. She can play politics, and that is what is going on
because economics and science do not fit at this moment. I think those
arguments have been well placed on the floor today and very clearly
understood.
So let us not waste money. Let us analyze this in a deficit neutral
way. Let us get to the Japanese and encourage them to come back on
board as they are standing waiting to go at this moment and not
discourage them but give them the green light that we will go through
to the completion of this research project.
That is what this debate is all about today. It is not about really
anything else. It cannot be about proliferation. It is a nonstarter
false argument, and we all know that today. That is the basis of the
new concept, which is to get away from proliferation, to get to a safer
reactor, a walk away, a hands-free reactor, that is cool in its
operation and safe to the society around it.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.
Unanimous-Consent Agreement
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I, at the conclusion of this vote--the
Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor], has been asking for 8 minutes to
make a statement.
I ask unanimous consent that he be recognized after this vote to make
a statement on an unrelated matter for 8 minutes.
Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished
Senator from Illinois.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.
Mr. SIMON. I thank Senator Johnston.
Mr. President, first, a clarification. We have been hearing about the
National Academy of Sciences on both sides of this. The National
Academy of Sciences says if you want to do this solely to get rid of
plutonium, this does not make sense. No one wants to do this solely to
get rid of plutonium. It is an energy creator.
Second, we have problems in almost every State. Someone just handed
me an Associated Press story from Newport News, VA. Let me just read a
few sentences.
The Navy and the Department of Energy have decided that the
Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company will not keep a
nuclear waste from warships after June 1995. However, it is
still not clear where the spent radioactive fuel will go
after then, Navy and DOE officials said. A recently released
4,200-page Department of Energy report listed 10 places,
including the Government-owned Norfolk Naval Shipyards in
Portsmouth where nuclear waste from warships weapons
factories and research reactors may be stored between 1995
and 2035. The Navy wants all its nuclear wastes to go to the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
That is just brand new.
In your State, Mr. President, in Nebraska, 34 percent of the energy
in Nebraska comes from nuclear energy. You have right now in Nebraska
351 tons of spent fuel in storage. If we do not find an answer, it is
going to just build up and build up and build up, totally aside from
the arms problem that is involved here.
We have letters from academics all over the country saying it is
really important to move ahead on this. I would like to put in the
Record a letter from the head of the nuclear engineering department of
MIT, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and 11 professors
there, and I ask unanimous consent to print that in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
March 17, 1993.
Subject: Advanced Nuclear Power Technologies in the Clinton/
Gore Era.
Letters to the Editor,
The Washington Post,
Washington, DC.
Gentlemen: The proposed federal budget would eliminate the
program to develop the two most innovative of the advanced
nuclear energy technologies, for a potential savings of $200
million in the next budget, and $1 billion over five years.
These programs, for the liquid metal-cooled and gas-cooled
reactor concepts, were started during the 1980s in an effort
to improve nuclear power plant safety.
We write, concerned that this decision may prove very
harmful to the country. We urge that a decision as important
as this one should be taken only after deliberate debate of
its full implications. This has not occurred. Instead, the
decision announced ignores the technological benefit of these
programs, such as were pointed out in the 1992 National
Academy of Sciences/National Research Council report
concerning our national advanced reactor development
strategy. That report has not been rebutted in formulation of
the announced policy. Instead, it has so far been ignored.
Much time is needed for developing new technological
options. The progress made to-date in the advanced nuclear
energy will be difficult to replicate if it is discarded.
Such a decision should only be made following an open
exhaustive discussion.
The technologies of the current DOE Program include Light
Water Reactors (LWRs), Modular Gas-Cooled Reactors (MGR) and
Liquid Metal-cooled Reactors (LMR). Each has a different role
and rationale in the overall national energy strategy adopted
by the Congress last fall. The LWR program is concerned with
making significant safety and economic improvements upon the
power plants in current use, both through evolutionary
improvements and improved safety concepts. The MGR has been
cited by its proponents as the concept offering possibly the
greatest potential for improved safety, and has provided the
inspiration for efforts to develop a new generation of
advanced reactors. The LMR is most important for its
capability to convert the very large non-fuel portion of
natural uranium into plutonium, which can be used as reactor
fuel. If nuclear energy is to play any important role in
mitigating global warming (should that phenomenon turn out to
be a serious problem), this capability will be essential as
terrestrial uranium resources appear to be small enough that
they would otherwise limit the contributions of nuclear
energy technologies. Conceivably the LMR can also be useful
for consuming long-lived nuclear wastes. All three reactor
types can also be used to consume plutonium from surplus
nuclear weapons.
The rationale offered by the White House for the announced
policy is that the LWR program should continue, as it offers
near-term payoffs; the MGR program should be ended because it
is not needed and will not provide benefits during this
decade, and the LMR program should be terminated because it
is of no interest to electric utilities and its promise for
alleviating nuclear waste disposal problems are too uncertain
and far into the future.
We have each worked on different aspects of advanced
nuclear power concepts throughout our careers. We believe
that the threatened reactor development programs have good
chances for success, and can provide valuable technological
options for the nation. Should these programs be ended, it
would be so expensive to revive them later that we might
never receive their benefits.
Beyond the implications for technological advancement, the
announced decision is important for the existing nuclear
power plants, which produce about 20% of the nation's
electricity. Experience has shown that nuclear technology can
be very valuable when used properly, but very unforgiving
when used carelessly. This effort demands the involvement of
our most capable people. The ability to attract individuals
of the highest quality into this field will be greatly
impaired if it comes to be viewed as having stagnated. The
announced decision implicitly makes that statement.
Thus, we argue that the advanced reactor development
programs should be improved, not shutdown. We suggest that
arguments to the contrary be examined carefully, and rejected
when they are found to reduce the nation's range of promising
energy options. This is the case with the proposed halt in
developing a new generation of advanced reactor technology,
and it should be reconsidered.
Sincerely,
Ronald G. Ballinger, Professor of Nuclear Engineering;
Elias P. Gyftopoaios, Professor of Nuclear Engineering;
John A. Bernard, Jr., Director, Reactor Operations
Nuclear Reactor Laboratory; Michael W. Golay, Professor
of Nuclear Engineering; Allan F. Henry, Professor of
Nuclear Engineering; Michael J.Driscoll, Professor
Emeritus of Nuclear Engineering; Otto K. Hariing,
Director, Nuclear Reactor Lab., Professor of Nuclear
Engineering; Mujid S. Kazimi, Professor and Head,
Nuclear Engineering Department; John E. Meyer,
Professor Nuclear Engineering.
Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, there is a point where it simply is not
prudent to stop a project.
When I was a Member of the House, I say with some reluctance to my
friends who have offices in the Hart Building, I voted against the Hart
Building. But once you had the building under construction, I then
voted to complete the building so we would not just waste the money.
We are in that situation here. We are in a situation where we can
either complete the project and learn something, or devastate the
project at the same cost. That just does not make sense.
I hear a great deal from citizens in Illinois when I go out that we
ought to be less partisan in this body. I agree on that completely.
Here is a case where the two Senators from Idaho, who are Republicans,
are working with the two Senators from Illinois, who are Democrats.
Congressman Hastert and Congressman Fawell, Republican Members of the
House are strongly in support of this.
I have heard from Gov. Cecil Andrus and Attorney General Larry
Echohawk, Democrats from Idaho who are on this.
I have a hard time believing that anyone who is reasonably objective
can look at this and not say the prudent thing for us to do, whether
from a fiscal viewpoint or from an arms proliferation viewpoint, is not
to go ahead.
Among others are the National Association of Regulated Utility
Commissioners, the AFL-CIO, the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, and most of the major utilities of our country.
On the question of Japan, in the first 5 months of fiscal year 1994,
Japan gave us $9 million. They were ready to give us another payment
for $10 million when, in the words of the Japanese leader, he says, it
was ``abruptly''--that was his word, ``abruptly''--``canceled by the
Department of Energy.'' The total commitment of Japan was for $60
million. Japan does not do these things lightly. And the indication
from them is if we stop, they are going to try and go ahead in this
field. If they go ahead, guess who profits all around the world from
the technology we are looking for?
Mr. President, I think it would be a great mistake for the future of
this country to adopt the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I might use.
Mr. President, there have been some extraordinary, broad, grabbing
comments about why this is necessary. And, frankly, they are just plain
incorrect; incorrect on the science as well as on the facts. Let me
discuss that.
The Senator from Idaho and the Senator from Illinois a moment ago
were saying, we are just going to have this waste build up and build up
and build up. And we just heard how plutonium is coming out of the
plant in Massachusetts and Arkansas and elsewhere, and we have to deal
with it.
The fact is that usable plutonium does not come out of the plan in
Massachusetts or in Arkansas. There are two kinds of waste that come
out of our current technology of nuclear plant. They are called
actinides, with a nuclear number of 89 or higher, which includes
plutonium, and then fission waste, fission waste which cannot be split
into further use of energy. That is what you get, plutonium mixed with
other components. And it is precisely because you have to reprocess it
that this cannot be used as a bomb material.
So the plutonium that the Senator from Idaho tries to scare everybody
about the build up of is already mixed in fuel and it is an
extraordinarily expensive and complicated process to get that plutonium
out in order to use it.
But the reactor that they are talking about building will build quite
near weapons grade plutonium, so you have a whole tracking process, not
exactly weapons grade plutonium, but much closer to weapons grade
plutonium than what you have in the present system. And that is a
matter of fact.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. KERRY. I will yield on your time.
Mr. JOHNSTON. On my time.
I would like to deny categorically and completely the Senator's last
statement. Our reactor does not use weapons grade plutonium.
Mr. KERRY. I said ``near.''
The Senator from Louisiana knows that the plutonium that is created
through the process and extracted because it has to be reused is nearer
to weapons grade fuel than the fuel of any mixed plutonium in a light
water reactor. Now you cannot deny that as a matter of scientific
evidence.
So you are creating a closer to weapons grade form of fuel and you
have a whole problem of trying to keep track of it.
But here is the reason. The Senator says, ``Why has the Secretary of
Energy changed her mind?''
Well, first of all, the Secretary of Energy came to me and said she
wishes she had paid more attention to this and been able to make this
decision last year, so they would not use her quotes this year. But she
did not have that time and now she has and she has reviewed it. And the
Secretary of Energy has written a letter which says point blank, ``Here
is the reason, my colleagues, that we do not need this.''
Quoting the Secretary of Energy:
No further testing of the Integral Fast Reactor concept is
required to prove the technical feasibility of actinide
recycle and burning.
There you go. We do not need to do it because it is not necessary in
terms of the science. She goes on further and says:
The basic physics and chemistry of this technology are
established.
Now, what is really going on here is an effort to try to--I mean, if
this is going to have all the great business technology aspects that
have been talked about and the future that the people are talking
about, that means you are going to use it. And the fact is that the
President of the United States has said we do not want to use it
because it has an affect on proliferation in the world and a host of
other entities have agreed with that.
Now we have had heard about the jobs issue. My good friend from
Illinois mentioned it earlier, something about little games with
careers. This is not a little game with anybody's career. There is no
game being played with people as far as the choice we face.
In fact, in the letter from the President of the United States, he
says:
In an effort to redirect the ALMR's dedicated and talented
workforce at the Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois and
Idaho, the Department of Energy, under Secretary O'Leary's
direction, recently completed a proposal to restructure its
nuclear research program and focus on areas that support the
administration's nuclear policy goals.
So there is a specific effort to keep people working.
Mr. President, I do not want these people put out of work. There is
plenty of research for them to do. But they do not need to do research
which the Secretary of Energy herself has said is already complete. We
do not need this in order to understand the basic physics and where we
are going.
Now, we have heard again and again, as a fundamental rationale for
trying to go down this road, that the ALMR will solve our plutonium
disposition problem and even deal with the question of waste.
Mr. President, that is not true. As a matter of scientific fact, it
is known that this reactor creates new kinds of waste. You cannot just
dispose of an element. You can change an element. Basic physics taught
us that.
And what happens when you burn the plutonium is you wind up with
other kinds of waste, some of which has a half-life much longer than
the plutonium itself. In fact, if you look at the cost of pursuing the
plutonium proposal put on the table versus the repository alone, which
is the current alternative, you are talking about the difference of $33
billion and $117 billion. You are talking about $4 billion per ALMR
reactor if you go down that road, not to mention the licensing
problems, the citing problems, and all of the public problems you are
going to have in trying to do that. You have not only done that, but
you have created a whole new form of waste.
As I mentioned earlier, you have two kinds of waste coming out of a
nuclear plant today. Supporters of this program have come to the floor
today and they are suggesting that you are going to solve the waste
problem by turning actinides into fuel.
But, Mr. President, I remind my colleagues that does absolutely
nothing to reduce disposal costs or risk. You still will have to have
the repository. In fact, DOE's own waste managers are not purchasing
the ALMR technology because they believe it is too costly and
unnecessary.
The Senator from Illinois a while ago talked about all the people in
the Energy Department that support this. The people in the Energy
Department do not support this technology and they are not even
pursuing it is because it is too costly and unnecessary.
Moreover, it does not reduce the volume of fissioned products. And,
as I just mentioned, the ALMR process itself, when you take the
plutonium and burn it, creates a whole new set of waste and that
continues as a result of the additives that are needed. And, according
to Argonne National Lab technical documents themselves, they
acknowledge it will create this new waste.
Now the reprocessing step alone, Mr. President, would increase the
amount of high-level waste by 30-percent. When you burn the plutonium,
you turn it into high- and low-level waste and you will create a 30
percent increase in waste that then still needs to go to a repository.
Moreover, those fission products that are left behind are both
intensely radioactive and water soluble, which means that they can be
much more dangerous to the environment. They will require a long-term
deposit in a repository and they will dominate the long-term risks of
that depository.
Let me give you a specific example. Iodine 129 has a half-life of 17
million years. Cesium 135, a 3-million-year half-life. Technetium, a
212,000 year life.
By comparison the half-life of plutonium 239 is 24,000 years.
So I respectfully suggest if you really examine what is at stake
here, on the issue of whether it is more expensive or less, we have
disposed of that. It is more expensive to continue. I ask any one of my
colleagues just to go back and remind themselves about this program
through the years. Go back to when Senator Bumpers said he started
trying to get rid of it in 1978. After hundreds of millions of dollars,
$8 billion, and you have nothing to show for it, and now a tough
President and others saying do not do it.
My colleagues have said not much has changed in the last year. That
is not true. Since last year you have a President who is specifically
saying I do not want this because it is a threat to proliferation
issues in the world. You have a National Academy of Science report that
says, ``The advanced reactors are not competitive for this mission
because of cost and delay of their development, licensing and
construction.'' You have an OTA report. Let me read from the OTA
report. Incidentally, all of these are neutral. We have heard from the
Chicago Tribune. We have heard from the attorney general and the
Governor of Idaho. But here are neutral students of this very issue.
The report of the OTA says:
A number of studies have examined the use of nuclear
reactors including the ALMR/IFR to dispose of plutonium from
dismantled U.S. and former Soviet nuclear weapons. These
studies were carried out by the Office of Technology
Assessment, the National Research Council Committee on
International Security and Control, the General Accounting
Office, the Rand Corporation and the Department of Energy.
Although each study approached the issue from a unique
perspective, they reached many similar conclusions.
Then I skip down:
Although all options involve some unresolved options and
risks of uncertain magnitude, these studies concluded that
the development of advanced reactors for plutonium
disposition would involve the highest costs and the greatest
uncertainties.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Louisiana is
recognized.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, sometimes I wonder how our colleagues
can possibly make sense of this debate. Both sides are quoting the
National Academy of Sciences. Both sides are talking about editorials,
one side saying it will and the other saying it will not. I really
think a couple of things are fairly clear. One is that this is not
about money. The Secretary of Energy testified before our committee. In
answer to a direct question, ``Is this about money?'' she said, ``No.''
The reason is we save money if the Japanese contribute, and we have
letters indicating, I think, a good possibility that will happen. I ask
unanimous consent that these letters, a whole series of letters here,
be printed in the Record at this time.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Power Reactor and Nuclear
Fuel Development Corp.,
June 17, 1994.
Hon. Bennett Johnston,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Johnston: In response to your inquiry, I would
be pleased to provide you with information on the status of
PNC's views about actinide recycling R&D activities. We have
three cooperative agreements with the Department of Energy
(DOE) in the areas of fast breeder reactors, waste management
activities, and safeguards. In general, we would like to
enhance our cooperative R&D activities with the DOE since we
believe that, through joint efforts in areas of mutual
interest, each country can further its own research agenda
and conserve limited budget resources as well.
In this regard, we did make a specific offer earlier this
year to contribute to a multi-year, R&D program on actinide
recycling and the IFR directed by the Argonne National
Laboratory (ANL). If realized, this would have marked the
first commitment by a corporation affiliated with the
Japanese Government such as ours (although several Japanese
private entities have supported certain projects in this
area). We came very close to reaching a final agreement with
the DOE.
Our tentative assumption for this cooperative project was
approximately $60 million over five years, subject of course
to the approval of the budgetary authorities in Japan.
However, the project was abruptly terminated by the DOE in
January of this year when funding wasn't identified in the
Administration's request for FY 1995 budget. We were
therefore forced to cease cooperative discussions with the
DOE and no longer secure financial resources for this
cooperative project in coming years.
Meanwhile, we are starting on our own to carry out R&D in
the field of actinide recycling. A new long-term plan for
nuclear energy, under the auspices of the Atomic Energy
Commission of Japan, will include specific reference to the
importance of carrying out R&D on advanced reactors,
including those for recycling actinides. It requires
technologies which are still in the initial stage of
research, but we are committed to proceed with R&D in the
long-term in order to make tangible progress.
We remain interested in working with the DOE in this field,
although its recent actions don't provide a stable, credible
basis on which to proceed at this point. If Congress were to
restore the program for the next fiscal year, we would
reconsider our options about participating in a joint
program.
We appreciate your interest and leadership on these issues
and hope our two Governments can continue to cooperate on
nuclear energy and other advanced technologies in the future.
Sincerely,
Takao Ishiwatari,
President.
____
Federation of Electric
Power Companies,
Tokyo, Japan, May 10, 1994.
Hon. J. Bennett Johnston,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Washington,
D.C.
Dear Chairman Johnston: On behalf of the Federation of
Electric Power Companies (FEPC) comprising of all nine
utilities in Japan, I wish to express our concerns over the
Department of Energy's decision to propose in its FY 1995
Congressional Budget Request the termination of the Integral
Fast Reactor (IFR) Program conducted at Argonne National
Laboratory.
In Japan, nuclear power is contributing over 25 percent of
electricity generation today and will have to expand its role
to meet the increasing electricity demand in the future, yet
protect our environment. A goal of a future nuclear
development in Japan is to establish a fast reactor
technology, combined with a fuel recycle technology, while
taking into consideration nonproliferation. More than 95
percent of the spent nuclear fuels are Uranium and Plutonium.
By reprocessing the spent nuclear fuels and recycling Uranium
and Plutonium to the nuclear power plants, we can extract
residual energy from the spent fuel to generate renewable
electric energy. Also it can reduce the volume of the high-
level radioactive waste and the radioactive toxic lifetime,
as compared with a case of the direct disposal of the spent
fuel.
Japanese utilities have two concerns regarding the future
development of fast reactors: economics and nonproliferation.
The IFR technology being developed in the U.S. has potential
in addressing both of these concerns. This is why FEPC
decided to participate in the U.S. IFR fuel cycle
demonstration program as a cost-sharing partner. The
conventional PUREX reprocessing in use in Europe and planned
in Japan is a mature technology. However, the IFR
pyroprocessing is a totally new technology that requires a
pilot-scale demonstration before we can make an independent
assessment for its feasibility and practicality.
Terminating this demonstration at this juncture, especially
when it is on the brink of a pilotscale operation in EBR-II
and Fuel Cycle Facility (FCF), is simply unconscionable for
the future of nuclear development. IFR pyroprocessing is the
only technology that has potential of solving the
proliferation concerns associated with fast reactors in the
long term. The U.S. has historically played a preeminent role
in developing the civilian nuclear power, and the IFR
demonstration will be a significant step in advancing a safe,
proliferation-resistant nuclear technology for future
generations.
For these reasons and to promote further U.S.-Japan
cooperation in the field of nuclear power development, we
strongly recommend that the funding for the IFR Program be
continued to the point that a meaningful assessment of this
new technology can be made with respect to its economics
potential and its role in achieving nonproliferation.
Sincerely,
Ryo Ikegame,
Chairman.
____
Central Research Institute of
Electric Power Industry
Tokyo 100, Japan, May 12, 1994.
Hon. Bennett Johnston,
Chairman, Senate Appropriation Subcommittee on Energy and
Water Development, Washington, DC.
Dear Hon. Johnston; There is an urgent worldwide need to
control the release of carbon dioxide so as to avoid the
possibility of a global warming disaster. Given the need to
take action promptly, and the growing energy demand due to
the population and economic growth of the developing nations,
use of nuclear energy, which emits no carbon dioxide or other
greenhouse gases, assumes critical importance.
The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) under development in the
U.S. is an extremely promising technology for the future
nuclear energy. It simplifies the fuel cycle. It solves the
waste problem through actinide recycling. Moreover, it
contributes positively toward achieving the non-proliferation
goal. Hence, Central Research Institute of Electric Power
Industry (CRIEPI) of Japan has been participating in the
program since 1989 both in funding and in joint research
undertakings. Japan has strong interest in the pyroprocessing
technology because of its highly proliferation-resistant
characteristics. This is one of the most important factors in
the long-term nuclear energy utilization planning process,
which is currently under consideration in Japan.
Termination of the IFR Program in the U.S. will prevent a
major breakthrough in nuclear power. This, in turn will
impede the resolution of the environmental problem on a
global scale through effective utilization of uranium. It may
seem that we have considerable time to prepare for the
commercialization of fast reactor in succession to today's
commercial reactors. However, if we are to follow a course in
which we do our best to solve the environmental problem
(CO2 counter measure), in fact we have no time to spare
at all. Moreover, commercialization of an innovative
technology generally requires a long time. It, therefore is
of extreme importance for the future of mankind that the U.S.
continues positive efforts to complete the IFR technology
development and demonstration.
In view of the above-mentioned circumstances, and to
promote further U.S.-Japan cooperation in the nuclear energy
field, I should be grateful if you would kindly take
appropriate measures which will allow the continuation of the
IFR Program along with the operation of EBR-II and the
related facilities at Argonne National Laboratory, so that
the IFR fuel cycle demonstration could proceed to completion
as planned.
Very truly yours,
Susumu Yoda,
President.
____
Nuclear Systems Association,
Tokyo, Japan, June 15, 1994.
The Hon. J. Bennett Johnston,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Washington DC.
Dear Chairman Johnston: This is to remind you of our deep
concern about the possible discontinuation of the development
of innovative nuclear energy technology, Integral Fast
Reactor (IFR) program in particular, expressed in our letter
to President Clinton dated June 1, 1993, which was sent to
you by carbon copy. We believe that you are a prominent
politician having a profound knowledge on energy problems.
Hence we are writing this letter to you.
As you know, various studies by experts have predicted that
the continued emission of carbon dioxide at present level
will cause unprecedented rate and level of global warming of
which ultimate potential impacts could be catastrophic. We
believe that the increased use of nuclear energy that
involves essentially no release of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse effect gases is one of the most practical steps we
developed countries should especially pursue, considering
steady increase in energy demand in the world and in the
developing countries in particular.
We believe that further sophistication of nuclear fuel
cycle technology in parallel with commercialization of fast
reactor is necessary and effective for wider use of nuclear
energy in future. The closure of nuclear fuel cycle through
reprocessing of spent fuel and fast reactors extremely
enhances the supply potential of nuclear energy and provide
us with a technological scheme fundamentally different from
the current once-through use of nuclear fuel since most of
the nuclear material is to be disposed of as waste in the
latter system.
We recognize that the pyroprocess technology the US has
successfully studied for more than ten years at Argonne
National Laboratory (ANL) is quite promising for the above
mentioned scheme. It makes it possible not only to close the
fuel cycle but to do so in simpler and far more proliferation
resistant way, producing lessor amount of waste. We therefore
have a great interest in demonstrating the feasibility of the
technology at ANL. This is the reason why Japanese electric
utilities entered the cooperative agreement with ANL in 1989
and provided fair amount of resources for the Fuel Cycle
Demonstration Test Program. Indeed it was our pleasure that
the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) program was endorsed by the
Energy Policy Act '92 approved by an overwhelming majority
``Yes'' in both Houses.
Japanese Atomic Energy Commission will continue to support
the development of fast reactor in the revised version of its
long term plan, recognizing that it is necessary and feasible
to commercialize the technology within fifty years through
continued research and development of enabling and innovative
technologies relevant to fast reactor. It is needless to say
that the pyroprocessing technology will be included in this
category of technology.
We are afraid that the discontinuation of the development
of this forward looking technology in the US would suggest
the loss of interest in the waste reduction and recycling
which nuclear business should take through the implementation
of this new thinking. Furthermore, subsequent delay in the
commercialization of such proliferation resistant technology
for recycled use of nuclear fuel would narrow the technology
option for future humankind to cope with the increased energy
demand in future. Theoretically speaking, the US can restart
the program when the real necessity will come into sight.
However, it would be very difficult in practice to do so if
the relevant resources and expertise have been depleted. We
believe that it is beneficial to the world as well as to the
US to finish the demonstration of the feasibility of this
innovative pyroprocessing technology, at least. We would do
our best asking the Japanese concerned authorities and
industries to contribute to this activity if continued as
planned.
Very truly yours,
Takashi Mukaibo,
Chairman of Japan Atomic Industrial Forum.
June 8, 1994.
Hon. J. Bennett Johnston,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Johnston: I, as one of staffs in Japanese
universities, is deeply concerned about the proposed phase-
out of advanced nuclear reactor research and development
programs on the U.S., in particular the Integral Fast Reactor
(IFR) Program including the shutdown of EBR-II from a long-
term viewpoint, namely, how we can keep a potential for
sustainable developments in the world.
I believe the IFR Program (metallic fuel and
pyroprocessing) for which R&D efforts are currently in
progress in the U.S. is a very valuable research program for
mankind not only as a technological project but as a landmark
to keep the potential solving our future issues.
Technologically it has a potential of simplifying nuclear
waste disposal, it viewpoint of resource utilization, and it
strives to realize a technology which contributes
significantly to the nonproliferation goal. We, therefore,
recognize the IFR metallic fuel cycle as an option in the
future generation of nuclear power, and have a strong
interest in the feasibility demonstration of the IFR
technology.
Furthermore, we are firmly convinced that to successfully
accomplish the program, we need databases concerning
pyroprocessing of the spent fuel, and safety verification.
Form this viewpoint, we believe the continued operation of
EBR-II and the related facilities is a decisive factor which
determines the feasibility demonstration.
In view of the above-mentioned circumstances, and to
further promote U.S.-Japan cooperation in the nuclear power
field, we would like to ask you to take appropriate measures
to enable continuation of the IFR Program to a successful
demonstration in EBR-II. We have a profound respect for the
preeminent role that the U.S. played in advancing the nuclear
technology, and we believe the IFR technology will benefit
mankind for generations to come. Hence we are sure that if
the U.S. continues to positively promote the demonstration of
the IFR Program, a greater cooperation from Japan will be
extended to the Program, not only as a partner of a project
but as one of colleagues to solve current problems in our
modern society.
Very truly yours,
S. Iwata,
Professor.
____
Nuclear Engineering Research
Laboratory Faculty of Engineering,
Tokyo, Japan, June 5, 1994.
Hon. J. Bennett Johnson,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Johnston: We, as nuclear enginering
specialists in Japanese universities, are deeply concerned
about the proposed phase-out of advanced nuclear reactor
research and development programs in the U.S., in particular
the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) Program including the
shutdown of EBR-II.
We believe that the IFR Program (metallic fuel and
pyroprocessing) for which R&D efforts are currently in
progress in the U.S. is a very valuable research program for
the mankind. This is because it has a potential to simplify
nuclear waste disposal, it includes actinide recycling
technology to contribute to the nonproliferation goal. We,
therefore, recognize the IFR metallic fuel cycle as an option
in the future generation of nuclear power, and have a strong
interest in the feasibility demonstration of the IFR
technology. That is why the Japanese electric utilities, with
the support given by various research organizations promoting
LMR development have been contributing funds to participate
in the IFR fuel cycle demonstration, as part of U.S.-Japan
cooperation in the LMR development.
Furthermore, we are firmly convinced that to successfully
accomplish the program, we need databases concerning
pyroprocessing of the spent fuel, and safety verification.
From this viewpoint, we believe the continued operation of
EBR-II and the related facilities is a decisive factor which
determines the feasibility demonstration.
In view of the above-mentioned circumstances, and to
further promote U.S.-Japan cooperation in the nuclear power
field, we would like to ask you to take appropriate measures
to enable continuation of the IFR Program to a successful
demonstration in EBR-II. We have a profound respect for the
preeminent role that the U.S. has played in advancing the
nuclear technology, and we believe the IFR technology will
benefit the mankind for the generations to come. Hence we are
sure that if the U.S. continues to positively promote the
demonstration of the IFR Program, a greater cooperation from
Japan will be extended to the Program.
Very truly yours,
M. Jamawaki,
Professor.
____
Nuclear Engineering Research Laboratory,
Faculty of Engineering,
Tokyo, Japan, June 9, 1994.
Hon. J. Bennett Johnston,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Johnston: I am a Professor of The University
of Tokyo and currently serving as the head of Nuclear
Engineering Research Laboratory, The University of Tokyo
operating a fast research reactor and two accelerators.
I am deeply concerned about the proposed phase-out of
advanced nuclear reactor research and development programs in
the U.S., in particular the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR)
Program including the shutdown of EBR-II.
We believe the IFR Program (metallic fuel and
pyroprocessing) for which R&D efforts are currently in
progress in the U.S. is a very valuable research program for
mankind because it has potential of simplifying nuclear fuel
reprocessing and improving the economy of electricity
generation in the future. We, recognize the IFR metallic fuel
cycle as an option in the future generation of nuclear power,
and have a strong interest in the feasibility demonstration
of the IFR technology. That is why the Japanese electric
utilities, with the support given by various research
organizations promoting LMR development have been
contributing funds to participate in the IFR fuel cycle
demonstration, as a part of U.S.-Japan cooperation in the LMR
development.
Furthermore, we are firmly convinced that to successfully
accomplish the program, we need databases concerning
pyroprocessing of the spent fuel, and safety verification.
From this viewpoint, we believe the continued operation of
EBR-II and the related facilities is a decisive factor which
determines the feasibility demonstration.
In view of the above-mentioned circumstances, and to
further promote U.S.-Japan cooperation in the nuclear power
field, we would like to ask you to take appropriate measures
to enable continuation of the IFR Program to a successful
demonstration in EBR-II. We have a profound respect for the
pre-eminent role that the U.S. played in advancing the
nuclear technology.
Very truly yours,
Yoshiaki Oka,
Professor.
____
Department of Quantum
Engineering and Systems Science,
Tokyo, Japan, June 3, 1994.
Hon. J. Bennett Johnston,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Johnston: I am a Japanese scientist in
nuclear engineering. I am heartly concerned on the
proposition of phase-out of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Research
and Development Program in the United States, hearing from
both of my colleagues and the news papers.
I am working also as the Japanese contact person of the US-
Japan student exchange program for these six years. Many
young post-graduates researchers in the nuclear engineering
have visited mutually. Many of Japanese visitors have
obtained so many important experiences in your dreamful
Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) program and through experiments
and analysis of EBR-IL. In this period, about sixteen US
students have stayed in Japanese universities from Illinois,
MIT, Stanford, Missouri, Purdue, Iowa Sate, Michigan, North
Carolina State, Santa Barbara, Virginia, Pennsylvania,
Maryland and Wisconsin. We have discussed them on the future
cooperative plan in the global nuclear engineering.
Therefore, I am sure that the U.S. continues to make
successive important efforts for the US and global
generations to come. I sincerely expect a greater cooperation
in nuclear engineering among your students and us.
Very truly yours.
M. Nakazawa,
Professor.
____
Faculty of Engineering,
Sapparo 060, Japan, June 2, 1994.
Hon. J. Bennett Johnston,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Johnston: We, Japanese Universities, are
deeply concerned about the proposed phase-out of advanced
nuclear reactor research and development programs in the
U.S., in particular the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) Program
including the shutdown of EBR-II.
We believe the IFR Program (metallic fuel and pyro-
processing) for which R&D efforts are currently in progress
in the U.S. is very valuable research program for mankind
because it has a potential of simplifying nuclear waste
disposal, it includes actinide recycling technology which is
important from the viewpoint of resource utilization. We,
therefore recognize the IFR metallic fuel cycle as an option
in the future generation of nuclear power, and have a strong
interest in the feasibility demonstration of IFR technology.
We have deep respect for the preeminent role that U.S.
played in advancing the nuclear technology, and we believe
the IFR technology will benefit mankind for generations to
come. Hence we are certain that if U.S. continues to
positively promote the demonstration of the IFR Program, a
greater cooperation from Japan will be extended to the
Program.
Sincerely yours,
Meisaki Katayama.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I believe, in fact, they will
contribute. If so, we actually save money by our 4-year termination. If
not, I believe the figure is $26 million over 4 years. Considering that
which has already been invested, that is not the issue here.
The issue is whether you terminate what we call EBR-II, which is the
experimental breeder reactor which is being used to do this research.
Under our proposal we would terminate EBR-II in 4 years, doing the
research along the way essentially without cost to the taxpayer. Or,
under the Kerry proposal, you terminate EBR-II in 4 years, not doing
the research.
There are a lot of antinukes who say, ``Do not possibly find out the
answer to these questions.'' I think the preferred scientific reaction
is just as the National Academy of Sciences says. They said, ``Do not
develop and deploy this reactor at this time. But research on fission
options for the near total elimination of plutonium should continue at
the conceptual level.''
That is what we proposed. We are not proposing the development or
deployment of a reactor at this time. Once we have settled among these
various options, then we can decide which option to do. Should we send
it to Canada and burn it in the CANDU reactors? Our weapons grade
plutonium going to Canada? Maybe so. If so, we ought to start talking
to the Canadians.
Should we use it in the WPPSS reactor, which is in Washington, which
is one of the proposals? Maybe so. If so, they better not lose that
option which they are going to lose soon.
Should we use it in the Palo Verde reactor in Arizona? Perhaps so.
But that is a civilian reactor and that has not been looked into.
One thing that is very clear is that we are not going to go to just
any reactor in the United States, even though technically, and I guess
theoretically, you could use any reactor to burn plutonium. You would
not do that because they are really not designed for it. That is why
you want to finish building the WPPSS reactors, which could be designed
for it, the Palo Verde reactor which could be redesigned for it, the
CANDU reactors in Canada, which could be used for it, or as Dr.
Panofsky said, build a new one at Savannah River. That technology is
now owned by ABB. But until we decide which of these options we want to
use, we ought to pursue this, as the National Academy of Sciences says.
I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this
point a letter signed by the heads of the nuclear engineering
departments of the most distinguished universities of the country,
saying we ought to pursue this, including the University of Michigan,
Pennsylvania State, MIT, University of Arizona, Florida, UC Berkeley,
UC Santa Barbara, University of Illinois, Cornell, University of
Missouri, Georgia Institute of Technology, North Carolina, Iowa--the
list goes on for another couple of pages, of the most distinguished
heads of university nuclear programs in the country.
I ask unanimous consent that list be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Nuclear Engineering Department
Heads Organization,
May 11, 1994.
Hon. J. Bennett Johnston,
Chairman, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and
Water Development, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Johnston: We are academic department and
program heads in the field of nuclear engineering. The
faculty in our institutions and the graduate students who
have worked on research in our departments have many years of
experience studying today's generation of nuclear power
plants, and many of us are involved in analyses of next
generation light water reactors and advanced nuclear reactors
that include the liquid metal-cooled reactors and the gas-
cooled reactors. In this letter we wish to express our
thoughts and concerns with respect to the FY 1995 budget as
it relates to nuclear power research.
We were pleased to see that the importance of the advanced
light water reactor program was recognized and funded.
Without such funding we would limit the opportunity to retain
the nuclear power option, an option we believe will become
increasingly important early in the next century. Lack of
funding would also inhibit our ability to compete in the
international arena in countries where nuclear power is
expanding in use.
However, we believe it is a serious error in policy to
eliminate the longer term advanced reactor programs,
specifically the liquid metal reactor (LMR) program and the
gas cooled reactor (GCR) program. We do not believe that
adequate consideration has been given to the benefits and
importance of these programs. These include:
Both reactor concepts offer unique safety features that are
not available in the present generation of light water
reactors.
The LMR is capable of destroying the longest lived elements
in radioactive waste, thus offering the potential to reduce
the burden of disposal of high level waste.
Both concepts represent potential methods for utilizing
bomb-grade plutonium as a safe fuel for electricity
generation.
The LMR has the capability, through actinide recycling, to
extend the nuclear fuel supply for centuries beyond that
available with the conventional light water reactor fuel
cycle utilizing uranium 235 as the fuel.
The LMR program is pioneering the Intergral Fast Reactor
(IFR) concept which involves the reprocessing and recycling
of fuel and long-lived radioactive waste in a closed-cycle,
proliferation-resistant system. Crucial tests of this
important technology will begin this year if funding
continues.
The IFR concept supports the Administration's non-
proliferation goals by providing a non-proliferation
alternative technology to the current commercial PUREX
reprocessing and by eliminating plutonium stockpiling.
The EBR-II liquid metal reactor in Idaho is the only rest
reactor of its kind in the United States. It is being used to
develop and test metallic fuel which increases the safety and
reduces the cost of such reactors. It is playing an important
international role for the Japanese, who are providing
financial support for the program, and is being used to test
new diagnostic and control technologies that are important to
the light water program.
We note that the Energy Policy Act of 1992 authorizes the
continuation of research and development of advanced reactor
technologies, including GCR and LMR designs, in order to
encourage the commercialization and deployment of advanced
reactor technologies by the year 2010. In addition, the Act
includes as a goal the evaluation of actinide burner
technologies to reduce the volume of high level nuclear
waste. It is clear that the elimination of the LMR, GCR, and
testing programs is counter to the provisions of the Energy
Policy Act of 1992.
The sudden cutoff of these advanced reactor programs
represents a serious loss of technology development that has
occurred over several decades. We are pleased that your long
term development policy includes research and development in
controlled fusion. But while fusion is a high risk technology
requiring the solution to many scientific, technology and
economic problems, the advanced reactor programs are much
nearer to demonstrated success.
Eliminating these programs will jeopardize the goal of
maintaining nuclear power as a viable energy option for this
nation into the next century, a consequence which could be
especially damaging to our country if acceptable
(environmentally and economically) alternative sources of
electricity cannot be developed to replace nuclear power for
electricity generation. In addition, this decision will deter
many of our brightest students in science and engineering
from entering this field, which will be perceived as at best
a stagnated field. Such students are needed for the safe
operation of this generation of plants, and to maintain and
develop the technical expertise for future uses of nuclear
energy. This will further exacerbate a manpower shortage for
the nuclear industry that is projected for this decade and
well into the next century.\1\ When and if this country
decides that nuclear power is needed, there will no longer be
the expertise or technology to provide it, except for foreign
corporations, which stand to benefit substantially as the
U.S. abandons its once-leading role in nuclear reactor
technology.\2\ The irony here is that U.S. light water
technology, licensed to foreign countries, may be
successfully marketed by these very countries as our nation
abdicates its leadership role in developing and utilizing
nuclear energy. Indeed, we may become purchasers of our own--
new and imrpoved--technology (once again!).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, if the U.S. wishes to play a major role in
deterring proliferation and enforcing IAEA safeguards with
respect to diversion of nuclear fuel for weapons use, this
nation must maintain a strong role in the development and use
of nuclear power, in particular to continue to make advances
in the development and use of nuclear power, in particular to
continue to make advances in the development of advanced
reactors (improved safety, economic fuel cycles,
proliferation-resistance, waste disposal, etc.). Otherwise we
run the clear risk of becoming a third-world country with
respect to nuclear power and have minimal impact on world
policy in this area.
Finally, not only do we feel strongly that the decision to
stop advanced reactor research and development is not in the
best interests of our country, we are concerned with the
process by which this decision was made. This decision, a
major energy policy decision which affects current and future
generations of Americans, has been made without the benefit
of informed public debate. The decision has been made behind
closed doors, without consideration of opposing viewpoints,
and is being presented to the nation as a fait accompli,
buried in the complex budget package for FY 1995. The manner
in which this decision was made is inappropriate for an issue
of such overriding national importance as the long-term
energy and environmental policy for our nation.
There is ample evidence to suggest that a broad segment of
the engineering and scientific community is not in agreement
with this decision. For example, two recent National Academy
of Science (NAS) reports have examined the issue of nuclear
power in different contexts. The first NAS report\3\ was
based on the premise that nuclear power would be maintained
as an important energy option as part of a balanced energy
policy. Given this premise, the report recommends actions
necessary to retain nuclear power as a viable energy option
in the next century, including strong support for investments
in advanced reactor research and development.
The second NAS report \4\ contains several recommendations
which address the need to maintain the nuclear option as a
substitute for fossil fuels to mitigate greenhouse warming.
However, it is recognized that current concerns (safety,
economics, waste disposal) need to be addressed and
alternative reactor concepts need to be examined. In
particular, investments in advanced reactor research and
development are strongly recommended.
These recommendations from prestigious national scientific
panels substantiate our remarks regarding the importance of
nuclear power for meeting the future energy needs of this
country, in an environmentally acceptable way. Moreover, they
give credence to our conclusion that the decision process did
not represent a balanced consideration of the scientific
merits of research and development for advanced reactor
concepts.
We, therefore, strongly recommend that the advanced nuclear
reactor research and development be continued in accordance
with the provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 1992. This
would be a prudent investment in the future energy security,
environmental health, and innovative technology
competitiveness of the nation. We urge you to restore the
funding for the advanced reactor R&D as you consider the FY
1995 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill.
Respectfully yours,
William R. Martin, Department of Nuclear Engineering,
University of Michigan; Edward H. Klevans, Nuclear
Engineering Department, Pennsylvania State University;
Edward N. Lambremont, Nuclear Science Center, Louisiana
State University; Gary A. Pertmer, Materials and
Nuclear Engineering, University of Maryland; John W.
Poston, Department of Nuclear Engineering, Texas A&M
University; Victor H. Ransom, School of Nuclear
Engineering, Purdue University; Gilbert A. Emmert,
Nuclear Engineering and Eng. Physics, University of
Wisconsin, Madison; Bernard W. Wehring, Nuclear
Engineering Program, University of Texas at Austin; N.
Dean Eckhoff, Department of Nuclear Engineering, Kansas
State University; Michael Z. Podowski, Nuclear
Engineering and Eng. Physics, Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute; Gary M. Sandquist, Nuclear Engineering
Program, University of Utah; Varada Charyulu, Nuclear
Science and Engineering, Idaho State University; Kirk
A. Matthews, Nuclear Engineering Curriculum, Air Force
Institute of Technology; Ronald D. Flack, Mech.,
Aerospace, and Nuclear Engineering, University of
Virginia.
Mujid S. Kazimi, Department of Nuclear Engineering,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; James S.
Tulenko, Dept. of Nuclear Engineering Sciences,
University of Florida; Glenn E. Lucas, Chemical and
Nuclear Engineering, University of California, Santa
Barbara; Barclay G. Jones, Department of Nuclear
Engineering, University of Illinois; William H. Miller,
Nuclear Engineering Program, University of Missouri,
Columbia; Donald J. Dudziak, Department of Nuclear
Engineering, North Carolina State University; Morris
Farr, Nuclear and Energy Engineering, University of
Arizona; T. Kenneth Fowler, Department of Nuclear
Engineering, University of California, Berkeley; Don W.
Miller, Nuclear Engineering Program, Ohio State
University; David D. Clark, Nuclear Science and
Engineering Program, Cornell University; Ward O. Winer,
Nuclear Engineering and Health Physics, Georgia
Institute of Technology; Daniel B. Bullen, Nuclear
Engineering Program, Iowa State University; Thomas W.
Kerlin; Nuclear Engineering Department, University of
Tennessee; David Woodall, Program in Nuclear
Engineering, University of Idaho; Gilbert J. Brown,
Chemical and Nuclear Engineering, University of
Massachusetts, Lowell; Roy Eckart, Mech., Industrial,
and Nuclear Eng., University of Cincinnati; Alan H.
Robinson, Department of Nuclear Engineering, Oregon
State University; Arvind Kumar, Department of Nuclear
Engineering, University of Missouri, Rolla.
footnotes
\1\U.S. Nuclear Engineering Education: Status and Prospects,
National Research Council, National Academy Press (1990).
\2\C.W. Forsberg, et al., The Changing Structure of the
International Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor Industry,
ORNL/TM-12284, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (1992).
\3\Nuclear Power: Technical and Institutional Options for the
Future, National Research Council, National Academy Press
(1992).
\4\Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming: Mitigation,
Adaptation, and the Science Base, National Research Council,
National Academy Press (1992).
Mr. CRAIG. Will the chairman yield?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes, I will yield for a brief time.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, the Senator from Massachusetts a moment ago
basically said the waste stream flowing from a light water reactor----
Mr. JOHNSTON. If the Senator will withhold that and let me make this
point, I will then yield to him.
Mr. CRAIG. Go right ahead.
Mr. JOHNSTON. The most telling recommendation of all comes from
another section of the Department of Energy. It is in a report dated
June 1994--I remind my colleagues that this is June 1994. ``Department
of Energy, Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho
National Engineering Laboratories Environmental Restoration and Waste
Management Program, Draft Environment Impact Statement.'' This is over
at Tom Grumbly's shop, who is in the Department of Energy. They list
the alternatives for disposition of the spent fuel at Idaho National
Lab, which is where this is located.
In each of their alternatives, the 10-year plan, the minimum
treatment storage and disposal plan, and maximum treatment storage and
disposal--each one of those alternatives includes demonstrating of the
actinide recycle. That is what we are talking about, the demonstration
of the actinide recycle.
So while one part of the Department of Energy has said, ``shut her
down, boys, do not possibly find out the information,'' the other part
that is charged with the cleanup, that has the dirty, hands-on job of
cleaning up Idaho National Lab, says, ``demonstrate the program.''
I guess the internal signals in behalf of the Department of Energy--
they have not gotten the political signals yet that tell them what to
do--but I am telling you, Mr. President, those who are charged with the
cleanup say we have to demonstrate this actinide recycle under any of
the alternatives.
All we want to do is to demonstrate at essentially no cost to the
taxpayer.
Mr. President, let me yield 2 minutes to my distinguished friend from
Idaho.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho is recognized.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, the environmental impact statement he just
referred to is the result of a lawsuit in Idaho that basically said, if
you are going to send us your Navy nuclear waste, give us a solution to
your problem or do not send us your waste. And we are offering that
solution today.
But there was a statement by the Senator from Massachusetts that
cannot be allowed to stand on the Record, and that is that the waste
stream coming from the light water reactor or an IFR configuration were
similar, very similar, I believe was his exact statements, hardly any
difference.
This is radioactivity life----
Mr. KERRY. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. CRAIG. Yes.
Mr. KERRY. Similar to what?
Mr. CRAIG. The Senator was talking about the radioactivity and the
plutonium, the actinides involved in these waste streams, as I read the
Senator.
Mr. KERRY. No.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, what did he say?
Mr. KERRY. I said fuel----
Mr. CRAIG. In one-half minute or less.
Mr. KERRY. Fuel in a once-fuel cycle within a light water reactor
comes out in spent fuel form which has both fissionable and the
actinide. The actinide is what contains the plutonium. You have to
separate the plutonium if you are going to use it in weapons-grade
fuel. That is what I said. You do not have, as the Senator seems to
imply, this pot of plutonium that is a threat.
Mr. CRAIG. I do not mean to give that impression. What is implied in
the Senator's statement is that they are very similar. They are not at
all similar. We are worried about life, radioactivity exposure to our
public, the availability to handle this waste stream. IFR waste streams
lose their radioactivity to background level in about 800 years; light
water reactor in nearly 10,000. And, of course, we are also talking
about volume. The Senator mentioned volumes. Substantially less volume
comes from an IFR versus a light water. His statements cannot be
allowed to stand on the Record. That is the science we are dealing
with, and we know that to be accurate science.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator would like to
have a further agreement to maybe sum up.
Mr. KERRY. I would be delighted to do that. There is another Senator
who is tied up and is not able to get here. I will yield back time. I
will keep that promise.
How much time remains, Mr. President?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Thirty-three minutes left. The Senator from
Louisiana has 12 minutes.
Mr. KERRY. Will the Senator from Louisiana agree to sum up and then I
will sum up? Whatever is agreeable to the Senator.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Whatever time the Senator agrees to, I will agree to.
Two minutes? Five minutes?
Mr. KERRY. Why do we not take 5 minutes each, and I will yield back
the difference of time on my 5 minutes.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time be
shortened to 10 minutes equally divided between myself and the Senator
from Massachusetts.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I may not take the full 5 minutes
because the issue has been stated and is simple. This is not about
money; it is not about the termination of the EBR-II or the reactor
program. The path of the Senator from Massachusetts and our path
terminates the EBR-II program. It is about doing the research along the
way which completes a 4-year program of research which is substantially
without cost to the taxpayer.
If the Japanese contribute, as the correspondence I have put in the
Record indicates, we save money; if not, we spend about $26 million out
of--I guess $800 million has already been spent on this program. So $26
million, if it would come to that over a period of 4 years, is
virtually without cost and the Secretary of Energy has so stated.
Mr. President, it is about options. Until the United States decides
on a short-term option, which I think will undoubtedly mean some kind
of treatment of the plutonium so as to make it proliferation proof,
that is the short-term option, and I think that will probably be
pursued. The National Academy of Sciences says we ought to have a long-
term option as well, and that is ridding ourselves of the plutonium,
which the IFR gives you the capacity to do. It is the only option that
rids you of the plutonium other than to shoot it into space.
Other options, such as dilution in the ocean or sinking it in the
ocean floor, I believe, are not options.
I think the scientists in the country, as indicated by that letter I
just put in, support this option. The National Academy of Sciences, as
I pointed out, also support it. I have read previously, but let me
reread, the one sentence from the National Academy of Sciences' 1992
report where they say:
The committee believes that the LMR should have the highest
priority for long-term nuclear technology development.
And then again they say: ``Special attention needs to be paid to the
LMR''. In the 1994 report, they say that you should pursue not the
development, not the deployment, but the conceptual design, which is
what we propose, of the IFR.
So we can do it virtually without cost. It ought to be done. There is
no reason not to do it. It is an option the United States needs.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I yield myself 4 minutes.
Let me correct something quickly for the Senator from Idaho, if I
can. Lawrence Livermore Labs has estimated that reprocessing high-level
wastes could generate up to a 30-percent greater volume of low-level
waste than direct disposal of comparable light water reactor waste.
So Lawrence Livermore and other independent labs have determined,
indeed, this process will create more waste. But that is arguing at the
margins of this.
We keep hearing this notion that it is really not going to cost more,
but, in point of fact, we all understand from experience around here
that this is not just about sort of a phaseout or a termination. This
is about the years and years and years this program has been going on
and those who get it going now have one intention, which is to get it
up to a demonstrated capacity and then to implement it.
The fact is that you have a choice today. You can pay operating costs
for 4 more years and termination costs, too, or you can save the
operating costs and pay only the termination cost. That is a difference
of some money and that has been established to be several millions of
dollars.
But more important is the question of whether or not we are going to
go against the expressed desire of the President of the United States
not to have this program, to go against his statement that he believes
this jeopardizes our status vis-a-vis other countries in arguing
proliferation and, most important, that contrary to the expressed
statement of this year--not last year which is what the proponents keep
going to--but this year the Secretary of Energy has said:
No further testing is required to prove the technical
feasibility. The basic physics and chemistry of this
technology are established.
Mr. President, the National Taxpayers Union lists this as one of the
10 great boondoggle programs of the country. They say point blank:
Myth, the ALMR is a budget-neutral program.
The National Taxpayers Union points out, as Secretary O'Leary has
pointed out, that it is really going to cost you $4.2 billion,
including $1 billion of industry cost-sharing to complete the
development. That is what we keep hearing about here, the development
of the integral fast reactor.
In addition, we have heard it asserted that this really is not a
budget issue, it is a termination issue. Again, the National Taxpayers
Union, Secretary O'Leary and others disagree with that. And in her June
27 letter, she says point blank:
The principal concerns that led me to withdraw my support
for this program are the high costs of further development.
Continuation of the program will be extremely costly and
termination of the program would require approximately $.3
billion instead of the $3.1 billion.
So you have a $2.9 billion difference.
Finally, Mr. President, I really believe that--and I just quote the
National Taxpayers Union--this is the old issue we face around here.
To continue to throw money at a project that has been rejected by
experts from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, Rand Corp., Office of Technology Assessment, General
Accounting Office, and the National Academy of Sciences is perpetuating
a myth that taxpayers will no longer tolerate and that the Senate
should not either.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has spoken 4 minutes.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment to
terminate funding for the advanced liquid metal reactor [ALMR].
Mr. President, last year I stood on the Senate floor to oppose
continued funding of the ALMR. Since that time the arguments against
continued funding of this project have only grown stronger. This
project raises serious safety and environmental concerns, economic
questions, and the threat of nuclear materials proliferation.
I was very encouraged when President Clinton's budget request
proposed terminating the ALMR based on concerns about proliferation
risks, and I certainly agree with Department of Energy's, Hazel
O'Leary's assessment that:
We cannot credibly urge that others not use technologies
for separating and using plutonium if we are pursuing those
same technologies ourselves. Such actions could provide an
excuse for rogue nations to oppose international efforts to
end their separation efforts.
Mr. President, at a time when events in Korea are highlighting
worldwide concerns about availability of weapons-grade plutonium, the
United States should be striving to lead by example, not pursing
technologies that leave our own policies open to question.
Last year on the Senate floor, many of my colleagues raised concerns
that the ALMR could easily be converted into a breeder. My friend and
colleague from Massachusetts has done an excellent job explaining that
new evidence only reinforces those fears.
The Office of Technology Assessment's report which states that
operating the ALMR to breed plutonium ``would probably not be
difficult,'' and which further states, ``it would, however, be
difficult to design an ALMR reactor core that could not be converted to
breeder operation * * *'' should alone give us pause.
The dangers this technology would present in the wrong hands are
alarming. That it should be developed by the U.S. Government at the
same time we wish to halt the pursuit of similar technologies in other
countries is incongruous and sets precisely the wrong example.
Nor do I believe switching from a uranium-based nuclear power system
to one based on plutonium makes economic sense when we have a readily
available and inexpensive supply of uranium that does not raise the
same proliferation concerns.
These concerns, in my mind, are alone sufficient to warrant
termination of the ALMR project. However, these reasons are reinforced
by budget concerns.
Mr. President, at a time when every item in the Federal budget is
being subjected to close scrutiny, this project does not even warrant a
second glance.
I understand that the committee has made the argument that completion
costs for the ALMR are actually somewhat less than early termination
costs.
Mr. President, even if one accepts the assumptions of the committee
in making that determination through fiscal year 1988, and I believe
there is room for discussion there, we as a body must consider the life
costs of the project. The Department of Energy's cost estimates for
construction of the power reactor and facility to recycle its fuel
exceeds $3 billion. Early termination costs would be about a tenth of
that amount.
Also with early termination, the ALMR facility will not have been
contaminated with radioactive material eliminating cleanup and
decommissioning concerns proponents may not have considered.
Proponents of the ALMR argue that it can be used to recycle other
nuclear waste. Given the long-term problems associated with nuclear
waste disposal this is certainly an enticing argument. However, the
recent GAO report, ``nuclear science: developing technology to reduce
radioactive waste may take decades and be costly'' found that the
Department of Energy's own waste managers believe other technologies
are more feasible.
Second, GAO also reported that it would take 20 ALMR systems 100
years or more to handle 90 percent of the light water reactor waste
inventory expected in the year 2010, raising even further budget
implications of construction, operation, and decommissioning of 20 ALMR
systems for radioactive waste disposal.
The National Academy of Sciences and independent scientists at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory have questioned the economic
viability of using ALMR technology for waste disposal estimating that
it could quadruple the cost of high-level waste disposal. Further, the
technology would not be commercially viable for 30 years.
And another more recent National Academy of Sciences report which
specifically explores the issues of disposition of excess weapons
plutonium states, ``advanced reactors should not be specifically
developed or built for transforming weapons plutonium into spent fuel,
because that aim can be achieved more rapidly, less expensively, and
more surely by using existing or evolutionary reactor types.''
Mr. President, last year the Senate voted unsuccessfully to terminate
funding for the ALMR. Given all of the new information which only
reinforces the arguments against continuing this technology, I hope
some of my colleagues will reconsider last year's vote.
We have a soaring Federal debt that has now well exceeded $4
trillion. In the past year and a half we have put up a good-sized down
payment on that following the President's deficit reduction plan.
Canceling funding for ALMR, an unnecessary and potentially dangerous
project will be another small monthly payment on that enormous debt.
Mr. President, as elected officials we are often called upon to make
tough funding choices. To me, this vote is not a tough choice at all,
and I hope my colleagues will join me in voting to terminate the ALMR
project.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I am prepared to yield back the
remainder of my time.
Mr. KERRY. I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time. I
move to table and ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to
table the amendment (No. 2127) of the Senator from Massachusetts. The
yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Riegle] is
necessarily absent.
I also announce that the Senator from Nevada [Mr. Bryan] is absent
because of attending a funeral.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dorgan). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber who desire to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 52, nays 46, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 175 Leg.]
YEAS--52
Bennett
Bond
Boren
Breaux
Brown
Burns
Byrd
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
Danforth
Daschle
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Durenberger
Faircloth
Ford
Gorton
Gramm
Grassley
Hatch
Heflin
Helms
Hollings
Hutchison
Inouye
Johnston
Kempthorne
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McConnell
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Murkowski
Nickles
Nunn
Packwood
Pressler
Sasser
Shelby
Simon
Simpson
Smith
Stevens
Thurmond
Wallop
Warner
NAYS--46
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Bradley
Bumpers
Campbell
Cohen
Conrad
DeConcini
Dorgan
Exon
Feingold
Feinstein
Glenn
Graham
Gregg
Harkin
Hatfield
Jeffords
Kassebaum
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Mathews
McCain
Metzenbaum
Mitchell
Moynihan
Murray
Pell
Pryor
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Roth
Sarbanes
Specter
Wellstone
Wofford
NOT VOTING--2
Bryan
Riegle
So the motion to table the amendment (No. 2127) was agreed to.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I
move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
(Later, the following occurred:)
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.
Change of Vote
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, on roll call 175 I voted ``aye.'' It was
my intention to vote ``nay.''
Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to change my
vote. This will in no way change the outcome of the vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The foregoing tally has been changed to reflect the above order.)
Mr. PRYOR addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized.
Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, until the Chamber clears, I suggest the
absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
statement on the fiscal year 1995 energy and water appropriations bill
Mr. SASSER. Mr. President, The Senate Budget Committee has examined
H.R. 4506, the Energy and Water appropriations bill and has found that
the bill is under its 602(B) budget authority allocation by $107,000
and under its 602(B) outlay allocation by $59 million.
I compliment the distinguished manager of the bill Senator Johnston,
and the distinguished ranking member of the Energy and Water
Subcommittee, Senator Hatfield, on all their hard work.
Mr. President, I have a table prepared by the Budget Committee which
shows the official scoring of the Energy and Water appropriations bill
and I ask unanimous consent that it be inserted in the Record at the
appropriate point.
There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE SCORING OF H.R. 4506--FISCAL YEAR 1995 ENERGY
AND WATER APPROPRIATIONS--SENATE-REPORTED BILL
[Dollars in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budget
Bill summary authority Outlays
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discretionary totals:
New spending in bill.......................... $20,513 $12,083
Outlays from prior year appropriations........ ......... 8,916
Permanent/advance appropriations.............. 0 0
Supplementals................................. 0 -115
---------------------
Subtotal, discretionary spending............ 20,513 20,884
Mandatory totals.................................. 0 0
Bill total.................................... 20,513 20,884
Senate 602(b) allocation...................... 20,513 20,943
---------------------
Difference.................................. 0 -59
=====================
Discretionary totals above (+) or below) (-):
President's request........................... 0 -56
House-passed bill............................. 157 31
Senate-reported bill.......................... ......... .........
Senate-passed bill............................ ......... .........
=====================
Defense..................................... 10,348 10,472
International affairs....................... 0 0
=====================
Domestic discretionary...................... 10,165 10,412
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BILL HISTORY--H.R. 4506--FISCAL YEAR 1995 ENERGY AND WATER APPROPRIATIONS
[In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
President's request House-passed Senate-reported Senate-passed Conference
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill summary Budget Budget Budget Budget Budget
authority Outlays authority Outlays authority Outlays authority Outlays authority Outlays
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discretionary totals:
New spending in bill........ 20,512,750 12,139,076 20,355,622 12,052,033 20,512,893 12,082,930 .............. .............. .............. ..............
Permanents/advances......... 0 0 0 0 0 0 .............. .............. .............. ..............
Outlays from prior years.... .............. 8,916,272 .............. 8,916,272 .............. 8,916,272 .............. .............. .............. ..............
Supplemental................ 0 -115,305 0 -115,305 0 -115,305 .............. .............. .............. ..............
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal, discretionary... 20,512,750 20,940,043 20,355,622 20,853,000 20,512,893 20,883,897 .............. .............. .............. ..............
Mandatory totals:
Mandatory spending in bill.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 .............. .............. .............. ..............
Budget resolution adjustment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal, mandatory....... 0 0 0 0 0 0 .............. .............. .............. ..............
===============================================================================================================================================================
Bill totals..................... 20,512,750 20,940,043 20,355,622 20,853,000 20,512,893 20,883,897 0 0 0 0
602(b) allocation............... 20,513,000 20,943,000 20,513,000 20,943,000 20,513,000 20,943,000 .............. .............. .............. ..............
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Difference.................. -250 -2,957 -157,378 -90,000 -107 -59,103 0 0 0 0
===============================================================================================================================================================
Defense..................... 10,541,065 10,584,521 10,319,147 10,442,422 10,348,232 10,471,685 0 0 0 0
International Affairs....... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Domestic Discretionary...... 9,971,685 10,355,522 10,036,475 10,410,578 10,164,661 10,412,212 0 0 0 0
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Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I wonder if, while we are waiting for
the distinguished Senator from Arkansas to begin his 8-minute
statement, we might find out from Senators who has amendments, if there
is anyone new, or anybody who indicated he has an amendment and is not
going to bring up an amendment. I am told Senator Wellstone has two
relevant amendments. Senator Lautenberg has two, which I believe have
been cleared, or one that has been cleared. I understand that Senator
Harkin has two amendments. I understand that Senator Stevens may have
an amendment. Other than that, I know of no other amendments. We have a
small package of agreed-to amendments.
I ask Senators, if they have amendments, to please let us know about
it. Otherwise, we will proceed as soon as these others are done to
final passage.
I yield the floor.
Mr. PRYOR addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Arkansas
[Mr. Pryor].
____________________