[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 144 (Thursday, October 6, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: October 6, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
INDEPENDENT SAFETY BOARD ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1994--MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE
Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair lay before the Senate a
message from the House of Representatives on a bill (H.R. 2440) to
amend the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to authorize
appropriations for fiscal years 1994, 1995, and 1996, and for other
purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message
from the House of Representatives:
Resolved, That the House agree to the amendment of the
Senate to the bill (H.R. 2440) entitled ``An Act to amend the
Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to authorize
appropriations for fiscal years 1994, 1995, and 1996, and for
other purposes.'', with the following amendment:
In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Independent Safety Board Act
Amendments of 1994''.
SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Section 1118(a) of title 49, United States Code, is amended
to read as follows:
``(a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated
for the purposes of this chapter $37,580,000 for fiscal year
1994, $44,000,000 for fiscal year 1995, and $45,100,000 for
fiscal year 1996. Such sums shall remain available until
expended.''.
SEC. 3. APPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN REGULATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
TO THE OPERATION OF PUBLIC AIRCRAFT.
(a) Definition of Public Aircraft.--Section 40102(a)(37) of
title 49, United States Code, is amended by striking
subparagraph (B) and inserting the following:
``(B) does not include a government-owned aircraft--
``(i) transporting property for commercial purposes; or
``(ii) transporting passengers other than--
``(I) transporting (for other than commercial purposes)
crewmembers or other persons aboard the aircraft whose
presence is required to perform, or is associated with the
performance of, a governmental function such as
firefighting, search and rescue, law enforcement,
aeronautical research, or biological or geological
resource management; or
``(II) transporting (for other than commercial purposes)
persons aboard the aircraft if the aircraft is operated by
the Armed Forces or an intelligence agency of the United
States.
An aircraft described in the preceding sentence shall,
notwithstanding any limitation relating to use of the
aircraft for commercial purposes, be considered to be a
public aircraft for the purposes of this part without regard
to whether the aircraft is operated by a unit of government
on behalf of another unit of government, pursuant to a cost
reimbursement agreement between such units of government, if
the unit of government on whose behalf the operation is
conducted certifies to the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration that the operation was necessary to
respond to a significant and imminent threat to life or
property (including natural resources) and that no service by
a private operator was reasonably available to meet the
threat.''.
(b) Authority To Grant Exemptions.--
(1) In general.--The Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration may grant an exemption to any unit of Federal,
State, or local government from any requirement of part A of
subtitle VII of title 49, United States Code, that would
otherwise be applicable to current or future aircraft of such
unit of government as a result of the amendment made by
subsection (a) of this section.
(2) Requirements.--The Administrator may grant an exemption
under paragraph (1) only if--
(A) the Administrator finds that granting the exemption is
necessary to prevent an undue economic burden on the unit of
government; and
(B) the Administrator certifies that the aviation safety
program of the unit of government is effective and
appropriate to ensure safe operations of the type of aircraft
operated by the unit of government.
(c) Investigative Authority of Board.--
(1) Accidents involving public aircraft.--Section
1131(a)(1)(A) of title 49, United States Code, is amended by
inserting before the semicolon at the end the following: ``or
an aircraft accident involving a public aircraft as defined
by section 40102(a)(37) of this title other than an aircraft
operated by the Armed Forces or by an intelligence agency of
the United States''.
(2) Duties and powers.--Section 1131 of title 49, United
States Code, is amended--
(A) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
(B) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Accidents Involving Public Aircraft.--The Board, in
furtherance of its investigative duties with respect to
public aircraft accidents under subsection (a)(1)(A) of this
section, shall have the same duties and powers as are
specified for civil aircraft accidents under sections
1132(a), 1132(b), and 1134(b)(2) of this title.''.
(d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (a)
and (c) shall take effect on the 180th day following the date
of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 5. RELEASE OF RESERVATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN
PROPERTY LOCATED IN RAPIDES PARISH, LOUISIANA.
(a) Release.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
and except as provided in subsections (b) and (d), the United
States releases without consideration all reservations,
restrictions, conditions, and limitations on the use,
encumbrance, or conveyance of certain real property (together
with any improvements thereon and easements appurtenant
thereto) consisting of approximately 1,991.53 acres of land
and located in Rapides Parish, Louisiana, the location of
Esler Field, as identified in the deed of conveyance from the
United States to the Parish of Rapides, Louisiana, dated
January 23, 1958, to the extent such reservations,
restrictions, conditions, and limitations are enforceable by
the United States.
(b) Exceptions.--The United States reserves the right of
reentry upon or use of the property described in subsection
(a) for national defense purposes in time of war or other
national emergency without charge. The release provided by
subsection (a) does not apply to any conditions or assurances
associated with (1) the continued nonexclusive use without
charge of the airport and use of space at the airport,
without charge, by the Louisiana National Guard, (2) the
nonexclusive use of the airport by transient military
aircraft without charge, or (3) the nonexclusive use of the
airport by transient military aircraft without charge during
periods of maneuvers.
(c) Limitation on Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this
section shall be construed to affect the disposition or
ownership of oil, gas, or other mineral resources either in
or under the surface of the real property described in
subsection (a).
(d) Federal Aviation Administration.--
(1) Nonapplicability of release to grant agreements.--The
release described in subsection (a) does not apply to any
conditions and assurances associated with existing airport
grant agreements between the Rapides Parish Airport
Authority/Esler Field and the Federal Aviation
Administration.
(2) Agreement.--Notwithstanding any other provisions of
law, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
shall enter into an agreement with the Airport Authority of
Rapides Parish, Louisiana, to provide for the terms and
conditions under which the real property described in
subsection (a) may be used, leased, sold, or otherwise
disposed. The agreement shall be concluded not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(e) Effective Date.--This section shall take effect on the
180th day following the date of the enactment of this Act.
Mr. FORD. Mr. President, today, the Senate will consider the
authorization of the programs of the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB). The bill will provide a 3 year authorization for the NTSB
and enable the agency to continue its work protecting the travelling
public. With the recent aviation crashes, the NTSB once again has
demonstrated its professionalism and dedication to protecting the
travelling public.
Last Friday, this body confirmed a new chairman of the NTSB, Jim
Hall. I know that Jim is looking forward to his stewardship and I wish
him and the NTSB well. H.R. 2440 will send him and the NTSB a message--
go out and continue your investigations, make those tough
recommendations, and help us ensure a safer transportation system.
As many of my colleagues know, the NTSB is comprised of 5 members,
who are responsible for investigating accidents and making
recommendations on how to improve the transportation system. The NTSB's
work is recognized around the world, and when a tragic accident occurs,
the entire nation instantly becomes aware of the work of the NTSB. By
the end of this year, the NTSB will need at least two new members. I
would hope that the nominees are available for consideration by the
Senate when the 104th Congress convenes.
I want to mention one final point with respect to H.R. 2440,
concerning public aircraft. Much time has been spent reviewing how best
to address the question of what constitutes a public aircraft. The
provision in H.R. 2440 will exclude aircraft used for passenger
transportation from the definition of public aircraft. Airplanes used
for executive transport, such as transporting a governor to meetings,
would not be considered a ``public aircraft''. On the other hand, using
aircraft for firefighting and law enforcement would continue to be
considered ``public aircraft.''
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, with the passage of H.R. 2440, the
Senate will reauthorize the programs of the National Transportation
Safety Board [NTSB].
The Senate version of the bill, S. 1588, was reported by the Commerce
Committee on November 17, 1993. The Senate considered S. 1588 on May
12, 1994. The House revised the bill with a number of non-controversial
and technical changes.
We all have witnessed the work of the NTSB sifting through the
wreckage of transportation accidents. Each of us has been affected by
the NTSB, whether it is because of a train wreck in South Carolina, an
aircraft accident in North Carolina, or some other tragic event.
Discussions with the NTSB and recommendations by the NTSB have led to
safety improvements throughout the country and the world. I appreciate
the hard work and dedication of the members and staff of the NTSB. What
many of my colleagues may not know is that at the end of this year, the
NTSB will lose the valuable services of John Lauber. He has served two
terms and has been an NTSB member since 1985. I thank him for his many
years of service on the Board.
I have some concerns about the future of the NTSB. At the end of this
year, it is possible that the Board may have only two members. At a
minimum, three members are needed for a quorum, and absent a quorum, no
recommendations can be made. The investigations into the two aviation
accidents in Pittsburgh and Charlotte, for example, may be completed in
the next 6 to 9 months, and we must ensure that the NTSB is able to
complete these and other pending investigations. I know the
Administration is seeking to fill these positions so that the vital
work of the NTSB will continue.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I am pleased to lend my support to
legislation to reauthorize the National Transportation Safety Board.
His agency provides invaluable expertise in their role as independent
investigators in transportation accidents. Tragically, we have had to
call on their skills too often this year but the public should be
reassured by the dedication and the professionalism of the men and
women of this important Federal agency.
In addition to providing the authorization for NTSB, I am pleased
that language was included in this bill to address the issue of
commercial purposes as it relates to public helicopters responding to
emergency situations.
As we all know, the summer wildfires of 1994 had a drastic impact
throughout the State of Washington. Local governments were frustrated
that although fires were burning, all available resources could not be
utilized. Emergency or not, it is presently prohibited for public
agencies to reimburse one another for the use of helicopters.
The language in this bill will now give authority to local
governments to respond immediately to emergency situations without
having to cut through the bureaucratic redtape. In certain cases where
an imminent threat is looming and private operators are not readily
available, public agencies will be allowed to use each other's
helicopters.
This language helps ensure that when an emergency breaks out, all
aircraft--public and private--will be available to respond without
delay.
I have worked with other members of the Washington delegation,
representatives from Federal, State, and local public agencies, and the
private sector on this issue and feel comfortable that the end result
is balanced and fair. I feel this language adequately addresses the
problems that public agencies have faced while at the same time
protecting the interests of the private sector.
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, the Senate is about to take final action
on H.R. 2440, a measure to reauthorize the National Transportation
Safety Board [NTSB] for 1994 through 1996. This bill contains a
provision I authored. It is designed to advance the safety of public
use aircraft. This bill is very important to promoting transportation
safety. I urge its prompt approval.
Mr. President, this reauthorization bill has gone through several
changes during this legislative session. It was originally approved by
the House of Representatives last November. The Senate's alternative
version, which included my public aircraft safety provision, was passed
by the Senate in May 1994. Earlier this week, the House agreed to the
Senate-passed version, with some additional provisions. Today, the
Senate is ready to pass the measure and send it to the President. The
final bill is a well-crafted product.
I would like to explain briefly my provision in this legislative
measure. Its purpose is to advance the safety of travel on public
aircraft; that is, aircraft used exclusively in the service of federal,
state, and local governments. Under current law, public use aircraft
are not subject to Federal Aviation Act [FAA] safety regulations to the
extent imposed on civil aircraft.
My provision would amend the definition of public use aircraft to
mandate that FAA safety regulations, directives and orders issued for
civil aircraft be made applicable to all government-owned, nonmilitary
aircraft engaged in passenger transport.
Further, the Administrator would be allowed to waive FAA requirements
for public aircraft provided an equivalent level of safety has been
established by the governmental entity responsible for the aircraft. I
am pleased the House incorporated some additional language with my
exemption provision, providing specific criteria which the
Administrator must consider in order to grant such an exemption. That
should help the Administrator ensure that any exemption from this
provision would not compromise safety.
Finally, my provision would grant the NTSB authority to investigate
accidents involving all public, nonmilitary aircraft. This last point
is very important because it will allow for an accurate data base to be
established. In turn, it should enable us to assess more conclusively
public aircraft safety standards and procedures.
Mr. President, I am pleased to report that Jim Hall, who became a
member of the NTSB last year and was confirmed by the Senate last week
to serve as NTSB Chairman, also recognizes the importance of expanding
the NTSB's authority to investigate public use aircraft accidents. Upon
enactment of this provision, Chairman Hall will face the challenge of
ensuring that the NTSB carries out this new mandate and, in the long
term, advances public use aircraft safety. I will do my part in working
to ensure adequate congressional oversight in this area.
Mr. President, some additional background on my provision may be
helpful. I first became aware of the regulatory exemptions for
government-owned aircraft soon after last year's tragic plane crash
that claimed the lives of Governor George Mickelson and seven other
South Dakotans. While the exemption for public use aircraft from FAA
safety regulations and directives had no bearing on the cause of that
particular crash, such exemptions could greatly jeopardize the safety
of passengers on public use aircraft. Therefore, I introduced
legislation to remedy this potential problem.
My original legislation would have mandated that all FAA regulations
issued for civil aircraft relating to airworthiness, and other safety
related orders, be made applicable to all public, nonmilitary aircraft.
I agreed to alter my original provision only after the FAA and several
other Federal agencies raised operational concerns that merited
consideration. While the resulting compromise is not as far reaching as
I think it should be, it is an important step forward in advancing
public use aircraft safety.
Mr. President, I also want to point out that the topic of public use
aircraft is gaining increased public awareness. In fact, several news
articles regarding this issue were printed recently. I ask unanimous
consent that articles by David Eisnstadt from the October 2 and 3,
1994, issues of the Times Union be printed in the Record immediately
following my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. PRESSLER. I want to commend the journalist, David Eisenstadt, and
the Hearst Newspapers, for recognizing the importance of this aviation
issue. These articles provide a great deal of insightful information
that merits the attention of all levels of government, from State and
local governments to Congress and the administration. I urge my
colleagues to read them and become more aware of the potential problems
that could result without necessary regulatory action. Let's not wait
for more aviation accidents and lost lives to spur necessary policy
considerations. Again, I urge my colleagues to read the articles.
As ranking member of the Senate Aviation Subcommittee, I believe
Congress is obligated to do its utmost to advance air travel safety
wherever a problem exists. This measure narrows greatly the areas in
which public use aircraft are exempted from FAA compliance. I urge my
colleagues to support the bill.
Exhibit 1
Unregulated pilots take their toll
(By David Eisenstadt)
Washington.--As soon as they learned that a U.S. Energy
Department airplane had slammed into a school warehouse near
Billings, Mont., killing all eight people aboard, air traffic
controllers across Montana suspected that they knew who was
piloting the jet.
At 39, pilot Curt Schwarz had earned a reputation for
flying dangerously. Pilots and mechanics gossiped that
Schwarz gambled with takeoffs and landings and often sneered
at basic airplane safety.
``He was always in a rush, trying to cut corners.'' said
Bob Chopko, a colleague of Schwarz at the Energy Department.
For his last flight, the government pilot had falsified his
medical certificate, one of the basic credentials of flying,
and was relying on a co-pilot, 32-year-old Dan Arnold, who
was not licensed to fly the sophisticated Cessna 550,
according to documents on the 1992 crash.
Robert Machol, the FAA's former chief scientist who helped
investigate the Billings crash, said of Schwarz, ``This
pilot, it was very clear, was reckless and stupid.''
Schwarz was also not covered by many of the FAA's
regulations for private and commercial pilots.
Two former National Transportation Safety Board officials--
Ira Furman and Herb Bates--think its crazy for government
airplanes to escape regulation.
``It's worth remembering that a government plane is just as
capable of killing as any other plane,'' says Furman.
Bates expresses his agreement, ``What you have is a large
group of flying people who are truly not monitored. It costs
so many people their lives,'' he says.
A Hearst analysis of the available information on
government aircraft accidents since 1983--272--reveals a
history marked by crashes involving reckless government
pilots, poorly trained government pilots and others who were
loosely supervised and monitored by managers who were not
pilots and lacked other aviation experience.
The General Accounting Office, the investigatory arm of
Congress, found a similar pattern in its 1986 examination of
Alaska's state flying operation. The GAO, relying on special
data provided them by the FAA, found that government aircraft
in Alaska crashed more often than general aviation planes and
helicopters.
``Our review disclosed no persuasive reason why
(government) aircraft should not be expected to meet at least
the minimum maintenance and crew standards expected of civil
aircraft,'' the GAO reported to Congress.
In the Schwarz case, the pilot's failure to follow routine
aviation maintenance and safety practices was blatant.
For example, he failed to undergo periodic ``checkrides''
with independent observers to assess his flying ability. He
didn't verify that operating procedures on the airplane were
safe. He didn't prepare a flight manifest listing his
passengers and crew. And he didn't update his flight plan
when he took off for his last leg that day.
``The pilot conducted unorthodox and nonstandard operating
techniques and procedures,'' according to the Energy
Department's crash study.
It's impossible to know whether Schwarz would have crashed
his government plane if he and the aircraft had been subject
to government safety rules.
However, Pamela Charles, a helicopter pilot, an FAA-
certified mechanic and aviation executive, speculated that
the chances were very good that Schwarz would not have been
flying that day had he been subject to federal oversight. Her
reasoning: FAA spot checks probably would have discovered the
altered health certificate.
``If the FAA had known, he (Schwarz) would have been cited
and may have had his certificate suspended,'' she said. ``By
virtue of having a review process, these things get caught.''
Other cases raise similar questions about the scant
oversight and few binding rules imposed on government
aviation.
In 1982, the city manager of Portsmouth, Va., was flying to
Baltimore to inspect the development of that city's harbor.
The police pilot flying the Beech D-95A airplane was licensed
but had not logged any time in airplanes in six months.
Instead, he'd been flying helicopters.
The pilot overloaded the plane and, in rain and fog,
crashed into an apartment building in Columbia, Md., about 20
miles from Baltimore. Five people died, including one person
in the apartment building.
Had he been subject to federal aviation rules, the pilot
would have broken regulations that require those carrying
passengers to have flown recently. It also violates federal
flying rules to exceed an airplane's carrying capacity.
``Even though this crash involved a pilot who was not fresh
on airplane flying, he did nothing illegal because he was a
public pilot,'' says former NTSB Chairman James Burnett.
In 1983, an Alaska Fish and Wildlife officer who would have
been banned from flying at night by federal flying rules
because he couldn't see well in the dark, took off after
dusk. He crashed and died.
This pilot also would have broken the rule that forbids
using an aircraft after sunset that's unequipped to fly at
night.
____
A Crash Waiting in the Wings
(By David Eisenstadt)
Washington.--Aircraft pilots and mechanics don't mince
words describing the airplane used to transport Gov. Mario M.
Cuomo and other top state officials.
They call it the ``death plane.''
The aircraft--a 13-passenger Grumman G-1 built in 1966--was
tagged with the name in 1988 when the pilot made a forced
landing at an airport near Williamsport, Pa., after radio
equipment began burning, filling the cabin with smoke. Cuomo,
returning to Albany from the Democratic National Convention
in Atlanta, was not hurt.
The plane made another emergency landing in 1990 with Lt.
Gov. Stan Lundine aboard. When an instrument panel light
began flashing to warn of an engine fire, the pilot quickly
found a runaway near Utica for an emergency landing. It
turned out to be a false alarm.
These emergency findings illustrate the consequences of a
bizarre anomaly in the elaborate American system of aviation
safety: Aircraft and pilots for local, state and federal
governments are exempt from almost all--54 of 63--key federal
aviation safety regulations that apply to commercial and
private aviation.
Cuomo and Lundine aren't the only state executives with
white-knuckle tales about flying on state-owned aircraft.
In Graefenburg, Ky., in 1992, Gov. Brereton C. Jones and
four others were injured when their state helicopters crashed
in a ravine. The Sikorsky S-76A went down after an engine
compartment door flew open, overheating the engine and
causing the aircraft to stall.
Scouring the debris, National Transportation Safety Board,
or NTSB, investigators discovered that two clamps on the
left-side engine door had been left unsnapped. The
investigators concluded that the governor's helicopter
crashed partly because the state flight crew did not
properly inspect the aircraft before takeoff.
In 1993, South Dakota Gov. George Mickelson and several
other state officials were killed when their state airplane,
a Mitsubishi MU-2, crashed into a grain silo during an
emergency landing near Dubuque, Iowa. The plane crashed after
a blade broke off a cracked propeller hub.
Crash investigators later discovered that the Federal
Aviation Administration had been warned by the manufacturer
and its own scientists about flaws in the MU-2's propeller
system. The FAA did not react to those warnings, however,
because it was unsure how frequently the problem occurred.
There's no way to determine if these episodes would have
been avoided had the aviation operations of New York State,
Kentucky and South Dakota been subject to federal safety
rules.
However, these cases spotlight government aviation's unique
status in the skies, creating a separate class of
approximately 4,000 aircraft flying for local, state and
federal governments across the country.
An examination by The Hearst Newspapers has found:
Government aircraft have higher crash rates than airplanes
in commercial and general--or private--aviation. (See
accompanying chart.)
Since 1983, at least 181 people have died in 272 crashes of
government aircraft. Experts say the number of crashes is
underreported and that many of them could have been avoided
if the planes and pilots had been subjected to the same
oversight that apply to private and commercial aviation.
In 1992, the year with the most recent data, more people
died in government air crashes (51) than in commercial air
travel (33), although there were about twice as many
airliners and commuter jets flying many times the miles and
passengers of government aviation.
Even the FAA, which enforces safety regulations on the
aviation industry, is exempt. It has 53 aircraft and about
2,000 pilots.
The United States treats government aviation far more
casually than countries such as Canada and the United
Kingdom.
Government agencies fiercely oppose moves to bring them
under safety rules that apply to commercial and general
aviation.
The Hearst inquiry shows that government aviation has
bucked the trend in aviation safety over the past decade:
While commercial and private aircraft are crashing less,
government aircraft are crashing more and killing more people
than 10 years ago.
``The safest way to fly in government airplanes is not to
fly in them,'' says Ira Furman, a former NTSB official who
now is an independent aircraft accident investigator and
aviation consultant based in Long Island.
The Hearst examination did not include military aircraft
because the Defense Department has a comprehensive set of
aviation safety regulations and accident investigation
programs tailored to the difficulty, hazard and special
requirements of flying military missions.
Sparse data conceal the safety problems of government
aircraft.
For example, until 1989, local, state and federal
authorities were not required to report crashes of government
aircraft to federal aviation safety officials. Furthermore,
there is no requirement that federal safety officials
investigate crashes of government airplanes.
For example, federal aviation safety authorities will have
no role in the investigation of the Aug. 27 crash in Peru of
a federal Drug Enforcement Administration plane that killed
five DEA agents. The DEA will handle its own investigation.
By contrast, federal law requires the NTSB to investigate
any crash of a commercial aircraft or a private plane
involving a death. (The International Civil Aviation
Organization investigates crashes of flights that cross
international boundaries.)
Former NTSB Chairman James Burnett believes that the actual
number of crashes of government-owned airplanes is vastly
understated. He estimates such crashes at ``several hundred a
year''--far higher than the 272 since 1983 tabulated by the
NTSB at the request of The Hearst Newspapers.
At any time, Burnett says, the 4,000 largely unregulated
government aircraft are an aviation disaster waiting to
happen.
``One of these days, we will see a big accident as a result
of (government aircraft),'' Burnett warns.
Pamela Charles, a commercial helicopter pilot, FAA-
certified mechanic and National Guard pilot, also suspects
that the crash rate of government aircraft is far higher than
official records show.
``There are lots of crashes that aren't reported, which
means we don't know what's really happening out there,'' she
says. ``It's really quite scary--we're setting ourselves up
for more and more accidents.''
Unlike government aviation, commercial and private flying
operations are subject to federal regulations covering three
main categories: pilots and crews, operational safety, and
maintenance and certification. Violators face penalties
ranging from license revocation to fines reaching into six
figures.
Arthur Wolk, a Philadelphia-based lawyer and pilot who
specializes in aviation law calls the exemption for
government-owned aircraft a blatant double standard.
``Our governments, flying the same airplanes with our
money, act above the law; create a hazard and set a bad
example,'' says Wolk.
Giffen Marr, a Bell Helicopter-Textron Inc. executive and
former military test pilot, said the lack of regulations for
government aircraft has created high-altitude anarchy.
``I just can't believe that we--as a large civilized
nation--allow a portion of the aviation system to go
uncontrolled,'' he said.
``You'd think governors and others who fly would be allowed
the same protection as everybody else--but most people don't
realize there are no requirements for these aircraft nor how
much jeopardy they are in.''
Richard Xifo, an aviation consultant based in Centreville,
Va who has worked for the FAA, points out one of the weird
consequences of the immunity granted government, aircraft and
pilots.
``The situation is so ludicrous that you don't even need a
pilot's license to fly a government airplane,'' he said.
As FAA lawyer Gregory Walden wrote in a 1990 internal memo
obtained through the Freedom of Information Act:
``A person without a pilot's certificate legally may
operate a public aircraft, and without an airworthiness
certificate, as far as the FAA is concerned.''
A pilot's certificate informally is called a pilot's
license. That and a medical certificate are the two essential
credentials of flying in the United States.
Small commercial operations and aviation safety experts see
the government's exemption from its own regulations as a free
ride given government-owned aircraft.
The idea of voluntary compliance smacks of a ``do as I say,
not as I do'' attitude from the federal government, they say.
Michael Pangia, a pilot and former top trial lawyer for the
FAA now in private aviation law practice in Washington, said:
``The federal government is passing regulations all the time
to get me to inspect my plane and other things. If it's that
important for me, it should be important for all.''
The experience of other aviation experts backs up Pangia.
Of the 272 government aircraft accidents over the last
decade that were reported to federal officials, as compiled
by the NTSB at the Hearst Newspapers' request, 57 might have
been avoided if the planes and pilots had been subjected to
federal aviation regulations, according to Xifo, Charles and
others who reviewed the NTSB crash data at the request of The
Hearst Newspapers.
Sloppiness runs like a plot through the records of the 57
crashes.
In some cases, the pilots, mechanics and their supervisors
were not qualified for the work they were assigned to do; in
other cases, the pilots had histories of careless flying.
In some instances, the government aircraft crashed after
key parts had been installed improperly, going unnoticed due
to insufficient inspection. In many cases, pilots were
unlicensed and flew in aircraft unequipped for the task.
Defenders of the current double standard argue that
governmental bodies would need more tax money to spend on
their aviation operations if all public aviation were subject
to FAA regulations.
Others point out that some governmental units get high
marks for keeping their airplanes in top shape and making
sure their pilots get top training.
For example, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department is
among those often cited for its professional flying
operations. The Los Angeles sheriff's aviation operation--and
other government units singled out for praise--exceed federal
government safety requirements in crucial areas like aircraft
inspection and maintenance.
Los Angeles County has a legion of aviation safety
officials, for example, and New York state toughened its
safety and flying standards after the incidents involving
Cuomo and Lundine.
``After the Williamsport incident, we reassessed our whole
aviation system. We looked at what needed to be improved,''
said Ben Marvin, a spokesman for the state Department of
Environmental Conservation, which oversees New York's
aviation operation. The result: The state is requiring its
planes to meet the same kind of FAA safety rules that would
apply to commuter airlines, he said.
``In all fairness, some of these operations are quite
professional,'' said William Dvorak, a vice president of
quality assurance for California Helicopters Inc., based in
Ventura, Calif. ``But anything can happen with a lot of
others, and that's the worry.''
Canada, Britain Subject Aircraft to Strict Rules
(By David Eisenstadt)
Washington.--When it comes to safety regulation of
government-owned aircraft, U.S. skies are in anarchy compared
to countries such as the United Kingdom and Canada.
Both Britain and Canada enforce standards at least as high
for government fliers and aircraft as for private and
commercial operations. By comparison, government planes in
the United States are exempt from 54 of 63 key federal safety
regulations overseeing private and commercial aviation.
Canadian aviation officials chuckle when discussing the
U.S. practice.
``It's a little bit of a joke up here, what you do down
there in the States,'' says William Peppler, general manager
of the Ottawa-based Canadian Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association. ``All people are entitled to the same safety
standards, aren't they?''
It's a different story in Canada.
There, government-owned airplanes must meet the same
safety, maintenance and flying rules that apply to commercial
and private pilots and aircraft, according to Peppler.
``We try to make government aircraft conform to a high
standard,'' says Peppler. ``Believing that everyone is
important, we maintain the same safety standards for all
airplanes.''
The British standards for government aircraft are even more
rigorous.
In contrast to U.S. practices, the more difficult or
dangerous a flying operation, the stiffer the rules a British
pilot is required to follow.
For example, U.S. police aviators are exempt from most
federal aviation laws. In Britain, by contrast, police flying
operations are subject to the same rules as commercial ones.
``It's a different picture here,'' says Ron Campbell of the
United Kingdom Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. ``The
more rigorous the role, the more rigorous the oversight and
inspection.''
In the United States, Canada and Britain, government
regulations require a private pilot to have an annual
aircraft inspection as well as an airworthiness certificate
for the aircraft.
But if a British aircraft and pilot are engaged in
government flying work, government aviation inspectors check
the airplane more frequently--every 50 hours of flying.
The Canadian government aircraft would face inspection
every 100 hours of flight.
The American government flier doesn't have to do either.
____
Government Aviation: Just the Facts
Government aircraft have higher crash rates than airplanes
in commercial and general (private) aviation.
Since 1983, at least 181 people have died in 272 crashes of
government aircraft. Experts say the number of crashes is
underreported and that many of them could have been avoided
if the planes and pilots had been subjected to the same rules
that apply to private and commercial aviation.
During the year with the most recent data--1992--more
people died in government aircrashes (51) than in commercial
air travel (33) although there were about twice as many
airliners and commuter jets flying many times the miles and
passengers of government aviation.
More than 200 pilots and aviation technicians have reported
incidents of risky and dangerous flying and poor safety
practices by government aircraft and aviators since 1986 to
an airplane safety hot line run by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
Even the FAA--which enforces safety regulations on the
aviation industry--exempts its 53 aircraft and 2,000 pilots
from many of the very rules it requires others to obey.
The United States treats government aviation far more
casually than countries like Canada and the United Kingdom.
Government agencies fiercely oppose moves to bring them
under safety rules that apply to commercial and general
aviation.
____
Agency Probe Under Way
(By David Eisenstadt)
The Federal Aviation Administration--the regulatory agency
responsible for enforcing airplane safety--can get
closemouthed when questions are raised about government
flying operations.
When The Hearst Newspapers last February began checking the
safety records of unregulated government aircraft, the FAA
wasn't eager to shed light on the question.
``There's really nothing I can give you about (government)
aircraft because we don't have anything to do with them,''
said Frasier Jones, and FAA spokesman.
As interviews with National Transportation Safety Board
officials and other federal officials progressed in May and
June, the FAA rejected four requests to speak with its top
official, David R. Hinson, about why the FAA opposes efforts
to end the exemption from federal regulation the government
aircraft have.
In late June, the FAA changed its tune.
While declining to allow Hinson to be interviewed, the FAA
permitted a reporter to talk with Anthony Broderick, its
chief of aviation regulations.
Broderick let drop the news that the FAA had just launched
its own investigation of government aircraft safety and would
release its findings in ``about six months.''
``One of the things we just started, literally within days,
is a project to try and assess the magnitude of that issue
and get a better feel for what's going on out there (in
government aircraft).''
Private, Commercial Skies Full of Regulations
(By David Eisenstadt)
Washington.--The good news is that the U.S. government has
63 key safety regulations to make sure private and commercial
pilots are well trained and the aircraft they fly are safe.
The bad news is that 54 of the rules don't apply if the
pilots or the aircraft work for the federal or any local or
state government in the country.
Although some government aviation units set high safety
standards for their pilots and planes, the only federal
aviation rules that apply to government aircraft pertain to
regulating aircraft in flight, such as the requirement that
planes keep a safe distance from each other.
The reactions by a commercial operation and a government
operation to a new safety rule illustrate the differences.
Bell Helicopters issued a warning in 1992 to owners and
pilots of their 205 series helicopter--a civilian version of
the military Huey UH-1. After several crashes and accidents,
Bell told the 205 owners of to replace the main yoke, a
critical part that holds the main rotor blades onto the
helicopter.
Under federal aviation rules, a private or commercial owner
of a Bell 205 series helicopter had to obey Bell's warning
and replace the old steel yoke with a stainless steel model
by Dec. 1, 1993, or face FAA penalties.
``I'd have hell to pay if I didn't replace mine,'' says Rod
Qvuaam, owner of Helijet Inc., a Eugene, Ore., commercial
helicopter operation. ``I'd have my certificate pulled. It
would put me out of business.''
However, a government operation using the same helicopter--
in many of the same tasks--could ignore the warning.
For example, the Washington state Department of Natural
Resources and the California Department of Forestry chose not
to replace the main yokes on any of their Bell 205s,
according to the agencies.
This isn't the only time government flying operations have
ignored a safety requirement imposed on commercial and
general aviation.
For example, Washington state has skipped these safety
practices that federal regulations require of commercial
aviation:
The state does not subject its pilots to drug or alcohol
tests.
None of Washington's five aircraft has been certified as
airworthy by the FAA.
None of the state's aircraft has fire-control equipment,
such as extinguishers on board, or first-aid kits.
In other areas, Washington state has elected to follow
federal aviation standards.
Its mechanics are FAA-certified, its pilots are FAA-
certified, and some maintenance practices are more rigorous
than the FAA requires.
Still, George Kerr, operations chief for the Washington
Department of Natural Resources, concedes that the state's
work is not always up to federal standards.
``To be quite honest, they don't have the expertise for
what they're doing,'' Kerr says in reference to the state's
aircraft mechanics.
It's a different universe for private and commercial
aviation.
To oversee those who fly for hire or fun and to protect the
public, the FAA requires private and commercial flying
operations to obey three sets of key safety regulations.
These cover pilots and crews, maintenance and safety, and
flying itself.
Private or commercial pilots, mechanics and aviation
supervisors who violate these federal rules face FAA
penalties that range from fines to license revocation. By
contrast, under federal aviation rules, a government pilot is
not subject to any outside authority.
____
Caution: FAA Rules Do Not Apply Here
Federal regulations that apply to private or commercial
pilots and aircraft but not to government aircraft and their
pilots include:
Mandatory drug tests.
A pilot's license.
A pilot's medical certificate, which is intended to
minimize the risk of a pilot being crippled by a health
problem in flight.
Flight training requirements.
Flight test requirements.
An instrument certification to fly in certain weather
conditions.
Required hours of flying experience to ensure a pilot can
safely handle the mission.
FAA annual aircraft inspections.
FAA spot checks, termed ``surveillance inspections.''
Inspections are required to be completed by an FAA-
certified mechanic.
An FAA-approved maintenance program.
An FAA-approved maintenance manual.
An after-maintenance inspection by the FAA or its
representatives to ensure the plane is safe to fly.
An accurate maintenance log.
Commercial operators and those carrying people and cargo
are required to have an aircraft inspection every 100 flying
hours.
Certain failures, like a false warning light in flight, are
required to be documented.
An aircraft airworthiness certificate, issued by the FAA
that testifies a plane or helicopter can fly as billed and is
without mechanical defect.
Fire-control equipment on board.
Operating aircraft within allowable weight limits.
A requirement on commercial operations that transport
people or cargo specifies that the FAA assess the carrier's
operations management structure and qualifications.
Commercial aircraft must have cockpit voice recorders and
flight data recorders.
Load manifests are required of commercial operations that
carry cargo.
____
Fatal FAA Crash Shows a Lack of Accountability
(By David Eisenstadt)
Linden, Va.--After nine years as a pilot for the Federal
Aviation Administration, the flying skills of 55-year-old
government aviator Donald Robbins had achieved a kind of
notoriety within the agency.
Three other FAA pilots had refused to fly with Robbins, who
liked to brood at the controls and play tricks in flight on
his crew members, FAA documents show. A favorite Robbins'
game was to ``communicate as little as possible'' with co-
pilots, meaning he often wouldn't tell them where they were
going even after being asked several times, according to the
documents obtained by The Hearst Newspapers through the
Freedom of Information Act.
During the time I flew with Robbins, there was never a crew
meeting. He did not like oral communication * * * and did not
want to see a checklist,'' according to one internal FAA memo
detailing complaints from fellow FAA pilots about Robbins.
``If he was flying, he would not allow the (co-pilot) to read
(the checklist); it appeared to me that Robbins thought this
proved he was a better pilot.''
Robert Pearce, an FAA safety worker, wrote in one
complaint, ``Mr. Robbins has had an attitude in the office
during the last month and a half. He has not talked to anyone
because of the poor performance appraisal he received.''
The anxiety about Robbins among his FAA pilots peaked last
September, prompting the FAA to dispatch an ``internal audit
team'' to see what was going on with Robbins and his
supervisors in FAA offices in Atlantic City, N.J., and
Oklahoma City, according to an FAA official.
The team's report, said to be critical of Robbins, was
never made public. The FAA kept Robbins in the cockpit.
Almost exactly a month late, Oct. 26, 1993, Robbins and two
FAA colleagues were killed when their government plane
crashed into the Blue Ridge Mountains.
After inspecting runway equipment at the Winchester
Regional Airport, Robbins was weaving in and out of fog about
1,800 feet above the Virginia countryside when the plane
slammed into High Knob mountain.
At the crash site in the woods about a mile from here, the
plane's sheared tail poked above other pieces of bent, metal,
its sharply detailed blue-and-white U.S. Transportation
Department logo identifying its owner:
After rummaging through the debris, National Transportation
Safety Board investigators accused the FAA of laxity toward
the safety of its own aviation program.
``The oversight the FAA routinely performs over commercial
carriers was not being conducted over its own operations,''
safety board Chairman Carl Vogt said in a statement after the
crash.
The Hearst Newspapers' inquiry learned that Robbins'
personnel file contained a major personal blemish that the
FAA had disregarded even though it would have caused troubles
had he been a commercial pilot: Robbins failed to tell the
FAA promptly about a conviction for drunken driving--a
violation of federal flying rules as well as the FAA's own
policies.
When he later received a second drunken-driving conviction,
Robbins also delayed reporting it. At the time of his death,
Robbins' New Jersey driver's license had been revoked because
he had failed to comply with the alcohol rehabilitation
program required by state law.
Federal law doesn't require a pilot convicted of drunken
driving to forfeit his flying license. However, federal
regulations require such convictions to be reported to the
FAA; a second such conviction prompts a special FAA
investigation into the circumstances and requires FAA-
certified rehabilitation.
The FAA did not launch an investigation into Robbins' case
or penalize him but did ask him to document his past history
of traffic violations. Said an AA official familiar with the
events: ``Despite all this stuff, we just did not do anything
with him at all.''
The events surrounding Robbins and his 1993 crash are
especially surprising because concerns about the FAA's
ability to police itself were raised after a 1988 FAA plane
crash. That crash in western Pennsylvania killed three agency
employees, two of whom--the pilot and co-pilot--had traces
of alcohol in their blood.
An FAA internal audit after the 1988 crash showed that the
agency violated federal aviation rules in 159 instances in
its own flying operations in 1988.
After the crash, the FAA gave assurances that it would
start regulating itself by the same standards it sets for the
airlines.
The goal is to foster and achieve the highest degree of
aviation safety in all facets of the flight inspection
mission,'' William Williams, the FAA's aviation standards
director, wrote in a 1992 internal memo almost a year before
Robbins died.
``In order to realize the highest level of aviation safety,
we have prescribed a program that adheres to standards set
forth for the aviation industry.''
However, The Hearst Newspapers inquiry found that the FAA
still has not met this goal.
As the Robbins crash suggests, the FAA makes weaker demands
on its aviation employees than it requires of the airline
industry in these areas;
The FAA performs drug tests on only a random selection of
its pilots. By contrast, commercial airline pilots have to
undergo at least annual drug tests.
The FAA often waives licensing requirements for some senior
FAA officials.
Under federal law, the airline officials responsible for
flight operations and their assistants are required to have
an airline transport pilot's license. Some of the FAA's
equivalent personnel, however, have been excused from this
requirement even though the safety board chided the FAA after
Robbins crashed last year for having unqualified flight
supervisors.
``We do not waiver this under any circumstances for the
airline industry nor would an airline want to do it anyway
because it's not very smart--it raises substantial liability
questions,'' said an FAA official, who spoke in an interview
on condition of anonymity.
The FAA's own rulebook for its pilots is vague compared
with the detailed manuals it mandates for airline pilots.
The FAA has no approved training program for its aviators
to maintain proficiency. On the other hand, federal aviation
regulations clearly spell out that an airline without a
training program won't get off the ground. The FAA even
has 2,000 flight standards inspectors to ensure that
airline pilot-training programs are up to speed.
In the Robbins' case, the FAA's only move to discipline him
took the form of a reprimand letter after he damaged the
engine of another FAA plane in an earlier incident.
``As far as many of us are concerned, someone should have
acted to ground Robbins, that we at the FAA really are to
blame for the crash,'' said one FAA official.
Reflecting on Robbins' death in an interview in August,
Anthony Broderick, the FAA's chief of aviation regulation,
said the FAA is trying to shape up.
``We are saddened by the tragic loss of lives and are
determined to make sure it doesn't happen again,'' Broderick
said.
On his last flight, Robbins ignored routine safety
procedures--such as not following a filed flight plan, a
violation of the FAA's internal code and federal safety
regulations.
After Robbins crashed last year, FAA spokeswoman Marcia
Adams said the agency had improved its practices since the
1988 crash. The FAA had ``adopted most'' of the recommended
changes to its flight operation urged by the safety board to
bring its practices in line with the airline industry, she
said, including spot checks of its own operation, filing
flight plans, moving forward on alcohol testing for pilots
and publishing maintenance and training manuals for FAA
flights.
However, a March 1994 crash of an FAA plane outside
Williamson, Ga., shows that some FAA pilots and supervisors
are having a hard time adapting to the rules.
Just two months earlier, in a January letter to the safety
board, FAA Administrator David R. Hinson assured the NTSB
that all FAA pilots would submit flight plans showing the
expected route, destination, mileage and fuel.
Noted safety board investigators after the Georgia crash,
which injured two: ``No flight plan was filed.''
A veteran FAA flight inspector who declined to be named
said: ``I have been involved with the FAA for more than 20
years and there really is a double standard, one that lets us
ignore the standards we impose on the rest of the aviation
community.
``That's why some of us here say the FAA leads the industry
in deaths.''
Ultimately, this FAA official said, events like the death
of Robbins and his two colleagues challenge the FAA's ability
to regulate the skies.
``If we can't control our own organization, how can any
citizen reasonably expect us to be able to keep them safe
when they fly?'' the official said.
____
Opponents Ground Legislative Regulation of Government Flights
(By David Eisenstadt)
Washington.--Ask those daredevil pilots who fly
firefighting airplanes and helicopters for a living if they
and their aircraft should be subject to federal aviation
safety laws.
But be prepared to hear the sound of grinding teeth and
listen to predictions of more red tape instead of more lives
saved.
``If you want to handcuff us, if you want to prevent us
from putting out the next fire at Barbra Streisand's mansion,
regulate!'' barks Rob Harrison, former safety director of the
U.S. Forest Service's Flying operation.
Harrison is not a lonely voice.
George Flanagan, No. 2 man for Washington State's flying
operations, has this to say about making his state's
airplanes meet federal safety rules:
``If you want to put us out of business, that's the way to
do it,'' says Flanagan.
Harrison and Flanagan are representative of the near-
universal opposition to broadening federal safety standards
to include government aviation among the nation's local,
state and federal firefighters and police officers. They say
more rules would make government flying operations more
expensive, handicap fliers and cost some people their homes
and perhaps their lives.
``Right now, we are already so burdened with nonsensical
paperwork,'' says Harrison.
Opposition to greater safety regulation and oversight for
government aviation isn't limited to those who risk their
lives protecting the public. Paul Erway, a Federal Aviation
Administration helicopter specialist, argues that more rules
and laws would actually diminish safety in the sky because
such a move would divert safety efforts from non-government
aviation.
Erway says the relatively small number of government
aircraft--4,000--doesn't merit the same scrutiny that is
given large commercial operations which carry thousands of
passengers a year. It would also force the FAA to scrimp in
other areas, he says.
``There's no payoff for us to bust their chops,'' says
Erway. ``In a situation of limited resources, you try to get
the most bang for the taxpayers' buck.''
Still, these opponents face some spirited foes.
At least one U.S. senator and a vociferous crown of
aviation safety advocates contend that fewer rules for
government aviation mean more government aircraft crashes and
unnecessary deaths.
A Hearst Newspapers investigation into the lack of federal
aviation safety regulations for government pilots or
airplanes found that government aircraft have higher crash
rates than do private and commercial aviation.
``We need to ensure that all aircraft be subject to
stringent and rigorous safety standards regardless of who
owns them,'' says Sen. Larry Pressler, a South Dakota
Republican. ``Government needs to sit up and take notice so
that safety regulations are written and enforced--we owe that
to the air-traveling public.''
Pressler has tried for two years to require government
aviation to obey the same safety rules that oversee
commercial and private aviation. But with Congress on the
verge of vacating Washington for the year, the senator's
effort this year is going the same way as last year's:
nowhere.
After South Dakota Gov. George Mickelson died in the crash
of a state airplane in 1992, Pressler proposed legislation to
subject government aircraft and fliers to the same rules as
private and commercial aircraft and pilots.
Pressler's bill finally passed the Senate in June. Pressure
from the FAA, other federal agencies and law enforcement
groups moved other lawmakers to weaken the measure, the
senator said.
``It's not my intention to obstruct law enforcement or
firefighting operations,'' the senator said. ``But all
aircraft, whether commercial, private or government, should
be required to maintain the highest level of safety.''
this draft version, now awaiting approval in the House of
Representatives, still would significantly expand federal
oversight of government aircraft. Any government aircraft
transporting passengers would be forced to meet the same FAA
safety requirements as commercial or private aircraft.
The bill also would require the National Transportation
Safety Board to investigate ever government aviation
accident. By comparison, the law requires the NTSB to
investigate the crash of every commercial aircraft that was
carrying people and every crash of a private aviation plane
when there was a fatality.
But there is a gaping loophole, Pressler said--a result of
the fierce lobbying against the measure by the FAA and
others.
As now before the House, the bill contains a waiver to
allow the FAA to excuse any government entity from the
beefed-up rules if it has a good aviation record.
In addition, the diluted version of Pressler's bill
provides the same special exemptions for some government
agencies--such as firefighters--enjoyed under current law.
Steve Burns, a Senator committee investigator, said in a
recent interview: ``The status quo is pretty much
indefensible in this area. People don't like the idea that
the government holds them to a different standard than it
holds itself.''
Earlier efforts to bring government aviation under federal
regulation also have failed--often because the FAA leadership
has opposed the move, documents obtained by Hearst Newspapers
through the Freedom of Information Act show.
In 1986, the General Accounting Office--the investigating
arm of Congress--looked into the safety record of government
aircraft in Alaska and concluded:
``Our review disclosed no persuasive reason why public
aircraft should not be expected to meet at least the minimum
FAA maintenance and crew standards expected of civil
aircraft.''
In 1991, the U.S. Senate Government Affairs Committee found
that ``government aircraft are held to a far lower standard
than the private sector when it comes to operation, safety
and maintenance specifications.''
The committee reported that the federal government spent
about $1.75 billion in 1991 to operate its non-military
aircraft fleet, although the government lacked a ``management
system capable of preventing waste and abuse.''
But after each attempt to close the loophole, top FAA
officials have helped block it, concerned that accompanying
costs could be too high, according to documents obtained
through the Freedom of Information Act.
Rep. Norman Mineta, D-Calif., tried in 1987 to bring
government fliers under the same rules as other pilots. His
bill, Mineta said in an interview, was watered down in the
House Transportation and Public Works Committee. In the end,
Congress only required that government air crashes were to be
reported to the NTSB, starting in 1989.
``That bill was killed from pressure by the FAA, the Energy
Department and others,'' Mineta says. ``Their objections had
no substance because safety ought not to be compromised.''
Another committee member, Rep. James Oberstar, D-Minn.,
chairman of its aviation panel, says the House so far has not
addressed the matter because ``no one has raised any concerns
about public-use aircraft.''
However, complaints about the use of so-called public use
or government aircraft have been filed from single pilots and
the Airline Pilots Association with the FAA and other
government agencies for at least two decades.
T.J. Shepard, the owner of Gallup Flying Service in Gallup,
N.M., framed the issue in a 1990 letter to his congressman,
Rep. Joe Skeen, R-N.M.
The letter, obtained through the Freedom of Information
Act, said: ``As a public official, next time you fly, will it
be by a qualified, currently checked pilot and aircraft?''
Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I move the Senate concur in the House
amendment to the Senate amendment and reconsider and table that motion.
The motion was agreed to.
____________________