[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 146 (Saturday, October 8, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: October 8, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF IRAQI CHEMICAL AGENTS DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. President, on several previous occasions, I have made
public important findings on the probable causes of the serious medical
problems facing gulf war veterans called gulf war syndrome.
The evidence available continues to mount indicating that exposure to
biological and chemical weapons is one cause of these illnesses.
The Department of Defense steadfastly refuses to acknowledge this
aspect of the problem. Their blanket denials are not credible. Recent
American history provides grievous examples of official military cover-
ups and Defense Department mistakes--the poisoning of countless
thousands of Vietnam veterans by agent orange is just one compelling
example.
To my mind, there is no more serious crime than an official military
cover-up of facts that could prevent more effective diagnosis and
treatment of sick U.S. veterans.
Today, I will present additional evidence to show that despite
repeated automatic denials by the Department of Defense, chemical
weapons and chemicals agents were present and found in the war zone.
First, we now have a British report and a U.S. Army report which
document in detail the discovery of more than 250 gallons of dangerous
chemical agents. According to the military units that were actually
there it was mustard gas and another blister agent.
Second, we have evidence of an Army sergeant, who received official
Defense Department awards and commendations for injuries from chemical
weapons in the Kuwaiti theater of operations that the Pentagon now says
did not exist. It is an astonishing example of the lengths the Defense
Department is going in order to deny reality.
Lastly, we have received the laboratory findings from a gas mask, its
case, and filter, taken from the gulf war battlefield that reveals the
presence of fragments of biological materials that cause illnesses
similar to gulf war syndrome.
british and united states army reports
We now have British and United States Army reports that document the
presence of chemical agents in Kuwait--well inside the Kuwaiti theater
of operations--well inside areas occupied by United States and British
forces. They had been placed there by Iraqi forces during the
occupation of Kuwait. The liquid was tested, and over 20 times the
presence of chemical agents was confirmed.
In this specific case, chemical specialists from the British Army
using a chemical agent monitor, M18A2 chemical agent detector, and
detector paper--chemical specialists from the United States Army using
a chemical agent monitor, detector paper, and two mass spectrometers,
detected chemical mustard agent.
Further, two sophisticated fox chemical detection vehicles' mass
spectrometers also identified the presence of phosgene oxime. This was
a direct sample--not random vapors collected by the vehicle--as in
previously reported cases.
A British soldier who came into contact with the liquid blistered
immediately and appeared to be going into shock--as might be predicted
from the nature of the agents present.
The tapes were ordered removed from the vehicle and to be sent
forward along with a sample of the chemical agents. The soldiers were
ordered to give the materials to individuals in unmarked uniforms--
unmarked uniforms. Earlier this year, Captain Johnson after hearing
that the Department of Defense was denying the presence of chemical
agents in Kuwait--forwarded the report on this incident through his
chain of command. But the report was returned to him and not forwarded
to the Department of Defense.
The Kuwaiti, United States, and British Governments all received
reports on this discovery and recovery of bulk chemical agents.
The Department of the Army originally told my staff that prior to
releasing Captain Johnson's report they must obtain clearance from the
Department of Defense, and that an intelligence review must be
conducted. That would seem to contradict their claim that there is no
classified information on this subject. They claimed that prior to
releasing the British report, they had to get the permission of the
British. However, when I received the British report, it was dated July
14, 1994, indicating that it had been prepared in response to my
request, in coordination with the Department of Defense. This official
dissembling and effort to obscure the facts are a continuation of
Defense Department tactics we have seen before on this issue. The
serious question remains as to why we were not provided with an
official report dating from the time of the incident by the Department
of Defense.
A July 14, 1994, report prepared by the British Chemical and
Biological Defense Establishment claimed that ``in their view'' the
substance was fuming nitric acid.
But we now have a copy of the British report prepared by the unit
actually present at the event, written 3 years earlier on August 8,
1991. I had to find this report myself. It confirms that mustard agent
was detected, and that the substance was oily, like mustard agent.
Nitric acid is not oily. In my view, this is an important example of a
pattern of deliberate misrepresentation of the truth. It is an
appalling record.
The U.S. report confirms that not only was mustard agent detected in
the container using a mass spectrometer, but also in microdoses on the
ground. This would appear to eliminate the possible explanation that
the container held fuming nitric acid--rocket fuel oxidizer--so
concentrated that it reacted with materials in the mass spectrometer
causing false readings when the material was examined. The mass
spectrometers in both fox vehicles were also successfully calibrated
before and after this detection event.
There is also the issue of how the Department of Defense has handled
the investigations into reported chemical agent detection events. We
continue to receive reports from individuals, many of whom are no
longer in the military--who have been contacted by high ranking
military officers assigned to work with the Defense Science Board Task
Force investigating this issue. We have receive complaints from
veterans that rather than trying to seek other witnesses or corroborate
their reports, these officers have called to convince them that they
were mistaken--that their individual experiences and findings were not
credible--and that their statements made to Congress would be refuted.
Most recently, an individual associated with this original detection of
chemical agents in the war zone was contacted by one of these officers.
This officer specifically told the individual that these findings would
be refuted by the Department of Defense--even before the Department
received the report from the British that was eventually forwarded to
me.
I ask my colleagues here in the Senate to evaluate these reports only
on their merits; 21 field tests conducted on this substance were
positive for mustard agent; both United States and British chemical
agent monitor readings confirmed eight bars for mustard gas, a maximum
reading indicating the presence of highly concentrated agent; eight of
eight mobile mass spectrometer tests, using two separate Fox vehicles
and liquid agent in a controlled setting identified identical
substances--mustard agent, and phosgene oxime; it was the same color as
mustard agent; it was oily like mustard agent; a mobile mass
spectrometer reading indicated that microdoses of mustard agent were
present in the soil; a British soldier suffered a chemical injury
consistent with what would be expected when exposed to these agents,
particularly to phosgene oxime; and a Department of Defense explanation
described by the National Institute for Standards and Technology
variously as ``high unlikely,'' ``no likelihood,'' and ``not
possible.''
ARMY SERGEANT'S ``MYSTERY'' AWARDS
The second case I would like to share with my colleagues is the story
of former Sgt. David Allen Fisher, who also discovered what appears to
be a cache of chemical weapons where the Department of Defense says
none were deployed.
In this case, as in the other cases like it, it seems impossible to
obtain an explanation from the Department of Defense that is consistent
with the events as reported by the soldiers present. In August, a
Pentagon spokesperson stated that whatever chemicals were encountered
in the bunker must have been left over from earlier fighting between
Iraq and Iran.
However, in September 1994, that same spokesperson said that he was
not aware that any chemical weapons crates were discovered by Mr.
Fisher, despite Colonel Dunn's report and despite the fact that Mr.
Fisher received a Purple Heart for his injuries from chemical agents.
Others who were present that date including the Fox vehicle operators,
one of whom received a bronze star and Colonel Dunn corroborate these
events. Further, according to Mr. Fisher, this was an active bunker
complex with artillery pieces present and their mission there was to go
from bunker to bunker searching for Iraqi soldiers. Old chemical
weapons, left over from a previous war, would be stored in a separate
storage facility; if they were present at an active artillery position,
they were deployed with the intention of using them.
What continues to emerge is a deeply troubling pattern of events
involving individuals who have received medals--Bronze Stars,
Meritorious Service Medals, Army Commendation Medals, and Purple
Hearts--in the course of comming into contact with weapons that the
Department of Defense insists were not even present in the theater of
war. Chemical and biological weapons were either present, or they were
not present. These events I have discussed raise serious concerns about
the veracity of the Department of Defense's claims as well as their
motives. I fully expect to find additional ``exceptions'' to the
Department of Defense assertion that, at no time, were chemical or
biological weapons ever found in the theater of operations.
I have no further confidence in the Defense Department's statement on
this vital matter. The evidence continues to grow that they will go to
any length to deny the facts surrounding this subject.
We now know that there were chemicals found near An Nasiriyah, in an
area that was secured by elements of the 18th Airborne Corps. The U.N.
confirms that they were there, and a Defense Department official
testifying before the Senate Banking Committee confirmed that troops
were close to this facility--contradicting previous testimony in the
same hearing by another senior Defense Department official;
The medical and technical evidence establishes that chemicals were
found in an Iraqi bunker complex south of Basra in an area that was
secured by elements of the 3d Armored Division;
According to official records and scientific evidence, chemicals were
found in a container in southeastern Kuwait in an area tested by
Kuwaiti, British, and American soldiers from the 11th Armored Cavalry
Regiment;
And, according to Marine Corps historical documents, two marines were
injured by chemical agents in breaching operations during the ground
war.
We also know that many of the soldiers that were present during each
of these events are now ill and others were given medals.
So what is the truth? Certainly not in the official Defense
Department statement that all U.S. troops were far from any chemical
agents. Were there 2, 3, 5, 10, or 100 chemical events like those
described above? Will Members of Congress and the soldiers have to
uncover each and every exposure in order to determine the causes of
these illnesses. And what can be best done to treat these sick, and
often dying, gulf war veterans?
We cannot allow the U.S. military establishment or our government to
turn its back upon hundreds of thousands of Americans and their
families who answered their country's call and who were almost
certainly exposed to chemical or biological weapons agents during the
gulf war. And what of the risk of those same exposures in future wars?
Is that why the Department of Defense is behaving in this manner--to
hide their lack of ability to adequately protect our troops from these
kinds of exposures in future wars?
new laboratory findings of materials found on the battlefield
Finally, I have submitted samples for analysis to several renowned
laboratories, including the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's
Forensic Science Center. In biological analyses, based on preliminary
testing using advanced DNA analyses and screening techniques, unique
DNA sequences were detected for Q-fever and brucella on the inside of a
gas mask carrying case, the top of a gas mask filter, and under the
rubber seal of masks submitted to my office for analysis by U.S.
Persian Gulf war veterans who brought them back from the Middle East.
When additional primer pairs were compared, the findings were
negative. These tests were repeated with identical findings--that is,
the same identical DNA primer pairs were indicated.
While false positive DNA testing can occur with only a single primer
pair analysis, these results can also be indicative of the presence of
only a single strand--perhaps due to the presence of another
genetically altered biological warfare-related microorganism.
We do know that the United States licensed the export of genetic
materials capable of being used to create these types of genetically-
altered biological warfare agents to the Iraqi Atomic Energy
Commission--an Iraqi governmental agency that conducted biological
warfare-related research--prior to the war. One method of creating
these genetically altered micro-organisms is by exposing them to
radiation. The United States also licensed that export of several
species of brucella to Iraqi governmental agencies. Both Q-fever and
brucellosis are also endemic to the region.
This study is far from conclusive but points to the need for further
research in this area. According to the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, biological studies need further attention. Cultures need to
be investigated more closely.
In addition many chemical compounds were present in the samples. The
scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Forensic Science
Center believe that additional analysis of more samples may isolate and
identify chemicals that in combination may be hazardous, chemical
warfare agent compounds, or biological pathogens on the surface of
collected items and that more study is warranted.
While these results are preliminary they are also very important.
They show that we have the tools to get to the bottom of this problem
if we simply choose to use them. Let me repeat that. We have the tools
to get to the bottom of this problem if we simply choose to use them.
The human toll continues to rise. Just over 1 year ago, on September
9, 1993, when the first staff report was prepared by the committee, we
were only able to estimate the numbers of sick veterans. Since that
time we have learned that 5,400 Persian Gulf war veterans has already
registered with the Department of Veterans Affairs up to that point.
The official Department of Defense Registry numbered only a few
hundred. But in just over a years time the number of veterans who have
since been added to these registries has grown by nearly 700 percent.
Currently it is estimated that there are 29,000 servicemen and women on
the Department of Veterans Affairs Persian Gulf Registry and 7,000 on
the Department of Defense Registry. The Department of Defense registry
is growing at a terrifying rate of about 500 individuals per week.
These are horrendous statistics that show the true scale of this
problem and the heartlessness and irresponsibility of a military
bureaucracy that gives every sign of wanting to protect itself more
than the health and well-being of our servicemen and women who actually
go and fight our wars.
We have also learned that many of the signs and symptoms of illnesses
initially experienced by the veterans of the Persian Gulf war are now
being experienced by their spouses and families. This data confirms
that these illnesses are becoming a major threat to the health and
well-being of a significant and rapidly growing number of individuals
and warrants a serious and all out urgent effort by the Government to
determine the precise causes of the illnesses.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of my
statement be inserted in the Record, and that excerpts from the staff
report prepared by the committee on this issue be inserted into the
Record in the appropriate place at the conclusion of my remarks.
There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Chemical and Biological Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact
on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War--Committee Staff
Report No. 3: Chemical Warfare Agent Identification, Chemical Injuries,
and Other Findings
A. Background
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
is responsible for U.S. government legislation and oversight
as it effects ``dual use'' exports--those materials and
technologies that can be converted to military uses.
During the Cold War, United States export policy focused
primarily on restricting the export of sensitive ``dual use''
materials and technologies to the Soviet Union and its
allies. This myopic approach to the non-proliferation of
these materials ultimately resulted in the acquisition of
unconventional weapons and missile-system technologies by
several ``pariah nations'' with aggressive military agendas.
For the United States, the reality of the dangers associated
with these types of policies were realized during the Persian
Gulf War. Recognizing the shortcomings of existing policies,
and with the dissolution of the Soviet empire, an inquiry was
initiated by the Committee into the contributions that
exports from the United States played in the weapons of mass
destruction programs that have flourished under the direction
of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
On October 27, 1992, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs held hearings that revealed that the United
States had exported chemical, biological, nuclear, and
missile-system equipment to Iraq that was converted to
military use in Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons program. Many of these weapons--weapons that the U.S.
and other countries provided critical materials for--were
used against us during the war.
On June 30, 1993, several veterans testified at a hearing
of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. There, they
related details of unexplained events that took place during
the Persian Gulf War which they believed to be chemical
warfare agent attacks. After these unexplained events, many
of the veterans present reported symptoms consistent with
exposure to a mixed agent attack. Then, on July 29, 1993, the
Czech Minister of Defense announced that a Czechoslovak
chemical decontamination unit had detected the chemical
warfare agent Sarin in areas of northern Saudi Arabia during
the early phases of the Gulf War. They had attributed the
detections to fallout from coalition bombing of Iraqi
chemical warfare agent production facilities.
In August 1993, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Donald W.
Riegle Jr. began to research the possibility that there may
be a connection between the Iraqi chemical, biological, and
radiological warfare research and development programs and a
mysterious illness which was then being reported by thousands
of returning Gulf War veterans. In September 1993, Senator
Riegle released a staff report on this issue an introduced an
amendment to the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense
Authorization Act that provided preliminary funding for
research of the illnesses and investigation of reported
exposures.
When this first staff report was released by Senator
Riegle, the estimates of the number of veterans suffering
form these unexplained illnesses varied from hundreds,
according to the Department of Defense, to thousands,
according to the Department of Veterans Affairs. It is now
believed that tens of thousands of U.S. Gulf War veterans are
suffering from a myriad of symptoms collectively labelled
either Gulf War Syndrome, Persian Gulf Syndrome, or Desert
War Syndrome. Hundreds and possibly thousands of servicemen
and women still on active duty are reluctant to come forward
for fear of losing their jobs and medical care. These Gulf
War veterans are reporting muscle and joint pain, memory
loss, intestinal and heart problems, fatigue, nasal
congestion, urinary urgency, diarrhea, twitching, rashes,
sores, and a number of other symptoms.
They began experiencing these multiple symptoms during and
after--often many months after--their tour of duty in the
Gulf. A number of the veterans who initially exhibited these
symptoms have died since returning from the Gulf. Perhaps
most disturbingly, members of veteran's families are now
suffering these symptoms to a debilitating degree. The scope
and urgency of this crisis demands an appropriate response.
This investigation into Gulf War Syndrome, which was
initiated by the Banking Committee under the direction of
Chairman Riegle, has uncovered a large body of evidence
linking the symptoms of the syndrome to the exposure of Gulf
War participants to chemical and biological warfare agents,
chemical and biological warfare pre-treatment drugs, and
other hazardous materials and substances. Since the release
of the first staff report on September 9, 1993, this inquiry
has continued. Thousands of government officials, scientists,
and veterans have been interviewed or consulted, and
additional evidence has been compiled. This report will
detail the findings of this ongoing investigation.
On February 9, 1994, Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
disclosed on the U.S. Senate floor that the U.S. government
actually licensed the export of deadly microorganisms to
Iraq. It was later learned that these microorganisms exported
by the United States were identical to those the United
Nations inspectors found and recovered from the Iraqi
biological warfare program.
Throughout this investigation, the Department of Defense
has assured the Committee that our troops were never exposed
to chemical or biological agents during the Persian Gulf War.
They have repeatedly testified in hearings and have made
public statements that, at no time, were chemical and
biological agents ever found in the Kuwaiti theater of
operations.
In February of this year, the Chairman wrote a letter
asking them to declassify all information on the exposure of
U.S. forces to chemical and biological agents.
Then on May 4, 1994, the Chairman received assurances in a
joint letter from Secretary Perry, Secretary Brown, and
Secretary Shalala, that ``there is no classified information
that would indicate any exposures to or detections of
chemical or biological weapons agents.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also in May, Undersecretary of Defense Edwin Dorn in sworn
testimony in a hearing before the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, claimed that all chemical agents
were discovered ``a great distance from the Kuwait theater of
operations.''\2\
During the same hearing, another senior Defense Department
official was forced to recant part of the statement when
confronted with the highly publicized discovery of chemical
agents by U.N. inspectors near An Nassiriyah, which was very
close to areas in which U.S. forces were deployed.\3\
In fact, we have received reports from Persian Gulf War
veterans that U.S. forces actually secured this chemical
weapons storage area.
Also during the hearing, a joint memorandum for Persian
Gulf War veterans from Secretary of Defense Perry and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was presented. The
memorandum stated, in part ``there is no information,
classified or unclassified, that indicated that chemical or
biological weapons were used in the Gulf.''\4\
Then, the Department of Defense announced on June 23, 1994,
that the Defense Science Board found that ``there is no
evidence that either chemical or biological warfare was
deployed at any level, or that there was any exposure of U.S.
service members to chemical or biological warfare
agents.''\5\
This report raises serious questions about the integrity of
the Department of Defense position. It describes events for
which the Department of Defense explanations are inconsistent
with the facts as related by the soldiers who were present,
and with official government documents prepared by those who
were present and with experts who have examined the facts.
b. recovery of chemical agents in kuwait
August 1991--Sabahiyah High School for Girls
The Committee staff has obtained British and U.S. Army
reports which document in detail the discovery of more than
250 gallons of dangerous chemical agents. According to the
units that were presents, mustard gas and another blister
agent were found in a storage tank in southeastern Kuwait.
These chemical agents were recovered in Kuwait, well inside
the Kuwait theater of operations, well inside areas occupied
by U.S. and British forces. According to the reports, they
had been placed there by Iraqi forces during the occupation
of Kuwait. The liquid was tested and over 20 times the
presence of chemical agents was confirmed.
The Committee staff has obtained a copy of a recommendation
for an Army Commendation Medal that was presented to Sergeant
James Warren Tucker for among other things ``participating in
the mission that located stores of chemicals agents'' while
deployed in Southwest Asia.\6\
Committee staff has also identified the commander of that
unit, Captain Michael F. Johnson, currently with the U.S.
Army at The Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia--who was
awarded a Meritorious Service Medal for his actions.\7\
These two soldiers and as many as six others from the 54th
Chemical Troop of the United States Army's 11th Armored
Cavalry Regiment were given Army medals for ``the positive
identification of suspected chemical agent,'' according to
the citation presented to Captain Johnson.\8\
We have obtained the actual reports from two NATO countries
who were Coalition members during the Persian Gulf War.\9\
This is a step-by-step analysis of the event as recorded in
documents and the testimony of Nuclear Biological and
Chemical, or NBC, officers who were there.
A container suspected of containing chemical agents was
located in southeastern Kuwait in an area about 50 kilometers
north of Saudi Arabia and 4 kilometers west of the Persian
Gulf. The precise coordinates are TN18832039 (Magellan)\10\
Maps showing the precise location in which this container was
found is attached.\11\
According to the British report, on August 5, 1991, several
months after the end of the Persian Gulf War, Major J.P.
Watkinson of the British Army received orders to investigate
a container that was believed to be leaking mustard gas.\12\
According to the official report prepared by Major
Watkinson on 7 August 1991, the request to investigate the
leaking container was made by Lt. Colonel Saleh Al Ostath of
the Kuwaiti Army and agreed to by Mr. Lucas of the Royal
Ordinance Corps.\13\
Major Watkinson and his unit, the 21st Explosive Ordinance
Disposal Squadron, were taken to the site of the Sabahiyah
High School for Girls and directed to a metal storage tank
with a capacity of approximately 2,000 liters. According to
the report, there appeared to be entry and exit bullet holes
of approximately 7.62 caliber in the container.\14\
A photograph of the schoolyard with some of the chemical
specialists approaching the tank that contained the chemical
agents is attached.\15\
According to Major Watkinson's report, the container was
leaking a brown vapor from both holes. The school was not in
use and there were U.S. civilian contractors clearing
explosives and rubbish from the area.\16\
The school security guard told the British that the tank
was not there before the war. He first noticed the tank when
he returned to the school after the war on March 20, 1991--
four and a half month prior to these tests. The British
report notes that the school was used as an Iraqi defensive
position during the war.\17\
Major Watkinson ordered all personnel to move up wind, and
after putting on his chemical protective clothing, approached
the container and tested the brown colored vapor with a
Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM).\18\
The Chemical Agent Monitor gave a reading of eight (8) bars
on H, for mustard agent--a maximum reading indicating a
highly concentrated agent--and no bars on G, indicating no
nerve agent present.\19\
This was the first positive test for chemical mustard agent
at this location.
Distilled mustard is described in the Merck Index, a
handbook for chemists, as an oily substance. It is also
described as being amber brown in color--remember Watkinson's
report describes it as a brown substance.\20\
A photo and diagram of a Chemical Agent Monitor or CAM in
use showing the types of displays that a chemical detection
specialist would observe is attached.\21\
A 8-bar reading indicates a highly concentrated agent.
These monitors are still in use by both U.S. and British
forces.
Watkinson then tested the vapor with one color detector
paper and nothing happened. He used three color detector
paper and it turned pink indicating the presence of mustard
agent.\22\ This was the second positive test for mustard
agent.
On a second visit to the container, according to the
report, he inserted a wire with one of the bullet holes, and
according to his report, ``wiped the oily substance on both
types of detector paper.''\23\
Again the oily nature of the substance indicates a property
that is consistent with the properties of mustard agent.
The one color paper turned brown and the three colored
paper turned pink, the latter again indicating the presence
of mustard agent. This was the third positive test for
mustard agent. Major Watkinson then sealed both in the
container with masking tape.\24\
On yet a third visit to the container, the holes were
uncovered and the vapor was tested using an M18A2 chemical
detector kit. This test was repeated six times. On four of
the tests the color indicator immediately turned blue
indicating mustard (or ``H'') agent.\25\
For the remaining two tests, the color indicator went
yellow but later turned blue.\26\ There were the fourth
through the ninth positive tests for mustard agent.
Another wire dip test was conducted using the three color
detector paper from the M18A2 kit and the paper turned
pinkish/orange indicating mustard agent for the tenth time.
The bullet holes were resealed using industrial silicone
filler and plaster of paris bandages. The container was
checked with the Chemical Agent Monitor for leaks and the
area was secured.\27\
On August 7, 1991, the Commander of the 11th Armored
Cavalry Regiment was asked to send two FOX chemical
reconnaissance vehicles, in support of the Kuwaiti Ministry
of Defense and the Royal Ordinance Corps, to assist Major
Watkinson in confirming the presence of a chemical agent.\28\
Since this was a joint and combined live agent chemical
detection mission, involving both U.S. and British forces,
detailed rehearsals occurred to ensure that no mistakes were
made. The unit then travelled to the Sabahiyah High School
for Girls in southeastern Kuwait.\29\
On August 8, 1991, one FOX team moved to the area near the
container and began to conduct point surveys inserting the
detection probe of the FOX vehicle into the ground to a depth
of about four centimeters. The mass spectrometer showed
microdoses of chemical mustard agent in the ground.\30\ This
was the eleventh confirmation'
At the same time another collection team in full chemical
protective clothing walked to the container, estimated to
contain between 800-1000 liters, or about 250 gallons of
liquid, with Chemical Agent Monitors and other assorted
chemical detection equipment. This team removed the storage
container's seals and there was a discharge of pressurized
vapor into the air.\31\
Captain Johnson's report confirms that he saw a light
copper to amber colored vapor exit from the hole.\32\ Again,
mustard agent is described as an amber brown liquid.\33\
Tests were conducted with both the Chemical Agent Monitor
and chemical detection paper. The detection paper confirmed
the presence of chemical mustard agent; the twelfth
confirmation. The Chemical Agent Monitor registered eight
bars, again confirming highly concentrated mustard agent.
This was the thirteenth confirmation of mustard agent by the
specialists present.\34\
Captain Johnson's unit then inserted a medical syringe with
a catheter tube into the container to extract liquid agent
for detection paper, Chemical Agent Monitor, and FOX
testing.\35\
The sample was placed into a metal dish. By the time a
ground team member moved to the rear of the Fox to the probe,
there was not enough liquid available to get a reliable
reading.\36\
Another attempt was made and the ground team extracted a
larger sample of liquid and placed it into the metal dish.
The dish was moved to the FOX probe and the liquid was drawn
for analysis--not random vapors--not oil fumes--but the
actual liquid chemical agent. Within six seconds, the mass
spectrometer detected and identified the liquid as highly
concentrated mustard agent.\37\ Both four point and full
spectrum readings were obtained, according to Captain
Johnson, in each of the mass spectrometer analyses.\38\ This
therefore was the fourteenth (4 point) and fifteenth (full
spectrum) confirmation of mustard agent.
Further analysis by the system also indicated the presence
of traces phosgene, a non-persistent choking agent, and
phosgene oxime, a blister agent. Another test was conducted
to validate the findings. Again the Fox vehicle confirmed the
presence of mustard agent for the sixteenth and seventeenth
time, and again phosgene, and phosgene oxime were
confirmed.\39\
Captain Johnson ordered yet another mass spectrometer test,
utilizing the second FOX vehicle. The team in the second
vehicle was not informed of the findings of the first
vehicle, to rule out any possibility of biased readings from
the team in the second vehicle. The team in the second FOX
vehicle repeated the test and reported the same findings
except that this time the reported levels of phosgene oxime
were much higher. They also performed a second test to
confirm their results. Again both 4-point and full spectrum
analysis was conducted during each of these tests.\40\ These
were the eighteenth through twenty-first confirmations.
While the Chemical Agent Monitor and many other chemical
detection kits available to military forces only detect H, or
mustard agents, and G and V nerve agents, the FOX chemical
reconnaissance vehicle accurately detects 60 known chemical
agents using a computerized mobile mass spectrometer.\41\
It is capable of identifying the individual component
chemical elements, such as sulfur, hydrogen, chlorine, and so
forth; their molecular composition; and their molecular
weight. This provides a scientific means to precisely
identify substances.
In response to a request by the Committee for an
explanation from the Department of Defense, Dr. Theodore
Prociv, Deputy Assistant for Chemical and Biological Matters
(Atomic Energy), replied on July 26 that the Department of
Defense analysis of the FOX tapes revealed that the ions
matched in three of four categories for a mustard agent, but
matched nitric acid in all four categories.\42\
Committee staff solicited an opinion from the National
Institute of Standards and Technology regarding the accuracy
of this explanation.\43\
On September 6, in response to several specific questions,
Dr. Stephen Stein, of the Institute, replied that ``HD
[mustard] has no major peaks in common with those expected to
arise directly from fuming nitric acid,'' and that it is
``highly unlikely that a properly functioning mass
spectrometer would produce any of the major peaks of nitric
acid or nitrogen oxides from HD.'' Furthermore, ``if fuming
red nitric acid did not decompose prior to detection
(ionization) there would be no possibility of mistaking it
for HD.''\44\
The commander of the unit said that the tests were run
using both the four principle mass peaks and full spectrum
analysis on the substance in question. The tests were run
twice each by two FOX vehicles. The mass spectrometers were
checked for calibration before and after each test, with no
problems noted.
Each of the four tests identified identical substances--
namely; mustard agent and phosgene oxime. When asked
specifically, ``how likely is it that under these
circumstances that the computer algorithm identified nitric
acid as these substances,'' Dr. Stein responded that ``if
fuming red nitric acid did not react prior to detection,
there is no likelihood that either the four peak analysis or
the full spectrum analysis would lead to false identification
of mustard.''\45\
And, ``if nitric acid did react, the reaction products
might generate a large number of peaks. Some of these might
fortuitously be those characteristic of HD or other chemical
agents and therefore might produce a false positive 4-peak
identification of HD. A robust full spectrum matching
algorithm, however, would not be expected to falsely identify
mustard.''\46\
The ground collection team then extracted a larger sample
from the container and prepared it for transport from the
area for further testing and evaluation.\47\
According to Captain Johnson's report and other eyewitness
testimony, a member of the British team was injured while
collecting a sample of the chemical agent. Some of the liquid
agent made contact with the soldiers left wrist. The soldier
immediately reacted to the liquid and was in severe pain and
was believed to be going into shock.\48\
The injured soldier was quickly taken to a decontamination
site and covered with decontamination powder and cut out of
his chemical protective clothing.\49\ A photograph of the
British soldier on the FOX vehicle and his clothing laying
in a pile beside the vehicle is attached.\50\
Dr. Prociv in his July 26, 1994 letter to the Committee
reported that the injured soldiers clothing had been found by
the British government to have been burned by fuming nitric
acid in tests conducted at Porton Down.\51\ Previously, in
response to direct questioning by Committee Staff, Captain
Johnson stated that the contaminated suit was burned, that
is, incinerated, at the site.\52\
The decontamination team then doused the soldier with a
decontamination solution. Within one minute, a small blister
was observed forming on his left wrist the size of a pinhead.
About five minutes later, the blister had already reached the
size of a U.S. fifty cent piece coin. Medics on the scene
screened the victim for residual liquid contamination and
sent him to the hospital for further treatment. After the
casualty was evacuated, the rest of the unit and equipment
was decontaminated.\53\
According to Military Chemical and Biological Agents:
Chemical and Toxicological Properties, mustard agents acting
alone may take hours to form blisters, but phosgene oxime
acts within 30 seconds leaving a blanched area and
immediately forms a red rash-like ring. With phosgene oxime,
instant death from systemic shock or trauma is possible from
exposure.\54\
The reported reaction of the British casualty was as might
have been predicted when exposed to the identified agents.
The fate of this inured British soldier is unknown.
After completing their testing, the U.S. FOX team leaders
were ordered to remove the tapes from the mass spectrometer
of the FOX vehicles by Lieutenant Colonel Killgore, the
chemical officer for Task Force Vicotry.\55\ These tapes are
the paper records of the chemical breakdown of the liquid or
vapors and are produced by the mobile mass spectrometer in
the FOX vehicle.
The tapes and the collected samples were reportedly turned
over to personnel wearing desert camouflage uniforms with no
rank or distinguishing patches.\56\ Captain Johnson does not
know what happened to the tapes or samples as he was ordered
from the scene after his unit's mission was completed.\57\
Dr. Prociv in his written response to the Committee stated
that these were U.N. personnel. According to Lt. Colonel
Killgore, while they were United Nations personnel, they were
assigned to the U.N. team from the British Chemical and
biological Defense Establishment at Porton Down--British
Ministry of Defence employees.\58\ In a subsequent inquiry,
the U.N. could produce no written records of the findings of
the U.N. team at the site.
Conclusions--
Chemical mustard agent was detected by: chemical
specialists from the British Army using a Chemical Agent
Monitor, M18A2 chemical agent detector, and detector paper;
and, chemical specialists from the United States Army using a
Chemical Agent Monitor, detector paper, and two mass
spectrometers.
Phosgene oxime was detected by: two sophisticated FOX
vehicles' mass spectrometers.
These were direct samples--not random vapors collected by
the vehicle--as in previously reported cases.
As cited above, mass spectrometry is capable of identifying
the individual chemical elements, such as sulfur, hydrogen,
chlorine, and so forth; their molecular composition; and,
their molecular weight. This provides a means to precisely
identify substances. This was not an intake of random fumes
by a moving vehicle in heavy smoke, it was a direct analysis
of liquid agent drawn from the container.
This was not the only confirmation of the identity of the
chemical agents present--the results were confirmed by nearly
every detector deployed with U.S. and British forces--in a
controlled setting.
A British soldier who came into contact with the liquid
blistered immediately and appeared to be going into shock--as
might be predicted from the nature of the agents present.
The tapes were ordered removed from the vehicle and forward
with a sample of the chemical agents. The soldiers were
ordered to given the materials to individuals in unmarked
uniforms and Captain Johnson, who earlier this year, after
hearing that the Department of Defense was denying the
presence of chemical agents in Kuwait, forwarded the report
on this incident through his chain of command, and had the
report returned to him. It was not forwarded to the
Department of Defense.
The Kuwaiti, U.S., and British governments all received
reports on this recovery of bulk chemical agents.
While these reports are not classified, the Department of
Defense has consistently maintained that no chemical agents
were located in areas occupied by U.S. forces--including in
testimony before committees of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
The Department of the Army originally told Committee staff
that prior to releasing Captain Johnson's report they must
obtain clearance from the Department of Defense, and that an
intelligence review must be conducted.\59\ That would seem to
contradict the claim that there is no classified information
on this subject. They claimed that prior to releasing the
British report, they must get the permission of the
British.\60\ However, when British report was received, it
was dated July 14, 1994, indicating that it had been prepared
in response to the Committee request, in coordination with
the Department of Defense.\61\
The Committee was not provided with an official British
report dating from the time of the incident by the Department
of Defense as requested. A copy of that report was obtained
by the Committee outside of Department of Defense channels.
This official report, dated August 7, 1991, confirms that
mustard agent was detected, and that the substance was oily,
like mustard agent.\62\ Nitric acid is not oily.
The U.S. report, prepared by Captain Johnson, confirms that
not only was mustard agent detected in the container using a
mass spectrometer, but also in microdoses on the ground.\63\
This would eliminate the explanation that the container held
fuming nitric acid--rocket fuel oxidizer--so concentrated
that if reacted with materials in the mass spectrometer
causing false readings when the material was examined. The
mass spectrometers in both FOX vehicles were also
successfully calibrated before and after this detection
event.
There is also the issue of how the Department of Defense
has handled this and other investigations into reported
chemical agent detection events. Committee staff continues to
receive reports from individuals, many of whom are no longer
in the military--civilians who have been contacted by high
ranking military officers assigned to work with the Defense
Science Board Task Force investigating this issue. We have
received complaints from veterans that rather than trying to
seek other witnesses or corroborate their reports, these
officers have called to convince them that they were
mistaken. That their findings were not credible--that their
statements made to Congress would be refuted.\64\ Most
recently, an individual associated with this detection of
chemical agents was contacted by one of these officers. This
officer specifically told the individual that these findings
would be refuted by the Department of Defense--even before
the Department received the report from the British that was
eventually forwarded to the Committee.
In this case there were 21 field tests conducted on this
substance which were positive for mustard agent; both U.S.
and British Chemical Agent Monitor readings confirmed 8 bars
for mustard gas, a maximum reading indicating the presence of
highly concentrated agent; 8 of 8 mobile mass spectrometer
tests, using two separate FOX vehicles and liquid agent in a
controlled setting identified identical substances--mustard
agent, and phosgene oxime; it was the same color as mustard
agent; it was oily like mustard agent; a mobile mass
spectrometer reading indicated that microdoses of mustard
agent were present in the soil; a British soldier suffered a
chemical injury consistent with what would be expected when
exposed to these agents, particularly to phosgene oxime; and
the Department of Defense explanation was described by the
National Institute for Standards and Technology variously as
``highly unlikely,'' ``no likelihood,'' and ``not possible.''
c. chemical injury and chemical storage bunker
Iraqi Bunker Complex--Southeastern Iraq (between Kuwaiti border and
Basra) March 1, 1991
This case involves the experiences of former Sergeant David
Allen Fisher, who also discovered what appears to have been a
cache of chemical weapons where the Department of Defense
says none were deployed.
While searching an Iraqi ammunition bunker in Iraq in an
area south of Basra, Mr. Fisher brushed up against some
wooden crated marked with skulls and crossbones. Within 8
hours his arm had reddened and began to sting. Several hours
later, he noticed painful blisters on this upper arm.\65\
In his report of the incident, in a Question and Answer
Brief prepared for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Public
Affairs Office, and in a subsequent journal article, Colonel
Michael Dunn, who would later become the commander of the
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense
confirmed that Fisher's injuries were the result of exposure
to chemical agents.\66\
In this case, as in the other cases like it, it seems
impossible to obtain an explanation from the Department of
Defense that is consistent with the events as reported by the
soldiers present. In August, a pentagon spokesperson stated
that whatever chemicals were encountered in the bunker must
have been left over from earlier fighting between Iraq and
Iran.\67\
However, in September 1994, that same spokesperson said
that he was not aware that any chemical weapons crates were
discovered by Mr. Fisher, despite Colonel Dunn's report and
despite the fact that Mr. Fisher received a Purple Heart for
his injuries.\68\ Others who were present that date including
the FOX vehicle operators, one of whom received a bronze
star, and Colonel Dunn corroborate these events. Further,
according to Mr. Fisher, this was an active bunker complex
with artillery pieces present and their mission there was to
go from bunker to bunker searching for Iraqi soldiers.\69\
Old chemical weapons, left over from a previous war, would be
stored in a separate storage facility; if they were present
at an active artillery position, they were deployed with the
intention of using them.
d. chemical detection and chemical injuries
Breaching Operations--Second Marine Divi- sion--Southwestern Kuwait
February 24, 1991
The following is an excerpt take directly from ``U.S.
Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2D Marine
Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm,'' an official
report published in 1993 by the History and Museums Division,
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC.
``The use of chemical munitions by the Iraqis had been
expected, but happily had not yet occurred. At approximately
0656, the ``Fox'' chemical reconnaissance vehicle at Red 1
detected a ``trace'' of mustard gas, originally thought to be
from a chemical mine. The alarm was quickly spread throughout
the division. Since everyone had been to don his protective
outer garments and boots the previous evening, it was only
necessary to hurriedly pull on a gas-mask and protective
gloves to attain MOPP level 4. A second ``Fox'' vehicle was
sent to the area, and confirmed the presence of an agent that
had probably been there a long time. Unknown in its origin,
it was still sufficiently strong to cause blistering on the
exposed arms of two AAV crewmen. Work continued on the
clearance of the lanes, and MOPP level was reduced to 2 after
about a half-hour.''\70\
Several issues are raised by this report. First, chemical
mustard agent was detected by the FOX vehicles with the unit.
Second, two marines were reportedly injured as a result of
exposure to these agents, Third, it is highly unlikely that
the chemical agents could have been there ``a long time.''
These detections were made in southwestern Kuwait, an area
not occupied by Iraq until after the invasion of Kuwait on
August 2, 1990. Investigation by the Committee into this
incident continues.
e. chemical and biological analysis of equipment
The Committee has submitted samples for analysis to several
renowned laboratories, including the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory's Forensic Science Center.\71\
In biological analyses, based on preliminary testing using
advanced DNA analyses and screening techniques, unique DNA
sequences were detected. Q-fever and Brucella were indicated
on the inside of a gas mask carrying case, the top of a gas
mask filter, and under the rubber seal of a mask submitted to
the Committee for analysis by U.S. Persian Gulf War veterans
who brought them back from the Middle East.\72\
When additional primer pairs were compared, the findings
were negative. These tests were repeated with identical
findings--that is, the same identical unique DNA primer pairs
were indicated.\73\
While false positive DNA testing can occur with only a
single primer pair analysis, these results can also be
indicative of the presence of only a single strand--perhaps
due to the presence of another genetically-altered biological
warfare-related microorganism.\74\
We do know that the U.S. licensed the export of genetic
materials capable of being used to create thee types of
genetically-altered biological warfare agents to the Iraqi
Atomic Energy Commission--an Iraqi governmental agency that
conducted biological warfare-related research--prior to the
war.\75\ One method of creating these genetically altered
micro-organisms is by exposing them to radiation. The U.S.
also licensed the export of several species of brucella to
Iraqi governmental agencies.\76\ Both Q-fever and Brucellois
are also endemic to the region.\77\
This study is far from conclusive but points to the need
for further research in this area. According to the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, biological studies need
further attention. Cultures need to be investigated more
closely. Experiments to amplify the whole genome and to allow
for the manipulation of increased concentrations of DNA by
advanced testing would likely be more precise in identifying
threat organisms--organisms that may be causing Gulf War
Syndrome.
In addition many chemical compounds were present in the
samples. The scientists at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory Forensic Science Center believe that additional
analysis of more samples may isolate and identify unusual
hazardous chemical compounds, chemicals that in combination
may be hazardous, chemical warfare agent compound's
or biological pathogens on the surface of collected
items--and that much more study is warranted.\78\
While these results are preliminary they are also very
important. They show that we have the tools to get to the
bottom of this problem if we simply choose to use them.
f. committee staff remarks
What seems to be emerging is a troubling pattern of events
involving individuals who have received medals--Bronze Stars,
Meritorious Service Medals, Army Commendation Medals, and
Purple Hearts--in the course of coming into contact with
unconventional weapons that the Department of Defense
continues to insist were not even present in theater.
Chemical and biological weapons were either present, or they
were not present. If weapons such as these were present, they
were deployed doctrinally, as a matter of Iraqi Army
practice, not in isolated instances. These events raise
serious concerns about the veracity of the Department of
Defense's claims as well as their motives. These reports call
into question each and every Department of Defense refutation
of previously reported detections and each and every
triggered chemical agent detection alarm.
We know that there were chemicals found near An Nasiriyah,
in an area that was secured by elements of the 18th Airborne
Corps. The U.N. confirms that they were there, and a Defense
Department official testifying before the Senate Banking
Committee confirmed that troops were close to this facility--
contradicting previous testimony in the same hearing by
another senior Defense Department official.
Careful scrutiny leads us to conclude that they were found
in a container in southeastern Kuwait in an area tested by
Kuwaiti, British, and American soldiers from the 11th Armored
Cavalry Regiment.
We know from the reports on Sergeant Fisher that they were
found in an Iraqi bunker complex south of Basra in an area
that was secured by elements of the 3rd Armored Division.
Two U.S. Marines were injured by chemical agents in
breaching operations during the ``ground war.''
We now know that many of the soldiers that were present
during each of these events are ill--others were given medals
for their actions. Many of the veterans of the Gulf War and
their families are now suffering permanently debilitating
illnesses--some have died. Currently it is estimated that
there are 29,000 servicemen and women on the Department of
Veterans Affairs Persian Gulf Registry and 7,000 on the
Department of Defense Registry. The Department of Defense
Registry is growing at a rate of about 500 individuals per
week.
Just over one year ago, on September 9, 1993, when the
first staff report was prepared for the Chairman, we were
forced to estimate the numbers of sick veterans. Since that
time we have learned that 5,400 Persian Gulf War veterans had
registered with the Department of Veterans Affairs up to that
point. The Department of Defense Registry numbered only a few
hundred. In just over a year's time the number of veterans
who have registered in these registries has grown by nearly
700%. We have also learned that many of the signs and
symptoms of illnesses initially experienced by the veterans
of the Persian Gulf War are now being experienced by their
spouses and families. This data confirms that these illnesses
are becoming a major threat to the health and well-being of a
significant and rapidly growing number of individuals and
warrants a serious and immediate effort by the government to
determine the precise causes of the illnesses.
Footnotes
\1\Letter to Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs from Secretary of Defense
William J. Perry, Secretary of Veterans Affairs Jesse Brown,
and Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala,
dated May 4, 1994. (Appendix A-1)
\2\Testimony of Dr. Edwin Dorn, Undersecretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs during a hearing convened
on U.S. Export Policies to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on
the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War, on May 25,
1994. (Appendix A-2)
\3\Department of Defense testimony before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs during a
hearing convened on U.S. Export Policies to Iraq and Their
Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian
Gulf War, on May 25, 1994. (Appendix A-3)
\4\Memorandum for Persian Gulf War Veterans, Persian Gulf War
Health Issues, from John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and William J. Perry, Secretary of
Defense, dated 25 May 1994. (Appendix A-4)
\5\``Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Persian Gulf War Health Effects,'' Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology,
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, June 1994); and
Department of Defense Press Release, June 23, 1994.
\6\Recommendation for Award of Army Commendation Medal,
Sergeant James Warren Tucker, Decontamination Platoon Squad
Leader, 54th Chemical Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment,
dated July 1993. (Appendix B-1)
\7\Recommendation for and Award of Meritorious Service Medal,
Captain Michael F. Johnson, Troop Commander, 54th Chemical
Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, dated January 1993.
(Appendix B-2)
\8\Ibid.
\9\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents--
Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi
Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.
Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994--FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY--Appendix B-3). Initial Report: Suspected
Chemical Container, prepared by Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer
Commanding, 21st EOD Squadron Group, Royal Ordinance (United
Kingdom), dated 7 August 1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN
CONFIDENCE--(Appendix B-4).
\10\Ibid.
\11\From Initial Report: Suspected Chemical Container,
prepared by Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer Commanding, 21st
EOD Squadron Group, Royal Ordinance (United Kingdom), dated 7
August 1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE--(Appendix
B-5, B-6).
\12\Initial Report: Suspected Chemical Container, prepared by
Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer Commanding, 21st EOD Squadron
Group, Royal Ordinance (United Kingdom), dated 7 August
1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE--Appendix B-4).
\13\Ibid.
\14\Ibid.
\15\Appendix B-7.
\16\Initial Report: Suspected Chemical Container, prepared by
Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer Commanding, 21st EOD Squadron
Group, Royal Ordinance (United Kingdom), dated 7 August
1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE--(Appendix B-4).
\17\Ibid.
\18\Ibid.
\19\Ibid.
\20\Susan Budavari, ed., ``The Merck Index: An Encyclopedia
of Chemicals, Drugs, and Biologicals, Eleventh Edition``
(Rahway, N.J.: Merck and Co., Inc., 1989), pp. 995-996.
(Appendix B-8) James A.F. Comptom, Military Chemical and
Biological Agents: Chemical and Toxicological Properties
(Caldwell, N.J.: The Telford Press, (September 1987), 9-17.
(Appendix B-9)
\21\Jane's NBC Protection Equipment, 1990-91, (London, U.K.:
Jane's Information Group, 1991). Appendix B-10).
\22\Initial Report: Suspected Chemical Container, prepared by
Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer Commanding, 21st EOD Squadron
Group, Royal Ordinance (United Kingdom), dated 7 August
1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE--(Appendix B-4).
\23\Ibid.
\24\Ibid.
\25\Ibid.
\26\Ibid.
\27\Ibid.
\28\Memorandum for the Commander, 11th ACR, Tasking Number
91-047, dated 7 August 1991 from Joseph W. Miller, Lieutenant
Colonel, GS, ACofs, G-3. (Appendix B-11)
\29\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents--
Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi
Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.
Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR
OFFICAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).
\30\Ibid.
\31\Ibid.
\32\Ibid.
\33\Ibid.
\33\James A.F. Comptom, ``Military Chemical and Biological
Agents: Chemical and Toxicological Properties'' (Caldwell,
N.J.: The Telford Press, (September 1987), 9-17. (Appendix B-
9)
\34\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents-
Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi
Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.
Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).
\35\Ibid.
\36\Ibid.
\36\Ibid.
\37\Ibid.
\38\Staff interviews with Captain Johnson and Sergeant
Tucker.
\39\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents
Information Paper; To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi
Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.
Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).
\40\Ibid.
\41\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents
Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi
Chemical Agents identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.
Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).
\42\Letter to Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, from Dr. Theodore M.
Prociv, Deputy for Chemical and Biological Matters, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, dated
July 26, 1994. (Appendix B-12).
\43\Committee inquiry to the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, dated August 1, 1994. (Appendix B-13).
\44\Letter to Committee staff from Dr. Stephen E. Stein,
Ph.D., Director, National Institute for Standards and
Technology, Director, Mass Spectrometry Data Center, Chemical
Science and Technology Laboratory, dated September 6, 1994.
(Appendix B-14).
\45\Ibid.
\46\Ibid.
\47\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents
Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi
Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.
Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).
\48\Ibid.
\49\Ibid.
\50\Appendix B-15.
\51\Letter to Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, from Dr. Theodore M.
Prociv, Deputy for Chemical and Biological Matters, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, dated
July 26, 1994. (Appendix B-10).
\52\Committee staff interviews with Captain Michael F.
Johnson.
\53\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents
Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi
Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.
Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).
\54\James A.F. Comptom, ``Military Chemical and Biological
Agents: Chemical and Toxicological Properties'' (Caldwell,
N.J.: The Telford Press, (September 1987), 9-17. (Appendix B-
16)
\55\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents
Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi
Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.
Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).
\56\Ibid.
\57\Staff interviews.
\58\Memorandum for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Chemical Biological Matters (OASD(CBM)), Suspect
Chemical Container found in Kuwait City, Kuwait City, Kuwait,
in August 1991, Don W. Killgore, Lieutenant Colonel,
Technical Inspections Branch, Office of the Inspector
General, Department of the Army, July 29, 1994.--FOR OFFICIAL
USE ONLY--(Appendix B-17)
\59\Staff interviews with Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S.
Department of the Army.
\60\Ibid.
\61\Memorandum to Lieutenant Colonel Vicki Merriman, Office
of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Chemical and Biological Matters from Dr. Graham S. Pearson,
Director General, Chemical and Biological Defence
Establishment, Ministry of Defence, Porton Down, Salisbury,
Wilts, U.K., Suspect Chemical Container: Kuwait City: August
1991. (Appendix B-18)
\62\Initial Report: Suspected Chemical Container, prepared by
Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer Commanding, 21st EOD Squadron
Group, Royal Ordinance (United Kingdom), dated 7 August
1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE--(Appendix B-4).
\63\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents--
Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi
Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.
Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).
\64\Letter of complaint from Mr. Randall Vallee, September
23, 1994 (Appendix B-19) and staff interviews.
\65\Information Paper: Chemical Agent Exposure--Operation
Desert Storm, prepared and authenticated by Colonel Michael
A. Dunn, March 5, 1991. (Appendix C-1)
\66\Information Paper: Chemical Agent Exposure--Operation
Desert Storm, prepared and authenticated by Colonel Michael
A. Dunn, March 5, 1991. (Appendix C-1), Question and Answer
Brief prepared for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Public
Affairs Office, March 1991 (Appendix C-2), Lieutenant Colonel
John V. Wade, Major Robert M. Gum, and Colonel Michael A.
Dunn, ``Medical Chemical Defense in Operation Desert Shield
and Desert Storm,'' Journal of the U.S. Army Medical
Department, (January-February 1992), pp. 34-36. (Appendix C-
3)
\67\Thomas D. Williams, ``Veteran's Story Counters Official
One on Gas War,'' The Hartford Courant (September 21, 1994)
A2. (Appendix C-4)
\68\Ibid.
\69\Staff interviews.
\70\Lieutenant Dennis P. Mroczkowski, ``U.S. Marines in the
Persian Gulf, 1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert
Shield and Desert Storm,'' (Washington, D.C.: History and
Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1993), p.
41 (Appendix D-1), p. 45 (Appendix D-2).
\71\Laboratory analysis request from Chairman Donald W.
Riegle, Jr., Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Forensic
Science Center, dated April 15, 1994. (Appendix E-1)
\72\Brian Andresen, Ph.D., Jackie Stilwell, M.S., Patrick
Grant, Ph.D., Jeff Haas, M.S., Richard Whipple, B.A., and
Armando Arcaraz, M.S., ``Preliminary Results of Gas Masks and
Exposure-Monitoring Equipment Associated with Desert Storm:
Chemical and Biological Analyses of First Samples Sent,''
Forensic Science Center, J Division/NAI Directorate, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, June 1994 (Appendix E-2);
Staff interviews with laboratory personnel.
\73\Ibid.
\74\Ibid.
\75\American Type Culture Collection, Rockville, Maryland
(January 21, 1994).
\76\American Type Culture Collection, Rockville, Maryland
(January 21, 1994).
\77\Robert Berkow, M.D., Editor-in-Chief, The Merck Manual of
Diagnosis and Therapy, Sixteenth Edition (Rahway, N.J.: Merck
and Co., Inc., 1992). Q-fever (Appendix E-3) and Brucellosis
(Appendix E-4) summaries attached.
\78\Brian Andresen, Ph.D., Jackie Stilwell, M.S., Patrick
Grant, Ph.D., Jeff Haas, M.S., Richard Whipple, B.A., and
Armando Arcaraz, M.S., ``Preliminary Results of Gas Masks and
Exposure-Monitoring Equipment Associated with Desert Storm:
Chemical and Biological Analyses of First Samples Sent,''
Forensic Science Center, J Division/NAI Directorate, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, June 1994 (Appendix E-2);
Staff interviews with laboratory personnel.
____________________