[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 107 (Wednesday, June 28, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9227-S9231]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
PAKISTAN AND THE F-16'S
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, many years ago I sponsored an amendment
dealing with our aid to Pakistan, and it has been a thorn in the side
of our relationship with Pakistan. It ultimately involved the delivery
of several F-16's. I had recently proposed a solution to that problem,
a resolution of that problem, to the President of the United States.
As my colleagues know, I have held a special interest in South Asia
for a number of years. I have the highest admiration for the character
of the South Asian people as they strive to better their conditions.
The singular tragedy of South Asia has been war--the reality of
conflicts past and the fear of future bloodshed. Pakistan and India
have fought three wars since independence in 1947. Tension still
remains high.
What was once a conventional military standoff has now become more
ominous. Both sides can assemble nuclear weapons. Both sides are
striving to obtain modern delivery systems, such as ballistic missiles
and aircraft. Just last week, the New York Times and Defense News
reported that in the past 3 months, Pakistan has received from
Communist China key components that could be used in M-11 ballistic
missiles. Without question, a nuclear war between India and Pakistan
would be cataclysmic. The names of the perpetrators, and their
accessories, would be cursed for a millennium.
To its credit, Mr. President, the U.S. Senate consistently has taken
the initiative to promote peace and stability in South Asia--the core
of that leadership has been the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A
decade ago, the committee--under the chairmanship of the distinguished
senior Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar]--decided to use the leverage of
our aid to Pakistan to try to keep it from going nuclear. Just as
important, the committee also decided that should Pakistan choose a
nuclear option, we would not condone its action through United States
aid.
Mr. President, those were the key reasons why the U.S. Congress
adopted the so-called Pressler amendment 10 years ago. It was the right
thing to do. President Ronald Reagan agreed. So did the Government of
Pakistan at that time. I believe the Pressler amendment is needed now
more than ever. To the extent that the current administration and this
Congress chooses to back away from that standard, the prospects for
regional instability and war are increased accordingly. Unfortunately,
some have called for a myriad of modifications to the Pressler
amendment, ranging from one-time waivers to outright repeal.
Mr. President, I have a more in-depth analysis of the Pressler
amendment, which I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record
at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. PRESSLER. In summary, any unilateral attempt to weaken or modify
the Pressler amendment for whatever reason--whether it be for economic
assistance, or drug or terrorism control--would not be in the best
interest of our more critical nuclear non-proliferation goals. I urge
my colleagues to study this extended analysis before the Senate
considers the foreign aid authorization bill later this year.
Today, however, I would like to discuss the initiative I offered to
the committee 1 month ago--a new, constructive initiative that will
make a significant contribution toward achieving a number of our
foreign policy goals.
As my colleagues well know, in 1990, President Bush could no longer
certify, under the terms of the Pressler amendment, that Pakistan did
not possess a nuclear explosive device. As a result, 28 F-16 aircraft
ordered by Pakistan could not be delivered. Today, those planes remain
undelivered. Of these 28, 11 were sold on a foreign military sales
basis--paid for up-front by the American taxpayer. The remaining 17
were paid for by Pakistan for about $650 million.
Let me be clear: I will oppose any attempt to waive the Pressler
amendment to allow for Pakistan to take delivery of these aircraft. My
rationale is simple: F-16's are capable of carrying a nuclear payload.
It would be contrary to the spirit and letter of our Nation's nuclear
non-proliferation policy for this Congress to allow Pakistan to take
possession of nuclear delivery vehicles under any condition short of
current law.
Doing so would have grave implications. Delivery of the F-16's could
spark an unprecedented, destabilizing arms buildup in South Asia. This
is not in the best interests of the people of the region. I would hope
that no Member of Congress would want his or her fingerprints on any
proposal that would spark such an unfortunate turn of events.
I recognize this leaves the United States in a quandary--a quandary
that I hope we can eliminate. To do so, Mr. President, please allow me
to turn our attention to the South China Sea, where the Communist
Chinese military machine is on the march.
Taiwan continues to be threatened with an increasing level of
intimidating military exercises by Communist China. In addition, the
Philippine Government is the victim of Chinese aggression in the
Spratley Islands. The Philippines and the other surrounding countries
in the region are concerned that this increased activity by the Chinese
military is a prelude to an outright attempt to gain control over the
South China Sea.
Three points about the Philippines are worth mentioning:
First, the Philippines is the democratic country in Asia with the
weakest military. Its government needs modern planes and naval craft.
Second, the Philippines has a security treaty with the United States.
The Philippine people are our allies.
Third, the U.S. Senate--through the leadership of former Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman Lugar and the distinguished Senator from
Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry--was instrumental in bringing democracy back
to the Philippines in 1986. We must not turn our back on them now.
My initiative is very simple. First, we arrange for the immediate
delivery to the Philippines, on a FMS basis, of 11 F-16's of the 28
held up by the Pressler amendment--the ones already paid for by the
American taxpayer.
At the same time, I recommended last month that we open negotiations
with Taiwan on the immediate delivery of the remaining 17 aircraft.
Taiwan already is purchasing 150 of the same model F-16 but the
delivery date is not until June 1997.
At the time of my announcement, I sent letters to President Clinton,
Philippine President Ramos and President Lee of the Republic of China,
detailing my initiative. Last week, President Clinton responded to my
proposal, stating that he was open to a third-party sale if it met
certain areas of concern. First, the President said that a third-party
transfer must serve our national interest. I agree. In fact, my
initiative produces a number of winners:
For Pakistan, the F-16 issue goes away as an irritant in its
relations with the United States. For India, 28 nuclear delivery
vehicles do not show up on her border, and that is something I feel
very concerned about. I think if these F-16's went to Pakistan, it
would accelerate the arms race there. I feel strongly we should be
friends with both India and Pakistan. Both countries have done a great
deal with us and for us.
I see in the long range a trading partnership with both countries,
and friendship. But also this will help us with Taiwan.
Taiwan can, for a price, close its 2-year window of vulnerability to
modern Russian aircraft in the hands of Chinese pilots. Finally, the
Philippines can get the air defense it needs.
By this initiative, a number of American foreign policy goals would
be furthered: lower tensions in South Asia, maintenance of a strong
nuclear nonproliferation policy, and an enhanced deterrent capability
of two democratic, nonnuclear powers in Asia. At home, American
aerospace would have new markets, and the American taxpayer would
receive a measurable enhancement of our global security for almost no
cost.
Second, the President stated that we would need to consider the
return to Pakistan of the military equipment
[[Page S9228]]
other than the F-16's for which it has paid. Frankly, I believe we must
study this option carefully. I would oppose the return of any military
equipment to Pakistan that would serve to undermine our nuclear non-
proliferation goals, and add to the current instability in the region.
We should not limit the third-party sale option just to the F-16's
exclusively.
Third, the President noted that a third party sale may not be
satisfactory to Pakistan if it does not receive most, if not all, of
the funds they originally paid to the United States Government for the
aircraft. As I stated last month, if the Congress opts to use any of
the funds raised from my initiative to compensate Pakistan for the
previously paid F-16's, I would not object. However, I would hope that
full compensation is not made a condition by the President for pursuing
a third party sale. As it stands right now, I believe it would be
difficult to convince Congress to either authorize the delivery of the
F-16's to Pakistan, or appropriate the full amount paid by Pakistan. My
initiative provides the Government of Pakistan the first real
opportunity to gain some compensation in the near future.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of my letter to President
Clinton dated May 23, 1995, and his response dated June 22, be printed
in the Record following my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I am pleased the President remains open
to a possible third party sale. Frankly, I believe that is his only
option. Let me state for the record that the Republic of China is open
to my proposal. I also received a very positive initial response from
representatives of the Philippine Government.
This initiative is simple but bold. I hope my colleagues will join
with me in urging the administration to make this initiative their own.
I stand ready to do my part to reach a solution that serves our
national interest--first and foremost being the preservation of a
tough, sound nuclear nonproliferation policy.
Mr. President, last month, I had the opportunity to testify before
the Foreign Relations Committee and present this idea. I am glad that
the President has responded favorably. But much remains to be done to
work out this agreement.
This has been a difficult matter to approach because in regard to the
amendment that was passed in the 1980's, one could say that Pakistan
purchased these planes with their eyes open, so to speak. They knew, on
the one hand, of the existence of our law that said we would not
continue aid if they developed a nuclear bomb. And, very frankly, they
were not being candid in what they told the then Vice President and
President George Bush about their nuclear program.
So if you take it from that point of view strictly, when the
Pakistanis got into this thing, they had full knowledge of what they
were doing back home in terms of developing a nuclear bomb. They knew
our law said what it said, and they moved forward with this purchase
which would have been in violation.
So we could say, ``Well, let us just let them be, that they made a
bad deal, and they paid the price.'' On the other hand, there has been
a great distinction in Pakistan. The military people have not always
told the civilian government what is going on, very frankly. And the
civilian government has engaged in some perhaps unwise decisions based
on bad information. That is really Pakistan's problem, I suppose.
But, as the years have gone by, I see an opportunity to get these F-
16's to Taiwan, which needs them to counterbalance China, and to the
Philippines, which is a longtime ally of ours.
Exhibit 1
In Defense of the Pressler Amendment
What the Pressler Amendment Requires
The Pressler Amendment requires Pakistan to satisfy two
conditions before it is eligible to receive U.S. foreign
assistance, including US military equipment or technology.
Aid may be provided in any fiscal year only if the President
has certified in that year that Pakistan (a) ``does not
possess'' a nuclear explosive device and (b) that the
proposed assistance ``will reduce significantly'' the risk of
possession.
Common Criticisms of the Pressler Amendment
Critics of the Pressler Amendment have alleged that this
legislation: (1) is unfair and discriminatory; (2) is not
effective; (3) is counterproductive; (4) penalizes Pakistan
when it has not even assembled, deployed, or tested weapons;
(5) is inflexible; (6) inhibits US encouragement of a free
market in Pakistan; (7) hurts US economic competitiveness;
(8) sets back US human rights initiatives; (9) interferes
with US counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics efforts; and
(10) fosters anti-Americanism in Pakistan.
Not one of these criticisms holds up to responsible
analysis. The criticisms reveal more about the critics
themselves than about any real shortcomings in the
legislation. In particular, these criticisms reflect: (1) a
profound misunderstanding of the purposes of the Pressler
Amendment, (2) a flagrant case of historical amnesia; (3) a
cynical fatalism about the inevitability of proliferation;
(4) an ignorance of the regional, global, and US national
security consequences of a Pakistani bomb; (5) the
susceptibility of the legislative process to special interest
lobbying; (6) the triumpth of slogans over analysis as a
basis of policy; (7) an utterly bizarre conception of what
constitutes a ``friend'' of the United States; (8) a
distorted perspective on US national priorities; (9) a
preference for the management rather than the prevention of
proliferation; and (10) a compulsive desire to channel even
more taxpayer dollars into unproductive pursuits.
Rebuttals to Specific Criticisms
1. ``Unfair and Discriminatory''
Between 1981 and 1990, Pakistan gave the US government both
formal and informal assurances about the peaceful nature of
its nuclear program, the level of enrichment of its uranium,
foreign nuclear procurements, cooperation with China, and
other such issues relating to nonproliferation issues--in
each case, Pakistan broke its word.
It is not unfair for America to defend its interests by
punishing those who violate their commitments to us.
On eight occasions, Congress authorized special waivers of
US nonproliferation laws to permit aid to continue to flow to
Pakistan. To this day, Pakistan is the only country ever to
have received (or required) a waiver of the Glenn/Symington
sanctions in order to qualify for US aid. It is true that
America engaged in discrimination, but this was
discrimination on behalf of Pakistan and against all other
countries that played by the rules.
How can Pakistan simultaneously condemn the country-
specific discrimination in the Pressler Amendment without
also condemning the country-specific discrimination that
authorized such aid?
Pakistan is not the only country to be mentioned by name in
the context of nonproliferation sanctions--for years, Iraq,
Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba have been designated for
special controls and sanctions.
US relations with India also have been affected by a
variety of US nonproliferation laws. Because of India's
unsafeguarded nuclear program, there is no US/Indian
agreement for nuclear cooperation; US military cooperation
with India is negligible; and the US will not export certain
forms of missile equipment and technology to India and other
goods related to weapons of mass destruction. Though
sanctions under Glenn/Symington have not been invoked against
India, it is because India, unlike Pakistan, has not violated
that law.
2. ``Not effective''
US policy throughout the 1980s asserted that US aid was an
effective way to lure Pakistan away from the bomb--yet
Pakistan made its most significant nuclear achievements
precisely when US aid was flowing at its highest levels.
The Pressler Amendment sanctions accomplished what $5
billion in US economic and military aid failed to
accomplish--it led Pakistan to stop producing highly-enriched
uranium.
The Pressler Amendment succeeded in enabling the
continuation of US efforts to drive the Soviets out of
Afghanistan while not sacrificing a bottom-line US nuclear
nonproliferation objective: nonpossession. If it were not for
this compromise, aid could have been terminated in 1985.
The Pressler Amendment was then and remains now a statement
of the priority that America attaches to nonproliferation as
a goal of policy.
The Pressler Amendment has unquestionably made Pakistan--
especially its air force, army, and navy--pay for its
misguided decisions to pursue the bomb. Indeed, if Pakistan
once again qualifies for US aid, it will no doubt be
Pakistan's military that will stand to benefit the most from
the new aid. This gives Pakistan a tangible incentive to
satisfy the certification terms under Pressler.
3. ``Counterproductive''
Though the sanctions have undoubtedly weakened Pakistan's
military capabilities, there is no evidence that the
sanctions have ``driven'' Pakistan to rely more upon nuclear
deterrence as a national defense strategy.
Pakistan's decisions to stop producing highly-enriched
uranium, not to test, and not to assemble or deploy nuclear
weapons hardly suggests a policy of increased reliance on a
nuclear deterrent.
[[Page S9229]]
The US denial of technology and aid has slowed down
Pakistan's bomb-making potential, a long-standing goal of US
nonproliferation policy.
Though Pakistan still has a nuclear weapons-capability and
is still cooperating with China on the bomb, these activities
were not ``caused by'' the Pressler Amendment. Pakistan was
seeking this capability and engaging in this cooperation with
China well before the Pressler Amendment came into existence.
For a truly counterproductive policy, one must look to the
1980s, when US taxpayers shelled out $5 billion in aid that
was supposed to appease Pakistan's nuclear ambitions . . .
aid that coincided Pakistan's acquisition of the bomb. Today,
critics of the Pressler Amendment are arguing that more US
taxpayer money should be channeled down that drain.
4. ``No assembly, deployment, or testing''
Pakistan's decisions not to assemble, deploy, or test have
very little to do with the flow of US aid.
The US nuclear arsenal in the 1950s was stored in separate
components: was the US a non-nuclear-weapon state as a
result?
Even the State Department concedes that a country can still
possess the bomb even if it has not yet actually assembled
one.
Pakistan's position is that it does not ``possess'' the
bomb because it has not assembled the requisite materials. By
this logic, Pakistan could acquire a nuclear arsenal with
hundreds of weapons simply by not tightening down the last
screw on the casing of each bomb.
Pakistan's new emphasis on the issue of assembling is just
another chapter of Pakistan's long history of dissembling
about its bomb.
It is widely believed that Pakistan got a pre-tested bomb
design from China. Why would Pakistan want to or need to test
a pre-tested design?
Pakistan has very limited supplies of bomb-usable nuclear
material. Why should it waste such precious material on an
unnecessary test?
Why should Pakistan engage in a test that would only give
India an excuse to commence a regional nuclear arms race that
Pakistan could never win?
If Pakistan's nuclear program is, as its government claims,
devoted entirely to peaceful purposes, how can it claim that
it has ``kept components separate'' and not ``assembled'' the
bomb? What would it have to assemble if its program were
peaceful? If its program is so peaceful, why does it refuse
to agree to international inspections independent of what
India does?
5. ``Inflexible''
Supporters of the Pressler Amendment make no apologies to
the charge that the law has been ``inflexible,'' assuming a
normal dictionary definition of this term: ``of an unyielding
temper, purpose, will, etc.'' The alternative of passive
accommodation has little attraction to supporters of
nonproliferation.
Even with the so-called ``inflexible'' label, the following
activities take place: (a) the US still issues licenses to
export commercial munitions and spare parts to Pakistan,
including spares for Pakistan's nuclear-weapons delivery
vehicle, the F-16; (b) US military visits and joint training
exercises continue to take place; (c) US aid with respect to
agriculture, counter-terrorism, nutrition, population
control, literacy, advancement of women, health and medicine,
environmental protection, disaster relief, and many other
areas can continue to flow to Pakistan via nongovernmental
organizations; (d) the Export-Import Bank also has extended
loans, grants, and guarantees to Pakistan; (e) PL-480
agricultural aid continues; (f) arms control verification
assistance continues (a seismic station); (g) millions of
dollars of aid in the ``pipeline'' as of October 1990 was
allowed to flow to Pakistan; (h) cooperation on peace keeping
is continuing; and (i) Pakistan continues to receive billions
of dollars in development assistance via multilateral lending
agencies.
Pakistan used almost $200 million in FMS credits to fund
the purchase of 11 F-16's between FY 1989 and 1993, of which
about $150 million were used after the Pressler sanctions
were invoked.
The US continues to review and approve licenses of dual-use
technology to Pakistan.
All the above hardly suggest that the Pressler Amendment
has been unduly inflexible.
6. ``Free Market''
Pakistan has a long way to go before it has a free market
and the Pressler Amendment is hardly to blame.
A recent Heritage Foundation worldwide review characterized
Pakistan's economy as ``Mostly Not Free.'' The report found
that Pakistan has a ``very high level of protectionism.''
The only market that is truly free in Pakistan is its black
market.
Free markets are an important US interest, but not an end
in themselves--they need to be weighed against other US
interests, especially national security, defense, and
nonproliferation objectives. Encouraging a free market in
weapons of mass destruction should not be high on America's
list of priorities.
7. ``Hurts US Economic Competitiveness''
The US has exported hundreds of millions of dollars in
defense goods to Pakistan since the Pressler Amendment came
into effect.
In 1994, the Commerce Department approved $96 million in
exports of dual-use goods to Pakistan, about triple the
amount approved in each of the three previous years.
Total US exports to Pakistan still come to less than $1
billion. Even if all of this trade was lost, it would have no
effect whatsoever upon the US national trade balance or US
economic competitiveness. By comparison,
US exports worldwide in 1994 were worth well over a half
trillion dollars.
8. ``Sets Back Human Rights Initiatives''
Congress has expressly authorized the transfer of
assistance to Pakistan via nongovernmental groups to advance
the cause of human rights (as indeed several other non-
military causes).
Despite some modest improvements since the days of General
Zia, the Pakistani government continues to repress the human
rights of Pakistani citizens, as most recently documented
both by the State Department's annual human rights report and
a recent global survey by Amnesty International.
The US experience in Iran should have taught us to beware
of cultivating cozy relationships with a repressive
government.
9. ``Interferes with Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Narcotics Efforts''
Congress has expressly authorized the transfer of
assistance to Pakistan via nongovernmental groups to
terrorism and narcotics trafficking.
Widespread terrorism and narcotics trafficking persists in
Pakistan.
Pakistan's recent cooperation with the US in apprehending
terrorists indicates that the Pressler Amendment is no
insuperable obstacle to such cooperation.
10. ``Fosters Anti-Americanism''
Anti-Americanism was not born in Pakistan with the
enactment of the Pressler Amendment--it predated the
amendment and has causes far beyond a nuclear dispute between
the US and Pakistan.
America opposes the global spread of nuclear weapons: it
should come as no surprise to witness leaders of governments
that are secretly building bombs encouraging anti-
Americanism.
America seeks to defend its national interests, not to win
popularity contests. As President Clinton stated on October
18, 1994: ``There is nothing more important to our security
and to the world's stability than preventing the spread of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.''
____
U.S. Aid Policies and Pakistan's Bomb: What Were We Trying to
Accomplish?
Letters to Congress from Presidents Reagan and Bush, 1985
to 1989, required under sec. 620E(e) of Foreign Assistance
Act (Pressler Amendment):
``The proposed United States assistance program for
Pakistan remains extremely important in reducing the risk
that Pakistan will develop and ultimately possess such a
device. I am convinced that our security relationship and
assistance program are the most effective means available for
us to dissuade Pakistan from acquiring nuclear explosive
devices. Our assistance program is designed to help Pakistan
address its substantial and legitimate security needs,
thereby both reducing incentives and creating disincentives
for Pakistani acquisition of nuclear explosives.''--President
George Bush, 10/5/89; President Ronald Reagan, 11/18/88; 12/
17/87; 10/27/86; and 11/25/85.
President George Bush, letter to Congress (addressed to J.
Danforth Quayle as President of the Senate), 12 April 1991,
urging abandonment of Pressler certification requirement:
``. . .my intention is to send the strongest possible
message to Pakistan and other potential proliferators that
nonproliferation is among the highest priorities of my
Administration's foreign policy, irrespective of whether such
a policy is required by law.''
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Teresita Schaffer,
testimony before House subcommittee, 2 August 1989:
``None of the F-16's Pakistan already owns or is about to
purchase is configured for nuclear delivery . . . a Pakistan
with a credible conventional deterrent will be less motivated
to purchase a nuclear weapons capability.''
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Hughes,
testimony before House subcommittee, 2 August 1989:
``Finally, we believe that past and continued American
support for Pakistan's conventional defense reduces the
likelihood that Pakistan will feel compelled to cross the
nuclear threshold.''
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Peck, testimony
before House subcommittee, 17 February 1988:
``We believe that the improvements in Pakistan's
conventional military forces made possible by U.S. assistance
and the U.S. security commitment our aid program symbolizes
have had a significant influence on Pakistan's decision to
forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons.''
Special Ambassador at Large Richard Kennedy, testimony
before two House subcommittees, 22 October 1987:
``We have made it clear that Pakistan must show restraint
in its nuclear program if it expects us to continue providing
security assistance.''
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, testimony
before Senate subcommittee, 18 March 1987:
``Our assistance relationship is designed to advance both
our non-proliferation and our
[[Page S9230]]
strategic objectives relating to Afghanistan. Development of a close
and reliable security partnership with Pakistan gives
Pakistan an alternative to nuclear weapons to meet its
legitimate security needs and strengthens our influence on
Pakistan's nuclear decision making. Shifting to a policy of
threats and public ultimata would in our view decrease, not
increase our ability to continue to make a contribution to
preventing a nuclear arms race in South Asia. Undermining the
credibility of the security relationship with the U.S. would
itself create incentives for Pakistan to ignore our concerns
and push forward in the direction of nuclear weapons
acquisition.''
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Howard Schaffer,
testimony before House subcommittee, 6 February 1984:
``The assistance program also contributes to U.S. nuclear
non-proliferation goals. We believe strongly that a program
of support which enhances Pakistan's sense of security helps
remove the principal underlying incentive for the acquisition
of a nuclear weapons capability. The Government of Pakistan
understands our deep concern over this issue. We have made
clear that the relationship between our two countries, and
the program of military and economic assistance on which it
rests, are ultimately inconsistent with Pakistan's
development of a nuclear explosives device. President Zia has
stated publicly that Pakistan will not manufacture a nuclear
explosives device.''
Special Ambassador at Large Richard Kennedy, testimony
before two House subcommittees, 1 November 1983:
``By helping friendly nations to address legitimate
security concerns, we seek to reduce incentives for the
acquisition of nuclear weapons. The provision of security
assistance and the sale of military equipment can be major
components of efforts along these lines. Development of
security ties to the U.S. can strengthen a country's
confidence in its ability to defend itself without nuclear
weapons. At the same time, the existence of such a
relationship enhances our credibility when we seek to
persuade that country to forego [sic] nuclear arms . . . We
believe that strengthening Pakistan's conventional military
capability serves a number of important U.S. interests,
including non-proliferation. At the same time, we have made
clear to the government of Pakistan that efforts to acquire
nuclear explosives would jeopardize our security assistance
program.''
Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harry
Marshall, 12 September 1983, before International Nuclear Law
Association, San Francisco:
``U.S. assistance has permitted Pakistan to strengthen its
conventional defensive capability. This serves to bolster its
stability and thus reduce its motivation for acquiring
nuclear explosives.''
President Ronald Reagan, report to Congress pursuant to
sec. 601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (``601
Report''), for calendar year 1982--
``Steps were taken to strengthen the U.S. security
relationship with Pakistan with the objective of addressing
that country's security needs and thereby reducing any
motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives.''
President Ronald Reagan, report to Congress pursuant to
sec. 601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (``601
Report''), for calendar year 1981--
``Military assistance by the United States and the
establishment of a new security relationship with Pakistan
should help to counteract its possible motivations toward
acquiring nuclear weapons. . . . Moreover, help from the
United States in strengthening Pakistan's conventional
military capabilities would offer the best available means
for counteracting possible motivations toward acquiring
nuclear weapons.''
Assistant Secretary of State James Malone, address before
Atomic Industrial Forum, San Francisco, 1 December 1981.
``We believe that this assistance--which is in the
strategic interest of the United States--will make a
significant contribution to the well-being and security of
Pakistan and that it will be recognized as such by that
government. We also believe that, for this reason, it offers
the best prospect of deterring the Pakistanis from proceeding
with the testing or acquisition of nuclear explosives.
Undersecretary of State James Buckley, testimony before
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 12 November 1981:
``We believe that a program of support which provides
Pakistan with a continuing relationship with a significant
security partner and enhances its sense of security may help
remove the principal underlying incentive for the acquisition
of a nuclear weapons capability. With such a relationship in
place we are hopeful that over time we will be able to
persuade Pakistan that the pursuit of a weapons capability is
neither necessary to its security nor in its broader interest
as an important member of the world community.''
Testimony of Undersecretary of State, James Buckley, in
response to question from Sen. Glenn, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, 12 November 1981, on effects of a
nuclear detonation on continuation of cash sales of F-16's:
``[Sen. Glenn] . . . so if Pakistan detonates a nuclear
device before completion of the F-16 sale, will the
administration cut off future deliveries?
``[Buckley] Again, Senator, we have underscored the fact
that this would dramatically affect the relationship. The
cash sales are part of that relationship. I cannot see
drawing lines between the impact in the case of a direct cash
sale versus a guaranteed or U.S.-financed sale.''
Undersecretary of State James Buckley, letter to NY Times,
25 July 1981:
``In place of the ineffective sanctions on Pakistan's
nuclear program imposed by the past Administration, we hope
to address through conventional means the sources of
insecurity that prompt a nation like Pakistan to seek a
nuclear capability in the first place.''
____
From Myth to Reality: Evidence of Parkistan's ``Nuclear Restraint''
Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained a
pre-tested, atomic bomb design from China.
Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained bomb-
grade enriched uranium from China.
1980--US nuclear export control violation: Reexport via
Canada (components of inverters used in gas centrifuge
enrichment activities).
1981--US nuclear export control violation: New York,
zirconium (nuclear fuel cladding material).
1981--AP story cites contents of reported US State
Department cable stating ``We have strong reason to believe
that Pakistan is seeking to develop a nuclear explosives
capability . . . Pakistan is conducting a program for the
design and development of a triggering package for nuclear
explosive devices.''
1981--Publication of book, ``Islamic Bomb,'' citing recent
Pakistan efforts to construct a nuclear test site.
1982/3--Several European press reports indicate that
Pakistan was using Middle Eastern intermediaries to acquire
bomb parts (13-inch ``steel spheres'' and ``steel petal
shapes'').
1983--Recently declassified US government assessment
concludes that ``There is unambiguous evidence that Pakistan
is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons development program .
. . We believe the ultimate application of the enriched
uranium produced at Kahuta, which is unsafeguarded, is
clearly nuclear weapons.''
1984--President Zia states that Pakistan has acquired a
``very modest'' uranium enrichment capability for ``nothing
but peaceful purposes.''
1984--President Reagan reportedly warns Pakistan of ``grave
consequences'' if it enriches uranium above 5%.
1985--ABC News reports that US believes Pakistan has
``successfully tested'' a ``firing mechanism'' of an atomic
bomb by means of a non-nuclear explosion, and that US
krytrons ``have been acquired'' by Pakistan.
1985--US nuclear export control violation: Texas, krytrons
(nuclear weapon triggers).
1985--US nuclear export control violation: US cancelled
license for export of flash x-ray camera to Pakistan (nuclear
weapon diagnostic uses) because of proliferation concerns.
1985/6--Media cites production of highly enriched, bomb-
grade uranium in violation of a commitment to the US.
1986--Bob Woodward article in Washington Post cities
alleged DIA report saying Pakistan ``detonated a high
explosive test device between Sept. 18 and Sept. 21 as part
of its continuing efforts to build an implosion-type nuclear
weapon;'' says Pakistan has produced uranium enriched to a
93.5% level.
1986--Press reports cite US ``Special National Intelligence
Estimate'' concluding that Pakistan had produced weapons-
grade material.
1986--Commenting on Pakistan's nuclear capability, General
Zia tells interviewer, ``It is our right to obtain the
technology. And when we acquire this technology, the Islamic
world will possess it with us.''
1986--Recently declassified memo to then-Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger states, ``Despite strong U.S. concern,
Pakistan continues to pursue a nuclear explosive capability .
. . If operated as its nominal capacity, the Kahuta uranium
enrichment plant could produce enough weapons-grade material
to build several nuclear devices per year.''
1987--US nuclear export control violation: Pennsylvania,
maraging steel & beryllium (used in centrifuge manufacture
and bomb components).
1987--London Financial Times reports US spy satellites have
observed construction of second uranium enrichment plant in
Pakistan.
1987--Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist states in
published interview that ``what the CIA has been saying about
our possessing the bomb is correct.''
1987--West German official confirms that nuclear equipment
recently seized on way to Pakistan was suitable for ``at
least 93% enrichment'' of uranium; blueprints of uranium
enrichment plant also seized in Switzerland.
1987--US nuclear export control violation: California,
oscilloscopes, computer equipment (useful in nuclear weapon
R&D).
1987--According to photocopy of a reported German foreign
ministry memo published in Paris in 1990, UK government
officials tells German counterpart on European
nonproliferation working group that he was ``convinced that
Pakistan had `a few small' nuclear weapons.''
1988--President Reagan waives an aid cutoff for Pakistan
due to an export control violation; in his formal
certification, he confirmed that ``material, equipment, or
technology covered by that provision was to be
[[Page S9231]]
used by Pakistan in the manufacture of a nuclear explosive
device.''
1988--Hedrick Smith article in New York Times reports US
government sources believe Pakistan has produced enough
highly enriched uranium for 4-6 bombs.
1988--President Zia tells Carnegie Endowment delegation in
interview that Pakistan has attained a nuclear capability
``that is good enough to create an impression of
deterrence.''
1989--Multiple reports of Pakistan modifying US-supplied F-
16 aircraft for nuclear delivery purposes; wind tunnel tests
cited in document reportedly from West German intelligence
service.
1989--Test launch of Hatf-2 missile: Payload (500
kilograms) and range (300 kilometers) meet ``nuclear-
capable'' standard under Missile Technology Control Regime.
1989--CIA Director Webster tells Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee hearing that ``Clearly Pakistan is engaged
in developing a nuclear capability.''
1989--Media claims that Pakistan acquired tritium gas and
tritium facility from West Germany in mid-1980's.
1989--ACDA unclassified report cites Chinese assistance to
missile program in Pakistan.
1989--UK press cites nuclear cooperation between Pakistan
and Iraq.
1989--Article in Nuclear Fuel states that the United States
has issued ``about 100 specific communiques to the West
German Government related to planned exports to the Pakistan
Atomic Energy Commission and its affiliated organizations,''
exports reportedly included tritium and a tritium recovery
facility.
1989--Article in Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly states
``sources close to the Pakistani nuclear program have
revealed that Pakistani scientists have now perfected
detonation mechanisms for a nuclear device.''
1989--Reporting on a recent customs investigation, West
German magazine Stern reports, ``since the beginning of the
eighties over 70 [West German] enterprises have supplied
sensitive goods to enterprises which for years have been
buying equipment for Pakistan's ambitious nuclear weapons
program.''
1989--Gerard Smith, former US diplomat and senior arms
control authority, claims US has turned a ``blind eye'' to
proliferation developments in Pakistan and Israel.
1989--Senator Glenn delivers two lengthy statements
addressing Pakistan's violations of its uranium enrichment
commitment to the United States and the lack of progress on
nonproliferation issues from Prime Minister Bhutto's
democratically elected government after a year in office;
Glenn concluded, ``There simply must be a cost to non-
compliance--when a solemn nuclear pledge is violated, the
solution surely does not lie in voiding the pledge.''
1989-1990--Reports of secret construction of unsafeguarded
nuclear research reactor; components from Europe.
1990--US News cites ``western intelligence sources''
claiming Pakistan recently ``cold-tested'' a nuclear device
and is now building a plutonium production reactor; article
says Pakistan is engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran.
1990--French magazine publishes photo of West German
government document citing claim by UK official that British
government believes Pakistan already possesses ``a few
small'' nuclear weapons; cites Ambassador Richard Kennedy
claim to UK diplomat that Pakistan has broken its pledge to
the US not to enrich uranium over 5%.
1990--London Sunday Times cites growing US and Soviet
concerns about Pakistani nuclear program; paper claims F-16
aircraft are being modified to nuclear delivery purposes;
claims US spy satellites have observed ``heavily armed
convoys'' leaving Pakistan uranium enrichment complex at
Kahuta and heading for military airfields.
1990--Pakistani biography of top nuclear scientist (Dr.
Abdul Qadeer Khan and the Islamic Bomb), claims US showed
``model'' of Pakistani bomb to visiting Pakistani diplomat as
part of unsuccessful nonproliferation effort.
1990--Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly reports ``US
officials now believe that Pakistan has quite sufficient
computing power in country to run all the modeling necessary
to adequately verify the viability of the country's nuclear
weapons technology.''
1990--Dr. A. Q. Khan, father of Pakistan's bomb, receives
``Man of the Nation Award.''
1990--Washington Post documents 3 recent efforts by
Pakistan to acquire special arc-melting furnaces with nuclear
and missile applications.
1991--Wall Street Journal says Pakistan is buying nuclear-
capable M-11 missile from China.
1991--Sen. Moynihan says in television interview, ``Last
July [1990] the Pakistanis machined 6 nuclear warheads. And
they've still got them.''
1991--Time quotes businessman, ``BCCI is functioning as the
owners' representative for Pakistan's nuclear-bomb project.''
1992--Pakistani foreign secretary publicly discusses
Pakistan's possession of ``cores'' of nuclear devices.
Exhibit 2
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, May 23, 1995.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: Occasionally there is an opportunity to
take a bold initiative which will further multiple American
foreign policy goals. Two of those goals are the maintenance
of peace and stability in South Asia and the deterrence of
aggression in East Asia. Such an opportunity is at hand.
The inability of the President since October 1, 1990, to
make the necessary certification under section 620E(e) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to the nuclear
activities of Pakistan) has prevented the delivery of twenty-
eight F-16 aircraft to Pakistan. Since F-16s in American
service are nuclear delivery vehicles, the possibility that
these aircraft might yet be delivered to Pakistan has raised
enormous concern in neighboring India. At the same time, our
inability to transfer the aircraft is an irritant in our
relations with Pakistan. For now, the aircraft in question
are in storage in Arizona.
In East Asia, both the Republic of China on Taiwan and the
Philippines have been the victims of aggression from the
People's Republic of China. In the case of the former, it's
military exercises designed to intimidate; in the latter it's
the actual take over of Philippine territory in the South
China Sea.
To serve as a deterrent for aggression across the Taiwan
Straits, Taiwan has ordered 150 American F-16 aircraft.
However, these aircraft will not begin to arrive in Taiwan
until June of 1997 suggesting that there may be a ``window of
opportunity'' for conflict. With regard to the Philippines, a
combination of historical factors and the need to devote
defense resources to opposing internal subversion has led to
a severe lack of external defense capability.
Considering the twenty-eight F-16 aircraft in storage, it
appears that eleven of them were to be delivered to Pakistan
under the United States Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.
Essentially, they were paid for already by the American
taxpayer. The remaining seventeen aircraft were paid for by
Pakistan.
Therefore, I recommend that the Administration open
negotiations with the Governments of the Philippines and the
Republic of China on Taiwan for the transfer of the aircraft.
Eleven of the aircraft could be transferred to the
Philippines on an FMS basis and the remaining seventeen could
be the subject of negotiations for payment with Taiwan. If a
decision is made to return to Pakistan some or all of the
money collected, I would not object.
If this initiative were carried out, it would directly
further American foreign policy goals in South and East Asia,
respectively. In South Asia tensions would be reduced as
twenty-eight potential nuclear delivery vehicles would be
removed from the region. In East Asia the military strength
of our friends and allies would be enhanced significantly and
a clear signal would be sent regarding our determination to
oppose aggression.
This initiative is simple but it requires a bold
imagination for execution. I hope that you will join with me
in putting it into effect and making a significant
contribution to our national security.
Sincerely,
Larry Pressler,
U.S. Senator.
____
The White House,
Washington, June 22, 1995.
Hon. Larry Pressler,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for writing to me about the
opportunity before us to resolve the F-16 issue with
Pakistan. I appreciate your initiative and hope some new
thinking will help create a consensus between the
Administration and Congress for a satisfactory solution.
As you know, when I met with Prime Minister Bhutto in
April, I told her I would explore with Congress the options
for returning either the F-16s and equipment or the funds
Pakistan had paid. The proposal to sell the planes and return
the funds is one possibility if we can resolve some areas of
concern. First, we must determine that the transfer of this
equipment to third parties would be in our national interest.
Second, we would need to be prepared to return to Pakistan
the equipment other than F-16s for which it has paid. We
would need to work with Congress on the necessary authorities
to do so. Third, such a proposal may make this solution less
than satisfactory for the Government of Pakistan if it
results in the return to Pakistan of significantly less money
then they originally paid for the aircraft.
Again, let me say that a solution accepted by Congress and
by Pakistan will clear the way for a more serious discussion
of the critical nonproliferation issues that concern us all.
It will also help to improve the atmosphere in our bilateral
relations and thus advance other U.S. interests in the
region.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
____________________