[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 46 (Friday, March 29, 1996)] [Senate] [Pages S3246-S3247] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] THE SWISS BANKS, THE NAZIS, AND HOLOCAUST ASSETSMr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the issue that I spoke about yesterday, namely that of the return, by Swiss banks, of assets deposited by European Jews and others in the years preceding the Holocaust. Today, I would like to discuss the revelations disclosed in newly discovered documents by my staff. These documents explain the connections of certain wartime Swiss bankers with Nazi Germany. The documents are disturbing to read, especially when one considers the history of the times and the horrors that took place because of the murderous actions of the Nazi regime with which these men dealt. One such declassified document, dated August 2, 1945, from the American Embassy in London, from which made up the American Occupational project, ``Operation Safe Haven,'' details the membership of the board of directors of the I.G. Farben Co. I.G. Farben was, at the time, the largest chemical company in the world, and is known, quite infamously for the fact that one of its subsidiaries produced ``Zyklon B,'' the poison gas used in the gas chambers in the Nazi extermination camps in Europe. While voluminous, the document provides short biographies of the directors. At this time, I would like to ask unanimous consent that a portion of this document be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks. It is in this document that several Swiss nationals are listed and some are listed as owners or directors of Swiss banks. Following are the names of the bankers: August Germann: Described as the ``Director of the Bank Fuer Unternehmungen, Zurich.'' Carlo Mollwo: Described as ``A cover man for I.G. Farben formally holding 100 percent of the shares of the Swiss bank, Ed. Greutert & Cie. (Now H. Sturzenegger & Cie.).'' Hans Sturzenegger: Described as ``A Swiss and relative of Greutert, became Managing Director of the Swiss Bank, Ed. Greutert & Cie. * * * In 1942, Sturzenegger was listed as the unlimited partner of the bank and Industrie Bank A.G. of Zurich was listed as the limited partner.'' Theodor Wolfensperger: Described as the ``President of Industrie Bank, Zurich. Known as a member of the I.G. clique.'' Mr. President, I know that this is the stuff of history, but it serves to point out one vital factor in understanding how this controversy in Switzerland today, came about. Here we have Swiss owners, or directors of banks in Switzerland, which might well have been the place of deposit for funds of European Jews, and they are sitting on the board of I.G. Farben, clearly a notorious company, by any standard. These men, as you will see by the document, also headed companies which acted as fronts for the Nazis, and later perhaps helped get assets looted by the Nazis, out of Europe. My question is, if they would do all this for the Nazis, what would they do with the assets of Europe's Jews? Mr. President, this is a disturbing question, and to one that I truly do not know the answer. Nevertheless, I fear the worst. Yet, when considering this question, it inevitably begs a further question. What role did the Swiss Government play in this regard? To provide a possible answer to this question, I would like to introduce the now declassified report of Daniel J. Reagan, then Counselor of Legation for Economic Affairs at the U.S. legation in Bern, who wrote to the Secretary of State on October 4, 1945 concerning the lack of cooperation of the Swiss Government. I would ask that the text of this report be inserted in the Record at this time. Mr. President, this is a devastating indictment of the Swiss Government and it illustrates how the Swiss went out of their way to avoid cooperating with the Allies in breaking up the German war effort and its vast economic structure. This is only the beginning of our inquiry. We are finding documents daily, and with each search, we find more evidence which, I hope will place us closer to the truth, namely the authoritative, accurate and final accounting of all assets that numerous Swiss banks continue to hold from this time period and to which the survivors and rightful heirs are entitled. The report follows: Secret Attachment Sponsor Agency: External Security Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Washington, D.C. 11. In Switzerland or Connected with the Swiss Business. Fritz Fleiner--Member of the Board of I.G. Chemie. Dr. Albert Gadow--I.G. Farbon's Swiss representative. Member of the Board of each chief figure in I.G. Chemie, Basle. Brother-in-law of Hermann Schmitz. August Gormann--Member of I.G. Chemie's Board of Directors, and Director of the Bank Fuer Unternehmungen, Zurich. Paul Haefliger--(See IV. A.2.). Anton Heinrich--(See IV. A.3.). Ernst Huelsmann--(See IV. A.3.). Felix Iselin--President of I.G. Chemie, Basle, replacing Hermann Schmitz in 1940. One of most important lawyers in eastern Switzerland, a colonel in the Swiss Army, and chief of its Intelligence Service. Also President of the Schweizerische Treuhand--Gesellschaft of Basle, the chartered accountant firm of the Swiss chemical concerns Ciba, Geigy, and Sandoz. A former colleague of Iselin's has stated that Iselin is a prominent representative of absolutely German interests, and that he goes to Berlin to take orders from Hermann Schmitz and then telephones them to New York from Basle, thus pretending to protect Swiss interests where he is really protecting the interests of I. G. Farben. Gottfried Keller--Member of the Board of Directors of I.G. Chemie, Basle. Carlo Mollwo--German by birth, married to a Swiss, Became a Swiss citizen. ``A cover man for I.G. Farben'' formerly, holding 100% of the shares of the Swiss bank, Ed. Greutert & Cie. (now H. Sturzenegger & Cie.). He was especially active for I.G. in the nitrogen cartel through Greutert & Cie. President of the Board of Administration of Societe Auxiliaire de Participations et de Depots S.A., and member of the Board of Directors of I.G. Chemie, Basle. Chief auditor for I.G. Chemie since 1929. Karl Pfoiffer--(See IV. A.1.). Hormann Schmitz--(See IV. A.2.) Resigned as President of I.G. Chemie in 1940 and was replaced by Felix Isolin. Hans Sturzeneggor--A Swiss and relative of Groutort, became Managing Director of the Swiss bank, Ed. Greutert & Cio., upon the death of Greutort in 1939, and the name of the bank was changed to H. Sturzeneggor & Cio. He had been trained in the Frankfurt offices of Metallgesellschaft and in the Finance Dept. of I.G. In 1942 Sturzenogger was listed as the unlimited partner of the bank and Industrie Bank A.G. of Zurich was listed as the limited partner. He is a member of the Board of I.G. Chemie Theordor Wolfensperger--President of Industrie Bank, Zurich, Switzerland. Known as a member of the I.G. clique. He has been used as a nominee for I.G. in other dummy holding companies, as for instance Mapro, an I.G. camouflaged holding company in the Dutch East Indies. 12. Turkey Widmann--Manger of Bayor; Turkey. His private funds and personal possessions insured for LT 85,000 are held by Dr. Feridun Frik, Istanbul, at the house of Salahettin Ozgen, Eskisohir. 13. Latin American Johann Carl Ahrons--Nominal partner in A. Quimica. Bayor Lda., Brazil, Probably a front for I.G. Farben. Ernst Holmut Andreas--German radio engineer who operated a radio station, ``Radio Bayer'' in Managua, Nicaragua, from 1929 to 1940. It advertised Bayer products and in the later years its programs included Nazi propaganda. (In 1940 the station was sold to Joso Mondoza.) He was deported to the U.S. in 1942 and in 1945 was a soldier in the U.S. Army. Believed to be a Nazi and to have operated a secret transmission set in Managua. ____ Bern, October 4, 1945. Subject: Transmission of statement from Swiss purporting to give an indication of results of census of German assets. [Via air mail pouch--USA War Crimes Office, Oct. 26, 1945--Secret] The Honorable The Secretary of State, Washington. Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Legation's telegram No. 4211 (Repeated to London as 1407 and to Paris as 692), September 25, 1945, wherein it was reported that despite repeated and joint efforts of the British, French and ourselves during the past six months to induce the Swiss to implement effectively the agreement of March 8, it now appears that the Swiss are failing to meet in certain respects their engagements under that agreement, indulging in procrastinating tactics and also undermining economic warfare measures. As evidence of this statement there is transmitted, in the original and in translation, a memorandum presented to the [[Page S3247]] Economic Counselor by Mr. Kohli on behalf of the Federal Political Department, embracing what the Swiss describe as their interim report on the census of German assets as promised two months ago (Par. 4, Legation's telegram No. 3667, July 24). As it may be seen, this statement presents a mere description of the mode of operation of the Swiss Compensation office, the number of cases blocked without any indication of the results of the census. Mr. Kohli refused to indicate, moreover, when, if at all, any results of the census would be made available to the Allies. He did not contest the joint understanding of the British, French, and ourselves that the Swiss would make available at least the approximate value of interim blocked assets, but they have now failed to do so. Early in August Mr. Schwab, Chief of the Swiss Compensation Office, informed the Economic Counselor that he had in the course of preparation what he intimated was a complete report which he was preparing for the Federal Political Department. Mr. Schwab stated at the time that he understood this report was intended for the Allies. Shortly afterwards Mr. Kohli, of the Federal Political Department, informed the Economic Counselor that he had received this report but that it was being translated from German into French for us. The Economic Counselor indicated that the German text would be satisfactory. Mr. Kohli stated he thought it more polite to transmit it in French. On August 23 Mr. Kohli was again reminded that we had not received this document. He stated that the translation had not yet been completed but that we would obtain it in the near future. At a meeting on September 12 the Economic Counselor stated that he could not understand why this report, which had been in Mr. Kohli's hands for approximately a month, had not yet been transmitted. Mr. Kohli replied that after the translation had been made from German into French, the latter text had been submitted to Mr. Schwab of the Swiss Compensation Office for the latter's approval, but that Mr. Schwab had been on vacation for two weeks. The Economic Counselor informed Mr. Kohli that this statement was most remarkable, for members of his office had been in communication with Mr. Schwab by telephone several times during the preceding week. The Economic Counselor added that he had advised the Department of State of the promise to supply a report giving the pertinent information so far obtained on the census, but that it now appeared that this report, although completed a month ago by the Swiss Compensation Office, had been held up by the Federal Political Department. He expressed the fear that its transmission to us was, for reasons unknown, no longer intended. Mr. Kohli thereupon gave instructions to his assistant to assure that the French text of the report be delivered to us on the following day, which it was. It should be observed that the Aide-Memoire enclosed herewith bears the date of August 27, although it was not delivered until September 13. The foregoing incident has been recited in detail because it suggests that the report prepared by the Swiss Compensation Office and intended for this and the British Legation and the French Embassy was censored and a perfunctory resume substituted therefor. The enclosed report, it is hardly necessary to state, represents a failure on the part of the Swiss to carry out their promise to acquaint us with the interim results of the census and was delivered two weeks after the census was technically closed on August 31. This failure of the Swiss to respect their promises is of especial significance at this time. It would appear to be related to the neglect the Swiss have shown inter alia for those provisions of the March 8 agreement which related to the prompt adoption of legislating necessary to facilitate the restoration of looted property and to the attempt made by the Swiss in the Viscose Suisse case, as reported in Legation's telegram 4211, September 25, to negate the influence of the Allied Proclaimed Lists. Reference must also be made by the belated response offered by the Swiss on September 25 (reported in Legation's telegram 4236 of September 28) to Legation's note of August 3 asserting title to German assets and to the Swiss failure to make any response to the Legation's note of July 12. The latter, as reported in Legation's dispatch 12188 of July 27, 1947, requested the Swiss to take steps, in accordance with the March 8 agreement, to assure that no disposition of German or German-controlled property in Switzerland would occur. As reported in Legation's telegram No. 4201 of September 24, 1945, despite this note and despite adequate notice from the Economic Counselor of this Legation that one such disposition was about to occur, the Swiss Government took no steps to intervene in the proposed sale of a German school at Davos. From these incidents one inference is difficult to avoid: the Swiss Government is pursuing dilatory tactics designed to test the sincerity, firmness, and unity of the Allies with respect to the German assets in Switzerland and with respect to the commercial future of those Swiss enterprises and individuals whose pro-German activities were sufficiently notorious to merit inclusion on the Allied black lists. These tactics are being employed, it would appear, in the belief that, in the interim, the Allies will become so preoccupied with other affairs as to neglect to press for further execution of the March 8, agreement. If they are successful, the Swiss will thereby have escaped the proper and legitimate obligations which the majority of other neutrals have assumed, vis-a-vis the Allies, to put an end to the more important potentials for the continuation of Nazi activities. In this connection, attention must be directed to recent discussions in the Swiss Parliament and the Swiss press. As reported in Legation's telegrams 4176, September 20 and 4186, September 21, 1945, Federal Councilor Stampfli, Chief of the Department of Public Economy, and Mr. Dutweiler, influential Swiss political leader, have violently attacked the Allies' listing policy. They have chosen deliberately to misrepresent the purposes and objectives of the Allies with respect to German and Japanese assets and the Proclaimed List. They have categorized these purposes and objectives as ``economic warfare'' directed against the Swiss economy, a statement so palpably false as to require no comment here. The significant point is that these responsible officials and influential spokesmen, supported by large sections of the Swiss press, choose this time to launch an offensive against our lists and the policy behind the lists. This campaign is mounting in scope and intensity. The conclusion here too is difficult to avoid: the Swiss officials are endeavoring to create a public opinion which will accept as proper and in the interests of Switzerland the failures of the Swiss Government to perform wholly in accordance with the provisions and spirit of the agreements made with the Allies. Meanwhile, the concealment of German assets is facilitated by inadequate enforcement of existing inadequate legislation and Swiss nationals, in direct contravention of the March 8 agreement, are taking title to important German enterprises located here, steps which further complicate the detection of enemy property and the restoration of looted property. Respectfully yours, For the Charge d'Affaires a.i. Daniel J. Reagan, Counselor of Legation for Economic Affairs. ____________________