[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 155 (Friday, November 7, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11957-S11958]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SENATOR BIDEN'S NATO SPEECH
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, our colleague, Senator Joe Biden, addressed
the Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council, the so
called NAC, during their visit to the United States last month. His
speech was an impressive overview of the state of debate here in the
United States on NATO enlargement and how that debate is being affected
the debate in Europe on issues of transatlantic security. Among these
are, of course, the effort to foster reconciliation and peace in the
Balkans.
The next coming months will feature a number of important events
concerning NATO enlargement, including the NAC ministerial in mid-
December which will yield protocols of accession into NATO for Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
Keeping in mind the debate that we will have early next year on NATO
enlargement, I encourage my colleagues to read Senator Binden's
statement. It is one that should also be closely read by our colleagues
in the executive branch.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Biden's
outstanding speech on NATO enlargement be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Ratification of NATO Enlargement by the U.S. Senate
(By Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.)
I am honored by the invitation of the North Atlantic
Council to share my thoughts on the American side of one of
the most important foreign policy decisions that our alliance
has faced for many decades: ratification of the admission of
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to membership in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
First, let me make clear that I am a strong proponent of
NATO enlargement. In the interest of brevity, and because
there is no need to persuade this audience, I will not go
into the details of my rationale.
Let me just say I believe the case for enlargement is
overwhelmingly persuasive. First, it is my belief that the
inclusion of the three aforementioned countries--if they meet
all of NATO's rigid political, military, and economic
criteria--would strengthen the alliance and enhance the
security of the United States.
Second, the consequences if we fail to act are equally
serious. The history of the twentieth century has taught us
that if the United States distances itself from European
affairs, the result on the continent is instability leading
to chaos. Ultimately, dealing with the instability and chaos
will cost far more in blood and treasure than the initial
costs of staying engaged.
Finally, there is the moral factor. As Secretary of State
Albright noted in her testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee:
What possible justification can there be for confirming the
old cold war division of Europe by freezing out the new
democracies east of Germany?
As most of you know, according to the U.S. Constitution,
international treaties must be ratified by a two-thirds
majority in the Senate. In this case, we would be ratifying
an amendment to the Treaty of Washington of 1949. As the
Democratic party's chief foreign policy spokesman in the
Senate, I have the responsibility to lead the fight for
ratification.
Despite what I believe to be the overwhelming logic for
NATO enlargement, ratification will not be easy--it will not
be a ``slam dunk,'' as we say in this country. It will be
considered, not only in the context of national security
policy, but in the context of domestic politics.
And in the context of our debate about engagement versus
isolationism. I know most of you are primarily concerned with
military matters. But I hope you will convey to the civilian
and political leaders in each of your countries the kinds of
issues that could derail ratification in the U.S. Senate--to
the detriment of all of us.
My principal reasons for being cautious about NATO
enlargement revolve around two sides of the same issue:
burden-sharing. The first side relates to sharing the costs
of NATO enlargement; the second side relates to sharing the
military duties in Bosnia.
Contrary to assertions by some European politicians, these
cost and burden-sharing issues are not superficial problems.
They have direct relevance, not only to the ratification of
enlargement, but also to the kind of alliance we will have in
the 21st century.
First the costs. There has been a good deal of publicity in
the United States about three widely differing cost estimates
of NATO enlargement. NATO's own cost-estimate--mandated by
the North Atlantic Council at last July's Madrid summit--will
not be known until just before the December NATO ministerial.
So any firm predictions about how that will come out would be
risky and premature.
Nonetheless, the latest estimate from the Clinton
administration, offered this week in testimony before the
Foreign Relations Committee, was somewhat reassuring. It
appears that the NATO estimate may be somewhat lower than the
Pentagon's earlier study because only three--not four--
countries are to be added to the alliance, and some of their
militaries are in a bit better shape than previously thought.
Whatever the final numbers, the atmospherics of the debate
over cost-sharing since Madrid have been damaging to Trans-
Atlantic solidarity. Public statements from West European
leaders that their countries should not--or even will not--
pay any additional costs for enlargement given potent
ammunition both to neo-isolationists in the U.S. Senate and
to those who favor engagement but who have legitimate
questions about costs.
Although there have been many warnings in the United States
about the possibly huge costs of NATO enlargement, to my
knowledge not a single American politician has said that we
will not pay our share if enlargement is ratified. Yet when
European leaders--before even waiting for the official NATO
cost-study to come out in December--threaten not to pay even
one additional franc or mark for enlargement, it is waving a
red flag in front of my colleagues in the Senate.
Many of my fellow Senators are aware of the fact that West
Europeans face competing priorities. We know that the eleven
European NATO members who are also members of the European
Union are currently engaged in painful budget cutting in
order to meet the criteria for a single currency, the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on January 1, 1999. And we
are aware that Germany and others are insisting that those
countries who qualify be held to rigid fiscal discipline
thereafter through a so-called ``stability pact'' without
``political'' criteria.
[[Page S11958]]
We do not underestimate the political stakes: resentment
against this belt-tightening played a key role in the defeat
of President Chirac's coalition in the French national
elections last June and in the one-day temporary fall of
Prime Minister Prodi's government in Italy earlier this
month. Several other EU member states have also seen anti-
austerity demonstrations.
As a politician, I empathize with the challenge my European
parliamentary colleagues face. But we all have to make
difficult choices. For example, in my country after years of
spirited debate we have finally agreed upon a plan to balance
the Federal budget by the year 2002. In fact, by having taken
extremely painful measures like reducing the civilian Federal
workforce by more than a quarter-million individuals we may
reach a balanced budget even earlier.
So however difficult it may be, if you--our European
allies--want continued American involvement in your security,
to use a baseball metaphor, your governments will have to
``step up to the plate.'' Let me be as frank as I possibly
can: Americans simply must not be led to believe that our
European allies will cut corners on NATO in order to fulfill
their obligations to the European union.
Let me go one step further, if NATO is to remain a vibrant
organization with the United States playing a lead role, when
the alliance cost figures are issued in December, the non-
U.S. members must join the United States in declaring their
willingness to assume their fair share of direct enlargement
costs.
This includes developing the power projection capabilities
to which all alliance members agreed in the ``strategic
concept'' in 1991, before enlargement was even being
seriously discussed. The flexibility afforded by these power
projection enhancements are central to NATO's ability to
carry out its expanded, new mission--to defend our common
ideals beyond our borders, while we continue to carry out the
core function of defending the territory of alliance members.
Some of our European allies--the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, and the Netherlands, in particular--are making
strides in improving the deployability and sustainability of
their forces. But neither their forces, nor those of the rest
of our European partners, are as yet fully deployable.
If our European partners were not to meet these force-
projection obligations--and it was this part of the Pentagon
study that occasioned the loudest criticism from across the
Atlantic--the United States would continue to possess the
only fully deployable and sustainable land and air forces in
the alliance and would therefore be cast in the permanent
role of ``the good gendarme of Europe''--a role that neither
the American people, nor the Senate of the United States,
would accept.
I also would like to comment on the recent call by some
West European defense ministers for counting economic
assistance to Central and Eastern Europe as a substitute for
meeting their countries' current alliance commitments and
their future share of enlargement costs. Their proposal makes
no sense and is totally counter-productive.
First of all, European statistics on economic assistance
typically include healthy components of export credits, tied
aid, and investment, making alleged comparisons with U.S.
assistance one of ``apples versus oranges.'' Thus, the
difference in the amount of economic aid from Western Europe
and from the United States is less significant than some
European politicians would have us believe.
Second, even if Western European economic assistance to the
East since 1990 has exceeded our own, it would be unwise to
consider these contributions as a substitute for obligations
related to NATO's military budget: it would only reinforce
the ``European businessman''/``American gendarme'' syndrome.
It would widen the military gap between the U.S. and the
continent and, not unintentionally, give a comparative
advantage to Western European companies in dealing with the
East on the economic front. We in the United States simply
won't play that game.
Third, and most importantly, such substitution arguments
are ultimately self-defeating for Europe. As many of my
Senate colleagues are eager to point out, if Western Europe
claims security credit for its economic assistance to Eastern
Europe, then the United States can justifiably claim credit
for its worldwide containment of the threat of nuclear
proliferation, for keeping international sea lanes open, and
for guaranteeing continued access to Middle East oil.
To be blunt: I don't think you want us to play that game,
because we can win it hands down.
The real point is that burden-sharing is not a book-keeping
exercise. We would all do well to restrict the NATO burden-
sharing discussion to just that--military burden-sharing in
the alliance.
One other point related to comparative spending on defense:
above and beyond enlargement and power-projection capability,
unless you--our European allies--significantly upgrade your
militaries, particularly in gathering and real-time
processing of information, a ``strategic disconnect'' between
a technologically superior United States military and
outdated Western European militaries will eventually make it
impossible for NATO to function effectively. From several
personal conversations, I believe that this is a worry that
many of you share.
There is a second dark cloud looming on the horizon of
Trans-Atlantic relations. In the spring of 1998, just when
the U.S. Senate is likely to be voting on amending the Treaty
of Washington to accept new members, American SFOR ground
forces are scheduled to be completing their withdrawal from
Bosnia.
As it now stands, our European NATO allies will follow
suit, in line with their ``in together, out together''
policy, despite a U.S. offer to make our air, naval,
communications, and intelligence assets available to a
European-led follow-on force, with an American rapid reaction
force on standby alert ``over the horizon'' in Hungary or
Italy.
My colleagues in the Senate have listened carefully as some
European NATO members, led by France, call for more European
leadership in the alliance and for a sturdier ``European
pillar'' in NATO. But when they hear those same European
voices say they will refuse to maintain troops in Bosnia
without U.S. participation, it sounds like unfair burden-
sharing and it only reinforces their doubts about NATO
itself. After all, if Bosnia is the prototypical crisis
the alliance will face in the next century, and internal
squabbling prevents it from dealing effectively with
Bosnia now, even staunch NATO supporters will be hard-
pressed to defend its continued relevance.
France's position on Bosnia is particularly irritating when
one considers its insistence on European command of Allied
Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples, the home of the
U.S. Sixth Fleet. No matter how Paris tries to dress it up,
this demand is perceived by U.S. Senators as a gratuitous
poke in the eye. Not only is this idea a non-starter, it
simply poisons the Trans-Atlantic atmosphere.
As many of you may know, I have been deeply involved in our
policy toward Bosnia since 1991. My own personal view is that
it was unwise to have set a June 1998 date for SFOR's
withdrawal and that the United States should agree to a
scaled-down ground force in Bosnia beyond that date, with
Europeans comprising the overwhelming majority of the ground
forces. In short, a C.J.T.F. (combined joint task force), but
one in which the United States has at least some forces
present in all its components.
But whatever the final mix of post-SFOR forces, it is
essential that we settle this issue this fall in order for an
orderely redeployment to take place and to clear the air for
the parliamentary debates on NATO enlargement. Time is
running short.
Let me sum up by giving you my prognosis for ratification
of NATO enlargement in the U.S. Senate. The debate has
already begun and will continue to be lively. In the end, I
believe it will be very difficult for most of my colleagues
to vote against admitting the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians
if the final accession negotiations reveal that they are
qualified for membership.
But I also believe that unless the United States quickly
comes to a satisfactory burden-sharing understanding with our
European and Canadian allies, the future of NATO in the next
century will be very much in doubt.
In that context, an advance European declaration of
willingness to share fairly in the enlargement costs that
NATO will announce in December, and a spirit of compromise on
a post-SFOR force for Bosnia, would considerably enhance the
chances for ratification of NATO enlargement by the U.S.
Senate.
Together we can enlarge and strengthen NATO, but only if we
fairly share the burden of meeting the challenges of the
twenty-first century.
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