[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 36 (Monday, April 4, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3115-S3119]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CHINA'S SPREADING GLOBAL INFLUENCE
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, as I have done many times before on this
floor, I rise to address a national security issue of the highest
importance, one that demands our utmost attention. I wish to alert this
body and the American people to China's spreading global influence and
the imminent threat this poses to our national security.
Our past concerns have come to fruition on all levels--economically,
militarily, and ideologically. We are on a collision course. As I will
detail, China has become a progressive danger we can no longer afford
to overlook. As I said, this is not new. Over the years I have made
numerous remarks on the Senate floor regarding our national security
and China.
During the Clinton administration, there were growing concerns about
Chinese espionage, which were later confirmed in the Cox report. The
report showed that reality surpassed our worst fears. China had been
stealing U.S. nuclear secrets. The W-88 warhead, with which we are all
familiar, was the crown jewel of our nuclear program which allowed for
up to 10 nuclear warheads to be attached to the same missile. In 1995,
we discovered that China had stolen this technology.
Under President Clinton, U.S. companies such as Loral Space and
Communications and Hughes Electronics were given the green light to
improve the precision and reliability of China's satellites and their
nuclear missiles, undoing 50 years of technology export restrictions.
China also gained the capability of accurately reaching the continental
United States with nuclear missiles and targeted between 13 and 18 U.S.
cities. All of this occurred while President Clinton proclaimed ``not
one missile is pointed at American children.'' This body responded by
investigating to what extent we were lied to and our security was
compromised, but ultimately nothing changed.
From those events, the Chinese Government learned that it could rely
on our acquiescence and charged ahead. China transferred prohibited
weapons technology to North Korea, Pakistan, Libya, Iraq, Iran, Syria,
and other countries. China threatened to absorb Taiwan and intimidated
our regional treaty allies, South Korea and Japan.
That was 5 years ago. Since then we have had a new administration and
have gone through such major events as 9/11, the current conflict in
Iraq, and an ideological shift in the way we fight war. I wish I could
say that with the new administration China's conduct has changed.
President Bush has taken some steps in the right direction, notably
rejuvenating the missile defense system; however, I am afraid that
transpiring events tell a different story.
Since 2000, the United States-China Security Economic Review
Commission has been holding hearings and issuing annual reports to
evaluate ``the national security implications of the bilateral trade
and economic relationship between the United States and the People's
Republic of China.'' Congress established the Commission to act as the
bipartisan authority on how our relationship with China affects our
economy, industrial base, China's military and weapons proliferation,
and our influence in Asia. I fear their reports have gone largely
unnoticed. It is remarkable they have gone unnoticed as significant as
they were.
In a most recent report, dated June of 2004, less than a year ago,
the Commission makes this alarming opening statement. This is a
bipartisan report:
Based on our analyses to date, as documented in detail in
our report, the Commission believes that a number of the
current trends in U.S.-China relations have negative
implications for our long-term economic and national security
interests and therefore that U.S. policies in these areas are
in need of urgent attention and course corrections.
As the report and recent events show, China has continued on an
alarming course in conflict with our national security.
Last January, the Bush administration imposed sanctions against eight
large Chinese companies for aiding Iraq's missile program and
transferring technology to other problematic countries. There was no
public announcement, and the only reason we know about this is that
some Sino-American Web sites came across this information on page 133
in the Federal Register. Last December, four companies were sanctioned
for the same reason. Many other examples can be cited from 2004, with
some of these companies being repeatedly penalized for more than a
decade. The fact is that China has repeatedly vowed to curb its weapons
sales and has gone back on its promises. This has been going on for
some time. I spoke of this on the Senate floor on June 23, 1999.
Beijing made nonproliferation commitments in 1992, 1994, 1998, 2000,
and most recently in 2002. The U.S. State Department admits these
guarantees came about ``only under the imminent threat, or in response
to the actual imposition, of sanctions.''
The Commission report comments on China's continued assistance to
countries such as Libya, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. This
assistance has continued despite nonproliferation assurances as the
report outlines. Keep in mind, they have agreed to all these
agreements, and yet the report says:
China's assistance to weapons of mass destruction-related
programs in countries of concern continues despite repeated
promises to end such activities and the repeated imposition
of U.S. sanctions. The Chinese Government and Chinese
enterprises have assisted such states to develop their
nuclear infrastructure, chemical weapons capabilities, and/or
ballistic missile systems notwithstanding a consistent
history of denials. Libya's decision to open up its weapons
of mass destruction programs and the revelations by Pakistan
that A.Q. Khan supplied uranium enrichment technology to
Libya, Iran, and North Korea, provides new insight into
China's legacy of proliferation. China's continued failure to
adequately curb its proliferation practices poses significant
national security concerns to the United States.
Again, this is not new. As I stated on the floor on March 15, 1999,
China has been stealing our nuclear secrets, but, as the Commission
points out, China is now sharing its nuclear knowledge--some of it is
quite possibly ours--with other countries. For years China has
transferred ballistic and cruise missile technology to countries with
troubling proliferation records, but these transfers have evolved to
become even more problematic.
Again I quote from the bipartisan Commission that spent 4 years
studying this relationship:
. . . Chinese transfers have evolved from sales of complete
missile systems, to exports of largely-dual use nuclear,
chemical, and missile components and technologies . . .
Recent activities ``have aggravated trends that result in
ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer
range missiles, and secondary proliferation.'' Continuing
intelligence reports indicate that the Chinese cooperation
with Pakistan and Iran remains an integral element of China's
foreign policy . . . Beijing's failure to control such
transfers gives the appearance that these are allowed in
accordance with an unstated national policy. China has
generally tried to avoid making fundamental changes in its
transfer policies by offering the United States carefully
worded commitments or exploiting differences between
agreements.
As further evidence of this disturbing proliferation, the CIA report
to Congress in mid-2003 said that ``firms in China provided dual-use
missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to . . .
countries of proliferation concern such as Iran, Libya, and North
Korea.''
Virtually every country we worry about possesses or has access to
some form of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon, but most lack
effective delivery systems. China is a proven violator of
nonproliferation treaties that keep such countries from gaining access
to delivery system technology. According to State Department testimony,
China has a ``serial proliferation problem,'' and while the official
line is to crack down on weapons trade, ``reality has been quite
different.'' In her January Senate confirmation hearings, Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice listed six countries as ``outposts of tyranny.''
China has strong ties to four of these. They are Cuba, Burma, North
Korea, and Iran.
[[Page S3116]]
Recently, Iran has been in the headlines because of its support for
terrorism, threatening posture, and nuclear program. China supplying
them with weapons technology is similar to the role the Soviet Union
played in the Cuban missile crisis. It is probably worse because at
least in Cuba, the U.S.S.R. maintained control of the weapons and
technology. On the other hand, China is fully willing to proliferate
regardless of the consequences. Some say the real issue is with private
companies and Beijing does not have knowledge of what is going on.
With the delicate situation in North Korea, the Bush administration
is holding that line. But the fact remains that at the very least, the
Chinese Government is negligent in deterring such proliferation and
apparently does not feel any pressure to do so. However, as some of
these companies are closely linked with the Chinese military, it is
clear that the government is not so ignorant as we may like to imagine.
This continued proliferation in the face of intense pressure to stop
makes me ask the question: What is China getting in return? China seems
to proliferate with countries that have been terrorist sponsors, such
as Iran, Iraq, and Libya. These countries offer China something they
desperately need, and that is oil. That is what is significant.
Energy is a major problem facing China, which ranks No. 2 in the
world for consumption. This is very interesting because right now we
have been talking about the fact we have a very serious problem in not
having an energy policy, not being able to pass an energy bill--it has
been killed by people who think we do not need to run this great
machine called America.
Since my floor speeches in 1999, China's oil imports have doubled and
surged upwards of 57 percent in the last year alone. I have a chart
that shows what could very well happen in the future. This chart starts
in 1990 and goes to 2025 and shows what China's projected oil
production versus consumption is. The red line is consumption. The
green line is production. We can see they do not have production. They
have to get production from someplace. That is something to which we
should be most sensitive. China's oil production is topped out while
its demand continues to rise at an alarming pace. Some analysts project
China's oil needs will double again by 2010, and it will use its
reserves within 14 years. This information is from International Energy
Outlook of 2004. We believe this to be accurate.
China's alarming need for oil has caused it to look around to the
world for new sources, sources that are often problematic states with
security concerns to the United States. The Commission makes an
unpopular but straightforward observation. I am going to quote this
very significant statement out of the Commission report:
This need for energy security may help explain Beijing's
history of assistance to terrorist-sponsoring states with
various forms of weapons of mass destruction-related items
and technical assistance, even in the face of U.S. sanctions.
But this pursuit of oil diplomacy may support objectives
beyond just energy supply. Beijing's bilateral arrangements
with oil-rich Middle Eastern states also helped create
diplomatic and strategic alliances with countries that were
hostile to the United States. For example, with U.S.
interests precluded from entering Iran, China may hope to
achieve a long-term competitive advantage relative to the
United States.
Over time, Beijing's relationship-building may counter U.S.
power and enhance Beijing's ability to influence political
and military outcomes. One of Beijing's stated goals is to
reduce what it considers U.S. superpower dominance in favor
of a multipolar global power structure in which China attains
superpower status on par with the United States.
In Venezuela, anti-American President Hugo Chavez announced a $3
billion trade strategy with China, including provision for oil and gas.
Army GEN Bantz Craddock, who heads the United States Southern Command,
stated that China is increasing its influence in South America, filling
a vacuum left by the United States.
In his March 9 House testimony, General Craddock called China's
progressive interest in the region ``an emerging dynamic that could not
be ignored.''
I have been traveling to Africa for many years. The Chinese are
everywhere. I just got back last night from Africa. I saw a conference
building being constructed, given to them free, from China, and we know
what kind of relationship that gives them. I saw a conference center
being constructed in the Congo. I saw a large sports stadium. Both were
donated by the Chinese. China has been expanding its influence
throughout Africa with projects like this.
One saying I heard was: The U.S. tells you what you need, but China
gives you what you want.
Has China suddenly become compassionate and generous? I think the
fact that these countries have large oil and mineral deposits paints a
real picture.
In the Middle East, Beijing recently signed a $70 billion oil and gas
deal with Iran from which it receives 14 percent of its oil imports.
Naturally, China has come out firmly against the U.N. Security Council
holding Iran economically accountable for its nuclear program.
I was just in Sudan 2 days ago. Likewise in Sudan, China seeks to
diffuse or delay any U.N. sanctions against Khartoum. It hardly seems
coincidental that 7 percent of its oil imports comes from that
conflict-stricken country, a supply that China seems ready to protect.
At this point, I will pause and tell my colleagues the experience we
had just 2 days ago in that area in Uganda, just across the Sudan
border. We were working with President Museveni. We actually went up to
the area called Gulu, which is right on the Sudan border where the
terrorists are coming across maiming children, cutting their limbs and
their lips off. It is horrible. It is beyond description. I do not
think there has been anything like that since the Holocaust. Yet China
is supporting that group.
Not only are they willing to use the U.N. to safeguard its energy
sources but also its regional influence. This is not new. In 2003, the
United States spearheaded the proliferation security initiative as a
multilateral weapons of mass destruction interdiction strategy. The
initiative has proven effective, particularly in the interception of
centrifuge parts bound for Libya. The Bush administration believes this
success was a major reason Libya peacefully ended its nuclear program.
Major European and Asian countries have joined and China was invited
to participate and refused, citing dubious concerns about the delicate
situation in North Korea. To quote the Commission:
China appears to be working through the United Nations to
not only undermine the initiative but also to render it
globally ineffective. This has been accomplished by getting
the United States to drop a provision on the interdiction of
foreign vessels carrying banned weapons on the high seas.
I think it is worth repeating what the Commission statement said:
One of Beijing's stated goals is to reduce what it
considers U.S. superpower dominance in favor of multipolar
global power structure in which China attains superpower
status on par with the United States.
The tense situation in Taiwan continues to simmer. A few days ago,
the Chinese Communist Party formalized a new stance on Taiwan. The
following was approved by the National People's Congress:
If possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be
completely exhausted, the state shall employ nonpeaceful
means and other necessary measures to protect China's
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
This represents a change from earlier ambiguous language that would
have allowed China flexibility to consider other options should a
conflict arise. As it is, China has taken away its alternatives.
This is a direct threat. The Chinese are solidifying and increasing
their presence in east Asia. When not using overt political influence,
they are expanding economically.
As political economist Francis Fukuyama observed:
The Chinese [have been] gearing up a series of multilateral
initiatives of their own, including Asean Plus One, Asean
Plus Three, a China-Asean Free Trade Area, a Northeast Asian
Free Trade Area and so on in seemingly endless profusion.
The purpose of these proposals, it seems fairly clear in
retrospect, was to allay fears of China's growing economic
power by offering selective trade concessions to various
Chinese neighbors. The Chinese greased the path to the East
Asian Summit last December by offering its Asean neighbors a
free trade agreement that would open access to much of the
Chinese market by 2010.
Asean Plus Three appears to be a weak and innocuous
organization. But the Chinese
[[Page S3117]]
know what they are doing: Over the long run, they want to
organize East Asia in a way that puts them in the center of
regional politics.
China is also expanding militarily. Their string of pearls strategy
includes a listening post in Pakistan, billions of dollars in military
aid to Burma, military training and equipment to Cambodia, increased
naval activities in the South China Sea, and expanding cooperation with
Thailand and Bangladesh.
The purpose of this strategy is to create a military corridor for the
Middle East to mainland China that would be impervious to any potential
American oil embargo. As a recent internal Pentagon report outlines:
China . . . is not looking only to build a blue-water navy
to control the sea lanes, but also to develop undersea mines
and missile capabilities to deter the potential disruption of
its energy supplies from potential threats, including the
U.S. Navy, especially in the case of a conflict with Taiwan.
The weapons in which China is investing include cruise missiles,
submarines, long-range target acquisition systems, specifically cutting
edge satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, and the advanced SU-30
fighter aircraft, and I have to pause at this moment and say something
about someone to this day I still think is a real American hero, GEN
John Jumper, the Chief of the Air Force. Back before he was in that
position in the late 1990s--I believe it was 1998--he had the courage
to stand up and publicly say something, and it certainly was not
endorsed or wanted by the Clinton administration, but he said we have
to do something. We have stopped our modernization program so now
Russia is selling tactical vehicles, air vehicles, that are better than
our fighters. He is talking about the SU-30 series, better than our F-
15s and F-16s.
There are a lot of people who do not want us to advance militarily
and be No. 1 and give our troops and our airmen the very best
equipment. There are people who are trying to keep us from developing
the F-22 and the joint strike fighter so that we again will gain
superiority. Right now we do not have it.
China has bought in one purchase, and this has been several years
ago, 240 of the SU-30s and probably a lot more, but that is what we
found out. The new intelligence report states that China has
accelerated its amphibious assault ship production. It plans to build
23 new boats capable of ferrying tanks and troops across the Taiwan
Strait. This development is potentially destabilizing and has alarming
implications.
We have to keep in mind they now are buying this capability to get
across to Taiwan after for the first time coming out and directly
threatening Taiwan.
A further concern is China's investment in nuclear submarines. It
recently launched the type 094 class, the first capable of striking the
continental United States with nuclear missiles from its own waters. It
can strike the United States of America from its own waters. They have
launched this class of a nuclear missile--or the ability to deploy it.
China has also been developing the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic
missile, expected to have a range of 4,600 miles. These represent a
departure from traditional Chinese deterrent strategies. They have
little tactical purposes. They will not be used in a regional battle.
Rather, their importance is strategic.
China has modernized its military at an unprecedented rate. According
to testimony from Dr. Evan Medeiros of the RAND Corporation, between
1990 and 2002 China's official defense budget for weapons procurement
grew approximately 1,000 percent. That is 1,000 percent in a 12-year
period. Nearly every year since 1997 has seen a defense budget increase
of 13 percent, an increase far above China's GDP growth average of 8.2
percent for those same years.
In comparison, President Bush's fiscal year 2005 budget increase in
defense spending is 4.8 percent. Keep in mind, we are currently engaged
in two major operations and numerous smaller ones as part of the global
war on terror. Yet this is just China's officially announced defense
budget.
The Commission and the Defense Department assess:
The PLA defense budget is grossly underreported and that
official figures exclude much of China's military
modernization program.
So when we are talking about what China is putting into their
military program, we recognize that this may be 50 percent of what they
are really putting in it because we have no way of knowing.
Our intelligence does show in an unclassified form that they are
doing a lot more than the reports they send out. The Commission
estimates the actual defense budget is two to three times the stated
amount.
In the midst of this ominous military expansion, the European Union
is planning on lifting its arms embargo against China. The embargo was
put in place after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre to reflect
China's appalling human rights record. The European Union claims the
embargo is no longer effective but ignores the obvious. Why lift the
embargo without replacing it with a better one?
Their solution, an informal code of conduct, allows for no
comprehensive enforcement. Without uniform and enforceable standards,
competent European firms will be left to themselves to determine
acceptable arms sales. Even with the embargo, Europe's sales to China
recently doubled this past year to a half billion dollars.
Underneath all of the semantics, the EU appears to have more to gain
in Euros than by maintaining what principled respect for human rights
it once had. Any weapons technology China buys will only add to its
leverage against Taiwan and our other Asian allies. If the embargo is
lifted, Europe and Russia will be in competition to sell China
increasingly higher technologies. We can also expect the EU technology
to proliferate beyond China's borders to states that would gladly use
it against the United States. The EU does not consider this a strategic
threat.
The United States-China Commission report observes, however:
Access to more advanced systems and integrating
technologies from Europe would have a much more dramatic
impact on overall Chinese capabilities today than say five or
ten years ago. For fourteen years China has been unable to
acquire systems from the West. Analysts believe a resumption
of EU arms sales to China would dramatically enhance China's
military capability. If the EU arms embargo against China is
lifted, the U.S. military could be placed in a situation
where it is defending itself against arms sold to the PLA by
NATO allies.
With all the other problems that we have had recently with some of
our multinational groups, this is really not surprising.
Imagine, we share military technology with our European allies and
then find our security threatened and possibly our servicemen killed by
this same technology. We cannot allow for this potential to exist.
Because of China's centralized economy, economic issues are
irrevocably intertwined with security implications. The Commission
reports:
The Chinese government has selectively chosen firms--
predominantly State-owned enterprises, SOEs--to list on
international capital markets . . . Many SOEs were previously
controlled by the People's Liberation Army, PLA, and there is
concern that unofficial links to the PLA remain intact after
privatization . . . As of 2002, more than three-quarters of
companies listed as A shares in China's capital market are
State-controlled. These include known proliferators such as
NORINCO, which was sanctioned by the U.S. Government on four
separate occasions in 2003 for offenses including missile
proliferation and sales of equipment or expertise to Iran
that could be used in a WMD or cruise or ballistic missile
program.
Chinese firms lack adequate disclosure; as the case of NORINCO
demonstrates, American investors may unwittingly be supporting
companies that oppose our national security.
One company, China National Nuclear Corporation--CNNC--is currently
slotted to receive $5 billion from the U.S. Export Import Bank to build
nuclear power plants in China. However, there are two problems: first,
this company was discovered to be sending Pakistan prohibited materials
that weaponize uranium. Sanctions were imposed for 1 month and removed.
Later that same year, a subsidiary of CNNC was discovered to be selling
more illegal materials to Pakistan. Connections have also been made to
Iran's weapon program. Second, because the Export-Import Bank of the
United States supplies the credit, the U.S. Treasury will have to back
this loan, either by direct payment or guarantee. Ultimately, American
taxpayers
[[Page S3118]]
will be aiding a Chinese company that is a known proliferator. I look
at these things and ask why doesn't that bother anybody? Nobody is
talking about it.
Another issue is China's purchasing of U.S. companies. On March 9,
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States--CFIUS--
approved China's Lenovo Group buying IBM's PC business. The $1.75
billion deal creates the third largest PC maker in the world. The
problem is that there is potential for Chinese computer experts to use
this as a base for espionage. Some say that this is ridiculous; that
China could never use IBM networks that way. I would ask that they
consider not only the immediate situation but also China's track
record. As a side note, I believe that CFIUS does not apply a broad
enough conception of U.S. security. I understand that Representatives
Hyde, Hunter and Manzullo expressed similar views in a January letter
to Treasury Secretary John Snow, the chairman of CFIUS.
One example of CFIUS falling short is with Magnequench International
Incorporated. In 1995, Chinese corporations bought GM's Magnequench, a
supplier of rare earth metals used in the guidance systems of smart-
bombs. For over 12 years, the company has been moved piecemeal to
mainland China, leaving the U.S. with no domestic supplier of
neodymium, a critical component of rare-earth magnets. CFIUS approved
this transfer. The problem takes a unique twist, as Nathan Tabor of The
Conservative Voice outlines:
China [has] become the dominant supplier of rare-earth
elements, also called lanthanides. But in the U.S., owners of
the Mountain Pass mine in California, one of the finest rare-
earth deposits in the world, have been spending millions of
dollars over many years to resolve an environmental complaint
that processing the element threatens the habitat of the
desert tortoise.
This is something that has restricted some of our activities.
Dependence on outsourcing has the potential to be a paralyzing
problem in time of war. During the current Iraq conflict, Switzerland
stopped shipments of smart-bomb components to the U.S. because it
disagreed with our role. As more and more of our military equipment is
outsourced, we have become dangerously dependent on the whims of
foreign countries. Current law requires only 50 percent of defense
equipment be American-made. When Representative Duncan Hunter tried to
raise this to 65 percent, defense contractors told him that it would
force them out of the market.
Information technology is also leaving our borders at an alarming
rate. John Chambers, the CEO of CISCO Systems, said:
China will become the IT center of the world, and we can
have a healthy discussion about whether that's in 2020 or
2040. What we're trying to do is outline an entire strategy
of becoming a Chinese company.
However, this technology transfer can also have a darker side. The
Commission report states:
U.S. advanced technology and technological expertise is
transferred to China in a number of ways, both legal and
illegal, including through U.S. invested firms and research
centers in China, Chinese investments in the United States,
bilateral science and technology cooperative programs, and
Chinese students and researchers who return home following
their work and study at U.S. universities and research
institutes.
In a previous speech that I gave on China, on June 23, 1999, I called
attention to China's covert stealing of our technology. The FBI is
currently investigating numerous instances of alleged industrial
espionage; over 3,000 companies in the U.S. are suspected of supplying
illegal technology and collecting information for China. Such cases are
major problems in industrial centers like Silicon Valley where
espionage investigations linked with China have increased 20 to 30
percent annually.
Most recently, the Bush administration is investigating whether China
has illegally altered legitimate U.S. exports for military use. One
instance of this is U.S.-made Boeing 737 jetliner being modified to
have military capabilities. Experts believe that China is using the
aircraft to monitor tests of its long-range cruise missile similar to
our Navy Tomahawk. Such a missile would be capable of delivering long-
range conventional or nuclear payloads.
Whether it is military or economic expansionism, human rights,
illegal proliferation or outright stealing of military technology,
China has continued to defy the U.S. and the world unabated and
unchallenged.
Let me repeat what concerns me, and apparently the U.S.-China
Commission, about China:
No. 1, eight major Chinese companies, some of which are directly
connected with the military, were sanctioned last January for illegally
selling weapons technology to countries including Iran. This is only
one example of an ongoing and grave strategic problem. It is a problem
we cannot afford to tolerate.
No. 2, China has been modernizing and expanding its military to
reduce any leverage we may have in a conflict situation, particularly
over Taiwan. They have been stealing or developing highly advanced
technology, including nuclear warhead designs and technology that would
enable them to reach the continental U.S.
No. 3, skyrocketing energy consumption is a major problem for China
and a potential conflict with us. It is drawing the PRC into
cooperation with Iran and other problematic states. These bilateral
arrangements improperly influence Chinese action the U.N., and in some
cases may involve illegal weapons transfers. You can see from this
chart behind me that China has to do something. Look at their energy
requirements. They are doing it today.
No. 4, the European Union is projected to lift its arms embargo on
China by this summer, an embargo that was meant to pressure China to
improve its human rights record. That record has not improved. Europe
has also failed to address the question: What country will China most
likely use the new European technology against? It is ultimately the
United States.
No. 5, despite Justice Department and Homeland Security concerns,
China's Lenovo Group is taking over IBM's PC manufacturing business,
based in North Carolina. This is revealing of a distressing trend that
threatens the U.S. industrial base. Our practice of outsourcing
military equipment is also of deep concern.
No. 6, China continues to repress religious and human rights, and
intimidate our Asian allies while expanding their influence in areas
like South America and Africa. The recent Taiwanese ``anti-secession''
bill is further evidence of this hegemonic outlook.
No. 7, according to the FBI, cases of Chinese espionage in the States
are increasing at 30 percent annually in some places. Civil aircraft
that the U.S. sold to China appear to be outfitted with military
surveillance equipment. Revelation of such activities garners few
headlines because this behavior is nothing new. They have been doing it
for a long time and no one seems to care.
Indeed, we are used to this pattern and have become all too
complacent about it. Scolding the Chinese for their disregard for
proliferation treaties, while providing them unprecedented economic
benefits is at best a bizarre foreign policy. We must link China's
trading privileges with its human rights record and its conduct abroad,
including its weapons proliferation. As China's No. 1 importing
customer, accounting for 35 percent of total Chinese exports, we have
the influence. I agree that the way we handle an emerging China must be
dynamic, but it must not be weak. As the Commission report concludes:
We need to use our substantial leverage to develop an
architecture that will help avoid conflict, attempt to build
cooperative practices and institutions, and advance both
countries' long-term interests. The United States has the
leverage now and perhaps for the next decade, but this may
not always be the case. We also must recognize the impact of
these trends directly on the domestic U.S. economy, and
develop and adopt policies that ensure that our actions do
not undermine our economic interests . . . the United States
cannot lose sight of these important goals, and must
configure its policies toward China to help make the
materialize . . . If we falter in the use of our economic and
political influence now to effect positive change in China,
we will have squandered an historic opportunity . . . China
will likely not initiate the decisive measures toward more
meaningful economic and political reform without substantial,
sustained, and increased pressure from the United States.
There is an inherent tension between drawing China to freedom through
relaxed policies, and a vital need to protect U.S. security. I fear we
have conceded far too much and contributed to the emergence of a very
real threat.
[[Page S3119]]
Finally, I wish to applaud the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission. Their efforts to provide this body with a clear
picture of a very complex and multifaceted situation have been
illuminating and challenge us to face these real problems. Thank you
for your hard work.
The Chinese have something called an idiom, a four-character phrase
that is sometimes used to simplify a complex thought. I would borrow
one to describe the current situation: ``One who obeys on the surface
but not from one's heart.'' Unless our relationship with China is
backed up with strong action they will never take us seriously. We will
certainly see more violations of proliferation treaties and in the
context of the growing threat of terrorism. That is unacceptable. We
have also ignored the danger that China is becoming in its own right.
Some think that I am alarmist. If China breaks its consistent pattern
of human rights abuses, military and economic expansionism, and illegal
weapons proliferation, I am prepared to concede my concerns are
unfounded. But I fear that the next few years will continue to confirm
an obvious trend. The time to act is now, before the problem is beyond
the realm of policy. We urgently need a coherent strategy for dealing
with China, one that allows room for China's changing role without
sacrificing our national security and other interests.
As I have demonstrated, we are on a collision course with China on
all levels: economically, militarily, and ideologically. The situation
has only worsened since my previous floor speeches about China in 1999.
We are two trains accelerating in different directions on the same
track. After the last decade I think we have seen that appeasement
doesn't work; it's time to deal in a very real way with our unpaid
bills.
I often think about the appeasement policies we sometimes have
against these countries.
I think it was Horace Mann who said:
No man survives when freedom fails. The best men rot in
filthy jails. Those who cried ``appease, appease'' are hanged
by those they try to please.
I am afraid that pretty well describes our relationship with China.
I hope this debate will awaken the American people to the real threat
China poses. To that end, I intend to deliver several more talks
highlighting the United States-China Commission's report and will
introduce a resolution to formally adopt the Commission's
recommendation.
I remember so well back when I was critical of the Clinton
administration in the very opening months of that administration in the
early 1990s when one of the first things they did at our energy
laboratories was to intentionally lower our security policy. They did
away with background checks. They did away with the color-coded
security badges to demonstrate on site what level of security an
individual could have. They did away with some of the FBI checks. I was
very disturbed. That was over 10 years ago. We knew this was coming,
and now it is here. It is time for us to take a different policy to
China.
With that, I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be permitted to
speak for up to 30 minutes after the distinguished Senator from
Massachusetts.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I understand we are in morning business.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator is correct. The Senator
should also be reminded he currently has a 10-minute time limit.
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