[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 73 (Wednesday, May 13, 2015)]
[House]
[Pages H2901-H2923]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY FULFILLING RIGHTS AND ENSURING
EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE OVER MONITORING ACT OF 2015
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 255, I call
up the bill (H.R. 2048) to reform the authorities of the Federal
Government to require the production of certain business records,
conduct electronic surveillance, use pen registers and trap and trace
devices, and use other forms of information gathering for foreign
intelligence, counterterrorism, and criminal purposes, and for other
purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 255, the
amendment printed in part B of House Report 114-111 is adopted, and the
bill, as amended, is considered read.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:
H.R. 2048
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
[[Page H2902]]
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Uniting
and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring
Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015'' or the
``USA FREEDOM Act of 2015''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978.
TITLE I--FISA BUSINESS RECORDS REFORMS
Sec. 101. Additional requirements for call detail records.
Sec. 102. Emergency authority.
Sec. 103. Prohibition on bulk collection of tangible things.
Sec. 104. Judicial review.
Sec. 105. Liability protection.
Sec. 106. Compensation for assistance.
Sec. 107. Definitions.
Sec. 108. Inspector General reports on business records orders.
Sec. 109. Effective date.
Sec. 110. Rule of construction.
TITLE II--FISA PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE REFORM
Sec. 201. Prohibition on bulk collection.
Sec. 202. Privacy procedures.
TITLE III--FISA ACQUISITIONS TARGETING PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED
STATES REFORMS
Sec. 301. Limits on use of unlawfully obtained information.
TITLE IV--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT REFORMS
Sec. 401. Appointment of amicus curiae.
Sec. 402. Declassification of decisions, orders, and opinions.
TITLE V--NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER REFORM
Sec. 501. Prohibition on bulk collection.
Sec. 502. Limitations on disclosure of national security letters.
Sec. 503. Judicial review.
TITLE VI--FISA TRANSPARENCY AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Sec. 601. Additional reporting on orders requiring production of
business records; business records compliance reports to
Congress.
Sec. 602. Annual reports by the Government.
Sec. 603. Public reporting by persons subject to FISA orders.
Sec. 604. Reporting requirements for decisions, orders, and opinions of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.
Sec. 605. Submission of reports under FISA.
TITLE VII--ENHANCED NATIONAL SECURITY PROVISIONS
Sec. 701. Emergencies involving non-United States persons.
Sec. 702. Preservation of treatment of non-United States persons
traveling outside the United States as agents of foreign
powers.
Sec. 703. Improvement to investigations of international proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction.
Sec. 704. Increase in penalties for material support of foreign
terrorist organizations.
Sec. 705. Sunsets.
TITLE VIII--SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM
CONVENTIONS IMPLEMENTATION
Subtitle A--Safety of Maritime Navigation
Sec. 801. Amendment to section 2280 of title 18, United States Code.
Sec. 802. New section 2280a of title 18, United States Code.
Sec. 803. Amendments to section 2281 of title 18, United States Code.
Sec. 804. New section 2281a of title 18, United States Code.
Sec. 805. Ancillary measure.
Subtitle B--Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism
Sec. 811. New section 2332i of title 18, United States Code.
Sec. 812. Amendment to section 831 of title 18, United States Code.
SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT OF 1978.
Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in this
Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an
amendment to, or a repeal of, a section or other provision,
the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or
other provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
TITLE I--FISA BUSINESS RECORDS REFORMS
SEC. 101. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CALL DETAIL RECORDS.
(a) Application.--Section 501(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1861(b)(2))
is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking ``a
statement'' and inserting ``in the case of an application
other than an application described in subparagraph (C)
(including an application for the production of call detail
records other than in the manner described in subparagraph
(C)), a statement''; and
(B) in clause (iii), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as
subparagraphs (B) and (D), respectively; and
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) (as so
redesignated) the following new subparagraph:
``(C) in the case of an application for the production on
an ongoing basis of call detail records created before, on,
or after the date of the application relating to an
authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment)
conducted in accordance with subsection (a)(2) to protect
against international terrorism, a statement of facts showing
that--
``(i) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the call
detail records sought to be produced based on the specific
selection term required under subparagraph (A) are relevant
to such investigation; and
``(ii) there is a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
such specific selection term is associated with a foreign
power engaged in international terrorism or activities in
preparation therefor, or an agent of a foreign power engaged
in international terrorism or activities in preparation
therefor; and''.
(b) Order.--Section 501(c)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1861(c)(2)) is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(2) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(F) in the case of an application described in subsection
(b)(2)(C), shall--
``(i) authorize the production on a daily basis of call
detail records for a period not to exceed 180 days;
``(ii) provide that an order for such production may be
extended upon application under subsection (b) and the
judicial finding under paragraph (1) of this subsection;
``(iii) provide that the Government may require the prompt
production of a first set of call detail records using the
specific selection term that satisfies the standard required
under subsection (b)(2)(C)(ii);
``(iv) provide that the Government may require the prompt
production of a second set of call detail records using
session-identifying information or a telephone calling card
number identified by the specific selection term used to
produce call detail records under clause (iii);
``(v) provide that, when produced, such records be in a
form that will be useful to the Government;
``(vi) direct each person the Government directs to produce
call detail records under the order to furnish the Government
forthwith all information, facilities, or technical
assistance necessary to accomplish the production in such a
manner as will protect the secrecy of the production and
produce a minimum of interference with the services that such
person is providing to each subject of the production; and
``(vii) direct the Government to--
``(I) adopt minimization procedures that require the prompt
destruction of all call detail records produced under the
order that the Government determines are not foreign
intelligence information; and
``(II) destroy all call detail records produced under the
order as prescribed by such procedures.''.
SEC. 102. EMERGENCY AUTHORITY.
(a) Authority.--Section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsections:
``(i) Emergency Authority for Production of Tangible
Things.--
``(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section,
the Attorney General may require the emergency production of
tangible things if the Attorney General--
``(A) reasonably determines that an emergency situation
requires the production of tangible things before an order
authorizing such production can with due diligence be
obtained;
``(B) reasonably determines that the factual basis for the
issuance of an order under this section to approve such
production of tangible things exists;
``(C) informs, either personally or through a designee, a
judge having jurisdiction under this section at the time the
Attorney General requires the emergency production of
tangible things that the decision has been made to employ the
authority under this subsection; and
``(D) makes an application in accordance with this section
to a judge having jurisdiction under this section as soon as
practicable, but not later than 7 days after the Attorney
General requires the emergency production of tangible things
under this subsection.
``(2) If the Attorney General requires the emergency
production of tangible things under paragraph (1), the
Attorney General shall require that the minimization
procedures required by this section for the issuance of a
judicial order be followed.
``(3) In the absence of a judicial order approving the
production of tangible things under this subsection, the
production shall terminate when the information sought is
obtained, when the application for the order is denied, or
after the expiration of 7 days from the time the Attorney
General begins requiring the emergency production of such
tangible things, whichever is earliest.
``(4) A denial of the application made under this
subsection may be reviewed as provided in section 103.
``(5) If such application for approval is denied, or in any
other case where the production of tangible things is
terminated and no order is issued approving the production,
no information obtained or evidence derived
[[Page H2903]]
from such production shall be received in evidence or
otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department,
office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or
other authority of the United States, a State, or a political
subdivision thereof, and no information concerning any United
States person acquired from such production shall
subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner by
Federal officers or employees without the consent of such
person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if
the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily
harm to any person.
``(6) The Attorney General shall assess compliance with the
requirements of paragraph (5).''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 501(d) (50 U.S.C.
1861(d)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking
``pursuant to an order'' and inserting ``pursuant to an order
issued or an emergency production required'';
(B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``such order'' and
inserting ``such order or such emergency production''; and
(C) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``the order'' and
inserting ``the order or the emergency production''; and
(2) in paragraph (2)--
(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``an order'' and
inserting ``an order or emergency production''; and
(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``an order'' and
inserting ``an order or emergency production''.
SEC. 103. PROHIBITION ON BULK COLLECTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS.
(a) Application.--Section 501(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1861(b)(2)),
as amended by section 101(a) of this Act, is further amended
by inserting before subparagraph (B), as redesignated by such
section 101(a) of this Act, the following new subparagraph:
``(A) a specific selection term to be used as the basis for
the production of the tangible things sought;''.
(b) Order.--Section 501(c) (50 U.S.C. 1861(c)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking the semicolon and
inserting ``, including each specific selection term to be
used as the basis for the production;''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) No order issued under this subsection may authorize
the collection of tangible things without the use of a
specific selection term that meets the requirements of
subsection (b)(2).''.
SEC. 104. JUDICIAL REVIEW.
(a) Minimization Procedures.--
(1) Judicial review.--Section 501(c)(1) (50 U.S.C.
1861(c)(1)) is amended by inserting after ``subsections (a)
and (b)'' the following: ``and that the minimization
procedures submitted in accordance with subsection (b)(2)(D)
meet the definition of minimization procedures under
subsection (g)''.
(2) Rule of construction.--Section 501(g) (50 U.S.C.
1861(g)) is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection
shall limit the authority of the court established under
section 103(a) to impose additional, particularized
minimization procedures with regard to the production,
retention, or dissemination of nonpublicly available
information concerning unconsenting United States persons,
including additional, particularized procedures related to
the destruction of information within a reasonable time
period.''.
(3) Technical and conforming amendment.--Section 501(g)(1)
(50 U.S.C. 1861(g)(1)) is amended--
(A) by striking ``Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, the'' and inserting ``The''; and
(B) by inserting after ``adopt'' the following: ``, and
update as appropriate,''.
(b) Orders.--Section 501(f)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1861(f)(2)) is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)(i)--
(A) by striking ``that order'' and inserting ``the
production order or any nondisclosure order imposed in
connection with the production order''; and
(B) by striking the second sentence; and
(2) in subparagraph (C)--
(A) by striking clause (ii); and
(B) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (ii).
SEC. 105. LIABILITY PROTECTION.
Section 501(e) (50 U.S.C. 1861(e)) is amended to read as
follows:
``(e)(1) No cause of action shall lie in any court against
a person who--
``(A) produces tangible things or provides information,
facilities, or technical assistance in accordance with an
order issued or an emergency production required under this
section; or
``(B) otherwise provides technical assistance to the
Government under this section or to implement the amendments
made to this section by the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
``(2) A production or provision of information, facilities,
or technical assistance described in paragraph (1) shall not
be deemed to constitute a waiver of any privilege in any
other proceeding or context.''.
SEC. 106. COMPENSATION FOR ASSISTANCE.
Section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861), as amended by section 102 of
this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(j) Compensation.--The Government shall compensate a
person for reasonable expenses incurred for--
``(1) producing tangible things or providing information,
facilities, or assistance in accordance with an order issued
with respect to an application described in subsection
(b)(2)(C) or an emergency production under subsection (i)
that, to comply with subsection (i)(1)(D), requires an
application described in subsection (b)(2)(C); or
``(2) otherwise providing technical assistance to the
Government under this section or to implement the amendments
made to this section by the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.''.
SEC. 107. DEFINITIONS.
Section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861), as amended by section 106 of
this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(k) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) In general.--The terms `foreign power', `agent of a
foreign power', `international terrorism', `foreign
intelligence information', `Attorney General', `United States
person', `United States', `person', and `State' have the
meanings provided those terms in section 101.
``(2) Address.--The term `address' means a physical address
or electronic address, such as an electronic mail address or
temporarily assigned network address (including an Internet
protocol address).
``(3) Call detail record.--The term `call detail record'--
``(A) means session-identifying information (including an
originating or terminating telephone number, an International
Mobile Subscriber Identity number, or an International Mobile
Station Equipment Identity number), a telephone calling card
number, or the time or duration of a call; and
``(B) does not include--
``(i) the contents (as defined in section 2510(8) of title
18, United States Code) of any communication;
``(ii) the name, address, or financial information of a
subscriber or customer; or
``(iii) cell site location or global positioning system
information.
``(4) Specific selection term.--
``(A) Tangible things.--
``(i) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
a `specific selection term'--
``(I) is a term that specifically identifies a person,
account, address, or personal device, or any other specific
identifier; and
``(II) is used to limit, to the greatest extent reasonably
practicable, the scope of tangible things sought consistent
with the purpose for seeking the tangible things.
``(ii) Limitation.--A specific selection term under clause
(i) does not include an identifier that does not limit, to
the greatest extent reasonably practicable, the scope of
tangible things sought consistent with the purpose for
seeking the tangible things, such as an identifier that--
``(I) identifies an electronic communication service
provider (as that term is defined in section 701) or a
provider of remote computing service (as that term is defined
in section 2711 of title 18, United States Code), when not
used as part of a specific identifier as described in clause
(i), unless the provider is itself a subject of an authorized
investigation for which the specific selection term is used
as the basis for the production; or
``(II) identifies a broad geographic region, including the
United States, a city, a county, a State, a zip code, or an
area code, when not used as part of a specific identifier as
described in clause (i).
``(iii) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this paragraph
shall be construed to preclude the use of multiple terms or
identifiers to meet the requirements of clause (i).
``(B) Call detail record applications.--For purposes of an
application submitted under subsection (b)(2)(C), the term
`specific selection term' means a term that specifically
identifies an individual, account, or personal device.''.
SEC. 108. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORTS ON BUSINESS RECORDS
ORDERS.
Section 106A of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-177; 120 Stat.
200) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``and calendar years
2012 through 2014'' after ``2006'';
(B) by striking paragraphs (2) and (3);
(C) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs
(2) and (3), respectively; and
(D) in paragraph (3) (as so redesignated)--
(i) by striking subparagraph (C) and inserting the
following new subparagraph:
``(C) with respect to calendar years 2012 through 2014, an
examination of the minimization procedures used in relation
to orders under section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861) and whether the
minimization procedures adequately protect the constitutional
rights of United States persons;''; and
(ii) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``(as such term is
defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401a(4)))'';
(2) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(3) Calendar years 2012 through 2014.--Not later than 1
year after the date of enactment of the USA FREEDOM Act of
2015, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice
shall submit to the Committee on the
[[Page H2904]]
Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives a report containing the results of the audit
conducted under subsection (a) for calendar years 2012
through 2014.'';
(3) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections
(e) and (f), respectively;
(4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new
subsection:
``(d) Intelligence Assessment.--
``(1) In general.--For the period beginning on January 1,
2012, and ending on December 31, 2014, the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community shall assess--
``(A) the importance of the information acquired under
title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(50 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.) to the activities of the
intelligence community;
``(B) the manner in which that information was collected,
retained, analyzed, and disseminated by the intelligence
community;
``(C) the minimization procedures used by elements of the
intelligence community under such title and whether the
minimization procedures adequately protect the constitutional
rights of United States persons; and
``(D) any minimization procedures proposed by an element of
the intelligence community under such title that were
modified or denied by the court established under section
103(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)).
``(2) Submission date for assessment.--Not later than 180
days after the date on which the Inspector General of the
Department of Justice submits the report required under
subsection (c)(3), the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the
Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report
containing the results of the assessment for calendar years
2012 through 2014.'';
(5) in subsection (e), as redesignated by paragraph (3)--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking ``a report under subsection (c)(1) or
(c)(2)'' and inserting ``any report under subsection (c) or
(d)''; and
(ii) by striking ``Inspector General of the Department of
Justice'' and inserting ``Inspector General of the Department
of Justice, the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community, and any Inspector General of an element of the
intelligence community that prepares a report to assist the
Inspector General of the Department of Justice or the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community in complying
with the requirements of this section''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the reports submitted
under subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2)'' and inserting ``any
report submitted under subsection (c) or (d)'';
(6) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (3)--
(A) by striking ``The reports submitted under subsections
(c)(1) and (c)(2)'' and inserting ``Each report submitted
under subsection (c)''; and
(B) by striking ``subsection (d)(2)'' and inserting
``subsection (e)(2)''; and
(7) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Intelligence community.--The term `intelligence
community' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
``(2) United states person.--The term `United States
person' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1801).''.
SEC. 109. EFFECTIVE DATE.
(a) In General.--The amendments made by sections 101
through 103 shall take effect on the date that is 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be
construed to alter or eliminate the authority of the
Government to obtain an order under title V of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861 et
seq.) as in effect prior to the effective date described in
subsection (a) during the period ending on such effective
date.
SEC. 110. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the
production of the contents (as such term is defined in
section 2510(8) of title 18, United States Code) of any
electronic communication from an electronic communication
service provider (as such term is defined in section
701(b)(4) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881(b)(4))) under title V of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861 et
seq.).
TITLE II--FISA PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE REFORM
SEC. 201. PROHIBITION ON BULK COLLECTION.
(a) Prohibition.--Section 402(c) (50 U.S.C. 1842(c)) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) a specific selection term to be used as the basis for
the use of the pen register or trap and trace device.''.
(b) Definition.--Section 401 (50 U.S.C. 1841) is amended by
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4)(A) The term `specific selection term'--
``(i) is a term that specifically identifies a person,
account, address, or personal device, or any other specific
identifier; and
``(ii) is used to limit, to the greatest extent reasonably
practicable, the scope of information sought, consistent with
the purpose for seeking the use of the pen register or trap
and trace device.
``(B) A specific selection term under subparagraph (A) does
not include an identifier that does not limit, to the
greatest extent reasonably practicable, the scope of
information sought, consistent with the purpose for seeking
the use of the pen register or trap and trace device, such as
an identifier that--
``(i) identifies an electronic communication service
provider (as that term is defined in section 701) or a
provider of remote computing service (as that term is defined
in section 2711 of title 18, United States Code), when not
used as part of a specific identifier as described in
subparagraph (A), unless the provider is itself a subject of
an authorized investigation for which the specific selection
term is used as the basis for the use; or
``(ii) identifies a broad geographic region, including the
United States, a city, a county, a State, a zip code, or an
area code, when not used as part of a specific identifier as
described in subparagraph (A).
``(C) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term `address'
means a physical address or electronic address, such as an
electronic mail address or temporarily assigned network
address (including an Internet protocol address).
``(D) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to
preclude the use of multiple terms or identifiers to meet the
requirements of subparagraph (A).''.
SEC. 202. PRIVACY PROCEDURES.
(a) In General.--Section 402 (50 U.S.C. 1842) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(h) Privacy Procedures.--
``(1) In general.--The Attorney General shall ensure that
appropriate policies and procedures are in place to safeguard
nonpublicly available information concerning United States
persons that is collected through the use of a pen register
or trap and trace device installed under this section. Such
policies and procedures shall, to the maximum extent
practicable and consistent with the need to protect national
security, include privacy protections that apply to the
collection, retention, and use of information concerning
United States persons.
``(2) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection
limits the authority of the court established under section
103(a) or of the Attorney General to impose additional
privacy or minimization procedures with regard to the
installation or use of a pen register or trap and trace
device.''.
(b) Emergency Authority.--Section 403 (50 U.S.C. 1843) is
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(d) Privacy Procedures.--Information collected through
the use of a pen register or trap and trace device installed
under this section shall be subject to the policies and
procedures required under section 402(h).''.
TITLE III--FISA ACQUISITIONS TARGETING PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED
STATES REFORMS
SEC. 301. LIMITS ON USE OF UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED INFORMATION.
Section 702(i)(3) (50 U.S.C. 1881a(i)(3)) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(D) Limitation on use of information.--
``(i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii), if
the Court orders a correction of a deficiency in a
certification or procedures under subparagraph (B), no
information obtained or evidence derived pursuant to the part
of the certification or procedures that has been identified
by the Court as deficient concerning any United States person
shall be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court,
grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body,
legislative committee, or other authority of the United
States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no
information concerning any United States person acquired
pursuant to such part of such certification or procedures
shall subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner
by Federal officers or employees without the consent of the
United States person, except with the approval of the
Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of
death or serious bodily harm to any person.
``(ii) Exception.--If the Government corrects any
deficiency identified by the order of the Court under
subparagraph (B), the Court may permit the use or disclosure
of information obtained before the date of the correction
under such minimization procedures as the Court may approve
for purposes of this clause.''.
TITLE IV--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT REFORMS
SEC. 401. APPOINTMENT OF AMICUS CURIAE.
Section 103 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the
end the following new subsections:
``(i) Amicus Curiae.--
``(1) Designation.--The presiding judges of the courts
established under subsections (a) and (b) shall, not later
than 180 days after the enactment of this subsection, jointly
designate not fewer than 5 individuals to be eligible to
serve as amicus curiae, who shall
[[Page H2905]]
serve pursuant to rules the presiding judges may establish.
In designating such individuals, the presiding judges may
consider individuals recommended by any source, including
members of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
the judges determine appropriate.
``(2) Authorization.--A court established under subsection
(a) or (b), consistent with the requirement of subsection (c)
and any other statutory requirement that the court act
expeditiously or within a stated time--
``(A) shall appoint an individual who has been designated
under paragraph (1) to serve as amicus curiae to assist such
court in the consideration of any application for an order or
review that, in the opinion of the court, presents a novel or
significant interpretation of the law, unless the court
issues a finding that such appointment is not appropriate;
and
``(B) may appoint an individual or organization to serve as
amicus curiae, including to provide technical expertise, in
any instance as such court deems appropriate or, upon motion,
permit an individual or organization leave to file an amicus
curiae brief.
``(3) Qualifications of amicus curiae.--
``(A) Expertise.--Individuals designated under paragraph
(1) shall be persons who possess expertise in privacy and
civil liberties, intelligence collection, communications
technology, or any other area that may lend legal or
technical expertise to a court established under subsection
(a) or (b).
``(B) Security clearance.--Individuals designated pursuant
to paragraph (1) shall be persons who are determined to be
eligible for access to classified information necessary to
participate in matters before the courts. Amicus curiae
appointed by the court pursuant to paragraph (2) shall be
persons who are determined to be eligible for access to
classified information, if such access is necessary to
participate in the matters in which they may be appointed.
``(4) Duties.--If a court established under subsection (a)
or (b) appoints an amicus curiae under paragraph (2)(A), the
amicus curiae shall provide to the court, as appropriate--
``(A) legal arguments that advance the protection of
individual privacy and civil liberties;
``(B) information related to intelligence collection or
communications technology; or
``(C) legal arguments or information regarding any other
area relevant to the issue presented to the court.
``(5) Assistance.--An amicus curiae appointed under
paragraph (2)(A) may request that the court designate or
appoint additional amici curiae pursuant to paragraph (1) or
paragraph (2), to be available to assist the amicus curiae.
``(6) Access to information.--
``(A) In general.--If a court established under subsection
(a) or (b) appoints an amicus curiae under paragraph (2), the
amicus curiae--
``(i) shall have access to any legal precedent,
application, certification, petition, motion, or such other
materials that the court determines are relevant to the
duties of the amicus curiae; and
``(ii) may, if the court determines that it is relevant to
the duties of the amicus curiae, consult with any other
individuals designated pursuant to paragraph (1) regarding
information relevant to any assigned proceeding.
``(B) Briefings.--The Attorney General may periodically
brief or provide relevant materials to individuals designated
pursuant to paragraph (1) regarding constructions and
interpretations of this Act and legal, technological, and
other issues related to actions authorized by this Act.
``(C) Classified information.--An amicus curiae designated
or appointed by the court may have access to classified
documents, information, and other materials or proceedings
only if that individual is eligible for access to classified
information and to the extent consistent with the national
security of the United States.
``(D) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed to require the Government to provide information
to an amicus curiae appointed by the court that is privileged
from disclosure.
``(7) Notification.--A presiding judge of a court
established under subsection (a) or (b) shall notify the
Attorney General of each exercise of the authority to appoint
an individual to serve as amicus curiae under paragraph (2).
``(8) Assistance.--A court established under subsection (a)
or (b) may request and receive (including on a
nonreimbursable basis) the assistance of the executive branch
in the implementation of this subsection.
``(9) Administration.--A court established under subsection
(a) or (b) may provide for the designation, appointment,
removal, training, or other support for an individual
designated to serve as amicus curiae under paragraph (1) or
appointed to serve as amicus curiae under paragraph (2) in a
manner that is not inconsistent with this subsection.
``(10) Receipt of information.--Nothing in this subsection
shall limit the ability of a court established under
subsection (a) or (b) to request or receive information or
materials from, or otherwise communicate with, the Government
or amicus curiae appointed under paragraph (2) on an ex parte
basis, nor limit any special or heightened obligation in any
ex parte communication or proceeding.
``(j) Review of FISA Court Decisions.--Following issuance
of an order under this Act, a court established under
subsection (a) shall certify for review to the court
established under subsection (b) any question of law that may
affect resolution of the matter in controversy that the court
determines warrants such review because of a need for
uniformity or because consideration by the court established
under subsection (b) would serve the interests of justice.
Upon certification of a question of law under this
subsection, the court established under subsection (b) may
give binding instructions or require the entire record to be
sent up for decision of the entire matter in controversy.
``(k) Review of FISA Court of Review Decisions.--
``(1) Certification.--For purposes of section 1254(2) of
title 28, United States Code, the court of review established
under subsection (b) shall be considered to be a court of
appeals.
``(2) Amicus curiae briefing.--Upon certification of an
application under paragraph (1), the Supreme Court of the
United States may appoint an amicus curiae designated under
subsection (i)(1), or any other person, to provide briefing
or other assistance.''.
SEC. 402. DECLASSIFICATION OF DECISIONS, ORDERS, AND
OPINIONS.
(a) Declassification.--Title VI (50 U.S.C. 1871 et seq.) is
amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``REPORTING REQUIREMENT''
and inserting ``OVERSIGHT''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 602. DECLASSIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS,
ORDERS, AND OPINIONS.
``(a) Declassification Required.--Subject to subsection
(b), the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation
with the Attorney General, shall conduct a declassification
review of each decision, order, or opinion issued by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (as defined in
section 601(e)) that includes a significant construction or
interpretation of any provision of law, including any novel
or significant construction or interpretation of the term
`specific selection term', and, consistent with that review,
make publicly available to the greatest extent practicable
each such decision, order, or opinion.
``(b) Redacted Form.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, may
satisfy the requirement under subsection (a) to make a
decision, order, or opinion described in such subsection
publicly available to the greatest extent practicable by
making such decision, order, or opinion publicly available in
redacted form.
``(c) National Security Waiver.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, may
waive the requirement to declassify and make publicly
available a particular decision, order, or opinion under
subsection (a), if--
``(1) the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Attorney General, determines that a
waiver of such requirement is necessary to protect the
national security of the United States or properly classified
intelligence sources or methods; and
``(2) the Director of National Intelligence makes publicly
available an unclassified statement prepared by the Attorney
General, in consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence--
``(A) summarizing the significant construction or
interpretation of any provision of law, which shall include,
to the extent consistent with national security, a
description of the context in which the matter arises and any
significant construction or interpretation of any statute,
constitutional provision, or other legal authority relied on
by the decision; and
``(B) that specifies that the statement has been prepared
by the Attorney General and constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.''.
(b) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in
the first section is amended--
(1) by striking the item relating to title VI and inserting
the following new item:
``TITLE VI--OVERSIGHT'';
and
(2) by inserting after the item relating to section 601 the
following new item:
``Sec. 602. Declassification of significant decisions, orders, and
opinions.''.
TITLE V--NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER REFORM
SEC. 501. PROHIBITION ON BULK COLLECTION.
(a) Counterintelligence Access to Telephone Toll and
Transactional Records.--Section 2709(b) of title 18, United
States Code, is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1)
by striking ``may'' and inserting ``may, using a term that
specifically identifies a person, entity, telephone number,
or account as the basis for a request''.
(b) Access to Financial Records for Certain Intelligence
and Protective Purposes.--Section 1114(a)(2) of the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(2)) is
amended by striking the period and inserting ``and a term
that specifically identifies a customer, entity, or account
to be used as the basis for the production and disclosure of
financial records.''.
(c) Disclosures to FBI of Certain Consumer Records for
Counterintelligence Purposes.--Section 626 of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u) is amended--
[[Page H2906]]
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ``that information,''
and inserting ``that information that includes a term that
specifically identifies a consumer or account to be used as
the basis for the production of that information,'';
(2) in subsection (b), by striking ``written request,'' and
inserting ``written request that includes a term that
specifically identifies a consumer or account to be used as
the basis for the production of that information,''; and
(3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``, which shall include
a term that specifically identifies a consumer or account to
be used as the basis for the production of the information,''
after ``issue an order ex parte''.
(d) Disclosures to Governmental Agencies for
Counterterrorism Purposes of Consumer Reports.--Section
627(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681v(a))
is amended by striking ``analysis.'' and inserting ``analysis
and that includes a term that specifically identifies a
consumer or account to be used as the basis for the
production of such information.''.
SEC. 502. LIMITATIONS ON DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY
LETTERS.
(a) Counterintelligence Access to Telephone Toll and
Transactional Records.--Section 2709 of title 18, United
States Code, is amended by striking subsection (c) and
inserting the following new subsection:
``(c) Prohibition of Certain Disclosure.--
``(1) Prohibition.--
``(A) In general.--If a certification is issued under
subparagraph (B) and notice of the right to judicial review
under subsection (d) is provided, no wire or electronic
communication service provider that receives a request under
subsection (b), or officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall
disclose to any person that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has sought or obtained access to information or
records under this section.
``(B) Certification.--The requirements of subparagraph (A)
shall apply if the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, or a designee of the Director whose rank shall
be no lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau
headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge of a Bureau field
office, certifies that the absence of a prohibition of
disclosure under this subsection may result in--
``(i) a danger to the national security of the United
States;
``(ii) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or
counterintelligence investigation;
``(iii) interference with diplomatic relations; or
``(iv) danger to the life or physical safety of any person.
``(2) Exception.--
``(A) In general.--A wire or electronic communication
service provider that receives a request under subsection
(b), or officer, employee, or agent thereof, may disclose
information otherwise subject to any applicable nondisclosure
requirement to--
``(i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in
order to comply with the request;
``(ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or
assistance regarding the request; or
``(iii) other persons as permitted by the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of the
Director.
``(B) Application.--A person to whom disclosure is made
under subparagraph (A) shall be subject to the nondisclosure
requirements applicable to a person to whom a request is
issued under subsection (b) in the same manner as the person
to whom the request is issued.
``(C) Notice.--Any recipient that discloses to a person
described in subparagraph (A) information otherwise subject
to a nondisclosure requirement shall notify the person of the
applicable nondisclosure requirement.
``(D) Identification of disclosure recipients.--At the
request of the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or the designee of the Director, any person
making or intending to make a disclosure under clause (i) or
(iii) of subparagraph (A) shall identify to the Director or
such designee the person to whom such disclosure will be made
or to whom such disclosure was made prior to the request.''.
(b) Access to Financial Records for Certain Intelligence
and Protective Purposes.--Section 1114 of the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(5), by striking subparagraph (D); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new
subsection:
``(c) Prohibition of Certain Disclosure.--
``(1) Prohibition.--
``(A) In general.--If a certification is issued under
subparagraph (B) and notice of the right to judicial review
under subsection (d) is provided, no financial institution
that receives a request under subsection (a), or officer,
employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any person that
the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained
access to information or records under subsection (a).
``(B) Certification.--The requirements of subparagraph (A)
shall apply if the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, or a designee of the Director whose rank shall
be no lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau
headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge of a Bureau field
office, certifies that the absence of a prohibition of
disclosure under this subsection may result in--
``(i) a danger to the national security of the United
States;
``(ii) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or
counterintelligence investigation;
``(iii) interference with diplomatic relations; or
``(iv) danger to the life or physical safety of any person.
``(2) Exception.--
``(A) In general.--A financial institution that receives a
request under subsection (a), or officer, employee, or agent
thereof, may disclose information otherwise subject to any
applicable nondisclosure requirement to--
``(i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in
order to comply with the request;
``(ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or
assistance regarding the request; or
``(iii) other persons as permitted by the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of the
Director.
``(B) Application.--A person to whom disclosure is made
under subparagraph (A) shall be subject to the nondisclosure
requirements applicable to a person to whom a request is
issued under subsection (a) in the same manner as the person
to whom the request is issued.
``(C) Notice.--Any recipient that discloses to a person
described in subparagraph (A) information otherwise subject
to a nondisclosure requirement shall inform the person of the
applicable nondisclosure requirement.
``(D) Identification of disclosure recipients.--At the
request of the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or the designee of the Director, any person
making or intending to make a disclosure under clause (i) or
(iii) of subparagraph (A) shall identify to the Director or
such designee the person to whom such disclosure will be made
or to whom such disclosure was made prior to the request.''.
(c) Identity of Financial Institutions and Credit
Reports.--Section 626 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15
U.S.C. 1681u) is amended by striking subsection (d) and
inserting the following new subsection:
``(d) Prohibition of Certain Disclosure.--
``(1) Prohibition.--
``(A) In general.--If a certification is issued under
subparagraph (B) and notice of the right to judicial review
under subsection (e) is provided, no consumer reporting
agency that receives a request under subsection (a) or (b) or
an order under subsection (c), or officer, employee, or agent
thereof, shall disclose or specify in any consumer report,
that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or
obtained access to information or records under subsection
(a), (b), or (c).
``(B) Certification.--The requirements of subparagraph (A)
shall apply if the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, or a designee of the Director whose rank shall
be no lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau
headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge of a Bureau field
office, certifies that the absence of a prohibition of
disclosure under this subsection may result in--
``(i) a danger to the national security of the United
States;
``(ii) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or
counterintelligence investigation;
``(iii) interference with diplomatic relations; or
``(iv) danger to the life or physical safety of any person.
``(2) Exception.--
``(A) In general.--A consumer reporting agency that
receives a request under subsection (a) or (b) or an order
under subsection (c), or officer, employee, or agent thereof,
may disclose information otherwise subject to any applicable
nondisclosure requirement to--
``(i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in
order to comply with the request;
``(ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or
assistance regarding the request; or
``(iii) other persons as permitted by the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of the
Director.
``(B) Application.--A person to whom disclosure is made
under subparagraph (A) shall be subject to the nondisclosure
requirements applicable to a person to whom a request under
subsection (a) or (b) or an order under subsection (c) is
issued in the same manner as the person to whom the request
is issued.
``(C) Notice.--Any recipient that discloses to a person
described in subparagraph (A) information otherwise subject
to a nondisclosure requirement shall inform the person of the
applicable nondisclosure requirement.
``(D) Identification of disclosure recipients.--At the
request of the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or the designee of the Director, any person
making or intending to make a disclosure under clause (i) or
(iii) of subparagraph (A) shall identify to the Director or
such designee the person to whom such disclosure will be made
or to whom such disclosure was made prior to the request.''.
(d) Consumer Reports.--Section 627 of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681v) is amended by striking
subsection (c) and inserting the following new subsection:
``(c) Prohibition of Certain Disclosure.--
``(1) Prohibition.--
``(A) In general.--If a certification is issued under
subparagraph (B) and notice of the right to judicial review
under subsection (d) is provided, no consumer reporting
agency that receives a request under subsection
[[Page H2907]]
(a), or officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose
or specify in any consumer report, that a government agency
described in subsection (a) has sought or obtained access to
information or records under subsection (a).
``(B) Certification.--The requirements of subparagraph (A)
shall apply if the head of the government agency described in
subsection (a), or a designee, certifies that the absence of
a prohibition of disclosure under this subsection may result
in--
``(i) a danger to the national security of the United
States;
``(ii) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or
counterintelligence investigation;
``(iii) interference with diplomatic relations; or
``(iv) danger to the life or physical safety of any person.
``(2) Exception.--
``(A) In general.--A consumer reporting agency that
receives a request under subsection (a), or officer,
employee, or agent thereof, may disclose information
otherwise subject to any applicable nondisclosure requirement
to--
``(i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in
order to comply with the request;
``(ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or
assistance regarding the request; or
``(iii) other persons as permitted by the head of the
government agency described in subsection (a) or a designee.
``(B) Application.--A person to whom disclosure is made
under subparagraph (A) shall be subject to the nondisclosure
requirements applicable to a person to whom a request under
subsection (a) is issued in the same manner as the person to
whom the request is issued.
``(C) Notice.--Any recipient that discloses to a person
described in subparagraph (A) information otherwise subject
to a nondisclosure requirement shall inform the person of the
applicable nondisclosure requirement.
``(D) Identification of disclosure recipients.--At the
request of the head of the government agency described in
subsection (a) or a designee, any person making or intending
to make a disclosure under clause (i) or (iii) of
subparagraph (A) shall identify to the head or such designee
the person to whom such disclosure will be made or to whom
such disclosure was made prior to the request.''.
(e) Investigations of Persons With Access to Classified
Information.--Section 802 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162) is amended by striking subsection (b)
and inserting the following new subsection:
``(b) Prohibition of Certain Disclosure.--
``(1) Prohibition.--
``(A) In general.--If a certification is issued under
subparagraph (B) and notice of the right to judicial review
under subsection (c) is provided, no governmental or private
entity that receives a request under subsection (a), or
officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any
person that an authorized investigative agency described in
subsection (a) has sought or obtained access to information
under subsection (a).
``(B) Certification.--The requirements of subparagraph (A)
shall apply if the head of an authorized investigative agency
described in subsection (a), or a designee, certifies that
the absence of a prohibition of disclosure under this
subsection may result in--
``(i) a danger to the national security of the United
States;
``(ii) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or
counterintelligence investigation;
``(iii) interference with diplomatic relations; or
``(iv) danger to the life or physical safety of any person.
``(2) Exception.--
``(A) In general.--A governmental or private entity that
receives a request under subsection (a), or officer,
employee, or agent thereof, may disclose information
otherwise subject to any applicable nondisclosure requirement
to--
``(i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in
order to comply with the request;
``(ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or
assistance regarding the request; or
``(iii) other persons as permitted by the head of the
authorized investigative agency described in subsection (a)
or a designee.
``(B) Application.--A person to whom disclosure is made
under subparagraph (A) shall be subject to the nondisclosure
requirements applicable to a person to whom a request is
issued under subsection (a) in the same manner as the person
to whom the request is issued.
``(C) Notice.--Any recipient that discloses to a person
described in subparagraph (A) information otherwise subject
to a nondisclosure requirement shall inform the person of the
applicable nondisclosure requirement.
``(D) Identification of disclosure recipients.--At the
request of the head of an authorized investigative agency
described in subsection (a), or a designee, any person making
or intending to make a disclosure under clause (i) or (iii)
of subparagraph (A) shall identify to the head of the
authorized investigative agency or such designee the person
to whom such disclosure will be made or to whom such
disclosure was made prior to the request.''.
(f) Termination Procedures.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall adopt
procedures with respect to nondisclosure requirements issued
pursuant to section 2709 of title 18, United States Code,
section 626 or 627 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15
U.S.C. 1681u and 1681v), section 1114 of the Right to
Financial Privacy Act (12 U.S.C. 3414), or section 802 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162), as amended by
this Act, to require--
(A) the review at appropriate intervals of such a
nondisclosure requirement to assess whether the facts
supporting nondisclosure continue to exist;
(B) the termination of such a nondisclosure requirement if
the facts no longer support nondisclosure; and
(C) appropriate notice to the recipient of the national
security letter, or officer, employee, or agent thereof,
subject to the nondisclosure requirement, and the applicable
court as appropriate, that the nondisclosure requirement has
been terminated.
(2) Reporting.--Upon adopting the procedures required under
paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall submit the
procedures to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate
and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives.
(g) Judicial Review.--Section 3511 of title 18, United
States Code, is amended by striking subsection (b) and
inserting the following new subsection:
``(b) Nondisclosure.--
``(1) In general.--
``(A) Notice.--If a recipient of a request or order for a
report, records, or other information under section 2709 of
this title, section 626 or 627 of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u and 1681v), section 1114 of the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414), or section
802 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162),
wishes to have a court review a nondisclosure requirement
imposed in connection with the request or order, the
recipient may notify the Government or file a petition for
judicial review in any court described in subsection (a).
``(B) Application.--Not later than 30 days after the date
of receipt of a notification under subparagraph (A), the
Government shall apply for an order prohibiting the
disclosure of the existence or contents of the relevant
request or order. An application under this subparagraph may
be filed in the district court of the United States for the
judicial district in which the recipient of the order is
doing business or in the district court of the United States
for any judicial district within which the authorized
investigation that is the basis for the request is being
conducted. The applicable nondisclosure requirement shall
remain in effect during the pendency of proceedings relating
to the requirement.
``(C) Consideration.--A district court of the United States
that receives a petition under subparagraph (A) or an
application under subparagraph (B) should rule expeditiously,
and shall, subject to paragraph (3), issue a nondisclosure
order that includes conditions appropriate to the
circumstances.
``(2) Application contents.--An application for a
nondisclosure order or extension thereof or a response to a
petition filed under paragraph (1) shall include a
certification from the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney
General, an Assistant Attorney General, or the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a designee in a
position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau
headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge in a Bureau field
office designated by the Director, or in the case of a
request by a department, agency, or instrumentality of the
Federal Government other than the Department of Justice, the
head or deputy head of the department, agency, or
instrumentality, containing a statement of specific facts
indicating that the absence of a prohibition of disclosure
under this subsection may result in--
``(A) a danger to the national security of the United
States;
``(B) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or
counterintelligence investigation;
``(C) interference with diplomatic relations; or
``(D) danger to the life or physical safety of any person.
``(3) Standard.--A district court of the United States
shall issue a nondisclosure order or extension thereof under
this subsection if the court determines that there is reason
to believe that disclosure of the information subject to the
nondisclosure requirement during the applicable time period
may result in--
``(A) a danger to the national security of the United
States;
``(B) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or
counterintelligence investigation;
``(C) interference with diplomatic relations; or
``(D) danger to the life or physical safety of any
person.''.
SEC. 503. JUDICIAL REVIEW.
(a) Counterintelligence Access to Telephone Toll and
Transactional Records.--Section 2709 of title 18, United
States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (d), (e), and (f) as
subsections (e), (f), and (g), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new
subsection:
[[Page H2908]]
``(d) Judicial Review.--
``(1) In general.--A request under subsection (b) or a
nondisclosure requirement imposed in connection with such
request under subsection (c) shall be subject to judicial
review under section 3511.
``(2) Notice.--A request under subsection (b) shall include
notice of the availability of judicial review described in
paragraph (1).''.
(b) Access to Financial Records for Certain Intelligence
and Protective Purposes.--Section 1114 of the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new
subsection:
``(d) Judicial Review.--
``(1) In general.--A request under subsection (a) or a
nondisclosure requirement imposed in connection with such
request under subsection (c) shall be subject to judicial
review under section 3511 of title 18, United States Code.
``(2) Notice.--A request under subsection (a) shall include
notice of the availability of judicial review described in
paragraph (1).''.
(c) Identity of Financial Institutions and Credit
Reports.--Section 626 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15
U.S.C. 1681u) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (e) through (m) as
subsections (f) through (n), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection:
``(e) Judicial Review.--
``(1) In general.--A request under subsection (a) or (b) or
an order under subsection (c) or a non-disclosure requirement
imposed in connection with such request under subsection (d)
shall be subject to judicial review under section 3511 of
title 18, United States Code.
``(2) Notice.--A request under subsection (a) or (b) or an
order under subsection (c) shall include notice of the
availability of judicial review described in paragraph
(1).''.
(d) Identity of Financial Institutions and Credit
Reports.--Section 627 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15
U.S.C. 1681v) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (d), (e), and (f) as
subsections (e), (f), and (g), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new
subsection:
``(d) Judicial Review.--
``(1) In general.--A request under subsection (a) or a non-
disclosure requirement imposed in connection with such
request under subsection (c) shall be subject to judicial
review under section 3511 of title 18, United States Code.
``(2) Notice.--A request under subsection (a) shall include
notice of the availability of judicial review described in
paragraph (1).''.
(e) Investigations of Persons With Access to Classified
Information.--Section 802 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (c) through (f) as
subsections (d) through (g), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new
subsection:
``(c) Judicial Review.--
``(1) In general.--A request under subsection (a) or a
nondisclosure requirement imposed in connection with such
request under subsection (b) shall be subject to judicial
review under section 3511 of title 18, United States Code.
``(2) Notice.--A request under subsection (a) shall include
notice of the availability of judicial review described in
paragraph (1).''.
TITLE VI--FISA TRANSPARENCY AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
SEC. 601. ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON ORDERS REQUIRING PRODUCTION
OF BUSINESS RECORDS; BUSINESS RECORDS
COMPLIANCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
(a) Reports Submitted to Committees.--Section 502(b) (50
U.S.C. 1862(b)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) as
paragraphs (6), (7), and (8), respectively; and
(2) by inserting before paragraph (6) (as so redesignated)
the following new paragraphs:
``(1) a summary of all compliance reviews conducted by the
Government for the production of tangible things under
section 501;
``(2) the total number of applications described in section
501(b)(2)(B) made for orders approving requests for the
production of tangible things;
``(3) the total number of such orders either granted,
modified, or denied;
``(4) the total number of applications described in section
501(b)(2)(C) made for orders approving requests for the
production of call detail records;
``(5) the total number of such orders either granted,
modified, or denied;''.
(b) Reporting on Certain Types of Production.--Section
502(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1862(c)(1)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and'';
(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end
and inserting a semicolon; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:
``(C) the total number of applications made for orders
approving requests for the production of tangible things
under section 501 in which the specific selection term does
not specifically identify an individual, account, or personal
device;
``(D) the total number of orders described in subparagraph
(C) either granted, modified, or denied; and
``(E) with respect to orders described in subparagraph (D)
that have been granted or modified, whether the court
established under section 103 has directed additional,
particularized minimization procedures beyond those adopted
pursuant to section 501(g).''.
SEC. 602. ANNUAL REPORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT.
(a) In General.--Title VI (50 U.S.C. 1871 et seq.), as
amended by section 402 of this Act, is further amended by
adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 603. ANNUAL REPORTS.
``(a) Report by Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts.--
``(1) Report required.--The Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts shall annually submit to
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on
the Judiciary of the Senate, subject to a declassification
review by the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence, a report that includes--
``(A) the number of applications or certifications for
orders submitted under each of sections 105, 304, 402, 501,
702, 703, and 704;
``(B) the number of such orders granted under each of those
sections;
``(C) the number of orders modified under each of those
sections;
``(D) the number of applications or certifications denied
under each of those sections;
``(E) the number of appointments of an individual to serve
as amicus curiae under section 103, including the name of
each individual appointed to serve as amicus curiae; and
``(F) the number of findings issued under section 103(i)
that such appointment is not appropriate and the text of any
such findings.
``(2) Publication.--The Director shall make the report
required under paragraph (1) publicly available on an
Internet Web site, except that the Director shall not make
publicly available on an Internet Web site the findings
described in subparagraph (F) of paragraph (1).
``(b) Mandatory Reporting by Director of National
Intelligence.--Except as provided in subsection (d), the
Director of National Intelligence shall annually make
publicly available on an Internet Web site a report that
identifies, for the preceding 12-month period--
``(1) the total number of orders issued pursuant to titles
I and III and sections 703 and 704 and a good faith estimate
of the number of targets of such orders;
``(2) the total number of orders issued pursuant to section
702 and a good faith estimate of--
``(A) the number of search terms concerning a known United
States person used to retrieve the unminimized contents of
electronic communications or wire communications obtained
through acquisitions authorized under such section, excluding
the number of search terms used to prevent the return of
information concerning a United States person; and
``(B) the number of queries concerning a known United
States person of unminimized noncontents information relating
to electronic communications or wire communications obtained
through acquisitions authorized under such section, excluding
the number of queries containing information used to prevent
the return of information concerning a United States person;
``(3) the total number of orders issued pursuant to title
IV and a good faith estimate of--
``(A) the number of targets of such orders; and
``(B) the number of unique identifiers used to communicate
information collected pursuant to such orders;
``(4) the total number of orders issued pursuant to
applications made under section 501(b)(2)(B) and a good faith
estimate of--
``(A) the number of targets of such orders; and
``(B) the number of unique identifiers used to communicate
information collected pursuant to such orders;
``(5) the total number of orders issued pursuant to
applications made under section 501(b)(2)(C) and a good faith
estimate of--
``(A) the number of targets of such orders;
``(B) the number of unique identifiers used to communicate
information collected pursuant to such orders; and
``(C) the number of search terms that included information
concerning a United States person that were used to query any
database of call detail records obtained through the use of
such orders; and
``(6) the total number of national security letters issued
and the number of requests for information contained within
such national security letters.
``(c) Timing.--The annual reports required by subsections
(a) and (b) shall be made publicly available during April of
each year and include information relating to the previous
calendar year.
``(d) Exceptions.--
``(1) Statement of numerical range.--If a good faith
estimate required to be reported under subparagraph (B) of
any of paragraphs (3), (4), or (5) of subsection (b) is fewer
than 500, it shall be expressed as a numerical
[[Page H2909]]
range of `fewer than 500' and shall not be expressed as an
individual number.
``(2) Nonapplicability to certain information.--
``(A) Federal bureau of investigation.--Paragraphs (2)(A),
(2)(B), and (5)(C) of subsection (b) shall not apply to
information or records held by, or queries conducted by, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
``(B) Electronic mail address and telephone numbers.--
Paragraph (3)(B) of subsection (b) shall not apply to orders
resulting in the acquisition of information by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation that does not include electronic mail
addresses or telephone numbers.
``(3) Certification.--
``(A) In general.--If the Director of National Intelligence
concludes that a good faith estimate required to be reported
under subsection (b)(2)(B) cannot be determined accurately
because some but not all of the relevant elements of the
intelligence community are able to provide such good faith
estimate, the Director shall--
``(i) certify that conclusion in writing to the Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary
of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives;
``(ii) report the good faith estimate for those relevant
elements able to provide such good faith estimate;
``(iii) explain when it is reasonably anticipated that such
an estimate will be able to be determined fully and
accurately; and
``(iv) make such certification publicly available on an
Internet Web site.
``(B) Form.--A certification described in subparagraph (A)
shall be prepared in unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex.
``(C) Timing.--If the Director of National Intelligence
continues to conclude that the good faith estimates described
in this paragraph cannot be determined accurately, the
Director shall annually submit a certification in accordance
with this paragraph.
``(e) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Contents.--The term `contents' has the meaning given
that term under section 2510 of title 18, United States Code.
``(2) Electronic communication.--The term `electronic
communication' has the meaning given that term under section
2510 of title 18, United States Code.
``(3) National security letter.--The term `national
security letter' means a request for a report, records, or
other information under--
``(A) section 2709 of title 18, United States Code;
``(B) section 1114(a)(5)(A) of the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(5)(A));
``(C) subsection (a) or (b) of section 626 of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u(a), 1681u(b)); or
``(D) section 627(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15
U.S.C. 1681v(a)).
``(4) United states person.--The term `United States
person' means a citizen of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in
section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a))).
``(5) Wire communication.--The term `wire communication'
has the meaning given that term under section 2510 of title
18, United States Code.''.
(b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents, as
amended by section 402 of this Act, is further amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 602, as added by
section 402 of this Act, the following new item:
``Sec. 603. Annual reports.''.
(c) Public Reporting on National Security Letters.--Section
118(c) of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act
of 2005 (18 U.S.C. 3511 note) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking
``United States''; and
(B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``, excluding the
number of requests for subscriber information'';
(2) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
``(2) Content.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
each report required under this subsection shall include a
good faith estimate of the total number of requests described
in paragraph (1) requiring disclosure of information
concerning--
``(i) United States persons; and
``(ii) persons who are not United States persons.
``(B) Exception.--With respect to the number of requests
for subscriber information under section 2709 of title 18,
United States Code, a report required under this subsection
need not separate the number of requests into each of the
categories described in subparagraph (A).''.
(d) Stored Communications.--Section 2702(d) of title 18,
United States Code, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking the period and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) the number of accounts from which the Department of
Justice has received voluntary disclosures under subsection
(c)(4).''.
SEC. 603. PUBLIC REPORTING BY PERSONS SUBJECT TO FISA ORDERS.
(a) In General.--Title VI (50 U.S.C. 1871 et seq.), as
amended by sections 402 and 602 of this Act, is further
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 604. PUBLIC REPORTING BY PERSONS SUBJECT TO ORDERS.
``(a) Reporting.--A person subject to a nondisclosure
requirement accompanying an order or directive under this Act
or a national security letter may, with respect to such
order, directive, or national security letter, publicly
report the following information using one of the following
structures:
``(1) A semiannual report that aggregates the number of
orders, directives, or national security letters with which
the person was required to comply into separate categories
of--
``(A) the number of national security letters received,
reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-999;
``(B) the number of customer selectors targeted by national
security letters, reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-
999;
``(C) the number of orders or directives received,
combined, under this Act for contents, reported in bands of
1000 starting with 0-999;
``(D) the number of customer selectors targeted under
orders or directives received, combined, under this Act for
contents reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-999;
``(E) the number of orders received under this Act for
noncontents, reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-999;
and
``(F) the number of customer selectors targeted under
orders under this Act for noncontents, reported in bands of
1000 starting with 0-999, pursuant to--
``(i) title IV;
``(ii) title V with respect to applications described in
section 501(b)(2)(B); and
``(iii) title V with respect to applications described in
section 501(b)(2)(C).
``(2) A semiannual report that aggregates the number of
orders, directives, or national security letters with which
the person was required to comply into separate categories
of--
``(A) the number of national security letters received,
reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-499;
``(B) the number of customer selectors targeted by national
security letters, reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-
499;
``(C) the number of orders or directives received,
combined, under this Act for contents, reported in bands of
500 starting with 0-499;
``(D) the number of customer selectors targeted under
orders or directives received, combined, under this Act for
contents, reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-499;
``(E) the number of orders received under this Act for
noncontents, reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-499;
and
``(F) the number of customer selectors targeted under
orders received under this Act for noncontents, reported in
bands of 500 starting with 0-499.
``(3) A semiannual report that aggregates the number of
orders, directives, or national security letters with which
the person was required to comply in the into separate
categories of--
``(A) the total number of all national security process
received, including all national security letters, and orders
or directives under this Act, combined, reported in bands of
250 starting with 0-249; and
``(B) the total number of customer selectors targeted under
all national security process received, including all
national security letters, and orders or directives under
this Act, combined, reported in bands of 250 starting with 0-
249.
``(4) An annual report that aggregates the number of
orders, directives, and national security letters the person
was required to comply with into separate categories of--
``(A) the total number of all national security process
received, including all national security letters, and orders
or directives under this Act, combined, reported in bands of
100 starting with 0-99; and
``(B) the total number of customer selectors targeted under
all national security process received, including all
national security letters, and orders or directives under
this Act, combined, reported in bands of 100 starting with 0-
99.
``(b) Period of Time Covered by Reports.--
``(1) A report described in paragraph (1) or (2) of
subsection (a) shall include only information--
``(A) relating to national security letters for the
previous 180 days; and
``(B) relating to authorities under this Act for the 180-
day period of time ending on the date that is not less than
180 days prior to the date of the publication of such report,
except that with respect to a platform, product, or service
for which a person did not previously receive an order or
directive (not including an enhancement to or iteration of an
existing publicly available platform, product, or service)
such report shall not include any information relating to
such new order or directive until 540 days after the date on
which such new order or directive is received.
``(2) A report described in paragraph (3) of subsection (a)
shall include only information relating to the previous 180
days.
``(3) A report described in paragraph (4) of subsection (a)
shall include only information for the 1-year period of time
ending on the date that is not less than 1 year prior to the
date of the publication of such report.
[[Page H2910]]
``(c) Other Forms of Agreed to Publication.--Nothing in
this section prohibits the Government and any person from
jointly agreeing to the publication of information referred
to in this subsection in a time, form, or manner other than
as described in this section.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Contents.--The term `contents' has the meaning given
that term under section 2510 of title 18, United States Code.
``(2) National security letter.--The term `national
security letter' has the meaning given that term under
section 603.''.
(b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents, as
amended by sections 402 and 602 of this Act, is further
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 603,
as added by section 602 of this Act, the following new item:
``Sec. 604. Public reporting by persons subject to orders.''.
SEC. 604. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR DECISIONS, ORDERS, AND
OPINIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT AND THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT OF REVIEW.
Section 601(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1871(c)(1)) is amended to read
as follows:
``(1) not later than 45 days after the date on which the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review issues a decision,
order, or opinion, including any denial or modification of an
application under this Act, that includes significant
construction or interpretation of any provision of law or
results in a change of application of any provision of this
Act or a novel application of any provision of this Act, a
copy of such decision, order, or opinion and any pleadings,
applications, or memoranda of law associated with such
decision, order, or opinion; and''.
SEC. 605. SUBMISSION OF REPORTS UNDER FISA.
(a) Electronic Surveillance.--Section 108(a)(1) (50 U.S.C.
1808(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on the Judiciary
of the Senate,'' and inserting ``the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary
of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the
Senate''.
(b) Physical Searches.--The matter preceding paragraph (1)
of section 306 (50 U.S.C. 1826) is amended--
(1) in the first sentence, by striking ``Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate,'' and inserting
``Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on
the Judiciary of the Senate''; and
(2) in the second sentence, by striking ``and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives''.
(c) Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices.--Section
406(b) (50 U.S.C. 1846(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period and inserting
a semicolon; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(4) each department or agency on behalf of which the
Attorney General or a designated attorney for the Government
has made an application for an order authorizing or approving
the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace
device under this title; and
``(5) for each department or agency described in paragraph
(4), each number described in paragraphs (1), (2), and
(3).''.
(d) Access to Certain Business Records and Other Tangible
Things.--Section 502(a) (50 U.S.C. 1862(a)) is amended by
striking ``Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the
Senate'' and inserting ``Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate''.
TITLE VII--ENHANCED NATIONAL SECURITY PROVISIONS
SEC. 701. EMERGENCIES INVOLVING NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS.
(a) In General.--Section 105 (50 U.S.C. 1805) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (f), (g), (h), and (i) as
subsections (g), (h), (i), and (j), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following:
``(f)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act,
the lawfully authorized targeting of a non-United States
person previously believed to be located outside the United
States for the acquisition of foreign intelligence
information may continue for a period not to exceed 72 hours
from the time that the non-United States person is reasonably
believed to be located inside the United States and the
acquisition is subject to this title or to title III of this
Act, provided that the head of an element of the intelligence
community--
``(A) reasonably determines that a lapse in the targeting
of such non-United States person poses a threat of death or
serious bodily harm to any person;
``(B) promptly notifies the Attorney General of a
determination under subparagraph (A); and
``(C) requests, as soon as practicable, the employment of
emergency electronic surveillance under subsection (e) or the
employment of an emergency physical search pursuant to
section 304(e), as warranted.
``(2) The authority under this subsection to continue the
acquisition of foreign intelligence information is limited to
a period not to exceed 72 hours and shall cease upon the
earlier of the following:
``(A) The employment of emergency electronic surveillance
under subsection (e) or the employment of an emergency
physical search pursuant to section 304(e).
``(B) An issuance of a court order under this title or
title III of this Act.
``(C) The Attorney General provides direction that the
acquisition be terminated.
``(D) The head of the element of the intelligence community
conducting the acquisition determines that a request under
paragraph (1)(C) is not warranted.
``(E) When the threat of death or serious bodily harm to
any person is no longer reasonably believed to exist.
``(3) Nonpublicly available information concerning
unconsenting United States persons acquired under this
subsection shall not be disseminated during the 72 hour time
period under paragraph (1) unless necessary to investigate,
reduce, or eliminate the threat of death or serious bodily
harm to any person.
``(4) If the Attorney General declines to authorize the
employment of emergency electronic surveillance under
subsection (e) or the employment of an emergency physical
search pursuant to section 304(e), or a court order is not
obtained under this title or title III of this Act,
information obtained during the 72 hour acquisition time
period under paragraph (1) shall not be retained, except with
the approval of the Attorney General if the information
indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any
person.
``(5) Paragraphs (5) and (6) of subsection (e) shall apply
to this subsection.''.
(b) Notification of Emergency Employment of Electronic
Surveillance.--Section 106(j) (50 U.S.C. 1806(j)) is amended
by striking ``section 105(e)'' and inserting ``subsection (e)
or (f) of section 105''.
(c) Report to Congress.--Section 108(a)(2) (50 U.S.C.
1808(a)(2)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(D) the total number of authorizations under section
105(f) and the total number of subsequent emergency
employments of electronic surveillance under section 105(e)
or emergency physical searches pursuant to section 301(e).''.
SEC. 702. PRESERVATION OF TREATMENT OF NON-UNITED STATES
PERSONS TRAVELING OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AS
AGENTS OF FOREIGN POWERS.
Section 101(b)(1) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting before the semicolon
at the end the following: ``, irrespective of whether the
person is inside the United States''; and
(2) in subparagraph (B)--
(A) by striking ``of such person's presence in the United
States''; and
(B) by striking ``such activities in the United States''
and inserting ``such activities''.
SEC. 703. IMPROVEMENT TO INVESTIGATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
Section 101(b)(1) is further amended by striking
subparagraph (E) and inserting the following new subparagraph
(E):
``(E) engages in the international proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, or activities in preparation therefor,
for or on behalf of a foreign power, or knowingly aids or
abets any person in the conduct of such proliferation or
activities in preparation therefor, or knowingly conspires
with any person to engage in such proliferation or activities
in preparation therefor; or''.
SEC. 704. INCREASE IN PENALTIES FOR MATERIAL SUPPORT OF
FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
Section 2339B(a)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``15 years'' and inserting ``20 years''.
SEC. 705. SUNSETS.
(a) USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005.--Section 102(b)(1) of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005 (50 U.S.C. 1805 note) is amended
by striking ``June 1, 2015'' and inserting ``December 15,
2019''.
(b) Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004.--Section 6001(b)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 1801 note) is
amended by striking ``June 1, 2015'' and inserting ``December
15, 2019''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 102(b)(1) of the USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (50
U.S.C. 1805 note), as amended by subsection (a), is further
amended by striking ``sections 501, 502, and'' and inserting
``title V and section''.
[[Page H2911]]
TITLE VIII--SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM
CONVENTIONS IMPLEMENTATION
Subtitle A--Safety of Maritime Navigation
SEC. 801. AMENDMENT TO SECTION 2280 OF TITLE 18, UNITED
STATES CODE.
Section 2280 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (1)(A)(i), by striking ``a ship flying the
flag of the United States'' and inserting ``a vessel of the
United States or a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States (as defined in section 70502 of title 46)'';
(B) in paragraph (1)(A)(ii), by inserting ``, including the
territorial seas'' after ``in the United States''; and
(C) in paragraph (1)(A)(iii), by inserting ``, by a United
States corporation or legal entity,'' after ``by a national
of the United States'';
(2) in subsection (c), by striking ``section 2(c)'' and
inserting ``section 13(c)'';
(3) by striking subsection (d);
(4) by striking subsection (e) and inserting after
subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Definitions.--As used in this section, section 2280a,
section 2281, and section 2281a, the term--
``(1) `applicable treaty' means--
``(A) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, done at The Hague on 16 December 1970;
``(B) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 23
September 1971;
``(C) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on 14 December 1973;
``(D) International Convention against the Taking of
Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on 17 December 1979;
``(E) the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, done at Vienna on 26 October 1979;
``(F) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at
Montreal on 24 February 1988;
``(G) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988;
``(H) International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on 15 December 1997; and
``(I) International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on 9 December 1999;
``(2) `armed conflict' does not include internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar
nature;
``(3) `biological weapon' means--
``(A) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins
whatever their origin or method of production, of types and
in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective, or other peaceful purposes; or
``(B) weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to
use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed
conflict;
``(4) `chemical weapon' means, together or separately--
``(A) toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where
intended for--
``(i) industrial, agricultural, research, medical,
pharmaceutical, or other peaceful purposes;
``(ii) protective purposes, namely those purposes directly
related to protection against toxic chemicals and to
protection against chemical weapons;
``(iii) military purposes not connected with the use of
chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic
properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; or
``(iv) law enforcement including domestic riot control
purposes,
as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such
purposes;
``(B) munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause
death or other harm through the toxic properties of those
toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (A), which would be
released as a result of the employment of such munitions and
devices; and
``(C) any equipment specifically designed for use directly
in connection with the employment of munitions and devices
specified in subparagraph (B);
``(5) `covered ship' means a ship that is navigating or is
scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters beyond the
outer limit of the territorial sea of a single country or a
lateral limit of that country's territorial sea with an
adjacent country;
``(6) `explosive material' has the meaning given the term
in section 841(c) and includes explosive as defined in
section 844(j) of this title;
``(7) `infrastructure facility' has the meaning given the
term in section 2332f(e)(5) of this title;
``(8) `international organization' has the meaning given
the term in section 831(f)(3) of this title;
``(9) `military forces of a state' means the armed forces
of a state which are organized, trained, and equipped under
its internal law for the primary purpose of national defense
or security, and persons acting in support of those armed
forces who are under their formal command, control, and
responsibility;
``(10) `national of the United States' has the meaning
stated in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22));
``(11) `Non-Proliferation Treaty' means the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington,
London, and Moscow on 1 July 1968;
``(12) `Non-Proliferation Treaty State Party' means any
State Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to include
Taiwan, which shall be considered to have the obligations
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty of a party to that treaty
other than a Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty;
``(13) `Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty' means a State Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
that is a nuclear-weapon State, as that term is defined in
Article IX(3) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;
``(14) `place of public use' has the meaning given the term
in section 2332f(e)(6) of this title;
``(15) `precursor' has the meaning given the term in
section 229F(6)(A) of this title;
``(16) `public transport system' has the meaning given the
term in section 2332f(e)(7) of this title;
``(17) `serious injury or damage' means--
``(A) serious bodily injury,
``(B) extensive destruction of a place of public use, State
or government facility, infrastructure facility, or public
transportation system, resulting in major economic loss, or
``(C) substantial damage to the environment, including air,
soil, water, fauna, or flora;
``(18) `ship' means a vessel of any type whatsoever not
permanently attached to the sea-bed, including dynamically
supported craft, submersibles, or any other floating craft,
but does not include a warship, a ship owned or operated by a
government when being used as a naval auxiliary or for
customs or police purposes, or a ship which has been
withdrawn from navigation or laid up;
``(19) `source material' has the meaning given that term in
the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute, done at New
York on 26 October 1956;
``(20) `special fissionable material' has the meaning given
that term in the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute,
done at New York on 26 October 1956;
``(21) `territorial sea of the United States' means all
waters extending seaward to 12 nautical miles from the
baselines of the United States determined in accordance with
international law;
``(22) `toxic chemical' has the meaning given the term in
section 229F(8)(A) of this title;
``(23) `transport' means to initiate, arrange or exercise
effective control, including decisionmaking authority, over
the movement of a person or item; and
``(24) `United States', when used in a geographical sense,
includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands, and all territories and
possessions of the United States.''; and
(5) by inserting after subsection (d) (as added by
paragraph (4) of this section) the following:
``(e) Exceptions.--This section shall not apply to--
``(1) the activities of armed forces during an armed
conflict, as those terms are understood under the law of war,
which are governed by that law; or
``(2) activities undertaken by military forces of a state
in the exercise of their official duties.
``(f) Delivery of Suspected Offender.--The master of a
covered ship flying the flag of the United States who has
reasonable grounds to believe that there is on board that
ship any person who has committed an offense under section
2280 or section 2280a may deliver such person to the
authorities of a country that is a party to the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation. Before delivering such person to the
authorities of another country, the master shall notify in an
appropriate manner the Attorney General of the United States
of the alleged offense and await instructions from the
Attorney General as to what action to take. When delivering
the person to a country which is a state party to the
Convention, the master shall, whenever practicable, and if
possible before entering the territorial sea of such country,
notify the authorities of such country of the master's
intention to deliver such person and the reasons therefor. If
the master delivers such person, the master shall furnish to
the authorities of such country the evidence in the master's
possession that pertains to the alleged offense.
``(g)(1) Civil Forfeiture.--Any real or personal property
used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the
commission of a violation of this section, the gross proceeds
of such violation, and any real or personal property
traceable to such property or proceeds, shall be subject to
forfeiture.
``(2) Applicable Procedures.--Seizures and forfeitures
under this section shall be governed by the provisions of
chapter 46 of title 18, United States Code, relating to civil
forfeitures, except that such duties as are imposed upon the
Secretary of the Treasury under the customs laws described in
section 981(d) shall be performed by such officers,
[[Page H2912]]
agents, and other persons as may be designated for that
purpose by the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney
General, or the Secretary of Defense.''.
SEC. 802. NEW SECTION 2280A OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE.
(a) In General.--Chapter 111 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding after section 2280 the following
new section:
``Sec. 2280a. Violence against maritime navigation and
maritime transport involving weapons of mass destruction
``(a) Offenses.--
``(1) In general.--Subject to the exceptions in subsection
(c), a person who unlawfully and intentionally--
``(A) when the purpose of the act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act--
``(i) uses against or on a ship or discharges from a ship
any explosive or radioactive material, biological, chemical,
or nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device in a
manner that causes or is likely to cause death to any person
or serious injury or damage;
``(ii) discharges from a ship oil, liquefied natural gas,
or another hazardous or noxious substance that is not covered
by clause (i), in such quantity or concentration that causes
or is likely to cause death to any person or serious injury
or damage; or
``(iii) uses a ship in a manner that causes death to any
person or serious injury or damage;
``(B) transports on board a ship--
``(i) any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that
it is intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause,
death to any person or serious injury or damage for the
purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a
government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act;
``(ii) any biological, chemical, or nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device, knowing it to be a biological,
chemical, or nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive
device;
``(iii) any source material, special fissionable material,
or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for
the processing, use, or production of special fissionable
material, knowing that it is intended to be used in a nuclear
explosive activity or in any other nuclear activity not under
safeguards pursuant to an International Atomic Energy Agency
comprehensive safeguards agreement, except where--
``(I) such item is transported to or from the territory of,
or otherwise under the control of, a Non-Proliferation Treaty
State Party; and
``(II) the resulting transfer or receipt (including
internal to a country) is not contrary to the obligations
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty State Party from which, to the territory of which, or
otherwise under the control of which such item is
transferred;
``(iv) any equipment, materials, or software or related
technology that significantly contributes to the design or
manufacture of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive
device, with the intention that it will be used for such
purpose, except where--
``(I) the country to the territory of which or under the
control of which such item is transferred is a Nuclear Weapon
State Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and
``(II) the resulting transfer or receipt (including
internal to a country) is not contrary to the obligations
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty of a Non-Proliferation
Treaty State Party from which, to the territory of which, or
otherwise under the control of which such item is
transferred;
``(v) any equipment, materials, or software or related
technology that significantly contributes to the delivery of
a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, with the
intention that it will be used for such purpose, except
where--
``(I) such item is transported to or from the territory of,
or otherwise under the control of, a Non-Proliferation Treaty
State Party; and
``(II) such item is intended for the delivery system of a
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device of a Nuclear
Weapon State Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; or
``(vi) any equipment, materials, or software or related
technology that significantly contributes to the design,
manufacture, or delivery of a biological or chemical weapon,
with the intention that it will be used for such purpose;
``(C) transports another person on board a ship knowing
that the person has committed an act that constitutes an
offense under section 2280 or subparagraph (A), (B), (D), or
(E) of this section or an offense set forth in an applicable
treaty, as specified in section 2280(d)(1), and intending to
assist that person to evade criminal prosecution;
``(D) injures or kills any person in connection with the
commission or the attempted commission of any of the offenses
set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (C), or subsection
(a)(2), to the extent that the subsection (a)(2) offense
pertains to subparagraph (A); or
``(E) attempts to do any act prohibited under subparagraph
(A), (B) or (D), or conspires to do any act prohibited by
subparagraphs (A) through (E) or subsection (a)(2),
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both; and if the death of any person results from
conduct prohibited by this paragraph, shall be imprisoned for
any term of years or for life.
``(2) Threats.--A person who threatens, with apparent
determination and will to carry the threat into execution, to
do any act prohibited under paragraph (1)(A) shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
``(b) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction over the
activity prohibited in subsection (a)--
``(1) in the case of a covered ship, if--
``(A) such activity is committed--
``(i) against or on board a vessel of the United States or
a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (as
defined in section 70502 of title 46) at the time the
prohibited activity is committed;
``(ii) in the United States, including the territorial
seas; or
``(iii) by a national of the United States, by a United
States corporation or legal entity, or by a stateless person
whose habitual residence is in the United States;
``(B) during the commission of such activity, a national of
the United States is seized, threatened, injured, or killed;
or
``(C) the offender is later found in the United States
after such activity is committed;
``(2) in the case of a ship navigating or scheduled to
navigate solely within the territorial sea or internal waters
of a country other than the United States, if the offender is
later found in the United States after such activity is
committed; or
``(3) in the case of any vessel, if such activity is
committed in an attempt to compel the United States to do or
abstain from doing any act.
``(c) Exceptions.--This section shall not apply to--
``(1) the activities of armed forces during an armed
conflict, as those terms are understood under the law of war,
which are governed by that law; or
``(2) activities undertaken by military forces of a state
in the exercise of their official duties.
``(d)(1) Civil Forfeiture.--Any real or personal property
used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the
commission of a violation of this section, the gross proceeds
of such violation, and any real or personal property
traceable to such property or proceeds, shall be subject to
forfeiture.
``(2) Applicable Procedures.--Seizures and forfeitures
under this section shall be governed by the provisions of
chapter 46 of title 18, United States Code, relating to civil
forfeitures, except that such duties as are imposed upon the
Secretary of the Treasury under the customs laws described in
section 981(d) shall be performed by such officers, agents,
and other persons as may be designated for that purpose by
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, or
the Secretary of Defense.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 111 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by adding after the item relating to section 2280 the
following new item:
``2280a. Violence against maritime navigation and maritime transport
involving weapons of mass destruction.''.
SEC. 803. AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 2281 OF TITLE 18, UNITED
STATES CODE.
Section 2281 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (c), by striking ``section 2(c)'' and
inserting ``section 13(c)'';
(2) in subsection (d), by striking the definitions of
``national of the United States,'' ``territorial sea of the
United States,'' and ``United States''; and
(3) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
``(e) Exceptions.--This section does not apply to--
``(1) the activities of armed forces during an armed
conflict, as those terms are understood under the law of war,
which are governed by that law; or
``(2) activities undertaken by military forces of a state
in the exercise of their official duties.''.
SEC. 804. NEW SECTION 2281A OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE.
(a) In General.--Chapter 111 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding after section 2281 the following
new section:
``Sec. 2281a. Additional offenses against maritime fixed
platforms
``(a) Offenses.--
``(1) In general.--A person who unlawfully and
intentionally--
``(A) when the purpose of the act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act--
``(i) uses against or on a fixed platform or discharges
from a fixed platform any explosive or radioactive material,
biological, chemical, or nuclear weapon in a manner that
causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or
damage; or
``(ii) discharges from a fixed platform oil, liquefied
natural gas, or another hazardous or noxious substance that
is not covered by clause (i), in such quantity or
concentration that causes or is likely to cause death or
serious injury or damage;
``(B) injures or kills any person in connection with the
commission or the attempted commission of any of the offenses
set forth in subparagraph (A); or
``(C) attempts or conspires to do anything prohibited under
subparagraph (A) or (B),
[[Page H2913]]
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both; and if death results to any person from
conduct prohibited by this paragraph, shall be imprisoned for
any term of years or for life.
``(2) Threat to safety.--A person who threatens, with
apparent determination and will to carry the threat into
execution, to do any act prohibited under paragraph (1)(A),
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5
years, or both.
``(b) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction over the
activity prohibited in subsection (a) if--
``(1) such activity is committed against or on board a
fixed platform--
``(A) that is located on the continental shelf of the
United States;
``(B) that is located on the continental shelf of another
country, by a national of the United States or by a stateless
person whose habitual residence is in the United States; or
``(C) in an attempt to compel the United States to do or
abstain from doing any act;
``(2) during the commission of such activity against or on
board a fixed platform located on a continental shelf, a
national of the United States is seized, threatened, injured,
or killed; or
``(3) such activity is committed against or on board a
fixed platform located outside the United States and beyond
the continental shelf of the United States and the offender
is later found in the United States.
``(c) Exceptions.--This section does not apply to--
``(1) the activities of armed forces during an armed
conflict, as those terms are understood under the law of war,
which are governed by that law; or
``(2) activities undertaken by military forces of a state
in the exercise of their official duties.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section--
``(1) `continental shelf' means the sea-bed and subsoil of
the submarine areas that extend beyond a country's
territorial sea to the limits provided by customary
international law as reflected in Article 76 of the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea; and
``(2) `fixed platform' means an artificial island,
installation, or structure permanently attached to the sea-
bed for the purpose of exploration or exploitation of
resources or for other economic purposes.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 111 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by adding after the item relating to section 2281 the
following new item:
``2281a. Additional offenses against maritime fixed platforms.''.
SEC. 805. ANCILLARY MEASURE.
Section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by inserting ``2280a (relating to maritime safety),''
before ``2281'', and by striking ``2281'' and inserting
``2281 through 2281a''.
Subtitle B--Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism
SEC. 811. NEW SECTION 2332I OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE.
(a) In General.--Chapter 113B of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding after section 2332h the following:
``Sec. 2332i. Acts of nuclear terrorism
``(a) Offenses.--
``(1) In general.--Whoever knowingly and unlawfully--
``(A) possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses
a device--
``(i) with the intent to cause death or serious bodily
injury; or
``(ii) with the intent to cause substantial damage to
property or the environment; or
``(B) uses in any way radioactive material or a device, or
uses or damages or interferes with the operation of a nuclear
facility in a manner that causes the release of or increases
the risk of the release of radioactive material, or causes
radioactive contamination or exposure to radiation--
``(i) with the intent to cause death or serious bodily
injury or with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury;
``(ii) with the intent to cause substantial damage to
property or the environment or with the knowledge that such
act is likely to cause substantial damage to property or the
environment; or
``(iii) with the intent to compel a person, an
international organization or a country to do or refrain from
doing an act,
shall be punished as prescribed in subsection (c).
``(2) Threats.--Whoever, under circumstances in which the
threat may reasonably be believed, threatens to commit an
offense under paragraph (1) shall be punished as prescribed
in subsection (c). Whoever demands possession of or access to
radioactive material, a device or a nuclear facility by
threat or by use of force shall be punished as prescribed in
subsection (c).
``(3) Attempts and conspiracies.--Whoever attempts to
commit an offense under paragraph (1) or conspires to commit
an offense under paragraph (1) or (2) shall be punished as
prescribed in subsection (c).
``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a)
is within the jurisdiction of the United States if--
``(1) the prohibited conduct takes place in the United
States or the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United
States;
``(2) the prohibited conduct takes place outside of the
United States and--
``(A) is committed by a national of the United States, a
United States corporation or legal entity or a stateless
person whose habitual residence is in the United States;
``(B) is committed on board a vessel of the United States
or a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
(as defined in section 70502 of title 46) or on board an
aircraft that is registered under United States law, at the
time the offense is committed; or
``(C) is committed in an attempt to compel the United
States to do or abstain from doing any act, or constitutes a
threat directed at the United States;
``(3) the prohibited conduct takes place outside of the
United States and a victim or an intended victim is a
national of the United States or a United States corporation
or legal entity, or the offense is committed against any
state or government facility of the United States; or
``(4) a perpetrator of the prohibited conduct is found in
the United States.
``(c) Penalties.--Whoever violates this section shall be
fined not more than $2,000,000 and shall be imprisoned for
any term of years or for life.
``(d) Nonapplicability.--This section does not apply to--
``(1) the activities of armed forces during an armed
conflict, as those terms are understood under the law of war,
which are governed by that law; or
``(2) activities undertaken by military forces of a state
in the exercise of their official duties.
``(e) Definitions.--As used in this section, the term--
``(1) `armed conflict' has the meaning given that term in
section 2332f(e)(11) of this title;
``(2) `device' means:
``(A) any nuclear explosive device; or
``(B) any radioactive material dispersal or radiation-
emitting device that may, owing to its radiological
properties, cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial
damage to property or the environment;
``(3) `international organization' has the meaning given
that term in section 831(f)(3) of this title;
``(4) `military forces of a state' means the armed forces
of a country that are organized, trained and equipped under
its internal law for the primary purpose of national defense
or security and persons acting in support of those armed
forces who are under their formal command, control and
responsibility;
``(5) `national of the United States' has the meaning given
that term in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22));
``(6) `nuclear facility' means:
``(A) any nuclear reactor, including reactors on vessels,
vehicles, aircraft or space objects for use as an energy
source in order to propel such vessels, vehicles, aircraft or
space objects or for any other purpose;
``(B) any plant or conveyance being used for the
production, storage, processing or transport of radioactive
material; or
``(C) a facility (including associated buildings and
equipment) in which nuclear material is produced, processed,
used, handled, stored or disposed of, if damage to or
interference with such facility could lead to the release of
significant amounts of radiation or radioactive material;
``(7) `nuclear material' has the meaning given that term in
section 831(f)(1) of this title;
``(8) `radioactive material' means nuclear material and
other radioactive substances that contain nuclides that
undergo spontaneous disintegration (a process accompanied by
emission of one or more types of ionizing radiation, such as
alpha-, beta-, neutron particles and gamma rays) and that
may, owing to their radiological or fissile properties, cause
death, serious bodily injury or substantial damage to
property or to the environment;
``(9) `serious bodily injury' has the meaning given that
term in section 831(f)(4) of this title;
``(10) `state' has the same meaning as that term has under
international law, and includes all political subdivisions
thereof;
``(11) `state or government facility' has the meaning given
that term in section 2332f(e)(3) of this title;
``(12) `United States corporation or legal entity' means
any corporation or other entity organized under the laws of
the United States or any State, Commonwealth, territory,
possession or district of the United States;
``(13) `vessel' has the meaning given that term in section
1502(19) of title 33; and
``(14) `vessel of the United States' has the meaning given
that term in section 70502 of title 46.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 2332h
the following:
``2332i. Acts of nuclear terrorism.''.
(c) Disclaimer.--Nothing contained in this section is
intended to affect the applicability of any other Federal or
State law that might pertain to the underlying conduct.
(d) Inclusion in Definition of Federal Crimes of
Terrorism.--Section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by inserting ``2332i (relating to acts of
nuclear terrorism),'' before ``2339 (relating to harboring
terrorists)''.
SEC. 812. AMENDMENT TO SECTION 831 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES
CODE.
Section 831 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(a) in subsection (a)--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (8) as
paragraphs (4) through (9);
[[Page H2914]]
(2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) without lawful authority, intentionally carries,
sends or moves nuclear material into or out of a country;'';
(3) in paragraph (8), as redesignated, by striking ``an
offense under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4)'' and inserting
``any act prohibited under paragraphs (1) through (5)''; and
(4) in paragraph (9), as redesignated, by striking ``an
offense under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4)'' and inserting
``any act prohibited under paragraphs (1) through (7)'';
(b) in subsection (b)--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``(7)'' and inserting
``(8)''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``(8)'' and inserting
``(9)'';
(c) in subsection (c)--
(1) in subparagraph (2)(A), by adding after ``United
States'' the following: ``or a stateless person whose
habitual residence is in the United States'';
(2) by striking paragraph (5);
(3) in paragraph (4), by striking ``or'' at the end; and
(4) by inserting after paragraph (4), the following:
``(5) the offense is committed on board a vessel of the
United States or a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States (as defined in section 70502 of title 46) or on
board an aircraft that is registered under United States law,
at the time the offense is committed;
``(6) the offense is committed outside the United States
and against any state or government facility of the United
States; or
``(7) the offense is committed in an attempt to compel the
United States to do or abstain from doing any act, or
constitutes a threat directed at the United States.'';
(d) by redesignating subsections (d) through (f) as (e)
through (g), respectively;
(e) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Nonapplicability.--This section does not apply to--
``(1) the activities of armed forces during an armed
conflict, as those terms are understood under the law of war,
which are governed by that law; or
``(2) activities undertaken by military forces of a state
in the exercise of their official duties.''; and
(f) in subsection (g), as redesignated--
(1) in paragraph (6), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end and
inserting a semicolon; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (7), the following:
``(8) the term `armed conflict' has the meaning given that
term in section 2332f(e)(11) of this title;
``(9) the term `military forces of a state' means the armed
forces of a country that are organized, trained and equipped
under its internal law for the primary purpose of national
defense or security and persons acting in support of those
armed forces who are under their formal command, control and
responsibility;
``(10) the term `state' has the same meaning as that term
has under international law, and includes all political
subdivisions thereof;
``(11) the term `state or government facility' has the
meaning given that term in section 2332f(e)(3) of this title;
and
``(12) the term `vessel of the United States' has the
meaning given that term in section 70502 of title 46.''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte)
and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) each will control 30
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.
General Leave
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their
remarks and include extraneous materials on H.R. 2048, currently under
consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Virginia?
There was no objection.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, as we speak, thousands--no, millions--of telephone
metadata records are flowing into the NSA on a daily basis, 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week. Despite changes to the NSA bulk telephone metadata
program announced by President Obama last year, the bulk collection of
the records has not ceased and will not cease unless and until Congress
acts to shut it down.
Not even last week's decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
will end this collection. The responsibility falls to us, and today we
must answer the call and the will of the American people to do just
that.
When we set out to reform this program 1 year ago, I made the pledge
to my colleagues in Congress and to the American people that Americans'
liberty and America's security can coexist, that these fundamental
concepts are not mutually exclusive. They are embedded in the very
fabric that makes this Nation great and that makes this Nation an
example for the world.
Mr. Speaker, the legislation before the House today--H.R. 2048, the
USA FREEDOM Act--protects these pillars of American democracy. It
affirmatively ends the indiscriminate bulk collection of telephone
metadata. But it goes much further than this. It prohibits the bulk
collection of all records under section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, as well
as under the FISA pen register trap and trace device statute and the
National Security Letter statutes.
In place of the current bulk telephone metadata program, the USA
FREEDOM Act creates a targeted program that allows the intelligence
community to collect non-content call detail records held by the
telephone companies, but only with the prior approval of the FISA court
and subject to the ``special selection term'' limitation. The records
provided to the government in response to queries will be limited to
two ``hops,'' and the government's handling of any records it acquires
will be governed by minimization procedures approved by the FISA court.
The USA FREEDOM Act prevents government overreach by strengthening
the definition of ``specific selection term''--the mechanism used to
prohibit bulk collection--to ensure the government can collect the
information it needs to further a national security investigation while
also prohibiting large-scale, indiscriminate collection, such as data
from an entire State, city, or ZIP Code.
The USA FREEDOM Act strengthens civil liberties and privacy
protections by authorizing the FISA court to appoint an individual to
serve as amicus curiae from a pool of experts to advise the court on
matters of privacy and civil liberties, communications technology, and
other technical or legal matters. It also codifies important procedures
for recipients of National Security Letters to challenge nondisclosure
requests.
The bill increases transparency by requiring declassification of all
significant FISA court opinions and provides procedures for certified
questions of law to the FISA court of review and the United States
Supreme Court.
Additionally, Mr. Speaker, H.R. 2048 requires the Attorney General
and the Director of National Intelligence to provide the public with
detailed information about how the intelligence community uses these
national security authorities, and provides even more robust
transparency reporting by America's technology companies.
The USA FREEDOM Act enhances America's national security by closing
loopholes that make it difficult for the government to track foreign
terrorists and spies as they enter or leave the country; clarifying the
application of FISA to foreign targets who facilitate the international
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; increasing the maximum
penalties for material support of a foreign terrorist organization; and
expanding the sunsets of the expiring PATRIOT Act provisions to
December 2019.
From beginning to end, this is a carefully crafted, bipartisan bill
that enjoys wide support. I would like to thank the sponsor of this
legislation, Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations
Subcommittee Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner; full committee Ranking Member
John Conyers; and Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet
Subcommittee Ranking Member Jerry Nadler for working together with me
on this important bipartisan legislation.
I also want to thank the staffs of these Members for the many hours,
weeks, yes, even months of hard work they have put into this effort.
Furthermore, I would like to thank my staff, Caroline Lynch, the chief
counsel of the Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations
Subcommittee, and Jason Herring, as well as Aaron Hiller with Mr.
Conyers and Bart Forsyth with Mr. Sensenbrenner for their long hours
and steadfast dedication to this legislation.
I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan bill, and I reserve
the balance of my time.
[[Page H2915]]
House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence,
Washington, DC, May 4, 2015.
Hon. Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, Rayburn House Office
Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Goodlatte: On April 30, 2015, the Committee
on the Judiciary ordered H.R. 2048, the USA Freedom Act of
2015, reported to the House.
As you know, H.R. 2048 contains provisions that amend the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which is within the
jurisdiction of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. As a result of your prior consultation with the
Committee, and in order to expedite the House's consideration
of H.R. 2048, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
will waive further consideration of the bill.
The Committee takes this action only with the understanding
that this procedural route should not be construed to
prejudice the jurisdictional interest of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence over this bill or any
similar bill. Furthermore, this waiver should not be
considered as precedent for consideration of matters of
jurisdictional interest to the Committee in the future,
including in connection with any subsequent consideration of
the bill by the House. The Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence will seek conferees on the bill during any
House-Senate conference that may be convened on this
legislation.
Finally, I would ask that you include a copy of our
exchange of letters on this matter in the Congressional
Record during the House debate on H.R. 2048. I appreciate the
constructive work between our committees on this matter and
thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Devin Nunes,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC, May 7, 2015.
Hon. Devin Nunes,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Nunes: Thank you for your letter regarding
H.R. 2048, the ``U.S.A. Freedom Act of 2015.'' As you noted,
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence was granted an
additional referral on the bill.
I am most appreciative of your decision to waive further
consideration of H.R. 2048 so that it may proceed
expeditiously to the House floor. I acknowledge that although
you waived formal consideration of the bill, the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence is in no way waiving its
jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in those
provisions of the bill that fall within your Rule X
jurisdiction. Further, I understand the Committee reserves
the right to seek the appointment of an appropriate number of
conferees to any House-Senate conference involving this or
similar legislation, for which you will have my support.
I will include a copy of your letter and this response in
the Committee Report as well as in the Congressional Record
during floor consideration of H.R. 2048.
Sincerely,
Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Financial Services,
Washington, DC, May 8, 2015.
Hon. Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, Rayburn House Office
Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Goodlatte: On April 30, 2015, the Committee
on the Judiciary ordered H.R. 2048, the USA FREEDOM Act, to
be reported favorably to the House. As a result of your
having consulted with the Committee on Financial Services
concerning provisions of the bill that fall within our Rule X
jurisdiction, I agree to discharge our committee from further
consideration of the bill so that it may proceed
expeditiously to the House Floor.
The Committee on Financial Services takes this action with
our mutual understanding that, by foregoing consideration of
H.R. 2048 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over
the subject matter contained in this or similar legislation,
and that our committee will be appropriately consulted and
involved as the bill or similar legislation moves forward so
that we may address any remaining issues that fall within our
Rule X jurisdiction. Our committee also reserves the right to
seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any
House-Senate conference involving this or similar
legislation, and requests your support for any such request.
Finally, I would appreciate your response to this letter
confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 2048 and
would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this
matter be included in your committee's report to accompany
the legislation and/or in the Congressional Record during
floor consideration thereof.
Sincerely,
Jeb Hensarling,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC, May 11, 2015.
Hon. Jeb Hensarling,
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, Rayburn House
Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Hensarling: Thank you for your letter
regarding H.R. 2048, the ``U.S.A. Freedom Act of 2015.'' As
you noted, the Committee on Financial services was granted an
additional referral on the bill.
I am most appreciative of your decision to waive further
consideration of H.R. 2048 so that it may proceed
expeditiously to the House floor. 1 acknowledge that although
you waived formal consideration of the bill, the Committee on
Financial Services is in no way waiving its jurisdiction over
the subject matter contained in those provisions of the bill
that fall within your Rule X jurisdiction. Further, I
understand the Committee reserves the right to seek the
appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any
House-Senate conference involving this or similar
legislation, for which you will have my support.
I will include a copy of your letter and this response in
the Congressional Record during floor consideration of H.R.
2048.
Sincerely,
Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Ladies and gentlemen, with the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act today,
the House will have done its part to enact historic and sweeping
reforms to the government's surveillance program and powers. This
legislation ends bulk collection, creates a panel of experts to guide
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and mandates extensive
government reporting.
Today we have a rare opportunity to restore a measure of restraint to
surveillance programs that have simply gone too far. For years the
government has read section 215 of the PATRIOT Act to mean that it may
collect all domestic telephone records merely because some of them may
be relevant at some time in the future.
Last week, endorsing a view that I and many of my colleagues have
held for years, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that ``the
text of section 215 cannot bear the weight the government asks us to
assign it, and it does not authorize the telephone metadata program.''
Now, with section 215 set to expire on June 1, we have the
opportunity--and the obligation--to act clearly and decisively and end
the program that has infringed on our rights for far too long.
A vote in favor of the USA FREEDOM Act is an explicit rejection of
the government's unlawful interpretation of section 215 and similar
statutes. Put another way, a vote in favor of this bill is a vote to
end dragnet surveillance in the United States.
Mr. Speaker, the ban on bulk collection contained in this legislation
turns on the idea of a ``specific selection term'' and requires the
government to limit the scope of production as narrowly as possible.
This definition is much improved from the version of this bill that
passed the House last Congress.
The bill further requires the government to declassify and publish
all novel and significant opinions of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court.
{time} 1430
It also creates a panel of experts to advise the court on the
protection of privacy and civil liberties, communications technology,
and other legal and technical matters.
These changes, along with robust reporting requirements for the
government and flexible reporting options for private companies, create
a new and inescapable level of that all-important consideration of
transparency. The government may one day again attempt to expand its
surveillance power by clever legal argument, but it will no longer be
allowed to do so in secret.
Mr. Speaker, there are Members of the House and Senate who oppose
this bill because it does not include every reform to surveillance law
that we can create, and then there are others who oppose it because it
includes any changes to existing surveillance programs.
This bill represents a reasonable consensus, and it will accomplish
the most sweeping set of reforms to government surveillance in nearly
40 years.
H.R. 2048 has earned the support of privacy advocates, private
industry,
[[Page H2916]]
the White House, and the intelligence community. It ends dragnet
surveillance and does so without diminishing in any way our ability to
protect this country.
I want to extend my sincere thanks to Chairman Goodlatte, to Mr.
Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin, and to Mr. Nadler of New York for working
with me to bring a stronger version of the USA FREEDOM Act to the
floor. I think we succeeded. I also want to thank Chairman Nunes and
Ranking Member Schiff for helping us to reach this point.
I urge all of my colleagues to support H.R. 2048, and I reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, at this time, it is my pleasure to yield
5 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), the
chairman of the Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigation
Subcommittee and the chief sponsor of this legislation.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, you know you have drafted a strong
bill when you unite both national security hawks and civil
libertarians. The USA FREEDOM Act has done that. It also has the
support of privacy groups, tech companies, and the intelligence
community.
This bill is an extremely well-drafted compromise, the product of
nearly 2 years of work. It effectively protects America's civil
liberties and our national security. I am very proud of the USA FREEDOM
Act and am confident it is the most responsible path forward.
I do not fault my colleagues who wish that this bill went further to
protect our civil liberties. For years, the government has violated the
privacy of innocent Americans, and I share your anger, but letting
section 215 and other surveillance authorities expire would not only
threaten our national security, it would also mean less privacy
protections. I emphasize it would also mean less privacy protections.
The USA FREEDOM Act also ends bulk collections across all domestic
surveillance authorities, not just section 215. It also expands
transparency with increased reporting from both government and private
companies. If the administration finds a new way to circumvent the law,
Congress and the public will know. The bill also requires the FISC to
declassify significant legal decisions, bringing an end to secret laws.
If the PATRIOT Act authorities expire and the FISC approves bulk
collection under a different authority, how will the public know?
Without the USA FREEDOM Act, they will not. Allowing the PATRIOT Act
authorities to expire sounds like a civil libertarian victory, but it
will actually mean less privacy and more risk--less privacy and more
risk.
Now, to my colleagues who oppose the USA FREEDOM Act because they
don't believe it does enough for national security, this bill is a
significant improvement over the status quo. Americans will be safer
post USA FREEDOM than they would be if Congress passes a clean
reauthorization of the expiring provisions.
I am not ignorant to the threats we face, but a clean reauthorization
would be irresponsible. Congress never intended section 215 to allow
bulk collection. That program is illegal and based on a blatant
misinterpretation of the law. That said, the FREEDOM Act gives the
intelligence community new tools to combat terrorism in more targeted
and effective ways.
Specifically, the bill replaces the administration's bulk metadata
collection with a targeted program to collect only the records the
government needs without compromising the privacy of innocent
Americans.
It includes new authorities to allow the administration to expedite
emergency requests under section 215 and fills holes in our
surveillance law that require intelligence agencies to go dark on known
terrorists or spies when they transit from outside to inside the U.S.
or vice versa.
Under current law, the administration has to temporarily stop
monitoring persons of interest as it shifts between domestic and
international surveillance authorities. What is more likely to stop the
next terrorist attack: the bulk collection of innocent Americans or the
ability to track down a known terrorist as soon as he or she enters the
United States?
If you answer that question the same way I do, then don't let the
bluster and fear-mongering of the bill's opponents convince you we are
safer with a clean reauthorization than we are with this bill.
Attorney General Lynch and Director of National Intelligence Clapper
recognize this. In a recent letter of support, they wrote:
The significant reforms contained in this legislation will
provide the public greater confidence in how our intelligence
activities are carried out and in the oversight of those
activities, while ensuring vital national security
authorities remain in place.
Let's not kill these important reforms because we wish this bill did
more. There is no perfect. Every bill we vote on could do more. I play
the lottery. When I win, I don't throw away the winning ticket because
I wish the jackpot were higher.
It is time to pass the USA FREEDOM Act. I am asking all my
colleagues--Democrats and Republicans, security hawks, and civil
libertarians--to vote for it. Let's speak with one voice in the House
of Representatives and together urge the United States Senate to work
quickly and adopt these important reforms.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), to recognize his indefatigable
work, a senior member of the Judiciary Committee.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman.
Mr. Speaker, the USA FREEDOM Act represents a return to the basic
principle of the Fourth Amendment, the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Before the government may search our homes, seize our persons, or
intercept our communications, it must first make a showing of
individualized suspicion. The intrusion it requests must be as targeted
and as brief as circumstances allow. The Fourth Amendment demands no
less.
That is why we are here today. We have learned that the government
has engaged in unreasonable searches against all of us. It has gathered
an enormous amount of information about every phone call in the United
States. It has deemed all of our phone calls relevant to a terrorism
investigation. It is intolerable to our sense of freedom.
Today, we are acting to stop it. The bill before us prohibits the
intelligence community from engaging in bulk data collection within the
United States.
This practice, the dragnet collection without a warrant of telephone
records and Internet metadata, is the contemporary equivalent of the
British writs of assistance that early American revolutionaries opposed
and that the Fourth Amendment was drafted to outlaw. It has never
complied with the Constitution and must be brought to an end without
delay.
The legal theories that justified these programs were developed and
approved in secret, and that practice must also come to an end. There
must not be a body of secret law in the United States.
Section 215 says tangible things may be seized if they are relevant
to a terrorism investigation. The government's interpretation that this
means ``everything'' is obviously wrong, could only have been advanced
in secret, and cannot withstand the public scrutiny to which it is now
subjected. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals threw out this notion
last week, and now, we must do so as well.
This bill further requires the government to promptly declassify and
release each novel or significant opinion of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court. In the future, if the government advances a
similarly dubious legal claim, there will be an advocate in court to
oppose it. If the court should agree with the novel claim, the public
will know about it almost immediately, and the responsibility will lie
with us to correct it just as quickly.
Before I close, I want to be clear. Not every reform I would have
hoped to enact is included in this bill. We must do more to protect
U.S. person information collected under section 702 of FISA. We must
act to reform other authorities, many of them law enforcement rather
than intelligence community authorities, to prevent indiscriminate
searches in other circumstances.
I will continue to fight for these reforms, among others, and I know
that I
[[Page H2917]]
will not be alone in taking up that challenge in the days to come, but
I am grateful that we have the opportunity to take this first major
step to restore the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects and to do so without in any way endangering
national security.
I thank Chairman Goodlatte, Chairman Sensenbrenner, and Ranking
Member Conyers for their continued leadership on this legislation, and
I urge every one of my colleagues to support this bill.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Before I yield to the next speaker, I want to say to him and his
colleagues on the House Intelligence Committee that they did marvelous
work in protecting not only the national security, but the civil
liberties of Americans.
They worked with the Judiciary Committee together to prove that we
can have very high levels of civil liberty and very high levels of
national security. I thank Chairman Nunes and his staff for that
outstanding work.
Now, it is my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Nunes), the chairman of the House Intelligence
Committee.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2048, the USA
FREEDOM Act of 2015.
Ideally, we would reauthorize section 215 of the U.S. PATRIOT Act and
other expiring FISA authorities without making any changes. These
provisions authorize important counterterrorism programs, including the
NSA bulk telephone metadata program.
What is more, they are constitutional, authorized by Congress, and
subject to multiple layers of oversight from all three branches of
government. As threats to Americans at home and abroad increase by the
day, now is not the time to be weakening our national security with all
the tragic consequences that may follow.
However, I also realize that some of my colleagues disagree. Despite
the fact that the NSA bulk telephone metadata program has never been
intentionally misused, many Members wish to make changes to increase
confidence in the program and allow greater transparency into
intelligence activities.
Like the bill the House passed last year with more than 300 votes,
this bill would replace the bulk program that will expire on June 1
with a targeted authority. This new targeted authority will be slower
and potentially less effective than the current program. Along with
Ranking Member Schiff, I have worked with the Judiciary Committee to
ensure these changes still allow as much operational flexibility as
possible.
Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, and Subcommittee Chairman
Sensenbrenner, thank you for the constructive work between our
committees.
In addition, the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 contains several significant
measures to improve national security that were not part of last year's
bill. It closes a loophole in current law that requires the government
to stop monitoring the communications of foreign terrorists, including
ISIL fighters from Syria and Iraq, when they enter the United States.
It streamlines the process for the government to track foreign spies
who temporarily leave the United States. It helps the government
investigate proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. It increases
the maximum sentence for material support to a foreign terrorist
organization.
Those changes are real improvements that will make it easier for our
intelligence and law enforcement agencies to keep Americans safe.
Again, I would prefer a clean reauthorization, but the bill we
consider today is the best way forward in the House to ensure Congress
takes responsible action to protect national security. I urge my
colleagues to support it.
Administrative Office of the
United States Courts,
Washington, DC, May 4, 2015.
Hon. Devin Nunes,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House
of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I write regarding H.R. 2048, the ``USA
Freedom Act,'' which was recently ordered reported by the
Judiciary Committee, to provide perspectives on the
legislation, particularly an assessment that the pending
version of the bill could impede the effective operation of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts.
In letters to the Committee on January 13, 2014 and May
13, 2014, we commented on various proposed changes to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Our comments
focused on the operational impact of certain proposed changes
on the Judicial Branch, particularly the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (``FISC'') and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review (collectively ``FISA Courts''),
but did not express views on core policy choices that the
political branches are considering regarding intelligence
collection. In keeping with that approach, we offer views on
aspects of H.R. 2048 that bear directly on the work of the
FISA Courts and how that work is presented to the public. We
sincerely appreciate the ongoing efforts of the bipartisan
leadership of all the congressional committees of
jurisdiction to listen to and attempt to accommodate our
perspectives and concerns.
We respectfully request that, if possible, this letter be
included with your Committee's report to the House on the
bill.
Summary of Concerns
We have three main concerns. First, H.R. 2048 proposes a
``panel of experts'' for the FISA Courts which could, in our
assessment, impair the courts' ability to protect civil
liberties by impeding their receipt of complete and accurate
information from the government (in contrast to the helpful
amicus curiae approach contained in the FISA Improvements Act
of 2013 (``FIA''), which was approved in similar form by the
House in 2014). Second, we continue to have concerns with the
prospect of public ``summaries'' of FISA Courts' opinions
when the opinions themselves are not released to the public.
Third, we have a few other specific technical concerns with
H.R. 2048 as drafted.
Nature of the FISA Courts
With the advent of a new Congress and newly proposed
legislation, it seems helpful to restate briefly some key
attributes of the work of the FISA Courts.
The vast majority of the work of the FISC involves
individual applications in which experienced judges apply
well-established law to a set of facts presented by the
government--a process not dissimilar to the ex parte
consideration of ordinary criminal search warrant
applications. Review of entire programs of collection and
applications involving bulk collection are a relatively small
part of the docket, and applications involving novel legal
questions, though obviously important, are rare.
In all matters, the FISA Courts currently depend on--and
will always depend on--prompt and complete candor fom the
government in providing the courts with all relevant
information because the government is typically the only
source of such information.
A ``read copy'' practice--similar to the practices employed
in some federal district courts for Title III wiretap
applications--wherein the government provides the FISC with
an advance draft of each planned application, is the major
avenue for court modification of government-sought
surveillance. About a quarter of ``read copies'' are modified
or withdrawn at the instigation of the FISC before the
government presents a final application--in contrast to the
overwhelming majority of formal applications that are
approved by the Court because modifications at the ``read
copy'' stage have addressed the Court's concerns in cases
where final applications are submitted.
The FISC typically operates in an environment where, for
natonal security reasons and because of statutory
requirements, time is of the essence, and collateral
litigation, including for discovery, would generally be
completely impractical.
At times, the FISA Courts are presented with challenging
issues regarding how existing law applies to novel
technologies. In these instances, the FISA Courts could
benefit from a conveniently available explanation or
evaluation of the technology from an informed non-government
source. Congress could assist in this regard by clarifying
the law to provide mechanisms for this to occur easily (e.g.,
by providing for pre-cleared experts with whom the Court can
share and receive information to the extent it deems
necessary).
the ``panel of experts'' approach of h.r. 2048 could impede the fisa
courts' work
H.R. 2048 provides for what proponents have referred to as
a ``panel of experts'' and what in the bill is referred to as
a group of at least five individuals who may serve as an
``amicus curiae'' in a particular matter. However, unlike a
true amicus curiae, the FISA Courts would be required to
appoint such an individual to participate in any case
involving a ``novel or significant interpretation of law''
(emphasis added)--unless the court ``issues a finding'' that
appointment is not appropriae. Once appointed, such amici are
required to present to the court, ``as appropriate,'' legal
arguments in favor of privacy, information about technology,
or other ``relevant'' information. Designated amici are
required to have access to ``all relevant'' legal precedent,
as well as certain other materials ``the court determines are
relevant.''
Our assessment is that this ``panel of experts'' approach
could impede the FISA Courts' role in protecting the civil
liberties of Americans. We recognize this may not be the
intent of the drafters, but nonetheless it
[[Page H2918]]
is our concern. As we have indicated, the full cooperation of
rank-and-file government personnel in promptly conveying to
the FISA Courts complete and candid factual information is
critical. A perception on their part that the FISA process
involves a ``panel of experts'' officially charged with
opposing the government's efforts could risk deterring the
necessary and critical cooperation and candor. Specifically,
our concern is that imposing the mandatory ``duties''--
contained in subparagraph (i)(4) of proposed section 401
(in combination with a quasi-mandatory appointment
process)--could create such a perception within the
government that a standing body exists to oppose
intelligence activities.
Simply put, delays and difficulties in receiving full and
accurate information from Executive Branch agencies
(including, but not limited to, cases involving non-
compliance) present greater challenges to the FISA Courts'
role in protecting civil liberties than does the lack of a
non-governmental perspective on novel legal issues or
technological developments. To be sure, we would welcome a
means of facilitating the FISA Courts' obtaining assistance
from nongovernmental experts in unusual cases, but it is
critically important that the means chosen to achieve that
end do not impair the timely receipt of complete and accurate
information from the government.
It is on this point especially that we believe the ``panel
of experts'' system in H.R. 2048 may prove counterproductive.
The information that the FISA Courts need to examine probable
cause, evaluate minimization and targeting procedures, and
determine and enforce compliance with court authorizations
and orders is exclusively in the hands of the government--
specifically, in the first instance, intelligence agency
personnel. If disclosure of sensitive or adverse information
to the FISA Courts came to be seen as a prelude to disclosure
to a third party whose mission is to oppose or curtail the
agency's work, then the prompt receipt of complete and
accurate information from the government would likely be
impaired--ultimately to the detriment of the national
security interest in expeditious action and the effective
protection of privacy and civil liberties.
In contrast, a ``true'' amicus curiae approach, as adopted,
for example, in the FIA, facilitates appointment of experts
outside the government to serve as amici curiae and render
any form of assistance needed by the court, without any
implication that such experts are expected to oppose the
intelligence activities proposed by the government. For that
reason, we do not believe the FIA approach poses any similar
risk to the courts' obtaining relevant information.
``summaries'' of unreleased fisa court opinions could mislead the
public
In our May 13, 2014, letter to the Committee on H.R. 3361,
we shared the nature of our concerns regarding the creation
of public ``summaries'' of court opinions that are not
themselves released. The provisions in H.R. 2048 are similar
and so are our concerns. To be clear, the FISA Courts have
never objected to their opinions--whether in full or in
redacted form--being released to the public to the maximum
extent permitted by the Executive's assessment of national
security concerns. Likewise, the FISA Courts have always
facilitated the provision of their full opinions to Congress.
See, e.g., FISC Rule of Procedure 62(c). Thus, we have no
objection to the provisions in H.R. 2048 that call for
maximum public release of court opinions. However, a formal
practice of creating summaries of court opinions without the
underlying opinion being available is unprecedented in
American legal administration. Summaries of court opinions
can be inadvertently incorrect or misleading, and may omit
key considerations that can prove critical for those seeking
to understand the import of the court's full opinion. This is
particularly likely to be a problem in the fact-focused area
of FISA practice, under circumstances where the government
has already decided that it cannot release the underlying
opinion even in redacted form, presumably because the
opinion's legal analysis is inextricably intertwined with
classified facts.
additional technical comments on h.r. 2048
The Judiciary, like the public, did not participate in the
discussions between the Administration and congressional
leaders that led to H.R. 2048 (publicly released on April 28,
2015 and reported by the Judiciary Committe without changes
on April 30). In the few days we have had to review the bill,
we have noted a few technical concerns that we hope can be
addressed prior to finalization of the legislation, should
Congress choose to enact it. These concerns (all in the
amicus curiae subsection) include:
Proposed subparagraph (9) appears inadvertently to omit the
ability of the FISA Courts to train and administer amici
between the time they are designated and the time they are
appointed.
Proposed subparagraph (6) dots not make any provision for a
``true amicus'' appointed under subparagraph (2)(B) to
receive necessary information.
We are concerned that a lack of parallel construction in
proposed clause (6)(A)(i) (apparently differentiating between
access to legal precedent as opposed to access to other
materials) could lead to confusion in its application.
We recommend adding additional language to clarify that the
exercise of the duties under proposed subparagraph (4) would
occur in the context of Court rules (for example, deadlines
and service requirements).
We believe that slightly greater clarity could be provided
regarding the nature of the obligations referred to in
proposed subparagraph (10).
These concerns would generally be avoided or addressed by
substituting the FIA approach. Furthermore, it bears emphasis
that, even if H.R. 2048 were amended to address all of these
technical points, our more fundamental concerns about the
``panel of experts'' approach would not be fully assuaged.
Nonetheless, our staff stands ready to work with your staff
to provide suggested textual changes to address each of these
concerns.
Finally, although we have no particular objection to the
requirement in this legislation of a report by the Director
of the AO, Congress should be aware that the AO's role would
be to receive information from the FISA Courts and then
simply transmit the report as directed by law.
For the sake of brevity, we are not restating here all the
comments in our previous correspondence to Congress on
proposed legislation similar to H.R. 2048. However, the
issues raised in those letters continue to be of importance
to us.
We hope these comments are helpful to the House of
Representatives in its consideration of this legislation. If
we may be of further assistance in this or any other matter,
please contact me or our Office of Legislative Affairs.
Sincerely,
James C. Duff,
Director.
{time} 1445
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren), an effective member of the
House Judiciary Committee.
Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, I believe this bill makes meaningful reform
to a few of the surveillance programs, but it in no way stops all of
the bulk collection of U.S. person communications currently occurring.
This bill won't stop the most egregious and widely reported privacy
violations that occur under section 702 and Executive Order No. 12333.
In a declassified decision, the FISA court said that the NSA had been
collecting substantially more U.S. person communications through its
upstream collection program than it had originally told the court. With
upstream collection, the NSA directly taps into international Internet
cables to search through all of the communications that flow through
it, looking for communications that map certain criteria.
Four years ago, the court found that the government was collecting
tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications a year. Why?
Because all of your data is everywhere. No accurate estimate can be
given for the even larger number of communications collected in which a
U.S. person was a party to the communication.
The Director of National Intelligence confirmed the government
searches this vast amount of data, including the content of email and
of telephone calls, without individualized suspicion, probable cause,
and without a warrant. The Director of the FBI says they use
information to build criminal cases against U.S. persons. This is an
end run around the Fourth Amendment, and it has to stop.
This bill did not create those problems. However, this bill doesn't
correct those problems. During the markup of the bill, Chairman
Goodlatte stated that these issues would be next, but we can't afford
to wait until the final hour of expiration to take action like we did
with this bill. To do so would mean at least another 2 years of the
mass surveillance of Americans, which is unconscionable. Last year, the
House voted 293-123 to close these backdoor loopholes, but the Rules
Committee would not allow the House to vote today to put these fixes
into this bill.
I voted in committee to advance this bill for a couple of reasons,
and I do want to thank all of the members who worked on this but single
out Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner, who was the author of the bill and
who has worked so hard to make sure that improvements are made. The
bill is an improvement over a straight reauthorization of the bill. I
also listened carefully to the verbal commitments that the 702 fix
would be included, and I reserve the right to oppose this bill when it
comes back from the Senate if we can't close these loopholes.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Forbes), a
[[Page H2919]]
member of the House Judiciary Committee and an original cosponsor of
this legislation.
Mr. FORBES. I thank the chairman.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the USA FREEDOM Act, which
passed the Judiciary Committee with bipartisan support just 2 weeks
ago.
The bill accomplishes the twin goals of protecting our Nation from
our enemies while safeguarding the civil liberties that our
servicemembers fight for every day.
Americans across the country have called for the NSA to listen less
and elected officials to listen more. The USA FREEDOM Act will end the
NSA's bulk collection program, which was established under section 215
of the PATRIOT Act, and it will further protect Americans' Fourth
Amendment rights by strengthening oversight and accountability of the
intelligence community.
As a member of the House Armed Services Committee, I work with our
servicemembers and military leaders daily to ensure our adversaries do
not harm this great Nation. That is why I applaud Chairman Goodlatte
and Mr. Sensenbrenner for including provisions in the bill to address
the growing threat of ISIL.
With continued threats of terrorism, our Nation's intelligence
community must be equipped to protect our Nation and national security
interests. However, any intelligence framework must be confined within
the boundaries of the United States Constitution. Striking this balance
between safeguarding privacy and protecting Americans is a challenge in
today's post-9/11 world, but it is one that should not tip towards
allowing the government to trample on our constitutional rights.
Security must not come at the cost of Americans' liberties. That is why
I urge my colleagues today to support this bill.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the
distinguished gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the ranking member and the chairman of
the full committee. As my colleagues have done, let me also acknowledge
the chairman of the Crime Subcommittee, Mr. Sensenbrenner, on which I
serve as the ranking member. As many have noted, let me acknowledge the
work of Mr. Goodlatte and Mr. Conyers and their leadership on a very
important statement on behalf of the American people.
Mr. Speaker, the USA FREEDOM Act is the House's unified response to
the unauthorized disclosures and subsequent publication in the media in
June 2013 regarding the National Security Agency's collection from
Verizon of the phone records of all of its American customers which
were authorized by the FISA court pursuant to section 215 of the
PATRIOT Act.
You can imagine, Mr. Speaker, the public was not happy. There was
justifiable concern on the part of the public and by a large percentage
of the Members of this body that the extent and scale of the NSA data
collection bundling, which, by orders of magnitude, exceeded anything
previously authorized or contemplated, may have constituted an
unwarranted invasion of privacy and a threat to the civil liberties of
Americans.
Mr. Speaker, I have been a decade-plus-long member of the Homeland
Security Committee. I do not in any way want to infringe upon the
security of this Nation, but if we allow the terrorists to terrorize
us, then we are in very bad shape, and I am glad the voices of
opposition were raised.
To quell the growing controversy, the Director of National
Intelligence declassified and released limited information about the
program, but it did not, by any means, satisfy the concern raised by
Americans. The DNI stated that the only type of information acquired
under the court's order was telephone metadata, such as telephone
numbers dialed and length of calls. That did not satisfy our concern.
I am very pleased that we are here on the floor of the House putting
forward something that addresses the concerns but that does not
undermine the security of America. For example, I introduced the FISA
court in the Sunshine Act of 2013 in response to this. Without
compromising national security, it was bipartisan legislation that gave
much-needed transparency to the decision orders and opinions of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or FISA.
My bill would require the Attorney General to disclose each decision.
I am glad that, in this bill, we have positions and points where the
Attorney General is conducting declassification review. I am also
pleased that the bill before us contains an explicit prohibition and a
restraint, pursuant to section 215, on the bulk collection of tangible
things.
We are making a difference with the USA FREEDOM Act, and it is
interesting that groups as different as the R Street Institute and the
Human Rights Watch are, in essence, supporting this legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I believe that we can do what we need to do by passing
this legislation and by then going to an amendment on section 702,
which I will support. Security goes along with protection, and I
believe this particular legislation does it.
Mr. Speaker, as a senior member of the Judiciary Committee and an
original co-sponsor, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2048, the ``USA
Freedom Act,'' which is stands for ``Uniting and Strengthening America
by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection, and
Online Monitoring Act.''
I support the USA Freedom Act for several reasons:
1. The bill ends all bulk collection of business records under
Section 215 and prohibits bulk collection under the FISA Pen Register/
Trap and Trace Device authority and National Security Letter
authorities.
2. The USA Freedom Act strengthens the definition of ``specific
selection term,'' the mechanism used to prohibit bulk collection, which
prevents large-scale, indiscriminate data collection while at the same
time ensuring the government can collect the information it needs to
further a national security investigation.
3. The USA Freedom Act strengthens protections for civil liberties by
creating a panel of experts to advise the FISA Court on matters of
privacy and civil liberties, communications technology, and other
technical or legal matters and also codifies important procedures for
recipients of National Security Letters.
4. The bill increases transparency by requiring declassification of
all significant opinions of the FISA Court and provides procedures for
certified questions of law to the FISA Court of Review and the Supreme
Court.
5. The USA Freedom Act requires the Attorney General and the Director
of National Intelligence to provide the public with detailed guidance
about how they can use these national security authorities, and
provides even more reporting by America's technology companies.
6. The USA Freedom Act contains several important national security
enhancements, including closing loopholes that make it difficult for
the government to track foreign terrorists and spies as they enter or
leave the country.
The USA Freedom Act is the House's unified response to the
unauthorized disclosures and subsequent publication in the media in
June 2013 regarding the National Security Agency's collection from
Verizon of the phone records of all of its American customers, which
was authorized by the FISA Court pursuant to Section 215 of the Patriot
Act.
Public reaction to the news of this massive and secret data gathering
operation was swift and negative.
There was justifiable concern on the part of the public and a large
percentage of the Members of this body that the extent and scale of
this NSA data collection operation, which exceeded by orders of
magnitude anything previously authorized or contemplated, may
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy and threat to the civil
liberties of American citizens.
To quell the growing controversy, the Director of National
Intelligence declassified and released limited information about this
program. According to the DNI, the information acquired under this
program did not include the content of any communications or the
identity of any subscriber.
The DNI stated that ``the only type of information acquired under the
Court's order is telephony metadata, such as telephone numbers dialed
and length of calls.''
The assurance given by the DNI, to put it mildly, was not very
reassuring.
In response, many Members of Congress, including the Ranking Member
Conyers, and Mr. Sensenbrenner, and myself, introduced legislation in
response to the disclosures to ensure that the law and the practices of
the executive branch reflect the intent of Congress in passing the USA
Patriot Act and subsequent amendments.
For example, I introduced H.R. 2440, the ``FISA Court in the Sunshine
Act of 2013,'' bipartisan legislation, that provided much needed
transparency without compromising national security to the decisions,
orders, and opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or
``FISA Court.''
[[Page H2920]]
Specifically, my bill required the Attorney General to disclose each
decision, order, or opinion of a Foreign Intelligence Survellance Court
(FISC), allowing Americans to know how broad of a legal authority the
government is claiming under the PATRIOT ACT and Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act to conduct the surveillance needed to keep Americans
safe.
I am pleased that these requirements are incorporated in substantial
part in the USA Freedom Act, which requires the Attorney General to
conduct a declassification review of each decision, order, or opinion
of the FISA court that includes a significant construction or
interpretation of law and to submit a report to Congress within 45
days.
As I indicated, perhaps the most important reasons for supporting
passage of H.R. 2048 is the bill's prohibition on domestic bulk
collection, as well as its criteria for specifying the information to
be collected, applies not only to Section 215 surveillance activities
but also to other law enforcement communications interception
authorities, such as national security letters.
Finally, I strongly support the USA Freedom Act because Section 301
of the bill continues to contain protections agains ``reverse
targeting,'' which became law when an earlier Jackson Lee Amendment was
included in H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007.
``Reverse targeting,'' a concept well known to members of this
Committee but not so well understood by those less steeped in the
arcana of electronic surveillance, is the practice where the government
targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to
collect information on certain U.S. persons.
One of the main concerns of libertarians and classical conservatives,
as well as progressives and civil liberties organizations, in giving
expanded authority to the executive branch was the temptation of
national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting may be
difficult to resist in the absence of strong safeguards to prevent it.
The Jackson Lee Amendment, preserved in Section 301 of the USA
Freedom Act, reduces even further any such temptation to resort to
reverse targeting by making any information concerning a United States
person obtained improperly inadmissible in any federal, state, or local
judicial, legal, executive, or administrative proceeding.
Mr. Speaker, I noted in an op-ed published way back in October 2007,
that as Alexis DeTocqueville, the most astute student of American
democracy, observed nearly two centuries ago, the reason democracies
invariably prevail in any military conflict is because democracy is the
governmental form that best rewards and encourages those traits that
are indispensable to success: initiative, innovation, courage, and a
love of justice.
I support the USA Freedom Act because it will help keep us true to
the Bill of Rights and strikes the proper balance between cherished
liberties and smart security.
I urge my colleagues to support the USA Freedom Act.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to
the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Mimi Walters), a member of the
House Judiciary Committee and an original cosponsor of this bill.
Mrs. MIMI WALTERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support
of H.R. 2048, the USA FREEDOM Act, of which I am proud to be an
original cosponsor.
This vital bill will reform our Nation's intelligence-gathering
programs to end the bulk collection of data, strengthen Americans'
civil liberties, and protect our homeland from those who wish to do us
harm.
In passing this legislation, we can provide officials with the tools
they need to combat terrorist groups, such as ISIL, by closing a
current loophole that requires the government to stop tracking foreign
terrorists upon their entering the United States.
This bill will also provide for the robust oversight of our
intelligence agencies by requiring additional reporting standards on
how FISA authorities are employed. Furthermore, H.R. 2048 will prevent
government overreach and will increase privacy protections by ending
the large-scale, indiscriminate collection of data, which includes all
records from an entire State, city, or ZIP Code.
With section 215 of the PATRIOT Act set to expire soon, it is vital
that Congress acts quickly to pass this bipartisan bill so that we can
keep our country safe and so that we can work to restore the trust of
the American people.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. Jeffries).
Mr. JEFFRIES. I thank the distinguished gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. Speaker, in a democracy, there must be a balance between
effective national security protection on the one hand and a healthy
respect for privacy and civil liberties interests on the other. This is
a balance that traces all the way back to the founding of the Republic.
It is rooted most prominently in the Bill of Rights, in the
Constitution, in the Fourth Amendment. Yet, in its zeal to protect the
homeland, our national security apparatus overreached into the lives of
everyday, hard-working Americans in a manner that was inconsistent with
our traditional notions of privacy and civil liberties. This overreach
was unnecessary, unacceptable, and unconstitutional.
By ending bulk collection through section 215, we have taken a
substantial step in the right direction toward restoring the balance.
More must be done, but I am going to support this legislation because
of the meaningful effort that has been made to help strike the
appropriate balance.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to
the gentleman from California (Mr. Issa), who is the chairman of the
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet Subcommittee and a
strong supporter of this legislation.
Mr. ISSA. I thank the chairman.
Mr. Speaker, each person who comes up here will talk to you about the
painstaking work that the chairman and the ranking member went through
to craft a bill that would both strengthen our security, following on
with things we have learned since the enactment of the PATRIOT Act, and
also make changes based on both lessons learned of things the PATRIOT
Act overdid and excesses by the Presidential usurping of the intent of
Congress. We have achieved that by a 25-2 vote in our committee, a vote
that is almost unheard of.
I think, most importantly, though, we are doing something the
American people need to know, and that is we are bringing transparency
to the process for the first time. Under this legislation, a FISA
court, working in secrecy, that makes a decision to expand or to in
some other way add more surveillance will have to publish those
findings, declassify them, and make them available not just to Congress
but to the American people.
We cannot guarantee that behind closed doors secret--and necessarily
secret--judge actions would always be what we would like, but under
this reform, we can ensure that Congress and the American people will
have the transparency and oversight as to those actions, not by whom
they were after but what they did. That is going to bring the true
reform that has been needed in a process in which the trust of the
American people has been in doubt since the Snowden revelation.
I, personally, want to thank the ranking member and the chairman.
This could not have happened without bipartisan work and without the
support of those who want to strengthen our security and of those who
want to strengthen and retain our freedoms under the Fourth Amendment.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. DelBene).
Ms. DelBENE. Mr. Speaker, last week, the Second Circuit confirmed
what a lot of Members have been saying for years: the NSA has brazenly
exploited the PATRIOT Act to conduct surveillance far beyond what the
law permits; but the court refrained from enforcing its decision,
instead placing the burden on Congress to protect Americans from
unwarranted mass surveillance.
That is why I am proud to be a cosponsor of this year's USA FREEDOM
Act, a serious reform bill that would go a long way to protecting
Americans' privacy by ending bulk collection and by creating greater
transparency, oversight, and accountability.
{time} 1500
After the House acts today, it is up to the Senate leaders to pass
these reforms or let the expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act sunset
on June 1 because a clean reauthorization is absolutely unacceptable. I
urge my colleagues in each Chamber to support this critical effort to
end bulk collection and protect both Americans' privacy and America's
security.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hurd).
[[Page H2921]]
Mr. HURD of Texas. I thank the chairman for yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, as a former CIA officer, I completely understand the
need for the men and women in our intelligence agencies to have access
to timely, vital information as they track down bad guys.
As an American citizen, I know how important our civil rights are and
that it is the government's job to protect those rights, not infringe
upon them. I believe that we, as a nation, as a government, as a people
can do both, and that is why I am supporting the USA FREEDOM Act.
Because it prioritizes both and strikes the right balance between
privacy and security, Americans can rest assured that their private
information isn't being subjected to bulk collection by the NSA. They
can be confident that there are privacy experts advising the FISA court
advocating for our civil liberties, and they can be proud of an
intelligence community who works hard every day to make sure that our
country is protected.
I have seen firsthand the value these programs bring, but I also know
that if Americans don't feel they can trust their own government, we
are losing the battle right here at home. It is my hope that this bill
will increase transparency and accountability to the program so that
our hard-working intelligence community can continue their job of
defending the country, and American citizens can be confident that they
are being protected from enemies both foreign and domestic. Upholding
civil liberties are not burdens; they are what make all of us safer and
stronger.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 8 minutes to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), who is the distinguished
ranking member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
I ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to manage that time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
time, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
First, let me say thank you to Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member
Conyers as well as to my colleague, Chairman Nunes. We have worked this
issue together for a long time, and I am very proud of the bipartisan
legislation that we have produced. I also want to thank the
administration that worked with us so long and hard, and the work done
in the last Congress by former HPSCI Chairman Mike Rogers and former
HPSCI Ranking Member Dutch Ruppersberger. I rise today in strong
support of H.R. 2048.
This Nation was founded on the revolutionary principle that liberty
need not be sacrificed to security, that public safety can and must
coexist with individual liberty. Our Founders set out to create a
lasting Union and a great Nation, one in which the people would be free
to govern themselves, to express themselves, to worship for themselves,
while also being secure in their homes, their papers, and their
persons.
Nearly two-and-a-half centuries later, it is easy to forget that
these freedoms were enshrined in the Constitution amidst great peril.
Americans had only recently fought a war for independence and would be
confronted by powerful and often hostile forces in the future,
including the powerful empires of Britain, France, and Spain. Here were
truly existential threats, and still the Founders said, We can be
secure and we can be free. They were right; we can and we must.
So today, at another moment of national danger, we are challenged to
reaffirm our commitment to these twin imperatives--security and
liberty--and to prove again that we can find the right balance for our
times. The USA FREEDOM Act strikes that delicate but vitally important
balance.
On the side of freedom, it ends bulk collection, not just of
telephone metadata under section 215, but of any bulk collection under
any other authority. It creates a specific procedure for telephone
metadata that allows the government, upon court approval, to query the
data that the telephone companies already keep, something I have long
advocated. It increases transparency by requiring a declassification
review of all significant FISA court opinions and by requiring the
government to provide the public with detailed information about how
they use these national security authorities. And it provides for a
panel of experts to advocate for privacy and civil liberties before the
FISA court, also something that I have advocated for quite sometime.
At the same time, the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 preserves important
capabilities and makes further national security enhancements by
closing loopholes that make it difficult for the government to track
foreign terrorists and spies as they enter or leave the country,
clarifying the application of FISA to those who facilitate the
international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
increasing the maximum penalties for those who provide material support
for terrorism. This is a strong bill and should advance with such an
overwhelming majority that it compels the Senate to act.
But this is not a one-and-done legislative fix or the end of our
work. Rather, it is a reaffirmation of our commitment to constantly
recalibrate our laws to make sure that privacy and security are
coexisting and mutually reinforcing. While the public may have begun
its debate on these programs 2 years ago, many of us--myself included--
have been working these issues long before, and we will continue to
work them long afterwards. That is our responsibility and the great
obligation the Founders bequeathed to us.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Holding).
Mr. HOLDING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Virginia, the
chair of the Committee on the Judiciary, for both the time today and
for his diligent work on the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
Mr. Speaker, the world we live in is a dangerous place. Indeed, it is
far more dangerous than it ever has been. Acts of terror reached a
record level last year, and with the wickedness of groups like ISIS and
Boko Haram showing continued, complete disregard for human life, our
Nation must always remain prepared and vigilant.
The legislation before us today, Mr. Speaker, builds on the reforms
from the legislation passed last Congress, championed by my friend
Representative Sensenbrenner, and it accounts for the absolute need to
protect civil liberties while also remaining clear-eyed and vigilant
about the real threats that we face every day around the world.
I thank the chairman and I thank the committee for their work. I urge
support for H.R. 2048.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the USA
FREEDOM Act, which virtually deletes the National Security Agency's
database of Americans' phone and email records. The bulk collection of
what we know now as metadata will end.
Under this bill, the government will now have to seek court approval
before petitioning private cell phone companies for records. The court
will have to approve each application except in emergencies, and major
court decisions will be made public.
It is very similar to legislation drafted and introduced last year by
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, under the leadership of
former Chairman Rogers and myself, together with our colleagues on the
Committee on the Judiciary, led by Congressmen Goodlatte and Conyers.
That bill passed with an overwhelming bipartisan majority, and I want
to thank Congressmen Goodlatte and Conyers, as well as Congressmen
Schiff and Nunes, also with Congressmen Sensenbrenner and Nadler and
other Members who worked hard and continued the pursuit on this much-
needed reform.
We need this bill, though, to keep our country safe. Section 215 of
the PATRIOT Act, which is the part that legalizes much of NSA's
critical work to protect us from terrorists, expires in less than 3
weeks, on June 1. If we do not reauthorize it with the reforms demanded
by the public, essential capabilities to track legitimate terror
suspects will expire also. That couldn't happen at a worse time. We
live in a
[[Page H2922]]
dangerous world. The threats posed by ISIS and other terrorist groups
are just the tip of the iceberg.
We also need strong defenses against increasingly aggressive
cyberterrorists and the lone wolf terrorists who are often American
citizens, for example. This bill restores Americans' confidence that
the government is not snooping on its own citizens by improving the
necessary checks and balances to our democracy. This bill balances the
need to protect our country with the need to protect our constitutional
rights and civil liberties.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, at this time I am pleased to yield 3
minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Marino), chairman of
our Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law Subcommittee and a
strong supporter of this legislation.
Mr. MARINO. I thank the chairman for yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the USA FREEDOM Act. I applaud my
colleagues on both sides of the aisle for their hard work on a true
compromise piece of legislation. It protects the privacy of American
citizens, according to the Constitution, while ensuring our national
security, which is a priority. I understand the importance of
reauthorizing these important FISA provisions.
As a U.S. attorney, I had these tools at my disposal, and I used them
to protect Americans in Pennsylvania and across the country. We needed
them at the time, and we need them now. However, I equally understand
the importance of also protecting the privacy interests of American
citizens. The act ends bulk collection; it strengthens protections of
civil liberties; it increases transparency; all while ensuring that our
intelligence and national security agencies have the tools they need to
fight terrorism abroad. In addition, the USA FREEDOM Act protects
American citizens at home.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Himes).
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, let me begin by thanking the chairman and
ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary, as well as Chairman
Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, for their good, bipartisan work on a bill that I think is
long overdue.
The good work on this bill, Mr. Speaker, goes back to the fact that
the PATRIOT Act, a piece of legislation crafted in haste and in fear
after the tragic events of 9/11, in my opinion, pushed the boundaries
too far on the government's ability to surveil and gather information
on people, including American citizens.
The USA FREEDOM Act, which I stand today to support, goes a very long
way to restoring an appropriate balance between the imperative of
national security and the civil liberties which we hold so dear. This
bill makes important reforms to the FISA court, but, importantly, it
prohibits--I will say again, prohibits--the bulk collection, under
section 215, under the pen register authorities, and under National
Security Letter statutes, of data on American citizens. Americans will
now rest easy knowing that their calls or other records will not be
warehoused by the government, no matter how careful that government is
in the procedures it uses to access those files.
Mr. Speaker, whatever the legal interpretations, most recently
definitively ruled upon by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
whatever the legal interpretations, there is something about the idea
of a government keeping extensive records on its free citizens which
damages our intuitive sense of freedom and liberty. So whatever the law
and whatever the legal interpretations--and I do believe those have
been settled--what we do here today, which is to say that the
government of the United States will not keep detailed call or other
bulk records on its free citizens, I believe is an important step
forward for this country.
I urge all of my colleagues to vote in favor of the USA FREEDOM Act.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time is remaining
on each side?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 30 seconds
remaining, the gentleman from Virginia has 8\1/2\ minutes remaining,
and the gentleman from Michigan has 6\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, 30 seconds, is that the total amount of
time the other side has?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The minority has 7 minutes total remaining.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, once again I want to thank my colleagues for
their good work. I also want to acknowledge Mr. Sensenbrenner for his
strong advocacy on this measure.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
{time} 1515
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker and Members of the House, I would like to simply ask my
colleagues to reject an unlawful surveillance program, to restore
limits to a range of surveillance authorities, to compel the government
to act with some measure of transparency, and to end the practice of
dragnet surveillance in the United States.
In addition, I would like to thank the staff who have worked so hard
on this bill: Caroline Lynch, Jason Herring, Bart Forsyth, Lara Flint,
Chan Park, Matthew Owen, and Aaron Hiller.
I close by thanking in advance my colleagues who, like many of us,
are inclined to strongly support H.R. 2048.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
From the founding of the American Republic, this country has been
engaged in a profound debate about the responsibilities and the limits
of our Federal Government.
The tension between these two essential functions of the government
did not suddenly spring into existence in this age of cyber attacks and
terrorist plots. Americans have long grappled with their need for
security and their innate desire to protect their personal liberty from
government intrusion.
Benjamin Franklin is often quoted as saying:
Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a
little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.
After the horrific attacks on September 11, the country was
determined not to allow such an attack to occur again. The changes we
made then to our intelligence laws helped keep us safe from implacable
enemies. Today, we renew our commitment to our Nation's security and
the safety of the American people.
We also make this pledge that the United States of America will
remain a nation whose government answers to the will of its people.
This country must be what it always has been, a beacon of freedom to
the world, a place where the principles of the Founders--including the
commitment to individual liberties--will continue to live, protected
and nourished for future generations.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this important
bipartisan legislation.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SANFORD. Mr. Speaker, last week a federal appeals court declared
that the NSA's bulk data collection on American citizens over the past
14 years was illegal. So why is Congress considering a bill that would
legalize a program already deemed illegal? Unfortunately, that is what
the USA FREEDOM Act does, and I believe codifies a program that
violates the Constitution. When the Fourth Amendment says that the
American people have the right to be free from warrantless searches and
seizures of themselves and their property, I think it's a pretty clear
statement on the limits of governmental action. Unfortunately, the bill
today does not fully protect that right and accordingly I don't support
it. The bill's purpose was to rein in the NSA's bulk data collection
program but failed on that front, and I wanted to offer a few thoughts
as to why.
First, the bill uses broad language to define who and what the
government can search, which means that it still could technically
collect Americans' information in bulk--just not as much as before. The
bill does this by leaving the door open for the government to search
geographic regions instead of the entire country as it does now. For
example, the government could require phone companies to turn over all
the records of their customers in South Carolina or even in a town like
Mt. Pleasant in my district. I don't think the Founding Fathers' intent
of the Fourth Amendment was to have it apply only in cases of nation-
wide warrantless searches; rather it should apply to any search
anywhere.
[[Page H2923]]
Second, the bill doesn't even address a part of the PATRIOT Act
called Section 702 that covers data that crosses our borders. This
section allows the government to sweep up the content of an American
citizen's emails, instant messages and web browsing history just
because they happen to be communicating with someone outside the U.S.
In fact, the former NSA director General Keith Alexander admitted that
the NSA specifically searches Section 702 data using ``U.S. person
identifiers.'' This so-called ``back door search loophole'' should have
been closed in this bill because it violates the Fourth Amendment by
getting around the warrant requirement. The notion that Americans'
rights are contingent on the geography of where a call is directed is
not consistent with the Constitution and highlights why this particular
section needs to be changed.
Third, this bill does not require the government to destroy
information obtained on Americans who are not connected to an
investigation. The way this happens is the government stores the
information it collected on a particular phone call, even if one of
those individuals on the call is suspected of no wrongdoing. The
Constitution I believe is rather clear in the principle that
organizations like the NSA and the FBI should not be able to store
information that is inadvertently collected on people who are not
suspected of committing a crime, and at a very minimum the FREEDOM Act
does not use this opportunity to shine a light on the problem.
Pericles, the Greek general of Athens, once said that ``Freedom is
the sure possession of those alone who have the courage to defend it.''
Ultimately, I believe this bill is another missed opportunity for
Congress to address what the judiciary has now ruled to be the
unconstitutional and unlawful actions of the Executive branch. It
really matters the Second Circuit federal court in New York issued an
opinion last week stating that the NSA has stretched the meaning of the
text of the PATRIOT Act so that it no longer represents congressional
intent and called the NSA's bulk data collection illegal. It really
matters that this bill would codify actions of the NSA that were ruled
to be outside the bounds of law. I think it also matters that the
debate that is taking place is as old as civilization as there has
always been a tension between security and freedom. And it really
matters that historically those civilizations that have given up
freedom in the interest of security have historically lost both. For
all these reasons each one of us should care deeply about what happens
next on bulk collections at the NSA--and the way this bill comes up
short in protecting liberty's foundation, civil liberty.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Speaker, out of necessity to reauthorize the
expiring intelligence gathering authorities, I reluctantly vote for
H.R. 2048. A recent federal appeals court decision has increased our
need to address these authorities. Unfortunately, their pending
expiration is now forcing Congress to act hastily rather than take the
necessary time to adequately analyze the court's decision and update
the laws accordingly.
I recognize the distrust created by the Obama Administration's abuse
of power, as well as the damage caused by recent intelligence leaks
containing fragments, inaccuracies, and speculation. It is unfortunate
that those actions will continue to make it more difficult to gather
the information necessary to counter terrorism. It is even more
alarming that this trend will inevitably make our country less safe.
Very few Americans will ever learn the full details of the
considerable successes of the National Security Agency (NSA). But
through the dedication and commitment of its men and women, the NSA has
helped to keep our nation and its citizens safe. I remain confident in
their professionalism as they strive to prevent future terrorist
attacks and support our warfighters overseas.
I believe the first job of the federal government is to defend the
country and protect our citizens within the framework of the
Constitution, and I will continue to do all I can to contribute to that
effort.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Speaker, tonight I must rise to voice my concerns with
the USA Freedom Act. While I recognize the improvements this bill
attempts to make with regard to mass surveillance and information
gathering efforts, I simply cannot vote for this bill.
I was pleased to hear that the Second Circuit Court recently found
metadata collection to be illegal and commend the bi-partisan work that
resulted in a bill that attempts to adhere to the court's decision. I
recognize that the USA Freedom Act includes positive changes such as
tighter language dictating when the NSA can access a database of call
records, new allowances that grant technology companies the right to
disclose governmental inquiries to their users and increases penalties
for people caught aiding in terrorist efforts.
Mr. Speaker, I am concerned that other provisions in the bill would
continue to allow for large swaths of information gathering. Simply
put, I cannot vote for a bill that does not protect the privacy
enshrined in the Fourth Amendment and guaranteed to all Americans. The
risk of faulty information collection is not a risk I am willing to
take with any American's privacy. Upholding the U.S. Constitution is
non-negotiable.
Mrs. CAPPS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to submit for the Record my
strong support of H.R. 2048, the USA Freedom Act of 2015, which I am
proud to cosponsor.
This bipartisan bill will go a long way to reign in the abusive bulk
surveillance practices that have left many Americans concerned for
their privacy protections.
Furthermore, this bill will establish additional civil liberty
protections and increased transparency, accountability, and oversight
for over our national security practices.
As a policymaker, I am proud to support legislation that will protect
our values of privacy and civil liberties while also providing our
national security officials with the targeted tools that they need to
ensure the safety of all Americans.
This bill is also a testament to what we can accomplish when we come
together to work in a bipartisan way to meet the needs of the American
people.
I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2048.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 255, the previous question is ordered on
the bill, as amended.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on
this question will be postponed.
____________________