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House of Representatives

The House met at noon and was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania).

DESIGNATION OF SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from the Speaker:

WASHINGTON, DC,
September 9, 2024.

I hereby appoint the Honorable GLENN THOMPSON to act as Speaker pro tempore on this day.

MIKE JOHNSON,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

MORNING-HOUR DEBATE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of January 9, 2024, the Chair will now recognize Members from lists submitted by the majority and minority leaders for morning-hour debate.

The Chair will alternate recognition between the parties, with time equally allocated between the parties and each Member other than the majority and minority leaders and the minority whip limited to 5 minutes, but in no event shall debate continue beyond 1:50 p.m.

GUN VIOLENCE EPIDEMIC

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. NICKEL) for 5 minutes.

Mr. NICKEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in devastation and anger following the shooting at Apalachee High School, the deadliest outbreak of school violence in Georgia's history.

As a father, I am heartbroken. As a Congressman, I am beyond frustrated that our work to improve school safety can't keep pace with the gun violence epidemic that is plaguing our country.

The time for thoughts and prayers is over. It is time for action. Our kids deserve much more from the United States Congress.

Guns are the leading cause of death for children in this country. This isn't normal, and it shouldn't be. Our students, families, and communities deserve to feel safe from gun violence. That means taking action, not just talking about it, and I believe we can do that together with responsible gun owners.

I am a responsible gun owner. We want commonsense measures, too: universal background checks, safe storage laws, and banning assault weapons. These are mainstream ideas supported by the vast majority of the American people. They are about saving lives.

Let me be clear, Mr. Speaker. We will not accept mass murder and gun deaths to be the norm. Mass school shootings are not a fact of life. We don't have to live this way.

This year, I had the opportunity to go to Parkland, Florida, with Congressman MOSKOWITZ where we met with survivors of the deadly 2018 shooting to hear their stories. They lived through the worst, and yet they keep pushing for change.

We have failed to do our part in the few short years since that horrific school shooting, even when the majority of the American people agree on how to move forward.

In an April 2023 survey, FOX News found overwhelming support for commonsense gun violence prevention measures. Over 80 percent of Americans support background checks, making 21 the legal age to buy guns, and requiring mental health checks on all gun buyers.

In Congress, I am part of the House Gun Violence Prevention Task Force and cosponsor of the Bipartisan Background Checks Act. It is simple. If you want to buy a gun, you should have to pass a background check. That applies

to sales between private parties, too. Right now, there are loopholes that let guns slip into the wrong hands. That has to end.

I have also cosponsored the Assault Weapons Ban. No civilian needs an assault rifle. These weapons belong on the battlefields, not in our schools and not in our neighborhoods.

There is also Ethan's Law. This is about accountability. It promotes the safe storage of firearms, so they don't end up in the hands of kids. It is about being responsible for your weapon, for your family, and for your community.

I support a ban on high-capacity magazines, and I support closing the boyfriend loophole. That is the one that lets domestic abusers buy guns. Domestic violence and gun violence are often linked. This loophole costs lives.

Let's not forget mental health. We need to fund mental health care and expand access to it, but mental health alone isn't the issue. This is also about guns.

We need to act now. We need to keep our kids, our neighbors, and our communities safe with no more delays. Over 40,000 people lost their lives to gun violence last year alone. There are no more excuses. Massacres carried out using high-capacity magazines and bump stocks must end.

There should be no more indifference. Poor and minority communities cannot continue to be disproportionately impacted by gun violence. No more inaction. Over 20,000 Americans die by gun suicide every year, which is why we mark tomorrow, September 10, Firearm Suicide Prevention Day.

There should be no more deadly outcomes. Domestic violence should never turn fatal because of easy access to guns. We have waited long enough. It is time to act. There is no question that gun violence is out of control, and it is time we face it head-on.

I will work with anyone—Republicans, Democrats, and Independents—

This symbol represents the time of day during the House proceedings, e.g., 1407 is 2:07 p.m.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.



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to make sure that happens. It is not just about policy. It is about people. People are dying. We can't wait any longer.

ADDRESSING RECKLESS SPENDING

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. JOYCE) for 5 minutes.

Mr. JOYCE of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, as Congress returns to Washington to address the Biden-Harris administration's reckless spending, the American people are continuing to face consequences of runaway inflation.

According to a recent Census Bureau survey, more than 35 percent of Pennsylvanians struggle to afford basic goods, gasoline, and groceries.

With prices rising by more than 20 percent since President Biden and Vice President HARRIS took office, it is the American people who have been left to pay the bill for the administration's failed spending policies.

Instead of working to lower prices and supporting American families, Vice President HARRIS championed reckless policies, including subsidies for purchasing electric vehicles and a student loan bailout paid for by hard-working American citizens.

America cannot afford another 4 years of far-left spending. It is time to put a stop to reckless spending that has brought on this inflation and once again return to the fiscal restraint and the strong economic policies put in place by President Donald J. Trump.

FOOD SECURITY IS NATIONAL SECURITY

Mr. JOYCE of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, from the dairy farms, cornfields, and orchards of Pennsylvania to the cattle ranches of the Midwest, American farmers produce the meat, the dairy, and the vegetables that feed American families.

However, that food supply has been put in danger as the Chinese Communist Party affiliates have begun to purchase our farmland, creating a dangerous American security risk.

By adding the Secretary of Agriculture to CFIUS, we can create the oversight that is needed to prevent our farmland from being purchased by the Chinese Communist Party.

It is time to pass the Protecting American Agriculture from Foreign Adversaries Act to ensure that the CCP is not continuing to make purchases in the production, development, transportation, or storage of our food supply.

Food security is national security. Shielding these assets from outside interference will help to ensure that American interests are the top priority for the farming industry.

Let's make sure that our fields are cared for by American farmers and American growers and that our food security is preserved.

RECOGNIZING ALPHA FIRE COMPANY OF CENTRE COUNTY

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. JOYCE of Pennsylvania). The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. THOMPSON) for 5 minutes.

Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize the Alpha Fire Company of Centre County, Pennsylvania.

This year, the Alpha Fire Company is celebrating 125 years of dedicated emergency services to the State College community.

In 1899, a group of volunteers recognized the need within their community to establish a fire company to protect and to serve the region. For the last 125 years, the Alpha Fire Company has remained steadfast in this commitment.

In its early years, the Alpha Fire Company, originally Union Fire Company, used hand-drawn hose carts to fight fires in the few blocks of homes and buildings that surrounded the Pennsylvania State College campus, which had its own student-run volunteer fire company.

Since its founding, the Alpha Fire Company has seen many changes as the community continues to grow. Still, they have continued to provide dedicated emergency services for the past 125 years. This fire company is entirely volunteer based and often includes multiple generations of firefighters. Mr. Speaker, this dedication is what keeps the Alpha Fire Company top-notch.

Currently, there are 100 volunteers, and they handle the four primary municipalities it covers: State College Borough, College Township, Ferguson Township, and Patton Township. It also provides automatic aid to Halfmoon and Harris Townships.

The men and women of Alpha Fire Company are more than just firefighters. They are our neighbors, our friends, and family members. These dedicated volunteers give their time and energy, often balancing demanding jobs and personal responsibilities, to ensure our safety. Their commitment to protecting lives and property is inspiring and deserves our deepest gratitude.

The Alpha Fire Company is more than just a group of fire stations that protect and serve the State College region. It is truly an integral part of the community.

Aside from their lifesaving efforts, these volunteer firefighters make the Centre Region a better place. Whether it be a Fourth of July carnival, a school demonstration, or aiding in a fundraiser, the men and women of the Alpha Fire Company embody the spirit of community service.

Mr. Speaker, this is not the first time I have recognized the Alpha Fire Company on the House floor. In the fall of 2023, an all-woman crew bravely led the initial attack line in a three-alarm fire, making a historic milestone in our journey of service and dedication.

Throughout its 125 years of dedicated service, the Alpha Fire Company has lost three brave men in the line of duty. Philip Foster, Larry Oberle, and Charles Zeigler selflessly laid down

their lives to protect the community they called home.

These heroes are not forgotten. The memorial honoring these fallen firefighters in the borough station will forever preserve their memory.

In a time when resources are often stretched thin, volunteer firefighters fill the gap, ensuring that no call for help goes unanswered.

They are trained professionals who bring their skills, courage, and compassion to the front lines, whether it is battling blazes, responding to accidents, or providing essential assistance for medical emergencies.

Over the past 125 years, the Alpha Fire Company has grown and evolved, continually adapting to meet the needs of our community. They have embraced advancements in technology and training, ensuring their brave men and women are prepared to handle any emergency with professionalism and expertise.

I know firsthand the dedication and passion volunteer firefighters have for protecting their communities. I am deeply grateful for the unwavering dedication and passion of the Alpha Fire Company's volunteer firefighters in protecting our neighborhoods.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank Alpha Fire Company for their bravery, their service, and their commitment to our community and congratulate them on 125 years of service.

□ 1215

CONGRATULATING INARF

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Indiana (Mrs. HOUCHIN) for 5 minutes.

Mrs. HOUCHIN. Mr. Speaker, I stand before you today to offer my congratulations to the Indiana Association of Rehabilitation Facilities on receiving an extraordinary milestone: 50 years of service. Over the past five decades, INARF has proudly represented its members who serve more than 50,000 citizens annually and employ nearly 15,000 dedicated professionals.

INARF plays an indispensable role in our southern Indiana community, shaping the landscape of disability services to provide the highest quality of care and support for nearly 900,000 people with disabilities.

Last month, I had the privilege of visiting one of INARF's member organizations where I witnessed the vital work that they do. Their unwavering commitment ensures that everyone has the opportunity to thrive and to reach their full potential.

As we celebrate 50 years of impact with our local disability service providers, I extend my sincere gratitude. I thank them for their tireless dedication to ensuring Indiana residents have access to the resources and services they need.

RECOGNIZING LISCHKGE MOTORS

Mrs. HOUCHIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize a remarkable milestone, Lischkge Motors' 100 years of

business in Aurora, Indiana. If you have ever driven along U.S. Route 50, you have likely seen the iconic 100-foot-tall round barn, the largest of its kind in the State. This impressive structure, built in 1901, took Clayton Lischkge 2 years to convert into a thriving business space, an achievement that amazed professional engineers and silenced the critics.

Mr. Lischkge's journey reflects the spirit of that very barn, defying the odds and exceeding all expectations. Starting out as an apprentice mechanic, earning little to no pay in exchange for learning the trade, he opened his own shop in June of 1924. His sheer determination kept the doors of Lischkge Motors open through the Great Depression, and his resilience carried the business through four devastating floods, including the infamous 1937 flood that reached the second floor of the shop.

In 1964, Lischkge Motors found its new home at the round barn, a symbol of the family's resilience and adaptability. Today, they hold the title of the oldest Mack Truck distributor in the world, and their impact on the Aurora community is immeasurable.

As we celebrate a century of Lischkge Motors, I stand here today to congratulate the Lischkge family on this tremendous achievement and to thank them for being an invaluable part of our community.

CONGRATULATING DECATUR COUNTY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

Mrs. HOUCHIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to congratulate the Decatur County Memorial Hospital for over 100 years of dedicated service to the people of our district and southern Indiana. Originally established as a memorial to honor Decatur County residents who bravely fought and lost their lives in World War I, this hospital embodies the care and spirit that rivals any institution in the Nation. With a commitment to integrity, compassion, quality, and a deep sense of community, Decatur County Memorial Hospital continues to be a cornerstone of healthcare in our region.

From its beginnings in a 16,000-square-foot facility, the hospital has grown to include surgery, women's care, and rehabilitation centers across multiple locations, all while staying true to its mission of providing top-tier care to southern Indiana. Thanks to their dedication, the need for residents to seek care outside of our community has been greatly reduced.

This past August, Decatur County Memorial honored its proud history and built upon its legacy by lowering a time capsule on campus, connecting the past, present, and future of this institution. As we reflect on its rich heritage and the sacrifices of those who have served, we are reminded of the enduring values that define this hospital. I look forward to the next 100 years of building upon these values.

RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania). Pursuant to clause 12(a) of rule I, the Chair declares the House in recess until 2 p.m. today.

Accordingly (at 12 o'clock and 17 minutes p.m.), the House stood in recess.

□ 1400

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mrs. KIM of California) at 2 p.m.

PRAYER

The Chaplain, the Reverend Margaret Grun Kibben, offered the following prayer:

In these days when there is much to be attended to, policies to be written, and elections to be run; when the tasks we have not yet completed vie for attention, in contest with all that must yet be achieved; when each day is a whirlwind of obligations and demands, break into our thoughts and concerns, O Lord, and remind us again how precious is the life You give to each of us.

As we grieve the loss of our dear friend and colleague, Representative Bill Pascrell, may it be his passionate and compassionate commitment to this country and the people he was proud to represent that inspires us to assess our spirit of service.

May it be his wry smile and playfully mischievous nature that reminds us to find reason to enjoy each moment. May it be his tender heart and gracious kindness that call us to love those with whom we labor in these Chambers.

God our creator, like trees planted by streams of water, may we each, like Bill Pascrell, yield fruit in our season. In the days that You give us, may our leaves not wither. In all that we do, may all be done for You. In this may our lives prosper with the certainty of Your favor.

In Your righteous name we pray.
Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House the approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1 of rule I, the Journal stands approved.

PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Will the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. THOMPSON) come forward and lead the House in the Pledge of Allegiance.

Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania led the Pledge of Allegiance as follows:

I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Repub-

lic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

MANSFIELD AREA GIRL SCOUTS' CENTENNIAL YEAR

(Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, I rise today to recognize the Mansfield area Girl Scouts' centennial year. The first Mansfield area Girl Scout troop was founded 100 years ago in September of 1924.

For the past century, the Mansfield Girl Scouts have played an instrumental role in the development of young women. The Girl Scouts are known for their emphasis on important values such as teamwork, integrity, and respect for others. These values foster an environment where girls can grow into strong, compassionate citizens.

As co-chair of the Congressional Scouting Caucus and a Scoutmaster for the Boy Scouts, I deeply respect the Girl Scouts organization.

The Mansfield area Girl Scouts have a rich history of accomplishments and service. In recent years these young women have raised thousands by selling their infamous Girl Scout cookies.

Over the past 100 years, many Scouts from Mansfield have received a Gold Award, the highest achievement in Girl Scouts.

Madam Speaker, I am confident that the Mansfield Girl Scouts are guiding these girls to become confident young women, and I congratulate them on 100 years of scouting.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania). Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the Chair will postpone further proceedings today on motions to suspend the rules on which a recorded vote or the yeas and nays are ordered, or votes objected to under clause 6 of rule XX.

The House will resume proceedings on postponed questions at a later time.

CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF FOREIGN COUNTRY FOR PURPOSES OF MALIGN FOREIGN TALENT RECRUITMENT RESTRICTION

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7686) to amend the Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act to clarify the definition of foreign country for purposes of malign foreign talent recruitment restriction, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7686

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF FOREIGN COUNTRY FOR PURPOSES OF MALIGN FOREIGN TALENT RECRUITMENT RESTRICTION.

Paragraph (4) of section 10638 of title VI of division B of the Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act is amended—

(1) by inserting “of concern” after “foreign country” each place such term appears;

(2) by striking “means—” and all that follows through “any program, position, or activity” and inserting “means any program, position, or activity”;

(3) by striking subparagraph (B);

(4) by redesignating clauses (i) through (ix) as subparagraphs (A) through (I), respectively, and moving such subparagraphs, as so redesignated, two ems to the left;

(5) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), as so redesignated, by striking “directly provided” and inserting “whether directly or indirectly provided”;

(6) in subparagraph (I), as so redesignated, by striking “; and” and inserting a period.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. LUCAS) and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. CASTEN) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 7686, the bill now under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to be here today to support H.R. 7686, which helps strengthen our research security.

Research theft is one of the single greatest threats to our competitiveness as a nation. It takes our hard-won innovation and puts it to work for our adversaries, hurting our economy and our national security.

This is no idle threat either.

The Chinese Communist Party has made it clear that they intend to surpass us as the global leader in science and technology, and they have no qualms about using intellectual property theft, forced technology acquisition, and other illicit means to do so.

□ 1415

The CCP uses our intellectual property to advance their own research and keep them at the leading edge of new technologies. After acquiring our research, they use subsidies and regulations that benefit Chinese companies, making it difficult for U.S. companies to compete globally.

According to some estimates, this is costing our economy between \$200 billion and \$600 billion a year. The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology has been proactive in our response to this threat and has passed multiple bills to protect American research.

When we passed the CHIPS and Science Act in 2022, we included a num-

ber of provisions to halt the theft of U.S. innovation. We prohibited Federal funding for any school that hosts Confucius Institutes, which are designed to spread CCP propaganda to students and researchers. We gave universities better tools to protect sensitive research from cyber theft. We created a dedicated office on research security at the National Science Foundation to help detect and combat foreign influence and theft.

We banned participation in malign foreign talent programs. These programs recruit researchers and provide funding, travel, and other benefits in exchange for access to research and intellectual property. We prohibited all Federal agency personnel and any researcher receiving Federal funding from participating in these talent programs.

As the government, labs, and universities began to implement this prohibition, it became clear that our definition of malign foreign talent programs needed to be updated. H.R. 7686 provides a clear, comprehensive definition that ensures that we are covering efforts by foreign countries of concern like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. This clarification will make it easier for universities and Federal research agencies to identify and address threats to our taxpayer-funded research.

I thank Representative GARCIA for his work on this important bill. Research theft is a broad threat that is difficult to extinguish, and it is challenging to protect our research while still maintaining helpful international scientific collaboration.

I appreciate Representative GARCIA's efforts to walk that line and improve our tools to stop research theft. I encourage all of my colleagues to support this important bill.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CASTEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 7686.

Mr. Speaker, we recently celebrated the 2-year passage of the CHIPS and Science Act. In those 2 years, we have reinvigorated domestic semiconductor manufacturing, and we are revitalizing the American scientific enterprise. The positive impact of that legislation can be felt in everyone's district, so we should be proud of this bipartisan accomplishment.

In the same vein, as with all great legislation, we need to perform some legislative maintenance and improvements. The CHIPS and Science Act has many provisions focused on improving research security. One of those provisions, section 10631, prohibits the distribution of Federal research awards to individuals participating in foreign talent recruitment programs.

Universities and research institutions are ultimately responsible for ensuring that their faculty members are aware of and compliant with that pro-

hibition, but the current law contains two independent, lengthy, and—I know this is the first time this has ever happened—rather complex prohibitions, which makes good faith implementation efforts difficult to achieve.

We have heard that there is a need for clearer definitions, specifically for the “malign foreign talent recruitment program.” H.R. 7686 amends the Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act to better clarify that definition.

The need for this clarification has been affirmed by the National Science Foundation. The agency believes that this change will aid Federal science agencies' work in ensuring compliance.

For all of my colleagues, please do keep in mind that this legislation is very sensitive in its nature. Even minor changes to these definitions can have decisive consequences that can make institutional compliance problematic.

Both Democratic and Republican staff have worked surgically, shall we say, to ensure that this amendment makes the necessary corrections so that institutions can faithfully carry out these research security efforts.

On that note, I would like to state my enthusiastic support for this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. MIKE GARCIA) to speak on his bill.

Mr. MIKE GARCIA of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman LUCAS and the entire committee for bringing this very important bipartisan bill to the floor.

It has now been 2 years since the CHIPS and Science Act was signed into law, providing a much-needed kick-start to America's lagging semiconductor industry as we compete with an accelerating Chinese Communist Party threat in China.

The CHIPS Act was a good bill that I supported, but as I said during the markup of this legislation, a bill is only as good as its implementation and only as good as Congress' oversight of its effectiveness. The CHIPS Act only works if the investments are available to American enterprises and not available to our foreign adversaries, like the CCP.

Following great oversight work by the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology and the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, it became clear that complicated and confusing language in the CHIPS Act would allow China access to American-paid, American-funded research.

This lack of clarity would allow China to use malign foreign talent recruitment programs in our universities and other research labs to recruit researchers to access this data, effectively getting our constituents to fund breakthrough research for the Communist Party.

The Chinese Government has a nasty tendency of doing what I call rob, replicate, and replace. They take our intellectual property. They replicate it. They make it slightly better, slightly cheaper, and then replace it on the open market and compromise our technical advantages.

These researchers in these universities may often be ensnared by China without even knowingly being ensnared and can unwittingly hand our enemies an advantage in technological advancements.

In order to address this, Congresswoman STEVENS and I introduced H.R. 7686, which updates and clarifies the definition of “malign foreign talent recruitment programs” to protect our national investments.

My bill is a simple, noncontroversial, bipartisan solution that ensures our taxpayer dollars and the research they fund are being protected from the CCP and their espionage behavior.

I thank Chairman LUCAS and the entire committee, again, for their support on this legislation. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Mr. CASTEN. Mr. Speaker, I close simply by thanking Mr. GARCIA and Ms. STEVENS on our side for all of their hard work on this extremely well-constructed bill. I urge all of my colleagues to vote “yes” on H.R. 7686.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, as you have heard today, H.R. 7686 is smart policy that will protect taxpayer-funded research from being stolen and misused by our adversaries. We want to give our scientific agencies and universities every tool they need to protect critical research. This bill does that and helps us better implement the CHIPS and Science Act.

I thank Representative GARCIA for his work on this issue, and I urge all of my colleagues to pass this important piece of legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. LUCAS) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 7686, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

CHINESE CURRENCY ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2023

Mrs. KIM of California. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 510) to require the United States Governor of, and the United States Executive Director at, the International Monetary Fund to oppose an increase in the weight of the Chi-

nese renminbi in the Special Drawing Rights basket of the Fund, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 510

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Chinese Currency Accountability Act of 2023”.

SEC. 2. OPPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES TO AN INCREASE IN THE WEIGHT OF THE CHINESE RENMINBI IN THE SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS BASKET OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.

The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Governor of, and the United States Executive Director at, the International Monetary Fund to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any increase in the weight of the Chinese renminbi in the basket of currencies used to determine the value of Special Drawing Rights, unless the Secretary of the Treasury has submitted to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate a written report which includes a certification that—

(1) the People’s Republic of China is in compliance with all its obligations under Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund;

(2) in the preceding 12 months, there has not been a report submitted under section 3005 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 or section 701 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 in which the People’s Republic of China has been found to have manipulated its currency; and

(3) the People’s Republic of China adheres to the rules and principles of the Paris Club and the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits.

SEC. 3. SUNSET.

Section 2 shall have no force or effect beginning 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. KIM) and the gentleman from California (Mr. SHERMAN) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mrs. KIM of California. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. RULLI). Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from California?

There was no objection.

Mrs. KIM of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, today, I rise in support of the Chinese Currency Accountability Act sponsored by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. DAVIDSON).

In 2016, the International Monetary Fund included the Chinese renminbi, RMB, in the currency basket that determines the value and interest rate for Special Drawing Rights, known as SDRs. SDRs are both reserve assets and an accounting unit for the IMF, so

they play a central role in the Fund’s lending throughout the world.

It was premature for the Fund to let the RMB influence the SDR, whose value had previously been determined only by the dollar, euro, yen, and pound.

The PRC has failed to make the serious reforms that would justify labeling the RMB a major currency. In addition, the People’s Bank of China was and remains a tool of the Chinese Communist Party, not an independent central bank.

The Treasury Department knows this all too well. Every year, it reports to Congress that China’s currency management is so opaque that it is difficult for the outside world to even understand Beijing’s policy toward the RMB.

In addition, Beijing’s lending policies abroad, including through the Belt and Road Initiative, have saddled developing countries with so much debt that the IMF faces difficulties designing rescue programs.

It is difficult to know how much debt these countries are in. The CCP refuses to play by the multilateral rules of the road to not only be transparent about the debt but to significantly restructure it. This has become one of the most acute threats to the mission of the Fund.

Nevertheless, in 2022, Treasury signed off when the IMF voted to increase the weight of the RMB in the SDR currency basket. As a result of this shocking decision, the RMB has now become the third most important currency in the basket, behind the dollar and euro.

This is why Mr. DAVIDSON’s bill is critical. H.R. 510 will prevent future increases to the RMB’s weight at the IMF until China starts playing by the rules.

This is a commonsense measure that was unanimously supported when the Financial Services Committee marked it up last year.

I commend Mr. DAVIDSON for his clear-eyed piece of legislation to hold Beijing accountable, and I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 510, the Chinese Currency Accountability Act of 2023, sponsored by Representative DAVIDSON. This bill is related to the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights, known as SDRs, and the influence of China’s currency in the SDR program.

SDRs are international assets created by the International Monetary Fund, the IMF, to supplement member countries’ foreign exchange reserves, and they can enable member countries to reduce their reliance on domestic or external debt when building those reserves.

SDRs can be converted into government-issued currency, such as the dollar, the yuan, or the pound, assuming that there are not sanctions or other

prohibitions that would prevent such financial transactions.

□ 1430

The value of an IMF member's SDRs is defined by a basket of currencies, which are a mix of five globally important currencies, sometimes called fiat currencies in that they are issued by governments or, in the case of a euro, an association of governments. Those five currencies that are behind the SDRs are the U.S. dollar, the euro, the Chinese yuan, the Japanese yen, and the British pound.

The key thing here is that the percentage of that basket that is comprised of the Chinese currency was increased in 2022 and now is at 12 percent of the total, compared to the U.S. dollar, which is at 43 percent of the total.

The bill would require the Treasury Secretary to oppose at the IMF any future percentage increase in the weight of the Chinese currency in that SDR currency basket. The bill would allow a waiver of such provision to the executive branch should the Secretary of the Treasury be able to certify to Congress that China meets certain standards.

Those standards include that China is in compliance with all of its obligations under article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF; second, that there has not been certain reports submitted in the prior 12 months indicating that China is engaging in currency manipulation; and, third, that China is adhering to the rules and principles of the Paris Club and the OECD Arrangement on officially supported export credits.

Mr. Speaker, I will note that the Department of the Treasury has expressed some concerns about this bill, especially due to the fact that the Department of the Treasury does not have visibility into China's confidential provisions of data to the IMF and may not be able to independently certify that China is complying with the IMF and other global obligations.

As a result, China has indicated that it may be difficult to certify whether China has met the standards outlined in that bill that underlie the possibility of a waiver of its provisions.

These are reasonable concerns. Democrats on the Financial Services Committee have urged our Republican colleagues to work to improve the bill before it is finally enacted into law. That might include allowing the Department of the Treasury to rely on certifications from the IMF as to whether China is meeting its responsibilities looking at that confidential information that is provided by China to the IMF.

In any case, this bill moves us forward. I am sure that, through the legislative process, there will be some improvements.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mrs. KIM of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to

the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. DAVIDSON).

Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 510, the Chinese Currency Accountability Act. I was proud to introduce this measure last year, which the Financial Services Committee embraced with a vote of 40-0.

Mr. Speaker, the International Monetary Fund acts as the world's lender of last resort, and its Special Drawing Rights serve as a unit of account for its activities. SDRs are also important reserve assets on the balance sheet of central banks. As such, SDR holdings can earn interest, and SDR liabilities can incur costs.

Prior to 2016, both the value and interest rate of the Special Drawing Rights was determined by major currencies issued by market economies and their central banks and overseen by democratic governments. They were the dollar, the euro, the yen, and the pound sterling.

China is not a market economy, so it is astonishing that the International Monetary Fund, with the approval of the current Treasury Department, then decided to add the Chinese renminbi to its currency basket. On a number of measures, the renminbi was nowhere near the level of these other currencies, and, of course, the Chinese Central Bank is the furthest thing from what one would call independent or representative of a market economy. This is still the case today.

Even more bewildering was the 2022 decision to increase the renminbi's weight, the proportion of influence it has, within the currency basket.

By this time, it was not only clear that China's exchange rate management remains subject to the whims of the Chinese Communist Party, but the IMF also knew that China's predatory lending to developing countries was putting the viability of IMF programs in jeopardy. In fact, China's Belt and Road Initiative is designed to undermine the International Monetary Fund, so why would IMF grow the rate or influence of it after having already made the mistake of even including it?

Currently, China's Communist Party is an economic and strategic rival, and hopefully it remains a rival in the market. However, China should not be allowed to skirt the rules at the expense of American taxpayers and at the expense of our market.

It is unacceptable for the IMF to preach to the world on debt transparency, the rule of law, and central bank independence while it is rewarding the Communist Party in China for violating every single one of these principles.

Our legislation says enough is enough. It requires the Treasury Department to oppose further increases of the renminbi for the IMF's currency basket until Treasury can certify that China is complying with the rules of the road.

As a member of the World Trade Organization and other international or-

ganizations China is part of, if we follow the rules, China should be held to the same standards. Of course, they are not doing that. It would include upholding China's obligations under the IMF's Articles of Agreement and complying with the same lending rules that other large economies have committed to.

This also means China would have to take significant steps toward restructuring its Belt and Road loans so that they are not actually working to undermine the IMF. In other words, the Chinese Currency Accountability Act isn't about holding China to different standards, but, rather, holding them to the exact same standards everyone else is held to.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this measure.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to close.

Mr. Speaker, in an effort to expand both its economy and global influence, China has been accused of manipulating its currency. Concerns about this abound and have been well expressed by Mr. DAVIDSON. This is especially concerning when it regards items that affect American interests at international institutions, such as the IMF.

This bill would empower the Department of the Treasury to address that issue and, in fact, require them to address that issue. I think that it is going to be an effective tool for us to deal with China, an important nation that doesn't always play by the rules.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. KIM of California. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 510, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. KIM) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 510, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

TAIWAN CONFLICT DETERRENCE ACT OF 2023

Mrs. KIM of California. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 554) to deter Chinese aggression towards Taiwan by requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to publish a report on financial institutions and accounts connected to senior officials of the People's Republic of China, to restrict financial services for certain immediate family of such officials, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 554

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act of 2023”.

SEC. 2. REPORT ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACCOUNTS CONNECTED TO CERTAIN CHINESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

(a) FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date that the President, pursuant to section 3(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302(c)), informs the Congress of a threat resulting from actions of the People’s Republic of China and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to the appropriate Members of Congress containing the following:

(A) With respect to each of at least 10 natural persons described under subsection (b), at least 1 of whom is a natural person listed under paragraph (1) of such subsection (b) and at least 1 of whom is a natural person listed under paragraph (2) of such subsection (b), the estimated total funds that are held in financial institutions and are under direct or indirect control by such natural person and a description of such funds.

(B) A list of any financial institutions that—

(i) maintain an account in connection with significant funds described in subparagraph (A); or

(ii) otherwise provide significant financial services to a natural person covered by the report.

(2) BRIEFING REQUIRED.—Not later than 30 days after submitting a report described under paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Treasury, or a designee of the Secretary, shall provide to the appropriate Members of Congress an unclassified or classified briefing (as determined appropriate by the Secretary) on the funds covered by the report, including a description of how the funds were acquired, and any illicit or corrupt means employed to acquire or use the funds.

(3) EXEMPTIONS.—The requirements described under paragraph (1) may not be applied with respect to a natural person or a financial institution, as the case may be, if the President determines:

(A) The funds described under paragraph (1)(A) were primarily acquired through legal and noncorrupt means.

(B) The natural person has agreed to provide significant cooperation to the United States for an important national security purpose with respect to China.

(C) A financial institution has agreed to—

(i) no longer maintain an account described under paragraph (1)(B)(i);

(ii) no longer provide significant financial services to a natural person covered by the report; or

(iii) provide significant cooperation to the United States for an important national security purpose with respect to China.

(4) WAIVER.—The President may waive any requirement described under paragraph (1) with respect to a natural person or a financial institution upon reporting to the appropriate Members of Congress that—

(A) the waiver would substantially promote the objective of ending the threat described under paragraph (1);

(B) the threat described under paragraph (1) is no longer present; or

(C) the waiver is essential to the national security interests of the United States.

(b) NATURAL PERSONS DESCRIBED.—The natural persons described in this subsection are persons who, at the time of a report, are the following:

(1) A member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

(2) A member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party that is not described under paragraph (1).

(3) A member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party that—

(A) is none of the foregoing; and

(B) performs any official duty that directly or indirectly affects Taiwan.

(c) FORM OF REPORTS; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—

(1) FORM.—The reports required under paragraphs (1) and (4) of subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(2) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall make the unclassified portion of the report required under subsection (a)(1) available to the public on the website and social media accounts of the Department of the Treasury—

(A) in English, Chinese, and any other language that the Secretary finds appropriate; and

(B) in precompressed, easily downloadable versions that are made available in all appropriate formats.

SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR CERTAIN IMMEDIATE FAMILY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall prohibit a United States financial institution, and any person owned or controlled by a United States financial institution, from engaging in a significant transaction with—

(1) a natural person covered by a report made under section 2(a); and

(2) the immediate family of a person described under paragraph (1), if the Secretary finds that such immediate family benefits from funds described in the report.

(b) EXCEPTIONS.—

(1) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES.—Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to any intelligence, law enforcement, or national security activity of the United States.

(2) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of subsection (a) with respect to a person upon reporting to the appropriate Members of Congress that—

(A) the waiver would substantially promote the objective of ending the threat described under section 2(a)(1);

(B) the threat described under section 2(a)(1) is no longer present; or

(C) the waiver is essential to the national security interests of the United States.

(3) FORM OF REPORTS.—The reports required under paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(4) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing or requiring any sanction with respect to the importation of any good.

(B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph, the term “good” means any article, natural or man-made substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.

(c) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section. Not later than 60 days after issuing a license pursuant to this section, the President shall submit a copy of the license to the appropriate Members of Congress.

(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section 206.

(d) TERMINATION.—This section shall have no force or effect on the earlier of—

(1) the date that is 30 days after the date that the President reports to the appropriate Members of Congress that the threat described under section 2(a)(1) is no longer present; or

(2) the date that is 25 years after the date that the Secretary of the Treasury submits the final report required under section 2(a)(1).

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

For purposes of this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate Members of Congress” means the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority leader and minority leader of the Senate, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives, and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

(2) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term “financial institution” means a United States financial institution or a foreign financial institution.

(3) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term “foreign financial institution” has the meaning given that term in section 561.308 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.

(4) FUNDS.—The term “funds” has the meaning given to such term by the Secretary of the Treasury.

(5) IMMEDIATE FAMILY.—The term “immediate family” of any natural person means the following (whether by the full or half blood or by adoption):

(A) Such person’s spouse, father, mother, children, brothers, sisters, and grandchildren.

(B) The father, mother, brothers, and sisters of such person’s spouse.

(C) The spouse of a child, brother, or sister of such person.

(6) UNITED STATES FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term “United States financial institution” has the meaning given the term “U.S. financial institution” under section 561.309 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. KIM) and the gentleman from California (Mr. SHERMAN) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mrs. KIM of California. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from California?

There was no objection.

Mrs. KIM of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 554, the Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act, authored by the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. HILL).

The Financial Services Committee has repeatedly pressed administration officials to devise a plan that imposes real costs on the Chinese Communist Party in the event it invades Taiwan. The time to formulate those measures is now. We must publicly communicate what we intend to do so that Beijing thinks twice before launching an attack against our friends on the island.

This is why Mr. HILL’s legislation is so important. If Beijing chooses to invade Taiwan, this bill requires the

Treasury Secretary to publish the ill-gotten gains of the Chinese Communist Party's top leadership no matter where they may be held around the world.

It would also require Treasury to expose the financial institutions that maintain accounts for those officials while prohibiting U.S. banks from letting their immediate families benefit from any of the funds.

Too often, Washington chooses to be reactive when it comes to our adversaries, scrambling to develop sanctions and other measures after the fact. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a case in point. Mr. HILL's legislation is proactive. It signals what is at stake to the Chinese Communist Party before Beijing goes too far.

I also point out that this legislation underscores an important point that Republicans and Democrats alike have made. Our problem lies with the Chinese Government, not the people of China, many of whom suffer daily under the thumb of Beijing's dictatorship. The Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act recognizes this.

By promising to publish the corrupt assets of PRC's top leadership, the bill would force CCP officials to face the ire of their own people, so many of whom are fed up with the illicit wealth of the CCP insiders.

I again commend Mr. HILL for his leadership in crafting this measure, which received unanimous support from the Financial Services Committee when we marked it up last year.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to vote in support of H.R. 554, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 554, the Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act of 2023, sponsored by Representative HILL. I am pleased to be the chief Democratic cosponsor of this legislation.

As China contemplates the possibility of an invasion or blockade of Taiwan, keeping in mind President Xi has told his military to be ready for an invasion by 2027, they faced from the United States strategic ambiguity as to what our military response would be.

Mr. Speaker, President Biden has announced that he would respond militarily, but President Biden will be leaving office in a few months. Any decision by the executive branch to deploy our forces is actually something that would be decided upon at the time and given the circumstances that exist.

We in Congress, while I don't think, by statute, we could compel the deployment of our military forces, we can lock into statute economic responses that should not be ambiguous but should be very clear to Beijing.

Mr. Speaker, I have a bill that goes beyond the legislation we are considering here today that would remove most-favored-nation status from China if it invades or blockades Taiwan and lock that in so that Beijing knows that

a military action against Taiwan would result in that enormous economic consequence.

This bill, I think, is a step in the right direction. As the bill's title suggests, it is designed to put the government of China on notice that the United States is closely watching its increasing threats toward Taiwan, and it serves as a warning that the U.S. will respond economically and that that is locked into statute should its aggression amount to a violation of section 3(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act.

□ 1445

I will point out that a violation of section 3(c) would include an invasion or blockade, but could also involve other aggressive actions of a less significant nature.

This is a tangible concern given the Chinese military activity in the region appears to be escalating as demonstrated by daily incursions undertaken by the Chinese military into Taiwan's air defense identification zone or across the median line of the Taiwan Strait.

In May, China conducted a large-scale military exercise near the island of Taiwan, intended to intimidate the Taiwanese people as they celebrated the inauguration of a new democratically elected President.

This bill would put pressure on China to not go further by requiring a response of the U.S. Government if its intimidation and coercion go to the point of triggering section 3(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act.

Specifically, if there is a notification by the President under section 3(c) of a threat resulting from the actions of the People's Republic of China and a danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom, the bill would require the Secretary of the Treasury to create and to make public the findings of a report on financial institutions and accounts that are connected to a select group of Chinese Communist Party officials.

This bill does not focus on retaliating against the Chinese Government per se, but rather on individuals who are in that government. The report is intended to raise public awareness of the hidden and corruptly gained funds that are directly or indirectly controlled by such individuals. It is designed to undermine the support of the Chinese Communist Party and its level of support inside China once we publish the corrupt gains of some of its high-ranking officials.

For those listed in the report and their immediate family members, the bill would also restrict U.S.-based financial services, intending to limit the financial options for these officials and to extend the deterrent or punitive impacts on those officials and their families. For assets in the United States, it is a freezing of those assets.

I will underscore again that these actions as set forth in the bill occur only

if the President exercises his, or soon, her, authority under section 3(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act.

Now, no President in the past has ever triggered section 3(c), and I hope that such a triggering is never necessary. I don't expect that a triggering will ever occur, but it is important to put Beijing on notice of what would happen if their threats against Taiwan raise to that level. The Taiwan Relations Act has been in effect for 40 years, and as I have said, no administration has triggered section 3(c). It did not even occur during the third Taiwan Strait crisis of the 1990s.

Democrats have worked on this bill. We have seen changes in the original bill, including the addition of Presidential waivers for national security, intelligence, and other purposes. For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mrs. KIM of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. HILL).

Mr. HILL. Mr. Speaker, I thank very much Chair KIM for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, what a marvelous signal it sends to the world and to the United States to have YOUNG KIM as our chair on the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the Indo-Pacific. She is a young woman born in South Korea, a proud American citizen, a proud American mom, and now Member of Congress and spectacular chair.

Mr. Speaker, to my other friend from California, Mr. SHERMAN, I think he has made some outstanding arguments on behalf of our bill, and I thank him for being an original cosponsor of H.R. 554, the Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act.

I modeled this bill on the Holding Iranian Leaders Accountable Act included in our national security package, which the House passed and President Biden signed into law this spring.

The idea is very straightforward: If we want to see the world's Communists and autocratic dictatorships change course, we must expose their wealth, corruption, and financial privilege of their elites to the citizens suffering daily under their rule.

This approach certainly applies to China's Communist Party, as well. The CCP leaders sit atop an authoritarian state littered with cronyism, kickbacks, graft, bribery, and a colossal misuse of public funds.

If China chooses to attack the free people of Taiwan, H.R. 554 requires the Treasury Secretary to publish the illicit assets of Beijing's senior-most leaders, including the names of financial institutions that maintain the accounts.

As Mr. SHERMAN noted, our 1979 recognition of the government in Peking, now Beijing, rests on the foundation that the future of Taiwan would be determined by peaceful means and that any other method, including boycotts or embargoes, is considered a threat to

peace and security in the western Pacific.

At a time when the Chinese youth face a 17 percent unemployment rate, Xi has failed to deliver a social safety net, and families are battered by sinking real estate debt. Let these corrupt officials explain to ordinary Chinese citizens how they acquired their riches on a government salary, even as they call on their public to support war across the Taiwan Strait.

This bill goes beyond just naming and shaming. It will also cut off access to the United States financial system for those CCP officials and their immediate family. This point is worth highlighting in order to convey the costs that Beijing will bear if they impose an embargo, boycott, or launch military action. Blocking Chinese leaders' use of the dollar will certainly be mirrored by restrictions from other major economies, as well. Further, for Chinese officials whose families profit from their ill-gotten gains, they too will find the world becoming a much smaller place.

In 2012, The Washington Post reported that most of China's politburo standing committee have children or grandchildren studying here in the United States, including CCP Chairman, Xi Jinping. Such privileges will be put in jeopardy if China decides to act against Taiwan. H.R. 554 guarantees it.

Let me underline one other detail of this legislation, which is central to how it works.

The bill triggers reporting on China's leadership, but it also contains exemptions for those who cooperate with the United States. If Chairman Xi engages in hostilities against Taiwan, the asset report required by this bill might leave out a number of his colleagues, but is this because the Treasury Secretary simply targeted other individuals or because the unnamed officials turned state's evidence, earning themselves an exemption from the U.S. sanctions?

No one in the CCP will ever know for sure.

By the same token, everyone covered by this bill has an incentive to turn against the politburo if they determine to take aggressive action in violation of their commitments against Taiwan before it is too late for them and they see their finances laid bare.

The legislation treats the CCP like the kleptocratic centrally planned Communist state that it is. It is the same way we frequently have defeated organized crime, sowing distrust and paranoia. We must do the same in Beijing if China moves against Taiwan.

Mr. Speaker, as Mr. SHERMAN noted, no one wishes to see conflict involving Taiwan, but we want to deter China from their worst instincts of potentially taking hostile actions. We must signal those consequences clearly and early.

Earlier this summer, Taiwan recorded 66 Chinese military planes operating around the island setting a sin-

gle-day record. Fifty-six of those aircraft entered Taiwan's air defense identification zone.

Last month, Taiwan's defense ministry reported to lawmakers in Taipei how Beijing is developing new weapons and tactics to pressure the island. It is up to Congress and the executive branch to communicate that war across the Taiwan Strait would destroy the global economy, impoverish the Chinese people, and now, thanks to H.R. 554, impose significant personal costs for the Chinese elite and high-ranking CCP members, but the time to do this is before the outbreak of any threats or hostilities.

Again, I thank Chairwoman KIM and my colleagues on the Financial Services Committee for endorsing this legislation during its markup.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all our colleagues to support this bill with a "yes" vote.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I join the gentlewoman from California in a parallel career. She is our chair of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. I was once chair of that subcommittee, and we both serve on two committees: Financial Services, Foreign Affairs. She has reflected an understanding of our situation with China, and that situation is that we don't want to respond to an invasion or blockade of Taiwan. We want to prevent an invasion or blockade of Taiwan.

The way to do that is on three levels. Most important and most expensive for the United States is that we have very substantial military capacities in the South China Sea and the Pacific in general. We have spent much time on this floor and literally hundreds of billions of dollars developing that capacity.

Second, and an element that Congress should explore, is that we need to have locked into statute broad-based and immediate economic consequences to the entire Chinese economy if, God forbid, their government invades or blockades. That is why I am seeking cosponsors for legislation that would say in the case of such an invasion or blockade, China would lose its MFN status.

Third, in addition to the military and the broad economic, we need the focused, personal economic consequences. That is what this bill does. It provides that if China were to take such action against Taiwan as to trigger the section 3(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act that we would take two actions against their top officials.

□ 1500

First, we would name and shame. We would publicize their assets, wherever they may be in the world. Then, second, we would deny them and their immediate families access to the American financial system.

It is time for China to give up the idea of intimidating the people of Taiwan and to recognize that America's

response will involve the military, will involve broad-based economic response, and will involve very personal economic disclosures and response.

That is the way to prevent what could cause an incredible disruption in the world and even possibly a world war. That is why Beijing needs to look at this bill and everything else that America would do and decide to put aside the idea of invading or blockading Taiwan.

Mr. Speaker, I again urge my colleagues to support this important legislation and yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. KIM of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague, the gentleman from California, for his support of this very important bill, and I thank Mr. HILL for his outstanding leadership and for introducing this thoughtful legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 554, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act, H.R. 554, first and foremost, because it underscores support for Taiwan, a true democracy and bastion of freedom in the Chinese-speaking world, and an example to which the repressed people of China can aspire.

Secondly, however, this bill would illuminate the extent to which the Chinese Communist Party, centered around Xi Jinping, is a gang of thieves who have exploited the Chinese people struggling to make ends meet in a "9-9-6 economy"—working 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. six days a week for a pittance with no job security.

All while Xi Jinping himself has amassed a Putin-like fortune.

We know that in 2012, when he was on the cusp of assuming supreme power, he had already squirreled away corporate investments worth approximately \$375 million.

Since then, it is estimated that his wealth has grown by leaps and bounds.

No wonder then that the Chinese government has lobbied extensively against the release of a long-delayed report by the Director of National Intelligence on the corrupt wealth of Xi and his Politburo cronies. They know that revelation of their ill-gotten gains undermines the Communist Party's so-called claims to revolutionary legitimacy.

The report that this bill calls for would also strip away any vestiges of Xi Jinping's claim to being an anti-corruption reformer. He never was. When he went against party rival Bo Xilai at the beginning of his regime, he was using "anti-corruption" as a weapon.

Sadly, many in America at the time called him a "rule-of-law" reformer. That was completely wrong. Xi never believed in rule-of-law; it was always "rule-by-law"—the dictates of the Chinese Communist Party and Xi Jinping cloaked in law that was selectively enforced.

For all these reasons, I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. KIM) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 554, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the

rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

REPEAL REQUIREMENT FOR CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE TO PREPARE ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION AND SUPPLEMENTS IN HARDBOUND VERSION

Mr. STEIL. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7592) to direct the Librarian of Congress to promote the more cost-effective, efficient, and expanded availability of the Annotated Constitution and pocket-part supplements by replacing the hardbound versions with digital versions.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7592

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPEAL REQUIREMENT FOR CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE TO PREPARE ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION AND SUPPLEMENTS IN HARDBOUND VERSION.

(a) REPEAL.—The first section of Public Law 91-589 (2 U.S.C. 168) is amended—

(1) by striking “the Librarian of Congress” and inserting “(a) subject to subsection (b), the Librarian of Congress”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(b)(1) Upon the completion of the October 2031 term of the Supreme Court and upon the completion of each tenth October term of the Supreme Court thereafter, the Librarian of Congress shall have prepared a digital decennial revised edition of the Constitution Annotated, which shall contain annotations of all decisions theretofore rendered by the Supreme Court construing provisions of the Constitution, in place of the hardbound decennial revised edition of the Constitution Annotated described in subsection (a)(3).

“(2) Upon the completion of the October 2023 term of the Supreme Court and upon the completion of each subsequent October term of the Supreme Court beginning in an odd-numbered year (the final digit of which is not a 1), the Librarian shall have prepared a digital cumulative pocket-part supplement to the most recent decennial revised edition of the Constitution Annotated, which shall contain cumulative annotations of all such decisions rendered by the Supreme Court which were not included in the most recent revised edition of the Constitution Annotated, in place of the hardbound editions of the cumulative pocket-part supplement described in subsection (a)(4).”.

(b) ENSURING AVAILABILITY OF DIGITAL VERSIONS.—Section 2 of Public Law 91-589 (2 U.S.C. 168a) is amended—

(1) by striking “All hardbound” and inserting “(a) All hardbound”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(b)(1) The digital decennial revised editions of the Constitution Annotated prepared under subsection (b)(1) of the first section of this Joint Resolution and the digital cumulative pocket-part supplements prepared under subsection (b)(2) of the first section of this Joint Resolution shall be available at a public website of the Library of Congress.

“(2) The Librarian of Congress shall ensure the continuing availability of the documents referred to in paragraph (1) to Congress and the public.”.

(c) REPEAL OF ADDITIONAL PRINTING REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) MANDATORY PRINTING OF ADDITIONAL COPIES.—Section 3 of Public Law 91-589 (2 U.S.C. 168b) is amended—

(A) by striking “There shall be printed” and inserting “(a) There shall be printed”; and

(B) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(b) Subsection (a) does not apply after completion of the October 2023 term of the Supreme Court, and the Librarian of Congress shall provide the decennial revised editions of the Constitution Annotated and the cumulative pocket part supplements prepared under this Joint Resolution exclusively in a digital format available at a public website of the Library of Congress.”.

(2) PRINTING OF ADDITIONAL COPIES PURSUANT TO CONCURRENT RESOLUTION.—Section 4 of Public Law 91-589 (2 U.S.C. 168c) is repealed.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. STEIL) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. KILMER) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. STEIL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 7592.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin?

There was no objection.

Mr. STEIL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 7592. Today, Congress will save taxpayers \$5 million. Yes, you heard me correctly: Congress will save taxpayer dollars today.

While our Nation is running \$32 trillion in debt, and we have a long way to go to get our country back on track, this is a good policy. It will save taxpayers money.

We do this by getting rid of the statutory requirement to print hardbound copies of the Constitution Annotated, or CONAN, as it is better known today.

An easily accessible and up-to-date online version of it already exists and is already used by millions of Americans. Continuing to print hardbound copies not only wastes taxpayer dollars, but it also wastes the time of CRS staff, who could better support the more pressing work of Congress.

It is a positive step in modernizing Congress. At the beginning of the 118th Congress, the Committee on House Administration took the important step of working to modernize how Congress works. The Modernization Subcommittee is led by Chairwoman STEPHANIE BICE and Ranking Member DEREK KILMER. The subcommittee is bringing good ideas to life by focusing on what we can do to make Congress a more effective and efficient institution.

I have argued that the work of modernizing Congress extends to Congress’

support agencies. They need to work in a way that reflects how today’s Congress works.

The CONAN print requirement reflects how Congress worked 50 years ago, before the internet even existed. Today, the rules don’t make much sense.

We do ourselves a disservice when we require CRS to do work that is no longer necessary, no longer meets our needs. The more Congress can do to optimize tremendous resources like CRS, the better off Congress is, and H.R. 7592 moves us toward that goal.

I recognize Modernization Subcommittee Chairwoman STEPHANIE BICE, who, along with subcommittee Ranking Member DEREK KILMER, Representative CAREY, and Representative MORELLE, introduced this measure and worked on a bipartisan basis to bring it to the floor today.

I also recognize Chairwoman BICE for demonstrating that subcommittees have an important role to play in the legislative process. This was the first time in 31 years that a subcommittee of the House Administration Committee held a markup.

Mr. Speaker, I am grateful for the hard work that went into this important measure, and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 7592. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. KILMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to stand before you today to speak about two bills that have come from the Modernization Subcommittee, which encompass the select committee’s mission to make Congress work better for the American people. Each of these bills addresses a problem or challenge we identified through the Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress.

I thank our subcommittee chair, STEPHANIE BICE, and our subcommittee colleagues, JOE MORELLE and MIKE CAREY, for their bipartisan partnership on these bills, too, as well as our full committee chairman, BRYAN STEIL.

As many of you know, the Congressional Research Service, or CRS, mission is to provide timely, objective, and authoritative research and analysis to Congress, its Members, committees, and staff.

The policy proposals we put forth are better for CRS’ involvement and support of us. That is why our subcommittee took it very seriously when CRS’ interim director, Robert Newlen, approached us about a few challenges CRS was having and ways we could help.

In the select committee, we recommended congressional committees consider the authorities for congressional support agencies and identify those that need updating. H.R. 7592 and our next bill, H.R. 7593, are perfect examples of this.

Under existing law, the Library of Congress is required to produce hardbound copies of the Constitution

with annotations, also referred to as CONAN.

You actually have to be as strong as Conan to lift this. My mother tells me that at birth, I was 6 pounds, 8 ounces. This is 8 pounds, 14 ounces, so it is larger than small DEREK KILMER.

The task of printing this behemoth has fallen to CRS, and the most recent CONAN print cost \$1 million per year to print, not to mention the considerable staff time and attention spent formatting, printing, and distributing said books.

The law requiring printed CONAN copies predated widespread internet access. Since 2019, the Library of Congress and CRS have made this same information available online, free of cost, with the added benefit of real-time updates that just aren't possible with printed books.

This bill simply replaces the requirement for the Library of Congress and CRS to prepare hardbound versions of the CONAN and replaces it with a requirement to prepare digital versions and publish them online instead, as they already have been doing.

Through this bill, the American people can receive better and more up-to-date information online. We can save taxpayer dollars and valuable CRS staff capacity. We can eliminate the 8 pounds and 14 ounces of print. I personally would like to eliminate 8 pounds and 14 ounces after the weight I have gained over the August recess.

I think this is a commonsense bill, and I thank my colleague, Chairwoman BICE, for her leadership on this.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. STEIL. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Oklahoma (Mrs. BICE) to speak on the bill.

Mrs. BICE. Mr. Speaker, as was mentioned by my colleague Mr. KILMER, this is the Constitution Annotated, or CONAN, as it is better known today. Its origins date back to 1797 when Congress passed legislation requiring that every Member of Congress be provided a copy of the Constitution.

These copies were then expanded to include Supreme Court case citations so that Members could see which clauses of the Constitution the Court used to decide those cases.

As the number of citations grew, Members became frustrated with the new format. The hundreds of citations listed under each clause of the Constitution were useless to most of them because they had no idea what the cases were about and what questions were before the Court.

In 1921, Congress passed a resolution requiring reprints of the Constitution to include explanatory language that would make sense of all the case citations throughout. This requirement made the reprints much more useful to the Members, and the format created then is one that is still used today.

Initially, CONAN was printed every 10 years or so, but by 1970, Members

began to complain that it was outdated almost as soon as it was printed. They addressed this by passing a resolution requiring that a paperbound supplement to CONAN be printed every 2 years, in addition to printing the hardbound version of the CONAN every 10.

Since 1972, that is what we have done: Print a hardbound version of CONAN every 10 years and a paperbound supplement every 2.

CONAN obviously has a rich history dating back over two centuries. The Constitution provides the framework for our government, and understanding that framework and how the Supreme Court has applied it to its decisions over the years is as essential today as it was over 200 years ago.

Nothing about H.R. 7592 erases or changes this important history. In fact, the legislative history of CONAN makes it clear that Congress has consistently prioritized up-to-date interpretation and analysis of court cases, and this resolution honors that long-standing tradition.

Today, people rely on digital sources for the most up-to-date information. This is true whether we are talking about breaking news, airfares, restaurant reviews, or Supreme Court case citations.

CONAN is a case in point. According to the GPO, the number of print copies of CONAN requested in 2012 by the House, Senate, and Joint Committee on Printing was just over 1,000. Ten years later, in 2022, the number of requested copies dropped to just 659.

It is no coincidence that this drop in requests for the hardbound version of CONAN coincides with the 2019 launch of a digital version of CONAN.

Over the past 5 years, the CONAN website has become an invaluable resource to individuals, citizens, schools, libraries, and, of course, Congress. The user-friendly site has received more than 28 million visits since it was created and features hundreds of pages of constitutional analysis and content.

The site is publicly accessible, easy to search, and provides links to Supreme Court decisions. Perhaps most importantly, it is updated in real time by CRS.

All of this raises the question of why we are wasting taxpayer dollars printing this giant hardcover version of CONAN along with paperbound supplements when a superior digital version already exists.

According to the CBO, replacing this version of CONAN with a digital version would reduce the Library of Congress' operating costs by millions over the next few years.

Eliminating the print requirement will also eliminate inefficient use of CRS staff time. In addition to updating the online version of CONAN in real time, CRS staff have to spend countless hours formatting and paginating the print version of CONAN. A more efficient CRS ultimately benefits Congress and, in turn, our constituents.

Mr. Speaker, replacing the CONAN print requirement with a digital requirement is a no-brainer. The digital version provides Members and other users with the most up-to-date information and analysis available at a significant cost savings for taxpayers.

History shows that Congress has consistently taken steps to ensure that CONAN meets the evolving needs of Members and other users. Passing this legislation is a logical next step in maintaining CONAN's relevancy and usefulness, both to Congress and to the American people.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 7592.

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Mr. KILMER. Mr. Speaker, I don't have any additional speakers, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. STEIL. Mr. Speaker, I again thank the gentlewoman from Oklahoma (Mrs. BICE), the Modernization Subcommittee chairwoman, for her leadership on this measure that will save taxpayer dollars.

I also recognize, once again, the subcommittee ranking member Mr. KILMER as well as Mr. CAREY and Mr. MORELLE. I urge all of my colleagues who want to save taxpayers \$5 million to vote in support of H.R. 7592. I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. STEIL) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 7592.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

MODERNIZING THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE'S ACCESS TO DATA ACT

Mr. STEIL. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7593) to enhance the authority of the Director of the Congressional Research Service to obtain information directly from agencies of the Federal government.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7593

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Modernizing the Congressional Research Service's Access to Data Act".

SEC. 2. ACCESS OF CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION.

(a) DIRECT ACCESS TO INFORMATION.—Section 203 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 166) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (j) as subsection (k); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (i) the following new subsection:

“(j)(1) In carrying out the duties and functions of the Congressional Research Service

under subsection (d), the Director is authorized to secure books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, documents, secure information, and other data in all forms directly from the various departments, agencies, and establishments of the executive branch of the Government and the regulatory agencies and commissions of the Government as the Director determines to be necessary to carry out the request, and all such departments, agencies, establishments, and regulatory agencies and commissions shall furnish the Director with all such available material in a timely manner.

“(2) With respect to books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, documents, secure information, and other data in all forms obtained under paragraph (1), the Director shall maintain the same level of confidentiality as is required by law of the department, agency, establishment, or regulatory agency or commission from which it is obtained. Officers and employees of the Congressional Research Service shall be subject to the same statutory penalties for unauthorized disclosure or use as officers or employees of the department, agency, establishment, or regulatory agency or commission from which it is obtained.”

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 203(d)(1) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 166(d)(1)) is amended in the matter following subparagraph (C) by striking “and in the performance of this duty” and all that follows through “comply with such request;”.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. STEIL) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. KILMER) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. STEIL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 7593, the Modernizing the Congressional Research Service's Access to Data Act.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin?

There was no objection.

Mr. STEIL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 7593, the Modernizing the Congressional Research Service's Access to Data Act.

Congress is a dynamic institution. The way it operates today is different from how it operated 50 years ago. It is probably safe to say that 50 years from now, Congress will look quite different than it does once again today.

The Committee on House Administration is working to modernize Congress. The Subcommittee on Modernization's mandate is to improve and update how Congress works on behalf of the American people. There is no expiration date on this work. Because society evolves, Congress must do the same.

Congress must be capable of continually adapting to address both the issues of the day and Americans' needs. As Congress evolves, its support agencies must do the same. They must be capable of working in a way that reflects how Congress works.

It has been over 50 years since Congress updated CRS' authorizing statute, and much has changed since then in terms of how Congress operates. The Federal policy landscape has grown more and more complex, and back home Americans are confronting a vast range of challenges and are increasingly seeking our help.

As a result, Members are relying on CRS more than ever for supporting their legislative and representational duties. In order for CRS to meet the growing demand, it needs quick access to current and reliable data and information.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 7593 fulfills this need. It updates CRS' statute to ensure that the agency can request data and information from Federal agencies to support its work on behalf of Congress. To be clear, we are talking about information and data that Congress and its support agencies have an established right to access.

This change to the statute reflects how Congress has changed over the past five decades and will greatly improve CRS' ability to support how we work today. I have advocated for a more modern CRS, and this measure fits into those efforts.

I thank the Modernization Subcommittee chairwoman STEPHANIE BICE for her leadership in bringing H.R. 7593 forward and more generally for her efforts to improve and modernize CRS. I also thank the Modernization Subcommittee ranking member, DEREK KILMER, as well as Representatives CAREY and MORELLE for their bipartisan support of this measure.

I urge my colleagues to join me in strengthening CRS by supporting H.R. 7593, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. KILMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The second bill we are considering today from the Modernization Subcommittee is H.R. 7593, the Modernizing the Congressional Research Service's Access to Data Act, which aims to address issues regarding CRS' access to Federal data.

As with the first bill, CRS itself has asked for this change, and it is a change that will again help the agency keep up with the times. When CRS' statute was developed in the 1970s, it stated that Federal agencies need to comply with data requests from Congress to serve congressional committees, and it mentions that CRS is responsible for otherwise assisting offices with informational requests, too. This stems from the committee-centric nature of Congress at the time.

However, given the lack of explicit reference to personal offices, CRS indicated to the Modernization Subcommittee that they, at times, have struggled to access necessary information from Federal agencies to execute their mission of serving committees and individual personal offices alike.

CRS should be able to update reports on nationally significant issues

proactively and simultaneously respond to specific Member office requests. Additionally, their access should be on par with that provided to other legislative branch support agencies, like the Congressional Budget Office, for example.

Accordingly, this bill updates the material CRS can request from Federal agencies to cover CRS' broad mission without the existing committee-specific limitation. The bill requires CRS to maintain the broad confidentiality protections for data as required by law of the agency providing the information. It also ensures the CRS director themselves would oversee the process of these Member-specific requests to ensure they align with CRS' long-standing objective, nonpartisan mission, and that they would not create additional burdens for Federal agencies.

It matters to me, to our Modernization Subcommittee, and hopefully to all my colleagues here that CRS has the Federal data resources it needs to do its job, to serve Congress as we serve the people we represent.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this commonsense bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. STEIL. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Oklahoma (Mrs. BICE) to speak on this bill.

Mrs. BICE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 7593, the Modernizing the Congressional Research Service's Access to Data Act.

In order for Congress to fulfill its Article I obligations and act as the first among coequal branches of government as the Framers intended, its support agencies need to be fully equipped to assist Congress in all of its legislative and representative duties.

When our support agencies falter, we falter, and it is incumbent upon us to fix what is not working. CRS is a case in point. The agency is bound by statute to outdated rules that do not reflect how Congress works today.

CRS' statute was last updated in 1970, and back then committees were very much at the center of the policy-making process. The agency's authority to request data and information from Federal agencies reflected that reality. Requests for data and information could only be made to support the work of committees.

More than five decades later, CRS continues to operate under this narrow and outdated request authority. Congress has evolved as an institution, but in many ways CRS has not. Its ability to fully support today's Congress is hindered by a statute drafted to support yesterday's Congress.

Committees continue to play an important role in the legislative process, but so do Members. Members today are doing more work on behalf of their constituents and relying more heavily on CRS for support. Whether they need data and information to better understand and address a problem in their

district or in anticipation of an emerging policy debate, Members rely on CRS for its nonpartisan expertise.

All of this work, for committees and for Members, depends on CRS having access to current and reliable data. It is the basis of the objective and informed analysis on which Congress depends to fulfill its Article I obligations.

When Federal agencies are compelled to share data and information with CRS only when it is requested on behalf of a committee, CRS is unable to fulfill its statutory obligation to support Congress in all of its duties.

H.R. 7593 fixes this limitation by granting CRS the authority to secure information and data from Federal agencies, as necessary, to carry out congressional requests; not committee requests, but congressional requests.

This fix is neither groundbreaking nor controversial. There is a nearly century-long chain of Supreme Court precedents that recognize the authority of Congress and, by extension, the legislative support agencies, to gather information from the executive branch.

In fact, GAO and CBO, CRS' sister support agencies, already enjoy greater access authorities because, as Congress has added to their responsibilities, it has also provided them with the additional tools and authorities needed to carry out that additional work.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for CRS. The agency's work has expanded tremendously since the 1970s, but Congress has failed to pair its extra responsibilities with extra support.

In granting CRS greater access, this bill requires CRS to maintain the same level of confidentiality for the data and information it receives, as is required by law of the agency from which it obtained. Any CRS employee who violates this requirement will be subject to the same statutory penalties that an employee of a providing agency would face. These provisions, it should be noted, mirror CBO's rigorous confidentiality authorities.

CRS has a long-established record of not making inappropriate or overly expansive information and data requests. Nothing about this resolution changes that. The agency routinely engages in an internal consultation process to ensure that requests are properly scoped and tailored. Maintaining these guardrails around its requests helps CRS properly evaluate the potential ways that data and information may be used.

The agency's strict adherence to its statutory mandate to advise and assist Congress without partisan bias has and will continue to guide its requests.

Updating CRS' statute to better reflect how Congress works today is an Article I strengthening endeavor. It does not concern politics or partisanship. It concerns institutions, plain and simple.

When CRS is unable to fully support Congress, Congress cannot fully act as a coequal branch of government, and when CRS is unable to fully support us

as Members in our legislative and representational duties, we are unable to fully support our constituents.

Mr. Speaker, I think we can all agree that both of these scenarios are unacceptable. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 7593.

Mr. KILMER. Mr. Speaker, I don't have any additional speakers. If the chairman is prepared to close, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. STEIL. Mr. Speaker, I again thank the Modernization Subcommittee chairwoman, STEPHANIE BICE, for her leadership on this measure. I also thank Ranking Member KILMER, as well as Representatives CAREY and MORELLE.

I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 7593, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. WEBER of Texas). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. STEIL) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 7593.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

CONFIRMATION OF CONGRESSIONAL OBSERVER ACCESS ACT OF 2023

Mr. STEIL. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 6513) to amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to confirm the requirement that States allow access to designated congressional election observers to observe the election administration procedures in congressional elections.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 6513

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; FINDINGS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the “Confirmation Of Congressional Observer Access Act of 2023” or the “COCOA Act of 2023”.

(b) FINDINGS RELATING TO CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OBSERVERS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Article 1, section 5, clause 1 of the Constitution grants Congress the authority to “be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members”.

(2) The House of Representatives serves as the final arbiter over any contest to the seating of any putative Member-elect.

(3) Congress has exercised this authority—and responsibility—since our Nation's very beginning, from the First Congress through the One Hundred Eighteenth Congress. Over our history, election contests have remained a normal and regular part of the biennial process for electing, recognizing, and seating new Members. Although Congress has opted to revise the statutory framework by which it considers election contests, consideration of such contests has been a regular and recurring part of Congress' constitutional prerogatives and work. For example, across our

Nation's history, more than approximately 610 elections have been contested in the House—an average of more than 5 per Congress. Indeed, even discounting the Reconstruction period and its surge in election contests, there have been 110 contested election cases considered in the House since 1933—an average of more than 2 contests per Congress.

(4) These election contest procedures are contained in the precedents of each House of Congress. Further, for the House of Representatives the procedures exist under the Federal Contested Elections Act.

(5) For decades, the House of Representatives has appointed its staff to watch the administration of congressional elections in the States and territories. Critically, congressional observers serve to gather real-time information and data for the House in anticipation of an election contest being filed.

SEC. 2. ACCESS FOR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OBSERVERS.

(a) ACCESS REQUIRED.—Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is amended—

(1) by redesignating section 304 and 305 as sections 305 and 306; and

(2) by inserting after section 303 the following new section:

“SEC. 304. ACCESS FOR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OBSERVERS.

“(a) FINDING OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY.—Congress finds that, regardless of legislative action, it has the authority to send congressional election observers to observe polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office under the authorities granted under article 1, section 5, clause 1 and article 1, section 4, clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States. Procedures described herein do not establish any new authorities or procedures with respect to Congress' constitutional authority to observe congressional elections but are provided simply to permit a convenient statutory reference for existing congressional authority and activity.

“(b) REQUIRING STATES TO PROVIDE ACCESS FOR OBSERVERS.—

“(1) REQUIREMENT.—A State shall provide each individual who is acting as a designated congressional election observer for an election for Federal office with full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures, including, but not limited to, access to any area in which a ballot is cast, processed, scanned, tabulated, canvassed, recounted, audited, or certified, including during pre- and post-election procedures.

“(2) RESTRICTIONS ON ACTIVITIES OF OBSERVERS.—No designated congressional election observer may handle a ballot or election equipment (whether voting or nonvoting or whether tabulating or nontabulating), advocate for any position or candidate, take any action to reduce ballot secrecy or voter privacy, take any action to interfere with the ability of a voter to cast a ballot or an election administrator to carry the administrator's duties, or otherwise interfere with the election administration process.

“(3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall prohibit a designated congressional election observer from asking questions of an election administrator, election official, or election worker, or any other State or local official.

“(c) CONDUCT OF OBSERVERS.—

“(1) REMOVAL.—

“(A) AUTHORIZATION REMOVAL BY ELECTION OFFICIAL.—If a State or local election official

has a reasonable basis to believe that a designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law, or in the disruption of voting, processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, or recounting of ballots, or the certification of results, a State or local election official may remove that observer from the area involved.

“(B) NOTICE TO COMMITTEE.—If a designated congressional election observer is removed from an area under subparagraph (A), the election official shall—

“(i) inform the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives; and

“(ii) provide written notice detailing the reason or reasons the designated congressional election observer was removed.

“(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—For purposes of this subsection, the mere presence of a designated congressional election observer during an observation of election administration procedures, without any additional indicia supporting a reasonable basis for removal, is not a sufficient reason for removal under subparagraph (A).

“(3) RIGHT TO REPLACE OBSERVER.—If a designated congressional election observer is properly removed under subparagraph (A), the chair or ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives, as appropriate, may send another designated congressional election observer as a replacement for the remaining duration of the observation of election administration procedures.

“(4) CLARIFICATION REGARDING APPLICABILITY OF CODE OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT.—It is the sense of Congress that, because the Code of Official Conduct for the House of Representatives (rule XXIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives) requires all employees of the House to behave at all times in a manner that reflects creditably on the House, an employee of the House who serves as a designated congressional election observer is subject to the Code of Official Conduct in the employee’s role as such an observer.

“(d) DESIGNATED CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OBSERVER DESCRIBED.—In this section, a ‘designated congressional election observer’ is a House employee (as contemplated by the Rules of the House of Representatives) who is designated in writing by the chair or ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives, or the successor committee, to gather information with respect to an election, including in the event that the election is contested in the House of Representatives and for other purposes permitted by article 1, section 5, clause 1 and article 1, section 4, clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States.

“(e) STATE DEFINED.—In this section ‘State’ means each of the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.”

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT RELATING TO ENFORCEMENT.—Section 401 of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21111) is amended by striking “and 303” and inserting “303, and 304”.

(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents of such Act is amended—

(1) by redesignating the items relating to sections 304 and 305 as relating to sections 305 and 306; and

(2) by inserting after the item relating to section 303 the following:

“Sec. 304. Confirming access for congressional election observers.”.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. STEIL) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. KILMER) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. STEIL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 6513, the COCOA Act of 2023.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin?

There was no objection.

Mr. STEIL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise today in strong support of H.R. 6513, the Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act, or the COCOA Act. Ensuring the fairness and accuracy of our elections is of utmost importance for me as chairman of the Committee on House Administration.

□ 1530

The Election Observer Program is one of the key ways my committee has worked to strengthen election administration practices.

Since 1933, there have been 110 contested election cases considered in the House. This averages to over two contests per Congress.

During the 2020 election cycle, House election observers were deployed to Iowa’s Second District to oversee the administration of the election of our now-colleague, Representative MARIANNETTE MILLER-MEEKS.

She went on to win that contested race by only six votes, and trained House election observers were instrumental in collecting on-the-ground, factual information for Congress.

The Constitution grants Congress the authority to be the “judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own Members.” It is under this constitutional authority that the House established the nonpartisan Election Observer Program.

In the 2022 election cycle, observers were deployed to roughly 25 sites across the country. This long-running program has deployed trained congressional staff as election observers to sites nationwide with close congressional contests.

Deploying election observers is much needed. Strong election integrity increases confidence and participation in our elections, which is a good thing.

Providing a statutory citation for these election observers to monitor election administration practices will achieve this goal.

Elections are partisan, but the administration of elections should never be partisan.

I strongly urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. KILMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 6513. I am proud to say this measure is the by-product of bipartisan agreement.

Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 of the Constitution grants Congress the authority to be the “judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own Members.”

The House of Representatives serves as the final arbiter over any contest to the seating of any putative Member-elect.

Simply put, this measure, H.R. 6513, confirms Congress’ constitutional authority to designate congressional staff to observe election administration procedures in congressional elections.

I am grateful to my colleague, Chairman STEIL, for agreeing to address several concerns raised in committee with an earlier version of the text.

For example, we were able to agree on the need to preserve the authority of local election officials to remove an observer who is being disruptive or interfering with the elections process, as well as the additional language stating our sense that all House employees deployed as observers must adhere to the Code of Official Conduct while serving in this role.

It is important to balance transparency with security, and at a time when election officials across the country have raised concerns about safety, security, and privacy, we should hold ourselves and our staff to the highest standards.

We are glad to have worked with Chairman STEIL and his staff to reach a bipartisan agreement.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 6513, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. STEIL. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. CAREY) to speak on the bill.

Mr. CAREY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of my bill, H.R. 6513, the Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act, or COCOA Act of 2023. It will provide a statutory citation for the long-running, nonpartisan Election Observer Program.

This program has trained and equipped congressional staff to serve as election observers during close election contests.

As we have seen or just heard, election contests can come down to just six votes.

This critical program adds the added layer of accountability for the American people during those close contests.

Ensuring our elections are fair, factual, and accurate is of utmost importance.

I have been proud to work with my colleagues on the Committee on House Administration this Congress to strengthen our Nation’s elections.

This program is a strong election integrity measure, and I encourage all of my colleagues to support it.

Mr. KILMER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the lead sponsor of the bill, Mr. CAREY,

both for his leadership on this bill and for his partnership on the Modernization Subcommittee.

Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. STEIL. Mr. Speaker, I further encourage the strong support of H.R. 6513, the Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act.

I encourage my colleagues to vote "yes," and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. STEIL) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 6513.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

BIOSECURE ACT

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 8333) to prohibit contracting with certain biotechnology providers, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 8333

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "BIOSECURE Act".

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON CONTRACTING WITH CERTAIN BIOTECHNOLOGY PROVIDERS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The head of an executive agency may not—

(1) procure or obtain any biotechnology equipment or service produced or provided by a biotechnology company of concern; or

(2) enter into a contract or extend or renew a contract with any entity that—

(A) uses biotechnology equipment or services produced or provided by a biotechnology company of concern and acquired after the applicable effective date in subsection (c) in performance of the contract with the executive agency; or

(B) enters into any contract the performance of which such entity knows or has reason to believe will require, in performance of the contract with the executive agency, the use of biotechnology equipment or services produced or provided by a biotechnology company of concern and acquired after the applicable effective date in subsection (c).

(b) PROHIBITION ON LOAN AND GRANT FUNDS.—The head of an executive agency may not obligate or expend loan or grant funds to, and a loan or grant recipient may not use loan or grant funds to—

(1) procure, obtain, or use any biotechnology equipment or services produced or provided by a biotechnology company of concern; or

(2) enter into a contract or extend or renew a contract with an entity described in subsection (a)(2).

(c) EFFECTIVE DATES.—

(1) CERTAIN ENTITIES.—With respect to the biotechnology companies of concern covered by subsection (f)(2)(A), the prohibitions under subsections (a) and (b) shall take ef-

fect 60 days after the issuance of the regulation in subsection (h).

(2) OTHER ENTITIES.—With respect to the biotechnology companies of concern covered by subsection (f)(2)(B), the prohibitions under subsections (a) and (b) shall take effect 180 days after the issuance of the regulation in subsection (h).

(3) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—

(A) CERTAIN ENTITIES.—Prior to January 1, 2032, with respect to biotechnology companies of concern covered by subsections (f)(2)(A), subsections (a)(2) and (b)(2) shall not apply to biotechnology equipment or services produced or provided under a contract or agreement, including previously negotiated contract options, entered into before the effective date under paragraph (1).

(B) OTHER ENTITIES.—Prior to the date that is five years after the issuance of the regulation in subsection (h) that identifies a biotechnology company of concern covered by subsections (f)(2)(B), subsections (a)(2) and (b)(2) shall not apply to biotechnology equipment or services produced or provided under a contract or agreement, including previously negotiated contract options, entered into before the effective date under paragraph (2).

(C) SAFE HARBOR.—The term "biotechnology equipment or services produced or provided by a biotechnology company of concern" shall not be construed to refer to any biotechnology equipment or services that were formerly, but are no longer, produced or provided by biotechnology companies of concern.

(d) WAIVER AUTHORITIES.—

(1) SPECIFIC BIOTECHNOLOGY EXCEPTION.—

(A) WAIVER.—The head of the applicable executive agency may waive the prohibition under subsections (a) and (b) on a case-by-case basis—

(i) with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense; and

(ii) if such head submits a notification and justification to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 30 days after granting such waiver.

(B) DURATION.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in clause (ii), a waiver granted under subparagraph (A) shall last for a period of not more than 365 days.

(ii) EXTENSION.—The head of the applicable executive agency, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, may extend a waiver granted under subparagraph (A) one time, for a period up to 180 days after the date on which the waiver would otherwise expire, if such an extension is in the national security interests of the United States and if such head submits a notification and justification to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 10 days after granting such waiver extension.

(2) OVERSEAS HEALTH CARE SERVICES.—The head of an executive agency may waive the prohibitions under subsections (a) and (b) with respect to a contract, subcontract, or transaction for the acquisition or provision of health care services overseas on a case-by-case basis—

(A) if the head of such executive agency determines that the waiver is—

(i) necessary to support the mission or activities of the employees of such executive agency described in subsection (e)(2)(A); and

(ii) in the interest of the United States;

(B) with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense; and

(C) if such head submits a notification and justification to the appropriate congress-

sional committees not later than 30 days after granting such waiver.

(e) EXCEPTIONS.—The prohibitions under subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply to—

(1) any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States;

(2) the acquisition or provision of health care services overseas for—

(A) employees of the United States, including members of the uniformed services (as defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code), whose official duty stations are located overseas or are on permissive temporary duty travel overseas; or

(B) employees of contractors or subcontractors of the United States—

(i) who are performing under a contract that directly supports the missions or activities of individuals described in subparagraph (A); and

(ii) whose primary duty stations are located overseas or are on permissive temporary duty travel overseas; or

(3) the acquisition, use, or distribution of human multiomic data, lawfully compiled, that is commercially or publicly available.

(f) EVALUATION OF CERTAIN BIOTECHNOLOGY ENTITIES.—

(1) ENTITY CONSIDERATION.—Not later than 365 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall publish a list of the entities that constitute biotechnology companies of concern based on a list of suggested entities that shall be provided by the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and the National Cyber Director.

(2) BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES OF CONCERN DEFINED.—The term "biotechnology company of concern" means—

(A) BGI, MGI, Complete Genomics, WuXi AppTec, and WuXi Biologics;

(B) any entity that is determined by the process established in paragraph (1) to meet the following criteria—

(i) is subject to the administrative governance structure, direction, control, or operates on behalf of the government of a foreign adversary;

(ii) is to any extent involved in the manufacturing, distribution, provision, or procurement of a biotechnology equipment or service; and

(iii) poses a risk to the national security of the United States based on—

(I) engaging in joint research with, being supported by, or being affiliated with a foreign adversary's military, internal security forces, or intelligence agencies;

(II) providing multiomic data obtained via biotechnology equipment or services to the government of a foreign adversary; or

(III) obtaining human multiomic data via the biotechnology equipment or services without express and informed consent; and

(C) any subsidiary, parent, affiliate, or successor of entities listed in subparagraphs (A) and (B), provided they meet the criteria in subparagraph (B)(i).

(3) GUIDANCE.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act for the biotechnology companies of concern named in paragraph (2)(A), and not later than 180 days after the development of the list pursuant to paragraph (1) and any update to the list pursuant to paragraph (4), the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the

Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and the National Cyber Director, shall establish guidance as necessary to implement the requirements of this section.

(4) **UPDATES.**—The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in coordination with or based on a recommendation provided by the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and the National Cyber Director, shall periodically, though not less than annually, review and, as appropriate, modify the list of biotechnology companies of concern, and notify the appropriate congressional committees of any such modifications.

(5) **NOTICE OF A DESIGNATION AND REVIEW.**—

(A) **IN GENERAL.**—A notice of a designation as a biotechnology company of concern under paragraph (2)(B) shall be issued to any biotechnology company of concern named in the designation—

(i) advising that a designation has been made;

(ii) identifying the criteria relied upon under such subparagraph and, to the extent consistent with national security and law enforcement interests, the information that formed the basis for the designation;

(iii) advising that, within 90 days after receipt of notice, the biotechnology company of concern may submit information and argument in opposition to the designation;

(iv) describing the procedures governing the review and possible issuance of a designation pursuant to paragraph (1); and

(v) where practicable, identifying mitigation steps that could be taken by the biotechnology company of concern that may result in the rescission of the designation.

(B) **CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.**—

(i) **NOTICE OF DESIGNATION.**—The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit the notice required under subparagraph (A) to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Oversight and Accountability of the House of Representatives.

(ii) **INFORMATION AND ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO DESIGNATIONS.**—Not later than 7 days after receiving any information and argument in opposition to a designation pursuant to subparagraph (A)(iii), the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit such information to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Oversight and Accountability of the House of Representatives.

(C) **EXCEPTIONS.**—The provisions under subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall not apply to an entity listed under paragraph (2)(A).

(6) **NO IMMEDIATE PUBLIC RELEASE.**—Any designation made under paragraph (1) or paragraph (4) shall not be made publicly available until the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in coordination with appropriate agencies, reviews all information submitted under paragraph (5)(A)(iii) and issues a final determination that a company shall remain listed as a biotechnology company of concern.

(g) **EVALUATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS POSED BY FOREIGN ADVERSARY ACQUISITION OF AMERICAN MULTIOMIC DATA.**—

(1) **ASSESSMENT.**—Not later than 270 days after the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General of the United States, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary

of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and the National Cyber Director, shall complete an assessment of risks to national security posed by human multiomic data from United States citizens that is collected or stored by a foreign adversary from the provision of biotechnology equipment or services.

(2) **REPORT REQUIREMENT.**—Not later than 30 days after the completion of the assessment developed under paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a report with such assessment to the appropriate congressional committees.

(3) **FORM.**—The report required under paragraph (2) shall be in unclassified form accompanied by a classified annex.

(h) **REGULATIONS.**—Not later than one year after the date of establishment of guidance required under subsection (f)(3), and as necessary for subsequent updates, the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council shall revise the Federal Acquisition Regulation as necessary to implement the requirements of this section.

(i) **REPORTING ON INTELLIGENCE ON NEFARIOUS ACTIVITIES OF BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES WITH HUMAN MULTIOMIC DATA.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of executive agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on any intelligence in possession of such agencies related to nefarious activities conducted by biotechnology companies with human multiomic data. The report shall include information pertaining to potential threats to national security or public safety from the selling, reselling, licensing, trading, transferring, sharing, or otherwise providing or making available to any foreign country of any forms of multiomic data of a United States citizen.

(j) **NO ADDITIONAL FUNDS.**—No additional funds are authorized to be appropriated for the purpose of carrying out this section.

(k) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Oversight and Accountability, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party of the House of Representatives.

(2) **BIOTECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT OR SERVICE.**—The term “biotechnology equipment or service” means—

(A) equipment, including genetic sequencers, combined mass spectrometry technologies, polymerase chain reaction machines, or any other instrument, apparatus, machine, or device, including components and accessories thereof, that is designed for use in the research, development, production, or analysis of biological materials as well as any software, firmware, or other digital components that are specifically designed for use in, and necessary for the operation of, such equipment;

(B) any service for the research, development, production, analysis, detection, or provision of information, including data storage and transmission related to biological materials, including—

(i) advising, consulting, or support services with respect to the use or implementation of a instrument, apparatus, machine, or device described in subparagraph (A); and

(ii) disease detection, genealogical information, and related services; and

(C) any other service, instrument, apparatus, machine, component, accessory, device, software, or firmware that is designed for use in the research, development, production, or analysis of biological materials that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the heads of Executive agencies, as determined appropriate by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, determines appropriate in the interest of national security.

(3) **CONTRACT.**—Except as the term is used under subsection (b)(2) and subsection (c)(3), the term “contract” means any contract subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation issued under section 1303(a)(1) of title 41, United States Code.

(4) **CONTROL.**—The term “control” has the meaning given to that term in section 800.208 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor regulations.

(5) **EXECUTIVE AGENCY.**—The term “executive agency” has the meaning given the term “Executive agency” in section 105 of title 5, United States Code.

(6) **FOREIGN ADVERSARY.**—The term “foreign adversary” has the meaning given the term “covered nation” in section 4872(d) of title 10, United States Code.

(7) **MULTIOMIC.**—The term “multiomic” means data types that include genomics, epigenomics, transcriptomics, proteomics, and metabolomics.

(8) **OVERSEAS.**—The term “overseas” means any area outside of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the United States.

The **SPEAKER pro tempore**. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. **COMER**) and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. **KRISHNAMOORTHY**) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky.

Mr. **MCGOVERN**. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition.

The **SPEAKER pro tempore**. Does the gentleman from Illinois oppose the bill?

Mr. **KRISHNAMOORTHY**. Mr. Speaker, no, I support the bill.

The **SPEAKER pro tempore**. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. **MCGOVERN**) will control 20 minutes in opposition.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. **COMER**. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The **SPEAKER pro tempore**. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kentucky?

There was no objection.

Mr. **COMER**. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to support H.R. 8333, the **BIOSECURE Act**.

This bipartisan, bicameral bill prevents U.S. tax dollars from flowing to biotechnology companies that are owned, operated, and controlled by China or other foreign adversaries.

Specifically, this bill names five genomic companies with direct ties to the Chinese Communist Party as biotechnology companies of concern.

The bill then prohibits a Federal agency from procuring any biotechnology equipment or service from such companies. The bill also prohibits Federal loan or grant dollars from being used to procure, obtain, or use biotechnology equipment or services from such companies.

The companies named in this legislation create significant risks to U.S. national security.

BGI, one of the named entities, is a CCP biotechnology company and is the world's largest collector of genetic data. BGI, alongside its subsidiaries, which are also named in the bill, have been found to conduct research alongside the Chinese military.

WuXi, through its two subsidiaries named in the bill, operates genetic testing centers established in coordination with the CCP, helps carry out research to promote the Chinese military, and has reportedly stolen U.S. firms' intellectual property.

The House Oversight Committee has worked hard with outside stakeholders and other committees of jurisdiction to ensure these national security risks are meaningfully addressed without disrupting medical and pharmaceutical supply chains.

Existing contracts are exempt from the prohibitions in the bill until January 2032, and the bill includes a targeted waiver and exception process.

The bill also exempts biotechnology equipment and services from the bill's prohibitions that were, but are no longer, produced or provided by a company of concern.

This bill is a necessary step toward protecting Americans' sensitive healthcare data from the CCP before these companies become more embedded in the U.S. economy, university, and Federal contracting base.

I thank the bill's sponsor, Representative BRAD WENSTRUP, chairman of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic, for his efforts in ensuring this bill continues to advance.

I also thank the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party chairman, JOHN MOOLENAAR, and ranking member, RAJA KRISHNAMOORTHY, both original cosponsors, as well as the House Oversight's ranking member, JAMIE RASKIN, and the Senate Homeland Security Committee chairman, GARY PETERS, and their staff for their hard work on this legislation over the past year.

I urge all my House Oversight colleagues to support this critical national security bill. I encourage everyone to support this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I deeply regret having to rise in opposition to this bill, but I feel that I need to, and I want to be clear as to why.

I think this bill as it is currently written, quite frankly, is not ready for

prime time, and I am urging my colleagues, particularly those who care about effectively taking on China to vote "no."

Mr. Speaker, for the record, I am not new to this issue. In fact, I welcome the fact that we are finally here on the House floor talking about not only the abysmal human rights violations committed by the People's Republic of China but their unsavory and unscrupulous business practices that could threaten patient privacy and even our national security.

Frankly, it is about damn time.

I have been sounding the alarm for years now asking Democrats and Republicans to hold China accountable.

I have worked with Presidents of both parties on this issue, including Joe Biden and Donald Trump.

Along with our colleagues, Representative CHRIS SMITH and Senator MARCO RUBIO, I wrote, and President Biden signed into law the bipartisan Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act to hold the PRC accountable for their genocide in Xinjiang and to prevent the import of goods made with forced labor into the United States.

Together, Chairman MCCAUL and I wrote the Resolve Tibet Act to hold the PRC accountable for their misinformation on Tibet, which was also just signed into law by President Biden a few months ago.

I passed into law the bipartisan Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act to deny PRC officials entry into the United States if they are responsible for the oppression of the people of Tibet. In 2019, I also authored legislation to prevent the export of crowd control equipment that was being used to go after peaceful protestors in Hong Kong, and President Trump signed that into law.

I am one of the few Members of Congress who was actually sanctioned by China. I am banned from going to China by the PRC. I can't meet with any Chinese Government officials because of my vocal advocacy for human rights and human dignity in that country. They clearly do not like me, but I wear their sanctions as a badge of honor.

All of this is to say that my record on this issue takes a back seat to nobody. That is why I deeply regret that we are bringing this particular bill to the floor. This is a lost opportunity to do something meaningful about an important and serious issue, an issue that frankly deserves a lot more thought and attention than this.

□ 1545

First of all, this bill lists out specific companies that it claims are exploiting the U.S. biopharmaceutical industry on behalf of the Chinese Government.

To be totally frank, some of them might be, but to be also totally frank, some of them might not be, and I can't get a clear answer from anyone on how the Select Committee came up with these names.

What was the process?

Were these companies brought in for questioning?

Again, no solid answers to why these companies and not others.

If we are going to name companies, then there ought to be a clear, transparent process that is implemented the same for all companies.

I am even told this by our regulatory agencies who, by the way, do not like the idea of naming companies by name in legislation because they think it gives the heads-up to bad companies who will try to evade this legislation as written by changing their name and reincorporating as something else in the Cayman Islands.

So I think we need to give some thought as to whether this is the best way to hold these companies to account.

The most ironic thing about this approach is this is how they do things in China: The PRC politicians decide they don't like you, so they blackball you.

Guess what, Mr. Speaker? That is not how we do things in the United States of America.

We ought to have due process of law here. We ought to have a transparent, inclusive process that involves all the relevant agencies that applies to all companies. We have an intelligence community, we have law enforcement agencies, we have an interagency entity list, and we have a Department of Defense 1260H list to determine what companies are engaged in bad behavior on behalf of the PRC.

Some of the companies listed in this bill are not on any lists at all, so it is up to us to guess why they are on here.

Now, I have no idea who wrote this text or why these companies and not others, but this is not the right way to legislate. This is being jammed through because I guess it is China week and God forbid we wait a couple of more weeks and get this right, but we want to get this thing done.

However, this is not the way we should be doing things around here.

What is even worse is that this bill is being brought up under suspension. People know that there are genuine concerns about this bill, and yet it is being brought up under suspension. We have no opportunity to amend it or to make improvements. There is no process through the Rules Committee, no amendments, nothing.

Believe me, Mr. Speaker, when I say that I really, really believe we can get to "yes" on a bill to hold bad companies accountable and to protect the American people. I think we could get "yes" to a bill that would not only have my support but the support of everybody in this Chamber. This is just take it or leave it, and I think the best thing for all of us to do is to leave it and go back to the drawing board and to come up with something better that we can get to the floor in the next several days or in the next couple of weeks.

I have spent my entire career standing up to the Chinese Communist

Party and to the PRC, and I have the battle scars to prove it. Yes, I do have a company in my district that is actually named in this bill, but that is not the only reason why I am here.

I am here because I care about these issues. I have cared about these issues for a long time. Yes, I did my due diligence on the company in my district and asked why they were included. That is not a radical question, it is not a tough question, and nobody can really tell me. I got a different answer every time I asked. Not in a classified setting and not in an unclassified setting can anybody still give me a straight answer. In fact, I have been given multiple conflicting reasons.

This should be easy. This company is on a list because they are doing X, Y, and Z, and we have the proof.

I have never heard that.

Maybe some of the concerns apply to some of these companies. I have no idea, and nobody, including the people who wrote this bill, could give me a clear answer on the basic question of why some entities are named and others are not.

Then, once they are named in this bill, the five companies that are named, I am told that it is literally impossible for them to get off the list. If one of these five companies does not belong on the list, then too bad, Congress doesn't like you, and that is that.

Let me be crystal clear. If a thorough interagency review concludes that any of these named companies, including the one in my district, are engaged in behavior that endangers our national security or violates people's privacy, then I will be the first in line to say: Shut them down.

However, without that process, again, this is how they do things in China. It shouldn't be how we do things in the United States.

I strongly urge a "no" vote, and I pledge that if this bill is defeated or if my friends pull it, I will proudly work to come up with a better bill that will actually get the job done and not create a slippery slope that we should not be going down.

We have other standing committees that should have been involved in drafting this bill, quite frankly, that have expertise on these matters: Foreign Affairs, Energy and Commerce, Ways and Means, Homeland Security, and Intelligence. They should have been consulted and at the table here. It should have been more than the Select Committee and the Oversight and Accountability Committee.

Let's do this in a better way. Let's create a fully vetted list that goes through an interagency process, not a flawed bill that has major enforcement problems that I believe will actually hurt us in opposing PRC's activities.

Let's pull this bill or defeat this bill, and let's get this right. We have an opportunity to get it right. Let's get it right, and we will get it to the floor in a matter of days.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. KRISHNAMOORTH).

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the bipartisan H.R. 8333, BIOSECURE Act.

Simply put, this bill prevents American taxpayer dollars from flowing to foreign adversary biotech companies of concern.

The bill creates a process by which the executive branch will develop a list of entities, review and modify this list at least annually, and formulate implementation guidance for all Federal agencies. Further, the bill has an even number of Democratic and Republican cosponsors and received a thumping 40-1 markup in the Oversight and Accountability Committee. Human rights groups strongly support this bill, as well.

Fundamentally, this bill is about protecting Americans' genomic data, their healthcare data, and sensitive IP on America's most innovative and cutting-edge medicines.

The intelligence community has warned that the PRC illegally obtains large healthcare data sets to help carry out human rights abuses against minority groups in China. The IC has also warned of the high threat of the CCP stealing American IP. It is our responsibility to ensure that taxpayer dollars do not flow to any companies supporting any of these efforts.

This bill does not stop these companies from doing business in the U.S.; however, it does stop them from receiving Federal dollars funding their operations.

I would like to respectfully make three key points:

First, BGI Group is run by bad actors. For example, BGI, which is on the Defense Department's Chinese military companies list, has harvested data from 8 million pregnant women's DNA without their consent, including Americans. BGI then used that data to publish at least a dozen joint studies with the People's Liberation Army, also known as the PLA, which, in turn, has used this information to suppress Uyghurs. BGI controls MGI and Complete Genomics, which are also named entities.

Second, the WuXi AppTec Group is also run by bad actors. U.S. intelligence has shown that WuXi AppTec has secretly transferred U.S. IP to Chinese authorities in Beijing.

Third, the founding CEO of WuXi AppTec is also the chairman of WuXi Biologics. Not only that, but the CEO of WuXi Biologics, this gentleman over here on the far left, has been a guest lecturer at the PLA's Academy of Military Sciences, an institution on the Commerce Department's red flag list.

In addition, here is the CEO of WuXi Biologics co-teaching a class with Chinese General Chen Wei, director of the Chinese military's biological research institute.

Here is a picture of the CCP Party cell embedded at WuXi AppTec.

As Congress, we need to ask ourselves: Are we comfortable sending taxpayer dollars to companies that are run by bad actors and that work so closely with the Chinese Communist Party, the CCP?

The answer is, of course, no. No.

We need to act now. I understand legitimate concerns have been raised about making further changes. Our preference is to give maximum discretion to the executive branch. It is Congress' decision that these companies must be included in this bill. There is no doubt that this is a valid approach.

I support further changes being made. I am voting "yes" to move this process along because, on balance, a "yes" vote is the right vote.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the passage of this legislation, the BIOSECURE Act, to protect American genetic data and to protect American drug supply chains.

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MCGOVERN. First of all, WuXi AppTec and WuXi Biologics are two separate entities. Again, I was hoping to get some more clarity, and this is what puzzles me as to why WuXi Biologics is on this list. I was told at one point that they were on the list because the Department of Commerce had them on the unverified list.

I actually had a conversation with the Department of Commerce to try to understand all these different lists, and they told me that it is not uncommon for companies to be on the unverified list, especially in the aftermath of COVID because it was hard to do the investigations. However, then they sent me a statement in which WuXi Biologics was removed from the unverified list.

Then I said: Well, they must be on another list.

They said that they had this thing called the entity list.

I asked them, I said that they must be on the entity list if they are named in this bill. The entity list is made up of foreign individuals, companies, and organizations deemed a national security concern subjecting them to export restrictions and licensing requirements for certain technologies and goods, so they must be on that list.

The Commerce Department said: No, they are not on that list.

I said: Okay, they are not on the unverified list, and they are not on the entity list.

Is there any other list out there?

Well, there is another one out there. It is the DOD section 1260H list.

Are they on that list?

I am told: No, they are not on that list either.

The section 1260H list is made up of Chinese military companies operating directly or indirectly in the United States in accordance with the statutory requirement of section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2021.

They are not on any of those lists. They are not on any of those lists.

Then here is the deal: If they don't belong in the underlying legislation, then there is no way to get off the list. There is no way for them to get off the list. I was told, with all due respect by the ranking member, and I have checked with our Senate colleagues and with Commerce, that those that are named cannot get off the list.

All I am simply saying is that—maybe I am missing something here—we ought to have an interagency review and thorough investigation before we start implementing these kinds of sanctions.

Again, this is what they do in China. This is not what we are supposed to do in the United States. Due process actually matters here. The truth should matter here.

Again, some of these companies absolutely may belong on this list, but I am just simply saying that I have questions that have not been answered either in a classified or unclassified setting, and they have certainly not been satisfied by members of the committee.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WENSTRUP), who is the sponsor of the bill.

Mr. WENSTRUP. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bill with Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY, my friend, the BIOSECURE Act which passed the Oversight and Reform Committee by an overwhelming bipartisan support vote of 40-1.

This legislation is a critical piece in our broader efforts this week to protect Americans, in this case, their personal health data, from the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party does not get due process in America.

The BIOSECURE Act will help protect the biologic data of American patients and make sure that their data does not fall into the hands of our adversaries. We do this by prohibiting Federal contracting with biotechnology companies of concern, companies and their subsidiaries that have overt and enduring ties with the CCP, or even using the equipment and services of these very companies.

Our government has acted to keep the CCP out of our telecommunication networks and communication platforms. Now we must act to keep them away from our genomic and health data.

China has publicly stated their desire to dominate the global biotechnology market by 2035. This is incredibly concerning given the Chinese Communist Party's national intelligence laws which require Chinese firms to share any requested data with the CCP. The existence of that law is enough to drive us forward with this bill because that law includes biotech companies that collect, test, and store American genomic data.

That is why they are named. It is because that is the risk to the American people and our national security.

This legislation affects companies like the Beijing Genomics Institute, known as BGI, a Chinese company that has collected DNA from millions around the world and used that data without consent for genomic projects conducted by the Chinese military.

□ 1600

A 2021 Reuters report found DNA data collected from BGI's prenatal test on women outside China has also been stored in China's government-funded gene database.

Another Chinese company, WuXi AppTec, has sponsored events with China's military, with IP reportedly stolen from the U.S., and jointly operated genetic collection sites with Chinese military.

Further, as was mentioned before, the chairman of WuXi AppTec is a board member of WuXi Biologics and a known member of the CCP. He has publicly mentioned many times about the central role of the CCP in WuXi group activities.

We have worked to ensure this bill provides an appropriate and workable offering for American companies and our government to decouple with CCP-aligned biotech firms. This is about protecting Americans from an adversary that will leave no stone unturned to get an upper hand over the United States of America and our people.

Time and time again, these biotech companies have proven they are more than willing to do the bidding of the CCP. It is a proven relationship. We can't at the same time allow them to collect the private health information of millions of Americans.

I spent 25 years as an Army physician and combat surgeon. I spent 10 years now on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Guess what? We don't bring our adversaries in for questioning. It doesn't work that way. As a matter of fact, I tried to do that, Mr. Speaker, on the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic. I asked the Chinese Ambassador about certain scientists in China we would like to speak to. They didn't respond.

It is time for Congress to take this step toward securing our national health security for every person in America, in every district of America.

This is no joke, and it is just the start. It really needs to be just the start.

My colleague said that he is not against this bill only because he has a company that wants to build in his district. I guess it must be one of his reasons. He said it is not the only reason.

I applaud the bipartisan work of the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party for their serious efforts, and I strongly urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan legislation.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

This is a very strange debate. Again, are we all comfortable moving forward

in a way that doesn't require any thoughtful or interagency investigation or process? You know, a process with integrity, by the way, will result in any of the bad actors getting on the list. That is what an interagency process is supposed to be about.

Our friends still haven't really told me the criteria they use to get people on their blacklist, except the gentleman from Ohio just said if I want to say that you are bad, then you are on the list. That is not the way we do things in the United States. I hope we never will do that in the United States. That is the way they do things in China.

Again, as I stated before, WuXi Biologics is distinct from WuXi AppTec, but during China week, anything with a Chinese name is somehow suspect and somehow bad.

Mr. Speaker, I include in the RECORD an article from InsideHealthPolicy, "Cutting Foreign Ties Could Lead To Drug Supply Chain Disruptions, Industry Warns."

[From InsideHealthPolicy, May 21, 2024]

CUTTING FOREIGN TIES COULD LEAD TO DRUG SUPPLY CHAIN DISRUPTIONS, INDUSTRY WARNS

(By Maaisha Osman)

As House committees advance bills that would bar American companies from working with some foreign-owned biotechnology companies in the future, industry experts warn ending pharmaceutical relationships with China could lead to drug shortages and supply chain disruptions.

Darius Lakdawalla, director of research at University of Southern California Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics, said at the U.S. Pharma and Biotech Summit Thursday (May 16) that cutting ties with foreign companies could worsen supply chain issues in the United States.

"I think the Chinese issue, there's no question that that's going to increase the risk of shortages and supply chain disruption, how could it not do those things?" Lakdawalla said. "And that's a particularly problematic issue in a moment when there's a lot of political pressure against the pharmaceutical industry (and) the last thing we need to see now is consumers (being) unable to fill their prescriptions at the pharmacy because of shortages."

Biogen's CEO, Chris Viehbacher, highlighted during the Thursday summit that drug company CEOs traditionally did not need to consider geopolitical issues, but this is now beginning to change.

"You know, amongst the CEOs we are suddenly saying, 'Hey, we haven't needed to think about geopolitics in years,'" Viehbacher said. "When I was CEO of Sanofi, those were the peak years of globalization, we could move products and people and capital all around the world and not even think about borders, and that's clearly changing."

Other executives also expressed discomfort with thinking about their business in national security terms.

"When we think about the BIOSECURE Act, I think Chris Viehbacher said it best which is, if it's in the form of a national security threat, that is one place that industry does not want to get into," Harmee Dhillon, head of public policy at GlaxoSmith Kline, said, referring to the legislation moving forward in the House. "We want to let that be handled by the appropriate experts from a policy and political perspective."

Viehbacher also noted that national security concerns are driven by mistrust between the East and West and the bipartisan support for the bill underscores the seriousness of these concerns.

“East-West divide has created a mistrust and that is driving a number of the national security concerns,” he said. “This is a bill that has extremely strong bipartisan support and if you can get Democrats and Republicans to agree on anything, that something must be serious.”

If passed by the House and Senate and signed into law, the BIOSECURE Act would prohibit federal agencies from contracting or procuring equipment or services from “biotechnology companies of concern.” This includes any company that is “subject to the jurisdiction, direction, control, or operates on behalf of the government of a foreign adversary” and poses a biotechnology security risk. Adversaries include China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran.

The most recent version of the bill in the House extends the deadline for U.S. companies to terminate their collaborations with specific Chinese entities until 2032. Additionally, it includes WuXi Biologics, a subsidiary of the targeted pharmaceutical company WuXi Apptec, on the list of companies of concern.

The *New York Times* reported that WuXi is involved in manufacturing about 25% of drugs sold in the United States. The leukemia treatment Imbruvica, for example, is sold by Janssen Biotech and AbbVie, but WuXi makes its active pharmaceutical ingredient (API).

“The reality is that a company like WuXi has been an extremely cost-effective and capable supplier to our industry,” Viehbacher said at the Thursday summit. “It’s not even going to be that easy to replace that capability either in the United States or in other countries.”

“It is a big market, but I think we’re going to have to imagine a border there that we haven’t had to think about in the past,” Viehbacher added.

At a STAT event in November, industry experts said that domestic manufacturing can very easily become “a feel-good strategy,” but onshoring a drug’s API wouldn’t solve the drug shortage crisis.

“We need to be very strategic on what we onshore,” Marta Wosinska, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on Health Policy, said. For example, Wosinska cautioned that the United States shouldn’t onshore an API manufacturer for a drug where all the upstream manufacturing still comes from China.

“That wouldn’t solve the problem,” she said.

Wosinska also noted that domestic drug manufacturing does not necessarily mean higher quality. She pointed out that historically drug shortages were primarily caused by manufacturing quality problem in U.S.-based facilities.

Meanwhile, FDA drug center chief Patrizia Cavazzoni said at an Alliance for Stronger FDA webinar May 6 the agency is focused on enhancing the resilience of the manufacturing supply chain and does not want manufacturers to stop production because of issues identified during inspections.

“When investigators understand the context of a facility and what is being manufactured there, we strongly encourage manufacturers not to stop manufacturing or halt operations as a result of inspections,” Cavazzoni said. “Even during inspections, we sometimes see manufacturers say they will hold off and shut down a line because of what they are hearing during the inspections.”

As a part of FDA’s initiative to modernize inspections, the agency is testing a program

aimed at improving communication among investigators, the drug shortage team and the compliance team. This enhanced communication would occur continuously, spanning before, during, and after inspections. The goal is to provide investigators with contextual understanding of the facility’s manufacturing activities.

“We really want manufacturers to call our drug shortage surveillance team immediately because we want to start problem-solving with manufacturers as soon as possible during the inspection to put in place mitigation approaches that will prevent outright stoppages of manufacturing essential drugs, as we have witnessed over the past year,” Cavazzoni said.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I point that out because we have to be very careful on how we proceed, to make sure we are going after truly bad actors so we don’t disrupt the supply chain in which we see a disruption in pharmaceuticals, which means higher prices and less availability. That is something that ought to be talked about. It would be nice if the Energy and Commerce Committee were part of this discussion because I think that is relevant.

Again, I have no problem with holding anybody accountable. I would just like a process that has integrity.

With due respect to the gentleman who just spoke, your word doesn’t cut it. I want a little bit more verification that, in fact, what we are doing is right. If the verification is there, I am with you.

We can get there. We can do this in a better way, one that upholds our values and one that holds these companies accountable, and we can go in a way that would have broad bipartisan support.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the time remaining.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Kentucky has 7½ minutes remaining.

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. MOOLENAAR).

Mr. MOOLENAAR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the bipartisan BIOSECURE Act.

I know that some of my colleagues may have questions about naming specific Chinese companies in this legislation, so let me be clear. It is Congress’ constitutional duty to write national security laws, and that includes the authority to investigate and name foreign-adversary-controlled companies in law because of the threat they pose to national security.

Make no mistake: BGI, WuXi AppTec, and WuXi Biologics all pose unacceptable threats to national security. The evidence is clear and available to all Members.

I have tremendous respect for my colleague from Massachusetts, who said that he did due diligence that there is complete separation between WuXi AppTec and WuXi Biologics when the CEO of one is the board chair or on the board of the other. To me, it just

seems like there might be a little ignoring of some of the evidence.

Courts have upheld laws in which Congress named Huawei and Kaspersky as national security threats and imposed prohibitions on their activities. I am confident that they will do the same for TikTok.

When the evidence in front of Congress shows that foreign adversary companies are a particularly important or especially urgent threat to national security, it is Congress’ job to act. Congress now has a duty to do exactly that. Please join me in supporting this vital legislation.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Just to respond to the gentleman from Michigan, I didn’t say I had done my due diligence and that there is no connection. I said they are two separate entities. I said we should have a process in place that has integrity that everyone has confidence in to do the due diligence to make sure, in fact, that the companies that are being named do, in fact, deserve to be named.

Experts, by the way, in my State tell me that we do not have enough domestic capacity to pick up the slack if the named companies were barred from doing business with the U.S. today.

Clearly, we need to increase our domestic drug production capacity and quality. The Federal Government should incentivize domestic biotech companies to manufacture products like active pharmaceutical ingredients and key starting materials to help ensure the security of our supply chains. We could better support workforce development by providing funding for regional training centers and efforts to diversify the workforce.

These are just some suggestions based on the feedback that I have received. The bottom line is we need to make some changes to improve capacity at home.

As we are going after the bad actors, let’s also figure out how to increase capacity at home. All I am saying is—let me repeat—if any or all of these companies deserve to be sanctioned, I am there. I just want a process that has integrity and that is worthy of this institution.

It seems to me it is not that difficult to get there, but I guess in the effort to try to comply with China week and to get a press release out, we are naming companies without really any thorough and thoughtful process. I have to say, I object to that. I worry that it is a slippery slope that will be replicated in other instances.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. DUNN).

Mr. DUNN of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 8333, the BIOSECURE Act.

Mr. Speaker, this bill ensures that biotech companies linked to foreign adversaries do not gain access to precious

U.S. taxpayer dollars via biotechnology contracts. We cannot allow the CCP-affiliated firms to gain access to U.S. genetic data. We cannot allow ourselves to be dependent on and vulnerable to the CCP for healthcare technologies, products, and services. Otherwise, we risk China using our own health data as leverage against us.

We recognize that our biotechnology companies did not arrive at this juncture on their own. Decades of failed policy, unreasonable, burdensome red tape, and a lack of oversight led to this precarious situation of overinvestment in and industrial partnerships with China.

We must act in coordination with the biotech sector to correct this imbalance. The BIOSECURE Act accomplishes this. I urge support of this bill.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, may I ask the gentleman how many more speakers he has.

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I have two speakers left.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Oklahoma (Mrs. BICE).

Mrs. BICE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the bipartisan BIOSECURE Act, which I am proud to cosponsor.

I reiterate the bipartisan piece of this because I think the integrity of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission is being questioned here, and it shouldn't be. It is a bipartisan bill.

As a member of the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, we looked at ways to strengthen America's bioeconomy while countering malign foreign influence, which this bill seeks to do.

It is no secret that China is attempting to dominate the global biotech market. While this is concerning, even more so is the fact that the Chinese Communist Party utilizes laws which require Chinese firms to share data requested by the CCP, including those of biotech companies which collect, test, and store American genomic data. It is unacceptable for U.S. taxpayer dollars to ever subsidize biotech companies of our foreign adversaries.

This act is a necessary step in protecting the privacy rights of Americans and our national security interests. Moving forward, we must take steps to promote growth, stability, and innovation in the biotech industry. America can and should lead in this sector.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I should point out for the record that WuXi Biologics did a third-party audit, which indicates that they don't contain any biogenetic information.

Again, all I am asking for here is a process that is above question. I do think there is something to be said to make sure that we get it right.

This idea that we may not get it right and it is too bad for a company,

it is too bad for the people who work there, it is too bad for the supply chain, and we will see prescription drugs go up for no reason just because we are lazy and we don't want to do a full audit, I am sorry. Democrats and Republicans should agree that process matters.

Again, we are not China. We are the United States of America. We do things in a transparent and open way. I don't think it is unreasonable to be here saying we ought to have a thorough process that these companies are subjected to and that all others are. If any of these companies or any others are deemed to be in collaboration with the Chinese Communist Party or PRC or whoever else you don't like, and there is sharing of sensitive information or behaving in a way that is unscrupulous and in violation of our laws, then we should hold them accountable. There is no question about that.

It is about this bill and about the lack of process and the lack of transparency.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 45 seconds to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY).

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY. Mr. Speaker, with regard to the process issue, on page 10 of the bill, there is actually a process where the Office of Management and Budget decides on no less than an annual basis to review the list and modify as appropriate.

OMB is given authority to promulgate regulations, and we think there should be additional details provided. I would like to work with the distinguished ranking member of the Rules Committee to further refine that process because I agree that it could use more detail.

Secondly, I point out again on WuXi Biologics, the chair of WuXi AppTec is the chair of WuXi Biologics.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 15 seconds to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY. Mr. Speaker, that is why it is so disturbing to so many to see the CEO, the current CEO, of WuXi Biologics co-teaching a class with a Chinese general at the Biological Engineering Research Institute, the current CEO of WuXi Biologics actually being on the faculty of a PLA-affiliated institution. That is why the International Campaign for Tibet and Uyghur human rights groups strongly, strongly support this bill.

□ 1615

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers and am prepared to close.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Massachusetts has 4 minutes remaining.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to close.

Mr. Speaker, it is so disappointing that we are here having this debate. With all due respect to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY), the idea that we are blacklisting a company that is not on any list in the Commerce Department or in the Defense Department and we are just doing it because Members don't like who they have been affiliated with over the years is really quite irresponsible.

Companies ought to be sanctioned that have done something wrong. WuXi Biologics did a third-party audit, and, again, they contained no biogenetic information. That is what the audit revealed. It doesn't really make any difference.

By the way, they can't get off the list. They can't get off the list because of how this bill is written. There is no remedy for them if my colleagues are wrong. Is that what we do in Congress? My colleagues don't like the name of a company. It is a Chinese name, and so automatically they have to be guilty of all the worst things that can be thought of.

Some of these companies might, but some of them might not be. That is why process matters. All of us, Democrats and Republicans, should want a thorough process, so that when we come here, we are speaking with one voice.

Again, some of these companies that the gentleman has put in his bill may, in fact, be justified, but let's do the process. Let's get this right. Why is that such a controversial thing?

The only thing I can think of is because Members are trying to rush to comply with China week and not trying to get legislation right. Committees of jurisdiction, the Intelligence Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Ways and Means Committee, the Energy and Commerce Committee, all of them, should be at the table working with my colleagues on this legislation, but they weren't. They weren't.

This is not the way we should address this very serious matter. I have been talking about the issue of China's unscrupulous business activities for years and years. I want to get this right. I want to get this right. I want to get it right in a way where we can't be accused of just blacklisting companies because we don't like their last name.

There is a better way to do this. Quite frankly, we tried to work with Members on a better way, but my colleagues had no interest in working with us on a better way. I regret that because I wouldn't be here today, and I think you would have a unanimous vote.

I think people are concerned about the process, and process matters. We are not China. We are the United States of America. We are better. We are transparent. We employ and embrace open processes for the world to see.

If any of these companies are engaged in activities that are objectionable, let's hold them accountable, but it should be as the result of a thorough process.

Again, I will close by saying I am one of the few persons here who is sanctioned by China, who cannot travel there. My family can't travel there according to their press release. They don't like me at all. The reason why they don't is because we have passed legislation that has been effective and that has worked.

We have an opportunity to do that here. There are no amendments. This bill has been brought to the floor that really has all these incredible consequences. There are no amendments allowed. There has been no input from other committees. Here, take it or leave it.

We ought to leave it and go back to the drawing board and get this right. We could figure this out in a matter of days. We can get this right. Let's do it. Let's do it, and let's do it in a way that holds China to account.

The final thing I will say is what we have been hearing from the regulatory agencies, that by naming these companies in a bill, you are giving them the heads up. They can change their name and reincorporate in the Cayman Islands and come back, and we are playing whack-a-mole with them. There is a better way to do this. Let us work together and get there.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, in closing, we have heard here today broad consensus among my House colleagues that U.S. taxpayer dollars should not go to foreign biotechnology entities that steal Americans' genetic data, contribute to a foreign adversary's military, or support the violation of human rights.

The BIOSECURE Act addresses this national security problem by clearly prohibiting a Federal agency from procuring any biotechnology equipment or service from a company controlled by a foreign adversary, such as the CCP.

Americans saw firsthand during the COVID pandemic what happens when a foreign adversary acts irresponsibly in the biotechnology sector. China restricted the export of vital medical equipment to the United States, refused to tell the world about COVID when it first emerged, and covered up evidence related to the origins of COVID-19.

This bill is a necessary step toward protecting Americans' sensitive healthcare data from a foreign adversary like the CCP before the U.S. biomedical and healthcare sector becomes even more dependent upon Chinese-influenced organizations. It is critical that we pass the BIOSECURE Act before more harm is done.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote in support of this national security bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 8333, the BIOSECURE Act which is critical legislation to prohibit federal contracts with biotechnology companies connected to foreign nations of concern to protect the U.S. national security, economic security and privacy.

Companies with ties to foreign adversaries, in particular the People's Republic of China, pose threats to the privacy and security of Americans. Under PRC law, any entity owned by or affiliated with Chinese companies could be compelled by the Chinese government to provide data on Americans.

The legislation addresses concerns about foreign nations' access to sensitive data on Americans by prohibiting federal contracts with biotechnology providers connected to foreign adversaries such as BGI, a PRC-affiliated company, its subsidiary MGI Americas, Complete Genomics, WuXi AppTec, and WuXi Biologics.

The legislation prevents funding from federal agencies to be spent on equipment or services provided by biotechnology companies of concern, including (1) entities subject to the jurisdiction, direction, control, or operated on behalf of the government of a foreign adversary, (2) entities involved in the manufacturing, distribution, provision, or procurement of a biotechnology equipment or service, and (3) entities which pose a risk to U.S. national security based on specified activities.

This legislation is an important step to protect American patients, our nation's biotechnology industry, and our national security from exploitation by hostile foreign entities, and I urge all my colleagues to support this bill and vote yes so we can pass this bill today.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. COMER) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 8333, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the yeas have it.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

COUNTERING CCP DRONES ACT

Mr. LATTI. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 2864) to amend the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 to provide for the addition of certain equipment and services produced or provided by DJI Technologies to the list of covered communications equipment or services published under such Act, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 2864

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Countering CCP Drones Act".

SEC. 2. ADDITION OF CERTAIN EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES OF DJI TECHNOLOGIES TO COVERED LIST.

(a) *IN GENERAL.*—Section 2(c) of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1601(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(5) The communications equipment or service being—

“(A) telecommunications or video surveillance equipment produced by Shenzhen Da-Jiang Innovations Sciences and Technologies Company Limited (commonly known as ‘DJI Technologies’) (or any subsidiary or affiliate thereof); or

“(B) telecommunications or video surveillance services, including software, provided by an entity described in subparagraph (A) or using equipment described in such subparagraph.”.

(b) *CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.*—Section 2 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1601) is amended by striking “paragraphs (1) through (4)” each place it appears and inserting “paragraphs (1) through (5)”.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTI) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PALLONE) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. LATTI. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material in the RECORD on the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. LATTI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation, H.R. 2864, the Countering CCP Drones Act, led by the gentleman from New York (Ms. STEFANIK).

DJI Technologies is the largest drone manufacturer in the world. Their drones are used by hobbyists, public safety agencies, and private companies to capture images from above, protect the public, and monitor critical infrastructure. Despite its significant presence, DJI is based in China, and it has known ties with the Chinese Communist Party, which represents a national security risk to the United States.

As we know, companies with ties to the CCP operate in an environment tightly intertwined with the Chinese Communist Government, raising serious concerns about the level of influence and potential for exploitation by the CCP.

For example, under China's 2017 National Intelligence Law, these companies are required to support, provide assistance to, and cooperate with China's national intelligence work, wherever they operate, which would and could jeopardize Americans. This threat is especially significant with DJI given how their drones are used within the United States, and we must act to address this threat.

H.R. 2864 adds telecommunications or video surveillance equipment and surveillance services produced or provided

by DJI Technologies to the FCC's covered list, which is a list of communications equipment or services that pose an unacceptable risk to national security. As a result of being placed on this list, the FCC could no longer authorize DJI drones going forward.

This legislation is forward looking. It only applies to drones that DJI seeks FCC authorization for after this bill becomes law. It would not affect the authorization of drones already in use today. It is imperative we move forward with these efforts to remove the threat posed by DJI.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2864, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2864, the Countering CCP Drones Act. Our country's communications networks help support many parts of our daily lives and play an essential role across almost every sector of our economy. Robust networks allow Americans to have easier access to doctors, teachers, and job opportunities, and they are also vital to our Nation's critical infrastructure, public safety systems, supply chains, and government functions.

This is unlikely to change anytime soon. In fact, as technology advances, our networks are only expected to become even more embedded in everyday life.

This growing reach has made our communications networks targets that face constant threats from adversarial nations and others. In the last few months, we have seen reports that hacking groups linked to China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are gaining access to our communications networks to conduct surveillance, collect massive amounts of data, and manipulate our elections.

As a result, there is a real risk that the information that they collect could be used to launch cyberattacks on our critical infrastructure and undermine our democratic values of free speech and expression, as well as civil and human rights.

Fortunately, Congress has acted with strong bipartisan support to bolster the defense of our communications networks. My bipartisan Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act, which became law in 2020, established a list of equipment and services that pose a national security risk and prevent their use in our communications networks.

H.R. 2864 builds on that bipartisan work by adding the telecommunications and video surveillance equipment and services provided by so-called DJI Technologies, better recognized as the equipment and services used in their drones, to the Federal Communications Commission's covered list. With this action, Congress will ensure that future versions of DJI drones cannot be imported, marketed, or sold in the United States.

DJI Technologies and its drones have repeatedly been flagged by the Federal Government as a national security risk. Since DJI is the global leader in drone manufacturing and has ties to the Chinese Communist Party, its drone technology and the data it collects could be exploited by the CCP to enable the theft of sensitive American data and compromise critical infrastructure in the United States.

This is especially true given that recent figures indicate that DJI controls almost 90 percent of the consumer drone market in North America, and DJI drones are often used by local law enforcement agencies for public safety operations.

With this bill, we continue our vigilance in protecting American data as well as our communications networks and other critical infrastructure from rogue nation-states.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2864, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. STEFANIK), the bill's sponsor.

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chair for yielding time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bipartisan legislation, the Countering CCP Drones Act.

First, I thank Chairwoman CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Chairman LATTA, Ranking Member PALLONE, and the Energy and Commerce Committee for their bipartisan support of this legislation and others that seek to end Communist China's malign influence in America.

□ 1630

Additionally, I will thank my colleague, Majority Leader SCALISE, for bringing these bills to the floor that clearly demonstrate that House Republicans will continue to lead in countering Communist China.

The Chinese Communist Party is working to undermine American sovereignty by forcing Americans to rely and depend on unsecure Communist Chinese technology.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the drone industry.

In 2015, the CCP launched the "Made in China 2025" initiative, which leveraged aggressive subsidies, direct CCP investment, and unfair trade practices to artificially drive down the cost of Chinese-manufactured drones undercutting American companies and ensuring the rest of the world was forced to rely on Communist China for unsecured drone technology.

Due to these authoritarian policies, America has been flooded with drones manufactured by the CCP-controlled drone company DJI.

Allowing artificially cheap DJI drones to monopolize our skies has decimated American drone manufacturing and given our greatest strategic adversary eyes in our skies.

Over the last 7 years, the U.S. Government has publicly confirmed time

and time again that DJI drones are being used to collect information on U.S. critical infrastructure and pose significant risks to U.S. national security.

Moreover, DJI is on the U.S. Department of Defense's list of Chinese military companies because it directly advances the modernization efforts of the People's Liberation Army. Not only does DJI improve the equipment of our greatest strategic adversary, which could one day be used against U.S. servicemembers, they also actively aid the CCP in carrying out genocidal crimes against ethnic minorities.

It is past time we end Communist China's role as the world's drone factory.

My legislation, the Countering CCP Drones Act, will place DJI on the FCC's covered list, which will prohibit new models of DJI drones from operating in America. This will initiate a much-needed transition period to improve the competitiveness of U.S. drone companies, remove Chinese spy drones from our skies, and end our reliance on CCP-manufactured drones.

For too long, we have allowed Communist China leverage over our critical industries through their malign drone monopoly. As drones become increasingly integrated into our military, law enforcement, agriculture, and critical infrastructure, the U.S. must build our domestic manufacturing capabilities.

Make no mistake, Communist China will use the successes of its "Made in China 2025" initiative to undercut American global leadership and domestic security. We have 3 months to reverse the course of these successes. The passage of my Countering CCP Drones Act is a critical step in that direction.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I have no additional speakers, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. MOOLENAAR).

Mr. MOOLENAAR. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of Conference Chair STEFANIK's bill, the Countering CCP Drones Act. This bill would add Chinese drone company DJI to the FCC covered list, meaning that any future models of DJI drones would be prohibited from operating on U.S. telecommunications infrastructure.

DJI poses a real national security risk to the United States given its deep partnership with the Chinese military, its expressed allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party, and its surveillance technology operating across U.S. soil. What is more, that very same technology equips the CCP's genocide of the Uyghur people in Xinjiang.

Understanding these risks, the Pentagon placed DJI on its blacklist as a Chinese military company. The Treasury Department forbids Americans from investing in DJI. The Commerce Department restricts U.S. companies

from exporting technology to DJI. It is time for Congress to do its part and to start winding down DJI's presence in the United States.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I simply urge support for this legislation on a bipartisan basis, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I further urge support of H.R. 2864. This bill, again, came out of the Energy and Commerce Committee 43-0, and I urge passage of the legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTA) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 2864, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States was communicated to the House by Ms. Avery M. Stringer, one of his secretaries.

FOREIGN ADVERSARY COMMUNICATIONS TRANSPARENCY ACT

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 820) to direct the Federal Communications Commission to publish a list of entities that hold authorizations, licenses, or other grants of authority issued by the Commission and that have certain foreign ownership, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 820

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act".

SEC. 2. LIST OF ENTITIES HOLDING FCC AUTHORIZATIONS, LICENSES, OR OTHER GRANTS OF AUTHORITY AND HAVING CERTAIN FOREIGN OWNERSHIP.

(a) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall publish on the internet website of the Commission a list of each entity—

(1) that holds a license issued by the Commission pursuant to—

(A) section 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j)); or

(B) the Act of May 27, 1921 (47 U.S.C. 34 et seq.; commonly known as the "Cable Landing Licensing Act") and Executive Order 10530 (3 U.S.C. 301 note; relating to the performance of certain functions vested in or subject to the approval of the President); and

(2) with respect to which—

(A) a covered entity holds an equity or voting interest that is required to be reported to the Commission under the ownership rules of the Commission; or

(B) an appropriate national security agency has determined that a covered entity exerts control, regardless of whether such covered entity

holds an equity or voting interest as described in subparagraph (A).

(b) *RULEMAKING.*—

(1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall issue rules to obtain information to identify each entity—

(A) that holds any authorization, license, or other grant of authority issued by the Commission (other than a license described in subsection (a)(1)); and

(B) with respect to which a covered entity holds an equity or voting interest that is required to be reported to the Commission under the ownership rules of the Commission.

(2) *PLACEMENT ON LIST.*—Not later than 1 year after the Commission issues the rules required by paragraph (1), the Commission shall place each entity described in such paragraph on the list published under subsection (a).

(c) *PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT EXEMPTION.*—A collection of information conducted or sponsored by the Commission to implement this section does not constitute a collection of information for the purposes of subchapter I of chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code (commonly referred to as the "Paperwork Reduction Act").

(d) *ANNUAL UPDATES.*—The Commission shall, not less frequently than annually, update the list published under subsection (a), including with respect to any entity required to be placed on such list by subsection (b)(2).

(e) *DEFINITIONS.*—In this section:

(1) *APPROPRIATE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.*—The term "appropriate national security agency" has the meaning given such term in section 9 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1608).

(2) *COMMISSION.*—The term "Commission" means the Federal Communications Commission.

(3) *COVERED COUNTRY.*—The term "covered country" means a country specified in section 4872(d)(2) of title 10, United States Code.

(4) *COVERED ENTITY.*—The term "covered entity" means—

(A) the government of a covered country;

(B) an entity organized under the laws of a covered country; and

(C) a subsidiary or affiliate of an entity described in subparagraph (B), regardless of whether the subsidiary or affiliate is organized under the laws of a covered country.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTA) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PALLONE) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and insert extraneous material in the record on the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 820, the Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act, led by the gentlewoman from New York's 21st District.

The Chinese Communist Party and other foreign adversaries present security threats to our critical infrastructure. Entities with ties to these countries could be called upon to support and assist their national intelligence

work, jeopardizing the security of American data and communications networks. As a result, the presence of their equipment in our networks pose a significant threat to our national security.

Over the years, Congress has worked to address these threats from passing legislation to rip-and-replace Huawei and ZTE equipment from our networks by encouraging TikTok to divest from its CCP-controlled parent company, ByteDance. We must build on this work by bringing transparency into the ways our foreign adversaries operate in our networks.

This legislation requires the FCC to annually publish a list of entities with ties to our adversaries, Communist China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, that hold a license, authorization, or other authority granted by the FCC.

Understanding which adversaries are present in our communications networks as well as the threat they pose is necessary to strengthen our networks.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from New York's 21st District for her leadership on this bill and the chair of the Energy and Commerce Committee for her leadership moving this bill to the floor.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 820, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 820, the Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act.

Last week, the Department of Justice indicted two Russian nationals over payments made to several extreme rightwing American influencers in an attempt to tip the scales in our Nation's upcoming elections. This is an extremely disturbing and stark reminder of the length that foreign adversary countries will go to use our media and communications networks to disrupt and divide us, weakening our country for their own benefit.

Whether it is through social media, equipment, or the communications networks itself, we have seen these operations time and time again, which is why we must stay vigilant to minimize these risks or avoid them all together.

Today, we are taking additional action to stay ahead of these risks. H.R. 820 will shed some light on the investments of foreign adversaries in our country's communications networks.

Every day these networks carry Americans' most sensitive personal data. We must have a clear understanding if any foreign adversary countries, or the companies operating within those countries, are investors in our communications networks.

This is critically important because, unfortunately, we have too often seen foreign adversary governments or those beholden to them target these networks and the devices and applications running on top of them as a way to disrupt our daily lives or to conduct espionage campaigns.

Any communications network with ties to China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran magnifies this target and endangers our national security interests.

H.R. 820 helps address these concerns. This bipartisan bill would require the Federal Communications Commission to publish a list within 4 months indicating any entities with ties to China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran that hold wireless and undersea cable licenses that power our country's mobile and fixed communications networks.

The bill would also require the FCC to issue rules in 18 months to help it attain foreign ownership information for the remaining authorization, licenses, and grants that the agency issues. The FCC would then publish on its list any additional entities with ties to China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran no later than 1 year after the new rules are adopted. The FCC would also need to update this entity list annually.

With this bill, we continue to secure our communications networks and protect Americans from rogue nation-states seeking to use our networks against us. This bill will also help us better protect our allies as they too rely on our global undersea cable network for broadband services.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 820, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LATTI. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. STEFANIK), the bill's sponsor.

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Speaker, once again, I rise today in support of bipartisan legislation, the Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency or FACT Act.

I will thank again our Energy and Commerce Chairwoman CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Chairman LATTI, Ranking Member PALLONE, and the entire committee for their support.

Additionally, I will take the time to thank the previous chair of the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, MIKE GALLAGHER; the current chair, Chairman JOHN MOOLENAAR; and Ranking Member RAJA KRISHNAMOORTHY for their work this Congress in advancing public awareness of the dire threat that Communist China poses to America's prosperity and passing critical legislation to counter that critical threat.

Communist China is using every tool at its disposal to conduct a coordinated campaign to surveil and collect information on Americans. One of the ways that the CCP is doing this is through infiltrating our telecommunications and technology markets.

Despite this clear and present threat posed by Communist Chinese-controlled telecommunications company, many still maintain authorities to operate in the United States. Even worse, while some CCP-controlled companies like Huawei and ZTE have been publicly identified, there are other Com-

munist Chinese telecom and tech companies that have not yet drawn public scrutiny.

My bipartisan FACT Act will provide much-needed transparency into the level of Communist China's infiltration into our technology sector.

The FACT Act will require the Federal Communications Commission to publish a list of companies who both hold FCC authorizations and have any ownership by foreign adversarial governments, including China, Russia, Iran, and others.

This public disclosure will help to shine a light on the malign access and influence Communist Chinese companies have inside our tech and telecom markets. We cannot allow companies controlled by the CCP or other foreign adversaries to have unfettered and unknown access to our telecommunications infrastructure.

This legislation will give Americans much-needed transparency and will pave the way for future action to counter these adversarial-owned listed companies.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this bipartisan bill to counter the influence of Communist China and other foreign adversaries on America's telecommunications infrastructure.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I, again, urge support for this important legislation to protect us on a bipartisan basis, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LATTI. Mr. Speaker, this legislation came out of the Energy and Commerce Committee 44-0. It shows how important this legislation is, and I urge support of H.R. 820.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTI) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 820, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

□ 1645

REMOVING OUR UNSECURE TECHNOLOGIES TO ENSURE RELIABILITY AND SECURITY ACT

Mr. LATTI. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7589) to direct the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, to conduct a study of the national security risks posed by consumer routers, modems, and devices that combine a modem and router, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7589

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Removing Our Unsecure Technologies to Ensure Reliability and Security Act" or the "ROUTERS Act".

SEC. 2. STUDY OF NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS POSED BY CERTAIN ROUTERS AND MODEMS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall conduct a study of the national security risks posed by consumer routers, modems, and devices that combine a modem and router that are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the influence of a covered country.

(b) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report on the results of the study conducted under subsection (a).

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) COVERED COUNTRY.—The term "covered country" means a country specified in section 4872(d)(2) of title 10, United States Code.

(2) SECRETARY.—The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTI) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PALLONE) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. LATTI. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material in the RECORD on the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. LATTI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of my legislation, H.R. 7589, the ROUTERS Act.

Routers and modems play a key role in communications networks. They are the entry point through which the public accesses the internet. Thus, we must make sure that they are secure.

Bad actors can exploit vulnerabilities in routers to infect users' computers, access their information, or disrupt their networks.

National security agencies, including the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security, have reported on the threat posed by the vulnerability in routers and how some Communist Chinese Party-sponsored hackers have used these vulnerabilities to launch attacks. We should take these matters and reports seriously.

Further, we know that companies with ties to the CCP could be forced to support China's intelligence activities. We can imagine how they could use vulnerabilities in their equipment to aid these efforts.

That is why I am pleased to sponsor the ROUTERS Act, which would direct

the Secretary of Commerce through the Assistant Secretary of Communications and Information to study the national security risk posed by routers and modems produced by companies with ties to foreign adversaries. This study will help Congress understand the scope and risk of this threat and will inform whether we need to remove this equipment from our networks.

This legislation bolsters our bipartisan efforts to remove untrusted equipment from our communications ecosystem.

In the past 4 years, we passed the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act to remove Huawei and ZTE equipment from our networks, and we passed the Secure Equipment Act, which prohibits the Federal Communications Commission from authorizing equipment from untrusted vendors. Today's legislation builds on this work.

I thank our chair, the gentlewoman from Washington (Mrs. RODGERS), and the members of the Energy and Commerce Committee for a strong bipartisan vote for this legislation back in March. It is imperative we move forward with these efforts to mitigate the widespread availability of this equipment.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 7589, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 7589, the Removing Our Unsecure Technologies to Ensure Reliability and Security Act, or the ROUTERS Act.

This bill is an important step to provide Americans with the confidence to trust that the devices they use in their homes to connect to the internet are free from the influence of our foreign adversaries.

H.R. 7589 accomplishes this objective by requiring the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, to study the national security risk posed by routers and modems found in American homes that are manufactured or sold to entities with ties to foreign adversary countries. The Secretary must also deliver a report to Congress of this study within 1 year.

I think it is crucial that we understand the cybersecurity and national security risks that our networks face from equipment that originates from our foreign adversaries. This is especially true given that our Nation's communications networks are an integral component to nearly every facet of American life, which also makes them prime targets for attack.

This legislation will help us to better protect American families and our country from bad actors who want to carry out malicious attacks.

Mr. Speaker, I thank Representative PELTOLA and Chairman LATTA of the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology for their bipartisan work on this bill.

Mr. Speaker, this is another bill that is part of this effort to try to make sure that our foreign adversaries are not hurting us in many ways in the communications sector. It is an important bill, and I urge my colleagues to vote for it on a bipartisan basis. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, this legislation moved through the Energy and Commerce Committee 43-0, showing the absolute importance of moving this legislation through. I urge support of H.R. 7589 and yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. MEUSER). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTA) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 7589.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

DECOUPLING FROM FOREIGN ADVERSARIAL BATTERY DEPENDENCE ACT

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 8631) to prohibit the Secretary of Homeland Security from procuring certain foreign-made batteries, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 8631

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act".

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR PROCUREMENT OF CERTAIN BATTERIES.

(a) *IN GENERAL.*—Beginning on October 1, 2027, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department of Homeland Security may be obligated to procure a battery produced by an entity specified in subsection (b).

(b) *ENTITIES SPECIFIED.*—The entities specified in this subsection are the following:

- (1) *Contemporary Amperex Technology Company, Limited (also known as "CATL").*
- (2) *BYD Company, Limited.*
- (3) *Envision Energy, Limited.*
- (4) *EVE Energy Company, Limited.*
- (5) *Gotion High tech Company, Limited.*
- (6) *Hithium Energy Storage Technology company, Limited.*

(7) *Any entity on any list required under clauses (i), (ii), (iv), or (v) of section 2(d)(2)(B) of Public Law 117-78 (commonly referred to as the "Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act").*

(8) *Any entity identified by the Secretary of Defense as a Chinese military company pursuant to section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 U.S.C. 113 note).*

(9) *Any entity included in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor regulation.*

(10) *Any subsidiary or successor to an entity specified in paragraphs (1) through (9).*

(c) *TREATMENT OF PRODUCTION.*—For purposes of this section, a battery shall be treated

as produced by an entity specified in subsection (b) if such entity—

(1) assembles or manufactures the final product that uses such battery; or

(2) creates or otherwise provides a majority of the components used in such battery.

(d) WAIVERS.—

(1) RELATING TO ASSESSMENT.—The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the limitation under subsection (a) if the Secretary assesses in the affirmative all of the following:

(A) The batteries to be procured do not pose a national security, data, or infrastructure risk to the United States.

(B) There is no available alternative to procure batteries that are—

(i) of similar or better cost and quality; and

(ii) produced by an entity not specified in subsection (b).

(2) RELATING TO RESEARCH.—The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the limitation under subsection (a) if the Secretary determines that the batteries to be procured are for the sole purpose of research, evaluation, training, testing, or analysis

(3) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 15 days after granting a waiver under this subsection, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a notification relating thereto.

(e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on the anticipated impacts on mission and costs on the Department of Homeland Security associated with carrying out this section, including with respect to following components of the Department:

(1) U.S. Customs and Border Protection, including the U.S. Border Patrol.

(2) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, including Homeland Security Investigations.

(3) The United States Secret Service.

(4) The Transportation Security Administration.

(5) The United States Coast Guard.

(6) The Federal Protective Service.

(7) The Federal Emergency Management Agency.

(8) The Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers.

(9) The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GIMENEZ) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. IVEY) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 8631, the bill now under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bill, H.R. 8631, the Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act.

Our world is increasingly reliant on battery technology, from the smartphones in our pockets to the energy storage systems that power our homes and businesses.

This dependence underscores a larger issue: Our Nation is becoming increasingly reliant on foreign adversarial entities for the materials and technologies that power these devices, which poses grave risk to our Nation's security and economic stability.

As it stands, Communist China produces approximately 80 percent of the world's batteries and roughly 70 percent of the world's lithium-ion batteries. These staggering numbers leave U.S. supply chains vulnerable and our Nation's security at risk.

Recently, the United States House Select Committee on Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, a committee that I am a member of, uncovered information that revealed that at least two of the world's top battery manufacturers, CATL and Gotion High-Tech, are affiliated with Xinjiang Production and Construction Corporation, a paramilitary and CCP-owned entity that is expressly named in the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act statute due to its egregious forced labor practices.

Specifically, XPCC has been accused of assisting the CCP's policy in Xinjiang that implemented comprehensive surveillance, detention, and indoctrination that targeted Uyghur Muslims and other ethnic minority groups that the CCP is attempting to eradicate. Furthermore, XPCC utilizes forced labor practices to manufacture their wide range of products.

In addition, dependence on batteries that are manufactured in the PRC presents incredible risks to our national security. There are legitimate concerns that PRC-aligned battery companies and other similar Chinese entities could install malware and other intelligence-gathering sensors on these products, which could result in gathering sensitive information or execute a shutdown on EV charging networks and battery-energy storage systems or even disable targeted vehicles through hardware infiltration.

Last year, reports indicated that the PRC-aligned CATL installed its batteries at facilities in Florida, Virginia, Nevada, and California, as well as a solar farm on leased land inside the U.S. Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. Energy-storage batteries produced by the PRC-aligned CATL at Camp Lejeune have been decommissioned, following increased pressure from Congress.

The Pentagon's decision to not only remove the PRC-aligned CATL batteries from Camp Lejeune but also to make it clear it will not buy CATL batteries because of concerns is more than adequate to demonstrate why we should not have these batteries in other parts of our critical infrastructure.

Our government should not be spending tax dollars to procure batteries from companies that profit from slave labor or provide another avenue for the CCP to expand their surveillance apparatus here in the United States homeland.

My legislation, H.R. 8631, the Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act, is a critical first step in addressing this issue. Modeled after previous provisions included in the fiscal year 2024 NDAA, my legislation builds off these efforts and prohibits the Department of Homeland Security from procuring battery technology companies that have deep ties to the CCP and engage in human rights abuses. In doing so, this bill helps our Nation take a step to advance efforts to decouple from the PRC and safeguard critical supply chains from exploitation.

I am proud to see this bill pass out of committee in a bipartisan nature and look forward to seeing it pass the full House with a bipartisan vote.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. IVEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, my fellow Democrats and I strongly support the intent of this bill, which is to reduce our reliance on global adversaries and build up an industrial manufacturing base in the United States by prohibiting DHS from procuring batteries from certain Chinese companies.

I am grateful the committee included Ranking Member THOMPSON's amendment to the original bill, which expands the number of companies subject to the prohibition. In addition to the six Chinese companies named in the original bill, Ranking Member THOMPSON's amendment expands the prohibition to include any companies using Uyghur forced labor identified by the Secretary of Defense as Chinese military companies and engaging in activities contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, according to the Department of Commerce.

I also thank the committee for including Representative SUOZZI's amendment, which requires DHS to produce a report on the potential impacts and costs associated with carrying out this bill before the prohibition goes into effect. The report will help DHS and Congress manage any unanticipated negative consequences from this bill.

While these amendments have made the bill better, there are lingering concerns, including how a ban on Chinese-made batteries will impact DHS' ability to buy American-made electric vehicles, since most American EV producers use Chinese-sourced batteries.

The bill could also further be improved by requiring DHS to identify ways to foster job creation and economic growth here at home and ensure the inclusion of economically disadvantaged individuals and small businesses when purchasing batteries.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

□ 1700

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. MOOLENAAR).

Mr. MOOLENAAR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support Representative GIMENEZ' Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act to protect taxpayer dollars from growing our dependence on CCP-controlled battery technology.

As Representative GIMENEZ noted, the House Select Committee on China has investigated the world's cutting-edge battery manufacturers in China. There is indisputable evidence that two CCP-aligned battery makers, Gotion and CATL, are deeply connected to forced labor and the ongoing genocide in China. Gotion and CATL plan to build factories in the United States and thereby grow our dependence on their slave labor-tainted supply chains.

For my colleagues who care deeply about embracing next-generation energy technologies, I would just say this: We need America to lead when it comes to new energy sources, not China. We cannot lead by following. Buying Chinese technology will only dig ourselves further into dependence on the CCP.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to vote in favor of this important legislation and to protect our critical supply chains.

Mr. IVEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Republicans and Democrats alike recognize the threat posed by China and stand unified in defense of our national and homeland security.

H.R. 8631 is imperfect, but it is a step in the right direction, and I urge my colleagues to support it. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, we cannot continue to surrender dominance over our critical supply chains to our geopolitical rivals. Communist China will exploit any economic or security vulnerabilities that could be created from the Department of Homeland Security's reliance on lithium-ion batteries.

To put an end to this dependence and to take important steps in decoupling from the CCP, I urge a "yes" vote on H.R. 8631.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GIMENEZ) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 8631, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

DETECTION EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION TO COUNTER THE THREAT OF FENTANYL AND XYLAZINE ACT OF 2024

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 8663) to require the Science and Technology Directorate in the Department of Homeland Security to develop greater capacity to detect, identify, and disrupt illicit substances in very low concentrations.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 8663

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.

This Act may be cited as the “Detection Equipment and Technology Evaluation to Counter the Threat of Fentanyl and Xylazine Act of 2024” or the “DETECT Fentanyl and Xylazine Act of 2024”.

SEC. 2. ENHANCING THE CAPACITY TO DETECT, IDENTIFY, AND DISRUPT DRUGS SUCH AS FENTANYL AND XYLAZINE.

Section 302 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 182) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (13), by striking “and” at the end;

(2) in paragraph (14), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(15) carrying out research, development, testing, evaluation, and cost-benefit analyses to improve the safety, effectiveness, and efficiency of equipment and reference libraries for use by Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies for the accurate detection of drugs or the disruption of drug trafficking for drugs such as fentanyl and xylazine, including, but not limited to—

“(A) portable equipment that can detect and identify drugs with minimal or no handling of the sample;

“(B) equipment that can separate complex mixtures containing low concentrations of drugs and high concentrations of cutting agents into their component parts to enable signature extraction for field identification and detection; and

“(C) technologies that use machine learning or artificial intelligence (as defined in section 5002 of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (15 U.S.C. 9401)) and other techniques to predict whether the substances in a sample are controlled substance analogues or other new psychoactive substances not yet included in available reference libraries.”.

SEC. 3. REQUIREMENTS.

In carrying out section 302(15) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by section 2, the Under Secretary for Science and Technology shall—

(1) follow the recommendations, guidelines, and best practices described in the Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (NIST AI 100-1) or any successor document published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology; and

(2) establish the Directorate of Science and Technology’s research, development, testing, evaluation, and cost-benefit analysis priorities under such section 302(15) based on the latest available information, including the latest State and Territory Report on Enduring and Emerging Threats published by the Drug Enforcement Administration or any successor document.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from

Florida (Mr. GIMENEZ) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. IVEY) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 8663, the bill now under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 8663, the DETECT Fentanyl and Xylazine Act of 2024.

As the catastrophe at our southern border has continued to spiral out of control, the trafficking of fentanyl and other drugs has reached critical levels, putting Americans and law enforcement officials at risk.

The unchecked drug flow has devastated families and communities across the country, and the Committee on Homeland Security has uncovered throughout the course of the past 2 years this devastating lack of enforcement at the southern border.

While our brave law enforcement and frontline border personnel do their best to interdict, they do not always have the tools and resources to effectively do so. H.R. 8663 will improve drug detection accuracy through DHS Science and Technology Directorate research and providing critical equipment for Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement dealing with fentanyl, xylazine, and other deadly drugs.

Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman from New York (Mr. LALOTA) for his work on this legislation. I urge all Members to support it, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. IVEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

H.R. 8663, the Detection Equipment and Technology Evaluation to Counter the Threat of Fentanyl and Xylazine Act is a critical piece of legislation that empowers the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to enhance the ability of all levels of law enforcement to detect and disrupt illicit substances.

This bipartisan bill, which is cosponsored in the House by my colleagues Congressmen LOU CORREA and DON DAVIS, was initially introduced by Senators CORNYN, OSSOFF, LANKFORD, and SINEMA this past spring.

The bill mandates the development of advanced technologies, such as portable drug detectors that require minimal sample handling, equipment capable of separating complex drug mixtures into identifiable components, and the use of artificial intelligence to identify emerging threats.

These innovations are designed to improve the efficiency and accuracy of drug detection efforts, providing law

enforcement with the tools they need to stay ahead of traffickers and safeguard our communities.

While this bipartisan bill is undeniably a step forward in combating the widespread issue of illicit substances like fentanyl and xylazine, it is essential to recognize that its impact goes far beyond the narrow scope of any nation’s involvement, including China’s. The challenges of detecting these dangerous drugs are global in nature, and the solutions proposed by this bill address a broad spectrum of threats that law enforcement faces across the United States.

This bill is primarily a response and provides comprehensive benefits in bolstering our national security and public health infrastructure. Therefore, while we strongly support the bill’s objectives, we resist the effort to politicize any aspect of this critical issue, especially given the complexity and widespread nature of this action.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York (Mr. LALOTA), the author of the legislation.

Mr. LALOTA. Mr. Speaker, the United States of America, the greatest nation the world has ever known, is facing an unprecedented crisis as deadly drugs like fentanyl and xylazine devastate our communities. It is imperative that our leaders here in Congress work together to confront this epidemic and save lives.

Last year, there were over 107,000 drug overdose deaths. Of those deaths, over 81,000 involved opioids. Based on prior years’ statistics, we estimate that fentanyl was responsible for nearly 90 percent of all synthetic opioid-related deaths. That is almost 73,000 fentanyl deaths in just 1 year.

These staggering statistics are not just numbers. They represent real lives lost, real families shattered, and real communities that are forever changed for the worse. It is the biggest cause of death of Americans ages 18-45, and it does not discriminate based on race or economic class. It kills in each of our districts—170 fentanyl deaths per congressional district per year on average.

Even more troubling is xylazine. Known on the streets as tranq, it is now being mixed with fentanyl, making the drug even more deadly and more difficult to detect.

We must do more, more to get these dangerous substances off our streets and ensure our law enforcement officers have every tool and resource necessary to combat this crisis effectively, which is why I was proud to introduce the DETECT Fentanyl and Xylazine Act, a bipartisan bill that will do just that.

This legislation is not just a response to the ever-growing threat of illicit narcotics like fentanyl and xylazine. It is a critical step in our fight to protect our communities and to save lives.

Too many Americans have experienced the devastation caused by illicit drugs like fentanyl and xylazine. These substances have infiltrated our neighborhoods, torn families apart, and claimed countless lives across our great Nation. From Long Island to Los Angeles, no community has been spared, and for far too long, illegal drug smugglers have made it their mission to poison our streets with these illicit substances.

Every day, our law enforcement officers, those on the front lines of this battle, are forced to confront these threats with often outdated and inadequate tools. That is why this legislation is so important.

The act will authorize the Department of Homeland Security to conduct critical research and development, testing, and evaluation of state-of-the-art detection equipment. This legislation will also empower Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies with the best technology available to detect and intercept even the smallest amounts of these dangerous substances.

This legislation will also create an important new statutory responsibility for the Science and Technology Directorate at DHS to focus on three key areas: one, developing portable detection equipment; two, improving technologies to separate complex mixtures; and, three, leveraging artificial intelligence and machine learning.

Let me be clear. This is not just about equipment and technology. This is about the lives that we have a duty to protect. It is about ensuring that a child does not lose a parent to a lethal dose of fentanyl. It is about preventing the next wave of overdose deaths that leaves yet another community in mourning. It is about making sure that every law enforcement officer has the tools they need to safely and effectively do their job.

I thank my friend from the other side of the aisle and fellow Homeland Security Committee member, Congressman LOU CORREA, for partnering with me in introducing this critical bipartisan legislation and Senators CORNYN, OSSOFF, and SINEMA for their partnership in the Senate in this vital legislation.

I also thank the coalitions of organizations representing law enforcement professionals, public health advocates, and local governments across the Nation that have endorsed this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to vote “yes” on the DETECT Fentanyl and Xylazine Act. Let’s give our law enforcement the resources they need, let’s protect our communities, and let’s save lives.

Mr. IVEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Republicans and Democrats alike recognize the challenges facing law enforcement in the detection of dangerous drugs like fentanyl. H.R. 8663 is a step in the right direction, and I urge my colleagues to support it. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. As more and more Americans are negatively impacted by fentanyl and other deadly drugs, it is important to take steps to mitigate and detect the flow of these drugs over our borders. I urge passage of H.R. 8663, which will develop a greater capacity to detect, identify, and disrupt illicit substances. I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GIMENEZ) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 8663.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

SUBTERRANEAN BORDER DEFENSE ACT

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7404) to require annual reports on counter illicit cross-border tunnel operations, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7404

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Subterranean Border Defense Act”.

SEC. 2. ANNUAL REPORTS ON COUNTER ILLICIT CROSS-BORDER TUNNEL OPERATIONS.

Paragraph (2) of section 7134(a) of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263; 6 U.S.C. 257 note) is amended by inserting “and annually thereafter” after “development of the strategic plan”.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GIMENEZ) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. IVEY) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 7404, the bill now under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 7404, the Subterranean Border Defense Act.

Due to President Biden, Vice President HARRIS, and Secretary Mayorkas’ collective failures and refusal to secure our border, transnational criminal organizations are unchecked in their efforts to infiltrate into the United States.

These illicit pathways into our country have only made it easier for criminals to bring their illegal business into the homeland, from human trafficking to drug smuggling deadly fentanyl and other drugs that are being funneled from nations afar, including Communist China.

H.R. 7404 will require DHS to provide annual reports on its efforts to counter illicit tunnel operations.

I commend the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. CRANE) for his leadership on this effort and urge strong support for the measure.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

□ 1715

Mr. IVEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this bill because we should have more oversight and information on the threat of tunnels going under our borders and the actions our government is taking to counter them.

Tunnels are used by transnational criminal organizations looking to make a profit, and most of the people using them are not Chinese.

Over the past 30 years, cartels have created illegal tunnels under border walls and barriers to smuggle people and drugs into this country and send out money and firearms, including assault weapons.

Since 1990, law enforcement has discovered more than 230 tunnels across U.S. borders.

These tunnels can be sophisticated. In 2019, CBP discovered a tunnel near the San Diego, California, and Tijuana, Mexico, border that was over three-quarters of a mile long.

This bill simply creates an annual reporting requirement to keep Congress informed on the DHS’ efforts to counter illicit cross-border tunnels and hold bad actors accountable.

The information this bipartisan piece of legislation requires will help inform Congress of the situation on the border and what authorities or resources might be needed.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. CRANE), the author of this legislation.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak in favor of my bill, the Subterranean Border Defense Act, a bipartisan piece of border security legislation that I have introduced alongside Congressman CORREA from California.

Effective border security is created by overlapping deterrents. That is something we are desperately lacking at our border.

The Subterranean Border Defense Act would help us address the growing threat of illicit cross-border tunnels by requiring annual reports to Congress on counter-tunnel operations, fortifying our security system at the border.

Put simply, this would help us ensure that Congress has the necessary data to forge another much-needed layer of defense.

As transnational criminal organizations continue to grow in both size and sophistication, illicit cross-border tunnels along the southwest border of the United States represent a significant and growing threat to national security.

Congress must address this deadly threat and ensure U.S. Customs and Border Protection has the resources needed to acquire counter-tunnel technology.

Since 1990, officials have discovered more than 140 tunnels that have breached the U.S. border with an 80 percent increase in tunnel activity occurring since 2008.

Over the years, CBP has worked to combat these tunnels as part of their overall strategy. In fact, the United States conducts research, development, and test activities with Israel who must contend with a vast network of Hamas tunnels originating in the Gaza Strip. This partnership helps us detect and destroy tunnels in our respective countries.

The FY23 NDAA mandated that CBP submit a one-time report to Congress on a strategic plan for countering illicit cross-border tunnel operations.

This singular report has since led Congress to conduct critical oversight and has enabled CBP to formalize many of the processes, technologies, and resources needed to counteract illegal tunnels under the U.S.-Mexico border.

My bill would expand on this success by mandating a report every year going forward to ensure Congress has sufficient knowledge and oversight regarding this dynamic threat.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support this legislation for a secure southern border.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers, I am prepared to close, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. IVEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I believe this bill is a step in the right direction.

Receiving information from the Department of Homeland Security on an annual basis will improve Congress' efforts to counter illicit cross-border tunnels and hold bad actors accountable.

I support this bipartisan piece of legislation, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to support the bipartisan Subterranean Border Defense Act, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GIMENEZ) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 7404.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

COUNTERING THE PRC MALIGN INFLUENCE FUND AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2023

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1157) to provide for the authorization of appropriations for the Countering the People's Republic of China Malign Influence Fund, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 1157

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Countering the PRC Malign Influence Fund Authorization Act of 2023".

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUNTERING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MALIGN INFLUENCE FUND.

(a) COUNTERING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MALIGN INFLUENCE FUND.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated \$325,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2023 through 2027 for the Countering the People's Republic of China Malign Influence Fund to counter the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the People's Republic of China and entities acting on their behalf globally.

(2) AVAILABILITY; AMOUNTS IN ADDITION TO OTHER AMOUNTS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under paragraph (1)—

(A) are authorized to remain available until expended; and

(B) shall be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated for the purposes described in paragraph (1).

(b) CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—The obligation of funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) or otherwise made available for the purposes described in subsection (a)(1) shall be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1), the regular notification procedures of—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(c) POLICY GUIDANCE, COORDINATION, AND APPROVAL.—

(1) COORDINATOR.—The Secretary of State shall designate an existing senior official of the Department of State to provide policy guidance, coordination, and approval for the obligation of funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a).

(2) ASSISTANT COORDINATOR.—The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall designate an existing senior official of the United States Agency for International Development to assist and consult with the senior official of the Department of State designated pursuant to paragraph (1).

(3) DUTIES.—The senior official of the Department of State designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for—

(A) on an annual basis, the identification of specific strategic priorities for using funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a), such as geographic areas of focus or functional categories of programming that funds are to be concentrated within, consistent with the national interests of the United States and the purposes of this section;

(B) the coordination and approval of all programming conducted using such funds, based on an assessment that such programming directly counters the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China, including specific activities or policies advanced by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China and entities acting on their behalf globally, pursuant to the strategic objectives of the United States, as established in the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and other relevant national and regional strategies as appropriate;

(C) ensuring that all programming approved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to such activities of the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China described in subsection (d) and adheres to the requirements outlined in subsection (e); and

(D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the effectiveness of all programming conducted using such funds to ensure that it advances United States interests and degrades the ability of the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China, to advance activities that align with subsection (d) of this section.

(4) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The senior official of the Department of State designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall, in coordinating and approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2), seek—

(A) to conduct appropriate interagency consultation; and

(B) to ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that all approved programming functions in concert with other Federal activities to counter the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China.

(d) MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this section, the term "malign influence", with respect to the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China, shall be construed to include acts conducted by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China, or entities acting on their behalf that—

(1) undermine a free and open international order;

(2) advance an alternative, repressive international order that bolsters the Chinese Communist Party's or the Government of the People's Republic of China's hegemonic ambitions and is characterized by coercion and dependency;

(3) undermine the national security or sovereignty of the United States or other countries; or

(4) undermine the economic security of the United States or other countries, including by promoting corruption and advancing coercive economic practices.

(e) COUNTERING MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this section, countering malign influence through the use of funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) shall include efforts—

(1) to promote transparency and accountability, and reduce corruption, including in governance structures targeted by the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China;

(2) to support civil society and independent media to raise awareness of and increase transparency regarding the negative impact of activities related to the Belt and Road Initiative, associated initiatives, other economic initiatives with strategic or political purposes, and coercive economic practices;

(3) to counter transnational criminal networks that benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China;

(4) to encourage economic development structures that help protect against predatory lending schemes, including support for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, such as digital economy, energy, and infrastructure;

(5) to counter activities that provide undue influence to the security forces of the People's Republic of China;

(6) to expose misinformation and disinformation of the Chinese Communist Party's or the Government of the People's Republic of China's propaganda, including through programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center; and

(7) to counter efforts by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China to legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology and governance models.

(f) ANNUAL SUMMARY.—Not later than September 30, 2023, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the senior official of the Department of State designated pursuant to subsection (c)(1) shall submit to the congressional committees specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b), a summary identifying each activity or program approved pursuant to subsection (c), and shall include—

(1) for each program or activity, an identification of the country or regional location of the program or activity;

(2) for each program or activity, whether the program or activity was ongoing prior to receiving support from funds from the Countering People's Republic of China Malign Influence Fund, or any predecessor resource intended for the same or substantially similar purpose;

(3) for each program or activity, an identification of the acts described in subsection (d) that such program or activity is intended to counter; and

(4) a table identifying the respective allocation of all programs or activities approved during that fiscal year across accounts and regional or functional bureaus.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kentucky?

There was no objection.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of my legislation, H.R. 1157, Countering the PRC Malign Influence Fund Authorization Act.

The Chinese Communist Party is the most dangerous threat America has

faced in decades, and Beijing has been spreading its malign influence across the world.

China knows that one of the United States' greatest assets is our credibility and effectiveness in supporting our allies and partners.

Thus, the CCP is actively working to undermine U.S. legitimacy across the world by undercutting and distorting markets in areas such as critical infrastructure.

Among other things, their disruptive tools include predatory lending, coercive economic practices, misinformation, taking advantage of foreign corruption, and legitimizing authoritarianism.

The Countering the PRC Malign Influence Fund was originally created by an appropriation intended to address China's pernicious and growing influence, but for too long it has been used as a slush fund for the State Department's vanity projects, for example: \$6 million for expanding Pacific Island weather and ocean data collection, \$5 million for English language training in Angola, \$2.5 million for scooter charging stations in Vietnam.

While some may argue that funding for these types of activities can counter the PRC by meeting the wish lists of our partners experiencing PRC pressure, there are other organizations like the Development Finance Corporation and USAID that are already able to meet these types of needs with their own appropriated and authorized funding.

The bill before us today will create specific statutory guardrails so that our taxpayer dollars are used strategically and effectively to counter the CCP's malign influence.

It specifies the aims and duties of the fund, requires consultation with Congress before funds are obligated, and mandates an annual report on the fund's activities. This is basic congressional stewardship of taxpayer dollars.

The bill received bipartisan support when it was marked up by the Foreign Affairs Committee last year.

While we will never be able to nor want to outspend the PRC dollar for dollar, we must ensure that every ounce of funding is going the farthest to counter this generational threat.

I urge my colleagues to support my bill, the Countering the PRC Malign Influence Fund Authorization Act, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1157, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

There is strong bipartisan support in Congress for the Countering the People's Republic of China's Malign Influence Fund because it is the primary pool of funding for USAID and State Department projects to compete with China on the global stage.

Given this bipartisan consensus on the importance of the fund, I had hoped we could engage in a bipartisan process for this bill. Instead, most of our recommended changes to the bill were not

accepted when this bill was rushed to a markup at the very start of this Congress. When offered an amendment to increase the fund's authorization from \$325 million to \$400 million per year—the same amount requested by the Biden-Harris administration—every Republican on our committee, unfortunately, voted against it.

Is that being tough on China? I don't think so.

In briefing after briefing, our committee has learned that the administration is laser-focused on addressing the China challenge and is utilizing the funds effectively to counter PRC disinformation, build resilience against the PRC's malign influence, and provide nations around the world with alternatives to China's extractive development framework. The administration is doing this work, and they are doing it very well.

□ 1730

As drafted, I believe H.R. 1157 could constrain the State Department and USAID in competing effectively. To compete with China, the fund and our institutions need to be nimble so they can adapt to Beijing's constantly evolving tactics and policies. While I support this bill, as it moves forward, there needs to be a real bipartisan consultation with the administration on how best to achieve our objectives and ensure the fund is effective for the long term.

If we are serious about the threat that China poses and if we are truly committed to winning this competition, then we need to put our money where our mouth is. We can hold all the China weeks we want, but if House Republicans keep cutting funding for the State Department and USAID, then we are not going to win the competition with China.

Mr. Speaker, we are in a global competition for influence with China, and if you want to win it, then you cannot do it on a middle power budget. China is putting its money up. We want to compete; we don't want to just talk about it. We need to put ours up so that we cannot just compete; we can win.

The stakes in our strategic competition with China are high. To come out ahead, we cannot spend our time playing whack-a-mole, reacting to every move China makes around the world. We have to proactively compete. That means sticking to our values because they are better than the values of the Chinese Communist Party. It means listening to our partners, our friends, our allies, and their needs, not forcing them to choose.

It means building resilience to China's malign influence by strengthening governance and the rule of law; and crucially, it means providing real, sustainable alternatives to China's financing and China's infrastructure and development assistance.

To achieve these goals and to do it effectively, we need more than just

rhetoric. We need creative thinking, a willingness to experiment, and a commitment to sustain American engagement and diplomacy. All that requires a clear strategy, a nimble State Department, and a USAID apparatus, and, again, dare I say it, money, not just for this fund but for our broader foreign operations and assistance also.

As we move forward with authorizing the Countering the PRC Malign Influence Fund Authorization Act, we need to remember that this is a long game. This is a long game. The game is not in the fourth quarter. If America wants to win it, then we must sufficiently invest. We must invest in our strengths as well as our tools of competition.

We are the greatest nation in the world with the greatest resources in the world. Let's do something so that we can continue being the leaders of the world.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, in closing, I thank Chairman MCCAUL and Ranking Member MEEKS for working with me to move this important legislation to the floor.

I share many of the comments that my friend, the ranking member from New York, just stated. We do need to invest. We need to invest in the tools of diplomacy that we have to counter PRC malign influence in the world. We need to support the China transformational exports program with the Export-Import Bank. We need to support the Development Finance Corporation. We need to support USAID where it can help and the Peace Corps where it can help with soft power. We need diplomacy. We need foreign deployed foreign service personnel. However, we have to remember that we cannot counter and we should not attempt to counter Communist China by becoming more like China.

We have a \$35 trillion national debt, Mr. Speaker. Spending money like drunken sailors without any accountability and without any effective strategy is not effective diplomacy in countering the malign influence from China.

While I certainly do support the PRC malign influence fund, for goodness' sake, we are the Congress. We control the purse strings. Let's do our job. Let's create an authorization, put some guardrails around it and not allow the administration to spend this country into bankruptcy. That is the fastest way to lose the competition to China.

Let's put some parameters around this PRC malign influence fund and direct those scarce taxpayer resources effectively so that they actually do the job that the taxpayers deserve and we actually win this fight.

Spending our country into oblivion is what Communists do. We don't do that. Our ace in the hole is that we are capitalists. We do not misallocate resources. That is why we need this bill.

All of us agree that American taxpayer dollars should be used more effectively to counter China's disruptive, predatory influence around the world, but let's do it smart, Mr. Speaker. Let's do it the smart way.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to vote in favor of H.R. 1157, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. EZELL). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1157.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the yeas have it.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

HONG KONG ECONOMIC AND TRADE OFFICE (HKETO) CERTIFICATION ACT

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1103) to require the President to remove the extension of certain privileges, exemptions, and immunities to the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices if Hong Kong no longer enjoys a high degree of autonomy from the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 1103

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office (HKETO) Certification Act".

SEC. 2. DETERMINATION ON WHETHER TO EXTEND CERTAIN PRIVILEGES, EXEMPTIONS, AND IMMUNITIES TO THE HONG KONG ECONOMIC AND TRADE OFFICES IN THE UNITED STATES.

(a) DETERMINATION REQUIRED.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and thereafter as part of each certification required by the Secretary of State under section 205(a)(1)(A) of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5725(a)(1)(A)), the Secretary of State shall, as part of such certification, include a separate determination that—

(1) the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices—

(A) merit extension and application of the privileges, exemptions, and immunities specified in subsection (b); or

(B) no longer merit extension and application of the privileges, exemptions, and immunities specified in subsection (b); and

(2) a detailed report justifying that determination, which may include considerations related to United States national security interests.

(b) PRIVILEGES, EXEMPTIONS, AND IMMUNITIES SPECIFIED.—The privileges, exemptions, and immunities specified in this subsection are the privileges, exemptions, and immunities extended and applied to the Hong Kong

Economic and Trade Offices under section 1 of the Act entitled "An Act to extend certain privileges, exemptions, and immunities to Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices", approved June 27, 1997 (22 U.S.C. 288k).

(C) EFFECT OF DETERMINATION.—

(1) TERMINATION.—If the Secretary of State determines under subsection (a)(1)(B) that the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices no longer merit extension and application of the privileges, exemptions, and immunities specified in subsection (b), the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices shall terminate operations not later than 180 days after the date on which that determination is delivered to the appropriate congressional committees, as part of the certification required under section 205(a)(1)(A) of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5725(a)(1)(A)).

(2) CONTINUED OPERATIONS.—If the Secretary of State determines under subsection (a)(1)(A) that the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices merit extension and application of the privileges, exemptions, and immunities specified in subsection (b), the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices may continue operations for the one-year period following the date of the certification that includes that determination or until the next certification required under section 205(a)(1)(A) of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5725(a)(1)(A)) is submitted, whichever occurs first, unless a disapproval resolution is enacted under subsection (d).

(d) CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW.—

(1) DISAPPROVAL RESOLUTION.—In this subsection, the term "disapproval resolution" means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress—

(A) the title of which is the following: "A joint resolution disapproving the certification by the President that the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices continue to merit extension and application of certain privileges, exemptions, and immunities."; and

(B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is the following: "Congress disapproves of the certification by the President under section 2(a)(1)(A) of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office (HKETO) Certification Act that the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices merit extension and application of certain privileges, exemptions, and immunities, on ____", with the blank space being filled with the appropriate date.

(2) INTRODUCTION.—A disapproval resolution may be introduced—

(A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader or the minority leader; and

(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority leader's designee) or the minority leader (or the minority leader's designee).

(3) FLOOR CONSIDERATION IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.—If a committee of the House of Representatives to which a disapproval resolution has been referred has not reported the resolution within 10 legislative days after the date of referral, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the resolution.

(4) CONSIDERATION IN SENATE.—

(A) COMMITTEE REFERRAL.—A disapproval resolution introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

(B) REPORTING AND DISCHARGE.—If the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate has not reported the resolution within 10 legislative days after the date of referral of the resolution, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the resolution and the resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.

(C) PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.—Notwithstanding Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any time after the Committee on Foreign Relations reports a disapproval resolution to the Senate or has been discharged from consideration of such a resolution (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution, and all points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. The motion to proceed is not debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order.

(D) RULINGS OF THE CHAIR ON PROCEDURE.—Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a disapproval resolution shall be decided without debate.

(E) CONSIDERATION OF VETO MESSAGES.—Debate in the Senate of any veto message with respect to a disapproval resolution, including all debatable motions and appeals in connection with the resolution, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.

(5) RULES RELATING TO SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.—

(A) TREATMENT OF SENATE RESOLUTION IN HOUSE.—In the House of Representatives, the following procedures shall apply to a disapproval resolution received from the Senate (unless the House has already passed a resolution relating to the same proposed action):

(i) The resolution shall be referred to the appropriate committees.

(ii) If a committee to which a resolution has been referred has not reported the resolution within 10 legislative days after the date of referral, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the resolution.

(iii) Beginning on the third legislative day after each committee to which a resolution has been referred reports the resolution to the House or has been discharged from further consideration thereof, it shall be in order to move to proceed to consider the resolution in the House. All points of order against the motion are waived. Such a motion shall not be in order after the House has disposed of a motion to proceed on the resolution. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the motion to its adoption without intervening motion. The motion shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is disposed of shall not be in order.

(iv) The resolution shall be considered as read. All points of order against the resolution and against its consideration are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the resolution to final passage without intervening motion except 2 hours of debate equally divided and controlled by the offeror of the motion to proceed (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to reconsider the vote on passage of the resolution shall not be in order.

(B) TREATMENT OF HOUSE RESOLUTION IN SENATE.—

(i) RECEIVED BEFORE PASSAGE OF SENATE RESOLUTION.—If, before the passage by the Senate of a disapproval resolution, the Senate receives an identical resolution from the House of Representatives, the following procedures shall apply:

(I) That resolution shall not be referred to a committee.

(II) With respect to that resolution—

(aa) the procedure in the Senate shall be the same as if no resolution had been re-

ceived from the House of Representatives; but

(bb) the vote on passage shall be on the resolution from the House of Representatives.

(ii) RECEIVED AFTER PASSAGE OF SENATE RESOLUTION.—If, following passage of a disapproval resolution in the Senate, the Senate receives an identical resolution from the House of Representatives, that resolution shall be placed on the appropriate Senate calendar.

(iii) NO SENATE COMPANION.—If a disapproval resolution is received from the House of Representatives, and no companion resolution has been introduced in the Senate, the Senate procedures under this subsection shall apply to the resolution from the House of Representatives.

(C) APPLICATION TO REVENUE MEASURES.—The provisions of this subparagraph shall not apply in the House of Representatives to a disapproval resolution that is a revenue measure.

(6) RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE.—This paragraph is enacted by Congress—

(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, and supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) HONG KONG ECONOMIC AND TRADE OFFICES.—The term “Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices” has the meaning given that term in section 1(c) of the Act entitled “An Act to extend certain privileges, exemptions, and immunities to Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices”, approved June 27, 1997 (22 U.S.C. 288k).

SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON CONTRACTING RELATING TO HONG KONG ECONOMIC AND TRADE OFFICES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date of the enactment of this Act, an entity of the United States Government may enter into an agreement or partnership with the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices to promote tourism, culture, business, or other matters relating to Hong Kong only if—

(1) the Secretary of State has submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a determination under section 2(a)(1)(A) that the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices merit extension and application of certain privileges, exemptions, and immunities;

(2) a disapproval resolution under section 2(d) is not enacted during the 90-day period following the submission of that determination; and

(3) the agreement or partnership does not promote efforts by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Government of the People’s Republic of China—

(A) to justify the dismantling of the autonomy of Hong Kong and the freedoms and rule of law guaranteed by the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984; and

(B) to portray within the United States the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or the Government of

the People’s Republic of China as protecting the rule of law or the human rights and civil liberties of the people of Hong Kong.

(b) HONG KONG ECONOMIC AND TRADE OFFICES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices” has the meaning given that term in section 1(c) of the Act entitled “An Act to extend certain privileges, exemptions, and immunities to Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices”, approved June 27, 1997 (22 U.S.C. 288k).

SEC. 4. POLICY OF UNITED STATES ON PROMOTION OF AUTONOMY OF GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to ensure that entities of the United States Government do not knowingly assist in the promotion of Hong Kong as a free and autonomous city or the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region as committed to protecting the human rights of the people of Hong Kong or fully maintaining the rule of law required for human rights and economic prosperity as long as the Secretary of State continues to determine under section 205(a)(1) of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5725(a)(1)) that Hong Kong does not enjoy a high degree of autonomy from the People’s Republic of China and does not warrant treatment under the laws of the United States in the same manner as those laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997;

(2) to recognize that promotion of Hong Kong as described in paragraph (1) should be considered propaganda for the efforts of the People’s Republic of China to dismantle rights and freedom guaranteed to the residents of Hong Kong by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984;

(3) to ensure that entities of the United States Government do not engage in or assist with propaganda of the People’s Republic of China regarding Hong Kong; and

(4) to engage with the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, through all relevant entities of the United States Government, seeking the release of political prisoners, the end of arbitrary detentions, the resumption of a free press and fair and free elections open to all candidates, and the restoration of an independent judiciary.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kentucky?

There was no objection.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1103, the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office Certification Act introduced by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. SMITH).

Hong Kong was once a shining beacon in Asia and the gateway into China, known for its economic freedom, rule of law, and vibrant civil society. Tragically, this ended when the Chinese

Communist Party crushed democracy and free enterprise in Hong Kong.

People of all walks of life, and much international capital, have fled this authoritarian wave, and the city has never been the same.

We cannot allow the CCP to use Hong Kong's former legitimacy as a continuing gateway into U.S. systems. Both Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary Blinken have certified that because of the Chinese Communist Party's control over Hong Kong's legislature, judicial system, and police force, Hong Kong can no longer be considered a separate entity from the People's Republic of China.

We must adjust our treatment of Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices to match the sad current reality.

This bill would require the President to annually certify whether those offices should be covered by the International Organizations Immunities Act. If certification is not granted, they must terminate their operations in the United States.

The bipartisan membership of the Foreign Affairs Committee voted unanimously in favor of this bill at our markup last year.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of our colleagues to support the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office Certification Act, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 1103, the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office Certification Act, as amended.

This bill recognizes that Beijing has ripped apart any credible notion of Hong Kong's autonomy and has undone the "one country, two systems" framework. In doing so, Beijing betrayed not only the people of Hong Kong but the commitments it made to the whole world.

Hong Kong is no longer a bastion of the rule of law, no longer a place of political freedom, and no longer a place where opinions can be voiced freely. Today, over 1,800 political prisoners sit behind bars. Trials are held in secret, and justice is sent to mainland China. The freedoms once cherished in Hong Kong are disappearing rapidly.

The bill in front of us today calls on the President to determine whether the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices in the United States should continue to get the privileges, exemptions, and immunities which were offered based on Hong Kong's distinct autonomous status. After all, why should we treat Hong Kong as different from China now when the Chinese Communist Party is tightening its grip over Hong Kong's political and governing system?

This bill is timely and necessary. As we move forward, it is critical the State Department has the ability to assist both the hundreds of U.S. businesses operating and the over 80,000 American citizens living in Hong Kong. We need to make sure that our actions

aren't indirectly strengthening Beijing's grip on Hong Kong's politics or its governance.

I had proposed changes to this legislation during our markup to address some of these concerns, but, unfortunately, these were not accepted by the majority.

After this bill passes, I hope that the executive branch and Congress can consider these issues together in a bipartisan manner so that we have one voice and so that with that one voice we may hold Beijing and Hong Kong accountable and protect American interests with one voice.

Finally, I will thank Representatives CHRIS SMITH for all of his hard work on the bill as well as Representative JIM MCGOVERN for introducing this important piece of legislation. In that spirit, I encourage all of my colleagues to support this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. SMITH), who is a tireless champion for human rights. He is the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, and he is the author of this bill.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend for yielding, and I thank him for his leadership, as well as the leadership of Mr. MEEKS and, of course, Chairman MCCAUL.

As the prime author of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, which I first introduced in 2014 when the umbrella revolution was occurring, many of us thought that if we did not take definitive actions, then Hong Kong would be lost.

Unfortunately, Congress refused for years to bring up that bill. We did get it enacted into law, but it was a day late and a dollar short. However, this legislation, H.R. 1103, is a necessary next step in tangibly demonstrating our solidarity with the persecuted citizens of Hong Kong.

I want to thank JIM MCGOVERN, my friend and colleague, for cosponsoring it. It is a bipartisan bill, and, again, I appreciate Mr. MEEKS' statement just a moment ago.

At one time, the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices in the United States represented a city whose prosperity was based on its protection of fundamental human rights and freedom of the Hong Kong people.

The U.S. gifted these offices, commonly known as HKETOs for short, with diplomatic privileges and immunities on the assumption that Hong Kong would remain free from Communist rule. However, 3 years after the CCP imposed the national security law on Hong Kong, we must deal with this new reality. The Hong Kong all of us knew, loved, and respected is gone. The city that was once a bastion of freedom in a sea of oppression is now governed by CCP puppets who have become as repressive as their masters in Beijing.

Hong Kong unjustly detains political prisoners at a rate only surpassed by a handful of dictatorships such as Belarus and Burma. There are over 1,000 political prisoners in Hong Kong today. Renowned pro-democracy figures like Jimmy Lai—I actually chaired a hearing where we heard from his son, Sebastien, pleading with the world to speak up on behalf of his father—is now languishing in prison.

Joshua Wong, whom we all met with during the great days when it looked like democracy was going to be protected, he, too, is languishing, as well as Tonyee Chow and so many others who are living in these horrible gulags in Hong Kong.

□ 1745

But most of Hong Kong's political prisoners actually are unknown. They are university and high school students, medical workers, first responders, lawyers, teachers, moms and dads, businesspeople, journalists, and municipal policymakers jailed and sometimes tortured for peacefully demonstrating and organizing to protect democracy and human rights.

The HKETOs are complicit in persecuting them. These offices serve as Beijing's propaganda arm in the United States, defending and dismantling the freedom of Hong Kong and obscuring the truth.

In addition, HKETOs help the Chinese Communist Party track exiled Hong Kong activists in our own country. Anna Kwok, the executive director of the Hong Kong Democracy Council, testified at one of my China hearings and made very clear that they are using these so-called economic leaders to track individuals and to hold family members and the like responsible back in the PRC as well as to put bounties on these individuals.

This must stop, Mr. Speaker. The United States should not be granting diplomatic privileges and immunities to a network of Communist spies and propagandists.

I spent a whole day reading each of the three HKETO websites. It was filled—overflowing with lies and deception, especially about the National Security Act, which is as draconian as any law that has ever been enacted.

I do hope Members will support this. Even during last year's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in San Francisco, who was organizing the counterprotests to the wonderful men and women of Hong Kong simply demanding freedom and democracy? Yes. It was HKETO there.

Mr. Speaker, I urge Members to support H.R. 1103.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, over the last year alone, we have seen Beijing and Hong Kong authorities crack down further on dissent and free expression at home and abroad.

In March, they enacted national security legislation under article 23 of

the Basic Law to once again fundamentally erode the rights and freedoms of Hong Kongers.

I am also especially concerned about Beijing's use of transnational repression on our shores, where we have seen democracy advocates, including a U.S. citizen, charged under the national security law, with rewards offered for their capture.

This bill is necessary right now because we need to ensure that Hong Kong's economic and trade offices in the United States are not being used by Beijing to execute its transnational repression here in the United States against those simply standing for freedom and democracy.

I hope all of our colleagues will join all of us here on the floor in supporting this timely and important bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time for the purpose of closing.

Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. SMITH as well as Mr. MCGOVERN and their bipartisan cosponsors for bringing this bill forward.

The tragedy that has unfolded in Hong Kong and the ripping up of an international treaty by the Chinese Communist Party is a stark lesson that Beijing cannot be trusted, which we have to learn, especially when it comes to deterrence in Taiwan. We cannot allow what happened in Hong Kong to happen to the democracy in Taiwan.

We also cannot allow the Chinese Communist Party to use Hong Kong's economic and trade offices as a back door into the United States. They must not be able to use the preferential treatment previously afforded to the city and society they continue to brutalize and oppress.

For these and many other reasons, I urge all Members to vote in favor of H.R. 1103, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1103, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE PREVENTION ACT

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 8361) to impose sanctions with respect to economic or industrial espionage by foreign adversarial companies, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 8361

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Economic Espionage Prevention Act".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) On March 14, 2024, the Department of State notified Congress of the following:

(A) People's Republic of China exports of semiconductors to Russia have increased substantially since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

(B) In the second half of 2023, China exported between \$25,000,000 and \$50,000,000 in additional semiconductors to Russia every month relative to pre-invasion levels.

(C) During the same period, China also exported between \$50,000,000 and \$100,000,000 in additional exports to Russia every month to known transshipment hubs.

(D) These exports include both Chinese and United States-branded semiconductors (integrated circuits), according to analysis of commercially available trade data by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce, and are almost certainly supporting Russia's military capabilities based on Ukrainian analysis of recovered Russian weapons.

(E) Because of the prevalence of United States manufacturing equipment in global semiconductor supply chains, nearly all chips produced worldwide, including in the People's Republic of China, are subject to United States export controls if destined for Russia or Belarus.

(F) All advanced semiconductors described on the Commerce Control List have been subject to a license requirement if destined to an entity in Russia since its further invasion of Ukraine.

(2) On April 3, 2024, Deputy Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell, said "I think we have assessed, over the course of the last couple of months that Russia has almost completely reconstituted militarily. And after the initial setbacks on the battlefield delivered to them by a brave and hearty group in Ukraine, with the support of China in particular, dual use capabilities and a variety of other efforts, industrial and commercial, Russia has retooled and now poses a threat to Ukraine. . . . But not just to Ukraine, its new found capabilities pose a longer term challenge to stability in Europe and threatens NATO allies."

SEC. 3. REPORT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, a written report that contains the following:

(1) An analysis and description of the extent to which any foreign person who is a citizen of the People's Republic of China or an entity organized under the laws of the People's Republic of China, or any foreign person or entity controlled by or operating at the direction of the Government of the People's Republic of China—

(A) is knowingly a material source of critical components necessary for the manufacture of weapons, vehicles, and other military equipment by the defense industrial base of the Russian Federation;

(B) has knowingly delivered critical components to or entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery of critical components with any entity operating in the de-

fense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation;

(C) has knowingly delivered critical components to or entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery of critical components with any country or entity with which the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of Russian Federation are cooperating in support of Russia's war against Ukraine; or

(D) has knowingly delivered critical components to or entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery of critical components with a foreign person that knowingly and directly provides these components to the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation.

(2) The extent to which—

(A) any foreign person that is a citizen of the People's Republic of China or an entity organized under the laws of the People's Republic of China has knowingly engaged, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, in transactions with a person that is part of, or operates on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation;

(B) any foreign person identified pursuant to subparagraph (A) has engaged in transactions which would constitute a significant transaction with persons that have been sanctioned for being part of, or operating on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation; or

(C) any foreign person identified pursuant to subparagraph (A) has been subjected to sanctions imposed pursuant to sections 231 and 235 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9525 and 9529).

(b) FORM AND AVAILABILITY.—

(1) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(2) AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified portion of the report required by subsection (a) may also be made available to the public.

SEC. 4. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ECONOMIC OR INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE BY FOREIGN ADVERSARY ENTITIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President (a) may impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) against any of the foreign persons described in subsection (b).

(b) FOREIGN PERSONS DESCRIBED.—A foreign person is described in this subsection if the President determines on or after the date of the enactment of this Act that the person is a foreign adversary entity that knowingly engages in—

(1) economic or industrial espionage with respect to trade secrets or proprietary information owned by United States persons;

(2) the provision of material support or services to a foreign adversaries' military, intelligence, or other national security entities; or

(3) the violation of United States export control laws.

(c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions that may be imposed with respect to a foreign person under subsection (b) are the following:

(1) PROPERTY BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An alien described in subsection (b) is—

- (i) inadmissible to the United States;
- (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and
- (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—An alien described in subsection (b) is subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revocation under clause (i) shall take effect immediately and automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien's possession.

(d) EXCEPTIONS.—

(1) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

(2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Sanctions under subsection (c)(2) shall not apply with respect to the admission of an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with—

(A) the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States; or

(B) other applicable international obligations.

(3) EXCEPTION TO CARRY OUT OR ASSIST LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under subsection (c)(2) shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States.

(e) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person for renewable periods of not more than 180 days each if the President determines and submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains a determination of the President that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States.

(f) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise the authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to the extent necessary to carry out this section.

(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (a) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

(3) PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES FOR SANCTIONS.—The President shall establish procedures and guidelines for the implementation and enforcement of sanctions imposed under this section.

(4) ANNUAL REPORT.—

(A) Unless the exception in subparagraph (B) applies, not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and for

each of the 5 years thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on any notable developments regarding economic or industrial espionage activities by foreign persons.

(B) The President shall not be required to submit the annual report described by subparagraph (A) if the President has imposed sanctions as authorized under this section within the previous calendar year.

(g) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—For purposes of this section, a transaction shall not be construed to include participation in an international standards-setting body or the activities of such a body.

SEC. 5. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS.

Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)—

(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “, directly or indirectly”;

(B) in paragraph (3)—

(i) by striking “including but not limited to” and all that follows through “news wire feeds.” and inserting “except to the extent that the President determines that such imports and exports would seriously impair his ability to deal with any national emergency declared under section 202.”; and

(ii) by striking “under section 5 of the Export Administration Act of 1979, or under section 6 of such Act” and inserting “under other statutory or regulatory export control authorities”; and

(C) in paragraph (4), by inserting “, except to the extent that the President determines that such imports and exports would seriously impair the ability to deal with any national emergency declared under section 202” before the period at the end; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(d) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION RELATING TO SENSITIVE AND PERSONAL DATA.—The communication, the importation to a country, or the exportation from a country, directly or indirectly, whether commercial or otherwise, of bulk sensitive personal data or of source code used in a connected software application may not be construed to constitute—

“(1) a ‘postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication’, for purposes of subsection (b)(1); or

“(2) an importation from a country, or an exportation to a country, of ‘information or informational materials’, for purposes of subsection (b)(3).”.

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(2) ECONOMIC OR INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE.—The term “economic or industrial espionage” has the meaning given that term in section 1637(d) of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015.

(3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign person” means any person that is not a United States person.

(4) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly”, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.

(5) OWN, PROPRIETARY INFORMATION, AND TRADE SECRET.—The terms “own”, “proprietary information”, and “trade secret” have the meanings given those terms in section 1637(d) of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Author-

ization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (50 U.S.C. 1708(d)).

(6) PERSON.—The term “person” means an individual or entity.

(7) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

(8) FOREIGN ADVERSARY.—The term “foreign adversary” means the countries listed in section 7.4 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kentucky?

There was no objection.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 8361, the Economic Espionage Prevention Act, introduced by my colleague and friend from Georgia, Mr. MCCORMICK.

Today, our adversaries are working more closely than ever before. The Chinese Communist Party is providing massive industrial and economic support to Russia's renewed invasion of Ukraine.

In fact, our State Department assesses that in the second half of 2023, China supported the transfer of nearly \$300 million worth of semiconductors to Russia, including for use in missiles and drones.

Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said: “I think we have assessed over the course of the last couple of months that Russia has almost completely reconstituted militarily . . . with the support of China in particular.”

The Economic Espionage Prevention Act is therefore essential to changing the nature of the battlefield in Ukraine. This bill addresses cooperation between the CCP and Russia's defense industrial base by providing for sanctions against Chinese and Iranian individuals and entities that violate U.S. export control laws, engage in economic or industrial espionage, or support the Russian defense industrial base.

The bill also requires the State Department to issue a report identifying Chinese individuals and entities that are supporting the Russian defense industrial base.

The United States and our allies cannot stand for China's decisive support

of Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. The Chinese companies providing that support must be subjected to the full weight of our sanctions regime.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC, September 3, 2024.

Hon. MICHAEL MCCAUL,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN MCCAUL: I write regarding H.R. 8361, the Economic Espionage Prevention Act. Provisions of this bill fall within the Judiciary Committee's rule X jurisdiction, and I appreciate that you consulted with us on those provisions. The Judiciary Committee agrees that it shall be discharged from further consideration of the bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

The Committee takes this action with the understanding that forgoing further consideration of this measure does not in any way alter the Committee's jurisdiction or waive any future jurisdictional claim over these provisions or their subject matter. We also reserve the right to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees in the event of a conference with the Senate involving this measure or similar legislation.

I ask that you please include this letter in your committee's report to accompany this legislation or insert this letter in the Congressional Record during consideration of H.R. 8361 on the House floor. I appreciate the cooperative manner in which our committees have worked on this matter, and I look forward to working collaboratively in the future on matters of shared jurisdiction. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Sincerely,

JIM JORDAN,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, September 6, 2024.

Hon. JIM JORDAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN JORDAN: Thank you for consulting with the Foreign Affairs Committee and agreeing to be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 8361, the Economic Espionage Prevention Act, so that the measure may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of your committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives on this measure or similar legislation in the future. I would support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate conference on this legislation.

I will seek to place our letters on this bill into the Congressional Record during floor consideration. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward to continuing to work together as this measure moves through the legislative process.

Sincerely,
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL,
Chairman.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 8361, as amended, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, 2½ years ago, we saw an unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine by Russia, an act that has de-

stabilized Europe and challenged the principles of sovereignty and self-determination. This blatant aggression is a direct attack on the international order that has kept the peace for decades.

Though Russia's illegal behavior is uniquely indefensible, countries such as China that have aggressively done business with the Russian military-industrial defense base are certainly not blameless.

The United States Government, including the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in a bipartisan manner, has engaged in extensive diplomacy to discourage countries from providing financial and material support for the Russian invasion.

The Biden-Harris administration has also used economic statecraft, including expansive export controls, to prevent key dual-use electronics items from reaching Moscow. Full blocking sanctions are a particularly formidable economic weapon, and the Biden-Harris administration has begun to use this part of the arsenal.

Bipartisan support for this legislation affirms that position, and financial sanctions must be on the table.

Finally, by imposing sanctions on the PRC and other entities that are fueling Russia's military machine, we send a clear message: We will not stand idly by while Ukraine's sovereignty is trampled.

This bill underscores the importance of unity among nations in opposing tyranny and supporting democracy.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to support this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. MCCORMICK), a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the author of this bill.

Mr. MCCORMICK. Mr. Speaker, since illegally invading Ukraine, the Russian Federation has become reliant on the People's Republic of China for the supply of semiconductors and other critical dual-use technologies.

The State Department notified Congress this March that the PRC exports of semiconductors significantly increased last year compared to the pre-invasion levels.

These semiconductors are critical to aspects of the Russian war effort, including electronic warfare, command and control, and targeting. These components allow Russia to terrorize Ukrainian civilians with ballistic missile strikes at will.

The prevalence of U.S. manufacturing equipment in global semiconductor production means nearly all are subject to U.S. export controls if destined for Russia or Belarus.

My bill seeks to reduce Russia's access to these semiconductors by authorizing sanctions on foreign countries and adversaries that materially support Russia's military and intelligence services, violate U.S. export laws, and steal U.S. intellectual property.

It further requires a report on whether China is providing significant support to Russia's military and updates existing law to provide greater flexibility to pursue sanctions against China and other foreign adversaries if they violate these export controls.

The PRC may publicly claim that they do not provide material support to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but their continued provision of dual-use technologies with military applications demonstrates otherwise.

Cutting off the supply of semiconductors will seriously hamper the Russian war effort and show the world that we will not allow our adversaries to work together in destroying sovereign nations and undermining the international system.

I thank Chairman MCCAUL, Ranking Member MEEKS, and my bipartisan colleagues on the Committee on Foreign Affairs for supporting the bill before us today. I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 8361.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 8361, as amended, is a valuable bill that grants the administration important authorities with necessary flexibility to sanction the PRC and other foreign businesses in league with the Russian defense industry base. I think this is something we all agree upon, and I urge all of my colleagues to vote "yea" on this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I thank Representative MCCORMICK for his bill and for his service, as well as Chairman MCCAUL, Ranking Member MEEKS, and Judiciary Committee Chairman JIM JORDAN for working to bring this bipartisan bill to the floor to ensure that we address China's support for Russia's defense industrial base.

There should be no doubt that the Chinese Communists are aiding and abetting Putin in his illegal aggression against Ukraine. General Secretary Xi and Putin have described the bilateral alliance between the PRC and Russia as a no-limits relationship. The material support that China is providing Russia with the semiconductors is evidence of that.

Mr. Speaker, that is why I urge all Members to support H.R. 8361, and I yield back the balance of my time.

□ 1800

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 8361, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENT ENHANCED CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION ACT OF 2024

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 5245) to amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 to require certain congressional notification prior to entering into, renewing, or extending a science and technology agreement with the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 5245

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Science and Technology Agreement Enhanced Congressional Notification Act of 2024".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The signing and implementation of the agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of China, known as the "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Cooperation in Science and Technology", signed in Washington on January 31, 1979 ("CST Agreement"), and its many subsequent implementing arrangements, has led to the development of many science and technology programs.

(2) Section 1207 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) required the Secretary of State to publish biennial reports detailing how the CST Agreement has benefited the economy, military, and industrial base of the People's Republic of China, a requirement that was repealed by Congress in 2016.

(3) The CST Agreement was last extended in 2018 by the Trump Administration after amending it to address United States concerns about the science and technology practices of the People's Republic of China.

(4) The People's Republic of China has restricted United States researcher access in China despite its commitments in the CST Agreement otherwise. This includes reportedly withholding avian influenza strains vital for United States vaccine development and cutting off United States access to coronavirus research in 2019, including United States-funded work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) science and technology cooperation with the People's Republic of China can be a useful tool of United States foreign policy and should be pursued when it reinforces and advances the values and interests of the United States;

(2) no research undertaken as part of a science and technology agreement should enable the People's Republic of China's development of dual-use and critical technologies that threaten United States national security;

(3) a science and technology agreement with the People's Republic of China should include human rights protections and projects undertaken as part of it should not directly or indirectly enable human rights abuses, including the persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang;

(4) a science and technology agreement with the People's Republic of China should include provisions to safeguard the safety of United States researchers and their intellectual property, as well as enhance their research access in China; and

(5) any renewal, extension, or changes to the CST Agreement should be made to ensure that United States and Chinese joint research is safer and remains beneficial for United States interests.

SEC. 3. ENHANCED CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION REGARDING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) NOTIFICATION REQUIRED.—Not later than 15 days before the date on which a renewal or extension of the CST Agreement, or the entry into or a renewal or extension of any other science and technology agreement with the Government of the People's Republic of China or an entity of the People's Republic of China, enters into effect, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a notification containing each of the matters described in subsection (b).

(b) MATTERS DESCRIBED.—The matters described in this subsection are, with respect to the science and technology agreement for which a notification is submitted under subsection (a), the following:

(1) The full text of such agreement and any annexes or side letters.

(2) A detailed justification for such agreement, including an explanation of the reasons for which entering into, renewing, or extending such agreement, as applicable, is in the national interest of the United States.

(3) An assessment of any risks posed by such agreement, and the checks it includes to prevent the transfer of technology or intellectual property capable of—

(A) harming the national security interests of the United States; or

(B) enabling of the People's Republic of China's military-civil fusion strategy.

(4) An explanation for how the Secretary of State intends to build in human rights protections for any scientific and technology collaboration conducted under such agreement.

(5) An assessment of the ways in which the Secretary will be able to prescribe terms for, and continuously monitor, the commitments and contracts made by the Government of the People's Republic of China or entity of the People's Republic of China under such agreement.

(6) A summary of changes or updates to the agreement that were secured to strengthen the United States ability to engage in science cooperation with the People's Republic of China in a way that is safer, more beneficial for the United States, or allows for stronger United States oversight over joint research.

(7) Such other information relating to such agreement as the Secretary of State may determine appropriate.

(c) APPLICABILITY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The notification requirements under subsection (a) shall apply with respect to any science and technology agreements entered into, renewed, or extended on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) EXISTING AGREEMENTS.—For any science and technology agreement between the United States Government and the People's Republic of China that is in effect as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes each of the matters described in subsection (b) with respect to such existing agreement, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 4. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to Congress a report on—

(1) the implementation of each science and technology agreement with the People's Republic of China, including implementing arrangements, entered into pursuant to the notification requirements under section 3; and

(2) all activities conducted under each such agreement.

(b) CONTENTS.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall also include each of the following:

(1) An accounting of all joint projects and initiatives conducted under the CST Agreement and its implementing arrangements since the previous report (or, in the case of the first report, since the CST Agreement was entered into), including the name of each project, agreement, or implementing arrangement.

(2) An evaluation of the benefits of the CST Agreement to the United States economy, scientific leadership, innovation capacity, and industrial base of the United States.

(3) An estimate of the costs to the United States to administer the CST Agreement during the period covered by the report.

(4) An evaluation of the benefits of the CST Agreement to the economy, to the military, and to the industrial base of the People's Republic of China.

(5) An assessment of how the CST Agreement has influenced the foreign and domestic policies and scientific capabilities of the People's Republic of China.

(6) Any plans of the Secretary of State for improving the monitoring of the activities and the People's Republic of China's commitments established under the CST Agreement.

(7) An assessment of any potential risks posed by ongoing science cooperation with the People's Republic of China.

(c) FORM.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form and may include a classified annex.

SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(2) CST AGREEMENT.—The term "CST Agreement" means the agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of China known as the "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Cooperation in Science and Technology", signed in Washington on January 31, 1979, and its protocols, as well as any sub-agreements entered into pursuant to such Agreement on or before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) IMPLEMENTING ARRANGEMENT.—The term "implementing arrangement", with respect to the CST Agreement or any other science and technology agreement, includes any sub-agreement or sub-arrangement entered into under the CST Agreement or other science and technology agreement between—

(A) any Federal governmental entity of the United States; and

(B) any governmental entity of the People's Republic of China, including state-owned research institutions.

(4) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENT.—The term "science and technology agreement" means any treaty, memorandum of

understanding, or other contract or agreement between the United States and 1 or more foreign countries for the purpose of collaborating on or otherwise engaging in joint activities relating to scientific research, technological development, or the sharing of scientific or technical knowledge or resources between such countries.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kentucky?

There was no objection.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of my bill, H.R. 5245, the Science and Technology Agreement Enhanced Congressional Notification Act.

In 2012, General Keith Alexander said that China's theft of industrial information and intellectual property through cyber espionage constituted the greatest transfer of wealth in history. The annual cost to the U.S. economy of China's intellectual property theft is between \$225 billion and \$600 billion.

China is using this access to American science and technology, including academic and research partnerships, to support state-owned or controlled national champions in key dual-use technologies.

In 1979, the United States and China signed a bilateral agreement to build science and technology ties between the two countries.

In 2018, the agreement was amended to address U.S. concerns about China's approach to technology, innovation, and practices of concern, including IP theft and forced technology transfer.

In February of 2024, the two sides agreed to another 6-month extension of the agreement to negotiate renewal terms, which actually expired on August 27.

This current lapse in the agreement provides the ideal context for Congress to assert our oversight responsibilities to ensure that any subsequent agreement does not threaten U.S. national security and American intellectual property.

Let's take a step back and review why we are here at this moment. Why is this a problem today?

Well, in his authoritative and influential book, "The Hundred-Year Marathon," Michael Pillsbury recounts key historical events since the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949, in which China embarked on this 100-year marathon to displace the United States as the world's global superpower.

In this book, he writes about this science and technology agreement and the mistake that was made, dating back to 1978.

Here is what he says: "In 1978, relations with the United States moved toward normalization—that is, official American recognition of Communist China as the legitimate government of the Chinese people. That year, Deng focused immediately on what was at the top of his American wish list: science and technology. This was an example of the Warring States concept known as *wu wei*, or having others do your work.

"As he formulated a strategy in 1978, Deng understood, as he put it, that 'technology is the number one productive force' for economic growth. The only way China could pass the United States as an economic power, Deng believed, was through massive scientific and technological development. An essential shortcut would be to take what the Americans already had. Deng found a willing partner in that effort in a new American President, Jimmy Carter, who was eager to achieve the diplomatic coup of a formal Sino-American partnership."

Later in that same chapter, he continues: "On January 31, 1979, during his visit to the United States, Deng and Fang Yi, director of the State Science and Technology Commission, signed agreements with the U.S. Government to speed up scientific exchanges. That year, the first 50 Chinese students flew to America. In the first 5 years of exchanges, some 19,000 Chinese students would study at American universities, mainly in the physical sciences, health sciences, and engineering, and their numbers would continue to increase.

"Carter and Deng also signed agreements on consular offices, trade, science, and technology—with the United States providing all sorts of scientific and technical knowledge to Chinese scientists in what would amount to the greatest outpouring of American scientific and technological expertise in history."

Mr. Speaker, we now know that was a massive, massive mistake. This bill establishes new oversight tools to create transparency and accountability in U.S.-China relations by requiring congressional notification of any scientific and technological partnership agreements between the two nations.

Under this bill, the State Department would be required to inform the House Foreign Affairs Committee 15 days before renewing the agreement, including the contents of the deal, national security concerns, and how the agreement addresses human rights concerns.

Science and technology are central to U.S.-China strategic competition, which are shaping the course of this century. Thus, Congress must exercise its oversight authority to ensure that U.S. national security and foreign policy interests are protected.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the Science and Technology

Agreement Enhanced Congressional Notification Act, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 5245, as amended, and yield myself such time as I may consume.

First, let me thank Representatives ANDY BARR and DINA TITUS for their leadership in developing this bill. I also thank Chairman MCCAUL for his collaboration in bringing this bill to a bipartisan consensus, ensuring that we have the necessary oversight over any U.S.-China governmental science cooperation.

We all know the challenges posed by the People's Republic of China. The Biden-Harris administration and this body are clear-eyed that the PRC is the only competitor with intent and means to reshape the rules-based international order.

To advance our interests, we must manage this critical relationship with shrewd diplomacy, not fear. This is why we must continue to engage China and find areas of cooperation where possible, even as we vigorously compete with and, where necessary, confront Beijing.

Since the U.S.-China Science and Technology Agreement was originally signed in 1979, the first bilateral agreement following our diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China, it has benefited the United States, China, and the global community.

Research collaborations have prevented disease, reduced pollution, and deepened our understanding of the Earth's history. The agreement has been renewed every 5 years or so under both Republican and Democratic administrations.

Mr. BARR's bill allows Congress to address robust oversight over the current and any updated U.S.-China Science and Technology Agreement, and it requires the State Department to ensure the agreement benefits the United States and includes standards and safeguards to protect the United States' interests.

It also enables Congress to monitor and track projects taking place under the agreement to ensure that they are consistent with U.S. values and interests. Therefore, it is for these reasons that we must pass H.R. 5245. This bill will allow Congress to effectively monitor the limited joint projects we do have with China, assess whether Beijing is living up to its commitments as part of the agreement, and ensure that American researchers, intellectual property, and data are adequately protected.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage all of my colleagues to support this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I have no additional speakers. I am prepared to close.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to close.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the House to pass H.R. 5245, as amended, so that we may

strengthen oversight of any U.S.-China science and technological agreements. These are routine mechanisms that lay out the rules of the road for government-to-government cooperation, providing a set of bilateral accepted standards, rules, and protections that guide any collaboration and provide access and protection for researchers, for data, and intellectual property.

We must continue to modernize the safeguards for government-to-government cooperation to manage the heightened risks in the case of China, while preserving space for scientific inquiry and innovations that may benefit us all.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bill. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

In closing, I thank Chairman MCCAUL, Ranking Member MEEKS, and the bipartisan membership of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who voted 50-0 to move this bill forward.

Regrettably, in the 1970s, when the United States extended the hand of peace, extended the hand of cooperation in advancement of science and technology for the advancement of mankind, that was not reciprocated. In fact, instead, the Chinese Communist Party rejected peace and cooperation and stole intellectual property and militarized that technology in a very hostile way.

Congress must ensure that any new science and technology agreements with China safeguard the interests, the property, and the values of the American people.

Mr. Speaker, for that reason, I urge unanimous support for this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 5245, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

SANCTIONS LISTS HARMONIZATION ACT

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 5613) to require a review of whether individuals or entities subject to the imposition of certain sanctions through inclusion on certain sanctions lists should also be subject to the imposition of other sanctions and included on other sanctions lists, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 5613

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Sanctions Lists Harmonization Act".

SEC. 2. REQUIREMENTS TO INCLUDE INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES SUBJECT TO UNITED STATES SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN OTHER SANCTIONS LISTS.

(a) NOTIFICATION TO OTHER FEDERAL OFFICIALS.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which an individual or entity is included on one of the lists described in subsection (d), the Federal official responsible for administering such list shall notify the Federal officials responsible for administering the other lists described in subsection (d) of the inclusion of the individual or entity on such list.

(b) DETERMINATION AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF OTHER FEDERAL OFFICIAL.—

(1) REVIEW.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which a Federal official receives a notification under subsection (a) of the inclusion of an individual or entity on one of the lists described in subsection (d), such Federal official shall initiate a review regarding whether such individual or entity warrants inclusion on such other lists.

(2) DETERMINATION.—Not later than 90 days after the date on which a Federal official receives a notification under subsection (a) of the inclusion of an individual or entity on one of the lists described in subsection (d), such Federal official shall make a determination of whether to include such individual or entity on such other lists.

(c) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the enactment of this Act, each Federal agency maintaining a list described in subsection (d) shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report—

(A) certifying compliance with subsections (a) and (b) of this section;

(B) explaining the agency's deliberative process to meet the requirements in subsections (a) and (b); and

(C) enumerating any instances in which the requirements in subsections (a) and (b) led to the inclusion of additional individuals or entities to one of the lists described in subsection (d).

(2) FORM.—The report required by this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(d) LISTS DESCRIBED.—The lists described in this subsection are the following:

(1) The list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury.

(2) The list maintained and set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations (commonly known as the "Entity List").

(3) The Department of Defense's list maintained and published under 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 U.S.C. 113 note).

(4) The Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies (NS-CMIC) List of the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury.

(5) The Sectoral Sanctions List of the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury.

(6) The Military End User List of the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce.

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate.

(2) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS.—The term "Export Administration Regulations" means the regulations set forth in subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, or successor regulations.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kentucky?

There was no objection.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. WALTZ), the author of this bill.

Mr. WALTZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to urge passage of my bill, H.R. 5613, the Sanctions Lists Harmonization Act.

Mr. Speaker, sanctions are a critical tool in America's foreign policy toolkit, and that has been the case really since the end of World War II.

Unfortunately, the U.S. faces significant challenges in coordinating its sanction policy to support our national security objectives. For example, entities that we sanction in the U.S. are not similarly sanctioned by our allies in Europe, even when our policies are aligned. We spend a significant amount of time and effort coordinating these actions to target actors like Iran and other malign actors, even when we are all rowing in the same direction.

Mr. Speaker, it is often even worse than that. We don't even coordinate within our own government. Under current law, our Federal agencies are not required to communicate with each other when foreign entities are added to their sanctions lists.

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For example, if the Department of Defense has concerns and they communicate those concerns, an entity may be denied an export license by the Department of Commerce but then still allowed to conduct banking transactions regulated by Treasury.

Mr. Speaker, there are many other examples, but at the very least, our agencies should proactively notify and coordinate with one another to maximize the penalties to these bad actors when it makes sense.

My bill simply requires the Department of Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Defense to notify each other and communicate with each other within 30 days

when placing a foreign entity on certain sanctions lists, whether it is with the Office of Foreign Asset Control, OFAC, BIS, or somewhere else.

From there, these other agencies would then have to determine whether that entity that is sanctioned should be added to their own sanctions list.

It is required, Mr. Speaker. It is not optional. It is not when the agency gets around to it, if ever. It is required.

Subsequently, each agency will be required to submit a report to Congress specifying which entities they chose to include on their list and explaining their process.

Let me be clear: This bill does not mandate inclusion of any entity on any list. It doesn't tie the hand of the executive branch, but it does require the executive branch agencies to communicate with each other.

I view this as a simple way for the interagency to coordinate, maximize penalties on foreign bad actors, close loopholes they may take advantage of, and it also creates the bureaucratic incentive to better coordinate our sanctions process.

Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman MCCAUL for his leadership and Ranking Member MEEKS for working with us to get this language to a bipartisan agreement in the Foreign Affairs Committee. I urge its swift passage on the floor.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to close, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 5613, as amended.

The U.S. Government operates many lists of foreign companies run by different departments with different departments. This is entirely appropriate. A North Korean nuclear proliferation agency is not the same as an unverified South Korean company.

While we may want to place restrictions on both, at least temporarily, the penalties and consequences should differ accordingly. The purpose of this bill is straightforward.

When one agency, like the Department of Commerce, lists a foreign entity, it ensures that other agencies, such as the Department of Defense, are formally notified. The right hand simply needs to know what the left hand is doing.

We need smart and effective policies, not a one-size-fits-all approach, particularly when it comes to economic statecraft and especially in our competition with China.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to support this bill. Also, since the gentleman said that he was prepared to close, that is my closing. It is my opening and my closing.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Well done, my friend, from New York for opening and closing.

Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend and colleague, Congressman WALTZ, for his leadership on this. This is a good bill. This is something we need to do. We need to force harmonization, coordination on the interagency. We have a lot of different lists. We have got the Treasury's Chinese Military-Industrial Complex List. We have the entity list at Commerce BIS. We have the Military End User List at Commerce. We have the 1260H list at DOD. We need this bill. We need better coordination.

I thank Chairman MCCAUL and Armed Services Committee Chairman ROGERS for their leadership in moving this bill to the floor today. I hope that all of our colleagues will join us in ensuring that U.S. sanctions remain a powerful tool for defending our interests and values against those who seek to undermine democracy, security, and human rights around the world. Until we get outbound sanctions legislation, this is a good placeholder.

Mr. Speaker, I urge unanimous support for H.R. 5613, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 5613, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

REMOTE ACCESS SECURITY ACT

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 8152) to amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 to provide for control of remote access of items, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 8152

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Remote Access Security Act".

SEC. 2. CONTROL OF REMOTE ACCESS OF ITEMS UNDER THE EXPORT CONTROL REFORM ACT OF 2018.

The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 is amended—

(1) in section 1742 (50 U.S.C. 4801), by adding at the end the following:

"(15) REMOTE ACCESS.—The term 'remote access' means access to an item that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (without regard to the physical location of the item) and included on the Commerce Control List set forth in Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the Export Administration Regulations, by a foreign person through a network connection, including the internet or a cloud computing service, from a location other than where the item is physically located, to use the functions of the item if the use of those functions may pose a serious risk to the national security or foreign policy of the United States, such as by—

"(A) training an artificial intelligence model that could—

"(i) substantially lower the barrier of entry for experts or non-experts to design, synthesize, acquire, or use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction;

"(ii) enable offensive cyber operations through automated vulnerability discovery and exploitation against a wide range of potential targets of cyber attacks; or

"(iii) permit the evasion of human control or oversight of automated systems through means of deception or obfuscation; or

"(B) accessing a quantum computer that could enable offensive cyber operations or other risks to national security; or

"(C) accessing hacking tools";

(2) in section 1752 (50 U.S.C. 4811)—

(A) in paragraph (1)—

(i) in subparagraph (A), by inserting "or remote access" after "export"; and

(ii) in subparagraph (B), by inserting "or remote access" after "export"; and

(B) in paragraph (2)—

(i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking "and in-country transfer of items" and inserting "in-country transfer, and remote access of items"; and

(ii) in subparagraph (A)—

(I) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking "release" and inserting "release or remote access";

(II) in clause (iv), by striking "or" and inserting a semicolon;

(III) in clause (v), by striking the period at the end and inserting "or"; and

(IV) by adding at the end the following:

"(vi) offensive cyber operations.";

(3) in section 1753 (50 U.S.C. 4812)—

(A) in subsection (a)—

(i) in paragraph (1), by striking "and" at the end;

(ii) in paragraph (2)(F), by striking the period at the end and inserting "and"; and

(iii) by adding at the end the following:

"(3) the remote access to—

"(A) items subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (without regard to the physical location of the items) that are determined by the President to warrant controls with respect to access by foreign persons or countries of concern; and

"(B) the functions of such items.";

(B) in subsection (b)—

(i) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (7) as paragraphs (4) through (8), respectively; and

(ii) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:

"(3) regulate the remote access by foreign persons of items as described in subsection (a)(3)"; and

(C) in subsection (c)—

(i) by striking "or in-country transfer" each place it appears and inserting "in-country transfer, or remote access"; and

(ii) by striking "subsections (b)(1) or (b)(2)" and inserting "subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3)";

(4) in section 1754 (50 U.S.C. 4813)—

(A) in subsection (a)—

(i) in paragraph (3), by striking "and in-country transfers" and inserting "in-country transfers, and remote access";

(ii) in paragraph (4), by striking "and in-country transfers" and inserting "in-country transfers, and remote access";

(iii) in paragraph (5), by striking "and in-country transfers" and inserting "in-country transfers, and remote access";

(iv) in paragraph (10), by striking "or in-country transferred" and inserting "in-country transferred, or remotely accessed";

(v) in paragraph (11), by adding at the end before the semicolon the following: "or remote access"; and

(vi) in paragraph (15), by adding at the end before “; and” the following: “or remotely access (including the provision thereof)”;

(B) in subsection (b), by striking “or in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, or remote access”; and

(C) in subsection (d)(1), by amending subparagraph (A) to read as follows:

“(A) the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of, or remote access to, items described in paragraph (2), or remote access to items described in section 1742(15), including, in both cases, items that are not subject to control under this part; and”.

(5) in section 1755(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 4814(b)(2))—

(A) in subparagraph (C), by striking “and in-country transfers” and inserting “in-country transfers, and remote access”; and

(B) in subparagraph (E), by striking “and in-country transfers” and inserting “in-country transfers, and remote access”; and

(6) in section 1756 (50 U.S.C. 4815)—

(A) in subsection (a), in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “and in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, and remote access”; and

(B) in subsection (b), by striking “or in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, or remote access”;

(7) in section 1757(a) (50 U.S.C. 4816(a)), by striking “or in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, or remote access”; and

(8) in section 1760 (50 U.S.C. 4819)—

(A) in subsection (a)(2)(F)(iii), by striking “or in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, or remote access”;

(B) in subsection (c)(1)(C), by striking “or in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, or remotely access (including the provision thereof)”;

(C) in subsection (e)(1)(A)—

(i) in clause (i), by striking “or in-country transfer outside the United States any item” and inserting “in-country transfer outside the United States any item, or remotely access any item”; and

(ii) in clause (ii), by striking “or in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, or remote access”;

(9) in section 1761 (50 U.S.C. 4820)—

(A) in subsection (a)(5), by striking “or in-country transferred” and inserting “in-country transferred, or remotely accessed”;

(B) in subsection (d)(2), by striking “export” each place it appears and inserting “export control”; and

(C) in subsection (h)(1)(B), by striking “or in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, or remotely access”; and

(10) in section 1767 (50 U.S.C. 4825)—

(A) in subsection (a), by striking “or reexport” and inserting “reexport, or remote access”; and

(B) in subsection (b)(2)—

(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking “and in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, and remote access”; and

(ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking “or in-country transferred” and inserting “in-country transferred, or remotely accessed”.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kentucky?

There was no objection.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 8152, the Remote Access Security Act.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. LAWLER), the author of the bill.

Mr. LAWLER. Mr. Speaker, today, I rise to urge the House to pass my bill, the Remote Access Security Act.

The U.S. export control regime exists to limit American critical technology and goods from falling into the hands of adversarial regimes and those who answer to them. Export controls are immensely important to ensure countries like China can't access U.S. advanced semi-conductor chips to enhance their own chip development, which has implications for their military capacity building, as well.

Unfortunately, there is a loophole in the current export control regime. Chinese companies have been remotely accessing tech covered by export controls, enabling the CCP to continue using U.S. chips to develop AI and modernize their military forces.

This must end.

My bill allows the Commerce Department's export controls authority to recover remote access of technology. That way, once my bill is signed into law, all exports of chips, including through the cloud, will be prohibited effectively closing the loophole.

The framework to combat China's growing tech developments already exist, but it is imperative that Commerce has the tools to make this effective.

I thank Chairman MCCAUL and all my Foreign Affairs Committee colleagues for passing this bipartisan bill through committee, and I thank the Speaker for bringing it to the floor today.

I urge all my colleagues to vote for this commonsense bill.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to close, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, over the past 3½ years, the Biden administration has imposed unprecedented export controls against China and Russia. These measures have been highly effective in restricting Beijing and Moscow's access to critical U.S. technologies that could be used to enhance their military capabilities. We know these controls are working because both nations are now seeking ways to circumvent them through various loopholes, diversion tactics, and deceptive practices.

One such loophole could involve PRC companies accessing U.S. chips remotely. Right now, our export control laws do not explicitly cover the remote access of controlled technologies through a network connection, including the internet or cloud computing services. H.R. 8152 would close that loophole.

I thank the majority for working with me to reach a bipartisan agreement on this bill. Since the markup, we have incorporated additional feedback from the administration to appropriately scope the bill and specify that offensive cyber operations against the United States are another end use that our export controls should be addressing.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I urge Members to vote in favor of 8152, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 8152, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

NO RUSSIAN TUNNEL TO CRIMEA ACT

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7701) to require the imposition of sanctions with respect to any foreign person that knowingly participates in the construction, maintenance, or repair of a tunnel or bridge that connects the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7701

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “No Russian Tunnel to Crimea Act”.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In February and March 2014, the Russian Federation invaded the Crimean peninsula and annexed Crimea, international recognized as Ukrainian territory.

(2) Following its annexation of Crimea, the Russian Federation constructed the Kerch Strait Bridge to connect the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula.

(3) On February 24, 2022, the Government of the Russian Federation, led by Vladimir Putin, launched an unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

(4) The Russian Federation has used Crimea as an integral part of its full scale invasion of Ukraine, including to house Russian troops, store ammunition and weapons, and host the Black Sea Fleet.

(5) In October 2023, it was publicly reported that Russian and Chinese business officials met and exchanged emails to discuss building a tunnel from the Russian mainland to illegally occupied Crimea.

SEC. 3. SANCTIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any foreign person that knowingly participates in the construction, maintenance, or repair of a tunnel or bridge that connects the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula.

(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—Notwithstanding the requirements of section 202 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701), the President may exercise of all powers granted to the President by that Act to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—An alien who the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or a designee of one of such Secretaries) knows, or has reason to believe, is described in subsection (a) is—

- (i) inadmissible to the United States;
- (ii) ineligible for a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and
- (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The issuing consular officer, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or a designee of one of such Secretaries) shall, in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), revoke any visa or other entry documentation issued to an alien described in subparagraph (A) regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is issued.

(ii) EFFECT OF REVOCATION.—A revocation under clause (i)—

- (I) shall take effect immediately; and
- (II) shall automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien's possession.

(c) EXCEPTIONS.—

(1) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Sanctions under subsection (b)(2) shall not apply with respect to the admission of an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations.

(2) EXCEPTION RELATING TO THE PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—Sanctions under this section may not be imposed with respect to transactions or the facilitation of transactions for—

- (A) the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices;
- (B) the provision of humanitarian assistance;
- (C) financial transactions relating to humanitarian assistance; or
- (D) transporting goods or services that are necessary to carry out operations relating to humanitarian assistance.

(3) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any authorized intelligence, law enforcement, or national security activities of the United States.

(d) CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—In any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the determination was based on classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act) such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any right to judicial review.

(e) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.

(2) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of regulations promulgated to carry out this section to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in section 206(a) of that Act.

(f) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of sanctions imposed with respect to a foreign person under this section if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days before such waiver is to take effect that the waiver is important to the national security interests of the United States.

(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

(1) the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the term “foreign person” means an individual or entity that is not a United States person; and

(3) the term “United States person” means—

- (A) a United States citizen;
- (B) a permanent resident alien of the United States;
- (C) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity; or
- (D) a person in the United States.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kentucky?

There was no objection.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 7701, the No Russian Tunnel to Crimea Act, a bipartisan bill introduced by the gentleman from New York, Ranking Member MEEKS, and the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. WILSON.

China has provided Russia with extensive dual-use goods that by the administration's own admission have helped Russia revitalize its defense industrial base, rebuild its military, and continue its genocidal campaign of aggression against Ukraine.

Aiding in the construction of repair of any infrastructure connecting Russia and Crimea would be yet another example of Chairman Xi's “no limits partnership” with Putin.

Mr. Speaker, for this reason, I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC, September 3, 2024.

Hon. MICHAEL MCCAUL,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN MCCAUL: I write regarding H.R. 7701, the No Russian Tunnel to Crimea Act. Provisions of this bill fall within the Judiciary Committee's Rule X jurisdiction, and I appreciate that you consulted with us on those provisions. The Judiciary Committee agrees that it shall be discharged from further consideration of the bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

The Committee takes this action with the understanding that forgoing further consideration of this measure does not in any way alter the Committee's jurisdiction or waive any future jurisdictional claim over these provisions or their subject matter. We also reserve the right to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees in the event of a conference with the Senate involving this measure or similar legislation.

I ask that you please include this letter in your committee's report to accompany this legislation or insert this letter in the Congressional Record during consideration of H.R. 7701 on the House floor. I appreciate the cooperative manner in which our committees have worked on this matter, and I look forward to working collaboratively in the future on matters of shared jurisdiction. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

JIM JORDAN,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, September 6, 2024.

Hon. JIM JORDAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN JORDAN: Thank you for consulting with the Foreign Affairs Committee and agreeing to be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 7701, the No Russian Tunnel to Crimea Act, so that the measure may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of your committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives on this measure or similar legislation in the future. I would support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate conference on this legislation.

I will seek to place our letters on this bill into the Congressional Record during floor consideration. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward to continuing to work together as this measure moves through the legislative process.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL,
Chairman.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation. This is the long-awaited proverbial “China week” on the House floor, so let me explain briefly why this legislation pertains to the PRC.

In February 2022, as the world turned its attention to the winter Olympics in Beijing, Vladimir Putin visited China to meet with President Xi where the two publicly declared what they called

a “no limits partnership” between Russia and China.

Just weeks after that declaration, Putin unleashed his devastating invasion of Ukraine, aimed at toppling the democratically elected government in Kyiv.

Since that time, China has played a crucial role in keeping the Kremlin’s war machine running. By purchasing Russian oil and gas in massive quantities, Beijing has funded the Kremlin coffers and the illegal invasion machine it operates. By exporting semiconductors, drones, telecommunications gear, and other strategic electronic equipment, the PRC companies have provided the technical know-how to backfill U.S. and European providers that have exited the Russian market.

Though the PRC has deepened its economic trade with Russia, including in dual-use items, it has thus far avoided directly arming Russia’s criminal war effort.

Recent reports have emerged about Russian officials meeting with leaders of major Chinese state-owned construction firms to discuss building a tunnel from Russia to Crimea. Of course, Crimea is of enormous strategic importance. Ukrainian forces have rightfully targeted this bridge multiple times, demonstrating their resilience and their determination to disrupt Russia’s illegal occupation. The construction of a tunnel linking Russia directly to Crimea would only further entrench Putin’s control over the Crimean Peninsula and bolster his war efforts.

Mr. Speaker, we have a duty to use every tool at our disposal to support Ukraine’s struggle for sovereignty and freedom. I will thank my colleague, Representative WILSON, for his partnership on this important bill. I also extend my gratitude to Chairman MCCAUL for his leadership in advancing this legislation, both at markup and now on the floor, and I thank all Members who have shown their support by cosponsoring this measure.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to support H.R. 7701, and I yield back the balance of my time.

□ 1830

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. MORAN). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 7701.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Proceedings will resume on motions to suspend the rules previously postponed.

Votes will be taken in the following order:

H.R. 1157; and
H.R. 8333.

The first electronic vote will be conducted as a 15-minute vote. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the remaining electronic vote will be conducted as a 5-minute vote.

COUNTERING THE PRC MALIGN INFLUENCE FUND AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2023

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the unfinished business is the vote on the motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1157) to provide for the authorization of appropriations for the Countering the People’s Republic of China Malign Influence Fund, and for other purposes on which the yeas and nays were ordered.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 351, nays 36, not voting 43, as follows:

[Roll No. 401]

YEAS—351

Adams	Cherfilus-	Fleischmann
Aderholt	McCormick	Fletcher
Alford	Chu	Flood
Allen	Ciscomani	Fong
Allred	Clark (MA)	Foster
Amo	Cleaver	Foushee
Amodei	Cline	Foxx
Armstrong	Clyburn	Frankel, Lois
Auchincloss	Cohen	Franklin, Scott
Babin	Cole	Frost
Bacon	Collins	Fry
Baird	Comer	Fulcher
Balderson	Connolly	Gallego
Balint	Correa	Garbarino
Banks	Costa	Garcia (TX)
Barr	Courtney	Garcia, Mike
Barragán	Craig	Garcia, Robert
Bean (FL)	Crawford	Gimenez
Beatty	Crenshaw	Golden (ME)
Bentz	Crockett	Gomez
Bera	Crow	Gonzales, Tony
Bergman	Cuellar	Gonzalez, V.
Beyer	Daids (KS)	Gooden (TX)
Bice	Davidson	Gottheimer
Bilirakis	Davis (IL)	Graves (LA)
Bishop (GA)	Davis (NC)	Graves (MO)
Bishop (NC)	De La Cruz	Green (TN)
Blumenauer	Dean (PA)	Green, Al (TX)
Bonamici	DeGette	Griffith
Bost	DeLauro	Grothman
Brecheen	DelBene	Guest
Brown	Deluzio	Guthrie
Buchanan	DeSaulnier	Harder (CA)
Budzinski	DesJarlais	Harshbarger
Burgess	Diaz-Balart	Hayes
Calvert	Dingell	Hern
Cammack	Doggett	Higgins (LA)
Caraveo	Donalds	Hill
Carbajal	Duarte	Himes
Cárdenas	Dunn (FL)	Hinson
Carey	Edwards	Horsford
Carl	Ellzey	Houchin
Carson	Emmer	Houlahan
Carter (GA)	Escobar	Hoyer
Carter (LA)	Eshoo	Hoyle (OR)
Carter (TX)	Espallat	Hudson
Cartwright	Estes	Huffman
Case	Ezell	Huizenga
Casten	Feenstra	Hunt
Castor (FL)	Finstad	Issa
Castro (TX)	Fischbach	Ivey
Chavez-DeRemer	Fitzgerald	Jackson (IL)
	Fitzpatrick	Jackson (NC)

Jackson (TX)	Miller (IL)	Sessions
Jacobs	Miller (OH)	Sewell
James	Miller (WV)	Sherman
Jeffries	Miller-Meeks	Sherrill
Johnson (SD)	Mills	Simpson
Jordan	Molinaro	Slotkin
Joyce (OH)	Moolenaar	Smith (MO)
Joyce (PA)	Moore (WI)	Smith (NE)
Kamlager-Dove	Moran	Smith (NJ)
Kaptur	Morelle	Smith (WA)
Kean (NJ)	Moskowitz	Smucker
Keating	Moulton	Sorensen
Kelly (IL)	Mrvan	Soto
Kelly (MS)	Mullin	Spanberger
Kelly (PA)	Murphy	Stansbury
Kennedy	Napolitano	Stanton
Khanna	Neal	Stauber
Kiggans (VA)	Neguse	Steel
Kildee	Nehls	Stefanik
Kiley	Newhouse	Steil
Kilmer	Nickel	Stevens
Kim (CA)	Norcross	Strickland
Krishnamoorthi	Nunn (IA)	Strong
Kuster	Obornolte	Suozi
LaHood	Owens	Swalwell
LaLota	Pallone	Sykes
Lamborn	Panetta	Takano
Landsman	Pappas	Tanney
Langworthy	Pelosi	Thanedar
Larsen (WA)	Pence	Thompson (CA)
Larson (CT)	Perez	Thompson (MS)
Latta	Peters	Thompson (PA)
LaTurner	Petterson	Timmons
Lawler	Pfluger	Titus
Lee (CA)	Phillips	Tokuda
Lee (FL)	Pingree	Tonko
Lee (NV)	Pocan	Torres (CA)
Leger Fernandez	Porter	Trahan
Letlow	Posey	Turner
Levin	Quigley	Underwood
Lieu	Raskin	Van Drew
Lofgren	Reschenthaler	Van Duyne
Lopez	Rodgers (WA)	Van Orden
Loudermilk	Rogers (AL)	Vargas
Lucas	Rogers (KY)	Vasquez
Luttrell	Rose	Veasey
Lynch	Ross	Wagner
Mace	Rouzer	Walberg
Magaziner	Ruiz	Waltz
Malliotakis	Ruppersberger	Wasserman
Mann	Rutherford	Schultz
Manning	Ryan	Watson Coleman
Mast	Salinas	Weber (TX)
Matsui	Sánchez	Webster (FL)
McBath	Sarbanes	Wenstrup
McCaul	Schakowsky	Westerman
McClain	Schiff	Wild
McClellan	Schneider	Williams (GA)
McCollum	Scholten	Williams (NY)
McGarvey	Schrier	Williams (TX)
McGovern	Schweikert	Wilson (SC)
Meeks	Scott (VA)	Wittman
Menendez	Scott, Austin	Womack
Meuser	Scott, David	Yakym
Mfume	Self	Zinke

NAYS—36

Arrington	Good (VA)	Ocasio-Cortez
Biggs	Gosar	Omar
Boebert	Greene (GA)	Palmer
Burchett	Harris	Perry
Burlison	Johnson (GA)	Pressley
Bush	Lee (PA)	Ramirez
Casar	Lesko	Rosendale
Cloud	Massie	Roy
Clyde	McClintock	Spartz
Crane	McCormick	Steube
Duncan	Moore (AL)	Tlaib
Garcia (IL)	Norman	Velázquez

NOT VOTING—43

Aguilar	Granger	Ogles
Blunt Rochester	Grijalva	Peltola
Bowman	Hagaman	Rulli
Boyle (PA)	Jayapal	Salazar
Brownley	Kim (NJ)	Scallion
Bucshon	Kustoff	Scanlon
Clarke (NY)	LaMalfa	Tiffany
Curtis	Luetkemeyer	Torres (NY)
D’Esposito	Luna	Trone
Evans	Maloy	Valadao
Fallon	McHenry	Waters
Ferguson	Meng	Wexton
Gaetz	Mooney	Wilson (FL)
Garamendi	Moore (UT)	
Goldman (NY)	Nadler	

□ 1853

Messrs. BURLISON, ARRINGTON, Mrs. RAMIREZ, Mr. DUNCAN, Ms. VELÁZQUEZ, Mr. PALMER, and Ms. BUSH changed their vote from “yea” to “nay.”

Ms. LEE of Nevada and Mrs. CHERFILUS-McCORMICK changed their vote from “nay” to “yea.”

So (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

MOMENT OF SILENCE IN REMEMBRANCE OF THE LATE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. PASCRELL, JR.

(Mr. SMITH of New Jersey asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, my colleagues and I rise to convey our deepest sorrow on the passing of our longtime friend and colleague, 14-term New Jersey Congressman Bill Pascrell of the Ninth District in New Jersey.

We offer our prayers and heartfelt condolences to his wife, Elsie, and three sons, Bill, David, and Glenn, the rest of the family, and, of course, close family friends as well.

Bill’s life was marked, Mr. Speaker, by exemplary service, having served in the United States Army, and as a high school history teacher and adjunct professor before becoming a State assemblyman for 5 terms, mayor for 2, and then Congressman for 28 years.

He was dedicated to New Jersey families and an outspoken advocate for our law enforcement community, our firefighters, and our Nation’s veterans. He is the author of the Bulletproof Vest Partnership Reauthorization.

His Firefighter Investment and Response Enhancement Act created the groundbreaking Assistance to Firefighters Grants Program, which provides funding for protective equipment, emergency vehicles, training, and other critical support for aid to our firefighters. Since its creation in 2001, this incredible program has awarded over \$10 billion to fire departments across the country, including almost \$200 million to our own State of New Jersey.

As co-chair and founder of the Congressional Brain Injury Task Force, Bill also helped lead the charge to advance brain health. His bipartisan Traumatic Brain Injury Reauthorization Act of 2018 provided critical funding to help patients with brain injuries and their families, enhance breakthrough research, and for the first time ever create a national concussion surveillance system to improve prevention, care, and recovery efforts for traumatic brain injuries.

Bill was also devoted to preserving New Jersey’s beautiful natural re-

sources and led efforts to designate Paterson Great Falls, the stunning 77-foot tall waterfall in the Passaic River as a national historic park.

Please join us in offering our heartfelt prayers for him and his family.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PALLONE), my good friend and colleague.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I thank Chris for yielding. I just thank so many people on both sides of the aisle who came to the beautiful funeral that we had for Bill Pascrell in the Cathedral of St. John the Baptist in Paterson with the Bishop.

One of the things you heard was that he spent his whole life in Paterson, New Jersey, and Paterson was how he identified: a tough, gritty, industrial city. He said what he pleased and always looked out for the little guy. That was true in Congress as well.

The things that CHRIS SMITH mentioned were all issues that the average person cared about: Having a good police force and fire department, being able to have good healthcare, consumer issues like the TICKET Act to make sure that the fans were properly cared for. This is what he was all about. He looked at Paterson and he looked at this place from the view of his neighbors.

I thank what we call the Pennsylvania corner. They are not all from Pennsylvania, but they all were his biggest boosters in Congress. He saw them as his neighbors and his close friends in the same way that he saw the city of Paterson.

I have one quote that I just have to read because it kind of summarizes everything about it. It is from the American author Tim O’Brien, who I think a lot of you know. It says: He was like America itself, big and strong, full of good intentions, always there when you needed him, a believer in simplicity, directness, and hard labor. That was Bill Pascrell.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. LARSON).

Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. As he said, he was one of us. He loved this place and so many of you. Monsignor Sylva, at that beautiful funeral that Frank was talking about, typified Bill by saying he was a man of justifiable anger.

Then he went on to say how Bill was driving someplace. He was supposed to appear at the church with the priest. He called the priest on the phone, and he said: Look, I am running about half an hour behind, could you hold the church service up until I get there? That was our guy.

The priest also went on. He had a beautiful way of putting this. He said that hope has two beautiful daughters: anger and courage—anger at the way things are and then the courage to step up and want to change that. That was Bill Pascrell at his core, as authentic, as original as they make them, not a phony bone in his body.

It should be called Pascrell’s corner, and we appreciate the flowers that were put over there today. We plan to have an event. There will be a planning committee meeting Wednesday night in the Ways and Means Committee after votes, and they will be planning not only another memorial, but we are going to have, believe it or not, a little party in honor of Bill Pascrell.

The SPEAKER. The Chair asks all those present in the Chamber as well as Members and staff throughout the Capitol to please rise for a moment of silence in remembrance of the late Honorable William J. Pascrell, Jr., of New Jersey.

BIOSECURE ACT

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the unfinished business is the vote on the motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 8333) to prohibit contracting with certain biotechnology providers, and for other purposes, as amended, on which the yeas and nays were ordered.

The Clerk read the title of the bill. The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. COMER) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, as amended.

This is a 5-minute vote. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 306, nays 81, not voting 44, as follows:

[Roll No. 402]
YEAS—306

Adams	Cherfilus-	Franklin, Scott
Aderholt	McCormick	Fry
Allen	Ciscomani	Fulcher
Allred	Cline	Gallego
Amodei	Cloud	Garbarino
Armstrong	Clyde	Garcia, Mike
Arrington	Cole	Garcia, Robert
Babin	Collins	Gimenez
Bacon	Comer	Golden (ME)
Baird	Costa	Gonzales, Tony
Balderson	Courtney	Gonzalez, V.
Banks	Craig	Good (VA)
Barr	Crane	Gooden (TX)
Bean (FL)	Crawford	Gottheimer
Bentz	Crenshaw	Graves (LA)
Bera	Crow	Graves (MO)
Bergman	Cuellar	Green (TN)
Bice	Davidson	Green, Al (TX)
Biggs	Davidson	Greene (GA)
Billirakis	Davis (NC)	Griffith
Bishop (GA)	De La Cruz	Grothman
Bishop (NC)	DelBene	Guest
Boebert	Deluzio	Guthrie
Bost	DeSaulnier	Harder (CA)
Brecheen	DesJarlais	Harris
Brown	Diaz-Balart	Harshbarger
Buchanan	Dingell	Hayes
Budzinski	Donalds	Hern
Burchett	Duarte	Higgins (LA)
Burgess	Duncan	Hill
Burlison	Edwards	Hinson
Calvert	Ellzey	Horsford
Cammack	Emmer	Houchin
Caraveo	Eshoo	Houlihan
Carbajal	Espallat	Hoyer
Carey	Estes	Hudson
Carl	Ezell	Huizenga
Carson	Feenstra	Hunt
Carter (GA)	Finstad	Issa
Carter (LA)	Fischbach	Jackson (NC)
Carter (TX)	Fitzgerald	Jackson (TX)
Cartwright	Fitzpatrick	James
Case	Fleischmann	Johnson (GA)
Castor (FL)	Flood	Johnson (LA)
Castro (TX)	Fong	Johnson (SD)
Chavez-DeRemer	Fox	Jordan
	Frankel, Lois	Joyce (OH)

Joyce (PA)	Moran	Sherman
Kaptur	Morelle	Sherrill
Kean (NJ)	Moskowitz	Simpson
Kelly (MS)	Moulton	Slotkin
Kelly (PA)	Mrvan	Smith (MO)
Kennedy	Mullin	Smith (NE)
Khanna	Murphy	Smith (NJ)
Kiggans (VA)	Napolitano	Smith (WA)
Kildee	Neguse	Smucker
Kiley	Nehls	Sorensen
Kilmer	Newhouse	Soto
Kim (CA)	Nickel	Spanberger
Krishnamoorthi	Norcross	Spartz
Kuster	Norman	Stanton
LaHood	Nunn (IA)	Stauber
LaLota	Obernoite	Steel
LaMalfa	Owens	Stefanik
Lamborn	Palmer	Steil
Landsman	Panetta	Steube
Langworthy	Pappas	Strickland
Larsen (WA)	Pelosi	Strong
Larson (CT)	Pence	Suozi
Latta	Perez	Swalwell
LaTurner	Perry	Sykes
Lawler	Peters	Tenney
Lee (FL)	Pettersen	Thanedar
Lee (NV)	Pluger	Thompson (CA)
Lesko	Phillips	Thompson (MS)
Letlow	Porter	Thompson (PA)
Levin	Posey	Timmons
Lofgren	Quigley	Titus
Lopez	Reschenthaler	Turner
Loudermilk	Rodgers (WA)	Van Drew
Lucas	Rogers (AL)	Van Dwyne
Luttrell	Rogers (KY)	Van Orden
Lynch	Rose	Vargas
Mace	Rosendale	Vasquez
Malliotakis	Ross	Veasey
Mann	Rouzer	Wagner
Manning	Roy	Walberg
Mast	Ruiz	Waltz
Matsui	Rulli	Wasserman
McBath	Ruppersberger	Schultz
McClain	Rutherford	Watson Coleman
McClintock	Ryan	Weber (TX)
McCormick	Salinas	Webster (FL)
McGarvey	Schiff	Wenstrup
Meuser	Schneider	Westerman
Miller (IL)	Scholten	Wild
Miller (OH)	Schrier	Williams (NY)
Miller (WV)	Schweikert	Williams (TX)
Miller-Meeks	Scott, Austin	Wilson (SC)
Mills	Scott, David	Wittman
Molinaro	Self	Womack
Moolenaar	Sessions	Yakym
Moore (AL)	Sewell	Zinke

NAYS—81

Amo	Fletcher	Meeks
Auchincloss	Foster	Menendez
Balint	Foushee	Mfume
Barragan	Frost	Moore (WI)
Beatty	Garcia (IL)	Neal
Beyer	Garcia (TX)	Ocasio-Cortez
Blumenauer	Gomez	Omar
Bonamici	Gosar	Pallone
Bush	Himes	Pingree
Cárdenas	Hoyle (OR)	Pocan
Casar	Huffman	Pressley
Casten	Ivey	Ramirez
Chu	Jackson (IL)	Raskin
Clark (MA)	Jacobs	Sánchez
Clarke (NY)	Jeffries	Sarbanes
Cleaver	Kamlager-Dove	Scott (VA)
Clyburn	Keating	Stansbury
Cohen	Kelly (IL)	Stevens
Cannolly	Lee (CA)	Takano
Correa	Lee (PA)	Tlaib
Crockett	Leger Fernandez	Tokuda
Davis (IL)	Lieu	Tonko
Dean (PA)	Magaziner	Torres (CA)
DeGette	Massie	Trahan
DeLauro	McClellan	Underwood
Doggett	McCollum	Velázquez
Escobar	McGovern	Williams (GA)

NOT VOTING—44

Aguilar	Ferguson	Maloy
Alford	Gaetz	McCaul
Blunt Rochester	Garamendi	McHenry
Bowman	Goldman (NY)	Meng
Boyle (PA)	Granger	Mooney
Brownley	Grijalva	Moore (UT)
Bucshon	Hageman	Nadler
Curtis	Jayapal	Ogles
D'Esposito	Kim (NJ)	Peltola
Dunn (FL)	Kustoff	Salazar
Evans	Luetkemeyer	Scalise
Fallon	Luna	Scanlon

Schakowsky	Trone	Wexton
Tiffany	Valadao	Wilson (FL)
Torres (NY)	Waters	

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. MORAN) (during the vote). There are 2 minutes remaining.

□ 1907

Mr. DOGGETT changed his vote from “yea” to “nay.”

So (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. VALADAO. Mr. Speaker, I missed tonight's vote due to travel complications. Had I been present, I would have voted YEA on Roll Call No. 401 and YEA on Roll Call No. 402.

CONTINUATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TERRORIST ATTACKS—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 118-164)

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1622(d), provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, within 90 days prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the *Federal Register* and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. Consistent with this provision, I have sent to the *Federal Register* the enclosed notice, stating that the emergency declared in Proclamation 7463 with respect to the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, is to continue in effect for an additional year.

The terrorist threat that led to the declaration on September 14, 2001, of a national emergency continues. For this reason, I have determined that it is necessary to continue in effect after September 14, 2024, the national emergency with respect to the terrorist threat.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.
THE WHITE HOUSE, September 9, 2024.

□ 1915

EXPRESSING THE PROFOUND SORROW OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON THE DEATH OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. PASCARELL, JR.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I offer a privileged resolution and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 1427

Resolved, That the House has heard with profound sorrow of the death of the Honorable William J. Pascrell, Jr., a Representative from the State of New Jersey.

from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, the Judiciary, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and House Administration, and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, within 90 days prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the *Federal Register* and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. In accordance with this provision, I have sent to the *Federal Register* for publication the enclosed notice stating that the national emergency with respect to the threat of foreign interference in or undermining public confidence in United States elections declared in Executive Order 13848 of September 12, 2018, is to continue in effect beyond September 12, 2024.

Although there has been no evidence of a foreign power altering the outcomes or vote tabulation in any United States election, foreign powers have historically sought to exploit America's free and open political system. In recent years, the proliferation of digital devices and internet-based communications has created significant vulnerabilities and magnified the scope and intensity of the threat of foreign interference. The ability of persons located, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States to interfere in or undermine public confidence in United States elections, including through the unauthorized accessing of election and campaign infrastructure or the covert distribution of propaganda and disinformation, continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. Therefore, I have determined that it is necessary to continue the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13848 with respect to the threat of foreign interference in or undermining public confidence in United States elections.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.
THE WHITE HOUSE, September 9, 2024.

Resolved, That the Clerk communicate these resolutions to the Senate and transmit a copy thereof to the family of the deceased.

Resolved, That when the House adjourns today, it adjourn as a further mark of respect to the memory of the deceased.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

EXPORT CONTROL ENFORCEMENT AND ENHANCEMENT ACT

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7151) to amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 to provide for expedited consideration of proposals for additions to, removals from, or other modifications with respect to entities on the Entity List, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7151

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Export Control Enforcement and Enhancement Act”.

SEC. 2. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS FOR ADDITIONS TO, REMOVALS FROM, OR OTHER MODIFICATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ENTITIES ON THE ENTITY LIST.

Section 1754 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4813) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(g) EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS FOR ADDITIONS TO, REMOVALS FROM, OR OTHER MODIFICATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ENTITIES ON THE ENTITY LIST.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Any member of the End-User Review Committee may submit a proposal directly to the Committee requesting a vote of all members of the Committee for additions to, removals from, or other modifications with respect to the Entity List. A proposal to add an entity to the Entity List shall be made in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (3).

“(2) CONSIDERATION.—Subject to paragraph (4)(B), the End-User Review Committee shall vote to approve or disapprove a proposal submitted under paragraph (1) not later than 30 days after the date on which the proposal is submitted to the Committee.

“(3) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.—The Chair of the End-User Review Committee, with the concurrence of the member of the Committee that submitted a proposal under paragraph (1), may suspend for an additional 15 days the time period specified in paragraph (2) with respect to consideration of the proposal if the Chair and the member determine that additional information is required in order make a determination with respect to the proposal, including the impact and effect of the proposal.

“(4) ADDITIONS TO THE ENTITY LIST.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—An entity may be added to the Entity List if the End-User Review Committee by majority vote of its members has determined that the entity has engaged, is engaged, or is at risk of engaging in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.

“(B) LICENSING POLICY.—

“(i) IN GENERAL.—Subject to clause (ii), there shall be in effect a policy of presump-

tion of denial for all applications for a license to export, reexport, or in-country transfer any item subject to the Export Administration Regulations if an entity added to the Entity List under this subsection is or would be a party to a transaction with respect to which the application applies.

“(ii) EXCEPTION.—The licensing policy required by clause (i) shall not apply with respect to an entity described in such clause if the members of the End-User Review Committee that voted to add the entity to the Entity List under this subsection agree by majority vote of such members to apply a different policy with respect to the entity for all or specific types of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations that would be in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.

“(C) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to limit or otherwise affect the escalation procedures described in part 750 of the Export Administration Regulations.

“(5) ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Each member of the End-User Review Committee shall have 1 vote with respect to matters described in this subsection. The chairperson of the Committee shall not have the authority to make determinations or override any voting decision with respect to such matters.

“(B) SUSPENSION OF VOTING PERIOD.—The chairperson of the End-User Review Committee may suspend the 30-day voting period described in paragraph (2) if the members of the Committee unanimously agree to postpone the vote.

“(C) NOTICE; IMPLEMENTING AUTHORITY.—The chairperson of the End-User Review Committee shall notify the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration of all final decisions of the Committee with respect to additions to, removals from, or other modifications with respect to the Entity List under this subsection so that the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration may implement all such modifications.

“(6) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection—

“(A) the terms ‘End-User Review Committee’ and ‘Committee’ mean—

“(i) the End-User Review Committee established under section 744.16(d) of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations; and

“(ii) any successor committee; and

“(B) the term ‘Entity List’ means the list maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations, or successor regulations.”.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

(2) END-USER REVIEW COMMITTEE.—The term “End-User Review Committee” means—

(A) the End-User Review Committee established under section 744.16(d) of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations; or

(B) any successor committee.

(3) EXPORT, REEXPORT, AND IN-COUNTRY TRANSFER.—The terms “export”, “reexport”, and “in-country transfer” have the meanings given such terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).

(4) ENTITY LIST.—The term “Entity List” means the list maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in Supplement No. 4

to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations, or successor regulations.

(5) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS.—The term “Export Administration Regulations” means the regulations set forth in subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, or successor regulations.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from Missouri (Mrs. WAGNER) and the gentlewoman from North Carolina (Ms. MAN-NING) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Missouri.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. STRONG). Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of my bill, H.R. 7151, the Export Control Enforcement and Enhancement Act.

The People’s Republic of China is bent on supplanting the U.S. economically and militarily. To do so, it seeks to turn our strengths against us, using American ingenuity to fuel its own dangerous and nefarious ambitions.

The U.S. export control regime is an important tool that helps us guard against China’s outright theft of the achievements of America’s brilliant entrepreneurs, inventors, and thinkers. Export controls are also a powerful tool against adversaries like Iran and Russia, adversaries that rely on access to ill-gotten foreign technology to support their violent and destabilizing agendas.

China, Iran, and Russia have formed a new axis of evil to attack our national security interests and help each other circumvent U.S. export controls. They have created a massive network designed to maintain the flow of controlled Western technologies to dictatorships like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, with China at the center.

To disrupt and destroy this web of evasion, vigilantly updating and enforcing our export controls is more important today, Mr. Speaker, than ever before.

However, America is losing the fight to keep our most sensitive technologies out of enemy hands.

Advanced American tech is being used to advance China’s hypersonic weapons program. It was found in the spy balloon that China sent over the continental U.S. last year, including directly over my home in St. Louis, Missouri, that collected data on our most sensitive military installations. It is turning up in Iranian drones and Russian military equipment.

In short, wherever our national security interests are at greatest risk, whether in People’s Liberation Army

laboratories or the military facilities of Iran and its proxies, our adversaries are exploiting vulnerabilities in our export control regime and using American products to gain an advantage.

The current export control regime is simply too slow and cumbersome to prevent Chinese and other companies from accessing sensitive technologies that can be used to give our adversaries a military edge.

My legislation on the floor today will give the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy greater ability to propose changes to the entity list, a roster of foreign companies, research institutions, and individuals who pose a serious national security risk to the United States and who are prohibited from purchasing sensitive American products.

Mr. Speaker, State, Defense, and Energy have deep expertise in the current threat landscape, and we should use that expertise to make sure that the entity list is comprehensive and accurate, and the bill makes sure that their recommendations are acted on rather than languishing in red tape by setting a 30-day clock to address proposed changes.

These reforms, Mr. Speaker, will make our export control regime agile and airtight, and they will give the United States the tools to fight back when our adversaries try to cheat the system.

I thank Chairman MCCAUL and Ranking Member MEEKS for working with me on this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I urge each of my colleagues to support this measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 7151, as amended. Export controls are more than just a bureaucratic tool. They are a key component of our national security strategy. By ensuring that sensitive American technology does not fall into the wrong hands, we protect not only our own interests but also those of our allies around the world.

Under the Biden-Harris administration, the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security has played a crucial role in this effort. BIS has imposed unprecedented controls against China in the semiconductor and advanced computing sectors as well as crippling controls on Russia and Belarus, in partnership with almost 40 other nations. It has also added nearly 1,000 entities from Russia, China, Iran, and more than 30 other countries to the entity list, effectively blocking their access to U.S. technology that could be used against us.

However, as we expand the use of the entity list, it becomes increasingly important that Congress oversees this process to ensure it remains rigorous, transparent, and inclusive. This bill does exactly that.

However, this bill is about more than just process. It is about safeguarding

the future. By ensuring that the End-User Review Committee operates fairly and efficiently, we strengthen our ability to respond to emerging threats in a rapidly changing world.

I thank Congresswoman WAGNER, Chairman MCCAUL, and Ranking Member MEEKS for their leadership and bipartisan cooperation on this bill.

In closing, Mr. Speaker, this bill is a vital step in protecting our national security by ensuring that our export controls are both robust and fair. It strengthens our ability to prevent sensitive technology from falling into the wrong hands while maintaining the rigorous oversight necessary to keep our processes fair, transparent, and effective.

By passing this measure, we affirm our commitment to safeguarding American innovation and staying ahead of emerging threats.

Mr. Speaker, I hope my colleagues will join me and support this important bill, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. In closing, we must act decisively to ensure that our export controls are robust, effective, timely, and adaptive to the threats that we face in today's world.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to support this bipartisan piece of legislation, H.R. 7151, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from Missouri (Mrs. WAGNER) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 7151, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

AMENDING THE EXPORT CONTROL REFORM ACT OF 2018 RELATING TO THE STATEMENT OF POLICY

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 6606) to amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 relating to the statement of policy.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 6606

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

Section 1752(2) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4811(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(H) To protect the trade secrets of the United States, its people, and its industrial base either related to items subject to control by the Secretary pursuant to this part or when the subject of economic espionage as described in section 1831 of title 18, United States Code.”.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN)

and the gentlewoman from North Carolina (Ms. MANNING) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from American Samoa.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from American Samoa?

There was no objection.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of my bill, H.R. 6606. Export controls are an important tool to ensure that American technology and items which are normally sold for commercial purposes cannot be used for nefarious purposes by our adversaries.

Currently, those adversaries are using technological and economic espionage to steal everything they can from the American people and to undermine our security and our industrial base.

H.R. 6606 clarifies U.S. policy to ensure that export controls can be used against those who want to steal America's trade secrets. It ensures that the most powerful tools we have in our policy toolbox can be used against economic espionage, as well.

This bill is a clear and important message to our adversaries. We will not allow the stealing of American trade secrets. H.R. 6606 deserves our unanimous support.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 6606.

Over and over, we have seen Beijing fail to safeguard and enforce IP rights for U.S. firms. More alarmingly, we have seen it obtain American IP through illicit and problematic means such as strategic acquisitions, cyberattacks, and policies that coerce technology transfers.

This is a direct threat to America's economic security and competitiveness, and we need to use every tool we have to protect our industries and our workers.

That is why I support this bill by Delegate RADEWAGEN. It makes a simple change to the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 to ensure that our export controls will better protect U.S. trade secrets on items subject to U.S. export control regulations.

Therefore, I encourage my colleagues to support this bill from Delegate RADEWAGEN. It reflects the strong, bipartisan concern about the violations of American IP rights by Chinese persons and entities.

This addition of a statement of our policy of Export Reform Act of 2018

will ensure that our export control policies account for China's intent to acquire or steal our trade secrets to bolster its military capabilities; therefore, I hope my colleagues will join me and support this important bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

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Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman MCCAUL and Ranking Member MEEKS for bringing to the floor my bill ensuring that our adversaries do not continue to steal American technology and trade secrets is a bipartisan priority. I urge all Members to support H.R. 6606, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 6606.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF TRILATERAL COOPERATION AMONG THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AND SOUTH KOREA

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution (H. Res. 1056) recognizing the importance of trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea.

The Clerk read the title of the resolution.

The text of the resolution is as follows:

H. RES. 1056

Whereas, in 2023, South Korea and Japan restarted bilateral summits for the first time since 2019 with President Yoon Suk Yeol and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio meeting seven times;

Whereas the two sides have made efforts to address longstanding historical grievances, including the issue of South Koreans forced to work for Japanese companies during World War II;

Whereas the Governments of Japan and South Korea restored normal economic ties, which had been strained since 2019, by reinstating each other on their respective "white lists" of preferential trade partners, with Japan lifting export controls on South Korea related to three materials needed to produce semiconductors and South Korea dropping its case before the World Trade Organization related to those export controls;

Whereas the United States, Japan, and South Korea have restarted trilateral summits, holding five trilateral meetings among President Biden, Prime Minister Kishida, and President Yoon since June 2022;

Whereas, on August 18, 2023, the United States, Japan, and South Korea held the first standalone trilateral leaders summit at Camp David;

Whereas the three allies issued a trilateral commitment to consult with one another tri-

laterally "in an expeditious manner to coordinate our responses to regional challenges, provocations, and threats affecting our collective interests and security";

Whereas the three allies improved deterrence and defense capabilities against the growing security threat posed by North Korea by resuming military exercises in 2022;

Whereas the United States, Japan, and South Korea expanded and developed a multi-year schedule for trilateral military exercises and conducted the first United States-Japan-South Korea aerial exercise in October 2023;

Whereas the three allies have activated a 2022 agreement to exchange real-time missile warning data focused on North Korean missile launches;

Whereas, in December 2022, South Korea and Japan published national security documents that closely mirrored those of the United States, setting the stage for greater policy alignment and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific;

Whereas the three allies announced plans for expanded and more regular summits, including agreeing to hold annual trilateral summit meetings, agreeing to hold annual trilateral meetings among cabinet-level officials, specifically the three countries' foreign ministers, defense ministers, commerce and industry ministers, and national security advisors, and agreeing to hold the first trilateral meeting among finance ministers;

Whereas the three allies announced a trilateral initiative to synchronize their efforts to build the maritime capabilities of Southeast Asian and Pacific Island countries;

Whereas South Korea and Japan have resumed cabinet- and subcabinet-level bilateral consultations, including holding a Security Dialogue and a Strategic Dialogue;

Whereas the Governments of Japan and South Korea announced a new bilateral science and technology cooperative arrangement, including a hydrogen and ammonia global value chain initiative, which includes raising funds for joint projects, and a quantum technology research and development initiative between the two countries' government-affiliated research institutes;

Whereas South Korea and Japan cooperated to evacuate Japanese and South Korean nationals from Sudan after the eruption of civil conflict in April 2023 and from Israel after Hamas' attack in October 2023;

Whereas South Korea arranged for the experts dispatched to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station to monitor TEPCO's release of treated water into the Pacific Ocean;

Whereas, in December 2023, the United States, Japan, and South Korea held the inaugural meeting of the trilateral Working Group on DPRK Cyber Activities;

Whereas the three allies have held trilateral dialogues on space security (November 2023) and Indo-Pacific policies (January 2024); and

Whereas the United States, Japan, and South Korea announced trilateral economic and technology cooperation initiatives, including a supply chain early warning system pilot program, a partnership program among the three countries' national laboratories: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives—

(1) commends the extraordinary leadership of President of South Korea Yoon Suk Yeol and Prime Minister of Japan Kishida Fumio in taking initiative to repair relations between their two countries;

(2) acknowledges that strengthening relations between Japan and South Korea has enabled greater ambition in trilateral cooperation involving the United States;

(3) encourages ever greater cooperation between South Korea and Japan and trilateral cooperation across diplomatic, economic, security, and informational domains;

(4) welcomes ever greater levels of trilateral strategic coordination among the United States, Japan, and South Korea as a stabilizing influence on the Western Pacific region and global order more broadly;

(5) celebrates the shared democratic, liberal values that are the bedrock of the enduring ties among the United States, Japan, and South Korea; and

(6) recognizes the critical importance to the interests of the United States and the peace and security of the Western Pacific of United States treaty alliances with South Korea and Japan.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN) and the gentlewoman from North Carolina (Ms. MANNING) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from American Samoa.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from American Samoa?

There was no objection.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution underscoring the vital importance of trilateral cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. I thank the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. CONNOLLY) and his 22 bipartisan cosponsors for introducing this text, which received unanimous support from the Committee on Foreign Affairs at our markup 4 months ago.

As the Chinese Communist Party and North Korea work to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region, we find ourselves in a pivotal moment where democracies must unite against authoritarianism. A trilateral partnership among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea exemplifies this unity, with two of our allies putting aside their historical differences to tackle the pressing challenges of our time.

This resolution acknowledges that as China and North Korea escalate their military activities in the region, our three nations are fortifying defense capabilities to deter and address these threats. It also promotes increased collaboration in technology, economics, and diplomacy while celebrating the shared democratic values that underpin our alliances.

By working with Japan and South Korea, we can dissuade the CCP and North Korea from acting recklessly.

Democracy will, and always will, prevail.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H. Res. 1056, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H. Res. 1056, recognizing the importance of trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I start by thanking my good friend, Representative CONNOLLY, for his leadership on this bipartisan resolution to emphasize and recognize the importance of trilateral cooperation for U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region.

I also commend the Biden-Harris administration, which has successfully revitalized our allies and partnerships in the region through proactive and effective diplomacy. The administration has significantly advanced America's strategic interests by seizing the opportunity provided by the bold leadership of President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida.

The administration has not only strengthened our bilateral ties with Japan and South Korea, but its decision to elevate this trilateral relationship has also reshaped the geopolitical landscape in a way that supports a rules-based international order.

Our collaboration with Tokyo and Seoul is essential to addressing challenges, from global health crises and environmental threats to countering China's economic and military coercion and North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

I express my gratitude to the governments and people of Japan and South Korea. Their commitment to upholding shared values, enhancing mutual prosperity, and strengthening deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is a testament to the power of democratic alliances.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to join in supporting this important measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I have no speakers, and I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. CONNOLLY).

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend from North Carolina for her leadership, and I thank my friend from American Samoa for her support for this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, responding to aggression is important. The failure of the 1930s must always be in our minds. Democracies failed every test in the 1930s: the Spanish Civil War, the Ethiopian invasion by Mussolini, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the carving up of the Sudetenland that led up to the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Anschluss. All of that led directly to World War II.

If we want to prevent war, we have to be strong, and we need alliances. We need strong alliances.

The aggression of Xi Jinping and China in the Indo-Pacific region must be met by the United States and its allies. The trilateral agreement President Biden, Vice President HARRIS, and

this administration brokered between two not particularly friendly allies, Japan and South Korea, is an extraordinary achievement because they have history. It is built on the foundation of AUKUS, the reintroduction of U.S. military bases in the Philippines, rapprochement between the United States and Vietnam, and meeting Chinese aggression in the air and at sea to insist that the South China Sea is not a Chinese private lake. It is international territorial waters. The United States will insist on the rule of law throughout that region.

We, too, are a Pacific nation, and any nation that misjudges that or forgets that does so at its own peril, as history has taught us.

So this resolution, I think, is an important statement by this body in recognizing that we will meet aggression. We will deter aggression. We seek peaceful coexistence, but we are going to build strong alliances to insist peaceful coexistence is possible.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I have no additional speakers, and I reserve the right to close.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume for the purpose of closing.

Mr. Speaker, in the Indo-Pacific and around the world, the United States is more secure when we build partnerships and work with our allies.

H. Res. 1056 recognizes the importance of trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea to uphold regional security, strengthen our economies, and work toward a free, open, and peaceful Indo-Pacific region.

By passing this resolution, we send a clear bipartisan message that Congress supports trilateral cooperation and that the U.S., Japan, and South Korea are not only aligned behind a shared vision but that we have the resolve to uphold it.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge my colleagues to support H. Res. 1056, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. CONNOLLY as well as Chairman MCCAUL and Ranking Member MEEKS for this opportunity to recognize the importance of trilateral cooperation between the United States and our allies South Korea and Japan.

Our shared democratic values and strategic cooperation are critical to the peace and security of the Western Pacific, especially as we face challenges and provocations posed by the Chinese Communist Party and North Korea.

Mr. Speaker, I urge unanimous support for this resolution, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN) that the House suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, H. Res. 1056.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

SECURING GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 4741) to require the development of a strategy to promote the use of secure telecommunications infrastructure worldwide, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 4741

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Securing Global Telecommunications Act".

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress as follows:

(1) The United States Government should promote and take steps to ensure American leadership in strategic technology industries, including telecommunications infrastructure and other information and communications technologies.

(2) The expansive presence of companies linked to the Chinese Communist Party, such as Huawei, in global mobile networks and the national security implications thereof, such as the ability of the People's Republic of China to exfiltrate the information flowing through those networks and shut off countries' internet access, demonstrates the importance of the United States remaining at the technological frontier and the dire consequences of falling behind.

(3) The significant cost of countering Huawei's market leadership in telecommunications infrastructure around the world underscores the urgency of supporting the competitiveness of United States companies in next-generation information and communication technology.

(4) To remain a leader at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and preserve the ITU's technical integrity, the United States must work with emerging economies and developing nations to bolster global telecommunications security and protect American national security interests.

(5) Multilateral cooperation with like-minded partners and allies is critical to carry out the significant effort of financing and promoting secure networks around the world and to achieve market leadership of trusted vendors in this sector.

SEC. 3. STRATEGY FOR SECURING GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and Energy and Commerce and the Committees on Foreign Relations and Commerce, Science, and Transportation and of the Senate a strategy, to be known as the "Strategy to Secure Global Telecommunications Infrastructure" (referred to in this Act as the "Strategy"), to promote the use of secure telecommunication infrastructure in countries other than the United States.

(b) CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—The Secretary of State shall consult with the President of the Export-Import Bank of the

United States, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Director of the Trade and Development Agency, the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission, and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, in developing the Strategy, which shall consist of an approach led by the Department of State using the policy tools, and informed by the technical expertise, of the other Federal entities so consulted to achieve the goal described in subsection (a).

(c) ELEMENTS.—The Strategy shall also include sections on each of the following:

(1) Mobile networks, including a description of efforts by countries other than the United States to—

(A) promote trusted Open RAN technologies while protecting against any security risks posed by untrusted vendors in Open RAN networks;

(B) use financing mechanisms to assist “rip-and-replace” projects and to incentivize countries to choose trusted equipment vendors;

(C) bolster multilateral cooperation, especially with developing countries and emerging economies, to promote the deployment of trusted wireless networks worldwide; and

(D) collaborate with trusted private sector companies to counter Chinese market leadership in the telecom equipment industry.

(2) Data centers, including a description of efforts to—

(A) utilize financing mechanisms to incentivize countries other than the United States to choose trusted data center providers; and

(B) bolster multilateral cooperation, especially with developing countries and emerging economies, to promote the deployment of trusted data centers worldwide.

(3) Sixth (and future) generation technologies (6G), including a description of efforts to—

(A) deepen cooperation with like-minded countries to promote United States and allied market leadership in 6G networks and technologies; and

(B) increase buy-in from developing countries and emerging countries on trusted technologies.

(4) Low-Earth orbit satellites, aerostats, and stratospheric balloons, including a description of efforts to work with trusted private sector companies to retain the ability to quickly provide internet connection in response to emergency situations.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON MALIGN INFLUENCE AT THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report on Russian and Chinese strategies and efforts—

(1) to expand the mandate of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to cover internet governance policy; and

(2) to advance other actions favorable to authoritarian interests and/or hostile to fair, industry-led processes.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall also identify efforts by China and Russia—

(1) to increase the ITU’s jurisdiction over internet governance and to propose internet governance standards at the ITU;

(2) to leverage their private sector actors to advance their national interests through the ITU, including—

(A) encouraging Chinese and Russian companies to leverage their market power to

pressure other member countries to deliver favorable decisions on ITU elections; and

(B) China’s efforts to leverage Huawei’s role as the primary telecommunications equipment and services provider for many developing countries to compel such countries to deliver favorable decisions on standards proposals, election victories, candidate selection, and other levers of power at the ITU; and

(3) to use the influence of Chinese and Russian nationals serving in the ITU to advantage the companies, standards decisions, and candidates that advance the CCP and Kremlin’s interests.

(c) FORM.—The report required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 5. REPORT ON MULTILATERAL COORDINATION.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the President of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Administrator for the United States Agency on International Development, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission, and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, shall develop and submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce and of the House of Representatives and the Committees Foreign Relations and on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and of the Senate a report that identifies opportunities for greater collaboration with allies and partners to promote secure information and communications technology infrastructure in countries other than the United States, including through—

(1) joint financing efforts to help trusted vendors win bids to build out information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure;

(2) incorporating ICT focuses into allies’ and partners’ international development finance initiatives; and

(3) diplomatic coordination to emphasize the importance of secure telecommunications infrastructure to countries using untrusted providers.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN) and the gentlewoman from North Carolina (Ms. MANNING) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from American Samoa.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from American Samoa?

There was no objection.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 4741, the Securing Global Telecommunications Act, introduced by my colleague from North Carolina, Congresswoman MANNING, and the gentlewoman from California, Congresswoman YOUNG KIM.

Telecommunications, including 5G, are critical to U.S. national security.

The United States cannot let Chinese military companies, like Huawei, attempt to dominate this sector through unfair trading practices, including IP theft and illegal subsidies.

Because of the CCP military-civil fusion strategy, we know that any valuable information flowing through a Huawei network can and will be sent to the CCP and its military.

The United States and our partners and allies must lead in the development of this technology and set the rules of the road at multilateral bodies, such as the International Telecommunication Union. Cooperation among partner and allied countries is critical for ensuring that trusted vendors are the backbone for this infrastructure.

The Securing Global Telecommunications Act will help us outcompete the CCP in this foundational technology. This bill requires the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to promote secure telecommunication infrastructure globally, including mobile networks, data centers, and 6G and beyond.

It also requires reports on how the CCP and Russia are undermining the ITU and how we are coordinating with partners and allies to counteract their malign influence. The United States cannot sit back and allow a CCP military company to build the networks that carry the world’s data.

For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to support the Securing Global Telecommunications Act, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 4741, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the Securing Global Telecommunications Act, bipartisan legislation that I introduced with Representative YOUNG KIM of California, will preserve America’s global leadership in tech and telecom and protect the safety and integrity of our networks.

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Mr. Speaker, the devices we use every day, cell phones, tablets, and computers, connect to increasingly advanced mobile networks that depend upon a nearly invisible set of internationally agreed-upon standards.

However, in recent years, our adversaries and competitors, Russia and China, have tried to maximize their influence over international bodies like the International Telecommunication Union, the ITU, to shape new technology standards to their liking. They are determined to dominate the future of critical technologies, like 5G and AI, by giving their companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, an unfair advantage. This effort goes beyond boosting their businesses. It is about controlling a strategic domain, which could threaten our own security.

Failing to secure our communications infrastructure and networks could open the door to data theft, surveillance, and malicious threats against Americans.

That is why the U.S. and our allies must remain alert to this pressing threat and work together to counter it. We must also make it easier to deploy more secure and reliable tech and telecom infrastructure.

That is exactly what my bipartisan bill would address. It would require a comprehensive strategy for securing global telecom infrastructure worldwide, crack down on Russian and Chinese malign influence at the ITU, and support greater cooperation with our allies to promote and finance secure networks and trusted vendors.

By taking these measures, we can shore up our critical vulnerabilities and counter our adversaries' strategic technology goals.

Mr. Speaker, in closing, our adversaries believe they can achieve undue influence over international telecom infrastructure and technical standards. This bill would help stop them.

I encourage all my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me in voting to support it, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. I yield myself the balance of my time.

In closing, I thank Congresswoman MANNING and Congresswoman YOUNG KIM for leading this bipartisan effort to take on Huawei and other CCP companies. I urge all Members to support H.R. 4741, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 4741.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP ACT

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7159) to bolster United States engagement with the Pacific Islands region, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7159

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Pacific Partnership Act".

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress as follows:

(1) The United States has longstanding and enduring cultural, historic, economic, strategic, and people-to-people connections with the Pacific Islands, based on shared values, cultural histories, common interests, and a commitment to fostering mutual understanding and cooperation.

(2) Successive United States administrations have recognized the critical importance of the Pacific Islands, to the world in

high-level strategic documents, including the—

(A) 2015 National Security Strategy, which first declared the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, affirmed the United States as a Pacific nation, and paved the way for subsequent United States engagement with the Pacific Islands;

(B) 2017 National Security Strategy, which includes a commitment to "shore up fragile partner states in the Pacific Islands region to reduce their vulnerability to economic fluctuations and natural disasters";

(C) 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which identified the Pacific Islands as "critical to United States strategy because of our shared values, interests, and commitments";

(D) 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which recognized the need to engage further with the Pacific Islands on shared security goals; and

(E) 2022 Strategy for Pacific Partnership, which outlined goals and methods for deepening the United States partnerships with Pacific Island nations.

(3) The United States Government should further develop, expand, and support a comprehensive and multifaceted United States policy for the Pacific Islands that—

(A) promotes peace, security, and prosperity for all countries that respects the sovereignty and political independence of all nations;

(B) preserves the Pacific Ocean as a corridor for international maritime economic opportunities and growth and promotes sustainable development;

(C) supports regional efforts to address shared challenges, including by strengthening resilience to natural disasters and stewardship of natural resources; and

(D) strengthens democratic governance and the rule of law, and promotes human rights and the preservation of the region's cultural heritages.

(4) The United States should support the vision, values, and objectives of existing regional multilateral institutions and frameworks, such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community.

(5) The United States should work closely with United States allies and partners with existing relationships and interests in the Pacific Islands, such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Taiwan, and regional institutions like the Pacific Islands Forum.

SEC. 3. STRATEGY FOR PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than January 1, 2026, and again not later than January 1, 2030, the President, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy entitled the "Strategy for Pacific Partnership" (in this section referred to as the "Strategy").

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The Strategy shall include each of the following:

(1) A description of overarching goals for United States engagement in the Pacific Islands region, including United States diplomatic posts, defense posture, and economic engagement.

(2) An assessment of threats and pressures to the Pacific Islands region including those caused by factors such as—

(A) natural disasters;

(B) illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing;

(C) non-United States military presence and activity;

(D) developmental challenges;

(E) economic coercion and corruption; and

(F) other factors assessed to be causing a direct risk to the United States national interests in the Pacific Islands.

(3) A plan to address the threats assessed pursuant to paragraph (2).

(4) An analysis of the needs and goals expressed by governments of the Pacific Islands region, including at or through multilateral institutions, evaluated in light of the United States national interests.

(5) A plan for the resources necessary for the United States to meet its goals in the Pacific Islands region.

(6) Mechanisms, including existing forums, for coordinating and cooperating on shared goals among the following, as appropriate:

(A) the governments of Pacific Island countries;

(B) regional partners in the Pacific Islands region, including multilateral forums and organizations, such as the Pacific Islands Forum;

(C) civil society in the Pacific Islands; and

(D) United States subnational governments in the Pacific.

(c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the Strategy, the President should consult, as appropriate, with—

(1) relevant United States governmental agencies;

(2) regional organizations, such as the Pacific Islands Forum, the Pacific Islands Development Program, the Pacific Community, the Forum Fisheries Agency, and the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme;

(3) the governments of the countries in the Pacific Islands;

(4) civil society stakeholders;

(5) United States allies and partners; and

(6) United States Pacific territories and States.

SEC. 4. EXTENSION OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES TO THE PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM.

The provisions of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288 et seq.) may be extended to the Pacific Islands Forum in the same manner, to the same extent, and subject to the same conditions as such provisions may be extended to a public international organization in which the United States participates pursuant to any treaty or under the authority of any Act of Congress authorizing such participation or making an appropriation for such participation.

SEC. 5. REPORTS ON IMPLEMENTATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of submission of a strategy detailed in section 3(a), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an implementation report—

(1) with a proposed timeline for implementation of the strategy described in section 3(a) of this Act;

(2) detailing the assessed number of full-time equivalent positions and contractors needed to achieve the goals laid out in the strategy described in section 3(a) of this Act;

(3) describing any institutional or structural re-organizations suggested to help carry out the strategy described in section 3(a) of this Act; and

(4) if necessary, identifying additional funding needed to support resource levels to carry out the strategy described in 3(a).

(b) CONSOLIDATION.—A report required by this subsection may be consolidated with any other report required to be submitted by the same Federal official on the same or similar date as the requirement under this subsection.

SEC. 6. ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President, in consultation with the Secretary of State, and the relevant heads of other Federal departments and agencies, should consult and coordinate with allies and partners in the Pacific Islands region, including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and regional institutions, such as the Pacific Islands

Forum, the Pacific Islands Development Program, the Pacific Community and Secretariat for the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, with respect to programs to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands, including for purposes of—

- (1) deconflicting programming;
- (2) ensuring that any programming does not adversely affect the absorptive capacity of the Pacific Islands;
- (3) ensuring complementary programs benefit the Pacific Islands to the maximum extent practicable; and
- (4) ensuring that programming aligns with regional development goals to promote a shared vision for the future of the Pacific Islands.

(b) **FORMAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.**—The President should establish a formal consultative process with such regional allies and partners to coordinate with respect to such programs and future-years programming.

SEC. 7. REPORTING.

(a) **UPDATES OF CERTAIN REPORTS.**—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall annually update the reports listed in subsection (b) to include within the scope of such reports a regional discussion of transnational crime affecting the Pacific Islands.

(b) **REPORTS LISTED.**—The reports listed in this subsection are the following:

(1) The International Narcotics Control Strategy report required by section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h).

(2) The Improving International Fisheries Management report required by section 607 of title VI of the Fisheries Act of 1995 (16 U.S.C. 1826h).

(3) The Trafficking in Persons report submitted under section 110 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107).

SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(2) **PACIFIC ISLANDS; PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION.**—The term “Pacific Islands” and “Pacific Islands region” mean the nations, territories, and other jurisdictions in the Pacific Ocean within the broad groupings of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia.

The **SPEAKER** pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN) and the gentlewoman from North Carolina (Ms. MANNING) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from American Samoa.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The **SPEAKER** pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from American Samoa?

There was no objection.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 7159, the Pacific Partnership Act. I was

proud to be the lead Republican on this bipartisan bill introduced by the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. CASE).

As a grateful and proud Pacific Islander, I remind my colleagues that the United States is a Pacific nation, from the West Coast of the continental U.S., to Hawaii, to American Samoa, to the Northern Mariana Islands, to Guam. The Pacific is critically important to American interests, American values, and to the Americans I have the privilege to represent.

However, in recent years, the Chinese Communist Party has mounted an aggressive campaign to increase its influence among Pacific Island countries. The 2022 security pact between Beijing and the Solomon Islands was seen by many as an alarming wake-up call. The CCP is pressuring island nations to overturn their recognition of Taiwan, illegally fishing in their exclusive economic zones, and bribing local law enforcement to influence local elections.

While Congress has done its job to extend the Compacts of Free Association for another 20 years, those only focus on three Pacific Island countries. There are 11 other countries who need our attention.

The United States has enduring cultural, historic, economic, and people-to-people connections with the Pacific Islands. We just opened up an embassy in Vanuatu, but we must do more.

Pacific Islands are strategically crucial to the United States. For that reason, the Pacific Partnership Act requires the State Department to submit to Congress a Strategy for Pacific Partnership that describes our goals for engaging with the Pacific Islands in the diplomatic, defense, and economic domains. It gives Congress the oversight visibility to ensure that the executive branch formulates and implements a strategy that addresses the many shared threats facing Pacific Island countries.

It also requires that we coordinate and collaborate with our allies and partners, like Australia, Taiwan, Japan, and New Zealand, to ensure that our programs directed toward the Pacific Islands are nonduplicative and complementary. The Pacific Partnership Act will help to better focus the United States' engagement with Pacific Island nations.

Mr. Speaker, I support the bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 7159, the Pacific Partnership Act, as amended, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I am proud that, in this Congress, we have been able to work in a bipartisan manner to strengthen our relationships with the Pacific Islands, from the bipartisan amendments, to the Compacts of Free Association, to the legislation before us today.

These legislative efforts support the leadership of the Biden-Harris administration, which hosted two summits with the Pacific Islands at the White

House, opened new embassies in the Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu, and released the first-ever U.S.-Pacific Partnership Strategy.

This legislation would codify that strategy, ensuring that future administrations maintain that focus and provide other authorities to strengthen our outreach to the Pacific Islands and our coordination with allies and partners.

Together, we are affirming a fundamental point: The United States is a Pacific nation. We are determined to deepen and maintain our lasting partnerships with each of the Pacific Islands, and we will do so by listening to and incorporating the principles of what the Pacific Islands have articulated themselves. That collaborative approach is reflected in this bill.

I thank the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. CASE), my good friend, for his leadership and dedication to this critical region. His work on this measure is a testament to our shared commitment to the Pacific and to ensuring that the United States remains a reliable and engaged partner.

Bipartisanship is so important because there is still so much work to be done. Our diplomats, developmental professionals, and Peace Corps volunteers are working tirelessly on the ground.

Can we sustain the resources they need to execute our policy?

Can we follow through on each of the deliverables the United States has promised, including at the Pacific Islands Forum that just concluded at the end of August?

I know each of us here understands the stakes, and I am committed to working with all of my colleagues to ensure that we follow through.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage support for this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. CASE).

Mr. CASE. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the very kind remarks of my colleague from North Carolina (Ms. MANNING).

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in very strong support of this bill, the Pacific Partnership Act, which aims to broaden and deepen our critical partnerships with our fellow nations of the Pacific.

I first thank my colleague, the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN), and our 24 bipartisan cosponsors, as well as our House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which reported out this bill unanimously.

Our country's Indo-Pacific Strategy states in no uncertain terms that no region is of more consequence to the world and to everyday Americans than the Indo-Pacific. The United States and our allies and partners around the world, who are aligned with an international rules-based order, share the common vision of a free and open Indo-

Pacific, whose governance, priorities, goals, and prosperity are determined by the countries of the Indo-Pacific without manipulation and dominance by malign actors.

This is especially true of the Pacific Islands themselves in the heart of the Pacific, which today face the challenges of increased natural disasters and human and drug trafficking, economic sustainability, threats to democracy, and more.

It is crucial that the United States continue to extend our hand of full partnership in assisting the countries of the Pacific to meet these challenges, as we have for generations.

Our bill, H.R. 7159, advances these goals. It first recognizes that the United States is and has been for two-plus centuries now a Pacific nation and has longstanding and enduring cultural, historic, economic, strategic, and people-to-people connections with the Pacific Islands based on shared values, cultural histories, common interests, and a commitment to fostering mutual understanding and cooperation. It acknowledges that the United States should support the vision, values, and objectives of the Pacific Islands.

This bill requires the President to develop a Strategy for Pacific Partnership that will set the goals for United States' engagement with the Pacific Islands, assess the threats and pressures to the region, and a plan to address such threats, and analyze the needs and goals of the Pacific Islands in the context of the national interests of the United States.

Critically, our bill requires a strategy to be developed in full consultation with the governments of the Pacific Island countries and their multilateral organizations, ensuring that the United States supports the priorities of, by, and for the Pacific itself, and not of other countries who may be pursuing inconsistent priorities.

Our bill also extends diplomatic courtesies and traditional protocols to the Pacific Islands Forum, the primary multilateral organization of the region. The Pacific Islands Forum engages in critical consensus-building work and just held its 53rd Leaders Meeting in Tonga 2 weeks ago in which Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell led the United States delegation.

The extension of such diplomatic courtesies will foster creation of a Pacific Islands Forum mission to the United States, which will strengthen the collective voice of the Pacific internationally in opposition to other attempts to divide and isolate the Pacific Islands, and further expand our relationship and collaboration on strategic matters of mutual interests.

Finally, as has been noted, our bill requires increased collaboration with our partners and allies in the region, including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and more, ensuring the most efficient and effective use of limited resources and programs. This is critical, as we are much stronger when we do

this important work in coordination with our allies and partners.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the passage of the Pacific Partnership Act.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time for the purpose of closing.

Mr. Speaker, the Pacific Islands are not just our neighbors. They are our partners. The security and prosperity of this region are directly linked to our own. Together, we can ensure that the United States continues to be a leader in promoting peace, security, and prosperity in the Pacific Islands for generations to come.

Mr. Speaker, I hope my colleagues will join me and support this important bill. I yield back the balance of my time.

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Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, in closing, I thank, again, my friend from Hawaii, Mr. CASE, for leading this bill that we introduced together.

The Pacific Partnership Act will help ensure that our area of the world receives the attention it requires in U.S. diplomatic, defense, and economic policymaking.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this important bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. KEAN of New Jersey). The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 7159, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

STARR-CAMARGO BRIDGE EXPANSION ACT

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (S. 1608) to provide for the expansion of the Starr-Camargo Bridge near Rio Grande City, Texas, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

S. 1608

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Starr-Camargo Bridge Expansion Act".

SEC. 2. STARR-CAMARGO BRIDGE.

(a) AUTHORIZATION.—The first section of Public Law 87-532 (76 Stat. 153; 130 Stat. 411) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(2)—

(A) by inserting "and expand" after "construct";

(B) by inserting "including the expansion and addition of adjacent spans to the existing international bridge," after "thereto";

(C) by inserting "multimodal toll" after "14";

(D) by striking "to maintain" and inserting "and to maintain, control,;" and

(E) by striking "such bridge" and inserting "those bridges"; and

(2) in subsection (b), in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting "expansion," after "construction,".

(b) RIGHTS OF STARR-CAMARGO BRIDGE COMPANY AND SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS.—Section 3(a) of Public Law 87-532 (76 Stat. 153; 130 Stat. 411) is amended by inserting "as needed for the location, construction, expansion, control, operation, and maintenance of the bridges referred to in subsection (a)(2) at or near Rio Grande City, Texas" after "chapter 466".

(c) SUNSET.—Section 5 of Public Law 87-532 (76 Stat. 153; 130 Stat. 411) is amended—

(1) by inserting "by the Starr-Camargo Bridge Company and its successors and assigns" after "constructed";

(2) by striking "three" and inserting "60";

(3) by striking "five" and inserting "65"; and

(4) by striking "date of enactment of this Act" and inserting "date of enactment of the Starr-Camargo Bridge Expansion Act".

(d) SAVINGS PROVISION.—Nothing in this section or the amendments made by this section—

(1) grants new rights or duties to the San Benito International Bridge Company (known as the "Free Trade International Bridge" as of the date of enactment of this Act); or

(2) alters, repeals, or voids any rights or duties held by the San Benito International Bridge Company (known as the "Free Trade International Bridge" as of the date of enactment of this Act) under Public Law 87-532 (76 Stat. 153; 130 Stat. 411), as in effect on the day before the date of enactment of this Act.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN) and the gentlewoman from North Carolina (Ms. MANNING) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from American Samoa.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from American Samoa?

There was no objection.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support for S. 1608, the Starr-Camargo Bridge Expansion Act, introduced by Senator CORNYN from Texas and passed unanimously by the Senate.

The development of critical infrastructure is vital for maintaining the smooth flow of goods and services. The Starr-Camargo International Bridge, a privately-owned toll bridge on the U.S.-Mexico border, serves as a crucial link spanning the Rio Grande. It connects Rio Grande City in Texas with Camargo in Mexico. This bridge is a significant commercial transit point, facilitating many hundreds of millions of dollars in trade every year.

Expanding this bridge will enhance international trade and help to reduce costs for American families by improving the flow of goods. The planned upgrades will ease commercial traffic and help address supply chain issues.

The proposed legislation will allow the bridge's private owners to finance the expansion and improvements through toll revenue without the use of taxpayer funds. Because it is an international port of entry, expanding the bridge requires statutory changes, which have been carefully reviewed and approved by the State Department, the Department of Transportation, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

As mentioned earlier, the Senate passed this measure with unanimous, bipartisan support. A House side companion bill was adopted by the House Foreign Affairs Committee by a unanimous bipartisan vote of 46-0.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of S. 1608, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, Mexico is the top U.S. trading partner with bilateral commercial activity totaling more than \$750 billion last year and accounting for more than 15 percent of total United States trade. These figures represent an investment in the American people and the Mexican economy.

In fact, U.S. companies directly invested \$130.3 billion into Mexico in 2022, and nearly 5 million U.S. jobs depend on trade with Mexico.

That is why I support S. 1608, which will allow for the expansion of the Starr-Camargo Bridge. The existing bridge supports the economic well-being of so many in south Texas and U.S. businesses that rely on the bridge as a critical entry point for import-export into the United States. The expansion of the bridge connecting the United States and Mexico will support more resilient supply chains and address blockages caused by outdated infrastructure and traffic.

It is invaluable to local growers and producers on both sides of the border as they move vegetables, fruit, and other needed products to market.

I understand that the project is also designed to include toll booths, the fees of which will help pay for the cost of upkeep and maintenance.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to support this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I have no speakers, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. CUELLAR).

Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from North Carolina for yielding. I thank her staff also for the hard work and long hours they have been putting in. I thank also my good friend from American Samoa and her staff for getting this bill to the floor.

This bill allows the Starr-Camargo Bridge, a privately-owned toll bridge between Texas and Mexico, to expand and become multimodal. This bridge's previous authorization for construction expired, so we are coming back for an extension to make sure that we pursue the planned expansion project and also add a rail bridge addition.

The planned expansion will ease congestion, reduce truck idling at the port of entry, and alleviate the supply chain issues as the gentlewoman from North Carolina just mentioned a few minutes ago.

This expansion will be paid by tolls, so no cost to the taxpayers. This bridge will serve as the vital trade link between the United States and Mexico.

Keep in mind that the trade between the U.S. and Mexico has been tremendous. In fact, just last year, the trade between the U.S. and Mexico, our number one trading partner, reached \$798.9 billion. I say that in the next 4 or 5 years, the trade between the U.S. and Mexico will increase to a trillion dollars of trade.

If you look at it right now, every minute you have \$1.4 million of trade between the U.S. and Mexico.

What does that mean? That means jobs, not only for the ranchers, not only for industries, not only on this side, but also on the Mexican side so people will stay over there and work over there on the other side.

This trade is important for farmers, for ranchers, for manufacturers, and producers. This bridge is not only important to south Texas, my district, but it is also important for the whole Nation.

Mr. Speaker, I thank not only my good friend from American Samoa and her staff, but also my good friend the gentlewoman from North Carolina and her staff, for their work.

Mr. Speaker, I also thank Senator JOHN CORNYN for his leadership and Senator CRUZ for getting this bill on the floor. I thank Chairman MCCAUL, Ranking Member MEEKS, and my good friend from San Antonio, Congressman CASTRO, for working to get this bill on the floor. I look forward to getting the President to sign this bill so we can continue creating jobs on both sides of the Rio Grande.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I have no additional speakers, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

I support this strong measure, which has strong bipartisan support. This bill will allow for the expansion of the Starr-Camargo Bridge, which will greatly benefit our supply chain capacity with our largest trading partner, Mexico. This is an investment in the American people and the U.S.-Mexican economy.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this important bill. I thank my colleague, my good friend, Mr. CUELLAR, for his work on this, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, allowing for the expansion of the Starr-Camargo Bridge at no cost to Federal taxpayers will make a real difference in the lives of American families, especially in Texas. I urge all Members to support S. 1608, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, S. 1608.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GLOBAL ANTI-HUMAN TRAFFICKING ENHANCEMENT ACT

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7089) to authorize the Diplomatic Security Services of the Department of State to investigate allegations of violations of conduct constituting offenses under chapter 77 of title 18, United States Code, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7089

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Global Anti-Human Trafficking Enhancement Act".

SEC. 2. EXPANDING PROTECTION AND PROSECUTION EFFORTS AT THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

(a) INVESTIGATION AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State is authorized to investigate transnational violations of chapter 77 of title 18, United States Code, in which part of the offense conduct occurred outside the United States or involved 1 or more foreign nationals.

(b) AUTHORITIES.—Section 37(a)(1) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2709(a)(1)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking “; or” and inserting a semicolon;

(2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D); and

(3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new subparagraph:

“(C) transnational violations of chapter 77 of title 18, United States Code, in which any part of the offense conduct occurred outside the United States or involved one or more foreign nationals; or”.

SEC. 3. REPORT.

Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for six years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report that includes each of the following:

(1) The number of relevant cases opened and investigated by the Diplomatic Security Service as a result of the additional authorities granted by the amendments made by this Act.

(2) The percentage of the cases opened and investigated by the Diplomatic Security

Service as a result of the additional authorities granted by the amendments made by this Act that were referred for further action, including prosecution.

(3) An assessment of the efficacy of the authorities granted by the amendments made by this Act and whether such authorities are sufficient to meaningfully contribute to Department of State and broader United States Government efforts to prosecute and prevent, where applicable, human trafficking and transnational violations of chapter 77 of title 18, United States Code.

(4) An assessment of whether the resources of the Diplomatic Security Service are sufficient to effectively carry out the objectives of this Act.

SEC. 4. SUNSET.

This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall terminate on the date that is 7 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, and the provisions of law amended by such amendments shall be restored as if such amendments had not been enacted.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN) and the gentleman from North Carolina (Ms. MANNING) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from American Samoa.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from American Samoa?

There was no objection.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support for H.R. 7089, the Global Anti-Human Trafficking Enhancement Act, introduced by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. JAMES).

We all believe that people have inherent dignity and possess equal human rights. Unfortunately, not everyone in the world respects that dignity and those rights.

Each year, millions of individuals are exploited through human trafficking. They are forced to work in dangerous, brutal jobs for little or no pay. They are forced to engage in commercial sex. They are forced to marry people they don't know or to join the Armed Forces before the age of consent.

All of us here believe that human traffickers must be caught, prosecuted, and punished to the full extent of the law. That is why the Global Anti-Human Trafficking Enhancement Act is so necessary.

This bill authorizes the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security to investigate criminal violations of U.S. Federal antitrafficking statutes that occur overseas or involve foreign persons.

Most people are not aware that Diplomatic Security is the most widely represented U.S. law enforcement agency overseas, with agents operating in over 270 foreign posts.

This new authority will serve as a force multiplier for the FBI and foreign country law enforcement, who are on the front lines of pursuing traffickers and protecting victims.

With this authority, Diplomatic Security agents would be able to investigate the dozens of Federal antitrafficking cases every year that currently are not pursued because of time and resource constraints at FBI and other Federal law enforcement agencies that do not have people in the far corners of the world.

This proposal has been lauded by the Department of Justice, advocacy groups, and others. It responds to the National Action Plan's mandate to increase trafficking prosecutions and fight modern slavery.

□ 2015

It was adopted in the Foreign Affairs Committee by a unanimous bipartisan vote of 46-0.

Let's empower our diplomatic security agents to assist in the mission of investigating violations of U.S. antitrafficking laws that have overseas elements by passing H.R. 7089, the Global Anti-Human Trafficking Enhancement Act.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 7089, as amended, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this important legislation authorizes the Diplomatic Security Service of the Department of State to investigate allegations of human trafficking crimes.

I thank Chairman McCAUL and Representative JAMES for their leadership and for working with us on this legislation. I also thank the Bureau of Diplomatic Security for engaging with the committee in a constructive manner.

Human trafficking is a scourge on humanity. It is a grave violation of human dignity and freedom, exploiting the most vulnerable among us, including women and children.

The scale of this crime is staggering, with millions of people around the world trapped in conditions of forced labor, sexual exploitation, and unimaginable suffering.

These are not just statistics. They are real people with dreams, families, and aspirations, all cruelly taken away by traffickers.

This bill is not just about expanding authority. It is about ensuring that we have the capacity to act decisively and effectively. By enhancing our ability to investigate these crimes, we can bring more traffickers to justice and, more importantly, rescue and rehabilitate more victims.

Mr. Speaker, the passage of H.R. 7089 is a moral imperative. It is about standing up for the voiceless and ensuring that justice prevails. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this critical bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. JAMES), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and the author of this bill.

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friends, Mrs. RADEWAGEN and Ms. MANNING, for their support of this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak in support of my bill, H.R. 7089, the Global Anti-Human Trafficking Enhancement Act.

God's children are not for sale. Mr. Speaker, I am sure we can all agree that human trafficking must be eradicated everywhere.

The effort behind this legislation is about confronting modern-day slavery, a major stain, the worst stain, on humanity and decency.

My bill allows the State Department, specifically the Diplomatic Security Service, to investigate instances of transnational human trafficking. To clarify, a human trafficking violation is transnational when part of the offense occurs outside of the United States or involves one or more foreign nationals.

Currently, Diplomatic Security must account for document fraud to allow them to start investigating these instances—minutiae, bureaucracy, red tape. We are going to cut that red tape with this bill.

My bill further complements current Federal law enforcement efforts to prosecute these instances, given Diplomatic Security's global reach.

Differences in language and culture are commonly the greatest barriers to successfully prosecuting these transnational trafficking purveyors. Diplomatic Security is by far the most widely internationally represented U.S. law enforcement agency, with agents operating in over 270 posts all over the world.

I often hear: Why is America involved in different parts of this world? Well, when it comes to the safety of our children, young adults, the elderly, the most vulnerable around the world, American leadership can do more to help bring justice to these victims.

According to the State Department: "There are about 27.6 million victims worldwide of human trafficking at any given time." Those are just the ones we know about.

This evil and depraved industry preys on people of all ages, backgrounds, and nationalities for their own profit—again, particularly women, children, and people coming from impoverished backgrounds.

God's will is clear. Luke 4:18-19 reads: The Spirit of the Lord is upon me because He has anointed me to proclaim good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim liberty to captives and recover sight to the blind and set at liberty those who are oppressed, and to proclaim the year of the Lord's favor.

Mr. Speaker, my bill empowers our law enforcement to liberate the oppressed and the captive, and I ask my colleagues to please support H.R. 7089.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume for the purpose of closing.

Human trafficking causes unimaginable suffering, and this bill empowers the Diplomatic Security Service to extend its essential work in investigating and combating these crimes, ensuring we can respond quickly and effectively.

Our Diplomatic Security officers, with their unique global reach and expertise, play a vital role in dismantling trafficking networks that operate across borders.

H.R. 7089 is not just about expanding authority. It is about delivering justice and hope to victims while holding traffickers accountable.

Mr. Speaker, I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting this important bill. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time, and I again thank Mr. JAMES and his bipartisan cosponsors for the bill before us today.

We need to unlock the investigative potential at the U.S. State Department. We need to give our Diplomatic Security agents the authority to assist in the mission of catching criminals who violate our anti-trafficking statutes.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to support H.R. 7089, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 7089, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

MAINTAINING AMERICAN SUPERIORITY BY IMPROVING EXPORT CONTROL TRANSPARENCY ACT

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 6614) to amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 relating to licensing transparency, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 6614

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Maintaining American Superiority by Improving Export Control Transparency Act”.

SEC. 2. LICENSING TRANSPARENCY.

Section 1756 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4815) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(e) REPORT.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, and not less frequently than every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees

a report on license applications, enforcement actions, and other requests for authorization for the export, reexport, release, and in-country transfer of items controlled under this part to covered entities.

“(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the 90 days preceding the previous 90-day period, the following:

“(A) For each license application or other request for authorization, the name of the entity submitting the application (both parent company as well as the subsidiary directly involved), a brief description of the item (including the Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) and level of control, if applicable), the name of the end-user, the end-user’s location, a value estimate, decision with respect to the license application or authorization, and the date of submission.

“(B) The date, location, and result of site inspections, monitoring, and enforcement actions to ensure compliance with United States export controls.

“(C) Aggregate statistics on all license applications and other requests for authorization as described in subparagraph (A).

“(D) For each license denial in which items in category EAR99 constitute at least 50 percent of the financial value of the license application, a list detailing what specific items are being denied a license.

“(3) CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION.—The information required to be provided in the reports required by this subsection (other than the information required by paragraph (2)(C)) shall be exempt from public disclosure pursuant to section 1761(h)(1).

“(4) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection—

“(A) the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

“(i) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

“(ii) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

“(B) the term ‘covered entity’ means any entity included on—

“(i) the list maintained and set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations; or

“(ii) the list maintained and set forth in Supplement No. 7 to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations.”.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN) and the gentlewoman from North Carolina (Ms. MANNING) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from American Samoa.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from American Samoa?

There was no objection.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Maintaining American Superiority by Improving Export Control Transparency Act, introduced by my colleague from Texas (Mr. JACKSON) along with Foreign Affairs Chairman MCCAUL.

Export controls are one of the most powerful tools we have to constrain

China’s military modernization and rebuke its severe human rights abuses.

Ultimately, the strength of our export control regime hinges on the ability to approve or deny a license to sell sensitive technology to China. That process is overseen by the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security, or BIS.

On multiple occasions, in response to persistent committee requests, BIS has provided the House Foreign Affairs Committee with licensing data—information on whether BIS approved or denied licenses to China.

The committee found that even for companies like SMIC and Huawei with deep ties to the Chinese Communist Party and military, BIS rarely, if ever, denied a license.

This data has been essential to our committee’s oversight efforts. This bill will ensure better oversight of the Commerce Department’s export control policies and licensing practices.

Every 90 days, the Secretary of Commerce will submit a report to Congress on activities related to items affected by export control policies, including licenses granted to foreign persons and entities on the entity list.

This bill will finally give Congress the visibility it needs to conduct real oversight on licensing decisions and will help us assess where and how BIS is drawing the line on U.S. national security.

At the Foreign Affairs Committee markup, H.R. 6614 was adopted by a unanimous bipartisan vote of 43–0.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the Maintaining American Superiority by Improving Export Control Transparency Act, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 6614, as amended, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the bill calls for more transparency around license application decisions by the Bureau of Industry and Security for potential exports to entities on its Entity and Military End Users Lists. Inclusion in these lists means that the export, re-export, and transfer of certain U.S. items to these entities requires a license.

This bill would enable Congress to conduct oversight to ensure that the BIS licensing and enforcement processes are working properly and effectively.

I thank Mr. JACKSON and Chairman MCCAUL for working with Ranking Member MEEKS to reach a bipartisan agreement on this bill, which will ensure that the committee is getting the information it needs while protecting business proprietary information and allowing BIS to effectively execute its core national security mandate.

As we add to the list of things we are asking BIS to do, it is also important that we equip BIS with the resources and staffing to meet those requirements. We are asking BIS to take on more responsibility with less.

BIS desperately needs to update its outdated and inefficient IT system, which has not been updated in over 15 years. In that time, the number of license applications BIS receives per year has more than doubled to over 40,000 per year.

As a result, simple data requests such as compiling license application information for Congress can be lengthy and often involve painstaking manual review of materials.

Let me repeat: We are adding more burden to BIS without giving them the resources they so desperately need.

Representative CROW and Ranking Member MEEKS have worked on a bill to fund IT modernization for BIS, and I sincerely hope that as we pass bills like this one offered by Mr. JACKSON, we also live up to our responsibility to actually equip BIS to do its important work and give them the resources they so desperately need.

Mr. Speaker, I support this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

□ 2030

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. JACKSON), a Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the author of this bill.

Mr. JACKSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, today we are bringing to the floor a very important bill, the Maintaining American Superiority by Improving Export Control Transparency Act.

Our country's determination and commitment to achieving what was once thought impossible has led to some of the most incredible technological advances in the history of the world. Consequently, many of the world's very best and most advanced goods are made right here in the United States of America. However, the reality is that it is hard to keep good things to yourself, and nations across the world want to benefit from American goods themselves.

As a general principle, we are happy to export the fruits of our labor because international trade is an important part of any successful and vibrant economy, especially for a country like the United States, but the harsh reality is that not every country who wants access to our goods and materials is friendly to the United States. Malign actors like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran would gladly seek to use our very own goods and technologies against us, whether in military engagements or on the economic battlefield.

The type of goods I am speaking about are not just overtly military hardware, like night vision goggles, tanks, or stealth technology. These bad actors are constantly thinking of new creative ways to use anything and everything against us, making everyday commercial items produced right here in the United States ripe to be weaponized against the American people.

One example would be telecommunications equipment. Anything from routers to cell phones to Bluetooth technology are generally thought of as harmless commercial goods, but they all have huge national security and military implications as well, especially in the hands of our adversaries. These so-called dual-use technologies are the type of goods that our current export controls attempt to prevent from falling into the hands of malign actors.

My bill, the Maintaining American Superiority by Improving Export Control Transparency Act, seeks to ensure increased transparency and accountability in the export control process by mandating a report on export control license applications.

Simply put, my bill creates a mechanism through tracking and reporting on export control license applications that can be utilized to form a paper trail to understand where dual-use technologies came from, who produced them, and whom they were sold to.

If our enemies are utilizing American technology against us, we need to know exactly how that happened and why. Further, my bill will provide some clarity to Congress on how these decisions are made.

Every 90 days, the House and the Senate would receive a report on export control license applications, gaining insight into where our American-made dual-use technologies are going abroad.

I want nothing more than for the American economy to be strong, open, and free, and international trade is a crucial part of that vision. Ultimately, our own free market cannot also be used as a source of our own downfall by allowing our adversaries to use our goods and technologies against us.

My bill ensures accountability and trackability when we send dual-use goods abroad.

In these increasingly dangerous times, there is a need for strong export controls with adequate oversight, which is why my bill passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee by a vote of 43-0. I thank Chairman MCCAUL for his cosponsorship of the legislation and Ranking Member MEEKS for supporting this legislation in our committee. I urge all of my colleagues to support this legislation, as it is necessary for our national security.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time for the purpose of closing.

Mr. Speaker, transparency is critical for effective congressional oversight, and Mr. JACKSON's bill will allow Congress greater insight into the license application decisions and enforcement actions taken by the Bureau of Industry and Security.

The bill reflects the critical national security role that BIS and our export controls play in today's world, but placing greater burdens on BIS while failing to provide the necessary funding to update the 15-year-old equipment it uses is only doing half the job.

Therefore, it is important that Congress provide BIS with the resources and technology necessary to effectively implement this bill and advance its core mandate. I, therefore, encourage my colleagues to work with the urgency required to help us address the resource issue.

With that in mind, I hope my colleagues will join me and support this bill. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to close.

I thank Chairman MCCAUL for his leadership in moving this bill through committee and to the floor. I also thank my bipartisan committee colleagues for their unanimous vote to ensure greater congressional oversight of export controls.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to vote in favor of H.R. 6614, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 6614, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

SENATE BILL REFERRED

A bill of the Senate of the following title was taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S. 612. An act to reauthorize the Lake Tahoe Restoration Act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Natural Resources; in addition, to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure; and to the Committee on Agriculture for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. JACKSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 8 o'clock and 35 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, and pursuant to House Resolution 1427, the House adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, September 10, 2024, at 10 a.m. for morning-hour debate and noon for legislative business, as a further mark of respect to the memory of the late Honorable William J. Pascrell, Jr.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

EC-5216. A letter from the Director, Regulatory Management Division, Environmental

Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's notice of proposed consent decree — Proposed Consent Decree, Clean Air Act Citizen Suit [EPA-HQ-OGC-2024-0319; FRL-12102-01-OGC] received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

EC-5217. A letter from the Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, transmitting the Commission's final rule — Addressing the Home-Work Gap through E-Rate Program [WC Docket No.: 21-31] August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

EC-5218. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's temporary rule — Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Pacific Cod in the Western Regulatory Area of the Gulf of Alaska [Docket No.: 230224-0053; RTID 0648-XD678] received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5219. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting notification that the continuation of the national emergency with respect to Ethiopia, that was declared in Executive Order 14046 of September 17, 2021, is to continue in effect for one year beyond September 17, 2024, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1622(d); Public Law 94-412, Sec. 202(d); (90 Stat. 1257) (H. Doc. No. 118—163); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed.

EC-5220. A letter from the Congressional and Public Affairs Specialist, Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, transmitting the Department's final rule — Iran Foreign Direct Product Rule [Docket No.: 240723-0203] (RIN: 0694-AJ75) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

EC-5221. A letter from the Director, Regulatory Secretariat Division, Office of Acquisition Policy, General Services Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule — General Services Administration Acquisition Regulation; GSAR Case 2024-G503; Updates to References to GSA Sustainable Leasing [GSAR Case 2024-G503; Docket No.: 2024-0014; Sequence No. 1] (RIN: 3090-AK82) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability.

EC-5222. A letter from the Director, Regulatory Secretariat Division, Office of Acquisition Policy, General Services Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule — General Services Administration Acquisition Regulation; Federal Supply Schedule Economic Price Adjustment [GSAR Case 2020-G510; Docket No.: 2023-0025; Sequence No. 1] (RIN: 3090-AK20) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability.

EC-5223. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's temporary rule — Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Pacific Cod by Vessels Using Pot Gear in the Central Regulatory Area of the Gulf of Alaska [Docket No.: 230224-0053] (RTID: 0648-XD651) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5224. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's temporary rule — International Fisheries; Pacific Tuna Fisheries; Inseason Action for 2024 Commercial Pacific Bluefin Tuna Annual Catch Limit in the Eastern Pacific Ocean [Docket No.: 220801-0167; RTID 0648-XD737] received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5225. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's temporary rule — Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic; 2024 Recreational Closure for Golden Tilefish in the South Atlantic [Docket No.: 231101-0256; RTID 0648-XD672] received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5226. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule — Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic; Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico; Commercial Trip Limit for Gray Triggerfish [Docket No.: 230726-0175] (RIN: 0648-BM13) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5227. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule — Pacific Halibut Fisheries; Catch Sharing Plan; Rulemaking To Modify the 2023-2027 Halibut Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) Vessel Harvest Limitations in IFQ Regulatory Areas 4A, 4B, 4C, and 4D [Docket No.: 230720-0171] (RIN: 0648-BM18) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5228. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule — Fisheries of the Northeastern United States; Improvement and Modernization of Atlantic Surfclam and Ocean Quahog Vessel Reporting Regulations [Docket No.: 230821-0201] (RIN: 0648-BL61) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5229. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule — Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic; Snapper-Group-er Fishery of the South Atlantic; Amendment 53 [Docket No.: 230914-0219] (RIN: 0648-BM27) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5230. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's notification of quota transfers- Fisheries of the Northeastern United States; Summer Flounder Fishery; Quota Transfers From NC and VA to NJ [Docket No.: 221223-0282; RTID 0648-XD599] received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5231. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, Na-

tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule — Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions; Fisheries Off West Coast States; Groundfish Electronic Monitoring Program; Service Provider Revisions; Correction (RIN: 0648-BM29) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5232. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's temporary rule — Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Pacific Ocean Perch in the Bering Sea Subarea of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Management Area [Docket No.: 230306-0065; RTID 0648-XD162] received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5233. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's temporary rule — Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Sablefish in the Bering Sea Subarea of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Management Area [Docket No.: 230306-0065; RTID 0648-XD117] received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5234. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's temporary rule — Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic; 2023 Commercial Closure for Gulf of Mexico Greater Amberjack [Docket No.: 1206013412-2517-02] (RTID 0648?XD065) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5235. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule — Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Rock Sole, Flathead Sole, Alaska Plaice, and Other Flatfish in the Herring Savings Areas of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Management Area [Docket No.: 230306-0065; RTID 0648-XC988] received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5236. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's temporary rule — Atlantic Highly Migratory Species; Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries; Closure of the Angling Category Southern New England Area Trophy Fishery for 2023 [Docket No.: 220919-0193] (RTID: 0648-XD039) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5237. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's temporary rule — Atlantic Highly Migratory Species; Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries; Harpoon Category Retention Limit Adjustment [Docket No.: 220919-0193] (RTID: 0648-XD158) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5238. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's temporary rule — Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic; 2023 Recreational Closure for Golden Tilefish in the South Atlantic [Docket No.: 180720681-8999-02; RTID 0648-XD155] received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5239. A letter from the Branch Chief, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule — Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone off Alaska; Longnose Skates in the Eastern Regulatory Area of the Gulf of Alaska [Docket No.: 230224-0053; RTID 0648-XD057] received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5240. A letter from the Deputy Assistant Administrator, NMFS, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule — Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Halibut Deck Sorting Monitoring Requirements for Trawl Catcher/Processors Operating in Non-Pollock Groundfish Fisheries Off Alaska [200113-0012] (RIN: 0648-BI53) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5241. A letter from the Deputy Assistant Administrator, NMFS, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule — Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Pacific Cod Management in the Groundfish Fisheries of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands and the Gulf of Alaska [Docket No.: 191212-0112] (RIN: 0648-BJ02) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5242. A letter from the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Regulatory Programs, NMFS, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule — Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Reclassifying Squid Species in the BSAI and GOA [Docket No.: 170714670-8561-02] (RIN: 0648-BH05) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5243. A letter from the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Regulatory Programs, NMFS, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule — Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Halibut Deck Sorting Monitoring Requirements for Trawl Catcher/Processors Operating in Non-Pollock Groundfish Fisheries off Alaska [Docket No.: 191004-0055] (RIN: 0648-BI53) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Natural Resources.

EC-5244. A letter from the Chief Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security, transmitting the Department's final rule — Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Application Period Extension [Docket ID: FEMA-2024-0024] (RIN: 1660-AB15) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

EC-5245. A letter from the Attorney-Advisor, Federal Transit Administration, Depart-

ment of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule — Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program [Docket No.: FTA-2023-0025] (RIN: 2132-AB43) received August 20, 2024, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. MCHENRY: Committee on Financial Services. House Joint Resolution 125. Resolution providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System relating to, "Principles for Climate-Related Financial Risk Management for Large Financial Institutions" (Rept. 118-651). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

Mr. MCHENRY: Committee on Financial Services. H.R. 7480. A bill to amend section 102(a)(20) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 to require the exclusion of service-connected disability compensation when determining whether a person is a person of low and moderate income, a person of low income, or a person of moderate income, and for other purposes; with an amendment (Rept. 118-652). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

Mr. LUCAS: Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. H.R. 7686. A bill to amend the Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act to clarify the definition of foreign country for purposes of malign foreign talent recruitment restriction, and for other purposes; with an amendment (Rept. 118-653). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

Mr. BOST: Committee on Veterans' Affairs. H.R. 2911. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to require the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to periodically review the automatic maximum coverage under the Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance program and the Veterans' Group Life Insurance program, and for other purposes; with an amendment (Rept. 118-654). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

Mr. BOST: Committee on Veterans' Affairs. H.R. 4190. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to repay the estates of deceased beneficiaries for certain benefits paid by the Secretary and misused by fiduciaries of such beneficiaries; with an amendment (Rept. 118-655). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XII, public bills and resolutions of the following titles were introduced and severally referred, as follows:

By Mr. HIGGINS of Louisiana (for himself and Mr. COLE):

H.R. 9494. A bill making continuing appropriations for fiscal year 2025, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Appropriations, and in addition to the Committee on the Budget, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall with-

in the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

By Ms. TENNEY (for herself, Mr. KUSTOFF, Mr. SCHNEIDER, and Ms. TITUS):

H.R. 9495. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to postpone tax deadlines and reimburse paid late fees for United States nationals who are unlawfully or wrongfully detained or held hostage abroad, to terminate the tax-exempt status of terrorist supporting organizations, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mrs. CHAVEZ-DEREMER:

H.R. 9496. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to include a representative of the National Association of State Veterans Homes on the Geriatrics and Gerontology Advisory Committee of the Department of Veterans Affairs; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. OBERNOLTE (for himself, Mr. LIEU, Mr. LUCAS, and Ms. LOFGREN):

H.R. 9497. A bill to amend the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 to establish a center on artificial intelligence to ensure continued United States leadership in research, development, and evaluation of the robustness, resilience, and safety of artificial intelligence systems, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.

By Mr. SCOTT FRANKLIN of Florida (for himself and Mr. MULLIN):

H.R. 9498. A bill to direct the use of artificial intelligence by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to adapt to extreme weather, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.

By Mr. BURCHETT (for himself and Mr. MCCAUL):

H.R. 9499. A bill to require the United States Agency for Global Media to verify the authenticity of foreign academic credentials purported to be held by prospective and existing employees of the Agency, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. FALLON:

H.R. 9500. A bill to require agencies to use information and communications technology products obtained from original equipment manufacturers or authorized resellers, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability.

By Mr. FITZPATRICK (for himself, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, and Mr. QUIGLEY):

H.R. 9501. A bill to promote peace, stability, and recovery in Ukraine, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

By Mr. FROST:

H.R. 9502. A bill to provide for automatic extension of employment authorizations, to require earlier determinations on temporary protected status designations, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HUIZENGA (for himself, Mr. MCCAUL, Mr. LAWLER, Ms. SALAZAR, Mr. SELF, Mr. BAIRD, Mr. DAVIDSON, Mr. GUEST, Mr. CLINE, Mr. NORMAN, and Mr. WEBER of Texas):

H.R. 9503. A bill to direct the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development to promulgate regulations to require all implementing partners receiving foreign assistance funds with activities in Afghanistan to submit a report on any payments or

withholdings, including for taxes, fees, duties, and utilities, made to the Taliban, state-owned enterprises, or governing institutions in Afghanistan, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. LOPEZ:

H.R. 9504. A bill to amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require information on the national debt to be included on ballots in elections for Federal office, and for other purposes; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Ms. NORTON:

H.R. 9505. A bill to authorize the establishment of a program of voluntary separation incentive payments for nonjudicial employees of the District of Columbia courts and employees of the District of Columbia Public Defender Service; to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability.

By Ms. PETTERSEN (for herself and Mr. CISCOMAN):

H.R. 9506. A bill to provide for the establishment of a Water Project Navigators Program, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Natural Resources.

By Ms. PORTER:

H.R. 9507. A bill to modify the definitions of congressional committees under the Leahy laws; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

By Ms. TENNEY (for herself and Ms. ROSS):

H.R. 9508. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow certain veterinary expenses for pets and service animals to be treated as amounts paid for medical care for purposes of a health savings account or flexible savings account; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Ms. VELÁZQUEZ:

H.R. 9509. A bill to amend section 7(j) of the Small Business Act to modify the start date used to calculate the period in which a small business concern is eligible to participate in the 8(a) program, and for the other purposes; to the Committee on Small Business.

By Ms. VELÁZQUEZ:

H.R. 9510. A bill to make improvements to Federal contracting opportunities for small business concerns owned and controlled by women, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Small Business, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, Veterans' Affairs, and Oversight and Accountability, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

By Mr. SMITH of New Jersey:

H. Res. 1427. A resolution expressing the profound sorrow of the House of Representatives on the death of the Honorable William J. Pascrell, Jr; considered and agreed to.

By Mr. CARTER of Georgia (for himself, Ms. MATSUI, Mr. CURTIS, Ms. SEWELL, Mr. THOMPSON of California, and Ms. BLUNT ROCHESTER):

H. Res. 1428. A resolution supporting the designation of the week of September 15, 2024, through September 21, 2024, as "Telehealth Awareness Week"; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. JAMES (for himself, Ms. TLAI, Mr. BERGMAN, Mr. THANEDAR, Mr. WALBERG, Ms. SCHOLTEN, Mr. HUIZENGA, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. MOOLENAAR, Mrs. DINGELL, Mrs. MCCLAIN, Ms. SLOTKIN, and Ms. STEVENS):

H. Res. 1429. A resolution congratulating the Olympians and Paralympians of Michi-

gan who competed in the 2024 Olympics and Paralympics in Paris, France; to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND SINGLE SUBJECT STATEMENTS

Pursuant to clause 7(c)(1) of rule XII and Section 3(c) of H. Res. 5 the following statements are submitted regarding (1) the specific powers granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact the accompanying bill or joint resolution and (2) the single subject of the bill or joint resolution.

By Mr. STEIL:

H.R. 9487.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Article I, Section 8

The single subject of this legislation is:

This bill will revise certain authorities of the House Office of Legislative Counsel.

By Mr. STEIL:

H.R. 9489.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Article I, Section 8

The single subject of this legislation is:

This bill will sunset the Advisory Committee on the Records of Congress.

By Mr. STEIL:

H.R. 9490.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Article I, Section 8

The single subject of this legislation is:

This bill will revise certain authorities of the Government Publishing Office.

By Mr. HIGGINS of Louisiana:

H.R. 9494.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

The principal constitutional authority for this legislation is clause 7 of section 9 of article I of the Constitution of the United States (the appropriation power), which states "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . ." In addition, clause 1 of section 8 of article I of the Constitution (the spending power) provides: "The Congress shall have the Power . . . to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . ." Together, these specific constitutional provisions establish the congressional power of the purse, granting Congress the authority to appropriate funds, to determine their purpose, amount, and period of availability, and to set forth terms and conditions governing their use.

The single subject of this legislation is:

The subject of the bill is the making of continuing appropriations.

By Ms. TENNEY:

H.R. 9495.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Article I, Section 8, Clause 1

The single subject of this legislation is:

Legislation that would prevent U.S. citizens who have been taken hostage or wrongfully detained abroad from incurring penalties for late tax payments while they were held, as well as terminating tax-exempt status for organizations found to be supporting terrorism.

By Mrs. CHAVEZ-DEREMER:

H.R. 9496.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution.

The single subject of this legislation is:

To amend title 38, United States Code, to include a representative of the National Association of State Veterans Homes on the Geriatrics and Gerontology Advisory Committee of the Department of Veterans Affairs.

By Mr. OBERNOLTE:

H.R. 9497.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18:

"The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution for foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."

The single subject of this legislation is:

Amends the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 to establish a center on artificial intelligence to ensure continued United States leadership in research, development, and evaluation of the robustness, resilience, and safety of artificial intelligence systems.

By Mr. SCOTT FRANKLIN of Florida:

H.R. 9498.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Congress is granted the authority to introduce and enact this legislation pursuant to Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.

The single subject of this legislation is:

To direct the use of artificial intelligence by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to adapt to extreme weather, and for other purposes.

By Mr. BURCHETT:

H.R. 9499.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Article 1, Section 8

The single subject of this legislation is:

To require the United States Agency for Global Media to verify the authenticity of foreign academic credentials purported to be held by prospective and existing employees of the Agency, and for other purposes.

By Mr. FALLON:

H.R. 9500.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Article I, Section 8

The single subject of this legislation is:

To require agencies to use information and communications technology products obtained from original equipment manufacturers or authorized resellers, and for other purposes.

By Mr. FITZPATRICK:

H.R. 9501.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Article I, Section VIII, Clause 18

The single subject of this legislation is:

U.S.-Ukraine Partnership

By Mr. FROST:

H.R. 9502.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 and 18 of the U.S. Constitution.

The single subject of this legislation is:

To provide for automatic extension of employment authorizations, to require earlier determinations on temporary protected status designations, and for other purposes.

By Mr. HUIZENGA:

H.R. 9503.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Article I Section 8 of the United States Constitution.

The single subject of this legislation is:

Oversight of the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development.

By Mr. LOPEZ:

H.R. 9504.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Article 1, Section 8

The single subject of this legislation is:

To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require information on the national debt to be included on ballots in elections for Federal office, and for other purposes.

By Ms. NORTON:

H.R. 9505.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

clause 17 of section 8 of article I of the Constitution

The single subject of this legislation is:

This bill would give the District of Columbia Courts and the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia the authority to offer voluntary separation incentive payments to their employees.

By Ms. PETERSEN:

H.R. 9506.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Clause 18 of Section of Article 1

The single subject of this legislation is:

Water

By Ms. PORTER:

H.R. 9507.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Article 1, Section 8

The single subject of this legislation is:

To modify the definitions of congressional committees under the Leahy laws.

By Ms. TENNEY:

H.R. 9508.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Article I

The single subject of this legislation is:

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow certain veterinary expenses for pets and service animals to be treated as amounts paid for medical care for purposes of a health savings account or flexible savings account.

By Ms. VELÁQUEZ:

H.R. 9509.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which gives Congress the power "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."

The single subject of this legislation is:

Would amend the timelines for small businesses participating in the SBA's 8(a) Business Development Program.

By Ms. VELÁQUEZ:

H.R. 9510.

Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following:

Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which gives Congress the power "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."

The single subject of this legislation is:

Would incentivize federal agencies to enhance contracting opportunities for women-owned small businesses.

ADDITIONAL SPONSORS

Under clause 7 of rule XII, sponsors were added to public bills and resolutions, as follows:

H.R. 33: Mr. LEVIN.
 H.R. 34: Mr. CARSON.
 H.R. 35: Ms. JACOBS.
 H.R. 53: Mr. BALDERSON, Mr. MILLS, Ms. LEE of Florida, and Ms. VAN DUYN.
 H.R. 196: Ms. CARAVEO.
 H.R. 205: Ms. CHU.
 H.R. 544: Mr. LEVIN and Mr. LARSON of Connecticut.
 H.R. 648: Mr. PHILLIPS.
 H.R. 744: Mr. KIM of New Jersey, Mr. RUPPERSBERGER, Mr. COHEN, Mr. VICENTE GONZALEZ of Texas, Mr. KILMER, Mr. DAVID SCOTT of Georgia, Mr. FROST, Ms. CARAVEO, Ms. CRAIG, Ms. STANSBURY, and Mr. LARSEN of Washington.
 H.R. 779: Mr. GUTHRIE.
 H.R. 782: Ms. BROWN.
 H.R. 809: Mrs. LUNA.
 H.R. 885: Ms. JACOBS.
 H.R. 920: Mr. PHILLIPS.
 H.R. 932: Mr. KIM of New Jersey.
 H.R. 972: Mr. SCHWEIKERT.
 H.R. 1088: Mr. MOLINARO and Ms. DE LA CRUZ.
 H.R. 1184: Mr. PHILLIPS.
 H.R. 1277: Ms. UNDERWOOD.
 H.R. 1321: Mr. TRONE and Ms. DELBENE.
 H.R. 1465: Mr. PHILLIPS.
 H.R. 1507: Ms. LEGER FERNANDEZ.
 H.R. 1544: Mr. PFLUGER.
 H.R. 1572: Mr. AUCHINCLOSS and Mr. LATURNER.
 H.R. 1594: Mr. SMUCKER.
 H.R. 1595: Mrs. FLETCHER.
 H.R. 1599: Ms. SALINAS.
 H.R. 1605: Mrs. GONZÁLEZ-COLÓN.
 H.R. 1833: Ms. KAPTUR and Mr. SUOZZI.
 H.R. 2389: Mr. SORENSEN, Mrs. CHAVEZ-DEREMER, Mr. SUOZZI, and Mr. MULLIN.
 H.R. 2413: Mr. AMO.
 H.R. 2501: Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia.
 H.R. 2630: Mr. MCGARVEY.
 H.R. 2672: Mr. PHILLIPS.
 H.R. 2725: Mr. SUOZZI, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. VASQUEZ, and Mr. RYAN.
 H.R. 2743: Mr. ALFORD, Mr. MILLS, Mr. VALADAO, Mr. CAREY, Mr. NEHLS, Mr. MOORE of Utah, Mr. CRENSHAW, and Ms. LEE of Florida.
 H.R. 2744: Mr. OBERNOLTE.
 H.R. 2748: Mr. RESCHENTHALER.
 H.R. 2827: Mr. ARMSTRONG and Mr. MORELLE.
 H.R. 2880: Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY and Mr. VAN ORDEN.
 H.R. 3005: Mr. SWALWELL.
 H.R. 3074: Ms. BROWNLEY.
 H.R. 3087: Mrs. KIM of California.
 H.R. 3238: Mr. GUEST and Ms. BUDZINSKI.
 H.R. 3258: Mr. TAKANO.
 H.R. 3375: Mrs. DINGELL.
 H.R. 3387: Mr. MRVAN.
 H.R. 3416: Ms. ROSS and Mrs. PELTOLA.
 H.R. 3475: Mr. BARR.
 H.R. 3541: Mr. LAWLER and Mr. FLEISCHMANN.
 H.R. 3592: Mr. LAWLER.
 H.R. 3649: Mr. MAST, Mr. VAN ORDEN, and Mr. BERGMAN.
 H.R. 3808: Mr. MEEKS.
 H.R. 4157: Mr. BAIRD.
 H.R. 4169: Mr. MAGAZINER.
 H.R. 4263: Mr. GOTTHEIMER.
 H.R. 4340: Mr. SUOZZI, Ms. ROSS, Mr. VASQUEZ, and Ms. LEE of Nevada.
 H.R. 4422: Mr. CASAR, Ms. STEVENS, and Mr. VEASEY.
 H.R. 4439: Mr. MENENDEZ.
 H.R. 4519: Mr. SUOZZI.
 H.R. 4567: Mr. GOTTHEIMER.
 H.R. 4627: Mr. TONY GONZALES of Texas and Mr. MEEKS.
 H.R. 4709: Mrs. MILLER-MEEKS and Mr. DELUZIO.
 H.R. 4731: Mrs. TORRES of California, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Ms. TITUS, Ms. BROWNLEY, Mr. MORELLE, and Ms. BONAMICI.

H.R. 4787: Mr. PHILLIPS and Mr. D'ESPOSITO.
 H.R. 4818: Mr. MORELLE.
 H.R. 4840: Mr. SUOZZI.
 H.R. 4936: Ms. BARRAGÁN.
 H.R. 4978: Mr. BISHOP of Georgia.
 H.R. 4979: Mr. BISHOP of Georgia.
 H.R. 5037: Mr. TAKANO.
 H.R. 5074: Mrs. STEEL.
 H.R. 5208: Mr. GROTHMAN.
 H.R. 5422: Mr. EMMER.
 H.R. 5432: Mr. LIEU.
 H.R. 5435: Mrs. DINGELL.
 H.R. 5467: Ms. STEVENS.
 H.R. 5502: Mr. ROBERT GARCIA of California and Ms. SCHAKOWSKY.
 H.R. 5825: Mr. RUPPERSBERGER.
 H.R. 5827: Mr. ESPAILLAT.
 H.R. 6003: Mr. CORREA and Mr. ESPAILLAT.
 H.R. 6031: Mrs. TRAHAN.
 H.R. 6299: Mr. VAN DREW.
 H.R. 6359: Ms. SALINAS.
 H.R. 6382: Mr. OBERNOLTE.
 H.R. 6430: Ms. BALINT.
 H.R. 6516: Mr. PHILLIPS.
 H.R. 6751: Mr. CASTRO of Texas.
 H.R. 6773: Ms. SÁNCHEZ, Ms. MATSUI, Mr. SWALWELL, Mrs. NAPOLITANO, Ms. BROWNLEY, and Ms. JACOBS.
 H.R. 6861: Mr. MIKE GARCIA of California.
 H.R. 6951: Mr. RULLI.
 H.R. 7035: Mr. OWENS.
 H.R. 7042: Mr. MILLS, Mr. ZINKE, Mr. ROGERS of Alabama, Mr. BOST, and Ms. VAN DUYN.
 H.R. 7084: Ms. WILD.
 H.R. 7116: Mr. TORRES of New York.
 H.R. 7137: Mr. BIGGS.
 H.R. 7159: Mrs. GONZÁLEZ-COLÓN, Ms. TITUS, and Mr. MOLINARO.
 H.R. 7195: Mr. ZINKE, Mr. BABIN, Mr. MILLS, Mr. ROGERS of Alabama, and Ms. VAN DUYN.
 H.R. 7222: Ms. OMAR.
 H.R. 7233: Mr. MRVAN.
 H.R. 7310: Mr. PHILLIPS.
 H.R. 7359: Ms. PRESSLEY.
 H.R. 7411: Mrs. STEEL.
 H.R. 7414: Mr. MOSKOWITZ and Mr. BACON.
 H.R. 7450: Mr. MILLS, Ms. LEE of Florida, Mr. BOST, Ms. VAN DUYN, Ms. DE LA CRUZ, and Mr. ZINKE.
 H.R. 7469: Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania.
 H.R. 7618: Ms. BONAMICI.
 H.R. 7620: Mr. HUIZENGA.
 H.R. 7764: Mr. VAN DREW and Mr. JACKSON of North Carolina.
 H.R. 7770: Mr. TURNER and Ms. JACOBS.
 H.R. 7779: Mr. NEHLS and Mr. BEAN of Florida.
 H.R. 7859: Mrs. PELTOLA.
 H.R. 7866: Mr. PHILLIPS.
 H.R. 8028: Ms. KELLY of Illinois, Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia, and Mr. TONKO.
 H.R. 8061: Mr. CARTER of Texas and Mr. FOSTER.
 H.R. 8066: Mr. ZINKE, Mr. MILLS, and Mr. GRAVES of Missouri.
 H.R. 8068: Mr. BERGMAN, Mr. LOPEZ, Mr. CARTER of Georgia, and Mr. CLINE.
 H.R. 8098: Mr. CASTEN and Ms. LEGER FERNANDEZ.
 H.R. 8119: Mr. TRONE.
 H.R. 8164: Mrs. TRAHAN.
 H.R. 8247: Mrs. MCBATH and Ms. CARAVEO.
 H.R. 8300: Mr. GOLDMAN of New York.
 H.R. 8307: Ms. DELBENE, Mrs. HAYES, and Mr. LALOTA.
 H.R. 8333: Mr. GREEN of Tennessee.
 H.R. 8340: Mrs. KIM of California, Mr. DESAULNIER, Mrs. HAYES, and Mr. VAN ORDEN.
 H.R. 8347: Mrs. HAYES.
 H.R. 8464: Mr. EMMER.
 H.R. 8501: Ms. CLARKE of New York.
 H.R. 8505: Mr. CARTER of Louisiana.
 H.R. 8614: Mr. BEYER.
 H.R. 8639: Ms. SALINAS.
 H.R. 8641: Mr. OBERNOLTE and Mr. MIKE GARCIA of California.

H.R. 8653: Mr. AUSTIN SCOTT of Georgia.
 H.R. 8693: Mrs. LUNA.
 H.R. 8702: Mr. GOLDMAN of New York and Mr. MORELLE.
 H.R. 8734: Mr. FLEISCHMANN and Mr. WILLIAMS of New York.
 H.R. 8758: Ms. CRAIG and Mr. MRVAN.
 H.R. 8790: Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota.
 H.R. 8796: Mr. HORSFORD.
 H.R. 8834: Mr. KELLY of Mississippi and Mr. AMODEI.
 H.R. 8836: Ms. CARAVEO and Mr. AMODEI.
 H.R. 8857: Mr. BOST.
 H.R. 8893: Mr. PHILLIPS.
 H.R. 8916: Mr. YAKYM.
 H.R. 8963: Mr. BOYLE of Pennsylvania, Mr. CARTWRIGHT, Mr. EVANS, and Ms. SCANLON.
 H.R. 8989: Mr. WEBER of Texas.
 H.R. 8996: Mr. ALLRED and Mr. MRVAN.
 H.R. 9002: Ms. CHU and Mr. CISCOMANI.
 H.R. 9003: Mr. PHILLIPS.
 H.R. 9053: Mr. VAN ORDEN.
 H.R. 9060: Mr. PANETTA.
 H.R. 9070: Ms. NORTON.
 H.R. 9096: Ms. PRESSLEY and Mr. FLEISCHMANN.
 H.R. 9124: Mr. PETERS and Mrs. TORRES of California.
 H.R. 9125: Mr. TONY GONZALES of Texas.
 H.R. 9151: Mr. ARRINGTON, Mr. MOULTON, Mr. KHANNA, and Ms. CASTOR of Florida.
 H.R. 9152: Ms. NORTON and Mr. ESPAILLAT.
 H.R. 9153: Mr. LAWLER.
 H.R. 9188: Mr. PHILLIPS.
 H.R. 9193: Mr. D'ESPOSITO and Ms. DAVIDS of Kansas.
 H.R. 9217: Mr. FROST.
 H.R. 9226: Mr. CARTER of Louisiana.
 H.R. 9244: Ms. UNDERWOOD.
 H.R. 9250: Mrs. HAYES.
 H.R. 9255: Mr. RYAN.
 H.R. 9260: Mr. ZINKE.
 H.R. 9266: Mr. CARSON, Ms. LEE of Pennsylvania, Ms. CHU, and Ms. OMAR.
 H.R. 9268: Mr. BERGMAN.
 H.R. 9271: Mr. OBERNOLTE.
 H.R. 9274: Mr. TONY GONZALES of Texas and Mr. LAWLER.
 H.R. 9284: Mr. HORSFORD.
 H.R. 9327: Mr. GARAMENDI and Mr. SMITH of Nebraska.
 H.R. 9340: Mr. LATTA.
 H.R. 9373: Mr. MEUSER.
 H.R. 9388: Mr. NORMAN.
 H.R. 9398: Mr. GOTTHEIMER.
 H.R. 9402: Ms. BONAMICI.
 H.R. 9424: Ms. OMAR.
 H.R. 9438: Mr. CISCOMANI.
 H.R. 9448: Mr. POCAN, Ms. BLUNT ROCH-ESTER, and Mrs. MCBATH.
 H.R. 9453: Mr. MOYLAN.
 H.R. 9456: Mrs. CAMMACK, Mrs. CHAVEZ-DEEMER, Mrs. KIGGANS of Virginia, Mr. STRONG, Mr. GUEST, Mr. CURTIS, Mr. FLEISCHMANN, Mrs. GONZÁLEZ-COLÓN, Mr. OWENS, Mr. GUTHRIE, Mrs. HOUCHIN, and Mr. BACON.
 H.R. 9462: Mrs. MILLER-MEEKS and Ms. STEFANIK.
 H.R. 9468: Mr. WOMACK and Mrs. BICE.
 H.R. 9479: Mr. NUNN of Iowa.
 H.J. Res. 8: Mr. KEAN of New Jersey, Mr. BOST, and Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky.
 H.J. Res. 54: Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi and Mr. LEVIN.
 H.J. Res. 144: Mr. LOUDERMILK and Mr. BAIRD.
 H.J. Res. 164: Ms. VAN DUYNE.
 H.J. Res. 168: Mr. FULCHER.
 H.J. Res. 193: Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi, Ms. DELBENE, and Mr. ESPAILLAT.
 H.J. Res. 202: Mrs. RADEWAGEN.
 H. Con. Res. 13: Mr. CISCOMANI.
 H. Res. 668: Mr. LAWLER and Mr. MAGAZINER.
 H. Res. 882: Mr. CARTER of Louisiana.
 H. Res. 1069: Mr. SUOZZI.
 H. Res. 1127: Ms. STANSBURY.
 H. Res. 1148: Ms. DAVIDS of Kansas.
 H. Res. 1317: Mr. LALOTA.

H. Res. 1374: Ms. LEE of Florida and Mr. BOST.
 H. Res. 1386: Ms. BROWN, Ms. CHU, and Mr. HUFFMAN.
 H. Res. 1394: Mr. ROGERS of Alabama.
 H. Res. 1418: Mr. PETERS.
 H. Res. 1419: Mrs. HAYES, Ms. BUDZINSKI, Ms. BALINT, Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN, and Mr. ALLRED.

CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, OR LIMITED TARIFF BENEFITS

Under clause 9 of rule XXI, lists or statements on congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits were submitted as follows:

OFFERED BY MR. MCCAUL

The provisions that warranted a referral to the Committee on Foreign Affairs in H.R. 9456, the *Protecting American Agriculture from Foreign Adversaries Act of 2024*, do not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9 of rule XXI.

OFFERED BY MRS. RODGERS

The provisions that warranted a referral to the Committee on Energy and Commerce in H.R. 9456, *Protecting American Agriculture from Foreign Adversaries Act of 2024*, do not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9 of rule XXI.

OFFERED BY MR. MCHENRY

The provisions that warranted a referral to the Committee on Financial Services in H.R. 9456, the *Protecting American Agriculture from Foreign Adversaries Act*, do not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9 of rule XXI.