[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 17]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page 23918]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                   LET PRIVATEERS TROLL FOR BIN LADEN

                                 ______
                                 

                             HON. RON PAUL

                                of texas

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, December 4, 2001

  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I recommend my colleagues read the attached 
article ``Let Privateers Troll for Bin Laden'' by Larry Sechrest, a 
research fellow at the Independent Institute in Oakland, California, 
and a professor of economics at Sul Ross State University. Professor 
Sechrest documents the role privateers played in the war against 
pirates who plagued America in the early days of the Republic. These 
privateers often operated with letters of marque and reprisal granted 
by the United States Congress.
  Professor Sechrest points out that privateers could be an effective 
tool in the war against terrorism. Today's terrorists have much in 
common with the pirates of days gone by. Like the pirates of old, 
today's terrorists are private groups seeking to attack the United 
States government and threaten the lives, liberty, and property of 
United States citizens. The only difference is that while pirates 
sought financial gains, terrorists seek to advance ideological and 
political agendas through violence.
  Like the pirates who once terrorized the high seas, terrorists today 
are also difficult to apprehend using traditional military means. We 
have seen that bombs and missiles can effectively and efficiently knock 
out the military capability, economy and technological infrastructure 
of an enemy nation that harbors terrorists. However, recent events also 
seem to suggest that traditional military force is not as effective in 
bringing lawless terrorists to justice.
  When a terrorist stronghold has been destroyed by military power, 
terrorists simply may move to another base before military forces 
locate them. It is for these reasons that I believe the drafters of the 
Constitution would counsel in favor of issuing letters of marque and 
reprisal against the terrorists responsible for the September 11 
attacks.
  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld recently acknowledged the role that 
private parties, when provided sufficient incentives by government, can 
play in bringing terrorists to justice. Now is the time for Congress to 
ensure President Bush can take advantage of every effective and 
constitutional means of fighting the war on terrorism. This is why I 
have introduced the Air Piracy Reprisal and Capture Act of 2001 (HR 
3074) and the September 11 Marque and Reprisal Act of 2001 (HR 3076). 
The Air Piracy Reprisal and Capture Act of 2001 updates the federal 
definition of ``piracy'' to include acts committed in the skies. The 
September 11 Marque and Reprisal Act of 2001 provides Congressional 
authorization for the President to issue letters of marque and reprisal 
to appropriate parties to seize the person and property of Osama bin 
Laden and any other individuals responsible for the terrorist attacks 
of September 11. I encourage my colleagues to read Professor Sechrest's 
article on the effectiveness of privateers, and to help ensure 
President Bush can take advantage of every available tool to capture 
and punish terrorists by cosponsoring my Air Piracy Reprisal and 
Capture Act and the September 11 Marque and Reprisal Act.

                   Let Privateers Troll for Bin Laden

                         (by Larry J. Sechrest)

       In the wake of the Sept. 11th attacks, a group of American 
     businessmen has decided to enlist the profit motive to bring 
     the perpetrators to justice. Headed by Edward Lozzi of 
     Beverly Hills, California, the group intends to offer a 
     bounty of $1 billion--that's billion with a ``b''--to any 
     private citizens who will capture Osama bin Laden and his 
     associates, dead or alive.
       Paying private citizens to achieve military objectives 
     seems novel but is hardly untried. Recall Ross Perot's 
     successful use of private forces to retrieve his employees 
     from the clutches of fundamentalist Muslims in Iran in 1979.
       We are all familiar with bail bondsmen, who employ bounty 
     hunters to catch bail-jumping fugitives. Less familiar are 
     two U.S. companies, Military Professional Resources Inc. and 
     Vinnell Corporation, which provide military services to 
     governments and other organizations worldwide.
       Historically, private citizens arming private ships, 
     appropriately called ``privateers,'' played an important role 
     in the American Revolution. Eight hundred privateers aided 
     the seceding colonists' cause, while the British employed 
     700, despite having a huge government navy.
       During the War of 1812, 526 American vessels were 
     commissioned as privateers. This was not piracy, because the 
     privateers were licensed by their own governments and the 
     ships were bonded to ensure that their captains followed the 
     accepted laws of the sea, including the humane treatment of 
     those who were taken prisoner. Congress granted privateers 
     ``letters of marque and reprisal,'' under the authority of 
     Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.
       Originally, privateering was a method of restitution for 
     merchants or shipowners who had been wronged by a citizen of 
     a foreign country. Privateers captured the ships flying the 
     flag of the wrongdoers' nation and sailed them to a friendly 
     port, where a neutral admiralty court decided whether the 
     seizure was just. Wrongful seizures resulted in the 
     forfeiture of the privateers' bond to the owners of the 
     seized ship.
       If the seizure was, just, the ship and cargo were sold at 
     auction, with the bulk of the proceeds going to the 
     privateer's owners and crew. The crews were volunteers who 
     shared in the profits, and the investors viewed the venture 
     as remunerative--albeit risky,
       Privateering soon evolved into a potent means of warfare. 
     Self-interest encouraged privateers to capture as many enemy 
     ships as possible, and to do it quickly. Were privateers 
     successful in inflicting serious losses on the enemy? 
     Emphatically, yes. Between 1793 and 1797, the British lost 
     2,266 vessels, the majority taken by French privateers.
       During the War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697) French 
     privateers captured 3,384 English or Dutch merchant ships and 
     162 warships, and during the War of 1812, 1,750 British ships 
     were subdued or destroyed by American privateers. Those 
     American privateers struck so much fear in Britain that 
     Lloyd's of London ceased offering maritime insurance except 
     at ruinously high premiums. No wonder Thomas Jefferson said, 
     ``Every possible encouragement should be given to 
     privateering in time of war.''
       If privateering was so successful, why has it disappeared? 
     Precisely because it worked so well. Government naval 
     officers resented the competitive advantage privateers 
     possessed, and powerful nations with large government navies 
     did not want to be challenged on the seas by smaller nations 
     that opted for the less-costly alternative--private ships of 
     war.
       In sum, the armed forces of the U.S. government are not the 
     only option for President Bush to defeat bin Laden, his al 
     Qaeda network, and ``every terrorist group with a global 
     reach.'' The U.S. military is not necessarily even the best 
     option.
       Let's bring back the spirit of the privateers. By letting 
     profits and justice once more go hand-in-hand, victims and 
     their champions can have an abundance of both, rather than a 
     paucity of either.





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