[Senate Report 104-158]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 201
104th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 104-158
_______________________________________________________________________
CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITS
_______
October 17 (legislative day, October 10), 1995.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Hatch, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany S.J. Res. 21]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the
joint resolution (S.J. Res. 21), proposing a constitutional
amendment to limit congressional terms, having considered the
same, reports favorably thereon, and recommends that the joint
resolution, as amended in the Subcommittee on Constitution,
Federalism, and Property Rights, do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Purpose........................................................2
II. Legislative history............................................2
III. Text of S.J. Res. 21, as amended...............................4
IV. Section-by-section analysis....................................4
V. Discussion.....................................................5
VI. Subcommittee action............................................7
VII. Committee action...............................................7
VIII. Regulatory impact statement....................................8
IX. Cost estimate..................................................8
X. Changes is existing law........................................8
XI. Additional views of Mr. Hatch..................................9
XII. Additional views of Messrs. Brown, Thompson, Kyl, and DeWine..12
XIII. Additional views of Mr. Abraham...............................19
XIV. Additional views of Mr. Biden.................................20
XV. Additional views of Mr. Leahy.................................22
XVI. Additional views of Messrs. Simon and Kennedy.................28
XVII. Additional views of Mr. Kohl..................................31
XVIII. Minority views of Messrs. Biden, Kennedy, Leahy, Heflin, Simon,
and Feingold...................................................32
XIX. Minority views of Mr. Feingold................................35
I. Purpose
The purpose of Senate Joint Resolution 21 is to limit the
number of terms a Member of Congress may serve. Senate Joint
Resolution 21, if approved by two-thirds of the Members of both
the Senate and the House of Representatives, and if ratified by
three-fourths of the States, will limit Senators to two terms
and Members of the House of Representatives to six terms.
II. Legislative History
In 1789, Representative Thomas Tucker offered the first
term limits proposal: a 1-year Senate term limited to 5 years
in any 6-year period and a 2-year House term limited to 6 years
in any 8-year period. Tucker's motion to refer the proposal to
the Committee of the Whole was defeated August 18, 1789.
A subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held the
first term limits hearings on September 27, 1945, regarding
S.J. Res. 21, a resolution to limit service of the President,
Vice-President, and Members of Congress to 6 years.
The first Senate vote on term limits occurred on March 12,
1947. Senator W. Lee O'Daniel of Texas introduced an amendment
to limit congressional terms to the proposed constitutional
amendment in H.J. Res. 27, which limited the President to two
terms. The O'Daniel amendment failed by a vote of 82 to 1.
Term limits were revisited by the Senate Subcommittee on
the Constitution at hearings on March 14 and 16, 1978. The
subcommittee considered S.J. Res. 27, and S.J. Res. 28, which
limited Senators to two terms and House Members to seven terms
and six terms, respectively.
The next Senate vote on term limits occurred May 22, 1991.
Senator Hank Brown of Colorado offered an amendment to S. 3, a
campaign finance reform bill, to limit the use of public funds
by Representatives or Senators who serve an aggregate of more
than 12 years in the House or Senate. The Brown amendment was
tabled by a vote of 68 to 30. The following Senators supported
term limits by voting against the motion to table:
Bond, Brown, Burns, Coats, Cochran, Craig, D'Amato,
Dole, Domenici, Garn, Gorton, Gramm, Grassley, Hatch,
Kasten, Lott, Mack, McCain, McConnell, Murkowski,
Nickles, Pressler, Seymour, Simpson, Smith, Stevens,
Symms, Thurmond, Wallop, Warner.
The last Senate vote on congressional term limits occurred
on May 26, 1993. Senator Lauch Faircloth of North Carolina and
Senator Brown again offered an amendment to a campaign finance
reform measure that would restrict the use of public funds for
those serving more than 12 years. The amendment was tabled by a
vote of 57 to 39. Senators voting against the motion to table
were as follows:
Bennett, Bond, Brown, Burns, Campbell, Coats, Cochran,
Coverdell, Craig, D'Amato, Danforth, DeConcini, Dole,
Domenici, Durenberger, Exon, Faircloth, Gorton, Gramm,
Grassley, Gregg, Hatch, Hatfield, Kassebaum,
Kempthorne, Lott, Mack, McCain, McConnell, Murkowski,
Nickles, Packwood, Pressler, Simpson, Smith, Specter,
Stevens, Thurmond, Wallop.
The House of Representatives held hearings on the subject
of term limits during the 103d Congress. The House Subcommittee
on Civil and Constitutional Rights held hearings on November
18, 1993, and June 29, 1994, to discuss the history of term
limits, the Framers' view of rotation in office, and the
arguments for and against term limitations.
On January 19, 1995, Senator Fred Thompson of Tennessee
introduced Senate Joint Resolution 21 proposing a
constitutional amendment to limit congressional terms to two
terms for Senators and three terms for Representatives.
The Subcommittee on Constitution, Federalism, and Property
Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings
on congressional term limits on January 25, 1995. The
subcommittee took testimony on S.J. Res. 21 and S.J. Res. 19 as
well as the statutory approaches to term limits embodied in S.
271 and S. 272.
Following the hearing, the subcommittee marked up S.J. Res.
21 on February 1, 1995. The three following amendments were
adopted by voice vote:
1) Clarify that the amendment will apply prospectively;
2) change the ratification procedure from ratification by
State constitutional conventions to ratification by
State legislatures;
3) impose a term limit of six terms on Representatives.
The subcommittee passed S.J. Res. 21, as amended by
rollcall vote, with five yeas and three nays.
Senate Joint Resolution 21, as amended, was marked up by
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on February 9, 1995.
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont offered an amendment to apply
term limits retroactively. The amendment was defeated by a vote
of 11 nays to 5 yeas.
The committee then passed S.J. Res. 21 by a rollcall vote,
with 11 yeas and 7 nays.
The first House vote on term limits occurred March 29,
1995, when one resolution and three amendments were considered.
Representative Bill McCollum of Florida authored the underlying
House Joint Resolution 73 proposing a constitutional amendment
to limit congressional terms to two terms for Senators and six
terms for Representatives.
The first amendment to H.J. Res. 73, offered by
Representative Pete Peterson of Florida, would make term limits
retroactive and limit Representatives to six terms and Senators
to two terms. It would also protect State laws limiting
congressional terms of service if the State laws are shorter.
This amendment was rejected 135 to 297.
The second amendment, offered by Representative Bob Inglis
of South Carolina, proposed to limit Members of the House to
three terms and Members of the Senate to two terms and defines
a full term to be more than 50 percent of a term. This
amendment failed by a vote of 114 to 316.
The third amendment, offered by Representative Van Hilleary
of Tennessee, proposed to limit Representatives to six terms in
office and Senators to two terms, while allowing State laws to
preempt the legislation if State limits are shorter. This
amendment also failed, by a vote of 164 to 265.
A final vote on H.J. Res. 73 failed to obtain the necessary
two-thirds of those present, by a vote of 227 to 204.
III. Text of S.J. Res. 21, as Amended
[104th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION proposing a constitutional amendment to limit
congressional terms
Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds
of each House concurring therein), That the following article
is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States:
``Article --
``Section 1. After this article becomes operative, no
person shall be elected to a full term as a Senator more than
twice, or to a full term as a Representative more than six
times; no person who has been a Senator for more than three
years of a term to which some other person was elected shall
subsequently be elected as a Senator more than once; and no
person who has been a Representative for more than a year of a
term to which some other person was elected shall subsequently
be elected as a Representative more than five times.
``Section 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it
shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by
the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within
seven years from the date of its submission to the States by
the Congress.
``Section 3. No election or service occurring before
ratification of this article shall be taken into account when
determining eligibility for election under section 1.''.
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1
This is the operative section that limits congressional
terms to two terms in the Senate and to six terms in the House
of Representatives.
This section also clarifies how the language applies to
partial terms in both the House and the Senate. This section
declares that 3 years of a Senate term and 1 year of a House
term constitute a full term for purposes of calculating the
limit on the number of terms that may be served.
Section 2
Article V of the U.S. Constitution describes the manner in
which the Constitution may be amended. After a constitutional
amendment is proposed by Congress or by a constitutional
convention, article V sets forth two paths for ratification.
One way is ratification by constitutional conventions in three-
fourths of the States. Another way is ratification by three-
fourths of the State legislatures.
All amendments to the U.S. Constitution have been ratified
by State legislatures, with the one exception of the 21st
amendment to the Constitution, which repealed the
constitutional amendment imposing prohibition. It seems more
reasonable to follow the ratification procedure that has been
used almost every time the Constitution has been amended.
Originally, S.J. Res. 21 called for ratification by State
constitutional conventions. In the Subcommittee on
Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights, section 2 was
changed to call for ratification by State legislatures in order
to employ a ratification procedure that has the benefit of
experience.
Section 3
Most laws are applied prospectively to avoid the unfairness
of changing the rules in the middle of the game. That same
principle applies here. This proposed constitutional amendment
is intended to apply prospectively only. That does not mean
that sitting Members of Congress are ``grandfathered;'' they
are not. Rather, sitting Members are term limited, and the
clock starts running at the same time for all citizens--after
ratification.
As originally drafted, S.J. Res. 21 was intended to be
prospective only. In fact, it would reasonably be read to be
prospective only. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the
service of a sitting Member of Congress, prior to ratification,
would be considered for purposes of the term limit imposed
after ratification. To avoid the unfair result of
retroactivity, the resolution was clarified to explicitly state
that there would be no retroactive application.
Some opponents have characterized this language as
providing special treatment for Members of Congress. Some have
gone so far as to claim that this language exempts sitting
Members of Congress. The plain language of the amendment
reveals that there is no special treatment. Quite the opposite
is true: the amendment applies to Members of Congress exactly
the same as it applies to other citizens.
V. Discussion
Term limitation is not a new or untried idea. Term limits
were in place before our Constitution was drafted. The Virginia
Plan, the model for our current Constitution, contained term
limits for elected officials; and in 1951, the 22d amendment to
the Constitution was ratified by three-fourths of the States,
imposing term limits on the President. Following passage of
this amendment, President Dwight D. Eisenhower added, ``What is
good for the President might very well be good for the
Congress.''
An overwhelming majority of Americans agree with President
Eisenhower's statement. In a study conducted in January 1994,
the Americans Talk Issues Foundation reported that even after
hearing the strongest arguments for and against the issue,
three out of every four citizens interviewed supported the idea
of term limits. This support has translated into substantial
action at the grassroots level and led to local campaigns,
petitions, and voter initiatives.
Since 1951, 35 States have imposed term limits on their
governors and State legislators. Twenty-three States have also
enacted term limits on their Federal congressional delegations.
Of these 23 States, 21 passed term limits by ballot
initiatives, with average support exceeding 64 percent. The
remaining States, Utah and New Hampshire, passed term limits
laws through their State legislatures. The 23 States include:
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Florida, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
Unfortunately, the gains made by grassroots efforts were
recently reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. On May 22, 1995,
the Supreme Court declared all State term limit laws
unconstitutional as they apply to Members of the U.S. Congress.
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. et al. v. Thornton, an Arkansas
taxpayer challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3 of
amendment 73 to the Arkansas Constitution. That section
prohibits the name of an otherwise eligible candidate for
Congress from appearing on the general election ballot if that
candidate has already served three terms in the House of
Representatives or two terms in the Senate. Both the circuit
court and the Arkansas Supreme Court found the provision
unconstitutional because the States have no authority ``to
change, add to, or diminish'' the requirements for
congressional service enumerated in the qualifications clauses.
In the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, writing for the
five member majority, affirmed the decision of the Arkansas
Supreme Court and held that:
1) The power granted to each House of Congress to judge the
``Qualifications of its own Members,'' art. I,
Sec. 5, cl. 1, does not include the power to alter
or add to the qualifications set forth in the
Constitution's text;
2) the 10th amendment to the Constitution does not authorize
States to add to the qualifications listed in the
Constitution;
3) denying access to the ballot does not constitute a
permissible exercise of State power under the
elections clause of art. I, Sec. 4, cl. 1, to
regulate the ``Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections;'' and
4) term limits for congressional service ``must come through
a constitutional amendment properly passed under
the procedures set forth in Article V.''
The dissent, written by Justice Thomas and joined by
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia, argued that nothing
in the Constitution deprives the people of each State the power
to proscribe eligibility requirements for the candidates who
seek to represent them in Congress. The Constitution is silent
on this issue, and where it is silent, the 10th amendment
reserves the power to the States or to the people.
The Court's unequivocal finding that term limits may only
be imposed through a constitutional amendment effectively
renders unconstitutional the statutes of the 23 States that
passed congressional term limits.
The only avenue left by the Court is for term limit
supporters to pursue passage of a constitutional amendment.
Article V of the Constitution prescribes two means of amending
the Constitution:
1) Through a constitutional convention called for by
Congress upon the application of 34 States; or
2) through the recommendation of two-thirds of the Members
of both the House and Senate.
Both methods are subject to ratification by either three-
fourths of the State legislatures or by ratifying conventions
in three-fourths of the States.
Although grassroots efforts are underway to organize the
States and call for a constitutional convention, a more
immediate answer for term limit supporters is embodied in
securing the passage of S.J. Res. 21.
VI. Subcommittee Action
The Senate Subcommittee on Constitution, Federalism, and
Property Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, with a
quorum present, met on Wednesday, February 1, 1995, at 10 a.m.
to mark up S.J. Res. 21.
Three amendments were adopted by voice vote. Senator Brown
offered two amendments which were accepted by voice vote: one
to clarify that the amendment will apply prospectively and
another to change the ratification procedure from ratification
by State constitutional conventions to State legislatures.
Senator Kyl offered an amendment to impose a limit of six terms
on Representatives, instead of three terms as the bill
originally specified, which was accepted by voice vote.
The subcommittee then passed S.J. Res. 21, as amended, by
rollcall vote, with five yeas and three nays. Senators Brown,
Hatch, Kyl, DeWine, and Abraham voted in favor of the measure.
Senators Simon, Kennedy, and Feingold voted against the
measure.
VII. Committee Action
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, with a quorum
present, met on Thursday, February 9, 1995, at 9 a.m. to mark
up S.J. Res. 21, as reported by the Subcommittee on
Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights.
Senator Leahy offered an amendment to apply term limits
retroactively. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 11 nays
to 5 yeas. Senators Leahy, Simon, Kohl, Feinstein, and Feingold
voted for the measure. Senators Hatch, Thurmond, Simpson,
Grassley, Brown, Thompson, DeWine, Abraham, Kyl, Biden, and
Kennedy voted against the measure.
The Committee on the Judiciary then passed S.J. Res. 21 by
a rollcall vote, with 11 yeas and 7 nays. Senators Hatch,
Thurmond, Simpson, Grassley, Brown, Thompson, DeWine, Abraham,
Kyl, Kohl, and Feinstein voted in favor of the measure.
Senators Biden, Kennedy, Leahy, Specter, Heflin, Simon, and
Feingold voted against the measure.
VIII. Regulatory Impact Statement
Pursuant to paragraph 11(b), rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the subcommittee, after due consideration,
concludes that Senate Joint Resolution 21 will not have direct
regulatory impact.
IX. Cost Estimate
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, February 9, 1995.
Hon. Orrin G. Hatch,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
reviewed S.J. Res. 21, a joint resolution proposing a
constitutional amendment to limit congressional terms, as
ordered reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on
February 9, 1995. We expect that enactment of this resolution
will result in no significant cost or savings to the federal
government, and no significant cost to State and local
governments.
The joint resolution would propose amending the
constitution to limit congressional terms to twelve years. The
legislatures of three-fourths of the States would be required
to ratify the proposed amendment within seven years for the
amendment to become effective.
Enactment of S.J. Res. 21 would not affect direct spending
or receipts. Therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would not
apply to the bill.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mary
Maginniss.
Sincerely,
Robert D. Reischauer,
Director.
X. Changes in Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the committee finds no changes in
existing law caused by passage of Senate Joint Resolution 21.
XI. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. HATCH
I believe that the proposed constitutional amendment on
term limits for Members of Congress is an important issue that
ought to be fully and carefully debated by the full Senate. For
this reason, despite my own strong reservations about the
merits of such an amendment, I have supported proponents of
S.J. Res. 21 by ensuring its full and timely consideration by
the Judiciary Committee and by voting to report it out to the
Senate.
My strong reservations about the merits of a constitutional
amendment on term limits prevent me from joining the committee
report. Before outlining these reservations, let me emphasize
two points. First, I have no personal interest in the prospects
of such an amendment. Even were it to passed by Congress and
ratified by the States in relatively short order, it likely
would not bar me from running for reelection until the year
2012, when I would hope to be a spry 78 years of age. There are
many things that I hope to be doing in the year 2012. Running
for reelection is not on the list. So I am offering here my own
disinterested observations, based on my years of experience in
serving the people of Utah in the U.S. Senate.
Second, I have not used my power as chairman of the
Judiciary Committee to stymie consideration of the term limits
amendment merely because I have strong reservations about the
merits of that amendment. Instead, I have sought to facilitate
its timely and full consideration by the committee.
Let me identify some of my major concerns about term
limits. First, term limits would indiscriminately operate
against both good legislators and bad legislators. I would
rather place my confidence in the good judgment of voting
Americans, who have shown time and time again that they can
distinguish between those legislators who are working
effectively to serve their interests and those who are not. I
have far more trust in the wisdom of the voters than in an
arbitrary rule that prevents voters from reelecting legislators
whom they believe have been serving them well.
Second, term limits threaten a massive and dangerous shift
in power to an unaccountable Federal bureaucracy. In an
increasingly complicated society, unelected, nameless, faceless
bureaucrats wield extraordinary influence on matters that
affect the daily lives, freedoms, and property of Americans.
There is no question in my mind that my experience in Congress
has made me better able to fight these bureaucrats. I fear that
term limits would have the unintended consequence of further
enhancing the power of an arrogant and heavyhanded bureaucracy.
Third, term limits would make Senators and Representatives
far more dependent on Capitol Hill staffers and special
interest lobbyists. By shifting power from the legislators to
the staffers and lobbyists, term limits might not only dilute
the power of voters but also produce a Congress less responsive
to their concerns.
Fourth, there is justifiable concern that term limits
would, in the words of one political scientist, ``skew the
membership of Congress even further in the direction of a
social and economic elite.'' How many potential citizen-
legislators would sell a family business or cut short a
promising career in the private sector in order to run for
Congress if they knew that term limits would prevent or impede
the possibility of devoting a career to public service? Some,
perhaps. But under a system of term limits, it is all the more
likely that candidates would be independently wealthy persons
who could afford the luxury of dabbling in politics for a
while.
Fifth, insofar as term limits are designed to respond to a
perceived problem of legislators who are primarily concerned
with advancing their own self-interest, term limits would not
eliminate the problem but would only change its form--and for
the worse. Under term limits, venal legislators would occupy
themselves disproportionately with setting up a ``soft
landing'' upon departing from public office. It seems to me
that the public interest is far better served by having
legislators worried about representing well their constituents'
interests--which is very much what the prospect of seeking
reelection operates to do.
Sixth, a term-limits constitutional amendment would destroy
the seniority system. By providing a clear basis for leadership
selection, the seniority system helps keep Congress from
splintering into a multitude of factions. As importantly, the
seniority system has given small States, like my home State of
Utah, a means of protecting their interests from being
trampled. Simple mathematics makes terms limits a big risk for
small States with small delegations.
Seventh, it seems to me that support for term limits
sometimes rests on a false picture of the composition of
Congress. Congress experiences considerable turnover. In the
104th Congress, for example, in the House of Representatives,
there are some 250 or so Members--around 60 percent of the
body--who have served three or fewer previous consecutive
terms. In the Senate, nearly a third of all Senators are in
their first term. More than half of all Senators have completed
only one full term. And only one-fourth of all Senators have
completed two terms. In short, the American people, through the
ballot box, have achieved in Congress a valuable combination of
experience and new blood.
The fact that a proposed constitutional amendment--rather
than a statute--is at issue aggravates all these concerns. I
certainly believe that there are instances where decades of
misrule make constitutional amendments necessary or appropriate
to restore the balance struck by the Constitution. That is why
I am the lead sponsor of the balanced-budget amendment and of
an amendment to bar the Federal Government from imposing
unfunded mandates on States and localities. But I believe that
we must be wary of restructuring something as fundamental as
the freedom of citizens to select their own representatives,
especially where the wisdom of the Framers considered and
rejected term limits.
It is worth noting that term limits have been imposed by
constitutional amendment before, and with dubious effect: the
22d amendment, ratified in 1951, imposes on the President a
limit of two terms in office. The 22d amendment shortchanged
the wisdom of the American people: American voters have shown
that they are quite capable of defeating incumbent Presidents
whom they view as ineffective. At best, the term limits imposed
by the 22d amendment have been unnecessary. Worse than that,
they have been destructive in that they have weakened
Presidents during their second terms. This experience with the
22d amendment should provide an object lesson as we consider
the merits of constitutionally imposed term limits on Members
of Congress.
Let me close by observing that I am certainly not one to
question the ability of everyday citizens to serve effectively
as Members of Congress. On the contrary: I myself was an
everyday citizen, without any previous legislative experience,
when the people of Utah first gave me the honor of representing
them in the U.S. Senate. But the experience that I have gained
in the interim has, I believe, made me ever more effective in
representing them.
I must also note that when I first ran, I defeated a
seemingly entrenched incumbent, a Senator who had been in
office for 18 years. As that election showed, while an
incumbent has obvious advantages in name recognition, he also
has vulnerabilities in his record if he has not been as
effective as he should have been in representing his
constituents. What that election taught me above all is to have
faith in the voters. At bottom, it is because a term-limits
constitutional amendment betrays a fundamental lack of faith in
the common sense and sound judgment of the voters that I am
distrustful of it as a remedy for the ills that have ailed our
system.
XII. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MESSRS. BROWN, THOMPSON, KYL, AND DeWINE
Term limits are founded on the conviction that self-
government is to be preferred to government by professional
politicians. Self-government means government by citizens who
temporarily step out of their private lives to carry the
people's voices to the councils of government. Self-government
is preferred because temporary representatives know that they
will soon return to live as private citizens, under the laws
they pass.
Our constitutional architects believed in self-government
and placed their trust in citizen representatives. Seeing
clearly that power tends to corrupt and that absolute power
corrupts absolutely, the framers turned away from a reliance on
noble birth or high office to place extraordinary decisions in
ordinary hands. Private citizens are asked by our Constitution
to take their turn representing their neighbors and communities
and to decide what laws are essential for the common good.
Unfortunately, today's politicians are too often careerists
who find themselves firmly ensconced in the trappings of power.
Surrounded by professional staffs and lobbyists, sheltered from
the electorate by a 91 percent reelection rate, and
disconnected from the laws they impose on ordinary citizens,
incumbents lose touch with the constituents they serve. These
career politicians, who relocate to Washington, D.C., who are
separated from their neighbors, communities and districts, and
who do not return home to live under the laws they pass, are
not the type of legislators our founding fathers envisioned
when they fashioned our republic.
More than two hundred years ago, Thomas Jefferson wrote a
friend suggesting ways that our newly drafted Constitution
could be improved. Jefferson said three things were missing: a
Bill of Rights, limits on the tenure of the Chief Executive,
and term limits on Congress. Since then, we have seen
Jefferson's first two ideas implemented; this joint resolution
embraces his last.
historical foundation for term limits
Term limits accompanied the emergence of democracy in
ancient Greece and Rome in the form of rotation in office.
Aristotle recommended short terms for officeholders, a
restriction on holding the same office twice, and the rule of
``all over each and each in turn over all.'' Aristotle argued
that the principle of rotation would increase participation and
educate citizens in the responsibilities of public life. He
added that term limits would restrict the amount of power that
any one person could have, thus forcing government to work for
the good of the majority instead of the powerful few.
Rotation was practiced in ancient Athens where people were
selected by lot to participate in the 500-member governing
council. In order to participate, the people of Athens agreed
never to serve on the council for more than two years in their
lifetime. In the Roman system, rotation in office was used to
ensure equitable service among all qualified candidates.
Rotation was guaranteed because no Roman was allowed to hold
the same office more than once.
A legendary example of rotation in office occurred when
Cincinnatus was appointed Dictator of Rome in order to rescue a
consular army that was surrounded by the Aequi on Mt. Algidus.
At the time of his appointment he was working a small farm. He
is said to have defeated the enemy in a single day and
celebrated the triumph in Rome. Yet, Cincinnatus maintained his
authority only long enough to bring Rome through the emergency.
He then resigned and returned to his farm.
These historical examples of rotation in office had a
profound effect on revolutionary America. When the Founders
began crafting our democracy they included term limits in the
Articles of Confederation and incorporated it into the original
Virginia Plan for the Constitution. Despite its popularity,
mandatory rotation was dropped from the Constitution, a fact
often misconstrued by term limits opponents as a repudiation of
the principle of rotation. Examination of the debate at the
Constitutional Convention, however, suggests that the framers
did not include term limits in the final draft of the
Constitution because it was widely assumed that Members would
rotate out of office voluntarily and frequently. It was
commonly believed that under Article I, Section 3 of the
Constitution, one-third of the Senate would ``go out'' every
two years. Alexander Hamilton, an opponent of mandatory
rotation, described the workings of the Senate as follows:
``One third of them are to go out at the end of two years, two
thirds at four years, and the whole at six years.'' In other
words, term limits were viewed as unnecessary because the whole
Senate would be changed every six years.
The Founders' actions following ratification of the
Constitution confirm their commitment to term limits. Offered a
position paramount to king following the defeat of England,
General George Washington felt morally obligated to return to
his life as a private citizen. Even after serving as the
nation's first President, Washington still believed that
rotation in office was a moral obligation consistent with the
ideals of a republican government. While in office, Washington
wrote, ``The spirit of the government may render a rotation in
the elected officers * * * most congenial with the ideas of
liberty and safety.''
The Senate responded in a similar manner. In the 36 years
following ratification of the Constitution, the average length
of service for Senators was approximately 4.8 years. During
that same period, the turnover rate in the Senate was nearly 47
percent--greater than the one-third turnover rate predicted by
Hamilton.
Some politicians remained concerned that term limits were
not explicitly included in the Constitution. Thomas Jefferson
frequently argued that term limitation was a way ``to prevent
every danger which might arise to American freedom by
continuing too long in office.'' When the Constitution was
finalized, Jefferson stated, ``One thing I dislike, and greatly
dislike, is the abandonment in every instance of the necessity
of rotation in office.''
Unfortunately Jefferson's words proved prophetic. The
Founders' adherence to the principles of rotation has given way
to a political culture marred by stagnation, continuous
campaigns and disproportionately influential special interests.
demise of rotation
In the century following the ratification of the
Constitution, the republican philosophy of rotation in office
was respected and practiced. At its peak, rotation in office
was so widely accepted in American politics that, without
mandated term limits, Congress experienced a 76 percent
turnover in 1842. On average, nearly one-third of the Members
of Congress voluntarily retired from office between 1789 and
1900. Among those adhering to the principle of rotation was a
young Illinois Congressman, Abraham Lincoln. After serving one
term in Congress, Lincoln returned to Illinois. As President,
Lincoln chastised those resisting rotation in office when he
stated: ``If our American society and United States Government
are overthrown, it will come from the voracious desire for
office, this wriggle to live without toil, work, and labor--
from which I am not free myself.''
Unfortunately, rotation in office and the voluntary return
to private life fell out of favor in the twentieth century.
Instead of leaving office to return to live under the laws they
made, Members became more likely to remain ensconced in their
sheltered public lives. Enticed to stay by a system that
distributes power based on seniority rather than merit, and
bolstered financially by special interests and PAC's,
incumbents have come to enjoy a seven or eight point advantage
over their opponents. As a result, since the early 1900's the
average number of Members voluntarily leaving office dipped
below 10 percent, and the average number of incumbent election
victories soared above 90 percent. Even in 1994, a supposedly
revolutionary year, over 91 percent of all incumbents won their
bids for reelection.
dangers of stagnation
Without turnover, politicians become entrenched and
stagnant. That stagnation is antithetical to the ideals of a
republican government and a representative citizen legislature.
Fresh ideas give way to reliance on lobbyists and special
interests. Allegiance to the district or the State gives way to
allegiance to campaign donors. Understanding the difficulty of
living under burdensome regulations gives way to the belief
that more regulations are needed. Fiscal responsibility and
good public policy give way to a commerce of special projects.
Studies have shown that the longer Members remain in
office, the more resources they spend. A study conducted by the
nonpartisan National Taxpayers Union found that if term limits
were in place during the 103rd Congress, Republican Senators
would have voted for 21.3 percent more spending cuts. Likewise,
term limited Democrats would have voted for fewer spending
increases.
The vote on the Balanced Budget Amendment shows a similar
trend. Despite its popularity with the American public, the
amendment failed to pass the Senate. The voting record reveals
that among Members serving more than twelve years in office,
42.2 percent voted against the measure. In contrast, only 27.3
percent of those serving less than twelve years opposed the
amendment.
The ability of long-term incumbents to defeat responsible
legislation is not a recent phenomenon. After the turn of the
century, perpetual incumbents secured their seats by
disenfranchising voters and gerrymandering districts. The
resulting sparse turnover allowed groups of politicians to form
cohesive voting blocks which defeated race related legislation
until the mid-1960's. Protected from competitive elections,
incumbents stopped anti-lynching legislation (1935, 1937),
anti-poll tax measures (1942, 1944, 1946), nondiscriminatory
educational funding (1943), appropriations for the Committee on
Fair Employment Practice (1945, 1950), civil rights provisions
(1960), and literacy tests (1962). Not until the civil rights
movement exploded in the 1960's, culminating in the passage of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, were
these entrenched incumbents defeated on the issue of race.
What these votes demonstrate is that entrenched incumbents
who spend too much time in Washington eventually lose touch
with the will of the people. Rotation in office prevents the
alienation of Members of Congress by involving more of the
citizenry in the legislative process, both as legislators and
voters, and by bringing new ideas, forged with the experience
of living a private life, to the government.
Without term limits, there is less opportunity for common
citizens to participate in the government of this country.
Without term limits, there remains a fear that Members of
Congress will become so safe in their seats that they will
resemble a ruling class rather than a citizen legislature. It
is essential to liberty and participatory democracy that our
legislators be rotated out of office regularly to live under
their own commands.
advancing democracy
Opponents of term limits argue that term limits threaten
democracy by limiting voter choice. This is a hollow argument.
Term limits promote democracy by opening up the system to
participation from all segments of the population, which in
turn creates a truly representative and democratic government.
To take just one example, Congress remains largely the
domain of white males. Although women account for 51 percent of
the population, only 11 percent of House seats and 8 percent of
Senate seats are held by women. Similarly, racial minorities
make up over 25 percent of the general population but only 14
percent of the House seats and 5 percent of the Senate seats.
Term limits might be especially useful in enhancing the
opportunities of women and minorities to win elections by
increasing the number of competitive congressional seats.
Statistics show that more women and racial minorities are
elected to Congress through open seat races than by challenging
incumbents. Over 87 percent of African-Americans in the House,
and 83 percent of Hispanics, were elected in open seat races.
Among female Members of Congress, 79 percent were elected in
open seat races. These numbers demonstrate that the turnover
created by term limits will help generate a more representative
and democratic federal government.
Term limits will promote democracy by opening the governing
process to all genders and races, and create more competitive
races by guaranteeing more open seats. With term limits come
greater opportunities for a truly participatory and
representative government.
giving the people a choice
Currently, thirty-five States impose limits on the number
of terms their governors and State legislators may serve.
Twenty-three States have also applied term limits to their
representatives in the U.S. House and Senate. In twenty-one of
these States, ballot initiatives imposing term limits passed
with average support exceeding 64 percent. Polling suggests
that as many as 75 percent of Americans nation-wide support
term limits. Already, 24 million Americans have cast their
votes for term limits, and Mississippi voters are scheduled to
consider a ballot initiative to limit congressional terms in
November of 1995.
Contrary to the desire of millions of Americans, however,
federal term limit laws were struck down by the United States
Supreme Court earlier this year in U.S. Term Limits. Inc. et
al. v. Thornton. In one fell swoop, the Supreme Court denied
the people and the States the right to determine their own
government and limit congressional terms. The only hope that
remains for term limits is a constitutional amendment. We owe
it to the people to pass S.J. Res. 21 and give them a chance to
support or reject term limits.
Every argument against term limits and in favor of
business-as-usual has one thing in common: Arrogance. To oppose
term limits is to decide what is best for the people without
letting them decide for themselves. To oppose term limits is to
assume that the people are not capable of making their own
decisions about their government. Opponents of term limits
argue that it will harm the political process or turn away
outstanding Members of Congress or deny voter choice. These
arguments founder on the most basic point: it is the people's
choice, and they will make it. Our government is a democratic
one in which the will of the people is what matters most. To
protect the people or decide what is best for them undermines
this basic principle of self-government.
We are not now deciding to amend the Constitution. Congress
does not have the power to amend the Constitution. Congress
does have the power to propose the amendment to the people and
the States. The vote on term limits is simply that: a vote to
allow the people, through their representatives, to decide on
term limits. Casting a vote against term limits denies the
people the right to determine their own government. All S.J.
Res. 21 asks Senators to do is send this measure to the States
where the people can decide for themselves.
political courage
One reason the people seek term limits is they perceive a
stunning lack of political courage in Washington. In their
eyes, Congress cannot even vote to balance the government
checkbook. There is the feeling that time and time again,
Congress is faced with basic problems and Congress cannot solve
those basic problems.
Americans faithfully pay their taxes, fall victim to crime,
and lose jobs as needless regulations strangle American
businesses. It is inconceivable to many Americans that Congress
allows these things to continue. To many Americans, the system
is broken. The difficult vote to end wasteful programs is not
cast because reelection depends on helping some special
interest. Without term limits, there may never be the political
courage to solve the nation's most difficult problems.
Term limits offer that political courage. Term limits would
enable Members of Congress to make the right decision, as
opposed to the decision that brings in more PAC money. Term
limits do not threaten good government decision-making. In
fact, term limits would improve the willingness of Members of
Congress to perform their tasks and attend to important
business.
In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights, former Tennessee
Governor Lamar Alexander stated that during his second of two
terms he was:
* * * a little braver, a little more concerned about
whether at the end of eight years I would have been
able to accomplish something useful for my State rather
than to worry about whether what I was trying to
accomplish might have helped me get reelected yet to a
third term.
Asked at the same January 25, 1995, Subcommittee hearing
whether he believed term limits would encourage legislators to
ignore their more tedious responsibilities, Senator John
Ashcroft, former Governor of Missouri, answered:
I lived under term limits as governor * * * and I do
not think the reality suggests that individuals fail
substantially in their service to their States at such
times. * * * I do not think the facts reflect that
individuals who are in their last terms abandon their
responsibilities.
As President John F. Kennedy said, ``[t]he desire to be re-
elected exercises a strong brake on independent courage.'' In
our Governors mansions and State legislatures, term limits are
proving that they can help restore the courage needed to cast
the difficult vote and govern this nation effectively.
conclusion
When Senators and Representatives come to Washington they
vow to represent the people of their State or district. The
time has come to support the will of the people and deliver a
term limits constitutional amendment to the States. With over
24 million people voting for term limits in local ballot
initiatives, and national polls showing strong and continuous
support for the issue, it is Congress' duty to represent the
people and restore the principle of a citizen legislature.
History has shown that term limits are consistent with the
basic principles of democracy. For over a century, our Founders
understood the virtue of limiting government service and
leaving public life to live under the laws they passed. That is
no longer the case. Today's politicians are too often motivated
by power rather than public service, influenced by special
interests rather than constituents, and more concerned with
pleasing the right people rather than casting the tough vote.
If we believe in the foundation of our democracy, if we
believe in the concept of a citizen legislature, and if we
believe that Senators and Representatives are the servants of
the people, we must pass S.J. Res. 21, send it to the people,
and give them the choice of whether to impose term limits on
Congress.
XIII. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. ABRAHAM
I agree that the Congress should propose an amendment to
the Constitution on term limits. I support the joint resolution
that the Committee has reported out. But I would prefer a
different resolution.
In my view it is within the States' powers right now to
limit the terms of Members of Congress. I believe that is what
our present Constitution, properly understood, provides.
Moreover, many States have exercised that power. My own State,
Michigan, for example, has adopted a limit of two terms for the
Senate and three terms for the House of Representatives.
Unfortunately, my view that the States presently have this
power is shared only by four Justices of the Supreme Court. The
other five recently concluded otherwise. See U.S. Term Limits
v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995). Accordingly, some
corrective action by Congress is necessary to restore term
limits as a viable political option. The only action we can
take that we can be confident the Court will not strike down is
the adoption of some form of constitutional amendment.
My preference would be for a constitutional amendment that
simply returns the power to set term limits for Members of
Congress to the States. Because Congressional term limits are
an innovation, I would prefer to allow the States to experiment
with them rather than freezing them, or freezing them in a
particular form, into our federal Constitution. I also believe
that if Michigan prefers one formula for limiting terms and
other States prefer a different formula, we should not preclude
any State from picking its preferred version. Accordingly, my
first choice would be for a resolution along the lines of S.J.
Res. 36, proposed by Senator Ashcroft, of which I am an
original cosponsor along with several other Members of this
Committee.
The joint resolution approved by the Committee is to me a
less preferable but acceptable choice. I have no objection to
the limits in the joint resolution (although if we in Congress
must pick specific limits, I would prefer that they be
consistent with the ones adopted by my home State, which is why
I voted against Senator Kyl's amendment to substitute the
limits presently in the bill for those in Senator Thompson's
original proposal). But I would prefer to see the States remain
free to select others. Therefore while I will support final
passage of this measure if it remains the only vehicle for
addressing term limits, on the floor I will seek to have other
approaches considered that will leave the States with more
authority to establish their own limits.\1\
\1\ In addition, while I agree with the arguments against the Leahy
amendment set out in the report, I also opposed it for the additional
reason that the question it seeks to resolve, whether current terms
should count for purposes of the limits, is a matter that I would also
prefer to leave to the States.
XIV. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. BIDEN
In Philadelphia in 1787, the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention rejected term limits on Members of
Congress. As was noted in the Minority Report, the Founding
Fathers viewed term limits as ``pernicious'' and ``ill-
founded'' in and of themselves. But, more than that, the
Framers also crafted a legislative branch of government to
which term limits were not conducive. Indeed, term limits would
have undermined the work of the Framers and would have been
contrary to one of the basic premises of their product: the
protection of the rights of small States.
When the Constitutional Convention was deadlocked over the
issue of representation in Congress--with large States
supporting proportional representation and small States
supporting equal representation--Benjamin Franklin and the
delegates from Connecticut crafted the ``Connecticut
Compromise.'' Under this proposal, membership in the House of
Representatives would be based on population, thus protecting
the interests of the large States, and membership in the Senate
would be based on strict equality, thus protecting the rights
of small States. Without this compromise, the Convention would
probably have disbanded after it had barely begun.
What is significant to this debate, however, is not only
what happened--but what it meant. Explicit in the Connecticut
Compromise is an equal vote for small States. But, implicit in
the Connecticut Compromise is equal power for small States.
An equal vote in the Senate does not ipso facto translate
into equal power in Congress. Even though all States have two
votes in the Senate regardless of size, large States can still
exercise tremendous control. Today, a majority of the American
people live in and a majority of Members of Congress come from
just nine States. Two of those nine States border on my own
State of Delaware. I admire my friends from New Jersey and
Pennsylvania, but when it comes to the interests of the State
of Delaware, I heed the words of Gunning Bedford, one of
Delaware's delegates to the Constitutional Convention: ``I do
not, gentlemen, trust you.''
James Madison knew about trust; he acknowledged that
average legislators pursued their own State's interests. And,
the Founders uniformly feared that a majority of people united
by some passion or by their own interests could run roughshod
over the rights and interests of a minority. So, the implicit
check and balance created by the Founders to prevent the
possible abuse of small States--the minority--by a few large
States--the majority--was the ability of small States to wield
power and influence through senior Members of Congress. In
other words, by allowing States--at the discretion of the
electorate--to reelect incumbents. Term limits would render
that ability nugatory and would drive a stake through the heart
of the Connecticut Compromise.
The people of the State of Delaware, just 700,000 of them--
the fifth smallest State--have an interesting little tradition:
if they do not like you, they throw you out. It may seem to
some a novel concept, but it's known as the power of the ballot
box, and it is the ultimate limit on congressional terms. At
the same time, however, the people of Delaware also have
another tradition--one that comes from a 200-year history as
one of the smallest States in the Union. Long ago, Delawareans
recognized that a small State gains equality with larger States
by reelecting its incumbents and benefiting from their
seniority. To deny that right--to impose artificial term
limits--is to tell the people of Delaware that someone else
knows better than them; that someone else can better decide
what is in their interests; that their rights and interests
will be at the whim of the larger States.
I join the Founding Fathers in categorically rejecting that
proposition. Delawareans were entrusted by the Constitution to
look out for the interests of Delaware. And, if they, in their
infinite wisdom, decide that reelecting an incumbent is the
best way to protect their rights and interests, they should
continue to be allowed to do so.
XV. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. LEAHY
I oppose this constitutional amendment. The Constitution
does not set congressional term limits, trusting to the people
to decide who will best represent them. Indeed, this proposal
is, in essence, a limitation on the rights of the electorate. I
reject it as such.
I urge my colleagues not to be afraid to do the right
thing, even if it does not appear from certain polls to be the
currently popular thing, and stop demagoguing constitutional
amendments as the cure to our ills. Our Constitution has served
us well, over more than 200 years. It is the cornerstone of our
vibrant democracy. It has been amended only 17 times since the
adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791--and two of those were
prohibition and its repeal.
The Constitution is now under attack. The fundamental
protections of separation of powers and the first amendment are
under siege. In the opening days of this Congress almost 100
constitutional amendments have been introduced. The Judiciary
Committee has already voted to report three. We risk making a
mockery of Article V's requirement that we deem a
constitutional amendment ``necessary'' before proposing it to
the States.
One way to consider the impact of this proposed amendment
is to look at who would not be here currently were this two-
term limit already part of the Constitution. The two-term limit
contained in S.J. Res. 21 would eliminate all of us who have
been returned to the Senate by our constituents after standing
for reelection more than once.
Think for a moment what imposing such a limitation would
mean to the Senate. For example, are Senators Thurmond,
Hatfield, Stevens, Roth, Domenici, Chafee, Lugar, Kassebaum,
Cochran, Simpson and Hatch, and Senators Byrd, Pell, Kennedy,
Inouye, Hollings, Nunn, Glenn, Ford, Bumpers, Moynihan,
Sarbanes, Biden and others not possessed of judgment and
experience on which we all rely and on which their constituents
depend? What of the majority leader, Senator Dole, should he
have had to retire in 1980 after serving only two terms?
Consider what this type of measure would have meant over
our history. Those who have served beyond two terms include
among their ranks some of our most distinguished predecessors.
Each of our Senate Office Buildings, in fact, is named for a
Senator whose service would have been cut short by the type of
term limit being proposed as a constitutional amendment:
Richard Russell, Philip Hart, Everett McKinley Dirksen. It is a
loss when illness takes such leaders from us; it would be a
tragedy to have denied the country and their constituents their
service through an arbitrary rule limiting congressional terms.
Think about Kentucky's Henry Clay; South Carolina's John C.
Calhoun; Missouri's Thomas Hart Benton; Ohio's Robert Taft;
Iowa's William Allison; Michigan's Arthur Vandenberg; Arizona's
Carl Hayden and Barry Goldwater; Maine's Margaret Chase Smith
and George Mitchell; Vermont's Justin Morrill and George Aiken;
Massachusetts' Daniel Webster and Charles Sumner; Montana's
Mike Mansfield; Washington's Scoop Jackson; North Carolina's
Sam Ervin; Arkansas's William Fulbright; New York's Jacob
Javits; Wisconsin's William Proxmire and the LaFollettes;
Minnesota's Hubert H. Humphrey; Tennessee's Howard Baker, Jr.
Such lists invariably leave out many who distinguished
themselves through their service into a third Senate term.
Voters have not had any trouble electing challengers in the
last several years. In 1978, 1980, and 1986, numbers of
incumbents were defeated in primaries and general elections for
the U.S. Senate. From the last election, one-third of those
elected to the Senate are serving in their first terms. In the
House of Representatives fully one-third of the Members are
beginning their first or second terms. The electorate does not
seem to have a problem deciding whom to elect and whom not to
reelect.
Indeed, rather than debating a constitutional amendment to
impose term limits, our time might be better spent thinking
about why more and more of our respected colleagues are
choosing to abandon this body. Our friend from Colorado, the
chairman of the Constitution subcommittee, has already
announced that he will not seek reelection in 1996, after five
terms in the House but only one here in the Senate. The senior
Senator from Illinois, the Ranking Democrat on the Constitution
subcommittee, has also announced that he will not seek
reelection after five terms in the House and two terms here in
the Senate. A number of others have announced similar
intentions.
Last year, George Mitchell and a total of nine of our
colleagues in the 103d Congress chose not to seek reelection.
The Congress has become less and less a place where Members
choose to run for reelection.
I respect my colleagues for doing what they think is right
for themselves and their families. I commend those who like
Hank Brown and our freshman colleagues believe strongly in term
limits and conform their own actions to that rule. I urge them,
however, to stop short of seeking to impose their view on all
others and upon all other States for all time by way of this
constitutional amendment.
The reality is that this is an institution that is called
upon to deal with many important and complex matters, where
judgment and experience do count for something. Some sense of
history and some expertise can, from time to time, be helpful
in confronting our tasks and fulfilling our responsibilities to
our constituents and the country. Thus, I do not believe that a
one-size-fits-all limit on congressional service makes sense.
Further, as the representative of a small State, I am
acutely aware that we fulfill the purposes of the Senate and
sometimes best represent our States when we have a bit of
seniority and a track record on the issues. I believe, as did
our Founders, that it is up to the people to let us know if we
seek to overstay our term of service.
Before we embark on this course to rewrite the work of the
Founders and impose an artificial limit on the length of
congressional service, we should know what evil this
constitutional amendment is intended to reach. On this the
proponents speak in conflicting voices--some urging that term
limits will make us more responsive to the electorate and
others arguing that it will give us greater distance and
independence from them. Which is it?
It is remarkable that while the majority has taken eight
months to report the Judiciary Committee's February 9 action,
it nowhere discusses--let alone justifies--the specific
congressional term limits it seeks to impose. The sole hearing
into this matter was focussed in large part on proponents
arguing that a six-term limit for the House was ``no limit at
all'' and that to include such a provision in this measure
amounted to ``phony term limits,'' since 12 years is longer
than the average term of service in the House. Nowhere in its
long-delayed report does the majority hint at the controversy
surrounding this key, substantive amendment to this measure
that doubled the House term limits from three to six terms. Nor
does it indicate that it would invalidate limits adopted in
over 20 states.
Further, the majority gives no consideration to the
effectiveness of limiting terms of only one group of actors in
our political democracy. Will we also limit the tenure of
professional staff? Will we limit the number of years someone
may lobby the Congress? Why not limit the years that someone
can serve as a political consultant, a pollster, or an adviser?
Are we prepared to venture into campaign reform and limit the
number of times a person may contribute to Senate races over
time? If not, term limits on candidates will only serve to
increase the influence of these other groups at the expense of
the people.
Do we expect first-term Senators intent on reelection to be
less responsive to lobbyists and political consultants? For
those who succeed in being reelected to a second and final
term, will they be oblivious of the need to earn a living in
succeeding years? With no prospect for a career in public
service, Members of Congress may become more solicitous of
``special interests'' as they look beyond their lame-duck
status to new career opportunities.
Despite good intentions, this proposed constitutional
amendment would not give us a citizen-legislature but, instead,
a legislature made up of those independently wealthy and
capable of taking 12 years from building a career outside this
body to serve for a time.
I must oppose what I perceive to be a growing fascination
with laying waste to our Constitution and the protections that
have served us well for over 200 years. The first amendment,
separation of powers, the power of the purse, the right of the
people to elect their representatives should be supported and
defended. That is the oath that we all swore when we entered
this public service. That is our duty to those who forged this
great document, our commitment to our constituents and our
legacy to those who will succeed us.
The Constitution should not be amended by sound bite. This
proposed limitation evidences a distrust not just of
congressional representatives but of those who sent us here,
the people. Term limits would restrict the freedom of the
electorate to choose and are based on disdain for their
unfettered judgment. These are not so much term limits as
limits on the electorate to choose their representatives.
To those who argue that this proposal will embolden us or
provide us added independence because we will not be concerned
about reelection, I would argue that you are turning our
democracy on its head. This proposal has the effect of
eliminating accountability, not increasing it.
It is precisely when we stand for reelection that the
people, our constituents, have the opportunity to hold us
accountable. This proposal would eliminate that accountability
by removing opportunities for the people to reaffirm or reject
our representation of them. It would make each of us a lame
duck immediately upon reelection.
Thus, my fundamental objection to the proposed
constitutional amendment is this: It is, at base, distrustful
of the electorate. It does not limit candidates so much as it
limits the rights of the people to choose whoever they want to
represent them. We should be acting to legislate more
responsively and responsibly, not to close off elections by
making some candidates off limits to voters. I will put my
faith in the people of Vermont and keep faith with them to
uphold the Constitution.
leahy amendment
When this matter reaches the Senate for debate, I intend to
offer an amendment, along the lines of the one that I offered
during the course of the Judiciary Committee's deliberations. I
will try to move us toward an honest discussion of what this
amendment would mean and what impact it would have on Congress.
When politicians talk about imposing term limits, they tend to
support proposals that, on examination, will not affect them.
Thus, I have pointed out that S.J. Res. 21 is drafted so as not
to affect adversely any of us.
This proposal is designed to become effective after the
ratification process, which may itself take 7 years.
Thereafter, and only thereafter, are we to start counting terms
in office for purposes of these constitutional term limits.
Thus, this proposal is drafted so that some of us can get in
two more successful reelection campaigns before we have even to
start counting terms toward the two-term limit. I suspect that
all of us expect to be ``former'' Senators in 2020 after as
many as four more terms, anyway. That is all that this
amendment contemplates.
By contrast, my amendment will have the effect of making
these constitutionally mandated congressional term limits apply
to each of us immediately upon ratification. Thus, the two-term
limit would apply to each of us then currently serving. Those
of us serving in our second term, or greater, would be able to
serve out the remainder of that term. Those in their first term
in the Senate at the time of ratification would be able to run
for reelection, once.
As I noted in the course of the Judiciary Committee's
deliberations, my amendment would conform the congressional
term-limits amendment to the transition rule adopted in the 22d
amendment, which imposed term limits on the President. The 22d
amendment provides that it would ``not prevent any person who
may be holding the office of President, or acting as President,
during the term within which this Article becomes operative
from holding the office of President or acting as President
during the remainder of such term.'' The 22d amendment did not
say that the President serving at the time of ratification
could be elected to two more, 4-year terms. It is noteworthy
that this precedent continues to be ignored by the majority.
As reported, S.J. Res. 21 includes language in section 3
intended to provide special privileges to those Members who are
serving at the time of ratification. Thus, all prior and
current service is to be disregarded and Members serving at the
time of ratification are to be accorded the prospect of two
additional 6-year Senate terms and six additional 2-year House
terms, regardless of the number of prior terms in the Senate or
House. Rather than have the constitutional amendment
eligibility limitations apply to everyone, S.J. Res. 21 is
drafted so that Members serving at the time of ratification
would be accorded the special privilege of being able to
complete their current terms and then start over, counting from
zero, with respect to elections and service toward term limits.
This is, in the words of a member of the committee who voted in
favor of the constitutional amendment, ``transparent
hypocrisy.''
A few examples indicate the unfairness of these special
privileges:
Senators elected after ratification would be locked
into inferior status in terms of seniority,
chairmanships, committee assignments and staff
allocations. By contrast, Senators serving now and at
the time of ratification would have their seniority
preserved and protected.
A Senator elected 1 day before ratification would be
able to serve three full 6-year terms before the limits
took effect.
A Senator first elected in 1990 could run for
reelection to a second term in 1996, run successfully
for a third term in 2002, see the ratification process
subsequently completed in 2003, finish out the third
term in 2008 and still be reelected to two more full
terms through 2020 before being affected by any term
limits. At the same time a new Senator first elected in
2004 would be restricted to two terms and be barred
from serving past 2016. Thus, the older Senator would
be able to serve 4 years past the forced retirement of
the newer and for a total of 18 years more than the
newer Senator.
Senators voting for the amendment ought to be willing to
bind themselves to its terms and not just to bind others who
follow in their footsteps.
The amendment I will propose to the Senate will strike
section 3 and its language excluding elections and service
occurring before final ratification from the calculation of the
term limits being imposed. Instead, the amendment will
expressly provide that the term limits being imposed by the
constitutional amendment would apply to Members serving at
ratification.
In order to avoid a retroactive effect or canceling the
results of a completed election, the amendment will allow
Members serving at the time of ratification to complete their
current term. The prohibition in the proposed constitutional
amendment would then operate prospectively to forbid any Member
serving a term at or beyond the term limit being imposed from
seeking reelection.
The amendment will also be intended to remove the ambiguity
created by language included in section 1, which begins:
``After this article becomes operative, no person * * *.''
Unless stricken, this language might be interpreted to exempt
Members of Congress serving before ratification from the effect
of the constitutional amendment entirely. At the least, the
language implies that the eligibility of those Members of
Congress serving at ratification is intended to be determined
by consciously disregarding their current and past elections
and service.
Unless stricken, this language could create a special class
of Members and grant them special privilege from the full
effect of the constitutional amendment at the moment that it is
ratified. The irony is that many of the very Members who vote
to impose term limits on others elected in the future would
secure for themselves special dispensation so that they may
serve either an unlimited number of terms or as many terms as
can be begun before final ratification plus an additional two
terms in the Senate and an additional six terms in the House.
The effect on my amendment will be that upon ratification
of this constitutional amendment to impose congressional term
limits, our current terms of service will be considered. This
is in keeping with the substance of the amendment and would
give it full effect upon ratification, rather than waiting for
another 12 to as many as 20 years before it takes effect. If
constitutionally mandated congressional term limits are
necessary to solve an important problem, then why should the
amendment to the Constitution exclude the very situation that
it is being proposed to correct? We should not provide
ourselves with special privileges and adopt rules for the next
generation of Members. Exempting ourselves from the full
effects of this amendment is not any way to proceed, if it is
the will of the Congress and the States that we should proceed.
XVI. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MESSRS. SIMON AND KENNEDY
Our opposition to S.J. Res. 21 stems in large part from our
belief that a constitutional term-limits amendment is totally
contrary to our democratic system of government.
We already have term limits--they're called elections. We
agree with House Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde, who
has indicated that any proposal to take away the right the
voters now have to elect whom they choose for Congress betrays
a basic mistrust of the electorate, and cannot be reconciled
with our most basic notions of representative democracy. We
have a fundamental objection to any proposal that would lump
together artificially those public servants that deserve
continued reelection by the people, and those that do not. We
have faith that the public will not permit this latter category
of representative to survive too long in Congress.
At the same time, we are aware of the disillusionment and
frustration that citizens sometimes feel toward the electoral
process, and are the first to admit that this process needs to
be fixed. We believe the answer to the failings of the
political process lies in meaningful campaign finance reform--
in legislation that eliminates the advantages held by
incumbents in our current system of campaign financing, not in
a constitutional term-limits amendment.
Not only do we believe that term limits are contrary to
democracy; we also believe that they would be harmful to
Congress as an institution.
First, a limitation on the number of years a representative
can serve would deprive Congress and the Nation of much insight
and knowledge. This country has been enriched by the continued
efforts and extended service of such men as Henry Clay, Daniel
Webster, Everett Dirksen, Henry Jackson, Jake Pickle, Morris
Udall, Howard Baker, Sam Ervin, and Sam Rayburn. Our Nation
would not have been as great had these men been forced to leave
Congress prematurely. The Founding Fathers recognized this very
point. In The Federalist #62, attributed to James Madison, they
warned against--and did not, as the proponents of term limits
suggest, endorse--rapid rotation in office, deeming
``mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid
succession of new Members'' to be ``inconsistent with every
rule of prudence and every prospect of success.''
Second, term limits would result in a fundamental shift in
the balance of power from the Congress to the President. A
Congress of citizen legislators, deprived of the expertise and
service of veteran members, would by its nature be more pliable
and deferential to the President, and would suffer a decrease
in stature and effectiveness. Ironically, the cynicism that now
motivates the call for term limits would simply lead to even
greater cynicism as the institution of Congress faded relative
to the other political branch of government.
Third, contrary to the arguments of term-limits advocates,
we do not believe that term limits would lead to the emergence
of a ``disinterested'' and more representative--that is, a
``better''--legislature. Rather, a Congress made up of term-
limited Members would be: (a) inexperienced; (b) heavily
reliant on Washington ``insiders'' such as congressional staff
and lobbyists; and (c) either more concerned about seeking job
opportunities for their post-congressional years than about
serving the country or sufficiently wealthy to be able, in the
words of Congressman Hyde, ``to devote their most productive
and creative years to a vocation with no tenure and whose only
prospect is enforced retirement.'' The greatest incentive to
good behavior and honorable service in the U.S. Congress is
one's regular accountability to the voters, not one's freedom
from that accountability. As Alexander Hamilton stated in The
Federalist #72 (emphasis in original):
There are few men who would not feel much less zeal
in the discharge of a duty when they were conscious
that the advantage of the station with which it was
connected must be relinquished at a determinate period,
than when they were permitted to entertain a hope of
obtaining, by meriting, a continuance of them.
In support of a term-limits amendment, the majority cites
the old adage that ``power corrupts and absolute power corrupts
absolutely.'' While the adage is no doubt true, it can hardly
support a measure to limit the service of individuals who (1)
stand for reelection once every 6 years and once every 2 years,
respectively; (2) belong to bodies that number 100 and 435,
respectively; and (3) belong to one of three coordinate
branches of government in a constitutional system founded on
the principle of separation of powers. As noted before, if
anything, congressional term limits increase the power of one
individual--the Chief Executive--and create an even greater
possibility of abuse of power than exists under the current
system.
Clearly, the Founding Fathers were intimately familiar with
arguments in favor of term limits--however, they rejected the
idea, the advantages of which they determined to be ``at best
speculative and equivocal'' and ``overbalanced by disadvantages
far more certain and decisive.'' Alexander Hamilton, The
Federalist #72. This assessment of term limits rings as true
today as it did over 200 years ago, and the Committee Report on
S.J. Res. 21 provides not one single compelling reason why we
should reject the wisdom of the Founders in this area. Indeed,
the best argument the proponents of S.J. Res. 21 can muster is
that a term limits amendment has popular support. But as
Senator McConnell, an ardent opponent of term limits, has
written, ``[t]hat [argument] begs the question: What other
constitutional amendments would be popular? The abolition of
all federal taxes comes to mind. How about suspension of all
civil rights for violent criminals?'' McConnell,
``Representation Without Limitation,'' The Washington Post,
March 23, 1995, page A27. As Senator McConnell rightly
concludes, ``term limits should be judged on the merits, not
popularity,'' ibid, and on the merits S.J. Res. 21 fails.
We already have significant turnover in both Houses of
Congress: over 50 percent of the House of Representatives has
been elected since 1990, and 55 Senators have been elected
since 1984. In the last 15 years, we have also witnessed a
change in control of one or another House of Congress no less
than four times. Clearly, consistent with the Framers' intent,
and with our most cherished notions of representative
democracy, the voters have spoken and will continue to speak,
if we let them. We must let them, and must not add to the
cynicism toward government that is all too rampant today.
XVII. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. KOHL
I write to express my support for congressional term limits
and to express my disappointment that the committee rejected
Senator Leahy's critical amendment, which would have eliminated
the ``grandfather clause'' that exempts sitting Members of
Congress from the limits contemplated by S.J. Res. 21. Indeed,
by defeating the Leahy amendment while maintaining an exemption
for ourselves, we sent precisely the wrong message to the
American people: that Congress is still engaging in politics as
usual. This is not a message that any member of the Judiciary
Committee should wish to endorse.
In my opinion, the effort to limit congressional terms,
embodied in S.J. Res. 21, has been prompted by a continuing
decline in the public's trust in its governing institutions.
This trust has been replaced by a deep and abiding cynicism.
The prevailing view is that elected representatives are
motivated all too often by a desire to ensure reelection,
rather than by the sense of virtue and deliberative spirit that
I know most of us share.
S.J. Res. 21 has been offered to address--at least in
part--these unfortunate sentiments. I count myself among the
supporters of S.J. Res. 21. But we are unlikely to succeed in
convincing the public of our good intentions when we exempt
sitting Members of Congress from the scope of a constitutional
term limitation. Indeed, I question how a sitting member can
both support term limitations and claim that he ought to be
above such a law. Yet a majority of the committee did just that
when they defeated Senator Leahy's amendment to apply S.J. Res.
21 to sitting Members.
I fear that the committee's defeat of the Leahy amendment
will be perceived as an act of hypocrisy. I have yet to hear or
read an adequate explanation for the exemption of sitting
Members of Congress from S.J. Res. 21, and I doubt whether a
reasonable justification could ever be crafted. No
representative of the people should hold himself above, or
beyond the reach of, the very Constitution he was sworn to
uphold. If the Constitution should be amended to limit
congressional terms, as I believe it should, then congressional
supporters of such an effort should muster the humility to
accept that this principle ought to bind them, too. I deeply
regret the defeat of the Leahy amendment.
XVIII. MINORITY VIEWS OF MESSRS. BIDEN, KENNEDY, LEAHY, HEFLIN, SIMON,
AND FEINGOLD
We live in a time when Congress is more representative than
ever before of the rich heritage that has been the source of
America's strength and greatness. Congress today is comprised
of citizens with widely varied educational backgrounds,
vocations, and economic circumstances, including automobile
assembly workers, a jewelry maker, funeral directors, law
enforcement officers, lawyers, a taxi-driver, ambassadors, a
winemaker, a riverboat captain, judges, a florist, doctors,
journalists, and teachers. Quite recently, we have also seen
the willingness of voters to send new representatives to
Congress in place of incumbents. In light of these facts, we
see no reason to deny voters the right to elect an individual
to Congress simply because of that person's previous service.
We do not doubt that more than one modern-day Cincinnatus
exists. We do question whether most working people can drop
their jobs, take the time and obtain the money to run for
office, and then easily return to their former jobs after
government service, as the proponents of term limits seem to
envision. We want to ensure the opportunity for the voters to
continue to send a cross-section of American society to serve
in Congress. If people of such varied life experiences commit
themselves to public service in Congress and are willing to
seek reelection after 12 years in office, the voters should not
be denied that choice.
The notion of term limits for Members of Congress is
antidemocratic in the most fundamental sense. Term limits
denies voters the opportunity to send to Congress those persons
the voters believe to be representative, hard-working, and
effective. The United States was founded as a representative
democracy in which the voters retained the right and the
responsibility to choose their representatives. Instead of
strengthening the democratic system, term limits will undermine
the democratic process by limiting the right to choose
representatives.
In their wisdom, the Founders chose not to incorporate into
the Constitution term limits for Members of Congress. Alexander
Hamilton called term limits ``ill-founded,'' ``pernicious,''
and ``a diminution of the inducements to good behavior.'' In
asking ``Who are to be the objects of popular choice?'' James
Madison responded, ``Every citizen whose merit may recommend
him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No
qualification * * * is permitted to fetter the judgement or
disappoint the inclination of the people.''
We share the majority's assertion ``that power tends to
corrupt, and that absolute power corrupts absolutely.'' Those
tenets, however, do not apply to a periodically elected
representative legislature like the U.S. Congress. Unlike
dictators, kings, queens, emperors, czarinas, tyrants, and
despots, Members of Congress are not appointed, anointed, or
even elected for life. The Constitution provides a ``check'' on
the power of Members of Congress by requiring each member of
the House and one-third of the Members of the Senate to stand
for reelection every 2 years. Some term limits advocates argue
that the prospects of reelection leave Members unwilling to
cast politically unpopular votes. By their logic, Members of
Congress should be limited to only one term so as to avoid the
``temptations'' that term limits advocates ascribe to
reelection.
But we question whether the advocates of term limits want
Members to be more accountable, or actually less so. The
frustration on the part of term limits advocates with voters
who choose their Members of Congress on criteria other than
length of service is difficult to understand. The proponents of
term limits claim that Members of Congress have lost touch with
the needs of their constituents at the same time these
proponents complain that Members of Congress need to be
insulated from the voters in order to cast ``politically
unpopular'' votes.
We wonder what form of accountability is left if the
incentives of reelection are removed. The danger that
particular Members of Congress will be ``captured'' by single-
issue special interest groups to the detriment of other issues
is that much greater if representatives do not have to justify
all their work to their constituents at election time. We agree
with Alexander Hamilton that the ability of individuals to be
re-elected would give them ``the inclination and the resolution
to act [their] part well.''
The single vote each Member is allotted to exercise on each
bill before Congress hardly can be equated to the ``absolute''
authority of a dictator--the single vote of a Member of
Congress does not approach the power vested in the President.
We are unaware of any Senator or Representative who wields
``absolute'' power over the administrative or legislative
functions of the U.S. Government; we doubt term-limits
proponents can find such a Member.
Indeed, if anything, term limits would threaten the balance
of power between the legislative and executive branches of
government. The President has at his disposal many levers of
power. The one constant bulwark to the abuse of power by the
Executive has been Congress. Out of fear and concern for the
concentration of that power in the executive branch, the Nation
adopted the 22d amendment to the Constitution limiting a
President to two terms.
Advocates of term limits should heed James Madison's
warning, ``[t]he greater the proportion of new members * * *,
the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be
laid for them.'' By denying voters the choice to send
experienced Members to Congress, terms limits will certainly
create the opportunity for the executive branch to overreach
and set snares for new and unwary Members of Congress.
Ironically, term limits will tend to shift the decisionmaking
power for complicated and controversial fiscal and social
issues to unelected and unaccountable career bureaucrats within
the executive branch.
Prior service in Congress is only one of the many criteria
under the category of ``experience'' that individual voters may
apply when casting a ballot. Each Member of Congress arrives
with a unique background and ideas about particular problems
and their solutions; after arrival, we sometimes find the
problems more complicated and the solutions more difficult to
obtain than previously expected. The realization that ``bumper
sticker'' solutions are not feasible means that each Member of
Congress, with the acquiescence of constituents, must become a
better student of the issues. Often, that process takes time.
Voters may prefer the long distance runner over the sprinter, a
representative for the long haul not just for the short term.
Voters should have the option of sending a person who will work
in the long run to accomplish their goals.
Members of Congress who do not engage their constituents in
discussions about the issues of the day can hardly be
considered representatives. We, however, have confidence that
voters can draw their own conclusions about the effectiveness
and worthiness of a candidate regardless of the length of
service. Indeed, there is no more effective or dependable
exercise for applying term limits than election day, the second
Tuesday of November every 2 years.
XIX. MINORITY VIEWS OF MR. FEINGOLD
Judging by the spirited and ardent efforts of those who are
seeking to propose a constitutional amendment to limit
congressional terms, one would assume that new faces in the
House and Senate are few and far between. But in fact, nearly
70 percent of the Members of the House have served less than
the 12-year House limit prescribed by S.J. Res. 21. In the
Senate, that figure is over 50 percent. In my view, we have a
well-balanced bicameral legislature where each Chamber is
divided between newly elected Members who bring energy and
fresh ideas to Washington, and more experienced Members, many
of whom bring expertise and sound judgment to what can be a
tedious and complex legislative process.
Those who support term limits should take a close look at
the election results of the past 14 years. In 1980,
dissatisfied yet anxious voters gave control of the White House
and the U.S. Senate to the Republican Party. Six years later,
voters returned control of the Senate to the Democrats. In
1992, the electorate transferred control of the Executive and
both Houses of Congress to the Democratic party. Then, just a
few short months ago, those same voters returned control of not
only the Senate to the Republicans, but also, for the first
time in over 40 years, gave us a Republican Speaker of the
House.
The public may be angry, they may be cynical and they may
be unsure of exactly what they want from their government. But
our recent election history points out the fallacies in what is
essentially the bottom line of this proposed legislation--that
term limits are necessary to bring about change.
Term limits supporters claim that the powers of incumbency
discourage and handicap challengers that do not have the
fundraising ability, name recognition, or the political clout
that sitting Members of Congress enjoy. First, it should be
noted that though difficult, it is far from impossible to
unseat an incumbent. In my 1992 campaign, though outspent by a
nearly 5-to-1 margin, I was able to upset an incumbent
Republican Senator. Not because he didn't have incumbent
advantages--he did. But the people of Wisconsin decided for
themselves that after 12 years, this particular incumbent (a
term-limits supporter running for his third term) no longer
represented their viewpoint. This is how the democratic process
should operate.
When the issue of term limits is debated on the floor of
the Senate in the coming weeks, I will be urging my colleagues
to reflect on the irreparable damage that such an amendment
might do to this institution. We have had some truly
outstanding individuals serve in the U.S. Senate. Republican or
Democratic, Conservative or Liberal--these individuals, whether
you agreed with them or not, were defined not only by their
legislative accomplishments but also by their character and the
principles for which they often stood and fought for. Had we
had term limits, many of these individuals would have been
forced prematurely out of office, and I am convinced that this
would have had a detrimental effect on the extraordinary
progress that this Nation has made on a wide range of issues
over the last 200 years.
In 1955, the Senate established a commission led by Senator
John F. Kennedy, charging that commission with the
responsibility of naming the five greatest U.S. Senators in our
Nation's history. After substantial input from other Members
and the academic community, the commission chose Henry Clay,
Daniel Webster, John C. Calhoun, Robert M. LaFollette, Sr., and
Robert A. Taft, Sr. Portraits of these five Senators are
hanging today in the Senate's reception room. Of Clay, Webster,
and Calhoun, Senator Kennedy said:
No other Senators have ever rivaled the unparalleled
leadership and statesmanship which they gave to a
growing and anxious nation during a critical era when
the Senate was the nation's most important body.
Of ``Fighting Bob'' LaFollette from the Great State of
Wisconsin, Senator Kennedy wrote:
[LaFollette's] impressive legislative accomplishments *
* * his tireless battles to make Government serve all
the people, and his deeply felt insight into social and
economic forces, all combined to shape a career we
rightfully honor today.
Clearly, the considerable legislative skills exercised by
these great figures were affected by their extended years of
service in the U.S. Senate. Calhoun served 19 years, LaFollette
served 22 years, and Clay and Webster each served 24 years.
Taft was the novice, having served only 14 years. His service
was cut short by his death in office during his third term. One
can only wonder how these historical figures would have turned
out if their service in the Senate would have been limited to
just 12 years.
And these five Senators are not alone. The history books
are full of names such as Hubert Humphrey, Everett Dirksen,
Barry Goldwater, and Phil Hart. Barry Goldwater, an icon of the
Conservative movement in this country, served in the Senate for
30 years. He came here during Eisenhower, took a break during
LBJ, came back during Nixon, and retired under Reagan. I can
say that as a progressive Democratic Senator from Wisconsin,
that this Nation, and this institution, are better today
because of Senator Goldwater's long service.
Finally, I would like to express my very serious concern
about the great enthusiasm in the 104th Congress for making
major alterations to the most fundamental parts of the United
States Constitution. Excluding the Bill of Rights which were
ratified together in 1791, this Nation has approved just 17
constitutional amendments in the past 200 years. That is an
average of about one amendment every 13 years. And yet here we
are about a month and a half into the 104th Congress and the
Senate Judiciary Committee has already reported out two
proposals to amend the Constitution. Besides the term-limits
and balanced-budget amendments, the committee has already
completed hearings on a line-item veto constitutional
amendment. School prayer and flag burning amendments have
already been introduced. I find it troubling and dangerous that
so many of my colleagues believe that the very important
fiscal, social, and political problems that we face today can
be so easily solved by making dramatic changes to a document
that was so carefully crafted and that has guided our Nation
for well over 200 years.
Interestingly enough, Mexico has a system of term limits
even more stringent than those contained in S.J. Res. 21. There
is no reelection for either the Mexican President or the
Mexican federal legislature. And since 1917, the Mexican
Constitution has been amended over 400 times.
If the powers of incumbency lend an unfair advantage to
sitting Members of Congress, we should roll up our sleeves and
pass campaign-finance-reform legislation so that challengers
have a reasonable chance of running a competitive campaign.
Term limits are no doubt a popular idea--but so is
comprehensive campaign finance reform. If we can solve a
problem that most parties seem to agree exists--that is, the
unfair advantages held by incumbents--by means other than a
constitutional amendment, we should aggressively pursue that
avenue before considering such a fundamental change to our
Constitution.