[Senate Report 106-45]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 106
106th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 106-45
======================================================================
THE SILK ROAD STRATEGY ACT OF 1999
_______
May 11, 1999.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany S. 579]
The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred
the bill (S. 579), to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
to target assistance to support the economic and political
independence of the countries of the South Caucasus and Central
Asia, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon
without amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purposes of the bill............................................. 1
Committee action................................................. 19
Section-by-section analysis...................................... 21
Cost estimate.................................................... 23
Evaluation of regulatory impact.................................. 24
Changes in existing law.......................................... 24
Minority views................................................... 31
Purposes of the Bill
Introduction
The Silk Road Strategy Act is necessitated by the failure
of current U.S. policy and assistance laws to resolve regional
conflicts or effectively advance American interests in the
South Caucasus and Central Asia. Eight years after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the Silk Road Strategy Act establishes a
policy framework that elevates and differentiates Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan from the status of ``former Soviet
republics'' and ``newly independent states.'' The very use of
these labels by U.S. policy makers has frustrated states in the
South Caucasus and Central Asia that view themselves as
permanently independent and sovereign countries. Most of these
states--including several pro-Western, secular Muslim
governments--are racked by civil wars, ethnic tensions, and
weak and undemocratic regimes. They are falling dangerously
behind in both economic and democratic reforms, which in turn
provides an opening for attempts by regional powers and sub-
regional forces to undermine their very sovereignty.
The countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia have
almost without exception shown a strong desire to work with the
United States in pursuit of economic and democratic reforms.
Clearly, enormous economic gains are possible in several
countries in the region due to the presence of oil and gas
reserves. The goal of the United States should be to promote
economic and democratic reforms in the region while helping to
develop oil and gas resources in a manner that is beneficial to
all states in the region. Specifically, American interests in
the region are threefold: (1) to ensure the development of
stable, democratic states in the region, including the
resolution of regional conflicts; (2) to develop friendly
relationships among the states in the region and with the
United States and its allies; and (3) to ensure that the
economies and the natural resources of the region are developed
in a manner dictated by the market, rather than through
exploitation by regional, hegemonic powers.
The Silk Road Strategy Act will not lead to any immediate
increase in foreign assistance to the South Caucasus and
Central Asia. The goal of the legislation is to focus U.S.
assistance better to achieve U.S. interests. The legislation
provides general authorization for a broad range of U.S.
assistance to promote reconciliation and recovery from regional
conflicts; to foster economic growth and development, including
the conditions necessary for regional economic cooperation; to
develop regional infrastructure; to secure borders and
implement effective controls necessary to prevent smuggling of
illegal narcotics and the proliferation of technology and
materials related to weapons of mass destruction; and to
promote institutions of democratic government and create the
conditions for the growth of pluralistic societies. As these
programs develop, in a regional context, the Silk Road Strategy
Act can be the means to bring peace, stability and economic
development to the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
The goal of regional cooperation, which is the underlying
rationale for the Silk Road Strategy Act, has drawn the support
of every government in the South Caucasus and Central Asia with
the exception of Armenia, as well as the governments of close
American allies such as Turkey, Ukraine, and Romania. The
legislation is endorsed by a broad coalition of organizations,
including the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and
Children, the American Petroleum Institute, the National
Association of Manufacturers, the National Foreign Trade
Council, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the Georgian
American Community, the American Jewish Committee, the American
Jewish Congress, the Anti-Defamation League, B'nai B'rith, and
the National Conference on Soviet Jewry.
The authorities in the Silk Road Strategy Act complement
and build upon the authorities included in the Freedom Support
Act (the law currently governing U.S. assistance to the 13
independent nations that once composed the Soviet Union), while
creating a regional focus for U.S. policy in the South Caucasus
and Central Asia. The legislation encourages a re-energized
U.S. assistance initiative in the region while maintaining a
strong emphasis on democratic reform and human rights. In fact,
the restrictions on assistance included in section 499E of the
Silk Road Strategy Act are, verbatim, the same restrictions on
assistance that are included in the Freedom Support Act. In a
May 19, 1998 letter to the Foreign Relations Committee, the
Department of State offers the Clinton Administration's
unqualified support for the Silk Road Strategy Act which
``provides a useful framework for U.S. interests in the
Southern Caucasus and Central Asia.'' The letter goes on to
state that, in the view of the Administration, ``(t)his Act
builds upon the Freedom Support Act and highlights America's
interests in this region.''
Under the Freedom Support Act, U.S. assistance in the
region has been skewed by earmarks, rigid restrictions and,
especially, an absence of correlation between dollar amounts
and results in economic or democratic reforms. For example, the
only country in the region recognized as having conducted a
fully free and fair election, Georgia, has received less than
half of the total assistance--and less than a quarter on a per
capita basis-- provided to Armenia since 1992. Yet, in a
critique of democratic progress in Armenia, a February 3, 1998
Human Rights Watch report reveals that the resignation of the
Armenian President last year was in fact forced by a powerful
Armenian militia group. Furthermore, according to the April
1998 Digest of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE), the subsequent March 1998 presidential election
in Armenia did not meet the standards of the Organization on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In fact, according
to the CSCE report, ``(s)ince the 1991 election of Levon Ter-
Petrossyan, Armenia has not held an election that the OSCE/
ODIHR observation missions have been able to certify as free
and fair.''
Other governments in the region have also failed to
implement democratic reforms. The government of Azerbaijan is a
case in point. Opposition candidates boycotted the October
1998, Azerbaijani presidential election due to a lack of
confidence in an electoral process solely under the control of
the incumbent president. Ironically, until 1996, the government
of Azerbaijan was prevented by the Freedom Support Act from
receiving any U.S. assistance, including technical assistance
designed specifically to promote the development of democratic
institutions and sound election laws. Nonetheless, in a June
1998 letter to the Congress, the five leading opposition
candidates in Azerbaijan made an explicit appeal for the
lifting of assistance restrictions against Azerbaijan as an
essential step for encouraging democratic development of their
country.
The Clinton Administration has requested that the Congress
allow broader U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan, pointing out that
critics of corruption and undemocratic tendencies in the
government of that country have simultaneously blocked the very
assistance that could facilitate reforms. According to the
Department of State, anti-corruption assistance, counter-
narcotics programs, economic reform assistance (including
transparency in budgeting and tax reform), and funding of
regional environmental cooperation programs are all prohibited
to the Government of Azerbaijan under section 907 of the
Freedom Support Act.
East-West versus North-South: The Silk Road Strategy
The Silk Road Strategy Act establishes a regional approach
for U.S. trade, economic assistance and foreign policy
specifically to build an East-West axis of political
cooperation among the eight countries that lie between Russia
and Iran on the southern periphery of the former Soviet Union.
Efforts to resolve conflicts in the region are at a standstill,
economic and democratic reforms are slowing, and Russia and
Iran are fomenting instability in order to establish political
influence over those states.
Russian and Iranian mischief can be attributed to a mutual
desire to expand political control in the South Caucasus and
Central Asia while seeking to maintain control over the flow of
oil and gas resources from the region. Senior officials from
Russia and Iran meet frequently to coordinate their interests
in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. At a June 27, 1998,
meeting between the Transportation Ministers of Russia and
Iran, a plan was announced to develop a North-South economic
corridor between the two countries. On July 19, 1998, the
governments of those two countries reiterated their intention
to frustrate efforts to delimit the ownership of resources in
the Caspian Sea. Meanwhile, Russia has used its exclusive
control of existing oil and gas pipelines to force economic and
political concessions from neighboring states.
As part of the deepening relationship with Iran, the
Russian Government has shown reckless disregard for the
proliferation of sophisticated weapons technology to that
country. According to an April 25, 1998, New York Times report,
the Russian Government failed to stop ``a truck laden with 22
tons of stainless steel that could be used to make missiles''
that was on its way to Tehran, despite advance warning by the
United States Government. Fortunately, according to the report,
cooperative customs agents in Azerbaijan were willing to stop
the shipment before it entered Iran.
Promoting Human Rights
A leading challenge for United States policy in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia is to determine when to disengage and
when to use the broad array of U.S. assistance programs to
strengthen democratic institutions, encourage economic reforms,
and foster the development of civil society in countries that
otherwise have poor human rights records. Among the factors
that must weigh heavily in deciding U.S. policy in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia are the friendly, pro-American
receptivity found among most states in the region that could
allow democratic ideals to take root. Also, consideration must
be given to compelling U.S. geostrategic and economic interests
in the region, as well as the likelihood that U.S.
disengagement will do nothing to improve human rights while
regional powers such as China, Iran and Russia (countries with
human rights records of even more dubious quality than those in
the South Caucasus and Central Asia) increase their political
influence over those states.
There is no benefit in the Silk Road Strategy Act for those
who violate basic human rights. Section 499E of the Silk Road
Strategy Act specifically prohibits assistance to the
government of any country that ``is engaged in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights.'' It is necessary to recognize that human rights
problems exist in every country in the region. However, under
existing human rights statutes, the Administration has not
found such violations to be sufficient to merit a cut-off of
U.S. assistance.
To some extent, human rights abuses, undemocratic
tendencies and authoritarian government can be attributed to
ongoing conflicts in the region, especially in Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tajikistan. Both Russia and Iran have
sought to exploit, and at times foment, instability in the
South Caucasus and Central Asia--a principal cause of
undemocratic behavior and abuse. Specifically, Russia has
provided covert and overt military assistance to fuel
separatist conflicts in Georgia and Azerbaijan, while Iran has
sought to impose an anti-Western, anti-Israeli orientation on
states in the region, including a direct threat by the Iranian
Government upon the life of the President of Azerbaijan in
retaliation for warming Azerbaijani-Isreali relations. To this
day Russia harbors the mastermind of a 1995 assassination
attempt against Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze. The
individual, Lt. General Igor Georgadze, was surreptitiously
flown out of a Russian military base in Georgia only days after
the assassination attempt.
When the Freedom Support Act was approved by the Congress
in 1992, few could have conceived that Russia would be actively
seeking to subvert the elected governments of neighboring
states within three years. In fact, while providing some
benefits to other eligible countries, the Freedom Support Act
has been most beneficial to Russia. From 1992, Russia has
maintained its position as the leading recipient of aid under
the Freedom Support Act, despite perpetrating the single
greatest human rights abuse by any recipient of U.S. foreign
assistance in the region. The Russian military's brutal 1994-
1996 assault on the southern Russian region of Chechnya
resulted in the massacre of tens of thousands of innocent men,
women, and children, and has plunged the area into ongoing
chaos. Nonetheless, these atrocities had absolutely no impact
on the Clinton Administration's determination to continue
Russia's generous aid levels. No other state in the region has
come close to such horrific action, although the human rights
records of most are in need of substantial improvement.
It is clear, in fact, that the level of U.S. assistance to
countries in the region is most certainly not correlated with
the human rights records of the recipients to date. Listed
below is a simple comparison of aid levels and human rights
records, with a breakdown of total assistance provided to each
country in the South Caucasus and Central Asia from 1992-1998
(as provided in the State Department's 1999 ``Report on U.S.
Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with the
New Independent States of the former Soviet Union''), and the
most recent assessment of each country's human rights record by
the United States Department of State:
Armenia
U.S. Assistance Provided under the Freedom Support Act: $519.03
million
Population: 3,465,611
Per Capita Assistance 1992-1998: $149.77
Armenia has a Constitution that provides for the separation
of powers; however, the directly elected President has
extensive powers of appointment and decree that are not
balanced by a legitimate legislature or an independent
judiciary. The President appoints the Prime Minister, who is in
charge of the Cabinet. Robert Kocharian was elected President
in a multi-candidate election in March 1998, after former
President Levon Ter-Petrossyan was forced to resign in February
by his former political allies in the Defense and Internal
Affairs and National Security Ministries.
Ter-Petrossyan's reelection in 1996 was flawed by numerous
irregularities and serious breaches of the election law. In an
interview in December 1998, the former Interior Minister
admitted that Ter-Petrossyan avoided a runoff against a strong
opponent in the 1996 presidential elections by falsifying the
results of the first round. The March elections were an
improvement with respect to the ability of a number of
candidates to campaign more freely, with access to the media;
however, the voting and counting process revealed numerous
irregularities, including bloc voting by the military and a
turnout inflated at least 10 percent by ballot box stuffing and
other fraud.
Although the Parliament is no longer as docile as in
previous years, the current parliamentary majority usually
votes in support of the executive branch, and does not
represent effectively either the views of the population or
existing political party composition. Armenian National
Movement (ANM) members won 88 percent of the seats in a
transitional National Assembly elected in 1995 in elections
that local and international observers characterized as
``generally free but not fair;'' however, most of the ANM
members had deserted the party by February. The current
Parliament showed increasing independence late in the year, as
it tried to distance itself from unpopular government reform
measures before the scheduled May 1999 parliamentary elections.
The legislature approves new laws, must confirm the Prime
Minister's program, and can remove the Prime Minister by a vote
of no confidence. Both the Government and the legislature can
propose legislation. The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice, judges are subject
to pressure from the executive branch and frequently corrupt.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and National Security is
responsible for domestic security, intelligence activities,
border control, and the national police force. Members of the
security forces committed human rights abuses.
The transition from a centralized, controlled economy to a
market economy continues to move forward, despite the collapse
of the industrial sector. Industrial output remains low. About
50 percent of the population is unemployed or underemployed,
and there is a high degree of income inequality. Most small and
medium enterprises have been privatized, as has most
agricultural land. About 75 percent of landowners now have
secure title to their land. Gross domestic product (GDP)
increased about 6 percent during the year, to about $600 per
capita. Inflation fell to under 5 percent for the year. Foreign
assistance and remittances from Armenians abroad play a major
role in sustaining the economy.
The Constitution provides for broad human rights
protections, but human rights problems persist in several
important areas. Substantial intervention by local power
structures in the March presidential election continued to
restrict citizens' ability to change their government
peacefully. Members of the security forces routinely beat
detainees during arrest and interrogation, made arbitrary
arrests and detentions without warrants, and did not respect
constitutional protections regarding privacy and due process.
Prison conditions remained poor. The judiciary is subject to
political pressure and does not enforce constitutional
protections effectively.
There are some limits on press freedom; journalists
practice self-censorship. State television, which refrains from
criticizing government policy, remains the major source of news
for most of the population, but independent television and
newspapers, along with private radio stations, offered
substantial competition. The nongovernmental media often
criticize the country's leadership and policies. Burdensome
registration requirements hinder freedom of association. The
law places some restrictions on religious freedom, including a
prohibition on proselytizing by religions other than the
Armenian Apostolic Church. Registration requirements for
religious groups kept Jehovah's Witnesses from being able to
operate legally, and seven Jehovah's Witnesses are in jail for
refusing military service. The Government places some
restrictions on freedom of movement. Discrimination against
women, minorities, and the disabled remains a problem.
After his election, President Kocharian appointed an
opposition presidential candidate to head two presidential
commissions charged with improving human rights and reforming
the Constitution to create a more even balance of power among
executive, legislative, and judicial branches. One of
Kocharian's first actions was to legalize the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation (ARF/Dashnaktsutyun) and to pressure
successfully the judiciary to secure the release of many
persons convicted in politically linked trials. At the new
President's urging, the Supreme Court quickly reviewed and set
aside the convictions of Dashnak and other figures convicted
for political reasons in the ``Dro'' and ``31'' trials in 1996
and 1997.
Azerbaijan
U.S. Assistance Provided under the Freedom Support Act: $104.82
million
Population: 7,735,918
Per Capita Assistance 1992-1998: $13.55
Azerbaijan is a republic with a presidential form of
government. Heydar Aliyev, who assumed presidential powers
after the overthrow of his democratically elected predecessor
in 1993, was reelected in October in a controversial election
marred by numerous, serious irregularities, violations of the
election law, and lack of transparency in the vote counting
process at the district and national levels. President Aliyev
and his supporters, many from his home region of Nakhchivan,
continue to dominate the Government and the multiparty 125-
member Parliament chosen in the flawed 1995 elections. The
Constitution, adopted in a 1995 referendum, established a
system of government based on a division of powers between a
strong presidency, a legislature with the power to approve the
budget and impeach the President, and a judiciary with limited
independence. The judiciary does not function independently of
the executive branch and is corrupt and inefficient.
After years of inter-ethnic conflict between Armenians and
Azerbaijanis, Armenian forces and forces of the self-styled
``Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh'' (which is not recognized by
any government) continue to occupy 20 percent of Azerbaijan's
territory. A cease-fire was concluded in 1994, and the peace
process continues. Exchanges of fire occurred frequently along
the Azerbaijan-Armenian border and along the line of contact
with Nagorno-Karabakh causing casualties, including some
civilians. Military operations continued to affect the civilian
population. There are 800,000 Azerbaijani refugees and
internally displaced persons (IDP's) who cannot return to their
homes. In the part of Azerbaijan that Armenians control, a
heavily militarized ruling structure prevents ethnic
Azerbaijanis from returning to their homes. In the part of
Azerbaijan that the Government controls, government efforts to
hinder the opposition continue to impede the transition to
democracy.
Police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry
of National Security are responsible for internal security.
Members of the police committed numerous human rights abuses.
Azerbaijan continued economic reform in 1998 and the
economy is in transition from central planning to a free
market. Economic growth has been spurred by substantial foreign
investment in the hydrocarbon sector, but it is offset by a
highly organized system of corruption and patronage. The
country has rich petroleum reserves and significant
agricultural potential. Oil and oil products are the largest
export, followed by cotton and tobacco. Other key industries
are chemicals and oil field machinery. The Government signed 5
oil production sharing agreements with foreign oil companies in
1998, bringing the total to 14. Agriculture employs 33 percent
of the labor force and contributes 20 percent to the gross
domestic product (GDP). The leading crops are wheat, fruit and
vegetables, cotton, tobacco, and grapes. Privatization of
industry continues through auction sales of small- and medium-
sized state-owned enterprises.
Large enterprises remain almost exclusively under
government control and operate at a fraction of their capacity.
Accumulation of large wage arrears is common. Private retail
enterprises, cotton gins, and grain mills are proliferating.
About 90 percent of the nation's farmland is now in private
hands, but new small farmers have poor access to credit and
markets, and commercial agriculture remains weak. Per capita
GDP is approximately $500 per year. Much of the labor force is
employed by the state sector where wages are low. The overall
economic situation of the average citizen remains tenuous,
although in urban areas a growing moneyed class with trade and
oil-related interests has emerged. According to the World Bank,
60 percent of the citizens live in poverty. Economic
opportunity for the average citizen still depends largely on
connections to the Government. Severe disparities of income
have emerged that are partly attributed to patronage and
corruption.
The Government's poor human rights record improved in a few
areas, but government actions toward the end of the year
negated some of the positive developments, and serious problems
remain. Police beat persons in custody, arbitrarily arrested
and detained persons, and conducted searches and seizures
without warrants. In most instances, the Government took no
action to punish abusers, although perpetrators were prosecuted
in a few cases. In a variety of separate incidents, the
Government arrested and opened criminal proceedings against
approximately 40 members of opposition parties. Prison
conditions remained harsh. The judiciary is corrupt,
inefficient, and subject to executive influence.
Corruption continued to pervade most government organs, and
it is widely believed that most persons in appointed government
positions and in state employment generally purchase their
positions. The Government holds an estimated 75 political
prisoners. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy
rights. The Government eased restrictions on freedom of speech
and the press. After open discussion in the press, the
Government abolished censorship in August. Scores of opposition
and independent newspapers continued to publish and discuss a
wide range of sensitive domestic and foreign policy issues.
However, the Government cracked down on the media later in the
year in the postelection period. The Government continued to
deny broadcast licenses to several organizations applying to
open independent television and radio stations. The Government
restricted freedom of assembly, association, religion, and
movement when it deemed it in its interest to do so.
Police suppressed or refused to allow many peaceful public
demonstrations, while allowing others to occur. Opposition
political parties carried on open and vigorous public
activities in the months leading up to the election. In August-
September, the Government allowed a number of public
demonstrations, and closed its criminal investigation of eight
prominent figures from opposition parties. After these positive
steps, the Government clamped down on freedom of assembly after
the election. The Government tolerated the existence of many
opposition political parties, although it continued to refuse
to register some of them. The Government continues to restrict
citizens' ability to change their government peacefully.
Although the Government passed an improved election law, the
presidential election was marred by many irregularities, and a
number of international and independent organizations concluded
that it did not meet international standards. The Government
was critical of certain domestic human rights activists,
although it was open to limited dialog with domestic and
international human rights organizations. Societal
discrimination and violence against women and discrimination
against certain ethnic minorities are problems.
Cease-fire violations by both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict continued. They resulted in injuries and deaths among
combatants and civilians, and the taking of prisoners,
including civilians. Insurgent Armenian forces in Nagorno-
Karabakh and the occupied territories continued to prevent the
return of IDP's to their homes. This restriction resulted in
significant human suffering for hundreds of thousands of
persons.
Georgia
U.S. Assistance Provided under the Freedom Support Act: $239.64
million
Population: 5,174,642
Per Capita Assistance 1992-1998: $46.31
Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union in
1991. Multiparty parliamentary elections followed a short-lived
military coup in 1992 that ousted the elected government of
Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The 1995 Constitution, as adopted by
Parliament, provides for an executive branch that reports to
the President and a legislature. In 1995 Eduard Shevardnadze
was elected President, and a Parliament was selected in
elections described by international observers as generally
consistent with democratic norms, except in the autonomous
region of Ajaria. The President appoints ministers with the
consent of the Parliament. The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, it is subject to executive
pressure.
Internal conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that
erupted in the early 1990's remain unresolved. Cease-fires are
in effect in both areas, although sporadic incidents of
violence occur in Abkhazia. These conflicts, together with
problems created by roughly 283,000 internally displaced
persons (IDP's), pose a significant threat to national
stability. In 1993 Abkhaz separatists won control of Abkhazia,
and most ethnic Georgians--a large plurality of the
population--were expelled or fled the region. In 1994 Russian
peacekeeping forces representing the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) deployed in the conflict area with the
agreement of the Government and the Abkhaz separatists. Despite
the presence of peacekeepers, there has been only very limited
repatriation of ethnic Georgian IDP's during the year, apart
from about 53,000 spontaneous returnees to the Gali region of
Abkhazia. However, in May fighting broke out again in Gali,
resulting in at least 239 casualties. Abkhaz forces burned an
estimated 50 percent of houses in some areas, and 40,000 of the
residents of Gali who had fled their homes have not yet
returned. A Russian peacekeeping force also has been in South
Ossetia since 1992. Repatriation to South Ossetia also has been
slow. The Government has no effective control over Abkhazia or
much of South Ossetia.
The Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Procuracy have primary
responsibility for law enforcement, and the Ministry of State
Security (MSS, formerly the KGB) plays a significant role in
internal security. In times of internal disorder, the
Government may call on the army. On October 19, army forces put
down a small scale mutiny led by Colonel Akaki Eliava, a
supporter of deceased former President Gamsakhurdia. The mutiny
resulted in the deaths of one soldier and two mutineers and
generated almost no popular support. Reformist, elected,
civilian authorities maintain inadequate control of the law
enforcement and security forces. Members of the security forces
committed serious human rights abuses, although slightly fewer
than in the previous year.
The economy continued to grow during the year but was
affected by the Russian financial crisis, which reduced exports
to Russia and the value of ruble-denominated remittances from
Georgians working in Russia. Agricultural production and
hydropower production suffered from the worst drought in 50
years. These factors, coupled with low government revenues,
created a fiscal crisis and pressure on the lari, which was
allowed to float on December 7. Key exports are manganese,
wine, mineral water, and agricultural products.
The Government continued efforts to improve its uneven
human rights record, but serious problems remain. Police and
security forces continued to torture, beat, and abuse prisoners
and detainees, force confessions, and routinely fabricate or
plant evidence. Security force abuses, along with inhuman
prison conditions, led to several deaths in custody. However,
local human rights groups reported that the extent of such
abuse declined slightly. Nonetheless, government promises of
reform of prison conditions remained unfulfilled. Authorities
continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention. Senior
government officials acknowledged serious human rights
problems, especially those linked to law enforcement agencies,
and sought international advice and assistance on needed
reforms. However, while structural reforms designed to improve
respect for human rights continued to be passed by the
reformist Parliament, law enforcement agencies have been slow
to adapt their practices to democratic norms.
The Government delayed implementation of the new Criminal
Procedures Code, passed in November 1997, until May 1999.
Corrupt and incompetent judges seldom displayed independence
from the executive branch, leading to trials that were neither
fair nor expeditious. However, the Government began serious
implementation of the 1997 Law on the Courts with the first
judicial examinations, which are designed to identify and
remove corrupt and incompetent judges. Law enforcement agencies
and other government bodies illegally interfered with citizens'
right to privacy. The Government constrains some press
freedoms. The Government limits freedom of assembly, and
security forces continued to disperse some peaceful rallies
violently. Discrimination and violence against women are also
problems. However, increased citizen awareness of civil rights
and democratic values and the continued evolution of civil
society provided an increasingly effective check on the
excesses of law enforcement agencies.
The number, variety, and sophistication of independent
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) grew, as did their
ability to speak out for, and defend the rights of, individual
citizens. Criticism from the press and the NGO community played
an important role in reducing the incidence of prisoner abuse.
It also led to the ouster of the corrupt Minister of
Communications, who had violated privacy laws routinely.
Independent newspapers continued to criticize government
policies and actions.
Kazakhstan
U.S. Assistance Provided under the Freedom Support Act: $316.90
million
Population: 16,898,572
Per Capita Assistance 1992-1998: $18.75
The Constitution of Kazakhstan concentrates power in the
presidency. President Nursultan Nazarbayev is the dominant
political figure. The Constitution, adopted in 1995 in a
referendum marred by irregularities, permits the President to
legislate by decree and dominate the legislature and judiciary;
it cannot be changed or amended without the President's
consent. President Nazarbayev was elected to a new 7-year term
on January 10, 1999 in an election that fell far short of
international standards. Previous presidential elections
originally scheduled for 1996 did not take place, as President
Nazarbayev's term in office was extended in a separate 1995
referendum, also marred by irregularities. Under the 1995
Constitution, Parliament's powers are more limited than
previously. However, members of Parliament have the right to
introduce legislation and some bills introduced by Parliament
have become laws. The judiciary remained under the control of
the President and the executive branch. The lack of an
independent judiciary made it difficult to root out corruption,
which was pervasive throughout the Government.
The Committee for National Security (the KNB, successor to
the KGB) is responsible for national security, law enforcement
activities on the national level, and counterintelligence. An
external intelligence service, Barlau (the Kazakh word for
intelligence) was created in 1997, but during the year,
Barlau's functions were reabsorbed into the KNB. The KNB
reports directly to the President. The Ministry of Internal
Affairs, which is subordinate to the KNB, supervises the
criminal police, who are poorly paid and widely believed to be
corrupt. The KNB continued efforts to improve its public image
by focusing on fighting government corruption, religious
extremism, terrorism, and organized crime. Members of the
security forces committed human rights abuses.
Kazakhstan is rich in natural resources, chiefly petroleum
and minerals. The Government has made significant progress
toward a market-based economy since independence. After a 5-
year decline, overall production began to rise in 1996,
although the rate of growth slowed in 1998. The Government has
been successful in stabilizing the local currency (tenge) and
reducing inflation to less than 10 percent a year. The average
annual wage was approximately $1,500. The agricultural sector
has been slow to privatize. The Government has privatized
successfully small- and medium-sized firms and most large-scale
industrial complexes. However, living standards for the
majority of the population continue to decline. According to
several surveys, in 1997 approximately 33 percent of citizens
lived below the government-defined poverty line of $50 per
month.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens in some areas, but serious problems remain in others.
Democratic institutions are weak. The Government infringed on
citizens' right to change their government, notably in its
flawed conduct of preparations for the January 1999
presidential election. The Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) publicly cited flawed election
preparations in declining the Government's request for election
observers. The Government used a new amendment to the
presidential decree on elections to prohibit some government
opponents from running in the election because they were found
guilty of participating in unauthorized public meetings and
demonstrations. The Government repeatedly harassed its
opponents during the election campaign and appeared to have
complicity in at least four assaults on perceived opponents.
The legal structure, including the Constitution adopted in
1995, does not fully safeguard human rights. Members of the
security forces often beat or otherwise abused detainees, and
prison conditions remained harsh. There were allegations of
arbitrary arrest and detention, and prolonged detention is a
problem. The judiciary remains under the control of the
President and the executive branch, and corruption is deeply
rooted. A political prisoner, Labor Movement leader Madel
Ismailov, was sentenced to 1 year in prison for insulting the
President. The Government infringed on citizens' rights to
privacy.
Government tolerance of the independent media markedly
deteriorated, as some opposition newspapers and other media
outlets were ordered to close, forced to sell to progovernment
interests, or brought under pressure by regulatory authorities.
The Government reportedly pressured media not to cover the
opposition during the presidential campaign. The media
practiced self-censorship and the Government maintained control
of most printing presses and facilities. Academic freedom is
not respected. Freedom of assembly sometimes was restricted.
Some organizers of unsanctioned demonstrations were arrested
and fined or imprisoned. Freedom of association, while
generally respected, sometimes was hindered by complicated and
controversial registration requirements that restrict this
right for organizations and political parties. Domestic
violence against women remained a problem. There was
discrimination against women, the disabled, and ethnic
minorities. The Government discriminated in favor of ethnic
Kazakhs. The Government limited worker rights; it tried to
limit the influence of independent trade unions, both directly
and through its support for state-sponsored unions, and members
of independent trade unions were harassed. The courts removed
the legal status of two independent unions in Kentau for
holding unauthorized demonstrations to protest unpaid wages.
Kyrgyz Republic
U.S. Assistance Provided under the Freedom Support Act: $158.24
million
Population: 4,540,185
Per Capita Assistance 1992-1998: $34.85
The Kyrgyz Republic became an independent state in 1991.
Although the 1993 Constitution defines the form of government
as a democratic republic with substantial civil rights for its
citizens, the President, Askar Akayev, dominates the
Government. Akayev was reelected in December 1995 in an open,
multi-candidate presidential election, which was marred,
however, by deregistration of three rival candidates
immediately prior to the vote. Also in 1995, a two-chamber
Parliament was elected for a 5-year term. The Constitution was
amended by referendum in February 1996 to strengthen
substantially the Presidency and define the role of Parliament.
However, the February referendum was marred by serious
irregularities. On October 17, the Government held a
constitutional referendum that, among other things, reformed
the structure of the Parliament and the national budget
process. The referendum passed by over 90 percent, but there
were again a number of serious irregularities. Although
Parliament has become increasingly active, it still does not
check the power of the President effectively. The judiciary is
dominated by the executive branch.
Law enforcement responsibilities are divided among the
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) for general crime, the
Ministry of National Security (MNB) for state-level crime, and
the procurator's office for both types of crime. Both the MVD
and MNB deal with corruption and organized crime. These
ministries inherited their personnel and infrastructure from
their Soviet predecessors. Both appear to be under the general
control of the Government and generally conform their actions
to the law. Kyrgyz Republic's border with China and one of its
two international airports are manned by Russian border troops
under an agreement with the Russian Federation. Border guards
are under the full control of the Government. As of January 1,
1999, responsibility for border control lies with the
Government, except for the Sino-Kyrgyz border where Russian
guards operate under joint Kyrgyz-Russian agreement. Final
withdrawal of Russian border guards is scheduled for 2003. Some
members of the police committed human rights abuses. Police
patrols are poorly supervised, not always paid promptly, and
sometimes commit crimes. Supervision of conditions for pretrial
detainees is also poor, and abuses sometimes occur.
The Kyrgyz Republic is a poor, mountainous country with a
rough balance of agricultural and industrial production.
Cotton, tobacco, and sugar are its primary agricultural
exports. The country also exports hydroelectric power,
antimony, mercury, and uranium. The Government has carried out
progressive market reforms. The moderate growth apparent in
most sectors has increased, and the public generally supports
economic reform. Gross domestic product for the first half of
1998 increased by 5 percent compared with the same period of
1997; however, the level of hardship for pensioners, unemployed
workers, and government workers with salary arrearages
continues to be very high. The average annual salary is $152
(4,641 som). Foreign assistance plays a significant role in the
country's budget.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens in many areas, but serious problems remained. The
Government limited citizens' ability to change their
government, and there were serious irregularities in the
October constitutional referendum. There were credible reports
of police abuse and brutality. Prison conditions are very poor,
and there were some cases of arbitrary arrest and detention.
Executive domination of the judiciary limited citizens' right
to due process, although the judiciary is undergoing reform.
Although government supervision of ``village elders courts''
remains uneven, abuses such as stoning and death sentences have
abated. Although sanctioned by the Government, elders' courts
are not part of the regular judicial structure, and the
Government has made efforts to curtail their activities.
The Government at times infringed on freedom of speech and
of the press. Authorities at times pressured journalists who
criticized individual members of the Government. Unlike the
previous year, the Government did not use libel laws against
the press; however, the Government on occasion apparently used
tax laws and registration requirements to intimidate the
opposition press or to suspend newspapers. The Government at
times inhibited freedom of assembly and association. The
Government deregistered the Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights
(KHRC) prior to the October referendum. The Government at times
infringes on freedom of religion. Violence against women is a
problem that authorities often ignore, and trafficking in women
also is a growing problem. Child abuse is a problem, and there
is a growing number of street children. Discrimination against
ethnic minorities persisted.
Tajikistan
U.S. Assistance Provided under the Freedom Support Act: $58.43
million
Population: 6,013,855
Per Capita Assistance 1992-1998: $9.72
Tajikistan remains in the hands of a largely authoritarian
government, although it has established some nominally
democratic structures. The Government's narrow base of support
limits its ability to control the entire territory of the
country. The Government of President Emomali Rahmonov, which
consists largely of natives of the Kulob region, continued to
dominate the State, even though some Kulobis were removed from
senior positions in 1998 and opposition members were taken into
Government. The judiciary is not independent.
Tajikistan took a significant step toward national
reconciliation after its 1992 civil war with the June 1997
signing of a comprehensive peace accord. Under the provisions
of the accord, the Commission of National Reconciliation (CNR)
began work in July 1997, and has made some progress in
establishing peace. By year's end, the Government almost had
fulfilled its obligation to name United Tajik Opposition (UTO)
candidates to 30 percent of senior government positions. The
UTO had registered virtually all of its fighters in
anticipation of their demobilization or reintegration into
regular military units. The return during the year of virtually
all exiled UTO leaders and Tajik refugees from Afghanistan
constituted further progress. However, implementation of the
peace agreement (originally scheduled to be completed during
the year) is still behind schedule, and basic issues such as
constitutional amendments, legalization of banned political
parties, and the disarming or reintegration of fighters remain
to be resolved. Parliamentary elections that were scheduled
under the agreement to take place in June are not expected to
be held until 1999 at the earliest. In addition the United
Nations Mission of Observers to Tajikistan (UNMOT) has reported
several cease-fire violations. The killing of four UNMOT
personnel in July led to the temporary withdrawal of most UNMOT
observers.
Internal security is the responsibility of the Ministries
of Interior, Security, and Defense. The Russian Army's 201st
Motorized Rifle Division, part of a Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) peacekeeping force established in 1993, remained
in the country. The Russian Border Guard Force (RBF) reports to
Moscow and has primary responsibility for guarding the border
with Afghanistan. It consists mostly of Tajiks with some
Russians and a limited number of other Central Asians, although
the officer corps remains principally Russian. The Government
depends militarily on a handful of commanders who use their
forces almost as private armies. The soldiers of some of these
commanders are the source of serious problems, including crime
and corruption. Some regions of the country remained
effectively outside the Government's control, and government
control in other areas existed only by day, or at the
sufferance of local opposition commanders. Some members of the
security forces and government-aligned militias committed
serious human rights abuses.
The economy continued to be extremely depressed, and
government revenue remains highly dependent on the government-
dominated cotton and government-owned aluminum industries. The
economy also suffers from narcotics trafficking, other forms of
corruption, and crime in general. Most Soviet-era factories
operate at a minimal level, if at all. Small-scale
privatization is over 60 percent complete, but medium- to
large-scale privatization still is stalled. Government figures
show a 3.8 percent increase in gross domestic product during
the first 8 months of 1998, but also indicate that as much as
one-third of the total population is unemployed or
underemployed. The Tajik ruble remained stable until its value
fell in August, mainly as a consequence of the economic crisis
in Russia. The inflation rate has stabilized at 7 percent, and
the Government essentially has followed recommendations by
international financial institutions to establish fiscal and
budgetary discipline. Many, but not all, wages and pensions are
being paid. There were serious shortages of natural gas for
heating and industry, largely as a result of continued disputes
with Uzbekistan over natural gas purchases. The Government
states that per capita gross domestic product is approximately
$230 to $300; other estimates are lower.
The Government's human rights record is poor and made only
limited improvements in a few areas over last year. The
Government limits citizens' right to change their government.
Some members of the security forces were responsible for
killings and beatings, and frequent abuse of detainees. These
forces were also responsible for threats, extortion, looting,
and abuse of civilians. Certain battalions of nominally
government forces operated quasi-independently under their
leaders. The Government prosecuted few of the persons who
committed these abuses. Prison conditions remain life
threatening, and the Government continued to use arbitrary
arrest and detention, and lengthy pretrial detention remains a
problem. Basic problems of rule of law persist. There are often
long delays before trials, and the judiciary is subject to
political and paramilitary pressure. The authorities infringe
on citizens' right to privacy.
The Government severely restricts freedom of speech and of
the press, and essentially controls the electronic media;
however, two new opposition newspapers began publishing during
the year. The authorities strictly control freedom of assembly
and association for political organizations. One new party was
allowed to register in 1998, but the registration of another
was held up by bureaucratic delays. Three opposition parties
and a branch of a fourth affiliated with the armed opposition
remained suspended. There are some restrictions on freedom of
movement. The Government cooperated to a limited extent with
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
in Dushanbe and in some field offices, but the officer in Pyanj
was accused of destabilizing the area and ordered out of the
district by local officials for a period of 2 weeks in May. The
Government still has not established a human rights ombudsman
position, despite a 1996 pledge to do so. Violence against
women is a problem, as is discrimination against the disabled.
The general weakness of the Government and its limited
ability to maintain law and order were evident in the armed
clashes between the Government and opposition forces at various
points during the year. The actions led by Mahmud Khudoiberdiev
in November indicated dissatisfaction among those who feel
blocked from participation in the current inter-Tajik peace
process. Other clashes during the year involved UTO elements.
All of these clashes resulted in civilian deaths, abuse, and
property damage. There are credible reports of excesses by both
opposition elements and government forces involved in these
clashes. Following the November anti-government action led by
Mahmud Khudoiberdiev, there were allegations of heavy-handed
treatment of civilians in the Leninabad region by government
forces seeking to identify potential insurgents and locate
caches of weapons allegedly left behind by Khudoiberdiev's
forces. There are credible reports that Ministry of Interior
troops killed civilians during and after May and July clashes
near Dushanbe.
The armed opposition committed serious abuses, including
killings and abductions. There were credible reports that UTO
units threatened, extorted, and abused the civilian
populations.
Turkmenistan
U.S. Assistance Provided under the Freedom Support Act: $51.05
million
Population: 4,225,351
Per Capita Assistance 1992-1998: $12.08
Turkmenistan, a one-party state dominated by its president
and his closest advisers, made little progress in moving from a
Soviet-era authoritarian style of government to a democratic
system. Saparmurad Niyazov, head of the Turkmen Communist Party
since 1985 (renamed the Democratic Party in 1992) and President
of Turkmenistan since its independence in 1991, legally may
remain in office until 2002. The Democratic Party, the renamed
Communist Party, retained a monopoly on power; the Government
registered no parties during the year and continued to repress
all opposition political activities. Emphasizing stability and
gradual reform, official nation-building efforts focused on
fostering Turkmen nationalism and the glorification of
President Niyazov. The 50-member unicameral Parliament (Mejlis)
has no genuinely independent authority, and in practice the
President controls the judicial system.
The Committee on National Security (KNB) has the
responsibilities formerly held by the Soviet Committee for
State Security (KGB), namely, to ensure that the regime remains
in power through tight control of society and discouragement of
dissent. The Ministry of Internal Affairs directs the criminal
police, which work closely with the KNB on matters of national
security. Both operate with relative impunity and have been
responsible for abusing the rights of individuals as well as
enforcing the Government's policy of repressing political
opposition.
Turkmenistan is largely a desert with cattle and sheep
raising, intensive agriculture in irrigated areas, and huge oil
and gas reserves. Its economy remains dependent on central
planning mechanisms and state control, although the Government
has taken a number of small steps to make the transition to a
market economy. Agriculture, particularly cotton cultivation,
accounts for nearly half of total employment. Gas, oil and gas
derivatives, and cotton account for almost all of the country's
export revenues. The Government is proceeding with negotiations
on construction of a new gas export pipeline across the Caspian
Sea, through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey, and also is
considering lines through Iran and Afghanistan.
The Government continued to commit human rights abuses, and
the authorities in particular severely restricted political and
civil liberties. Citizens do not have the ability to change
their government peacefully. Following a commitment by
President Niyazov in May, dissident Gulgeldi Annaniyazov was
released on January 9, 1999. Security forces continued to beat
and otherwise mistreat suspects and prisoners, and prison
conditions remained poor and unsafe. Arbitrary arrest,
detention, unfair trials, and interference with citizens'
privacy remained problems. The Government completely controls
the media, censoring all newspapers and rarely permitting
independent criticism of government policy or officials. The
Government imposes restrictions on some religious groups. The
Government generally gave favored treatment to ethnic Turkmen
over minorities and to men over women. Women experience
societal discrimination, and domestic violence against women is
a problem.
The law on religion, amended most recently in 1996,
reaffirmed a number of important religious freedoms but also
tightened government control of religious groups. The
requirement that religious organizations have at least 500
Turkmen citizens as members to be registered legally has
prevented all but Sunni Muslims and Russian Orthodox Christians
from legally establishing themselves.
The Institute for Democracy and Human Rights, given a
mandate to conduct research in support of the democratization
of the government and society and to monitor the protection of
human rights, completed its second year of operation in
October. In December the Government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concerning the opening of an OSCE
office in Ashgabat in 1999.
Conclusion
The states in the South Caucasus and Central Asia are
falling behind in economic and democratic reforms and in their
respect for human rights. The choice for the United States is
either to remain passive, with a parochial and largely
ineffective aid program, or to re-engage with these countries
to advance an agenda of real economic and democratic gains we
support. Failure to engage will likely result in a downward
spiral of economic hardship and a deterioration of human rights
for populations in the region, followed most likely by the full
collapse of state structures and an ensuing loss of
sovereignty. Once state structures collapse, the choice for
populations in the region will be either anarchy or
incorporation with Russia or Iran, circumstances that offer no
hope for improved human rights, democratic opportunities or
economic prosperity.
Absent a renewed effort by the United States Government,
prospects for economic and democratic reforms in the region are
bleak. Currently, in many of these countries, major investment
in the oil and gas sectors by U.S. companies is the single
greatest form of engagement with the United States. This will
remain the case, regardless of how undemocratic or corrupt
governments in the region become. The Silk Road Strategy Act is
necessary to ensure that natural resource development will not
be the only form of engagement. While United States economic
assistance is not a requirement for economic or democratic
reforms to be undertaken in the South Caucasus and Central
Asia, targeted U.S. assistance would address areas--such as
democratic governance and human rights--that simply are not a
priority for foreign investors. For better or for worse,
without the flexibilities included in the Silk Road Strategy
Act, the dominant and even exclusive source of U.S. engagement
in countries such as Azerbaijan will remain oil and gas
interests.
If broader engagement is the choice for the United States,
as outlined by the Silk Road Strategy Act, time is of the
essence. Restive populations, increasing misery, and
exploitation by hostile powers must be addressed through a
comprehensive regional strategy. U.S. economic assistance and
diplomacy must be brought to bear to resolve regional
conflicts, to open blocked borders, to build regional economic
cooperation, to advance human rights, and to promote the
establishment of democratic governments. It is not
inconceivable that, in failing to act, the United States would
miss an opportunity to secure the independence of states that,
in the worst circumstance, could prove to be the building
blocks of a hostile, regional empire reproducing the threat and
tensions of the Cold War. The Silk Road Strategy Act is an
active step toward a much brighter alternative in the region.
Committee Action
The Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999 was introduced by
Senator Sam Brownback, Senator Gordon Smith, and eleven
cosponsors on March 10, 1999. On March 23, 1999, the Committee
on Foreign Relations debated and ordered reported the bill by a
voice vote. Prior to committee approval of the Silk Road
Strategy Act of 1999, several hearings were held in the
Committee on Foreign Relations to assess United States policy
in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
April 24, 1997
Full Committee hearing: Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty, Revisions of the Flank Agreement.
The Honorable Lynn Davis, Undersecretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security Affairs.
The Honorable Walter Slocombe, Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy.
General Gary M. Rubus, Deputy Director for
International Negotiations, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Dr. Sherman Garnett, Senior Associate. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
Dr. Paul Goble, Director of Communication Department,
Radio Free Liberty/Radio Liberty.
May 5, 1997
Subcommittee on European Affairs hearing: The Foreign
Assistance Program to the Former Soviet Union and Central
and Eastern Europe.
The Honorable Richard L. Morningstar, Coordinator,
Office of U.S. Assistance to the Newly Independent
States.
Mr. James H. Holmes, Coordinator, Office of Eastern
European Assistance.
July 21, 1997
Subcommittee on European Affairs and Subcommittee on Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs joint subcommittee hearing:
U.S. Foreign Policy Interests in the South Caucasus and
Central Asia.
The Honorable Stuart E. Eizenstat, Undersecretary of
State for Economic Affairs.
The Honorable Caspar Weinberger, Chief Executive
Officer, Forbes, Inc.
Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, USA (ret.), Director of
National Security Studies, Hudson Institute.
Dr. Paul Goble, Director, Communications Department,
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
Dr. Martha Olcott, Senior Associate, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
October 22, 1997
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade
Promotion hearing: U.S. Economic and Strategic Interests in
the Caspian Sea Region: Policies and Implications.
The Honorable Sam Brownback (R-KS), United States
Senate.
The Honorable Stuart E. Eizenstat, Undersecretary of
State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs.
The Honorable Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Senior Foreign
Policy Advisor, Baker, Donelson, Bearman and Caldwell.
Mr. Charles J. Pitman, Chairman and President, Amoco
Eurasia Petroleum Company.
February 24, 1998
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade
Promotion hearing: Implementation of U.S. Policy on
Construction of a Western Caspian Sea Oil Pipeline.
The Honorable Robert W. Gee, Assistant Secretary of
Energy for Policy and International Affairs.
Mr. Jan Kalicki, Counselor to the Department of
Commerce.
Mr. Lawrence R. Fisher, Vice President, Production
and Pipelines, Fluor-Daniel Incorporated.
The Honorable Charles William Maynes, President, The
Eurasia Foundation.
June 16, 1998
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade
Promotion hearing: Implementation of U.S. Policy on
Construction of a Western Caspian Pipeline.
The Honorable Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Canadian Affairs.
The Honorable Stephen R. Sestanovich, Special Advisor
to the Secretary of State for the New Independent
States.
The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski, Counselor, Center
for Strategic and International Studies.
Dr. Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
Mr. Van Krikorian, Chairman, Board of Directors,
Armenian Assembly.
March 3, 1999
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade
Promotion hearing: Commercial Viability of a Caspian Sea
Main Energy Pipeline.
The Honorable Richard L. Morningstar, Special Advisor
to the President and Secretary of State for Caspian
Basin Energy Diplomacy.
Mr. Edward M. Smith, President and CEO, Pipeline
Solutions Group International.
Mr. J. Michael Stinson, Senior Vice President, Conoco
Inc.
Ms. Maureen Greenwood, Advocacy Director for Europe
and the Middle East, Amnesty International.
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1--Short Title
This Act may be cited as the Silk Road Strategy Act of
1999.
Section 2--Findings
Section 3--Policy of the United States
Section 3 establishes that it shall be the policy of the
United States in the South Caucasus and Central Asia to promote
and strengthen independence, sovereignty, democratic
government, and respect for human rights; to promote tolerance,
pluralism, and understanding and counter racism and anti-
Semitism; to assist actively in the resolution of regional
conflicts and to facilitate the removal of impediments to
cross-border commerce; to promote friendly relations and
economic cooperation; to help promote market-oriented
principles and practices; to assist in the development of
infrastructure necessary for communications, transportation,
education, health, and energy and trade on an East-West axis in
order to build strong international relations and commerce
between those countries and the stable, democratic and market
oriented countries of the Euro-Atlantic Community; and, to
support United States business interests and investments in the
region.
Section 4--United States Efforts to Resolve Regional Conflicts in the
South Caucasus and Central Asia
Sense of the Congress that the President should use all
diplomatic means practicable, including the engagement of
senior United States Government officials, to press for an
equitable, fair and permanent resolution to the conflicts in
the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Section 5--Amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
The Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999 authorizes the provision
of assistance to countries in the South Caucasus and Central
Asia to promote reconciliation and recovery from regional
conflicts; to foster economic growth and development, including
the conditions necessary for regional economic cooperation; to
secure borders and implement effective controls necessary to
prevent the trafficking of illegal narcotics and the
proliferation of technology and materials related to weapons of
mass destruction; and to promote institutions of democratic
government and to create the conditions for the growth of
pluralistic societies, including religious tolerance and
respect for internationally recognized human rights.
The Silk Road Strategy Act restricts assistance to
countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia on the exact
same eligibility requirements that are otherwise currently
applied to those countries under Foreign Assistance Act of
1961. Specifically, except as provided in the waiver contained
in this section (also identical to that contained in the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), assistance may not be provided
under this chapter for the government of a country of the South
Caucasus or Central Asia if the President determines and
certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the
government of such country:
(1) is engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights;
(2) has, on or after the date of enactment of this
chapter, knowingly transferred to another country--
(A) missiles or missile technology
inconsistent with the guidelines and parameters
of the Missile Technology Control Regime; or
(B) any material, equipment, or technology
that would contribute significantly to the
ability of such country to manufacture any
weapon of mass destruction(including nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons) if the
President determines that the material,
equipment, or technology was to be used by such
country in the manufacture of such weapons;
(3) has repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism; or
(4) is prohibited from receiving such assistance by
chapter 10 of the Arms Export Control Act or section
306(a)(1) and 307 of the Chemical Biological Weapons
Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991.
Section 6--Restriction on Assistance for the Government of Azerbaijan
This section amends Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act
to provide the President with the authority to waive
restrictions on assistance to the Government of Azerbaijan if
it is in the national interest of the United States of America.
Section 7--Annual Report
The annual reporting requirements under section 104 of the
Freedom Support Act are revised to include specific analysis on
progress toward implementing the policies of the Silk Road
Strategy Act of 1999.
Section 8--Conforming Amendments
Conforming amendment to the Freedom Support Act (Public Law
102-511).
Section 9--Definitions
Precise definitions of terms used in the Silk Road Strategy
Act of 1999.
Cost Estimate
In accordance with rule XXVI, paragraph 11(a) of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides the
following estimate of the cost of this legislation prepared by
the Congressional Budget Office.
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, April 6, 1999.
Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 579, the Silk
Road Strategy Act of 1999.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Joseph C.
Whitehill.
Sincerely,
Barry B. Anderson
(for Dan L. Crippen, Director.)
Enclosure.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
S. 579--Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999
S. 579 would state U.S. policy on various economic and
political matters related to countries of the South Caucasus
and Central Asia. Although the bill would authorize several
broad categories of assistance to the region, it would not
authorize specific amounts, and the authorizations would
overlap with more general authorizations in current law.
Because the bill would not substantially expand the
Administration's authority to provide assistance, either
geographically or programmatically, CBO estimates that spending
targeted at the region would continue at the current rate--
approximately $460 million in economic assistance, security
assistance, food aid, and export financing. That spending would
be subject to appropriation. S. 579 would not affect direct
spending or receipts; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would
not apply.
The bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, and
would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal
governments.
The estimate was prepared by Joseph C. Whitehill. This
estimate was approved by Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with rule XXVI, paragraph 11(b) of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has concluded that
there is no regulatory impact from this legislation.
Changes in Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of Rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 11--SUPPORT FOR THE ECONOMIC AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE
INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 12--SUPPORT FOR THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA
SEC. 499. UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE RECONCILIATION AND
RECOVERY FROM REGIONAL CONFLICTS.
(a) Purpose of Assistance.--The purposes of assistance
under this section include--
(1) the creation of the basis for reconciliation
between belligerents;
(2) the promotion of economic development in areas
of the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia
impacted by civil conflict and war; and
(3) the encouragement of broad regional cooperation
among countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia
that have been destabilized by internal conflicts.
(b) Authorization for Assistance.--
(1) In general.--To carry out the purposes of
subsection (a), the President is authorized to provide
humanitarian assistance and economic reconstruction
assistance for the countries of the South Caucasus and
Central Asia to support the activities described in
subsection (c).
(2) Definition of humanitarian assistance.--In this
subsection, the term ``humanitarian assistance'' means
assistance to meet humanitarian needs, including needs
for food, medicine, medical supplies and equipment, and
clothing.
(c) Activities Supported.--Activities that may be supported
by assistance under subsection (b) include--
(1) providing for the humanitarian needs of victims
of the conflicts;
(2) facilitating the return of refugees and
internally displaced persons to their homes; and
(3) assisting in the reconstruction of residential
and economic infrastructure destroyed by war.
(d) Policy.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should, where appropriate, support the establishment of
neutral, multinational peacekeeping forces to implement peace
agreements reached between belligerents in the countries of the
South Caucasus and Central Asia.
SEC. 499A. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.
(a) Purpose of Assistance.--The purpose of assistance under
this section is to foster economic growth and development,
including the conditions necessary for regional economic
cooperation, in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
(b) Authorization for Assistance.--To carry out the purpose
of subsection (a), the President is authorized to provide
assistance for the countries of the South Caucasus and Central
Asia to support the activities described in subsection (c).
(c) Activities Supported.--In addition to the activities
described in section 498, activities supported by assistance
under subsection (b) should support the development of the
structures and means necessary for the growth of private sector
economies based upon market principles.
(d) Policy.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should--
(1) assist the countries of the South Caucasus and
Central Asia to develop policies, laws, and regulations
that would facilitate the ability of those countries to
join the World Trade Organization to enjoy all the
benefits of membership; and
(2) consider the establishment of zero-to-zero
tariffs between the United States and the countries of
the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
SEC. 499B. DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Purpose of Programs.--The purposes of programs under
this section include--
(1) to develop the physical infrastructure
necessary for regional cooperation among the countries
of the South Caucasus and Central Asia; and
(2) to encourage closer economic relations and to
facilitate the removal of impediments to cross-border
commerce among those countries and the United States
and other developed nations.
(b) Authorization for Programs.--To carry out the purposes
of subsection (a), the following types of programs for the
countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia may be used to
support the activities described in subsection (c):
(1) Activities by the Export-Import Bank to
complete the review process for eligibility for
financing under the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945.
(2) The provision of insurance, reinsurance,
financing, or other assistance by the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation.
(3) Assistance under section 661 of this Act
(relating to the Trade and Development Agency).
(c) Activities Supported.--Activities that may be supported
by programs under subsection (b) include promoting actively the
participation of United States companies and investors in the
planning, financing, and construction of infrastructure for
communications, transportation, including air transportation,
and energy and trade including highways, railroads, port
facilities, shipping, banking, insurance, telecommunications
networks, and gas and oil pipelines.
(d) Policy.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States representatives at the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance
Corporation, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development should encourage lending to the countries of the
South Caucasus and Central Asia to assist the development of
the physical infrastructure necessary for regional economic
cooperation.
SEC. 499C. BORDER CONTROL ASSISTANCE.
(a) Purpose of Assistance.--The purpose of assistance under
this section includes the assistance of the countries of the
South Caucasus and Central Asia to secure their borders and
implement effective controls necessary to prevent the
trafficking of illegal narcotics and the proliferation of
technology and materials related to weapons of mass destruction
(as defined in section 2332a(c)(2) of title 18, United States
Code), and to contain and inhibit transnational organized
criminal activities.
(b) Authorization for Assistance.--To carry out the purpose
of subsection (a), the President is authorized to provide
assistance to the countries of the South Caucasus and Central
Asia to support the activities described in subsection (c).
(c) Activities Supported.--Activities that may be supported
by assistance under subsection (b) include assisting those
countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia in developing
capabilities to maintain national border guards, coast guard,
and customs controls.
(d) Policy.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should encourage and assist the development of regional
military cooperation among the countries of the South Caucasus
and Central Asia through programs such as the Central Asian
Battalion and the Partnership for Peace of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.
SEC. 499D. STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY, TOLERANCE, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CIVIL SOCIETY.
(a) Purpose of Assistance.--The purpose of assistance under
this section is to promote institutions of democratic
government and to create the conditions for the growth of
pluralistic societies, including religious tolerance and
respect for internationally recognized human rights.
(b) Authorization for Assistance.--To carry out the purpose
of subsection (a), the President is authorized to provide the
following types of assistance to the countries of the South
Caucasus and Central Asia:
(1) Assistance for democracy building.
(2) Assistance for the development of
nongovernmental organizations.
(3) Assistance for development of independent
media.
(4) Assistance for the development of the rule of
law.
(5) International exchanges and advanced
professional training programs in skill areas central
to the development of civil society.
(6) Assistance to promote increased adherence to
civil and political rights under section 116(e) of this
Act.
(c) Activities Supported.--Activities that may be supported
by assistance under subsection (b) include activities that are
designed to advance progress toward the development of
democracy.
(d) Policy.--It is the sense of Congress that the Voice of
America and RFE/RL, Incorporated, should maintain high quality
broadcasting for the maximum duration possible in the native
languages of the countries of the South Caucasus and Central
Asia.
SEC. 499E. INELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE.
(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b),
assistance may not be provided under this chapter for the
government of a country of the South Caucasus or Central Asia
if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees that the government of such country--
(1) is engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights;
(2) has, on or after the date of enactment of this
chapter, knowingly transferred to another country--
(A) missiles or missile technology
inconsistent with the guidelines and parameters
of the Missile Technology Control Regime (as
defined in section 11B(c) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 950 U.S.C. App.
2410b(c); or
(B) any material, equipment, or technology
that would contribute significantly to the
ability of such country to manufacture any
weapon of mass destruction (including nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons) if the
President determines that the material,
equipment, or technology was to be used by such
country in the manufacture of such weapons;
(3) has repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism; or
(4) is prohibited from receiving such assistance by
chapter 10 of the Arms Export Control Act or section
306(a)(1) and 307 of the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (22
U.S.C. 5604(a)(1), 5605).
(b) Exceptions to Ineligibility.--
(1) Exceptions.--Assistance prohibited by
subsection (a) or any similar provision of law, other
than assistance prohibited by the provisions referred
to in paragraphs (2) and (4) of subsection (a), may be
furnished under any of the following circumstances:
(A) The President determines that
furnishing such assistance is important to the
national interest of the United States.
(B) The President determines that
furnishing such assistance will foster respect
for internationally recognized human rights and
the rule of law or the development of
institutions of democratic governance.
(C) The assistance is furnished for the
alleviation of suffering resulting from a
natural or man-made disaster.
(D) The assistance is provided under the
secondary school exchange program administered
by the United States Information Agency.
(2) Report to congress.--The President shall
immediately report to Congress any determination under
paragraph (1) (A) or (B) or any decision to provide
assistance under paragraph (1)(C).
SEC. 499F. ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES.
(a) Assistance Through Governments and Nongovernmental
Organizations.--Assistance under this chapter may be provided
to governments or through nongovernmental organizations.
(b) Use of Economic Support Funds.--Except as otherwise
provided, any funds that have been allocated under chapter 4 of
part II for assistance for the independent states of the former
Soviet Union may be used in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter.
(c) Terms and Conditions.--Assistance under this chapter
shall be provided on such terms and conditions as the President
may determine.
(d) Relationship to Other Laws.--
(1) Superseding existing law.--The authorities
contained in this chapter and in chapter 11 to provide
assistance for the countries of the South Caucasus and
Central Asia shall supersede the FREEDOM Support Act
(22 U.S.C. 5801 et seq.).
(2) Available authorities.--The authority in this
chapter to provide assistance for the countries of the
South Caucasus and Central Asia is in addition to the
authority to provide such assistance under the FREEDOM
Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5801 et seq.) or any other Act,
and the authorities applicable to the provision of
assistance under chapter 11 may be used to provide
assistance under this chapter.
SEC. 499G. DEFINITIONS.
In this chapter:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Countries of the south caucasus and central
asia.--The term ``countries of the South Caucasus and
Central Asia'' means Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan.
Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets
Support Act of 1992
FREEDOM Support Act
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 102. PROGRAM COORDINATION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND OVERSIGHT.
(a) Coordination.--The President shall designate, within
the Department of State, a coordinator who shall be responsible
for--
(1) * * *
(2) ensuring program and policy coordination among
agencies of the United States Government in carrying
out the policies set forth in [this Act] this Act and
the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999 (including the
amendments made by [this Act] this Act and the Silk
Road Strategy Act of 1999);
(3) * * *
(4) ensuring that United States assistance programs
for the independent states are consistent with [this
Act] this Act and the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999
(including the amendments made by [this Act] this Act
and the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999);
(5) * * *
* * * * * * *
SEC. 104. ANNUAL REPORT.
* * * * * * *
(3) an assessment of the effectiveness of United
States assistance in achieving its purposes; [and]
(4) an evaluation of the manner in which the
``notwithstanding'' authority provided in section
498B(j)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and
the ``notwithstanding'' authority provided in any other
provision of law with respect to assistance for the
independent states, has been used and why the use of
that authority was necessary[.]; and
(5) with respect to the countries of the South
Caucasus and Central Asia--
(A) identifying the progress of United
States foreign policy to accomplish the policy
identified in section 3 of the Silk Road
Strategy Act of 1999;
(B) evaluating the degree to which the
assistance authorized by chapter 12 of part I
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 has been
able to accomplish the purposes identified in
those sections; and
(C) recommending any additional initiatives
that should be undertaken by the United States
to implement the policy and purposes contained
in the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999.
* * * * * * *
TITLE IX--OTHER PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 907. RESTRICTION ON ASSISTANCE TO AZERBAIJAN.
(a) Restrictions.--United States assistance under this or
any other Act (other than assistance under title V of this Act)
may not be provided to the Government of Azerbaijan until the
President determines, and so reports to the Congress, that the
Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease
all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia
and Nagorno-Karabakh.
(b) Waiver.--The restriction on assistance in subsection
(a) shall not apply if the President determines, and so
certifies to Congress, that the application of the restriction
would not be in the national interests of the United States.
MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS SARBANES, KERRY, FEINGOLD, WELLSTONE, BOXER
AND TORRICELLI
While we strongly support efforts to promote peace,
democracy and prosperity in the South Caucasus and Central
Asia, it is our view that the legislation as written will not
further these objectives. Rather, by waiving important human
rights and humanitarian conditions on bilateral assistance, S.
579 contradicts fundamental U.S. values and principles, thereby
sending an unfortunate message to the countries of the region
and the entire world.
We appreciate the efforts of the sponsors of this
legislation to respond to some of the concerns raised last
year, but the changes fall short of what is needed to produce a
policy that will advance U.S. national interests and encourage
respect for international law. As reported, the bill would have
several damaging consequences.
First, the bill would grant the President authority to
waive Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act without requiring
the Government of Azerbaijan to take any steps to lift its
economic blockade against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Such a
waiver runs directly counter to the intent of the law, which is
to create pressure for ending the blockade. We believe that
Section 907 made sense when it was enacted and that it
continues to make sense today. To waive it in the absence of
any progress toward a lifting of the blockade would reward the
Government of Azerbaijan for its intransigence and remove a
major incentive for good-faith negotiation from one side in the
conflict.
For nearly a decade, the government of Azerbaijan has
prevented the transport of food, fuel, medicine, and other
vital commodities to Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, causing
immense human suffering. During winters, much of the Armenian
population has had to live without heat, electricity or water.
Schools and hospitals have been unable to function, and most
Armenian industries have been forced to close down, crippling
the economy and producing widespread unemployment and poverty.
Under current law, all Azerbaijan must do in order for
Section 907 to be lifted is to ``take demonstrable steps to
cease all blockades against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.''
This is an entirely reasonable expectation, especially given
the basic purpose of this bill, which is to promote trade and
economic cooperation between the countries of the region.
Supporters of this legislation have called Section 907 an
economic ``sanction'' and argued that such sanctions are unfair
or ineffective. Yet it should be understood that United States
foreign assistance is not an entitlement. The placing of
conditions upon government-to-government aid is both reasonable
and appropriate, for policy as well as budgetary reasons. Such
conditions on government aid are not sanctions; they are a
means for ensuring that foreign assistance serves American
values and interests. While there may be disagreements over
what the conditions should be, aid should not be provided
without regard to the recipient's policies and actions.
Even with the existing Section 907, Azerbaijan receives
tens of millions of dollars each year in U.S. aid. In FY 1999,
Azerbaijan is slated to receive $24 million in economic
assistance, bringing the total of U.S. aid to Azerbaijan to
over $100 million since it began in 1994. Annual appropriations
bills have exempted from coverage under Section 907 all
assistance through the Trade and Development Agency (TDA), the
Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), the Foreign and Commercial Service, and non-
governmental organizations, as well as programs for
humanitarian relief, democracy promotion, and nonproliferation
and disarmament. Moreover, trade with Azerbaijan is unaffected
by Section 907. The U.S. has normal trading relations with
Azerbaijan.
Our second objection to S. 579 is that it will undermine
U.S. efforts to promote respect for human rights and the
development of open and accountable government institutions.
According to the State Department's Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 1998, Turkmenistan is ``a one-party state
dominated by its president and his closest advisers'' which
``made little progress in moving from a Soviet-era
authoritarian style of government to a democratic system.''
Human Rights Watch called the year 1998 ``disastrous for human
rights in Uzbekistan,'' noting that ``in a sweeping effort to
eliminate religion as a potential source of political
opposition, the government of [President] Islam Karimov
employed mass arbitrary arrests, torture of men in custody,
religious discrimination, and harassment of independent human
rights activists and journalists.'' And the New York Times
condemned Kazakhstan's ``empty election'' last November,
calling its leader ``a thinly disguised dictator who stages
elections he has no chance of losing.''
By increasing the availability of U.S. assistance for
countries that fail to demonstrate a commitment to democratic
principles and routinely violate the basic rights of their
citizens, the legislation rewards poor performance and
eliminates incentives for improvement. It unfortunately
suggests that economic prosperity can be achieved outside the
context of political freedom and the rule of law. In our view,
human rights, democracy and free markets are goals that need to
be achieved in relationship to one another.
We are particularly concerned by language in the bill that
could have the effect of exempting recipient countries from
U.S. laws designed to promote cooperation on human rights,
counterterrorism, and nonproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. For instance, the new section 499E, which the bill
would add to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, would weaken
the standards for waiving laws such as the ban on assistance to
any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the
Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has
committed gross violations of human rights. We believe the
countries of the Caspian Sea basin should be held to the same
standards of conduct in the areas of human rights,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism as
every other country that receives foreign assistance.
Finally, S. 579 repudiates the framework established by the
Freedom Support Act, through which the United States has
encouraged the transition to democracy and free markets in the
New Independent States of the former Soviet Union. In providing
assistance under that Act, the President must take into account
the extent to which each government is committed to, and making
progress toward, such goals as the establishment of a
democratic political system and a market-based economy, respect
for internationally recognized human rights, adherence to
international law and obligations, cooperation in seeking
peaceful resolution of ethnic and regional conflicts,
implementation of responsible security and non-proliferation
policies, and protection of the international environment. All
the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia currently
receive U.S. aid under this program, amounting to $342 million
in FY 1999. The ``Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999'' exempts
eight of the thirteen former Soviet republics from the
requirements of the Freedom Support Act while authorizing new
forms of aid for them, thus creating two classes of states:
those who must comply with the Freedom Support Act, and those
who are outside it. We believe this unequal treatment, based
not on the progress made in each country but rather on its
geographic location, could have a negative effect on our
relations with Russia and the other New Independent States.
For all of these reasons, we are unable to support this
legislation. In our judgment, S. 579 represents an unwise shift
from the current, more balanced approach to the problems of the
region.