[House Report 107-454]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Union Calendar No. 269
107th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 107-454
_______________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS IN THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE
__________
SECOND REPORT
by the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
Volume 1 of 3
together with
MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS
Chapter 1--``Take Jack's Word'': The Pardons of International Fugitives
Marc Rich and Pincus Green
Chapter 2--Roger Clinton's Involvement in Lobbying for Grants of
Executive Clemency
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
May 14, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
78-264 WASHINGTON : 2002
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
------ ------ (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel
M. Scott Billingsley, Counsel
Pablo E. Carrillo, Counsel
Jason A. Foster, Counsel
Hilary J. Funk, Counsel
Matthew J. Rupp, Counsel
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief Counsel
Michael Yeager, Minority Deputy Chief Counsel
Michael Yang, Minority Counsel
?
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, May 14, 2001.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on
Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee's second
report to the 107th Congress. The committee's report is based
on a study conducted by the full committee.
Dan Burton,
Chairman.
DEDICATION
----------
This report is dedicated to the memory of M. Scott
Billingsley, counsel for the House Committee on Government
Reform from 1999-2001. Scott died unexpectedly on March 25,
2002, at the age of 31.
During his time on the Committee staff, Scott was centrally
involved in a number of important investigations. Scott made
immeasurable contributions to the Committee's work, not only
through his critical thinking and excellent writing, but also
through his professionalism and cheerful spirit, which made him
a pleasure to work with.
Scott devoted two years of his short life to the Committee
on Government Reform because he wanted to root out waste,
fraud, and abuse, and promote integrity in the federal
government. Scott's final, and most important work for the
Committee was on the investigation of President Clinton's
eleventh-hour clemency grants. Scott played a key role
investigating the pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green and
drafted much of the first chapter of this report. Scott's work
on the Rich and Green pardons was typical of all of his work
for the Committee: excellent, accurate, and thorough.
Scott Billingsley certainly has a legacy that goes far
beyond his work on this Committee. He has left behind many
individuals who will miss him dearly. His memory will be
cherished by his parents, sister, fiance, family, and countless
others whose lives he touched. However, this report should
serve as a small, but lasting, reminder of Scott Billingsley's
work and his devotion to the pursuit of truth.
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Volume 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................ 1
INTRODUCTION..................................................... 25
Chapter One--``Take Jack's Word'': The Pardons of International
Fugitives Marc Rich and Pincus Green
FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE........................................ 99
INTRODUCTION..................................................... 105
I. BACKGROUND OF MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN........................107
A. Rich and Green's Business Activities...................... 107
1. How Rich and Green Became Wealthy..................... 107
2. Marc Rich's History of Illegal and Improper Business
Dealings............................................. 108
a. Iran.............................................. 110
b. South Africa...................................... 110
c. The Soviet Union/Russia........................... 111
d. Cuba.............................................. 113
e. Libya............................................. 113
f. Iraq.............................................. 113
g. Angola............................................ 114
h. Romania........................................... 114
i. Serbia............................................ 115
B. The Criminal Charges Against Marc Rich and Pincus Green... 115
1. The Investigation of Rich and Green................... 115
2. The Indictment........................................ 120
3. Rich and Green Flee the Country....................... 121
4. The Corporate Guilty Pleas............................ 122
C. Attempts to Bring Rich and Green to Justice............... 123
1. Attempts to Extradite Rich and Green.................. 123
2. Marc Rich and Pincus Green's Attempts to Renounce
Their Citizenship.................................... 123
3. U.S. Attempts to Apprehend Rich and Green............. 125
4. 1992 Congressional Hearings........................... 127
5. Actions Taken by the U.S. Against Rich's Business
Interests............................................ 128
a. U.S. Mint Contract Cancellation................... 128
b. Suspension of Rich's Grain Dealings............... 129
c. Cuban Asset Forfeiture............................ 130
II. ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN CASE..........131
A. Attempts to Settle in the 1980s........................... 131
B. Marc Rich's Humanitarian Activities in the 1980s and 1990s 133
C. Rich Hires Jack Quinn..................................... 135
D. Quinn's Fee Arrangements.................................. 137
1. Was Quinn Expecting Payment for His Work on the
Pardon?.............................................. 137
2. Has Quinn Received Payments from Marc Rich Since the
Pardon Was Granted?.................................. 141
E. Quinn's Attempts to Settle the Case....................... 145
III.THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN PARDON PETITION..................149
A. Rich Contemplated a Pardon Early in 2000.................. 149
B. The Preparation of the Pardon Petition.................... 154
C. The Misleading Legal Arguments in the Petition............ 156
1. The Indictment of Rich Was Not Flawed................. 156
a. The Department of Energy Regulations Were Fair.... 156
b. Rich and Green Were Not Singled Out............... 157
c. Rich and Green Did Trade with the Enemy........... 159
d. Rich and Green Did Evade Federal Taxes............ 160
2. The Prosecutors Were Not ``Overzealous''.............. 162
a. The Prosecutors Negotiated with Rich and Green.... 162
b. The Rich Prosecution Was Not Tainted with Media
Attention........................................ 164
c. RICO Charges Were Fairly Brought.................. 165
D. The ``Letters of Support'' in the Petition................ 167
1. Rich Paid a Number of Individuals Who Wrote in His
Support.............................................. 167
2. Some Who Wrote Letters Were Misled About the Purpose.. 170
3. Many of the Letters Were Misrepresented to the
President............................................ 171
IV. LOBBYING FOR THE MARC RICH PARDON...............................173
A. The Marc Rich Lobbying Team............................... 173
1. Denise Rich........................................... 173
a. Denise Rich's Relationship with Marc Rich......... 173
b. Denise Rich's Relationship with President Clinton. 175
c. Denise Rich's Role in the Marc Rich Pardon Effort. 176
d. Denise Rich's Motives............................. 180
2. Beth Dozoretz......................................... 182
a. Beth Dozoretz's Relationship with Bill Clinton.... 182
b. Beth Dozoretz's Involvement in the Marc Rich
Pardon Campaign.................................. 184
c. Jack Quinn's Attempt to Keep Information About
Dozoretz from the Committee...................... 187
3. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Other Israeli
Leaders.............................................. 188
4. Elie Wiesel........................................... 192
5. King Juan Carlos...................................... 195
6. Avner Azulay.......................................... 196
7. Michael Steinhardt.................................... 196
8. Gershon Kekst......................................... 197
9. Robert Fink........................................... 206
10. Kathleen Behan....................................... 206
11. Peter Kadzik......................................... 206
B. Importance of Secrecy to the Marc Rich Team............... 207
C. Jack Quinn and Eric Holder Cut the Justice Department Out
of the Process........................................... 208
D. The Filing of the Pardon Petition......................... 214
1. December 11, 2000, Call from Ehud Barak............... 215
2. Quinn Was Likely Legally Prohibited from Lobbying the
White House.......................................... 216
E. The Lobbying Effort....................................... 218
1. Quinn's Contacts with Bruce Lindsey in Belfast........ 219
2. Peter Kadzik's Lobbying Contacts with John Podesta.... 220
3. Further Contacts Between Jack Quinn and White House
Staff................................................ 223
4. Initial Discussions Between the White House and
Justice Department................................... 225
5. January 8, 2001, Call Between President Clinton and
Ehud Barak........................................... 226
6. ``The HRC Option''.................................... 227
F. The Final Days of the Marc Rich Lobbying Effort........... 230
1. Communications Between Peter Kadzik and John Podesta.. 230
2. The January 16, 2001, White House Meeting Regarding
Rich................................................. 231
3. The Justice Department Receives Jack Quinn's January
10 Letter............................................ 233
4. Final Lobbying Contacts Leading up to January 19, 2001 233
a. Jack Quinn's January 18, 2001, Letter to the
President........................................ 235
b. Bruce Lindsey's Contacts with SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt........................................... 236
G. January 19-20, 2001....................................... 238
1. The Call Between Prime Minister Barak and President
Clinton.............................................. 238
2. Eric Holder Weighs In................................. 240
3. The January 19 Meeting Between White House Staff and
President Clinton.................................... 245
4. The President's Call to Jack Quinn.................... 247
5. The White House Informs the Justice Department of the
Decision............................................. 250
H. Aftermath of the Rich and Green Pardons................... 254
1. Eric Holder's Congratulatory Remarks.................. 254
2. The Rich Team's Effort to Deal with the Press......... 255
3. President Clinton's Column in The New York Times...... 258
V. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS
GREEN INVESTIGATION.............................................262
A. Marc Rich................................................. 262
B. Pincus Green.............................................. 263
C. Jack Quinn................................................ 263
D. Denise Rich............................................... 264
E. Beth Dozoretz............................................. 264
F. Avner Azulay.............................................. 265
G. Peter Kadzik.............................................. 265
H. Terry McAuliffe........................................... 266
Chapter Two--Roger Clinton's Involvement in Lobbying For Executive
Clemency
FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE........................................ 709
INTRODUCTION..................................................... 715
I. ROGER CLINTON'S PATTERN OF TRADING ON HIS BROTHER'S NAME........717
A. Roger Clinton's Foreign Travelers Checks and Other
Questionable Sources of Income........................... 719
B. Roger Clinton's Lobbying Regarding Cuban Travel
Restrictions............................................. 723
C. The Shakedown of John Katopodis........................... 725
II. THE GAMBINO PAROLE AND PARDON EFFORTS...........................731
A. Rosario Gambino's Involvement with Organized Crime........ 731
B. The U.S. Parole Commission's Handling of Rosario Gambino's
Case..................................................... 735
C. Roger Clinton's Involvement with the Gambino Family....... 739
1. Clinton's Contacts with the Parole Commission......... 743
a. Clinton's Initial Approach to the Parole
Commission....................................... 743
b. Clinton's Meetings with Parole Commission Staff... 747
i. December 1997 Meeting......................... 747
ii. Spring 1998 Contacts......................... 751
iii. July 1998 Meeting........................... 753
2. The FBI Investigation of Clinton's Contacts with the
Parole Commission.................................... 753
a. Clinton's Continued Attempts to Contact the
Commission....................................... 755
b. The FBI's Request to Have an Agent Pose Undercover 758
c. The FBI's Recording of Clinton's Conversations
with Thomas Kowalski............................. 760
3. Roger Clinton's Apparent Attempt to Involve the White
House in the Parole Decision......................... 764
D. Roger Clinton's Financial Relationship with the Gambinos.. 765
E. The FBI's Interview of Roger Clinton...................... 766
1. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding His Brother's
Knowledge............................................ 767
2. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding Payment from the
Gambinos............................................. 768
3. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding the Rolex Watch.. 771
F. The Efforts to Obtain Executive Clemency for Rosario
Gambino.................................................. 773
III.THE LINCECUM PARDON OFFER.......................................777
A. Garland Lincecum's Account................................ 778
1. The Initial $35,000 Payment........................... 778
2. The First Dallas Meeting.............................. 779
3. Lincecum's Attempts to Raise the Remaining Money...... 782
4. Lincecum's Payment of $200,000........................ 785
5. The Division of Lincecum's Money Among Clinton, Locke,
and Morton........................................... 786
6. Lincecum's Attempts to Receive the Pardon............. 787
B. Roger Clinton's Reaction to the Allegations............... 790
C. Dickey Morton's and George Locke's Reactions to the
Allegations.............................................. 792
D. Analysis.................................................. 795
IV. OTHER PARDON CANDIDATES.........................................799
A. Dan Lasater and George Locke.............................. 799
B. J.T. Lundy................................................ 802
C. Blume Loe................................................. 807
D. Rita Lavelle.............................................. 809
E. John Ballis............................................... 811
F. Stephen Griggs............................................ 815
G. Phillip Young............................................. 819
H. Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan................................... 822
I. Mitchell Wood............................................. 823
J. Mark St. Pe............................................... 825
K. William D. McCord......................................... 826
V. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE ROGER CLINTON
INVESTIGATION...................................................827
A. Roger Clinton............................................. 827
B. Tommaso Gambino........................................... 828
C. Lisa Gambino.............................................. 828
D. Victor Crawford and Kathy Vieth........................... 828
E. George Locke.............................................. 829
F. Dickey Morton............................................. 829
G. Richard Cayce............................................. 829
H. J.T. Lundy................................................ 829
I. Robert Lundy.............................................. 829
J. Chief Carl Griggs......................................... 830
K. Blume Loe and Cynthia Goosen.............................. 830
L. Bruce Lindsey............................................. 830
M. Meridith Cabe............................................. 830
N. Department of Justice..................................... 831
O. The White House........................................... 831
Volume 2
Chapter Three--Hugh Rodham's Role in Lobbying for Grants of Executive
Clemency
FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE........................................ 1261
INTRODUCTION..................................................... 1267
I. THE CARLOS VIGNALI COMMUTATION.................................1267
A. The Case Against Carlos Vignali........................... 1267
B. Vignali's Efforts to Obtain Executive Clemency............ 1276
1. Initial Efforts to Reduce Vignali's Sentence.......... 1276
a. Contacts with Prosecutors in Minnesota............ 1276
b. Vignali's Appeal.................................. 1277
c. Letters to the White House and Justice Department. 1277
2. Vignali's Clemency Petition........................... 1280
3. Supporters of Vignali's Clemency Petition............. 1283
a. Letters of Support from Prominent California
Politicians...................................... 1284
i. Congressman Xavier Becerra.................... 1284
ii. Congressman Esteban Torres................... 1286
iii. State Senator Richard Polanco............... 1286
iv. Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria Molina.. 1287
v. Los Angeles City Councilmember Mike Hernandez. 1288
vi. Cardinal Roger Mahony........................ 1289
b. Support from Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca.. 1290
i. Sheriff Baca's Relationship with the Vignalis. 1290
ii. Sheriff Baca's Involvement in the Vignali
Clemency Effort.............................. 1292
iii. Conclusion.................................. 1293
c. Support from U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas..... 1295
i. Mayorkas' Initial Exposure to the Vignali
Matter....................................... 1296
ii. Mayorkas Calls the White House............... 1297
iii. Conclusion.................................. 1299
4. California Law Enforcement and Political Officials
Supported Vignali's Clemency Petition Despite Serious
Allegations Against Horacio and Carlos Vignali....... 1301
a. There Were Extensive Allegations of Drug
Trafficking Against Both Horacio and Carlos
Vignali.......................................... 1301
b. The Extensive Allegations Against Horacio and
Carlos Vignali Were Never Considered by Sheriff
Baca, U.S. Attorney Mayorkas, or the Clinton
White House...................................... 1304
C. The White House's Review of the Vignali Clemency Request.. 1307
1. Hugh Rodham's Hiring.................................. 1307
2. Hugh Rodham's Initial Approach to the White House..... 1309
3. The Justice Department's Input on the Vignali Case.... 1311
4. The Final Decision on the Vignali Commutation......... 1314
a. Contacts Between the White House and Interested
Parties.......................................... 1314
b. Contacts Between the White House and Hugh Rodham.. 1317
c. Hugh Rodham's Invocation of First Lady Hillary
Clinton.......................................... 1318
d. The President's Decision to Grant the Commutation. 1319
5. The White House Has No Justification for the Vignali
Commutation.......................................... 1320
D. The Aftermath of the Vignali Commutation.................. 1324
1. The Response of Hugh Rodham........................... 1324
2. The Florida Bar's ``Investigation'' of Hugh Rodham.... 1325
3. The Message Sent by the Vignali Commutation........... 1327
II. THE PARDON OF A. GLENN BRASWELL................................1328
A. Braswell's History of Misconduct.......................... 1329
B. Consideration of the Braswell Pardon by the Clinton White
House.................................................... 1332
III.HUGH RODHAM'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN CLEMENCY FOR THE LUMS..........1336
A. Background on Gene and Nora Lum........................... 1336
B. Hugh Rodham Approaches the White House About the
Possibility of a Pardon for the Lums..................... 1337
IV. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE HUGH RODHAM
INVESTIGATION..................................................1339
A. Hugh Rodham............................................... 1339
B. Horacio and Carlos Vignali................................ 1340
C. James Casso............................................... 1340
D. Glenn Braswell............................................ 1341
E. Kendall Coffey............................................ 1341
F. Gene and Nora Lum......................................... 1341
G. Nicole Lum................................................ 1341
Chapter Four--Tony Rodham's Role in Lobbying for Grants of Executive
Clemency
FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE........................................ 1589
INTRODUCTION..................................................... 1590
I. EDGAR AND VONNA JO GREGORY.....................................1591
A. Background................................................ 1591
B. Tony Rodham's Relationship with the Gregorys.............. 1592
C. Tony Rodham's Efforts to Help the Gregorys Obtain Pardons. 1595
D. Deliberations by the Administration....................... 1598
E. Conclusion................................................ 1600
II. FERNANDO FUENTES COBA..........................................1602
A. Background on Fernando Fuentes Coba....................... 1602
B. The Pardon Attorney Refuses to Process Fuentes' Clemency
Petition................................................. 1604
C. Tony Rodham's Attempt to Become Involved in the Fuentes'
Clemency Effort.......................................... 1605
D. Tony Rodham's Representations to Mannerud Were Fraudulent. 1608
Chapter Five--The Grant of Clemency to Drug Money Launderer Harvey
Weinig
FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE........................................ 1709
I. BACKGROUND.....................................................1712
A. Weinig and His Co-Conspirators............................ 1712
B. The Money Laundering Operation............................ 1713
C. Weinig and His Co-Conspirators Run Afoul of the Colombian
Cocaine Cartel........................................... 1714
D. Weinig's Prosecution and Sentencing....................... 1718
II. WEINIG'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY..................1722
A. Weinig Hires Reid Weingarten to Lobby for Clemency........ 1722
B. Weinig's Wife Seeks Support for His Clemency Petition..... 1725
C. Weinig's Wife Obtains Support from Individuals with Ties
to the Administration.................................... 1726
III.THE WHITE HOUSE'S REVIEW OF WEINIG'S COMMUTATION REQUEST.......1729
A. The Justice Department's Input in the Weinig Clemency
Matter................................................... 1729
1. The U.S. Attorney Strongly Objected to Commuting
Weinig's Sentence.................................... 1729
2. The Pardon Attorney Objected to Commuting Weinig's
Sentence............................................. 1730
B. The White House's Deliberations........................... 1732
C. The White House Had No Justification for the Weinig
Commutation.............................................. 1733
D. Aftermath of the Weinig Commutation....................... 1736
Volume 3
Appendices
Appendix I.--Committee correspondence............................ 2079
Appendix II.--Committee subpoenas................................ 2577
Appendix III.--Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardon petition........ 2967
Views
Minority views of Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon.
Major R. Owens, Hon. Edolphus Towns, Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski,
Hon. Patsy T. Mink, Hon. Bernard Sanders, Hon. Eleanor Holmes
Norton, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich, Hon.
Danny K. Davis, Hon. Thomas H. Allen, Hon. Janice D.
Schakowsky, and Hon. Diane E. Watson........................... 3292
Additional views of Hon. Dan Burton.............................. 3389
Union Calendar No. 269
107th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 107-454
======================================================================
JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS IN THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE
_______
May 14, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Burton, from the Committee on Government Reform submitted the
following
SECOND REPORT
On March 14, 2002, the Committee on Government Reform
approved and adopted a report entitled ``Justice Undone:
Clemency Decisions in the Clinton White House.'' The chairman
was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE PARDONS OF MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN
Marc Rich and Pincus Green have a history of illegal and
corrupt business dealings contrary to the security interests of
the United States.
Rich and Green have had extensive trade with
terrorist states and other enemies of the United States.
Despite clear legal restrictions on such trade, Rich and Green
have engaged in commodities trading with Iraq, Iran, Cuba, and
other rogue states which have sponsored terrorist acts. By
engaging in these activities, Marc Rich and Pincus Green
demonstrated contempt for American laws, as well as the well-
being of Americans who were harmed or threatened by these
states.
The Central Intelligence Agency provided the
following declassified information about Marc Rich to the
Committee:
If President Clinton had checked with the CIA, he would
have learned that Marc Rich had been the subject of
inquiries by various foreign government liaison
services and domestic government agencies regarding
their ongoing investigations of criminal activity.
In addition, President Clinton would have received
information worthy of his consideration in making his
decision on the pardon. This information cannot be
declassified.
Marc Rich and Pincus Green were guilty of serious crimes and
showed contempt for the American justice system.
Marc Rich and Pincus Green attempted to obstruct the
criminal investigation of them in every way imaginable,
including attempting to smuggle subpoenaed documents out of the
country. Rich and Green's tactics resulted in a record-setting
contempt fine against them, totaling $21 million. Despite these
tactics, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York was able to indict Marc Rich and Pincus Green on 51 counts
of illegal activity, including tax evasion, mail fraud, wire
fraud, and racketeering. The evidence against them was
overwhelming.
Because of the strength of the case against them,
Marc Rich and Pincus Green fled the country rather than face
trial. Rich's own lawyer told him that by fleeing the country,
Rich had ``spit on the American flag'' and that ``whatever you
get, you deserve.'' For the 17 years leading up to his pardon,
Marc Rich was one of America's 10 most wanted international
fugitives. Although Jack Quinn, Rich's attorney, argued that
Rich did not flee the United States to avoid prosecution,
Rich's ex-wife refuted this view, stating that Rich told her
that ``I'm having tax problems with the government . . . and I
think that we are going to have to leave.''
In order to avoid extradition or apprehension by
United States law enforcement, Marc Rich and Pincus Green
attempted to renounce their United States citizenship. While
this attempt was rejected by the United States, it demonstrated
that Rich and Green had no loyalty to the United States and
viewed their citizenship as a liability to be discarded at
will.
Rich and Green's crimes were so serious that for seventeen
years, the U.S. government devoted considerable resources to
apprehending them and closing down their business activities.
Rich and Green were such high-profile fugitives that
on a number of occasions in the 1980s and 1990s, the United
States Marshals Service attempted to arrest them in various
foreign countries. A number of countries from the United
Kingdom to Russia attempted to assist the United States in
these efforts. The pardons of Rich and Green have sent a
message that individuals can go from the FBI's most wanted list
to a Presidential pardon if they spend money and have the
proper connections. This message undermines U.S. efforts to
apprehend fugitives abroad.
Rich and Green were such high-profile fugitives that
in 1991, the Government Reform Committee, under Democratic
leadership, held a number of hearings, and issued two reports
about the government's efforts to apprehend Rich and Green. At
that time, Democrats and Republicans in Congress took the Bush
Administration to task for not being aggressive enough in
hunting down Rich and Green, or shutting down their business
interests in the U.S.
While Rich and Green were fugitives from justice,
the American government took a number of actions against their
interests in the U.S. The federal government seized Rich's
assets and shut down his trade in metals and grain with the
government.
The United States government repeatedly tried to reach a plea
agreement with Rich and Green.
For a number of years after Rich and Green fled the
country, the U.S. government attempted to negotiate a plea
bargain to settle the case. The government made a number of
concessions in an attempt to reach a deal, but all offers were
rebuffed by Rich and Green, who would not agree to any deal
that resulted in jail time. While lobbying for a pardon, Jack
Quinn and Rich's other lawyers claimed that the Justice
Department had not even negotiated with Rich, and therefore,
that a pardon was justified. Quinn and the other lawyers were
misleading the White House when they made these claims.
Jack Quinn misled the White House about the Rich case and
attempted to mislead the Committee and the public regarding his
work for Marc Rich.
Marc Rich hired Jack Quinn after a recommendation
from Eric Holder. After numerous failed attempts to have his
case settled, Marc Rich hired Jack Quinn to represent him.
Quinn was hired after a recommendation from Deputy Attorney
General Eric Holder. Gershon Kekst, who worked for Marc Rich on
the pardon matter, asked Holder for a recommendation of how to
settle a criminal matter with the Justice Department. Holder
recommended that he hire a Washington lawyer ``who knows the
process, he comes to me, and we work it out.'' Holder then
explicitly recommended the hiring of Jack Quinn. While Holder
did not know that Kekst was referring to Marc Rich, it suggests
that Holder was favorably disposed to Jack Quinn, and would be
very receptive to arguments made by Quinn, no matter how
baseless they were.
Marc Rich was going to pay Jack Quinn for his work
on the pardon. After the Marc Rich pardon was granted, Jack
Quinn claimed that he was not being paid by Rich for his work
on the pardon and that he expected no future payment for his
work on the pardon. However, the Committee has uncovered
evidence that Robert Fink, a lawyer close to Marc Rich, had
discussions with Rich and Quinn about paying Quinn for his work
on the Rich pardon. Documents which Quinn and Fink withheld
from the Committee for over a year, and which were produced
only after a federal judge ordered them produced to a grand
jury, shed further light on the contemplated payment of Quinn.
These documents indicate that Quinn raised the question of his
``status'' with Rich and asked that Rich pay him a $50,000 per
month retainer. The Committee attempted to interview Quinn
about these documents, but Quinn refused to meet with Committee
staff.
Jack Quinn may have been attempting to receive money
from Marc Rich after the pardons were granted. At the
Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing, Quinn pledged that ``I
will not bill [Rich], and I will not accept any further
compensation for work done on the pardon.'' This pledge
surprised Rich's lawyer, who expected that Rich would be paying
Quinn for his work. Indeed, records just produced to the
Committee indicate that Quinn may have been attempting to
negotiate some payment from Marc Rich shortly after he pledged
that he would not take additional money for his work. A March
5, 2001, e-mail from Quinn to Rich states, ``If you are
agreeable, and I hope you are, I need to fax to you in the next
few days a new retainer agreement.'' This e-mail raises the
possibility that Quinn has been attempting to obtain payments
from Rich, in possible violation of his pledge to the
Committee. The Committee attempted to interview Quinn about
this matter, but he refused.
Jack Quinn's work on the Rich pardon was in apparent
violation of Executive Order 12834. That executive order was
enacted as part of President Clinton's promise to create ``the
most ethical administration in history,'' and it prohibited
former executive branch employees from lobbying their former
executive branch agencies within five years of their departure.
Quinn has claimed that his work on the Rich pardon came within
an exception for ``communicating . . . with regard to a . . .
criminal . . . law enforcement inquiry, investigation or
proceeding[.]'' However, this exception was clearly intended to
apply to appearances before courts, not lobbying the White
House for a pardon. The ``revolving door'' lobbying ban was
intended to apply exactly to cases like this, where a former
White House Counsel could come back and lobby the President to
take an action that had no constitutional limits on it, largely
based on the President's personal trust for that former
staffer.
The pardon petition compiled by Jack Quinn and the
other Marc Rich lawyers was highly misleading. Most of the
arguments used by Jack Quinn to justify the Rich and Green
pardons were false and misleading. These arguments could have
been completely refuted if anyone in the White House had sought
out any of the prosecutors familiar with the Rich case.
The ``letters of support'' in the pardon petition
were used in a misleading manner. Another key element of the
Rich pardon petition was a number of letters of support for
Rich and Green from prominent Americans and Israelis. Rich and
Green used these letters to try to show that their humanitarian
activities justified their pardons. However, many of these
letters were obtained under false pretenses, and the writers of
the letters were not told that they were being used to obtain a
Presidential pardon. In addition, a number of individuals who
wrote in support of Rich and Green received large amounts of
money from them.
Marc Rich and Pincus Green used a number of different
individuals with close personal relationships with President
Clinton and his staff to lobby regarding the pardon.
The role of Denise Rich. Denise Rich played a key
role in obtaining the Rich and Green pardons. Denise Rich had a
close relationship with President Clinton, which was based in
part on her role as a large-scale contributor to Democratic
causes and the Clinton library, and in part on her extensive
personal contacts with President Clinton. The $450,000 given by
Denise Rich to the Clinton Library was an early and large
contribution. Denise Rich used her relationship with President
Clinton to lobby for the Marc Rich pardon on a number of
occasions. She has refused to cooperate with the Committee,
invoking her Fifth Amendment rights rather than answer
questions about her role in the pardon.
The role of Beth Dozoretz. Beth Dozoretz, another
close friend of President Clinton, played a key role in
obtaining the Rich pardon. Like Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz had
a relationship with President Clinton built on personal ties
and political fundraising. Dozoretz has raised and contributed
millions of dollars for the Democratic party and has pledged to
raise an additional million dollars for the Clinton library.
Beth Dozoretz also has close relationships with Denise Rich and
Jack Quinn. Dozoretz used her close relationship with President
Clinton to lobby for the Rich pardon. Because Dozoretz has
invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination,
the Committee is unable to conclude whether or not Dozoretz
made any linkage between contributions to the DNC or the
Clinton library and the granting of the Rich pardon.
The role of Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Barak spoke to President Clinton three times
about the Rich pardon. In his public statements about the Rich
pardon, President Clinton has pointed to these conversations
with Prime Minister Barak as one of the primary reasons he
granted the pardon. However an examination of the transcripts
of the calls shows that Barak did not make a particularly
impassioned plea for Rich. Therefore, it appears that the
President may be attempting to use Prime Minister Barak's
interest in the Rich matter as a cover for his own motivations
for granting the Rich pardon.
Barak had met with Rich personally and told Clinton
that the Rich pardon ``could be important . . . not just
financially, but he helped Mossad on more than one case.''
Barak's statement raises the possibility that either Barak or
Clinton acted on the Rich matter because of some promise of
future financial return.
Eric Holder and Jack Quinn worked together to cut the Justice
Department out of the decisionmaking process. Holder's decision
to support the pardon had a critical impact.
Jack Quinn and Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder
worked together to ensure that the Justice Department,
especially the prosecutors of the Southern District of New
York, did not have an opportunity to express an opinion on the
Rich pardon before it was granted. The evidence amassed by the
Committee indicates that Holder advised Quinn to file the Rich
pardon petition with the White House, and leave the Justice
Department out of the process. One e-mail produced to the
Committee suggests that Holder told Quinn to ``go straight to
wh'' and that the ``timing is good.'' The evidence also
indicates that Holder failed to inform the prosecutors under
him that the Rich pardon was under consideration, despite the
fact that he was aware of the pardon effort for almost two
months before it was granted.
Eric Holder's support of the Rich pardon played a
critical role in the success of the pardon effort. Holder
informed the White House that he was ``neutral, leaning towards
favorable'' on the Rich pardon, even though he knew that Rich
was a fugitive from justice and that Justice Department
prosecutors viewed Rich with such contempt that they would no
longer meet with his lawyers. Holder has failed to offer any
credible justification for his support of the Rich pardon,
leading the Committee to believe that Holder had other
motivations for his decision, which he has failed to share with
the Committee.
Eric Holder was seeking Jack Quinn's support to be
appointed as Attorney General in a potential Gore
Administration, and this may have affected Holder's judgment in
the Rich matter. On several occasions, Holder sought out
Quinn's endorsement to be appointed as Attorney General if Al
Gore were to win the November 2000 election. Quinn was a Gore
confidant whose endorsement would carry great weight. Holder's
initial help to Quinn in the Rich matter predated the Supreme
Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, and accordingly, Holder had
some legitimate prospect of being appointed Attorney General
when he was helping Quinn keep the Rich matter from the Justice
Department's scrutiny. While Holder denies that his desire to
be appointed Attorney General had anything to do with his
actions in the Rich matter, it provides a much clearer and more
believable motivation than any offered by Holder to date.
President Clinton made his decision knowing almost nothing
about the Rich case, making a number of mistaken assumptions,
and reaching false conclusions.
The White House never consulted with the prosecutors
in the Southern District of New York regarding the Rich case.
As a result, the White House staff was never able to refute the
false and misleading arguments made in the Marc Rich pardon
petition.
Every White House staff member who was working on
the Rich pardon opposed it. However, because they failed to do
the necessary background research on the Rich case, they were
unable to refute the arguments made by Jack Quinn.
President Clinton was misled by Jack Quinn in their
negotiations regarding the Rich pardon. Late in the evening of
January 19, 2001, President Clinton and Jack Quinn had a
telephone discussion regarding the Rich pardon. During this
conversation, Quinn repeated his usual misleading arguments
about the Rich case. Quinn also offered to make his clients
subject to civil liability for their actions. In furtherance of
this offer, Quinn agreed to waive all statute of limitations
and other defenses, which Rich and Green would have as a result
of their fugitivity. President Clinton has cited this waiver as
a key factor in his decision to grant the pardons. However, if
President Clinton or his staff had done even cursory legal
research, they would have understood that this was a hollow,
meaningless deal. First, Quinn agreed to waive defenses that
Rich and Green did not have. It is basic legal doctrine that
fugitivity tolls the statute of limitations. Second, Rich and
Green likely do not face any civil liability for their crimes,
since those fines were already paid by their companies. Third,
Rich and Green had been willing to pay $100 million to settle
their case for years. A fine, even a large one, would have had
no impact on Rich and Green, and it would merely stand for the
proposition that the U.S. justice system is for sale.
When the White House did finally provide the names
of Marc Rich and Pincus Green for a Justice Department
background check in the middle of the night on January 19,
2001, the check turned up new, troubling information which was
disregarded by President Clinton. When the White House
requested the Justice Department to perform a computer
background check on Rich and Green prior to granting the
pardons, the check came back with information that they were
wanted for ``arms trading.'' This was new information for all
of the White House staff, and it raised serious questions among
them as to whether the pardons should be granted. However, the
only step the White House took to check on this allegation was
to call Jack Quinn. Quinn predictably denied that his clients
were involved in arms trading. Faced with this conflicting
information about Rich and Green, President Clinton instructed
his staff to ``take Jack's word'' and issue the pardons.
President Clinton has failed to offer a full accounting for his
decision to issue the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardons.
President Clinton has failed to answer any questions
about the Rich and Green pardons. The few statements that he
has issued have been misleading, incomplete, and raised more
questions than they answered. Given his complete failure to
explain the pardons, the Committee is left with serious
unanswered questions regarding President Clinton's motives.
ROGER CLINTON'S EFFORTS TO LOBBY FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
Roger Clinton engaged in a systematic effort to trade on his
brother's name during the Clinton Administration.
President Clinton encouraged Roger Clinton to
capitalize on their relationship. At the beginning of his
second term, President Clinton instructed Roger Clinton to use
his connections to the Administration to gain financial
advantage. According to the lawyer for former Arkansas State
Senator George Locke: ``Roger related that Bill Clinton had
instructed him that since this was his last term in office,
Roger should find a way to make a living and use his
relationship with the President to his advantage.'' By
suggesting that Roger Clinton exploit his name, Bill Clinton
encouraged the conduct described in this chapter. Roger Clinton
apparently took this advice to heart, telling one person from
whom he solicited money that he and the President ``had only
four years to get things done'' and that they did not care
``about ethics or what appearances were.''
Roger Clinton received substantial sums of money
from foreign governments solely because he was the President's
brother. When the FBI interviewed him, Roger Clinton admitted
that since the beginning of the Clinton Administration, he had
received substantial sums of money from foreign governments.
Clinton told the FBI that ``he knows he receives these
invitations [to make paid appearances in foreign countries]
strictly because he is the First Brother of the President of
the United States.'' Clinton also informed the FBI that in
addition to receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars for
musical performances from foreign governments, he also received
money for President Clinton from foreign governments. Roger
Clinton told the FBI that he had to be instructed repeatedly by
the President or White House staff that the President was not
permitted to receive cash from foreign governments.
Roger Clinton received at least $335,000 in
unexplained travelers checks, many of which were purchased
overseas and likely imported illegally. The Committee uncovered
at least $335,000 in travelers checks deposited in Roger
Clinton's bank account. Most of these travelers checks
originated overseas, largely from Taiwan, South Korea, and
Venezuela. The travelers checks were not restrictively endorsed
by the purchaser but were instead given to Roger Clinton blank.
This method of transferring large sums of money to Roger
Clinton appears designed to conceal the fact that the funds
originated overseas and probably violated criminal statutes
requiring reports of the importation of monetary instruments.
Roger Clinton has refused to provide the Committee with any
explanation of why he received these funds. These suspicious
transactions require a complete and thorough investigation by
law enforcement authorities, especially in light of his
admissions to the FBI about receiving money from foreign
governments.
Roger Clinton likely violated federal law by failing
to register as required under the Lobbying Disclosure Act. One
company paid Roger Clinton $30,000 to lobby President Clinton
and others to loosen government restrictions on travel to Cuba.
Although his activity appears to meet the criteria outlined in
the statute for those required to disclose their contacts with
covered executive branch officials, Roger Clinton did not
register as a lobbyist and did not disclose his paid lobbying
contacts with his brother. His failure to register, therefore,
needs to be investigated carefully and completely by the
Department of Justice.
Roger Clinton participated in a plot to obtain a
$35,000 per month contract in exchange for delivering a cabinet
secretary to a speaking event. The FBI briefly investigated
Roger Clinton's involvement in a scheme with Arkansas lawyer
Larry Wallace to pressure John Katopodis, promoter of an
Alabama airport project. Clinton and Wallace attempted to
obtain a $35,000 per month contract in exchange for Clinton's
promise to ensure that Secretary of Transportation Rodney
Slater would speak at a conference sponsored by Katopodis'
organization of local governments. When Katopodis refused to
pay and Slater subsequently refused to acknowledge the
invitation, Katopodis suspected that Clinton and Wallace were
to blame. Wallace had told him that his project would remain at
a standstill until Katopodis ``showed him the money.''
Roger Clinton lobbied for the release from prison of Rosario
Gambino, a notorious heroin dealer and organized crime figure.
Rosario Gambino was a major drug trafficker. Rosario
Gambino has been convicted in the United States and Italy of
heroin trafficking. Before being sentenced to 45 years in
federal prison, Gambino associated with known members of
organized crime both in Italy and the United States. His
associates have described him as a member of the Sicilian
Mafia. When his brothers were convicted of racketeering,
murder, illegal gambling, loan sharking, and heroin trafficking
in 1994, witnesses described them as ``the main link between
Mafia heroin traffickers in Sicily and the American Mafia.''
Roger Clinton received at least $50,000 from the
Gambino family, and he expected to receive more if he succeeded
in getting Rosario Gambino out of prison. Tommaso ``Tommy''
Gambino, the son of Rosario Gambino, approached Roger Clinton
to help win the release of Rosario Gambino from prison. Tommy
Gambino promised Roger Clinton a substantial financial reward
if he was successful. Even though he never was successful,
Tommy Gambino provided Roger Clinton with $50,000, a gold Rolex
watch, and an undisclosed amount of ``expense money.''
Roger Clinton attempted to use his relationship to
the President to influence the decisionmaking of the United
States Parole Commission (``USPC''). Roger Clinton lobbied the
Parole Commission to grant parole to Gambino. While lobbying
Parole Commission staff, Roger Clinton informed them that
President Clinton was aware of his efforts on behalf of Rosario
Gambino and that the President had suggested that he contact
the Parole Commission members directly. Although the Commission
staff tried to insulate the Commissioners from undue influence,
Roger Clinton clearly attempted to use his relationship to the
President to influence the Commission improperly and win
Gambino's release.
The Chief of Staff of the Parole Commission hindered
the FBI's investigation. In 1998, the FBI began investigating
Roger Clinton's contacts with the Parole Commission. However,
it met resistance from Marie Ragghianti, the Chief of Staff of
the Parole Commission. Ragghianti, who had participated in
meetings with Roger Clinton on the Gambino case, objected to
the FBI investigation and successfully halted an FBI plan to
have an undercover agent meet with Clinton posing as a Parole
Commission staffer. She also attempted to keep the FBI from
recording a meeting between Roger Clinton and a Parole
Commission staffer. Ragghianti's efforts may have kept the FBI
from reaching a full understanding of Roger Clinton's
involvement in the Gambino case.
Roger Clinton lied to FBI agents investigating his
contacts with the Parole Commission and his relationship with
the Gambino family. When interviewed by the FBI in 1999, Roger
Clinton said that he had never represented to anyone at the
Parole Commission that the President was aware of his contacts
with the Commission on behalf of Rosario Gambino. This self-
serving claim is contradicted by contemporaneous, written
memoranda detailing Clinton's contacts as well as by the vivid
and credible recollections of Parole Commission staff. Clinton
also lied about the purpose of a $50,000 check from the
Gambinos, which he deposited on the day of the FBI's interview.
While it is unclear whether he deposited the check before or
after the interview, Clinton told the agents that Tommy Gambino
had offered to loan him money for a down payment on his house.
He repeated this explanation to the media when news of the
money became public in 2001. However, after reviewing both
Clinton's and Gambino's bank records, the Committee has found
no evidence that Clinton used the $50,000 for a down payment or
that he ever repaid any of the money. Accordingly, his claim to
the FBI that the money was merely a loan is false. During his
interview, Clinton also told the FBI agents three separate and
contradictory stories in response to questions about his
receipt of a Rolex watch from Tommy Gambino before finally
producing a Rolex to the agents and claiming he had bought it
in Tijuana, Mexico.
Roger Clinton apparently lobbied the White House to
grant a commutation to Rosario Gambino. In the last days of the
Clinton Administration--after Roger Clinton had failed to win
parole for Rosario Gambino and after he had received a Rolex
watch and $50,000 from the Gambino family--the White House
received a petition for commutation for Rosario Gambino.
Documents indicate that the White House lawyer responsible for
clemency matters requested a criminal background check on
Gambino, which is normally done when some serious consideration
is being given to a grant of clemency. The obvious and logical
inference that explains how the Gambino petition garnered that
level of attention at the White House is that Roger Clinton was
pushing for it. Because key Clinton White House staff have
refused to answer questions about this matter, it is unknown
whether Roger Clinton hand-delivered the Gambino petition as he
did with others or whether he brought it to the attention of
the White House some other way. Although the President did not
ultimately grant clemency to Gambino, the circumstances
surrounding the consideration of his petition are nevertheless
suspect. The fact that granting clemency to a mobster and
confirmed criminal like Gambino was considered at all is
disturbing enough, but the reason it was considered is even
more offensive. The Gambino family was apparently able to
purchase access to the parole and clemency processes with cash
payments and expensive gifts to the brother of the President of
the United States. Moreover, despite an FBI investigation of
the matter, the Justice Department has, to date, been unwilling
or unable to prosecute Clinton for any of his activities.
Roger Clinton received a substantial portion of $225,000 that
was swindled from the Lincecum family in Clinton's name with
the promise of a pardon that never came.
The Lincecum family paid $225,000 to obtain a pardon
for Garland Lincecum. In 1998, Garland Lincecum, a convicted
felon, was informed that he could purchase a presidential
pardon for $300,000. Lincecum was told that Arkansas
businessmen Dickey Morton and George Locke, who had a close
relationship with Roger Clinton, could obtain the pardon.
Lincecum borrowed $225,000 from his mother and brother and
claims that a business associate paid another $70,000 to Morton
and Locke for his pardon. The money he borrowed from his family
constituted their life savings and means of support in
retirement.
Roger Clinton received at least $43,500 in proceeds
from the Lincecums' payments to Morton and Locke. Dickey
Morton, George Locke, and Roger Clinton divided the funds among
themselves with Roger Clinton receiving a total of $25,500 in
checks and $18,000 in cash. The Lincecums paid the checks to a
company called CLM, which they were told stands for Clinton,
Locke, and Morton. Dickey Morton then disbursed the funds from
the company's bank account to Clinton, Locke, and himself.
Roger Clinton has falsely denied any relationship with CLM
while offering no explanation of why he received this
substantial share of an elderly woman's retirement savings
through CLM.
Roger Clinton may have been involved in a scheme to
defraud the Lincecums. Garland Lincecum never received a
pardon, and there is no evidence that Dickey Morton, George
Locke, or Roger Clinton ever submitted Lincecum's name to the
Justice Department or White House for consideration for a
pardon. Therefore, it appears that the Lincecums were the
victims of a scam perpetrated by Morton, Locke, and perhaps
Roger Clinton as well.
Roger Clinton may have been involved in lobbying for as many as
13 other pardons and commutations.
Roger Clinton publicly admitted involvement in six
clemency efforts, but the evidence connects him to many more.
Roger Clinton told the media that he had asked for pardons for
approximately six close friends and that he did so because of
concern for them and not for any personal gain. For example,
Roger Clinton lobbied for pardons for George Locke and Dan
Lasater, two associates from Arkansas who were convicted of
drug offenses together with Clinton himself in the 1980s.
However, the Committee has obtained evidence connecting Clinton
to many more pardon seekers. Some of the cases involve people
who were not his personal friends and some involve
solicitations or offers of money and lucrative business
opportunities in exchange for his ability to place a clemency
petition in front of the President.
Roger Clinton was asked to lobby for a pardon for
horse breeder J.T. Lundy in exchange for secretly sharing
profits in a lucrative business venture. Lundy promised Clinton
a share of a the profits from a Venezuelan coal deal in
exchange for Clinton's help in obtaining a pardon for him.
Lundy suggested a scheme whereby the payments to Clinton could
be concealed by placing his share of the profits in Dan
Lasater's name. Lasater, who owned a 20 percent interest in the
venture, discussed the possibility of a pardon for Lundy with
Roger Clinton.
Roger Clinton delivered the pardon petition of
former Reagan EPA official Rita Lavelle to the White House.
According to Lavelle, an intermediary for Roger Clinton asked
her for a $30,000 fee for him to hand-carry her petition to the
President. Lavelle responded that she could not afford to pay
any money, but she said Clinton agreed to deliver the petition
anyway. On the last night of the Clinton presidency, Roger
Clinton asked Lavelle, ``do you have $100,000 to get this
through?'' Being bankrupt, however, Lavelle laughed at the
question. She did not pay Clinton any money and did not receive
a pardon.
Roger Clinton was asked to lobby for a pardon for
Houston real estate developer John Ballis, and Ballis' petition
was seriously considered at the White House. After being
convicted of S&L fraud, Ballis married a former employee of Dan
Lasater and friend of Roger Clinton. Through his wife's
connection, Ballis sought Roger Clinton's help. Clinton first
lobbied for Ballis before the U.S. Parole Commission, sometimes
during the same meetings in which he lobbied for mobster
Rosario Gambino. Ballis credited Clinton with helping him
obtain early release and sought his help in obtaining a
presidential pardon to eliminate his parole supervision and
restitution payments. While he was not granted any form of
clemency, the President reviewed his petition, and a White
House lawyer called Ballis' lawyer two nights before
inauguration day to ask if Ballis would accept a grant of
clemency that left intact his obligation to pay restitution.
Roger Clinton lobbied his brother to grant clemency
to Steven Griggs, the son of the chief of an unrecognized
American Indian tribe, who was in prison on drug charges. Like
Ballis, Steven Griggs was not a close friend of Roger Clinton's
but merely someone who knew someone who knew him. Griggs also
did not receive clemency, but Roger Clinton helped ensure that
Griggs' petition was brought to the attention of the President
even though Griggs had been a fugitive for a year before being
sentenced. Griggs argued in his petition that he had received
an unusually harsh sentence but failed to mention that he had
fled after his conviction. It is not clear what motivated Roger
Clinton to assist Griggs, but some evidence suggests that the
tribe may have planned to open a casino when and if it were to
become recognized by the federal government.
According to his former lawyer, Arkansas restaurant
operator Phillip Young was approached with an offer to obtain a
pardon through Roger Clinton for $30,000. While Young denied to
Committee staff that he was actually approached by anyone with
such a proposal, his denial is not as credible as his former
attorney's version of events.
Both the White House and the Justice Department hindered the
Committee's investigation of Roger Clinton by improperly
refusing to produce key documents.
For months, the Bush White House prevented the
National Archives from producing even non-deliberative,
clemency-related records from the Clinton administration. The
Committee did not learn that President Clinton had been
considering a clemency petition from notorious mobster Rosario
Gambino until after Archives personnel ``inadvertently''
produced documents that President Bush's Counsel had sought to
withhold. The accidental production also included documents
relating to three other previously unknown individuals who had
sought clemency through Roger Clinton. The Bush Administration
did manage to retain four additional deliberative Gambino
documents from the files of the Clinton White House, refusing
to produce the records even though they were not subject to any
executive privilege claim.
The Ashcroft Justice Department produced certain
Gambino-related records, but inexplicably withheld others.
After producing sensitive documents such as U.S. Parole
Commission files related to Rosario Gambino and a summary of an
FBI interview with Roger Clinton, the Justice Department ceased
producing additional documents, claiming they were related to
an ongoing criminal investigation, even though the Clinton-
Gambino matter had reportedly been closed in 2000.
HUGH RODHAM'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIGNALI COMMUTATION
Vignali's clemency petition was false and misleading.
Carlos Vignali lied in his clemency petition. First,
he continued to maintain his innocence, despite overwhelming
evidence of his involvement in selling a substantial amount of
cocaine across state lines and a specific finding by the
sentencing judge that he lied at trial about his involvement in
a large drug distribution network. Second, Vignali claimed that
he was a first-time offender, despite the fact that he had a
prior criminal record. By not accepting responsibility for his
crime and lying about his background, he should not have been
eligible for executive clemency.
Vignali's supporters provided letters of support which were
false and misleading.
A key element of the campaign by Carlos Vignali and
his father Horacio Vignali, was a series of letters on Carlos'
behalf from prominent Los Angeles politicians. A number of
these letters contained misleading statements calculated to
create the impression that Carlos Vignali was innocent. The
officials who submitted letters included Representative Xavier
Becerra, Representative Esteban Torres, State Assembly Speaker
Robert Hertzberg, State Assembly member Antonio Villaraigosa,
State Senator Richard Polanco, Los Angeles County Supervisor
Gloria Molina, Los Angeles City Councilmember Mike Hernandez,
and Cardinal Roger Mahony, Archbishop of Los Angeles.
Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca provided critical support
for the Vignali commutation, which was inappropriate, given his
position.
Sheriff Baca had a close relationship with Horacio
Vignali which was based on Vignali's political and financial
support for Baca. Sheriff Baca has known Horacio Vignali since
1991, and Vignali has been a key political supporter of Baca,
giving him at least $11,000 in contributions and raising
between $60,000-$70,000 more.
Sheriff Baca spoke with the White House in support
of the Vignali commutation. In January 2001, Baca received a
telephone call from Hugh Rodham in which Rodham told Baca that
he would get a call from the White House about Horacio Vignali.
Shortly thereafter, Baca received a call from White House staff
and spoke in support of Horacio Vignali. Based on Baca's
statements in this telephone call, White House staff clearly
and justifiably concluded that Baca supported the commutation
of Carlos Vignali's sentence.
Sheriff Baca continues to claim, without any basis,
that he did not support the Vignali commutation. Rather than
express regret for his role in the Vignali commutation, Sheriff
Baca maintains that he opposed the Vignali commutation and did
nothing that could have been interpreted as support for the
commutation. However, Sheriff Baca's supposed opposition to the
Vignali commutation does not square with the fact that: (1) he
drafted a letter which he believed Horacio Vignali would use in
the clemency effort; and (2) when he was asked squarely by the
White House if the President should commute Vignali's prison
sentence, he stated that it was ``the President's decision to
make,'' rather than express his opposition. These facts, and
others outlined in this report, indicate that Sheriff Baca
wanted to support the Vignali commutation, but was afraid of
creating a paper record which would clearly indicate his
support.
Sheriff Baca's efforts on behalf of the Vignalis are
even more inappropriate given that there were extensive
allegations that Horacio Vignali, Carlos' father, was also
involved in illegal drug trafficking. It is inappropriate
enough for a senior law enforcement official like Baca to
support a grant of clemency for an unrepentant, large-scale
drug dealer like Carlos Vignali. However, when coupled with
credible allegations indicating that Horacio Vignali was a drug
dealer, and in fact was the source of cocaine supply for his
son, Baca's support of Horacio and Carlos Vignali is even more
inappropriate.
U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas provided critical support for
the Vignali commutation, which was inappropriate, given his
position.
U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas called the White
House in support of the Vignali commutation. Mayorkas, the top
federal prosecutor in Los Angeles, was asked by Horacio Vignali
to call the White House in support of his son's clemency
petition. Mayorkas then called the White House about the
Vignali commutation. While Mayorkas does not recall the details
of his conversation, he now concedes that his call conveyed
support for the Vignali commutation.
Mayorkas supported the Vignali commutation despite
his ignorance of the facts of the case and his knowledge that
the prosecutors responsible for the Vignali case opposed
clemency. Before he called the White House, Mayorkas had spoken
twice with Todd Jones, the U.S. Attorney responsible for the
Vignali case. Jones told Mayorkas that Vignali was a ``major
player'' in drug trafficking, that he was ``bad news'' and that
Mayorkas should not ``go there'' when it came to Vignali.
Despite these warnings from a prosecutor who was intimately
familiar with the Vignali case, Mayorkas still called the White
House in support of the Vignali commutation.
Mayorkas' support for the Vignali commutation was
inappropriate. Mayorkas knew little about the Vignali case.
What he did know indicated that Carlos Vignali was an
unrepentant large-scale criminal. These facts alone make his
support for the commutation, as a senior federal prosecutor,
totally inappropriate.
There are a number of allegations that both Horacio and Carlos
Vignali were involved in illegal drug trafficking.
There are allegations that, in addition to his son,
Horacio Vignali was involved in illegal drug trafficking and
that Carlos Vignali was involved in drug trafficking far beyond
the conduct which led to his conviction in Minnesota. DEA
reports documenting these allegations include the following
statements:
``[Horacio Vignali] negotiated with ATF agents to sell
a machine gun and stated to them that he had also
smuggled heroin into the United States utilizing
automobiles.''
``[Redacted] has also purchased cocaine from Carlos
Vignali Jr. of Los Angeles . . . Vignali's father
Carlos Vignali aka ``pops'' owns a body shop, at 1260
Figueroa and is the source of supply for his son.''
``Carlos Horatio Vignali's role in [George Torres' drug
dealing] organization is relatively unknown at this
time. It is believed that Vignali functions as a
financial partner in the organization.''
These DEA reports are corroborated by law
enforcement personnel who indicate that they had received
information indicating that both Horacio and Carlos Vignali
were involved in large-scale drug trafficking. These charges
have never been formally made in court, or substantiated by
physical evidence. However, the mere existence of such
allegations should have precluded senior law enforcement and
political officials from supporting a commutation for Carlos
Vignali on the strength of his father's reputation. However, it
appears that no one checked with the DEA prior to granting the
commutation.
Hugh Rodham provided false and misleading information to the
White House in support of the Vignali commutation.
Hugh Rodham was paid $204,200 for his work on the
Vignali commutation. It appears that in return for this money,
he worked part-time for two months gathering materials in
support of Vignali's case and making telephone calls to White
House staff. It appears that Rodham's payment in the Vignali
matter was contingent upon his success, as he received the
$200,000 payment on January 24, 2001, after President Clinton
granted clemency to Vignali.
Rodham repeatedly provided false information during
his communications with the White House. First, and most
importantly, Rodham told Bruce Lindsey that the trial attorney
who prosecuted Vignali supported the commutation. This was
completely false. Second, Rodham told Lindsey that Vignali was
a first-time offender, when in fact, he had two prior
convictions and two other arrests. Rodham also told Lindsey
that Vignali ``did not play a major role in the offense,'' when
in fact, Vignali was a major source of cocaine for the
Minnesota drug-dealing ring at issue in his case.
Hugh Rodham told the White House that First Lady Hillary Rodham
Clinton was aware of his lobbying efforts and that the Vignali
commutation was ``very important'' to her.
Hugh Rodham told White House staff that the Vignali
commutation was ``very important to him and the First Lady as
well as others.'' This statement is confirmed by the
independent recollection of the White House staffer who spoke
to Rodham as well as the note which she took contemporaneously.
Rodham's statement raises two possibilities: first, that the
First Lady was aware of, and approved of, Hugh Rodham's
lobbying efforts; or second, that Hugh Rodham was lying to
White House staff regarding the First Lady's knowledge of his
efforts.
The White House sought the opinion of powerful Los Angeles
political figures, but failed to consult with the prosecutors
or judge who understood the Vignali case.
White House staff engaged in telephone conversations
with a number of outside individuals regarding the Vignali
case--Hugh Rodham, Lee Baca, and Alejandro Mayorkas, none of
whom knew very much about the Vignali case. It appears that key
White House staff gave great weight to the input provided by
Rodham, Baca, and Mayorkas, even though they knew little about
the case and had mixed motives.
White House staff failed to reach out to the
prosecutors who had convicted Vignali, or the judge who
sentenced him. White House staff justified their failure to
take this simple action by concluding that they knew that the
prosecutors and judge would object, so there was no need to
speak to them. However, if the White House had spoken to Todd
Jones, Denise Reilly, Andrew Dunne, or Judge David Doty, they
would have learned that Carlos Vignali: (1) was not a small-
time drug dealer; (2) was unrepentant about his criminal
activity; and (3) never cooperated with law enforcement by
telling them who supplied him cocaine.
The White House ignored the strenuous objections to the Vignali
commutation which were lodged by the Pardon Attorney.
The Pardon Attorney provided the White House with a
report that contained his recommendation against granting the
Vignali commutation. This report contained a number of powerful
arguments against the commutation, which were apparently
ignored by the White House. The existence of the Pardon
Attorney's report means that the White House cannot claim that
it was totally unaware that Vignali's arguments were completely
false. The White House knew that the Vignali clemency petition
had no merit, yet decided to grant the commutation anyway.
President Clinton's decision raises questions about why the
Vignali commutation was granted.
Rodham has apparently misled the public about returning to the
Vignalis those fees he received in connection with the clemency
and ignored former President and Senator Clinton's request that
he do so.
On February 21, 2001, at the request of former
President Clinton and Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Rodham
promised to return to Horacio Vignali the legal fees he
received in connection with the Vignali clemency. But, as of
June 2001, Rodham had apparently returned only about $50,000 of
the money that Horacio Vignali paid him. Rodham's attorney has
confirmed to Committee staff that Rodham has not returned any
additional amounts and has no plans to return the remaining
$154,000.
HUGH RODHAM'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE BRASWELL PARDON
Glenn Braswell was under investigation by multiple federal
agencies and several state attorneys general when the pardon
was granted.
Over the past two decades, Braswell has created a
dietary supplement empire using false advertising to mislead
consumers. After serving time in prison for mail fraud and tax
evasion in 1983, Braswell has continued to defraud consumers
about the benefits of his herbal remedies. In addition to
facing numerous lawsuits, Braswell's companies have been
investigated by the Internal Revenue Service, Federal Trade
Commission, Food and Drug Administration, and Better Business
Bureau.
Unsurprisingly, Braswell was under another criminal
investigation by federal prosecutors for a massive tax evasion
and money-laundering scheme when he was pardoned. Braswell's
petition bypassed the traditional route through the Justice
Department and went directly to the White House. If the FBI had
conducted a background investigation instead of the White
House, Braswell's petition would have been rejected quickly.
Braswell paid Hugh Rodham $230,000 for successfully obtaining
the pardon.
Braswell hired Rodham to support his pardon petition
for $230,000. For this price, Rodham claims he forwarded a
letter of support for Braswell to the White House Counsel's
Office, and he made a follow-up inquiry. According to Rodham,
these two actions were the extent of his role in the Braswell
pardon. Rodham refunded the $230,000 to Braswell after facing
widespread criticism from the media and members of both
political parties.
HUGH RODHAM'S EFFORTS TO LOBBY FOR CLEMENCY FOR THE LUMS
Gene and Nora Lum, prominent Democratic contributors and
fundraisers, were convicted of making illegal conduit
contributions and tax offenses.
In 1997, the Lums pleaded guilty to making $50,000
in illegal conduit contributions to the DNC. They were
sentenced to home detention, confinement in a halfway house and
a $30,000 fine. In August 1998, Gene Lum pleaded guilty to tax
fraud for filing tax returns claiming more than $7.1 million in
false deductions and was sentenced to two years imprisonment.
The Lums attempted to obtain executive clemency through Hugh
Rodham.
Hugh Rodham lobbied the White House as part of the
Lums' efforts but failed to secure them a grant of clemency. In
December 2000, Nora Lum called one of her husband's criminal
attorneys and asked him to send various documents to Hugh
Rodham at the White House. He did so. In early January 2001,
Rodham called Gene Lum's attorney again and asked him to resend
those documents directly to, among others, Meredith Cabe, an
associate White House counsel responsible for clemency matters.
Subsequently, Rodham telephoned Cabe and discussed the merits
of the Lums' pardon request. Cabe then told White House Counsel
Beth Nolan and Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey about
her discussion with Rodham. Both told Cabe that the Lums were
not going to receive clemency.
The Lums and Hugh Rodham have refused to cooperate with the
Committee's investigation.
Gene and Nora Lum have refused to cooperate with the
Committee's investigation. The Lums' daughter, Nicole (with
whom Hugh Rodham apparently had some sort of business
relationship), has likewise declined to be interviewed by the
Committee. Hugh Rodham has also refused to cooperate with the
Committee's request for an interview. Therefore, the Committee
is unable to obtain a full understanding of the Lums' efforts
to obtain executive clemency and Rodham's role in those
efforts.
TONY RODHAM'S EFFORTS TO LOBBY FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
Tony Rodham's Role in the Case of Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory
Tony Rodham lobbied President Clinton to grant
pardons to Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory while he was receiving
substantial sums of money from the Gregorys. Rodham received
$244,769 in salary from the Gregorys over two and a half years
and also received another $79,000 in loans from the Gregorys.
The Gregorys claim that they paid Rodham this large sum of
money for various consulting services that Rodham provided to
the Gregorys. However, the Gregorys do not have any
documentation reflecting work performed for them by Rodham.
Given the fact that the Gregorys do not have any
documentary evidence reflecting the $244,769 of work performed
for them by Rodham, substantial questions are raised as to what
Rodham actually did for the Gregorys that was so valuable. The
most valuable thing that Rodham did for the Gregorys was to
obtain presidential pardons. Therefore, there is a substantial
question as to whether the Gregorys paid Rodham for his efforts
to obtain presidential pardons for them.
If Rodham was paid to obtain presidential pardons
for the Gregorys, it creates the strong appearance of
impropriety. The prospect of financial benefit for Rodham would
taint Rodham's actions in lobbying for the pardon. Also, if
President Clinton knew about Rodham's financial arrangement, it
would taint his actions in granting the pardons.
Compounding the appearance of impropriety in the
Gregory case is the fact that the pardons were opposed by the
Justice Department, the prosecutors responsible for the case,
and also the Gregorys' sentencing judge. Apparently, the only
people in the Clinton Administration who felt that the Gregorys
deserved pardons were President Clinton and Deputy White House
Counsel Bruce Lindsey, both of whom knew of Tony Rodham's
involvement in the matter.
Tony Rodham's Role in the Case of Fernando Fuentes Coba
Tony Rodham offered to help Vivian Mannerud obtain a
pardon for her father, Fernando Fuentes Coba, in exchange for
$50,000. When Rodham learned in late 2000 that Mannerud was
seeking a pardon for her elderly father, he met with Mannerud
and told her that he could help obtain the pardon if she paid
him a $50,000 consulting fee. Rodham told Mannerud that he had
successfully obtained pardons before and showed her the
Gregorys' pardon petition to support his claim.
Rodham attempted to convince Mannerud to hire him by
making a number of false representations to her. Rodham told
Mannerud that he was close personal friends with the Pardon
Attorney, Roger Adams. Rodham also told Mannerud that he would
use the $50,000 to hire a law firm to handle her case and that
Roger Adams' wife worked at the law firm, which would help her
case be treated favorably. All of these representations were
completely false and were apparently made to mislead Mannerud
as to the purpose of the payment to Rodham.
Mannerud rejected Rodham's offer. Mannerud was
concerned that Rodham could not guarantee that he could obtain
a pardon in exchange for the $50,000. She was also concerned
about becoming embroiled in a scandal. Therefore, she rejected
Rodham's offer.
After Mannerud rejected Rodham's offer, an associate
of Rodham came back to Mannerud with another offer. According
to Mannerud, a month after she rejected Tony Rodham's proposal,
Marilyn Parker, a mutual friend of Rodham's and Mannerud's who
attended the initial meeting between them, came back to
Mannerud and told her that Rodham now wanted only $30,000 to
help her obtain a pardon for her father. Mannerud was still
concerned about the nature of Rodham's proposal and rejected
it.
The actions taken by Rodham and Parker may have been
illegal. Rodham, and maybe Parker as well, engaged in an effort
to defraud Mannerud. While the effort was unsuccessful, it may
have constituted criminal conduct. The Committee recommends
that the Justice Department investigate these allegations.
PRESIDENT CLINTON'S GRANT OF CLEMENCY TO DRUG MONEY LAUNDERER
HARVEY WEINIG
Weinig was properly imprisoned for conspiring to launder
millions of dollars in drug money and concealing and furthering
an extortion-by-kidnapping scheme.
Weinig, a former Manhattan attorney, conspired to
launder about $19 million in drug proceeds through a Swiss bank
for the Cali cartel. Members of the money laundering
organization, of which Weinig was a part, boasted that they
successfully laundered more than $70 million for the cartel. In
addition to conducting banking transactions for the
organization, Weinig consulted with co-conspirators in
furtherance of the organization's activities and stored the
drug proceeds in his New York City apartment.
Weinig and other co-conspirators at his law firm
stole from the Cali cartel about $2.5 million they were
supposed to have laundered. This theft exposed Weinig's family
to a risk of being harmed by those drug dealers. In the course
of investigating the organization's money laundering
activities, authorities intervened when they learned that the
drug dealers sent a hit man to kill one of Weinig's co-
conspirators.
Weinig learned that one of his co-conspirators
kidnapped an individual as part of a scheme to extort money
from the victim's family. Rather than report the kidnapping,
Weinig made his office available as a meeting place where the
ransom could be delivered and directed his associates at the
firm to execute transfer agreements.
Weinig's lawyer, a prominent Washington attorney with close
connections to the Clinton Administration, lobbied the White
House in support of Weinig's clemency petition.
Weinig's wife, Alice Morey, retained Reid
Weingarten, who was close to the Clinton White House, to lobby
for the commutation. In April 2000, Weingarten filed a clemency
petition on Weinig's behalf with the Justice Department and the
White House. Knowing that the Justice Department would advise
the President to reject the Weinig commutation petition,
Weingarten lobbied the White House directly, approaching White
House Counsel Beth Nolan, Deputy White House Counsel Bruce
Lindsey and Chief of Staff John Podesta.
Weingarten chose not to familiarize himself with the
facts of Weinig's underlying conviction. Accordingly, he was
unable to convey to those he lobbied a full, accurate factual
basis of the merits of Weinig's petition.
Two former Clinton Administration officials, David Dreyer and
Harold Ickes, lobbied the White House on Weinig's behalf.
Alice Morey enlisted the assistance of her cousin,
former White House Deputy Communications Director David Dreyer.
Dreyer repeatedly raised the Weinig commutation with John
Podesta. Ultimately, Podesta recommended that the President
grant the Weinig commutation. Dreyer has invoked his Fifth
Amendment rights rather than cooperate with the Committee's
investigation.
Morey also obtained support for Weinig's commutation
from former Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes, whose children
attended the same school as did her sons. Ickes discussed the
Weinig case with President Clinton twice and recommended the
commutation of Weinig's sentence.
The Justice Department repeatedly and adamantly recommended
against the commutation of Weinig's sentence.
On several occasions, U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White,
whose office convicted Weinig, objected to any reduction of
Weinig's sentence. Ultimately, in a report to President
Clinton, the Pardon Attorney and Deputy Attorney General Eric
Holder voiced their strong opposition to a commutation of
Weinig's sentence.
Pardon Attorney Roger Adams submitted a report to
the President advising against the Weinig commutation. Adams
pointed out that Weinig ``was a well-respected lawyer who used
his professional skills to assist in laundering millions of
dollars that he knew constituted the proceeds of a huge
narcotics trafficking enterprise. He was involved in this
activity for an extended period of time, and he admits that he
engaged in it purely out of greed.'' Adams also informed the
President that Weinig ``aided and abetted the extortion of
money from an individual he knew had been kidnapped at the
direction of a co-defendant in order to coerce the production
of a ransom.''
After an apparently cursory review, the White House set aside
the Justice Department's negative recommendation and granted
Weinig clemency.
Support for Weinig's petition from John Podesta and
Beth Nolan appears to have been critical. The Associate White
House counsels responsible for clemency matters did not support
the petition. However, setting aside the negative
recommendations of not only the Justice Department but also
staff at the White House Counsel's Office, Nolan and Lindsey,
who were lobbied by Weingarten, recommended Weinig's clemency
to President Clinton. John Podesta, who was lobbied by
Weingarten and Dreyer, also recommended to the President that
Weinig's sentence be commuted.
The White House was unjustified in commuting Weinig's sentence.
None of the arguments made by Weinig entitle him to
executive clemency. In his petition, Weinig stated three main
reasons why his sentence should have been commuted: (1) his
sentence was disproportionate and excessive; (2) his
contributions to society justified his early release from
prison; and (3) one of his children was suffering emotional
difficulties as a result of his imprisonment and needed him to
return home. The first reason is simply not true. Weinig's
sentence was comparable to those received by other co-
conspirators who were directly responsible for laundering large
amounts of drug money and declined to cooperate with
authorities. Weinig's sentence was also comparable to those
received by co-defendants who participated in the extortion-by-
kidnapping scheme, which Weinig concealed and facilitated. The
other two reasons fail to distinguish Weinig from the vast
number of other similarly situated felons, who were properly
sentenced but whose families have suffered because of their
imprisonment.
President Clinton's commutation of Weinig's sentence has sent
out the wrong message about the United States' commitment to
fighting drug trafficking.
President Clinton's decision conveyed an appearance
of granting special consideration to wealthy, politically well-
connected criminals and their relatives. Pardon Attorney Roger
Adams foresaw the message sent by the Weinig commutation,
warning President Clinton that ``[t]o commute [Weinig's] prison
term to the five years he proposes would denigrate the
seriousness of his criminal misconduct, undermine the
government's legitimate interest in encouraging prompt guilty
pleas and truthful cooperation from criminal defendants, and
could give the appearance of granting special consideration to
economically advantaged, white-collar offenders.''
The Weinig commutation undermines the nation's
efforts to fight the illegal drug trade. Complaints are
frequently made that U.S. drug laws punish low-level drug
criminals too severely, yet do not punish high-level drug
distributors enough. When a large-scale drug money launderer
like Harvey Weinig receives executive clemency after serving
five years of an eleven-year sentence, it sends the message
that the U.S. is not serious about prosecuting the high-level
criminals who make the drug trade possible.
The Weinig commutation has eroded the United States'
moral authority to press other countries to fight the drug
trade within their own borders. The Weinig commutation could
harm the efforts of the U.S. government to extradite drug
traffickers and money launderers from Latin America. Newspapers
in Latin American countries have accused the U.S. of hypocrisy
in the Weinig case. For example, in Colombia's leading daily,
former Colombian attorney general Gustavo De Greiff, in an op-
ed entitled ``The Morality of the Strongest,'' labeled
President Clinton's clemency decision ``monstrous.''
INTRODUCTION
A. Why the Committee Investigated These Matters
Unlike most other powers granted to the President by the
Constitution, the power to grant executive clemency is
virtually unchecked. Some have argued that because the power to
grant clemency is unlimited, Congress has no oversight role
over grants of executive clemency. The opposite is true.
Because the President can grant clemency to whomever he wants
for whatever reasons, it is critically important that certain
grants of clemency be subject to Congressional and public
scrutiny. If this scrutiny were not applied to grants of
clemency, the power could easily be abused. As James Madison
observed:
A popular Government, without popular information, or
the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a Farce
or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever
govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own
Governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.\1\
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\1\ James Madison, The Writings of James Madison 103 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 9th ed. 1910).
While the grants of clemency issued by President Clinton will
not, and cannot, be overturned by the Committee's
investigation, this report can serve a valuable purpose to
inform the public about President Clinton's abuse of power in
issuing grants of clemency to so many undeserving individuals.
The report can also serve as a reminder to future Presidents
not to exercise their pardon power in such a reckless and
corrupting fashion.
Before President Clinton, when a President made
controversial grants of clemency, he often provided a full
accounting of his reasons for the decision. For example, when
President Ford pardoned former President Nixon in 1974,
President Ford made an unprecedented appearance before the
House Judiciary Committee to explain his decision.\2\ When
President George H.W. Bush pardoned Caspar Weinberger for his
involvement in the Iran-Contra matter, he provided a full
accounting of his decision in a public statement and released a
number of documents dispelling any concerns that President
Bush's pardon was meant to cover up his own involvement in the
Iran-Contra matter.\3\ President Bush even consulted with
prominent Democratic Members of Congress before issuing the
Weinberger pardon to see if they would object.\4\ However,
President Clinton issued a number of controversial pardons and
commutations and failed to ever provide a satisfactory
accounting for his decisions. Not only did he avoid
consultation with Members of Congress, but President Clinton
also avoided consultation with his own Justice Department and
other knowledgeable agencies. Moreover, President Clinton has
declined to answer any questions about his decisions, choosing
instead to make occasional self-serving statements to friendly
reporters.\5\
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\2\ ``Pardon of Richard M. Nixon and Related Matters,'' Hearing
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. (Oct. 17, 1974).
\3\ 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (1992).
\4\ According to news reports, House Speaker Tom Foley, Chairman
Les Aspin, and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan told President Bush that
they would not object to the Weinberger pardon. Senator Moynihan even
urged President Bush to grant a pardon to Iran-Contra figure Elliot
Abrams, a former Moynihan aide. See Marjorie Williams, Burden of Proof,
Wash. Post Mag., Apr. 11, 1993, at 6; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak,
Bush Faces Fallout on Iran-Contra Pardons, Chi. Sun-Times, Dec. 30,
1992, at 25.
\5\ See, e.g., Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast, Feb. 15,
2001).
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President Clinton's abuse of the clemency power began with
the August 11, 1999, grants of clemency to 16 terrorists who
were part of the FALN and Macheteros terrorist network. When
the Committee and the public understandably raised questions
regarding these grants of clemency, President Clinton did
nothing to answer those questions. Rather, he invoked executive
privilege over 2,800 pages of documents which would have showed
why he made his decision.\6\ When President Clinton did attempt
to offer an explanation for the FALN clemency, it was factually
inaccurate. Indeed, some documents indicated that the President
made his decision for political benefit.\7\ For example, one
document said that the release of the 16 terrorists would
``have a positive impact among strategic Puerto Rican
communities in the U.S. (read, voters).'' Another document
stated: ``[t]he Vice President's Puerto Rican position would be
helped.'' \8\
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\6\ Log of Documents Subject to Executive Privilege, noted in ``The
FALN and Macheteros Clemency: Misleading Explanations, A Reckless
Decision, A Dangerous Message,'' Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt.
Reform, 106th Cong. 325-68 (Dec. 10, 1999).
\7\ See generally ``The FALN and Macheteros Clemency: Misleading
Explanations, A Reckless Decision, A Dangerous Message,'' Hearing
Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 106th Cong. (Dec. 10, 1999).
\8\ Id.
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In the final hours of his term, President Clinton issued
141 pardons and 36 commutations.\9\ While other Presidents had
issued controversial pardons and commutations, never before had
a President made so many grants of clemency with so little
justification. To understand the wholesale nature of the
President's questionable clemency grants, it is useful to
recall that he granted clemency to 13 individuals convicted in
connection with independent counsel investigations of the
Clinton Administration.\10\ Strong arguments could be made
against all of these grants of clemency. The individuals who
received these grants of clemency were convicted of serious
crimes, and many of them played significant roles in major
political scandals. For example, Susan McDougal was convicted
of mail fraud, misapplication of funds, and false statements,
and then was jailed on contempt of court charges for refusing
to tell a grand jury whether President Clinton had testified
truthfully at her trial. If Susan McDougal were not a close
friend of the President, her pardon would be troubling enough.
She was a convicted felon who defrauded a bank and defied the
right of a grand jury to receive honest testimony. Considering
that McDougal was a close friend of the President, who was
jailed for contempt rather than testify against him, there is
the indelible appearance that the pardon was a reward for
McDougal's silence. Yet the Committee did not investigate the
McDougal pardon or any of the other 12 pardons and commutations
relating to independent counsel investigations. Neither did the
Committee investigate the pardons and commutations granted to
former Congressman Mel Reynolds,\11\ William Borders,\12\ or
CIA Director John Deutch,\13\ all of which were subject to
widespread criticism. Rather, the Committee limited its
investigation to pardons and commutations where there was no
credible explanation for the grant of clemency, and where there
was an appearance of impropriety relating to inappropriate
access or corruption. The fact that the Committee did not
investigate pardons like Susan McDougal's speaks volumes about
both the Committee's exercise of restraint and the severity of
the abuses in those cases the Committee did investigate.
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\9\ Department of Justice Document Production DJ/PAO-MR-00009-23
(List of Pardon and Commutation Grants, Jan. 20, 2001) (Exhibit 1).
\10\ Individuals convicted in the Whitewater investigation and
receiving pardons on January 20, 2001, were: Susan H. McDougal; Robert
W. Palmer; Stephen A. Smith; and Christopher V. Wade. Individuals
convicted in the investigation of former Agriculture Secretary Mike
Espy and receiving pardons on January 20, 2001, were: Richard Douglas;
Alvarez Ferrouillet; John Hemmingson; James H. Lake; Brook K. Mitchell,
Sr.; and Jack L. Williams. Receiving a commutation for a conviction in
the Espy case was Ronald Blackley. Individuals convicted in the
Cisneros investigation and receiving pardons on January 20, 2001, were:
Henry Cisneros and Linda Jones. In addition, Archibald Schaffer, a key
defendant in the Espy investigation, received a pardon shortly before
the end of the Clinton Administration, on December 22, 2000.
\11\ Reynolds received a commutation for his federal convictions
for bank fraud, wire fraud, false statements, and conspiracy to
defraud. He also served time in prison for state convictions for sexual
misconduct, obstruction of justice, and solicitation of child
pornography. He is currently a registered sex offender in the state of
Illinois. See Illinois Sex Offender Information (visited Mar. 4, 2002)
(listing Reynolds' registration as a
sex offender).
\12\ Borders was convicted for participating in a conspiracy to
bribe federal judge Alcee Hastings. Borders refused to testify at
Hastings' criminal trial or his impeachment hearings, which resulted in
Borders' imprisonment for both contempt of court and contempt of
Congress. By granting clemency to Borders, President Clinton violated
his own standards as drafted by then-White House Counsel Jack Quinn.
Quinn wrote that ``offenses involving central involvement in political
corruption'' were among those President Clinton would not consider
``under almost any circumstances.'' Arnold & Porter Document Production
A0556-57 (Executive Clemency Policy, Jan. 26, 1996) (Exhibit 2).
\13\ Deutch was accused of mishandling hundreds of highly
classified documents, including information relating to covert actions,
storing many on a home computer used to surf ``high risk'' sites on the
internet, making the documents easily accessible to a hacker. Jerry
Seper, Deutch Planned Guilty Plea Before Clinton Pardoned Him, Wash.
Times, Jan. 25, 2001, at A3. Less than a day before receiving the
pardon, Deutch had signed a plea agreement wherein he admitted a
misdemeanor and agreed to pay a $5,000 fine. Vernon Loeb, Senate
Committee Questions Clinton's Pardon of Deutch, Wash. Post, Feb. 16,
2001, at A2.
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The Committee investigated two types of clemency grants.
First was the case of Marc Rich and Pincus Green, which raised
substantial questions of direct corruption, primarily whether
pardons were issued in exchange for political and other
financial contributions. The second group of cases involved
indirect corruption, where close relatives of the President--
namely Roger Clinton, Hugh Rodham, and Tony Rodham--apparently
traded on their relationships with the President to lobby for
pardons and commutations. These cases raised serious concerns
that Roger Clinton and the Rodhams used their access to the
White House to lobby for pardons, in some cases successfully,
and received large payments for their lobbying efforts.
The Committee had three main purposes in its clemency
investigation. First, as discussed above, the Committee sought
to let the public know whether President Clinton had abused the
clemency power. By subjecting the President's exercise of
clemency to public scrutiny, the Committee hopes to make it
clear to future Presidents that history will hold them
accountable for clemency grants that are abusive. Second, the
Committee sought to determine whether there are adequate
safeguards in place to prevent individuals with close
relationships with the President from trading on their access
to win pardons. A number of the most troubling pardons granted
by President Clinton were the result of lobbying from former
White House staff like Jack Quinn or close relatives like Hugh
Rodham. Third, the Committee examined whether there are
adequate procedures in the pardon process to protect against
abuse by the President. While the Justice Department has
regulations governing its handling of applications for
clemency, the President is free to ignore those regulations,
and President Clinton did ignore them in the last month he was
in office. The key lesson to be learned from the facts detailed
in this report is that more disclosure is likely to remedy the
problems in each of these three areas of concern. Public
scrutiny after-the-fact may provide some deterrence, but a more
open process before a grant of clemency is likely to be more
effective. That is why the Committee moved legislation to
require public disclosure of contributions to entities like the
Clinton Library, given the potential effect of such
contributions on policymaking decisions.\14\ Another example of
potential legislation would be a clarification of the
definition of ``lobbying'' under the Lobbying Disclosure
Act.\15\ It could be amended to explicitly cover those who are
paid to contact executive branch officials on behalf of
clemency seekers.\16\ If Jack Quinn and Hugh Rodham had been
required to disclose their status publicly as paid lobbyists
seeking clemency for their clients, then Marc Rich and Carlos
Vignali may not have been pardoned. The public outcry could
have occurred beforehand and possibly prevented the damage done
by these grants of clemency to public confidence in the
integrity of government. Even if such a measure would not have
prevented these particular grants of clemency, knowing who is
paid to lobby for clemency would certainly assist future
presidents in making appropriate decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ As a result of the Committee's investigation into the Marc
Rich and Pincus Green pardons, the Committee voted out H.R. 577, the
Presidential Library Disclosure Act, a bill which ensures that
contributions to presidential libraries are publicly disclosed. This
bill was approved by the House of Representatives in a 392 to 3 vote on
February 5, 2002, and is awaiting action in the Senate.
\15\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(8)(a) currently defines a ``lobbying
contact'' as:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. . any oral or written communication . . . to a covered
executve branch official . . . that is made on behalf of a
client with regard to--
G(i) the formulation, modification, or adoption of
Federal legislation (including legislative proposals);
G(ii) the formulation, modification, or adoption of a
Federal rule, regulation, Executive order, or any other
program, policy, or position of the United States
Government;
G(iii) the administration or execution of a Federal
program or policy (including the negotiation, award, or
administration of a Federal contract, grant, loan, permit,
or license);
Gor (iv) the nomination or confirmation of a person for
a position subject to confirmation by the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(8)(b)(xii) currently contains an exception
for ``a communication that is . . . made to an official in an agency
with regard to . . . a judicial proceeding or a criminal or civil law
enforcement inquiry, investigation, or proceeding.'' This exception
could arguably exclude lobbying for clemency from the statute's
disclosure requirements. But see In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 179 F.
Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 9, 2001) (holding that ``the pardon process
was not adversarial'' in the Marc Rich case, that his lawyers were
``acting principally as lobbyists,'' and that they were, therefore, not
entitled to withhold certain documents under the attorney-client
privilege).
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B. President Clinton Deviated From All Applicable Standards
In his rush to grant pardons and commutations in the waning
hours of his presidency, Bill Clinton ignored almost every
applicable standard governing the exercise of the clemency
power. There were three obvious sources of guidance regarding
the exercise of the power. First, the Justice Department had
published guidelines regarding its handling of clemency
petitions. While these guidelines were not binding upon the
President, they should have provided guidance to the Justice
Department and the President. At a minimum, they provide a
mechanism to provide the President with relevant information.
The Justice Department guidelines state first that pardon
petitions should not be filed until five years after the
petitioner is released from prison, or, if no prison time is
served, five years after the date of conviction.\17\ The
guidelines also state that commutation petitions should not be
filed while there are other forms of judicial or administrative
relief, like appeals, still available.\18\
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\17\ 28 C.F.R. Sec. 1.2 (2002).
\18\ 28 C.F.R. Sec. 1.3 (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Attorney's Manual also contains detailed standards
applied to clemency petitions by the Pardon Attorney's Office.
The Manual lists five standards applicable to the review of
pardon petitions:
1. Post-conviction conduct, character, and reputation.
An individual's demonstrated ability to lead a
responsible and productive life for a significant
period after conviction or release from confinement is
strong evidence of rehabilitation and worthiness for
pardon.
* * *
2. Seriousness and relative recentness of the offense.
When an offense is very serious (e.g., a violent crime,
major drug trafficking, breach of public trust, or
white collar crime involving substantial sums of
money), a suitable length of time should have elapsed
in order to avoid denigrating the seriousness of the
offense or undermining the deterrent effect of the
conviction. In the case of a prominent individual or
notorious crime, the likely effect of a pardon on law
enforcement interests or upon the general public should
be taken into account.
* * *
3. Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and
atonement.
The extent to which a petitioner has accepted
responsibility for his or her criminal conduct and made
restitution to its victims are important
considerations. A petitioner should be genuinely
desirous of forgiveness rather than vindication. While
the absence of expressions of remorse should not
preclude favorable consideration, a petitioner's
attempts to minimize or rationalize culpability does
not advance the case for pardon.
* * *
4. The need for relief.
The purpose for which a pardon is sought may influence
disposition of the petition. A felony conviction may
result in a wide variety of legal disabilities under
state or federal law, some of which can provide
persuasive grounds for recommending a pardon.
* * *
5. Official recommendations and reports.
The comments and recommendations of concerned and
knowledgeable officials, particularly the United States
Attorney whose office prosecuted the case and the
sentencing judge, are carefully considered. The likely
impact of favorable action in the district or
nationally, particularly on current law enforcement
priorities, will always be relevant to the President's
decision.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ U.S. Attorney's Manual 1-2.112.
The U.S. Attorney's manual also contains standards for the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
consideration of commutation petitions:
Generally, commutation of sentence is an extraordinary
remedy that is rarely granted. Appropriate grounds for
considering commutation have traditionally included
disparity or undue severity of sentence, critical
illness or old age, and meritorious service rendered to
the government by the petitioner, e.g., cooperation
with investigative or prosecutive efforts that has not
been adequately rewarded by other official action.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ U.S. Attorney's Manual 1-2.113.
A second source of guidance comes from a 1996 memorandum
from then-White House Counsel Jack Quinn to Deputy Attorney
General Jamie Gorelick and Pardon Attorney Margaret Colgate
Love. In this memorandum, Quinn issued a number of directives
from President Clinton regarding the exercise of his clemency
authority. Quinn first stated that the ``President intends to
continue to rely greatly on your joint recommendations
regarding clemency applications.'' Quinn also stated that
President Clinton had identified a number of factors in
addition to those listed in the U.S. Attorney's Manual, which
he wanted considered as part of the review of clemency
petitions:
The following circumstances would weigh in favor of
granting clemency:
1. Indications that the crime for which clemency is
sought was truly abberational, i.e., a lone instance of
criminal behavior in an otherwise exemplary life.
2. Cases committed long ago when the individual was
very young and which do not involve major crimes.
3. Cases not involving major crimes in which the
individual has clearly turned his or her life around by
making sustained and significant contributions to the
community since being released from prison.
By contrast, in certain cases, even extraordinarily
exemplary actions post-conviction may not merit the
remedy of executive clemency. These cases might
include:
1. The commission of major crimes: There are categories
of crimes which are so serious that the President will
not consider granting a pardon for them under almost
any circumstances. Such crimes would include large-
scale drug trafficking, sex offenses involving minors,
offenses involving central involvement in political
corruption, or violent crimes such as murder or rape.
2. An extensive criminal history: Three or more
separate convictions should raise a substantial
presumption against granting a pardon with respect to
any one of them. This presumption would only be
overcome by a truly exceptional rehabilitative history
involving exemplary service to the individual's
community or country.\21\
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\21\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0556-57 (Memorandum from
Jack Quinn to Jamie Gorelick (Jan. 26, 1996)) (Exhibit 2).
The final source of guidance regarding the exercise of the
President's clemency power is, of course, the President's own
personal views. In 1996, President Clinton was asked if he was
considering a pardon for Susan McDougal and other Whitewater
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
defendants. He responded:
[M]y position would be that their cases should be
handled like others . . . there's a regular process for
that, and I have regular meetings on that. And I review
those cases as they come up and after there's an
evaluation done by the Justice Department, and that's
how I think it should be handled.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Sept.
23, 1996).
Therefore, the President suggested that the McDougal case,
and all others, would be handled according to the ``regular
process,'' including screening by the Justice Department.
As to the President's claim that he would follow the
``regular process,'' he granted clemency to 30 individuals who
had not even filed clemency petitions with the Justice
Department,\23\ and some who had not filed any petition at all,
not even with the White House.\24\ The President also granted
clemency to 14 individuals who had their petitions previously
denied and thus were not pending with the Justice
Department.\25\ Even more important, in a number of cases,
President Clinton dramatically deviated from the ``regular
process'' of seeking the Justice Department's input.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Letter from Sheryl Walter, Office of Legislative Affairs,
Department of Justice, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform (Feb. 6, 2001) (Exhibit 3).
\24\ The Committee has not attempted to discover every single case
where clemency was granted without a clemency petition being filed.
However, it has been reported that a number of individuals who were
convicted in connection with independent counsel investigations, for
example, Richard Douglas, Alvarez Ferrouillet, John Hemmingson, James
H. Lake, Brook K. Mitchell, Sr., Jack L. Williams, Ronald Blackley,
Henry Cisneros, and Linda Jones all received grants of clemency without
having filed a petition with either the White House or the Justice
Department. See Weston Kosova, Running on Fumes: Pulling All-Nighters,
Bill Clinton Spent His Last Days Obsessing Over Details and Pardons,
Newsweek, Feb. 26, 2001, at 30.
\25\ Letter from Sheryl Walter, Office of Legislative Affairs,
Department of Justice, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform (Feb. 6, 2001) (Exhibit 3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many of the President's last-minute grants of clemency
violated all of these standards. Marc Rich and Pincus Green,
for example, fail all five Justice Department criteria for
pardons. They did not demonstrate responsible behavior after
their indictment. Rather, by all accounts, they have remained
fugitives from justice and continued to engage in business
relations with the enemies of the United States. Their offenses
were serious and notorious crimes for which, according to the
Justice Department, a suitable length of time should pass
between conviction and pardon. Yet Rich and Green never even
stood trial. Rich and Green did not demonstrate any
responsibility, remorse, or atonement for their crimes. Rather,
they maintained that they were ``singled out'' and unfairly
prosecuted. Rich and Green had no real need for relief. They
lived in luxury and apparently sought the pardons only so that
they could travel freely around the world, without the fear of
being apprehended by the U.S. Marshals Service in countries
that were cooperating with U.S. efforts to apprehend them.
Finally, there were no official recommendations or reports
regarding the Rich and Green pardons, since the White House
circumvented the normal pardon review process. If there had
been such reports, however, it is safe to assume that the U.S.
Attorney's office would have strongly objected to the Rich and
Green pardons.
The other grants of clemency reviewed in this report also
fail to meet the applicable standards. Carlos Vignali satisfies
none of the appropriate grounds for commutation identified in
Justice Department regulations, as his sentence was not
disparate or unfair, and he did not cooperate with law
enforcement. As a large-scale drug dealer, Vignali also was not
eligible for clemency under the President's own guidelines of
1996. Harvey Weinig similarly failed all relevant standards,
having been sentenced fairly and having never cooperated with
law enforcement. Weinig, as a large-scale money launderer for
the Cali Cartel, also was ineligible for clemency under the
President's guidelines. Glenn Braswell clearly failed to meet
the standards for a pardon, as he was under active
investigation for new criminal acts at the time he received a
pardon. Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory similarly fell short of the
applicable standard, having committed one of the largest bank
frauds in Alabama history. Moreover, prosecutors objected to
the Gregory pardons.
C. Individuals Close to President Clinton Used Their Influence to Lobby
for Undeserved Grants of Clemency
One of the most disturbing aspects of the closing month of
President Clinton's term in office is that a number of people
close to the President used their relationship with him to
lobby for clemency grants which ordinarily would not have been
considered. While there are certainly individuals who would
seek to abuse their access in any administration, never have
they been so successful as in the Clinton Administration. Jack
Quinn abused his relationship with the President to lobby for
the pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green. There can be little
doubt that these pardons would not have been issued if Jack
Quinn had not exploited his position as former White House
Counsel. Hugh Rodham successfully lobbied the President for
grants of clemency to Carlos Vignali and Glenn Braswell. Tony
Rodham successfully lobbied the President to grant pardons to
Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory. David Dreyer, a former White House
staffer, lobbied the President to grant a commutation to his
cousin, Cali cartel money launderer Harvey Weinig.
It is clear that none of these grants of clemency would
have been issued on the merits. Marc Rich and Pincus Green were
fugitives from justice, indicted for the largest tax evasion
scheme in U.S. history and for selling oil to Iran while
Americans were being held hostage. Carlos Vignali was the
source of cocaine for a major drug dealing ring. Glenn Braswell
was an extremely successful con artist who was actually under
criminal investigation at the time he received his pardon from
President Clinton. Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory had been
convicted for the largest bank fraud in Alabama history. Harvey
Weinig laundered millions of dollars for the Cali cartel and
participated in a kidnapping, and was only caught when he began
to steal money from the Cali cartel. Only by capitalizing on
relationships between President Clinton and individuals close
to him were these petitioners able to obtain grants of
clemency.
D. A Number of Potential Violations of Law Have Been Discovered by the
Committee
In the course of its investigation, the Committee has
learned of a number of potential violations of law by Roger
Clinton and Tony Rodham. The Committee recommends that the
Department of Justice review these matters in conjunction with
the ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by the U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York.
The Committee has uncovered a number of potential criminal
acts by Roger Clinton. First, Roger Clinton may have imported
more than $10,000 in monetary instruments into the United
States without properly disclosing it to the Customs Service.
Clinton received substantial sums of money originating from
overseas between 1998 and 2000. If Clinton imported this money
into the United States, then he was required to report it to
proper authorities and apparently did not do so. Second, Roger
Clinton appears to have violated the Lobbying Disclosure Act.
There is evidence that Roger Clinton lobbied the President
regarding travel restrictions to Cuba. Clinton did not register
as a lobbyist, despite the fact that he was likely required to
do so. Third, Clinton lied to FBI agents who interviewed him
regarding his lobbying for Rosario Gambino in 1999. When they
interviewed Roger Clinton, he claimed that ``he did not
represent to anyone on the Parole Commission that his brother
was aware of his efforts to assist the Gambino family.'' \26\
However, when Clinton lobbied the U.S. Parole Commission, he
had explicitly stated that his brother was ``completely aware''
of his involvement.\27\ Roger Clinton also lied to the FBI
about a $50,000 payment from the Gambino family.\28\ Although
he deposited the payment the same day as the FBI interview, he
did not disclose it to the agents explicitly or truthfully.
Rather he claimed that Rosario Gambino's son had offered to
loan him money for a down payment on a house.\29\ Despite this
claim to the FBI, which Clinton repeated to the media in the
summer of 2001, bank records indicate that Clinton neither used
the $50,000 for a down payment nor did he ever repay any of the
money. During the interview, Clinton also told three separate
and contradictory stories when questioned about a Rolex watch
he received from the Gambinos.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Department of Justice Document Production FBI-RC-00003
(Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 4).
\27\ USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A.
Stover, General Counsel, U.S. Parole Commission, to File (Jan. 31,
1996)) (Exhibit--5); Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case
Operations Manager, U.S. Parole Commission (July 27, 2001). Roger
Clinton made it clear to Parole Commission staff on multiple occasions
that President Clinton had specific knowledge that he was contacting
the Parole Commission regarding Rosario Gambino. See generally, Chapter
Two: Roger Clinton's Involvement in Lobbying for Executive Clemency,
Section II.E.1., ``Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding his Brother's
Knowledge.''
\28\ See generally, Chapter Two: Roger Clinton's Involvement in
Lobbying for Executive Clemency, Section II.E.2., ``Roger Clinton's
Statements Regarding Payment from the Gambinos.''
\29\ Department of Justice Document Production FBI-RC-00005-06
(Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 4).
\30\ The interviewing FBI agents apparently were not satisfied with
Roger Clinton's candor during the interview, as they took the unusual
step of explaining to Clinton the penalties for making false statements
during the course of the interview. Id. at FBI-RC-00006. See generally,
Chapter Two: Roger Clinton's Involvement in Lobbying for Executive
Clemency, Section II.E.3., ``Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding the
Rolex Watch.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee has also learned about Tony Rodham's
participation in a scheme to defraud Vivian Mannerud in
connection with Mannerud's effort to obtain a commutation for
her father, Fernando Fuentes Coba. Tony Rodham was introduced
to Mannerud by his business partner, Marilyn J. Parker.
Together, Rodham and Parker attempted to convince Mannerud to
hire Rodham to help her obtain a commutation for her father. In
making his pitch to Mannerud, Rodham made a number of false
statements to Mannerud, including the assertion that he was
friendly with Pardon Attorney Roger Adams, and that he would
hire a law firm at which Adams' wife was a partner. Rodham then
asked Mannerud to pay him $50,000 to help with the Fernando
Fuentes Coba commutation effort. After Mannerud refused,
Marilyn Parker called Mannerud to tell her that Rodham now only
wanted $30,000 to help with the Fuentes commutation. Mannerud
declined both offers for fear of being involved in some
improper activity. The activity by Rodham and Parker may amount
to a criminal conspiracy to defraud Vivian Mannerud. Whether or
not the conduct by Rodham and Parker amounts to criminal
activity depends greatly upon the specific evidence that can be
gathered by the Justice Department. However, it is clear that
this matter deserves thorough investigation by the Department
of Justice.
E. The Message Sent by President Clinton's Grants of Clemency
The way in which a President exercises the clemency power
speaks volumes about that President's priorities. The clemency
grants reviewed in this report send a clear message, one that
does not speak well of President Clinton. While the clemency
power is vitally important and should be used by the President,
it should not be debased, particularly where large sums of
money are flowing to relatives of the President or to
foundations in which he has a significant interest.
First, President Clinton granted pardons and commutations
to individuals who never would have received clemency but for
the fact that they hired individuals close to the President to
represent them. Marc Rich, Pincus Green, Carlos Vignali, Glenn
Braswell, Edgar Gregory, and Vonna Jo Gregory were all
extremely wealthy and were able to hire Jack Quinn, Tony
Rodham, and Hugh Rodham to lobby the White House and short-
circuit the normal clemency review procedures. The average low-
income criminal defendant does not have the money necessary to
hire a White House insider to lobby for his pardon. At best, he
can fill out his clemency application and watch it proceed
through the normal Justice Department review process. By
listening to the advice of highly-paid White House insiders
like Jack Quinn, Hugh Rodham, and Tony Rodham, and by granting
clemency to their clients, President Clinton has sent the
message that he had two standards of justice--one for the rich,
and one for the poor. Representative Elijah Cummings described
some of his concerns about this issue at the Committee's
February 8, 2001, hearing:
One of the things that concerns me about [the Rich]
pardon is that I think anybody who is sitting in this
audience or anybody who is watching this at home, you
know, when the little guy, when the Department of
Justice comes after the little guy, the guys that I
used to represent, they tear their lives apart, I mean
rip them apart. They can't afford the Mr. diGenovas,
the great lawyers, as he is and others. They do the
best they can. They spend all of their money. Their
reputations are tarnished. Even if they're found not
guilty, friends are brought in, FBI goes into their
homes, subpoenas are issued.
And when people look at Mr. Rich and others who
apparently goes off to another country, they've got the
money to do so, and it appears as if they're evading
the process. The little guys that I represent and the
women, you know, they really have a problem with that,
because they sit here and they say, wait a minute, you
know, I'm sitting in jail for 20 years. And it does not
even compare. I mean, I may have done one-millionth of
what was allegedly done here, but I'm sitting in jail.
And I didn't have the money to go off somewhere else. I
didn't have the money to do that. I didn't have the
money to hire the big-time lawyers. So it does concern
me.
* * *
And it's one thing to go to trial. It's one thing to
stay here and face the music. It's one thing to be
found not guilty. It's a whole other thing, in my
opinion, when somebody, because they have the money,
can go outside the country and evade the system. I tell
you it really concerns me because my constituents have
a major problem with that, and I do, too.\31\
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\31\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 164-65
(Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Elijah Cummings).
These concerns are shared by many on the Committee.
President Clinton's pardons did not just send the message
that he believes in two standards of justice. By pardoning
fugitives from justice, President Clinton undermined the
efforts of law enforcement officers everywhere. Since 1983,
Assistant United States Attorneys and agents of the United
States Marshals Service have been trying to apprehend Marc Rich
and Pincus Green. They listed Rich as one of the most wanted
fugitives in the world. They set up sting operations to arrest
Rich overseas. They have submitted arrest requests and
extradition requests to a number of foreign countries.
President Clinton's pardon of wanted fugitives is a direct slap
in the face to the U.S. law enforcement officers who spent
almost two decades trying to apprehend Rich. The pardons also
could serve to undermine U.S. efforts to extradite fugitives in
the future.
By commuting the sentences of Carlos Vignali and Harvey
Weinig, President Clinton undermined U.S. efforts to fight the
flow of illegal drugs into the country. Neither was a minor
participant in drug trafficking. Vignali supplied cocaine to
the largest drug-dealing ring in Minnesota history. Moreover,
he never cooperated with law enforcement and failed to reveal
where he obtained his cocaine. Harvey Weinig laundered millions
of dollars for the Cali cartel. Without individuals like Harvey
Weinig, drug traffickers would not be able to enjoy the
proceeds from their drug sales. Despite the seriousness of
their crimes, President Clinton commuted the sentences of both
Vignali and Weinig.
The message of these commutations was loud and clear. Tony
Adams, a narcotics detective in Minnesota, spoke eloquently to
the meaning of the Vignali commutation. Adams stated that he
was stunned to learn of the commutation: ``It's like,
basically, you've just been told that this kid, he's
untouchable.'' \32\ Adams observed that the Vignali case ``more
or less tells us that America's system has been bought if you
have money.'' \33\ He also observed that ``politicians always
get in front of this camera and say ``We're trying to take dope
off the streets. We're trying to put dope dealers in jail.''
Well, you just let one out, a big one.'' \34\ Finally, Adams
suggested that ``the politicians in L.A. or Washington, D.C.,
should finish the nine years that [Vignali] has left on his
time, and I'm standing right by that.'' \35\ Adams is certainly
not alone in his criticism of the Vignali commutation, but his
comments are particularly noteworthy, coming from a detective
who investigated the case, and who routinely places his life on
the line to protect the public from drug traffickers.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, Working the American
System, L.A. Times, Apr. 29, 2001, at 10.
\33\ Fox Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox News television
broadcast, Feb. 27, 2001).
\34\ Nightline (ABC News television broadcast, Feb. 23, 2001).
\35\ Fox Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox News television
broadcast, Feb. 23, 2001).
\36\ While conducting plainclothes surveillance in April 2001,
Adams was shot at by a suspect and escaped uninjured. David Chanen, Man
Fires at Officer, But Nobody is Hurt, Star Trib. (Minneapolis, MN),
Apr. 20, 2001, at 9B.
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The Weinig case has sent no less a destructive message to
U.S. law enforcement. In fact, the Weinig commutation has
created a great deal of consternation in Latin American nations
from which the U.S. is attempting to extradite drug kingpins.
Many individuals in these nations have argued that they should
not extradite their citizens to the U.S. for narcotics offenses
because the U.S. clearly is not serious about enforcing its
narcotics laws, pointing specifically to the Weinig
commutation.\37\ By pardoning a major money launderer for the
Cali cartel, President Clinton has made it harder for the U.S.
to extradite drug traffickers to the U.S. and harder to fight
the war on drugs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ See Colombian General Hits Clinton Commutation, Wash. Times,
Mar. 6, 2001, at A13; Russell Crandall, The Americas: In the War on
Drugs, Colombians Die, Americans Are Pardoned, Wall St. J., Apr. 20,
2001, at A15.
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F. Obstacles Faced by the Committee
The Committee conducted a thorough investigation,
interviewing dozens of witnesses. The majority of parties
contacted by the Committee cooperated with the investigation.
However, a number of key individuals refused to cooperate,
which in turn seriously hampered the Committee's investigation.
1. Witnesses Who Have Not Cooperated with the Investigation
The Committee has faced a number of obstacles that have
prevented it from discovering the full truth regarding the
pardon and commutations which it investigated. The greatest
problem faced by the Committee was that a number of key
witnesses invoked their Fifth Amendment rights or otherwise
refused to cooperate with the Committee's investigation. A
total of 26 witnesses either invoked their Fifth Amendment
rights or refused to be interviewed in the course of the
Committee's investigation. Some of these witnesses, like Marc
Rich, Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz, and Roger Clinton, were
critically important. The impact of the refusal of key
witnesses to cooperate is discussed below in the relevant
chapters regarding each part of the investigation.
Another significant problem the Committee has faced is the
refusal of a number of parties to produce records subpoenaed or
requested by the Committee. A number of document requests
issued by the Committee have not been complied with by their
recipients, either because of an invocation of Fifth Amendment
rights or an invocation of attorney-client privilege. In some
cases, the invocation of privilege has been spurious. For
example, Hugh Rodham refused to produce any records regarding
the Vignali matter because of the attorney-client privilege.
Obviously, Rodham possesses records which are not privileged,
which he could provide to the Committee, however, he simply
declined to do so.\38\ This refusal adversely impacted the
ability of the Committee to develop a full understanding of
Rodham's work on the Vignali matter. The specific problems
faced by the Committee in each aspect of the pardon
investigation are discussed below in the relevant chapters
regarding each pardon and commutation.
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\38\ Such records would include records provided to Rodham by third
parties and documents which Rodham provided to third parties.
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2. The White House
It is a matter of some concern that the Bush White House
and Justice Department failed to cooperate fully with the
Committee's investigation. Early in its investigation of the
Marc Rich pardon, the Chairman requested that former President
Clinton waive any claim of executive privilege he might have
over testimony and documents relating to the pardons and
commutations he granted.\39\ On February 27, 2001, former
President Clinton's attorney, David Kendall, sent the Chairman
a letter in which he informed the Committee that ``he will
interpose no Executive Privilege objections to the testimony of
his former staff concerning these pardons, or to other pardons
and commutations he granted.'' \40\ Despite former President
Clinton's decision to waive executive privilege, the Committee
faced a number of problems receiving records relating to the
pardons and commutations, both from the White House and the
Justice Department.
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\39\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt.
Reform, to former President William J. Clinton (Feb. 15, 2001) (Exhibit
6).
\40\ Letter from David E. Kendall, Counsel for President Clinton,
Williams & Connolly, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform (Feb. 27, 2001) (Exhibit 7). In addition to waiving any
claim of privilege with respect to the testimony of his former staff,
President Clinton has not raised executive privilege with respect to
any of the records the Committee has requested from the National
Archives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beginning on January 25, 2001, the Committee issued a
series of document requests to the National Archives and
Records Administration (``NARA''), seeking records relating to
pardons and commutations issued or considered by former
President Clinton. Under the Presidential Records Act, once the
responsive records were located by NARA staff, they were
provided to staff for former President Clinton to be reviewed
for executive privilege concerns.\41\ After President Clinton's
staff had reviewed them, the records were reviewed by staff for
President Bush, who independently has the right to assert
executive privilege over the records. The Committee's first
requests to NARA for records relating to Marc Rich and Pincus
Green were satisfied. However, shortly thereafter, the
Committee began to have significant problems receiving the
records it had requested from NARA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ See 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2204 (2002).
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On March 8, 2001, the Committee issued a request to NARA
for records relating to the pardons and commutations of a
number of individuals--including Glenn Braswell, Carlos
Vignali, Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory, and Eugene and Nora Lum--
as well as records relating to Roger Clinton's involvement in
lobbying for pardons. The Committee's request called for the
records to be provided to the Committee by March 22, 2001. At
some point in April 2001, NARA had gathered all of the
responsive documents, and they had been reviewed and cleared by
the office of former President Clinton. However, they had not
been provided to the Committee because of objections from the
Bush White House Counsel's Office.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Notes of Telephone Conversation with Amy Krupsky, Associate
General Counsel, National Archives and Records Administration (May 1,
2001).
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Committee staff spent the next month engaged in fruitless
negotiations with the Bush White House regarding the production
of the requested records. Staff from the Bush White House
explained that they had concerns about producing the requested
records, because the records went to the heart of the clemency
review process, which was part of a core Presidential power.
During these negotiations, Committee staff pointed out that the
White House had been delaying the production of a wide variety
of records from NARA, including documents sent into the White
House from individuals seeking pardons, and that these records
could not possibly raise any privilege concerns. The White
House agreed to provide these types of non-deliberative records
to the Committee.\43\
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\43\ The White House did not agree to provide records provided to
the White House from third parties until June 6, 2001. It is unclear
why these types of records, which were clearly not privileged, were
withheld from the Committee for so long. The delay in the production of
these records--which did not occur until three months after they were
requested--imposed a substantial delay on the Committee's
investigation.
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However, the White House was not nearly so accommodating
with respect to deliberative documents about the clemency
process that were generated inside of the Clinton
Administration. White House staff informed the Committee staff
that the White House did not plan to assert executive privilege
over these records but would simply decline to produce them and
hope that the Committee understood the reasons why. Committee
staff attempted to explain that a number of these records were
critically important to the Committee's investigation. For
example, the report prepared by Pardon Attorney Roger Adams
regarding the Vignali commutation was central to the
Committee's understanding of the Vignali matter. Committee
staff also offered to reach a number of compromise
accommodations, which would satisfy the Committee's needs to
review the Adams memo, while still protecting the White House's
interests. All of these offers were rejected. The White House's
refusal to reach any accommodation meant that the Committee was
unable to obtain a number of key documents regarding pardons
and commutations issued by President Clinton.
On June 7, 2001, shortly after the Committee's offers to
the White House were rejected, the Committee received a
production of records from NARA. This production apparently
included both deliberative and non-deliberative records
responsive to the Committee's March 8, 2001, request.
Approximately two weeks later, Committee staff informed the
White House that NARA had provided the Committee with a number
of records that the White House may have intended to withhold
from the Committee. Shortly thereafter, the Committee received
a telephone call and then a letter from the NARA General
Counsel, Gary Stern, requesting the return of the documents. In
his letter, Stern stated that ``some of the records that were
provided to the Committee were inadvertently produced.
Accordingly, we now request the return of these records, and
any copies made thereof.'' \44\
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\44\ Letter from Gary Stern, General Counsel, NARA, to Jim Wilson,
General Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 21, 2001) (Exhibit 8).
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However, for several reasons, the Committee decided not to
return the records in response to Stern's request. First, the
records were responsive to the Committee's request and,
therefore, should have been produced in any event. Second,
neither President Bush nor President Clinton asserted any
privilege over the documents. In the absence of a valid claim
of privilege, the Committee has a right to receive documents
responsive to its request. Third, even if President Bush or
President Clinton had asserted executive privilege, the
Committee might have determined to keep certain essential
records produced by NARA on June 7, 2001. A number of these
records were critical to the Committee's investigation and did
not raise legitimate executive privilege concerns. However,
since neither the current nor the former President raised any
such privilege, the Committee used these documents in its
investigation and in this report.
The documents that were ``inadvertently'' produced to the
Committee were of central importance to the Committee's
investigation. The following is a brief description of some of
the records included in that production:
All White House records regarding the Vignali
commutation: These records included the report by Pardon
Attorney Roger Adams objecting to the Vignali commutation.\45\
This report was of critical importance to the Committee, as it
showed the extent to which the Clinton White House was aware of
Carlos Vignali's criminal activities. These records also
included one White House document indicating that Hugh Rodham
had informed the White House staff that the Vignali commutation
was ``very important'' to First Lady Hillary Clinton.\46\
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\45\ See NARA Document Production (Report to the President on
Proposed Denial of Executive Clemency for Carlos Anibal Vignali, Jr.,
Jan. 12, 2001) (Exhibit 9).
\46\ See NARA Document Production (Note from Dawn Woolen,
Administrative Assistant, to Bruce Lindsey, Deputy Chief of Staff, the
White House) (Exhibit 10).
Documents that led the Committee to uncover Roger
Clinton's efforts to obtain a commutation for organized crime
figure Rosario Gambino: Before receiving these records from
NARA, the Committee was aware only of a payment of $50,000 from
Anna Gambino to Roger Clinton. Only after receiving these
documents did the Committee have reason to believe this payment
might be related to an effort to free Rosario Gambino from
prison.\47\
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\47\ Committee staff had been unable to reach Mrs. Gambino or
determine the purpose of her payment. The key document in the NARA
production was a note apparently drafted by White House staffer
Meredith Cabe which referenced the fact that she was requesting an NCIC
check on Rosario Gambino. Given the fact that Rosario Gambino was a
well-known organized crime figure who was an exceedingly unlikely
candidate for a legitimate grant of clemency, the Committee
investigated this matter and determined that Anna Gambino was Rosario
Gambino's daughter, and that the payment of $50,000 from Anna Gambino
to Roger Clinton was part of the Gambinos' efforts to obtain a
commutation for Rosario Gambino.
Documents showing three additional pardons that
Roger Clinton attempted to obtain: These documents indicated
that representatives of Mark St. Pe and Steven Griggs sent
materials requesting pardons to Roger Clinton at the White
House, and that these materials were forwarded to the White
House Counsel's office. Another document indicating that
William McCord had sent a petition was produced in the midst of
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other Roger Clinton-related material.
Pardon Attorney Roger Adams' report on the
commutation of drug money launderer Harvey Weinig: This report
demonstrated that the White House was fully aware of the extent
of Weinig's criminal activities, including his role in a
kidnapping.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ See NARA Document Production (Report to the President on
Proposed Denial of Executive Clemency for Harvey Weinig) (Exhibit 11).
Given the importance of these records to the Committee's
investigation, and the absence of any claim of privilege over
the documents, the Committee decided to use the records in its
investigation and in this report. Given the apparent
sensitivity of the records to the White House, the Committee is
using only those records which are directly relevant to
necessary subject matter covered in this report.
The Committee must emphasize that it is disappointed with
the way the Administration handled its requests for documents
relating to the pardon matter. It is clear that if a large
number of documents relating to the pardon had not been
``inadvertently'' produced by NARA personnel on June 7, the
Committee would never have received those records.
Consequently, Members of Congress, historians, and the public
might never have known about many of the significant abuses of
public trust detailed in this report. Developments since June
2001 have made it clear that the Administration is engaged in a
wide-ranging effort to expand executive privilege beyond its
traditional boundaries and reduce Congressional oversight of
the White House and Justice Department. It is disappointing
that the Bush Administration would attempt to withhold key
documents from the Committee in an investigation like this,
where the Committee is looking into allegations of malfeasance
at the highest levels of government. That the Bush
Administration attempted to withhold these records even though
former President Clinton approved their release is especially
discouraging.
3. The Justice Department
The recalcitrance of the Bush Administration in refusing to
turn over records in the pardon investigation also extended to
the Justice Department. The Justice Department refused to
provide a number of records requested by the Committee in the
course of its investigation. Most of these documents related to
the Committee's investigation of Roger Clinton, specifically
relating to Roger Clinton's efforts to obtain a commutation for
Rosario Gambino. The Committee requested from the Justice
Department all records relating to any consideration of a grant
of clemency for Rosario Gambino, as well as all records
relating to the Justice Department's investigation of Roger
Clinton's efforts to obtain a grant of clemency for Gambino.
The Justice Department refused to comply fully with either
request.
With respect to the Committee's request for records
relating to the Justice Department's work on the Gambino
commutation request, the Department refused to turn over any
records or even specify which records it was withholding.
Apparently, the Justice Department based its refusal on
privilege concerns, presumably executive privilege, although
Justice Department staff did not identify any specific
privileges in explaining their decision.
With respect to the Committee's request for records
relating to the investigation of Roger Clinton's involvement in
the Gambino matter, the Justice Department initially provided
records but then abruptly stopped doing so. The Justice
Department claimed that it was entitled to withhold records
because of its ongoing investigation of Roger Clinton. However,
the records that the Committee sought related to the Justice
Department's investigation of Roger Clinton, which was
conducted in 1998 and 1999, and then closed, not its ongoing
investigation from the Southern District of New York. The
Justice Department's decision to withhold these records
significantly hindered the Committee's investigation of the
Gambino matter. The withheld documents likely contain the
Justice Department's rationale for failing to pursue criminal
charges against Roger Clinton, as well as the answers to key
factual questions such as whether the FBI was even aware of the
$50,000 payment from the Gambinos before the Committee
uncovered it in the summer of 2001. Without a complete
understanding of facts and reasoning underlying the Justice
Department's decision to close the Clinton-Gambino
investigation, the Committee is unable to determine whether
that decision was made in good faith or may have been tainted
by political considerations.
[Exhibits referred to follow:]
CHAPTER ONE
``TAKE JACK'S WORD'': THE PARDONS OF INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVES MARC RICH
AND PINCUS GREEN
FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE
Marc Rich and Pincus Green have a history of illegal and
corrupt business dealings contrary to the security interests of
the United States.
Rich and Green have had extensive trade with
terrorist states and other enemies of the United States.
Despite clear legal restrictions on such trade, Rich and Green
have engaged in commodities trading with Iraq, Iran, Cuba, and
other rogue states that have sponsored terrorist acts. By
engaging in these activities, Marc Rich and Pincus Green
demonstrated contempt for American laws, as well as the well-
being of Americans who were harmed or threatened by these
states.
The Central Intelligence Agency provided the
following declassified information about Marc Rich to the
Committee:
If President Clinton had checked with the CIA, he would
have learned that Marc Rich had been the subject of
inquiries by various foreign government liaison
services and domestic government agencies regarding
their ongoing investigations of criminal activity.
In addition, President Clinton would have received
information worthy of his consideration in making his
decision on the pardon. This information cannot be
declassified.
Marc Rich and Pincus Green were guilty of serious crimes and
showed contempt for the American justice system.
Marc Rich and Pincus Green attempted to obstruct the
criminal investigation of them in every way imaginable,
including attempting to smuggle subpoenaed documents out of the
country. Rich and Green's tactics resulted in a record-setting
contempt fine against them, totaling $21 million. Despite these
tactics, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York was able to indict Marc Rich and Pincus Green on 51 counts
of illegal activity, including tax evasion, mail fraud, wire
fraud, and racketeering. The evidence against them was
overwhelming.
Because of the strength of the case against them,
Marc Rich and Pincus Green fled the country rather than face
trial. Rich's own lawyer told him that by fleeing the country,
Rich had ``spit on the American flag'' and that ``whatever you
get, you deserve.'' For the 17 years leading up to his pardon,
Marc Rich was one of America's 10 most wanted international
fugitives. Although Jack Quinn, Rich's attorney, argued that
Rich did not flee the United States to avoid prosecution,
Rich's ex-wife refuted this view, stating that Rich told her
that ``I'm having tax problems with the government . . . and I
think that we are going to have to leave.''
In order to avoid extradition or apprehension by
United States law enforcement, Marc Rich and Pincus Green
attempted to renounce their United States citizenship. While
this attempt was rejected by the United States, it demonstrated
that Rich and Green had no loyalty to the United States, and
viewed their citizenship as a liability to be discarded at
will.
Rich and Green's crimes were so serious that for seventeen
years, the U.S. government devoted considerable resources to
apprehending them and closing down their business activities.
Rich and Green were such high-profile fugitives that
on a number of occasions in the 1980s and 1990s, the United
States Marshals Service attempted to arrest them in various
foreign countries. A number of countries from the United
Kingdom to Russia attempted to assist the United States in
these efforts. The pardons of Rich and Green have sent a
message that individuals can go from the FBI's most wanted list
to a Presidential pardon if they spend money and have the
proper connections. This message undermines U.S. efforts to
apprehend fugitives abroad.
Rich and Green were such high-profile fugitives that
in 1991 the Government Reform Committee, under Democratic
leadership, held a number of hearings and issued two reports
about the government's efforts to apprehend Rich and Green. At
that time, Democrats and Republicans in Congress took the Bush
Administration to task for not being aggressive enough in
hunting down Rich and Green, or shutting down their business
interests in the U.S.
While Rich and Green were fugitives from justice,
the American government took a number of actions against their
interests in the U.S. The federal government seized Rich's
assets and shut down his trade in metals and grain with the
government.
The United States government repeatedly tried to reach a plea
agreement with Rich and Green.
For a number of years after Rich and Green fled the
country, the U.S. government attempted to negotiate a plea
bargain to settle the case. The government made a number of
concessions in an attempt to reach a deal, but all offers were
rebuffed by Rich and Green, who would not agree to any deal
that resulted in jail time. While lobbying for a pardon, Jack
Quinn and Rich's other lawyers claimed that the Justice
Department had not even negotiated with Rich, and therefore,
that a pardon was justified. Quinn and the other lawyers were
misleading the White House when they made these claims.
Jack Quinn misled the White House about the Rich case and
attempted to mislead the Committee and the public regarding his
work for Marc Rich.
Marc Rich hired Jack Quinn after a recommendation
from Eric Holder. After numerous failed attempts to have his
case settled, Marc Rich hired Jack Quinn to represent him.
Quinn was hired after a recommendation from Deputy Attorney
General Eric Holder. Gershon Kekst, who worked for Marc Rich on
the pardon matter, asked Holder for a recommendation of how to
settle a criminal matter with the Justice Department. Holder
recommended that he hire a Washington lawyer ``who knows the
process, he comes to me, and we work it out.'' Holder then
explicitly recommended the hiring of Jack Quinn. While Holder
did not know that Kekst was referring to Marc Rich, it suggests
that Holder was favorably disposed to Jack Quinn, and would be
very receptive to arguments made by Quinn, no matter how
baseless they were.
Marc Rich was going to pay Jack Quinn for his work
on the pardon. After the Marc Rich pardon was granted, Jack
Quinn claimed that he was not being paid by Rich for his work
on the pardon, and that he expected no future payment for his
work on the pardon. However, the Committee has uncovered
evidence that Robert Fink, a lawyer close to Marc Rich, had
discussions with Rich and Quinn about paying Quinn for his work
on the Rich pardon. Documents which Quinn and Fink withheld
from the Committee for over a year, and which were produced
only after a federal judge ordered them produced to a grand
jury, shed further light on the contemplated payment of Quinn.
These documents indicate that Quinn raised the question of his
``status'' with Rich and asked that Rich pay him a $50,000 per
month retainer. The Committee attempted to interview Quinn
about these documents, but Quinn refused to meet with Committee
staff.
Jack Quinn may have been attempting to receive money
from Marc Rich after the pardons were granted. At the
Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing, Quinn pledged that ``I
will not bill [Rich], and I will not accept any further
compensation for work done on the pardon.'' This pledge
surprised Rich's lawyer, who expected that Rich would be paying
Quinn for his work. Indeed, records just produced to the
Committee indicate that Quinn may have been attempting to
negotiate some payment from Marc Rich shortly after he pledged
that he would not take additional money for his work. A March
5, 2001, e-mail from Quinn to Rich states ``If you are
agreeable, and I hope you are, I need to fax to you in the next
few days a new retainer agreement.'' This e-mail raises the
possibility that Quinn has been attempting to obtain payments
from Rich, in possible violation of his pledge to the
Committee. The Committee attempted to interview Quinn about
this matter, but he refused.
Jack Quinn's work on the Rich pardon was in apparent
violation of Executive Order 12834. That executive order was
enacted as part of President Clinton's promise to create ``the
most ethical administration in history,'' and it prohibited
former executive branch employees from lobbying their former
executive branch agencies within five years of their departure.
Quinn has claimed that his work on the Rich pardon came within
an exception for ``communicating . . . with regard to a . . .
criminal . . . law enforcement inquiry, investigation or
proceeding[.]'' However, this exception was clearly intended to
apply to appearances before courts, not lobbying the White
House for a pardon. The ``revolving door'' lobbying ban was
intended to apply exactly to cases like this, where a former
White House Counsel could come back and lobby the President to
take an action that had no constitutional limits on it, largely
based on the President's personal trust for that former
staffer.
The pardon petition compiled by Jack Quinn and the
other Marc Rich lawyers was highly misleading. Most of the
arguments used by Jack Quinn to justify the Rich and Green
pardons were false and misleading. These arguments could have
been completely refuted if anyone in the White House had sought
out any of the prosecutors familiar with the Rich case.
The ``letters of support'' in the pardon petition
were used in a misleading manner. Another key element of the
Rich pardon petition was a number of letters of support for
Rich and Green from prominent Americans and Israelis. Rich and
Green used these letters to try to show that their humanitarian
activities justified their pardons. However, many of these
letters were obtained under false pretenses, and the writers of
the letters were not told that they were being used to obtain a
Presidential pardon. In addition, a number of individuals who
wrote in support of Rich and Green received large amounts of
money from them.
Marc Rich and Pincus Green used a number of different
individuals with close personal relationships with President
Clinton and his staff to lobby regarding the pardon.
The role of Denise Rich. Denise Rich played a key
role in obtaining the Rich and Green pardons. Denise Rich had a
close relationship with President Clinton, which was based in
part on her role as a large-scale contributor to Democratic
causes and the Clinton library, and in part on her extensive
personal contacts with President Clinton. Denise Rich used this
relationship with President Clinton to lobby for the Marc Rich
pardon on a number of occasions. Denise Rich has refused to
cooperate with the Committee, invoking her Fifth Amendment
rights rather than answer questions about her role in the
pardon.
The role of Beth Dozoretz. Beth Dozoretz, another
close friend of President Clinton, played a key role in
obtaining the Rich pardon. Like Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz had
a relationship with President Clinton built on personal ties
and political fundraising. Dozoretz has raised and contributed
millions of dollars for the Democratic party, and has pledged
to raise an additional million dollars for the Clinton library.
Beth Dozoretz also has close relationships with Denise Rich and
Jack Quinn. Dozoretz used her close relationship with President
Clinton to lobby for the Rich pardon. Because Dozoretz has
invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination,
the Committee is unable to conclude whether or not Dozoretz
made any linkage between contributions to the DNC or the
Clinton library and the granting of the Rich pardon.
The role of Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Barak spoke to President Clinton three times
about the Rich pardon. In his public statements about the Rich
pardon, President Clinton has pointed to these conversations
with Prime Minister Barak as one of the primary reasons he
granted the pardon. However an examination of the transcripts
of the calls shows that Barak did not make a particularly
impassioned plea for Rich. Therefore, it appears that the
President may be attempting to use Prime Minister Barak's
interest in the Rich matter as a cover for his own motivations
for granting the Rich pardon.
Barak had met with Rich personally and told Clinton
that the Rich pardon ``could be important . . . not just
financially, but he helped Mossad on more than one case.''
Barak's statement raises the possibility that either Barak or
Clinton acted on the Rich matter because of some promise of
future financial return.
Eric Holder and Jack Quinn worked together to cut the Justice
Department out of the decisionmaking process. Holder's decision
to support the pardon had a critical impact.
Jack Quinn and Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder
worked together to ensure that the Justice Department,
especially the prosecutors of the Southern District of New
York, did not have an opportunity to express an opinion on the
Rich pardon before it was granted. The evidence amassed by the
Committee indicates that Holder advised Quinn to file the Rich
pardon petition with the White House and leave the Justice
Department out of the process. One e-mail produced to the
Committee suggests that Holder told Quinn to ``go straight to
wh,'' and that the ``timing is good.'' The evidence also
indicates that Holder failed to inform the prosecutors under
him that the Rich pardon was under consideration, despite the
fact that he was aware of the pardon effort for almost two
months before it was granted.
Eric Holder's support of the Rich pardon played a
critical role in the success of the pardon effort. Holder
informed the White House that he was ``neutral, leaning towards
favorable'' on the Rich pardon, even though he knew that Rich
was a fugitive from justice, and that Justice Department
prosecutors viewed Rich with such contempt that they would no
longer meet with his lawyers. Holder has failed to offer any
credible justification for his support of the Rich pardon,
leading the Committee to believe that Holder had other
motivations for his decision, which he has failed to share with
the Committee.
Eric Holder was seeking Jack Quinn's support to be
appointed as Attorney General in a potential Gore
Administration, and this may have affected Holder's judgment in
the Rich matter. On several occasions, Holder sought out
Quinn's endorsement to be appointed as Attorney General if Al
Gore were to win the November 2000 election. Quinn was a Gore
confidant whose endorsement would carry great weight. Holder's
initial help to Quinn in the Rich matter predated the Supreme
Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, and accordingly, Holder had
some legitimate prospect of being appointed Attorney General
when he was helping Quinn keep the Rich matter from the Justice
Department's scrutiny. While Holder denies that his desire to
be appointed Attorney General had anything to do with his
actions in the Rich matter, it provides a much clearer and more
believable motivation than any offered by Holder to date.
President Clinton made his decision knowing almost nothing
about the Rich case, making a number of mistaken assumptions
and reaching false conclusions.
The White House never consulted with the prosecutors
in the Southern District of New York regarding the Rich case.
As a result, the White House staff was never able to refute the
false and misleading arguments made in the Marc Rich pardon
petition.
Every White House staff member who was working on
the Rich pardon opposed it. However, because they failed to do
the necessary background research on the Rich case, they were
unable to refute the arguments made by Jack Quinn.
President Clinton was misled by Jack Quinn in their
negotiations regarding the Rich pardon. Late in the evening of
January 19, 2001, President Clinton and Jack Quinn had a
telephone discussion regarding the Rich pardon. During this
conversation, Quinn repeated his usual misleading arguments
about the Rich case. Quinn also offered to make his clients
subject to civil liability for their actions. In furtherance of
this offer, Quinn agreed to waive all statute of limitations
and other defenses, which Rich and Green would have as a result
of their fugitivity. President Clinton has cited this waiver as
a key factor in his decision to grant the pardons. However, if
President Clinton or his staff had done even cursory legal
research, they would have understood that this was a hollow,
meaningless deal. First, Quinn agreed to waive defenses that
Rich and Green did not have. It is basic legal doctrine that
fugitivity tolls the statute of limitations. Second, Rich and
Green likely do not face any civil liability for their crimes,
since those fines were already paid by their companies. Third,
Rich and Green had been willing to pay $100 million to settle
their case for years. A fine, even a large one, would have had
no impact on Rich and Green, and it would merely stand for the
proposition that the U.S. justice system is for sale.
When the White House did finally provide the names
of Marc Rich and Pincus Green for a Justice Department
background check in the middle of the night on January 19,
2001, the check turned up new, troubling information which was
disregarded by President Clinton. When the White House
requested the Justice Department to perform a computer
background check on Rich and Green prior to granting the
pardons, the check came back with information that they were
wanted for ``arms trading.'' This was new information for all
of the White House staff, and it raised serious questions among
them as to whether the pardons should be granted. However, the
only step the White House took to check on this allegation was
to call Jack Quinn. Quinn predictably denied that his clients
were involved in arms trading. Faced with this conflicting
information about Rich and Green, President Clinton instructed
his staff to ``take Jack's word,'' and issue the pardons.
President Clinton has failed to offer a full accounting for his
decision to issue the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardons.
President Clinton has failed to answer any questions
about the Rich and Green pardons. The few statements that he
has issued have been misleading, incomplete, and raised more
questions than they answered. Given his complete failure to
explain the pardons, the Committee is left with serious
unanswered questions regarding President Clinton's motives.
INTRODUCTION
The pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green were the most
controversial and most outrageous pardons issued by President
Clinton, and likely, by any President. Rich and Green were
fugitives from justice, and were two of the largest tax cheats
in U.S. history. In addition, they had a long and disgraceful
record of trading with America's enemies, helping prop up the
Ayatollah Khomeini, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi, and the
Russian mafia, among others. This track record has led even
Marc Rich's lawyers to call him a ``traitor'' and observe that
he has ``spit on the American flag.''
It is beyond any dispute that Marc Rich and Pincus Green
did not deserve pardons. Therefore, the inevitable question is
why the President granted them. Some believe that the Rich and
Green pardons were the product of a pardon process that
completely broke down at the end of the Clinton Administration.
These individuals would argue that in his rush to create a
legacy at the end of his term, President Clinton short-
circuited the normal clemency review process, and granted
pardons without conducting the due diligence that was required.
While this is hardly a charitable view of President Clinton, it
is the most innocuous explanation that can be presented for the
Rich and Green pardons.
There are a number of reasons to believe that the pardons
were not just the product of a sloppy process. After all, even
though they did not fully understand the scope of Rich and
Green's crimes, the President and White House staff grasped the
essentials of the Rich case: Rich and Green were massive tax
cheats, fugitives from justice, and had traded with the enemy.
Yet, they received the pardons despite these damning facts.
Therefore, the Committee has looked at the motives of the key
players in the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardon effort.
The evidence raises many questions regarding the motives of
the key players.
Jack Quinn, for example, used his influence as a
former White House Counsel to lobby the President on Rich's
behalf. Quinn repeatedly provided misinformation to the White
House. At the height of the public's outcry about the Rich
case, Quinn claimed that he was representing Rich on a pro bono
basis. However, the evidence obtained by the Committee shows
that Quinn was attempting to secure a lucrative payment from
Rich, and may still be trying to obtain payment from Rich.
Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder provided
critical support for the Rich pardon. While Holder should have
ensured that the Justice Department's views were represented in
the pardon process, Holder instead advised Jack Quinn on how to
cut the Justice Department out of the process. While all of the
White House staff was opposing the Rich and Green pardons, Eric
Holder provided critical support for it at the eleventh hour.
Holder may claim that his actions were the result of
misjudgment, but Holder himself admitted that he was seeking
Quinn's support to be nominated as Attorney General if Al Gore
was elected President. This created a conflict of interest for
Holder.
Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz were both close
friends of President Clinton and major contributors to the
Democratic Party. In addition, Denise Rich contributed $450,000
to the Clinton Library, and Dozoretz pledged to raise $1
million for the Clinton Library. Both lobbied the President on
the Rich pardon. Both have also invoked their Fifth Amendment
rights rather than testify about their discussions with the
President.
President Clinton is ultimately responsible for the
pardons, and must ultimately provide an explanation of why he
granted them. He has, however, failed to provide any
satisfactory rationale for his actions. He has failed to answer
any serious questions, and instead, has offered only one self-
serving, factually inaccurate newspaper column to justify the
pardons. President Clinton's attempted explanations have raised
more questions than answers about his motivations for granting
two of the most unjustified pardons in U.S. history.
Regardless of the motivations for the Rich and Green
pardons, the nation must live with the consequences of them.
The pardons have sent two equally destructive messages. First,
by granting the pardons, President Clinton undermined the
efforts of U.S. law enforcement to apprehend fugitives abroad.
By pardoning a man who evaded capture by the U.S. Marshals
Service for almost two decades, President Clinton sent the
message that indeed, crime can pay, and that it may be
worthwhile to remain a fugitive rather than face charges. The
pardon also could undermine U.S. efforts to obtain extradition
of fugitives from foreign countries. When a man like Rich can
go from the Justice Department's most wanted to a free man with
a stroke of the pen, it is difficult for the U.S. to credibly
demand the extradition of wanted fugitives. Finally, the
pardons send the message that President Clinton did believe
that different rules applied to wealthy criminals. If he did
not have the money to hire Jack Quinn and his White House
access, Marc Rich never would have obtained a pardon. The
President abused one of his most important powers, meant to
free the unjustly convicted or provide forgiveness to those who
have served their time and changed their lives. Instead, he
offered it up to wealthy fugitives whose money had already
enabled them to permanently escape American justice. Few other
abuses could so thoroughly undermine public trust in
government.
I. BACKGROUND OF MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN
A. Rich and Green's Business Activities
1. How Rich and Green Became Wealthy
Marc Rich is one of the wealthiest people in the world. His
network of business enterprises is estimated to generate
upwards of $30 billion annually.\1\ Rich's personal net worth
is estimated at between $1.5 and $8 billion.\2\ Along with his
business partner Pincus ``Pinky'' Green, Rich has made this
fortune principally through the commodities trading business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Josh Getlin, Clinton Pardons a Billionaire Fugitive, and
Questions Abound, L.A. Times, Jan. 24, 2001, at A1.
\2\ A. Craig Copetas, Court TV Chat Transcript (visited Mar. 10,
2002) http://www.courttv.com/talk/chat--transcripts/2001/0220rich-
copetas.html. It should be noted that estimates of Rich's personal
fortune are probably lower than the actual amount because of Rich's
history of questionable accounting and tax evasion, including that for
which he was indicted in 1983.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rich began his career as a commodities trader in 1954 with
the New York office of the trading firm Philipp Brothers.\3\
Rich traded in a wide variety of commodities, including
precious metals. Throughout his early career he was highly
successful, amassing huge profits for the firm. Over time, Rich
also developed a niche within the firm as a crude oil trader.
He and Green revolutionized international oil trading by
creating the ``spot market,'' which is the practice of
purchasing oil from producers and immediately selling it to
refineries for a large profit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-
Dollar Scam 65 (1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After more than twenty years of trading for Philipp
Brothers, Rich decided that he could make more money on his
own. In 1975, while managing Philipp Brothers' Madrid office,
Rich called a meeting of the firm's European managers in Zug,
Switzerland, during which he demanded an impossibly high
bonus.\4\ When, as expected, Rich's boss refused, Rich
announced that he was leaving the firm to start his own
company. He left with Pincus Green, taking six other top
traders from the firm, as well as files of information on
Philipp Brothers' clients.\5\ Rich's new firm was a success,
and Rich was well on his way to becoming a billionaire. By
1982, Marc Rich + Co. A.G. had become the second largest
commodities firm in the world.\6\ However, as Rich's biographer
explained, the initial financing for Rich's new company was
based largely on ``a promise from Iranian Senator Ali Rezai to
help set up a series of no-holds-barred oil deals that would,
in part, lead to making Marc Rich the most wanted white-collar
fugitive in American history.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Id. at 96.
\5\ Id. at 99.
\6\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 98 (Feb.
8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., and
Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y.,
Department of Justice).
\7\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-
Dollar Scam 99 (1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Marc Rich's History of Illegal and Improper Business
Dealings
Even before he had departed Philipp Brothers, Marc Rich
developed a reputation as a shrewd and unethical manipulator.
As fellow Phillip Brothers' trader Bill Spier explained, ``What
separated our friendship was his belief that you could only
make it bigger and better than the next guy by buying people
off. Marc was suave and sophisticated and obsessed with power.
He was always looking to see who he could buy off.'' \8\ While
at Philipp Brothers, Rich also learned to deal with rogue
political regimes in order to make a profit. For example, in
1958, Rich was sent to Cuba, and continued to work there after
the fall of the Batista regime. As one former associate
explained, ``Marc cut his teeth in Havana, and the experience
shaped his character because it taught him that being illegal
was okay under certain conditions[.]'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Id. at 66.
\9\ Id. at 71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Once he set up his own business enterprise, Rich's
questionable practices appear to have expanded. His trading
empire was based largely on systematic bribes and kickbacks to
corrupt local officials. For example, in 1977, one of Rich's
traders claimed to have deposited $125,000 into the Swiss bank
account of Reza Fallah, then-head of the Iranian National Oil
Company, in exchange for ``services rendered'' in securing a
shipment of Iranian oil to Spain.\10\ In 1978, Rich and Green
were caught diverting Nigerian oil shipments to South Africa.
When the Nigerians threatened to cut off relations with Rich,
he paid a $1 million bribe to the Nigerian transport minister
to get the contract back.\11\ Rich also reportedly paid former
Jamaican President Edward Seaga $45,000 to send the Jamaican
track and field team to the 1984 Olympics. In return, Rich
signed a ten-year agreement to purchase most of the output of
the Jamaican Alcoa plant, which annually produced a significant
portion of the world's aluminum.\12\ One former Rich trader
explained the standard practices of Rich's companies as
follows: ``[t]o go into places like Iran and do honest business
is naive. I'd figure 15 percent of your net in payoffs for
every deal made.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Id. at 115.
\11\ Id. at 119.
\12\ Shawn Tully, Why Marc Rich is Richer Than Ever, Fortune, Aug.
1, 1988, at 74.
\13\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-
Dollar Scam 115 (1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As is explained in more detail below in the section
discussing Rich's legal troubles in the United States, Rich
also laundered funds and hid his profits to protect them from
the taxing authorities of various countries. For example, Rich
routinely used Panamanian shell companies (Sociedades Anonimas)
to launder money and to conceal profits from taxing
authorities.\14\ As explained by author Craig Copetas:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Id. at 125.
Panamanian corporate law is particularly helpful to a
trader whose operations extend outside the Central
American nation and into several different countries. A
Sociedad Anonima is never required to file financial
reports or tax returns and may maintain its books in
any manner it desires in any part of the world. This
permits a procedure generally known as laundering, and
for Marc Rich--an expert at sidestepping the politics
of nations by acting as a maverick middleman between
producers and consumers--it was quite the bargain at
$1,650 plus a $50 annual franchise tax.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Id.
Rescor Incorporated, (a company that Rich used in his illegal
oil scam that led to his legal troubles in the United States)
was one such shell company. At one point, according to a former
Rich shareholder, Rich had $800 million in cash concealed in
his Panamanian shell companies.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Working with corrupt governments was not Marc Rich's only
trademark. Much of Rich's fortune was made dealing with
countries that no one else would deal with. Rich shrewdly used
his multinational status, and his familiarity with unscrupulous
business practices, to profit from embargoes and wars by
trading with pariah nations. Rich's pattern of dealing with
America's enemies, especially Iran, led even one of Rich's own
lawyers to admit that Rich could be considered a traitor to his
country:
Mr. Waxman. Do you agree with the statement that these
gentlemen [Rich and Green] were two traitors to their
country?
Mr. Libby. I can understand someone using those terms.
Mr. Waxman. Do you agree with them?
Mr. Libby. Their companies engaged in trades with
Iran--
Mr. Waxman. Traitors not traders.
Mr. Libby. No, sir, I was trying to finish--during a
period when trades [sic] were held, and that was an act
you could consider an act of a traitor.
Mr. Waxman. That someone could consider, but you do not
consider it?
Mr. Libby. I could consider it. I do not condone it. I
didn't advise it. I do not admire it.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 486
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of I. Lewis ``Scooter'' Libby).
The following section describes specific business
relationships that Rich maintained with regimes or countries
with interests adverse to the United States. U.S. intelligence
agencies have considerable information about Marc Rich, none of
which was reviewed by the White House prior to the pardons.
Unfortunately, most of the information remains classified. The
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CIA, however, did declassify the following statement:
If President Clinton had checked with the CIA, he would
have learned that Marc Rich had been the subject of
inquiries by various foreign government liaison
services and domestic government agencies regarding
their ongoing investigations of criminal activity.
In addition, President Clinton would have received
information worthy of his consideration in making his
decision on the pardon. This information cannot be
declassified.
As described below, though, the public record alone should have
been enough to eliminate any possibility of pardons for Marc
Rich and Pincus Green.
a. Iran
Marc Rich got his start in the oil trade through business
dealings with the Shah of Iran. After the Shah fell from power,
many were concerned by Ayatollah Khomeini's violent rise to
power. However, Rich saw a new opportunity, and began trading
with the Khomeini regime. In the early days of the Iranian
revolution, after the new Iranian government seized 51 American
hostages, the United States imposed a strict trade embargo on
Iran. Nevertheless, Rich directed his staff to meet the new
directors of the Iranian state-owned oil company.\18\ Shortly
thereafter, Marc Rich and Pincus Green reached a deal to
purchase Iranian oil through his Swiss company, Marc Rich + Co.
A.G. Reportedly, Rich paid for much of this purchase in small
arms, automatic rifles, and hand-held rockets.\19\ One of
Rich's colleagues stated that because of this deal ``Rich got
more excited than I had ever seen him.'' \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-
Dollar Scam 131 (1985).
\19\ Id.
\20\ Id. at 132.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. South Africa
Rich's companies also dealt extensively with the South
African government throughout the apartheid regime.
Notwithstanding the United Nations' ban on oil sales to South
Africa, throughout the 1980s Rich's company was one of the
three main traders of oil between the Middle East and South
Africa.\21\ Where other companies saw legal peril, Marc Rich
saw profit, with South African companies willing to pay a
premium of $8 per barrel of oil. According to the Dutch-based
Shipping Research Bureau, Rich supplied about 6 percent of all
oil imports to South Africa between 1979 and 1986, earning
upwards of $1 billion from the transactions.\22\ And according
to a former Rich shareholder, at the time of their indictment
in the United States, Rich and Green were trading Soviet and
Iranian oil to the apartheid government in South Africa in
exchange for Namibian uranium, which Rich and Green in turn
sold back to the Soviet Union.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Andrew Lycett, Spectrum: Plain Sailing Through the Sanctions
Net, Times (London), Sept. 12, 1986.
\22\ Shawn Tully, Why Marc Rich is Richer Than Ever, Fortune, Aug.
1, 1988, at 74.
\23\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-
Dollar Scam 198 (1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At times, Rich's deals with South Africa were so risky and
profitable that Rich would scuttle the oil tanker at the
conclusion of the deal and fly the crew home. In one deal, a
tanker was loaded with oil from the Soviet Union, was diverted
from its intended itinerary, covered its name with tarpaulins,
communicated only in code, and then delivered its oil in secret
to South Africa.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Jim Hougan, King of the World (Marc Rich), Playboy, Feb. 1,
1994, at 104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. The Soviet Union/Russia
The South African uranium transactions were not the only
dealing Rich had with the Soviet Union. In fact, Rich and his
companies dealt extensively with the Soviet Union and other
Communist countries. His oil trading with the Soviet Union
provided Moscow with the hard currency needed to purchase grain
during the United States' grain embargo.\25\ Rich's dealings
with the Soviet Union were so extensive and helpful to the
Soviet Union that when he was indicted in the United States in
1983, one Moscow newspaper printed a front page, above-the-fold
story defending Marc Rich and attacking the United States.\26\
In fact, the Russian newspaper Izvestia wrote the following in
defense of Rich:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Id.
\26\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-
Dollar Scam 196-197 (1985).
The United States thinks that all countries, big and
small, must subvert their national interests to
American measures. . . . Under the pretext of
nonpayment of taxes by the Swiss branch of the Marc
Rich firm, American authorities have given an
ultimatum: either Switzerland changes its internal
legislation or its companies will be deprived of
admission to American markets. This action by the
Reagan Administration is an open threat, an attempt to
interfere into the internal affairs of Western European
countries through the threat of economic sanctions. The
Americans are living under the illusion of a Pax
Americana.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Id. at 197.
The fact that one of the leading propaganda organs of the
Soviet state would dedicate itself to the defense of a
capitalist commodities trader like Marc Rich shows the
importance Rich and his company had in providing hard currency
to the Soviet regime.
Marc Rich's influence has only grown in post-Communist
Russia. Rich took advantage of widespread privatization in
Russia to acquire large supplies of industrial materials at
bargain prices. As explained in The Washington Post, ``[a]fter
the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, these relationships helped
Rich become for a time the single most important Western trader
in Russia.'' \28\ There is also evidence that Rich has
developed deep ties with Russian organized crime, a powerful
force in post-Communist Russia.\29\ According to press
accounts, law enforcement agencies including the FBI and the
CIA had information indicating that Rich had financial ties to
the Russian mafia.\30\ According to one U.S. intelligence
source who spoke to the press, ``Clinton would have found out
about the relationships if he had asked either the FBI or CIA,
[but] [h]e clearly never bothered to ask.'' \31\ Another source
told the press that ``[t]he FBI has tons of material on the
Russian mafia and in particular the Rich-mafia connection.''
\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Michael Dobbs, Rich Made His Fortune by Breaking the Rules,
Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 2001, at A1.
\29\ Robert I. Friedman, Red Mafiya: How the Russian Mob has
Invaded America 51 (2000) (indicating that Rich had a relationship with
Russian gangster Marat Balagula, now serving time in prison for
gasoline price fixing). Rich is also suspected to have been involved in
metals trading going in and out of the Estonian port of Tallinn, where
Russian copper, nickel and cobalt are often exported. Tallinn is
notorious for being controlled by the Russian mafia. Rich's company has
denied using the port of Tallinn. See Tony Glover, The EU's Baltic
Extension, EuroBusiness, May 1, 1994.
\30\ Matthew McAllester, Rich's Suspect Ties/Sources: Clinton Could
Have Learned Russian Mob Links, Newsday, Mar. 1, 2001, at A5.
\31\ Id.
\32\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reportedly, Rich has been linked specifically by U.S. law
enforcement to Mikhail Chernoy, a former agent for Trans-World
Metals. Chernoy is a defendant in a civil case in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York. He is
named as a controller of two Russian aluminum companies by
European companies who claim that the defendants used bribery,
money-laundering and extortion in order to illegally seize a
large aluminum plant in Russia.\33\ Moreover, according to an
investigative report commissioned by the World Bank in 1998,
Chernoy was arrested by the Swiss police in 1996 during an
investigation of Russian gangs.\34\ As the report states,
Mikhail's brother Lev ``is believed to be a major Russian mafia
figure by most international police and intelligence
organizations.'' \35\ The report further states that Marc Rich
provided the seed money necessary to start up Trans-World
metals.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Id.
\34\ Id.
\35\ Id.
\36\ Id. David Reuben, the Chairman of Trans-World has denied this
account. See Letters, Newsday, Mar. 7, 2001, at A39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rich has also been linked to Grigori Loutchansky, a
Georgian-born Israeli citizen who is considered to be a
significant player in Russian mob activities. According to
press accounts, Loutchansky worked with Rich in the early 1990s
selling Russian oil and aluminum from formerly state-run
enterprises.\37\ Loutchansky, who was ``accused of drug
trafficking and smuggling nuclear weapons,'' \38\ is ``listed
in a 1995 State Department `watch list' as a `suspected
criminal,' '' \39\ and was involved in the 1996 campaign
fundraising scandal. Time magazine has said that Loutchansky is
``considered by many to be the most pernicious unindicted
criminal in the world,'' \40\ yet he dined with Clinton at a
White House dinner in 1993 and subsequently channeled money
into Clinton's campaign.\41\ He was also invited to a
fundraising dinner in July 1995 but was unable to attend when
his visa was denied and invitation withdrawn.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ The U.S. Connection in Caucasus, Intelligence Newsletter, No.
401, Mar. 8, 2001.
\38\ Judi Hasson, Panel Offers Evidence of China Link Beijing Bank
Wired Funds to L.A. Man Prior to Donation, USA Today, July 11, 1997, at
6A.
\39\ Jerry Seper, Ukrainian Gained U.S. Entry Because of Spelling
Mismatch, Wash. Times, Dec. 13, 1997, at A4.
\40\ Statement by Former CIA Director on Clinton Ties to
Loutchansky, U.S. Newswire, Nov. 3, 1996.
\41\ Jerry Seper, Soloman Asks Again for Data on Meetings with
Russian, Wash. Times, Feb. 11, 1997, at A4.
\42\ Lee Davidson, Bennett Zeros in on Demo Donations, Deseret News
(Salt Lake City, UT), July 11, 1997, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Cuba
In this hemisphere, Rich continued to conduct business with
Communist Cuba, notwithstanding the U.S. embargo. Rich's early
dealings with Fidel Castro as a trader for Philipp Brothers
apparently paid off decades later when he started his own
companies. Marc Rich reportedly assisted Cuban efforts to
escalate its nuclear power program in 1991.\43\ Rich negotiated
with Castro's son to develop a uranium deposit in Western
Cuba.\44\ The highly enriched uranium could be used to fuel
Cuba's twin 440-megawatt nuclear power reactors. In addition,
U.S. officials were concerned about the weapons potential of
the enriched uranium used in the reactor.\45\ Also in 1991,
Marc Rich & Co., Ltd. arranged a $3.9 million deal for sugar
and oil that were transferred through Cuba.\46\ Ultimately,
these transactions violated the Cuban Assets Control
regulations, and the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the
U.S. Department of Treasury blocked nearly $3 million of funds
from Rich's Cuba transactions.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ John J. Fialka and Jose de Cordoba, Cuba Speeds Nuclear
Project; Marc Rich Is Said to Assist, Wall St. J. europe, June 4, 1991,
at 2.
\44\ Id.
\45\ See id.
\46\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000635 (Note to
file C-17306 from the Compliance Programs Division) (Exhibit 1).
\47\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000652 (Memorandum
from R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets
Control, Department of the Treasury, to Ronald K. Noble, Under
Secretary for Enforcement, Department of the Treasury (Sept. 16, 1994))
(Exhibit 2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
e. Libya
Marc Rich also apparently traded with Libya under Muammar
Qaddafi.\48\ Rich's companies purchased oil from Libya
beginning in the 1970s.\49\ Yet even after the United States
bombed Libya in April of 1986 in response to the terrorist
attacks originating in that country, Rich reportedly continued
to purchase crude oil from Qaddafi's regime.\50\ Rich continued
to do business with Libya even after U.S. oil companies
completely withdrew from the country.\51\ Unlike the other
American oil companies, Rich ignored the oil embargoes and
executive orders of the Reagan Administration designed to
punish the terrorist-sponsoring state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-
Dollar Scam 118 (1985).
\49\ Id.
\50\ Strong Tanker Fixtures Seen as Indication of Undiminished
Interest in Libyan Oil, Platt's Oilgram News, July 16, 1986, at 1.
\51\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
f. Iraq
It has also been reported that Marc Rich attempted to
violate the UN embargo against Iraq during the Persian Gulf
War.\52\ Other reports indicate that U.S. officials have been
investigating charges that Rich lent money to Saddam Hussein's
government in exchange for future deliveries of cheap oil.\53\
In a statement to The Financial Times of London, Marc Rich
acknowledged that he had communications with Iraq in September
of 1991, but denied that it involved oil trading.\54\ The fact
that Rich would admit to having discussions with Saddam
Hussein's government just months after the end of the Gulf War
is remarkable. Based on his pattern of shrewd, unethical, and
illegal business dealings with other rogue regimes, Rich's
claim to be interested only in humanitarian aid for Iraq
completely lacks credibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ See John Hooper, Oil Traders Get Rich in Global Game of Chess,
The Guardian (London), Aug. 7, 1990. See also Jim Hougan, King of the
World (Marc Rich), Playboy, Feb. 1, 1994, at 104.
\53\ Paul Klebnikov, How Rich Got Rich, Forbes, June 22, 1992, at
41.
\54\ Ian Rodger, Marc Rich Hopes for Resolution of Tax Case,
Financial Times, (London), Mar. 12, 1993, at 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
g. Angola
In Angola, as in many other countries, Marc Rich and Pincus
Green became close to the dictators ruling the country. These
relationships gave them exclusive rights to the country's oil.
When other Western oil companies wanted Angolan oil, they had
to turn to Marc Rich and Pincus Green. This point was made with
somewhat comedic effect when, in the late 1970s, a number of
western oil executives were called to a meeting with Angola's
oil agents. Expecting a group of communist officials, the
executives ``were visibly stunned when the communist
representative who walked into the conference room turned out
to be Pinky Green, greeting Exxon executives with a hearty `How
ya doin'?' '' \55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-
Dollar Scam 115 (1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
h. Romania
Marc Rich is reported to have traded several commodities,
including oil, with the Romanian regime of Nicolae
Ceausescu.\56\ At the time, Rich reportedly had his own
refineries based in Romania.\57\ Trade unionists in Romania
have accused Rich of cashing in on the fortunes that Ceausescu
stole from the Romanian people.\58\ It also appears that, based
on documents received by the Committee from the U.S. Department
of Agriculture, Marc Rich was trading grain with the Ceausescu
regime in the late 1980s.\59\ As is discussed in detail below,
these sales (in addition to sales to countries like China, the
Soviet Union, and Saudi Arabia) resulted in Rich's companies
receiving $95 million from the Department of Agriculture
through a program that provided surplus grain to companies
selling subsidized grain abroad.\60\ This led to an
investigation by then-Congressman, and later Secretary of
Agriculture, Dan Glickman. Glickman's investigation would
eventually lead the first Bush Administration to direct the
Department of Agriculture to bar Rich's companies from
receiving any new contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Romania: Life After Debt, International Trade Finance, May 18,
1989.
\57\ Jim Hougan, King of the World (Marc Rich), Playboy, Feb. 1,
1994, at 104.
\58\ Id.
\59\ See Department of Agriculture Document Production (Minutes of
Richo Grain Board Meeting, Jan. 6, 1987); Department of Agriculture
Document Production (Listing of E.E.P. Awards Made to Richco Grain,
Sept. 27, 1989) (Exhibit 3).
\60\ Bruce Ingersoll, U.S. Suspends Grain Export Subsidies for Firm
Linked to Fugitive Marc Rich, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1989, at sec. 3, p.
19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
i. Serbia
One document from the Office of Foreign Assets Control
produced to the Committee by the U.S. Department of Treasury
indicates that Rich was also dealing with Serbia in violation
of U.S. and international sanctions.\61\ Press accounts
indicate that Rich violated the U.N. trade embargo by dealing
with Belgrade in a variety of commodities, including copper and
oil.\62\ According to an article in The Oil Daily, at the time
of the U.N. embargo, Serbia reportedly had a deal in place with
Marc Rich to process crude oil in Romania.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000652 (Memorandum
from R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets
Control, Department of the Treasury, to Ronald K. Noble, Under
Secretary for Enforcement, Department of the Treasury (Sept. 16, 1994))
(Exhibit 2).
\62\ Michael Dobbs, Rich Made His Fortune by Breaking the Rules,
Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 2001, at A1.
\63\ Roger Benedict, U.N. Oil Cutoff of Serbia Hinges on Russia,
China (Security Council Vote), Oil Daily, June 1, 1992, at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When asked at a Committee hearing about allegations
relating to Marc Rich's transactions with rogue states, Rich's
lawyer Jack Quinn responded ``I don't know the answer to
that.'' \64\ When asked about the White House's knowledge and
research of these activities, White House Counsel Beth Nolan
told the Committee that she never received an intelligence
briefing and never explained Rich's shady dealings to the
President.\65\ While it may be understandable that Jack Quinn
would not know--or at least not want to know--about Rich's
dealings with so many dictatorships and rogue regimes, it is
inexcusable that the White House failed to take the time to
learn about these disturbing details.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 111
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
\65\ Id. at 374.
\66\ The Committee, however, does not take the position that it was
``understandable'' for Quinn not to have known about Rich's dealings
with rogue states. While Quinn's actions may be legally permissible,
one must think long and hard about the morality of Quinn's actions.
Given Rich's status as a fugitive, common sense and due diligence
should have led Quinn to inquire further into Rich's past dealings.
However, the power of money is often enough to promote willful
ignorance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is clear that Rich built his fortune doing business
without legal, ethical, or even moral restraints. He regularly
dealt with corrupt officials, dictators and rogue regimes. U.S.
and international embargoes and sanctions were not barriers to
Rich, merely hurdles to be climbed over, under, or around. As
is discussed in more detail below, it is shameful and an
embarrassment to the United States that the Clinton
Administration did not take adequate steps to determine the
extent of Marc Rich's illegal and unethical business activities
before the President granted his pardon. This failure by the
Clinton Administration is especially troubling in light of the
fact that Marc Rich built his fortune by trading with so many
enemies of the United States.
B. The Criminal Charges Against Marc Rich and Pincus Green
1. The Investigation of Rich and Green
Marc Rich's illegal business practices in the United States
came under the scrutiny of the United States government in the
early 1980s. In the fall of 1981, staff from the Fraud Section
of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice called
Assistant U.S. Attorney Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr. of the
Southern District of New York (``SDNY'').\67\ They told
Weinberg of a lead they had received concerning a crude oil
reseller named Marc Rich whose company had an office in New
York City.\68\ As Weinberg and his fellow former prosecutor
Martin Auerbach explained to the Committee during the first
hearing on the Rich pardon, this initial lead on Marc Rich was
developed through oil reseller prosecutions in Abilene,
Texas.\69\ John Troland and David Ratliff of West Texas
Marketing--who had been prosecuted for illegal oil reselling--
provided information about the offshore laundering of funds by
Rich.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 97 (Feb.
8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., and
Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y.,
Department of Justice).
\68\ Id.
\69\ Id. at 97-98.
\70\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In December of 1981, when Weinberg flew to Texas to
investigate, he obtained a furlough for the principals of West
Texas Marketing (``WTM''), who took him to their office.\71\
Upon reviewing their records of WTM's dealings with Marc Rich,
Weinberg confirmed that Rich earned $70 million in illegal oil
resale profits in 1980 and 1981 and had funneled the money to
his Swiss company in order to evade federal income tax and
federal energy oil control regulations.\72\ As Weinberg
testified to the Committee, it was then apparent to him that he
and his office had uncovered ``the biggest tax fraud in
history.'' \73\ As he further testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ Id. at 98.
\72\ Id.
\73\ Id. The eventual indictment accused Marc Rich's companies of
evading taxes on over $100 million in unreported income.
The case against Mr. Rich and Mr. Green was very
strong. . . . Like any fraud case, the evidence was
rife with false documents, inflated invoices, sham
transactions and off the books deals. The conspirators
kept track of the illegal profits in hand written
journals in what was described as the ``pot.'' . . .
[T]he evidence included meetings between co-
conspirators and Marc Rich regarding the pots and the
scheme to funnel the illegal profits out of the country
to off-shore accounts.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ Id. at 104.
The illegal scheme that Weinberg uncovered stemmed from
Marc Rich's evasion of specific Department of Energy (``DOE'')
regulations. In September of 1980, pursuant to the Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973,\75\ the DOE promulgated
regulations establishing the permissible average markup for oil
reselling.\76\ The permissible price was different for
different regulatory categories of crude oil. The categories
contemplated by the regulations included: ``old'' or ``lower
tier;'' ``new'' or ``upper tier;'' and ``stripper.'' \77\ Under
the regulations, every seller or reseller of domestic crude oil
was required to certify to the purchaser the respective amounts
and prices of old oil, new oil, and stripper oil contained in
the crude oil that was being sold.\78\ The regulations
prohibited markups of more than 20 cents per barrel of oil for
a reseller such as Marc Rich's company, Marc Rich + Co.
International, Ltd. (``International'').\79\ International was
also required to submit ERA-69 forms to the DOE on a monthly
basis that set forth the dollar amount of any permissible
average markup overcharges so that they could be immediately
refunded to customers.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ 15 U.S.C. Sec. 751, et seq.
\76\ Indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. 8-9
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4).
\77\ Id. at 6. As the indictment states, ``Crude oil coming from a
well at or below a designated 1972 level of production was labelled
`old'; `new' oil referred to crude oil discovered since 1973 or oil
obtained from existing wells in excess of the 1972 level of production;
`stripper' oil referred to crude oil produced from a well whose average
daily production was less then [sic] ten barrels.''
\78\ Id. at 7.
\79\ Id. at 8-9.
\80\ Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beginning in September of 1980, Marc Rich and Pincus Green
agreed with the principals of West Texas Marketing that when
International was limited to the 20 cents per barrel markup,
the huge profits from their crude oil transactions would be
retained by WTM rather than being reflected on the books of
International.\81\ These profits were referred to as the
``pot.'' \82\ As the indictment against them would allege, to
further conceal the scheme, Rich, Green and the principals at
WTM conspired to have WTM prepare and mail invoices to
International, which falsely indicated that WTM had sold oil
barrels to International ``at the high world market price, when
in truth and in fact . . . International was paying a far lower
price upon WTM's agreement secretly to kickback to [Rich and
Green] the huge profits held by WTM for . . . International in
the `pot.' '' \83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ Id. at 10-11.
\82\ Id. at 11.
\83\ Id. The manipulation of the oil categories by oil resellers
such as Marc Rich and his companies was referred to as ``daisy
chaining.'' As is explained in the indictment:
GDuring the period of price controls, in order to evade
the regulations and produce huge profits, controlled oil
was on occasion sold through a series of oil resellers
known in the crude oil industry as a ``daisy chain.'' The
defendant INTERNATIONAL frequently participated as the
original reseller of controlled oil into a ``daisy chain.''
The ``daisy chain'' was utilized by the original reseller
to make it extremely difficult to trace the movement of
controlled barrels and to facilitate alteration of the
certifications on controlled barrels into stripper barrels
(uncontrolled) which could then be sold at the much higher
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
world market price.
Id. at 7-8.
The profits in these ``pots'' were moved out of the U.S. to
foreign bank accounts at the direction of Marc Rich and Pincus
Green.\84\ This would occur through sham foreign loss
transactions involving Marc Rich + Co., A.G., (``A.G.'').\85\
From October 1980 through May 1981, Rich, Green, and their
companies moved more than $23 million in income to offshore
accounts from WTM ``pots.'' \86\ These fraudulent transactions
were transmitted through telefaxes and wire transfers.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ Id. at 11.
\85\ Id. at 11-12.
\86\ Id. at 12.
\87\ Id. at 12-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This scheme by Rich and Green was essentially repeated with
another company, Listo Petroleum, for a total of $47
million.\88\ Rich and Green also entered into false deduction
transactions with Charter Crude Oil Company, as well as
ARCO.\89\ In the case of Charter, at the direction of Marc
Rich, International prepared fraudulent invoices purporting
that International had purchased foreign crude oil from A.G. at
its fair market value and subsequently sold it to a Charter
subsidiary at a substantial discount.\90\ As a result,
International fraudulently reduced its amount of taxable income
by more than $31 million dollars.\91\ In the ARCO case, in the
fall of 1980, Rich and Green's company Rescor invoiced their
other company, International, for nearly $3 million. The
invoice concerned a non-existent contract for the sale of
foreign crude oil to Rescor by International. The fraudulent
invoice made it appear that International had failed to provide
oil to Rescor which subsequently had to purchase a similar
quantity of oil from Arco at five dollars per barrel above the
original contract price.\92\ As a result, International
fraudulently reduced its amount of taxable income for 1980 by
nearly $3 million.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ Id. at 13, 15.
\89\ Id. at 15-18.
\90\ Id. at 16.
\91\ Id.
\92\ Id. at 17-18.
\93\ Id. at 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, Weinberg uncovered evidence of Marc Rich and
Pincus Green trading with Iran during the American hostage
crisis. In 1979 and 1980, President Carter issued several
executive orders and the Department of Treasury subsequently
promulgated regulations that prohibited any American from
trading with Iran without a special license from the Department
of Treasury.\94\ The regulations further required all
individuals engaging in trade with Iran to keep records to be
available for examination by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control.\95\ Nevertheless, on April 30, 1980, Marc Rich + Co.,
A.G. entered into a contract with the National Iranian Oil
Company (``NIOC'') for the purchase of crude and fuel oil from
May 1, 1980 through September 30, 1980.\96\ As the indictment
indicates, from their offices in New York City, Rich and Green
in turn sold 6,250,000 barrels of the Iranian oil to an oil
company in Bermuda for a total of more than $200 million. In
order to conceal this scheme, Rich and Green did not disclose
to their banks in the United States that the ultimate
beneficiary of the U.S. dollars was the NIOC.\97\ Rich and
Green further devised a secret code for their interoffice cable
communications to disguise the participation of the Iranian oil
company.\98\ The scheme was completed through several wire
transactions and transmissions, and ultimately caused United
States dollars to be illegally transferred to Iran at the same
time that Iran was holding American hostages.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ Id. at 44-45. The executive orders issued pursuant to the
International Economic Emergency Powers Act of 1977 included Executive
Orders No. 12,170, 12,205, and 12,211.
\95\ Id. at 45.
\96\ Id.
\97\ Id. at 46.
\98\ Id. at 47.
\99\ Id. at 47, 49. These charges were brought under 31 CFR
Sec. Sec. 535.206(a)(4), 535.208, 535.701, and 50 USC Sec. 1705, and 18
USC Sec. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In early 1982, the Southern District of New York began
subpoenaing millions of documents from oil companies and crude
oil resellers in the United States that had done business with
Marc Rich.\100\ Prosecutors also served subpoenas on Marc
Rich's companies in New York.\101\ The Southern District
decided to subpoena Marc Rich + Co. A.G.--even though it was a
Swiss company--because there were sufficient contacts through
its American subsidiary to give them jurisdiction for enforcing
document subpoenas.\102\ Rich, who had retained high-powered
attorneys such as Edward Bennett Williams, Peter Fleming, and
former federal judge Marvin Frankel, sought to quash the grand
jury subpoenas.\103\ However, United States District Judge
Leonard Sand denied the Rich team's motion to quash and ordered
A.G. to produce the documents from Switzerland.\104\ The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Sand's decision in May
of 1983.\105\ When Marc Rich + Co. A.G. refused to produce the
documents, Judge Sand held the company in contempt and ordered
a $50,000 per day fine in order to compel production of the
documents.\106\ Nevertheless, Rich and his company refused to
produce the documents or pay the fine.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 99 (Feb.
8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., and
Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y.,
Department of Justice).
\101\ Id.
\102\ Id.
\103\ Id.
\104\ Id.
\105\ Id.
\106\ Id. at 100.
\107\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rich's behavior during the litigation soon became even more
confrontational and deceptive. As the Southern District of New
York was to learn, on June 29, 1983, Rich quietly sold off his
company's only American asset.\108\ Judge Sand called the sale
a ``ploy to frustrate the implementation of the court's
order,'' and thereby ordered a freeze of A.G.''s assets in the
United States.\109\ The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also
concluded that the sale was a fraud.\110\ As a result of these
rulings by the courts, Rich and his lawyers agreed to negotiate
a resolution of the contempt issue. A.G. agreed to pay the more
than $1 million in contempt fines that had accumulated and to
continue paying the contempt fines until all of the documents
had been produced from Switzerland.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\ Id.
\109\ Id.
\110\ Id.
\111\ Id. at 101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At first, Rich's company appeared to be complying with the
agreement by producing hundreds of thousands of documents from
Switzerland. However, on August 9, 1983, four days after the
agreement, the Southern District received an anonymous tip that
subpoenaed documents were being secreted out of the U.S. by a
paralegal of the law firm Milgrim Thomajan & Lee.\112\ In
responding to the tip, the Southern District seized two steamer
trunks full of subpoenaed documents from a Swiss Air
flight.\113\ As a result of this incident, Judge Sand ordered
the production of every document of the Marc Rich companies in
the world that had been subpoenaed.\114\ Rich and his legal
team argued that the Swiss government had already seized all of
the remaining documents, thereby rendering compliance with the
agreement they had reached impossible.\115\ Judge Sand
nevertheless ruled that the contempt fines should
continue.\116\ In total, Marc Rich + Co. A.G. paid over $21
million in contempt fines over the course of the
litigation.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ Id. When asked about this episode at the Committee's hearing,
Jack Quinn testified ``what I have been told is that those documents
were going to Switzerland for the purpose of being reviewed for
privilege by the lawyers.'' Id. at 113 (testimony of Jack Quinn). In
response to this claim, Martin Auerbach testified: ``With respect to
the documents that were being slipped out of the country, the
suggestion was never that those were being reviewed for attorney-client
privilege. It was simply that it would be more convenient for counsel
to review them in Switzerland then [sic] to review them in New York.
Now, we had tons and tons of documents delivered to us. These two
steamer trunks were slipping out. We didn't get a call from them
saying, you know, we've got some people over in Zug with nothing better
to do than to look at documents; would you mind if we took them over
there outside of the jurisdiction at the time when we're in contempt
for refusing to produce documents from Switzerland?'' Id. (testimony of
Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.,
Department of Justice).
\113\ Id. at 101 (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg,
Jr., and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the
S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
\114\ Id.
\115\ Id. at 101-02. The Committee does not know Rich's precise
role in orchestrating this action by the Swiss government. Rich's power
in that country makes it reasonable to assume that he might have played
a part in creating the condition that made his representations in the
United States possible. The Committee is not aware of the Swiss
government penalizing Rich or taking any other action against him.
\116\ Id. at 102.
\117\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rich's attorneys made a number of attempts to settle the
case before an indictment was issued. When Rich hired Edward
Bennett Williams to represent him, Williams assured him that he
could settle the case if Rich paid a large fine, telling Rich
``I can get rid of it for $30 million.'' \118\ Williams then
went to Sandy Weinberg and asked how much the government wanted
to settle the case. When Weinberg told Williams he was not
interested, Williams asked Weinberg what he had in mind.\119\
Weinberg responded ``J-A-I-L.'' \120\ Later, Williams would
offer as much as $100 million to settle the Rich case.\121\ All
of these offers were rejected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\ Evan Thomas, The Man to See: Edward Bennett Williams 415
(1991).
\119\ Id. at 416.
\120\ Id.
\121\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 103
(Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr.,
and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the
S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The Indictment
In September of 1983, a federal grand jury in New York
returned a 51-count indictment against Marc Rich, Pincus Green,
and their companies.\122\ The original indictment was
restructured into a 65-count indictment in March of 1984.\123\
All of the first 42 counts were charged against Marc Rich,
Pincus Green, Clyde Meltzer, A.G., and Marc Rich + Co,
International Ltd. The superseding indictment was arranged to
include in counts 1 through 23 the scheme to defraud the
IRS.\124\ These charges were brought pursuant to 18 USC
Sec. 1343, the federal statute prohibiting wire fraud.\125\
These charges related to the fraudulent transactions among WTM,
and Marc Rich's companies discussed above. Counts 24 through 38
included the scheme to defraud the Department of Energy, and
were brought pursuant to 18 USC Sec. 1341, prohibiting mail
fraud.\126\ Count 39 and 40 were racketeering charges brought
under the RICO statute, 18 USC Sec. 1962(c).\127\ Counts 41 and
42 included two tax evasion counts for Marc Rich + Co.
International's 1980 and 1981 tax returns, covering an amount
totaling over $100 million in unreported income which was
concealed by the efforts of Rich, Green, Meltzer, and Rich's
two companies.\128\ As stated in the indictment, International
was able to evade more than $49 million in taxes.\129\ These
counts were also brought against Marc Rich and Pincus Green
personally. The tax and racketeering counts were approved and
authorized by the Department of Justice.\130\ Counts 43 through
57 alleged that Rich defrauded the Department of Treasury for
his transactions with the Iranians during the oil embargo and
the American hostage crisis. Finally, counts 57 through 65
charged Rich with ``trading with the enemy'' for Rich's secret
deals with the Iranians.\131\ In the superseding indictment,
these charges were not leveled against the companies. As a
letter accompanying the indictment states, ``[t]he primary
focus of those counts has always been the activities of the
American individuals, Marc Rich and Pincus Green.'' \132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\ Id.
\123\ See Indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al.
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4).
\124\ Id. at 19-22.
\125\ Id. at 22.
\126\ Id. at 22-25.
\127\ Id. at 33-34.
\128\ Id. at 40-42.
\129\ Id.
\130\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 102-03
(Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr.,
and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the
S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
\131\ U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6,
1984) (S 83 Cr. 579). See also 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1705.
\132\ Cover letter to superseding indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich,
Pincus Green et al. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Rich and Green Flee the Country
Even though their companies eventually pled guilty and paid
heavy fines, Rich and Green personally refused to face the U.S.
justice system. Rich and Green were out of the country when
their indictments were handed down. They refused to return to
the United States, even after warrants were issued for their
arrest. As Weinberg and Auerbach explained to the Committee,
``[b]y the time of the indictment, Marc Rich and Pincus Green
had made it clear that they would not return to the United
States to face the charges. Apparently, they had quietly left
the United States in June 1983 at a time when their lawyers
were attempting to negotiate a resolution of the case.'' \133\
Even Rich's own lead attorney, Edward Bennett Williams, was
shocked by Rich's conduct:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 103
(Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr.,
and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the
S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). It should be noted that by this
point, Rich and Green had already renounced their U.S. citizenship and
become citizens of Spain and perhaps Bolivia.
Rich responded to the warrant for his arrest by
refusing to return from Switzerland. Williams was
standing in the office of Marvin Davis in Los Angeles
when he heard the news that his client was on the lam.
According to Davis, Williams shouted in the phone,
``You know something, Marc? You spit on the American
flag. You spit on the jury system. Whatever you get,
you deserve. We could have gotten the minimum. Now
you're going to sink.'' \134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\ Evan Thomas, The Man to See: Edward Bennett Williams 417
(1991). Rich denied Davis' account of this conversation, saying,
``There is not a shred of truth in it.''
Despite the outrage of their own lawyers, as well as the
prosecutors, Rich and Green never returned to the country to
face the charges. They remained fugitives in Switzerland for
more than seventeen years until they received their pardons
from President Clinton.
4. The Corporate Guilty Pleas
Notwithstanding the fact that Rich and Green would not
return to face the charges against them, their companies
entered plea negotiations with the government. A year after the
indictment was handed down, Marc Rich's companies pled guilty
to evading $50 million in taxes. In the allocution on October
11, 1984, Peter Fleming, counsel for Marc Rich + Co.
International, Ltd. stated to the court:
Beginning in September 1980 International generated
millions of dollars of income from crude oil
transactions which International should have disclosed
but intentionally did not disclose to the Internal
Revenue Service and the Department of Energy.
* * *
In connection with matters within the jurisdiction of
agencies of the United States, specifically the
Department of Energy and the Internal Revenue Service,
International and A.G. knowingly and willfully made
those documents and the ERA 69s filed with the
Department of Energy which were false in that they
failed to disclose material facts regarding the actual
income from those crude oil transactions, in violation
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001, which is
the charging statute of counts 1 through 38.
* * *
In addition, by knowingly and willfully failing to
report at least $50 million of taxable income generated
from these transactions for the years 1980 and 1981,
International committed income tax evasion for these
years in violation of Title 26, United States Code,
Section 7201.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\135\ Transcript of Allocution, U.S. v. Marc Rich + Co., A.G. et
al. 18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 5).
Counsel for Marc Rich + Co. A.G. then stated to the court,
``[a]s you know, A.G. is charged only in counts 1 through 38 of
this information, and A.G. adopts Mr. Fleming's statements in
connection with those counts.'' \136\ As part of their guilty
plea, A.G. and International (which by then had been renamed
``Clarendon, Ltd.''), also agreed to pay the United States $150
million,\137\ and agreed to waive any right to recover the $21
million in fines they had already paid the government.\138\ The
total amount that the companies paid to the government for
their crimes was $200 million.\139\ As then-United States
Attorney Rudolph Giuliani explained in court, this represented
the largest amount of money ever recovered by the United States
in a criminal tax evasion case.\140\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\ Id. at 20.
\137\ Id. at 3.
\138\ Id. at 4.
\139\ Id.
\140\ Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The guilty pleas and fines paid by the companies controlled
by Marc Rich and Pincus Green clearly demonstrate the guilt of
the two principals. Based on the overwhelming evidence against
them, it is no wonder Rich and Green fled the country rather
than face trial. The evidence, including the admissions by Marc
Rich's companies, also explains why Martin Auerbach of the
Southern District of New York could confidently respond to Jack
Quinn's criticism at the Committee's hearing, stating, ``Mr.
Quinn has suggested to the Committee and to the Nation that we
had a legal house of cards. Well, if we did, it was all aces.''
\141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\141\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 106
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Attempts to Bring Rich and Green to Justice
1. Attempts to Extradite Rich and Green
After Rich and Green fled the country in anticipation of
their indictment, the Southern District of New York made many
attempts to have foreign governments extradite the two
fugitives in order to bring them back to the country to stand
trial on the numerous charges against them. On July 20, 1984,
the United States requested extradition of Rich and Green from
Switzerland. That request was rejected by the Swiss government
in September of 1984 on the basis that the offenses charged
against Rich and Green were ``fiscal violations'' and
violations of ``provisions concerning currency, trade policy
and economic policy'' \142\ and that the government of
Switzerland did not recognize the charges against Rich and
Green as extraditable crimes. In June of 1994, the Justice
Department attempted to extradite Rich and Green from Israel,
but the Israeli government also turned down the request.
Israel's Attorney General, Michael Ben-Ya'ir, told the U.S.
Government that the extradition treaty between the two
governments did not include fiscal offenses.\143\ And even
though Rich had become a citizen of Spain, prosecutors could
not extradite him from that country because, like Switzerland
and Israel, Spain does not extradite its citizens for tax
evasion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\ Unofficial translation of a note delivered on September 25,
1984, by the Office for Police Matters to the Embassy of the United
States. See ``They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and
Pincus Green,'' Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d
Cong. 3 (May 27, 1992).
\143\ Bo'az Ga'on, Rich as Korach, Ma'ariv Weekend Magazine, Oct.
1, 1999 (Exhibit 6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Marc Rich and Pincus Green's Attempts to Renounce Their
Citizenship
After fleeing the United States, Rich and Green attempted
to renounce their U.S. citizenship for the specific purpose of
avoiding extradition on the charges against them. According to
a U.S. government memorandum from the Embassy in Madrid, Rich
expatriated himself on September 3, 1982, prior to his
indictment, and became a naturalized Spaniard on February 11,
1983.\144\ As Rich explained in a letter to the U.S. Consul
General in Zurich, ``I was naturalized under the laws of Spain,
swore an oath of allegiance to the King of Spain, and formally
stated that I thereby renounced U.S. nationality.'' \145\ On
May 27, 1983, Green, and perhaps Rich, were naturalized as
Bolivian citizens according to U.S. State Department
cables.\146\ In the case of Green, a letter from the Ministry
of the Interior in Bolivia states that ``the privilege of
Bolivian nationality has been given to Pincus Green Bergstein,
who previously renounced his nationality of origin and complied
with the required procedures determined by current legal
regulations.'' \147\ According to a letter from the Department
of Justice to Congressman Robert Wise in November of 1991, Rich
and Green also became citizens of Israel in 1983.\148\ The
pardon application submitted to the White House by Jack Quinn
also lists Green as a citizen of Switzerland, although it does
not list Rich as a Swiss citizen, and it appears that Rich is,
in fact, not a Swiss citizen.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\ Department of State Document Production (Government
Memorandum from U.S. Embassy in Madrid to U.S. Department of State,
Aug. 25, 1983) (Exhibit 7).
\145\ Department of State Document Production (Letter from Marc
Rich to Ruth H. Van Heuven, U.S. Consul General, Switzerland (Oct. 27,
1992)) (Exhibit 8). In this and other letters, Rich claims that he
became a citizen of Spain in July of 1982, earlier than the date
indicated by the U.S. government. Spanish government documents appear
to confirm this. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also affirmed a
district court ruling that Rich's attempt to renounce his citizenship
in Madrid had failed. The Second Circuit held:
GThe evidence strongly supports the district court's
finding that Rich had no intention whatsoever to relinquish
his American citizenship prior to commencement of this
action. Despite mouthing words of renunciation before a
Spanish official, he refused to acknowledge such
renunciation before the United States Consul in Madrid
before this action commenced. Instead, he brought a Swiss
action as an American national, traveled on his American
passport, and publicized himself in a commercial register
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
as a United States citizen.
Action S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., Inc., 951 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\ Department of State Document Production (Letter from the
American Consul to Pincus Green (Dec. 19, 1983)) (Exhibit 9). The State
Department apparently believed that Rich and Green entered Bolivia
illegally because of the restrictions on their passports, which would
have jeopardized their claim of Bolivian citizenship. See U.S. Marshals
Service Document Production (Department of State Cable, Oct. 11, 1983)
(Exhibit 10).
\147\ Department of State Document Production (Letter from Dr.
Emilio Perez Barrios, Sub-Secretary of Immigration, Bolivian Ministry
of Interior, to the American Consul (Sept. 9, 1983)) (Exhibit 11).
\148\ Department of Justice Document Production DOJ/SDNY-MR-00008-
09 (Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, to the Honorable Robert E.
Wise, Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on Govt. Information, Justice, and
Agriculture, Comm. on Govt. Operations (Nov. 21, 1991)) (Exhibit 12).
\149\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green 1, 3 (Dec.
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1983, the State Department informed the Southern
District of New York that Rich was seeking to renounce his U.S.
citizenship. The American embassy attempted to contact Rich to
have him fill out a questionnaire to determine his citizenship,
but he never responded.\150\ Rich and Green also never
responded to letters from the American Consul in Bern,
Switzerland, attempting to determine their citizenship. On
September 29, 1993, the U.S. State Department revoked Rich's
American passports because of the ``outstanding federal felony
warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York.'' \151\ The next day, the State
Department also revoked Pincus Green's passport.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ Department of State Document Production (Letter from Julian
L. Bartley, Consul, Embassy of the United States of America in Madrid,
to Marc Rich (Mar. 25, 1983)) (Exhibit 13).
\151\ U.S. Marshals Service Document Production (State Department
Cable, Sept. 29, 1983) (Exhibit 14).
\152\ U.S. Marshals Service Document Production (State Department
Cable, Sept. 30, 1983) (Exhibit 15).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The confusion over Marc Rich's citizenship status also
became an issue of concern to the U.S. Treasury Department in
November of 1991. A letter written by the Office of Foreign
Assets Control prompted the State Department to make a
determination of Rich's citizenship. In its response of April
14, 1992, the State Department made a final determination that
Marc Rich had failed to renounce his citizenship, and was still
a U.S. citizen.\153\ The conclusion was based on the fact that
the Department never approved Rich's Certificate of Loss of
Nationality.\154\ It was also based on the fact that Rich did
not demonstrate the requisite intent to lose his U.S.
Citizenship--in part because he used his U.S. passport to
travel to the United States after he became a Spanish
citizen.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000660-61 (Letter
from Carmen A. DiPlacido, Director of the Office of Citizens Consular
Services, Department of State, to Richard Newcomb, Director of the
Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury (Apr. 14,
1992)) (Exhibit 16).
\154\ Id.
\155\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the U.S. Government's official finding that Rich is
still a U.S. citizen, Rich and his lawyers claim that he is not
a U.S. citizen. When he appeared on television after the Rich
pardon, Jack Quinn stated ``he is a U.S. citizen.'' \156\
However, when he appeared before the Committee, Quinn stated
that he ``misspoke'' when he was on Meet the Press, and took
the position that Rich had indeed renounced his citizenship.
Sandy Weinberg, testifying with Quinn, observed:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\ Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 28, 2001).
I suppose when he [Marc Rich] heard on television from
Mr. Quinn that he was a citizen, I'm sure it did
concern him whether or not he had a problem over the
last 20 years. I suspect that . . . Mr. Quinn got a
call the next day saying ``no, I'm not a citizen''
because I believe that there are some very significant
tax implications if he's been a citizen all these
years.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 167
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former
Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. U.S. Attempts to Apprehend Rich and Green
Between 1984 and 1992, the Department of Justice submitted
five provisional arrest requests to various countries in an
attempt to apprehend Rich and Green.\158\ None of these
attempts were successful. As early as October 9, 1985, Rich and
Green were listed as wanted international criminals by the U.S.
National Central Bureau of Interpol.\159\ In 1987, Interpol
issued an international ``red notice'' (warrant) that requested
the provisional arrest of Rich and Green with the eventual goal
of extradition.\160\ On several occasions, the FBI and the U.S.
Marshals Service appeared ready to apprehend the two fugitives.
One operation set up by the Marshals Service to snare Rich,
referred to as ``the Otford Project,'' was nearly
successful.\161\ In the fall of 1987, a U.S. Marshal assigned
to the project barely missed apprehending Rich in France after
he canceled a meeting with an African oil minister.\162\ A few
months later, in November of 1987, the U.S. Marshals Service
again came close to capturing Rich. They were tipped off by a
businessman close to Rich that Rich would be taking a private
plane to England for a weekend party. The Marshals set the trap
for Rich at the Biggen Hill Airport in Kent. However, thick fog
settled in over England, and Rich's plane turned back to
Switzerland.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\ See ``They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and
Pincus Green,'' Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. 10 (May 27, 1992)
(quoting Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, to the Honorable Robert
E. Wise, Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on Govt. Information, Justice, and
Agriculture, Comm. on Govt. Operations (received Oct. 11, 1991)).
\159\ Interpol Document Production (Wanted International Criminal
Request, Oct. 9, 1985) (Exhibit 17). The document itself lists Rich and
Green as wanted for the indictments in the Southern District of New
York for wire fraud, mail fraud, income tax evasion, racketeering,
racketeering conspiracy, and trading with the enemy.
\160\ Interpol Document Production (Interpol International Red
Notice, June 4, 1992) (Exhibit 18).
\161\ Craig Copetas, The Sovereign Republic of Marc Rich,
Regardie's, Feb. 1, 1990, at 46.
\162\ Id.
\163\ Id.
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In 1986, prior to the international arrest warrant being
issued, Rich had another brush with the law. Rich had been
asked by his wife Denise to visit her in London. After the
visit, Rich was at Heathrow airport to catch the return
Swissair flight to Zurich. As he approached the gate, Rich
apparently noticed that the security staff was conducting a
complete search of luggage and identification.\164\ Rather than
submit to the search, Rich apparently went to a public
telephone and left three checks payable to him for
1.6 million stuck between the pages of a telephone
book.\165\ Free of the checks that Rich thought would identify
him to the British authorities, Rich then boarded the flight
for Zurich.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\ Id.
\165\ Id.
\166\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In September of 1991, the FBI and Interpol attempted to
arrest Rich in Finland.\167\ According to a Finnish businessman
who helped the FBI with the matter, Rich was tipped off that he
would be arrested at the Helsinki airport, and he therefore
turned his plane around before landing.\168\ Other failed
attempts to arrest Rich are indicated by several documents
produced to the Committee. As an Interpol cable indicates, Rich
was expected to be in Moscow both in May and September of 1992.
Attempts were made at the Justice Department in September of
that year to ``insure a provisional arrest warrant is in place
should [Rich] appear in Moscow.'' \169\ In March of 1992, the
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, as well as
the Office of International Affairs at the Justice Department,
made a request for Interpol to assist in apprehending Rich in
Dushanbe, Tajikistan, based on information that he would be
meeting with the new republic's prime minister.\170\ In fact,
Interpol sent a senior officer directly to Dushanbe carrying
the United States' provisional arrest request.\171\ A request
for the arrest of Rich was also made in anticipation of his
arrival in Czechoslovakia in February of 1992, when Rich was
negotiating the purchase of the Slovak Aluminum Company.\172\
Yet another document indicates that provisional arrest warrants
were also issued for Marc Rich in France, Portugal, and
Norway.\173\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\ Interpol Document Production (Letter from Darrell W. Mills,
Chief, Interpol-USNCB (1991)) (Exhibit 19).
\168\ Telephone Interview with Pertti Ruoho, Finnish Oil Trader
(Feb. 22, 2001). See also Letter from Darrell W. Mills, Chief,
Interpol-USNCB (1991)) (Exhibit 19).
\169\ Interpol Document Production (Interpol-USNCB transmission,
Sept. 1, 1992) (Exhibit 20).
\170\ Interpol Document Production (Interpol-USNCB transmission,
1992) (Exhibit 21).
\171\ Id.
\172\ Interpol Document Production (Fax from Donald S. Donovan,
Assistant Chief, Interpol-USNCB, to Don Ward, Deputy Chief, U.S.
Marshals Service (Feb. 21, 1992)) (Exhibit 22).
\173\ Interpol Document Production 000317 (Identifiers on Marc
Rich, Nov. 19, 1991) (Exhibit 23).
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It is difficult to believe that Marc Rich went from being
an international fugitive, sought by teams of Marshals across
the world, to a free man with the simple stroke of a pen. The
effort to apprehend Marc Rich was the subject of intense law
enforcement, diplomatic, and Congressional interest. Beyond the
obvious negative effects of the Rich pardon, it also had a
demoralizing effect on the individuals who tried for so long to
track down Rich. In addition, it undermines U.S. authority to
apprehend criminal fugitives. When the United States government
attempts to apprehend someone by utilizing Interpol and working
with law enforcement in foreign countries, it is reasonable to
assume that those persons being sought should have to face
trial in the United States. By granting pardons to Rich and
Green, international law enforcement efforts on behalf of the
United States were seriously undermined.
4. 1992 Congressional Hearings
The Marc Rich matter and the failure of the government to
apprehend him was an issue of great interest to this Committee
when it was under a Democratic chairmanship in the early 1990s.
In particular, Congressman Robert Wise held three days of
hearings on the matter when he served as chairman of the
Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice, and
Agriculture of the Committee on Government Operations.\174\ The
hearings, entitled ``The Strange Case of Marc Rich: Contracting
with Tax Fugitives and At Large in the Alps,'' also resulted in
two Committee reports. One of those reports, entitled ``They
Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and Pincus
Green,'' focused on the efforts of the United States to
apprehend the two fugitives.\175\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\ The Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture
Subcommittee held three separate Marc Rich hearings on December 4,
1991, February 18, 1992, and March 5, 1992, entitled ``The Strange Case
of Marc Rich: Contracting with Tax Fugitives and At Large in the
Alps.''
\175\ ``They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and
Pincus Green,'' Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d
Cong. (May 27, 1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congressman Wise and his Subcommittee criticized the Reagan
and Bush Administrations for failing to take adequate steps to
apprehend Marc Rich. At a hearing on December 4, 1991,
Congressman Mike Synar was particularly critical of the
Department of Justice for failing to apprehend the fugitives:
It is unacceptable that the Justice Department has
failed to show up today. It is unacceptable that they
have failed to enforce the law in this very important
matter, and as the chairman pointed out, in the case of
the No. 1 tax abuser in our history. Can there be
little wonder, can there be little wonder why Americans
have lost confidence with respect to this government's
ability to enforce the laws? And can there be little
wonder why most Americans believe there are two sets of
laws in this country, one for the rich, no pun
intended, and one for the rest of us? \176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\176\ ``The Strange Case of Marc Rich: Contracting with Tax
Fugitives and At Large in the Alps,'' Hearing Before the Govt.
Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee of the Comm. on
Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. 7 (Dec. 4, 1991) (statement of the
Honorable Mike Synar).
The Committee reached similar conclusions in its 1992
reports on the Rich matter, stating, for instance, that the
U.S. government ``lacked the political will to effect the
return of these fugitives[.]'' \177\ The Subcommittee urged
``that the Department of Justice rejuvenate its efforts to
apprehend the fugitives Marc Rich and Pincus Green and that it
become a high profile matter for the U.S. Government.'' The
report continued to admonish, stating, ``[t]he continuing
failure to return these fugitives to the United States to stand
trial before their fellow citizens only furthers the idea `that
there are . . . two standards of justice in the United States .
. . one for accused criminals without money and there's one for
accused criminals with money.' '' \178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\177\ ``They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and
Pincus Green,'' Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d
Cong. 37 (May 27, 1992).
\178\ Id. at 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second report by the Subcommittee, ``Coin, Contracting,
and Chicanery: Treasury and Justice Departments Fail to
Coordinate,'' focused on the failure of the U.S. government to
keep Rich from receiving government contracts after he fled the
U.S.\179\ The Subcommittee concluded that Rich's Clarendon firm
continued to provide the U.S. Mint with metals despite being
debarred from government contracting.\180\ The Subcommittee
also criticized the Justice and Treasury Departments for
failing to take any action against Clarendon for over three
years because of a series of missteps and
miscommunications.\181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\179\ ``Coins, Contracting, and Chicanery: Treasury and Justice
Departments Fail to Coordinate,'' Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt.
Operations, 102d Cong. (May 27, 1992).
\180\ Id. at 18.
\181\ Id. at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Actions Taken by the U.S. Against Rich's Business
Interests
After they fled the country, several federal agencies took
actions against Rich and Green's businesses. Notwithstanding
their indictment and fugitive status, Rich and Green continued
to contract with several agencies within the U.S. government.
Companies controlled by Rich and Green held contracts with the
U.S. Mint as well as the U.S. Department of Agriculture. These
contracts continued for several years until they were
eventually reviewed by Congress and relevant agencies. The
Department of the Treasury also was forced to block money
destined for Rich and Green because of their companies'
dealings with Cuba.
a. U.S. Mint Contract Cancellation
In the wake of Rich's indictment, in 1985, one of his
companies, Clarendon, Ltd., was debarred from contracting with
the federal government by the Defense Logistics Agency.
However, the debarment lasted only three years. Soon after that
period, in July of 1988, Clarendon, Ltd. began contracting with
the U.S. Mint to supply raw metal for producing coins. From
1989 through 1992, Clarendon won numerous contracts to supply
the mint with copper, nickel, and zinc.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\ ``The Strange Case of Marc Rich: Contracting with Tax
Fugitives and At Large in the Alps,'' Hearing Before the Govt.
Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee of the Comm. on
Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. 58 (Dec. 4, 1991) (statement of Kenneth
Gubin, Chief Counsel, U.S. Mint).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clarendon was able to secure the metal contracts because,
from mid-1988 on, the company was not listed on the GSA's
``Parties Excluded from Procurement Programs'' list. This was
possible in part because Marc Rich set up the management of the
company so that he was not the majority stockholder. By
controlling 49 percent of Clarendon's stock, Rich could claim
that he did not have control over the company's business
decisions. This move, however, was part of a scheme by Marc
Rich in which he purchased back the remaining 51 percent of
Clarendon through a wholly owned subsidiary of Marc Rich + Co.,
A.G.\183\ By the time Clarendon was reaping the benefits of the
new contract with the Mint, Marc Rich was in full control of
the company. The contracts were reported to be worth up to
$45.5 million to Marc Rich's company.\184\ As discussed above,
this prompted congressional hearings and a subsequent report.
Congressman Robert Wise of West Virginia, who chaired the
hearings, stated to the press, ``[e]very time I reach into my
pocket for some change, I have to wonder if there's a little
bit of Marc Rich in there.'' \185\ This attention by Congress
eventually played a part in ending Rich's contracts with the
U.S. Mint. In a letter on February 27, 1992, Rich's lawyers
announced that, ``Clarendon does not intend to participate in
bid or contract opportunities with the Mint in the foreseeable
future.'' \186\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\ This scheme also led to a civil action against the company.
See U.S. v. Clarendon, Ltd. (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1995) (CA 1:95CV00700).
The charges were authorized under the signature of Deputy Attorney
General Eric Holder.
\184\ Rick Wartzman, Bid to End Pact to Clarendon Comes Amid
Disputes Over Marc Rich's Stake, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1992, at B2a.
\185\ Id.
\186\ Department of Agriculture Document Production (Letter from
David P. Langlois, Partner, Milgrim Thomajan & Lee, to Kenneth Gubin,
Chief Counsel, U.S. Mint (Feb. 27, 1992)) (Exhibit 24).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Suspension of Rich's Grain Dealings
Between July of 1986 and September of 1989, one of Marc
Rich's companies, Richco Grain Ltd., participated in the
Commodity Credit Corporation's Export Enhancement Program. The
Department of Agriculture used the program to sell American
grain to overseas customers at prices below U.S. market levels.
The companies who won the contracts received subsidies from the
department in the form of surplus grains. A tally by the
Department showed that Richco received $95 million worth of
such U.S. grain through the program.\187\ Rich made money
through his sales of grain to China, the Soviet Union, Romania,
and Saudi Arabia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\187\ Bruce Ingersoll, U.S. Suspends Grain Subsidies for Exporter,
Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1989, at sec. 3, p. 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After prompting from Congressman Dan Glickman and an
investigation by the Inspector General, the Department of
Agriculture suspended Richco Grain Ltd. from participating in
the program. A letter written on September 29, 1989, by the
Vice-President of the Commodity Credit Corporation listed Rich
and Green's fugitivity and indictment as reasons for the
suspension.\188\ Notwithstanding the suspension, Congressman
Glickman continued to press the Bush Administration on the
matter. On March 4, 1992, Congressman Glickman wrote to
President Bush to ask that the Department of Agriculture
permanently exclude Rich and Green from participating in the
program by debarring them.\189\ The Bush Administration
responded by referring Glickman's letter to the Department of
Agriculture, requesting that the department ``take action, if
warranted, to see that no new contracts are awarded to Richco
Grain.'' \190\ It appears that no new contracts were awarded to
Marc Rich's company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\188\ Department of Agriculture Document Production (Letter from
R.E. Anderson, Jr., Vice President of the Commodity Credit Corporation,
Department of Agriculture, to Robert Thomajan, Partner, Milgrim
Thomajan & Lee (Sept. 29, 1989)) (Exhibit 25).
\189\ Department of Agriculture Document Production (Letter from
Dan Glickman, Chairman, Subcommittee on Wheat, Soybeans, and Feed
Grains, Committee on Agriculture, to President George H.W. Bush (Mar.
4, 1992)) (Exhibit 26).
\190\ Department of Agriculture Document Production (Letter from
Allan V. Burman, Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy, the White House, to Charles R. Hilty, Assistant Secretary for
Administration, Department of Agriculture (Apr. 20, 1992)) (Exhibit
27).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is troubling that a member of President Clinton's own
cabinet, who, as a Member of Congress was justifiably concerned
over Marc Rich's dealings with the Agriculture Department, was
apparently not consulted when the White House was considering
the pardons. As Secretary of Agriculture, Glickman could have
provided insight into the ways in which the fugitive from
American justice continued to profit from the very government
that had indicted him.
c. Cuban Asset Forfeiture
Marc Rich has also had Department of Treasury actions taken
against his companies because of his disregard for U.S.
regulations related to the embargo against Cuba. In late 1991,
the Compliance Programs Division of the Office of Foreign
Assets Control blocked more than $2.5 million relating to a
$3.9 million deal for Cuban sugar brokered by Marc Rich + Co.,
Ltd. in the United Kingdom.\191\ This transaction had run afoul
of the Cuban Assets Control regulations.\192\ As R. Richard
Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control
explained to Rich attorney Robert Fink in a December 27, 1995,
letter, these regulations prohibit transactions by persons
subject to U.S. jurisdiction involving any property of Cuba or
Cuban nationals.\193\ According to Newcomb, Rich's Cuban sugar
deal was clearly contemplated by the regulations and was
therefore illegal.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000022 (Memorandum
from R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets
Control, Department of Treasury, to Peter K. Nunez, Assistant Secretary
of Enforcement of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of
Treasury) (Exhibit 28).
\192\ Id. See 31 C.F.R. part 515.
\193\ Department of Treasury Document Production (Letter from R.
Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Department of Treasury, to Robert F. Fink, Partner, Piper and Marbury
(Dec. 27, 1995)) (Exhibit 29).
\194\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In September of 1994, Marc Rich + Co., A.G. in Switzerland
provoked a similar blocking of nearly $1 million in proceeds
from an oil deal with Venezuela going through Cuba. Internal
notes of the Compliance Programs Division indicate deep concern
with attempts by the Venezuelan state-run oil company to have
the funds released. As the Compliance Division wrote in its
internal notes, the Venezuelan oil company ``also stated that
it `believes' that Marc Rich intended to resell the oil to
Cuba, but that this particular transfer did not relate to the
sale of the oil to Cuba. If it did not relate to Cuba, why did
it reference Cuba?'' \195\ Ultimately, in February of 1995, the
Department of Treasury unblocked the funds because, as it
stated in one document, ``Cuba does not have a direct interest
in the blocked transaction, which involves a Venezuelan and a
Swiss company[.]'' \196\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000635 (Note from
Compliance Programs Division, Office of Foreign Assets Control)
(Exhibit 1).
\196\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000636 (License
Request by J. Kerrigan, Compliance Programs Division of the Office of
Foreign Assets Control, Department of Treasury (Jan. 1, 1995)) (Exhibit
30).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It does not appear that the Clinton Administration took
into consideration the fact that Marc Rich and Pincus Green
profited from the United States while flouting its embargoes.
Indeed, a review of Rich and Green's business relationships
shows a complete disregard for the welfare of the United States
and its citizens. Furthermore, Rich's clever and illegal
business schemes meant that U.S. taxpayers' money came out of
agencies such as the U.S. Mint and the Department of
Agriculture and wound up in the pockets of Rich and Green while
they evaded the U.S. legal system, and U.S. income taxation.
This is one of the many reasons that Republicans and Democrats
alike have been so critical of President Clinton's decision to
grant these men a pardon.
II. ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN CASE
A. Attempts to Settle in the 1980s
While living as fugitives in Switzerland, Marc Rich and
Pincus Green attempted to negotiate a settlement with the
Southern District of New York. In addition to prominent lawyers
such as Edward Bennett Williams, Rich and Green hired other
well-known and politically connected lawyers.\197\ In the
Spring of 1985, they hired President Richard Nixon's attorney
Leonard Garment.\198\ Around this same time, Garment hired
Lewis ``Scooter'' Libby to join his firm.\199\ Garment assigned
Libby the task of assessing whether or not there were legal
defenses to the charges to which Rich and Green's companies had
already pled guilty.\200\ As Libby testified at the Committee's
March 1, 2001, hearing, he worked with Robert Fink and other
attorneys in an attempt to demonstrate that Marc Rich's
companies ``had properly reported their tax obligations and
energy transactions and that these criminal charges should be
reexamined.'' \201\ Libby and the Rich legal team used their
analysis in an effort to negotiate a settlement with the
Southern District on the outstanding indictment.\202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\ Marc Rich's practice of hiring attorneys who are close to the
parties investigating him has continued to this day. In response to
this Committee's investigation, Rich and his attorneys have hired an
array of prominent Republicans, including the former personal attorneys
to Chairman Burton and the Committee's former Chief Investigator.
\198\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 438
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Lewis Libby, former counsel for Marc Rich,
Dechert Price & Rhoads).
\199\ Id. Libby is currently Chief of Staff to Vice President Dick
Cheney.
\200\ Id.
\201\ Id.
\202\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It should be noted that Lewis Libby's involvement in the
Rich matter--like that of Garment and former Reagan Justice
Department official William Bradford Reynolds--was limited to
settlement negotiations and never included work on the pardon
matter. Libby, and to a lesser extent, Garment and Reynolds,
have been mentioned by President Clinton and others as
prominent Republicans who supported the Rich pardon. This
representation is inaccurate, as Libby, Reynolds and Garment
worked only on settlement negotiations, and did not work on the
pardon. Libby's efforts included an attempt to negotiate a
settlement with the Southern District of New York in the late
1980s until he left to work at the Pentagon in the first Bush
Administration in 1989.\203\ When he returned to private
practice in 1993, Libby again attempted to achieve a settlement
for Rich and Green.\204\ This attempt again failed by
1995.\205\ Libby's final involvement in the Rich case was in
1999 and early 2000, when he briefed the newly-hired Jack Quinn
on the legal team's previous efforts to reach a settlement with
the Southern District and helped prepare yet another request to
the Southern District.\206\ Libby was instructed to cease all
work on behalf of Rich and Green in the spring of 2000.\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\ Id.
\204\ Id. On this occasion he also worked with Laurence Urgenson of
Kirkland & Ellis.
\205\ Id.
\206\ Id. at 438-39.
\207\ Id. at 439. It appears that Rich's lawyers considered
approaching Libby to help with the pardon effort, but were concerned
that he would refuse them. On December 26, 2000, Robert Fink sent the
following e-mail to Jack Quinn and Michael Green:
GMarc thought it made sense to call Scooter to see if he
could be helpful, knowing he might not be able to be
helpful but that he would never do anything that hurt Marc.
I agreed and raised it with Mike Green. Mike is concerned
that Scooter would want to help but would feel he had to
raise the matter with the ethics committee on the
transition and it would get caught up there, and we would
effectively be bringing it to the attention of a number of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
people who might not be helpful.
Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00398 (E-mail
from Robert Fink, Partner, Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe, to Jack Quinn
and Michael Green, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky (Dec.
26, 2000)) (Exhibit 31).
Despite the fact that Rich and Green fled the country as a
result of their pending indictment, the Southern District of
New York continued to negotiate with lawyers like Fink, Libby
and Garment to try to achieve the return of Rich and Green to
the United States. In their appeals to President Clinton for a
pardon, Rich's lawyers often claimed that the SDNY refused to
negotiate with Rich. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Despite the fact that Rich and Green had fled the country, SDNY
prosecutors continued to negotiate with Rich, even offering to
reduce the charges against Rich and Green in return for their
surrender. For example, in the early 1990s, Otto Obermaier,
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, traveled
to Switzerland to meet with Rich and Green. This was a highly
unusual step for a United States Attorney to make. In fact,
Eric Holder testified at a Committee hearing that he could
think of no other instance in which a U.S. Attorney had
traveled to a foreign country to negotiate with an indicted
fugitive.\208\ Despite this accommodation, Rich and Green
failed to reach an agreement with the Southern District to
return to the United States to stand trial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 268-69
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The SDNY also offered a number of other accommodations if
Rich would return to the U.S. to face the charges. For example,
prosecutors offered to agree in advance on bail, so that Rich
would not have to be incarcerated pending trial.\209\ They also
offered to have a full meeting with Rich's attorneys, and
conduct a complete review of the charges against Rich.\210\
Most importantly, they offered to drop the RICO charges against
Rich and Green.\211\ Marc Rich's own lawyer, Robert Fink,
confirmed that prosecutors offered to drop the RICO charge as a
result of negotiations.\212\ Fink wrote about these
negotiations in an e-mail he sent to Avner Azulay on February
10, 2000, stating ``I was told at one point that they would
drop the RICO charge if we wanted if Marc came in.'' \213\ Fink
confirmed the substance of this e-mail at the Committee's
hearing:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00697
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation
(Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 32).
\210\ Id.
\211\ Id.
\212\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 469
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink).
\213\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00697
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation
(Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 32).
Mr. LaTourette. Looking at [the February 10, 2000, e-
mail], or your recollection from the representation of
Marc Rich, is it accurate that at one point you were
told that the prosecuting authorities would drop the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
RICO charge if Marc Rich returned to this country?
Mr. Fink. That was something that was discussed with me
in at least one meeting I had with the
prosecutors.\214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\214\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 469
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink).
Given the fact that the SDNY had offered to drop the RICO
charges if Rich and Green returned to the U.S., it is
interesting that Quinn continued to cite the RICO charges as
one reason the pardon was necessary. Throughout the pardon
petition, his contacts with White House officials, and even his
attempts to justify the pardon after the fact, Quinn cited the
RICO charges as a reason Rich and Green fled the country rather
than face trial. However, the SDNY's offer makes it clear that
Quinn's RICO argument, like most of his other arguments, was
false and misleading.
Finally, in addition to the offer to drop the RICO charges,
prosecutors also offered another accommodation to Rich and
Green. The SDNY indicated it would agree to bail so that Rich
and Green would not have to be incarcerated while they stood
trial. The only condition of this offer was that they give up
their passports.\215\ Even after the offers to drop RICO and
allow bail was presented to them, the two men still chose to
remain fugitives and refused to face the American judicial
system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\ Id. at 470.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Marc Rich's Humanitarian Activities in the 1980s and 1990s
After he fled the United States, Marc Rich began to
contribute large sums of money to various humanitarian
activities, mainly in Israel and to Jewish communities in
Europe and the United States. Marc Rich's contributions, beyond
achieving their humanitarian purposes, also served a useful
purpose of making Rich a well-known and respected figure in
Israeli and Jewish political circles. These contacts would
prove useful both in Rich's unsuccessful attempt to settle his
indictment and in his successful campaign to win a pardon.
Rich also used his wealth to cultivate political contacts.
In 1985, after an Egyptian policeman shot and killed a number
of Israeli tourists at Ras Burka, Rich contributed $400,000 to
a compensation fund which was established for the victims.\216\
More recently, in 1995, Rich began to make offers of providing
substantial sums of money to help the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process.\217\ According to internal Marc Rich legal documents,
Rich offered to help fund the economic development of
Palestinian territories as part of the peace process.\218\ As
part of his offer, Rich apparently told Israeli officials that
his ability to help was limited by his outstanding U.S.
indictment. Receptive Israeli officials then went to U.S.
officials to see what could be done to settle Rich's case.
According to an account of the negotiations prepared by Rich's
lawyers, the Israeli government approached the Justice
Department to discuss the Rich case.\219\ Mark Richard, a
Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division,
informed the Israelis that while the Justice Department could
not act directly on the Israeli request, the Justice Department
would ``give serious consideration to a statement by the State
Department or the White House that the United States had an
interest in allowing Israel to obtain the active participation
of Rich in a Middle East Initiative.'' \220\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green 8 (Dec.
11, 2000) (Appendix III); Leonard Garment, Crazy Rhythm 375 (1997).
\217\ Id. at 9; Jack Quinn Document Production (Background
Memorandum to the Marc Rich Case, Dec. 1997) at 5 (Exhibit 33).
\218\ Id.
\219\ Id.
\220\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following Mark Richard's suggestion, the Israeli Foreign
Ministry took the Rich case to the State Department. In July
1995, Uri Savir, the Director General of the Foreign Ministry,
presented Ambassador Dennis Ross with a briefing paper on the
Rich case.\221\ Several months later, Ross informed Savir that
the Rich case was a ``hot potato'' and should not be
pursued.\222\ Despite Ross' rebuff, then-Foreign Minister
Shimon Peres instructed the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.,
Itamar Rabinovich, to press the Rich matter with the State
Department.\223\ Peres himself also raised the Rich case with
Ross and the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk.\224\
While Ross did not respond to Peres, Indyk suggested that the
Rich case could be discussed at greater length by Israeli
officials and the State Department.\225\ Ambassador Rabinovich
and his staff met with a State Department official in October
1995 and discussed the Rich case.\226\ In follow-up meetings
with the State Department, Israeli officials learned that they
were not likely to win support from the State Department for
settling the Rich case.\227\ According to the Israeli
officials, State Department officials were concerned about
allegations that the Administration was interfering with law
enforcement for political purposes, and the potential
embarrassment that would follow if the public learned of a deal
with Marc Rich.\228\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\221\ Id. at 5-6.
\222\ Id. at 6.
\223\ Id. Itamar Rabinovich, now President of Tel Aviv University,
wrote a letter of support for the Rich pardon to President Clinton.
\224\ Id.
\225\ Id.
\226\ Id.
\227\ Id.
\228\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the internal account prepared by the Marc Rich
lawyers, Shimon Peres continued his efforts on behalf of Marc
Rich even after Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated and Peres became
Prime Minister.\229\ However, by 1996, as Israeli elections
approached, Peres' priorities shifted, and Israeli contacts
with the U.S. government on the Rich matter subsided until the
pardon effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\229\ Id. at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other than the initial response from Mark Richard, it
appears that Justice Department and State Department officials
were unified in their resistance to Israeli efforts to have the
Rich case settled. The resistance of these government officials
should be contrasted with the receptivity displayed by
President Clinton and Deputy Attorney General Holder for the
much more drastic step of pardoning Rich. Also noteworthy is
the fact that this brief effort in 1995 appears to be the only
time that Marc Rich's name came up in the context of the Middle
East peace talks. To the extent that Rich's name came up, it
appears to have been a minor matter that never had any impact
on the Middle East peace talks. Dennis Ross, the Clinton
Administration's Middle East envoy, has stated that Marc Rich
``was not a factor in the Middle East talks.'' \230\ The fact
that Marc Rich was never a factor in the peace talks, either in
1995 or in 2000, suggests that President Clinton's key
justification for the pardon--that it was important to Israel--
is an after-the-fact excuse that the President has put forward
to cover up other motivations for the pardon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\230\ James Risen and Alison Leigh Cowan, U.S. Diplomats Turned
Aside Israeli Push on Rich's Behalf, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2001, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Rich Hires Jack Quinn
After several years of failed negotiations with the
Southern District of New York, Marc Rich and his team tried
another approach to resolve his case. Instead of dealing only
with the federal prosecutors from New York, Rich began a
process of going directly to the Justice Department in
Washington. Beginning sometime in 1997, Michael Steinhardt, a
prominent hedge-fund investor and friend of Rich, recommended
that Rich hire public relations consultant Gershon Kekst to
help with his case.\231\ Although Kekst was at first reluctant
to get involved, he eventually began working with Rich to help
resolve his legal troubles in the United States.\232\ It was
through Kekst's efforts that Jack Quinn was hired to work on
the Marc Rich case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\231\ Telephone Interview with Michael Steinhardt (Mar. 12, 2001).
\232\ As discussed in Section IV(A)(9) of the report, Kekst tried
to disavow his role in helping Marc Rich with negotiations and the
pardon effort. It appears, however, that Kekst was deeply involved in
the pardon effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kekst explained that in late 1998, he attended a dinner
celebrating the merger of Daimler Benz and Chrysler.\233\ At
the dinner, he was seated next to an individual he did not
know, who explained that he worked at ``Main Justice.'' \234\
It turned out that this individual was Deputy Attorney General
Eric Holder.\235\ Kekst asked this stranger to whom U.S.
Attorneys are accountable.\236\ Holder explained that they
answer to Main Justice.\237\ Kekst had Marc Rich in mind, but
did not mention Rich's name at the time.\238\ Kekst then asked
Holder what someone should do if ``they were improperly
indicted by an overzealous prosecutor.'' \239\ Holder told
Kekst that a person in that situation should try to work it out
and resolve it.\240\ Holder further stated that, ``lawyers know
there is a path back to DOJ, to me.'' \241\ Holder told Kekst
that such a person should ``hire a lawyer who knows the
process, he comes to me, and we work it out.'' \242\ Kekst
asked who such a lawyer would be, and Holder pointed to an
individual sitting at a nearby table and said, ``there's Jack
Quinn. He's a perfect example.'' \243\ According to Kekst,
Quinn was in attendance, but he did not discuss Marc Rich or
Eric Holder with Quinn at that dinner.\244\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\233\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar.
15, 2001). To the best of Kekst's recollection, the Daimler Chrysler
dinner took place in November of 1998.
\234\ Id.
\235\ Id.
\236\ Id.
\237\ Id.
\238\ Id.
\239\ Id.
\240\ Id.
\241\ Id.
\242\ Id.
\243\ Id.
\244\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly after the Daimler Chrysler dinner, Kekst began to
explore this new strategy. First, he worked to gather names of
lawyers in addition to Jack Quinn who might be able to help
Marc Rich.\245\ By the time he met with Michael Steinhardt and
Robert Fink to discuss the Rich case several weeks later, Kekst
recommended that Rich hire a senior Washington lawyer who could
intercede with the Justice Department in Washington.\246\ Kekst
then provided the names of three such lawyers who might be able
to help: Warren Christopher, Judah Best, and Jack Quinn.\247\
Kekst called each of the three to introduce them to Fink.\248\
According to Kekst, Warren Christopher said that taking the job
would be inappropriate since he had just come out of
government.\249\ Fink interviewed Best but did not like him
enough to hire him for the job. Rich, Fink, and Kekst
eventually settled on Jack Quinn. As Quinn explained to The New
York Times, he traveled to Switzerland, studied the issues, and
met with Marc Rich ``not for hours, but for days.'' \250\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\245\ Id.
\246\ Id.
\247\ Id.
\248\ Id. At the Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing, Fink testified
that he asked Kekst to ``recommend someone who [he] called the white-
haired man.'' Fink testified that this expression referred to ``someone
who understood the entire political process.'' ``The Controversial
Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm.
on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 471 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert
Fink).
\249\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar.
15, 2001).
\250\ Alison Leigh Cowan and Raymond Bonner, Lawyer Tells of His
Pursuit of Pardon for His Client, and Conversation With Clinton, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 25, 2001, at A21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jack Quinn began working for Marc Rich in the spring of
1999.\251\ According to Quinn, he was hired at first, ``not to
go to the White House, but to work with Main Justice and the
Southern District of New York.'' \252\ It is noteworthy that
Eric Holder's recommendation to Gershon Kekst was the impetus
for Marc Rich's hiring of Jack Quinn. Quinn had a warm
relationship with Holder--Holder even solicited Quinn for
support to have Holder nominated as Attorney General. This warm
relationship appears to have had a significant role in Holder's
support for the Rich pardon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\251\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 216
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
\252\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Quinn's Fee Arrangements
Jack Quinn was a partner with the law firm of Arnold &
Porter when he began working for Marc Rich. Quinn also worked
on the Rich matter with Kathleen Behan, another Arnold & Porter
partner. As Behan explained to Committee staff, although they
were not officially retained by Marc Rich until July of 1999,
from February until July, Quinn and Behan were ``engaged in a
series of familiarization and preparatory efforts'' to learn
about the case ``in preparation for possible retention on the
matter.'' \253\ Quinn and Behan were officially retained after
they met with Marc Rich in Zug, Switzerland, in May of 1999 to
discuss the representation.\254\ As the engagement letter
explains, Quinn and Behan were hired for a minimum rate of
$55,000 per month for six months, totaling $330,000, with an
option to reconsider if their billable hours were to
``substantially exceed'' $55,000 per month.\255\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\253\ Interview with Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb.
27, 2001).
\254\ Id.
\255\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0507-10 (Letter from
Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter, to Marc Rich (July 21, 1999))
(Exhibit 34).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Was Quinn Expecting Payment for His Work on the Pardon?
In November 1999, just several months after he was hired by
Rich, Quinn left Arnold & Porter to form the lobbying firm of
Quinn and Gillespie.\256\ While Quinn brought Rich as a client
to the new firm, he did not sign a new retainer with Rich.
Quinn continued to work for Rich at Quinn and Gillespie, both
on negotiations with the Justice Department, and on lobbying
for the pardon. However, Quinn has taken the incredible
position that he did not expect to be paid for any of his work
on the Rich case after he left Arnold & Porter. In the first
days of the uproar regarding the pardon, Quinn told The New
York Times, ``I have no understanding with Marc Rich about
future payments. If Marc Rich sent me a box of Godiva
chocolates tomorrow, it would be more than he is obligated to
do.'' \257\ He expanded on this position at a Committee
hearing:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\256\ According to one magazine article about his departure from
Arnold & Porter, Quinn brought $4.5 million in business to Arnold &
Porter. The article continued:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GBut that's small potatoes to what he can make on his
own, because now Quinn is not constrained by the hourly
rate structure and will take equity stakes in start-up
companies in exchange for his services. That will give him
the possibility of making millions on one client when it
goes public. Arnold & Porter, like almost all corporate
firms, does not allow equity participation with clients.
Kim Eisler, Old Political Opponents Join Forces for Lucrative Lobbying,
Washingtonian, Feb. 2000, at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\257\ Raymond Bonner and Alison Leigh Cowan, Notes Show Justice
Official Knew of Pardon Application, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2001, at A14.
Mr. Burton. You left [Arnold & Porter], and I guess the
contract stayed with them; is that right? What
happened? They went on just to a fee-for-service with
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that law firm?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. And you have said that you didn't receive
any fees from Mr. Rich. You said something about a box
of chocolates. It was all going to be voluntary if you
got that. That just seems very unusual to me. Don't
most attorneys have some kind of a contractual
agreement when they leave a law firm with a new client?
Mr. Quinn. Yeah. Let me try to explain this to you. The
fees you just reported were received by Arnold and
Porter. And, of course, as a partner, and because I had
a contractual relationship with a firm, I benefited to
some extent from those fees. To another extent, the
fees went to other partners of the firm.
After leaving Arnold and Porter, I did consider and
discuss with Mr. Fink whether we should have a new
arrangement. I came to the conclusion that,
particularly because of the fact that we were
unsuccessful in achieving a resolution of this at the
Southern District, and because I didn't think, frankly,
there would be that much more additional time in it,
and because I believed that the earlier payments had
been fair and reasonable, that I would see this through
to the end simply on the basis of the fees we had been
paid earlier.
Mr. Burton. So you received nothing further from Mr.
Rich?
Mr. Quinn. I have not received any further fees from
him on this pardon matter.
Mr. Burton. Have you received any fees from him for
anything?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. You've received no fees from Marc Rich or
his--how about any of his companies or friends or
associates?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. All that was received was from the--to the
law firm that you previously worked with?
Mr. Quinn. Right.
* * *
Mr. Burton. Do you have any kind of understanding where
he is going to give you a lump sum of money or funds
down the road for the services you've rendered?
Mr. Quinn. No sir[.] \258\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\258\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 242
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
It is impossible to believe that Jack Quinn did his work on
the Rich pardon out of the goodness of his heart, on a pro bono
basis. Quinn apparently spent hundreds of hours \259\ on the
Rich matter, calling and e-mailing his colleagues on the Rich
legal team in the middle of the night, on vacation, on
Christmas Day, and New Year's Eve.\260\ While Quinn's
dedication to his client was admirable, it suggests that Quinn
anticipated some satisfaction beyond seeing Marc Rich and
Pincus Green pardoned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\259\ In media accounts Quinn claimed that he spent 60-100 hours on
the Rich pardon. These claims simply are not credible. Kitty Behan, who
was considerably less involved in the Rich pardon than Quinn spent 126
hours on the Rich pardon. Arnold & Porter Document Production A0513-15,
A1128 (Arnold & Porter billing records for Marc Rich (Jan. 16, 2001 and
Feb. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 35). It is likely that Quinn was
underestimating his hours to the media to try to support his claims
that he was not expecting to be paid.
\260\ See Arnold & Porter Document Production A0844 (E-mail from
Jack Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Dec. 25,
2000)); Arnold & Porter Document Production A0850 (E-mail from Jack
Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Dec. 27,
2000)); Arnold & Porter Document Production A0861 (E-mail from Robert
Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 2, 2001));
Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00091 (E-mail
from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, and Marc
Rich (Dec. 28, 2000)); Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document
Production PMR&W 00097-98 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Dec.
31, 2000)) (Exhibit 36).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the common sense rejection of Quinn
proceeding on a pro bono basis, e-mails between Jack Quinn,
Robert Fink, and Marc Rich indicate that Rich was specifically
contemplating entering into a large-dollar retainer agreement
with Quinn after Quinn left Arnold & Porter. These documents
were withheld from the Committee for over a year on the basis
of a claim of attorney-client privilege which was rejected by
federal Judge Denny Chin. Once provided to the Committee, the
documents seriously undermined Quinn's claims that he never
expected any payment from Rich. On February 3, 2000, the day
after the Southern District of New York rejected Quinn's
request for a meeting to discuss the Rich case, Quinn asked
Fink about his status with Marc Rich, asking ``not that I'm
concerned, but did marc decide to renew the retainer? I've not
heard anything.'' \261\ Two weeks later, Fink addressed Quinn's
status in an e-mail to Marc Rich, suggesting that Quinn could
still be useful, despite his failure to date:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\261\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02847 (E-mail from Jack
Quinn to Robert Fink (Feb. 3, 2000)) (Exhibit 37).
Separately, I have been thinking about your reaction to
Jack. When we meet [sic], he felt (and made it clear
that he believed this, but was not sure) that he could
convince Eric that it made sense to listen to the
professors and that he could convince Eric to encourage
Mary Jo to do the same. In this he was correct.
Moreover, in the preparation process, it became clear
that Jack was not just a pretty face but had thoughtful
ideas and questions and was not simply relying on his
past contacts to make this happen. So, I would not give
up on him, at least not yet, as he is still a
knowledgeable guy who has a clear understanding of
relationships and what may be doable. While we may get
more than that, we should not have enlarged
expectations.\262\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\262\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W
00720-21 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 17, 2000))
(Exhibit 38).
On February 29, 2000, Fink sent another message to Rich
suggesting that he enter into a retainer agreement with Quinn
while their negotiations with the Justice Department were still
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
pending:
All in all, while he has been very busy and sometime
hard to get to, he has not separated himself from the
matter and has fully participated. He has not pushed me
for the retainer, though, and realizes that he does not
have an agreement with you. I think it makes sense to
compensate him for what he has done and may continue to
do. Just give it some more thought and we can come back
to it soon. We can wait, if you want, to see what Eric
says, although it may pay to respond now, before Eric
response [sic] to the last message from Jack, so it
does not look like you were only willing to pay because
of a positive response, as that was not the agreement.
Even if we stop everything we are doing, and decide not
to investigate the pardon, etc., at this time, we
should fold this down in a friendly way.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\263\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00722
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 39).
After the effort to settle the criminal case with the
Justice Department failed, Fink continued to recommend that
Rich enter into a retainer agreement with Quinn, who was
continuing to raise the issue. On June 6, 2000, Fink sent the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
following e-mail to Rich:
Jack raised the question of his status. I told him that
I felt that you would feel that he had been compensated
for the past, even though the retainer had run out
before he stopped work, but that you would not want or
expect him to work without compensation going forward--
indeed, you appreciated that it was important to
compensate people who asked you to perform for you;
although I thought you would not want to get involved
in another one of those six month retainers.
Jack said he did not want to make a proposal that you
might find objectionable, but felt some clear
arrangement for the future was appropriate. I told him
I hoped to see you soon, and that I would raise it with
you when I see you and come back with a suggestion. He
was happy with that and we agreed to catch up with each
other on this issue in the beginning of July.\264\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\264\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00731
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (June 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 40).
At the beginning of July 2000, Fink e-mailed the figures for a
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
proposed retainer agreement to Marc Rich:
Here is my proposal on Jack Quinn, consistent with your
advice to me.
Jack originally proposed a $50,000 per month retainer
and additional hourly charges for Kitty Behan. We
settled at $55,000 per month, including Kitty, which
was a better deal because at her hourly rate her
billings would have averaged over $10,000 per month.
Moreover, we continued to consult with Jack (and Kitty)
after the retainer period had ended so that the average
blended rate for Jack was well below $45,000. (OK,
enough with making you feel better.)
At the moment the issue raised by you and Michael is
how to keep Jack on a ``retainer'' so that he is
available for questions that might arise and, more
importantly, available in the Fall, if we want him to
be. Since the Fall is not far away, and you will know
whether you want him to gear up again within four
months or so, I suggest that we offer Jack $10,000 per
month as a retainer to keep his eyes, ears and brain
open to events and thoughts that may be helpful, with
the understanding that if a decision is made to proceed
that we will renegotiate the monthly retainer to
reflect the changed circumstances.
This arrangement could start mid-July or August 1st. He
has not pushed me for this and, indeed, we are the ones
who raised the idea of keeping him on a retainer.
Still, if we do go back to Jack and offer a package, we
should not schedule it to begin weeks after the
proposal. So, if I were to call him next week, I would
want to suggest a July 15th start date.\265\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\265\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00732
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (July 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 41).
Despite the clear and detailed indications that Rich and Quinn
were negotiating a lucrative retainer agreement, Quinn
testified that he never received any money from Marc Rich
between the time that he left Arnold & Porter and the time that
the pardon was granted. The Committee requested interviews with
Jack Quinn and Robert Fink so that they could provide further
explanation regarding these e-mails. Both refused to
participate in an interview.
2. Has Quinn Received Payments from Marc Rich Since the
Pardon Was Granted?
Because he spent so much time and effort on the Marc Rich
pardon effort, and was successful, many believe that Quinn may
have expected some large payment from Rich after the pardon was
granted. Quinn has always denied these allegations. However,
among the documents withheld by Quinn, and which were forced
out by the decision of Judge Denny Chin in December 2001, were
documents which undermined Quinn's denials. Shortly after the
pardon was granted, Quinn was asked by a reporter if he
received a fee for his work on the Rich matter. Rather than
just saying ``no,'' it appears that Quinn did not know what to
say. On January 23, Quinn told Gershon Kekst that ``Debra [sic]
Orin wants to know if I received a fee. My instinct is to
either not respond or say that I have never, in 25 yrs, thought
it propoer [sic] to discuss a client fee arrangement or even if
there was one. What say you?'' \266\ Kekst suggested a response
that ``[t]he privacy of my personal and professional
relationships is inviolate and so I would not, as a lifelong
practice, discuss such a question. Suffice to say that in this
case my motivation was quite simple: an injustice needed to be
corrected and I determined to do what I could to help
accomplish that.'' \267\ Quinn then fueled further speculation
about his fee arrangement when he told the press that he was
handling the Rich pardon as a ``personal matter,'' indicating
he would not share the profits with his partners at Quinn &
Gillespie.\268\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\266\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02973 (E-mail from Jack
Quinn to Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Jan. 23, 2001))
(Exhibit 42).
\267\ Id.
\268\ Alison Leigh Cowan and Raymond Bonner, Lawyer Tells of His
Pursuit of Pardon for His Client, and Conversation With Clinton, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 25, 2001, at A21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E-mails between Marc Rich and Jack Quinn after January 20,
2001, suggest that Rich was seeking some way to show his thanks
to Quinn, perhaps alluding to a payment to Quinn. On January
23, 2001, Rich told Quinn that ``As time goes by it's sinking
in more and more and I once again want to thank you for all
you've done. I still want to thank you personally and properly
on a separate occasion when we meet.'' \269\ After Quinn's
appearance before the Committee, and on a number of television
programs, Rich e-mailed Quinn to congratulate him.\270\ Quinn
responded with his own thanks, and an assurance that he would
continue to fight to point out the flaws in Rich's
indictment.\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\269\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02924 (E-mail from Marc
Rich to Jack Quinn (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 43).
\270\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02916 (E-mail from Marc
Rich to Jack Quinn (Feb. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 44).
\271\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02930 (E-mail from Jack
Quinn to Marc Rich (Feb. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 45).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most conclusive piece of evidence that Quinn fully
intended to be paid by Marc Rich for his work on the pardon
came from Rich lawyer Robert Fink at the Committee's March 1
hearing. Fink confirmed that Rich fully intended to pay Quinn
for his work. Fink's testimony also strongly suggests that
Quinn was lying when he stated that he had no expectation of
being paid for his work on the pardon:
Counsel. When Mr. Quinn began pursuing the pardon, the
prospect of a pardon, did you anticipate compensating
him for that work?
Mr. Fink. I anticipated that he would be compensated
for that work by Mr. Rich.
Counsel. And if you could, tell us what you were
thinking.
Mr. Fink. Actually, I--I don't know that I was thinking
anything other than he was entitled to some fair fee,
the exact parameters of which I did not have in mind. I
believe I told Mr. Quinn when we started to discuss the
pardon that we would find a fair fee arrangement for
him consistent with whatever his fee arrangements were.
I did not know how he was handling his fee
arrangements.
Counsel. Did you discuss with Mr. Rich compensating Mr.
Quinn?
Mr. Fink. Could you excuse me just one moment?
Counsel. Certainly.
[Mr. Fink confers with counsel.]
Mr. Fink. The answer is yes, I did. I communicated
thoughts I had to Mr. Rich, with which he did not
disagree.
Counsel. And what did you communicate to him?
Mr. Fink. I actually communicated to him what I told to
Mr. Quinn.
Counsel. And what was that?
Mr. Fink. That we would come to a fair fee arrangement
that was consistent with his normal fee arrangements.
Counsel. So you had communicated to Mr. Quinn that you
would come to an arrangement with him to compensate
him?
Mr. Fink. Yes.
Counsel. And when was that?
Mr. Fink. The precise date I do not know, but it was
most likely early November 2000.
Counsel. And when did you stop thinking that was going
to be the case?
Mr. Fink. I stopped thinking that was going to be the
case during the first hearings of this committee.
Counsel. When I was asking Mr. Quinn about his
compensation?
Mr. Fink. I believe you were the questioner.
Counsel. I'm not quite sure where to go after that. But
you had not had a conversation with Mr. Quinn during
which you had discussed the prospect of him not being
compensated up until at least the time of our last
hearing; is that correct?
Mr. Fink. It was always my contemplation, I mean, not
that I reflected on this frequently, but if you had
stopped me at any point in time and said would you
expect that Mr. Quinn would be compensated for this
work, I would have thought that he would be.\272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\272\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 505-06
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink).
Fink's testimony, in addition to the circumstantial evidence,
establishes that Quinn expected to receive payment for his work
on the Rich pardon. It is likely that Quinn attempted to
mislead the public and the Committee on this point to try to
improve the public perception of his actions in this case. That
is, if Quinn could say he did all of his work on the Rich
pardon out of his belief in the merits, rather than his belief
in a large payday, it would show the strength of the Rich case.
Knowing now that Quinn did do his work on the Rich pardon
with an expectation of payment, the question is--how large of a
payment would Quinn receive? Fink loosely characterized it as
``consistent with his normal fee arrangements.'' However, given
the enormous sums at Rich's disposal, and the vast amounts Rich
had spent, unsuccessfully, to resolve his case, it is not
unreasonable that Rich would pay Quinn a large sum of money.
However, at the Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing, Quinn
pledged not to accept any future payment on the Rich case:
Counsel. Mr. Quinn, the Chair asked you some questions
about compensation. Apart from your attorney's fees,
will you accept any money from Mr. Rich in the future?
Mr. Quinn. Well, look, I don't think it would be fair
to ask me to commit never to accept moneys from him. As
I've said to you, if I do work that justifies my
billing him for it, I will do so. I expect to be
reimbursed for the expenses I'm put to in connection
with this. Those are the only moneys I anticipate
receiving from him.
Counsel. But as far as your work done in pursuit of
obtaining a pardon for him, you do not anticipate him--
you're not going to ask him to pay you any money?
Mr. Quinn. That's correct.
Counsel. You're not going to accept any money if he did
offer it to you; is that correct?
Mr. Quinn. I only anticipate receiving from him moneys
in connection with work I may do.
Counsel. My question was, will you accept any money if
he offers it to you for the work you did in obtaining
the pardon?
Mr. Quinn. I have no idea what he might offer. It's a
hypothetical question. I don't think I should be
required to say--
Counsel. It's not a hypothetical question. It's a very
clear question. If Mr. Rich offers to pay you money in
the future for work you did in pursuit of obtaining his
pardon, will you accept it or will you not accept it?
Mr. Quinn. I will not bill him, and I will not accept
any further compensation for work done on the
pardon.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\273\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 266
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
However, in February 2002, as a result of Judge Chin's
decision in the Southern District of New York, the Committee
received a number of documents which had been earlier withheld
from the Committee on the basis of attorney-client privilege.
One of the e-mails provided to the Committee indicated that on
March 5, 2001, after the Committee's second and final hearing
on the Marc Rich pardon, Quinn asked Rich to enter into a new
retainer agreement to pay Quinn. Quinn's e-mail reads as
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
follows:
Greetings. Quite a month we have had! If you are
agreeable, and I hope you are, I need to fax to you in
the next few days a new retainer agreement. I cannot,
under the D.C. Bar rules continue to work without a
written agreement, and I have been crafting one which I
will forward shortly. I hope that, in recent days, the
public has begun to see your pardon in a different
light. I particularly thought that our hearing last
Thursday brought to the fore aspects not previously
appreciated. About all this I hope we shall speak soon.
Best to you.\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\274\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02916 (E-mail from Jack
Quinn to Marc Rich (Mar. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 44).
Rich responded to Quinn by telling him: ``[w]ith reference
to your email of March 5, please go ahead and send me the new
retainer agreement.'' \275\ Neither Quinn nor Robert Fink
provided the Committee with a copy of any retainer agreement,
or any further e-mails regarding payments from Rich to Quinn
after March 5, 2001. However, the March 5 e-mail raises the
possibility that Quinn is receiving payment from Rich, despite
his express promise to the contrary at the Committee's February
8 hearing. The Committee requested an interview with both Quinn
and Fink to provide further explanation for these e-mail
messages, but both declined to participate. While Quinn has
refused to provide an explanation to the Committee, his
spokesman has told the press that Quinn has signed a new
retainer with Rich to ``cover new legal matters.'' \276\ The
Committee will continue to investigate this matter to determine
the nature of Quinn's work for Rich and the amounts that Quinn
is being paid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\275\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02974 (E-mail from Marc
Rich to Jack Quinn (Mar. 6, 2001)) (Exhibit 46).
\276\ Michael Isikoff, Secret E-Mail, Newsweek, Mar. 10, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Quinn's Attempts to Settle the Case
In October 1999, Quinn followed the advice offered by Eric
Holder to Gershon Kekst and approached Main Justice in an
effort to settle the Rich case. He started by drafting a
presentation for the Justice Department. Quinn also hired Neal
Katyal, a lawyer who interned for Quinn when he was Counsel to
Vice President Gore.\277\ Katyal had also worked as National
Security Advisor to Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder.
According to Katyal, he was hired more as a consultant than as
a lawyer.\278\ Katyal characterized the presentation he helped
prepare as more marketing than legal.\279\ Katyal helped draft
documents that were presented to Eric Holder. He denied
contacting Holder directly, or using his access to Holder to
benefit the Rich lawyers. However, he did acknowledge that on
several occasions Jack Quinn told him, ``you know, I want to
talk to Eric about this.'' \280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\277\ Telephone Interview with Neal Katyal, Associate Professor,
Georgetown University Law Center (Mar. 26, 2001).
\278\ Id.
\279\ Id.
\280\ Id. Katyal further explained that Quinn already had an
independent relationship with Holder and would not have needed Katyal's
assistance in setting up any meetings between them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quinn had a number of contacts with Holder about settling
the Rich case. It appears that Quinn's main request to Holder
was that he intercede with the Southern District of New York
and have the Southern District's prosecutors meet with the
members of the Marc Rich legal team. On October 22, 1999, Quinn
met with Holder for the first time regarding the Rich case.
Quinn reviewed a number of points about the Rich case with
Holder, and asked that Holder intervene with the Southern
District of New York, to encourage the Southern District to
meet with Marc Rich's lawyers and reach a settlement of the
criminal case.\281\ On November 8, 1999, Holder called Quinn
and told him that he and other senior staff at the Justice
Department believed that the refusal of the Southern District
to meet with Rich's lawyers was ``ridiculous.'' \282\ Holder
recommended that Quinn send a letter requesting a meeting to
U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White, with copies to Holder and
Assistant Attorneys General James Robinson and Loretta Collins
Argrett.\283\ Holder told Quinn that once he got the letter, he
would call White and suggest that she should meet with
Quinn.\284\ Holder also told Quinn that he was assigning one of
his top deputies, David Margolis, to look at the Rich
matter.\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\281\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit
47).
\282\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn (Nov. 8,
1999)) (Exhibit 48).
\283\ Id.
\284\ Id.
\285\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After Holder spoke with Mary Jo White about a meeting with
Quinn and members of the Rich legal team, Quinn made a direct
appeal to Mary Jo White, writing her on December 1, 1999:
We would like to begin by asking that you or your
representative, along with representatives of the Tax
and Criminal Divisions of the Department of Justice,
meet with Professors Wolfman and Ginsburg, and members
of our legal team, to personally evaluate their
conclusions. We urge this approach because the tax
allegations underlie so much of the indictment, and
because the merits of our tax position can be quickly
evaluated. We believe that such a meeting will advance
a resolution of this matter. We further believe that we
can persuade you that neither the law nor the policies
of the Department of Justice support the RICO charges
and that, in this regard, too, the indictment as
currently drafted should not stand.\286\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn and
Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter, to Mary Jo White, U.S.
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Dec. 1, 1999))
(Exhibit 49).
On January 18, 2000, Quinn spoke to Holder to see how Mary
Jo White had received his letter. Holder told Quinn that he had
spoken to White, and that she was reviewing the matter
personally. Holder told Quinn that he would ``do what he can,''
\287\ and also provided encouragement to Quinn, telling him
that White ``didn't sound like her guard was up.'' \288\ On
February 2, 2000, the Southern District responded to Quinn and
Behan's letter by turning down their request to meet in order
to modify the indictment.\289\ As Mary Jo White further
explained in her letter to Quinn, ``I have communicated with
representatives of the Deputy Attorney General and Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, and with the Acting
Assistant Attorney General of the Tax Division. They all concur
that this is a matter within the discretion of the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.'' \290\
White's letter was a complete rejection of the overtures made
by Quinn and Holder, and was a significant setback for the Marc
Rich legal team. Robert Fink sent an e-mail to Avner Azulay
explaining that ``[w]e received a negative response to our
overture from [Deputy U.S. Attorney] Shira[h Neiman]. She said
her office will not negotiate while Marc is away, and that the
DoJ agrees. JQ was surprised and disappointed that the DoJ had
agreed even though he had not heard from Eric.'' \291\ Azulay
responded that ``I am not exactly surprised. I foresaw this
answer from the moment I read JQ's ltr. I hate to say that `I
told you so.' I was surprised by JQ's optimistic report.''
\292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\287\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit
50).
\288\ Id.
\289\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Mary Jo White,
U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan,
Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 2, 2000)) (Exhibit 51).
\290\ Id.
\291\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00697
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation
(Feb. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 32).
\292\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After this rejection, Quinn turned his efforts to Eric
Holder, asking him to review the Rich case, despite White's
refusal to do so. Robert Fink laid out Quinn's proposed plan of
action in a February 17, 2000, e-mail to Marc Rich:
[Jack] agrees (subject to further discussion) with
trying to have Eric help us meet with the tax lawyers
in Main Justice (and maybe the head of the criminal
division) to see if the professors can convince the
chief government tax lawyers that this was a bad tax
case. He also agrees that such a conclusion would be
useful for many purposes including going back to the
SDNY. Similarly, he agrees we should make something of
the fact that the office was dealing with fugitives
(who surrendered this week) in connection with the
Russian money laundering case, while insisting that
they can't deal with fugitives. Still, he wants to give
Eric a short list of what is wrong with the indictment
as he agreed to do that. He feels we can do both.\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\293\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00701
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 52).
On February 28, 2000, Quinn sent Holder a short memorandum
entitled ``Why DOJ Should Review the Marc Rich Indictment.''
\294\ In this memorandum, Quinn stated that ``[t]he refusal of
the SDNY to participate in a discussion of the Marc Rich case
is sorely disappointing. That office (and DOJ) should not sit
on a defective indictment.'' \295\ Quinn then explained why he
believed that the RICO, mail fraud, wire fraud, tax evasion,
and energy charges against Rich were faulty.\296\ Quinn also
claimed that the SDNY had recently negotiated with fugitive
Russian money launderers, despite their policy against
negotiating with fugitives. Quinn also stated that ``[t]he DOJ
website lists Marc Rich on its International Fugitive page.
This involves USG resources and is a potential embarrassment
for DOJ.'' \297\ Quinn did not provide any explanation, though,
of why listing Rich as a fugitive would be an embarrassment for
DOJ, given the fact that the Justice Department had been trying
to extradite or apprehend him for almost 20 years. Holder
apparently reviewed Quinn's arguments, but failed to help
Quinn. Quinn spoke to Holder on March 14, 2000, and reported
back to Fink, Behan, and Kekst:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\294\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum entitled ``Why DOJ
Should Review the Marc Rich Indictment'' (Feb. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 53).
\295\ Id.
\296\ Id.
\297\ Id.
[W]e spoke briefly today. it started out badly--``we've
gone as far as we can go, can't figure out a way around
Shira[h Neiman], etc.''--but I pushed back hard on the
russian money laundering culprits and the uneven
treatment of marc. he wants to talk further about that
with his people, said he'd call me back tomorrow. it's
time to move on the GOI [Government of Israel]
front.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\298\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to
Robert Fink (Mar. 14, 2000)) (Exhibit 54). Quinn's suggestion to ``move
on the GOI front'' was rebuffed by Avner Azulay, who stated that
``there is no way the MOJ [Israeli Minister of Justice] is going to
initiate a call to EH--a minister calling a second level bureaucrat who
has proved to be a weak link.'' Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document
Production PMR&W 00728 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich
Foundation, to Robert Fink (Mar. 18, 2000)) (Exhibit 55).
Holder did speak to Quinn almost a month later, on March 25,
2000, and told him that ``we're all sympathetic'' and that the
``equities [are] on your side.'' \299\ However, Holder
apparently informed Quinn that he could not force a meeting on
the Rich case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\299\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit
56). In this conversation, Holder also answered Quinn's arguments
regarding the SDNY's negotiations with the fugitive Russian money
launderers, pointing out that they, unlike Rich, agreed to cooperate
with the government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing, Jack Quinn
confirmed that Holder was sympathetic to his cause:
I certainly formed the impression that there was, as
one of my notes reflect, a view among some senior
people in Main Justice that the equities were on our
side in some senses.
Again, I'm not trying to overstate this. I'm not trying
to say that I believed that senior people at Main
Justice thought the indictment was meritless, but I did
absolutely believe that Main Justice thought that the
Southern District was being unreasonable in being
unwilling to talk to us. I thought that there was a
more sympathetic audience at Main Justice.\300\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\300\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 230
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
However, Eric Holder attempted to qualify his support of Jack
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quinn's arguments:
With regard to question of equities and whether or not
we thought the Southern District was being
unreasonable, I think Mr. Quinn was just a little
confused. What we were talking about there was them
being unreasonable and not having the meeting. The
equities were on their side, as Mr. Quinn's side, with
regard to the meeting. No one at Main Justice thought
that, with regard to the substance, the equities were
on Mr. Quinn's side.\301\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\301\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 231
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice).
Even assuming, though, that Holder's support was limited to his
request for a meeting with Mary Jo White, it is still unclear
why he thought the ``equities were on Quinn's side,'' even with
respect to a meeting. The SDNY had a number of meetings and
negotiations with Rich's attorneys, both before and after
Rich's flight from the U.S. The SDNY had made a number of
reasonable offers to settle the case, and U.S. Attorney Otto
Obermaier and one of his senior aides even met with Rich in
Switzerland. Rich's lawyers, however, took an inflexible
position that they would not agree to any plea that required
jail time. Given this position, the SDNY decided further
negotiations would not be productive. For Holder to
characterize the SDNY's position as ``ridiculous,'' suggests
that Eric Holder supported Quinn's efforts to settle the Rich
case from the beginning.
III. THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN PARDON PETITION
A. Rich Contemplated a Pardon Early in 2000
Jack Quinn and others on the Marc Rich legal team have
maintained that they did not decide to seek pardons for Rich
and Green until October 2000.\302\ However, there is extensive
evidence that Marc Rich and his lawyers were contemplating a
pardon as early as February 2000, while they were still
attempting to settle Rich's criminal case with the Southern
District of New York. It appears that Rich and his legal team
viewed the Presidential pardon effort as a fall-back in case
they were unable to settle the criminal case. Moreover, it
appears that although they were considering petitioning for a
pardon as early as February 2000, Rich and his legal team
waited until November 2000 to submit their petition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\302\ See, e.g., ``The Controversial Pardon of International
Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th
Cong. 45 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed previously, on February 2, 2000, Mary Jo
White, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York,
rejected Jack Quinn's offer to meet regarding the Marc Rich
case. After White's rejection, Jack Quinn turned again to
Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, and asked him to intervene
and force a reconsideration of the Marc Rich indictment. By
late March 2000, it became clear to Quinn that Holder was
sympathetic to Quinn's requests, but would not force the
Southern District to meet with Quinn. However, during the time
that Quinn was discussing his request for a meeting with Eric
Holder, the Marc Rich legal team was already considering a
Presidential pardon.
A privilege log submitted to the Committee by Arnold &
Porter suggests that attorneys working for Marc Rich had been
researching Presidential pardons as early as March 1999.\303\
It appears, though that serious consideration of a pardon began
in February 2000, while Quinn was still attempting to settle
the criminal case through Eric Holder. February 9, 2000, Robert
Fink sent an e-mail to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, which
referred to the pardon effort cryptically as the ``second
option:''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\303\ Arnold & Porter Document Production (Privilege Log, Mar. 27,
2001) (Exhibit 57). The privilege log notes that a memorandum regarding
the pardon power was prepared on March 12, 1999, and withheld from the
Committee on the basis of the attorney work product privilege.
I briefed Marc and he is awaiting word on your call. (I
have also sent Avner a briefed [sic] email letting him
know of the current status.) I also told Marc that I
would discuss with you and Kitty your views on the
second option (whether there is any reason to consider
it, or whether what happened here made it so unlikely
that you did not think it worthwhile, as I told him
that you would not work on it unless you thought there
was some possibility of success). He was curious as to
your thinking. I told him I would also check on your
thinking on what Avner was doing. but let's see what
Eric says.\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\304\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00695
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, Partner,
Arnold & Porter (Feb. 9, 2000)) (Exhibit 58).
On February 14, 2000, Fink had a telephone discussion with
Quinn regarding the efforts to settle Rich's criminal case in
New York. Quinn apparently mentioned the possibility of seeking
a Presidential pardon, as Fink's notes of the call state in
part, ``Pardon--mid to late Nov.'' \305\ Two weeks later,
Robert Fink sent another e-mail to Marc Rich explaining Quinn's
role in the negotiations with the Justice Department, and his
potential role in seeking a Presidential pardon. Fink concluded
his e-mail to Rich by suggesting that Rich enter into a
retainer agreement with Quinn before they heard back from Eric
Holder:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\305\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W
01202-03 (Notes of Robert Fink, Feb. 14, 2000) (Exhibit 59).
I think it makes sense to compensate him for what he
has done and may continue to do. Just give it some more
thought and we can come back to it soon. We can wait,
if you want, to see what Eric says, although it may pay
to respond now, before Eric response [sic] to the last
message from Jack, so it does not look like you were
only willing to pay because of a positive response, as
that was not the agreement. Even if we stop everything
we are doing, and decide not to investigate the pardon,
etc., at this time, we should fold this down in a
friendly way.\306\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\306\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00722
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 39).
On March 18, 2000, Avner Azulay sent Fink an e-mail which
again alluded to the possibility of seeking a pardon in
November 2000. More importantly, this e-mail also raised the
possibility of capitalizing on Denise Rich's relationship with
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Clinton:
I had a long talk with JQ and Michael. I explained why
there is no way the MOJ [Israeli Minister of Justice]
is going to initiate a call to E[ric] H[older]--a
minister calling a second level bureaucrat who has
proved to be a weak link. We are reverting to the idea
discussed with Abe--which is to send D[enise] R[ich] on
a ``personal'' mission to N01. with a well prepared
script. IF it works we didin't [sic] lose the present
opportunity--until nov--which shall not repat [sic]
itself. If it doesn't--then probably Gershon's course
of acion [sic] shall be the one left option [sic] to
start all over again.\307\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\307\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00729
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink
(Mar. 18, 2000)) (Exhibit 60).
At the March 1, 2001, hearing on the Rich pardon, Jack Quinn
and Robert Fink were asked to explain their understanding of
this communication. Fink stated that he understood ``N01'' to
mean President Clinton.\308\ However, neither of the two
attorneys could provide a definitive answer as to whether
Denise Rich actually undertook the `` `personal' mission'' to
the President contemplated in the e-mail. For example, Quinn
provided the following response:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\308\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 515
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink).
Now, I'm telling you, I did not speak to the President
in the year 2000 about the Marc Rich matter. I was not
a recipient of this [e-mail]. I have no reason to
believe that anyone asked Denise Rich to speak to him
about this matter, and I have no reason to believe that
she did so. But my firsthand knowledge of this is
limited to the facts I'm able to testify to.\309\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\309\ Id. at 396 (testimony of Jack Quinn).
When asked what Denise Rich's involvement was around this time,
Robert Fink provided an even more lawyerly response: ``I have
an imperfect memory, so I'll be careful. I believe as I sit
here that there was no involvement by Denise Rich in Mr. Rich's
problems during that period of time. I have absolutely no
recollection that she became involved in any way.'' \310\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\310\ Id. at 515 (testimony of Robert Fink).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, neither attorney could give a definitive
answer as to whether this ``well prepared script'' for Denise
Rich related to the pardon, or to negotiations with the
Department of Justice. During questioning about the March 18,
2000, e-mail, Quinn testified that it was possible that ``every
one of us involved in this thought out loud with each other, is
there any way to persuade the President to tell Justice, to
tell the southern district to do something.'' \311\ Quinn
continued, however, stating, ``It's also entirely possible that
Mr. Azulay, others, myself included, were involved in a
conversation where someone said you know we are going to try to
pardon one of these days.'' \312\ Robert Fink's testimony,
while also not definitive, suggests that the script related to
negotiations with the Department of Justice. When asked about
the last sentence of Azulay's e-mail that discusses reverting
to ``Gershon's course of action'' if Denise Rich's script were
to fail, Fink stated, ``I suspect that he's talking about an
application for a pardon here.'' \313\ Assuming Fink's
supposition is correct, then the script for Denise would have
related to Department of Justice negotiations.\314\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\311\ Id. at 396 (testimony of Jack Quinn).
\312\ Id.
\313\ Id. at 516 (testimony of Robert Fink).
\314\ This also tends to suggest that while the attorneys were not
working on a pardon effort in March of 2000, the idea had already been
discussed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In June 2000, Robert Fink had further communications with
Marc Rich indicating that they were intentionally waiting until
after the November 2000 election to petition for a Presidential
pardon:
Jack Quinn and I traded calls until today. He is well
and doing well. He has not forgotten you or what we set
out to do, but has pretty much concluded that there is
nothing to do until we get closer to (or even passed)
[sic] the election, or as he put it, the closing days
of the current administration.\315\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\315\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00731
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (June 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 40).
In July 2000, Fink again e-mailed Rich suggesting that Rich
sign a retainer agreement with Quinn so that he would be
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
available to work in the Fall of 2000:
At the moment the issue raised by you and Michael is
how to keep Jack on a ``retainer'' so that he is
available for questions that might arise and, more
importantly, available in the Fall, if we want him to
be. Since the Fall is not far away, and you will know
whether you want him to gear up again within four
months or so, I suggest that we offer Jack $10,000 per
month as a retainer to keep his eyes, ears and brain
open to events and thoughts that may be helpful, with
the understanding that if a decision is made to proceed
that we will renegotiate the monthly retainer to
reflect the changed circumstances.\316\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\316\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00732
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (July 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 41).
This documentary evidence is supported by the information
provided by two witnesses who indicate that they were aware of
pardon discussions well before the Fall of 2000. Abraham
Foxman, the National Director of the Anti-Defamation League,
informed the Committee that he recommended that Rich seek a
Presidential pardon as early as February 2000. Foxman first met
Marc Rich fifteen years ago through mutual friend Max Maxin who
was President of B'nai B'rith.\317\ According to Foxman, Maxin
asked Foxman to meet with Rich ``because Rich felt that there
may have been anti-Semitism involved in his prosecution.''
\318\ According to Foxman, he met Rich in Europe sometime in
late 1998 or early 1999.\319\ Foxman told Rich at that meeting
that he did not see any evidence to support a charge of anti-
Semitism.\320\ Later, in February of 2000, Foxman was contacted
by Zvi Rafiah, who was then congressional liaison for the
Israeli Embassy in Washington.\321\ Rafiah suggested that
Foxman go to Paris to meet with Avner Azulay, the former Mossad
agent who managed Marc Rich's philanthropic organizations.\322\
At that meeting in Paris, Foxman allegedly told Azulay that if
the attorneys for Rich continued to be unsuccessful in their
negotiations with the prosecutors in New York, a pardon might
be a ``long-shot'' possibility to consider.\323\ Foxman told
Azulay that, to the best of his knowledge, Denise Rich ``hated
Marc Rich's guts,'' but that if someone could convince her to
speak to the President, ``then you have the beginning of a
pardon situation.'' \324\ Foxman later learned that, ``as it
turns out, that is what happened.'' \325\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\317\ Interview with Abraham Foxman, National Director, Anti-
Defamation League (Mar. 19, 2001).
\318\ Id. Marc Rich has charged on a number of occasions that he
was singled out for prosecution because he was Jewish. There is no
support for Mr. Rich's assertion. Mr. Rich's decision to play the race
card emphasizes the extent to which he has failed to accept
responsibility for his crimes. Rather than recognizing the extent of
his criminal acts, of which violation of Department of Energy
regulations and the Tax Code were among the least, Rich has made
baseless accusations against federal prosecutors.
\319\ Id.
\320\ Id.
\321\ Id. According to Foxman, Rafiah is now a lobbyist for
``commercial interests.'' Id. Lobbying registration materials from the
FEC indicate that Rafiah's main client is Elisra Electronic Systems
Ltd., a company that develops and manufactures electronic warfare
systems. Lobbying Registration of Zvi Rafiah (visited Feb. 16, 2001)
(Exhibit 61).
\322\ Id.
\323\ Id.
\324\ Id.
\325\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Publicist Gershon Kekst claims that he mentioned the
possibility of a Presidential pardon to Rich's lawyers as early
as 1999. Kekst had been hired by Rich to assist with strategy
and public relations relating to his criminal case.\326\ In
1999, the same time period in which Kekst was looking for a
Washington lawyer to represent Rich, Kekst was giving general
thought to the Rich case, including his basic conclusion that a
public relations campaign could not help Rich. Seeking to
conduct a ``sanity check'' on his conclusion, Kekst turned to
former Attorney General William P. Barr, the Senior Vice
President and General Counsel for Verizon Communications. Kekst
met Barr through public relations work he did for Verizon
Communications.\327\ Kekst claimed that he was unaware at that
time that Barr had been U.S. Attorney General.\328\ However,
Kekst was impressed with Barr's legal acumen, and thought that
he could offer some insight into the Rich case. Kekst called
Barr, and asked him whether he thought that a public relations
campaign would be useful in trying to resolve the Rich
case.\329\ Kekst claims that Barr told him that a public
relations campaign was the worst thing he could do. According
to Kekst, Barr told Kekst that, assuming the Rich case was a
bad case, the most that Rich could do was wait until the end of
the Administration and seek a pardon from President
Clinton.\330\ Kekst stated that before Barr's suggestion, he
had never heard any discussion of Rich seeking a Presidential
pardon. Kekst also believes that Barr told him that even if the
case against Rich was not justified, as long as Mary Jo White
was U.S. Attorney and Rudolph Giuliani was Mayor, there was
nothing to be done.\331\ The latter point appears to have been
the main thing taken away from the conversation by Kekst and
those on the Rich team who he informed about the conversation
with Barr. In December 2000, Robert Fink e-mailed Jack Quinn
and reminded him that Kekst had spoken to Barr in 1999, and
that Barr believed ``it paid to wait for the new administration
and the retiring of several of the then-current players.''
\332\ Fink then suggested that they ask Barr to assist with the
pardon effort, but apparently, Quinn and Fink decided not to
include a prominent Republican in their efforts.\333\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\326\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar.
15, 2001).
\327\ Id.
\328\ Id.
\329\ Id.
\330\ Id.
\331\ Id.
\332\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00073
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn (Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 62).
\333\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For his part, Barr recalls that he told Kekst that
political pressure would be a ``waste of time.'' \334\ Barr
explained to Kekst that the Justice Department supported the
Southern District of New York prosecutors because it was a
matter of significant principle for the Department.\335\ He
also told Kekst that it was inconceivable that any relief was
possible as long as Rich remained a fugitive.\336\ In short,
Barr believed that the White House would never do anything for
Rich unless Rich were willing to surrender himself and accept
responsibility for what he had done.\337\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\334\ Telephone interview with William P. Barr (Mar. 10, 2002).
\335\ Id.
\336\ Id.
\337\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the days immediately following the Rich pardon, Jack
Quinn and the other lawyers for Marc Rich emphasized that they
did not decide to seek a pardon for Rich until October 2000.
What they did not make clear, however, was that they were
actively considering a pardon much earlier. They decided to
wait until the closing days of the Clinton Administration to
apply for the pardon. While the reasons for the delay are not
clear, there are two likely reasons: first, by waiting until
December to apply, opponents of the pardon would have a limited
amount of time to learn of and resist the pardon effort;
second, the Clinton White House would have limited time to
conduct a detailed review of the petition and learn of its
numerous flaws.
B. The Preparation of the Pardon Petition
The centerpiece of Marc Rich's effort to obtain a
Presidential pardon was the pardon petition, which was put
together by the Marc Rich legal team in October and November
2000. The main attorneys involved in preparing the pardon
petition were Jack Quinn; Kathleen Behan; Robert Fink;
Christopher Man, an associate at Arnold & Porter; Michael
Hepworth, Of Counsel at Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe; and G.
Michael Green of Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky. These
lawyers spent dozens, if not hundreds, of hours compiling the
petition.
The resulting document, which had a number of
misrepresentations and factual inaccuracies, was a surprisingly
poor effort, considering the amount of time and money that went
into it. The argument section of the petition, the only portion
that was actually drafted anew in October and November 2000,
totaled 31 double-spaced pages. The first 20 of those pages
were dedicated to biographical sketches of Rich and Green.
These pages attempted to cast Rich and Green in a favorable,
even likable light. These statements seem almost laughable
given what the world knows now about Marc Rich and Pincus
Green:
Mr. Rich and Mr. Green have lived exemplary, indeed,
remarkable lives. Although they have suffered terrible
hardships as the result of their exile from the United
States, they have continued to work productively and
contribute to society.\338\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\338\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green,
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 4 (Dec.
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
Although it is true that the work of Rich and Green assisted
the governments of countries like Iraq, Iran, and Libya, it is
difficult to argue that they contributed to the United States
once they fled their country and attempted to renounce their
citizenship.
Included in the attempt to make Marc Rich seem like the
victim was a reference to the tragic death of his daughter
Gabrielle while Marc Rich was a fugitive from justice:
``Because Gabrielle lived and died in the United States, Mr.
Rich felt the extra weight of being unable to personally visit
with her during her final months.'' \339\ This claim, which was
repeated by Denise Rich in her appeals to the President, made
it sound as if the prosecutors in the Southern District of New
York denied Rich the opportunity to visit with his dying
daughter. Nothing could be further from the truth. Rich knew
that if he returned he would receive bail, and that he would
not be incarcerated unless convicted of the crimes he had been
accused of committing. He was prevented from returning to visit
his dying daughter only if he refused to face the U.S. justice
system. Rich's desire to both have his cake and eat it too,
makes it difficult to generate any sympathy for him in this
matter. In fact, the only possible conclusion is that Marc Rich
placed his own needs over those of his daughter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\339\ Id. at 7 n.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The petition also made it sound as if Rich was providing
the world with an economic benefit through his dealings:
In building this business, Mr. Rich and Mr. Green made
substantial contributions to the world economy by
increasing competition--and even breaking cartels--in
the physical commodities industries.\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\340\ Id. at 6.
Of course, the petition did not mention that Marc Rich's
business was built by supporting corrupt and dictatorial
regimes across the world, ranging from Communist Cuba to
apartheid South Africa. Nor did the petition mention that
Rich's deals with third world countries meant that Rich himself
gained monopolies over commodities that often paid developing
nations less than fair-market prices for their commodities. Nor
did the petition point out that Rich provided opportunities to
those regimes the United States was actively attempting to
penalize, including Iran during the period when 54 Americans
were held hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.
The petition also made the claim that Rich and Green's
lives were exemplary, setting aside the 65-count indictment:
Other than the allegations for which clemency is
sought, Mr. Rich and Mr. Green never have been charged
with a crime. Indeed, Mr. Rich's and Mr. Green's lives
both before and after the accusations have been ones of
hard-working, resourceful businessmen who have become
remarkably successful and have devoted much time and
money to philanthropy and statesmanship.\341\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\341\ Id. at 20.
Again, the pardon petition made no mention of other less-than-
savory aspects of Marc Rich's business dealings, for which he
was never prosecuted, but which remain of questionable legality
and morality, including supporting the Khomeini regime while it
held U.S. hostages, selling weapons and missile parts to
Khomeini, and trying to do business with Saddam Hussein during
the Gulf War.
The petition then takes six pages to argue that the
indictment of Rich and Green was flawed and unfair, and the
appropriate subject of a Presidential pardon. As described
below, these arguments were largely a rehash of the same
arguments that Rich and his lawyers had been making since the
indictment was handed down. The final four pages of the
petition were used to explain that it was permissible for the
President to issue a pardon before a conviction. Also attached
to the petition were the ``letters of support,'' as well as
other attachments, including the tax analysis by Professors
Ginsburg and Wolfman, as well as other varied materials related
to negotiations with the Southern District of New York and the
President's pardon power in general.
C. The Misleading Legal Arguments in the Petition
The pardon petition crafted by Jack Quinn and the other
attorneys on the Rich legal team is filled with numerous
misleading and disingenuous legal arguments. Many commentators
have stated that Quinn was merely being a good lawyer providing
zealous representation to Marc Rich. However, many of the
points made by Quinn and others go beyond zealous
representation to the point of deception. Quinn had a
responsibility to be honest in the pardon petition, and he
failed. Normally, such dishonesty would not have a tremendous
effect, but when it was combined with the total failure of the
Clinton White House to examine the Rich case, the result was
disastrous.
1. The Indictment of Rich Was Not Flawed
The first charge leveled by Quinn and the Rich legal team
is that Rich and Green and their companies, Marc Rich + Co.
A.G. (``A.G.'') and Marc Rich + Co. International, Ltd.
(``International''), were subjected to an ``unprecedented
criminal investigation'' and ``a unique indictment based on
now-discarded and rejected theories.'' \342\ Notwithstanding
the fact that this is an argument made by almost all
individuals and companies accused of white collar crime, this
claim is especially specious here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\342\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. The Department of Energy Regulations Were
Fair
In his pardon petition, Rich claimed to have been the
victim of overly complex and unfair Department of Energy
regulations. One element of this line of defense is that the
regulations governing the conduct for which Rich and Green were
indicted were too confusing. According to the pardon petition,
the Department of Energy regulations limiting prices in oil
reselling were ``extremely complicated,'' and were therefore
rescinded in January 1981 because they were ``unworkable.''
\343\ Such an argument is completely disingenuous. Rich and
Green were able to understand the regulations well enough to
exploit them for millions of dollars in profit. Regardless of
whether they outlived their usefulness, they were deemed
appropriate at the time when the United States was seriously
concerned about fuel shortages. More important, they were the
law at that time, and Rich and Green therefore had a duty to
play by the rules or face the consequences. Indeed, other
companies were able to obey the law and were not subject to
prosecution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\343\ Id. at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quinn also argued that the Department of Energy indicated
that Rich and his company ``properly . . . accounted for the
transactions.'' \344\ This argument is irrelevant because
Rich's accounting was not the central issue. Rather, Rich's
companies falsified reports in order to hide profits over the
legal limits in violation of law. Marc Rich's own companies
admitted as much when they pled guilty and paid $200 million in
taxes, penalties, and interest. As the lawyers for Rich's
companies stated in federal court:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\344\ Id. at 27.
Beginning in September 1980 International generated
millions of dollars of income from crude oil
transactions which International should have disclosed
but intentionally did not disclose to the Internal
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Revenue Service and the Department of Energy.
* * *
In connection with matters within the jurisdiction of
agencies of the United States, specifically the
Department of Energy and the Internal Revenue Service,
International and A.G. knowingly and wilfully made
those documents and the ERA 69s filed with the
Department of Energy which were false in that they
failed to disclose material facts regarding the actual
income from those crude oil transactions[.] \345\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\345\ Transcript of Allocution, U.S. v. Marc Rich + Co., A.G. et
al. 18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 5).
This language from the allocution clearly demonstrates not only
that the Department of Energy in no way exonerated Rich and
Green's activities, but also that Rich and Green and their
companies clearly understood the nature of the supposedly
complicated regulations well enough to violate them ``knowingly
and wilfully.'' Their arrangement with West Texas Marketing was
clearly intended to contravene the regulations and perpetrate
tax fraud against the United States.
b. Rich and Green Were Not Singled Out
Another element of Quinn's attack on the indictment is that
Rich and Green were unfairly singled out because ``others
engaging in similar activity'' were pursued only in civil
regulatory actions.\346\ This argument is simply false, and a
minimally competent lawyer would have known that it was false.
Even Rich's own lawyers had earlier determined this in their
research, which was also in Jack Quinn's possession. According
to a 1988 memo drafted by Rich's lawyers, there were 48
criminal cases nationwide brought against crude oil
resellers.\347\ In 14 cases, the defendants spent some time in
prison.\348\ Texas resellers John Troland and David Ratliff of
West Texas Marketing were prosecuted for ``daisy chain'' oil
transactions and for falsely classifying different types of
crude oil to skirt DOE regulations. It was while serving 10
months in prison that they first alerted prosecutors to the
activities of Rich and Green.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\346\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green,
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 22 (Dec.
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
\347\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum from Mark Ehlers
to Scooter Libby 1 n.1 (June 10, 1988)) (Exhibit 63).
\348\ Id. at 1-2 n.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rich's lawyers have also argued that, unlike Rich and
Green, the few violators who were pursued criminally were
involved in ``daisy chaining'' or miscertification (falsely
labeling controlled oil as uncontrolled oil).\349\ However,
Rich and Green were not alone in facing criminal penalties even
though they were not accused of miscertification. Oscar Wyatt,
David Chalmers, and Sam Wilson, Jr. pled guilty to a willful
violation of the price control enforcement provision that
involved no accusation of miscertification.\350\ These cases
are consistent with the relevant statute, which distinguishes
between civil and criminal violations on the basis of whether
the conduct was willful--not whether it involved
miscertification.\351\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\349\ Quinn made this argument before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. See ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing
Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 78 (Feb. 14, 2001)
(testimony of Jack Quinn).
\350\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum from Mark Ehlers
to Scooter Libby 2-3 n.4 (June 10, 1988)) (Exhibit 63).
\351\ 15 U.S.C. Sec. 754 (1982 ed.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More important, Rich and Green were also involved in
illegal conduct that was unique in the context of the commodity
they were trading. In September 1980, DOE clarified its oil
reseller regulations to make it plain that resellers were not
permitted to profit more than $0.20 per barrel.\352\ Rich and
Green made profits far in excess of that limitation but created
fraudulent invoices and filed false reports to hide about $100
million in illegal profits from both the DOE and the IRS. In
other words, Rich and Green were engaged in classic criminal
financial fraud. The grand jury in New York had ample evidence
from documents and witnesses that Rich and Green were willfully
violating the price controls and, as discussed above, their
companies later pled guilty to doing so.\353\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\352\ U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. 9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6,
1984)(S 83 Cr. 579).
\353\ Telephone Interview with Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr.,
former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice
(Feb. 7, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quinn further tried to advance the argument that Rich and
Green's entire case was sui generis by stating in the petition
that similarly situated individuals and corporations such as
ARCO were never criminally charged.\354\ However, ARCO was not
a similarly situated corporation because it was never involved
in attempting to hide illegal profits as was Rich's company. In
fact, in looking at the more analogous case of the corporations
(West Texas Marketing and Listo Petroleum) that helped Rich
hide illegal profits, the executives of those companies were
prosecuted. Two executives from West Texas Marketing served 10
months in prison and one from Listo pled guilty to felony
charges of making false statements and was sentenced to five
years probation and fined $5,000.\355\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\354\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green,
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 26 (Dec.
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
\355\ See Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. Grand Jury Probing Shift of Oil
Profits, Wash. Post, Oct. 18, 1982, at A1. See also Rich Associate Gets
Probation, Associated Press, Dec. 17, 1984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond being completely false, the argument that Marc Rich
was ``singled out'' for prosecution also draws upon the
preposterous claims, made by Marc Rich himself, that the
prosecution was the result of anti-Semitism.\356\ In an
interview with the Israeli Ma'ariv Weekend Magazine, Rich
stated, ``I'm convinced that the fact that I was a foreigner
and a relative newcomer on the oil-trading market and Jewish
influenced the manner in which my case was handled.'' \357\
Rich has never provided any support for this outlandish claim.
Rich's clumsy attempt to play the race card was rejected even
by associates like Abraham Foxman, who found no evidence to
support it. Rich's attorneys did not make any overt reference
to anti-Semitism in the pardon petition, but did repeatedly
claim that Marc Rich had been ``singled out'' by prosecutors,
never explaining why they believed that to be the case.
Furthermore, Quinn's own notes make it appear possible that he
raised the specter of anti-Semitism in his last-minute appeal
to the President on January 19, 2001.\358\ It is unfortunate
that the President found Rich's arguments believable--when in
fact, they were completely inaccurate--a fact the President
could have discovered with minimal due diligence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\356\ While these arguments were not made explicitly in the pardon
petition, Rich made them in the media, and Jack Quinn may have made
them to President Clinton. See Section IV(G)(4).
\357\ Bo'az Ga'on, Rich as Korach, Ma'ariv Weekend Magazine, Oct.
1, 1999 (Exhibit 6).
\358\ For a detailed discussion, see Section IV(G)(4) below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Rich and Green Did Trade with the Enemy
The pardon petition claims that ``the Iranian [trading with
the enemy] counts were added to the indictment to incite public
opinion against the defendants.'' \359\ The petition further
claims that ``[t]he prosecutors quietly dropped the Iranian
claims against the companies, but never dealt with the claims
against the individuals.'' \360\ By making this claim, Rich
suggested that the charges had no merit. In fact, the charges
appear to have been accurate, and were only dropped from the
indictment for technical reasons. The trading with the enemy
charges against the Marc Rich companies were dropped because
Clyde Meltzer--the Listo petroleum executive who, unlike Rich
and Green, did not flee the United States--was not involved in
trading with Iran. Since Rich and Green fled and were
unavailable for trial, the only charges of conspiracy against
the remaining defendants were unrelated to Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\359\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green,
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 22 (Dec.
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
\360\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The charges against Rich and Green personally for trading
with Iran during the hostage crisis were never dropped or
dismissed. They remained in effect at the time of the
pardon.\361\ Indeed, there is voluminous evidence that Rich and
Green traded with Iran, in addition to a number of other
prominent enemies of the United States. While a foreign company
may have been allowed to trade with Iran, Rich and Green were
American citizens and it was illegal for them to engage in
trade with Iran regardless of whether they did so on foreign
soil or through the use of a foreign corporation. In fact, the
evidence showed that Rich and Green negotiated the deals from
the Manhattan offices of Marc Rich International, an American
firm.\362\ It was the height of irresponsibility for Marc Rich
and his lawyers to suggest that prosecutors charged Rich with
trading with the enemy only to ``incite public opinion''
against Rich when Rich was, in fact, trading with Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\361\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 110
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former
Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
\362\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jack Quinn, who signed the pardon petition, admitted in the
Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing that Rich had indeed
traded with Iran:
Mr. Shays. Did Mr. Rich trade with Iran when U.S.
hostages were being held captive?
Mr. Quinn. I do not know the precise answer to that
question. It is my belief that he traded with Iran. I
can't tell you right now when that occurred.
Mr. Shays. Should it make any difference to you if it
did?
Mr. Quinn. Again, I approached this as a lawyer
concerned with the indictment that was before me and
whether or not it should stand. I was not here to be a
character witness. I was here to take on four points--
Mr. Shays. It didn't make any difference to you. Should
it have made a difference to the President of the
United States?
Mr. Quinn. It is something he well may have taken into
consideration, certainly.\363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\363\ Id. at 111.
While Quinn admitted that he knew that Rich did indeed trade
with Iran, he failed to address how he could state in the
pardon petition that ``the prosecutors quietly dropped the
Iranian charges against the companies, but never dealt with the
claims against the individuals.'' Quinn likely failed to
address this statement because he knew the implication that the
charges were ``quietly'' dropped for lack of evidence is
misleading.
d. Rich and Green Did Evade Federal Taxes
Quinn and the Rich legal team also attacked the core tax
evasion counts in the indictment against Rich and Green. As
they argued in the petition, ``The tax treatment of the
transactions in the indictment, however, is governed by a U.S.-
Swiss tax treaty, which was ignored by the prosecution. . . .
The transactions in issue were consistently reported in
accordance with the tax treaty.'' \364\ In making these
arguments, Rich's lawyers relied on what they called the
``independent'' analyses of law professors Bernard Wolfman and
Martin Ginsburg.\365\ However, the language from the pardon
application is misleading in its use of the word
``independent.'' First of all, the professors were paid
handsomely by Marc Rich for their work on his behalf. Professor
Ginsburg, husband of Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
was paid $66,199 for his work on the Rich case.\366\ Professor
Wolfman was paid $30,754 for his analysis.\367\ Wolfman was
hired as a consultant by one of Rich's firms, and was paid
between $250 and $300 per hour.\368\ Hence, the analysis was
not ``independent'' of Marc Rich. Second, the professors did
not come to the same conclusion ``independently'' of each
other, but rather worked jointly. Third, they emphasized that
their analysis made ``no independent verification of the
facts,'' and that they were merely ``accepting the statements
thereof made to us by'' Marc Rich's attorneys.\369\ As Rich
prosecutor Martin Auerbach stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\364\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green,
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 23 (Dec.
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
\365\ Id.
\366\ Letter from Professor Martin D. Ginsburg, Professor,
Georgetown University Law Center, to the Honorable Dan Burton,
Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 12, 2001) (Exhibit 64). Ginsburg
is also of Counsel at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson. Of the
$66,199 received by his firm on the Rich matter, $43,980 reflected work
by Ginsburg personally. The remainder reflects work by other attorneys
assisting Ginsburg. Ginsburg billed his time at rates of $300 to $400
per hour. Id.
\367\ Letter from Bernard Wolfman, Professor, Harvard Law School,
to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 8,
2001) (Exhibit 65).
\368\ Id.
\369\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Bernard Wolfman,
Professor, Harvard Law School, to Gerard E. Lynch, Criminal Division
Chief of the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department
of Justice (Dec. 7, 1990)) (Exhibit 66).
The transmittal letter that came with that analysis
says it all and betrays the problem, the fundamental
flaw in the pardon application as it was applied to Mr.
Rich and Mr. Green, and that is a complete absence of a
knowledge of the facts, the true facts of this case,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the facts that led the companies to plead guilty.
When that analysis was sent 10 years ago, the
professors who wrote it said, . . . quote, making no
independent verification of the facts but accepting the
statements thereof made to us by Mr. Rich and Mr.
Green's lawyers.
And that is the problem. The President relied on the
facts as described to him by Mr. Rich and Mr. Green's
lawyers, making no independent investigation.\370\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\370\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 106
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
In the end the analysis by the two professors cannot, and does
not, attempt to explain the necessity for double accounting,
phony invoices, and false reports to the Department of Energy.
Nor do the professors discuss the double accounting, phony
invoices, and false reports employed by Rich and Green to hide
their illegal profits. The only rational explanation for the
artifices employed by Rich is that he was fraudulently
attempting to hide profits from the DOE and the IRS. In the
final analysis, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that
Professors Ginsburg and Wolfman sold their names to the highest
bidder, thereby turning their backs on the accounting and legal
considerations that were necessary for a meaningful
professional opinion.
Quinn further attempted to justify the granting of a pardon
by explaining that Rich's companies reached a settlement with
the government and ``paid a total of approximately 200 million
dollars in back taxes, interest, fines and foregone tax
deductions, an amount far in excess of any taxes, penalties or
interest which might have been assessed in a civil tax
proceeding.'' \371\ Far from being a reason to grant a pardon,
this fact only proves the point that Rich and Green fled from
justice because they were caught red-handed and most likely
would have gone to prison if they stood trial in the United
States. Marc Rich + Co., A.G. and Marc Rich + Co.
International, Ltd. each pled guilty to making false statements
and evading about $48 million in taxes because the strength of
the case against them was overwhelming.\372\ Rich's companies
pled guilty to a criminal scheme to conceal ``in excess of $100
million in taxable income . . . most of which income was
illegally generated through the defendants' violations of
federal energy laws and regulations.'' \373\ Rich's companies
further admitted that they had engaged in this criminal scheme
``together with Marc Rich, Pincus Green . . . and others . . .
unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly[.]'' \374\ That Rich's
companies paid these moneys and made these admissions of guilt
squarely contradicts Quinn's claim that the indictment was
without merit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\371\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green,
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 24-25
(Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III).
\372\ The case against Rich and Green individually was just as
strong as the case against the companies. As noted above, Edward
Bennett Williams offered to have Rich pay $100 million to settle the
charges against him individually. Prosecutor Sandy Weinberg told
Williams that the government would not reach any settlement that did
not result in jail time for Rich. See ``The Controversial Pardon of
International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 176 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris
``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the
S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). See also Evan Thomas, The Man to See:
Edward Bennett Williams 415-16 (1991).
\373\ Indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. at 3-4
(Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4). See Transcript of
Allocution, U.S. v. Marc Rich + Co., A.G., Marc Rich Int'l, Ltd. et al.
at 11 (Oct. 11, 1984) (SS 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 5).
\374\ Indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. at 3 (Mar.
6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4). See Transcript of Allocution, U.S.
v. Marc Rich + Co., A.G., Marc Rich Int'l, Ltd. et al. at 11 (Oct. 11,
1984) (SS 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The Prosecutors Were Not ``Overzealous''
A second theme in the pardon application is that the
investigation and indictment of Rich and Green was flawed
because the prosecutors were overzealous and overly ambitious.
Quinn attacked not only Weinberg and Auerbach on this basis,
but also Rudolph Giuliani who was at the time the United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York. As with the
claims of the flawed indictment, however, these claims were
also misleading.
a. The Prosecutors Negotiated with Rich and
Green
The pardon petition claims that the federal prosecutors
refused to negotiate with Rich and Green. Quinn repeated this
claim before the Committee, as well as in the press. However,
as is discussed in detail above, Rich and Green were fugitives.
The Southern District of New York had (and continues to have) a
longstanding policy of not negotiating with fugitives from
justice. As was explained by the SDNY in its February 2, 2000,
letter to Quinn, negotiating with fugitives ``would give
defendants an incentive to flee,'' providing them ``the
inappropriate leverage and luxury of remaining absent unless
and until the Government agrees to their terms.'' \375\ The
particular history of the office's dealings with Rich counseled
against negotiations. As is discussed in detail above, Rich had
a history of acting in bad faith during the grand jury
investigation. From refusal to obey grand jury subpoenas to
attempting to fly two steamer trunks full of subpoenaed
documents to Switzerland, Rich showed that he was not the type
of defendant with whom to negotiate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\375\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Mary Jo White,
U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn
and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 2, 2000)) (Exhibit
51).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet even with such outrageous conduct, the Southern
District of New York made many good faith efforts to reach an
accommodation with Rich. During the investigation of Rich and
his companies, prosecutors undertook numerous negotiations with
Rich's lawyers, which resulted in the guilty pleas by Rich's
companies. Even after Rich fled the country, prosecutors
attempted to negotiate terms for Rich's return. In the early
1990s, U.S. Attorney Otto Obermaier and a top prosecutor in his
office took the extraordinary step of flying to Switzerland and
meeting with Marc Rich in an attempt to negotiate a resolution
to the case. Moreover, the Southern District made numerous
accommodations for Rich, including offering to drop the RICO
charges as well as allowing him and Green to stand trial
without spending any time in jail prior to trial. Despite these
efforts, Rich and Green refused to return to the United States
to stand trial. Rather, they would only return as part of a
settlement that guaranteed they would not serve jail time
unless convicted. It is therefore misleading for Quinn to
simply state that the Southern District of New York ``takes the
position that it will not even discuss the matter while Mr.
Rich and Mr. Green continue to live outside of the United
States.'' \376\ By itself, this statement fails to account for
the numerous good faith efforts of the prosecutors in spite of
their well-founded reluctance to negotiate with fugitives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\376\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green,
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 25 (Dec.
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quinn also argued in the petition that the Southern
District had ``negotiated with numerous other absent defendants
over the years, and the Department of Justice has no such
policy against such negotiations.'' \377\ However, as the
Southern District noted in its February 2, 2000, letter to
Quinn, Department of Justice policy places the decision to
negotiate with a fugitive within the discretion of the office
responsible for the prosecution.\378\ The Southern District of
New York was well within the reasonable exercise of its
discretion to require Rich to return to the United States
before engaging in further negotiation, especially given Marc
Rich's history of bad faith behavior and brazen legal tactics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\377\ Id.
\378\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Mary Jo White,
U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn
and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 2, 2000)) (Exhibit
51).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, Quinn argued that the Southern District refused to
negotiate with his legal team by failing to agree to a meeting
between Professors Wolfman and Ginsburg and tax experts in the
Department of Justice.\379\ This, too, is misleading. As the
Southern District explained in the February 2, 2000, letter to
Quinn, ``in 1987, an Assistant in this Office met with Mr.
Rich's counsel and listened to the same presentation by
Professor Martin D. Ginsburg referenced in your letter
regarding the merits of the tax charges.'' \380\ Prosecutors
had rejected the Wolfman/Ginsburg analysis because it was based
on an inaccurate and incomplete representation of the facts of
this case. Its legal conclusions were, therefore, irrelevant.
For the Southern District to meet with the professors again
would have been redundant and fruitless.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\379\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green,
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 26 (Dec.
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
\380\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Mary Jo White,
U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn
and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 2, 2000)) (Exhibit
51).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. The Rich Prosecution Was Not Tainted with
Media Attention
Quinn and the Rich legal team further tried to discredit
the prosecution by claiming that United States Attorney Rudolph
Giuliani was unfairly bringing the glare of the media to the
case. According to the pardon petition, Giuliani
``aggressively'' pursued Rich and Green in court as well as in
the press: ``Not only did Mr. Giuliani and other prosecutors
from his office speak frequently to the media in off and on
record conversations, the office held formal press conferences
where purported `evidence' against Mr. Rich and Mr. Green was
showcased to the press.'' \381\ Responding to this charge,
Mayor Giuliani said on Meet the Press,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\381\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green,
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 23 (Dec.
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
First of all, the indictment was actually just about
put together before I even became United States
Attorney. It's been pursued by at least three
Democratic appointees, who were United States attorney
and the Justice Department, that had him number six on
the fugitive list, was President Clinton's Democratic
Justice Department. And the United States attorney of
the Southern District in New York, an appointee of
President Clinton, is as outraged as I am by the pardon
that was given here. . . . You've been covering me a
long time, right, running for office? Did you ever hear
me mention Marc Rich? So this was hardly used by me in
any way in any of my political campaigns. . . . And the
fact that he was a fugitive--it was not something
[about which I would] say, ``Gee, look what a good job
I did as United States attorney.'' So that's kind of a
silly thing to [s]ay.\382\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\382\ Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 28, 2001).
Rudolph Giuliani was one of dozens of prosecutors,
Republican and Democrat, who worked on the Rich case. Robert
Litt and Gerald Lynch were prominent Democrats who were also
involved in the case. It would be strange for Quinn also to
accuse them of overcharging. Litt was one of Attorney General
Janet Reno's closest advisors, and Lynch, currently a professor
at Columbia University Law School, was appointed to the federal
bench by President Clinton. The two main prosecutors who
brought the Rich case, Morris Weinberg and Martin Auerbach,
were Democrats as well. The attempt to cast the Rich indictment
as the result of partisan prosecutorial overreaching by Rudolph
Giuliani is simply one more fabrication by Marc Rich's legal
team. This argument had no basis in reality, and likely was
invented to appeal to President Clinton's partisan instincts,
as well as his dislike for aggressive prosecutors. As many have
observed, by the end of his term, President Clinton was very
sensitive to issues of prosecutorial overreaching, as a result
of his perceptions of the Independent Counsel
investigations.\383\ Quinn exploited these sentiments
masterfully by fabricating claims regarding prosecutorial
conduct in the Rich case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\383\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 341
(Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Henry Waxman).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. RICO Charges Were Fairly Brought
The pardon application also accuses the federal prosecutors
of unfairly bringing a racketeering charge against Rich and
Green. According to Quinn, RICO was misused because the
underlying allegation involved tax fraud.\384\ The petition
points to a Department of Justice policy that was adopted in
1989, stating that, ``[f]ollowing the indictment, the United
States government recognized the misuse of RICO in tax fraud
cases and issued guidance in the United States Attorney's
Manual explicitly stating that tax offenses are not predicates
for RICO offenses.'' \385\ Jack Quinn suggested at the
Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing that the decision to
bring RICO charges against Marc Rich and Pincus Green was the
key factor that led to their flight from the United States:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\384\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green,
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 22 (Dec.
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
\385\ Id.
It's the position of my client that he remained outside
the United States because what Mr. Weinberg earlier
described to you as, in essence, a simple tax evasion
case was also made into a RICO case. And he may choose
to say it was only one count in the indictment, but it
was the sledgehammer that brought about the current
impasse.\386\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\386\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 161
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
Quinn's argument is flawed for a number of reasons. First,
at the time of the indictment, there was no policy against
bringing RICO charges predicated on tax offenses. To the
contrary, the RICO charges were brought consistent with Justice
Department policy and the RICO charges were reviewed and
approved by the RICO section of the Department of Justice--as
were the tax charges by the tax section.\387\ As prosecutor
Sandy Weinberg observed:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\387\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 187
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former
Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
If you're away for 20 years and you're fortunate enough
to be able to persuade two foreign States not to
extradite you, the gloss of time is always going to
change the interpretation of the law. You can look at
indictments that were brought in 1980, and if you
examine them in 2000, the gloss of time is--you're
going to find that the courts interpret the laws
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
different in 2000 than they did in 1980.
But you've got to look at the guts of what the case was
about and these people. And when you look at the guts
of what the case was about and the people, it doesn't
make any difference whether or not we would bring a
RICO charge today. It is whether or not we would bring
a criminal charge today and whether or not it is
acceptable to be pardoning folks who have done things
like renouncing their citizenship, becoming fugitives,
not coming back and making these arguments that they
say are so clear. I mean it--was it justified? And you
can't come in and say, well, 20 years have passed and,
you know, the courts now interpret or the Justice
Department interprets the RICO statute
differently.\388\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\388\ Id. at 156.
Along similar lines, even former Clinton White House Counsel
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abner Mikva has stated:
Clearly, a defendant would rather negotiate the
unfairness of RICO charges from a comfortable abode in
Switzerland than from a hardback chair in the U.S.
attorney's office in Manhattan. This is especially true
when defendants have been trying, unsuccessfully, to
make the same ``unfair'' point about RICO for the last
30 years.\389\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\389\ Coming in from the Cold, The Recorder, Mar. 28, 2001, at 5.
Second, Quinn's argument also fails to address the non-tax
RICO predicates in the case or the fact that there are money
laundering statutes available today that were not available in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1980. As prosecutor Martin Auerbach observed:
I'm afraid that the argument with respect to the change
in RICO policy is as disingenuous as I find the
argument with respect to fugitivity. While it is true
that the Justice Department changed its view with
respect to tax counts as a predicate for RICO, it has
not changed its view with respect to mail and wire
fraud as a predicate to RICO. And as Mr. Quinn knows,
as the indictment reflects, there are both mail and
wire fraud counts which are predicates for RICO.
So I believe that the Justice Department might well
approve this indictment today. And I, in fact, believe
that, were they to review this indictment today, and of
course they did review it before it was brought, there
would be money laundering charges in this case.\390\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\390\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 156
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
Therefore, it is likely that if he was charged today, Rich
would be facing stiffer, not lighter penalties.
Third, and most importantly, Quinn conveniently ignored the
fact that the prosecutors tried to reach an accommodation with
the two fugitives by offering to drop the RICO charges. As
Robert Fink himself testified to the Committee, he was in
discussions with prosecutors during which they offered to drop
the RICO charges if Rich and Green would simply stand trial in
the United States.\391\ These discussions are reflected in a
February 10, 2000, e-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay:
``[a]t those times the office [Southern District of New York]
offered to do a variety of things, none of which are
necessarily still on the table. First, I was told at one point
that they would drop the RICO charge if we wanted if Marc came
in.'' \392\ Given the willingness of the SDNY to drop the RICO
charges, Quinn's claim that the RICO charge was ``the
sledgehammer that brought about the current impasse,'' is
completely inaccurate and misleading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\391\ Id. at 469 (testimony of Robert Fink).
\392\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00697
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation
(Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 32).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It appears that even Jack Quinn realized that the arguments
in the petition were deeply flawed. On December 29, 2000, he
sent the following e-mail to Kathleen Behan:
What do you think our chances really are for Marc? the
hardest question, i think, is ``if you're right about
the weakness of the govts case, why not go to ct and
win?'' the answr, i guess is that we couldn't have
gotten a fair trial, but that was 18 years ago.
couldn't he get one now? isn't that the way this shd
go? these are tough questions, but I guess we have
decent answers.\393\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\393\ Arnold & Porter Document Production KB00037 (E-mail from Jack
Quinn to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Dec. 29, 2000))
(Exhibit 67).
It is unclear what ``decent answers'' Quinn had to that
argument or to any of the multiple arguments against the Rich
pardon.
D. The ``Letters of Support'' in the Petition
The legal arguments contained in the petition are not the
only problematic section of the Rich and Green pardon petition.
The ``letters of support'' in the petition also raise several
troubling issues. Most of the letters were collected by Avner
Azulay.\394\ Those letters were a crucial part of the pardon
petition, as they helped create the impression that Marc Rich
was a humanitarian who had made a minor mistake but who had a
positive impact on countless lives. The significance and import
of the letters presented to President Clinton was compromised
by several factors, including: (1) many of those who wrote the
letters in support of the pardon were either themselves, or
their organizations, given money by Rich; (2) many who wrote
the letters were misled about the purpose of the letter; and
(3) their letters were misrepresented to the President. Given
these facts, the letters of support in the Rich pardon petition
represent just one more dishonest ploy in Marc Rich's overall
scheme to obtain a pardon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\394\ Interview with Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb.
27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Rich Paid a Number of Individuals Who Wrote in His
Support
The letter written by Abraham Foxman is one of the most
prominently displayed letters in the petition. As National
Director of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), his support of
clemency for Marc Rich was of obvious importance to the
application. However, the ADL received $100,000 from Marc Rich
shortly after Foxman became involved in the pardon effort.\395\
In fact, this money was received a few weeks after Foxman flew
to Paris to meet with Rich aide Avner Azulay.\396\ Moreover,
Rich has given the ADL a total of $250,000 since he fled the
country in 1983.\397\ Foxman has publicly denied that Rich's
contributions to the ADL had anything to do with his help in
the pardon effort. He stated to a group of reporters, ``I
really find offensive the idea that Abe Foxman was bought for a
check for $100,000. If he gave me nothing--or he gave me $10
million--I would have made the same decision, for which I now
say I made a mistake.'' \398\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\395\ Michael Isikoff, ``I Made a Mistake''; The ADL's Abe Foxman
Admits the Jewish Organization Received a $100,000 Grant from Marc Rich
but Maintains He Wasn't ``Bought,'' Newsweek, Mar. 23, 2001, at 2001 WL
24138340.
\396\ Id.
\397\ Id.
\398\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notwithstanding Foxman's denial of a quid pro quo, the
payment to the ADL raises the general question of Marc Rich's
tactics in drumming up support for his pardon application. The
ADL was not the only organization to which Marc Rich paid money
or attempted to pay money. In another instance, Marc Rich
attempted to secure the assistance of the American Jewish
Congress (AJC) with the promise of a large contribution. A week
after Foxman's admission, Phil Baum, executive director of the
AJC revealed that his organization had been approached by a
representative of Marc Rich who told them, ``that if we were to
speak favorably of Mr. Rich, we would be the beneficiary of a
gift.'' \399\ Baum denied that there was any direct quid pro
quo.\400\ However, Baum went on to state that, ``there was an
understanding communicated to us[.]'' Baum further stated, ``It
was not a contract. But these things are communicated in more
subtle ways. We had reason to hope or expect that if we did
this thing, we could probably be the recipient of Mr. Rich's
generous recognition of our importance.'' \401\ The AJC
ultimately turned down Rich's request.\402\ Committee staff
attempted to contact Baum to corroborate this account and learn
other details of the offer from the Rich team. Unfortunately,
Baum failed to cooperate with the Committee's investigation,
refusing on three separate occasions to return phone calls from
Committee staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\399\ Beth J. Harpaz, Jewish Group Says Rich Reps Sought Pardon
Help for Money, Associated Press State and Local Wire, Mar. 28, 2001.
See also Brian Blomquist, Rich Tried to Tempt Jewish Group, N.Y. Post,
Mar. 29, 2001, at 14.
\400\ Beth J. Harpaz, Jewish Group Says Rich Reps Sought Pardon
Help for Money, Associated Press State and Local Wire, Mar. 28, 2001.
\401\ Id.
\402\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another example of Rich's efforts includes Birthright
Israel, an organization that pays for young American Jews to
travel to Israel. Marc Rich has pledged $5 million to
Birthright Israel.\403\ The organization was founded by Michael
Steinhardt, a longtime friend of Rich's who was heavily
involved in the pardon effort. Steinhardt wrote a letter that
was included in the petition. In addition, Birthright Israel's
current North American Chairperson, Marlene Post, also wrote a
letter supporting Rich's request for clemency.\404\ This letter
was prominently displayed in the petition. As with the public
statements of the ADL and the AJC, a spokesman for Birthright
Israel denied any quid pro quo relating to the $5 million
pledge to the organization and the organization's support for
the Rich pardon.\405\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\403\ Beth J. Harpaz, Jews Divided Over Rich Pardon, Associated
Press, Mar. 29, 2001, at 2001 WL 17989287.
\404\ Letter from Marlene E. Post, North American Chairperson,
Birthright Israel, to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 7, 2000)
(Exhibit 68). The original letter was part of Rich and Green's pardon
petition.
\405\ Brian Blomquist, Rich Tried to Tempt Jewish Group, N.Y. Post,
Mar. 29, 2001, at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet another person with a connection to Birthright Israel
also wrote a letter on behalf of Marc Rich. Rabbi Irving
Greenberg, Chairman of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum
Council, wrote a letter on Holocaust Museum Council letterhead
in favor of clemency for Rich. Rabbi Greenberg is also
President of the Jewish Life Network, an organization that is a
partner with Birthright Israel.\406\ However, when Committee
staff asked Greenberg's lawyer about press accounts of Rich's
contributions, he stated that Rich had never given any
contributions to any organization or entity controlled or
operated by Greenberg.\407\ Greenberg's letter and Rich's
contributions to Birthright Israel caused seventeen former and
current members of the Holocaust Museum Council to send a
letter demanding Greenberg's resignation.\408\ Rabbi Greenberg
apologized for his letter on behalf of Rich, and ultimately,
the Council voted to keep him as Chairman.\409\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\406\ Jacqueline Trescott, Holocaust Council Head Urged to Resign,
Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 2001, at C9.
\407\ Telephone Interview with Andrew Levander, Partner, Swidler
Berlin Shereff Friedman (representing Rabbi Greenberg) (May 2, 2001).
\408\ Jacqueline Trescott, Holocaust Council Head Urged to Resign,
Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 2001, at C9. Kitty Dukakis also signed the letter.
\409\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are other cases of Rich contributing or attempting to
contribute to individuals (and their organizations) who wrote
letters on his behalf. One prominent example is Jerusalem Mayor
Ehud Olmert, who wrote a letter to President Clinton on
November 27, 2000, that was included in the petition. According
to The New York Times, Rich contributed $25,000 to Olmert's
first mayoral campaign in 1993.\410\ The Committee has not been
able to determine whether Rich made financial contributions to
other foreign political officials who supported his pardon.
However, the Marc Rich team was clearly concerned about
inquiries along these lines. Shortly after the pardon was
granted, Avner Azulay sent an e-mail to others on the Rich team
stating that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\410\ William A. Orme, Jr., Marc Rich Aided Israeli Official, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 22, 2001, at A21.
Pse [sic] keep barak [sic] out of the media. We have
enough names on the list other than his. Important to
keep all politicians out of the story. Pse [sic] share
with me the inclusion of any one on the list. This is
election time here and has a potential of blowup. A
newsweek reporter here has already asked if there were
any political contributions.\411\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\411\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00191
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et
al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 69).
Some of the other letter writers have also mentioned Rich's
generosity and philanthropy as the reason for agreeing to write
their letters. For example, several of the letter writers in
Switzerland have ties to the Doron Foundation, an organization
of Rich's that gives awards of $63,000 to Swiss groups and
individuals.\412\ Zurich Mayor Josef Estermann was among that
group.\413\ Estermann did not return calls from Committee
staff. He has, however, spoken on the matter in his home
country, saying, ``I think every person has a right to a
pardon.'' \414\ To this, one Swiss paper responded, ``Yes, but
does this right have to be one you can buy?'' \415\ Others with
connections to the Doron Foundation who wrote letters on Rich's
behalf include: Pierre de Weck, of UBS Bank; Michael de
Picciotto, a director of Union Bancaire Privee in Geneva; Kurt
R. Bollinger, of the Swiss Air Rescue Foundation; and Professor
Verena Meyer of Zurich University. Michael de Picciotto spoke
with Committee staff over the phone. When asked if Marc Rich or
any of his associates had ever given anything of value to him
or his company in exchange for his letter, de Picciotto
responded, ``an important man like Mr. Rich does not need to do
anything like this.'' \416\ The others with connections to the
Doron Foundation failed to return Committee calls. Kurt
Bollinger, whose rescue service received an award from Rich's
foundation in 1992 failed to return the Committee's calls.\417\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\412\ Elizabeth Olson, Pardon in U.S. for Marc Rich Creates Storm
in Switzerland, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2001, at 11. The Doron Foundation
has now been folded into the Marc Rich Foundation.
\413\ Id.
\414\ Id.
\415\ Id.
\416\ Telephone Interview with Michael D. de Picciotto, Managing
Director, Union Bancaire Privee, Geneva, Switzerland (Apr. 26, 2001).
\417\ Elizabeth Olson, Pardon in U.S. for Marc Rich Creates Storm
in Switzerland, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2001, at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committee staff contacted or attempted to contact almost
all of those whose letters were included in the section of the
pardon petition entitled, ``Letters Addressed to the Honorable
President William J. Clinton Expressing Support for the Pardon
of Mr. Marc Rich.'' While the Committee does not have
sufficient evidence to conclude that all of the letters were
written on a quid pro quo basis, it cannot completely rule out
the possibility. This is largely because a number of the letter
writers and intended letter writers failed to cooperate with
the Committee by not returning phone calls. Nevertheless, there
does appear to be a pattern of receiving contributions or
pledges from Marc Rich among many of those who wrote letters.
The fact that a number of the most prominent letters of support
for the Rich pardon were tainted with allegations of linkage to
large financial contributions diminishes Rich's claims to have
been a great humanitarian. Rather, it appears that many of
Rich's humanitarian activities were just one part of a lengthy
strategy to escape criminal prosecution in the U.S.
2. Some Who Wrote Letters Were Misled About the Purpose
The significance and import of several of the letters is
further weakened by the lack of candor of the Rich team in
soliciting them. Rich's own lawyer, Robert Fink, admitted that
during the solicitation of the letters, ``[n]ot everyone was
necessarily told it was going to be for a pardon.'' \418\
Professor Verena Meyer, who serves on the board of the Doron
Foundation, stated that she did not know that her letter would
be included in a pardon petition.\419\ She thought the letters
were ``routine'' and ``assume[d] other members of the
foundation also wrote letters.'' \420\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\418\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Some Used in Pardon Effort Were Unaware
of Purpose, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2001, at A15.
\419\ Elizabeth Olson, Pardon in U.S. for Marc Rich Creates Storm
in Switzerland, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2001, at 11.
\420\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several others who wrote letters on behalf of Rich felt
even more deceived. Professor Jonathan Halevy, CEO of the
Shaare Zedek Medical Center in Jerusalem, wrote a letter on
November 30, 2000, acknowledging contributions from Marc Rich's
Doron Foundation. Halevy was contacted by Avner Azulay and
asked to write a letter acknowledging the contribution.\421\
According to Halevy, Azulay told him that the letter would be
used in a ``book in honor of Mr. Rich and the foundation.''
\422\ When interviewed about his letter being used in Rich's
pardon application, Halevy stated, ``I'm obliged, if I got a
donation from someone, to confirm that I got it in writing. But
I think it would be very fair to tell me this was the
purpose.'' \423\ Anthony J. Cernera, President of Sacred Heart
University, in Fairfield, Connecticut, was similarly misled
about his letter. Cernera wrote Rich to ``express my deepest
appreciation for your on-going support for our program of
Christian-Jewish understanding.'' \424\ When the director of
public relations for the University discovered that Cernera's
letter was included in the pardon petition, he was astonished,
responding, ``Wow. So these letters were used as part of the
petition for his pardon?'' \425\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\421\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Some Used in Pardon Effort Were Unaware
of Purpose, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2001, at A15.
\422\ Id.
\423\ Id.
\424\ Letter from Anthony J. Cernera, President, Sacred Heart
University, to Marc Rich (Nov. 27, 2000) (Exhibit 70).
\425\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Some Used in Pardon Effort Were Unaware
of Purpose, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2001, at A15. In fact, when reached by
The New York Times, only one of six letter writers were aware that
their letters would be used as part of a pardon effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fact that Avner Azulay and others on the Marc Rich team
misled individuals to obtain letters of support from them
suggests a level of dishonesty that calls into question all
representations made by the Rich pardon team. It also suggests
that a number of people affiliated with Marc Rich, many of whom
received his money, would not have written in his support if
they had known that their letter was being used to get a
pardon.
3. Many of the Letters were Misrepresented to the President
Finally, the letters included in the pardon petition are
further compromised by the way in which they were presented to
President Clinton. The second section of the petition
containing these letters was divided into two parts, one
entitled ``Letters Addressed to the Honorable President William
J. Clinton Expressing Support for the Pardon of Mr. Marc
Rich,'' and another entitled ``Letters Expressing Support for
the Pardon of Marc Rich.'' Both of these titles are misleading.
All of the twenty-one letters in the first part of this
section were addressed to President Clinton. However, several
of these letters made no mention of Marc Rich's request for a
pardon or executive clemency. Among the letters that included
no reference to the pardon issue were those written by Nobel
Laureate Camilio Jose Cela, Chief Rabbi of France; Rene-Samuel
Sirat, President of the Jewish Community of Madrid; Issac
Querub Caro; and President of the Association of Spanish
Business Enterprises Fernando Fernandez Tapias. These letters
all refer to Rich's philanthropic contributions over the years.
But none of them makes any reference to the pardon. It is
therefore misleading for such letters to be included under the
cover page indicating that all of the writers are expressing
their support for a pardon.
The cover page for the second part of this section of the
petition is even more problematic. There are fifty-two letters
included under the title ``Letters Expressing Support for the
Pardon of Mr. Marc Rich.'' Not one of these letters makes any
mention of the pardon effort. Almost all of these letters were
addressed to Marc Rich or Avner Azulay, thanking them for the
generosity of Marc Rich and his foundations. Furthermore, based
on the fact that most of these letters were written in late
November and early December of 2000, it is clear that they were
solicited by the Rich team for use in the pardon. However, as
discussed above, their use in the pardon application came as a
surprise to many of the letter writers. It stands to reason,
therefore, that most of the writers were not informed of the
purpose of the letters, let alone that they would be sent to
President Clinton in such a misleading format.
There is also disturbing evidence that a more accurate
title for these letters was considered, but not used, in the
application. Among the materials produced for the Committee was
an earlier draft of the same document, containing the same list
of names, but with a different header reading ``List of Letters
of Support for Marc Rich and Foundation.'' \426\ The existence
of this more accurate title makes it much less likely that the
use of the inaccurate and misleading title was a mere oversight
by the Rich team. Lawyers billing many hundreds of dollars an
hour certainly should not make such errors, and circumstantial
evidence makes it appear that they were simply trying to
mislead. Given the rejection of an accurate title, and the fact
that it was replaced with an inaccurate title, there can be no
other reasonable conclusion. Moreover, when the Committee
confronted Jack Quinn about the misleading cover page that was
included in the pardon petition, he stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\426\ Compare Jack Quinn Document Production (Document entitled
``List of Letters of Support for Marc Rich and Foundation'') (Exhibit
71), with Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Document
entitled ``Letters Expressing Support for the Pardon of Mr. Marc Rich''
(Dec. 11, 2000) (Exhibit 72).
I don't know who made that change. And I accept
responsibility for anything filed in my name. I will
tell you that, for the most part, I was not involved in
the effort to gather these letters. I became aware
after the petition had been filed that some of these
letters were simply sought as testimonials to his
charitable activities and that some of the people from
whom they were sought were not told in advance that
these letters were going to be used from a pardon
application. I very much regret that. And to the extent
that, as a result, any of that was misunderstood or was
misleading, I certainly apologize for it.\427\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\427\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 172
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
The deceptive tactics used by the Rich team in securing and
presenting so many of the letters sent to President Clinton in
the pardon application are disturbing. The Committee is also
troubled by the fact that the Clinton Administration failed to
take the time to review these letters and the misleading way in
which they were presented. However, in the context of the rush
to grant last-minute pardons, and all of the unfortunate
decisions made during the pardon process, the dishonest use of
these letters is not surprising. The misleading presentation of
the letters is consistent with the misleading legal arguments
that form the basis of the Rich and Green pardon petition.
IV. LOBBYING FOR THE MARC RICH PARDON
A. The Marc Rich Lobbying Team
Marc Rich employed much more than Jack Quinn and a
deceptive petition to obtain his Presidential pardon. Just as
important to the pardon effort was a carefully orchestrated
lobbying campaign that used a number of individuals with unique
access to the Clinton White House. Rich employed private
attorneys with personal relationships with White House staff,
personal friends of the President, and foreign leaders to press
his case with the White House. The key players in the lobbying
effort included Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz, Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Barak, as well as other Israeli leaders, King
Juan Carlos of Spain, Michael Steinhardt, Peter Kadzik, and a
number of other individuals, all working for the same goal, the
pardon of Marc Rich and Pincus Green.
1. Denise Rich
Denise Rich was in many ways the key figure in the effort
to obtain a pardon for Marc Rich. She enjoyed a close
relationship with President Clinton, which gave the Rich team
the access they needed to make their case directly to the
President. She used this access as much as she could, sending
two letters to the President, and making her case to him
personally on at least three occasions. Denise Rich's
involvement in the pardon effort has raised three serious
questions: (1) why did Denise Rich agree to help Marc Rich; (2)
what were the nature of her communications with President
Clinton; and (3) did she in any way connect the pardon of Marc
Rich to contributions she had made or would make to the DNC or
Clinton Library? The Committee has not been able to find
definitive answers to these critical questions, largely because
Denise Rich has invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against
self-incrimination rather than cooperate with the Committee. To
attempt to understand Denise Rich's role in helping to obtain
Marc Rich's pardon, the Committee has considered documents
about the pardon effort, testimony provided by other
individuals, and even Denise Rich's self-serving media
appearances.
a. Denise Rich's Relationship with Marc Rich
Denise Rich was wealthy before she married Marc Rich. She
was the daughter of Emil Eisenberg, who founded Desco
Incorporated, one of the largest shoe manufacturers in the
United States. In 1966, at the age of 22, Denise married Marc
Rich, whom she had met six months earlier. Denise Rich was
married to Marc Rich for the next 25 years, having three
children. In 1983, when Marc Rich was indicted and fled the
country, Denise and her children left the United States with
Marc Rich. Despite the fact that she accompanied her husband
into exile, and remained with him there for the next eight
years, Denise Rich claims to have been ignorant of the reasons
for Rich's indictment and flight:
Question. In 1980, were you aware that your husband was
reportedly trading with Iran after we had an embargo
because of the hostages?
Denise Rich. I really didn't know much about that at
all because I was so involved in my life. It's not like
he would come home and he would say, ``Hey, I'm trading
with the enemy.'' We didn't talk about it.
* * *
Question. How did you find out [about the indictment]
and what was your reaction?
Denise Rich. All I really knew was that he spoke to me
and he said that ``I'm having tax problems with the
government. And--and I think that we are going to have
to leave.'' And my response was, ``I am his wife. These
are my children. I'm not going to split up the
family.'' And, so, I did what I think any wife would
do. I left the country.
Question. Did you understand that by fleeing to
Switzerland and refusing to return to this country,
that your husband was considered one of the 10 most
wanted fugitives in America?
Denise Rich. That had nothing to do with me because I
was . . .
Question. Yes. It's your husband, Denise. It's the
father of your children.
Denise Rich. Yes, he's the father of my children . . .
Question. He's a fugitive.
Denise Rich. . . . and he was my husband, but as far as
I knew, it was a tax situation. So I really never
understood anything else. And I really didn't--that's
all that I knew.\428\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\428\ 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001).
While living in exile, Denise began her musical career,
becoming a successful songwriter. In approximately 1990, Denise
discovered that Marc Rich had taken up with a younger woman,
model Gisela Rossi. In 1991, Denise divorced Marc Rich. In the
ensuing legal battle, she received a substantial sum of money,
which has never been disclosed by Marc Rich, Denise Rich, or
their representatives, but is believed to be in the vicinity of
$500 million.\429\ As a result of the divorce, Denise and Marc
Rich were reportedly on very poor terms, rarely speaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\429\ Some estimates list the amount as high as $900 million. See
Debunking the Buzz Over Denise, N.Y. Post, Feb. 1, 2001, at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1996, however, the Richs' daughter Gabrielle died of AML
leukemia. Denise Rich has often pointed to Gabrielle's death as
an important factor in her change of heart regarding her ex-
husband. First, she has claimed that Marc Rich was ``cruelly
denied the opportunity'' \430\ to return to the U.S. to visit
her. She has also claimed that the death of Gabrielle caused
her to forgive her ex-husband for his transgressions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\430\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Denise Rich to
President William J. Clinton (Dec. 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 73).
Question. Here is what a lot of people don't
understand. How do you go from almost hating your
husband at the time of the divorce to writing a letter
pleading for his clemency and his pardon? What changed
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
in your mind?
Denise Rich. My daughter died. And when you've lost a
child, there's nothing more you can say. There are no
more questions. When you've lost a child, everything
changes, and I felt--I felt in my heart
forgiveness.\431\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\431\ 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001).
This explanation, however, fails to address one fundamental
issue: should Marc Rich have decided to spend time with his
daughter, he could easily have done so. Rather, he placed his
legal jeopardy ahead of his concerns for his family and elected
to refrain from visiting her. Years later, it appears that he
and his ex-wife would cynically use the death of his daughter
to gain sympathy for his earlier transgressions.
b. Denise Rich's Relationship with President
Clinton
After her divorce from Marc Rich, Denise Rich returned to
New York, where she purchased what is reportedly the largest
penthouse on Fifth Avenue, a 28-room triplex filled with works
of art by Picasso, Miro, Dali, Calder, Warhol, and Chagall, as
well as a staff of 20 to serve her needs, including two cooks,
a stylist, and a ``personal healer.'' \432\ Shortly after
arriving in New York, Denise Rich sought to establish herself
as a leading figure in New York social circles. Geraldo Rivera,
a close friend of Denise Rich, observed that ``[t]he people who
think she wants to be a kind of Pamela Harriman person are not
off the mark. . . . She wanted a salon, she wanted a Gertrude
Stein, Paris kind of scene, she wanted to watch the parade of
contemporary popular cultural life march through her living
room.'' \433\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\432\ Lloyd Grove, The Reliable Source, Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 2001,
at C3.
\433\ Elisabeth Bumiller, Tossed Into a Tempest Over a Pardon;
Friends See Naivete, Critics a Payoff in a Clinton Fund-Raiser's Acts,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2001, at B1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An important part of becoming a ``kind of Pamela Harriman''
was to get involved in political fundraising. Denise Rich began
making large political contributions and holding lavish
fundraisers shortly after her return to the United States.
Denise Rich and her daughters gave over $1.1 million to federal
political causes between 1993 and 2000, all but $5,000 of that
to Democrats. Denise Rich's political contributions increased
as the end of the Clinton Administration neared, with over
$625,000 of her contributions coming between 1998 and 2000.
While she was giving and raising vast amounts of money for
the Democratic Party, Denise Rich developed a close
relationship with President Clinton:
When I met him there was so much charisma, and I saw a
lot of idealism, and eventually I had a very special
relationship with the former President and the former
First Lady because they were so compassionate to me
when I lost my daughter. And it--and it was as if he
understood and . . . could put himself in my
shoes.\434\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\434\ 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001).
This special personal relationship was also manifested in
Denise Rich's political fundraising, where she became one of
the Democratic Party's largest and most reliable fundraisers.
In fact, Denise Rich held the fundraiser that was President
Clinton's first public appearance after the publication of the
Independent Counsel's referral in 1998. It raised nearly $3
million.\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\435\ Elisabeth Bumiller, Tossed Into a Tempest Over a Pardon;
Friends See Naivete, Critics a Payoff in a Clinton Fund-Raiser's Acts,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2001, at B1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Denise Rich's special relationship with President Clinton
was also manifested in her large contributions to the William
J. Clinton Presidential Foundation, the charitable foundation
responsible for building the Clinton Library. Between 1998 and
2000, Denise Rich gave $450,000 to the Clinton Library.\436\
Among these contributions was a $250,000 gift in July 1998,
which was one of the earliest large contributions to the
Library, made during one of the darkest times in the Clinton
presidency.\437\ Because she and her friend Beth Dozoretz have
used the Fifth Amendment to avoid answering the Committee's
questions, little is known about Denise Rich's motivations for
contributing to the Clinton Library. However, one document
suggests that Denise Rich was seeking ``help'' from Dozoretz.
On a note accompanying her $100,000 library contribution,
Denise Rich wrote, ``Dear Beth, Thanks for your help, Lots of
love, Denise.'' \438\ However, since both Rich and Dozoretz
have refused to testify on grounds that their testimony would
incriminate them, the Committee has not been able to develop an
understanding of this note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\ See William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document
Production WJCPF 0002 (Check from Denise Rich to the Clinton Library
for $250,000 (July 15, 1998)); William J. Clinton Presidential
Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0008 (Check from Denise Rich to
the Clinton Library for $100,000 (Aug. 7, 1999)); William J. Clinton
Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0031 (Check from
Denise Rich to the Clinton Library for $100,000 (May 11, 2000))
(Exhibit 74).
\437\ Id.
\438\ William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document
Production WJCPF 0037 (Note from Denise Rich to Beth Dozoretz, former
finance chair, Democratic National Committee) (Exhibit 75).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Denise Rich helped President Clinton with his charity,
he helped Denise Rich with hers. In 1998 and 2000, President
Clinton attended fundraising galas for the G&P Charitable
Foundation, which Denise Rich established to raise funds for
cancer research.
c. Denise Rich's Role in the Marc Rich Pardon
Effort
Little is known about when Denise Rich decided to assist
the Marc Rich pardon effort, or who asked her to help.\439\
Avner Azulay has stated that he personally convinced her to
write in support of the pardon, telling her that ``everyone in
the world is supporting this and you can't just stand aside,
it's embarrassing.'' \440\ The first documentary evidence of
her support for the effort to resolve Marc Rich's criminal case
appears in the March 2000 e-mail discussing sending her on a
``personal mission'' to President Clinton.\441\ The first
specific references to her role in the late 2000 pardon effort
come in November 2000, in a meeting agenda prepared by attorney
Robert Fink. The agenda for that meeting, which included Jack
Quinn, includes an item ``Maximizing use of D.R. and her
friends.'' \442\ It appears that the first conversation between
Denise Rich and the pardon team took place on December 4, 2000,
when she spoke to Robert Fink.\443\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\439\ There are reports that Denise Rich may have also assisted the
effort to obtain a pardon for ex-boyfriend Niels Lauersen, a prominent
New York gynecologist who was convicted of fraudulent billing
practices. According to one account, though, Rich was approached to
help with Lauersen's pardon effort, and was willing to help, until she
was ``reminded that she might be spreading herself thin.'' See James
Barron with Alison Cowan and Shaila Dewan, A Second Pardon Front, N.Y.
Times, May 15, 2001, at B2.
\440\ Rich's Israeli Aide: The Pardon Surprised Us. So Did the
Furor, Forward, (Feb. 23, 2001), at 1.
\441\ There is some circumstantial evidence of reconciliation
between Denise Rich and Marc Rich somewhat earlier, at least in
November 1999, when Denise Rich and her daughter Danielle traveled to
Israel to attend the dedication of the Gabrielle Rich wing of the Tel
Aviv Museum of Art, which was funded by Marc Rich. A photograph of that
event shows Denise and Danielle Rich posing with one of Marc Rich's
closest aides, Avner Azulay.
\442\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0567-69 (Agenda of Nov.
21, 2000, Meeting) (Exhibit 76).
\443\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00021
(Billing Records for Marc Rich, Dec. 19, 2000) (Exhibit 77).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Rich legal team did maximize use of Denise Rich. They
started with a December 6, 2000, letter from Denise Rich to the
President. This letter was in many ways, the centerpiece of the
pardon petition. While it appears to have been a heartfelt
plea, in reality, it was drafted by Marc Rich's lawyers. The
letter combines inaccurate charges about the indictment with
emotional pleas about Rich's ``exile:''
I support his application with all my heart. The pain
and suffering caused by that unjust indictment battered
more than my husband--it struck his daughters and me.
We have lived with it for so many years. We live with
it now. There is no reason why it should have gone on
so long. Exile for seventeen years is enough. So much
of what has been said about Marc as a result of the
indictment and exile is just plain wrong, yet it has
continued to damage Marc and his family.
* * *
My husband and I could not return to the United Sates
[sic] because, while the charges were untrue, no one
would listen--all the prosecutors appeared to think
about was the prospect of imprisoning Marc for the rest
of his life. With a life sentence at stake, and press
and media fueled by the U.S. Attorney, we felt he had
no choice but to remain out of the country.
Let no one think exile for life is a light burden. The
world we cared about was cut off from us. When our
daughter was dying from leukemia, Marc was cruelly
denied the opportunity to see her by the prosecutors.
What was this exile for? The charges all relate to old
energy regulations, where all of the other people and
companies involved in the same kinds of transactions
were never charged with a crime. Only my husband was
treated differently.\444\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\444\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Denise Rich to
President William J. Clinton (Dec. 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 73).
This letter was placed prominently at the front of the stack of
testimonials in the Marc Rich pardon petition, and it was
quoted extensively in the petition itself. Of course, the
arguments in the letter were completely inaccurate.
After including the letter in the pardon petition, Denise
Rich took a number of other actions to lobby for the pardon.
Another letter from her to President Clinton was prepared by
Marc Rich's lawyers on December 20, 2000. This letter was
discussed among the Marc Rich legal team, with Robert Fink
suggesting the following text: ``Because I could not bear it
were I to learn that you did not see my letter and at least
understand my special person[al] reasons for being a supporter
of a pardon, I am sending you an additional copy, and an
additional request that you wisely use your power to pardon
Marc.'' \445\ Jack Quinn thought that this language was
``perfect,'' \446\ and suggested that Denise Rich should ``hand
it to him [the President] in [a] sealed envelope and mention
that she is aware I intend to discuss the matter with him
personally. She shd simply ask him to read it later and let him
know how strongly we feel that we have the merits on our
side.'' \447\ After Marc Rich's lawyers had finalized the text
of the letter, it was presented to Denise Rich for her
signature. Denise Rich did see the President on December 20,
2000, at a White House Christmas party. According to one
witness at the party, Rich wrested the President away from
Barbra Streisand to press her case about the pardon.\448\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\445\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00068
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter et
al. (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 78).
\446\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00069
(E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit
79).
\447\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00397
(E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit
80).
\448\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Documents Show a Complex Campaign to Win
a Pardon, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2001, at A11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Little is known about how many other contacts Denise Rich
might have had with President Clinton during the final month of
the Clinton Administration. There is evidence that she had at
least one, and maybe more, telephone calls with the President
about the pardon. E-mails between Jack Quinn and Robert Fink on
January 16, 2001, indicate that they wanted Denise Rich to make
``another call,'' indicating there had been other calls before
this one. First, Quinn wrote that:
I am advised that it would be useful if she [Denise]
made another call to P. I am in a fannie mae bd mtg,
but would like to set this in motion asap. Message shd
be simple: ``I'm not calling to argue the merits. Jack
has done that, and we believe a pardon is defensible
and justified. I'm calling to impress upon you that MR
and our whole family has paid a dear price over 18 yrs
for a prosecution that shd never have been brought and
that singled out MR while letting the oil companies he
dealt with go scot free. Please know how important this
is to me personally.'' can you or avner call her this
morning? \449\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\449\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00167
(E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 16, 2000)) (Exhibit
81).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fink responded:
I called at 10:30 AM and she is still asleep (she was
at her Dad's yesterday and it was a very full day) but
I left a message that I had to talk to her before a
noon meeting. I expect I will hear from her and I will
give her the message.\450\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\450\ Id.
In the absence of cooperation from Denise Rich, however, it
is impossible to know exactly how many contacts Rich had with
President Clinton, and what those contacts were about. An e-
mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink's assistant shortly after
the pardon raises interesting questions. This document was
withheld from the Committee for over a year, and was produced
only after a decision from a federal district court judge
requiring it to be turned over to a grand jury. Quinn wrote the
following in response to an e-mail titled ``One of the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reporters' Requests:''
Shd def confirm it didn't. Is this the moment to say
that he asked DR for pol support? Or might DR have said
something stupid like that when they spoke. God knows,
I hope not.\451\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\451\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02958 (E-mail from Jack
Quinn to Rosemary Micciulli, Quinn Gillespie & Associates (Jan. 24,
2001)) (Exhibit 82).
The Committee requested an interview with Jack Quinn after it
received this e-mail, but he refused. Without further
illumination from Quinn, this e-mail's meaning is not clear.
One interpretation suggests that a reporter may have called
asking whether the President asked Denise Rich for ``political
support,'' perhaps in the context of their discussions about
the Rich pardon. It also suggests that Quinn was fearful that
Denise Rich might have said something like this to the press.
Quinn's question ``is this the moment to say that he asked DR
for pol support,'' raises a real question as to whether
President Clinton asked Denise Rich for ``political support''
in the midst of their discussions about the Rich pardon. While
Quinn has refused to answer questions from the Committee about
this e-mail, his spokesman has informed the press that the
``he'' in the e-mail refers to former New York Mayor Rudy
Giuliani, not President Clinton.\452\ While Quinn's explanation
is possible, it is troubling that Quinn has refused to provide
this explanation to the Committee himself. Absent further
information from Quinn, Denise Rich, or President Clinton, the
Committee can only speculate as to the meaning of this e-mail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\452\ Michael Isikoff, Secret E-Mail, Newsweek (Mar. 10, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is clear that Denise Rich had frequent opportunities to
press the pardon case with President Clinton. Rich was
scheduled to visit the White House 19 times during the Clinton
presidency, with six of those visits scheduled between May 2000
and January 2001.\453\ In addition, Rich also called the White
House on several occasions near the end of the Clinton
Administration.\454\ However, without cooperation from Denise
Rich or President Clinton, the Committee is unable to know what
was discussed during those telephone calls or how many of those
scheduled White House visits actually occurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\453\ National Archives and Records Administration Document
Production (WAVES records (1994-2000)).
\454\ See, e.g., Verizon Document Production (Telephone calls from
Denise Rich to the White House (Dec. 9, 1999)); Qwest Document
Production (Telephone call from Denise Rich to the White House (Feb.
16, 2000)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Denise Rich's Motives
Denise Rich's involvement in the Marc Rich pardon effort
raises a number of serious questions: (1) why did Denise Rich
agree to help Marc Rich; (2) did Denise Rich's extremely large
political contributions play any role in the President's
decision to grant the pardon of Marc Rich; (3) were additional
large contributions envisioned or hoped for; (4) what did the
President and Denise Rich discuss; and (5) was Denise Rich
making her political contributions with her own money? Due to
Denise Rich's decision to invoke her Fifth Amendment rights
against self-incrimination, the Committee is not able to answer
any of these questions definitively. However, there are a
number of factors suggesting that Denise Rich's involvement in
the Marc Rich pardon case is far more complicated than she has
suggested.
First, Denise Rich's explanation for why she helped Marc
Rich obtain the pardon does not withstand full scrutiny. Denise
Rich has stated that she helped him because, after her daughter
died, she forgave Marc Rich for his transgressions. She also
claimed that she helped get the pardon so that her daughters
could be with their father again. However, the Committee is
unaware of Rich returning to the United States since he has
obtained the pardon. Moreover, during Marc Rich's self-imposed
``exile,'' his daughters were free to visit him in Europe and
Israel, as they often did. Since Denise Rich's explanations do
not fully explain her involvement, it is fair to consider other
possible motivations. One comes from the fact that Rich
promised to give $1 million a year to the G&P Charitable
Foundation, at the precise time that he was trying to get
Denise Rich to help with the pardon effort.\455\ This sum would
have represented a major influx of cash for the G&P Foundation,
which raised $2.4 million in 1998 and only $978,000 in
1999.\456\ Second, the Committee has attempted to examine
whether Denise Rich and her daughters continue to receive
financial support from Marc Rich, or would receive enhanced
financial support in the future, other factors which could have
influenced their decision to support his pardon. While Denise
Rich's bank records do not indicate any influx of money from
Marc Rich, at least one document received by the Committee
suggests that Rich might have established a Swiss bank account
for his daughter Ilona. In a December 4, 2000, letter from
Robert Fink to Ilona Rich, Fink wrote ``here are some banking
papers to set up the account with UBS for you that need your
signature. Please execute where indicated and also return these
to me so I can send them back to Switzerland.'' \457\ While
this reference is certainly capable of multiple
interpretations, it at least raises the possibility that Marc
Rich was providing untraceable funds to his family through
Swiss bank accounts. This could provide another explanation for
their support for the pardon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\455\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Rich Pardon Reportedly Followed Pledge to
Charity of Former Wife, N.Y. Times, May 1, 2001, at A1. $500,000 of
this sum would have been given by Marc Rich and the other $500,000
would have been given by Pincus Green.
\456\ See Department of the Treasury Form 990-PF, G&P Charitable
Foundation, 1998; Department of Treasury Form 990-PF, G&P Charitable
Foundation, 1999 (Exhibit 83). A copy of G&P's tax return for the year
2000 was unavailable because the Foundation may have received a filing
deadline extension.
\457\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00259
(Letter from Robert Fink to Ilona Rich (Dec. 4, 2000)) (Exhibit 84).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, the Committee is unable to reach any firm
conclusions regarding the nature of Denise Rich's
communications with the President, and specifically whether
Denise Rich's political contributions and contributions to the
Clinton Library played any role in the pardon. Absent true
cooperation from Denise Rich or President Clinton, there is no
way of knowing what they discussed, or what they were thinking
about the Marc Rich pardon. However, there are a number of
pieces of circumstantial evidence that raise the indelible
appearance of impropriety in this case, which Denise Rich and
President Clinton have done nothing to refute. First, Denise
Rich made $1.1 million in political contributions to Democrats,
including the Clintons, and the contributions increased
dramatically toward the end of the Clinton Administration.
Denise Rich also made $450,000 in contributions to the Clinton
Library, including one of the earliest large contributions to
the Library. Although this sum has been downplayed, it was in
fact an appreciable percentage of cash actually advanced to the
Library. Given the difficulties generally experienced raising
money after a President leaves office, the individuals who are
prepared to give large sums--particularly after there are no
more elections to finance--assume a particular importance.
Second, Denise Rich used the relationship she had with the
President, which was built in large part of political
contributions, to lobby the President to grant the pardon.
Third, Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz, the two people who were
privy to the reasons for Denise Rich's political contributions
and her discussions with the President regarding the pardon,
were so concerned about their potential criminal exposure that
they invoked their Fifth Amendment rights. Were there a benign
explanation to the events prior to the pardon, there is little
conceivable reason to have invoked the Fifth Amendment. Fourth,
the President, Denise Rich, and Beth Dozoretz have offered the
weakest of justifications for their actions in the Marc Rich
pardon matter. Given these facts, there is an unmistakable
appearance of impropriety.
The Committee had the opportunity to grant Denise Rich
immunity against prosecution so that it could receive compelled
testimony from her, but decided not to proceed with a grant of
immunity for several reasons. First, there was no evidence that
Denise Rich intended to cooperate with the Committee. After the
Committee received notice that the Justice Department had no
objection to a grant of immunity, Committee staff contacted
counsel for Mrs. Rich, to determine whether they would offer
the Committee a proffer before the immunity vote. By receiving
a proffer, the Committee hoped to receive an understanding of
what Mrs. Rich would testify to if she received immunity.
Counsel for Mrs. Rich were unwilling to provide a proffer. By
refusing to provide a proffer, counsel for Mrs. Rich made it
clear that they had no intent of cooperating with the
Committee's investigation, and would make obtaining information
from Denise Rich as difficult as possible.
Another factor that played a role in the Committee's
decision not to grant immunity to Denise Rich were Mrs. Rich's
own public statements about her role in the investigation. When
Mrs. Rich appeared on the television program 20/20, to the
extent she made any statements addressing her role in the
pardon, her statements were difficult to believe. This
appearance raised real questions as to whether Denise Rich
intended to provide honest and complete testimony to the
Committee, even if she were immunized.
2. Beth Dozoretz
Together with Denise Rich and Jack Quinn, Beth Dozoretz
served a key role in lobbying for the pardon of Marc Rich. Like
Denise Rich, Dozoretz enjoyed a close personal relationship
with President Clinton that was a mixture of friendship and
extremely significant political fundraising. Like Denise Rich,
Dozoretz took advantage of this close relationship to press
President Clinton about the Rich pardon. Also, much like her
friend Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz has invoked her Fifth
Amendment rights rather than testify before the Committee.
a. Beth Dozoretz's Relationship with Bill
Clinton
In 1992, Beth Dozoretz attended the Democratic Convention
in New York City at the urging of her husband, Ron Dozoretz.
Until that point, Dozoretz had never been significantly
involved in political events of any type. But at the Democratic
convention, Dozoretz had an epiphany of sorts, as Hillary
Clinton passed by:
On her way to the podium she had to walk by where I was
sitting. . . . She was looking around, smiling, and I
flattered myself to think that our eyes met. And I
blurted something out like, ``I just think you're
fabulous!'' And I felt like she looked at me and said,
``Thank you!'' with her big, beautiful smile.\458\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\458\ Lloyd Grove, The A-List's No. 1 Political Partiers; How Beth
and Ron Dozoretz Made Washington Their Very Own, Wash. Post, Apr. 1,
1999, at C1.
Beginning with the 1992 convention, Beth Dozoretz began to be
deeply involved in Democratic politics. She and her husband
moved to Washington from Norfolk, Virginia, in 1993. First at
an apartment in Georgetown and then at an estate in Northwest
Washington, the Dozoretzes began to host high-profile
fundraising events. Through these events, the Dozoretzes had
frequent contact with the Clintons, and struck up a warm
relationship with both the President and First Lady. During the
course of the Clinton presidency, the Dozoretzes were close to
the Clintons, vacationing with them, and playing golf with
them.\459\ Like Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz remained close to
the President throughout the Monica Lewinsky scandal. In
November 1998, the Dozoretzes asked the President to serve as
godfather to their infant daughter.\460\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\459\ Id. The Dozoretzes had their critics, some of whom suggested
that their friendship with the Clintons was the result of a deliberate
plan:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GStarting from the very beginning, they were having
dinners and soirees at their apartment in Washington
Harbour. . . . The whole program was geared to rising to
the top. She had a staff from the very first day. I mean,
how many housewives have staffs? She played golf with the
president, and she took golf lessons so she could play with
him. Her husband obviously is very, very wealthy, and this
is something they set out to accomplish. And obviously they
have.
Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\460\ Id. President Clinton agreed, and he and Hillary Clinton
attended a high-profile christening at the Dozoretz estate. The star-
studded attendance list for the event also included Jack Quinn. Annie
Groer and Ann Gerhart, The Reliable Source, Wash. Post, Nov. 12, 1998,
at C3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the close personal relationship she
maintained with President Clinton, Beth Dozoretz also developed
a fundraising relationship with the President. In 1994,
Dozoretz served as co-Chairman of the DNC's large contributor
program. By 1999, Dozoretz had raised $5 million for various
Democratic causes.\461\ As a result, in early 1999 Dozoretz was
appointed, with the President's personal blessing, as Finance
Chairman of the DNC, the chief fundraiser for the Democratic
Party. Dozoretz resigned her post in September 1999, to allow
new DNC Chairman Ed Rendell to appoint his own Finance
Chairman. However, even after she left her position as Finance
Chairman, Dozoretz continued to raise funds for the Democratic
Party, and maintain a warm relationship with President Clinton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\461\ It was through her fundraising work for the DNC that Beth
Dozoretz became enmeshed in her first White House scandal. In September
1997, Dozoretz testified before the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs regarding a controversial White House fundraising coffee
attended by John Huang and Pauline Kanchanalak. Two witnesses at the
coffee testified that Huang made an illegal appeal for political
contributions at the White House coffee. Dozoretz, who was also
attending the coffee with a prospective donor, denied that Huang made
the remarks. See ``Investigation into Fundraising Activities During the
1996 Elections,'' Hearings Before the Senate Governmental Affairs
Special Investigations Comm., 105th Cong. (Sept. 16, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to raising funds for the DNC, Beth Dozoretz
raised money for President Clinton's personal causes. For
example, she raised money for the President's legal defense
fund. She also raised money for the Clinton Library. Dozoretz
solicited Denise Rich for her first contribution to the Clinton
Library, a $250,000 contribution made in July 1998.\462\
Apparently, Rich gave the check to Dozoretz, who sent it on to
the lawyers for the Library.\463\ In connection with this, or
one of Denise Rich's other contributions to the Clinton
Library, Rich drafted a note to Dozoretz reading ``Dear Beth,
Thanks for your help, Lots of love, Denise.'' \464\ Apparently,
Denise Rich was a person specifically targeted by Dozoretz to
solicit for the Clinton Library. Dozoretz gave Peter O'Keefe,
the chief fundraiser for the Clinton Library, a list of
individuals Dozoretz intended to solicit, and Denise Rich was
listed on this document.\465\ In addition to the substantial
sums she raised from Denise Rich, on May 23, 2000, Beth
Dozoretz pledged to raise $1 million for the Clinton
Library.\466\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\462\ William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document
Production WJCPF 0002 (Check from Denise Rich to the William J. Clinton
Presidential Foundation Library for $250,000 (July 15, 1998)) (Exhibit
74).
\463\ William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document
Production WJCPF 0004 (Letter from Janine Werkman, Chief of Staff for
Beth Dozoretz, to Nicole Seligman (July 17, 1998)) (Exhibit 85).
\464\ William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document
Production WJCPF 0037 (Note from Denise Rich to Beth Dozoretz, former
finance chair, Democratic National Committee) (Exhibit 75).
\465\ William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document
Production WJCPF 0048 (List of Potential Contributors to William J.
Clinton Presidential Foundation) (Exhibit 86); Interview with Peter
O'Keefe, Fundraiser, William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation (Apr.
12, 2001).
\466\ This information was provided to the Committee in a briefing
by David Kendall and Nicole Seligman, counsel for the Clinton
Foundation. See also William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation
Document Production WJCPF 0024 (Letter from Skip Rutherford, President,
William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation, to Beth Dozoretz, former
finance chair, Democratic National Committee (Jan. 4, 2000)) (Exhibit
87).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Beth Dozoretz's Involvement in the Marc Rich
Pardon Campaign
Around Thanksgiving of 2000, Jack Quinn informed Beth
Dozoretz that he would be filing a pardon petition on behalf of
Marc Rich. Quinn was close friends with Dozoretz, and also knew
that she was close to Denise Rich. Quinn testified that he
``encouraged her to help me be sure that the President himself
was aware of the fact that the application had been filed with
the White House Counsel's office.'' \467\ According to Quinn,
Dozoretz did talk to the President, who told her that Quinn
should make his case to Bruce Lindsey and the other staff in
the White House Counsel's office.\468\ Quinn described his
motivation for involving Dozoretz at the Committee's March 1
hearing:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\467\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 69 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony
of Jack Quinn).
\468\ Id.
I did so because she was a friend of mine, because she
had a relationship with Denise Rich, she was in much
more frequent communication with the President than I
was. I was motivated by two things principally; one, I
was hopeful that she could let the President know that
I had or was going to file this so that he would be
aware it was there; and two, she was another person who
I hoped might be in a position to give me the kind of
information that I have, as a lawyer, thought would be
useful to me to pursue their efforts on behalf of my
client vigorously. Now, I want to also tell you have
[sic] that in that conversation I had with her again
around Thanksgiving time, I cautioned her that it would
be very important to make sure that no such
conversation was ever connected in any way with any
kind of fundraising activity. She reacted to that by
kind of looking at me like how could I even suggest
that. She said to me, of course I would never do that
to him.\469\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\469\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 410-11
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
It is apparent that Quinn turned to Dozoretz because of her
access to and influence with the President. Precisely how
Dozoretz used these skills is a mystery, because of Dozoretz's
invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights.\470\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\470\ Irving Sandorf, a former colleague of Dozoretz's from the
clothing industry, noted that ``She has a way of getting into you a
little bit. She knows how to manipulate people. I don't know if you'd
call them `people skills.' It's more like `I'll use you, you use me'
skills.'' See Lloyd Grove, The A-List's No. 1 Political Partiers; How
Beth and Ron Dozoretz Made Washington Their Very Own, Wash. Post, Apr.
1, 1999, at C1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over the course of the next two months, Beth Dozoretz and
Jack Quinn were in frequent contact about the Marc Rich pardon
effort.\471\ Jack Quinn estimated that they spoke between five
and ten times about the Marc Rich pardon effort. The real
question is, of course, how many times Beth Dozoretz spoke to
the President about the Marc Rich pardon, and what they spoke
about. Because of the Fifth Amendment claims of Dozoretz and
Denise Rich, the Committee knows little about these
communications. However, the e-mail discussions of the Marc
Rich legal team offer some insight into the matter. On January
10, 2001, Avner Azulay e-mailed Jack Quinn with the following
message:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\471\ Beth Dozoretz left telephone messages for Jack Quinn on:
December 8, 2000; January 2, 2001, with the question, ``[A]ny news on
the matter?''; January 8, 2001; an undated message between January 8
and January 18, 2001; January 18, 2001; and January 19, 2001, leaving
her contact information for the rest of that day. Jack Quinn Document
Production (Telephone Messages from Beth Dozoretz, former finance
chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 88).
2. D[enise] R[ich] called from aspen. Her friend B--who
is with her--got a call today from potus--who said he
was impressed by J[ack] Q[uinn]'s last letter and that
he wants to do it and is doing all possible to turn
around the WH counsels. D[enise] R[ich] thinks he
sounded very positive but ``that we have to keep
praying.'' There shall be no decision this wknd and the
other candidate Milik [sic] is not getting it.\472\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\472\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00162
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et
al. (Jan. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 89).
When questioned about this e-mail, Quinn confirmed that the
``B'' referred to by Azulay was indeed Beth Dozoretz.\473\
However, Quinn could do little to explain the message,
including why the President would by trying to convince the
staff of the need for the pardon, rather than vice-versa.
Robert Fink responded to this message with an e-mail stating,
``I said it before, and I say it again, `nice letter.' Keep on
praying, and, oh, a few phone calls won't hurt.'' \474\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\473\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 246-48
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
\474\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00162
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn (Jan. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 89).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dozoretz remained deeply involved in the Marc Rich pardon
effort through the granting of the pardon. Three e-mail
messages to Jack Quinn make it appear that Dozoretz was
urgently trying to reach Quinn on January 17, 2001. At 12:13
p.m., Quinn's assistant informed him that ``Beth Dozoretz wants
you to call her on her cell if you get a chance.'' \475\ At
1:38 p.m., Quinn's assistant told him that ``Beth is very eager
to talk to you. She called again and knows that you are at the
WH.'' \476\ A mere 24 minutes later, Quinn's assistant sent
Quinn an e-mail regarding ``BETH'' stating ``[v]ery sorry to
bother you with this but she is insistent. Please call her--she
says that it is URGENT.'' \477\ On January 19, 2001, Dozoretz
traveled to Beverly Hills, California, with her husband.\478\
That day, she called Jack Quinn to let him know her contact
information, both in her private jet, and at the Peninsula
Hotel, where she would be staying.\479\ At 10:48 p.m., Quinn
called Dozoretz at the Peninsula Hotel.\480\ Presumably, Quinn
informed Dozoretz that he believed Marc Rich was going to
receive a pardon. Shortly after that call, Dozoretz called the
White House and spoke to President Clinton.\481\ According to
one press report, Dozoretz thanked President Clinton, but he
was so busy that he did not initially understand why Dozoretz
was thanking him.\482\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\475\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 03027 (E-mail from April
Moore, Secretary to Jack Quinn, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack
Quinn (Jan. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 90).
\476\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 03028 (E-mail from April
Moore, Secretary to Jack Quinn, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack
Quinn (Jan. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 91).
\477\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 03029 (E-mail from April
Moore, Secretary to Jack Quinn, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack
Quinn (Jan. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 92).
\478\ WAVES records from the White House indicate that both
Dozoretz and Denise Rich visited the White House on January 19, 2001.
However, it appears that these records are spurious. White House WAVES
records usually show a scheduled time of entry for any scheduled visit
to the White House. However, only if a visitor actually shows up at the
White House is an actual time of entry entered into the WAVES system.
In this case, the WAVES records show actual times of entry for Rich and
Dozoretz. The United States Secret Service, has explained, however,
that a large group of individuals were scheduled to visit the White
House at one time for a party. Rather than hold up the group of
individuals who were actually there, the Secret Service waved through
the entire group. Therefore, the WAVES system shows erroneously that
everyone who was scheduled for that event actually showed up. Hotel
records as well as several eyewitnesses confirm the fact that Dozoretz
was in transit and in California on January 19. The fact that the
United States Secret Service had no idea of who was actually admitted
to the White House is obviously troubling.
\479\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth
Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack
Quinn (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 88).
\480\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Quinn Gillespie telephone
bill, Feb. 9, 2001) (Exhibit 93).
\481\ Peninsula Hotel Document Production (Dozoretz Invoice from
Peninsula Hotel, Jan. 21, 2001) (Exhibit 94).
\482\ Corky Siemaszko, Dem Aide Had Early Word of Pardons, N.Y.
Daily News, Feb. 26, 2001, at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the pardon was granted, Dozoretz continued her
contacts with Jack Quinn. Between January 23, 2001, and
February 5, 2001, Dozoretz called Quinn at least nine times,
leaving messages of support such as (1) ``NY Times was great
today!'' \483\ (2) ``You are getting a reputation as the
smartest lawyer in America;'' \484\ (3) ``Hearing lots of good
things about you especially hearing that you are brilliant;''
\485\ and (4) ``Just had important conversation she would like
to share with you.'' \486\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\483\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth
Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack
Quinn (Jan. 25, 2001)) (Exhibit 95).
\484\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth
Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack
Quinn (Jan. 29, 2001)) (Exhibit 96).
\485\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth
Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack
Quinn (Jan. 31, 2001)) (Exhibit 97).
\486\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth
Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack
Quinn (Feb. 1, 2001)) (Exhibit 98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beth Dozoretz's efforts to help get Marc Rich's pardon cast
yet additional doubt on the motives of President Clinton. Like
Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz was a close personal friend of
President Clinton. Also like Denise Rich, and a number of the
President's other close friends, her friendship was closely
intertwined with her fundraising relationship for the President
and Democratic Party.
Dozoretz's involvement in the Marc Rich pardon effort has
the indelible appearance of impropriety. Whether or not
criminal acts were involved is unknown, and can only be
discovered with facts not available to the Committee--namely
the truthful testimony of Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz.
However, the appearance of impropriety is substantial:
Beth Dozoretz was herself a major fundraiser for the
DNC as well as President Clinton's personal causes, including
his legal defense fund and library. In addition, she was the
primary solicitor for Denise Rich's contributions to the
Clinton Library. Therefore, at a minimum, Beth Dozoretz's
endorsement of a pardon carried particular weight with the
President.
The one communication between Dozoretz and President
Clinton of which the Committee is aware raises serious
questions. According to the e-mail describing the call,
President Clinton told Dozoretz that he was ``doing all
possible to turn around the WH counsels.'' This upside-down
construction suggests that the President had made up his mind
to grant the pardon, but was hoping to convince the staff so as
to improve appearances.
No acceptable explanation has been made to the
Committee of why Beth Dozoretz agreed to become involved in the
pardon effort. Obviously, Dozoretz is friendly with both Denise
Rich and Jack Quinn. It is possible that she agreed to help
Rich and Quinn as part of this friendship.\487\ However, given
the substantial effort that Dozoretz made, and the excitement
that she showed at the President's decision to grant the
pardon, the possibility that Dozoretz had some other motivation
should be considered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\487\ Of course, there are questions regarding why Denise Rich and
Jack Quinn were making such great efforts to obtain the pardon. As
described above, Rich has never adequately explained her motivations,
leading to speculation that her motivation may have been financial, not
personal. Jack Quinn's explanations have been even more suspect, as he
has maintained that he was not expecting any payment for his work on
the Marc Rich pardon effort. As described above, this suggestion is
contradicted by common sense, as well as by Marc Rich's primary U.S.
lawyer, Robert Fink. Fink confirms that Quinn's motivation was likely
financial, as he was going to receive handsome financial compensation
for his efforts. Because Quinn and Rich have offered weak reasons for
their involvement in the Rich pardon effort, the motivations of
individuals with even less at stake, like Beth Dozoretz, must be
subjected to even greater scrutiny.
Rather than cooperate with the Committee's
investigators, Dozoretz invoked her Fifth Amendment right
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
against self-incrimination.
However, absent cooperation from Ms. Dozoretz, the
Committee is unable to answer these questions.
c. Jack Quinn's Attempt to Keep Information
About Dozoretz from the Committee
It should be noted that Jack Quinn apparently tried to keep
the Committee from learning the true nature of Beth Dozoretz's
role in the pardon effort. When Quinn was asked about the
January 10, 2001, e-mail at the Committee's February 8, 2001,
hearing, the Committee did not have any information regarding
the role of Dozoretz in the pardon effort. When he was asked
about the e-mail, Quinn did acknowledge that it referred to
Beth Dozoretz, but he was then quite reticent about explaining
Dozoretz's role:
Mr. Barr. Why would the President be sharing this
information with the finance chair of the DNC? What do
they have to do with it?
Mr. Quinn. I was on the receiving end of this e-mail,
and I don't know the answer to that. I was aware of
this e-mail.
Mr. Barr. Work with me, speculate a little bit, why
would the DNC finance chair be involved here?
Mr. Quinn. Well, I believe--my impression was that
Denise and Beth were--have been friends, and that, in
fact, they grew--
Mr. Barr. I suspect so.
Mr. Quinn. That they grew up in the same town in
Massachusetts up north.
* * *
Mr. Quinn. But let me be clear, I don't know that he
[the President] called her about this.
* * *
Mr. Barr. Clearly it was about this.
Mr. Quinn. I believe that--my impression was that in
the course of the conversation they were having she
asked him what is happening with these two pardon
applications, and apparently was with Denise Rich at
the time, which may have motivated her to ask the
President in the course of the conversation, but I was
not of the impression, I want to be careful to say this
accurately, that the call was placed for the purpose of
discussing the pardons.\488\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\488\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 248
(Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Bob Barr and testimony of
Jack Quinn).
Quinn's initial testimony on this point was misleading.
When Representative Barr asked why the President would be
calling Beth Dozoretz about the Rich pardon, Quinn answered ``I
don't know the answer to that.'' When Representative Barr asked
Quinn to speculate about why Dozoretz was involved in this
matter, the best Quinn could offer was that Denise Rich and
Beth Dozoretz were friends, and had grown up in the same town
in Massachusetts. Quinn neglected to mention the more salient
point that he had personally asked Dozoretz to become involved
in the pardon effort. Therefore, he knew specifically why she
was discussing the Rich pardon with the President. However, at
no time during the Committee's February 8 hearing did Quinn
disclose the fact that he had specifically asked Dozoretz to
become involved in the pardon effort, because of her close
relationship with President Clinton. If the House Government
Reform Committee and Senate Judiciary Committee had not held
follow-up hearings on this matter, it is likely that Quinn
never would have told the truth about Dozoretz's involvement.
The fact that Quinn tried to conceal this information only adds
to the appearance that Dozoretz's role in the pardon was
improper.
3. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Other Israeli
Leaders
Key players in the lineup of individuals assisting the Marc
Rich pardon effort were Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and a
number of other current and former Israeli officials who
weighed in with the Clinton Administration. President Clinton
has made much of the influence of Prime Minister Barak's appeal
in his decision making. This claim can be debated. However, it
cannot be debated that the Marc Rich team made a substantial
effort to get these Israeli officials involved. However, much
like some of the key American players, it is difficult to gauge
whether these officials were involved because they believed in
the Rich pardon, or because they received financial support
from Marc Rich.
After he fled the United States in 1983, Marc Rich began to
make large financial contributions to various charities in
Israel, as well as Jewish charities in Europe and the United
States. Marc Rich also made political contributions to Israeli
political candidates. However, since Israeli law does not
require the public disclosure of these contributions, the
Committee is not able to determine to whom Rich has
contributed. Communications among the Marc Rich legal team make
it clear that they were able to call upon a number of prominent
Israelis to weigh in on Rich's behalf with President Clinton.
Marc Rich's pardon petition included a number of letters of
support from prominent Israelis, including: Shlomo Ben-Ami, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Public Security;
Itamar Rabinovich, the former Israeli Ambassador to the United
States; Yaakov Neeman, the former Minister of Finance and
former Minister of Justice; Ehud Olmert, the Mayor of
Jerusalem; Isaac Herzog, the Israeli Government Secretary; and
Shabtai Shavit, the former Director of the Mossad.\489\ A
number of these officials received some sort of financial
contributions from Marc Rich. Olmert received a $25,000
political contribution from Rich in 1993.\490\ A community
development organization called Yedid, which was linked to
Shlomo Ben-Ami, received $100,000 from Rich.\491\ Herzog's wife
worked for the Rich Foundation.\492\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\489\ See Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green (Dec.
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
\490\ Michael Dobbs, Pardon Smoothed Ties to Israel; Barak, Others
Aided Rich's Campaign, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 2001, at A1.
\491\ Id.
\492\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More important than the letters of support, though, were
telephone calls to President Clinton from some of these Israeli
leaders. Most importantly, Marc Rich's supporters were able to
have Prime Minister Ehud Barak raise the Marc Rich pardon with
President Clinton. Prime Minister Barak described the approach
to him by Avner Azulay as follows:
Few months ago [sic] I was approached by the chairman
of the Rich Foundation in Israel. The chairman, Mr.
Azoulay is a man I know [sic] for many years, who had
contributed a lot to the security of the State of
Israel. The Rich Foundation is well known and highly
appreciated in Israel for its philanthropic activities
in the fields of healthcare, education and culture.
Mr. Azoulay asked me to raise Mr. Rich case with
President Clinton. I raised the subject with President
Clinton several times (probably three) in the course of
routine telephone conversations during the last two or
three months of his presidency and made a personal
recommendation to him to consider the case.\493\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\493\ Letter from Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, Israel, to the
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 13, 2001)
(Exhibit 99).
Avner Azulay's efforts to enlist Israeli officials in the
pardon effort were helped dramatically when, in early January
2001, Marc Rich himself flew to Israel to attend a convention
for Birthright Israel, a recipient of Rich's largesse. While
Rich was in Israel, he took the opportunity to meet senior
Israeli political officials as well as Jewish-American leaders.
During this trip to Israel, Rich met personally with Prime
Minister Barak, and shortly after that meeting, Barak raised
the Rich pardon with President Clinton a second time. Azulay
referred to Rich's scheduled meetings in a January 4, 2001, e-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mail to the Rich legal team:
As I have already mentioned--during this wknd [sic]
M[arc] R[ich] is scheduled to meet the P[rime]
M[inister], F[oreign] M[inister] & SH[imon] P[eres]--as
well as a main vector to E[lie] W[iesel].
If possible it would be very useful to ask the W[hite]
H[ouse] to hold the final decision (unless it is
positive!)--until the above have the opportunity to
make/repeat their personal appeals.\494\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\494\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0865 (E-mail from Avner
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 4, 2001))
(Exhibit 100).
It also appears that the Rich team attempted to have other
Israeli officials call the President or his staff. Former
Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres called President Clinton
about the Marc Rich matter on December 11, 2000,\495\ the day
that the Rich petition was filed, and the same day that Prime
Minister Barak spoke to the President. On December 19, 2000,
Avner Azulay suggested that he ask Knesset Speaker Avraham Burg
to call the President on Marc Rich's behalf.\496\ It is unclear
whether Burg actually spoke with President Clinton. Burg
apparently did write a letter to President Clinton on January
9, 2001, advocating Rich's pardon.\497\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\495\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0842 (E-mail from Avner
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 25,
2000)) (Exhibit 101).
\496\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00071
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Kathleen
Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter et al. (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 102).
\497\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W
00163-64 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack
Quinn et al. (Jan. 11, 2001)) (Exhibit 103). While Burg's letter did
expressly advocate Rich's pardon, it was criticized by Gershon Kekst
and Bob Fink. Kekst asked Quinn and Fink ``is this a helpful letter?''
Id. Fink responded, ``I think Potus will realize that it is intended to
be helpful. Frankly, I am a little surprised Avner let it go in this
form, as we pulled one like it from the original petition. Maybe he did
not see it until after it had gone. I see no reason to rain on anyone's
parade.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Azulay also asked Israel Singer, Secretary General of the
World Jewish Congress, and Edgar Bronfman, President of the
World Jewish Congress, to raise the Marc Rich matter with the
President:
Israel Singer & Edgar Bronfman (CEO & President of the
World Jewish Congress) are scheduled to meet potus on
Sunday evening in NY (the Israel Policy Forum--not
adequate for a private talk) and on Wednesday for a
private seance at the WH. In anticipation of Abraham
Burg's meeting, I contacted Singer through Rabbi
Rizkin. Burg will give his support only if he knows
that Singer and Bronfman will . . [sic] I don't know
but suspect that this has to do with JPoll.
Now Singer wants to be sure that the MRPG petition is
on the agenda of potus. I suggest you contact Israel
Singer the soonest possible--either to brief him and
answer his questions or arrange for a mtg with him
before he meets potus.\498\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\498\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0866 (E-mail from Avner
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 5, 2001))
(Exhibit 104).
In his desperation to find prominent Israeli supporters for
the Marc Rich petition, Jack Quinn even suggested that the
deceased widow of assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin, Leah, call President Clinton. Robert Fink made this
request to Avner Azulay in an e-mail: ``Oh one more thing. Jack
asks if you could get Leah Rabin to call the President; Jack
said he was a real big supporter of her husband.'' \499\ Azulay
responded the following day: ``Bob, having Leah Rabin call is
not a bad idea. The problem is how do we contact her? She died
last November--on the 5th anniversary of her husband's
murder.'' \500\ In the end, the Rich team settled for the
Rabins' daughter, who met with Avner Azulay on January 10,
2001, and informed him that she would call President Clinton on
Rich's behalf.\501\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\499\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00091
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation
(Dec. 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 36).
\500\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00094
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink
(Dec. 31, 2000)) (Exhibit 105).
\501\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00162
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et
al. (Jan. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 89).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the tactics used by Azulay to enlist Israeli leaders
was to link the Rich pardon to the Jonathan Pollard matter. The
Pollard pardon had long been a priority for a number of Israeli
officials, and Azulay attempted to use the Pollard matter to
Rich's advantage:
I can also cfm [sic] the info on J[onathan] P[ollard].
It seems that the topic was discussed in telecons with
potus--within the framework of the peace agreement.
JP's freedom is considered as a public-political
``sweet pill'' which shall help swallow (or divert
public attention from) the more sour pills in the
agreement with arafat [sic]. I am sure potus is aware
that JP is going to be big trouble with the entire
intelligence community and MR could go along with it
``less unnoticed''. On the other hand if he says no to
JP--one more reason to say yes to MR.\502\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\502\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0865 (E-mail from Avner
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 4, 2001))
(Exhibit 100).
Jack Quinn made the same linkage between Rich and Pollard in
his appeals to the White House: ``Lastly, I told her [Beth
Nolan] that, if they pardon JP, then pardoning MR is easy, but
that, if they do not pardon JP, then they should pardon MR. In
the last connection, she affirmed that they have heard from
people in or connected to the GOI [Government of Israel].''
\503\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\503\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00111
(E-mail from Jack Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et
al. (Jan. 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 106).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is difficult to gauge whether the efforts of the Marc
Rich team to link their fate to that of Jonathan Pollard helped
their cause. Jonathan Pollard certainly feels that the Rich
pardon was granted at his expense. Pollard made the following
statement after the Rich pardon:
I've become disillusioned. This is the hardest thing
for me. . . . But what has shaken me to my very bones
is to finally realize, after 16 years, that I made a
mistake. For 16 years I have been desperately waving
the Israeli flag, crying out for help to the Israeli
political establishment. But since the Marc Rich
campaign, I realize that I made a mistake. All those
years I should have waved something else to get their
attention. I should have waved a dollar bill in front
of them and convinced them that I had a lot of money.
That is the depths to which we have sunk as a nation,
that an agent has to bribe his own government to rescue
him. That is how low we have sunk.
Esther and I are pinching pennies in order to stay
alive. Israel has never assisted us. But this Marc Rich
fellow, with all of his millions, he's the one that
everyone in Israel is breaking their backs for.
* * *
Barak, the politicians, and all those who were
involved, were corrupted and debased by Marc Rich's
money. Every one of them was corrupted at some level or
another. The corruption and the repulsiveness that
characterized the Rich pardon campaign is
appalling.\504\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\504\ Eran Tiffenbraun and Mody Kreitman, Expose: Using Pollard to
Get Rich, Yediot Achronot, Feb. 25, 2001 (Exhibit 107).
While Pollard clearly did not deserve a pardon of his own, his
comments about the Rich pardon may be accurate.
4. Elie Wiesel
The Rich team also attempted to recruit prominent Holocaust
survivor and author Elie Wiesel to their cause. As a prominent
spokesman for Jewish causes and a close friend to President
Clinton, Wiesel was a logical candidate for the Rich team to
turn to. It appears that Gershon Kekst initially identified
Wiesel as a potential supporter of the Rich pardon. After a
meeting with Kekst, Avner Azulay informed Behan, Fink, and Marc
Rich that Kekst ``proposed Elie Wiesel as the ``moral
authority'' to present the plea. We discussed some ideas how to
reach him--and that I shall do in the next few days.'' \505\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\505\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0542 (E-mail from Avner
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold &
Porter et al. (Nov. 15, 2000)) (Exhibit 108). When asked about this
document, Kekst said, ``I would not have proposed Elie Wiesel as a
moral authority to anyone on any subject.'' Interview with Gershon
Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). Kekst said that he was
asked, but refused, to request Wiesel's help. As discussed below, Kekst
has repeatedly denied that he made suggestions and recommendations even
when they are corroborated by contemporaneous e-mails. Kekst's denials
are not credible, and appear to be part of an effort to understate his
role in the Marc Rich pardon effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It appears that Azulay followed Kekst's recommendation, and
attempted to enlist Wiesel. In an e-mail of November 29, 2000,
Azulay suggested that the Rich team might be obtaining a letter
of support from Wiesel: ``We shall have a few days to get
additional letters in New York (Elie Wiesel, Abe Foxman and
others). I assume by now you are getting letters from
Switzerland and Spain.'' \506\ When he was interviewed over the
telephone by Committee staff, Wiesel confirmed that he was
asked by Avner Azulay to write a letter on behalf of Rich. At a
November or December 2000 meeting at Wiesel's home in New York
City, Azulay showed Wiesel other letters written on behalf of
Marc Rich.\507\ According to Wiesel, although he told Azulay
that he was impressed by the list of names, he said he could
not write such a letter for someone he did not know.\508\
Wiesel told Committee staff that he also told Azulay that he
did not believe Rich could legally receive a pardon without
standing trial.\509\ According to Wiesel, even though Azulay
assured him that Rich could receive a pardon, Wiesel told
Azulay that he could not write the letter because he had
already written a letter requesting a commutation of Jonathan
Pollard's sentence. Wiesel felt that he could not make another
request.\510\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\506\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00066
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink
and Marc Rich (Nov. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 109).
\507\ Telephone Interview with Elie Wiesel (Apr. 2, 2001). Yossi
Ciecanover, a banker and former high official in Israel, and Danny
Karavan, who lived in both Paris and Israel, arranged this meeting.
Wiesel indicated that he was under the impression that Gershon Kekst
asked Yossi Ciecanover to contact Wiesel on behalf of Azulay.
\508\ Id.
\509\ Id.
\510\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Wiesel, Avner Azulay called him several days
later to see if he had changed his mind.\511\ Wiesel told him
that he had not.\512\ While this seemingly would have been the
end of Wiesel's involvement in the Rich pardon campaign, there
is evidence that it was not. Several e-mails indicate that
Wiesel may have lobbied the White House. On December 21, 2000,
Jack Quinn wrote to Robert Fink and Azulay, responding to
Azulay's question about ``having another VIP place an
additional call'' to President Clinton.\513\ As Quinn wrote,
``I think another call is fine, but it needs to come from
someone who can get POTUS personally on the line. Did Elie
Wiesel call?'' \514\ Azulay responded to Quinn's inquiry by e-
mailing, ``I don't know positively if he talked directly to
potus and if he did what was his reaction. All he told me was
that `he was at the WH the day potus traveled but he couldn't
give me any reaction.' '' \515\ Azulay then spoke with Wiesel
again, and on December 25, 2000, Azulay responded to Quinn in
an e-mail with the subject line ``elie wiesel,'' stating:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\511\ Id.
\512\ Id.
\513\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0831 (E-mail from Jack
Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Dec. 21, 2000)) (Exhibit 110).
\514\ Id.
\515\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0836 (E-mail from Avner
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 22,
2000)) (Exhibit 111).
I talked to him today. He says that he brought up the
topic at the WH on Monday Dec 12th, he refused to
disclose who he met. He was told of the difficulties
lying ahead in dealing with it (he would explain it
only in a face to face meeting) and hopes that they can
be surmounted[.] \516\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\516\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0845 (E-mail from Avner
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 25,
2000)) (Exhibit 112).
On December 27, 2000, Azulay told Quinn, Kekst, Behan,
Fink, and Marc Rich that he was looking for some way to have
Wiesel express his opinion on the Rich pardon in a clear way to
the President: ``Elie Wiesel--I am still checking if there is a
way to get from him a straight forward support statement--
direct call to potus.'' \517\ Azulay followed up with another
e-mail on December 31, 2000, stating that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\517\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0851 (E-mail from Avner
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 27,
2000)) (Exhibit 113).
I was informed today that EW visited the WH last Dec
12th. He didn't meet or speak directly with potus. EW
had a scheduled mtg [sic] with the ``person responsible
for the pardons.'' His original goal was to discuss
Pollard--and at the same time raised a question about
the MRPG case. He was told that the MRPG case can't be
defined as humanitarian because there was no trial,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conviction or punishment to deal with[.]
I understand--although he didn't disclose it that he
talked with a lawyer, the WH counsel. Perhaps BL.
This is not new to you. What the lawyers think or
thought at the time. However, I think it worthwhile
mentioning that EW's mtg [sic] was held in the morniing
[sic] hours of Monday, Dec 12th--before xx [sic] before
the formal petition was delivered in the afternoon
hours. I hope that the lawyers have a different view of
the case by now?
It is clear that EW is reluctant to make a direct
appeal to potus--with the uncertainty that he is doing
something that doesn't stand a chance. Therefore, it
seems plausible that if someone he respects will
convince him that he is doing the right thing it might
still be possible.\518\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\518\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0854 (E-mail from Avner
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 31,
2000)) (Exhibit 114).
Despite the assurances that Wiesel had raised the Rich pardon
with White House staff, Azulay apparently continued his efforts
to have Wiesel raise it directly with the President. On January
2, 2001, he e-mailed Fink, Quinn, and Behan to tell them that
Knesset Speaker Avraham Burg was going to try to recruit Wiesel
to help with the Rich case.\519\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\519\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00104
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink et
al. (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 115).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other than the information that Azulay was able to get from
Wiesel, Gershon Kekst also told the rest of the Rich team that
Wiesel had weighed in with the White House on the Rich pardon.
In a January 9, 2001, e-mail, Kekst wrote that ``[b]y the way,
please tell marc [sic] that I am `assured' the call has been
made by elie [sic].'' \520\ Robert Fink responded that he would
``tell Marc about Elie.'' \521\ When he was interviewed by
Committee staff, Kekst explained that he discussed Wiesel's
involvement in the Rich pardon effort with Yossi Ciecanover, a
former senior Israeli government official.\522\ Ciecanover told
Kekst that he had been asked by Azulay to ask Wiesel to express
support for the Rich pardon.\523\ Ciecanover said that Wiesel
either ``would call'' or ``did call'' the President.\524\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\520\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00159
(E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink
and Jack Quinn (Jan. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 116).
\521\ Id.
\522\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar.
15, 2001).
\523\ Id.
\524\ Id. Associate White House Counsel Eric Angel also suggested
that he heard that Wiesel raised the Rich matter with President
Clinton. However, after making this initial assertion, Angel
backtracked, and said that he was not certain if he recalled hearing
this before the pardons were granted, or from media accounts after the
fact. Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Elie Wiesel has denied any involvement in the Marc Rich
pardon effort, calling such allegations ``pure fantasy.'' \525\
Wiesel acknowledged that he did visit the White House in
December 2000 and January 2001.\526\ However, Wiesel denied
that he raised any Marc Rich pardon issues with anyone at the
White House on either of those visits.\527\ He also denied that
he ever raised any pardon issues with anyone at the White House
in any other form, other than writing a letter on Jonathan
Pollard's behalf to the President.\528\ Given the lack of any
first-hand evidence that Wiesel did actually lobby the
President on behalf of Marc Rich, the e-mails of Kekst and
Azulay most likely overstated involvement of Wiesel in the Rich
pardon effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\525\ Telephone Interview with Elie Wiesel (Apr. 2, 2001).
\526\ Id.
\527\ Id.
\528\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. King Juan Carlos
King Juan Carlos apparently made two contacts with the
White House over the Rich pardon. The first contact was a
direct one, when the King called President Clinton personally
regarding the Rich pardon. On January 13, 2001, Avner Azulay
sent an e-mail to the Rich legal team indicating that ``we have
a CFM [confirmation] that the king of spain [sic] talked to
potus. He reports a positive conversation. No concrete sayings
[sic].'' \529\ It is unclear why the King took this action on
Rich's behalf. It is possible that the King was motivated by
Rich's support of Madrid's Jewish community, but he has not
offered any explanation for his actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\529\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0881 (E-mail from Avner
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 13,
2001)) (Exhibit 117).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also in this same time frame, John Podesta heard of King
Juan Carlos' interest in the Rich pardon. Podesta received a
telephone call from former Congressman John Brademas, President
Emeritus of New York University, who is a friend of King Juan
Carlos.\530\ The King had informed Brademas that he had
recently met with the Israeli Foreign Minister, Shlomo Ben Ami,
who had raised the Marc Rich pardon with the King. The King in
turn called Brademas to see if Brademas could make the King's
interest in the pardon known to the White House. Podesta told
Brademas that ``while it was the President's decision, the
White House Counsel's Office and I were firmly opposed and I
did not believe that the pardon would be granted.'' \531\ While
Podesta apparently braced the King for the worst, the King's
interest in the Rich matter was made known to the President, as
well as Marc Rich's supporters, who have often mentioned his
support for the pardon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\530\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 320
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the
President, the White House).
\531\ Id. at 317.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Avner Azulay
Avner Azulay is a former high-ranking Mossad agent. He
founded his own security consulting company after leaving the
Mossad in the early 1990s.\532\ Marc Rich retained his services
and placed him as the head of the Marc Rich Foundation and the
Doron Foundation, based in Jerusalem.\533\ These Foundations
handle all of Rich's philanthropic interests (they were
recently merged and are now referred to only as the Marc Rich
Foundation). These foundations also paid significant amounts of
money to many organizations and persons who wrote letters on
behalf of Marc Rich that were included in the pardon petition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\532\ Bo'az Ga'on, Rich as Korach, Ma'ariv Weekend Magazine, Oct.
1, 1999 (Exhibit 6).
\533\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Azulay was a central figure in the pardon effort. His name
appears on a large number of the e-mails produced to the
Committee that were sent among the Rich pardon team. Azulay
played a key role in securing many of the letters included in
the petition. He traveled throughout Israel, Europe, and the
United States soliciting the letters for the pardon. Azulay
also solicited many Jewish leaders for their support of Rich.
In this effort, Azulay contacted Abraham Foxman, Elie Wiesel,
and Rabbi Irving Greenberg, among others. As would be revealed
after the pardon was granted, however, not everyone who was
approached by Azulay was told that their letter would be used
in the pardon effort.
The Committee first sought Avner Azulay's cooperation in
its investigation in a March 8, 2001, letter asking him to
participate in an interview with Committee staff.\534\ Azulay
refused to meet with staff, citing health reasons.\535\
Committee staff followed up with a number of telephone calls to
Azulay's counsel to try to secure an interview, but he made it
clear that Azulay would not participate in an interview, due to
health concerns and concerns regarding the ongoing criminal
investigation by the Southern District of New York. As a close
advisor to Marc Rich and a key participant in the pardon
effort, Azulay has a great deal of valuable information that he
has decided to withhold from the Committee. His lack of
cooperation appears to be part of a concerted effort by Marc
Rich and his closest advisers to keep critical information
about the pardon effort from the American people.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\534\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Mar. 8, 2001)
(Exhibit 118).
\535\ Letter from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to the
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 15, 2001)
(Exhibit 119).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Michael Steinhardt
Michael Steinhardt is a prominent hedge fund investor who
has also been involved in Democratic politics, having served as
the Chair of the Democratic Leadership Council and the
Progressive Policy Institute. He first met President Clinton
while serving in the former position. Steinhardt mentioned this
fact in his December 7, 2000, letter to President Clinton that
was included in the pardon application.\536\ Steinhardt also
wrote a follow-up letter to President Clinton on Marc Rich's
behalf on January 16, 2001.\537\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\536\ Letter from Michael Steinhardt to President William J,
Clinton (Dec. 7, 2000) (Exhibit 120). As Steinhardt mentioned in the
letter to President Clinton, ``I think you may remember me as one of
your earliest national supporters.'' Steinhardt went on in the letter
to explain his decision to step away from the DLC in 1995 ``when ideas
and human judgments seemingly led in different directions[.]''
\537\ Letter from Michael Steinhardt to President William J.
Clinton (Jan. 16, 2001) (Exhibit 121).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Steinhardt has been an acquaintance of Marc Rich since the
1970s, and a close friend since 1996. Both Marc Rich and Denise
Rich's father, Emil Eisenberg, had invested in Steinhardt's
fund.\538\ In 1997, Steinhardt made his first recommendation to
Rich, which was to hire public relations specialist Gershon
Kekst to help him with his case.\539\ Over the course of the
last few years, Steinhardt had numerous meetings and
discussions with Rich, Azulay, Kekst, Jack Quinn, and Robert
Fink concerning the legal negotiations and the pardon effort.
Throughout that time, Steinhardt advised Rich on his efforts to
settle his criminal case. In the fall of 2000, when the efforts
to settle the case reached a dead-end, Steinhardt claims that
he conceived of the pardon option and recommended that Rich
seek a presidential pardon.\540\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\538\ Telephone Interview with Michael Steinhardt (Mar. 12, 2001).
\539\ Id.
\540\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Steinhardt was also involved in the effort to solicit Edgar
Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress, to assist in
the Rich lobbying effort. Around the same time that he faxed
his follow-up letter to President Clinton, Steinhardt attempted
to contact Bronfman in Washington, D.C. In a January 16, 2001,
e-mail to Jack Quinn and copied to Robert Fink and Marc Rich,
Avner Azulay wrote, ``Michael faxed the letter to potus as
requested. Edgar B. is in DC. Michael is trying to contact him
to enlist his support.'' \541\ When asked about this e-mail by
Committee staff, Steinhardt confirmed that he had tried to
contact Bronfman to enlist his support in the pardon
effort.\542\ However, Steinhardt explained that he did not
contact Bronfman in time for him to help.\543\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\541\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00171
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et
al. (Jan. 16, 2001)) (Exhibit 122).
\542\ Telephone Interview with Michael Steinhardt (Mar. 12, 2001).
\543\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. Gershon Kekst
Gershon Kekst is a prominent public relations specialist
who heads his own firm, Kekst and Company, which focuses on
corporate communications. Kekst was hired by Marc Rich to
assist with strategy and public relations relating to his
criminal case.\544\ Michael Steinhardt told Committee staff
that he first recommended Kekst to Marc Rich sometime in
1997.\545\ Kekst recalled this meeting, explaining to Committee
staff that he met Steinhardt and two of Marc Rich's lawyers,
including Robert Fink, at Steinhardt's office.\546\ According
to Kekst, he told the lawyers that he would probably not get
involved because he did not believe a public relations campaign
would be helpful for Rich.\547\ Rich's lawyers implored Kekst
to study the Rich case and to meet personally with Rich to
discuss working for him.\548\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\544\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar.
15, 2001).
\545\ Telephone Interview with Michael Steinhardt (Mar. 12, 2001).
\546\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar.
15, 2001).
\547\ Id.
\548\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A few months later, Kekst met with Marc Rich in
Switzerland.\549\ According to Kekst, Rich told him that unless
Kekst could guarantee that getting publicity would help resolve
Rich's problems, Rich did not want to go through with it.\550\
Kekst said he left the meeting with the understanding that he
would do no work on the Rich case.\551\ When back in the United
States, he again met with Fink and Steinhardt.\552\ According
to Kekst, he told them that they should either let Marc Rich
live in peace or get a lawyer in Washington who worked with DOJ
to work on the case.\553\ As is discussed in a previous
section, it was Kekst who recommended Jack Quinn to the Rich
team in late 1998.\554\ Nevertheless, Kekst claims that he
never worked on the Rich case and ``turned down'' work on the
case.\555\ In 1997 and 1998, Rich paid Kekst $75,000 for the
time he spent reviewing the case and traveling to Switzerland.
However, Kekst did not receive any payments from Rich after
1998 despite the fact that he devoted considerable time to the
Rich case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\549\ Id.
\550\ Id.
\551\ Id.
\552\ Id.
\553\ Id.
\554\ Id.
\555\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite his claim that he repeatedly rebuffed the Rich
team's attempts to recruit him throughout the late 1990s, there
is evidence that Kekst was working with the team at least as
early as 1999. In responding to an October 13, 1999, e-mail
from Robert Fink concerning press articles written about Rich,
Kekst wrote, ``I did not like it because we had agreed that no
publcity [sic] best serves us for the time being. If someone
wanted to change that position, I would have liked to have
known so I could argue a bit.'' \556\ It is telling that at
this point in 1999, Kekst was referring to ``us'' when
responding to Marc Rich's lawyer. It is also telling that in a
fax sent the previous day from Azulay to Fink, Azulay suggests
conferring with Kekst to get his opinion on the articles.\557\
This evidence strongly indicates that Kekst was already part of
the Rich team in 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\556\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W
00642-43 (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst & Co., to Robert
Fink (Oct. 13, 1999)) (Exhibit 123).
\557\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00839
(Fax from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink (Oct.
12, 1999)) (Exhibit 124).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to several e-mails produced to the Committee,
Kekst continued to be included in the strategy and planning of
the Rich team in 2000. In late January of 2000, Fink e-mailed
Marc Rich to inform him that Fink and Quinn would be meeting
with Kekst to discuss their negotiations with the Southern
District of New York.\558\ Furthermore, in a February 10, 2000,
e-mail, Avner Azulay described Kekst's active role in strategy
sessions involving the Southern District. Discussing the
rejection letter sent by Mary Jo White's deputy Shirah Neiman,
Azulay wrote, ``I note that Shirah's ltr is dated feb [sic] 2.
This means that she had already issued the ltr when you JQ GK
[sic] were discussing what to do and how to approach her.''
\559\ After the rejection letter from the SDNY, Kekst continued
to consult on the next steps the Rich team should take. As
Robert Fink explained to Marc Rich on February 17, 2000, ``I
have only recently spoken to Jack, Gershon and Kitty on this
issue and all agree that we should try to approach the DoJ tax
lawyers even without the SDNY if necessary.'' \560\ On February
29, 2000, Fink sent Marc Rich an e-mail noting that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\558\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A1011-12 (E-mail from
Robert Fink to Marc Rich et. al. (Jan. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 125).
\559\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00698
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink
(Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 126).
\560\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00701
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich and Avner Azulay, Director, Rich
Foundation (Feb. 17, 2000)) (Exhibit 52).
Gershon has not billed for months. He has spoken to me
many time[s] and Avner at least one and meet [sic] with
me and Jack at least three times (Jack speaks to him
more) in the last two months and I know he speaks to
Michael from time to time. He even did a draft outline
of what he thought our response should be to the
Southern District, which he, frankly, thought required
a response. No doubt he has some billable work for
which we have not been billed. He knows that you do not
want him to work for free, but has not billed or has
just delayed it.\561\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\561\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00722
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 39).
As these e-mails demonstrate, Kekst was obviously much more
involved in the pre-pardon efforts than he was willing to
reveal to the Committee.
Kekst's claim not to be involved in the Rich pardon
campaign is also strongly contradicted by the documentary
evidence received by the Committee. As early as March of 2000,
Kekst was mentioned by the Rich team in their strategic
planning. A March 18, 2000, e-mail from Avner Azulay to Robert
Fink discussing Denise Rich's ``personal mission'' states, ``IF
it works we didin't [sic] lose the present opportunity--until
nov--which shall not repat [sic] itself. If it doesn't--then
probably Gershon's course of acion [sic] shall be the one left
option to start all over again.'' \562\ When asked about this
e-mail, Kekst told Committee staff that he has no understanding
of what this e-mail means.\563\ He said his entire awareness of
Denise Rich comes from watching C-SPAN.\564\ Kekst further
stated that he did not think he knew Denise Rich was
involved.\565\ He said he has never met Denise Rich and does
not recall speaking to Azulay around March 2000, the time of
this e-mail.\566\ Kekst's lack of memory on this message is
brought into question by the testimony of Jack Quinn and Robert
Fink. When asked about the March 18, 2000, e-mail, Quinn
testified, ``It's also entirely possible that Mr. Azulay,
others, myself included, were involved in a conversation where
someone said you know we are going to try to pardon one of
these days.'' \567\ Perhaps most significantly, when Fink was
asked about this e-mail, he testified that he believed that
``Gershon's course of action'' referred to the idea of a pardon
application.\568\ This raises the distinct possibility that not
only was Kekst heavily involved in the pardon effort, but more
importantly that the idea to seek a pardon was his own. This
may explain why Kekst was not forthcoming when he was
interviewed by Committee staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\562\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00729
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink
(Mar. 18, 2000)) (Exhibit 60).
\563\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar.
15, 2001).
\564\ Id.
\565\ Id.
\566\ Id.
\567\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 396
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
\568\ Id. at 516 (testimony of Robert Fink).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kekst again became heavily involved with the Rich team when
the pardon effort began in earnest. In November of 2000, Robert
Fink asked Kekst to meet with Avner Azulay.\569\ This meeting
took place on November 15, 2000.\570\ According to Kekst, he
told Fink that he had no interest in mounting a public
relations campaign and that it would only hurt Rich.\571\
Nevertheless, Kekst met with Azulay. Azulay told Kekst about
the plans for a pardon petition and the need to get letters of
support.\572\ Azulay asked for Kekst's help but, according to
Kekst, he told Azulay ``no.'' \573\ Kekst told Committee staff
that he knew before his conversation with Azulay that Rich was
seeking a pardon.\574\ From time to time Kekst received e-mail
asking if he had changed his mind. According to Kekst, he
either clicked the delete button or would send a short negative
answer.\575\ Kekst asked the Rich team to let him know if Jack
Quinn changed his mind about a public relations campaign.\576\
Kekst thought that if Quinn thought a public relations campaign
was warranted, then he would reconsider.\577\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\569\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar.
15, 2001).
\570\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0541 (E-mail from Robert
Fink to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter, and Avner Azulay,
Director, Rich Foundation (Nov. 15, 2000)) (Exhibit 127).
\571\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar.
15, 2001).
\572\ Id.
\573\ Id.
\574\ Id.
\575\ Id.
\576\ Id.
\577\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kekst's claim that he refused to help Azulay is undermined
by a November 15, 2000, e-mail from Avner Azulay to Kathleen
Behan, Robert Fink, and Marc Rich, the subject line of which
reads, ``meeting with gershon kekst[.]'' The e-mail begins with
the statement ``GK supports the idea of presenting the request
for a P[ardon].'' The e-mail also goes on to state the
following:
Although chances are not high, no damage could result
thereof if plea is rejected. It could also generate a
positive effect on the DOJ even if case is not
resolved.
-Media & public criticism can be countered by the fact
that for years DOJ and SD stonewalled and were never
open to find a solution that the interested parties
offered. The most recent rejection of JQ's proposal for
a review can be used as an example.
-GK proposed Elie Wiesel as the ``moral authority'' to
present the plea. We discussed some ideas how to reach
him--and that I shall do in the next few days.
-I gave GK a copy of my updated long list of potential
supporters (Bob--pse [sic] fax a copy to KittY [sic]),
and reported on my contacts with DR's friend. I expect
to recieve [sic] a priority list from these to work on.
-GK pointed out that Prof. Itamar Rabiinovitch [sic] is
an important supporter because he is highly respected
in the US and could help with additional names in the
US--which are lacking in my list.
-The time-table [sic] for implementing this project
with a dead line should be decided upon with JQ.
-I also raised the idea that ``a task force'' under his
guidance and strategy should be established to make
sure we make good use of the time and means available.
I understood from GK that he shall undertake this
project.
-GK is meeting Bob on Thursday, shall contact JQ and
decide on how to proceed.\578\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\578\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0552-53 (E-mail from
Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Kathleen Behan, Partner,
Arnold & Porter et al. (Nov. 15, 2000)) (Exhibit 128).
This e-mail was followed up by Azulay in an e-mail which reads,
``-GK thinks it is better to present the plea in 2 consecutive
steps (MR first and PG later). It might be easier to obtain
positive results, if any, for one single. If it succeeds then
the second shall be easier to obtain.'' \579\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\579\ Id. at A0552.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These e-mails indicate that Kekst was heavily involved in
the pardon process. From holding meetings with the Rich team,
to going over lists of potential supporters, to recommending
Elie Wiesel to lobby the President, Kekst had a hand in many
aspects of the campaign. When asked about this first e-mail,
however, Kekst told Committee staff that the e-mail does not
accurately reflect what he said at the meeting.\580\ Kekst
stated that he does not believe he advocated seeking a pardon
or taking any particular option.\581\ He said he did not know
how criticism could be countered, and that is why he did not
agree to assist in the first place.\582\ He also stated, ``To
think you could counter the record, which was pretty awful, is
outrageous to me. I would not have proposed Elie Wiesel as a
moral authority to anyone on any subject.'' \583\ However, e-
mails sent by Robert Fink strongly contradict Kekst's claim
concerning Wiesel. On November 17, 2000, Fink wrote to Azulay
and Behan that ``Gershon made it clear that he thinks his
proposed moral authority, EW, is the most important person by
far.'' \584\ On January 5, 2001, Fink sent Quinn an e-mail
stating that ``Gershon continues to believe, indeed, he is very
consistent, that Elie Weisel [sic] is the key. I will email
Avner and ask where he is on that.'' \585\ The Committee is
troubled by Kekst's apparent dishonesty regarding his suggested
use of Elie Wiesel in the pardon process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\580\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar.
15, 2001).
\581\ Id.
\582\ Id.
\583\ Id.
\584\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0564 (E-mail from Robert
Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, and Kathleen Behan,
Partner, Arnold & Porter (Nov. 17, 2000)) (Exhibit 129).
\585\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00403
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn (Jan. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 130).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committee staff also asked Kekst about numerous other e-
mails also detailing his involvement in the Rich case. In one
of the e-mails, Kekst personally responds to the Rich team
about a meeting agenda from November 21, 2000, concerning the
pardon petition and lobbying campaign. One of the bullets from
the meeting agenda mentions ``Maximizing use of Gershon.''
\586\ In response to the meeting agenda, Kekst wrote the
following, in all capital letters, to Robert Fink:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\586\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0567-0569 (Agenda of
Nov. 21, 2000, Meeting) (Exhibit 76).
ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT THE CASE MUST BE MADE (FOLLOWING
THE GUIDELINES MEMO) IN THE CORE DOCUMENT. AS THERE IS
NO MARGIN FOR ERROR OR OMISSION, I MUST LEAVE THE
DRAFTING TO THE EXPERTS (YOU, KITTY AND JACK). I WOULD
WANT A SHOT AT IT, THOUGH, BECAUSE ONCE THAT DOCUMENT
HAS PASSED THAT TEST, IT SHOULD BE LOOKED AT FROM A
PUBLIC AND PERSUASION TEST, AS WELL. SECOND, THE
SUPPORT-SPONSORSHIP OF AN ELIE WIESEL IS CRUCIAL: AVNER
SAID HE WOULD WORK ON THAT. A [sic] AND THE LIST OF
SUPPORTERS MUST NOT BE ALL RECIPIENTS OF PHILANTHROPY,
JEWS AND ISRAELIS: IT MUST INCLUDE POLITICAL AND
BUSINESS LEADERS FROM AROUND THE WORKLD [sic],
INCLUDING THE U.S.A. I BELIEVE AVNER SAID HE WOULD
START ON THAT. (AS TO HOW TO USE GERSHON BEST . . . . .
GEE, LET ME KNOIW [sic] WHEN YOU DECIDE !) BY THE WAY,
I WILL ONLY HAVE ABOUT AN HOUR (PERHAPS A FEW MINUTES
LESS) BECAUSE I AM TO CATCH A PLANE THAT
AFTERNOON.\587\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\587\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0570 (E-mail from
Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink and Jack Quinn
(Nov. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 131).
When asked about the meeting and this e-mail, Kekst told
Committee staff that he was unaware of any meeting being
planned.\588\ Committee staff then asked him about the
specifics of his response. Kekst stated that he wrote this e-
mail as an ``angry e-mail,'' suggesting that he did not want to
be involved.\589\ Asked why he said he wanted ``a shot at [the
pardon petition] though because once the document has passed
that test, it should be looked at from a public and persuasion
test as well,'' Kekst said ``I don't know.'' \590\ Later, Kekst
claimed that he was concerned because Azulay went so far in
enlisting Jewish organizations that it would have a negative
``boomerang'' effect on the Jewish people.\591\ So, Kekst said
he may have offered to review the petition as ``one last shot
to keep them from doing that.'' \592\ Kekst stated that his
offer to review the pardon petition was limited solely to this
aspect.\593\ Kekst claimed that when he stated, ``it should be
looked at from a public and persuasion test as well,'' he was
referring to trying to limit any anti-Semitic backlash.\594\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\588\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar.
15, 2001).
\589\ Id.
\590\ Id.
\591\ Id.
\592\ Id.
\593\ Id.
\594\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The explanation by Kekst that he was only reluctantly
involved, and only offered advice because of fear of an anti-
Semitic backlash is belied by the fact that the Rich team
included him in numerous conference calls, and continued to
include him in their e-mail loop. Moreover, Kekst continued to
respond to some of the messages. For example, before the pardon
application was submitted, Robert Fink forwarded Kekst a copy
of Avner Azulay's work on the letters concerning Rich's
philanthropic activity that would be included in the
application.\595\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\595\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production
DSM0001 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and
Co. (Nov. 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 132).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 26, 2000, Kekst responded to a Robert Fink e-
mail, which discussed contacting Hillary Rodham Clinton for her
support and having Denise Rich call the White House, by
registering his agreement with Fink's recommendation.\596\ The
following day, Kekst responded to an e-mail from Robert Fink,
reminding him of his position on submitting two separate pardon
applications for Marc Rich and Pincus Green. Kekst responded,
``As you will recall, I always thought it best to de-link the
two. But . . . .'' \597\ Finally, on December 27, 2000, Kekst
responded to an e-mail from Fink concerning Senator Charles
Schumer, stating, ``Can quinn tell us who is close enough to
lean on schumer?? I am certainly willing to call him, but have
no real clout. Jack might be able to tell us quickly who the
top contributors are . . . . . . maybe Bernard Schwartz??''
\598\ As this series of e-mails makes clear, Kekst was far from
a passive bystander who was simply worried about anti-Semitism.
He was actively making suggestions about tactics--including the
use of prominent political contributors to enlist the help of
elected officials in the pardon effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\596\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00076
(E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink
(Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 133).
\597\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00081
(E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink
(Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 134).
\598\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00083
(E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink
(Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 135).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the last few weeks of the Clinton Presidency, Kekst
continued to advise the Rich team. When asked on January 9,
2001, by Robert Fink about a potential press story on Rudy
Giuliani's treatment of Marc Rich, Kekst responded:
Unless jack quinn changes his views about the risk-
reward ratio for publicity, I vote against it. The
herald tribune, in any event, is not the place for us
to be. The publicity I was referring to relates to the
repair of marc's name assuming we fail, not to help
make it happen (unless jack says it would). By the way,
please tell marc that I am ``assured'' the call has
been made by elie.\599\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\599\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00159
(E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink
and Jack Quinn (Jan. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 116).
Two days later, Fink wrote to Marc Rich, stating, ``Meanwhile I
spoke to Gershon yesterday, and he said he would call first
thing this morning to specifically ask that EW call Potus and
no one else.'' \600\ That same day, January 11, 2001, Kekst
received a copy of a letter from the Speaker of the Israeli
Knesset concerning Marc Rich. Kekst questioned its
effectiveness in asking Quinn and Fink, ``[I]s this a helpful
letter?'' \601\ On January 16, 2001, Robert Fink e-mailed Marc
Rich about Kekst's views on the pardon effort:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\600\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00165
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich and Avner Azulay, Director, Rich
Foundation (Jan. 11, 2001)) (Exhibit 136).
\601\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W
00163-64 (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to
Robert Fink and Jack Quinn (Jan. 11, 2001)) (Exhibit 103).
Gershon just called and said he is convinced this is
still possible and that this is a critical week, and
suggests you call Jack directly and encourage him to
keep plugging away, and thanking him for what he has
done. Gershon is also convinced that the no publicity
route was correct.\602\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\602\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMRW 00168
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Jan. 16, 2001)) (Exhibit 137).
Even after the pardon was granted, Kekst continued to
receive and respond to e-mails from the Rich team. In a January
23, 2001, e-mail that Kekst sent to Quinn and Fink, he stated
``I spoke with marc. He asked the question and I told him that
he should not speak with any reporters anywhere, , , , , , ,
[sic] if after his first trip to America and that `trauma'
passes, he may be able to make `courtesy calls' in Europe.''
\603\ By dealing directly with Marc Rich concerning press
inquiries, Kekst was clearly actively involved in the pardon
process until the end. When asked about this e-mail, Kekst said
that he spoke with Marc Rich twice after the pardon.\604\ The
first, he claimed, was to say congratulations.\605\ The second
was to say that he should do nothing at all about the public
relations strategy.\606\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\603\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Gershon Kekst,
President, Kekst and Co., to Jack Quinn and Robert Fink (Jan. 23,
2001)) (Exhibit 138).
\604\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar.
15, 2001).
\605\ Id.
\606\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A series of e-mails from January 22 and January 24, 2001,
suggests, however, that Kekst was actively consulting with the
Rich team on post-pardon public relations strategy. On January
22, Kekst made suggestions for a post-pardon letter from Marc
Rich to President Clinton. He wrote, ``I think he needs to make
reference to the fact that the president's opinion and action
were based on his having been willing to take the time and give
consideration to the best professional analysius [sic] of the
matter which made clear the need to `do justice' at this
point.'' \607\ That same day, Avner Azulay wrote to Quinn,
Fink, Behan, Green, Kekst, and Rich, stating, ``I thought we
agreed that all inquiries, interviews should be channeled to
gershon. Why is BF giving interviews? He shouldn't be dealing
with this aspect.'' \608\ Furthermore, in a discussion about an
op-ed piece being solicited by the Rich team, a statement to
Robert Fink reads, ``It is Gershon's view that the New York
Times is the first choice for placement. He suggests that Jack
resubmit this version for the Time's consideration.'' \609\ In
another e-mail of January 24, 2001, Fink asked a question about
a New York Times reporter. In response, Kekst wrote, ``I
believe the paper is being dealt with . . . . and has been[.]''
\610\ Asked about this e-mail by Committee staff, Kekst said he
was ignoring Azulay and did not want to talk to him.\611\ Kekst
said he believed Azulay had the ``insane idea'' that the Times
reporter could help turn the public relations campaign
around.\612\ Nevertheless, Kekst continued to advise the Rich
team and deal with members of the press. On January 25, 2001,
when it was clear that the press was turning negative on the
Rich pardon, Kekst issued a warning to Azulay, Fink and Quinn.
He stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\607\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Gershon Kekst,
President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink and Jack Quinn (Jan. 22,
2001)) (Exhibit 139).
\608\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00191
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et
al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 69).
\609\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Roanne Kulakoff
to Robert Fink (Jan. 24, 2001)) (Exhibit 140).
\610\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Gershon Kekst,
President, Kekst and Co., to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et
al. (Jan. 24, 2001)) (Exhibit 141).
\611\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar.
15, 2001).
\612\ Id.
The reporter at the ny times is Allison cowan working
with Johnny apple. A senior, well-experienced team.
They have met with jack and I believe you should run
this past him. Unless there is strong evidence, they
are not likely to fabricate a story. Is there any trace
of evidence?? lenzner told me that forbes believes
milkin [sic] should have been pardoned and he wanted to
do a piece contrasting the two and showing that if mike
did'nt [sic] deserve one certainly m.,r. [sic] didn't
either. Talk with fink about him. PLEASE be careful
about letting so many people talk with reporters. . . .
. .all that is being accomplished is that, however
``well-intentioned'' they stir the story and keep it
cooking!! We are a stage [sic] now at which the story
is being kept alive be [sic] wannabe heroes.\613\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\613\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Gershon Kekst,
President, Kekst and Co., to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et
al. (Jan. 25, 2001)) (Exhibit 142).
Kekst's claim not to be actively involved in the pardon
effort is simply not believable. It is troubling that, despite
all of the evidence to the contrary, Kekst told the Committee
that he ``did not work on the Marc Rich case.'' \614\ It would
make no sense for Azulay or others on the Rich team to waste
time e-mailing each other about suggestions that were not made
or offers to help that were fabricated. If Kekst were not
involved, the Rich team would have been engaged in a fruitless
effort to include him in their deliberations. Kekst made far
too many suggestions to the Rich team throughout the pardon
campaign for him to credibly assert that he was not involved.
Kekst even admitted to Committee staff that he billed Marc Rich
between $80,000 and $90,000--a large fee for someone who was
not involved in the process.\615\ It stands to reason that a
person such as Kekst who needs to preserve his public image for
his own livelihood as a public relations consultant would try
to distance himself from the Marc Rich affair. Unfortunately,
Kekst did so at the expense of providing the Committee with
candid information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\614\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar.
15, 2001).
\615\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. Robert Fink
Robert Fink has worked as an attorney for Marc Rich for two
decades, beginning in 1980.\616\ At that time, Fink was with
the law firm of Milgrim Thomajan and Lee. Fink's former law
firm was responsible for what the Southern District of New York
referred to as the ``steamer trunk affair,'' in which
subpoenaed documents from Marc Rich's company were taken out of
the country on a plane to Switzerland.\617\ Fink continued to
represent Rich when he moved to his new law firm, Piper Marbury
Rudnick & Wolfe. Fink was involved throughout the 1980s and
1990s with the failed efforts to reach an acceptable
arrangement with the SDNY. It was Fink to whom the SDNY
communicated the offer to drop the RICO charge in the
indictment if Rich and Green would return to the United States
to face trial.\618\ Fink continued to work on the matter when
Jack Quinn and Kitty Behan were retained by Rich. He was one of
the most active and important members of the Rich pardon
effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\616\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 467
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink).
\617\ See Section I(B)(1) above.
\618\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production 00697 (E-
mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Feb.
10, 2000)) (Exhibit 32).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Kathleen Behan
Kathleen Behan is a partner at the law firm Arnold &
Porter. Jack Quinn recruited her to the Marc Rich case when he
was also at the firm. Behan was one of the three most active
lawyers in the pardon process, along with Quinn and Fink. Behan
met Marc Rich in 1999 when she and Quinn flew to Switzerland to
discuss their representation of Rich. Like Quinn, Behan was
retained in July of 1999 to work for Marc Rich for a fee of at
least $330,000 that included $55,000 per month for the first
six months.\619\ Behan was interviewed by Committee staff on
February 27, 2001. Behan asserted attorney-client privilege or
work product privilege in response to the majority of questions
relating to her work on the pardon.\620\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\619\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0507-10 (Letter from
Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter, to Marc Rich (July 21, 1999))
(Exhibit 34).
\620\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Peter Kadzik
Peter Kadzik is a partner at Dickstein Shapiro Morin &
Oshinsky LLP. According to Jack Quinn, Kadzik was hired at the
suggestion of Michael Green, a fellow partner of Kadzik's,
because he was ``trusted by [White House Chief of Staff John]
Podesta,'' and was considered to be a ``useful person to convey
[Marc Rich's] arguments to Mr. Podesta.'' \621\ Kadzik's effort
on behalf of the Rich team included seven contacts with the
White House Chief of Staff or his assistants between December
12, 2000, and the end of the Clinton Administration.\622\ He
also called the White House four out of the final five days of
the Administration to see what progress had been made on the
Rich pardon.\623\ Based on the testimony of Podesta before the
Committee, it does not appear that Kadzik's efforts were
successful, as Podesta remained opposed to the Marc Rich pardon
until the end.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\621\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 432
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
\622\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production
DSM0064-65 (Billing records from Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to
Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143).
\623\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Importance of Secrecy to the Marc Rich Team
During the lobbying campaign for the pardon, the Rich team
was keenly aware that public knowledge of their efforts would
hamper their ability to secure a pardon. The most logical
reason for their concern was knowledge that sunshine regarding
the Rich pardon application would severely curtail their
ability to misrepresent facts about the history of Rich's legal
troubles. Perhaps more importantly, public attention probably
would have resulted in the Administration consulting with the
Central Intelligence Agency or the National Security Agency.
Such consultation would certainly have had a negative impact on
the Rich pardon petition.
Rich's legal team was determined to keep their efforts
secret from the outset. An agenda for one of the first meetings
regarding the Rich pardon effort lists as a discussion item ``A
need for secrecy and possibility/likelihood of potential leaks.
(Kitty says people are watching this closely.)'' \624\ Robert
Fink defended this approach, testifying that ``Marc Rich has
been victimized by the press and publicity and that if the
press learned about this that victimization would continue.''
\625\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\624\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0569 (E-mail from Robert
Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Nov. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 76). Fink sent the
agenda for the November 21, 2000, meeting as an e-mail attachment.
\625\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 476
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On January 9, 2001, Robert Fink sent an e-mail to Gershon
Kekst and Jack Quinn in which he discussed a negative story
that was being written about New York Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani.\626\ Fink mentioned that the story ``led to a
discussion [with Marc Rich] on whether we seek any publicity
about the pardon application[.]'' \627\ As Fink continued, ``I
explained that we did not want publicity now. He [Marc Rich]
understands that is our view. I look forward to hearing from
you.'' \628\ Jack Quinn responded to Fink's e-mail the same day
stating, ``[I] think we've benefitted from being under the
press radar. [P]odesta said as much.'' \629\ Gershon Kekst also
responded to Fink's message, stating, ``Unless jack quinn [sic]
changes his views about the risk-reward ratio for publicity, I
vote against it.'' \630\ To this, Fink responded, ``I agree
with your views on publicity[.]'' \631\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\626\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00158
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co.,
and Jack Quinn (Jan. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 144).
\627\ Id.
\628\ Id.
\629\ Id.
\630\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00159
(E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink
and Jack Quinn (Jan. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 116).
\631\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fears over the disclosure of the pardon effort
concerned the Rich team up until the very end of the Clinton
Administration. On January 19, 2001, Robert Fink e-mailed Avner
Azulay, Mike Green, and Kitty Behan, and informed them that the
head of the SEC knew about the pardon efforts.\632\ As Fink
stated in the message, ``[w]e agree that is not good and that
maybe the SDNY knows too, but we have no information on it.''
\633\ In other words, the Rich team recognized that knowledge
of their efforts could produce an outcry, especially if
government officials who knew the details of the criminal case
became aware of the possibility of a pardon for Rich and Green.
Jack Quinn acknowledged as much at the Committee's February 8,
2001, hearing:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\632\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00180
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et
al. (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 145).
\633\ Id.
Mr. LaTourette. [I]s there any plain reading of that e-
mail on January 19, 2001, other than you all were
afraid if the Southern District of New York caught wind
of what you were up to, the egg was going to hit the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
fan?
Mr. Quinn. My preference was that the White House
counsel contact Main Justice and that, based on the
course of dealings we had earlier, that they would make
a recommendation that would be helpful to us. I
certainly knew that if Main Justice deferred to the
prosecutors in New York, they were likely to have a
negative recommendation. But I thought that, based on
our earlier dealings, they had enough information.\634\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\634\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 230-31
(Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Steven LaTourette and
testimony of Jack Quinn).
Not only did Quinn and the Rich team recognize the public
relations problem posed by the Rich pardon campaign, but,
according to one e-mail, the White House Chief of Staff
recognized this potential problem as well.\635\ As it turned
out, the eventual pardon of Marc Rich by President Clinton
produced exactly the public outrage that the Rich team sought
to avoid by keeping their lobbying campaign secret. However, by
the time this wide-ranging public outrage was realized, Marc
Rich already had his presidential pardon secured.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\635\ For his part, Podesta stated that he did not recall telling
Kadzik that Rich had benefited from being ``under the press radar.''
See ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,''
Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 432 (Mar. 1,
2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the
President, the White House).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Jack Quinn and Eric Holder Cut the Justice Department Out of the
Process
By late November 2000, the Marc Rich pardon petition had
been prepared and was ready to be filed with the White House.
Rather than go immediately to the White House, Jack Quinn first
turned to Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder. Holder had
worked with Quinn during the previous year to try to force the
Southern District of New York to sit down and meet with Quinn
about settling the charges against Rich. During that process,
Holder became more familiar with the Marc Rich case, to the
extent he was aware of the charges against Rich, and the fact
that Rich was a fugitive from justice. Despite these facts,
Holder had a basically sympathetic view of the Rich case.
Holder believed that the prosecutors in New York should meet
with Quinn, despite the fact that Rich was a fugitive and that
prosecutors from the SDNY had already had a number of
unproductive negotiations with Rich's lawyers. In fact, Holder
told Quinn the refusal of the prosecutors to meet was
``ridiculous,'' \636\ that ``we're all sympathetic,'' and the
``equities [are] on your side.'' \637\ By taking this position
with Quinn, Holder had already sent the message to Quinn that
he had a favorable view of the Marc Rich case, despite the
firmly entrenched position that his own agency had taken for
the preceding seventeen years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\636\ See Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn, Nov.
8, 1999) (Exhibit 48). See also ``The Controversial Pardon of
International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt.
Reform, 107th Cong. 45 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
\637\ See Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn)
(Exhibit 56).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Marc Rich's lawyers prepared to file the pardon
petition, Eric Holder provided pivotal assistance to their
effort. Holder encouraged Jack Quinn to seek the pardon and
helped Quinn cut the Justice Department out of the process of
reviewing Rich's pardon petition. Ordinarily, the Justice
Department has a key role in reviewing pardon petitions and
providing a recommendation to the President as to whether each
petition should be granted. However, Eric Holder abdicated his
responsibilities as the Deputy Attorney General and took
actions that ensured the Justice Department would have no
meaningful input on the Rich and Green pardons. This was the
first of two actions taken by Holder at the Justice
Department's expense. After first succeeding in keeping the
career prosecutors at the Justice Department from having any
input in the Rich pardon, Holder informed the White House on
the last day of the Clinton Administration that he was
``neutral, leaning towards favorable'' on the Rich and Green
pardons.\638\ Together, these actions had a dramatic impact on
ensuring that the pardons were ultimately granted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\638\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 198
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Knowing that Holder was favorably disposed to the Marc Rich
case, Quinn approached Holder and confided in him that he was
going to file the pardon petition with the White House. On
November 21, 2000, Holder, Quinn, and representatives from the
U.S. Marshals Service met regarding a matter for another client
of Quinn's. After this meeting was over, Quinn took Holder
aside and informed him that he would be filing a pardon
petition on behalf of Marc Rich directly with the White House.
Quinn then stated that ``I hoped I could encourage the White
House to seek his views and he said I should do so.'' \639\
Quinn then asked Holder if Quinn should send a letter to the
White House encouraging the White House Counsel to seek
Holder's views. Holder told Quinn ``no, just have him [sic]
call me.'' \640\ It is also likely that at the November 21,
2000, meeting, Quinn and Holder discussed whether Holder wanted
to receive a copy of the pardon petition. When a senior Justice
Department official informed The Washington Post that Holder
left the November 21 meeting expecting to receive a copy of the
pardon petition from Quinn, Quinn told the newspaper that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\639\ Id. at 44 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
\640\ Id. at 158.
I am astounded that he now takes that position. . . . I
am astounded because I specifically had a conversation
[in November] with him [Holder] about the fact that I
was going to submit it to the White House and I asked
him if he needed it in writing and he said he did
not.\641\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\641\ James V. Grimaldi and Robert O'Harrow Jr., Recollections at
Odds on Pardon, Wash. Post, Jan. 26, 2001, at E1.
While Quinn did not repeat this charge at the Committee's
hearings, his statement to the newspaper makes it fairly clear
that he offered to provide Holder with a copy of the pardon
petition, and that Holder decided he did not want one. This
appears to be in keeping with Holder's apparent disinterest in
learning about the details of Marc Rich's legal troubles. In
the normal course of events, one would expect Holder to have
welcomed input from professional staff with experience in the
pardon process. For some unknown reason, however, he eschewed
such expertise.
For his part, Holder has testified that he does not recall
any discussion of Marc Rich with Jack Quinn on November 21,
2000:
Mr. Quinn has recently stated after the meeting he told
me he was going to file a pardon request on behalf of
Mr. Rich at the White House. I have no memory of that
conversation but do not question Mr. Quinn's assertion.
His comment would have been a fairly unremarkable one,
given my belief that any pardon petition filed with the
White House ultimately would be sent to the Justice
Department for review and consideration.\642\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\642\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 193
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
What I assumed was going to happen in late November of
2000 was that after the petition had been filed, that
the White House would be reaching out to the Justice
Department, and that we would have an opportunity at
that point to share with them as we do in pardon--that
we generally do in pardon requests, after all of the
vetting had been done, the opinion of the Justice
Department.\643\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\643\ Id. at 212.
Holder's defense is difficult to believe. First, his
characterization of Quinn's comments as ``unremarkable'' is
inconsistent with everything about the Rich case. Marc Rich was
one of the most wanted fugitives in the United States, and the
largest tax cheat in the country's history at the time of his
indictment. Holder knew that his fugitive status meant that
federal prosecutors wouldn't even meet with Rich's lawyers.
Yet, when Jack Quinn informed him that he was seeking a
presidential pardon, outside of the normal pardon process,
Holder claims that he did not take note of it and could not
even remember it two months later. Equally as unbelievable is
Holder's claim that he did not want a copy of the pardon
petition because he was confident that the White House would
send the Justice Department a copy of the petition and seek out
the Department's opinion. The fact that Quinn was going
directly to the White House indicated that Quinn was trying to
avoid the normal Justice Department procedure by which pardon
petitions were reviewed. It also indicated that no serious
vetting would be done on the Rich petition.
For his part, Jack Quinn claimed that he was not trying to
keep any information from the Justice Department, but rather
was filing his petition with the White House merely to expedite
consideration of the pardon. Quinn claimed that he believed
that the White House would provide the Justice Department with
a copy of the pardon petition, and therefore, that he had no
malign intent in failing to provide Holder with a copy of the
petition in November, or at any point during the application
process:
Counsel. Why did you not send Mr. Holder the pardon
application?
Mr. Quinn. I believed that a good deal of the material
included in the pardon application consisted, at least
in their central parts, of the materials that I had
provided to him in October 1999 when he asked Mr.
Margolis to take a look at this matter. But you're
correct. I did not at that time send him a copy of the
full pardon petition.
Counsel. The question was, why did you not do that? Is
it because you thought he had all of the material from
over a year previous?
Mr. Quinn. Well, I thought he was sufficiently familiar
with the underlying case that, when he was asked, he
would be in a position to advise the White House.
* * *
Counsel. But you had not provided the extent of your
ultimate argument to the President, so you didn't feel
that he needed to see that?
Mr. Quinn. Well, again, I think, in fairness, you have
to say, if you look at the material I provided to him
earlier about the flaws in the indictment, you will see
that it was the same argument made in the pardon
petition.
Counsel. Because you're proud of your work, and you
believe in your work, you want to provide it to people.
It's not a matter of how much it costs, because that's
not the issue. You would like to provide it to people
so they can see the extent of what you are representing
in whatever material you're pursuing. And, generally,
it seems when you don't provide material to people it's
because you don't want them to review it or you don't
want them to poke holes in it or perhaps find a flaw. I
mean, the courts require briefs. You have to provide
them so they can see your legal reasoning. In this
case, were you concerned that if you provided Mr.
Holder your application that Mr. Holder might send it
on to somebody who might actually read it and look at
it?
Mr. Quinn. Absolutely not. Again, I had provided these
arguments to him at an earlier point.
Counsel. You haven't provided all of the arguments, all
the letters and all the other things in the tabs. You
couldn't have provided them previously.
Mr. Quinn. Fair enough. The other point I was going to
make is, as I said earlier, I encouraged the White
House Counsel's Office to reach out to him, and there's
no reason in the world why they couldn't have shared a
copy of the pardon petition when they did so.
Counsel. I understand, but I've not yet heard of a
lawyer who has decided to take a weak argument and
leave it on the table when he's strengthened his
argument. . . . . [I]t's hard for us to understand,
even if it was the 11th hour, why you simply wouldn't
put it in an envelope, messenger it over, let Mr.
Holder take a look at it, take it home, spend a couple
of hours. He could think to himself, maybe we want to
talk to security people; maybe we want to send it over
to the FBI. It's just--we still don't understand. I
guess what you said is you provided material the
previous year, and that was enough for Mr. Holder.
Mr. Quinn. Well, look, you can disagree with me on
this. I was not--I didn't make that decision in an
effort to hide the pardon petition from anybody. I
encouraged the White House to reach out to the Justice
Department and seek their views. That's my
testimony.\644\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\644\ Id. at 267-68 (testimony of Jack Quinn).
Quinn's testimony is not convincing. As the questioning at the
hearing demonstrated, Quinn simply did not have any reasonable
justification for failing to send Holder a copy of the pardon
petition. Perhaps most important, Quinn knew that if the
petition were provided to Holder, Holder would likely forward
it to the staff of the Pardon Attorney. Even more likely, the
correspondence would be copied to the Pardon Attorney as a
matter of routine. These lawyers would review the case, which
would have likely involved contacts with the attorneys at the
Southern District of New York, FBI, CIA, and NSA. If that had
happened, Quinn's arguments would have been revealed as
fraudulent, and this might have proven fatal to the pardon
effort.
Quinn's claim that he had provided Holder with everything
he needed to know in 1999 simply is not true. In early 2000,
Quinn provided Holder with a two-page set of talking points
that addressed solely why the Justice Department should review
the Rich indictment.\645\ It did not even begin to address the
issues raised in the 31-page pardon petition. Quinn could have
no reason for wanting to keep the pardon petition from Holder
other than his desire to keep Rich's quest for a pardon as
confidential as possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\645\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum entitled ``Why DOJ
Should Review the Marc Rich Indictment,'' Feb. 28, 2000) (Exhibit 53).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The key point that must be taken away from November 21,
2000, discussion between Holder and Quinn is that it took both
of them to keep the Rich pardon petition from the Justice
Department. It cannot be disputed that Holder should have
recognized the significance of the fact that Quinn was applying
for a pardon for Rich, and should have asked for a copy of the
pardon petition to be forwarded to the Justice Department.
Holder has not provided any coherent explanation of why he
failed to do so. Similarly, Quinn should have provided a copy
of the pardon petition to Holder. Quinn has claimed that he had
nothing to hide, and frequently asked the White House to
include the Justice Department in the pardon process. Quinn's
claims are misleading. Quinn clearly tried to keep his pardon
petition from the Justice Department, apparently out of the
fear that it could fall into the wrong hands, namely the
prosecutors in New York, or anyone else who had knowledge of
Rich's illegal activities or his subsequent actions in support
of countries like Iraq, Iran, and Libya.
The final question then is whether Holder's failure to
obtain the Rich petition and involve the Justice Department in
the pardon process was the result of incompetence or a
deliberate decision to assist Jack Quinn. At the Committee's
hearing, Holder suggested that it was the result of poor
judgment, initially not recognizing the seriousness of the Rich
case, and then, by the time that he recognized that the pardon
was being considered, being distracted by other matters.\646\
However, it is difficult to believe that Holder's judgment
would be so monumentally poor that he could not understand how
he was being manipulated by Jack Quinn. Rather, the
preponderance of the evidence indicates that Eric Holder was
deliberately assisting Quinn with the Rich petition, and
deliberately cut the rest of the Justice Department out of the
process to help Quinn obtain the pardon for Marc Rich. This
conclusion is supported by the following e-mail, which was sent
by Quinn to Kitty Behan, Gershon Kekst, and Robert Fink on
November 18, 2000, three days before Quinn's meeting with
Holder on November 21:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\646\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 193-95
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: eric
spoke to him last evening. he says go straight to wh.
also says timing is good. we shd get in soon. will elab
when we speak.\647\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\647\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0565 (E-mail from Jack
Quinn to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter et al. (Nov. 18,
2000)) (Exhibit 146).
Assuming the ``eric'' referenced is Eric Holder, this e-mail
contradicts the heart of Holder's defense. Holder claims that
he was not focused on the Rich pardon until late in the
process, at first on January 6, when he spoke to Beth Nolan,
and then, not really until January 19, when he announced his
position of ``neutral, leaning towards favorable.'' He claims
that he does not even recall the November 21, 2000, meeting,
because it was an unremarkable request. And he claims that he
did not ask for a copy of the petition because he thought he
would get everything in due course from the White House.
However, this e-mail indicates that Holder suggested that Quinn
file the petition directly with the White House and circumvent
the Justice Department. It also suggests that Holder had reason
to know that the request was remarkable, as he suggested to
Quinn that he circumvent the Justice Department. Finally, it
indicates that Holder was a willing participant in the plan to
keep the Justice Department from knowing about and opposing the
Marc Rich pardon.
The final question is why Eric Holder would do such a
thing. As discussed below, Holder had been asking Quinn for his
help in being appointed Attorney General in a Gore
Administration. At the time when Holder made the decision to
assist Quinn, there was still a realistic possibility of Vice
President Gore winning the election. As an influential friend
of Vice President Gore, Jack Quinn would be in a key position
to assist Holder's chances of becoming Attorney General. While
this may not have been Holder's sole motivation in aiding
Quinn, it was likely a powerful motivation for Holder.\648\
Regardless of Holder's motivations, his actions were
unconscionable. One of Holder's primary duties in the pardon
process was to make sure that the views of the Justice
Department were adequately represented in the pardon process.
In addition, as a Justice Department employee, he was bound by
federal regulations that required the Justice Department to
review pardon petitions before they were presented to the White
House. Finally, as a simple matter of prudence, Holder should
have ensured that he knew something about the pardon before he
took action that substantially assisted the chances that the
pardon would be issued. By helping Quinn circumvent the Justice
Department, Holder ensured that his own prosecutors would not
be able to express their opinion about the Rich case. In so
doing, Holder disserved his own Department, as well as the
statutes he was sworn to uphold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\648\ In evaluating Holder's motivations, one should keep in mind
that the only reason Jack Quinn was hired by Marc Rich was because of
Eric Holder's initial recommendation to Gershon Kekst. Holder's
suggestion to Kekst that he hire a lawyer like Quinn, who could come to
him and solve the problem, was a self-fulfilling prophecy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. The Filing of the Pardon Petition
On December 11, 2001, Jack Quinn called White House Counsel
Beth Nolan to inform her that he would be submitting a pardon
application to the White House that day.\649\ Quinn personally
delivered the application to the White House later that
day.\650\ Accompanying the application was a letter from Quinn
to President Clinton, briefly explaining Rich's arguments.\651\
In that letter, Quinn provided a brief summary of his
arguments, claiming that a ``grave injustice'' had been done,
that Rich and Green's attempts at settlement had been rebuffed,
and that the charges against Rich and Green were unjustified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\649\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 431
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the
President, the White House). By contrast, Kathleen Behan, who was
present when Quinn called Nolan, told Committee Staff that she did not
recall Quinn saying he was sending over a pardon application. Behan
stated, ``It sounded like he didn't need to explain to her what it was.
It was very cordial conversation.'' Interview with Kathleen Behan,
Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 27, 2001).
\650\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to
President William J. Clinton (Dec. 11, 2000)) (Exhibit 147).
\651\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The filing of the pardon petition triggered a small wave of
phone calls and other attempts to lobby the President and top
White House officials on the Rich pardon. These contacts ranged
from calls from Prime Minister Ehud Barak to personal
communications between Jack Quinn and his former White House
colleagues.
1. December 11, 2000, Call from Ehud Barak
On December 11, 2000, the same day that the pardon
application was delivered to the White House, the Rich pardon
became a topic of discussion between President Clinton and
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. One can only speculate as to
whether this was orchestrated or an extraordinary coincidence.
Barak's involvement in the lobbying campaign was secured by
Avner Azulay of the Rich Foundation. On May 13, 2001, Barak
responded to a March 8, 2001, inquiry by the Committee
concerning his involvement in the Rich pardon. As he stated in
his letter:
Few months ago [sic] I was approached by the chairman
of the Rich Foundation in Israel. The chairman, Mr.
Azoulay [sic] is a man I know [sic] for many years, who
had contributed a lot to the security of the State of
Israel for its philanthropic activities in the fields
of healthcare, education and culture.
Mr. Azoulay [sic] asked me to raise Mr. Rich case with
President Clinton. I raised the subject with President
Clinton several times (probably three) in the course of
routine telephone conversations during the last two or
three months of his presidency and made a personal
recommendation to him to consider the case.\652\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\652\ Letter from Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, Israel, to the
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 13, 2001)
(Exhibit 99).
The first of these three telephone conversations between
Barak and Clinton concerning clemency for Marc Rich took place
on December 11, 2000. The notes of the conversation taken by
National Security Council staff indicate Prime Minister Barak
raised the matter towards the end of the nineteen-minute
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conversation:
Barak. Okay, thank you. One last remark. There is an
American Jewish businessman living in Switzerland and
making a lot of philanthropic contributions to Israeli
institutions and activities like education, and he is a
man called Mark [sic] Rich. He violated certain rules
of the game in the United States and is living abroad.
I just wanted to let you know that here he is highly
appreciated for his support of so many philanthropic
institutions and funds, and that if I can, I would like
to make my recommendation to consider his case.
Clinton. I am going to take all of them up at the same
time. I know about that case because I know his ex-
wife. She wants to help him, too. If your ex-wife wants
to help you, that's good.
Barak. Oh. I know his new wife only, an Italian woman,
very young. Okay. So, Mr. President, thank you very
much. We will be in touch.\653\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\653\ Verbatim notes of transcript of telephone conversation
between President William J. Clinton and Ehud Barak, Prime Minister,
Israel (Dec. 11, 2000) (Exhibit 148).
As this exchange indicates, President Clinton may have
already heard of the Marc Rich matter because of some contact
with Denise Rich. It is unclear, however, when this contact
occurred or in what context it occurred. It is also possible
that President Clinton discussed with Denise Rich her ex-
husband's pardon over the phone. Phone records reflect a number
of telephone calls between Rich and the White House.\654\ It
may also be that the President discussed the Marc Rich matter
with Beth Dozoretz, who visited the White House on numerous
occasions and placed numerous phone calls prior to Barak's
first phone call. In any event, it is clear from the transcript
of this conversation that President Clinton was already aware
of the Marc Rich pardon effort when he first spoke with Prime
Minister Barak.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\654\ See, e.g., Verizon Document Production (Telephone calls from
Denise Rich to the White House, Dec. 9, 1999); Qwest Document
Production (Telephone call from Denise Rich to the White House, Feb.
16, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There were additional lobbying contacts made with the White
House on the Marc Rich matter on December 11. That same day,
former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres contacted President
Clinton about the Marc Rich case. Presumably, this call, like
the call from Prime Minister Barak, was initiated by Avner
Azulay. Also on December 11, 2000, President Clinton attempted
to call Beth Dozoretz. \655\ It is unclear, from available
documentary evidence, whether Dozoretz successfully spoke with
the President, or what they spoke about. However, it is clear
that Dozoretz and President Clinton discussed Marc Rich at some
point in the days around when the petition was filed. In this
conversation, President Clinton told Dozoretz that Quinn should
make his case to the White House Counsel's Office. Finally, as
discussed above, on December 12, 2000, Elie Wiesel visited the
White House and may have raised the Rich pardon with a member
of the White House staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\655\ NARA Document Production (White House record of attempted
call between Dozoretz and President Clinton).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Quinn Was Likely Legally Prohibited from Lobbying the
White House
When Jack Quinn filed the Marc Rich pardon petition with
the White House and contacted White House staff regarding the
pardon, he violated Executive Order 12834. On January 20, 1993,
the first day of the new administration, President Clinton
signed into law Executive Order 12834.\656\ The order
prohibited persons who had worked for the administration from
lobbying the administration for a five-year period.\657\ In
fact, Jack Quinn had a hand in writing this regulation. Quinn
had left the White House in February of 1997, and was therefore
under the prohibition when he submitted the pardon petition.
Beth Nolan testified that when Quinn brought the pardon
application to the White House, she raised the issue of his
eligibility to represent someone before the White House.\658\
According to Nolan, Quinn responded to her concerns by telling
her that he ``had obtained a legal opinion that it was
permissible for him to represent someone in a pardon
application.'' \659\ Kathleen Behan also told Committee staff
that Quinn told Nolan he could act ``pursuant to the exception
for representations like this.'' \660\ In fact, Quinn does not
appear to have obtained a ``legal opinion.'' Rather, it appears
that he exchanged brief e-mails with Kathleen Behan. Behan's
entire ``legal opinion'' appears to be a two-sentence e-mail
titled ``Re: exec order 12834.'' Behan stated, ``Certainly the
plain language you have cited would not preclude your
participation. I'd be happy to look at the whole order.'' \661\
Nolan also testified that she ``asked one of [her] associate
counsels to look at the question independently and got the
answer back that Quinn's work did meet the exception.'' \662\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\656\ Exec. Order No. 12,834; 58 Fed. Reg. 5,911 (1993) (Exhibit
149).
\657\ Id.
\658\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 324
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the
President, the White House).
\659\ Id.
\660\ Interview with Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb.
27, 2001).
\661\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Kathleen Behan,
Partner, Arnold & Porter, to Jack Quinn (Dec. 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 150).
\662\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 324
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the
President, the White House).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Executive Order 12834 prohibits lobbying of the executive
branch agency for which the person was employed for a five-year
period. The exception to this rule referred to by Quinn reads
as follows:
[T]he term ``lobby'' does not include: . . . (2)
communicating or appearing with regard to a Judicial
proceeding, or a criminal or civil law enforcement
inquiry, investigation or proceeding (but not with
regard to an administrative proceeding) or with regard
to an administrative proceeding to the extent that such
communications or appearances are made after the
commencement of and in connection with the conduct or
disposition of a Judicial proceeding[.] \663\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\663\ Exec. Order No. 12,834; 58 Fed. Reg. 5,911 (1993) (Exhibit
149).
Quinn testified to the Committee that he believed he was within
this exception when he lobbied the White House on behalf of
Marc Rich. In response to a question from Congressman
LaTourette, Quinn stated, ``there was, as you've heard, an
indictment pending in the Southern District of New York, so
there was a judicial proceeding that had been commenced.''
\664\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\664\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 153
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contradiction of Quinn, ethics expert Stephen Gillers of
New York University law school says that Quinn has twisted this
exception beyond its original intent. Gillers explains that the
provision, known as the ``judicial exception,'' is boilerplate
for government ethics regulations and laws. It is meant for
former government employees who are advocates in court, acting
as attorneys in the traditional sense. According to Gillers:
The problem with Quinn's efforts to use that loophole
is that the president, in exercising his pardon power,
is not performing in a judicial capacity . . . . He is
performing in an executive capacity. And the pardon
function does not enjoy any of the safeguards that led
to the creation of the judicial exception. There is no
judge, there is no adversary process necessary and
there is no sunshine. . . . I don't think any
reasonable interpretation of the language, in light of
the history of this exception, can support his claim[.]
\665\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\665\ James V. Grimaldi, In Rich Pardon Case, Did Quinn Violate the
Ethics Rule He Wrote?, Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 2001, at E4.
Quinn's claim that he was appearing with regard to a
``judicial proceeding'' is not credible. Quinn was appearing to
obtain a pardon, which is not a judicial power, but rather, is
an executive power. If Quinn had been lobbying the President to
intervene and force the Justice Department to drop criminal
charges against Rich, his argument might be more sound. Quinn's
claim was also severely undercut by a ruling in Federal Court
that he and his colleagues were acting principally as lobbyists
in the Rich case, rather than as attorneys.\666\ As Judge Chin
held in that decision:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\666\ In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, No. M11-189 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Although Quinn may be an excellent attorney, he was
preceded by series of excellent attorneys; clearly, he
was not hired for his ability to formulate better legal
arguments or write better briefs. To the extent it
contained legal arguments at all, the [pardon] Petition
made the same arguments that Rich and his prior
attorneys had been presenting, unsuccessfully, to the
Southern District for almost 17 years. Rather, Quinn
was hired because he was ``Washington wise'' and
understood ``the entire political process.'' He was
hired because he could telephone the White House and
engage in a 20-minute conversation with the President.
He was hired because he could write the President a
``personal note'' that said ``I believe in this cause
with all my heart,'' and he would know that the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President would read the note and give it weight.
* * *
The public relations consultants and media experts here
were not helping the lawyers prepare for litigation. It
was the other way around, as the lawyers were being
used principally to put legal trappings on what was
essentially a lobbying and political effort.\667\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\667\ Id. at 41-42.
It should also be noted that Quinn's position is
diametrically opposed to Hugh Rodham's view of his work
lobbying for pardons. Rodham received two large contingency
fees for his work in lobbying for a pardon for Glenn Braswell
and a commutation for Carlos Vignali. Florida bar rules
prohibit lawyers from receiving contingency fees in criminal
matters. When questioned about this matter, Rodham took the
position that his contingency fees were permissible, because
his appearance before the White House was a lobbying matter,
not a criminal matter.
E. The Lobbying Effort
After the initial filing of the pardon petition, the Marc
Rich legal team began a coordinated campaign to lobby the White
House on the Rich and Green pardons. These contacts ranged from
telephone calls from Jack Quinn to Beth Nolan, to personal
appeals made by Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz to the President,
to calls from other lawyers to staff they knew at the White
House. The apparent goal of this campaign was to raise the Rich
pardon as frequently as possible and keep it as prominent as
possible in the White House, without letting anyone outside of
the White House know of the effort.
1. Quinn's Contacts with Bruce Lindsey in Belfast
Immediately after submitting the pardon application, Jack
Quinn began to personally lobby the White House on behalf of
Marc Rich. On December 13, 2000, Jack Quinn traveled to
Belfast, Northern Ireland, with President Clinton's delegation
for the peace talks. During this trip, Quinn took the
opportunity to raise the Marc Rich pardon with Bruce Lindsey,
who was also on the trip. But the first reaction by the Deputy
White House Counsel was not positive: ``Mr. Quinn asked me if I
had gotten his packet of material on Mr. Rich and Mr. Green. I
told him I had. He asked me what I thought. I told him I
thought they were fugitives.'' \668\ Apparently, Quinn disputed
Lindsey's assertion, but it is not clear what else they
discussed about the Rich matter during the Belfast trip.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\668\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 323
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel to
the President, the White House).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When Quinn returned to the United States, he sent a brief
letter to Lindsey to try to address Lindsey's concerns. In his
letter, Quinn summarized some of the same arguments made in the
pardon petition:
You expressed a concern that they [Rich and Green] are
fugitives; and I told you they are not. Here is why:
Rich and Green were in fact residing in Switzerland
when they were indicted in September 1983. They
(understandably in my mind) chose not to return to the
US for a trial in light of all that had happened to
them; particularly the enormous and overwhelmingly
adverse and prejudicial publicity generated, I am sure,
by then U.S. Attorney Giuliani. Their failure to return
to New York was not a crime and no one has ever accused
them of a crime for failing to come to the US for a
trial. . . . Our review of the law in the area (18 USC
1073) similarly confirms to us that their conduct is
not proscribed by federal law.\669\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\669\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to
Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel to the President, the White House
(Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 151).
Quinn's claims were absurd, and it appears that the White
House staff recognized that they were absurd. As described
further below, Rich and Green were fugitives, both in the
practical and the legal sense. Practically, they fled the
country when they believed that their indictment was imminent,
and never returned, because they knew they would be arrested.
The federal government considered them fugitives, listing Rich
as one of its ten most wanted international fugitives,
attempting to extradite Rich and Green, and mounting
complicated operations to apprehend them abroad. In the legal
sense, Rich and Green clearly violated the federal statute
outlawing fugitivity, which prohibits ``travel[ing] in . . .
foreign commerce with intent . . . to avoid prosecution.''
\670\ The fact that Rich and Green were never charged with
violating this statute has more to do with the fact that they
were already facing dozens of felony counts, rather than any
lack of evidence. It appears that Quinn's facile arguments had
little impact on Lindsey as he, and every other lawyer at the
White House who considered the Marc Rich matter, continued to
believe that Rich was a fugitive.\671\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\670\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1073 (2000). This section states:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GWhoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign
commerce with intent either (1) to avoid prosecution, or
custody or confinement after conviction, under the laws of
the place from which he flees, for a crime, or an attempt
to commit a crime, punishable by death or which is a felony
under the laws of the place from which the fugitive flees,
or (2) to avoid giving testimony in any criminal
proceedings in such place in which the commission of an
offense punishable by death or which is a felony under the
laws of such place, is charged, or (3) to avoid service of,
or contempt proceedings for alleged disobedience of, lawful
process requiring attendance and the giving of testimony or
the production of documentary evidence before an agency of
a State empowered by the law of such State to conduct
investigations of alleged criminal activities, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both. For the purposes of clause (3) of this
paragraph, the term ``State'' includes a State of the
United States, the District of Columbia, and any
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United
States. Violations of this section may be prosecuted only
in the Federal judicial district in which the original
crime was alleged to have been committed, or in which the
person was held in custody or confinement, or in which an
avoidance of service of process or a contempt referred to
in clause (3) of the first paragraph of this section is
alleged to have been committed, and only upon formal
approval in writing by the Attorney General, the Deputy
Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, or an
Assistant Attorney General of the United States, which
function of approving prosecutions may not be delegated.
(Emphases added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\671\ Moreover, it appears that Quinn's own associates believed
that Rich was a fugitive. Shortly after the pardon was granted, Jeff
Connaughton, one of Quinn's partners, sent him an e-mail explaining
that Quinn had to make the case that ``President Clinton was right to
pardon Rich despite the fact that he's a fugitive.'' Jack Quinn
Document Production JQ 03088 (E-mail from Jeff Connaughton, Quinn
Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 27, 2001)) (Exhibit 152).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More important, should there have been any doubt about the
matter, Quinn had Denise Rich to tell him what really happened.
As she succinctly explained to the American people on April 27,
2001:
Question. How did you find out [about the indictment]
and what was your reaction?
Denise Rich. All I really knew was that he spoke to me
and he said that ``I'm having tax problems with the
government. And--and I think that we are going to have
to leave.'' And my response was, ``I am his wife. These
are my children. I'm not going to split up the
family.'' And, so, I did what I think any wife would
do. I left the country.\672\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\672\ 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001).
There can be no clearer ``cause and effect'' explanation of
what happened than this, and it is hard to argue that Denise
Rich failed to understand, at the time, why she and her
children fled from the United States. In short, Quinn's after-
the-fact rationalization is nothing more than pure dishonesty.
2. Peter Kadzik's Lobbying Contacts with John Podesta
Peter Kadzik is a partner at the law firm Dickstein Shapiro
Morin & Oshinsky LLP, the same firm as long-time Rich lawyers
Michael Green and I. Lewis Libby. Kadzik was recruited into
Marc Rich's lobbying campaign because he was a long-time friend
of White House Chief of Staff John Podesta, dating back to law
school. Kadzik had also represented Podesta in connection with
Congressional and independent counsel investigations.\673\ Over
the course of his lobbying efforts for Marc Rich, Peter Kadzik
had seven contacts with either Podesta or administrative staff
at the White House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\673\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 445-46
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro
Morin & Oshinsky).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 12, 2000, Peter Kadzik had his first telephone
conversation with John Podesta relating to the Marc Rich pardon
application.\674\ In his opening testimony before the
Committee, Podesta explained his initial contact with Kadzik:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\674\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production
DSM0059-0069 (Billing records from Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky
to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143).
My first recollection of this matter is that some time
in mid-December 2000 I returned a call from Mr. Peter
Kadzik who has been a friend of mine since we attended
law school together in the mid-1970's. I remember that
Mr. Kadzik told me that his firm represented Mr. Rich
and Mr. Green in connection with a criminal case and
that Jack Quinn was seeking a Presidential pardon from
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
them.
At that point, I was unfamiliar with the Rich/Green
case. Mr. Kadzik asked me who would be reviewing pardon
matters at the White House. I recalled that I told him
that the White House Counsel's office was reviewing
pardon applications.\675\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\675\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 316
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the
President, the White House).
A few days after this initial contact, on December 15,
2000, Kadzik sent Podesta a copy of Jack Quinn's cover letter
to the pardon application, which provided a summary of Marc
Rich's case.\676\ Podesta testified that he forwarded this on
to the White House Counsel's Office.\677\ Kadzik next contacted
Podesta on January 2, 2001.\678\ According to Podesta, Kadzik
``asked, in light of the pardons that Mr. Clinton had issued
around Christmas, whether any more pardons were likely to be
considered.'' \679\ Podesta told Kadzik that President Clinton
``was considering additional pardons and commutations, but it
was unlikely that one would be granted under the circumstances
he had briefly described unless the counsel's office, having
reviewed the case on the merits, believed that some real
injustice had been done.'' \680\ Apparently, Kadzik also
informed his partner Michael Green that the Rich case was
pending, and would be considered within the next week, but that
they needed a supporter in the Counsel's Office. As Fink
explained to Jack Quinn:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\676\ Id. See also Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document
Production DSM0005 (Letter from Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein
Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky, to John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the
President, the White House (Dec. 15, 2000)) (Exhibit 153).
\677\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 316
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the
President, the White House).
\678\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production
DSM0059-0069 (Billing records from Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky
to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143).
\679\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 316
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the
President, the White House).
\680\ Id.
Mike spoke with his partner [Kadzik] today who spoke to
Podesta who said, in effect, that we are still in the
running but we are fourth and long. It seems that there
are many requests and only the ones being pushed by
Beth or Bruce are being followed, so we have to get one
of them strongly behind this. They have to become
advocates.\681\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\681\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production
DSM0370 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn and Michael Green,
Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit
154).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fink sent a similar message to Avner Azulay:
I learned from Mike Green today that our case is still
pending and is part of a large group that may be
considered at the end of the week. But his friend
[Kadzik] told him that we need a rabbi among the people
in the counsel's office (it seems that Mike's friend
[Kadzik] believes we do not have one yet), so I have
written Jack to ask him to follow up with the two
people there (Beth and Bruce), both of whom received
our papers, both of whom he knows well and both of whom
he has already discussed this matter [sic].\682\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\682\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00108 (E-mail from
Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 3, 2001))
(Exhibit 155). Fink's use of the term ``rabbi'' caused some confusion
for Azulay, who responded ``I don't understand the comment about the
rabbi. Our book is full of rabbis. Could you get more specific?'' Id.
Fink then responded, ``Yes, by rabbi I meant someone inside who is in
favor of the pardon and working for it to be granted. Sorry about the
lack of clarity, it is just common usage here.'' Id.
On January 6, 2001, Kadzik met with Podesta in the White
House.\683\ At this meeting, Podesta conveyed the collective
view of the White House Counsel's Office on the potential
pardon of Marc Rich and Pincus Green:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\683\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the
President, the White House). See also Dickstein Shapiro Morin &
Oshinsky Document Production DSM0059-0069 (Billing records of Dickstein
Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13,
2001)) (Exhibit 143).
I told him that I, along with the entire White House
staff counsel, opposed it and that I did not think it
would be granted. At that point, I believed that the
pardons would not be granted in light of the uniform
staff recommendation to the contrary and that little
more needed to be done on the matter.\684\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\684\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the
President, the White House).
Notwithstanding Podesta's negative views, and the discouraging
news on the White House's consideration of the Rich pardon,
Kadzik placed one more call to Podesta on January 16,
2001.\685\ According to Podesta, Kadzik told him that ``he had
been informed that the President had reviewed the submissions
Mr. Quinn had sent in and was impressed with them and was once
again considering the pardon.'' \686\ Podesta told Kadzik that
he still opposed the pardon and did not believe it would be
granted.\687\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\685\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production
DSM0059-0069 (Billing records from Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky
to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143).
\686\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the
President, the White House).
\687\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Taking John Podesta's testimony at face value, it does not
appear that the Rich team's Kadzik approach was successful.
Podesta, like Bruce Lindsey and the other key staff, appears to
have been steadfastly against the pardon. However, as is
discussed in more detail below, notwithstanding their strong
opposition, White House staff did not give their best efforts
to dissuade President Clinton from granting the Rich and Green
pardons.
3. Further Contacts Between Jack Quinn and White House
Staff
After Peter Kadzik spoke to John Podesta, and learned that
Rich needed a ``rabbi'' among the White House staff to press
the case for a pardon, Robert Fink decided that they needed to
press their case as strongly as possible at both the staff
level and with the President.\688\ Fink then apparently asked
Jack Quinn to make another call to the White House.\689\ Quinn
agreed to make the call,\690\ and spoke to Beth Nolan on
January 3, 2001.\691\ He reported back to Fink, Marc Rich,
Avner Azulay, and Behan later on January 3:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\688\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00106-07 (E-mail from
Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 3, 2001))
(Exhibit 156).
\689\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00108 (E-mail from
Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 3, 2001))
(Exhibit 155).
\690\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00109 (E-mail from
Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Jan. 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 157).
\691\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0864 (E-mail from Jack
Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 3, 2001))
(Exhibit 158).
I just got off the phone with Beth Nolan, the White
House Counsel. She told me that her office will do the
next ``reassessment'' of our and other applications on
Friday [January 5]. I impressed upon her that our case
is ``sui generis'' only in that M[arc] R[ich] was
indicted but did not stand trial and then elaborated at
some length on the circumstances of MR's decision not
to return--the facts that Rudy was new, was trying to
make a reputation, overcharged in the most gross way
(and in ways that would not stand today--RICO, mail/
wire fraud, etc.) and that MR, seeing the mountain of
adverse publicity generated by the US Atty's ofc and
the disproportionate charges, made the choice anyone
would make, i.e., not to return. She responded that
this is still a tough case--that the perception will
nevertheless be that MR is in some ``sense'' a
fugitive. I explained why he is not. I told her that I
want an opportunity to know, before a final decision,
if there are things we have not said or done that
should be said or done. She promised me that
opportunity. I asked if she would see us to review the
matter in person and she said she would if there was
reason to think, after her reassessment, that that
would be fruitful. I told her, finallt [sic], that I
intend to have one more conversation with POTUS before
this is finalized in order to make the case to him,
focusing in particular on his appreciation of what an
overly-zealous prosecutor can do to make a fair trial,
in court or in the court of public opinion, impossible.
Lastly, I told her that, if they pardon J[onathan]
P[ollard], then pardoning MR is easy, but that, if they
do not pardon JP, then they should pardon MR. In the
last connection, she affirmed that they have heard from
people in or connected to the G[overnment] O[f]
I[srael].\692\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\692\ Id.
After this call, Jack Quinn also tried to bring another
former White House staffer into the Marc Rich pardon effort.
Cheryl Mills was the former Deputy Counsel to the President,
and was now an executive at Oxygen Media in New York. However,
Mills was still influential in the Clinton White House, and
Quinn brought his arguments to her. At some point before
January 5, 2001, Quinn apparently called Mills and discussed
the Rich pardon with her. Then, on January 5, 2001, Mills was
in the White House for a party for former White House
Counsels.\693\ On January 5, Quinn sent a new letter to the
President outlining his key arguments on the Rich pardon.\694\
He sent copies of this letter to Beth Nolan, Bruce Lindsey, and
Mills.\695\ Quinn explained that he sent the material to Mills
because she was:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\693\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 19, 2001).
\694\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to
President William J. Clinton (Jan. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 159).
\695\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00153 (E-mail from
April Moore, Secretary to Jack Quinn, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to
Robert Fink and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Jan. 5,
2001)) (Exhibit 160).
A person who, after some 7 years at the White House,
was enormously well regarded and trusted, well might at
some point be consulted on this. I had raised with her
the fact that I was pursuing the pardon as I did with
others from time to time to just bounce ideas off. But
also I was hopeful, knowing of her relationship with
Ms. Nolan and Mr. Lindsey and the President, that as
any good lawyer would, that as this thing progressed,
if it were progressing, that I would get some sense of
how people were reacting to different arguments in
order that I might be in a position to know better what
concerns the folks advising the President might have so
that I might address those concerns.\696\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\696\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 331
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
Then, at the party for former White House Counsels later that
day, where the former counsels, including Abner Mikva, Lloyd
Cutler, and Bernard Nussbaum were filming a video for President
Clinton, Quinn raised the Rich pardon with Nolan again. At that
time, Mills told Quinn to ``stop pestering'' Nolan about the
Rich pardon.\697\ While Mills had received information about
the pardon from Quinn, she was not familiar enough with the
issue to discuss the merits with Quinn.\698\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\697\ Id. at 333.
\698\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 19, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Quinn apparently did not make much progress with
Mills at the January 5 party, he did lay important groundwork
for the last day of the Clinton Administration, when Cheryl
Mills would be the most supportive voice for the Rich pardon
among White House staff.
4. Initial Discussions Between the White House and Justice
Department
When he met with Eric Holder on November 21, 2000, Jack
Quinn had told Holder that he was going to urge the White House
to contact him about the Rich pardon. At the time, Holder had
indicated that he looked forward to contact from the White
House. True to his word, Quinn did suggest that the White House
contact Holder. Quinn recognized that what Holder said to the
White House would be crucial to whether or not Rich received a
pardon. In an e-mail on Christmas 2000, Quinn told his
colleagues that ``[t]he greatest danger lies with the lawyers.
I have worked them hard and I am hopeful that E. Holder will be
helpful to us. But we can expect some outreach to NY.'' \699\
Apparently, Quinn underestimated just how helpful Holder would
be, keeping the Rich pardon completely to himself, and keeping
his prosecutors in New York from even knowing about the effort
to pardon Rich, much less asking for their opinion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\699\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0844 (E-mail from Jack
Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Dec. 25,
2000)) (Exhibit 36).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the first week of January, Beth Nolan met with
Holder, and asked for his opinion regarding a number of
clemency matters. During this conversation, Nolan brought up
Marc Rich's name. Holder told Nolan that he was neutral.\700\
Later, at the Committee's February 8 hearing, Holder explained
that when he used the term ``neutral,'' he was trying to convey
that he ``didn't have the basis to form an opinion.'' \701\
However, it is unclear why, if he was trying to tell Nolan that
he did not know enough about the Rich case to have an opinion,
Holder simply did not say that. In addition, it is strange that
Holder would start out with a position of ``neutral'' on the
Rich case, knowing what he did, namely, that Rich was a
fugitive from justice, that his had been one of the largest tax
cases in history, and that the prosecutors in New York would
not even meet with his lawyers. However, late on January 19,
2001, Holder would revise his opinion of the Rich pardon from
``neutral'' to ``neutral, leaning towards favorable,'' on the
basis of a third-hand account of Prime Minister Barak's call to
President Clinton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\700\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 205
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice). See also id. at 354 (Mar. 1, 2001)
(testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White
House).
\701\ Id. at 205 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former
Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holder's default position of neutrality on the Marc Rich
case is especially peculiar in light of express Justice
Department policy regarding grants of clemency to fugitives. In
the case of Fernando Fuentes Coba, Pardon Attorney Roger Adams
rejected Fuentes' petition for clemency because Fuentes was a
fugitive from the United States. Adams stated that:
Mr. [Fuentes] Coba is ineligible to apply for a
presidential pardon. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Sec. 1.2 . .
. ``[n]o petition for pardon should be filed until the
expiration of a waiting period of at least five years
after the date of the release of the petitioner from
confinement . . . .'' Because Mr. Coba has served none
of his prison sentence, he fails to meet this most
basic eligibility requirement for pardon consideration.
Moreover, the Department of Justice has consistently
declined to accept pardon petitions from individuals,
such as Mr. Coba, who are fugitives, since the pardon
process assumes the Government's ability to implement
either of the President's possible decisions regarding
a petition--that is, a denial of clemency as well as a
grant of clemency. Put another way, it is not
reasonable to allow a person to ask that the President
grant him a pardon which, if granted, would have the
effect of eliminating the term of imprisonment to which
he has been sentenced, while at the same time
insulating himself from having to serve the sentence if
the pardon is denied.\702\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\702\ Vivian Mannerud Document Production (Letter from Roger Adams,
Pardon Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, to Lonnie Anne Pera,
Counsel to Vivian Mannerud, Zuckert Scoutt & Rasenberger (Nov. 7,
2000)) (Exhibit 161).
The same principles should have applied to the Marc Rich
pardon. The fact that Eric Holder disregarded this policy, as
well as every other warning sign about the Rich case, raises
further questions about his motivations in the Rich case.
5. January 8, 2001, Call Between President Clinton and Ehud
Barak
The second week in January started with another call from
Prime Minister Barak on the Rich pardon. Towards the end of the
eighteen-minute call on January 8, 2001, Barak mentioned the
Marc Rich pardon for a second time. It appears that this second
conversation was prompted by a meeting between Marc Rich and
Prime Minister Barak. A January 12, 2001, e-mail from Avner
Azulay to Jack Quinn, Marc Rich, Robert Fink, and Kathleen
Behan included the subject line ``telecons to potus.'' \703\ As
Azulay wrote, ``Following mr's mtg with the pm--the latter
called potus this week. Potus said he is very much aware of the
case, ``that he is looking into it and that he saw 2 fat books
which were prepared by these people.'' Potus sounded positive
but maede [sic] no concrete promise.'' \704\ Azulay's summary
closely tracks the discussion between the President and the
Prime Minister as recorded by the National Security Council
staff:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\703\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00166 (E-mail from
Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 12,
2001)) (Exhibit 162).
\704\ Id.
Prime Minister Barak. Let me tell you last but not
least two names I want to mention. [Redacted] The
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
second is Mark [sic], the Jewish American.
President Clinton. I know quite a few things about
that. I just got a long memo and am working on it. It's
best that we not say much about that.
Prime Minister Barak. Okay. I understand. I'm not
mentioning it in any place.
President Clinton. I understand.
Prime Minister Barak. I believe it could be important
[gap] not just financially, but he helped Mossad on
more than one case.
President Clinton. It is a bizarre case, and I am
working on it.
Prime Minister Barak. Okay. I really appreciate
it.\705\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\705\ Verbatim notes of transcript of telephone conversation
between President William J. Clinton and Ehud Barak, Prime Minister,
Israel (Jan. 8, 2001) (Exhibit 148).
Two facts about this telephone conversation stand out.
First, it appears that President Clinton told Prime Minister
Barak to ``not say much'' about the Rich matter. It is
difficult to know exactly what the President meant by this
comment, but one interpretation is that President Clinton did
not want to discuss the Rich matter with Barak when there were
a number of staff on the line taking notes about the
conversation. Perhaps most important, if he was leaning towards
pardoning Rich, he probably understood that if this became
known, the public outcry would have made the pardon politically
untenable. Indeed, it is difficult to think of any other reason
why President Clinton would tell Prime Minister Barak to ``not
say much'' about Rich.
Another critical element of the telephone call is Barak's
statement that ``I believe it could be important [gap] not just
financially, but he helped Mossad on more than one case.'' Read
literally, Barak's statement suggests that the Rich pardon had
future financial implications for Barak, and perhaps President
Clinton as well. It is also possible, though, that Prime
Minister Barak was referring to Rich's past financial
assistance to Israel. While the Committee does not have enough
information to confirm that Barak or Clinton took action on
behalf of Rich in exchange for future payment, Barak's comments
raise this possibility.
6. ``The HRC Option''
The Marc Rich legal team used a number of approaches to
influence President Clinton and his staff. One approach that
was considered was for then-First Lady Hillary Clinton to
become involved. There is now, however, a uniform denial that
she ever participated in the Marc Rich pardon process.
Beginning in late December, the lawyers representing Rich
had a number of discussions in which they debated the merit of
asking Hillary Clinton for help with the Rich pardon.
Apparently the first discussions regarding Mrs. Clinton started
around December 26, 2000, when Robert Fink sent the following
e-mail to Quinn, with copies to Marc Rich, Kitty Behan, and
Avner Azulay: ``Kitty and I think the best person to call
Hilary [sic] (if it makes sense to call her at all) may well be
Denise. She is in Aspen; let me know if you need the number.''
\706\ Later that day, Fink e-mailed the same group again:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\706\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00072
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit
163).
Of all the options we discussed, the only one that
seems to have real potential for making a difference is
the HRC option and even that has peril if not handled
correctly. I assume, and am emphasizing that this is an
assumption, that we want Avner to speak to Abe [Foxman]
about the support this will get in NY to see if Abe
could make the necessary representation to HRC.\707\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\707\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00075
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit
164).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following day, December 27, 2000, Avner Azulay weighed in:
I have been advised that HRC shall feel more at ease if
she is joined by her elder senator of NY who also
represents the jewish [sic] population. The private
request from DR shall not be sufficient. It seems that
this shall be a prerequisite from her formal position
[sic].\708\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\708\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00080
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et
al. (Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 165).
Robert Fink passed this recommendation on to Gershon Kekst, who
had been advising the Rich team with media relations. Kekst
seemed to be taken with the idea, and recommended asking
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Schumer's campaign contributors to ``lean'' on him:
Good point. Can [Q]uinn tell us who is close enough to
lean on [S]chumer?? I am certainly willing to call him,
but have no real clout. Jack might be able to tell us
quickly who the top contributors are . . . . . . maybe
Bernard Schwartz?? \709\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\709\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00083
(E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink
(Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 135).
Jack Quinn apparently signed onto the concept of involving
the First Lady in the Rich pardon effort. On December 28, 2000,
Robert Fink apparently contacted Quinn about the proposal, and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
sent the following confirming e-mail to Quinn:
I understand I am to call DR and ask her to call HRC,
but I wanted to talk to you first to make sure that
makes sense and to determine what you thought DR should
be saying, not just what she should be asking.\710\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\710\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00401
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn (Dec. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 166).
It appears that Robert Fink discussed the ``HRC option'' with
Denise Rich, and that Denise Rich did not react well to the
idea. He sent the following e-mail to Azulay and Marc Rich on
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 28, describing his conversation with Denise Rich:
I spoke to DR who was adamantly against the proposal.
She is convinced it would be viewed badly by the
recipient. Nothing good will come of the overture even
with a good word from anyone in NY. She said she is
convinced of this and so is her friend who has advised
DR not to discuss it in front of HRC. I spoke to MR
both before the call and in the middle of this email
and he now agrees we should do nothing on this
topic.\711\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\711\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00087
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation,
and Marc Rich (Dec. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 167).
From this e-mail, it appears that the proposal to lobby
Hillary Clinton was presented to Denise Rich, who in turn
discussed it with Beth Dozoretz. Dozoretz advised Rich not to
lobby Hillary Clinton on the pardon, and Denise Rich rejected
the plan. In turn, Marc Rich decided not to press the matter
any further. However, Jack Quinn and Robert Fink still saw
merit in the ``HRC option,'' and continued to pursue it. Quinn
told Fink that he thought ``the friend [Dozoretz] is naive to
think this will not be discussed in front of her [Hillary
Clinton].'' \712\ Fink replied that ``I cannot help but think
they are right. She has something to lose and little to gain
and may not want anything which will affect her new position.''
\713\ Quinn also stated, ``I continue to think it most likely
HRC would be at least informed before anything positive
happens, given the possibility of a Giuliani/NY press
reaction.'' \714\ Fink then replied to Quinn's suggestion: ``I
will call Avner to see what he thinks. . . . DR was very sure
speaking to HRC was a mistake and told me that Beth worned
[sic] her not to raise the issue while HRC was in ear shot.
Still want to contact HRC?'' \715\ Quinn replied:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\712\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W
00097-98 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Dec. 28, 2000))
(Exhibit 36).
\713\ Id.
\714\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00089
(E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Dec. 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 168).
\715\ Id.
[I]t's a tough call, no doubt. [I] just think HE will
know the calculation you mention and therefore she will
become aware it is pending. If this is right, do we
want her to hear about it first in that way or from
someone (assuming we have someone) who can put it to
her in the context we need? \716\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\716\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W
00097-98 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Dec. 31, 2000))
(Exhibit 36).
By January 2, 2001, Fink was apparently convinced, and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
suggested to Quinn that he call Hillary Clinton:
Frankly, I think you are the best person at this point.
You signed the petition and the letter and know the
case better than anyone else who could call. DR is out
and probably could only make a personal appeal. You
know of Abe Foxman and of the Israeli connection and of
all the giving and the Brooklyn connection (Pinky). So
my vote is that you call her.\717\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\717\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00102
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit
169).
But, it appears that by later on January 2 and on January 3,
Marc Rich and Avner Azulay had decided against an approach to
Hillary Clinton. First, around January 2, Marc Rich apparently
spoke to Denise Rich. Azulay reported that ``her impression--
from Beth is that HRC shall try to be protective of her husband
and stay out of potential trouble.'' The following day, January
3, Azulay e-mailed Quinn, Fink, Behan and Rich, and stated
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that:
Looking from the sideline and hearing all this--I would
like to forward the idea that perhaps we should just
leave HRC alone. By initiating a call to her we are
``saying in a way that there is a problem here . . .'',
and in the process we might create a problem out of
speculations on her reaction. I don't think we have any
positive knowledge that she is for or against, only
assumptions. Potus should deal with this himself--and
if it does then intervene with all the arguments
etc.\718\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\718\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00109
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et
al. (Jan 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 157).
Apparently, Azulay's suggestion settled the matter, as
there was no more discussion of the ``HRC option.'' At the
Committee's February 8 hearing, Jack Quinn testified that ``I'm
confident that I never communicated with the First Lady about
this, and I don't believe that anyone else did.'' \719\ In
addition, the Committee has received no documents suggesting
that the First Lady was actually contacted by anyone connected
to Marc Rich or that the First Lady offered any opinion on the
Marc Rich pardon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\719\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 257
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. The Final Days of the Marc Rich Lobbying Effort
1. Communications Between Peter Kadzik and John Podesta
As the end of the Clinton presidency approached, the Marc
Rich legal team increased the intensity of its lobbying
efforts. Peter Kadzik called the White House four out of the
final five days of the Administration to see what progress had
been made on the Rich pardon. On January 16, 2001, he spoke to
his friend and sometime client, White House Chief of Staff John
Podesta. Kadzik asked Podesta what the status of the Rich
pardon was, and what recommendation the White House staff would
make. After a conversation with Podesta, Kadzik relayed the
results of that conversation to his partner at Dickstein
Shapiro, Michael Green. The two calls took Kadzik a total of
thirty minutes.\720\ According to an e-mail sent by Robert Fink
to the rest of the Rich legal team:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\720\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production
DSM0064 (Billing records of Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to
Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143).
[Kadzik partner] Mike Green called after speaking with
Peter [Kadzik] who spoke with Podesta: it seems that
while the staff are not supportive they are not in a
veto mode, and that your efforts with POTUS are being
felt. It sounds like you are making headway and should
keep at it as long as you can. We are definitely still
in the game.\721\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\721\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00169
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 16, 2001)) (Exhibit
170).
The e-mail message indicates that Podesta informed Kadzik that
he and the other key White House staff did not support the Rich
pardon, but at the same time, appeared to give Kadzik some
encouragement, indicating that the President still might decide
to grant the Rich pardon. However, when questioned about these
discussions at the Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing, both
Podesta and Kadzik disowned the contents of the e-mail message.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Podesta described the conversation with Kadzik as follows:
He told me he had been informed that the President had
reviewed the submissions Mr. Quinn had sent in and was
impressed with them and was once again considering the
pardon. I told him I was strongly opposed to the
pardons and that I did not believe they would be
granted.\722\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\722\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the
President, the White House).
Kadzik likewise indicated that the e-mail describing his
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conversation with Podesta was inaccurate:
Mr. LaTourette. [T]his e-mail in particular states that
Mike Green spoke with Peter, who I assume is you, who
spoke with Podesta; and that Podesta told Peter that
while the staff are not supportive they are not in the
veto mode.
First of all, did Mr. Podesta communicate that to you
on January 16th?
Mr. Kadzik. No. . . . Again, he told me he was opposed
to it, that the staff was opposed to it, but no final
decision had been made and again the decision was the
President's.\723\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\723\ Id. at 464-66 (testimony of Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein
Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky).
It is difficult to square the recollections of John Podesta
and Peter Kadzik with the contents of the Robert Fink e-mail
message. The e-mail message is consistent with the portrait of
the White House painted by a number of other contemporaneous e-
mail messages--namely that the White House staff opposed the
Rich pardon, but was not fully engaged on the issue, and that
the President was open to it. This is the message that the Marc
Rich legal team was getting from its contacts with the White
House, despite the after-the-fact characterizations from
Podesta and Kadzik.
2. The January 16, 2001, White House Meeting Regarding Rich
White House staff had a number of contacts with Jack Quinn
and other lawyers representing Marc Rich regarding the Rich
pardon in December 2000 and January 2001. Similarly, the
President had contacts with individuals advocating on Rich's
behalf during those two months. However, the first time that
the President sat down with his staff to discuss the Rich
pardon was January 16, 2001, just four days before the end of
his Administration. The purpose of the January 16 meeting was
for the President to discuss other clemency matters with White
House staff. According to John Podesta, who was present at the
meeting, President Clinton then initiated discussion of Marc
Rich:
[T]he President brought up the Rich case and told us
that he thought Mr. Quinn had made some meritorious
points in his submission. He clearly had digested the
legal arguments presented by Mr. Quinn since he made a
point of noting the Justice Department had abandoned
the legal theory underlying the RICO count and
mentioned the Ginsburg/Wolfman tax analyses. The staff
informed the President that it was our view that the
pardon should not be granted.\724\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\724\ Id. at 317 (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff
to the President, the White House).
Podesta interpreted the President's reaction to the views of
the White House staff as meaning that ``he accepted our
judgment and I didn't think this was a particularly active
matter.'' \725\ Beth Nolan, who also attended the January 16
meeting, also remembered a fairly brief discussion:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\725\ Id. at 325.
I don't recall that it was an extensive discussion.
However, we were going through a number of pardon
applications, and my memory is that it was a fairly
brief discussion in which he heard from all of us our
opposition. I didn't think it was going anywhere. . . .
I did not believe that the pardon was going anywhere.
He was familiar with it. He was sympathetic with it.
And he was familiar with the issues, but I did not have
the sense . . . at that meeting or until the 19th that
he really was inclined to grant the pardon.\726\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\726\ Id. at 324-25 (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the
President, the White House).
While Beth Nolan interpreted the President's comments as
meaning that the Rich pardon was not ``going anywhere,'' Bruce
Lindsey did not reach the same conclusion, informing the
Committee, ``I clearly left the meeting understanding that no
decision had been made. I don't know if I knew what was in his
mind.'' \727\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\727\ Id. at 325 (testimony of Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel
to the President, the White House).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The account of the January 16, 2001, meeting appears to be
an attempt by senior White House staff to explain why they were
caught so unprepared when the President decided to grant the
Marc Rich pardon three days later. As became clear on that day,
White House staff knew little about the Rich case, and had not
made any attempt to gather the necessary information. The
ignorance of the senior White House staff meant that they were
unable to provide any clear refutation of the arguments made by
the Rich legal team. As explained by Beth Nolan, John Podesta,
and to a lesser extent, Bruce Lindsey, they were caught
unprepared because they simply did not believe that the
President was going forward with the Rich pardon, based on the
opposition that they expressed at the January 16 meeting. This
argument explains why White House staff, while claiming to be
opposed to the Rich pardon, did so little to actually keep it
from being granted.
However, the defense of the White House staff does not seem
to comport fully with reality. While the President listened to
the White House staff as they objected to the Rich pardon, he
apparently did not say anything to indicate that he actually
agreed with White House staff. Rather, he clearly expressed
that he was sympathetic to the Rich pardon. If the White House
staff were serious about opposing the Rich pardon, they would
have done more than simply express their opposition to the
pardon. They would have taken the time period between January
16 and January 20 to gather information about the Rich case,
and present it to the President as reasons why he should not
grant the pardon. Unfortunately, White House staff never took
any such steps.
3. The Justice Department Receives Jack Quinn's January 10
Letter
On January 17, 2001, the letter that Jack Quinn sent to
Eric Holder on January 10, 2001, finally arrived at the Justice
Department. Quinn had intended to have the letter delivered to
Holder by messenger, but due to a secretarial error, the letter
was sent to 901 E Street, in Washington, rather than the main
Justice Department headquarters building, where Holder
maintained his office.\728\ The January 10 letter from Quinn to
Holder represented the only documentary information the Justice
Department ever received regarding the Rich pardon. The cover
letter from Quinn to Holder stated ``I hope you can say you
agree with this letter. Your saying positive things, I'm told,
would make this happen.'' Attached to the letter was a copy of
Quinn's January 5 letter to President Clinton, which summarized
the arguments made by Quinn in the Rich pardon petition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\728\ The Justice Department's Civil Division maintained offices at
901 E Street. While it is not clear why Quinn sent the letter to 901 E
Street, the most obvious explanation is that Quinn's secretary had sent
materials to the Justice Department Civil Division offices at 901 E
Street in the past, and mistakenly assumed that Deputy Attorney General
Holder had an office at 901 E Street as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Between January 10 and January 17, this letter made its way
from the Justice Department offices at 901 E Street to the
Justice Department Executive Secretariat, which is in charge of
managing the paper flow at Justice Department headquarters.
Despite the fact that the letter was addressed to the Deputy
Attorney General, because it obviously related to pardon
matters, the letter was directed to Roger Adams, the Pardon
Attorney. The Office of Pardon Attorney received the letter
during the afternoon of January 18, and Adams saw it in his
inbox on the morning of Friday, January 19.\729\ Adams drafted
a short response to the Quinn letter, stating that neither Marc
Rich nor Pincus Green had filed a pardon petition with the
Justice Department, and advising Quinn that petition forms were
available upon request from his office. Adams decided not to
send the letter out, and instead hold it until the following
Monday. Adams explained that he did not send the letter out
because he recognized Jack Quinn's name, and knew that Quinn
had substantial influence as a former White House Counsel, and
acknowledged that he could not be certain of what was going on
at the White House. Rather than send out what amounted to a
rejection letter for a person who might yet receive a pardon
later that day, Adams decided to hold the letter until after
President Clinton left office, when he could be certain that
Rich was not going to receive a pardon. As it turned out,
Adams' fears were realized, and he never did mail the rejection
letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\729\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 24 (Feb. 14, 2001)
(testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Final Lobbying Contacts Leading up to January 19, 2001
As the Clinton Administration entered its final days, the
Rich team increased its efforts. It was well known that the
President was considering granting a large batch of pardons as
one of his final acts as President. In fact, during his final
visit to Arkansas as President on January 17, 2001, the
President acknowledged this, asking reporters, ``You got
anybody you want to pardon? Everybody in America either wants
somebody pardoned or a national monument.'' \730\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\730\ Andrew Goldstein, Countdown to a Pardon, Time, Feb. 26, 2001,
at 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Rich team increased the intensity of its lobbying
campaign in the final days. First, Jack Quinn faxed a memo to
Beth Nolan that purported to provide additional evidence that
Rich had been singled out for prosecution. In a note at the top
of the memo, Quinn wrote: ``This is FYI further to the point
that no one else was prosecuted.'' \731\ In fact, the memo
stands for the opposite point. The memo, which was drafted by a
lawyer on the Rich legal team in 1988, provided a review of
enforcement actions against individuals who had violated energy
regulations. The memo concluded that ``[w]e have uncovered no
case in which a jail sentence has been imposed for a willful
violation of the PAM regulations, the conduct for which M[arc]
R[ich] and P[incus] G[reen] have been indicted.'' \732\
Ironically, this memo, which was intended to provide support
for the Rich case, actually weakens it. A close reading of the
memo indicates that the Rich lawyers located 48 criminal cases
brought for violations of the energy regulations, 14 of which
resulted in jail time.\733\ The Rich legal team distinguished
those cases on the thinnest of technical grounds, since those
convictions were for ``miscertification'' of oil, not a
violation of the permissible markup regulations. However, it is
most likely that the memo had no impact on the White House's
consideration of the Rich pardon, either pro or con, since the
White House staff took little time to read the Rich pardon
petition, much less extraneous information pertaining to the
case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\731\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum from Mark Ehlers
to Scooter Libby (June 10, 1988) (Exhibit 63).
\732\ Id.
\733\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attorney Peter Kadzik called the White House on each of the
last three days of the Clinton Administration, seeking
information about the status of the Rich pardon. On January 18,
January 19, and January 20, Kadzik called staff in John
Podesta's office to see if the President had made any decisions
on pardons. After the calls on the 19th and 20th, he relayed
what he had learned to his partner Michael Green, who was also
working on the Rich pardon.\734\ Kadzik characterized these
calls as ministerial in nature--simply trying to determine
whether any pardons had been granted, and if so, whether a list
of pardons was available--as opposed to his earlier direct
contacts with his client John Podesta.\735\ Nevertheless,
Kadzik billed Marc Rich an hour for his work on January 18,
half an hour for his work on January 19, and half an hour for
his work on January 20.\736\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\734\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production
DSM0065 (Billing records of Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to
Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143).
\735\ See ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 466
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro
Morin & Oshinsky).
\736\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production
DSM0065 (Billing records of Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to
Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143). The
billing entry on January 18 consists of two items, the call to the
White House and a redacted entry. The entries on January 19 and January
20 each consist of two items, calls to the White House and Michael
Green. Based on his descriptions of the calls to the White House, those
calls should not have taken more then 6 minutes each, the minimum
amount of time that could be billed at Dickstein Shapiro. While it is
possible that Kadzik spent 54 minutes on other Marc Rich business on
January 18, and 24 minutes speaking to Michael Green on January 19 and
20, the length of the periods of time billed during these days casts
doubt either on Kadzik's description of the calls to the White House or
the accuracy of his billing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Jack Quinn's January 18, 2001, Letter to the
President
Also on January 18, 2001, Jack Quinn submitted a letter to
the President ``to clarify several points with regard to the
petition'' and to ``propose a solution to any concerns . . .
regarding the setting of an unwise precedent involving
individuals living outside the jurisdiction of our American
country.'' \737\ In this letter, Quinn again attempted to
refute the argument that Rich was a fugitive. To support his
position, Quinn made three arguments, all of them spurious.
First, Quinn claimed that ``much of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green's
professional lives have been spent abroad. . . . Thus, while
they did not return to the United States following the issuance
of the indictment, there is no question that this did not
constitute a significant change in their international living
circumstances.'' \738\ Second, Quinn claimed that Rich and
Green ``violated no laws in not returning to the United States,
and no violation of law with regard to their purported
``fugitivity'' ever has been alleged.'' \739\ Third, Quinn
pointed out that Rich and Green ``have lived not as fugitives,
but their residences and places of business always have been
available to and known to the United States.'' \740\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\737\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to
President William J. Clinton (Jan. 18, 2001)) (Exhibit 171).
\738\ Id.
\739\ Id.
\740\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quinn's first point, that Rich and Green spent a great deal
of time outside of the country prior to their indictment, was
completely irrelevant. It is undisputed that Rich and Green
refused to return after their indictment. Legally and
practically, the fact that Rich and Green had houses in
Switzerland prior to that indictment was meaningless. They fled
to those homes in anticipation of the indictment and to avoid
its consequences. That they managed to escape before rather
than after the indictment is irrelevant.\741\ Quinn's second
assertion, that Rich and Green had not violated the law by
remaining outside of the United States, was completely wrong.
18 U.S.C. Sec. 1073, which outlaws fugitivity, states that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\741\ U.S. v. Lupino, 171 F. Supp 648 (D.C. Minn. 1958).
Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign
commerce with intent . . . to avoid prosecution . . .
under the laws of the place from which he flees, for a
crime, or an attempt to commit a crime . . . which is a
felony under the laws of the place from which the
fugitive flees . . . shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.\742\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\742\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1073.
This statute clearly proscribes the behavior of Marc Rich and
Pincus Green, namely, traveling in foreign commerce to avoid
prosecution for a felony. The fact that Rich and Green were
never charged with violation of this statute has more to do
with the fact that they were already facing numerous felony
charges than any innocence on their part.\743\ Quinn's final
point, rather than dispelling the argument that Rich and Green
were fugitives, only shows the contempt with which they treated
American laws. The fact that Rich and Green both lived in
palatial estates in Switzerland, at addresses known to American
authorities, did not mean that they were not fugitives. Swiss
authorities refused to extradite Rich and Green, and they were
therefore able to live their lives in comfort, rather than in
hiding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\743\ See ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 123
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former
assistant U.S. attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the facile and irrelevant arguments
regarding his clients' status as fugitives, Quinn also made an
offer to President Clinton in the January 18 letter. Quinn
stated that ``[m]y clients have authorized me to make it clear
that they have always sought to negotiate a civil resolution
with the government, and would willingly accept a disposition
that would subject them to civil proceedings with the
Department of Energy (or other appropriate agencies).'' \744\
While this offer might have appeared dramatic to President
Clinton, someone with any understanding of the Rich case would
have recognized that Rich and Green were not offering anything
that they had not offered on any number of previous occasions.
Throughout the Rich investigation, Rich's lawyers had offered
to pay many millions of dollars to settle the case, as long as
Rich was not required to serve jail time. This offer was
repeatedly rejected by prosecutors, who recognized that Rich's
crimes were of such a scale that jail time was amply justified.
In addition, someone with knowledge of the Rich case would have
recognized another serious flaw with Quinn's January 18 offer.
All civil liability for Rich and Green was extinguished with
the guilty pleas of the Rich companies, and that the only
penalties available against Rich in 2001 were criminal.\745\
Thus, Rich's offer--to be subject to civil penalties that could
not be applied against him--was an empty offer. However, this
letter, and the empty offer in it, had an impact at the White
House, as would be demonstrated the following day. It does not
appear that Quinn had any misgivings about what was really at
issue--Rich wanted to buy his way out of his legal predicament,
and if this was not an option, he would not only eschew the
United States, but also work against vital U.S. interests. It
is an interesting commentary on Quinn that he appears to agree
with the thesis that rich people should be able to pay money to
avoid prison.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\744\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to
President William J. Clinton (Jan. 18, 2001)) (Exhibit 171).
\745\ At the Committee's hearing, Mr. Auerbach stated, ``The civil
liabilities in this case were fully extinguished in 1984 when Marc Rich
and Co. A.G. and Marc Rich and Co. International Limited paid $150
million to the U.S. Government. The civil liabilities were corporate
civil liabilities.'' ``The Controversial Pardon of International
Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th
Cong. 108 (Feb. 8, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Bruce Lindsey's Contacts with SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt
In this same time period, Clinton aide Bruce Lindsey made
an apparent effort to gather information to use in opposition
to the Rich pardon. On the morning of January 17 or 18, Lindsey
called Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC.\746\ Lindsey asked
Levitt what he knew about Pinky Green.\747\ Levitt told Lindsey
that he had never heard the name.\748\ Lindsey then told Levitt
that Green was Marc Rich's business partner.\749\ Levitt told
Lindsey that he would find out what he could about the matter.
Levitt consulted with his staff, who informed him that the SEC
had no information about Rich and Green, because theirs had
been an IRS and Commodities and Futures Trading Commission
matter, not an SEC matter.\750\ Levitt then left a message for
Lindsey indicating that he was getting back to him about the
Marc Rich matter. Lindsey called back that afternoon, and
Levitt told Lindsey that the Rich matter was not in the SEC's
jurisdiction. However, Levitt then added that he believed that
pardons of Rich and Green would be a ``real bad idea.'' \751\
Lindsey agreed that Rich and Green were ``fugitives'' who had
``never set foot in the country'' and that this ``is not what
pardons are intended for.'' \752\ Based on his contacts with
Lindsey, Levitt assumed that Lindsey was personally opposed to
the pardons of Rich and Green, and that he was looking for
further justification or reinforcement for his position.\753\
Levitt also assumed that the pardons would not be granted,
given Lindsey's great influence in the White House.\754\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\746\ Telephone Interview with Arthur Levitt (Feb. 20, 2001).
\747\ Id.
\748\ Id.
\749\ Id.
\750\ Id.
\751\ Id.
\752\ Id.
\753\ Id.
\754\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly after the call between Lindsey and Levitt, the Marc
Rich team found out about the call. In the afternoon of January
19, Robert Fink e-mailed Avner Azulay, Mike Green, and Kitty
Behan, and informed them that:
I just spoke to Jack [Quinn]. He has not heard from the
President, but agreed to call him as soon as he gets to
a hard line phone (he was in the car). He said that the
SEC knows of the request and for some reason opposed
it. But not like they opposed Milken. He does not know
how they learned of it. (He found out when the head of
the SEC gave one of his partners a hard time about Marc
yesterday.). We agree that is not good and that maybe
the SDNY knows too, but we have no information on it.
No other pardons have been announced yet, as far as we
know. Bob \755\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\755\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production 00180 (E-
mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al.
(Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 145).
The Fink e-mail again confirms that the Rich team was counting
on secrecy to achieve its objective. Fink's message shows the
concern with which the Rich team reacted any time that any
government agency outside of the White House received word of
the effort to obtain the pardon. When questioned about this
matter at the Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing, Fink stated
that he was concerned not that certain government agencies
would learn of the pardon effort, but that he was concerned
that the press would learn of it, and that the press' reaction
``would not be helpful for a thoughtful review of the pardon
application.'' \756\ However, Fink's assertion is not
plausible. Fink's contemporaneous e-mail specifically
identifies the prosecutors in the Southern District of New
York, not the public or the press, as a subject of concern.
Fink's e-mail, along with other evidence, shows that Rich's
lawyers were trying to keep the pardon effort from the
prosecutors in New York, the people who knew the most about the
Rich case and could do the most to thwart the pardon effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\756\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 509
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lindsey's interaction with Arthur Levitt on the Rich and
Green pardons represents the only time that White House staff
reached out to anyone other than Rich's lawyers and Eric Holder
to gather information about the Rich case. It was a half-
hearted effort, as the SEC was not involved in the Rich case,
and had no information to offer. Lindsey's effort at outreach
therefore demonstrated two important facts. First, it shows
that Lindsey had little understanding of the Rich case, as he
did not even know where to turn to get information about Rich.
If Lindsey had turned to the Southern District of New York,
rather than the SEC, he would have obtained voluminous
information that refuted Quinn's arguments. Second, the Lindsey
effort shows that there was a genuine rift between President
Clinton and his closest advisor on this issue--to the extent
that Lindsey even felt the need to gather outside information
to bolster his case.
G. January 19-20, 2001
The final full day of the Clinton Presidency was obviously
a busy one. Early in the day, President Clinton reached an
agreement with the Office of Independent Counsel whereby the
President admitted that ``I acknowledge having knowingly
violated Judge Wright's discovery orders in my deposition in
[the Jones] case. I tried to walk a line between acting
lawfully and testifying falsely but I now recognize that I did
not fully accomplish this goal and that certain of my responses
to questions about Ms. Lewinsky were false.'' \757\ After
making these admissions, which the President reportedly
considered difficult to make, the President began final
consideration of a number of grants of clemency.\758\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\757\ Neil A. Lewis, Transition in Washington: The President;
Exiting Job, Clinton Accepts Immunity Deal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 2001,
at A1.
\758\ Many, including Representative Waxman, have speculated that
President Clinton was especially sensitive to ``overzealous
prosecutors'' after making these admissions regarding his testimony in
the Jones case. ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive
Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 341
(Mar. 1, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Henry Waxman). It is very
possible that the President was motivated to issue a number of
controversial grants of clemency in Independent Counsel cases as a
result of his feelings about the Whitewater-Lewinsky investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. The Call Between Prime Minister Barak and President
Clinton
Also on the final day of his presidency, President Clinton
made a number of farewell telephone calls to world leaders.
Among these was a call to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak.
Between 2:47 and 3:09 p.m., Clinton and Barak spoke.\759\
During that conversation, it appears that President Clinton
brought up that Marc Rich matter:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\759\ Verbatim notes of transcript of telephone conversation
between President William J. Clinton and Ehud Barak, Prime Minister,
Israel (Jan. 19, 2001) (Exhibit 148).
President Clinton. [Redacted] I'm trying to do
something on clemency for Rich, but it is very
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
difficult.
Prime Minister Barak. Might it move forward?
President Clinton. I'm working on that but I'm not
sure. I'm glad you asked me about that. When I finish
these calls, I will go back into the meeting on that
but I'm glad you raised it. Here's the only problem
with Rich; there's almost no precedent in American
history. There's nothing illegal about it but there's
no precedent. He was overseas when he was indicted and
never came home. The question is not whether he should
get it or not but whether he should get it without
coming back here. That's the dilemma I'm working
through. I'm working on it.
Prime Minister Barak. Okay.\760\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\760\ Id.
There are two important aspects of this call. First, the
transcript does not make it appear that Prime Minister Barak
was tenaciously lobbying for the Rich pardon. The only comments
he made at this critical juncture were ``Might it move
forward?'' and ``Okay.'' Neither can be seen as a forceful
request. In fact, the transcript raises the possibility that
Prime Minister Barak, not President Clinton, brought up the
Marc Rich pardon during the telephone call. Second, not in this
call, or in any other call, did Prime Minister Barak claim that
the Rich pardon would have any foreign policy benefits.
These facts undermine the suggestions made by the President
and his supporters which place great importance on the January
19 call by Prime Minister Barak. For example, in the
Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing, John Podesta stated that
``[w]hile the bulk of that [January 19] call concerned the
situation in the Middle East, Prime Minister Barak raised the
Rich matter at the end and asked the President once again to
consider the Rich pardon.'' \761\ Bruce Lindsey testified that
``[i]n our meeting when he [the President] said Barak had
raised it in his conversation that day he indicated that was, I
think, the third time it had been raised by Mr. Barak.'' \762\
If the notes of the call prepared by the White House are
correct, it appears that the President, not Prime Minister
Barak, raised the question of the Marc Rich pardon during the
January 19 telephone call. James Carville, a longtime defender
of President Clinton, appeared on Meet the Press and stated
that ``Prime Minister Barak made enormous concessions to try to
get a peace agreement. It was very important to him. And on the
last day, he called and said `look, I really would like for you
to do this,' and the President did it.'' Again, Carville's
description of the January 19 call was completely inaccurate
and was either purposefully misleading or the result of false
information provided to him by President Clinton or the
President's staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\761\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the
President, the White House).
\762\ Id. at 431 (testimony of Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel
to the President, the White House).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most importantly, both on January 19, and during the
controversy about the Rich pardon that followed, President
Clinton repeatedly suggested that the calls from Prime Minister
Barak ``profoundly'' influenced his decision making.\763\ This
claim was echoed by John Podesta at the Committee's March 1
hearing:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\763\ Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast, Feb. 15, 2001).
I do know that Mr. Barak--as Mr. Lindsey said and
raised a couple of times--that was, as you properly
point out, was an emotional time. The peace process
obviously wasn't coming to fruition. He had enormous
respect for Mr. Barak. I think Mr. Barak had asked him
for several things, if you will, that were intended to
show support for the State of Israel, not so much for
Mr. Barak but for the State of Israel, including, for
example, the pardon of Jonathan Pollard.\764\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\764\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 376
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the
President, the White House).
There is nothing in any of the discussions between Clinton and
Barak, especially the January 19 discussion, that supports
President Clinton's conclusion that the Rich pardon was
especially important to Prime Minister Barak so that Barak's
calls should have had a ``profound'' influence on the
President. The actual transcripts of the calls suggest that, at
least on January 19, the Rich pardon seemed to have a more
prominent place in President Clinton's mind than in Prime
Minister Barak's mind.
2. Eric Holder Weighs In
At about 6:30 in the evening on January 19, 2001, Jack
Quinn called the office of Eric Holder. Quinn said that the
Rich pardon was receiving serious consideration at the White
House and that the White House would be calling Holder for his
opinion before any decision was made.\765\ Holder told Quinn
that while he ``had no strong opposition based on [Quinn's]
recitation of the facts, law enforcement in New York would
strongly oppose it.'' \766\ Quinn's notes of the conversation
with Holder indicate that Holder told Quinn that he had ``no
personal prob[lem]'' with the Rich pardon, and that his
personal feeling was that he was ``not strongly against'' it,
but that the prosecutors in the Southern District would
``howl.'' \767\ It also appears that Quinn informed Holder that
Prime Minister Barak had expressed support for the Rich
pardon.\768\ Holder was told that Barak ``had weighed in
strongly on behalf of the pardon request,'' and this assertion
``really struck'' Holder.\769\ It appears that Quinn learned of
Barak's call to President Clinton from sources in Israel,
likely Avner Azulay, rather than the White House.\770\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\765\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 45 (Feb.
8, 2001) (statement of Jack Quinn).
\766\ Id. at 194 (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice).
\767\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit
172).
\768\ In his hearing testimony, Holder stated that he did not
recall whether he learned of Barak's support through Quinn or Nolan.
However, Beth Nolan made it clear that Holder stated that he had heard
that Barak was interested in the pardon, and explained that this new
information moved his position from ``neutral'' to ``neutral leaning
toward or neutral leaning favorable.'' See ``The Controversial Pardon
of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on
Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 354 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan,
former Counsel to the President, the White House). Given Nolan's
seemingly clear recollection that Holder already knew about Barak's
support when she spoke to him on January 19, it is fair to conclude
that it was Quinn, rather than Nolan, who told Holder about the Barak
call.
\769\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 194
(Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice).
\770\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 348
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Earlier that afternoon, Cheryl Mills arrived in Washington
from New York to visit the Clinton White House one last time.
Mills spent some of the afternoon in the West Wing office of
White House Counsel Beth Nolan. While Mills was in Nolan's
office, Jack Quinn called for Nolan. Nolan told Mills that she
was busy and couldn't take the call, and asked Mills to take it
instead. Mills picked up the line, and spoke with Quinn. Quinn
told Mills that he had recently spoken with Eric Holder, and
that Holder informed him that his position on the Rich pardon
was ``neutral, leaning favorable.'' Mills passed this
information on to Nolan. Nolan understood Mills to say that
Quinn had told her that Holder ``favored the pardon.'' \771\
Mills was surprised that Holder had taken such a positive
position on the Rich pardon, as she believed him generally to
be ``conservative'' with respect to pardons, and believed that
under Holder the Justice Department ``had not fulfilled its
pardon function.'' \772\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\771\ Id. at 354 (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the
President, the White House).
\772\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate White House
Counsel, in New York, NY (Mar. 19, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After Mills told Nolan that Quinn said that Holder
``favored the pardon,'' Nolan decided to call Holder herself to
see if this was true. She called Holder at about 6:40
p.m.,\773\ and described her conversation with Holder as
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\773\ Department of Justice Document Production DOJ/ODAG-MR-00040
(Telephone log of Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, Jan. 22, 2001)
(Exhibit 173).
I had talked with him the first week in January about
it, and I did not have the impression that he was in
favor of it, so that's what I said. I said, I'm hearing
you're in favor of it. I didn't think you were in favor
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of it.
He said that he was neutral, which I think is the
language he had used earlier in January about it. He--
and I said, well, I'm a little confused because I'm
hearing that you're not just neutral. And he said that
he, if--he had heard that Mr. Barak was interested,
that if that were the case, while he couldn't judge the
foreign policy arguments, he would find that very
persuasive and that--and I finally said, well, are you?
I still don't understand what neutral means here. And
he described it as neutral leaning toward or neutral
leaning favorable.\774\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\774\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 354
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the
President, the White House).
The position that Holder took in support of the Rich pardon
took many by surprise. Obviously, Beth Nolan was surprised at
Holder's position, especially when he had been neutral with
respect to the pardon just two weeks earlier. Cheryl Mills was
surprised, given what she considered Holder's ``conservative''
perspective on pardons. Other White House staff were surprised
as well. After her call with Holder, Beth Nolan informed
Associate White House Counsel Eric Angel that Holder was in
favor of the Rich pardon. Angel, like the rest of the staff,
opposed the pardon and exclaimed, ``Why the f**k would he say
that?'' \775\ Nolan responded by shrugging her shoulders.\776\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\775\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
\776\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Eric Holder's support for the Rich pardon would have a
significant impact in the President's deliberations later that
evening. Coming from the nation's second-ranking law
enforcement official, Holder's support could easily
counterbalance the objections to the Rich pardon made by White
House staff. Holder's support also had the illusory effect of
giving the Justice Department's blessing to the Rich pardon,
when in reality, not a single individual at the Justice
Department other than Eric Holder knew that the Rich pardon was
even being considered. No information about the Rich pardon had
been shared with the Justice Department through official
channels. Indeed, Holder had a central responsibility for
ensuring that no one else at the Justice Department knew that
the pardon was even under consideration. Moreover, despite the
fact that he had been on notice that Rich was seeking a pardon
since November 2000, and that the White House was actively
considering it in early January 2001, Holder made no attempt to
contact prosecutors in the Southern District of New York to get
their opinion regarding the case.
One of the most serious questions before the Committee is
why Holder decided to support the Rich pardon, given the
paucity of information that Holder had about the matter. Holder
had never seen any documents regarding the Rich pardon, and his
sum total of knowledge about the Rich case came from a page of
talking points provided to him by Jack Quinn in 2000, before
the pardon effort had even begun. Holder offered a number of
excuses for his decisionmaking, many of them conflicting, none
of them convincing. First, Holder claimed that he was really
neutral, not in favor of, the Rich pardon:
Neutral meaning I don't have a basis to form an opinion
consistent with what I told him before. . . . I was
neutral because I didn't have a basis to make a
determination. I have not seen anything on the pardon.
I'm now saying that I'm neutral consistent with what I
said before, leaning toward it if there were a foreign
policy benefit. I could not make the determination if
there were foreign policy benefit[s].\777\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\777\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 201
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice).
Holder's claims of ``neutrality'' are completely
implausible. First, everyone who had contact with Holder on
this matter took Holder's words as being in support of the Rich
pardon. Second, Holder had to have known that when he was asked
for his opinion regarding a prosecution which had been brought
by his agency, if he said that he was ``neutral, leaning
towards favorable,'' it was tantamount to supporting the
pardon. Representative Barr pointed this fact out to Holder in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Committee's February 8 hearing:
Mr. Barr. [I]n one conversation, you were swayed from
let's give you the benefit of the doubt that you didn't
know anything about the case and it was unremarkable to
you, to understanding that it was important enough for
a foreign leader to become personally involved in, and
just based on that information alone . . . not having
heard anything back from your prosecutors who
identified this case as one of the most significant in
white collar crime history, you all of a sudden become
leaning toward favorably simply because some foreign
leader, for whatever reason, [says] that he wants us to
act favorably on this pardon?
Mr. Holder. What I said was that I was neutral leaning
toward. Neutral, meaning consistent with what I said
before, which was I don't have a basis to one way or
the other--
Mr. Barr. Is that your presumption as the second top
official at Justice, that if somebody comes in and asks
you about a pardon that you don't know anything about,
that your position is immediately neutral and therefore
their job is to move you toward favorable? I mean,
wouldn't your position as a prosecutor be you stand by
your prosecutors and your initial position when you
don't know about a case is to oppose it?
Mr. Holder. No. Without a basis to know whether--how
the decision should go, I think it would be incumbent
upon--
Mr. Barr. Don't you presume that your prosecutors have
prepared good cases, and therefore you would operate
from the presumption as their superior at the
Department of Justice that you were going to stand by
them and not take a neutral position? \778\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\778\ Id. at 209-10 (statement of the Honorable Bob Barr and
testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of
Justice).
What Holder could not see, or would not admit to, even after it
was made clear by Representative Barr, was that when he refused
to support the work of the prosecutors in his own office, it
amounted to one of the largest expressions of support for the
Rich pardon that any independent party could muster.
Holder also attempted to argue that he was presumptively
neutral on the Rich case because Rich was a fugitive, and
Holder had supported a pardon for another fugitive several
years earlier.
I did not reflexively oppose it [the Rich pardon]
because I had previously supported a successful pardon
request for a fugitive, Preston King, who, in the
context of a selective service case, had been
discriminated against in the 1950's because of the
color of his skin.\779\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\779\ Id. at 194 (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice).
Holder's argument amounts to a claim that since he once
supported a pardon for a fugitive, he had to support all future
pardon requests by fugitives. Holder's bizarre argument
actually treats fugitivity as a bonus in the consideration of a
pardon, rather than a criminal act.
Mere incompetence cannot account for Eric Holder's
decisionmaking in the Marc Rich case. Holder knew about Jack
Quinn's efforts to obtain a pardon for Rich as early as
November 2000, yet he never mentioned the effort to prosecutors
in New York or the Pardon Attorney. Holder kept this
information from them, even though he knew that they would
vehemently oppose any effort to pardon Rich. Perhaps more
important, he never made an effort to educate himself about the
facts of the case. These efforts to keep prosecutors from
finding out what was happening, in conjunction with Holder's
complete inability to explain or defend his decisionmaking,
make the concerns regarding Eric Holder's motivations even more
serious.
During the Committee's February 8 hearing, at least one
potential motivation for Holder was revealed. Holder asked Jack
Quinn for his support to have Holder nominated as Attorney
General in a future Gore Administration.\780\ Quinn recalled
such a discussion, but claimed that it was in the fall, prior
to the election, and prior to the filing of the Rich pardon
petition.\781\ However, Holder allowed that there might have
been more than one discussion with Quinn regarding his
appointment as Attorney General.\782\ When asked about this
matter, Holder angrily denied that his efforts to be appointed
as Attorney General, and his solicitation of Quinn's support,
had any effect on his decisionmaking:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\780\ Id. at 202.
\781\ Id. (testimony of Jack Quinn).
\782\ Id. (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice).
My actions in this matter were in no way affected by my
desire to become Attorney General of the United States,
any desires I had to influence or seek to curry favor
with anybody. I did what I did in this case based only
on the facts that were before me, the law as I
understood it and consistent with my duties as Deputy
Attorney General, nothing more than that.\783\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\783\ Id. at 203.
Holder's impassioned defense would be more believable if
Holder's decisionmaking could be justified based on the facts
that were in front of him. However, given his complete
inability to justify his decision to keep the Rich matter from
the rest of the Justice Department and his position in favor of
the Rich pardon when he knew next to nothing about the case,
the Committee must question Holder's motivations.
3. The January 19 Meeting Between White House Staff and
President Clinton
After hearing from Deputy Attorney General Holder, Beth
Nolan, Bruce Lindsey, John Podesta, Meredith Cabe, Eric Angel,
and Cheryl Mills all went to an Oval Office meeting with
President Clinton to discuss the President's last grants of
clemency.\784\ This meeting took place at approximately 7:00
p.m. The presence of Cheryl Mills, who at this time was not a
government employee, and had not been for over a year, has
raised two serious concerns. First, Mills might have been
exposed to information, that as a private citizen, she was not
legally entitled to review. Certainly, if minimal due diligence
regarding the Rich pardon had been performed, Mills would have
been exposed to a considerable amount of highly classified
information. Furthermore, even NCIC information on Rich and
Green would have been inappropriate to disseminate to a private
citizen like Mills. Second, at the time, Mills was a trustee of
the Clinton Library. As a trustee, Mills was responsible for
supervising the effort to construct the Library. However, Mills
claimed that she was unaware both of general fundraising
efforts, and of Denise Rich's large contributions to the
Library. The White House staff present at the meeting explained
that Mills was invited to the meeting because of her
substantial knowledge regarding the various independent counsel
investigations of the Clinton Administration.\785\ The bulk of
this meeting concerned pardons relating to various
investigations by independent counsels, and Mills was asked for
her opinion on whether various individuals involved in these
investigations should receive pardons.\786\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\784\ Id. at 428 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former
Counsel to the President, the White House); Interview with Meredith
Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar.
16, 2001).
\785\ During her tenure as Associate White House Counsel and then
Deputy White House Counsel, Mills was one of the primary lawyers
handling scandal-related matters at the Clinton White House.
\786\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 19, 2001); See also ``The
Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings
Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 328 (Mar. 1, 2001)
(testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the
White House).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After a lengthy discussion regarding the Independent
Counsel-related pardons, the President raised the issue of Marc
Rich. President Clinton said that he had received a message
from Jack Quinn,\787\ and that he had also received a call from
Prime Minister Barak. Bruce Lindsey clearly recalled that the
President stated that ``Prime Minister Barak had spoken to him
that afternoon and had asked him again--I don't believe it was
the first time that the Prime Minister had raised the Marc Rich
pardon--had asked him again to consider it.'' \788\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\787\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001). Quinn's phone records
indicate that he called the President at 12:29 p.m. on January 19 for a
duration of two minutes. Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone bill
of Jack Quinn, Feb. 9, 2001) (Exhibit 174). It appears that Quinn did
not actually speak to the President, but rather left a message, which
was returned in the evening.
\788\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 347
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel to
the President, the White House). See also id. at 328.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Before the President raised the Marc Rich matter, everyone
on the White House staff thought it was a dead letter, and had
not prepared for the issue to be brought up at the January 19
meeting.\789\ Nevertheless, once the President raised the
matter, Nolan, Lindsey, Cabe, and Angel all expressed their
opposition to the Rich pardon.\790\ Those present recall
Lindsey giving a strong statement of opposition, focusing on
the fact that Rich and Pincus Green were fugitives from justice
who had never faced the charges against them.\791\ The basic
thrust of all of the arguments offered by the staff focused on
the fact that Rich and Green were fugitives. When asked about
the strength of the arguments made by Rich and Green, Meredith
Cabe stated that if their arguments were strong, Rich and Green
could obviously finance an excellent defense, and they should
make those arguments in court.\792\ During this discussion,
Beth Nolan also expressed her opposition to the pardon.
However, she also informed the President that Eric Holder was
``leaning toward'' the granting of the pardon. A number of
individuals involved in the decisionmaking process have
identified Holder's position as being a significant factor in
the President's decisionmaking.\793\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\789\ Id. at 344-45 (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of
Staff to the President, the White House).
\790\ Id. at 110. See also Interview with Eric Angel, former
Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
John Podesta was present for the portion of the meeting where the
independent counsel pardons were discussed, but left the meeting prior
to the discussion of Marc Rich to tape a television appearance.
\791\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\792\ Id.
\793\ See ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 367
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the
President, the White House).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the White House staff argued against the Rich pardon,
Cheryl Mills questioned their knowledge of the case. Mills
pointed out that the White House Counsel's Office staff was not
responding to the substantive issues raised in the Marc Rich
petition. Mills specifically pointed out that Bruce Lindsey was
not the best person to give an opinion on the Rich case since
he had not even read the petition.\794\ It appears that no one
among the six individuals discussing the Rich pardon had even
read through the 31-page petition. At this point, Mills
outlined what she did know about the case, based on her review
of materials provided to her by Jack Quinn. The President then
asked her what she thought about the arguments made by Quinn
about Rich's fugitive status in his January 18 letter. Mills
stated that she did not find Quinn's arguments persuasive.\795\
She did say that the President should look at the selective
prosecution argument which had been raised by Rich. According
to Beth Nolan, Mills said that the White House should be
looking at the selective prosecution argument ``seriously.''
\796\ But then Mills told them ``you know me, I don't care
about rich white guys,'' and then argued that American blacks
were selectively prosecuted every day.\797\ Of the individuals
present at the meeting, only Mills made any statements that can
be construed as anything other than negative about the Rich
petition. The President indicated he was interested in the
matter, but did not make any clear statements that he was going
to issue the Rich pardon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\794\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 19, 2001).
\795\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
\796\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 346
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the
President, the White House).
\797\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After this discussion, the President indicated that he had
to return Quinn's call. He did not indicate whether he had made
up his mind on the Rich pardon. It was clear, though, that the
President still had a strong interest in the matter.
4. The President's Call to Jack Quinn
The President then tracked down Jack Quinn, who was having
dinner at the home of a friend. Clinton spoke to Quinn about
the Rich case. According to Quinn, this conversation lasted
approximately twenty minutes. Before the call, Robert Fink e-
mailed Quinn the following suggestion: ``I would say, Do it for
me. I know it is deserved.'' \798\ Also providing a suggestion
as to the topics discussed between Quinn and President Clinton
is a list of bullet points apparently prepared by Quinn for the
call:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\798\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00406
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 175).
unusual
but not unworthy
never was a case
tax RICO fraud
stayed away--publicity
CTS/RUDY SAY OVERREACHED
will submit to some civil processes in ARCO
others similarly sit.
controversial/defensible
humanitarian record since that time
Ken Starr
Ira[n]-Contra
inequity
bias--rich Jew
Israel \799\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\799\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit
176).
As has been discussed throughout this report, most of Quinn's
apparent arguments were completely false, ranging from the
assertion that there ``never was a case,'' to the claim that
other similarly situated defendants were subject to civil
penalties, to the preposterous claim that Rich was targeted
because he was Jewish.
According to Quinn, ``President Clinton had obviously read
and studied the pardon petition. He grasped the essence of my
argument about this case being one that should have been
handled civilly, not criminally, and he discussed with me
whether the passage of time would permit statute of limitations
defenses in such a civil proceeding.'' \800\ After President
Clinton expressed this opinion, Quinn told the President that
he ``would happily give him a letter waiving those defenses,
and he insisted that I provided one to him within an hour.''
\801\ Quinn has testified that his discussion with the
President was limited to the law and the facts of the Rich
case, and at no time touched upon the financial contributions
of Denise Rich. After getting off the phone with the President,
Quinn drafted a short letter making the necessary waiver. The
letter reads as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\800\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 70 (Feb. 14, 2001)
(testimony of Jack Quinn).
\801\ Id.
I am writing to confirm that my clients, Marc Rich and
Pincus Green, waive any and all defenses which could be
raised to the lawful imposition of civil fines or
penalties in connection with the actions and
transactions alleged in the indictment against them
pending in the Southern District of New York.
Specifically they will not raise the statute of
limitations or any other defenses which arose as a
result of their absense [sic].\802\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\802\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to
President William J. Clinton (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 177).
This letter was then faxed to the White House, where it was
apparently provided to the President and the relevant White
House staff.
It was after the telephone call with Jack Quinn that
President Clinton apparently decided to grant the pardons to
Marc Rich and Pincus Green. The President himself has pointed
to this agreement as a significant concession that he was able
to obtain from Jack Quinn and Marc Rich.\803\ That the
assurances given by Jack Quinn had any impact on President
Clinton's decisionmaking is deeply troubling. The promise made
by Quinn was an empty promise for at least three reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\803\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 2001 (Exhibit 178).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, Quinn agreed to waive a defense that Marc Rich and
Pincus Green could not use in any event. Due to their absence
from the United States, Marc Rich and Pincus Green did not have
a statute of limitations defense to waive. The statute of
limitations provision of the Petroleum Overcharge Distribution
and Restitution Act of 1986 \804\ would apply to any civil
enforcement action imposing civil penalties on Marc Rich and
Pincus Green for violations of the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act of 1973 \805\ and the Economic Stabilization Act
of 1970.\806\ The limitations provision provides that a civil
enforcement action cannot be commenced after the later of
September 30, 1988, or six years after the date of the
violation.\807\ It appears that this provision would provide a
defense for Marc Rich and Pincus Green; however, immediately
following the limitations provision are exceptions tolling the
limitations period. The first exception provides:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\804\ 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. Sec. 4501-4507 (2001).
\805\ 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. Sec. 751-760(h) (2001), omitted pursuant to
15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 760(g).
\806\ 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1904 (1976) omitted, pursuant to Pub.L. 91-
151, Title II, Sec. 211.
\807\ 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4504(a)(1).
(1) In computing the periods established in
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (a)(1) of this
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
section, there shall be excluded any period--
(A) during which any person who is or may become the
subject of a civil enforcement action is outside the
United States, has absconded or concealed himself, or
is not subject to legal process.\808\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\808\ 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4504(b)(1)(A).
Therefore, according to the plain meaning of the statute, the
time Marc Rich and Pincus Green were outside the United States
tolled the statute of limitations. Furthermore, a look at the
legislative history of this provision shows that Congress
intended this result. Congress enacted the limitations
provision with the intent that all alleged violations of the
law would be pursued expeditiously but it did not intend for
those who violated the laws to escape prosecution.\809\ It is
evident from the plain meaning of the statute, as well as the
legislative history, that Marc Rich and Pincus Green did not
have a statute of limitations defense to raise, but that, in
fact, their absence tolled the limitations period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\809\ H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-1012, at 234 (1986).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, it appears almost certain that Rich does not have
any civil liability relating to the charges against him in
1983. Martin Auerbach, one of the main prosecutors responsible
for investigating Rich, opined that ``[t]he civil liabilities
in this case were fully extinguished in 1984 when Marc Rich and
Co. A.G. and Marc Rich and Co. International Limited paid $150
million to the U.S. Government. The civil liabilities were
corporate civil liabilities.'' \810\ When asked about Rich's
promise to pay civil liabilities, Sandy Weinberg stated, ``What
civil penalties? The civil penalties already have been
extracted, $200 million worth. They were corporate liabilities
and were already handled through plea agreements. This is about
as big an empty promise as can be made.'' \811\ Rich's own
lawyers agree with the assessment of the prosecutors. Michael
Green, one of the main lawyers representing Rich, stated that
``[w]e think he [Marc Rich] owes no civil liabilities.'' \812\
Perhaps the most telling sign is that over a year after the
Rich pardon, the Department of Energy has taken no action to
collect civil penalties from Rich.\813\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\810\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 108
(Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Martin Auerbach, former assistant U.S.
attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
\811\ Jerry Seper, Pardoned Financier Gives ``Empty Promise,'' Ex-
Prosecutor Says, Wash. Times, Jan. 30, 2001, at A1.
\812\ Raymond Bonner and Alison Leigh Cowan, Notes Show Justice
Official Knew of Pardon Application, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2001, at A14.
\813\ Department of Energy staff have informed the Committee that
they are still reviewing the Rich case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, to the extent that civil penalties were available,
Marc Rich had been willing to pay as much as $100 million to
settle the case against him, going back to the early 1980s.
What Rich had feared though, and was not willing to accept, was
any time in jail. Rather than representing a concession, the
agreement between the President and Quinn represented exactly
what Rich had been demanding all along.
It cannot be disputed that the deal the President reached
with Jack Quinn on January 19, 2001, was a hollow, meaningless
deal. The only remaining question is whether the President's
mistake was the result of ignorance, part of his complete
failure to conduct any research about the Marc Rich case, or
whether the President knew it was an empty agreement and made
it solely to provide window dressing for his decision. Since
this question goes to the heart of whether or not President
Clinton's decision was corrupt, it is difficult for the
Committee to reach a conclusion on this question, absent
additional information from individuals who have refused to
cooperate with the Committee's investigation. However, it is
difficult to understand why President Clinton would enter into
these kinds of negotiations with Jack Quinn, reach this kind of
agreement, and then use the agreement as a justification for
granting the pardon without even checking with someone who
understood the case to see if the agreement had substance.
President Clinton knew that his staff had not even read Quinn's
submissions to the White House, much less spoken to parties
outside the White House about the Rich matter. Therefore,
President Clinton, if he was attempting to reach a reasonable
decision in the Rich matter, should have understood the need to
turn to someone who understood the case to assist him in the
matter. That he did not seek such advice raises further
questions about his decisionmaking, and about his motive for
issuing the Rich and Green pardons.
5. The White House Informs the Justice Department of the
Decision
President Clinton apparently made the decision to pardon
Rich and Green in the evening of January 19, 2001. After the
President made the decision, Bruce Lindsey and Beth Nolan were
informed of the decision. Nolan then asked Associate White
House Counsel Meredith Cabe to inform the Justice Department,
and have the Justice Department perform a National Crime
Information Center (``NCIC'') check on Rich and Green. It was
standard procedure for the Justice Department to perform this
kind of check on an individual before they received a pardon,
even under the dramatically truncated background checks
employed by the Clinton Administration in January 2001. The
purpose of the NCIC check was to ensure that the individual
receiving the pardon did not have any outstanding warrants or
criminal charges.
Shortly after midnight on January 20, 2001, less than
twelve hours before the end of the Clinton Administration, Cabe
telephoned Roger Adams, the Pardon Attorney, and informed him
that she would be faxing over a list of additional individuals
to whom President Clinton was considering granting
pardons.\814\ When the list arrived, Adams saw the names of
Marc Rich and Pincus Green on the list. This was the first time
that Adams had heard of Rich or Green being considered for
pardons. Adams saw that the faxed list did not contain any
identifying information for Rich or Green, so he called Cabe to
ask for additional information.\815\ Cabe provided Adams with
dates of birth and social security numbers for Rich and Green.
Cabe then informed Adams that she expected that there would be
little information on them, because they had been ``living
abroad'' for several years.\816\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\814\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 22-23 (Feb. 14, 2001)
(testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice).
\815\ Id. at 23.
\816\ Id.; Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department
of Justice (Feb. 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the FBI conducted the NCIC check on Rich and Green,
the White House Counsel's Office faxed further information on
Rich, consisting of several pages from Quinn's pardon petition,
to the Pardon Attorney's Office.\817\ Based on his review of
these pages, Roger Adams understood the full magnitude of the
Rich and Green case for the first time. He saw that they had
been indicted 17 years earlier in New York, and had remained
fugitives since then. A member of Adams' staff then began to
conduct internet research on Rich and Green.\818\ While Adams's
staff was attempting to gather information about Rich and
Green, the FBI faxed the results of the NCIC check to Adams.
The NCIC check revealed that Rich and Green were fugitives
wanted for mail and wire fraud, arms trading, and tax
evasion.\819\ Adams drafted a summary of the charges against
Rich and Green, and faxed the summary to the White House
shortly before 1:00 a.m. on January 20.\820\ At this point,
Adams was obviously concerned about the effort to pardon Rich
and Green, and called his superior at the Justice Department,
Deputy Attorney General Holder, at home.\821\ Adams informed
Holder that President Clinton was considering granting pardons
to Rich and Green. Holder then informed Adams that he was aware
of the pending clemency requests from Rich and Green.\822\
According to Holder, when he received this call from Roger
Adams, it was the first time that he actually thought that the
Rich pardon was likely to be granted.\823\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\817\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 23 (Feb. 14, 2001)
(testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice).
\818\ Id.
\819\ Id.; Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department
of Justice (Feb. 27, 2001).
\820\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 23 (Feb. 14, 2001)
(testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice).
\821\ Id.
\822\ Id.
\823\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 194
(Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After his brief conversation with Holder, Adams received
another call from the White House Counsel's office, which by
this time had received Adams' summary of the charges against
Rich and Green. During this conversation, Adams told Meredith
Cabe that in addition to the charges against Rich, there was a
customs alert posted for Rich and Green and that he believed
this was significant. Apparently not trusting Adams' summary,
Cabe asked Adams to fax over the original printout from the
NCIC check that was performed by the FBI. Adams faxed the
printout over, as well as the articles that his staff had been
able to locate through their Internet searches.\824\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\824\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 23-24 (Feb. 14, 2001)
(testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What had caused such concern at the White House was the
reference in the NCIC check to ``arms trading.'' No one at the
White House had ever heard that Rich or Green had been involved
in arms trading. Cabe and Eric Angel took the information about
arms trading to Beth Nolan. Nolan and Cheryl Mills were in
Nolan's office. Bruce Lindsey had apparently left the White
House for the evening. Cabe gave Nolan and Mills the
information, which had been provided to her by the Pardon
Attorney's office. Nolan compared the information in the NCIC
printout to the Rich and Green indictment, attempting to
discern whether they had been charged with arms trading in
1983, or whether this was new information. Cabe, Angel, Mills,
and Nolan were unable to come to any definitive answer as to
whether the information about arms trading was already known,
or whether this was new information which would complicate the
effort to issue a pardon. At the time, they speculated that
either this was a new charge for which Rich and Green were
wanted, unrelated to their 1983 indictment, or this was the way
that the NCIC database referred to the Trading with the Enemy
count which was part of their indictment.\825\ In short,
however, they did not have an understanding of what the ``arms
trading'' reference meant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\825\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 374-75
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the
President, the White House).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The meaning of the ``arms trading'' reference in the NCIC
is not entirely clear, since none of the charges in Rich and
Green's 1983 indictment related to arms trading. The NCIC
printout itself, however, does not support the speculation by
the White House staff that the ``arms trading'' reference was
just another term for trading with the enemy. The printouts for
Marc Rich from the NCIC database show separate entries for
``trading with the enemy'' and ``arms trading,'' suggesting
that they are separate offenses.\826\ Given the fact that on
its face the NCIC printout raises serious questions about Rich
being wanted for arms trading, President Clinton clearly should
have made a serious inquiry to determine what the arms trading
entry meant before granting the Marc Rich pardon.\827\ Instead,
he did not make a single inquiry of law enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\826\ Department of Justice Document Production DOJ/SDNY-MR-00021-
23 (NCIC Printouts for Pincus Green and Marc Rich (Mar. 3, 1992, and
Mar. 18, 1994)) (Exhibit 179).
\827\ The Committee is not aware of any criminal charges that have
been lodged against Rich or Green for illegal arms trading. There are
numerous reports, however, that Marc Rich is involved in trafficking
weapons, included sophisticated missile guidance systems. This arms
dealing activity may or may not be legal. See, e.g., A. Craig Copetas,
Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-Dollar Scam 131 (1985)
(indicating that Rich paid for Iranian oil with small arms, automatic
rifles, and hand-held rockets); Jim Hougan, King of the World (Marc
Rich), Playboy, Feb. 1, 1994, at 104 (indicating that Rich bought gas-
fired gyroscopes from North Korea and sold them to Iran).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To try to figure out a response to this new piece of
information, Nolan, Mills, Cabe, and Angel called Bruce
Lindsey. Lindsey did not have any insight regarding the arms
trading information, but reiterated his opposition to the Rich
pardon, and stated that the arms trading information was yet
another reason not to issue the pardon.\828\ Nolan then called
Jack Quinn. Quinn expressed irritation to be receiving a call
at 2:00 a.m.\829\ Quinn also was not immediately responsive to
the concerns Nolan was raising.\830\ Quinn told Nolan that he
``would have known if [Rich] had been charged with that.''
Apparently Nolan, and Cheryl Mills as well, did not consider
that a satisfactory answer, and pressed Quinn for more
information. Mills told Quinn that ``you've got to work with us
here.'' \831\ At that point, Quinn told Nolan and the others
that he would check back on this issue and call them back.\832\
Shortly thereafter, Quinn called back and forcefully told Nolan
and the others that he had no knowledge about any arms trading
charges against Rich.\833\ He told them to look at the
indictment against Rich, and that the indictment ``was the only
thing out there.'' \834\ Quinn's answer was obviously non-
responsive but no one appears to have taken any steps to obtain
a responsive answer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\828\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
\829\ Id.
\830\ Id.
\831\ Id.
\832\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 19, 2001); Interview with Eric Angel,
former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 28,
2001).
\833\ Id.
\834\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the Committee's March 1 hearing, Nolan was asked why she
did not take any further steps to determine exactly what
charges were outstanding against Marc Rich. Nolan's answer was
less than satisfactory:
Mr. Burton. An intelligence agency tells you that there
was arms trading, a violation of law, and all these
other things had taken place which had not just been
revealed or checked; and you take the man's word or the
President takes his word on the pardon of one of the
most wanted fugitives in the world who renounced his
citizenship and all the other things we talked about.
You took his word when Mr. Quinn was representing him.
And Mr. Quinn said in previous testimony the last time
he was here, my job wasn't to tell all the facts that
were against the pardon. My job was to point out all
the reasons why there should be a pardon.
You know as an attorney that's what you do. You try to
make the best case for your client.
Why in the world would you go to Mr. Quinn when there
was a question of illegal activity and say, hey, what
about this? You know darn well he's going to say, oh,
that's nothing. That was just a minor thing. That was
probably not arms trading. It was oil trading or
something else. Why would you take his word for it and
why would the President take his word for it and then
go ahead and grant the pardon? I just don't understand
it. It eludes me. Would you explain that to me?
* * *
Ms. Nolan. This was 2:30 a.m. My eyes were officially
stuck together by then. I had my contact lenses in
since 7 or 6 the morning before. I had been going on a
couple hours of sleep most nights that week, as had the
President; and I think frankly, as Mr. Podesta said,
because this came up so late we did not do the kind of
checks that we would have if we would have had the
time. . . . As Mr. Lindsey indicated, he had indeed
indicated that, understand Mr. Quinn is not your
advisor, he is an advocate. But I do think that the
President viewed Mr. Quinn as somebody who he truly did
trust to give him correct information; and as far as we
know that information was correct, not incorrect.
* * *
Mr. Burton. I'm running out of time here. Was Mr. Quinn
at the White House?
Ms. Nolan. No.
Mr. Burton. So you had the ability with your eyes stuck
together to get ahold of Mr. Quinn, but you didn't try
to contact the Justice Department to ask them about it
because it was 2:30 a.m.? And you can get a hold of the
man who is an advocate for pardoning one of the most
wanted fugitives in the world, but you don't call the
Justice Department or the intelligence agency at 2:30
a.m.? I don't understand that.\835\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\835\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 379
(Mar. 1, 2001).
After the final conversation with Quinn, at 2:30 a.m.,
Nolan called President Clinton. Nolan told the President that
they had performed an NCIC check, which showed that Rich was a
wanted fugitive, and also revealed new information suggesting
that Rich was wanted for arms trading. Nolan then told the
President that the White House did not have any information
showing that the NCIC information was inaccurate, other than
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
what Quinn had told them:
I said all we have is Jack Quinn's word that the arms
trading is not, in fact, an issue for Mr. Rich.
* * *
[T]hat's when I said, you know, what we have is Jack
Quinn's word; that's all we have at this hour. And he
said, take Mr. Quinn's word, or take Jack's word.\836\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\836\ Id. at 378, 429 (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to
the President, the White House).
With that sentence--``take Jack's word''--President Clinton
decided to grant the pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green.
Nolan informed Cheryl Mills and Meredith Cabe, both of whom
were in her office, of the decision, and then went home for the
evening. The actual master warrant granting pardons to Marc
Rich, Pincus Green, and 139 others was prepared at the Justice
Department, and then delivered to the White House on the
morning of January 20. The warrants were then signed by
President Clinton.
H. Aftermath of the Rich and Green Pardons
1. Eric Holder's Congratulatory Remarks
The first reaction of the Marc Rich legal team to the
pardons was one of happiness and self-congratulation. By
Monday, January 22, they had turned to more practical concerns,
like having the travel restrictions and arrest warrants for
Rich and Green lifted. Jack Quinn spoke with Eric Holder, who
was now Acting Attorney General. Quinn asked Holder what steps
needed to be taken to ensure that Rich and Green were not
arrested when they traveled. Holder told Quinn he needed to
have detainers removed from computers, as well as inform
Interpol of the pardon.\837\ Apparently, Holder thought that
the Southern District of New York might resist the pardon, and
refuse to dismiss the indictment. In that case, Holder
counseled Quinn, Rich and Green to move to dismiss the
indictment in court.\838\ According to Jack Quinn, who took
notes of the conversation, Holder said that Quinn ``did a very
good job.'' \839\ Holder also gave Quinn advice on how to
handle the burgeoning media requests regarding the pardon
effort, telling Quinn that he should ``make public [their]
commitment to waive defenses to civil penalties at [DOE] and
tthe [sic] support of [B]arak.'' \840\ Also in this same
conversation, Holder asked Quinn to consider hiring two of his
former aides at the Justice Department.\841\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\841\ Id. Holder sent the resumes of the two aides, former
Associate Deputy Attorney General Bernard J. Delia and former Associate
Deputy Attorney General Nicholas M. Gess, later that day. Jack Quinn
Document Production (Fax from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney General,
Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn (dated Dec. 1, 2000, date stamped
by fax machine Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 182). In addition, at least one
of these aides, Nick Gess, called Quinn as early as January 2, 2001,
presumably seeking a job. The telephone message reads, ``Calling at
Holder's suggestion.'' See Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone
Message from Nick Gess, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Department
of Justice, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 183).
\837\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 194
(Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice).
\838\ See Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to
Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 180); Jack Quinn Document
Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 181).
\839\ Id.
\840\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to
Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 180).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holder has offered evolving accounts of his congratulatory
remarks to Jack Quinn. At first, Holder's supporters informed
the press that his comments to Quinn were ``sarcastic, not
congratulatory.'' \842\ Then, when questioned about this matter
at the Committee's hearing, Holder denied making the comments
at all.\843\ Given the fact that Quinn took notes and sent an
e-mail contemporaneously with the conversation with Holder, and
that Holder has offered conflicting accounts of the
conversation, it appears that Holder has not offered an honest
explanation, and that he did indeed make the congratulatory
comments to Quinn. Such comments support the Committee's
conclusion that Eric Holder was sympathetic to the Marc Rich
pardon or was willing, through his own inaction, to see the
pardon granted so as not to interfere with his other interests.
It is also worth noting that Holder, who had himself sought
Quinn's support for his appointment as Attorney General if Vice
President Gore won the presidency, continued to seek Quinn's
support for finding employment for his underlings, even after
the Rich pardon had been granted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\842\ Lucy Howard, Susannah Meadows, Bret Begun and Katherine
Stroup, Periscope, Newsweek, Feb. 12, 2001, at 6.
\843\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 215
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The Rich Team's Effort to Deal with the Press
After Holder's congratulations, things began to go downhill
for the Marc Rich team. By the end of the day on Monday,
January 22, it became clear that the pardons of Marc Rich and
Pincus Green were going to be a major news story. E-mails
between Rich's representatives showed that they were having
some difficulty dealing with this unforeseen consequence of the
pardons. Rich lawyer Robert Fink began by asking how he should
deal with press calls:
I have been asked who lobbied the President in behalf
of Marc (and Pinky) and said it may be private and
therefore did not immediately respond. May I? Who
should I say? I have told everyone that Denise was in
favor of the resolution of this case and was in favor
of the pardon.\844\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\844\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00191
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et
al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 69).
Rich's representative in Israel, Avner Azulay, was concerned
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
about the publicity:
Pse [sic] keep barak [sic] out of the media. We have
enough names on the list other than his. Important to
keep all politicians out of the story. Pse [sic] share
with me the inclusion of any one on the list. This is
election time here and has a potential of blowup. A
newsweek reporter here has already asked if there were
any political contributions. Other than that I thought
we agreed that all inquiries, interviews should be
channeled to [G]ershon. Why is B[ob] F[ink] giving
interviews? He shouldn't be dealing with this
aspect.\845\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\845\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jack Quinn also made a case for further disclosure:
I have this very great concern: we are withholding our
very good and compelling petition from the press only
to protect the tax professors who don't want to be too
far out front. The tail is wagging the dog. I think it
is critical that one of us sit down with some
journalist and share the petition. I hope I'm not over-
reacting, but thins [sic] is my best judgment. I'd do
it with the NY Times. In the next hour or so. Is that
possible? \846\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\846\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00195
(E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit
184).
Avner Azulay agreed with the need to make the tax professors'
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
opinion public:
You are right. Why do we have to worry so much about
the professors. They did a job and there is nothing
wrong in giving expert onions [sic]. A lot know about
it, including the doj and sdny. It is part of the
petition. Why hide it? \847\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\847\ Id.
The e-mails indicate that Professors Ginsburg and Wolfman
expressed some hesitancy to have their work for Marc Rich
publicly disclosed. When asked if Professor Ginsburg was
hesitant to be linked to the Rich case because it might harm
the reputation of his wife, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Quinn said Professor Ginsburg's, and Professor
Wolfman's concerns were limited to a fear of being ``besieged
with media requests.'' \848\ It appears that the professors'
concerns were more serious than fear of dealing with a barrage
of press calls, and it stands to reason that they were
concerned about having their reputations tarnished by having
the public know of their lucrative work for Marc Rich and
Pincus Green.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\848\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 180
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While they were deciding how to deal with the public, the
Marc Rich team was also receiving communications from former
President Clinton. On January 23, Anne McGuire, an associate at
Quinn Gillespie, e-mailed Jack Quinn to let him know that she
had heard from Clinton Library fundraiser Peter O'Keefe:
Just got a weird call from Peter O'Keefe--was up in
Chappaqua for the last few days--he asked me to check
with you on whether or not you were going to go out and
start defending vigorously--said ``we wanted to find
out.'' I am assuming he meant Terry [McAuliffe]--but I
did not go into it on the cell phone.\849\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\849\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Anne McGuire,
Associate, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 23, 2001))
(Exhibit 185). Shortly after her conversation with O'Keefe, McGuire
spoke to Terry McAuliffe and asked Quinn to ``[c]all me as soon as you
can.'' Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Anne McGuire,
Associate, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 23, 2001))
(Exhibit 186). The timing of McAuliffe's call suggests that it was
related to Quinn's response to the Rich matter. However, since
McAuliffee has refused to participate in an interview with Committee
staff, the Committee cannot know definitively what McAuliffe's call was
about.
It appears that Quinn spoke to former President Clinton on
January 23 and 24, about how to handle the Rich issue in the
press. On January 23, Quinn e-mailed Avner Azulay and pointed
out that Clinton ``himself is saying in his frustration about
the press coverage that good people like the PM [Barak]
supported this.'' \850\ The following day, Quinn e-mailed the
Marc Rich team and said that he ``spoke to BC. [He] thinks we
shd offer op-ed to daily news. [C]an anyone help?'' \851\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\850\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to
Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 23, 2001))
(Exhibit 187).
\851\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to
Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 24, 2001)) (Exhibit 188).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On January 26, 2001, Quinn did write an op-ed piece, which
was published by The Washington Post. The article was little
more than a rehash of the same inaccurate arguments that Quinn
made to the White House when he was seeking the pardon. Quinn's
main claims were that: (1) companies which committed acts
similar to those of Rich and Green were not prosecuted for
their actions; (2) the prosecutors in the Southern District of
New York refused to negotiate with Rich and Green; and (3)
Quinn did not violate the Executive Order banning lobbying by
officials who had left the White House in the previous five
years. As explained earlier in this report, all of these
arguments were misleading.
Internal e-mails among the team defending Jack Quinn
indicate that they were particularly concerned about Quinn's
exposure for his possible role in ``coordinating'' political
activities and the effort to obtain the Rich pardon. These e-
mails also indicate that Quinn was eager to place the blame for
the Rich pardon onto others. The day after the Committee's
February 8, 2001, hearing, Quinn associate Peter Mirijanian
sent the following e-mail to Quinn and a number of his
associates:
Where Jack remains exposed is in defending the optics
of the emails, contributions and the DNC piece (Beth
Dzoretz [sic]). We need to anticipate the worst in this
regard--i.e. Fink refuses to testify, Denise is granted
immunity and Beth is brought before the committee.
Since Jack has been out front and center on this the
impression will stick that, yes, he knew of these
activities and gave them his tacit approval.
Just like with Holder, if these other parties don't
come forward and instead duck their responsibility on
these matters, we'll have to do it for them. (Does that
sound too ``Sopranos-like''?) \852\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\852\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02943 (E-mail from Peter
Mirijanian, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Scott Hynes, Quinn
Gillespie & Associates et al. (Feb. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 189).
On February 10, 2001, Mirijanian advised Quinn against
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
appearing on Meet the Press because of similar concerns:
My concern jack is that russert is going to get into a
series of questions involving denise's political
activities and you will be the de facto defender of
what she did. That will only result in more press
inquiries about your ``coordinating'' role--something
we want to avoid.\853\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\853\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02946 (E-mail from Peter
Mirijanian, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Feb. 10,
2001)) (Exhibit 190).
These e-mails suggest that Quinn and his defenders felt that
they were vulnerable to questions about Quinn's coordination of
the political activities of Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz and
the effort to obtain Marc Rich's pardon. The e-mails raise the
possibility that Denise Rich and Dozoretz might have had
valuable information regarding these activities which they did
not share with the Committee, due to the invocation of their
Fifth Amendment rights.
3. President Clinton's Column in The New York Times
For the first month of public outcry about the Marc Rich
pardon, President Clinton was largely silent. He made a few
scattered comments about the matter, most notably a telephone
call to Geraldo Rivera. Through the call to Rivera, the public
learned that the President felt ``blindsided by this. I have no
infrastructure to deal with this, no press person. I just
wanted to go out there and do what past presidents have done,
but the Republicans had other ideas for me.'' \854\ President
Clinton also suggested that the outcry over Marc Rich was
hypocritical, because Republicans had worked on the Rich case:
``It's terrible! I mean, he had three big-time Republican
lawyers, including Dick Cheney's chief of staff. Marc Rich
himself is a Republican.'' \855\ President Clinton also told
Rivera about the influence that Israeli support for Rich had
played: ``Now, I'll tell you what did influence me. Israel did
influence me profoundly.'' \856\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\854\ Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast, Feb. 15, 2001).
\855\ Id.
\856\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Sunday, February 18, former President Clinton attempted
a fuller defense by publishing a column in The New York Times.
Unfortunately for the President, his attempt at defense only
made matters worse. The column largely parroted the arguments
made by Jack Quinn and the other Marc Rich lawyers. Therefore,
it was rife with false and misleading statements. The following
is a summary of the arguments made by the President, and the
problems with each argument:
``I understood that the other oil companies
that had structured transactions like those on which
Mr. Rich and Mr. Green were indicted were instead sued
civilly by the government.'' \857\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\857\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 2001, at sec. 4, p. 13 (Exhibit 178).
LAs explained earlier in this report, there were 48
criminal prosecutions for violations of oil price
control regulations by crude oil resellers, and 14 of
those individuals served time in prison. In fact, John
Troland and David Ratliff, resellers of oil who played
a small part in Marc Rich's plan to avoid U.S. oil
regulations and tax laws, served 10 months in prison,
and provided vital evidence against Marc Rich and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pincus Green.
``I was informed that, in 1985, in a related
case against a trading partner of Mr. Rich and Mr.
Green, the Energy Department, which was responsible for
enforcing the governing law, found that the manner in
which the Rich/Green companies had accounted for these
transactions was proper.'' \858\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\858\ Id.
LThe so-called DOE finding was completely irrelevant
to the criminal charges against Rich and Green. Despite
the finding about accounting methods in a related case,
the Department of Energy never disputed that Rich's
companies falsified reports to hide illegal profits and
then failed to pay taxes on those illegal profits.
Furthermore, the former President neglected to mention
that he made no effort, and he was aware that his staff
made no effort, to check with Justice Department or
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Energy Department experts regarding this matter.
``[T]wo highly regarded tax experts, Bernard
Wolfman . . . and Martin Ginsburg . . . reviewed the
transactions in question and concluded that the
companies `were correct in their U.S. income tax
treatment of all the items in question[.]' '' \859\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\859\ Id.
LThe tax analysis that was performed by Ginsburg and
Wolfman was performed only with facts provided to the
professors by the Marc Rich legal team.\860\ The
professors did not gather facts independently, and
therefore based their analysis on an incorrect set of
assumptions. In addition, the President failed to
disclose in his column that Marc Rich paid Professors
Ginsburg and Wolfman over $96,000 for their work on the
Rich case.\861\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\860\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Bernard Wolfman,
Professor, Harvard Law School, to Gerard E. Lynch, Criminal Division
Chief of the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department
of Justice (Dec. 7, 1990)) (Exhibit 66).
\861\ See Letter from Professor Martin D. Ginsburg, Professor,
Georgetown University Law Center, to the Honorable Dan Burton,
Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 12, 2001) (Exhibit 64); Letter
from Bernard Wolfman, Professor, Harvard Law School, to the Honorable
Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 8, 2001) (Exhibit
65).
``[I]n order to settle the government's case
against them, the two men's companies had paid
approximately $200 million in fines, penalties and
taxes, most of which might not even have been warranted
under the Wolfman/Ginsburg analysis that the companies
had followed the law and correctly reported their
income.'' \862\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\862\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 2001, at sec. 4, p. 13 (Exhibit 178).
LRather than being an argument in support of the
pardon, the fact of the corporate guilty plea and the
massive fines shows that the case against Rich and
Green was overwhelming. As prosecutor Sandy Weinberg
observed, ``if the case is so weak, I mean what in the
world were those lawyers [for Rich's companies]
thinking at that time . . . . They would have never
pled guilty, they would have never paid those fines.
Whatever the reason for the pardon, Mr. Chairman, and
members of the committee, whatever the reason, surely
the reason was not the merits of the case.'' \863\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\863\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 91 (Feb.
8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former assistant
U.S. attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
``[T]he Justice Department in 1989 rejected
the use of racketeering statutes in tax cases like this
one[.]'' \864\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\864\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 2001, at sec. 4, p. 13 (Exhibit 178).
LThe fact that the Justice Department stopped using
the tax charges as predicate offenses for bringing RICO
charges is irrelevant to the Rich pardon. While the
Justice Department did stop using tax charges in this
way, it continues to allow mail and wire fraud as
predicate offenses, and therefore, RICO charges could
still be brought against Rich and Green under current
legal theories. In addition, money laundering statutes
were not in place in 1983, and Rich could have been
charged under these statutes if he were charged today.
Finally, to look at the evolution of the law over the
seventeen years that Marc Rich was a fugitive from
justice, and argue that those changes merit a pardon
for Rich is to reward Rich for his flight from the
country. Indeed, sophisticated practitioners of money
laundering--which is one of the things that Rich and
Green were doing--would be in a far worse position if
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
indicted today.
``It was my understanding that Deputy
Attorney General Eric Holder's position on the pardon
application was `neutral, leaning for.' '' \865\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\865\ Id.
LAs explained throughout this report, Holder's
position on the pardon is more of an indictment of
Holder's judgment and reasoning than it is a
justification for the pardon. Holder served the Justice
Department and President poorly by failing to gather
any facts about the Rich case before reaching his
decision about the pardon. He also created the
indelible impression that he did not have a pure motive
in supporting Rich's request while he was soliciting
Jack Quinn's support for appointment as Attorney
General. This point is also an indictment of Jack
Quinn, who worked very hard to keep the Rich pardon
matter away from anyone who would be able to refute his
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
spurious arguments.
``[T]he case for the pardons was reviewed
and advocated not only by my former White House counsel
Jack Quinn but also by three distinguished Republican
attorneys: Leonard Garment, a former Nixon White House
official; William Bradford Reynolds, a former high-
ranking official in the Reagan Justice Department; and
Lewis Libby, now Vice President Cheney's chief of
staff.'' \866\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\866\ Id.
LThis was President Clinton's most misleading
assertion. When President Clinton initially drafted
this statement, it said that ``the applications were
viewed and advocated'' not only by my former White
House counsel Jack Quinn but also by three
distinguished Republicans[.]'' \867\ After some initial
copies of the newspaper were printed, the former
President's spokesmen called The New York Times and
asked that the word ``applications'' be replaced with
``the case for the pardons.'' \868\ The pardon
applications were never reviewed by Garment, Reynolds,
or Libby, so the initial form of the statement was
blatantly untrue.\869\ However, even the improved
statement was misleading. Garment, Reynolds and Libby
had worked with Rich in the 1980s and early 1990s to
try to reach a resolution of the charges against Rich
in New York. The arguments made by Garment, Reynolds
and Libby focused on the claim that the SDNY was
criminalizing what should have been a civil tax case.
They did not make, compile, or in any other way lay the
groundwork for, or make a case for a Presidential
pardon. When former President Clinton stated that they
``reviewed and advocated'' ``the case for the
pardons,'' he suggested that they were somehow involved
in arguing that Rich and Green should receive pardons.
This was completely untrue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\867\ Editors' Note, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2001, at A15.
\868\ Id.
\869\ Id.
``[F]inally, and importantly, many present
and former high-ranking Israeli officials of both major
political parties and leaders of Jewish communities in
America and Europe urged the pardon of Mr. Rich because
of his contributions and services to Israeli charitable
causes, to the Mossad's efforts to rescue and evacuate
Jews from hostile countries, and to the peace process
through sponsorship of education and health programs in
Gaza and the West Bank.'' \870\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\870\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 2001, at sec. 4, p. 13 (Exhibit 178).
LThis argument would have been more sound if
President Clinton had been President of Israel, rather
than President of the United States. Indeed, President
Clinton received more pressure from the Israeli
government, Israelis, and Israeli sympathizers for a
pardon for Jonathan Pollard than for Marc Rich and
Pincus Green. Presumably, President Clinton was
representing U.S. interests when he declined to pardon
Pollard. While it would certainly not have been
inappropriate to take many concerns into consideration,
one would have expected President Clinton to continue
to put U.S. interests above all others when considering
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Rich and Green pardons.
LThere were a number of other problems with
President Clinton's reliance on statements of support
from Israeli and Jewish officials. First, as discussed
throughout this report, it appears that Marc Rich
carefully cultivated support by making large financial
contributions to political candidates and charitable
groups, in some cases making his financial support
contingent on their support for his pardon. In other
cases, individuals voicing support for Rich were
misled, and had no idea that their support would be
used to obtain a pardon. Finally, as explained
previously, it appears that the President has grossly
exaggerated the extent to which Prime Minister Barak
pressed him to issue the Rich pardon. President Clinton
even misinformed his staff on January 19 that Prime
Minister Barak had raised the Marc Rich issue, when in
reality, it was President Clinton who raised the Rich
pardon with Barak.
Given the fact that every reason that the President offered
for the Rich pardon was either misleading or inaccurate, the
President's column added to the public furor over the pardons.
Given the President's inability to provide any factually
accurate or convincing justification for the Rich pardon, the
public, and the Committee, are left wondering what the
President's true motivations were.\871\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\871\ In a televised interview, Roger Clinton made the following
statement about the Marc Rich pardon:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GWell, it was surprising, I can't--but I'm not saying it
was wrong. I have talked to my brother about it, not in
detail, but he has explained to me the reasons, the
nonpersonal reasons--because I don't need to know the
personal ones--but he has explained to me how he was right
in doing it, and he thought that he was right, specially
based on all the people that had written him about it.
Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, June 21, 2001). Roger
Clinton's reference to the ``personal reasons'' for President Clinton's
action is noteworthy. While Roger Clinton has limited credibility, as
the President's brother, he would have reason to know whether President
Clinton had hidden motives for issuing the Marc Rich and Pincus Green
pardons. However, it is unclear, what, if any, ``personal reasons'' the
President had for issuing the pardons.
V. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS
GREEN INVESTIGATION
The Committee's investigation of the pardons of Marc Rich
and Pincus Green was hampered by a number of Fifth Amendment
claims and other refusals to cooperate with the Committee.
A. Marc Rich
On February 15, 2001, Chairman Burton directed a letter to
Marc Rich, asking him to testify before the Committee and waive
attorney-client privilege with respect to documents relating to
his efforts to obtain a pardon. On February 27, 2001, Laurence
Urgenson, counsel for Mr. Rich, informed the Committee that
because of the various criminal investigations into Mr. Rich's
activities, Rich would not waive his attorney-client privilege,
or appear before the Committee.\872\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\872\ Letter from Laurence A. Urgenson, Counsel for Marc Rich,
Kirkland & Ellis, to James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt.
Reform (Feb. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Pincus Green
On August 27, 2001, Chairman Burton sent a letter to Pincus
Green, requesting that he participate in an interview with
Committee staff.\873\ Green never responded to this request.
Given that Green apparently still lives outside of the United
States, the Committee has not been able to serve him with a
subpoena requiring the production of documents or testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\873\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Pincus Green (Aug. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Jack Quinn
Jack Quinn cooperated with the initial phase of the
Committee's investigation, testifying at both the February 8,
2001, and March 1, 2001, hearings. Quinn also produced a number
of documents to the Committee regarding his work for Marc Rich
and Pincus Green. However, Quinn also withheld hundreds of
pages from the Committee, claiming that they were covered by
the attorney-client privilege. Quinn and three other law firms
which had represented Marc Rich also made similar arguments to
try to withhold the documents from the grand jury investigating
the Rich and Green pardons. In December 2001, Federal District
Court Judge Denny Chin overruled the claims of privilege by
Quinn and the other lawyers, and directed them to produce the
subpoenaed records to the grand jury. On December 17, 2001,
Chairman Burton requested that Quinn and three other law firms
representing Rich to produce to the Committee any documents
they produced to the grand jury in response to Judge Chin's
ruling.
On February 7, 2002, Quinn produced hundreds of pages of
documents to the Committee which he had withheld for over a
year. The documents were highly significant, and raised serious
questions about Quinn's work on the Rich case, including
whether Quinn was going to receive money from Rich, contrary to
assurances given by Quinn at the Committee's February 8, 2001,
hearing. On February 19, 2002, Chairman Burton asked Quinn to
participate in a voluntary interview with Committee staff
regarding the documents he had turned over. On March 5, 2002,
Quinn's counsel Victoria Toensing informed Committee staff that
Quinn would not participate in an interview with Committee
staff. It is disturbing that Quinn withheld documents from the
Committee for over a year, and then refused to answer questions
about those documents when they were finally turned over to the
Committee. Quinn's refusal to answer questions about these
documents creates an impression that Quinn is still attempting
to conceal relevant information from the Committee about his
work on the Marc Rich case. In an attempt to obtain further
information from Quinn, the Committee issued a document
subpoena to him on March 6, 2002.
D. Denise Rich
On February 5, 2001, Chairman Burton submitted a list of
written questions to Denise Rich regarding her efforts to win a
pardon for her ex-husband.\874\ Chairman Burton sent this
letter in an attempt to obtain information from Mrs. Rich
without calling her to testify at a public hearing. On February
7, 2001, Committee staff met with Carol Elder Bruce, counsel
for Denise Rich. Bruce informed Committee staff that Rich would
be invoking her Fifth Amendment rights rather than answer the
questions posed to her by the Chairman. Bruce also informed the
Committee staff that Rich was ``privy to a number of private
conversations that might be of interest'' to the
Committee.\875\ She further informed the Committee that Rich
had given a large amount of money with respect to the Clintons,
including an ``enormous sum'' of money to the Clinton
Library.\876\ However, Bruce denied that Rich had any intent to
bribe President Clinton. Later that day, Bruce sent a letter to
Chairman Burton in which she confirmed that ``Ms. Rich is
asserting her privilege under the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution not to be a witness against herself and,
accordingly, will not be answering any questions of the
Chairman or the Committee.'' \877\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\875\ Notes of meeting with Carol Elder Bruce, Counsel for Denise
Rich, Tighe Patton Armstrong & Teasdale (Feb. 7, 2001).
\874\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Carol Elder Bruce, Counsel for Denise Rich, Tighe
Patton Armstrong & Teasdale (Feb. 5, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\876\ Id.
\877\ Letter from Carol Elder Bruce, Counsel for Denise Rich, Tighe
Patton Armstrong & Teasdale, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman,
Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 7, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Beth Dozoretz
After the Committee learned of Beth Dozoretz's involvement
in the Rich pardon matter at its February 8, 2001, hearing,
Committee staff attempted to interview Dozoretz. She refused to
answer calls from Committee staff, and accordingly, on February
16, 2001, Chairman Burton sent a letter to Dozoretz requesting
her to participate in an interview.\878\ On February 20, 2001,
Tom Green, counsel for Dozoretz, called Committee staff and
stated that Dozoretz declined to be interviewed. Accordingly,
on February 23, 2001, Chairman Burton issued a subpoena to
Dozoretz requiring her to testify before a hearing of the
Committee on March 1, 2001. On February 26, 2001, Mr. Green
wrote to the Chairman to inform him that Dozoretz ``has elected
to invoke her constitutional privilege not to testify.'' \879\
When Chairman Burton informed Green that he intended to call
Dozoretz to invoke her Fifth Amendment rights publicly,\880\
Green sent a letter requesting that Dozoretz be excused from
her appearance.\881\ However, the Chairman required Dozoretz to
testify for two main reasons: first, a letter from counsel
stating that a client will invoke the Fifth Amendment if called
is not a satisfactory invocation of the Fifth Amendment; and
second, the Committee could not be certain that Dozoretz would
actually take the Fifth if called to testify, and accordingly
had a responsibility to call her to determine whether or not
she would actually invoke her Fifth Amendment rights. On March
1, 2001, Dozoretz appeared before the Committee and invoked her
Fifth Amendment rights rather than testify about her role in
the Rich and Green pardons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\878\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Beth Dozoretz, former Finance Chair, Democratic
National Committee (Feb. 16, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\879\ Letter from Thomas C. Green, Counsel for Beth Dozoretz,
Sidley & Austin, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt.
Reform (Feb. 26, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\880\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Thomas C. Green, Counsel for Beth Dozoretz, Sidley &
Austin (Feb. 26, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\881\ Letter from Thomas C. Green, Counsel for Beth Dozoretz,
Sidley & Austin, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt.
Reform (Feb. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. Avner Azulay
Avner Azulay was a key participant in the effort of Marc
Rich and Pincus Green to obtain a pardon. Since Azulay resides
outside of the United States, the Committee was not able to
compel Azulay's testimony. However, on March 8, 2001, Chairman
Burton sent a letter to Azulay requesting that he participate
in an interview with Committee staff.\882\ On March 15, 2001,
Azulay responded by referring the Committee to his lawyer in
New York, Robert Morvillo.\883\ Committee staff then had a
number of communications with Morvillo attempting to arrange an
interview of Azulay. The Committee was initially informed that
Azulay was undergoing medical treatment, and was unable to
participate in an interview. However, over the course of the
negotiations with Morvillo, it became clear that Azulay had no
intention of cooperating with the committee. In a final
discussion on February 28, 2002, Morvillo confirmed that Azulay
would not participate in an interview with Committee staff.
Given his key role in enlisting support for the Rich and Green
pardons among Israeli leaders, Azulay's refusal to cooperate
with the Committee's investigation has had a significant
negative impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\882\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Mar. 8, 2001)
(Exhibit 118).
\883\ Letter from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to the
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 15, 2001)
(Exhibit 119).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. Peter Kadzik
The Committee only learned of Peter Kadzik's role in
lobbying for the Rich and Green pardons after receiving records
from his law firm, Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky, which
reflected Kadzik's work on the matter. On Friday, February 23,
2001, Committee staff left a message with Kadzik's attorney
informing him that Kadzik would be called to testify at the
Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing. On Monday, February 26,
Chairman Burton sent a letter to Kadzik formally notifying him
that he would be called to testify.\884\ At 7:40 p.m. on
February 27, 2001, only 36 hours before the March 1 hearing,
and without so much as a telephone call from Kadzik or his
attorneys to Committee staff, Kadzik sent a response to the
Chairman, declining to testify because he was to be in
California for a meeting.\885\ Upon receiving this information,
Chairman Burton issued a subpoena for Kadzik's attendance at
the hearing.\886\ Despite the fact that Committee staff
informed Kadzik's attorneys that the Chairman would subpoena
Kadzik to attend the hearing, Kadzik boarded a plane for
California on the morning of February 28, 2001. Accordingly,
the Committee provided the subpoena to the U.S. Marshals
Service for service upon Kadzik. When Kadzik exited his plane
in San Francisco, he was served by a U.S. Marshal. He then
boarded the next plane for Washington, and arrived in time to
testify at the Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing. While the
Committee was able to serve Kadzik and receive testimony from
him, his attempts to avoid compulsory process were unseemly.
Kadzik declined to testify voluntarily. Then, when he was
informed that the Committee would issue a subpoena to compel
his attendance at the hearing, he left Washington, mistakenly
assuming that the Committee would not be able to serve him.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\884\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin &
Oshinsky (Feb. 26, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\885\ Letter from Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin &
Oshinsky, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform
(Feb. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\886\ Subpoena from House Comm. on Govt. Reform to Peter Kadzik,
Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky (Feb. 27, 2001) (within
Appendix II).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. Terry McAuliffe
In a letter dated February 16, 2001, Chairman Burton
requested Terry McAuliffe to participate in an interview with
Committee staff regarding the Rich and Green pardons,
specifically regarding Denise Rich's contributions to the
Clinton Library.\887\ Shortly thereafter, Richard Ben-Veniste,
McAuliffe's attorney, contacted Committee staff to state that
he wanted to wait until the Committee reached an accommodation
with the Clinton Library regarding access to the Library's
information, before he decided whether to make McAuliffe
available. On March 22, 2001, Chairman Burton informed Ben-
Veniste that after obtaining information from the Clinton
Library, he still wanted McAuliffe to participate in an
interview with Committee staff.\888\ On March 23, 2001, Ben-
Veniste responded to state that he wanted more information
regarding what the Committee sought from McAuliffe.\889\ The
Committee's Chief Counsel provided this information in a letter
dated March 30, 2001.\890\ Nevertheless, on April 11, 2001,
Ben-Veniste sent a reply stating that ``it does not appear that
a personal interview with the staff is warranted at this time.
Mr. McAuliffe wishes you to know that his obligations as
Chairman of the Democratic National Committee to help elect a
Democratic majority to the House and Senate are fully occupying
his time at the present.'' \891\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\887\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, Weil
Gotshal & Manges (Feb. 16, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\888\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, Weil
Gotshal & Manges (Mar. 22, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\889\ Letter from Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe,
Weil Gotshal & Manges, to James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on
Govt. Reform (Mar. 23, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\890\ Letter from James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt.
Reform, to Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, Weil
Gotshal & Manges (Mar. 30, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\891\ Letter from Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe,
Weil Gotshal & Manges, to James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on
Govt. Reform (Apr. 11, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Exhibits referred to follow:]
CHAPTER TWO
ROGER CLINTON'S INVOLVEMENT IN LOBBYING FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE
Roger Clinton engaged in a systematic effort to trade on his
brother's name during the Clinton Administration.
President Clinton encouraged Roger Clinton to
capitalize on their relationship. At the beginning of his
second term, President Clinton instructed Roger Clinton to use
his connections to the Administration to gain financial
advantage. According to the lawyer for former Arkansas State
Senator George Locke: ``Roger related that Bill Clinton had
instructed him that since this was his last term in office,
Roger should find a way to make a living and use his
relationship with the President to his advantage.'' By
suggesting that Roger Clinton exploit his name, Bill Clinton
encouraged the conduct described in this chapter. Roger Clinton
apparently took this advice to heart, telling one person from
whom he solicited money that he and the President ``had only
four years to get things done'' and that they did not care
``about ethics or what appearances were.''
Roger Clinton received substantial sums of money
from foreign governments solely because he was the President's
brother. When the FBI interviewed him, Roger Clinton admitted
that since the beginning of the Clinton Administration, he had
received substantial sums of money from foreign governments.
Clinton told the FBI that ``he knows he receives these
invitations [to make paid appearances in foreign countries]
strictly because he is the First Brother of the President of
the United States.'' Clinton also informed the FBI that in
addition to receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars for
musical performances from foreign governments, he also received
money for President Clinton from foreign governments. Roger
Clinton told the FBI that he had to be instructed repeatedly by
the President or White House staff that the President was not
permitted to receive cash from foreign governments.
Roger Clinton received at least $335,000 in
unexplained travelers checks, many of which were purchased
overseas and likely imported illegally. The Committee uncovered
at least $335,000 in travelers checks deposited in Roger
Clinton's bank account. Most of these travelers checks
originated overseas, largely from Taiwan, South Korea, and
Venezuela. The travelers checks were not restrictively endorsed
by the purchaser but were instead given to Roger Clinton blank.
This method of transferring large sums of money to Roger
Clinton appears designed to conceal the fact that the funds
originated overseas and probably violated criminal statutes
requiring reports of the importation of monetary instruments.
Roger Clinton has refused to provide the Committee with any
explanation of why he received these funds. These suspicious
transactions require a complete and thorough investigation by
law enforcement authorities, especially in light of his
admissions to the FBI about receiving money from foreign
governments.
Roger Clinton likely violated federal law by failing
to register as required under the Lobbying Disclosure Act. One
company paid Roger Clinton $30,000 to lobby President Clinton
and others to loosen government restrictions on travel to Cuba.
Although his activity appears to meet the criteria outlined in
the statute for those required to disclose their contacts with
covered executive branch officials, Roger Clinton did not
register as a lobbyist and did not disclose his paid lobbying
contacts with his brother. His failure to register, therefore,
needs to be investigated carefully and completely by the
Department of Justice.
Roger Clinton participated in a plot to obtain a
$35,000 per month contract in exchange for delivering a cabinet
secretary to a speaking event. The FBI briefly investigated
Roger Clinton's involvement in a scheme with Arkansas lawyer
Larry Wallace to pressure John Katopodis, promoter of an
Alabama airport project. Clinton and Wallace attempted to
obtain a $35,000 per month contract in exchange for Clinton's
promise to ensure that Secretary of Transportation Rodney
Slater would speak at a conference sponsored by Katopodis'
organization of local governments. When Katopodis refused to
pay and Slater subsequently refused to acknowledge the
invitation, Katopodis suspected that Clinton and Wallace were
to blame. Wallace had told him that his project would remain at
a standstill until Katopodis ``showed him the money.''
Roger Clinton lobbied for the release from prison of Rosario
Gambino, a notorious heroin dealer and organized crime figure.
Rosario Gambino was a major drug trafficker. Rosario
Gambino has been convicted in the United States and Italy of
heroin trafficking. Before being sentenced to 45 years in
federal prison, Gambino associated with known members of
organized crime both in Italy and the United States. His
associates have described him as a member of the Sicilian
Mafia. When his brothers were convicted of racketeering,
murder, illegal gambling, loan sharking, and heroin trafficking
in 1994, witnesses described them as ``the main link between
Mafia heroin traffickers in Sicily and the American Mafia.''
Roger Clinton received at least $50,000 from the
Gambino family, and he expected to receive more if he succeeded
in getting Rosario Gambino out of prison. Tommaso ``Tommy''
Gambino, the son of Rosario Gambino, approached Roger Clinton
to help win the release of Rosario Gambino from prison. Tommy
Gambino promised Roger Clinton a substantial financial reward
if he was successful. Even though he never was successful,
Tommy Gambino provided Roger Clinton with $50,000, a gold Rolex
watch, and an undisclosed amount of ``expense money.''
Roger Clinton attempted to use his relationship to
the President to influence the decisionmaking of the United
States Parole Commission (``USPC''). Roger Clinton lobbied the
Parole Commission to grant parole to Gambino. While lobbying
Parole Commission staff, Roger Clinton informed them that
President Clinton was aware of his efforts on behalf of Rosario
Gambino and that the President had suggested that he contact
the Parole Commission members directly. Although the Commission
staff tried to insulate the Commissioners from undue influence,
Roger Clinton clearly attempted to use his relationship to the
President to influence the Commission improperly and win
Gambino's release.
The Chief of Staff of the Parole Commission hindered
the FBI's investigation. In 1998, the FBI began investigating
Roger Clinton's contacts with the Parole Commission. However,
it met resistance from Marie Ragghianti, the Chief of Staff of
the Parole Commission. Ragghianti, who had participated in
meetings with Roger Clinton on the Gambino case, objected to
the FBI investigation and successfully halted an FBI plan to
have an undercover agent meet with Clinton posing as a Parole
Commission staffer. She also attempted to keep the FBI from
recording a meeting between Roger Clinton and a Parole
Commission staffer. Ragghianti's efforts may have kept the FBI
from reaching a full understanding of Roger Clinton's
involvement in the Gambino case.
Roger Clinton lied to FBI agents investigating his
contacts with the Parole Commission and his relationship with
the Gambino family. When interviewed by the FBI in 1999, Roger
Clinton said that he had never represented to anyone at the
Parole Commission that the President was aware of his contacts
with the Commission on behalf of Rosario Gambino. This self-
serving claim is contradicted by contemporaneous, written
memoranda detailing Clinton's contacts as well as by the vivid
and credible recollections of Parole Commission staff. Clinton
also lied about the purpose of a $50,000 check from the
Gambinos, which he deposited on the day of the FBI's interview.
While it is unclear whether he deposited the check before or
after the interview, Clinton told the agents that Tommy Gambino
had offered to loan him money for a down payment on his house.
He repeated this explanation to the media when news of the
money became public in 2001. However, after reviewing both
Clinton's and Gambino's bank records, the Committee has found
no evidence that Clinton used the $50,000 for a down payment or
that he ever repaid any of the money. Accordingly, his claim to
the FBI that the money was merely a loan is false. During his
interview, Clinton also told the FBI agents three separate and
contradictory stories in response to questions about his
receipt of a Rolex watch from Tommy Gambino before finally
producing a Rolex to the agents and claiming he had bought it
in Tijuana, Mexico.
Roger Clinton apparently lobbied the White House to
grant a commutation to Rosario Gambino. In the last days of the
Clinton Administration--after Roger Clinton had failed to win
parole for Rosario Gambino and after he had received a Rolex
watch and $50,000 from the Gambino family--the White House
received a petition for commutation for Rosario Gambino.
Documents indicate that the White House lawyer responsible for
clemency matters requested a criminal background check on
Gambino, which is normally done when some serious consideration
is being given to a grant of clemency. The obvious and logical
inference that explains how the Gambino petition garnered that
level of attention at the White House is that Roger Clinton was
pushing for it. Because key Clinton White House staff have
refused to answer questions about this matter, it is unknown
whether Roger Clinton hand-delivered the Gambino petition as he
did with others or whether he brought it to the attention of
the White House some other way. Although the President did not
ultimately grant clemency to Gambino, the circumstances
surrounding the consideration of his petition are nevertheless
suspect. The fact that granting clemency to a mobster and
confirmed criminal like Gambino was considered at all is
disturbing enough, but the reason it was considered is even
more offensive. The Gambino family was apparently able to
purchase access to the both the parole and clemency processes
with cash payments and expensive gifts to the brother of the
President of the United States. Moreover, despite an FBI
investigation of the matter, the Justice Department has, to
date, been unwilling or unable to prosecute Clinton for any of
his activities.
Roger Clinton received a substantial portion of $225,000 that
was swindled from the Lincecum family in Clinton's name with
the promise of pardon that never came.
The Lincecum family paid $225,000 to obtain a pardon
for Garland Lincecum. In 1998, Garland Lincecum, a convicted
felon, was informed that he could purchase a presidential
pardon for $300,000. Lincecum was told that Arkansas
businessmen Dickey Morton and George Locke, who had a close
relationship with Roger Clinton, could obtain the pardon.
Lincecum borrowed $225,000 from his mother and brother and
claims that a business associate paid another $70,000 to Morton
and Locke for his pardon. The money he borrowed from his family
constituted their life savings and means of support in
retirement.
Roger Clinton received at least $43,500 in proceeds
from the Lincecums' payments to Morton and Locke. Dickey
Morton, George Locke, and Roger Clinton divided the funds among
themselves with Roger Clinton receiving a total of $25,500 in
checks and $18,000 in cash. The Lincecums paid the checks to a
company called CLM, which they were told stands for Clinton,
Locke, and Morton. Dickey Morton then disbursed the funds from
the company's bank account to Clinton, Locke, and himself.
Roger Clinton has falsely denied any relationship with CLM
while offering no explanation of why he received this
substantial share of an elderly woman's retirement savings
through CLM.
Roger Clinton may have been involved in a scheme to
defraud the Lincecums. Garland Lincecum never received a
pardon, and there is no evidence that Dickey Morton, George
Locke, or Roger Clinton ever submitted Lincecum's name to the
Justice Department or White House for consideration for a
pardon. Therefore, it appears that the Lincecums were the
victims of a scam perpetrated by Morton, Locke, and perhaps
Roger Clinton as well.
Roger Clinton may have been involved in lobbying for as many as
13 other pardons and commutations.
Roger Clinton publicly admitted involvement in six
clemency efforts, but the evidence connects him to many more.
Roger Clinton told the media that he had asked for pardons for
approximately six close friends and that he did so because of
concern for them and not for any personal gain. For example,
Roger Clinton lobbied for pardons for George Locke and Dan
Lasater, two associates from Arkansas who were convicted of
drug offenses together with Clinton himself in the 1980s.
However, the Committee has obtained evidence connecting Clinton
to many more pardon seekers. Some of the cases involve people
who were not his personal friends and some involve
solicitations or offers of money and lucrative business
opportunities in exchange for his ability to place a clemency
petition in front of the President.
Roger Clinton was asked to lobby for a pardon for
horse breeder J.T. Lundy in exchange for secretly sharing
profits in a lucrative business venture. Lundy promised Clinton
a share of the profits from a Venezuelan coal deal in exchange
for Clinton's help in obtaining a pardon for him. Lundy
suggested a scheme whereby the payments to Clinton could be
concealed by placing his share of the profits in Dan Lasater's
name. Lasater, who owned a 20 percent interest in the venture,
discussed the possibility of a pardon for Lundy with Roger
Clinton.
Roger Clinton delivered the pardon petition of
former Reagan EPA official Rita Lavelle to the White House.
According to Lavelle, an intermediary for Roger Clinton asked
her for a $30,000 fee for him to hand-carry her petition to the
President. Lavelle responded that she could not afford to pay
any money, but she said Clinton agreed to deliver the petition
anyway. On the last night of the Clinton presidency, Roger
Clinton asked Lavelle ``do you have $100,000 to get this
through?'' Being bankrupt, however, Lavelle laughed at the
question. She did not pay Clinton any money and did not receive
a pardon.
Roger Clinton was asked to lobby for a pardon for
Houston real estate developer John Ballis, and Ballis' petition
was seriously considered at the White House. After being
convicted of S&L fraud, Ballis married a former employee of Dan
Lasater and friend of Roger Clinton. Through his wife's
connection, Ballis sought Roger Clinton's help. Clinton first
lobbied for Ballis before the U.S. Parole Commission, sometimes
during the same meetings in which he lobbied for mobster
Rosario Gambino. Ballis credited Clinton with helping him
obtain early release and sought his help in obtaining a
presidential pardon to eliminate his parole supervision and
restitution payments. While he was not granted any form of
clemency, the President reviewed his petition, and a White
House lawyer called Ballis' lawyer two nights before
inauguration day to ask if Ballis would accept a grant of
clemency that left intact his obligation to pay restitution.
Roger Clinton lobbied his brother to grant clemency
to Steven Griggs, the son of the chief of an unrecognized
American Indian tribe, who was in prison on drug charges. Like
Ballis, Steven Griggs was not a close friend of Roger Clinton's
but merely someone who knew someone who knew him. Griggs also
did not receive clemency, but Roger Clinton helped ensure that
Griggs' petition was brought to the attention of the President
even though Griggs had been a fugitive for a year before being
sentenced. Griggs argued in his petition that he had received
an unusually harsh sentence but failed to mention that he had
fled after his conviction. It is not clear what motivated Roger
Clinton to assist Griggs, but some evidence suggests that the
tribe may have planned to open a casino when and if it were to
become recognized by the federal government.
According to his former lawyer, Arkansas restaurant
operator Phillip Young was approached with an offer to obtain a
pardon through Roger Clinton for $30,000. While Young denied to
Committee staff that he was actually approached by anyone with
such a proposal, his denial is not as credible as his former
attorney's version of events.
Both the White House and the Justice Department hindered the
Committee's investigation of Roger Clinton by improperly
refusing to produce key documents.
For months, the Bush White House prevented the
National Archives from producing even non-deliberative,
clemency-related records from the Clinton administration. The
Committee did not learn that President Clinton had been
considering a clemency petition from notorious mobster Rosario
Gambino until after Archives personnel ``inadvertently''
produced documents that President Bush's Counsel had sought to
withhold. The accidental production also included documents
relating to three other previously unknown individuals who had
sought clemency through Roger Clinton. The Bush Administration
did manage to retain four additional deliberative Gambino
documents from the files of the Clinton White House, refusing
to produce the records even though they were not subject to any
executive privilege claim.
The Ashcroft Justice Department produced certain
Gambino-related records, but inexplicably withheld others.
After producing sensitive documents such as U.S. Parole
Commission files related to Rosario Gambino and a summary of an
FBI interview with Roger Clinton, the Justice Department ceased
producing additional documents, claiming they were related to
an ongoing criminal investigation, even though the Clinton-
Gambino matter had reportedly been closed in 2000.
INTRODUCTION
Unlike other presidential relatives discussed in this
report, Roger Clinton was fairly unsuccessful in actually
obtaining clemency for anyone but himself. Nevertheless, the
Committee investigated his activities because the substantial
number of credible allegations of influence peddling demanded
further scrutiny. Even though Roger Clinton was unable to
deliver actual grants of clemency, he was able to deliver the
time and attention of the President and his senior staff. Roger
Clinton's ability to circumvent the normal process was worth a
great deal of money to those hoping for clemency, and he
exploited it for his personal gain. The damage done by this
exploitation is even worse in light of evidence suggesting that
President Clinton was aware of and even encouraged it. While
investigating these matters, the Committee also discovered
several potential violations of law and suspicious
transactions, some of which are not directly related to
clemency requests. However, these non-clemency matters are
detailed briefly in this chapter because they provide evidence
of a pattern of behavior by Roger Clinton that is instructive
when considering the evidence in the clemency-related matters.
For a variety of reasons, including his 1985 conviction for
cocaine distribution, Roger Clinton was generally mocked and
regarded with derision during President Clinton's two terms in
office. When Roger Clinton's involvement in lobbying for
presidential pardons came to light, it was often treated with
humor in the press and was fodder for late-night talk show
monologues. However, as the Committee investigated these
allegations, it became clear that Clinton was involved in
serious and reckless misconduct constituting a systematic
effort to cash in on his fame as the President's brother. Roger
Clinton's efforts to use his status as the President's brother
to try to win clemency for an organized crime figure represents
one of the darkest examples of influence peddling ever reviewed
by the Committee. His other seamy business dealings, along with
his frequent acceptance of large cash payments from foreign
governments, only compounds the disturbing appearance that
access to the President was up for sale. That the President
could have been completely unaware of these sordid dealings is
implausible at best. Yet, too often, public disclosure of this
type of behavior has prompted laughter rather than stern
rebukes. To dismiss Roger Clinton's activities as merely the
comical bumbling of Bill Clinton's less-gifted half-brother,
however, runs the risk of seriously undermining public
confidence in the integrity of government.
At the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, Clinton
attempted to obtain grants of clemency for a number of
individuals, many of whom he barely knew. While he appears to
have been motivated by friendship in some instances, many of
the others appear to be motivated by the promise of financial
reward. The Committee has collected evidence indicating that
Roger Clinton was connected to pardon or commutation requests
for at least 15 different individuals, excluding himself: John
Ballis, Rosario Gambino, Steven Griggs, Dan Lasater, Rita
Lavelle, Garland Lincecum, George Locke, Blume Loe, J.T. Lundy,
Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan, Jim McClain, William McCord, Mark St.
Pe, Mitchell Wood, and Phillip Young. For his part, Roger
Clinton has admitted only to leaving a list of six pardon
requests at the White House for his brother's consideration.\1\
The Committee has been unable to obtain a copy of the list \2\
or confirm which names were on the list.\3\ Whether Roger
Clinton provided President Clinton with a list of six names is
largely irrelevant, however, as the Committee has compiled
evidence clearly demonstrating that of the 15 cases with some
connection to Roger Clinton, he actually pressed for grants of
clemency for at least eight individuals.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Roger Clinton Says He
Promised Pardons, L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 2001, at A1.
\2\ In attempting to obtain a copy of the list from the files of
the former Administration, the Committee requested from the National
Archives, ``All records relating to any requests for clemency made by
Hugh Rodham or Roger Clinton on behalf of any individual.'' Letter from
the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to John W.
Carlin, Archivist of the United States, National Archives and Records
Administration (Mar. 8, 2001) (within Appendix I). On March 14, 2001,
the Committee also issued a subpoena to Roger Clinton seeking, inter
alia, ``all records relating to any efforts made by you, or on your
behalf, to assist in the obtaining of any grant of executive clemency''
(within Appendix II).
\3\ The Committee sent Roger Clinton a letter requesting answers to
a number of questions, including, ``Please list all individuals on
whose behalf you ever requested executive clemency.'' Letter from the
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Roger C.
Clinton (June 25, 2001) (within Appendix I). The reply from his lawyer
refused to answer any of the questions, stating, ``Like anyone who
values his own privacy and who respects the privacy of those close to
him, Mr. Clinton will not submit willingly to a general warrant.''
Letter from Bart H. Williams, Munger, Tolles & Olson, to the Honorable
Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 27, 2001) (within
Appendix I).
\4\ The eight individuals are Rosario Gambino, Steven Griggs, Dan
Lasater, Rita Lavelle, George Locke, Joseph McKernan, William McCord,
and Mark St. Pe. Their cases are discussed in more detail below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although Roger Clinton failed to obtain the grants of
clemency for which lobbied, he did receive clemency for his own
cocaine conviction. While the Committee did not investigate it
directly, President Clinton's grant of clemency to his brother
now appears to be one of his most egregious last-minute
pardons. Roger Clinton was involved in potentially illegal
conduct and was under active investigation by the FBI at the
time that he received his pardon. The fact that he was involved
in the type of conduct described in this report should have
disqualified him from receiving clemency. Moreover, the media
widely reported in August 2001 that Roger Clinton had entered
rehabilitation for chronic cocaine abuse.\5\ Obviously, if
Roger Clinton was engaged in illegal cocaine use in January
2001, it would indicate that he was neither rehabilitated nor
remorseful for his cocaine distribution crimes, making him an
unsuitable candidate for a presidential pardon under President
Clinton's own guidelines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See, e.g., Lloyd Grove, The Reliable Source: First Paula
Poundstone, then Ben Affleck, now Roger Clinton, Wash. Post, Aug. 10,
2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The focus of this chapter, though, is Roger Clinton's
involvement in lobbying for others in their attempts to obtain
executive clemency. The sheer number of people who attempted to
purchase or were solicited to purchase a pardon through Roger
Clinton gives credence to allegations that he was engaged in a
systematic effort to capitalize on his relationship to the
President of the United States. Moreover, the Committee's
investigation has revealed that his attempts to sell his access
to the President were not confined to clemency-related matters.
Indeed, Roger Clinton repeatedly treated his relationship to
President Clinton as a commodity to be sold to the highest
bidder. This disturbing pattern of behavior began shortly after
Bill Clinton became President and apparently continued until
Bill Clinton's last day in office. Roger Clinton's behavior was
unseemly at best, but it is even more troubling is that the
President himself appears to have instigated and encouraged
this behavior.
I. ROGER CLINTON'S PATTERN OF TRADING ON HIS BROTHER'S NAME
When the FBI interviewed Roger Clinton in conjunction with
its investigation of his relationship with the Gambino family,
Clinton made a number of startling admissions. He admitted that
since early in President Clinton's term, foreign governments
had paid him hundreds of thousands of dollars. Clinton claimed
that these payments were for musical performances but
acknowledged that he knew he was receiving the money only
because he was the President's brother. Roger Clinton also
admitted that foreign governments had given him gifts for
President Clinton and that he had kept some of those gifts for
his own use. He informed the FBI that early in President
Clinton's term, he received cash payments from foreign
governments, which he was to give to the President. White House
staff had to instruct him that the President could not accept
cash payments from foreign countries. Some of Clinton's conduct
is explained in his interview with FBI investigators:
[Roger Clinton] has made a number of business trips to
foreign countries over the last few years. Clinton
stated that he is a musician and plays with a six piece
band. He has received invitations from Presidents and
other foreign government leaders from between 10-12
different countries. Clinton advised he knows he
receives these invitations strictly because he is the
First Brother of the President of the United States.
Clinton advised that the President is aware of the
invitations, in general, but may not know each time he
takes a trip. Clinton stated that when he received an
invitation to visit a country he is offered money by
the country to make the trip. He stated that he would
not accept the invitation unless he could earn the
money. He insists on performing with his band while
visiting the country. He is a musician and wants to be
recognized for his music. Clinton stated he receives a
minimum of $25,000 per performance when he travels. He
may play a few nights during a given trip. He likes to
perform for children during these trips and attempts to
make those arrangements.
Clinton stated he has traveled to South Korea
approximately six times. He has gone as the personal
guest of President Kim Dae Jong (phonetic). He has been
paid as much as $200,000 for performing on a trip. He
has also traveled to Japan, Argentina, and 8 to 10
other countries. Clinton stated that the country
extending the invitation usually pays for him and his
six piece band to fly to the country and perform. The
host country usually pays all their expenses and
provides a Presidential security detail while they are
there.
Clinton stated he has received payment for these
performances in a number of ways. He has received
payment by check in United States dollars, cash in
United States dollars and also in the currency of the
host country. Clinton stated in some instances the
foreign government even provides extra funds to cover
the costs of taxes that would be assessed against the
money. Clinton advised he did not want to provide
specific details on what exactly he is paid for his
performances because that is ``personal.''
Clinton stated that when he receives an invitation to a
country he always calls the National Security Council
to get the clearance to make the trip. He stated that
they usually say no at the very beginning, then he
talks them into agreeing to let him make the trip.
Clinton stated that he always provides the Security
Council with an itinerary whenever he makes one of
these trips.
* * *
Clinton advised that while he visits foreign countries
as their guest he is often presented with all kinds of
gifts. Examples he gave were vases, sheep skin rugs and
many more he could not remember. He also received gifts
for the President which he has sometimes kept. Clinton
advised that in his earliest trips, at the beginning of
the Presidents [sic] term, he would be offered money
for the President from some of the foreign government
officials he was visiting. He stated years ago he did
not know he could not accept money for the President.
Clinton stated he was told by either the President or
his staff that he could not bring money back from a
foreign country for the President. He advised he was
told on a couple of occasions to send the money back
because the President was not allowed to accept money
from a foreign country.
Clinton was asked if he reported the money he earned on
his foreign country visits as income on his United
States tax returns. He stated that yes he reported the
income. He was asked if he claimed the expenses on his
tax returns as well. Clinton stated that he only
claimed the expenses that he actually paid for on his
tax returns. Clinton further advised that years ago he
had some tax problems. At one point he owed between
$40,000 to $60,000 dollars [sic] in taxes. He made
arrangements with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to
pay of [sic] the tax debt, and does not want to have
any more problems.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000007-8 (Summary of Interview
with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).
Roger Clinton's statements to the FBI make it clear that
from the earliest days of his brother's presidency, he used his
fame and proximity to power to make as much money as possible.
Over the next eight years, Roger Clinton accepted hundreds of
thousands of dollars from foreign governments in exchange for
``musical performances.'' Clearly, the payments made to Clinton
far exceeded the actual value of his performances. Presumably,
the foreign governments paying Roger Clinton were attempting to
curry favor with the Clinton Administration by paying large
sums of money to the President's brother. Whether these
governments found increased favor or access with the Clinton
Administration is unknown. However, this pattern of conduct
clearly establishes that Roger Clinton was attempting to use
his position and access to cash in, without regard to whether
his actions were legally or ethically questionable.
Although Roger Clinton used his name to make money early in
the Clinton Administration, he apparently believed the
potential to exploit his relationship to the President was
greater than he had previously realized. Roger Clinton's
longtime friend and fellow convicted cocaine felon George Locke
told the Committee through his lawyer about a conversation in
which Roger Clinton described his determination to profit more
effectively from his status as brother of the President:
On the night of the reelection of Bill Clinton as
president, a special party was held at the Excelsior
Hotel for VIP guests. Roger Clinton invited George
Locke to the party. During the course of the evening,
Roger had a conversation with George Locke. Roger
Clinton advised that during his brother's first term in
office, (although he had been invited to numerous
social gatherings as a result of being the president's
brother) Roger Clinton had never ``capitalized'' on his
relationship to the president. Further, Roger related
that Bill Clinton had instructed him that since this
was his last term in office, Roger should find a way to
make a living and use his relationship with the
President to his advantage. Bill Clinton had stressed
to Roger that whatever business endeavors Roger was
involved in, they must be legitimate concerns and not
to find himself involved in any illegal activity.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and
George Locke, Hampton and Larkowski, to David Kass, Deputy Chief
Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I).
It appears that Roger Clinton took at least part of Bill
Clinton's advice to heart. During the last term of the Clinton
presidency, Roger Clinton was involved in a number of efforts
to use his brother's name to make large amounts of money.
However, despite his brother's advice to engage only in
legitimate and legal business, Roger Clinton's activities may
have violated the law and clearly raise substantial ethical
questions.
A. Roger Clinton's Foreign Travelers Checks and Other Questionable
Sources of Income
A review of Roger Clinton's bank records shows that he
received money from a wide variety of sources, ranging from
small amounts for television and film appearances to large
amounts for lobbying his brother. However, one of the greatest
influxes of money to Roger Clinton during the Clinton
Administration came in the form of at least $335,000 in
overseas travelers checks. These transactions present a number
of troubling issues. Nevertheless, Roger Clinton has provided
no explanation of why he received these travelers checks.
First, almost all of these travelers checks
were purchased by third parties overseas, largely in
Taiwan, South Korea, and Venezuela. Why Roger Clinton
received these substantial sums of money from overseas
is unknown.
Second, the travelers checks were provided
to Roger Clinton blank. Clinton signed and
countersigned all of the checks, despite the fact that
he did not purchase the checks. Usually, the individual
who purchases travelers checks signs them when they are
purchased, so that they cannot be stolen or used by an
unauthorized individual. The fact that the buyer did
not sign them and gave them to Clinton blank suggests
that the funds were intentionally provided to Clinton
in a manner calculated to conceal their origin.
Third, the travelers checks were purchased
overseas and then imported into the United States. If a
total of $10,000 or more was imported at any one time,
then the importation should have been declared on
customs forms. However, Roger Clinton did not file any
such forms with the Customs Service.\8\ If Roger
Clinton imported these travelers checks into the United
States from overseas without filing the required forms
with the Customs Service, then he committed a serious
crime.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The Committee sought any records indicating, inter alia, that
Roger Clinton filed forms declaring the importation of more than
$10,000 into the United States. Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton,
Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to James F. Sloan, Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network Director, Department of Treasury (June 1, 2001)
(within Appendix I). The one document produced in response to this
request appears to be unrelated to the travelers checks deposited into
Roger Clinton's bank account. Letter from Albert R. Zarate, Senior
Counsel, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, to David A. Kass, Deputy
Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 8, 2001) (within Appendix
I).
\9\ 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5316 imposes an obligation on anyone who
``transports . . . monetary instruments of more than $10,000'' into the
United States or who ``receives monetary instruments of more than
$10,000 at one time transported into the United States'' to file a
report of the importation. Failure to file such a report can result in
both civil penalties under 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5321 and criminal penalties
under Sec. 5322. Monetary instruments subject to the reporting
requirement include travelers checks in any form, whether restrictively
endorsed or not. U.S. v. Larson, 110 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 1997).
The following is an accounting of the travelers checks
received by Roger Clinton, indicating the country of origin of
the checks and the name of the purchaser. Although the
Committee has been able to obtain the name of the individual
purchasing the travelers checks, it has been unable to obtain
further information regarding the purpose of the checks.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Deposited Type of Check Origin Purchaser Name Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
November 30, 1998 American Express Unknown Chen Jianxing $1,000
December 1, 1998 American Express Taiwan Huang Xian Wen $15,000
December 8, 1998 American Express Taiwan Huang Xian Wen $23,000
December 15, 1998 Citicorp Taiwan Unknown $90,000
December 15, 1998 Unknown Unknown Unknown $29,000
December 15, 1998 Visa-Sumitomo Taiwan Lin Mei Guang $4,000
December 15, 1998 American Express Taiwan Huang Xian Wen $2,000
July 12, 1999 American Express Unknown Unknown $20,000
July 12, 1999 Citicorp South Korea Sook-Eun Jang \10\ $5,000
November 30, 1999 Citicorp Taiwan Unknown $3,000
November 30, 1999 Citicorp Taiwan Unknown $10,000
November 30, 1999 Citicorp Taiwan Unknown $5,000
November 30, 1999 Visa Taiwan Unknown $1,000
November 30, 1999 Visa Taiwan Xu Jingsheng $3,000
November 30, 1999 Citicorp Venezuela Pedro Jose Garboza $38,000
Matos
November 30, 1999 Unknown Unknown Unknown $40,000
February 22, 2000 American Express Taiwan Qu Guang Yin $7,000
March 24, 2000 Citicorp Venezuela Pedro Jose Garboza $3,000
Matos
April 5, 2000 American Express Taiwan Mou Chuanxue $4,000
April 17,2000 American Express Taiwan Qu Guang Yin $13,000
April 17, 2000 American Express Unknown Suk Eun Chang $5,000
May 15, 2000 American Express Unknown Unknown $5,000
July 13, 2000 Citicorp South Korea Seung-Chul Ham $1,000
July 27, 2000 Citicorp South Korea Seung-Chul Ham $2,000
July 31, 2000 Citicorp South Korea Seung-Chul Ham $4,000
August 2, 2000 American Express Unknown Unknown $1,000
August 11, 2000 American Express Unknown Unknown $1,000
------------
Total: $335,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Roger Clinton therefore deposited in his bank accounts at
least $335,000 in travelers checks, most or all of which
originated overseas. It is possible that Clinton was provided
with even more funds in travelers checks, which were not
deposited in his bank accounts but were spent instead. Roger
Clinton has refused to answer any questions about the travelers
checks, including why they were paid to him, who paid them to
him, or whether he paid appropriate taxes on them.\11\ Given
the large amount of money involved and the attempt to conceal
its source, these circumstances give rise to a reasonable
suspicion that multiple laws may have been violated, including
those relating to declaring monetary instruments imported into
the United States and reporting the income for tax purposes.
Accordingly, the Committee believes this matter should be
investigated further by the Department of Justice, which would
have the ability to review Roger Clinton's tax records and
could potentially obtain sworn testimony from him.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ This individual is likely the same person identified as ``Suk
Eun Chang'' who purchased $5,000 in travelers checks deposited by Roger
Clinton on April 17, 2000. See also n.19 and accompanying text.
\11\ See Letter from Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform,
to Roger Clinton (June 25, 2001) (within Appendix I); Letter from Bart
H. Williams, Munger, Tolles & Olson, to the Honorable Dan Burton,
Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 27, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the $335,000 in travelers checks, Roger
Clinton has also received funds from a number of other
suspicious sources, raising questions about the legality of his
activities:
Cash: Roger Clinton deposited into his bank accounts
$85,000 in cash between February 1998 and February 2001.
Clinton claimed to the FBI that he received this cash while
traveling to foreign countries ostensibly for the purpose of
performing with his six-piece band. Like the transactions
involving blank travelers checks, these large cash transactions
give rise to reasonable suspicions that the purpose of the
payments was not legitimate. In addition, the $85,000 figure
represents only the money that Clinton deposited into his
account. It seems likely that Clinton received more money and
spent it, rather than depositing it. However, as Clinton has
refused to answer any questions from the Committee, it is
impossible to know exactly how much cash he received, from
whom, and for what purpose.
Seaway II Florida and Tony Rodham: Seaway II Florida
is a company controlled by Florida businessman Gene
Prescott.\12\ Prescott owns the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables,
Florida, as well as a number of other properties. Prescott also
has a close relationship with Hillary Clinton's brother Tony
Rodham and has an interest in Rodham's consulting business,
Tony Rodham and Associates. Between January and November 1998,
Seaway II Florida issued three checks to Roger Clinton totaling
$20,000. According to the lawyer for Seaway II Florida, Roger
Clinton was paid this money for referring business to Tony
Rodham, although neither the attorney nor Prescott could recall
the specific referral.\13\ In addition, it appears that Tony
Rodham attempted to pay Roger Clinton $25,000 personally, in
April 1998, but that the check was returned for insufficient
funds.\14\ Due to the refusal of Rodham and Clinton to
cooperate with the Committee, the purpose of the attempted
$25,000 payment is not clear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ See Telephone Interview with Gene Prescott, Owner, Biltmore
Hotel (June 5, 2001).
\13\ Telephone Interview with Daniel Ponce, Counsel for Gene
Prescott (June 29, 2001).
\14\ Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 2).
Edvard Akopyan: Edvard Akopyan is a Glendale,
California, resident who paid $61,100 to Roger Clinton between
August and December 1999. Akopyan claims that he paid the money
to Clinton because he was acting as a middleman in scheduling
Clinton's appearance at a musical concert in Kazakhstan.\15\
Akopyan stated that Clinton made one appearance in Kazakhstan
in the summer of 1999 and a second in January 2000.\16\ Akopyan
stated that the individual in Kazakhstan who provided the funds
to him for Clinton's payment was named Darkhan Berdaleav.\17\
Akopyan also stated that Roger Clinton informed him that he
checked with the State Department before he traveled to
Kazakhstan to perform.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Telephone Interview with Edvard Akopyan (June 5, 2001).
\16\ Id.
\17\ Id.
\18\ Id.
Suk Eun Chang: In December 1999, Suk Eun Chang
provided Roger Clinton with a cashier's check for $70,000.\19\
The source of the cashier's check was apparently $193,000
deposited by Chang into a bank in Los Angeles.\20\ Chang also
provided $10,000 in travelers checks to Clinton. However, the
Committee has been unable to locate Chang to ask him about the
source of this cash or the purpose of the payment to Clinton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 3).
\20\ Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 4).
These questionable sources of income, together with the
travelers checks received by Roger Clinton, should be the
subject of further investigation by the Department of Justice.
At a minimum, the government should satisfy itself that the
requisite taxes have been paid.
B. Roger Clinton's Lobbying Regarding Cuban Travel Restrictions
In the course of reviewing Roger Clinton's bank records,
the Committee learned that during 2000, Roger Clinton was paid
to lobby President Clinton regarding the restrictions on travel
to Cuba. Roger Clinton's receipt of substantial sums of money
to lobby his brother raises serious ethical and legal questions
given Clinton's failure to register as a lobbyist as required
by federal law. This arrangement also served as a precedent for
Roger Clinton's acceptance of money to lobby his brother for
grants of clemency at the end of President Clinton's term.
In June 2000, a Los Angeles-based company called Cuba
Travel Services (``CTS'') hired Roger Clinton. Michael Zuccato,
President of CTS, is a personal friend of Roger Clinton's.\21\
According to Zuccato, Roger Clinton was hired to help CTS lift
restrictions on travel to Cuba.\22\ CTS specialized in
arranging charter flights from Los Angeles to Cuba and would
substantially benefit from a loosening of legal restrictions on
such travel. A CTS affiliate, J. Perez Associates, and Roger
Clinton's company, Odgie Music, signed a consulting agreement
in which CTS retained Roger Clinton to ``provide counsel,
advice and to promote [CTS] to entities necessary to conduct
its import and export business.'' \23\ CTS agreed to pay
Clinton $5,000 per month for these services.\24\ Over the next
four months, CTS and J. Perez Associates paid Roger Clinton a
total of $30,000.\25\ According to Zuccato, Roger Clinton was
paid during this period to present information to ``his brother
and other people.'' \26\ Indeed, one invoice from Odgie Music
to J. Perez and Associates charges $5,000 for a trip made by
Roger Clinton to Washington, D.C.\27\ Although Zuccato denied
that Roger Clinton's contacts with ``his brother and other
people'' constituted ``lobbying,'' \28\ there is no other
accurate description for what Roger Clinton did. The Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995 (``the Act'') defines the term
``lobbying contact'' as:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Telephone Interview with Michael Zuccato, President, Cuba
Travel Services (June 5, 2001).
\22\ Id.
\23\ Cuba Travel Services Document Production (Consulting
Agreement) (Exhibit 5).
\24\ Id.
\25\ Bank of America Document Production (Checks from CTS and J.
Perez Associates) (Exhibit 6).
\26\ Telephone Interview with Michael Zuccato (June 5, 2001).
\27\ Cuba Travel Services Document Production (Invoice from Odgie
Music) (Exhibit 7).
\28\ Telephone Interview with Michael Zuccato, President, Cuba
Travel Services (June 5, 2001).
[A]ny oral or written communication . . . to a covered
executive branch official . . . that is made on behalf
of a client with regard to--(i) the formulation,
modification, or adoption of Federal legislation
(including legislative proposals) [or] (ii) the
formulation, modification, or adoption of a Federal
rule, regulation, Executive order, or any other
program, policy, or position of the United States
Government[.] \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(8)(a). A ``covered executive branch
official'' includes the President. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(3)(a).
Any contact Roger Clinton had with the President about easing
restrictions on travel to Cuba would certainly constitute a
communication with regard to a modification of a policy or
position of the United States. If Roger Clinton's lobbying
activities \30\ for Cuba Travel Services constituted more than
20 percent of the total work he did for the company, then he
would be ``a lobbyist'' under the provisions of the Act.\31\ As
a lobbyist who earned more than $5,500 in a six-month period
from a single client, Roger Clinton would have an obligation to
register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the
House of Representatives.\32\ A search of those filings
indicates that he did not do so.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ The term ``lobbying activity'' is broadly defined as
``lobbying contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, including
preparation and planning activities, research and other background work
that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use in contacts, and
coordination with the lobbying activities of others.'' 2 U.S.C.
Sec. 1602(7).
\31\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(10).
\32\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1603(a)(1); 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(a)(3)(A)(1); 2
U.S.C. Sec. 1603(a)(3)(b).
\33\ See Office of Public Records, United States Senate, ``Lobby
Filing Disclosure Program,'' (U.S. Lobby
Report Images for 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because Roger Clinton declined to be interviewed by the
Committee, the precise content of his discussions with
President Clinton is unknown.\34\ However, it is clear that he
was paid $30,000 to lobby the President to loosen travel
restrictions to Cuba and that he told his clients that he had,
in fact, contacted his brother on their behalf. These
circumstances warrant further investigation by law enforcement
authorities to determine whether Roger Clinton violated federal
law by failing to register as a lobbyist.\35\ Apart from his
failure to register, Roger Clinton's activity in this case was
likely legal. However, whether such activities should be legal
is another question. Even when properly disclosed, which these
contacts were not, paid lobbying of the President by close
relatives is likely to decrease public confidence in the
integrity of government. As a matter of prudence, the President
should not have agreed to be lobbied by family members who
received payment. President Clinton implicitly admitted this
principle when he asked his brother-in-law Hugh Rodham to
return money paid to lobby for the pardons of Carlos Vignali
and Glenn Braswell. The day after learning of the payments,
President Clinton issued a statement: ``Neither Hillary nor I
had any knowledge of such payments. We are deeply disturbed by
these reports and have insisted that Hugh return any moneys
received.'' \36\ The payments to Roger Clinton to lobby his
brother on travel restrictions to Cuba should be equally
disturbing for exactly the same reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ A statement in the summary of the FBI's interview with Roger
Clinton suggests that at some point, Roger discussed the Cuban trade
embargo with President Clinton:
G[Roger] Clinton recalled a conversation, the date or
approximate time of which he could not recall, he had with
his brother, Bill Clinton, who told him the [Cuban] cigar
embargo would not be lifted while he was still President.
President Clinton allegedly said ``The embargo will be
eased for food and medicine because that is the direction
the world is going, but not for cigars, not during your
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
life time [sic].''
DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000004 (Summary of Interview with Roger
Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ The penalty for such a violation is a fine of up to $50,000. 2
U.S.C. Sec. 1606.
\36\ John Solomon, Clinton Kin Returns Pardon Fee, Associated
Press, Feb. 21, 2001. See generally Chapter Three, ``Hugh Rodham's Role
in Lobbying for Grants of Executive Clemency,'' Section I.D.1., ``The
Response from Hugh Rodham.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. The Shakedown of John Katopodis
The Committee investigated another episode in which Roger
Clinton tried to exploit his Administration contacts to enrich
himself. Roger Clinton and a business associate, Larry Wallace,
pressured the president of an association of local governments
in Alabama, John Katopodis, to hire Clinton for his ability to
contact Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater and others in
the Clinton Administration. As described below, Wallace and
Clinton apparently engaged in strong-arm tactics to try to
force Clinton's hiring.
In early 1996, John Katopodis, a Harvard-educated Fulbright
Scholar,\37\ was advocating the construction of a new
international airport for Alabama.\38\ Katopodis served as
Executive Director of the Council of Cooperating Governments,
an association of city and county governments dedicated to
improving transportation in the Southeast.\39\ As part of its
efforts to publicize the airport project, the Council was
seeking a prominent guest speaker for its 1996 symposium.\40\
Local and state political figures, as well as federal agency
representatives, were planning to attend the symposium,\41\ and
Katopodis sought the Secretary of Transportation as the ideal
guest speaker.\42\ Yet, attracting the Secretary of
Transportation proved to be no easy task. While discussing the
airport project with his colleague Dr. Frank Stuart, Katopodis
was advised that Arkansas attorney Larry Wallace could be
instrumental in arranging for the Secretary's visit.\43\
Katopodis eventually received an unsolicited telephone call
from Wallace.\44\ Mr. Wallace, a self-proclaimed power broker
from Little Rock, Arkansas, was well connected to the Clinton
Administration.\45\ One of these connections included the White
House Chief of Staff at the time, Mack McLarty, Wallace's
former law partner.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Telephone Interview with John Katopodis, Executive Director,
Council of Cooperating Governments (Sept. 5, 2001).
\38\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000011 (Summary of Interview
with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
\39\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000166 (Council of Cooperating
Governments Brochure) (Exhibit 9)
\40\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000020 (Summary of Interview
with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
\41\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000091 (Symposium Schedule,
June 27, 1997) (Exhibit 11).
\42\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000011 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
\43\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000020 (Summary of Interview
with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
\44\ Id.
\45\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000011 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
\46\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000024 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Katopodis explained that he wanted Secretary of
Transportation Federico Pena to speak at a symposium on
Alabama's aviation future.\47\ Wallace agreed to use his
influence to help Katopodis draw the Secretary to the
conference.\48\ Wallace informed Katopodis that Rodney Slater
would replace Pena once President Clinton was reelected.\49\
Wallace contacted Katopodis at least eight times in late
September and early October of 1996.\50\ He advised Katopodis
to talk to Wallace's ``friend at the White House,'' \51\ Bob
Nash, the Director of Presidential Personnel.\52\ All White
House liaisons reported directly to Nash, and Wallace promised
that the transportation liaison would have an answer for
Katopodis soon.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001).
\48\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000147 (Fax from Larry
Wallace, to John Katopodis (Sept. 24, 1996)) (Exhibit 12).
\49\ Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001).
\50\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000147 (Fax from Larry
Wallace, to John Katopodis (Sept. 24, 1996)) (Exhibit 12); DOJ Document
Production FBI-RC-0000200-01 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis
(Oct. 1, 1996)) (Exhibit 13); DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000191
(Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 2, 1996)) (Exhibit
14); DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000162 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to
John Katopodis (Oct. 9, 1996)) (Exhibit 15); DOJ Document Production
FBI-RC-0000146 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 11,
1996)) (Exhibit 16); DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000169 (Fax from
Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 12, 1996)) (Exhibit 17); DOJ
Document Production FBI-RC-0000159 (Telephone message from Larry
Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 14, 1996)) (Exhibit 18); DOJ Document
Production FBI-RC-0000168 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis
(Oct. 15, 1996)) (Exhibit 19).
\51\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000146 (Fax from Larry
Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 11, 1996)) (Exhibit 16).
\52\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000200-01 (Fax from Larry
Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 1, 1996)) (Exhibit 13).
\53\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000162 (Fax from Larry
Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 9, 1996)) (Exhibit 15).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On November 5, 1996, Katopodis attended an election night
party hosted by Wallace in Little Rock. At the election night
party--the same party where Roger Clinton informed George Locke
that President Clinton had advised him to make the most of his
last four years in office \54\--Wallace introduced Katopodis to
individuals Wallace described as ``financial heavy hitters''
and ``friends of Bill.'' \55\ Among these individuals was a
former state senator whom Wallace introduced as ``Roger
Clinton's mentor and closest associate,'' \56\ likely George
Locke.\57\ Roger Clinton had apparently enlisted Locke's
assistance because Locke lobbied for Roger's employment during
the election night party.\58\ Locke was not the only one trying
to find Roger Clinton gainful employment. After the party,
Wallace and Katopodis continued to discuss the airport
issue.\59\ During one of these conversations, Wallace told
Katopodis that his close personal friend, President Clinton,
was concerned about his ``baby brother's'' lack of employment
and income.\60\ According to Wallace, the President tasked him
with finding some type of job for Roger.\61\ Wallace wanted to
follow the President's directive and asked Katopodis if they
could meet in Washington to discuss a possible contract for
Roger.\62\ To lure him to the nation's capital, Wallace even
offered Katopodis the opportunity to spend a night in the
Lincoln Bedroom of the White House.\63\ Katopodis declined the
invitation.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ See n.7 and accompanying text.
\55\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000020 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
\56\ Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001).
\57\ See Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Partner, Hampton and
Larkowski, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform
(May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\58\ See Telephone Interview with Larry Wallace (Aug. 27, 2001).
\59\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000021 (Summary of Interview
with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
\60\ See id.; DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000012 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
\61\ Id.
\62\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000021 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
\63\ See id. Wallace extended this invitation before the Lincoln
Bedroom scandal became public.
\64\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Katopodis wanted to define and formalize Clinton's
responsibilities before signing a contract for his
services.\65\ Katopodis also wanted to ensure that Clinton's
responsibilities passed ethical and legal standards of conduct
and could not be construed as influence peddling.\66\ In fact,
Katopodis offered to hire Wallace, instead of Clinton, to avoid
these concerns.\67\ Wallace stated that he could not guarantee
the Secretary's appearance and would not be acting as an
attorney, but he did offer Clinton's access ``thrown in as a
bonus.'' \68\ Katopodis rejected this proposal because he
wanted to hire Wallace only in his capacity as an attorney.\69\
In future conversations, Wallace returned the focus of contract
discussions to finding Roger employment as the President
directed.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ See id. at FBI-RC-0000022.
\66\ See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001).
\67\ See id.
\68\ Id.
\69\ Id.
\70\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000022 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When Katopodis asked Wallace to place a figure on Roger
Clinton's services, Wallace suggested that $30,000-$35,000 per
month would be sufficient.\71\ Katopodis asserted that the
Council of Cooperating Governments could not possibly afford to
pay Clinton such an inordinate amount.\72\ Moreover, Katopodis
was understandably suspicious of this proposal because he had
never spoken with Roger Clinton \73\ and was beginning to doubt
whether Wallace was actually as ``connected'' to the Clinton
Administration as he claimed.\74\ These doubts were dispelled,
however, when Roger Clinton personally telephoned
Katopodis.\75\ During the call, Clinton and Katopodis discussed
the $35,000 per month contract.\76\ In return for such a large
fee, Clinton offered to ``open a lot of doors'' for the
Council.\77\ The President's brother gave Katopodis his pager
number and his telephone and fax numbers in Farmer's Branch,
Texas.\78\ Clinton was aware of contract details that Wallace
and Katopodis had discussed, which convinced Katopodis of
Wallace's close relationship with Clinton.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ See id.; Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5,
2001). In this interview, Katopodis stated that Wallace proposed a
contract for Roger at $30,000 per month. See id. When the FBI
interviewed Katopodis in May 1997, soon after these events occurred, he
stated that Wallace proposed a contract for Roger at $35,000 per month.
See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000022 (Summary of Interview with
John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
\72\ See id.
\73\ See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001).
\74\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000022 (Summary of Interview
with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
\75\ See id.; Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5,
2001).
\76\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000022 (Summary of Interview
with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
\77\ See Bob Johnson, Former Birmingham Official Says FBI Probed
Clinton's Half-Brother Over Job Query, Associated Press, Feb. 22, 2001.
\78\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000035 (Roger Clinton
Contact Information) (Exhibit 20). Roger Clinton was likely visiting
his wife's family who live in Farmer's Branch, Texas.
\79\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000022 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following their introductory conversation, Katopodis and
Clinton discussed a possible business relationship on several
occasions.\80\ Katopodis maintained that having the Secretary
of Transportation as a guest speaker was not worth hiring
Clinton for $35,000 per month.\81\ As Katopodis later told
Newsweek, the $35,000-per-month contract was ``a pretty big
consulting fee for someone who plays in a rock band.'' \82\
Katopodis asked Clinton to create a list of tasks with a
reasonable amount of money assigned to each task before the
Council could make a financial commitment.\83\ The potential
conflict of interest between having the President's brother
lobby the Secretary of Transportation for the Council concerned
Katopodis.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ See id. at FBI-RC-0000023.
\81\ See id.
\82\ Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, His Brother's Keeper,
Newsweek, Feb. 26, 2001, at 33.
\83\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000012 (Summary of Interview
with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
\84\ See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Dec. 17, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another concern disturbing Katopodis was the relationship
between Wallace and Clinton.\85\ Clinton clarified Wallace's
role by declaring that Wallace had no influence that did not
``drive directly through me.'' \86\ Clinton continued that he
was tired of doing favors without being recognized or
compensated.\87\ Clinton then asked Katopodis to meet him in
Redondo Beach, California, because Clinton wanted to avoid
further discussions over the telephone.\88\ The conversation
concluded with Clinton saying that he and his brother had
``only four years to get things done'' and did not care about
``ethics or what appearances were.'' \89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000021 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
\86\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000012 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
\87\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000023 (Summary of Interview
with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
\88\ See id.
\89\ Id. Katopodis recorded some of his telephone conversations
with Roger Clinton once the situation became ``stickier.'' Telephone
Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). Due to the passage of
several years, Katopodis cannot locate these tapes and believes that
they may have been turned over to the FBI. If the FBI has possession of
these tapes, they should have been provided to the Committee based on
the Committee's request to the FBI for ``[a]ll records relating to any
criminal investigation relating to the relationship between Roger
Clinton, Arkansas lawyer Larry Wallace, and Birmingham, Alabama,
businessman John Katopodis.'' Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton,
Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to the Honorable John Ashcroft,
Attorney General, Department of Justice (Mar. 14, 2001) (within
Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A few minutes after this telephone call, Wallace contacted
Katopodis and expressed frustration over the difficulty in
formalizing a contract between Clinton and the Council.\90\
Wallace reiterated his demand for a one-month's payment to
Clinton and informed Katopodis that the airport project would
remain at a standstill until Katopodis ``showed him the
money.'' \91\ After Wallace's not-so-veiled threat to block
Katopodis' efforts with Secretary of Transportation Rodney
Slater, Katopodis made no progress on attracting the Secretary
to the aviation seminar as Wallace promised.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000012 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
\91\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While negotiating with Wallace and Clinton, Katopodis
concurrently continued his individual efforts to have Secretary
Slater speak at the seminar.\92\ In a December 19, 1996,
letter, Katopodis congratulated Slater on his selection as
Secretary, explained the purpose of the symposium, and invited
him to give the keynote address.\93\ The Secretary responded
one month later to Katopodis' congratulatory wishes without
mentioning the conference.\94\ On February 24, 1997, Katopodis
sent a fax to the Secretary's office reminding them of the
invitation and requesting an answer.\95\ Katopodis then called
the Secretary's office several times to determine whether an
answer was forthcoming.\96\ The Secretary refused to give
Katopodis an answer--not even a ``no''--for nearly four
months,\97\ so he tried a different strategy by establishing a
deadline for the Secretary's response in a letter dated April
11, 1997.\98\ The deadline passed without a word from the
Secretary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ See id. at FBI-RC-0000013.
\93\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000076 (Letter from John
Katopodis, to Rodney Slater, Federal Highway Administrator, Department
of Transportation (Dec. 19, 1996)) (Exhibit 21).
\94\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000041 (Letter from Rodney
Slater, Federal Highway Administrator, Department of Transportation, to
John Katopodis (Jan. 22, 1997)) (Exhibit 22).
\95\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000104 (Fax from John
Katopodis, to Peg Weathers, Deputy Scheduler for Rodney Slater,
Department of Transportation (Feb. 24, 1997)) (Exhibit 23).
\96\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000089 (Letter from John
Katopodis, to Eddie Carazo, Scheduling Assistant for Rodney Slater,
Department of Transportation (Apr. 11, 1997)) (Exhibit 24).
\97\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000023 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
\98\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000089 (Letter from John
Katopodis, to Eddie Carazo, Scheduling Assistant for Rodney Slater,
Department of Transportation (Apr. 11, 1997)) (Exhibit 24).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Upon hearing that the Secretary was considering a separate
speaking engagement in Birmingham, Katopodis faxed another
letter on April 28, 1997, requesting to be included on the
Secretary's schedule.\99\ The Council again received no
response. On May 7, 1997, Katopodis called Slater's scheduler,
Vonnie Robinson, and expressed his suspicion that Clinton and
Wallace had urged the Secretary's office not to respond while
contract discussions were ongoing.\100\ Robinson told Katopodis
that this was not the case but did acknowledge knowing who
Roger Clinton and Wallace were.\101\ After speaking with
Robinson, Katopodis received a brusque telephone call later
that day from Catherine Grunden, Secretary Slater's Director of
Scheduling and Advance.\102\ Grunden immediately launched into
a monologue stating that the Secretary's office disclaimed any
connection with Roger Clinton or Larry Wallace.\103\ If
Katopodis still was not satisfied, Grunden advised him to turn
over any allegations of wrongdoing to the proper
authorities.\104\ Katopodis indicated his understanding and
hung up.\105\ Following this unsolicited telephone call,
Katopodis faxed Robinson a letter on May 8, 1997, in which he
wrote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000090 (Letter from John
Katopodis, to Vonnie Robinson, Scheduler for Rodney Slater, Department
of Transportation (Apr. 28, 1997)) (Exhibit 25).
\100\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000023 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
\101\ Id.
\102\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000013 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
\103\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000023 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
\104\ Id. at FBI-RC-0000024.
\105\ Id.
I can't begin to tell you how disgusted I am with this
whole matter. If it is the normal policy of your office
to not respond to written requests from established
organizations, then perhaps I am wrong in my
assumptions about the lack of response being tied to an
attempt at extortion.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000088 (Letter from John
Katopodis, to Vonnie Robinson, Scheduler for Secretary Rodney Slater,
Department of Transportation (May 8, 1997)) (Exhibit 26).
Grunden's was not the only odd telephone call Katopodis
received while trying to schedule Secretary Slater's
appearance. On April 16, 1997, Katopodis reached out to his
local Congressman, Representative Earl Hilliard, to ask for his
advice and assistance in solving this problem.\107\ On May 14,
1997, less than one week after Katopodis' letter to Robinson,
Congressman Hilliard's staff member cryptically told Katopodis
that the Congressman had received a call ``from the highest
level'' concerning this matter.\108\ The staff member told
Katopodis that he had ``been bad again'' and that he should
stop incriminating Roger Clinton and Larry Wallace.\109\ This
conversation, in addition to Grunden's telephone call and the
Secretary's absolute lack of response, reinforced Katopodis'
conclusion that Clinton and Wallace were obstructing any
progress on the airport project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000013 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8); DOJ Document
Production FBI-RC-0000101 (Fax from John Katopodis, to Ken Mullinax,
Staff Assistant, Office of the Honorable Earl Hilliard (Apr. 16, 1997))
(Exhibit 27).
\108\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000013 (Summary of
Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
\109\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On May 16, 1997, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
contacted Katopodis regarding this matter.\110\ Agents from the
FBI asked Katopodis to wear a wire in a meeting with Wallace or
Clinton.\111\ Katopodis declined to wear a wire because he had
friends in both political parties and feared a political
backlash if he fully pursued an investigation.\112\
Nevertheless, Katopodis participated in one face-to-face
meeting and two full telephone interviews with the FBI,\113\
and provided FBI agents with all of his documents regarding
Wallace and Clinton.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000020 (Summary of Interview
with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
\111\ Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Dec. 17, 2001).
\112\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000013 (Summary of Interview
with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
\113\ See id. at FBI-RC-0000011-13; DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-
0000020-24 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997)
(Exhibit 10).
\114\ See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Dec. 17, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Referring to the FBI's handling of this information as an
``investigation'' may be a misnomer. Notwithstanding the facts
that Katopodis submitted to multiple interviews, possessed
incriminating recordings of conversations with Roger Clinton,
and provided hundreds of pages of documentation supporting his
allegations, the Committee has been unable to obtain any
evidence that the FBI ever interviewed Larry Wallace or Roger
Clinton regarding this incident. Katopodis described the FBI as
not ``follow[ing] up with any sort of intensity.'' \115\
Without aggressive pursuit by the FBI, the investigation
effectively died.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ Id.
\116\ See Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, His Brother's
Keeper, Newsweek, Feb. 26, 2001, at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The airport project met a similar fate. Katopodis severed
his ties with Clinton and Wallace in Spring 1997,\117\ but he
continued as director for the Council of Cooperating
Governments. Support for the airport and its promotional
symposium lost all momentum because of the delay in receiving a
response from the Secretary. In fact, the Secretary never
responded to Katopodis' series of invitations or pleas for an
answer. Larry Wallace and Roger Clinton apparently ensured that
no answer would be forthcoming as long as Katopodis was
unwilling to pay their price.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Dec. 17, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Roger Clinton's dealings with John Katopodis served as a
harbinger of things to come in 1998-2001. Clinton would use his
status as the President's brother to obtain even larger
payments, lobbying for parole and pardons of convicted
criminals, including a member of the Gambino crime family.
Moreover, Roger Clinton's lobbying efforts in these other areas
would show no more subtlety than did his crude dealings with
Katopodis.
II. THE GAMBINO PAROLE AND PARDON EFFORTS
While Roger Clinton lobbied for executive clemency for a
number of unsavory and undeserving individuals, none was as
unsavory as Rosario Gambino. Gambino was a major organized
crime figure serving a 45-year prison sentence for heroin
trafficking. It is difficult to believe that anyone, much less
the brother of the President, would lobby for parole or
clemency for an individual like Gambino. Indeed, Roger
Clinton's involvement in this matter can be explained only by
the fact that he received $50,000 from the Gambinos and was
promised even more money.
A. Rosario Gambino's Involvement with Organized Crime
At 20 years of age in 1962, Rosario ``Sal'' Gambino was
arrested on immigration charges and deported to Italy.\118\ At
some point, however, this son of a Sicilian butcher \119\
returned to the United States and, between the ages of 27 and
38, was arrested three times on charges ranging from possession
of a dangerous weapon to assault and extortion.\120\ Then in
1980, he was arrested for conspiracy to import heroin after
police in Milan, Italy, confiscated 91 pounds of heroin valued
at $60 million destined for the United States.\121\ Although
acquitted in the United States, Gambino was tried in absentia
(with representation by counsel) in Italy, convicted, and
sentenced to 20 years in prison.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\ USPC Document Production 00067 (Pre-sentence Report, U.S. v.
Gambino (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 1984)) (Exhibit 28).
\119\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0096 (Hearing
Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 29).
\120\ USPC Document Production 00067 (Pre-sentence Report, U.S. v.
Gambino (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 1984)) (Exhibit 28).
\121\ Id.
\122\ Id. at 00068.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without being extradited to serve any time in Italy,
Gambino was arrested yet again in the United States in March
1984 and was convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin, use
of a communication facility to distribute heroin, and
possession with intent to distribute heroin.\123\ Following his
conviction in October 1984, Gambino was sentenced to 45 years
in prison, which he has been serving since December 6,
1984.\124\ Throughout his incarceration, Gambino has failed to
take responsibility for his crimes, has maintained his
innocence, and has vigorously pursued every possible avenue of
appeal including arguments that he was entrapped, that he was
denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel, and that he was the victim of racial discrimination.
Yet, his conviction, sentence, and denials of parole have
withstood every legal challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\ Id. at 00038.
\124\ USPC Document Production 00075 (Progress Report, Federal
Bureau of Prisons, Jan. 4, 2001) (Exhibit 30).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January 1984, two of Gambino's relatives and co-
conspirators, Anthony Spatola and Antonio Gambino, were seeking
to sell heroin. Unknown to them, the prospective buyer was an
undercover FBI agent. In intercepted phone conversations,
Anthony Spatola and Antonio Gambino discussed Rosario Gambino
and the heroin deal in code.\125\ They referred to the heroin
as a ``car'' and to Rosario as the ``short guy.'' \126\ The
intercepts made it plain that Rosario Gambino was in a
leadership role in the conspiracy. The first transaction was
completed in a room at Caesar's Boardwalk Regency Hotel in
Atlantic City.\127\ A call was placed from the room to Rosario
Gambino's residence and immediately after leaving the hotel,
the co-conspirators drove to his residence to pay him his
proceeds from the deal.\128\ The undercover agent continued to
communicate with Antonio Gambino in an attempt to negotiate a
second transaction.\129\ The FBI intercepted several additional
phone calls related to a second sale of heroin to the
undercover agent and involving Rosario Gambino or referring to
him in code, such as ``Saruzzo'' and ``the short one.'' \130\
The undercover agent eventually completed a second purchase of
a half-kilogram of heroin for $120,000.\131\ When Rosario
Gambino was arrested in March 1984, a search of his master
bedroom uncovered two of the $100 bills the agent had used to
purchase the heroin.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ U.S. v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 942 (1986).
\126\ Id.
\127\ Id.
\128\ Id.
\129\ Id.
\130\ Id.
\131\ Id.
\132\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Throughout his attempts to obtain parole, Rosario Gambino
has claimed that authorities treated him unfairly merely
because of his infamous name. In his initial parole hearing,
Gambino denied his guilt and implied that he was a victim of
either mistaken identity or prejudice:
Hearing Officer. Now, what the government writes is
that you were involved in a large-scale heroin
distribution ring. You've told me that you didn't have
anything to do with this whatsoever. What do you think
caused the jury to believe that you were involved with
the other guys. What do you think would cause the jury
to convict you?
Gambino. Because number one is my name. Because see,
they [built] this name like [a] big building[.] I'm
not, I'm not the name they're looking for.
Hearing Officer. Who they [sic] looking for?
Gambino. I don't know. They looking [sic] for some big
name.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0057-58 (Hearing
Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 31).
Prosecutors have maintained that Rosario Gambino is a relative
of the 1950s-era ``boss of bosses,'' Carlo Gambino, the man for
whom the Gambino crime family is named. Reports by special
organized crime task forces in two states, Pennsylvania and New
Jersey, linked Rosario Gambino to the Gambino crime
family,\134\ and regulators banned him from Atlantic City
casinos.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\ Pennsylvania Crime Commission, A Decade of Organized Crime
70-72 (1980), New Jersey State Commission of Investigation, Twelfth
Annual Report 15 (1980).
\135\ Division of Gaming Enforcement, New Jersey Department of Law
and Public Safety, ``Exclusion List,'' (exclusion ordered Oct. 30, 1987).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rosario Gambino's representatives, however, have argued
that he is not related to members of the Gambino crime family
and that claims to the contrary were unsubstantiated. However,
the transcript of one of Rosario Gambino's parole hearings
seems to indicate that Rosario Gambino himself believes his
grandfather may have been related to the 1950s mob boss:
Hearing Officer. Is there any family connection between
those people--between he and Carlo Gambino?
Lawyer. There is none.
Hearing Officer. I just want it for the record.
Lawyer. The report tries to make an unsubstantiated
allegation of some tie on Mr. Gambino's part to--
Gambino. Excuse me, there was a my grandfather,
grandfather relative--I don't know. Maybe, I don't
know.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0092 (Hearing
Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 29). At another hearing, Gambino made
separate statement, which could be construed as a denial of a
relationship to Carlo Gambino:
GHearing Officer. Let's put the cards on the table.
GGambino. Go ahead.
GHearing Officer. Carlo Gambino. What relationship are
you to Carlo Gambino?
GGambino. No relationship. No because I refuse him to be
my cousin or something like that.
Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0057-58 (Hearing Transcript, USPC)
(Exhibit 31).
Regardless of whether or how closely Gambino is related to the
notorious family whose name he shares, members of his immediate
family have admitted to being involved in organized criminal
activity. Rosario's brothers, Giovanni ``John'' Gambino and
Giuseppe ``Joe'' Gambino pled guilty in January 1994 to charges
of racketeering, murder, illegal gambling, loan sharking, and
heroin trafficking.\137\ Witnesses had testified in court that
John and Joe Gambino were the ``main link between Mafia heroin
traffickers in Sicily and the American Mafia.'' \138\ The media
also described John Gambino as a ``capo'' in John Gotti's
organization, the Gambino crime family.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\ Selwyn Raab, Two Admit Importing Heroin for Mafia Crime
Family, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1994.
\138\ Id.
\139\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not only were Rosario Gambino's brothers known associates
of Gambino crime family members, but Rosario himself was as
well. He was a close friend with Philadelphia mob boss Angelo
Bruno, and police surveillance revealed that Bruno often met
New York underboss Paul Castellano at the Valentino's supper
club,\140\ which was owned by Rosario Gambino.\141\ Castellano
later became boss of the Gambino crime family, until John Gotti
had him assassinated and became boss in December 1985.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of
Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, has Local Roots, Philadelphia City
Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001.
\141\ USPC Document Production 00499 (Pre-hearing Assessment, Feb.
3, 1994) (Exhibit 32).
\142\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of
Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, Philadelphia City
Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to his ties to the U.S. Mafia, Rosario Gambino
is also alleged to be an associate of well-known members of the
Sicilian Mafia:
When Tommaso Buscetta, a Sicilian Mafia boss from
Palermo, needed to hide his ex-wife and daughter in
America, Rosario Gambino took the women in. A few years
later, Buscetta fled a violent mob war in Sicily and
settled in Brooklyn, where he often hung out with the
Gambino brothers as well as Carlo Gambino.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\ Id.
A letter to the Parole Commission advocating Gambino's release
also confirms Rosario Gambino's association with Buscetta. The
letter refers to statements by Buscetta that he knew Gambino
and his brothers but claimed that they were not a part of
organized crime.\144\ Parole Commission documents and news
reports also refer to Rosario Gambino's role in the phony
kidnapping of Michele Sindona, an international banker and
money launderer for the Sicilian Mafia.\145\ After being
indicted in both the U.S. and Italy in 1979 for bank fraud
involving more than $400 million,\146\ Sindona disappeared and
friends claimed he had been kidnapped.\147\ During the sham
kidnapping, Sindona flew to Sicily accompanied by Rosario
Gambino's brother, Giovanni, and when he returned to the U.S.,
Rosario Gambino met him at JFK airport.\148\ Giovanni Gambino
and Michele Sindona were arrested in Italy for aggravated
extortion in connection with this incident.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\ USPC Document Production 00758 (Letter from Edward S. Panzer,
to Hearing Examiner (Sept. 25, 1995)) (Exhibit 33).
\145\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of
Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, Philadelphia City
Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001.
\146\ USPC Document Production 00925 (Memorandum from Thomas C.
Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff
(Dec. 30. 1997)) (Exhibit 34).
\147\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of
Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, Philadelphia City
Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001.
\148\ Id.
\149\ Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362, 377 (E.D.N.Y.
1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, a 1995 report issued by the New Jersey State
Commission of Investigation refers to evidence that Rosario
Gambino was not merely a relative and associate of members of
the Mafia. The report details the testimony of Philip Leonetti,
whom it describes as ``a former, high-ranking La Cosa Nostra
member'' and the ``underboss and confidant to his uncle
Nicodemo Scarfo, the boss of the Southeastern Pennsylvania-
South Jersey Family of La Cosa Nostra, commonly referred to as
the Scarfo Family.'' \150\ The report also makes a distinction
between being a member of La Cosa Nostra (the American Mafia)
and being a member of the Sicilian Mafia:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ New Jersey State Commission of Investigation, Organized Crime
in Bars, Part II 1 (1995).
Leonetti learned from Scarfo that John Gambino was a La
Cosa Nostra member in the Gambino Family. Gambino and
Leonetti were later introduced to each other as ``amico
nostra'' by Nicholas ``Nick'' Russo at a sit-down at an
Atlantic City restaurant in approximately 1983. Russo
was a member of the Gambino Family who lived in the
Trenton, N.J., area. The words ``amico nostra'' mean
``friend of ours.'' If a La Cosa Nostra member
introduces two people as ``amico nostra,'' it lets each
know that the other is a La Cosa Nostra member. The
words are only used when introducing La Cosa Nostra
members to each other. [Rosario ``Sal''] Gambino
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[however,] was a member of the Sicilian Mafia.
Scarfo told Leonetti that sometime in the 1970s, he was
introduced to Sal Gambino as ``amico nostra'' by
[Philadelphia crime boss] Angelo Bruno. Because of the
way that Bruno introduced Sal Gambino to Scarfo, Scarfo
and Leonetti always thought that he was a member of La
Cosa Nostra. It wasn't until January or February of
1986, when Scarfo and Leonetti first met John Gotti
after he became the boss of the Gambino Family, that
they found out that Sal Gambino wasn't a member of La
Cosa Nostra. Gotti informed Scarfo and Leonetti that
Gambino was a member of the Sicilian Mafia, not La Cosa
Nostra.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\151\ Id.
Italian authorities also allege that Rosario Gambino and his
brothers were members of the Sicilian Mafia, so-called ``men of
honor,'' at the time he entered the United States.\152\ Given
all these circumstances, prosecutors' allegations against
Gambino seem well founded. Rosario Gambino appears to be more
than merely associated with mobsters; the evidence suggests
that he is himself a ``made man.'' As one New Jersey
investigator put it, ``[t]o call Rosario Gambino a mob
associate is like saying John Gotti was just a street corner
thug. Rosario and his brothers were some of the most important
Sicilian Mafiosi to ever operate in this country.'' \153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of
Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, Philadelphia City
Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001. Moreover, the body of an execution-style
murder victim was found in the trunk of a car belonging to Erasmo
Gambino, a cousin, co-conspirator, and fellow leader with Rosario
Gambino in the heroin distribution ring that led to his incarceration.
The body was that of Pietro Inzerillo, Gambino's cousin and partner in
his pizzeria business. While Erasmo Gambino was never implicated in the
murder and a court found that it could not be considered as a factor in
denying Erasmo's parole request, it is nevertheless worth noting as an
example of the kind of activity surrounding Rosario Gambino and his
associates. See Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 162 (1998).
\153\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of
Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, Philadelphia City
Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. The U.S. Parole Commission's Handling of Rosario Gambino's Case
At Rosario Gambino's initial parole hearing in February
1995, the hearing officer recommended a release date of July
15, 1996.\154\ As Hearing Examiner Harry Dwyer explained at the
time, however, this was merely a recommendation subject to
review by the U.S. Parole Commission:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\ USPC Document Production 00486 (Initial Hearing Summary, Feb.
16, 1995) (Exhibit 35).
I'm going to take it to 148 months, recommend that you
get a date of July 15[.] You've been in custody since
March 16 of '84. Twelve years and four months, 148
months, that would be--July 15. I'm going to tell you,
I do not believe it's going to come back any less than
that. It could come back more. They could disagree with
me and push you way down the road. So don't pack your
bags.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0068 (Hearing
Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 31).
Although Dwyer set a presumptive parole date, he noted that
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gambino had not taken full responsibility for his crimes:
After careful consideration of subject's statements and
information contained in the pre-sentence report this
examiner believes that there is more credible evidence
that subject did in fact engage in the activities as
described in the pre-sentence report and that subject's
statements [of denial] are self-serving. Thus, this
examiner has concluded by the preponderance of evidence
that subject did in fact engage in a Category eight
offense behavior regarding the extremely large scale
heroin distribution.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\ USPC Document Production 00486 (Initial Hearing Summary, Feb.
16, 1995) (Exhibit 35).
No other examiner or commissioner ever concurred with Dwyer's
initial recommendation of a July 1996 release date, and even
Dwyer himself later repudiated it.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\ USPC Document Production 00551 (Original Jurisdiction Appeal
Summary) (Exhibit 36).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After Acting Regional Commissioner Jasper Clay reviewed the
decision in March 1995, he referred it to the National
Commissioners for original jurisdiction consideration and voted
to require that Gambino serve out his entire sentence. Clay's
decision memorandum cited as factors in his decision both
Gambino's connections to organized crime and the leadership
role he played in the heroin conspiracy that landed him in
jail:
Although he was not convicted of racketeering or
continuing criminal enterprise, the New Jersey and
Pennsylvania crime commission reports indicate that Mr.
Gambino is a soldier and descendant in the Organized
Crime Family of the late mob boss, Carlo Gambino. The
PSI further indicates that he, along with his brother,
Giuseppe, owned and operated pizza parlors in New York,
Pennsylvania and Southern New Jersey to facilitate a
continuing criminal enterprise[.]
The current conviction surrounds Mr. Gambino's heroin
distribution activities between October 1983 and March
1984. The PSI indicates that our subject was the most
culpable, holding a high managerial role in this scheme
which centered around six individuals, all of whom were
related. Mr. Gambino had the authority to determine who
would be actively involved in the heroin negotiations
and transactions and how the profits would be divided
among the participants.
Specifically, he was involved in the arrangements to
deliver \1/2\ kilogram of heroin to undercover agents
on two occasions. Also, 3 kilograms and later 2
kilograms of heroin were made available during
negotiations and subject and his co-conspirators
offered guarantees to supply 10 kilograms of heroin per
month to the agents.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\ USPC Document Production 00490 (Memorandum from Jasper R.
Clay, Acting Regional Commissioner, to National Commissioners (Mar. 13,
1995)) (Exhibit 37).
In April 1995, the full Commission agreed with Clay and
rejected Dwyer's initial recommendation, voting to continue
Gambino's case until a 15-year reconsideration hearing in March
2010.\159\ Gambino appealed the decision, arguing the
Commission did not have enough evidence of his reputed
membership in organized crime to legitimately consider it as a
factor in denying his parole. Ultimately, the Commission based
its final decision on Gambino's actual conduct rather than on
his associations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\ USPC Document Production 00480 (Continuation Order) (Exhibit
38).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is not necessary for one to be a member of the specific
group known as La Cosa Nostra or the Sicilian Mafia to be an
organized crime figure of the type for whom early release would
be inappropriate. Rather, it is enough that one demonstrate
certain characteristics of a lifetime, career criminal who has
the inclination and capacity to run a large-scale criminal
enterprise upon release. Apart from his relatives,
associations, and Sicilian Mafia membership, Rosario Gambino
has himself engaged in behavior that invites scrutiny from
those charged with combating organized crime--behavior that led
to his conviction and incarceration. In denying his parole,
officials at the U.S. Parole Commission relied on Gambino's own
activities and leadership in the heroin trafficking scheme for
which he was convicted, noting that he exhibited the
characteristics of an organized crime boss:
It would appear that Rosario Gambino certainly has more
extensive ties to organized criminals than his own
circle of codefendants, but his status as a member of
``organized crime'' is not sufficiently clear to
support a finding by the Parole Commission. . . .
[However,] the Commission was persuaded that Rosario
Gambino was, within his own circle, a traditional
organized crime boss who operated through a reputation
for violence, through evident corruption of local
police, and through subordinates with close family ties
of loyalty. . . . Gambino certainly has the background
and behavioral characteristics of the career organized
criminal, and it is reasonable to suppose that he knows
no other way to succeed in life than through his
``family business.'' His connections within the world
of organized crime would probably still be extensive
upon release, and Gambino shows nothing in his makeup
that would distinguish him from the familiar type of
Mafioso who is not deterred even by long imprisonment
from continuing the only career he knows. In
particular, as long as Gambino continues to file
appeals in which he denies his leadership role, and
portrays himself as a simple first offender, it will be
difficult for the Commission to find any basis for
deciding that Gambino has the capacity to shake off his
past, and discover a law-abiding way to make
living.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\ USPC Document Production 00702-03 (Original Jurisdiction
Appeal Summary) (Exhibit 39).
There is no shortage of evidence to support the assertion
that Gambino exhibited the characteristics of an organized
crime boss by operating through a reputation for violence and
corruption of local police. When he was arrested, Gambino was
in possession of police surveillance documents relating to his
own case, which the Commission considered to be significant
circumstantial evidence that Gambino had a ``a sophisticated
ability to penetrate police operations.'' \161\ Furthermore, an
investigation by the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms in
1980 produced evidence implicating Rosario Gambino in two
arsons:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\ Id. at 00701-02.
[The arsons] appear related to efforts by Rosario and
his brother, Guiseppe Gambino, to take over a pizza
franchise in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. Rosario and his
brother were observed at the scene of a pizza
restaurant following the arson and shortly thereafter,
the manager received a call and [was] told to close the
store and return to New York. Two days later, the
manager's automobile was destroyed by a firebomb. Two
days later, the manager received a telephone call and
[was] threatened with death.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\162\ USPC Document Production 00887 (Memorandum from Thomas C.
Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff
(Dec. 30, 1997)) (Exhibit 40).
The Commission also relied on evidence that his subordinate co-
conspirators deliberately promoted Rosario Gambino's reputation
for violence to undercover police agents during the commission
of the crimes for which he was convicted.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\ USPC Document Production 00702 (Original Jurisdiction Appeal
Summary) (Exhibit 39)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although Rosario Gambino's lawyers argued in court that
denial of his parole was motivated by prejudice based on his
national origin, that claim was rejected by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The statement that
allegedly indicated the bias was, ``Gambino appears to come
from an immigrant background in which family connections are
simply exploited (as in the current offense) to get around the
law.'' \164\ However, the court ruled that, ``[Gambino's]
contention is devoid of merit. . . . The reference to Gambino's
`immigrant background' in a Commission memorandum is
insufficient to establish a due process violation. In sum, the
Commission's final decision was not tainted by ethnic bias.''
\165\ The court also rejected Gambino's argument that his due
process rights were violated when his offense severity rating
was set higher than that of his co-defendants:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\ Id.
\165\ Gambino v. United States Parole Comm'n, 216 F.3d 1083 (9th
Cir. 2000).
Differences between Gambino's offense severity rating
and his codefendants' were justifiable in light of
their differing roles in the heroin distribution
conspiracy. Holding Gambino accountable for an amount
of heroin greater than what was actually sold to
government agents was supported by evidence
establishing his ability and willingness to provide
greater amounts.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\ Id.
Despite Gambino's claims to be a victim of prejudice because of
his last name, the evidence is clear that he was indeed
involved in organized criminal activity, and it is certainly
reasonable to conclude that he was at least an associate, if
not an outright member, of the Mafia. All of which made the
denial of his request for early release the only conscientious,
responsible course of action the U.S. Parole Commission could
have taken.
C. Roger Clinton's Involvement in the Gambino Parole Effort
Tommaso ``Tommy'' Gambino is the 27-year old son of Rosario
Gambino and a personal friend of Roger Clinton.\167\ That the
President's brother lobbied for the release of Rosario Gambino
is troubling enough, but that he came to do so through a
personal relationship with Tommy Gambino is positively
alarming. According to Los Angeles law enforcement and press
accounts, Tommy Gambino is not only the son of a mobster, he is
a reputed underboss in the Los Angeles Mafia currently under
investigation for his own criminal activity.\168\ While Tommy
Gambino purportedly runs a company called Progressive Telecom
that places pay phones in bars, restaurants, and other
businesses, his standard of living appears to be well beyond
his visible means of support.\169\ Like his father, Tommy
Gambino associates closely with known mobsters; his partner in
the pay phone business is Dominick ``Donnie Shacks''
Montemarano.\170\ Montemarano was convicted in 1987 on
racketeering, bribery, and extortion charges.\171\ The
indictment described Montemarano as a captain in ``the Colombo
organized-crime family of La Cosa Nostra.'' \172\ He served 11
years of an 18-year sentence for his role in the scheme to
obtain cash payments from New York City concrete companies in
exchange for major construction projects.\173\ In addition to
Tommy Gambino's business partnership with a known mobster, law
enforcement also suspected that he was involved in the
distribution of the drug Ecstasy.\174\ In October 2001, the
investigation of a lab capable of producing up to 1.5 million
tablets of Ecstasy per month was linked to Tommy Gambino:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\ Tommy Gambino, a resident of Los Angeles, should not be
confused with the legendary Carlo Gambino's son, Thomas, a 72 year-old
resident of New York. Through his lawyer, Michael Rosen, Thomas Gambino
was quick to make this clear in the days following the public
revelations of Roger Clinton's efforts on behalf of Tommy and Rosario.
Rosen said, ``my client had nothing to do with the low-rent, trailer-
park trash politicians who infested our country for the past eight
years.'' Al Guart, Wiseguy Fires at ``Trashy'' Clintons, N.Y. Post,
July 1, 2001.
\168\ Telephone Interview with [name redacted], Detective, Los
Angeles Police Department (June 28, 2001) (identity withheld due to the
sensitive nature of the detective's work). Tommy Gambino ``is
considered by Southern California organized crime investigators to be a
rising star in the Los Angeles underworld.'' John L. Smith, Las Vegas
Review Journal, June 29, 2001. ``[T]he police and FBI . . . suspect
young Gambino is a rising underboss in the Los Angeles La Cosa Nostra
scene.'' John L. Smith, Pardons Scandal Could Mean Congressional Heat
for Gambino, Las Vegas Review Journal, July 5, 2001. See also John L.
Smith, Will the Last Guy Left in L.A. Mob Please Turn Out the Lights?
Las Vegas Review Journal, Nov. 16, 1997 (indicating that Tommy Gambino
was ``sent West by father Rosario Gambino'').
\169\ Telephone Interview with [name redacted], Detective, Los
Angeles Police Department (June 28, 2001).
\170\ Id.
\171\ Arnold H. Lubasch, 2 Convicted of Racketeering in Mafia
Construction Case, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1987.
\172\ Id.
\173\ Alan Abrahamson, UCLA is Cleared after FBI Probe, L.A. Times,
Mar. 12, 1999. Following his release, Montemarano was the subject of an
FBI investigation of point shaving by UCLA football players. Id.
\174\ Telephone Interview with [name redacted], Detective, Los
Angeles Police Department (June 28, 2001).
Federal agents raided the lab Oct. 17 in an industrial
park. During the yearlong investigation, authorities
say they taped phone conversations between Derek
Galanis [one of the defendants accused of building the
lab] and Tommy Gambino, the son of a convicted drug
trafficker. Federal authorities contend his father,
Rosario Gambino, is an associate of the New York-based
Gambino crime family.\175\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\ Marisa Taylor, Feds Link Ecstasy Case, Organized Crime;
Escondido Wiretapping also Points to Trafficking in Kosovo, San Diego
Union-Tribune, Oct. 25, 2001.
While Tommy Gambino was not among the 24 defendants charged,
prosecutors said that ``members of the drug ring were
attempting to seek financing for the Ecstasy lab from the
Gambino family.'' \176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\176\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All these circumstances make Tommy Gambino's friendship
with the brother of the President of the United States
unseemly, to say the least. That friendship began when the
manager for 70s pop star Gino Vanelli introduced Roger Clinton
to Tommy Gambino sometime in the mid-1990s at a club in Beverly
Hills.\177\ The purpose of the introduction was so that Tommy
could request Roger's help in obtaining his father's release
from prison.\178\ When FBI agents interviewed him regarding the
Gambino case, Roger described how he was introduced to the
matter:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\177\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00001 (Summary of Interview
with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).
\178\ Id.
The two most common questions he gets asked regularly
are, ``What is it like to be the President's brother?
and Can you help me get someone out of jail?'' Clinton
stated after talking to Tommy Gambino he knew the
reason for the introduction was to see if he could help
Tommy Gambino get his father released from prison.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\179\ Id.
Despite the fact that Clinton was accustomed to requests to
help get convicts out of prison, he became particularly
enamored with the Gambino family. Clinton described to the FBI
why he enthusiastically joined in the effort to secure Rosario
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gambino's release:
Clinton advised that after he began to spend time with
Tommy Gambino, he learned about the family and the
efforts that they have made to get Tommy's father,
Rosario, released from prison. They have hired very
qualified attorneys and been through the appeal
process. Clinton stated that he identified with Tommy
Gambino on a number of levels and because of this, he
became passionate about trying to help him get his
father released.
Clinton stated that since Rosario Gambino has been in
prison, Tommy has had to grow up without a father.
Clinton advised that he, too, had grown up without a
father, and sympathized with that position. Tommy
Gambino has a close knit Italian family. Clinton stated
that when he grew up in Arkansas he and his brother
grew up close to an unnamed tight knit Italian family.
He further stated that he has is [sic] own prison
experience which has given him an insight to the prison
system. Through his experience of being incarcerated,
he claimed to have learned that things are not always
as they appear or as they are reported.
Clinton advised that Tommy Gambino provided him with
all the case files related to his father's case. He has
spent hours reviewing all the files. Clinton stated
that after his full review of the case, he does not
believe that Rosario Gambino is being treated fairly.
Rosario Gambino has served three years longer than the
maximum guidelines for his offenses. He has been given
release dates on two occasions and they have both been
denied. The same person, whose name he declined to
provide, has denied the release, and provided different
reasons each time. Clinton further advised that he
believes Tommy Gambino's father may be treated
differently than other people strictly because of this
name. Clinton advised that he too has experienced that
problem. He stated that the name can be both a positive
or negative depending on the circumstances.\180\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\ Id. at FBI-RC-00002.
When the Committee subpoenaed Clinton for all of his materials
relating to Gambino, he provided approximately 130 pages of
documents, many of which were apparently provided to him by
Tommy Gambino. Most of these documents were transcripts and
forms related to Rosario Gambino's parole.
After he conducted his ``full review'' of the Gambino case
files, Roger Clinton decided to assist Gambino with his effort
to obtain parole. Clinton described his decision to help
Gambino to the FBI when they interviewed him in September 1999:
He [Clinton] told Tommy Gambino that he would not agree
to help the family unless they provided him with all
the information related to the case. Clinton told Tommy
Gambino that he did not want any information withheld
that might effect his decision to help the family.
Gambino told Clinton if there is any information
withheld from you, it was also being withheld from him
(Tommy Gambino). Clinton stated he really felt for the
family and grew passionate about trying to help them.
He further advised that he told Tommy Gambino that by
his providing assistance and making contact with the
U.S. Parole Commission to seek assistance with this
case, it could actually work against him. Clinton
stated his name will not necessarily be an advantage
when it comes to fighting this matter. Gambino was
willing to take the risk and have Clinton attempt to
help.\181\
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\181\ Id.
Given the assurances by Tommy Gambino to Roger Clinton--and
by Clinton to the FBI--that Clinton had been provided with all
of the relevant background information about Rosario Gambino,
it is fair to conclude that Clinton was aware of the extent and
seriousness of Rosario Gambino's criminal activity and mob
ties, including: (1) Rosario Gambino's conviction for dealing
heroin; (2) his Italian conviction for conspiracy to distribute
$60 million of heroin; (3) his role in extortion and arson in
southern New Jersey; and (4) his involvement in a phony
kidnapping to keep a Mafia money launderer from U.S.
authorities.\182\ Despite his knowledge of some or all of these
issues, Roger Clinton decided that he should lend his support
to getting Rosario Gambino out of prison.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\ See n.145 and accompanying text.
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By Roger Clinton's own admission, he was frequently asked
to help get people out of prison. Accordingly, it should be
asked why he would decide to assist someone who was a member of
organized crime, whose involvement in large-scale heroin
dealing was beyond dispute, and who was reputed to be involved
in a series of serious and violent crimes? If his motives were
pure, then surely Roger could have chosen a more deserving case
to champion from among all those who approached him for help.
Despite Roger Clinton's efforts to convince the FBI that he
assisted Gambino because he believed in the merits of his
cause, and because he had known a close-knit Italian family
growing up in Arkansas, the primary motivation for Roger
Clinton was clearly money. Clinton confirmed this fact during
his FBI interview:
Clinton was asked if he was ever given anything of
value for his assistance in this matter. He advised he
had not received anything for this assistance. Clinton
stated that Tommy Gambino said if he (Clinton) could
help get his father out of prison, ``we will take care
of you.'' Clinton said that he knows what that means.
He stated ``I'm not stupid, I understand what the big
picture is.'' He again stated that no specific
compensation was discussed if he were to be successful
in obtaining Rosario Gambino's release. Clinton advised
it was his understanding if he were successful, he
would be financially compensated. Clinton is not sure
however, if he will be able to help Tommy Gambino and
his family.\183\
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\183\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00004 (Summary of Interview
with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).
Clinton admitted that the ``big picture'' included the
expectation that the Gambinos would pay him for his work. What
he did not admit, however, was that the Gambinos actually did
pay him significant amounts of money. As discussed below, Tommy
Gambino paid at least $50,000 to Roger Clinton during the time
that Clinton was trying to obtain parole or executive clemency
for Rosario Gambino. Clinton was also provided with an
unspecified amount of ``expense money,'' as well as a gold
Rolex, while he was working on the Gambino matter. This
payment, and the promise of additional payments, likely had a
great deal to do with Roger Clinton's willingness to disregard
the clear evidence that Rosario Gambino was a career criminal
and use his influence with the Clinton Administration to help
get Gambino out of prison. Once Roger Clinton decided to help
Gambino, the real question was whether his status as the
President's brother would help convince the Parole Commission
to release Gambino or whether the Parole Commission would
resent Clinton's attempts to lobby them. In fact, some members
and staff on the Parole Commission attempted to assist Clinton,
while others resisted his attempts to win the release of a
major criminal.
1. Clinton's Contacts with the Parole Commission
a. Clinton's Initial Approach to the Parole
Commission
Roger Clinton's lobbying on behalf of Rosario Gambino began
in earnest in January 1996. He first contacted the U.S. Parole
Commission's regional office in Kansas City, which had been the
source of the recommendation to deny early release.\184\
Apparently, Clinton spoke with Parole Commissioner Carol P.
Getty and voiced his support for the parole of Rosario Gambino.
Clinton also apparently told Getty that he planned on visiting
her office in Kansas City on January 17 or 18, 1996, and asked
if he could meet with her or her staff, and Getty agreed to a
meeting between Clinton and her staff.\185\ During this
conversation, Clinton also mentioned that he was aware that the
Kansas City Regional Office of the Parole Commission, of which
Getty was the head, was scheduled to be closed.\186\ Getty was
concerned that Roger Clinton had this information, as it
apparently made it appear that Roger Clinton was aware of some
of the inner workings of the Parole Commission.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\184\ USPC Document Production 00898 (Memorandum from Michael J.
Gaines, Commissioner, to Sharon Gervasoni, Designated Agency Ethics
Officer (Jan. 30, 1996)) (Exhibit 41).
\185\ Id.
\186\ Id.
\187\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After Clinton had spoken to Getty, on January 16, 1996,
Getty called Parole Commission headquarters in Maryland and
spoke to Commissioner Michael J. Gaines regarding the Clinton
call.\188\ Getty related to Gaines the fact that Clinton had
called about the Gambino case. Getty told Gaines that she had
scheduled a meeting between Clinton and her staff to discuss
the case. Getty also told Gaines that she was concerned that
Clinton was aware of the planned closure of her regional Kansas
City Parole Commission office and asked Gaines if he had spoken
to Clinton about the closure.\189\ Gaines said he had not, to
his knowledge, ever spoken with Roger Clinton.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\188\ Id.
\189\ Id.
\190\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following his conversation with Getty, Gaines notified the
White House Counsel's Office of Roger Clinton's attempt to
contact a Commission member about a pending case.\191\ The
Commission's General Counsel, Michael A. Stover said that he
had suggested to Gaines that he call the White House to ``warn
them about Roger Clinton.'' \192\ When interviewed by Committee
staff, Gaines said his decision to contact the White House was
``a spur of the moment decision'' because of the appearance of
impropriety.\193\ He contacted someone in the Counsel's office
that he had known from Arkansas, Trey Schroeder. Gaines said he
wanted to ensure that someone at the White House was aware that
Roger Clinton had contacted the regional office about an
inmate's case.\194\ Gaines told Schroeder that he did not
intend to speak to Clinton, and Schroeder replied, ``okay,
thanks,'' and that was the end of the conversation.\195\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\ Id.
\192\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July
17, 2001).
\193\ Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman,
USPC (Aug. 7, 2001).
\194\ Id.
\195\ Id. When asked about Gaines' contact with the White House,
Chief of Staff Marie Ragghianti stated that Gaines told her about his
conversation with someone at the White House. According to Gaines, when
he told White House staff about Roger Clinton's contacts with the
Parole Commission, the staffer replied ``for God's sake, you can handle
that one.'' Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff,
USPC (July 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On January 17, 1996, Commissioner Getty again contacted
Commissioner Gaines to inform him that Roger Clinton had
contacted Rosario Gambino's hearing examiner, Sam
Robertson.\196\ Clinton told Robertson he would not come to the
Kansas City office as he had planned, but instead would contact
the Parole Commission's main offices in Maryland.\197\ On
January 30, 1996, he did so, leaving a message with a secretary
for Commissioner Gaines.\198\ The message slip read, ``Roger
Clinton, very important . . . ASAP, re: brother recommended
meeting.'' \199\ Because Commissioner Gaines knew from
Commissioner Getty that Roger Clinton was planning to contact
him about the Gambino case and because he knew that any such
contact would be improper, he consulted the General Counsel
Michael Stover.\200\ Stover volunteered to contact Roger
Clinton on behalf of Gaines to shield him from an inappropriate
contact and to advise Clinton that such a contact would be
inappropriate.\201\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\196\ USPC Document Production 00898 (Memorandum from Michael J.
Gaines, Commissioner, to Sharon Gervasoni, Designated Agency Ethics
Officer (Jan. 30, 1996)) (Exhibit 41).
\197\ Id.
\198\ USPC Document Production 00896 (Memorandum from Michael A.
Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42).
\199\ Id; Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC
(July 17, 2001) (indicating that the message slip was attached to the
last page of his January 31, 1996, memo to file at 00896).
\200\ USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A.
Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42).
\201\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the Parole Commission's Deputy Designated Agency
Ethics Officer (``DAEO'') Sharon Gervasoni present, Stover
returned Roger Clinton's phone call, describing it in detail in
a memo dated the following day.\202\ According to Stover's
memo, Roger Clinton immediately invoked his brother, President
Clinton, saying not only that the President was aware of what
Roger was doing but also that he was assisting Roger with
strategy on the best way to achieve his objectives:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\202\ Id.
[Roger Clinton] began the conversation by informing me
that his brother ``[]is completely aware of my
involvement.'' Roger Clinton stated that his brother
had recommended to him that he not meet with
Commissioner Getty . . . because Commissioner Getty's
Kansas City Regional Office was about to be closed.
Roger Clinton informed me that his brother suggested
that he contact Commissioner Gaines instead. (I knew
about the previous contact with Commissioner Getty's
office, and that Roger Clinton is apparently a friend
of Rosario Gambino's son Thomas, who also lives in
California.) \203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\ Id.
The parenthetical comment inserted by Stover makes clear that
he understood the context of the conversation related
specifically to the case of inmate Rosario Gambino. This is
important because when he was interviewed by the FBI regarding
his efforts in the Gambino matter, Roger Clinton told the FBI
that ``he did not represent to anyone on the Parole Commission
that his brother was aware of his efforts to assist the Gambino
family or that the President was supporting his effort to
assist in getting Rosario Gambino released from prison.'' \204\
In light of Stover's memo (as well as subsequent contacts with
Case Operations Manager Tom Kowalski),\205\ Roger Clinton's
statement to the FBI appears to be false. If Roger Clinton
believed that his brother's involvement would be illegal or
improper and might spark another scandal, then he would have
had a powerful motivation to lie to the FBI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\204\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00001 (Summary of Interview
with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).
\205\ Kowalski recalled that on several occasions, Clinton made it
clear that his brother knew of his involvement in the Gambino matter.
Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stover's record of the January 30, 1996, conversation with
Clinton indicates that Stover clearly explained to Clinton the
applicable law and proper procedures for lobbying for parole:
I informed Roger Clinton that . . . the Privacy Act of
1974 prohibited Commissioners and staff of the U.S.
Parole Commission from discussing any case with a
member of the public without a signed waiver from the
inmate in question. . . . I further informed Roger
Clinton that Commissioner Gaines could not meet with
him because, even if Roger Clinton were an authorized
representative of the inmate, he would have to appear
before the hearing examiners at a regularly-scheduled
parole hearing. . . . I explained the Commission's
procedures whereby hearing examiners make recommended
decisions after hearing presentations on the record,
and that Commissioners vote and make their decisions
without meeting with prisoners' representatives. I
explained that, in this respect, the Commission
operates like a court of law.\206\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\206\ USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A.
Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42).
According to Stover's memo, Roger Clinton reacted to Stover's
explanation by once again invoking the President's authority in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
suggesting he meet with Commissioner Gaines:
Roger Clinton evinced his strong disappointment upon
learning that he could not meet with Commissioner
Gaines about this case. . . . I informed him that such
a meeting would not have been appropriate. Roger
Clinton then asked me how it could be that the
President would be misinformed as to the law, and
emphasized that the President had suggested that he
should meet with Commissioner Gaines, ``. . . a friend
of ours from Arkansas.'' Roger Clinton professed his
bewilderment as to how the President would not be
knowledgeable as to the law with regard to the
propriety of this suggested meeting. He stated that he
would have to inform his brother that his brother had
been wrong. I replied that it would be an honor for me
to be advising the President of the United States,
directly or indirectly, as to the law. Roger Clinton
again stated that he would have to report this
information to his brother, who would be ``glad to
know'' what I had said. During this colloquy, however,
Roger Clinton's voice rose, and betrayed the fact that
he was upset with what I was saying.\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\207\ Id. at 00895.
Stover and Gervasoni clearly believed that Clinton's call was
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
an attempt to exercise political influence:
Deputy DAEO and I are disturbed at the tactic employed
by Roger Clinton of repeatedly invoking his brother as
having allegedly recommended that he meet with
Commissioner Gaines[.] The U.S. Parole Commission must
not permit itself to be subjected to improper attempts
to exercise political influence over its procedures.
(Roger Clinton did not address himself to the merits of
the case itself.) . . . My preference is for the
Commission to vote a decision based only on the facts
of the Gambino case, and without reference to this
episode.
Finally, I have discussed the situation with
Commissioner Gaines, who agrees that the Commission
should be shielded, if at all possible, from the
unwelcome intrusion of a man who would appear to have
nothing to contribute to the Commission's deliberations
in the Gambino case but a crude (and I hope
unauthorized) effort to exercise political influence.
When interviewed by Committee staff, Stover reiterated his
strong disapproval of Roger Clinton's attempts to contact
Commission members and Commission staff, saying he ``was
concerned that Roger had no business contacting the
Commission'' and that his goal in advising Gaines on how to
proceed was to keep Clinton ``as far away as possible from the
Commission.'' \208\ Stover emphasized that he took two steps in
response to Clinton's contact: (1) he suggested that Gaines
call the White House ``to warn them about Roger Clinton;'' and
(2) he called the Deputy Attorney General's office and spoke to
Roger Adams about the matter.\209\ Stover explained that ``an
alarm bell goes off when the half-brother of the President is
helping an organized crime figure.'' \210\ He believes that
Adams discussed the matter with Deputy Attorney General Jamie
Gorelick.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July
17, 2001).
\209\ At this time, Adams was an Associate Deputy Attorney General,
and was Stover's primary contact at Main Justice. He later became U.S.
Pardon Attorney. Id.
\210\ Id.
\211\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Clinton's Meetings with Parole Commission
Staff
From February 1996 to November 1997, there was a pause in
Roger Clinton's approaches to the Parole Commission. After
Roger Clinton had his hostile telephone discussion with Michael
Stover in January 1996, he did not approach the Parole
Commission again until December 1997. Due to Roger Clinton's
refusal to discuss the Gambino matter with Committee staff,
little is known about the reasons for the nearly two-year
hiatus.\212\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\ In the middle of this lull in activity, Rosario Gambino
signed a letter apparently intended for President Clinton seeking his
assistance. A copy of the letter was produced to the Committee by Roger
Clinton. The salutation of the January 9, 1997, letter is curiously
blank, but the rest reads in relevant part:
GI am writing this letter to you as my last hope to get
justice. I feel that the system has been turned inside out
in my case, and I now seek your help in the hope that you
can right the wrong that is being done to me. What I am
asking for is that my punishment be based on the crime that
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I did, and not on my name.
GThe reason I am asking for your help is because my son
knows your brother, and my son has told me that your
brother is a good and honorable man; I know such traits run
in families, and I have heard that you are also such a man.
Because of the trust and respect that my son has for your
family, he suggested that I write this letter to you to
explain my situation in more detail. So please let me take
a few lines to explain my case.
Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0046 (Letter from Rosario Gambino
(Jan. 9, 1997)) (Exhibit 43). The letter continues to explain the
detailed procedural history of the case and makes false statements in
the process. For example, Gambino claimed that after his December 1995
parole hearing, the examiner ``made a finding that I was not connected
to `Organized Crime.' '' Id. at RCC0047. In truth, the examiner merely
found that there was insufficient evidence for the Commission to
conclude, for the purpose of a parole decision, that Gambino was a
member of La Cosa Nostra. This finding of insufficient evidence in a
particular proceeding is far different from the blanket exoneration
Gambino claimed he received.
i. December 1997 Meeting
In December 1997, Chairman Michael Gaines informed his
Chief of Staff, Marie Ragghianti, that Roger Clinton had
contacted him. Ragghianti had come to the Commission as its
first politically appointed staffer \213\ around August
1997.\214\ According to Ragghianti, Gaines called her into his
office and said, ``I have a problem. I hope you can handle it
for me.'' \215\ He explained to her that Roger Clinton was
trying to meet with him but that he did not think it would be
appropriate to do so.\216\ Gaines also informed Ragghianti that
Clinton had tried to contact him about the same matter almost
two years earlier, in January 1996. Gaines asked Ragghianti to
meet with Clinton and treat him the way she would ``anyone
else.'' \217\ According to Ragghianti, Gaines' instructions to
her about meeting with Roger Clinton were ``as scrupulous as
you could want.'' \218\ She said that Gaines told her to be
courteous because Roger was the President's brother, but to
tell him that if Gaines spoke to him, Gaines would have to
recuse himself.\219\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\213\ Before her appointment, only the Commissioners were
politically appointed. Interview with Michael A. Stover, General
Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001).
\214\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001). As head of the Tennessee Parole Board in the 1970s,
Ragghianti had been responsible for initiating a federal investigation
of Governor Ray Blanton, who was later convicted on other charges, and
his staff for soliciting money in exchange for clemency. Her story was
told in a book by Peter Maas and in a motion picture. Id.
\215\ Id.
\216\ Id.
\217\ Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman,
USPC (Aug. 7, 2001).
\218\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\219\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was Ragghianti's understanding that Gaines believed it
would be inappropriate for him to meet Clinton and that he
wanted her to shield him from the inappropriate approach being
made by Clinton.\220\ When asked by Committee staff why he
referred the Clinton matter to Ragghianti rather than, as
before, to General Counsel Stover, Gaines said that in 1996 he
had not been the Chairman of the Commission and Marie
Ragghianti did not yet work for the Commission.\221\ In 1997,
he had become the Chairman, and as such, Chief of Staff Marie
Ragghianti answered directly to him. Therefore, he subsequently
asked her to handle such matters.\222\ Gaines was aware that
the January 1996 telephone conversation between Clinton and
Stover did take place, as he requested that Stover make the
contact. However, he claims that he was not aware until well
after the call of what Clinton and Stover discussed or that the
call was quite hostile, likely because Stover was attempting to
shield him from knowledge that could arguably require his
recusal from the Gambino case.\223\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\220\ Id.
\221\ Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman,
USPC (Aug. 7, 2001).
\222\ Id.
\223\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After her meeting with Chairman Gaines, Ragghianti called
Roger Clinton and scheduled a meeting with him for December 23,
1997.\224\ Before the meeting occurred, General Counsel Michael
Stover learned that it had been scheduled from Tom Kowalski,
the Director of Case Operations at the Parole Commission.\225\
Ragghianti had asked Kowalski to join her in the meeting with
Clinton.\226\ Stover said he was not pleased upon learning that
the meeting was scheduled and that he called Chairman Gaines to
see if he knew the meeting was going to occur.\227\ Stover
reiterated his advice to Gaines that ``as a matter of prudence
that it was not a good idea to meet with a man who had
previously attempted to use political influence in an improper
way.'' \228\ According to Stover, Gaines responded ``in a
peremptory tone that this discussion was over'' and that he
believed that Roger Clinton deserved to be treated with the
same courtesy as any other member of the public.\229\ Wanting
to do everything possible to discourage the meeting without
being insubordinate, Stover made a copy of his January 1996
memo that described his conversation with Roger Clinton and
gave it to Ragghianti.\230\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\224\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\225\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July
17, 2001).
\226\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\227\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July
17, 2001).
\228\ Id.
\229\ Id. When interviewed by Committee staff, Gaines stated that
he did not recall Stover advising against having the meeting with
Clinton, or of any effort by Stover to prevent the meeting. Telephone
Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, USPC (Aug. 7, 2001).
\230\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July
17, 2001). Ragghianti, however, denies that she received a copy of the
memo before her meeting and denies having read it until being shown a
copy by Committee staff during her interview. She said she would have
remembered the memo because it ``slams the Chairman.'' Ragghianti said
she could not have forgotten ``this `friend of ours' business'' and
that the memo was, ``pure Michael [Stover].'' Interview with Marie
Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Gaines asked Ragghianti to extend only common
courtesy to Clinton and treat him like any other member of the
public, it is clear that from the outset, Ragghianti treated
Roger Clinton like a celebrity and gave him access that she
never would have afforded a member of the general public. She
gave Roger Clinton her home telephone number even before she
met with him, and he placed at least four calls to that home
number.\231\ Ragghianti's warm approach to Roger Clinton
continued at the December 23, 1997, meeting. Clinton,
Ragghianti, and Kowalski attended the meeting.\232\ Ragghianti
said the meeting was cordial and that Clinton was personable
and bright.\233\ Ragghianti said that Roger Clinton was ``not
the yokel he is painted to be'' and ``was downright engaging.''
\234\ After the meeting, Ragghianti marveled at Roger's
charisma, telling Tom Kowalski, ``this isn't even the
President. Imagine what the President is like.'' \235\
Ragghianti explained that she had ``connected'' with Roger
Clinton because her mother had died a few years earlier and
that Roger Clinton's mother had also died recently.\236\
Ragghianti took Clinton to Tom Kowalski's office, where Clinton
began referring to papers regarding specific cases he wanted to
discuss.\237\ In addition to the Gambino case, Clinton also
wanted to discuss the cases of two other prisoners. For one,
John Ballis,\238\ he was seeking to obtain a furlough, and for
the other, whose name Ragghianti could not recall, he was
seeking a pardon.\239\ Tom Kowalski explained that for a
furlough, Roger needed to speak to the warden of the prison in
which Ballis was incarcerated and for a pardon, he needed to
contact the Pardon Attorney's office.\240\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\231\ Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Jan 1,
1998, at 12-13; Mar. 1, 1998, at 16; Aug. 1, 1998). Ragghianti claims
that she gave her home telephone number to Clinton because it was
difficult to get in touch with him, given the time differential between
the east coast and west coast.
\232\ USPC Document Production 00889 (Memorandum from Thomas C.
Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Michael J. Gaines, Chairman (Dec.
24, 1997)) (Exhibit 44).
\233\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\234\ Id.
\235\ Id.
\236\ Id.
\237\ Id.
\238\ See generally Section IV.E., ``John Ballis.''
\239\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\240\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the first two issues, Clinton turned to the Gambino
matter. In describing the denial of Gambino's parole to
Committee staff, Ragghianti claimed that the Commission had
``thrown the book'' at Gambino and that ``intelligent people
would be able to say that a case could be made for less time.''
\241\ She said Clinton delivered a ``heartfelt narrative''
about how he had been in prison and knew what it was like.\242\
The following day, Kowalski prepared a memo summarizing Roger's
appeal on behalf of Gambino, whom Kowalski described as a
``notorious organized crime figure:'' \243\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\241\ Id.
\242\ Id.
\243\ USPC Document Production 00890 (Memorandum from Thomas C.
Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Michael J. Gaines, Chairman (Dec.
24, 1997)) (Exhibit 44).
[Roger Clinton] basically believes that the Commission
has been much too harsh in this case and that Rosario
Gambino is not an organized crime boss as the
Commission has considered him to be. If anything, he
believes that he is only on the fringes of organized
crime and he is being discriminated against because his
name happens to be ``Gambino.'' He used the Original
Jurisdiction Appeal Summary by Michael Stover as his
primary source of information. He specifically named
Michael Stover as being discriminatory in his
description of the prisoner and was particularly
incensed by the statement in the summary which states,
``Gambino appears to come from an immigrant background
in which family connections are simply exploited (as in
the current offense) to get around the law.'' In
discussing this case, he was actually quite animated
and argued rather emotionally about how the Commission
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
is being too harsh with the prisoner.
Ms. Ragghianti and I merely listened throughout the
session since we did not have file [sic] nor did Mr.
Clinton have a signed release from the subject. He was
advised that the case would be reviewed and no further
promises were given.\244\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\244\ Id.
Marie Ragghianti also drafted a memo regarding the same
meeting, and rather than being critical of Clinton's approach,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ragghianti appeared sympathetic:
Regarding Rosario Gambino, who apparently has been
denied parole by this Commission, Mr. Clinton asked for
any possible reconsideration of the matter. He pointed
out that Gambino has served nearly 15 years, has at
least 2 potential job opportunities, and also the
support of a loving son, Tommy (Mr. Clinton's friend),
and his wife and other children. We explained to him
that the Commission takes a hard line in matters
perceived as related to organized crime. Tom did offer
to review the history of the case and write a summary
(which will be sent to me). At that time, with the
approval of the Commission or its legal department, I
will notify Mr. Clinton of Tom's summary, as (or if)
appropriate.\245\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\245\ A handwritten note at this place on the memo dated September
17, 1998, nine months after the memo was initially prepared, reads ``I
never discussed Tom's summary at any time with Mr. Clinton (nor did he
ask me to).'' USPC Document Production 00891 (Memorandum from Marie
Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to File (Dec. 23, 1997)) (Exhibit 45). Even
if Ragghianti did not share the summary with Clinton, it is troubling
that she considered doing so, as it would have been a violation of
Commission rules.
Mr. Clinton was articulate. His questions and comments
were thoughtful and appropriate, which is to say that
he in no way came across as wishing to capitalize on
his name. Instead, he apologized for taking our time.
He appeared to be a genuinely caring person, not only
for the 3 individuals he was seeking advice for, but in
general.\246\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\246\ Id.
While Ragghianti took the position that Clinton did not appear
to be capitalizing on his name, Tom Kowalski disagreed, noting
that Clinton ``mentioned his brother'' at virtually every
meeting and made it clear that he was operating ``with his
brother's knowledge.'' \247\ Kowalski said Clinton frequently
made references to his plans to be in Washington and to stay at
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, saying, ``he threw it in your face
that he was staying at the White House.'' \248\ Kowalski said
that from the first meeting, Clinton made it clear that his
brother knew of his involvement.\249\ Specifically, Kowalski
said his impression was the President knew that Roger was
contacting the Parole Commission about the Gambino case.\250\
Kowalski's memory on this point was vivid. He explicitly
recalled his reaction, ``I thought to myself, `Lord, Lord, Oh
Lord, why would the President want to get involved in the case
of this guy?' '' \251\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\247\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001).
\248\ Id.
\249\ Id.
\250\ Id.
\251\ Id. Kowalski's recollections raise serious questions about
Roger Clinton's veracity when he was interviewed by the FBI. See also
n.205 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ragghianti told Committee staff that she and Kowalski
instructed Clinton that in the future, ``the best way of doing
this'' would be to address his concerns to the Commission in
writing rather than through further meetings, although this
admonition was not recorded in either of the contemporaneous
memos.\252\ Ragghianti thought that following her initial
contact, Clinton would not return seeking further
meetings.\253\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\252\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\253\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the December 1997 meeting, Ragghianti also asked
Kowalski to review the Gambino file. In case Ragghianti had any
doubts about the lack of merit in Clinton's argument,
Kowalski's December 30, 1997, memo summarizing the Gambino case
should have dispelled them. Kowalski found, in part, that: (1)
Gambino participated in a conspiracy which promised the
delivery of 10 kilograms of heroin per month; (2) ``Rosario
Gambino's criminal activities also extend to arson and
extortion;'' (3) Gambino participated in harboring Michele
Sindona while he was a fugitive; and (4) ``[t]he Sentencing
Memorandum and documents in the file clearly depict the subject
as an individual deeply involved in organized criminal
activity.'' \254\ Given these findings, it is disturbing that
Ragghianti continued to meet with Clinton and discuss the
Gambino case with him.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\254\ USPC Document Production 00925-26 (Memorandum from Thomas C.
Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff
(Dec. 30. 1997)) (Exhibit 34).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Spring 1998 Contacts
Roger Clinton continued to remain in contact with
Ragghianti and Kowalski after the December 1997 meeting, making
telephone calls to both of them regarding the Gambino case.
Kowalski recalls that Gambino was scheduled for a parole review
hearing and that Clinton called because he was concerned that
Gambino had been moved from a prison in California to one in
Arizona, which was further from Gambino's family.\255\ Clinton
asked Kowalski to find out why Gambino was moved.\256\ Kowalski
looked into the matter and discovered that Gambino was moved
because he had been ``muscling,'' or intimidating, other
inmates at the prison.\257\ Kowalski did not pass this
information on to Clinton, but it did confirm his feelings
regarding Rosario Gambino.\258\ Clinton apparently prepared
talking points for himself in anticipation of these telephone
calls. One set of notes, in Clinton's handwriting, reads as
follows and provides a further suggestion as to the nature of
Clinton's calls to Kowalski:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\255\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001).
\256\ Id.
\257\ Id.
\258\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Questions for Tom Kowalski:
1) Possibility of re-transfer back to Terminal Island.
Should he before or after parole hearing?
2) If transfer back to Ca. is accepted, can Sam
Robertson still conduct the hearing or is it out of his
jurisdiction? (Harry Dwyer?)
3) What else can I do to serve as a reminder or as
further emphasis? (personal letter, etc.)
4) What is the state of the upcoming hearing at FCI-
Phoenix? The last one was postponed because the
Commission's counsel was reviewing the file. Sam
Robertson wasn't at the last hearing that was
postponed. Will he, in fact, conduct this hearing?
\259\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\259\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0031 (Handwritten notes)
(Exhibit 46).
Clinton also sent two handwritten letters to Kowalski in
February 1998, in advance of the review hearing. One stated in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
part:
We need someone to ``step up to the plate'' on this
one. I firmly feel that if everything in this case was
the same and the prisoner's name was Rosario Stevens
(only an example), then Mr. Stevens would have been
released in July 1996.
I understand the scenario of decisions based on name
recognition, be it positive or negative. This man
deserves to be released to return to his family after
14 years. He did the crime and he has done the time. We
all deserve a second chance! I am living proof of that.
Please help us achieve what is right! \260\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\260\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0176 (Letter from Roger
C. Clinton to Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (Feb.
13, 1998)) (Exhibit 47).
In the other letter to Kowalski, Clinton made slightly more
sophisticated arguments, analyzing the applicable sentencing
provisions, arguing that Gambino was eligible for release.\261\
In this letter, Clinton denied that Gambino was a member of La
Cosa Nostra and claimed that the Gambino name was a common one:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\261\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0173 (Letter from Roger
C. Clinton to Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (Feb.
13, 1998)) (Exhibit 48).
As documented by copies of pages from the Sicilian
phone book, Gambino is a very popular name. A large
majority is unrelated to the Gambino crime family.\262\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\262\ Id. at RCC0175.
Remembering an occasion when Clinton made the same argument to
Kowalski in person, Kowalski said: ``I was very professional .
. . I didn't laugh.'' \263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\263\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Roger Clinton's Dogged Effort for Drug
Trafficker, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the spring of 1998, Clinton scheduled another meeting
with Ragghianti and Kowalski. Both Ragghianti and Kowalski
recall that Clinton basically repeated the same arguments that
he had made in December 1997, claiming that Gambino had been
treated unfairly by the Parole Commission and should be
released.\264\ At the end of this meeting, as Clinton,
Kowalski, and Ragghianti were saying their goodbyes in the
lobby, Parole Commission Chairman Michael Gaines walked through
the lobby.\265\ Clinton apparently recognized Gaines on sight,
and eagerly introduced himself to him. According to Gaines,
Roger ``acted like he knew who I was,'' despite the fact that
he did not know Clinton.\266\ According to all of those
present, Gaines kept the conversation with Clinton short and
limited to superficial matters.\267\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\264\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001); Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former
Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001).
\265\ Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman,
USPC (Aug. 7, 2001).
\266\ Id.
\267\ Id; Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001); Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former
Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. July 1998 Meeting
After the spring 1998 meeting, Clinton continued to make
telephone calls to Ragghianti and Kowalski to press his case.
Between May 1998 and July 1998, Clinton called Kowalski and
Ragghianti at least 11 times.\268\ He even called Ragghianti at
home on at least one occasion.\269\ In July, Clinton apparently
asked for and received another meeting with Kowalski and
Ragghianti. While Clinton was waiting for Kowalski at the
Parole Commission offices, he had a second fortuitous run-in
with Chairman Gaines. Again, Gaines attempted to avoid any
substantive discussion with Clinton and ended the discussion as
quickly as he could.\270\ The meeting between Clinton,
Ragghianti, and Kowalski went much like the previous two
meetings. Roger repeated his arguments that Rosario Gambino had
been treated unfairly and deserved to be released. Neither
Kowalski nor Ragghianti provided extensive substantive comments
about the case but simply tried to listen to Clinton's
concerns.\271\ At the conclusion of the meeting, Ragghianti and
Clinton looked over pictures of Clinton's new baby, and then
Ragghianti saw Clinton to the elevators.\272\ Referring to the
Gambino case, Ragghianti told Clinton ``the only thing worse
than no hope is false hope'' and that she ``did not want him to
have false hope.'' \273\ Then, as Clinton got onto the
elevator, Ragghianti counseled him to pray about the Gambino
matter.\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\268\ Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, July
1, 1998, at 10-11; Aug. 1, 1998, at 14-15); WorldCom Document
Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, May 23, 1998, at 8-9).
\269\ Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Aug.
1, 1998, at 14).
\270\ Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman,
USPC (Aug. 7, 2001).
\271\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001); Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former
Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001).
\272\ Id.
\273\ USPC Document Production 00923 (Memorandum from Marie F.
Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to File (Sept. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 49).
\274\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The FBI Investigation of Clinton's Contacts with the
Parole Commission
In late August 1998, the FBI sought to review Rosario
Gambino's file at the Parole Commission.\275\ Michael Stover
said that the FBI's original interest appeared to be in Rosario
Gambino rather than Roger Clinton.\276\ Stover provided the FBI
with all of the documents relating to the Gambino case,
including those relating to Roger Clinton's contacts with the
Parole Commission.\277\ On September 11, 1998, Stover informed
Ragghianti that the FBI had visited USPC offices to review the
Gambino file. In the following days, the agents returned to
interview Stover, Ragghianti, and Kowalski about their contacts
with Roger Clinton.\278\ Ragghianti was ``very annoyed'' that
Stover had not told her earlier about the FBI's interest in the
Gambino file.\279\ Ragghianti told Committee staff that her
``private view'' was that Stover had initiated the FBI's
investigation of Roger Clinton's contacts with the Parole
Commission.\280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\275\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July
17, 2001).
\276\ Id.
\277\ Id.
\278\ USPC Document Production 00922 (Memorandum from Marie F.
Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to File (Sept. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 49). FBI
interview summaries relating to Ragghianti, Kowalski, and Stover
presumably exist, but the Justice Department has refused to produce
them to the Committee. After producing hundreds of pages regarding the
Clinton-Gambino matter, the Justice Department stopped producing
records in August 2001 because of its ``ongoing criminal
investigation'' into the Clinton-Gambino matter.
\279\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\280\ Id. There appears to be no support for Ragghianti's view.
Rather, it appears that Roger Clinton was of investigative interest to
the FBI well before this point.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the FBI began its investigation of Roger Clinton's
lobbying for Gambino, Michael Stover learned that Marie
Ragghianti and Tom Kowalski had been maintaining contact with
Roger Clinton over the preceding eight months. While discussing
the FBI's interest in the Gambino matter with Stover, Tom
Kowalski indicated that he and Ragghianti had two additional
meetings with Clinton, as well as a number of telephone
conversations after the December 1997 meeting.\281\ Stover knew
only about the December 1997 meeting and was not happy to learn
about the additional meetings, especially given the fact that
he was not consulted about them before they took place.
Ragghianti defended her decision to keep Stover from knowing
about the meetings with Clinton on the basis that, as Chief of
Staff, she did not report to Stover.\282\ While Ragghianti may
have been above Stover in the hierarchy of the Parole
Commission, her decision to engage in a series of contacts with
Roger Clinton without consulting her General Counsel is
troubling and suggests that she wanted to provide Roger Clinton
with an extraordinary measure of access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\281\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July
17, 2001).
\282\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the FBI conducted its investigation of Clinton's
contacts with the Parole Commission, Ragghianti and Stover
disputed the propriety of the series of contacts between
Clinton and Commission staff between December 1997 and July
1998. Ragghianti wrote of the meetings in a memo drafted just
after she learned the FBI was involved: ``[a]fter his initial
visit, Mr. Clinton called and came in 2 other times. I did not
record additional memoranda on either of the subsequent visits,
because he did not offer additional information, but seemed
only to want to be heard.'' \283\ Rather than scrupulously
attempting to avoid any appearance of impropriety and follow
Stover's advice, Ragghianti continued her contacts with Roger
Clinton unapologetically and without informing Stover.
Ragghianti told Committee staff that there was ``no question''
in her mind about the propriety of her meetings.\284\ She
dismissed Stover's concerns, suggesting he was motivated by a
feeling that ``he had been ignored'' and that ``he didn't like
Roger Clinton.'' \285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\283\ USPC Document Production 00923 (Memorandum from Marie F.
Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to File (Sept. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 49).
\284\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\285\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The split between Ragghianti and Stover over the propriety
of staff contacts with Clinton appears to be part of a broader
animosity Ragghianti harbored for Stover, but it is unclear
whether their dispute over the Clinton contacts was a symptom
of her antagonism or a catalyst for it. During her interview
with Committee staff, Ragghianti went out of her way to
criticize Stover, describing him as ``a bull in a china shop''
who ``doesn't have a fine touch in extending common courtesy.''
\286\ Ragghianti similarly criticized Stover's handling of the
Roger Clinton matter. She wrote in a September 14, 1998, memo:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\ Id.
I think the record should show that I felt that Mr.
Stover had, in the past, been gratuitously rude to Mr.
Clinton. My personal philosophy was that Mr. Clinton
deserved to be treated at least courteously by this
Commission, which is why I agreed to see him.
Nevertheless, it seemed appropriate that I should not
visit with him alone, not only because of
``appearances,'' but because I did not really know the
intricate details of reading inmate files, nor the
precise legal constraints on what information might be
appropriately shared with interested parties.\287\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\287\ USPC Document Production 00923 (Memorandum from Marie F.
Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to File (Sept. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 49).
When asked what her basis was for writing that Stover had been
``gratuitously rude'' to Clinton, Ragghianti said she could not
recall but that it might have come from Chairman Gaines and may
have been the reason Gaines asked her to handle the second
Clinton contact rather than Stover, whom he had asked to handle
the first.\288\ Stover said that Ragghianti had never discussed
with him his handling of the 1996 Clinton contact.\289\
Ragghianti complained that Stover, ``did not give Clinton the
benefit of any doubt,'' that he viewed Clinton as ``guilty
until proven innocent,'' and that Stover's memo was ``very
heavy-handed.'' \290\ For his part, Stover did not engage in
any attacks on Ragghianti, but he did maintain that it was
unwise for Ragghianti to engage in a series of contacts with
Clinton about the Gambino case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\288\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\289\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July
17, 2001).
\290\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Clinton's Continued Attempts to Contact
the Commission
In the fall of 1998, Roger Clinton was apparently unaware
that the FBI was looking into his contacts with the Parole
Commission. Following the initial FBI interviews of Parole
Commission staff in the fall of 1998, Roger Clinton continued
calling Commission staff. Ragghianti and Kowalski did not
respond to most of these calls. When they received these calls,
they reported them to Michael Stover. On the one occasion where
Clinton did successfully reach Tom Kowalski, Kowalski prepared
a memo to the file summarizing the conversation.\291\ Clinton
also called seeking a meeting with Chairman Gaines, despite
having been informed repeatedly that he could not meet with
members of the Parole Commission.\292\ Gaines, Ragghianti, and
Stover then met to discuss how to respond to Clinton's request
for a meeting with Gaines. They decided to send a letter to
Clinton informing him that he could not meet with Gaines and
that he could no longer meet with staff. Stover prepared the
initial draft of the letter, and then Ragghianti ``toned it
down.'' \293\ Curiously, the letter was addressed to Roger
Clinton at 1015 Gayley Avenue in Los Angeles, a commercial
mailbox used by Tommy and Anna Gambino.\294\ The letter, dated
October 26, 1998, stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\291\ USPC Document Production 00915 (Memorandum from Thomas C.
Kowalski, Case Operations Administrator, to File (Oct. 2, 1998))
(Exhibit 50).
\292\ USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999)
(Exhibit 51).
\293\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\294\ U.S. Postal Service Document Production (Application for
Delivery of Mail Through Agent, June 2, 2001) (Exhibit 52).
The Chairman has asked me to express his sincere
regrets that he cannot accept your kind invitation to
meet during your trip to Washington this week. As I
have mentioned before, it is agency policy that members
of the Commission cannot engage in private meetings of
any kind with parties having an interest in parole
proceedings. This is true even if the meeting is sought
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
for purely social reasons.
Similarly, our policy also restricts the ability of
Commission staff from engaging in any continued series
of calls or discussions on official matters that are
not in the context of an agency proceeding. Should you
have any further request, I encourage you to write
us.\295\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\295\ USPC Document Production 00876 (Letter from Marie F.
Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to Roger C. Clinton (Oct. 26, 1998))
(Exhibit 53).
The sentence regarding staff contacts appears to be at odds
with the practice of Ragghianti and Kowalski before the FBI
began investigating. When asked about whether the policy
against third party-meetings as stated in the letter was in
fact the practice of Commission staff beforehand, Stover said,
``Sometimes you state a policy at the moment of its creation.''
\296\ He said he was trying hard to set a useful policy for
future precedent and that he saw Ragghianti's sending the
letter with his language about staff contacts included as a
victory on that issue.\297\ It is curious that before the FBI
began its investigation of Clinton and Gambino in September
1998, Ragghianti was strongly in favor of meeting with Clinton,
and then, once the FBI began its investigation, she suddenly
agreed with Michael Stover's longstanding advice to stop
meeting with Clinton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\296\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July
17, 2001).
\297\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the letter's clear instructions to put future
requests in writing, Clinton immediately called Ragghianti upon
receiving the fax.\298\ In a voice mail message left for
Ragghianti, Clinton said he was embarrassed and hurt that
anyone at the Commission might have thought he was asking for
something inappropriate and asked Ragghianti to return his
call, which she did not.\299\ Ragghianti described the message
as ``long, wordy, [and] slightly incoherent'' and quoted
Clinton as saying, ``I guess I went over the line. I didn't
mean to do anything wrong.'' \300\ Ragghianti said she did not
acknowledge the call in any way.\301\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\298\ USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999)
(Exhibit 51).
\299\ Id.
\300\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\301\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In November 1998, Hearing Examiner Sam Robertson
recommended reexamination of the Commission's decision and a
possible reduction of time to be served. Apparently unaware
that Robertson's recommendation was only preliminary advice and
not a final action on the case, Clinton sent ``a lavish letter
of gratitude'' to the Commission on November 17, 1998.\302\ The
letter states in part:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\302\ USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999)
(Exhibit 51); USPC Document Production 00875 (Letter from Roger C.
Clinton, to the U.S. Parole Commission (Nov. 17, 1998)) (Exhibit 54).
There are certain situations in almost everyone's life
that require standing up for what is right, regardless
of the possible consequences. . . . Over the past few
years, and for several reasons, this particular case
became very personal with me. I felt it necessary to
stand and fight for what I thought was fair. I never
asked for, never expected and never received any
preferential treatment. You simply treated me with
respect by allowing me, through written
correspondence,\303\ to express my passionate feelings
regarding this case. The entire process was handled in
a fair and professional manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\303\ To the extent Clinton's letter suggested that his contacts
with the Parole Commission were limited to ``written correspondence,''
it is, of course, completely untrue.
At the conclusion of the hearing on Friday, October
30th, 1998, a release date was given. It is to be
January 15, 1999. I have marked that date on my
calendar as a day of celebration. I will celebrate in
my own private way, filled with satisfaction and pride.
With your decision, I feel that justice has now been
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
served for everyone.
With the utmost respect, appreciation and gratitude, I
want to thank you from the bottom of my heart.\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\304\ USPC Document Production 00875 (Letter from Roger C. Clinton,
to the U.S. Parole Commission (Nov. 17, 1998)) (Exhibit 54).
Neither Ragghianti nor Kowalski acknowledged the letter in any
way.\305\ In January 1999, the Parole Commission overruled
Robertson's recommendation and set a new parole date of March
2007.\306\ In April 1999, the full Parole Commission denied
Gambino's final appeal and left in place a parole date of March
2007.\307\ Parole Commission Chairman Michael Gaines recused
himself from this decision, based on his involvement in the
myriad meetings and discussions regarding Roger Clinton's
involvement in the Gambino case and the resulting FBI
investigation of Clinton's contacts with the Commission.\308\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\305\ USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999)
(Exhibit 51).
\306\ USPC Document Production 00665 (Memorandum from John R.
Simpson, Commissioner, to National Commissioners (Jan. 13, 1999))
(Exhibit 55).
\307\ USPC Document Production 00817 (Notice of Action on Appeal,
Apr. 14, 1999) (Exhibit 56).
\308\ USPC Document Production 00820 (Memorandum from Michael J.
Gaines, Chairman, to File (Apr. 9, 1999)) (Exhibit 57).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In mid-January 1999, the FBI again contacted the Commission
requesting access to the Gambino file.\309\ On Friday, January
22, 1999, FBI Agent Jackie Dalrymple went to the Parole
Commission Offices to review the file.\310\ While she was
there, Roger Clinton again attempted to contact Ragghianti and
Kowalski, leaving messages on their voice mail.\311\ Ragghianti
and Kowalski notified General Counsel Stover who suggested that
Agent Dalrymple be notified.\312\ Dalrymple asked to hear the
two voice mail messages and, upon hearing them, asked
Ragghianti and Kowalski not to delete them for a few days.\313\
On Monday, January 25, 1999, Agent Dalrymple returned and asked
to tape record the two voice mail messages. Stover advised
Ragghianti to cooperate, and she did.\314\ When asked about the
content of the messages, Ragghianti said she could not recall
precisely what her message said but that she was surprised
Clinton was calling yet again.\315\ Ragghianti said she ``felt
kind of bad'' about allowing the FBI to tape the message,
comparing it to how she felt years ago in Tennessee when
``friends were in trouble with the law'' because of actions she
had taken.\316\ Ragghianti recalled that Kowalski's message was
longer than hers and that Clinton had said something on
Kowalski's message that ``made it sound like they were in
cahoots.'' \317\ Ragghianti recalled that she said jokingly to
Kowalski, ``My God Tom, what do you two have going?'' \318\ She
believed Kowalski was embarrassed by the message and that is
why he ultimately cooperated with the FBI.\319\ There is no
support for Ragghianti's suggestion, but it is telling that
Ragghianti thought Kowalski would need some sort of secret
motivation to work with the FBI. Every indication is that
Kowalski worked with the FBI merely because he believed it is
important to cooperate with law enforcement when requested to
do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\309\ USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999)
(Exhibit 51).
\310\ Id.
\311\ Id.
\312\ Id. at 00869.
\313\ Id.
\314\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July
17, 2001); Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\315\ Id.
\316\ Id. See generally n.214.
\317\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\318\ Id.
\319\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. The FBI's Request to Have an Agent Pose
Undercover
After listening to Roger Clinton's messages to Ragghianti
and Kowalski, the FBI decided to intensify its investigation of
Clinton. The FBI came to Ragghianti and suggested a plan
whereby Kowalski would set up a meeting with Clinton away from
the Parole Commission headquarters, at a local restaurant.\320\
Kowalski would then introduce Clinton to another Parole
Commission staffer who could help Clinton with the Gambino
case.\321\ In reality, this Parole Commission staffer would be
an undercover FBI agent. This agent would then be able to talk
to Clinton about the Gambino case and determine if Clinton was
attempting to influence the Commission illegally. General
Counsel Michael Stover had no objection to the FBI plan.\322\
Marie Ragghianti, though, rejected this proposal out of hand
without consulting with Chairman Gaines or the rest of the
Parole Commission.\323\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\320\ Id.
\321\ Id.
\322\ Id.
\323\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ragghianti's basis for rejecting the FBI proposal was
highly suspect. She felt that the Parole Commission ``did not
conduct its business in restaurants'' and that it would make
the Parole Commission look bad if someone overheard the
discussion between Clinton and the undercover FBI agent.\324\
She also felt that it was entrapment to allow the FBI to
operate under Parole Commission auspices in order to obtain
evidence against Roger Clinton.\325\ Ragghianti also was
annoyed by Stover's approval of the FBI plan. She felt that he
had ``crossed over the line and lost legal objectivity'' and
``had no concern'' for the Commission.\326\ However, Ragghianti
appears to be the one who ``crossed over the line and lost
legal objectivity'' in rejecting the FBI's request. Her reason
for rejecting the request--that it did not reflect the way the
Commission normally conducts business--misses the point. In
order to be successful, an FBI operation of this sort requires
exactly the sort of informal environment to which Ragghianti
objected. The fact that such a meeting would be less formal and
less professional than normal Commission business is exactly
why the FBI wanted to do it. If Clinton were so inclined, a
relaxed environment would make him feel comfortable enough to
make candid admissions that might yield evidence of illegality
in the Gambino case. Ragghianti's reason for opposing the
request, therefore, was essentially that it was likely to be
successful. Moreover, her characterization of the FBI proposal
as ``entrapment'' is without merit and represents a judgment
that she lacked both the expertise and the responsibility to
make. The FBI agents and their superiors are accountable for
entrapment issues in their investigations, not the Parole
Commission Chief of Staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\324\ Id.
\325\ Id.
\326\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The real question is what was Marie Ragghianti's actual
motive for rejecting the FBI request. Ragghianti had a
reputation for ethical conduct prior to coming to the
Commission. That she would make such a decision is, therefore,
surprising. However, she clearly went out of her way to be
accommodating to Roger Clinton. Whether Ragghianti was trying
to curry favor with the Clinton Administration or whether she
just genuinely liked Roger Clinton is unclear. But, for
Ragghianti to ignore the advice of the Parole Commission
General Counsel regarding such a sensitive legal matter
suggests, at best, that she was not objective in her handling
of the Clinton-Gambino matter. At worst, Ragghianti may have
been trying to protect Roger Clinton.
The effect of Ragghianti's decision certainly was to
protect Clinton. Her decision to reject the undercover plan may
have had a crippling effect on the FBI investigation. As
described below, the FBI would continue with its attempts to
determine the purpose of Clinton's contacts with the Parole
Commission. Rather than having an undercover FBI agent directly
in contact with Clinton, though, the FBI had to work through
Tom Kowalski, who allowed the FBI to place listening devices in
his office. However, Kowalski, unlike a trained FBI agent, was
uncomfortable talking to Clinton while his office was bugged.
Law enforcement sources who helped investigate the Clinton-
Gambino case have informed the Committee that the undercover
contacts with Clinton were exactly the thing that the case was
missing.\327\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\327\ Interview with Judge Stephen Larson, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney, Central District of California (Aug. 16, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. The FBI's Recording of Clinton's Conversations
with Thomas Kowalski
After Ragghianti rejected the initial FBI proposal, Agent
Dalrymple proposed another possible approach to Roger Clinton.
In late January 1999, she suggested that Tom Kowalski page
Roger Clinton, and then when Clinton called back, the FBI would
tape their conversation.\328\ The FBI would provide Kowalski
with suggested questions for Clinton to determine Clinton's
purpose in contacting the Parole Commission. Even though the
FBI had significantly reduced the scope of its request,
Ragghianti still opposed cooperation.\329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\328\ USPC Document Production 00869 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999)
(Exhibit 51).
\329\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite her opposition to the FBI's request, Ragghianti
took the FBI request to other staff at the Parole Commission.
According to Ragghianti's contemporaneous notes \330\ of a
meeting held later that day, her initial reaction upon hearing
of the request was to question whether any taping at the
Commission's headquarters in Maryland would be illegal,
``recalling the Linda Tripp debacle related to a similar tape
recording.'' \331\ Ragghianti also referred to her experiences
in Tennessee, explaining that she had not cooperated with an
FBI request for her to allow them to make recordings of her
conversations.\332\ Deputy DAEO Sharon Gervasoni advised
Ragghianti and Kowalski that she would ordinarily urge that
Clinton's call be answered by another letter requesting that
Clinton send his inquiries in writing.\333\ Given the FBI's
request, however, she recommended that General Counsel Stover,
who was home on sick leave, be contacted for his input about
how to handle the situation.\334\ Stover told his colleagues
that a similar situation had arisen before and that the
Commission employee was advised that the decision of whether to
record a conversation to assist the FBI was a personal decision
left to the employee and not one to be dictated by the
Commission.\335\ Therefore, Stover advised that the Commission
precedent be followed and that Kowalski should make the
decision about whether and to what extent he wished to
cooperate with the FBI.\336\ Ragghianti disagreed, inquiring as
to ``why any USPC employee might be free to exercise that kind
of decisionmaking in an issue so important to the functioning
of the Commission.'' \337\ Because she disagreed with Stover on
how to handle this issue, Ragghianti took it to the Parole
Commissioners for their decision.\338\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\330\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001); Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel,
USPC (July 17, 2001).
\331\ USPC Document Production 00869 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999)
(Exhibit 51).
\332\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001). See n.214.
\333\ USPC Document Production 00869 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999)
(Exhibit 51).
\334\ Id. Stover said he was sick with the flu and a 102-degree
temperature on this day, so it was difficult for him to remember the
details. He does recall staff from the Commission called him at home
and insisted that he ``weigh in'' on the matter. After reviewing
Ragghianti's meeting notes, Stover said he did not see anything in them
that was inconsistent with his recollection. Interview with Michael A.
Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001).
\335\ USPC Document Production 00869 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999)
(Exhibit 51).
\336\ Id.
\337\ Id.
\338\ Id. at 00870.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At 4:35 p.m. that day, Chairman Gaines convened a meeting
with Commissioner Reilly, Commissioner Simpson, Chief of Staff
Ragghianti, and Deputy DAEO Gervasoni to discuss the FBI's
request.\339\ Two main issues arose during this meeting. First,
there was discussion about whether Kowalski should be able to
decide for himself whether to cooperate with the FBI or whether
that was a decision for the Parole Commission to make. Second,
there was extensive discussion about why the FBI was
investigating Clinton and whether the investigation was part of
the Office of Independent Counsel investigation of President
Clinton. The Commissioners ended the meeting by reaching ``the
general consensus that no one present should tell Mr. Kowalski
what to do.'' \340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\339\ Id. at 00867.
\340\ Id. at 00871.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, because of the concerns that the Commissioners and
Ragghianti had about why the FBI was investigating Roger
Clinton, Ragghianti followed up to determine the purpose of the
Clinton investigation. According to Ragghianti, she had fears
that the FBI's investigation of Roger Clinton was a
``witchhunt.'' \341\ These fears appear to have been based
partly on Ragghianti's erroneous belief that the FBI
investigation was part of the Office of Independent Counsel
investigation of President Clinton.\342\ Ragghianti first
called Lynn Battaglia, the U.S. Attorney in Maryland.\343\
Agent Dalrymple had told Ragghianti to call Battaglia if she
had any concerns. Battaglia told Ragghianti that the
investigation was ``not a wild goose chase,'' that she knew
Agent Dalrymple was a ``good agent,'' and that this was not ``a
witch hunt.'' \344\ Some of Ragghianti's fears about the
investigation were allayed by Battaglia's assurances.\345\
Battaglia's familiarity with the case also convinced Ragghianti
that this investigation was being conducted by the U.S.
Attorney's Office in Maryland, not Independent Counsel
Starr.\346\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\341\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\342\ During the Parole Commission's debate of this issue,
Commissioner Simpson also expressed concerns that the Office of
Independent Counsel was involved: ``Commissioner Simpson again stated
that someone needs to ask Jackie Dalrymple what they're investigating.
There was subsequent discussion regarding the fact that it appears at
this time not to be related to Ken Starr. Commissioner Simpson stated
that we need to call [Eric] Holder if we believe it's a Starr matter.''
USPC Document Production 00870 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit
51). However, Deputy DAEO Gervasoni ``expressed doubts'' about whether
the Commission should contact Holder's office. She said that her
``impression of Holder is that he's a `stickler,' `by the book' kind of
person,'' and that the Commission would need a ``good reason to refuse
cooperation'' with the FBI. Id.
\343\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\344\ Id.
\345\ Id.
\346\ Michael Stover also discovered that the Roger Clinton
investigation was not being conducted by Independent Counsel Starr.
According to a memorandum prepared by Ragghianti, ``Mr. Stover advised
Ms. Ragghianti that he had been advised by Roger Adams [who was
informed by the FBI when they visited his office] that the
investigation was Ken Starr's; however, Mr. Stover stated that sometime
later, he had received a call from an FBI asst. general counsel, who
said that the investigation had the attention of both the FBI Director
& Gen'l Counsel.'' USPC Document Production 00870 (Meeting Notes, Jan.
26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). Ragghianti also said that Stover had told her
on another occasion that he believed the investigation had been
initiated in a U.S. Attorney's Office in California. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, Ragghianti still was not comfortable with Michael
Stover's conclusion that whether Tom Kowalski cooperated with
the FBI was a personal decision, not a Parole Commission
decision. Therefore, Ragghianti and Stover called the Deputy
Attorney General's office and discussed the matter with Kevin
Ohlsen, the Chief of Staff to the Deputy Attorney General, and
David Margolis, an Associate Deputy Attorney General.\347\ They
called to see if ``any responsible person in Main Justice was
aware'' of the investigation.\348\ Ohlsen promised to look into
it and later told Stover that the ``higher-ups knew about it.''
\349\ Ragghianti also recalls that Ohlsen and Margolis informed
them that the FBI's proposed contacts with Roger Clinton were
not ``entrapment,'' but on the other hand, they stated that the
Parole Commission did have a say in whether Kowalski should
cooperate with the FBI.\350\ But, according to Ragghianti, by
this point, the Commissioners did not want to have any more
meetings about the Gambino matter because they were concerned
that they would have to recuse themselves from a decision on
the Gambino case.\351\ Therefore, they allowed Kowalski to
decide for himself whether to cooperate with the FBI.\352\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\347\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July
17, 2001)
\348\ Id.
\349\ Id.
\350\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\351\ Id.
\352\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Marie Ragghianti, the Parole Commission staff
also debated whether they should inform the White House
regarding the FBI's investigation. According to Ragghianti,
they debated this point a ``number of times'' but decided not
to inform the White House. While it is comforting that Parole
Commission decided not to inform the White House about the
investigation, it is slightly troubling that such action was
even seriously considered. Clearly, the FBI was conducting a
proper, authorized investigation that targeted the President's
brother and potentially involved the White House. For the
Parole Commission to inform the White House of such an
investigation would likely have hindered the legitimate FBI
inquiry.
Kowalski quickly agreed to cooperate with the FBI's
investigation.\353\ He went to an FBI office where there were
facilities to record a telephone call and placed one to Roger
Clinton's cell phone.\354\ Kowalski left a voice mail for
Clinton, but Clinton did not call back.\355\ Kowalski could not
recall for certain whether they were ever successful in
recording a live telephone conversation with Clinton but said
they may have.\356\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\353\ USPC Document Production 00866 (Memorandum from Thomas C.
Kowalski, Case Operations Administrator, to File (Jan. 27, 1999))
(Exhibit 58).
\354\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001).
\355\ Id.
\356\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given their inability to obtain any useful evidence from a
recorded telephone call, the FBI then arranged to record a
meeting between Kowalski and Clinton at the Parole Commission
offices. In Spring 1999, Clinton called Kowalski and told him
that he was coming into town for the White House Easter Egg
hunt and arranged to come by the Parole Commission offices and
meet with Kowalski.\357\ The FBI wired Kowalski's office with a
microphone under his desk and monitored the conversation from a
car in front of the building.\358\ Kowalski said the FBI had
suggested questions to ask Clinton such as, ``Is there anything
you want me to do,'' and ``Should I do anything further?''
\359\ Clinton and Kowalski had the meeting, but Clinton did not
provide any incriminating responses to Kowalski's
questions.\360\ Kowalski said that after the meeting, the
agents came to his office and indicated they would have to
close the investigation.\361\ That was the last time Kowalski
recalled having contact with the FBI regarding this
matter.\362\ Indeed, it appears that the FBI's interest in
Clinton's contacts with the Parole Commission did come to an
end with the taped meeting between Clinton and Kowalski.\363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\357\ Id.
\358\ Id.
\359\ Id.
\360\ Id. A transcript exists of this taped conversation between
Clinton and Kowalski. Despite specific requests from the Committee for
the transcript, the Justice Department has refused to produce it.
Despite the fact that they have provided the Committee with hundreds of
pages regarding Clinton's involvement in the Gambino case, and the
FBI's investigation of Clinton's role in Gambino case, the Justice
Department claims that the transcript, and a number of other documents
cannot be provided to the Committee because of the Department's
``ongoing criminal investigation.''
\361\ Id.
\362\ Id.
\363\ Other commission staff also had the impression that the FBI
had ceased its investigation. According to Michael Stover, ``things
were pretty tense at the Parole Commission about this,'' before he went
on vacation from late March to early April 1999. However, when he
returned, the issue appeared to be over because ``the FBI had not heard
what they wanted to hear Roger say.'' From Stover's perspective, they
had ``dropped the matter.'' Stover said he was not aware of any other
incidents in which conversations with Roger Clinton were recorded, and
he was also unaware of other contacts between Roger Clinton and Parole
Commission personnel. Interview with Michael A. Stover, General
Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the fact that the Committee has not been provided
with the transcript of the taped conversation between Clinton
and Kowalski, it is difficult to determine all of the reasons
why the FBI was not able to pursue the investigation of
Clinton's lobbying of the Parole Commission. However, Kowalski
made it clear that he was not comfortable participating in the
taped conversation with Clinton. Kowalski's lack of comfort
likely had some impact on Roger Clinton, and if Clinton had
been planning to make any illegal proposals, he was unlikely to
do so in such a meeting. The failure of the taped conversation
with Kowalski makes Ragghianti's decision to reject the FBI
undercover proposal even more significant. If the FBI was able
to have a trained, professional undercover agent discussing
Gambino's parole with Clinton, it might have made a significant
difference in the FBI's case. However, due to Ragghianti's
refusal to cooperate with the FBI, it is impossible to know
what would have happened.
3. Roger Clinton's Apparent Attempt to Involve the White
House in the Parole Decision
One set of notes produced to the Committee by the National
Archives indicates that Roger Clinton approached White House
staff regarding the Gambino case. Notes produced to the
Committee from the files of White House Deputy Counsel Bruce
Lindsey indicate that Lindsey and Clinton met on February 19 of
an unknown year regarding the Gambino matter. While assigning a
date to the notes without Bruce Lindsey's or Roger Clinton's
cooperation is somewhat speculative, the facts suggest that the
meeting most likely occurred in February 1999.\364\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\364\ In February 1998, Clinton was still in the middle of his
series of meetings with Commission staff, and likely did not yet see
the need to escalate matters to the White House. By February 2000, the
Commission had rejected Gambino's bid for parole, but it was likely
still too early for Clinton to be meeting with Lindsey regarding a
pardon or commutation for Gambino. Nothing in the notes suggests that
Clinton was asking for executive clemency; rather, the discussion
appeared to be limited to parole. In addition, Gambino's commutation
petition was not filed with the White House until November 2000. NARA
Document Production (Petition for Commutation, Nov. 2000) (Exhibit 59).
In February 1999, on the other hand, Clinton was still trying to obtain
meetings with Parole Commission staff, but their receptiveness had
dropped off considerably, since, unknown to Clinton, the FBI was
investigating the matter. In January 1999, the Commission overturned
the preliminary decision in favor of Gambino, and was moving towards a
final resolution of Gambino's parole bid in April 1999. A final piece
of evidence supporting the conclusion that the meeting took place in
February 1999 is the fact that Bruce Lindsey conducted legal research
regarding the Gambino case in April 1999. NARA Document Production
(Summary page from Lexis-Nexis Research, the White House, Apr. 5, 1999)
(Exhibit 60). This research may have been prompted by Clinton's meeting
with Lindsey. Accordingly, February 1999 is the likely time when Roger
Clinton approached Lindsey and asked for his assistance with Gambino's
parole bid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lindsey's notes reflect that Roger Clinton explained the
procedural history of Rosario Gambino's criminal case and bid
for parole. Clinton apparently claimed that: (1) Gambino had
only dealt one kilogram of heroin; (2) Gambino's codefendants
were treated more leniently than Gambino; and (3) there was no
evidence that Gambino was linked to organized crime.\365\ The
first and third claims are false. The second claim is true but,
according to a federal appeals court, was justified in light of
his leadership role in the conspiracy. Clinton apparently made
special reference to Parole Commission General Counsel Michael
Stover, who had rejected Clinton's previous entreaties to the
Commission.\366\ Lindsey's notes state, ``Michael Stover--
counsel to Mike Gaines'' and then have an arrow pointing from
Stover's name to the word ``improper,'' which is
underlined.\367\ The notes also indicate that Clinton provided
Lindsey with a number of documents relating to the Gambino
parole case.\368\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\365\ NARA Document Production (Handwritten Notes) (Exhibit 61).
\366\ Id.
\367\ Id.
\368\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assuming that the meeting took place on February 19, 1999,
and related to the Gambino parole effort rather than the
Gambino clemency effort, the question is what, if any, action
did Lindsey or other White House staff take as a result of the
meeting with Roger Clinton. Neither Parole Commission nor White
House records reflect any contacts between the White House
staff and the Parole Commission regarding the Gambino case,
other than the one previously described.\369\ However, Roger
Clinton's attempt to reach out to Bruce Lindsey demonstrates
that Clinton was intent on using his influence at the White
House improperly to influence the Parole Commission's handling
of the Gambino case. While Clinton may not have successfully
enlisted Bruce Lindsey in his effort, it is disturbing that
Clinton's overtures received any consideration at the Clinton
White House at all, much less the lengthy meeting and follow-up
research indicated by the documents in Lindsey's file.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\369\ The contact took place in January 1996 when Commissioner
Michael Gaines called Trey Schroeder at the White House to let him know
that Clinton was contacting the Commission about Gambino. See n.195 and
accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite Roger Clinton's efforts, Rosario Gambino's bid to
obtain parole failed. In April 1999, the Parole Commission
denied Gambino's final appeal and set a parole date of March
2007.\370\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\370\ USPC Document Production 00010 (Sentence Monitoring
Computation Data, Mar. 19, 2001) (Exhibit 62).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Roger Clinton's Financial Relationship with the Gambinos
Undeterred by his failure to win parole for Rosario
Gambino, Roger Clinton's contacts with the Gambino family
continued. Clinton's relationship with Tommy Gambino included a
March 1999 trip together from Los Angeles to Washington,
D.C.\371\ It is unknown what Gambino and Clinton did in
Washington or with whom they met.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\371\ American Express Document Production (Exhibit 63).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clinton's relationship with Gambino also had a significant
financial dimension. In 1999, Roger Clinton was playing a game
of pick-up golf with three strangers at a public course in Los
Angeles.\372\ Somewhere near the tenth hole, Tommy Gambino
drove up in a golf cart and had a brief conversation with
Clinton, handed Clinton a box, and left.\373\ Clinton told his
golfing partners that the person who had been talking to him
was Tommy Gambino and that he was ``helping'' Tommy Gambino's
father.\374\ Clinton then opened the box Gambino had given him.
In the box was a gold Rolex watch.\375\ What Roger Clinton did
not know was that two members of his foursome were Air Force
intelligence officers.\376\ They were apparently troubled by
Clinton's relationship with Gambino and the receipt of the
Rolex and reported the incident to the FBI, which was
continuing its investigation.\377\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\372\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Roger Clinton's Dogged Effort for Drug
Trafficker, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2001. The Committee requested records
relating to this matter, including summaries of FBI interviews with the
Air Force intelligence officers. The Justice Department declined to
produce those records to the Committee because of its ongoing criminal
investigation of Roger Clinton.
\373\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Roger Clinton's Dogged Effort for Drug
Trafficker, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2001.
\374\ Id.
\375\ Id.
\376\ Id.
\377\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Later in 1999, Clinton received a $50,000 payment from the
Gambinos. On September 27, 1999, Anna Gambino, Tommy Gambino's
sister, wrote a check to Roger Clinton's company in the amount
of $50,000 dated September 29, 1999.\378\ The funds used to pay
Clinton appear to have originated with Lisa Gambino in Staten
Island, New York. Anna Gambino deposited three cashier's checks
from Lisa Gambino dated April 30, 1999, totaling $227,889.97
into the account from which she later paid Roger Clinton's
company $50,000.\379\ The bank records indicate that without
this deposit, there would have been insufficient funds to cover
the check to Clinton.\380\ However, Lisa Gambino has refused to
answer requests for an interview. Accordingly, the Committee
has been unable to determine the nature of the relationship
between Lisa Gambino and Anna Gambino or why Lisa Gambino paid
Anna Gambino the money.\381\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\378\ The discovery of this check in Roger Clinton's bank records
is what led the Committee to begin inquiries regarding Rosario Gambino.
When the Committee received the original check from Tommy Gambino in
response to a subpoena, it became apparent that the check had been
filled out by three different individuals using three different pens.
Anna Gambino apparently signed the check, which was presumably blank;
Tommy Gambino then apparently filled out the amount of the check,
$50,000; and then the ``payable to'' line was filled out in Roger
Clinton's handwriting, payable to Odgie Music. Tommy Gambino Document
Production (Exhibit 64).
\379\ Fidelity Federal Document Production (Exhibit 65).
\380\ Fidelity Federal Document Production (Exhibit 66).
\381\ The Committee was, however, able to determine the source of
the funds. The cashier's checks provided to Anna by Lisa Gambino were
the proceeds of a $499,000 mortgage on her home in Staten Island, New
York. Staten Island Savings Bank Document Production (Exhibit 67). In
the loan application documents, Lisa Gambino wrote a note in her own
hand indicating she was seeking the loan ``for an investment.'' Staten
Island Savings Bank Document Production (Exhibit 68). Given the refusal
of Roger Clinton and Tommy Gambino to cooperate, however, the Committee
has also been unable to definitively determine the purpose of the
$50,000 payment to Roger Clinton. However, as discussed below, Clinton
suggested to the FBI and the media that the money was a loan, which
appears to be false.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other evidence connects Lisa and Anna Gambino to reputed
organized crime figures. Both the accounts of Anna and Lisa
Gambino received frequent inflows of funds from Antonio
Genovese,\382\ a New York businessman who was partners with
Giovanni Gambino in G&G Concrete Company.\383\ Giovanni
``John'' Gambino is the brother of Rosario Gambino and was
convicted of murder and heroin distribution, together with his
other brother, Giuseppe ``Joe'' Gambino.\384\ G&G Concrete
played a central role in a 1995 dispute between another New
York construction firm, Nasso and Associates, and the city's
School Construction Authority (``SCA''). The disagreement was
settled, but according to reports, Nasso had failed to disclose
that it received financing from G&G Concrete partner Antonio
Genovese.\385\ Both Genovese and John Gambino had worked for
Julius Nasso, the grandfather of the principal of Nasso and
Associates, before forming G&G Concrete.\386\ According to news
reports:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\382\ See Fidelity Federal Document Production.
\383\ William K. Rashbaum, Concrete Case; Firm Allegedly Tied to
Mob Helps Build Federal Prison, Newsday, Jan. 23, 1995.
\384\ Selwyn Raab, Two Admit Importing Heroin for Mafia Crime
Family, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1994.
\385\ William K. Rashbaum, Concrete Case; Firm Allegedly Tied to
Mob Helps Build Federal Prison, Newsday, Jan. 23, 1995.
\386\ Id.
Testimony at the 1987 trial of Genovese mob boss
Anthony Salerno's [sic] disclosed that the elder Nasso
met with then-Gambino boss Paul Castellano and others
in an effort to convince another firm to step aside and
let Nasso take the $26 million Javits Convention Center
job.\387\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\387\ Id.
The controversy led to Nasso and Associates being prohibited
from bidding on New York City school projects.\388\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\388\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. The FBI's Interview of Roger Clinton
In the same time that Roger Clinton was receiving $50,000
and a gold Rolex from the Gambinos, the FBI was continuing its
investigation of his relationship with Tommy Gambino. The
report of Clinton's receipt of the Rolex reinvigorated the
investigation, leading to the interview of Clinton. At some
point in 1999, the Justice Department also issued a grand jury
subpoena to Tommy Gambino.\389\ Through his attorney, James
Henderson,\390\ Gambino informed the Justice Department that he
planned on invoking his Fifth Amendment rights.\391\
Accordingly, the Department did not call Gambino to the grand
jury.\392\ Instead, Gambino and his attorney participated in an
interview with the Justice Department.\393\ However,
reportedly, little resulted from the interview.\394\ Due to the
Justice Department's decision to withhold documents selectively
relating to the Clinton-Gambino investigation from the
Committee, including the Tommy Gambino interview summary, it is
not clear exactly what Gambino was questioned about, whether he
was truthful, or whether he was interviewed before or after
Roger Clinton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\389\ Interview with Judge Stephen Larson, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney, Central District of California (Aug. 16, 2001).
\390\ Although Henderson is the former head of the Justice
Department's Organized Crime Strike Force in Los Angeles, he has
represented individuals alleged to have ties to organized crime,
including Tommy Gambino, Louis Caruso, a ``reputed soldier in the Los
Angeles mob family,'' and Ronald ``The Cigar'' Sacco, an alleged $1
billion per year bookie with reputed ties to organized crime families.
John L. Smith, Oddsmaker Going Back to Control Board to Clear His Name,
Las Vegas Review Journal, June 11, 1997; Seth Rosenfeld, Alleged Bookie
Gets Huge Bail, San Francisco Examiner, Dec. 31, 1993.
\391\ Interview with Judge Stephen Larson, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney, Central District of California (Aug. 16, 2001).
\392\ Id.
\393\ Id.
\394\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 30, 1999, the same day that Roger Clinton
deposited the $50,000 Gambino check, two FBI agents interviewed
Clinton at his home in California.\395\ It is not clear what
prompted the FBI's interview, and specifically, whether they
were aware of the $50,000 check. The FBI interview summary
shows that Clinton attempted to mislead the FBI agents on
several occasions and had to change his story a number of
times. Even with Clinton's belated efforts to correct his
falsehoods, in the end he appears to have lied to the FBI
agents about multiple topics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\395\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00001 (Summary of Interview
with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding His Brother's
Knowledge
Clinton's first falsehood related to whether he discussed
his efforts on behalf of Gambino with President Clinton:
Clinton stated he did not discuss his decision to
assist the Gambino family in this case with anyone. . .
. Clinton stated he did not tell his brother, the
President of the United States, specifically what he
was working on. He believes, however, that the
President knew he had some business with the U.S.
Parole Commission, but did not know specifically what
he was working on. He did not tell his brother that he
was working on the Rosario Gambino case. He did not
seek advise [sic] or referrals from the President in
his efforts to contact the Parole Commission on behalf
of Rosario Gambino.\396\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\396\ Id. at FBI-RC-00003.
As discussed earlier, Clinton told Thomas Kowalski the
opposite. According to Kowalski, Clinton explicitly told him on
several occasions that the President knew what Roger was doing
for Gambino.\397\ Michael Stover's contemporaneous record of
his conversation with Clinton in January 1996 is also far more
consistent with Kowalski's recollection than with Clinton's
claims to the FBI:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\397\ See n.251 and accompanying text.
[Roger Clinton] began the conversation by informing me
that his brother ``[]is completely aware of my
involvement.'' Roger Clinton stated that his brother
had recommended to him that he not meet with
Commissioner Getty . . . because Commissioner Getty's
Kansas City Regional Office was about to be closed.
Roger Clinton informed me that his brother suggested
that he contact Commissioner Gaines instead.\398\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\398\ USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A.
Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42).
Clinton told Kowalski that the President knew of his
efforts on behalf of Gambino; then, he told the FBI that he
never discussed the matter with his brother. Clinton told
Stover that the President was actively advising him in his
efforts to contact the Commission; then, he told the FBI that
his brother was not involved at all. If he had said nothing
further on the matter, the worst one could conclude would be
that either Clinton was lying to Kowalski and Stover or he was
lying to the FBI. However, Clinton went further by telling the
FBI ``that he did not represent to anyone on the Parole
Commission that his brother was aware of his efforts to assist
the Gambino family or that the President was supporting his
effort to assist in getting Rosario Gambino released from
prison.'' \399\ If Kowalski is to be believed, then Clinton's
statement is false. According to Kowalski, Clinton did
represent that his brother was aware of his efforts to assist
Gambino.\400\ Unlike Clinton's statement to the FBI, Kowalski's
statement is not a self-serving denial standing alone. Rather,
Kowalski has no discernable motivation to lie, and his
recollection about Clinton's representation of his brother's
knowledge is consistent with the contemporaneous, written
record of a conversation in which Clinton made very similar
statements to Stover.\401\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\399\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00003 (Summary of Interview
with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).
\400\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001).
\401\ USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A.
Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding Payment from the
Gambinos
Clinton told the FBI that his efforts on behalf of Rosario
Gambino were ``above board.'' \402\ He told the agents that
immediately after learning that Commission personnel were
unable to discuss particulars of the case with him without
violating the Privacy Act, he ``processed the proper paperwork
to register as an official representative of Rosario Gambino.''
\403\ The agents then began to ask about compensation for
Clinton's assistance:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\402\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00003 (Summary of Interview
with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).
\403\ Id. It appears that this statement was also untrue. The
Parole Commission did not provide the Committee with any such
paperwork, and internal Parole Commission documents repeatedly refer to
the fact that Clinton had not filed the appropriate paperwork under the
Privacy Act. See, e.g., USPC Document Production 00879 (Memorandum from
Sharon Gervasoni, DDAEO, to Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff (Sept. 23,
1998)) (Exhibit 69).
Clinton was asked if he was ever given anything of
value for his assistance in this matter. He advised he
had not received anything for this assistance. Clinton
stated that Tommy Gambino said if he (Clinton) could
help get his father released from prison, ``we will
take care of you.'' Clinton said that he knows what
that means. He stated ``I'm not stupid, I understand
what the big picture is.'' . . . Clinton advised it was
his understanding [that] if he were successful, he
would be financially compensated. . . . Clinton then
stated that he had received two airline tickets to
Washington D.C. from Tommy Gambino and expenses for the
trips. Tommy Gambino put the airline tickets on his
credit card. Clinton also admitted to having received
an undisclosed amount of expenses, but did not provide
any information as to how the expense money was
furnished to him.\404\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\404\ Id. at FBI-RC-00004.
The trip to Washington D.C. mentioned here appears to be a
different trip than the one mentioned earlier, because the
earlier trip was paid for on Roger Clinton's company credit
card, not on Gambino's. Accordingly, Clinton and Gambino may
have traveled to Washington together on more than one occasion.
After Clinton initially denied that he had ever received
anything of value for his assistance to the Gambino family
(other than the airline tickets and expense money), the agents
began questioning him about any gifts he may have received from
the Gambinos. Clinton then partially addressed the $50,000 he
had either just received or was about to receive from Gambino
that day: \405\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\405\ The Roger Clinton FBI interview summary does not state what
time of day on September 30 the interview was conducted. Similarly,
Roger Clinton's bank records do not indicate what time of day Clinton
deposited the $50,000 check from Gambino. In the absence of more
documentation, it is difficult to be certain that Clinton had received
the Gambino check at the time of the FBI interview. However,
considering the fact that the check was dated September 29, and
deposited September 30, it is distinctly possible that Clinton received
the check before September 30. If Clinton had the check in his
possession at the time of the FBI interview, his statements about
payment from Gambino would have been explicitly false.
Clinton advised he is currently trying to buy a house
in the Torrance, California area and Tommy Gambino has
offered to loan him an undisclosed amount of money for
the down payment. This loan is not compensation for his
assistance to the Gambino's [sic] in attempting to get
Rosario Gambino released from prison. The offer is for
a loan which must be repaid. It is not to give Clinton
the money. This offer was made regardless of the
outcome with Clintons [sic] efforts to obtain Rosario
Gambino's release.\406\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\406\ Id. at FBI-RC-00005-06.
Clinton's explanation of the Gambino ``loan offer'' is
misleading for a number of reasons. First, if Clinton had
received the $50,000 check from Anna Gambino at the time of the
interview, his statements would clearly be misleading, as he
would have received an actual payment, not just an ``offer.''
Second, there is no evidence that the payment from Gambino was
a loan, or was ever intended to be a loan. There is no record
of repayment of the $50,000 in either Clinton's or Gambino's
bank records.
Also undermining Clinton's claims that the money from
Gambino was a loan are the other large payments Clinton
received in this same period, which were clearly intended to be
loans and which Clinton repaid in short order. For example, in
the same time period, Clinton received and repaid a large loan
from Gerard Guez, CEO of the Tarrant Apparel Group. According
to Guez, Clinton said he needed money to buy a house and
promised to repay Guez from funds he would soon receive as
payment for a performance in Korea.\407\ On October 25, 1999,
Guez wired $100,000 to Roger Clinton's business checking
account.\408\ Less than three months later, Clinton had repaid
the entire amount (with no interest) through two checks from
his personal checking account: one on December 17, 1999, for
$50,000 and another on January 6, 2000, also for $50,000.\409\
Clinton did purchase a home for $570,000 on September 27, 1999,
with a down payment of $114,000.\410\ The deed transfer was
recorded on October 29, 1999, four days after Guez wired the
funds and two days after Clinton withdrew $115,703 from his
account.\411\ The $100,000 from Guez appears to have been the
primary source of funds for the down payment rather than the
$50,000 from Gambino. Even if Roger Clinton used some of the
money from Gambino ($15,703 at most) for the down payment,
there appears to be no record of his repaying any of it. This
is in contrast to the $100,000 from Guez, which Roger repaid in
full within three months. Accordingly, the claim that the
payment from Gambino was a loan for a down payment on his house
is clearly false.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\407\ Telephone Interview with Gerard Guez, CEO, Tarrant Apparel
Group (June 11, 2001).
\408\ Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 70).
\409\ Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 71).
\410\ Property Transfer Record, Los Angeles County, CA (Doc. #:99-
2032105).
\411\ Id; Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 72).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is also evidence that Clinton attempted to coach
Tommy Gambino and influence his potential testimony regarding
this payment. When it became clear that the Committee was
investigating the $50,000 payment from Gambino, Roger Clinton
reportedly called Gambino and attempted to convince him that
the payment had been a loan. As The New York Times reported:
According to one person close to the Gambinos, Roger
Clinton called Tommy Gambino on Monday [June 25, 2001]
because questions were being raised about the 1999
payment.
``Don't you remember this is money you gave me for my
house for a loan?'' this person quoted Roger Clinton as
saying to Tommy Gambino.
Tommy Gambino, this person said, thought it best not to
reply on the chance that the phone was tapped.\412\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\412\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Pardon for Felon Considered After Kin
Paid Roger Clinton, N.Y. Times, June 28, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding the Rolex Watch
Roger Clinton also attempted to mislead the interviewing
FBI agents regarding the gold Rolex that he received from Tommy
Gambino. Clinton first attempted to tell the agents that he
never received any gifts from Gambino and then altered his
story several times:
Clinton was asked if he had received any gifts from
Tommy Gambino while he was assisting the family with
the case, and Clinton initially responded ``no.'' After
further inquiry, Clinton then advised ``I was shown a
Rolex watch once, but it was not given to me.'' Clinton
explained that the watch was on the wrist of Tommy
Gambino who asked Clinton if he ever had a Rolex.
Clinton related that he and Tommy Gambino were
discussing watches and cigars at a coffee shop in
Beverly Hills, the name and location of which Clinton
could not remember.
* * *
Clinton stated that after leaving the coffee shop,
Tommy Gambino took him to look at watches at an unnamed
``pawn shop,'' also in Beverly Hills, California where
they encountered actor and Hollywood celebrity George
Hamilton. Clinton said Hamilton, who is ``a friend of
Tommy's,'' sells watches and cigars. Clinton said
Hamilton had a briefcase full of watches which he
displayed to Clinton and Gambino, but they left without
buying a watch.\413\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\413\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00004-05 (Summary of Interview
with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).
So, Clinton's initial response when asked specifically about
the watch was to deny that he had ever received one. That
version of events, however, did not withstand scrutiny for
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
long:
Clinton subsequently reversed his earlier denials and
admitted to having actually received a watch from Tommy
Gambino, who told him it was an ``Italian custom'' to
give such a gift as a token of appreciation. Clinton
could not remember either when he was given the watch,
or where he was when he received it. Clinton claimed,
however, he did not keep it, but returned it to Gambino
after he had ``heard'' the watch is a ``fake.'' Clinton
could not remember who told him the watch was an
imitation, or when he had learned it was a ``fake.''
\414\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\414\ Id. at FBI-RC-00005.
Thus, Clinton's second story was that he did receive a watch
from Gambino but had returned it. Again, this story did not
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
withstand scrutiny and was withdrawn:
Clinton again amended his previous statement when
pressed for details regarding the watch's return.
Clinton stated that even though it was supposed to be
``a fake,'' he did not return the watch because it was
a gift of appreciation from the family. Clinton
contended that he never wore it because it was ``too
gaudy'' with a thick gold band and a blue face. Clinton
said he was confused in that he did not know the
present location of the watch. Clinton stated ``Tommy
could have it,'' or that he may actually still have the
watch. He stated ``he really didn't know.'' Clinton
advised ``It could be in my flippin trunk for all I
know, it could be in my garage, or almost anywhere.''
Clinton offered to locate the watch ``if it is really
important, but it's going to take a lot of effort, so
don't ask unless you really need it.'' Clinton was
asked to look for the watch after the interview and
contact the interviewing agents if he located it.
Clinton agreed to do so.
Clinton asked if Tommy Gambino was in trouble and if he
was involved in something Clinton should know about. He
stated that as far a [sic] he knew, Tommy Gambino is
very clean.\415\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\415\ Id.
Hence, Clinton's third version was that he had received the
watch, did not return it, and was unsure of its location.
Despite all three earlier claims, Clinton later produced a
Rolex watch to the agents and offered the following explanation
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of how he had obtained it:
Clinton stated that he does now own a silver Rolex
watch. He bought it from an unknown street vendor in
front of a ``rainbow'' or ``multicolored'' hotel in
Tijuana, Mexico. He paid $250 dollars for the watch in
cash and has no receipt of the purchase. He could not
provide either the name, street address or approximate
location of the hotel.\416\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\416\ Id. at FBI-RC-00006.
At this point in the interview, the agents took the unusual
step of warning Clinton about the potential consequences of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
lying to the FBI:
[T]he interviewing agents advised Clinton of the
provisions of Title 18, U.S. Code Section 1001 and the
criminal exposure of making false statements to federal
agents. Clinton was informed it was a violation of law
to provide false information to federal law enforcement
officers and that he could be prosecuted, fined and
imprisoned for doing so. Clinton was then asked, after
being advised of Title 18, U.S. Code Section 1001,
would he care to change or otherwise amend any of his
previous statements, and Clinton replied ``No,'' he was
comfortable with what he had said.\417\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\417\ Id.
Clinton's bumbling efforts to mislead the interviewing FBI
agents should not distract from the central fact that Roger
Clinton was attempting to conceal from the FBI the true nature
of his relationship with Tommy Gambino, reputed underboss of
the Los Angeles Mafia, and his efforts to win the release of
Rosario Gambino, a convicted heroin trafficker and organized
crime figure. Clinton's efforts on behalf of the Gambino family
were not merely embarrassing. His behavior was unconscionable
and his attempts to conceal certain key aspects of his
involvement from the FBI were illegal. Clinton was attempting
to use his influence to affect the decision of the U.S Parole
Commission; he was receiving money from the Gambino family; and
he may have been doing it with the full knowledge of his
brother, the President. For Roger Clinton to refuse to
cooperate fully and truthfully with the FBI in an investigation
of these deeply disturbing issues only strengthens the
conclusion that Clinton knew his activity was highly unethical
and quite possibly illegal.
F. The Efforts to Obtain Executive Clemency for Rosario Gambino
In November 2000, Rosario Gambino requested that President
Clinton exercise his power of executive clemency and commute
his prison sentence. Gambino filed with the White House a two-
page commutation petition, as well as a twelve-page brief with
a number of attachments.\418\ Gambino's brief in support of his
commutation request made a number of familiar arguments: (1)
that Gambino was given a higher ``offense severity rating''
than his co-conspirators; (2) that Gambino had been subjected
to prejudice based on national origin; and (3) that Gambino had
an ``outstanding institutional record'' and strong family
support, which merited release from prison.\419\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\418\ NARA Document Production (Petition for Commutation, Nov.
2000) (Exhibit 59).
\419\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The arguments raised by Gambino were seriously flawed. As
has been noted before, a federal appeals court explicitly
rejected the first two. The Parole Commission repeatedly and
properly found that Gambino's offense severity rating was
correctly set at level eight, the highest available to the
Commission. This rating was based on the courts' and the
Commission's judgment that Gambino was at the head of a major
heroin distribution ring and had been involved in other major
organized criminal activities. Gambino's argument focused on
the claim that his co-defendants received a less severe rating
of level six while being equally involved in the heroin
distribution ring. This claim does not have great merit. First,
there was evidence that it was Rosario Gambino, rather than
Erasmo Gambino or Anthony Spatola, who headed the heroin
distribution ring. In addition, the Parole Commission also
determined that Erasmo Gambino may have incorrectly been
granted a rating of level six, and likely should have received
a more severe rating. The Commission found that it ``need not
give the ringleader of a major heroin conspiracy a lower rating
just because his subordinates have been rated too low.'' \420\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\420\ USPC Document Production 00664 (Memorandum from John R.
Simpson, Commissioner, to National Commissioners (Jan. 13, 1999))
(Exhibit 55).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It also appears that Gambino's arguments of discrimination
based on national origin were completely spurious. The only
evidence cited in support of Gambino's claim was a Parole
Commission memo stating that ``Gambino appears to come from an
immigrant background in which family connections are simply
exploited (as in the current offense) to get around the law.''
\421\ This quote simply provides no evidence of prejudice
against Gambino. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
summarily rejected Gambino's claim of racial prejudice.\422\
The Court likely recognized that the Commission memo stated a
simple fact, namely that Gambino's background indicated that he
did, in the current offense, employ family loyalty as a tool to
ensure the success of his criminal enterprise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\421\ USPC Document Production 00890 (Memorandum from Thomas C.
Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Michael J. Gaines, Chairman (Dec.
24, 1997)) (Exhibit 44).
\422\ Gambino v. United States Parole Comm'n, 216 F.3d 1083 (9th
Cir. 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gambino's claim that he was a model prisoner was incorrect.
Gambino did have one official infraction in his prison record,
and the Committee also learned that Gambino was transferred
from at least one prison because he was ``muscling'' other
prisoners.\423\ While these offenses may not be as serious as
other inmates' infractions, they are not the actions of a model
prisoner. Finally, Gambino argued brazenly that he had ``strong
family support'' and could be provided a job by his son Tommy
upon release. Given the allegations suggesting that Tommy
Gambino is an organized crime figure in his own right and that
his business partner is convicted mobster Dominick ``Donnie
Shacks'' Montemarano,\424\ it is hardly an argument for Rosario
Gambino's release that he would return home and take a job in
the ``family business.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\423\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001).
\424\ See Arnold H. Lubasch, 2 Convicted of Racketeering in Mafia
Construction Case, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1987 (describing Montemarano's
conviction).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is clear that the Gambino commutation petition was filed
with the White House and rejected at some point in January
2001. Beyond that, few facts about consideration of his
petition are known. The inability to discover this information
is the result of two unfortunate decisions. First, former
Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey and former Associate
White House Counsel Meredith Cabe refused to be interviewed by
Committee staff regarding their handling of the Gambino matter.
Second, the Bush Administration withheld from the Committee
four deliberative documents regarding the Gambino commutation
decision.\425\ Both of these decisions are disturbing. Lindsey
and Cabe would be able to shed light on whether the President
was receptive to his brother's pleas and how close the Gambino
commutation came to being granted. It is difficult to
understand why the Bush Administration would want to withhold
from the Committee key documents about the Gambino matter. The
documents have a direct bearing on an apparent attempt by the
former President's brother to sell his access to the White
House to an alleged member of the Sicilian Mafia. Documents
like these, which have a direct bearing on a case involving the
sale of access to the clemency process by a presidential
sibling, should not be withheld from Congress. The decision of
the Bush Administration to withhold these documents has kept
the Committee from determining how the Gambino commutation
request was handled at the White House. These documents likely
would inform the Committee whether the Gambino commutation was
seriously considered, what position White House staff took on
the matter, and whether the President was receptive to the
Gambino request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\425\ Letter from Gary M. Stern, General Counsel, National Archives
and Records Administration, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel,
Comm. on Govt. Reform (Aug. 2, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The few documents received by the Committee suggest that
the Gambino commutation may have received serious consideration
at the White House. Two documents located in the files of
Meredith Cabe indicate that Cabe requested a National Crime
Information Center (``NCIC'') background check on Rosario
Gambino.\426\ Cabe was the primary attorney in the White House
Counsel's office handling clemency-related matters in the
waning days of the Clinton Administration.\427\ The two
documents were printed from a computer diskette labeled,
``pardon lists.'' \428\ One of the documents reads as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\426\ NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73).
\427\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate White House
Counsel, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\428\ NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCIC for Michael Mahoney?
NCIS [sic] \429\ for Rosario Gambino, [date of birth
redacted], no social security number, incarcerated at
Terminal Island, CA
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\429\ The reference ``NCIS'' is apparently a typographical error by
Cabe. Supporting this conclusion first is the fact that there is no
relevant database called ``NCIS.'' Second, the preceding sentence
references NCIC. Third, another document prepared by Cabe indicates
that she was requesting an NCIC check on Gambino.
Please provide all information known regarding Kimberly
Johnson's incident report for ``threatening bodily
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
harm''
Ask DOJ to contact sentencing judge in Diana G. Nelson
case?
NCIC: Peter Ninemire, [date of birth redacted], [social
security number deleted]: what happened if we commute
entire federal sentence; is he remanded to state
custody??? \430\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\430\ NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The other document prepared by Cabe reads as follows:
1. NCIC Checks
Michael Mahoney,
Rosario Gambino, [date of birth redacted], no social
security number, incarcerated at Terminal Island, CA
Peter Ninemire, [date of birth redacted], [social
security number deleted]:
John Bustamente, [date of birth redacted], [social
security number deleted]
2. Follow up questions
Kimberly Johnson: please provide all information known
regarding incident report for ``threatening bodily
harm''
Diana G. Nelson: Please contact sentencing judge
regarding position on commutation.
Peter Ninemire: can you determine what happened if we
commute entire federal sentence; is he remanded to
state custody??? \431\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\431\ NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73).
These documents suggest that Gambino may have been a serious
candidate for clemency. Cabe was interviewed by Committee staff
prior to the discovery of the Clinton-Gambino matter and
explained that she was responsible for obtaining NCIC checks on
serious candidates for clemency.\432\ The purpose of such a
background check was to ensure that there was no further
criminal activity on the part of the petitioner that had not
been disclosed on the petition.\433\ The fact that the White
House was requesting a background check on Gambino suggests
that his name had passed some level of serious scrutiny, and
the White House was considering the commutation. The other
names listed with Gambino's also suggest that the commutation
was being seriously considered. Gambino's name is listed with
Michael Mahoney, Peter Ninemire, John Bustamente, Kimberly
Johnson, and Diana G. Nelson.\434\ Three of those five
individuals received executive clemency.\435\ This fact
indicates that Cabe's list was not some preliminary list of
individuals whose names had been received by the White House.
Rather, since sixty percent of those on the list with Gambino
actually received executive clemency, the list appears to
consist of individuals receiving serious consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\432\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate White House
Counsel, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\433\ Id.
\434\ NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73).
\435\ See ``Clemency Recipients'' (Pardons Granted by President Clinton and Commutations
Granted by President Clinton).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee has not been able to determine exactly when
the President decided not to grant clemency to Rosario Gambino.
However, Roger Clinton's telephone records make it appear that
he was holding out hope for a commutation until the final
moments of the Clinton Administration. The very first call
placed by Roger Clinton after the expiration of his brother's
term as President on January 20, 2001, was to the cell phone of
Tommy Gambino. It seems likely that the call was to break the
news to Tommy Gambino that his father would not be receiving a
commutation. Supporting this conclusion is the fact that
Clinton also placed telephone calls to three other individuals
immediately after his call to Gambino, informing them that they
did not receive the pardons that Roger Clinton had been
attempting to get them. After he called Tommy Gambino, Roger
Clinton called Dan Lasater, George Locke, and Joseph ``Jay''
McKernan and informed them that the President had not granted
them pardons, despite Roger's request.\436\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001); Telephone
Interview with George Locke (Mar. 27, 2001); Telephone Interview with
Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan (Apr. 10, 2001). See also Verizon Document
Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Feb. 1, 2001) at 8-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Rosario Gambino case is one of the most disturbing
matters reviewed by the Committee as part of its clemency
investigation. The President's brother worked to free a
convicted heroin dealer and member of organized crime from
prison. The President's brother engaged in these activities
because of his friendship with Tommy Gambino, himself a reputed
senior organized crime member. He also engaged in these efforts
because of the promise of a lucrative reward from the Gambino
family, a reward that Clinton received in part, even though he
did not succeed in winning Rosario Gambino's release. Moreover,
when questioned by the FBI, Roger Clinton lied repeatedly in
order to cover up the true nature of his relationship with the
Gambino family. This episode sets a new low for presidential
siblings.
III. THE LINCECUM PARDON OFFER
Among the first public reports of Roger Clinton's pardon-
related activities was the story of Garland Lincecum. Garland
Lincecum has claimed that he and his family were bilked out of
$235,000 by Roger Clinton and two of his associates, Dickey
Morton and George Locke, who claimed that they could sell
presidential pardons.\437\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\437\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Garland Lincecum was convicted in July 1998 along with
three co-defendants for wire fraud and mail fraud in connection
with a scheme to defraud investors of $8 million.\438\
Lincecum's co-defendants were Valerie Miremadi, Anthony
Miremadi, and Paul Eggers, a former general counsel to the
Treasury Department in the Nixon Administration and candidate
for the governorship of Texas.\439\ All were convicted for
their roles in the scheme. Lincecum was sentenced to 87 months
in prison, which he began serving in April 1999.\440\ According
to the government, the defendants had engaged in a ``prime
bank'' fraud, a common scheme described by the Securities and
Exchange Commission as involving ``the purported issuance,
trading, or use of so-called `prime' bank, `prime' European
bank or `prime' world bank financial instruments, or other
`high yield investment programs[.]' '' \441\ Investors are told
that ``prime banks'' use their funds for short-term loans and
that they will be able to earn a return of 100 percent or
more.\442\ Lincecum, however, maintains that little or no money
was actually lost in this investment scheme and that all
investors' funds were treated with care.\443\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\438\ Nixon Official Facing 5 Years for Fraud, United Press
International, Aug. 1, 1998.
\439\ Id.
\440\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001).
\441\ ``Warning to All Investors About Bogus `Prime Bank' and Other
Banking-Related Investment Schemes,'' Securities and Exchange
Commission, .
\442\ Nixon Official Facing 5 Years for Fraud, United Press
International, Aug. 1, 1998.
\443\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lincecum also had a prior conviction from 1982 for
transporting an individual across state lines in furtherance of
a fraudulent scheme.\444\ Lincecum served 40 months in prison
on those charges but maintains that he is innocent of any crime
for his role in either fraudulent scheme.\445\ He also believes
that his co-defendants in the 1998 trial received much lighter
sentences than he did, despite their more serious involvement
in the investment plan.\446\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\444\ Id. Lincecum's prior conviction related to his role in
finding investors for a fraudulent gold refining process. Lincecum and
two other individuals claimed to have a new process for refining gold
ore. Lincecum and his investors then used the ore, which authorities
charged was worthless, as collateral to borrow $250,000 from a bank in
Pennsylvania. Lincecum and his partners were all convicted. Interview
with Robert ``R.V.'' Wilson (Apr. 25, 2001).
\445\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001).
\446\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The other key actors in the Lincecum matter were George
Locke and Dickey Morton. George Locke was an Arkansas State
Senator from 1970 to 1983 but was convicted of cocaine
distribution charges in 1986.\447\ Locke's conviction stemmed
from drug dealing activities he conducted in Arkansas in the
1980s together with Dan Lasater and Roger Clinton.\448\ Locke
was also a partner of Lasater's in the investment firm of
Collins, Locke, and Lasater in Little Rock.\449\ Dickey Morton
was a star running back for the University of Arkansas during
the 1970s who then played briefly for the Pittsburgh Steelers.
In 1974, Morton married Sandra Clark, who was the daughter of
Jimmy Clark, Locke's business partner.\450\ Locke and Morton
have been close since 1973 and have had a number of business
ventures together.\451\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\447\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David
A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 1 (May 18, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
\448\ Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C.
(Mar. 27, 2001).
\449\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David
A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 1 (May 18, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
\450\ Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C.
(Mar. 27, 2001).
\451\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David
A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 2 (May 18, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Garland Lincecum's Account
1. The Initial $35,000 Payment
The first time that Garland Lincecum discussed a
presidential pardon with anyone was in August 1998 after he was
convicted in the prime bank fraud but before he was
sentenced.\452\ Richard Cayce, a longtime business associate,
approached Lincecum.\453\ Cayce told Lincecum that he was
involved in business with Roger Clinton and two of his
associates, Dickey Morton and George Locke.\454\ Cayce said
that Clinton, Morton, and Locke had the ability to obtain
presidential pardons.\455\ Cayce told Lincecum that he could
obtain a pardon if Lincecum could pay Clinton, Morton, and
Locke $300,000.\456\ Lincecum told Cayce that he was interested
in this proposal, but that it would take him some time to come
up with the necessary funds.\457\ Cayce told Lincecum that if
he was interested, he should come up with $25,000 to $35,000
immediately to indicate that his interest was serious.\458\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\452\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001).
\453\ Id.
\454\ Id. Cayce had extensive business contacts with Morton and
Locke prior to approaching them about the Lincecum pardon. Letter from
Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief
Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 2-3 (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I).
According to George Locke, Cayce was attempting to enlist Roger
Clinton's support for an entity called the Legacy Foundation. Telephone
Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001). The
Legacy Foundation claimed to be a charitable organization selling tax-
exempt charitable bonds. Id. Cayce and others involved in the Legacy
Foundation wanted to use the Clinton name to help sell the charitable
bonds. Id. After the Securities and Exchange Commission launched an
investigation, the Legacy Foundation halted its plans to issue the
bonds. Cayce was trying to enlist Clinton, Morton, and Locke's support
for the Legacy Foundation during the same time as Lincecum was trying
to obtain his pardon. However, Morton and Locke have claimed that all
of the money exchanged between Cayce, Lincecum, and CLM related to the
Legacy Foundation, not any attempt to sell pardons. Letter from Mark F.
Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel,
Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). As discussed
in the conclusion below, this claim is not credible.
\455\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001).
\456\ Id.
\457\ Id.
\458\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lincecum went to his mother, Alberta Lincecum, and borrowed
$35,000 from her.\459\ Alberta Lincecum confirmed that she
provided $35,000 for Garland's initial payment and also said
that she overheard telephone conversations between Garland and
other unnamed individuals regarding his effort to buy a pardon.
In her interview with Committee staff, Alberta Lincecum stated
that she listened, on an extension, to a telephone conversation
between Garland and other individuals where those unknown
individuals told Garland that he needed to come up with
$100,000 for a pardon.\460\ Alberta Lincecum cashed a
certificate of deposit and wrote a personal check to Garland
for $35,000.\461\ Garland then signed the check over to Richard
Cayce.\462\ Cayce told Lincecum that he would cash the check
and deliver the cash personally to Roger Clinton.\463\
According to Lincecum, Cayce also offered to loan him $70,000
to help pay for the pardon and to provide these funds directly
to Morton.\464\ Bank records indicate that the MM Foundation,
an organization controlled by Cayce, wired $70,000 to CLM,
L.L.C.,\465\ a company created by Clinton, Locke, and
Morton.\466\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\459\ Id; Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 19,
2001).
\460\ Id.
\461\ Id.
\462\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001).
\463\ Id.
\464\ Id.
\465\ First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit
74).
\466\ Records indicate that Dickey Morton was the registered agent
for the company. Arkansas Secretary of State Document Production
(Articles of Organization) (Exhibit 75). Clinton's and Locke's
involvement in the company was confirmed by George Locke. Telephone
Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The First Dallas Meeting
After Garland Lincecum informed Cayce that he was
interested in paying $300,000 for a pardon, Cayce informed
Dickey Morton that Lincecum was interested.\467\ Cayce told
Morton that Lincecum would want to meet with him personally to
discuss the arrangements for the pardon.\468\ Morton sent the
following remarkable fax to Cayce (handwritten notations on the
fax are indicated in parentheses):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\467\ Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to
David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
\468\ Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to
David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
RE: Political Meeting Agreement
Richard: The following is an understanding of the way
this meeting will occur on Tuesday August 12, 1998,
along with the compensation required to get you this
meeting.
Please review and sign and fax back to my fax number by
this early afternoon if your group wants to consumate
[sic] this meeting.
1. Call an airline representative for reservations for
Roger Clinton, Mrs. Roger Clinton, and Molly Clinton
\469\ from Los Angeles to Dallas, Friday the 7th of
August 1998, for a late direct flight first class. You
pre-pay by your credit card today August 7th 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\469\ Given that Molly Clinton is Roger Clinton's wife, it is not
clear who Morton was referring to as ``Mrs. Roger Clinton.''
2. The 1/3 of cookies ($) that we discussed or 33,000
cookies ($) will be delivered by your representative or
you, cookies need to be ready to eat. A time and place
will be setup early Monday morning for exchange for the
meeting to set up for Tuesday, place needs to a private
meeting place, as we do not need any auto graph [sic]
seekers there. Roger will send his representative to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
meet you.
3. The meeting will be set for Tuesday, as to time and
place, when you deliver cookies to Roger's
representative on Monday morning the 11th of August.
4. The rest of cookies ($ money) can be delivered
Tuesday right before meeting.
By signing you accept conditions of meeting.
I am not the representative of Roger Clinton in this
transaction, you will meet him in Dallas, Texas.
Best regards, Dickey Morton
($ cookies = money) \470\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\470\ Dickey Morton Document Production 001144 (Letter from Dickey
Morton, to Richard Cayce (Aug. 7, 1998)) (Exhibit 76).
In his proffer to the Committee, Morton claimed that this
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
letter was written at the behest of Cayce:
Casey [sic] asked that a confirmation letter be sent to
him spelling out the agreement. Casey [sic] stated that
the letter must be written in code since the Legacy
Foundation was at present, working covertly with the
federal government. Casey [sic] told Morton not to
mention money in the letter.\471\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\471\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David
A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 4 (May 18, 2001)
(within Appendix I). In this proffer, Morton also maintained that the
100,000 ``cookies'' in the letter referred to the ``appearance fee''
charged by Roger Clinton for meeting with Cayce and Lincecum, not any
payment for a pardon.
Cayce made the requested arrangements and met with Clinton,
Locke, Morton, and Lincecum in a Dallas hotel in approximately
August 1998.\472\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\472\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001); Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to David
Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001) (within
Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the morning of the meeting, Cayce first met alone with
Clinton, Locke, and Morton in a hotel room.\473\ Garland
Lincecum was not present at the meeting, but after the meeting,
Cayce informed Lincecum that Cayce provided to Roger Clinton
the $35,000 in cash that Lincecum had raised from his
mother.\474\ Dickey Morton and George Locke admitted, through
their lawyer, to accepting $7,000 and $5,000 respectively at
this meeting.\475\ They also confirmed that Roger Clinton
accepted $18,000 in cash as his share of the payment.\476\ Bank
records provide corroboration, indicating that Roger Clinton
made a series of large cash deposits into his bank accounts
around the same time frame.\477\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\473\ Id; Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001).
\474\ Id.
\475\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and
George Locke, Hampton and Larkowski, to David Kass, Deputy Chief
Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\476\ Id.
\477\ Between August 19, and August 25, 1998, Clinton made three
separate deposits totaling $12,500. Bank of America Document Production
(Exhibit 77).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cayce informed Lincecum that he discussed the pardon
arrangements with Clinton, Locke, and Morton, and that they
assured him that, through Clinton's contacts, they would be
able to obtain the pardon.\478\ After the private meeting,
Cayce, Locke, and Morton came down to the hotel lobby, where
they met with Garland Lincecum.\479\ Roger Clinton did not
participate in this meeting. During this meeting, Garland
Lincecum asked whether he would definitely receive a pardon in
exchange for his money.\480\ Morton explained that he would
receive a pardon, not merely that he and Roger would make their
``best efforts'' to obtain a pardon.\481\ Garland said he would
not have agreed to pay the money merely for a promise of ``best
efforts.'' \482\ Morton stated that Roger Clinton could obtain
pardons in batches of six at a time.\483\ Concerned about this
arrangement, Lincecum asked if this was legal, and Morton
assured him that it was.\484\ Morton claimed that most pardon
petitions were rejected because the applicants failed to fill
out the paperwork properly.\485\ He explained that he, Locke,
and Roger Clinton used a Washington, D.C., law firm to prepare
the necessary paperwork on the pardon and that Roger would then
personally deliver the paperwork to his brother, the
President.\486\ George Locke told Lincecum that they had
obtained pardons in this way previously but declined to name
any of the individuals who had obtained pardons in this manner.
Locke said that after Lincecum received his pardon, he would
likewise accord the same confidentiality to Lincecum if ever
asked about it.\487\ Morton confirmed during this meeting that
he had already received $100,000 of the necessary $300,000
towards Lincecum's pardon.\488\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\478\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001).
\479\ Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to
David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001)
(within Appendix I); Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX
(Apr. 19, 2001).
\480\ Id.
\481\ Id.
\482\ Id.
\483\ Id.
\484\ Id.
\485\ Id.
\486\ Id.
\487\ Id.
\488\ Id. The $100,000 that had been paid at this point consisted
of the $70,000 wired by the M.M. Foundation plus the $30,000 to $35,000
delivered in cash.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Roger Clinton did not participate in this hotel lobby
meeting.\489\ However, after the meeting, Cayce asked Lincecum
if he had noticed an individual who had been watching the
meeting from a second-story balcony overlooking the lobby.\490\
Lincecum stated that he had, and Cayce told him that the
individual was Roger Clinton.\491\ Lincecum asked Cayce ``well,
why didn't the little bastard come down?'' \492\ At this point,
Cayce told Lincecum that he had met with Clinton, Locke, and
Morton earlier that morning and that Roger Clinton told him he
would help obtain the pardon.\493\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\489\ Id.
\490\ Id.
\491\ Id.
\492\ Id.
\493\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lincecum believed the claims of Morton and Locke for a
number of reasons. First, he had heard from Cayce that they had
the ability to obtain diplomatic passports.\494\ This suggested
to Lincecum that they had influence in the U.S. government.
Second, Cayce confirmed for Lincecum that Roger Clinton was
indeed working with Morton and Locke on these matters.\495\
Third, Lincecum trusted Morton and Locke. Morton was a standout
football player with the University of Arkansas and had a
reputation as a devoted family man.\496\ Locke was a former
Arkansas state senator who had been close to Bill Clinton when
he was Governor.\497\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\494\ Id.
\495\ Id.
\496\ Id.
\497\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In his proffer to the Committee, Cayce offers a slightly
different version of events with regard to the two initial
payments. Cayce claims that he, not Alberta Lincecum, was the
source of the initial cash payment.\498\ He also claims that he
provided $30,000, rather than $35,000, in cash to Clinton,
Locke, and Morton at the Dallas meeting.\499\ According to
Cayce, the cash from the Dallas meeting plus the $70,000 wire
from the MM Foundation were intended to pay for his attempt to
purchase diplomatic passports and were unrelated to Lincecum's
attempt to obtain a pardon. While the differences between the
accounts of Cayce and Lincecum are noteworthy, they are not
highly significant. First, Cayce's account cannot be given
great weight, since Cayce has invoked his Fifth Amendment
rights and provided his information in the form of a proffer.
Second, while there are some differences between Cayce and
Lincecum, for the most part, Cayce supports Lincecum's account.
Cayce confirms that Morton and Locke offered to sell a pardon
to Lincecum. Cayce also confirms that Roger Clinton was
directly involved in the plot to sell a pardon to Lincecum.
Cayce merely disagrees on the amount of money that was paid by
Lincecum for the pardon. This difference does not undermine the
core of Lincecum's allegations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\498\ Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to
David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
\499\ Id. The two numbers may be reconcilable. If the Lincecums
gave Cayce $35,000, he may have used $5,000 for airline tickets, hotel
accommodations, and other expenses for Roger Clinton and his companions
on the trip to Dallas. According to Guy and Alberta Lincecum, their
copy of the $35,000 check that they gave to Richard Cayce was lost.
Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001);
Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). The
Committee was unsuccessful in its attempts to obtain records of the
$35,000 directly from the bank. However, the fact that a $30,000 cash
payment occurred was corroborated by George Locke and Dickey Morton,
through their attorney, who explained that all three received cash from
Cayce, with Roger Clinton receiving $18,000, Morton receiving $7,000,
and Locke receiving $5,000. Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for
Dickey Morton and George Locke, Hampton and Larkowski, to David Kass,
Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within
Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Lincecum's Attempts to Raise the Remaining Money
Between August and November 1998, Garland Lincecum had a
number of contacts with Morton regarding the payment of the
remaining $200,000 towards his pardon. Lincecum stated that
Morton and Locke maintained a ``soft pressure'' on him that was
very effective in motivating Lincecum to find the money.\500\
According to Lincecum, Morton had a ``take it or leave it''
attitude and often offered to return the money that Lincecum
had already paid.\501\ In Lincecum's mind, Morton's position
only confirmed that the cash-for-pardon scheme was legitimate
and that Morton was not swindling him.\502\ However, Lincecum
still had some concerns about paying all $300,000 up front
before he received the pardon. At one point, he asked Morton if
he could make arrangements to pay a portion of the fee after he
received the pardon.\503\ Lincecum even offered to place part
of the funds in escrow until he received the pardon.\504\
Morton responded to these suggestions by telling Lincecum that
the pardon business was ``strictly cash and carry.'' \505\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\500\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001).
\501\ Id.
\502\ Id.
\503\ Id.
\504\ Id.
\505\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the fall of 1998, when he was still trying to come
up with the remaining $200,000, Lincecum was concerned that
Morton, Locke, and Clinton would sell off the remaining pardon
slots available to Roger Clinton.\506\ Garland Lincecum could
not travel to Arkansas himself because the court sentenced him
but had not yet ordered him to report to prison. Accordingly,
the court had ordered Lincecum not to leave Texas.\507\ So, he
sent his brother, Guy Lincecum, to meet with Morton in Little
Rock, Arkansas and hand-deliver a letter from Garland to
demonstrate his serious intention to find the necessary funds
for the pardon.\508\ Guy traveled to Little Rock and met with
Morton at a Holiday Inn.\509\ Guy delivered the letter to
Morton, Morton read it, and Morton then told Guy that he was
puzzled as to why Guy had traveled all the way to Little Rock
when he could have just mailed the letter.\510\ Guy told Morton
that he traveled to Little Rock because Garland wanted him to
know that he was serious about wanting the pardon.\511\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\506\ Id.
\507\ Id; Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20,
2001).
\508\ Id; Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001).
\509\ Id; Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20,
2001). Guy Lincecum provided hotel records to corroborate the account
of his trip. Guy Lincecum Document Production (Exhibit 78).
\510\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001).
\511\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After his meeting with Morton and Locke, Garland Lincecum
was convinced that he wanted to obtain the pardon, but he was
faced with the obstacle of raising the outstanding $200,000. To
raise these funds, he initially turned to Jim McClain, a Dallas
real estate developer he had done business with in the
past.\512\ Lincecum knew that McClain had a conviction in his
past and might also be interested in obtaining a pardon
himself.\513\ Lincecum approached McClain and explained the
offer he had received from Morton and Locke.\514\ McClain
informed Lincecum that he was interested in obtaining a pardon
and offered to pay $300,000 for his own pardon, as well as loan
Lincecum $200,000 for Lincecum's pardon.\515\ McClain explained
that he would be able to make the payment as soon as a major
real estate deal he was working on closed.\516\ Lincecum called
Morton to check and see if they had a ``slot'' for a pardon
available for McClain. Lincecum remembers that when he asked
Morton this question, Morton told Lincecum to wait while he
purported to check with Roger Clinton on another telephone
line.\517\ Lincecum heard Morton's side of the conversation as
Morton purportedly confirmed with Roger Clinton that there was
indeed a ``slot'' available for McClain.\518\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\512\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001).
\513\ Id.
\514\ Id.
\515\ Id.
\516\ Id.
\517\ Id.
\518\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Lincecum was receiving pressure from Morton to complete
his payment for the pardon, he wrote a check for $500,000 to
Morton, telling him to hold the check until he was able to get
the necessary funds from McClain.\519\ Lincecum hoped that the
check would help reserve his and McClain's ``slots'' and keep
Morton, Locke, and Clinton from selling them to someone
else.\520\ However, after waiting for several weeks, it became
clear that McClain was having difficulty with his real estate
deal and would not be able to provide any funds, either for his
own pardon or as a loan for Lincecum's pardon.\521\
Accordingly, this $500,000 check was never cashed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\519\ Id.
\520\ Id.
\521\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When Committee staff interviewed McClain, he confirmed many
key aspects of Lincecum's account. McClain confirmed that he
had a number of discussions with Lincecum about buying a pardon
through Morton, Locke, and Clinton.\522\ McClain stated that
Lincecum initially told him it would cost $500,000 to obtain a
pardon.\523\ Then, after checking with Morton and Locke,
Lincecum returned to McClain and told him that a pardon for
past offenses would cost $500,000 and a pardon for crimes
currently under investigation was $1 million.\524\ McClain
spoke to his lawyer about Lincecum's offer.\525\ The lawyer
told McClain that he should not discuss these matters any
further unless he wanted to be indicted again.\526\ At that
point, McClain stopped discussing the matter with
Lincecum.\527\ McClain denies that he ever took any steps
toward raising the money for the pardon and also denies that he
had any discussions with Morton, Locke, or Clinton regarding
pardons.\528\ One document produced by one of Dickey Morton's
companies, however, undermines McClain's claim. A November 9,
1998, letter from Morton to McClain states:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\522\ Telephone Interview with Jim McClain (Apr. 25, 2001).
\523\ Id.
\524\ Id.
\525\ Id.
\526\ Id.
\527\ Id.
\528\ Id.
We had an extremely good week, with President Bill
coming down to visit with us this week. After the
Senator and I and Roger got together we all agreed to
go forward. My only question is are you wanting to do
business or not, since we have not heard from you and I
left several messages on your voice mail and with your
associate at Charter Financial. If so give me a call,
if not, good luck.\529\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\529\ Dickey Morton Document Production 000044 (Letter from Dickey
Morton, to Jim McClain (Nov. 8, 1998)) (Exhibit 79).
While it is not certain that Morton is referring to an offer to
obtain a pardon, the time frame is consistent with the period
in which Lincecum was discussing the pardon with McClain.
4. Lincecum's Payment of $200,000
After failing to raise funds for the pardon from any other
source, Lincecum approached his family and asked his mother and
brother to provide the necessary money.\530\ In November 1998,
Alberta Lincecum, Garland's mother, cashed a number of
certificates of deposit and on November 23, 1998, had a
cashier's check for $100,000 issued to CLM.\531\ Morton had
told Lincecum that he should make the check payable to CLM,
which was the company formed by Clinton, Locke, and
Morton.\532\ Alberta Lincecum provided the check to Garland
Lincecum, who then mailed the check to Morton, who on November
25, 1998, deposited the check into the CLM account at the First
National Bank of Crossett in Arkansas.\533\ The $100,000 used
by Alberta Lincecum to pay for her son's pardon came from her
life savings.\534\ Her late husband had invested their savings
in CDs, which she used for her living expenses as they came
due.\535\ Alberta is 85 years old and has significant health
problems, which cause her to need more than the approximately
$900 per month provided by her monthly social security
benefits.\536\ As a result of losing this money in the pardon
scheme, Alberta is finding it difficult to make ends meet and
is unable to travel or make any other large expenditures.\537\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\530\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001); Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001);
Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001).
\531\ First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit
80).
\532\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001); Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001);
Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001).
\533\ Id; Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001); Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001).
\534\ Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20,
2001).
\535\ Id.
\536\ Id.
\537\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approximately one month later, Guy Lincecum provided the
remaining $100,000 for Garland's pardon. Guy had a large amount
of funds in an account at Edward Jones Investment, which
constituted his retirement savings.\538\ Before Guy cashed out
the account, he had an investment representative send a letter
to Dickey Morton informing Morton that Guy had $100,000
available in his account.\539\ After he was able to clear the
funds from the account, on December 22, 1998, he had a check
issued by Edward Jones Investments to him.\540\ On December 29,
1998, Guy traveled to Little Rock and hand-delivered the check
to Morton.\541\ Guy signed the check over to Morton and handed
it to him.\542\ When Morton accepted the check, he told Guy
that they were ``paid in full'' for Garland's pardon.\543\
Shortly thereafter, on December 31, 1998, the check was
deposited into CLM's account at the First National Bank of
Crossett.\544\ To withdraw the $100,000, Guy had to pay a
significant amount in taxes.\545\ He also is unable to open a
small business that he was planning on running after he retired
from his job.\546\ He now lives with his mother, helping care
for her.\547\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\538\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001).
\539\ Edward Jones Investments Document Production (Fax from Bill
Hayes, Investment Representative, to Dickey Morton (Dec. 16, 1998))
(Exhibit 81).
\540\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001).
\541\ Id; Guy Lincecum Document Production (Southwest Airlines,
Ticket Stub, Dec. 29, 1998) (Holiday Inn, Bill, Dec. 28, 1998)
(Exhibits 82, 78).
\542\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001).
\543\ Id.
\544\ First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit
83).
\545\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001).
\546\ Id.
\547\ Id; Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20,
2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. The Division of Lincecum's Money Among Clinton, Locke,
and Morton
Between August and December 1998, the CLM bank account at
the First National Bank of Crossett received $270,000 related
to the Lincecum pardon.\548\ In fact, apart from the $100
opening deposit on August 17, 1998, the Lincecum-related
deposits were the only deposits to the account until June 1999
when the balance had dwindled to under $1,000.\549\ Bank
records indicate that the $270,000 was divided between Morton,
Locke, and Clinton. Morton, the only individual who had power
to withdraw money from the CLM account, signed checks totaling
$67,000 from the CLM account for his company, Southern Belle
Construction.\550\ Morton issued two checks to George Locke
totaling $65,000.\551\ Morton also signed three checks to Roger
Clinton totaling $25,500.\552\ The following table summarizes
how the money provided by Lincecum and Cayce was divided among
Clinton, Locke, and Morton:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\548\ First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit
84).
\549\ Id.
\550\ Id.
\551\ First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit
85).
\552\ First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit
86).
Funds Provided to CLM for the Pardon
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Amount Source of Funds Use of Funds
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8/98 $35,000 Alberta Lincecum Expenses and
$30,000 in cash
to CLM.\553\
8/19/98 $70,000 Richard Cayce Wire from the
M.M. Foundation
to CLM.
11/25/98 $100,000 Alberta Lincecum Deposited into
the CLM bank
account.
12/31/98 $100,000 Guy Lincecum Deposited into
the CLM bank
account.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\553\ See n.499.
Significant Activity in the CLM Account
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Transaction Amount To/From
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8/19/98 deposit - wire $70,000 MM Foundation (Dallas, TX)
8/21/98 debit -$4,000 Southern Belle Construction
8/25/98 debit -$52,000 George Locke
8/26/98 debit -$4,000 Southern Belle Construction
11/25/98 deposit $100,000 Alberta Lincecum
11/25/98 check #1014 -$20,000 Southern Belle Construction
12/01/98 check #1015 -$13,000 George Locke
12/10/98 check #1016 -$10,000 Roger Clinton
12/10/98 check #1017 -$5,500 Roger Clinton
12/10/98 check #1019 -$5,000 Southern Belle Construction
12/14/98 check #1020 -$5,100 Southern Belle Construction
12/21/98 check #1023 -$8,100 Southern Belle Construction
12/22/98 check #1026 -$8,000 Southern Belle Construction
12/28/98 check #1029 -$5,000 Southern Belle Construction
12/31/98 deposit $100,000 Guy Lincecum
1/7/99 check #1030 -$10,000 Roger Clinton
4/1/99 check #1062 -$8,300 Southern Belle Construction
--------------------------
Total to Roger Clinton: $25,500 \554\
Total to George Locke: $65,000
Total to Southern Belle: $67,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The remainder of the funds in the CLM account was
apparently used for other small company transactions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\554\ When the $18,000 provided to Roger Clinton in cash is added
to the two checks, Roger Clinton's share of the Lincecum funds amounts
to just over $43,500. See n.499.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Lincecum's Attempts to Receive the Pardon
As of December 1998, Lincecum had paid in full for his
pardon and expected that he would receive the pardon soon
thereafter, before he was sent to prison.\555\ He had a number
of telephone contacts with Morton and Locke between December
1998 and April 1999, when he reported to prison, attempting to
determine the status of his pardon request.\556\ A number of
times after paying for the pardon, Garland asked Morton if he
could meet with Roger Clinton to discuss how his request was
progressing.\557\ Each time Garland asked, Morton told him that
Roger was traveling or otherwise unavailable.\558\ As a result,
neither Garland nor Guy Lincecum ever met with or discussed the
pardon matter with Roger Clinton.\559\ Garland also could not
get a definitive answer from Morton on where his pardon stood
until shortly before he reported to prison in April 1999. At
that time, Morton told Garland that he would have to serve some
amount of prison time before they were able to get the
pardon.\560\ After Garland was sent to prison, his brother Guy
took over as the principal contact with Morton and Locke and
continued to press them on Garland's pardon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\555\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001).
\556\ Id.
\557\ Id.
\558\ Id.
\559\ Id.
\560\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After Garland was sent to prison, Guy Lincecum frequently
contacted Morton and Locke to inquire as to the status of
Garland's pardon.\561\ After Garland had served several months
in prison, the Lincecums became very anxious that they receive
the pardon as agreed. Most of these contacts between Guy
Lincecum and Dickey Morton took place over the telephone, and
Morton provided a number of different excuses for the delay in
receiving the pardon. Initially, Morton told Guy that Garland
would have to serve at least three months in prison.\562\ After
that time had passed, in the fall of 1999, Morton then informed
Guy that the controversy over the President's grants of
clemency to the FALN terrorists would delay any grant of
clemency to Garland.\563\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\561\ Id.
\562\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001).
\563\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the same period of time in 1999 and 2000 after
Garland had been sent to prison, Garland and Guy Lincecum
attempted to introduce friends and business associates to
Morton, Locke, and Clinton, believing that they offered
valuable business opportunities. The Lincecums believed that
Morton, Locke, and Clinton, through their political contacts,
would be good partners for a variety of business deals. Morton
had informed the Lincecums that they had contacts in China who
could provide them with cheap cement and drywall, which could
be sold at a large profit in the United States, as the U.S. was
experiencing a shortage of those products.\564\ Morton told the
Lincecums that they were also able to bring the cement and
drywall into the U.S. without customs problems because of Roger
Clinton's connections.\565\ As a result, Lincecum introduced a
number of business associates to Morton and Locke, including
Robert Wilson, Jim McCaskill, Rod Osborne, David Crockett, and
Harvey Greenwald.\566\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\564\ Id.
\565\ Id.
\566\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 19,
2001). It should be noted that a number of these individuals who had
business dealings with Morton and Locke had extremely negative
experiences with them. McCaskill, Osborne, and Crockett all claim that
they were cheated out of substantial sums of money by Morton and Locke
in their business dealings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By the summer of 1999, Guy had grown frustrated with the
failure to receive the pardon. As he arranged a meeting in
Dallas to discuss a deal to import cement, he planned on asking
Morton about the status of the pardon.\567\ In June 1999, Guy
Lincecum, Richard Cayce, and Harvey Greenwald met with Dickey
Morton and George Locke in a Dallas hotel to discuss a possible
deal to import cement into the U.S. through Morton and
Locke.\568\ After the meeting, Guy Lincecum approached George
Locke and asked him about the status of Garland's pardon. Locke
told Guy that he had reviewed Garland's trial transcript and
was convinced that Garland had been wrongfully convicted.\569\
Locke then told Guy that the pardon was ``a done deal.'' \570\
Guy understood Locke's comments to mean that they had paid for
the pardon in full and that Garland would be receiving it
shortly.\571\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\567\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001).
\568\ Id.
\569\ Id.
\570\ Id.
\571\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, Garland did not receive his pardon in the summer
of 1999. Nonetheless, he continued to show some optimism that
he would receive it. In October 1999, Garland sent a letter to
Dickey Morton largely concerning business ventures he planned
on pursuing with Morton. In this letter, Garland stated, ``I am
sure that within 60 days of my release there will be four
parties prepared to proceed on a similar item for themselves.''
\572\ This letter indicates that Garland expected to be
released from prison in a much shorter time frame than his 87-
month prison sentence suggested.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\572\ This letter was apparently drafted by Garland Lincecum in
prison and then handed to his brother Guy Lincecum, who mailed it to
Morton. Dickey Morton Document Production 000321 (Letter from Guy
Lincecum, to Dickey Morton (Oct. 26, 1999)) (Exhibit 87).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the efforts of Guy Lincecum, one of
Garland's friends and business associates, R.V. Wilson, also
attempted to obtain assurances from Clinton, Locke, and Morton
that the pardon would be issued. In June 1999, Wilson said he
traveled twice from his home in Mississippi to Arkansas to meet
with Morton and Locke, ostensibly about importing cement and
drywall from China.\573\ Wilson knew that Lincecum had paid
$235,000 for a pardon and was being stalled, so Wilson brought
up the issue during a meal at the Southern Kitchen, a
restaurant in Little Rock.\574\ Wilson said that when he raised
the issue of Lincecum's pardon, Locke and Morton both looked
``scared to death.'' \575\ Wilson said Locke raised his hand
and waved it in his face as if wiping something away and Dickey
Morton began touching him.\576\ Wilson said he then realized
that Morton was patting him down to see if he was wearing a
wire because they thought the FBI had sent him.\577\ They said
they would not discuss it.\578\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\573\ Telephone Interview with R.V. Wilson (Apr. 25, 2001).
\574\ Id.
\575\ Id.
\576\ Id.
\577\ Id.
\578\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the meal, Morton gave Wilson a ride to his hotel and
while in the car, without Locke present, Morton said that ``the
Senator'' didn't want those matters discussed in front of him
in public.\579\ Wilson said, ``I thought this was all legal,''
to which Morton replied that it was ``100 percent legal'' but
that it was ``politically sensitive.'' \580\ Morton said that
while he was part of the company, CLM, Roger Clinton and George
Locke handled all the pardon matters.\581\ Then Morton refused
to talk any more about it.\582\ Wilson said he tried to obtain
a meeting with Roger Clinton during his visits to Arkansas but
was always told that Roger was on the golf course or
sleeping.\583\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\579\ Id.
\580\ Id.
\581\ Id.
\582\ Id.
\583\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, through the fall of 1999, despite the efforts of
Guy Lincecum and R.V. Wilson, there was still no forward
progress in receiving the pardon. Accordingly, when Guy
Lincecum next met with Morton and Locke in person, he raised
the issue again. Following another meeting about selling
imported construction products, Guy Lincecum cornered Dickey
Morton in the restroom of an Applebee's restaurant in Ardmore,
Oklahoma, and confronted him once again about his brother's
pardon.\584\ Guy asked, ``Is this legal?'' \585\ Morton said
that it was and that the reason people fail to obtain pardons
is that their lawyers do not know how to fill out the forms
properly.\586\ Morton assured Guy that CLM had two of the best
lawyers in the country working on Garland's case, that they
would complete the forms, and that Roger would deliver them to
the President personally.\587\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\584\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001).
\585\ Id.
\586\ Id.
\587\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the meeting in Ardmore, Oklahoma, Guy had introduced
Morton and Locke to Jim McCaskill, who wanted to sell cement
for CLM on commission.\588\ Morton had provided phone numbers
for McCaskill to call when he had buyers ready to place orders,
but during the winter of 1999-2000, McCaskill was having
trouble contacting Morton, which was preventing him from
completing any sales.\589\ So, a second meeting was arranged in
Oklahoma in late spring 2000 to address the problems McCaskill
was having in contacting Morton and Locke.\590\ McCaskill, Guy
Lincecum, Morton, and Locke met early in the morning at a fast
food restaurant in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma. In the parking lot
as they were leaving, Guy turned to Morton and asked again when
Garland would be pardoned and released from prison.\591\ Morton
turned to Locke and asked, ``When is Garland scheduled to be
released?'' \592\ Locke pulled out a small book; he opened it,
flipped through it, and said, ``He is scheduled to be released
in July, the third quarter.'' \593\ Jim McCaskill who
corroborated Guy Lincecum's account to Committee staff
witnessed this exchange.\594\ Guy took Locke's statement to be
a definitive assurance as to when the pardon would be received.
However, shortly after this meeting, Guy said that Locke and
Morton stopped returning his phone calls.\595\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\588\ Id.
\589\ Id.
\590\ Id.
\591\ Id.
\592\ Id.
\593\ Id.
\594\ Telephone Interview with Jim McCaskill (May 2, 2001).
\595\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the failure of Guy Lincecum and R.V. Wilson to
obtain assurances from Morton and Locke that Garland Lincecum
would be receiving a pardon, the Lincecums continued to be
optimistic that Garland would receive a pardon from President
Clinton. Garland Lincecum informed Committee staff that he
fully expected his name would be included on the list of
pardons issued on President Clinton's last day in office and
that he had ``done everything except pack my bags.'' \596\
Obviously, when he learned that he had not received a pardon,
he was deeply disappointed and felt that Morton, Locke, and
Clinton had cheated him.\597\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\596\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19,
2001).
\597\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Roger Clinton's Reaction to the Allegations
Despite repeated attempts to obtain Roger Clinton's version
of events, he failed to cooperate with the Committee's
investigation. He refused to be interviewed by Committee staff.
His lawyer indicated that if called to testify before the
Committee, Clinton would likely assert his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Finally, through his
lawyer, Clinton also refused to answer questions posed to him
in writing.\598\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\598\ Letter from Bart H. Williams, Munger, Tolles & Olson, to the
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 27, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite his refusal to cooperate with the Committee, Roger
Clinton did speak to the press. Shortly after the Lincecum
allegations became public, The New York Times reported that
``Roger Clinton said through a spokeswoman today that though he
knew Mr. Locke and Mr. Morton, he never heard of C.L.M. and had
never authorized either man to use his name in any way.'' \599\
Bank records indicating that he deposited two large checks from
CLM, however, directly contradict this denial. Later, in an
appearance on Larry King Live, Clinton was asked about the
Lincecum allegations and stated that ``I can tell you that
there is no truth to money for pardons. There is zero truth to
that, zero truth.'' \600\ He declined to offer any details
refuting the Lincecum allegations but generally suggested that
Morton and Locke may have swindled Lincecum without his
knowledge:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\599\ Neil A. Lewis, Swindle Is Reported to Use the Name of Roger
Clinton, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 2001, at A9.
\600\ Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, June 21, 2001).
King. So this guy is lying to Mr. Serrano of the L.A.
Times when he tells him he gave money and he was
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
promised a pardon.
Clinton. No, sir, I'm not saying he is lying. I'm not
saying he's lying.
King. You just said there was no money changed hands
and he said--
Clinton. I said there was no--let me clarify: there was
no money exchanged with me.
King. You never got a penny.
Clinton. And I never heard one word about a pardon.
* * *
Clinton. Now there are some details that we can dress
it up with, but the bottom line is I didn't do it. I
don't care what this flipping guy says and his buddy
[sic]. I don't care what they say. It doesn't matter to
me. But I'm not saying they are lying about what they
are saying, because they are not saying that I took it.
They are not saying that I was there.
* * *
King. Is it possible, Mark [Geragos, Roger Clinton's
lawyer], that someone in the middle here--is this
possible--hypothetical scenario--someone that knows
Roger and knows these guys sets up a deal where he,
this someone, gets money, tells him I got Roger, I will
get it to Roger. They pay it as best they can and he
says he will get it to Roger. Roger is innocent and
they are kind of innocent.
Clinton. Ding, ding, ding, ding, ding.
Geragos. Which is exactly what I said. When you've got
triple hearsay, and then you've got somebody saying I
pointed to a mezzanine over there, start to think about
what the quality of that accusation is.\601\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\601\ Id.
However, the explanation offered by Roger Clinton to Larry King
is not even remotely credible. While Clinton claimed that he
never heard of CLM, he actually had a one-third ownership
interest in the company, as well as other companies owned by
Morton and Locke.\602\ Furthermore, bank records clearly
establish that Clinton received a substantial portion of the
funds that were bilked from Lincecum's mother and brother.
Clinton received three checks from CLM totaling $25,500 and
deposited them into his bank account.\603\ As discussed
earlier, the source of these funds was the retirement savings
of Guy and Alberta Lincecum.\604\ There are only two
explanations offered for how Roger Clinton acquired a
substantial share of the life savings from a federal prisoner's
mother and brother: the one offered by the Lincecums and the
one offered by Locke and Morton. Yet, Clinton denies both and
offers no explanation of his own, denying on national
television that he even received the money when it is well
documented that he did.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\602\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and
George Locke, Hampton and Larkowski, to David Kass, Deputy Chief
Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). A
document produced to the Committee by American Gypsum and Cement
Products, one of Dickey Morton's companies, suggests that Roger Clinton
was a ``member'' of that company as well. See Dickey Morton Document
Production 000654 (Letter from Rod Osborne, American Gypsum Cement
Products, to Robert Hutchison, Hutchison Consulting Company (Feb. 17,
2000)) (Exhibit 88).
\603\ First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit
86).
\604\ Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 19,
2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Dickey Morton and George Locke's Reactions to the Allegations
Dickey Morton and George Locke have not provided the
Committee with an extensive account of the Lincecum matter.
Committee staff did conduct a telephone interview of George
Locke shortly after the Committee began its investigation of
the Lincecum allegations. However, shortly after that
interview, George Locke and Dickey Morton hired a lawyer and
decided not to cooperate with the Committee's investigation.
Therefore, the Committee was unable to interview Morton at all,
and it was unable to contact Locke after the initial interview.
Rather than cooperate with the Committee, Morton and Locke
invoked their Fifth Amendment rights against self-
incrimination.\605\ However, Morton and Locke's attorney did
provide the Committee with a proffer of what Morton and Locke
would testify to if the Committee immunized them.\606\ Because
the proffer was provided by the attorney and was not made under
penalty of perjury, it is of limited value. However, between
the Committee staff's interview of George Locke and the proffer
from Locke and Morton, the Committee is able to understand
Morton and Locke's response to the Lincecum allegations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\605\ In response to a document request from the Committee, Locke
stated that he had no responsive records. Letter from George Locke, to
the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 9,
2001) (within Appendix I). See also Letter from Marietta Alphin,
Hampton, Larkowski & Benca, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel,
Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 3, 2001) (within Appendix I). By contrast,
Morton provided extensive corporate records in response to a subpoena.
\606\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David
A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In short, Morton and Locke acknowledge that CLM received
$200,000 from Lincecum and another $100,000 from Richard Cayce.
However, they deny that the money had any connection to an
effort to obtain a presidential pardon for Garland
Lincecum.\607\ Rather, they claim that Cayce and Lincecum paid
the $300,000 to CLM as ``appearance fees'' charged to them by
Roger Clinton. Morton and Locke claim that Cayce and Lincecum
paid this money to CLM because they wanted Clinton's support
for the plan to sell tax-exempt bonds through Cayce's Legacy
Foundation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\607\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Locke and Morton claim that Richard Cayce, who had a prior
business relationship with Morton, approached Morton with ``an
exotic plan'' to make money by selling tax-exempt bonds through
a charitable organization, the Legacy Foundation.\608\ Locke
said that Cayce wanted to use the Clinton name to sell these
bonds and specifically wanted to use Morton's contacts with
George Locke and Roger Clinton to see if President Clinton
would support the charity.\609\ Morton told Cayce that he knew
Locke and agreed to take the idea to Locke to see if Locke
would ask Roger Clinton to present it to the President.\610\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\608\ Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C.
(Mar. 27, 2001).
\609\ Id.
\610\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Locke told Committee staff that people had often approached
Roger Clinton asking him to talk to the President about a
variety of issues and that Roger always helped them.\611\
However, Locke said that Roger was ``always left out in the
cold'' afterwards.\612\ After a number of these unpleasant
experiences, Roger Clinton decided that he would not assist
anyone with their business unless he received an ``appearance
fee'' paid up front.\613\ According to Locke, the fee
guaranteed only a meeting with Roger Clinton to present a
request and nothing more.\614\ Locke informed Committee staff
that he and Dickey Morton used Roger Clinton's name in their
business ventures, with Roger's permission, and that they paid
Roger for the right to use his name.\615\ When asked how Roger
Clinton's name was used, Locke stated that Morton used it
``when making contacts with buyers and sellers.'' \616\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\611\ Id.
\612\ Id.
\613\ Id.
\614\ Id.
\615\ Id.
\616\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When Locke contacted Roger Clinton about Cayce and the
Legacy Foundation, Roger agreed to meet with Cayce only if they
paid him such an appearance fee.\617\ Morton then arranged the
meeting with Cayce, sending the coded letter referring to the
number of ``cookies'' required to meet with Roger Clinton.\618\
In his interview with Committee staff, Locke acknowledged
meeting Cayce, Morton, and Roger Clinton in Dallas in August
1998.\619\ Locke claimed that, at this meeting, Cayce discussed
two main topics: the plan to have Clinton endorse the Legacy
Foundation and Cayce's desire to obtain a U.S. diplomatic
passport.\620\ The proffer from Morton and Locke is similar to
Locke's account in the interview but provides more detail. The
proffer claims that Cayce met with Morton and Locke on August
12, 1998, and provided them with $30,000 in cash.\621\ Morton
and Locke then met with Roger Clinton and divided the cash
between them, with Roger receiving $18,000, Locke receiving
$5,000, and Morton receiving $7,000.\622\ Also according to the
proffer, on August 13, Cayce met with Clinton, Morton, and
Locke, and Cayce discussed his desire to have Clinton's support
for the Legacy Foundation. The proffer also states that Cayce
asked about the possibility of obtaining a diplomatic passport
through Roger Clinton. The proffer also claims that Cayce
inquired whether Clinton could obtain pardons for two
individuals, and while Morton and Locke do not recall whom
Cayce mentioned, they are certain that it was not
Lincecum.\623\ Locke and Morton maintain that the additional
$70,000 wired to CLM by the MM Foundation on August 19
represented the completion of the $100,000 appearance fee
charged to Cayce by Clinton, Locke, and Morton for the August
12 meeting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\617\ Id.
\618\ Dickey Morton Document Production 001144 (Letter from Dickey
Morton, to Richard Cayce (Aug. 7, 1998)) (Exhibit 76).
\619\ Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C.
(Mar. 27, 2001)
\620\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David
A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
\621\ Id.
\622\ Id.
\623\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Locke and Morton claim that in September and October 1998,
they had two meetings with Cayce in Las Vegas regarding the
Legacy Foundation.\624\ Roger Clinton came with Morton and
Locke to each of these meetings, and accordingly, Cayce was
charged $100,000 for each meeting.\625\ However, Cayce did not
pay, and after the second meeting, Morton and Locke claim that
they refused to provide Roger Clinton for any more meetings
with Cayce until they had paid $200,000 for the previous two
meetings.\626\ Morton and Locke claim that they then met with
Cayce and Garland Lincecum. They claim that Lincecum provided
them with a check for $600,000 and told them that the check
would be good in two weeks.\627\ Cayce informed Morton and
Locke that the additional $400,000 represented an
``investment'' in CLM.\628\ Morton and Locke claim that Cayce
and Lincecum never made good on the $600,000 check.\629\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\624\ Id.
\625\ Id.
\626\ Id.
\627\ Id.
\628\ Id.
\629\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In their proffer, Morton and Locke state that in November
1998, CLM received a check from Lincecum for $100,000.\630\
Then, in December, CLM received another check from Lincecum.
With these two checks, Morton and Locke believed that Cayce and
Lincecum had paid for the two meetings Cayce had with Roger
Clinton in Las Vegas.\631\ Morton and Locke acknowledge that
they divided this money with Roger Clinton, providing him with
more than $25,000 of the $200,000 they received.\632\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\630\ Id.
\631\ Id.
\632\ In his interview, Locke claimed he received only ``a small
portion'' of the payment, and claimed that he could not recall exactly
how much. Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C.
(Mar. 27, 2001). When asked to estimate how much he received, Locke
said it was approximately $20,000 to $25,000. Id. Locke also said he
was surprised to learn that CLM had received $200,000 from any source
for any reason, an assertion which contradicts the proffer provided by
his lawyer. Id. In fact, Locke received $65,000 from CLM, or
approximately three times the amount he admitted to Committee staff.
First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 85).
According to Locke, he thought the money had come from Richard Cayce,
not from Garland Lincecum's brother and mother. Telephone Interview
with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001). Locke told
Committee staff that the purpose of the payments had nothing to do with
any effort to obtain a pardon. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With two exceptions, Morton and Locke deny that they ever
discussed pardons with Richard Cayce, Garland Lincecum, or Guy
Lincecum. The first time they did discuss pardons was at the
first meeting between Cayce, Morton, Locke, and Clinton when
Cayce asked whether they could help him obtain pardons for two
friends.\633\ Clinton, Morton, and Locke claim that they did
nothing to assist Cayce.\634\ Morton and Locke also admit to
having discussed pardons on one other occasion.\635\ Morton and
Locke acknowledge that they met with Guy Lincecum and Jim
McCaskill in March 2000 at a McDonald's restaurant in Broken
Arrow, Oklahoma, to discuss their business dealings.\636\ While
Lincecum and McCaskill claim that they had a detailed
discussion about Garland Lincecum's efforts to buy a pardon
through Clinton, Locke, and Morton, Locke and Morton tell a
different story. They claim that Guy Lincecum informed them,
for the first time, that Garland Lincecum hoped to obtain a
pardon.\637\ Locke offered his advice:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\633\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David
A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
\634\ Id.
\635\ Id.
\636\ Id.
\637\ Id.
First you must hire an attorney. That attorney must
make application with the Department of Justice for a
pardon. Then it would be up to the president as to
whether a pardon would be given. Lincecum asked if the
president normally gives pardons. Locke informed
Lincecum that usually at the end of his term most
presidents' [sic] give pardons.\638\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\638\ Id.
However, Locke and Morton deny that Guy Lincecum ever asked for
Roger Clinton's help in obtaining a pardon.\639\ After this
discussion, Morton and Locke say that they had no further
communications with Guy Lincecum regarding the pardon.\640\
Other than these two brief discussions, Morton and Locke deny
any communications with Garland Lincecum, Guy Lincecum, or
Richard Cayce regarding presidential pardons. Obviously, there
is a significant conflict between the Lincecums' account and
that of Morton, Locke, and--to the extent he has offered an
account--Roger Clinton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\639\ Id.
\640\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Analysis
The Committee is faced with two starkly different accounts
of the Lincecum matter. However, there are certain facts that
are beyond dispute. First, Richard Cayce provided Morton,
Locke, and Clinton with $30,000 or $35,000 in cash. Second,
Cayce wired $70,000 to CLM. Third, Garland Lincecum provided
CLM with $200,000. Fourth, the $300,000 in funds provided to
CLM were divided between Clinton, Locke, and Morton, with
Clinton receiving $25,500 in checks and as much as $18,000 in
cash, Locke receiving $65,000 in checks and $5,000 in cash, and
Morton receiving $67,000 in checks and $7,000 in cash. Dickey
Morton apparently used the remaining funds, approximately
$112,500, to pursue other business interests. It is also clear
that no work was ever undertaken on the Lincecum pardon.
Neither the White House nor the Justice Department ever
received a pardon petition for Lincecum or ever considered
Lincecum for a pardon in any way. Moreover, there is no
evidence that Morton and Locke even hired a Washington law firm
to prepare a pardon petition for Lincecum.
There are also a number of key facts in dispute, centering
on the purpose of the funds paid to CLM, with the Lincecums
claiming that the money was paid to secure a pardon for Garland
Lincecum, and Morton and Locke claiming that the money was paid
for ``appearance fees'' to meet with Roger Clinton.
There is no single piece of evidence that proves the
Lincecums' account is true. However, collectively, the
preponderance of the evidence supports the Lincecums' account.
In contrast, little evidence supports the denials offered by
George Locke and Dickey Morton, and some evidence contradicts
their claims. The following is a summary of the evidence that
supports the Lincecums' account.
GFirst, there are a number of witnesses who
support the Lincecums' account. Garland and Guy
Lincecum both gave clear and detailed accounts of their
conversations. In addition, Alberta Lincecum, Jim
McCaskill, and R.V. Wilson all claim that they observed
or participated in discussions with Morton and Locke
regarding the Lincecums' efforts to purchase a
presidential pardon.
GSecond, the denial offered by Locke and
Morton is not convincing. Morton and Locke maintain
that Garland Lincecum had his mother and brother raid
their savings so that he could pay Roger Clinton
$200,000 in ``appearance fees'' for meetings regarding
the Legacy Foundation. Given the fact that the
Lincecums appear to live under relatively modest
circumstances, it is difficult to believe that they
would give $200,000 of their money to pay for these
meetings. Rather, the Lincecums have offered the only
convincing explanation that has been offered about why
they would surrender their life savings--because they
were attempting to obtain a pardon for Garland.
GThird, Garland Lincecum, Guy Lincecum,
Alberta Lincecum, and every witness who supported their
account cooperated with the Committee. On the other
hand, Locke, Morton, and Roger Clinton all refused to
cooperate with the Committee. The Lincecums, R.V.
Wilson, Jim McClain, and Jim McCaskill were all willing
to step forward and say what they knew, facing the
potential of prosecution if they were lying. Therefore,
their story has much more credibility than any accounts
offered by attorneys for Clinton, Locke, or Morton, who
have either taken the Fifth or made it clear that they
would take the Fifth.
GFourth, the documentary evidence tends to
support the Lincecum account. For example, on August 7,
1998, Dickey Morton sent Richard Cayce a letter
demanding payment of $100,000 in relation to a
``political meeting''--not a business meeting.\641\
While this document does not explicitly refer to a
pardon, the phrase ``political meeting'' applies more
accurately to an illicit pardon-for-cash discussion
than to a legitimate business proposition. Another
document that supports Lincecum's account is an October
1999 letter to Dickey Morton discussing a potential oil
deal between Morton and some of Lincecum's associates.
In the letter, Lincecum, writing from prison, states,
``I am sure that within 60 days of my release there
will be four parties prepared to proceed on a similar
item for themselves.'' \642\ It is not clear whether
the ``item'' referred to by Lincecum is a pardon, but
it is clear that he anticipated a prompt release when
he wrote the letter. Given that Garland had served only
six of the 87 months required by his sentence when he
wrote the letter, it appears to be contemporaneous
corroboration of Garland's claim that he expected to
receive a pardon after paying CLM. The letter supports
Lincecum's claims because it establishes that his
expectation significantly predates his public
allegations about the payment-for-pardon scheme.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\641\ Dickey Morton Document Production 001144 (Letter from Dickey
Morton, to Richard Cayce (Aug. 7, 1998)) (Exhibit 76).
\642\ Dickey Morton Document Production 000323 (Letter from Guy
Lincecum, to Dickey Morton (Oct. 26, 1999)) (Exhibit 87).
While there is a preponderance of evidence showing that
Garland Lincecum attempted to purchase a presidential pardon
through Dickey Morton and George Locke, there is less evidence
that shows Roger Clinton was an active participant in the
scheme. However, the evidence against Roger Clinton is still
substantial. There are three main pieces of evidence that
suggest Roger Clinton participated in the scheme to defraud the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lincecum family.
GFirst, Roger Clinton received at least
$25,500 (or more likely $43,500, including the cash
payment admitted by Locke and Morton) from CLM.\643\
Yet, Roger Clinton claimed that he ``never heard of
CLM'' and never authorized Morton or Locke to use his
name in any way. Clinton's denials do not square with
the indisputable fact that he received two checks from
CLM totaling $25,500. Considering Roger Clinton's
sporadic employment in this time frame, this was not an
insignificant amount of money likely to be forgotten.
The only two explanations that have been offered for
these payments are that: (1) Roger Clinton was selling
pardons or (2) Roger Clinton was selling his name.
Clinton denied both but has offered no alternative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\643\ While Roger Clinton's receipt of a portion of the cash
delivered by Richard Cayce is not established with absolute certainty,
two factors strongly support it. First, in their proffer, Locke and
Morton state that they gave Clinton $18,000 of the $30,000. Letter from
Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief
Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I).
Second, Roger Clinton's bank records indicate that he deposited $12,500
in late August 1998, after the meeting in Dallas. Bank of America
Document Production (Exhibit 77).
GSecond, in his proffer, Richard Cayce has
claimed that he discussed the Lincecum pardon with
Clinton, Locke, and Morton. Cayce maintains that
Clinton, Locke, and Morton all told him that they could
arrange the pardon for Lincecum, provided that he paid
$200,000 to them. While Cayce offers a clear and
damning statement against Clinton, it cannot be given
significant weight for the same reason that the proffer
of Morton and Locke cannot be given significant weight.
Richard Cayce has invoked his Fifth Amendment rights,
and has made his statements through his lawyer. On the
other hand, Cayce told Lincecum in August 1998, shortly
after the meeting with Clinton, Locke, and Morton, that
he had discussed the purchase of a pardon with them and
that they had agreed to do it. Therefore, there is some
contemporaneous corroboration of Cayce's proffer.
Moreover, unlike Locke and Morton, Cayce does not
appear to have profited at the expense of the Lincecum
family. His organization, the M.M. Foundation, actually
lost $70,000 to CLM. Hence, it is difficult to imagine
a motive for Cayce to lie to Lincecum in 1998 about
whether he had discussed a pardon with Clinton, Locke,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and Morton.
GThird, Garland Lincecum has stated that he
saw Roger Clinton at the meeting in Dallas where he
first arranged the purchase of the pardon. Lincecum did
not participate in the meeting where the purchase of
the pardon was discussed with Roger Clinton, but he did
see Roger Clinton watching his meeting with Cayce,
Locke, and Morton from a mezzanine in the hotel.
Obviously, the mere fact that Lincecum saw Roger
Clinton at a hotel in Dallas while he met with Cayce,
Morton, and Locke regarding his pardon does not prove
that Clinton was involved. However, that fact becomes
significant when combined with the allegation that
Cayce met with Roger Clinton earlier that day and
discussed the purchase of a pardon with Clinton.
Therefore, there is substantial evidence that Dickey Morton
and George Locke participated in a scheme to defraud Garland
Lincecum and his family of a significant sum of money by
promising them that they could obtain a pardon in exchange for
$300,000. There is also evidence that Roger Clinton
participated in this scheme. Bank records establish
conclusively that Clinton received, at a minimum, $25,500 from
Morton and Locke that they had obtained directly from the
Lincecums, yet Clinton has offered no satisfactory explanation
as to why he received this money. However, the evidence against
Roger Clinton in the Lincecum matter is somewhat equivocal. A
full understanding of his role in the Lincecum matter could not
be obtained without full and honest cooperation from Dickey
Morton, George Locke, and most importantly, Roger Clinton. All
three refused to provide the requisite level of cooperation.
IV. OTHER PARDON CANDIDATES
In addition to Gambino and Lincecum, the Committee obtained
evidence connecting Roger Clinton to many other pardon
seekers--many more than the six, unnamed ``close friends'' for
whom Clinton has publicly admitted lobbying. While Clinton was
unsuccessful in actually obtaining a pardon for anyone but
himself, he nonetheless attempted to misuse his position and
access to the President for personal gain. It appears that
President Clinton may have categorically decided to deny
clemency petitions advocated by his brother. Roger Clinton told
the media that his brother's rejection of his appeals caused
``a serious rift'' between him and his brother:
Saying he told his brother he would forgo a pardon for
himself if the president would grant clemency to his
friends, Roger Clinton added: ``I cried about a couple
of days; I was in an emotional funk. I didn't know how
to feel. It was so important to me that these people on
the list, that they get it and not me. I guess he
didn't think so[.]'' \644\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\644\ Susan Schmidt, Clinton's Brother Promised Pardons, Wash.
Post, Feb. 24, 2001.
Regardless of whether President Clinton's clemency decisions
involving his brother were categorical or based on the merits
of each individual case, the unusually large number of cases
associated with Roger Clinton merit further inquiry and
explanation. Some of the clemency-seekers discussed below were
likely in the category of ``close friends.'' Others, however,
had only met Roger Clinton, if at all, after he began lobbying
on their behalf. More importantly, several of the cases involve
solicitations or promises of some form of payment, such as cash
or lucrative business interests, in exchange for Clinton's
assistance.
A. Dan Lasater and George Locke
In the early 1980s, Dan Lasater was a Little Rock,
Arkansas, bond broker and partner in the firm Collins, Locke,
and Lasater. Lasater was a close associate of the Clintons,
raising money for Bill Clinton's political campaigns and
loaning money to pay Roger Clinton's drug debts. George Locke
was an Arkansas state senator and business associate of
Lasater's. In December 1986, Dan Lasater pled guilty in federal
court to conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and was
sentenced to 30 months in prison.\645\ Roger Clinton and George
Locke were also convicted for their involvement in the Lasater
cocaine distribution conspiracy.\646\ Clinton was sentenced to
24 months in prison and Locke was sentenced to 15 months.\647\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\645\ Dan Lasater Document Production (Petition for Pardon, May 4,
2000) (Exhibit 89).
\646\ Id.
\647\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Clintons have a long association with Lasater and
Locke, dating back years before the cocaine convictions. Bill
Clinton met with Dan Lasater, David Collins, and George Locke
the day after losing his re-election bid for Governor to Frank
White in 1980.\648\ The purpose of the meeting was to secure
Lasater's support for his bid to regain the governorship in
1982.\649\ Lasater subsequently became a major donor and
fundraiser for Clinton's political campaigns. At the request of
then-Governor Bill Clinton, Lasater gave Roger Clinton a job in
1983 on his horse farm in Ocala, Florida.\650\ When Roger
Clinton could not pay debts to his drug dealer, Lasater loaned
him $8,000.\651\ In its final report, the Senate's Special
Committee on Whitewater detailed the troubling evidence that
Governor Clinton's office steered state bond business from the
Arkansas Housing Development Agency and the Arkansas State
Police Commission to Lasater's firm, providing it an unfair
advantage over other firms competing for the underwriting
business.\652\ In 1990, Governor Clinton issued a conditional
state pardon proclamation restoring all of Lasater's rights,
privileges, and immunities under state law before his cocaine
conviction, ``including the right to own and possess firearms
provided, however, no such restoration is effective until a
federal removal of disabilities has been granted.'' \653\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\648\ Investigation of Whitewater Development Corporation and
Related Matters, S. Rep. No. 104-280, at 361.
\649\ Id.
\650\ Id. at 361-62.
\651\ Id. at 362.
\652\ Id. at 363-71.
\653\ Dan Lasater Document Production (State of Arkansas
Proclamation, Nov. 13, 1990) (Exhibit 90).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lasater filed a federal pardon application to the Justice
Department on May 4, 2000.\654\ In the petition for clemency,
Lasater maintains, ``I never sold cocaine, ever.'' \655\
Rather, Lasater says he merely ``shared my financial success''
with friends by paying for their dinners and drinks and drugs:
``If we were in a social setting and cocaine was available,
anyone who wanted to could participate. No one forced it on
anyone.'' \656\ However, this account from the clemency
petition appears to have been somewhat sanitized. According to
news reports, affidavits gathered by Julius ``Doc'' Delaughter,
the State Police Investigator who conducted the Lasater
investigation, tell a more damning story:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\654\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001).
\655\ Dan Lasater Document Production (Petition for Pardon, May 4,
2000) (Exhibit 89).
\656\ Id.
The extent of Lasater's alleged partying and coke
distribution, and of his preying on teenage girls and
young women, is outlined in dozens of affidavits taken
by Delaughter. In one affidavit, Patricia Anne Smith
alleges: ``I was introduced to cocaine by Dan Lasater
when I was 16 or 17 years old and a student at North
Little Rock Old Main High School. . . . I was a virgin
until two months after I met Dan Lasater. Lasater plied
me with cocaine and gifts for sexual favors.'' She
claimed he also arranged for her to see a doctor and be
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
put on birth-control pills.
Other young girls related similar stories. Lisa Ann
Scott, who was 19 when she first encountered Lasater
and one of his broker partners, George Locke, alleged
she received cocaine from both men from the middle of
1984 to the beginning of 1985: ``The first time I met
Dan Lasater and George Locke was at George Locke's
apartment. On this particular evening George Locke gave
me approximately ten snorts of cocaine. I received
approximately eight to ten snorts from Dan Lasater.''
Scott also detailed a trip to Las Vegas that she took
with other girls on Lasater's jet where cocaine was
made available.\657\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\657\ Jamie Dettmer, Dan Lasater: A Friend of Bill's, Insight, Nov.
6, 1995.
Lasater told Committee staff that he discussed his pardon
petition with Roger Clinton on several occasions.\658\ He also
forwarded a copy of his petition to Roger Clinton on May 8,
2000, four days after filing it with the Justice
Department.\659\ Lasater understood that Roger would bring his
petition to the President's attention but did not recall Roger
saying anything about contacts with other White House staff
regarding the petition.\660\ He recalled Roger talking about
his plan to give the President a list of people that Roger
wanted to receive pardons but did not know whether that
actually happened.\661\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\658\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001).
\659\ Dan Lasater Document Production (Letter from Dan Lasater, to
Roger Clinton (May, 8, 2000)) (Exhibit 91).
\660\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001).
\661\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
George Locke also sought a pardon through Roger Clinton.
Discussions about a pardon between Clinton and Locke began
after Bill Clinton's reelection in 1996.\662\ Roger informed
Locke that ``when the time was right that he would ask `big
brother' if he would consider giving Roger, Dan Lassiter [sic]
and George Locke a pardon[.]'' \663\ In December 2000, Locke
prepared a pardon petition and sent it to Roger Clinton at the
White House.\664\ Shortly thereafter, Roger informed Locke that
he was going to discuss the pardon with the President.\665\
Both Locke and Lasater deny that they paid any money to Roger
Clinton to obtain his help lobbying for the pardons. Rather,
Locke believes that ``Roger still felt responsible for the
investigation and conviction of George Locke and Dan Lassiter
[sic] and was, in essence, attempting to set the record
straight between Locke, Lassiter [sic] and Clinton.'' \666\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\662\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David
A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 9 (May 18, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
\663\ Id.
\664\ Id.
\665\ Id.
\666\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee has been unable to obtain detailed
information about the President's reasons for denying the Locke
and Lasater pardons. The only information obtained by the
Committee comes from Associate White House Counsel Eric Angel,
who stated that President Clinton, Bruce Lindsey, and Beth
Nolan discussed the Lasater and Locke pardons.\667\ Angel
stated that President Clinton believed that Lasater and Locke
deserved pardons on the merits of their cases.\668\ However,
according to Angel, the White House staff opposed the Lasater
and Locke pardons because they believed they would be too
controversial.\669\ Angel himself expressed concern to the
President that conservative publications had written about
Lasater and Locke and that they were the subject of
``conspiracy theories'' and the ``conservative conspiracy
theorists'' would ``go nuts'' if the pardons were granted.\670\
Whether the President rejected the Lasater and Locke pardons
for these reasons or others is unknown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\667\ Interview with Eric Angel, Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
\668\ Id.
\669\ Id.
\670\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It appears that Roger Clinton called Dan Lasater and George
Locke on January 20, 2001, immediately after President Clinton
left office. Roger Clinton told Lasater and Locke in these
calls that he had failed to obtain their pardons. According to
Lasater, Roger Clinton said he was embarrassed that his brother
would not do that favor for him.\671\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\671\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. J.T. Lundy
In 1982, J.T. Lundy became President of Calumet Farms, the
legendary horse-breeding farm that had dominated U.S.
horseracing for decades.\672\ Lundy gained control of the farm
through his marriage to Calumet heiress Cindy Wright.\673\
Despite continued success at the track, by 1991, Calumet was
bankrupt.\674\ Lundy was convicted in February 2000 on charges
of bank fraud and bribery; he was sentenced in October 2000 to
four and a half years in prison and $20 million in restitution
to the FDIC.\675\ The jury found that Lundy paid a $1.1 million
bribe to a Houston bank in exchange for $65 million in
unsecured loans.\676\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\672\ Jacalyn Carfagno, Fabled Silks, Faded Glory; The Rise and
Fall of the Legendary Calumet Farm, Houston Chronicle, Mar. 29, 1992.
\673\ Id.
\674\ Id. (``Calumet's board learned that the farm had $400 in the
bank and $40 million in debt currently due. It was a steep plunge for a
farm that had been transferred, debt-free, to a new generation of
owners less than a decade before'').
\675\ Calumet Farm Executives Sent to Prison for Bribery, Fraud,
Associated Press, Oct. 20, 2000.
\676\ Id. During the financial downfall of Calumet Farms, its
largest asset and most famous stallion, Alydar, died under suspicious
circumstances. Prosecutors in Houston argued unsuccessfully that Lundy
was complicit in the death of Alydar, who was insured for $35 million.
Janet Patton, Closing the Book on Calumet Story: Farm's Friends Hope
Sentencing Spells the End, Lexington Herald Leader, Oct. 21, 2000. A
U.S District Judge found, ``There is some physical evidence, and
circumstances surrounding the event that are suspicious, but I cannot
conclude he is responsible.'' Id. However, Alydar's groom, on duty when
he was injured, was convicted of perjury before a Houston grand jury
investigating the incident. Calumet Farm Executives Sent to Prison for
Bribery, Fraud, Associated Press, Oct. 20, 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dan Lasater knew J.T. Lundy through their mutual
involvement in the horseracing business.\677\ Following his
release from prison, Lundy had employed Roger Clinton at
Calumet farms.\678\ Lasater indicated that he had discussed
with Roger Clinton the possibility of obtaining a pardon for
Lundy and that he believed Lundy and Clinton may have met to
discuss a pardon as well.\679\ Documents indicate that, in late
1999, J.T. Lundy and his son Robert had extensive contacts and
discussions with Lasater and Clinton regarding several business
deals.\680\ It appears that Lundy was offering these business
opportunities to Lasater and Clinton in return for Clinton's
help in obtaining a pardon for Lundy before his case went to
trial. On September 14, 1999, J.T. Lundy wrote to Dan Lasater:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\677\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001),
\678\ Josh Tyrangiel, Viveca Novak, and Michael Weisskopf, Brother,
Where Art Thy Standards? Time, July 9, 2001.
\679\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001).
\680\ Id.
I absolutely give you my word that all things we have
given to you and everything we have told you is 100%
true and proven. You can use what has been told to you
without any worries or any concerns. I have been
working on these projects for several years and have
put together the whole structure. This is not hear say
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[sic] I am telling you.
* * *
We have every document, map, studies, mining plans and
everything to provide for you.
* * *
Once again I want to thank you for helping to save
me.\681\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\681\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0006 (Letter from J.T.
Lundy, to Dan Lasater (Sept. 14, 1999)) (Exhibit 92).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the same day, Robert Lundy wrote to Lasater:
My Venezuelan partners Aura Diaz and Robert Korsakas
are scheduled to meet with British Petroleum on Sept.
20. BP is being represented by an agent from Spain, BP
has a [sic] tentatively offered .38 cents USD a metric
ton. There are an [sic] estimated reserves of
107,000,000+.
(.38 X 107 million metric tons = $40,660,000) We have
not accepted this offer, we [sic] feel the concessions
are worth .30 to .55 cents per metric ton.
All of our information is from the Venezuelan
Government's geological reports of the coal in the
Franja Nor Oriental coal region of Tachira State. Our
concessions are located in this region. The concessions
we have offered to BP are Concession Las Mesas
Escalante, #16, #17 and #18.\682\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\682\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0007 (Letter from Robert
Lundy, to Dan Lasater (Sept. 14, 1999)) (Exhibit 93).
On October 11, 1999, Robert Lundy wrote to Roger Clinton (and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
provided a copy to Dan Lasater) the following letter:
I wish to find out when you and Dan [Lasater] will be
able to schedule a meeting in Florida. Dan said, he
will work with your schedule and will be available at
your convenience.
* * *
I want to point out a couple of things to you. As you
know, Dan and J.T. have been doing deals together for
more than 25 years. I am sure that Dan will tell you
that J.T. has never told him anything that is not 100%
right.
Dan has told J.T., He [sic] agreed to put the stock in
his name for the group's interest. This way there will
be no hassles or worries.
* * *
If you recall when we met at the Dallas Airport, we
talked about racehorses. . . . J.T. really wants to get
back into it full time. . . . With the impute [sic] and
directions from everyone, we can all have a lot of fun
and make money.
* * *
I know you understand the anxiety that J.T. is going
through. Please try to set up a meeting date as soon as
your schedule permits.\683\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\683\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0010 (Letter from Robert
Lundy, to Roger Clinton (Oct. 11, 1999)) (Exhibit 94).
Approximately one month later, on November 10, 1999, J.T. Lundy
wrote to Roger Clinton, indicating his growing concern as his
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
trial date grew nearer:
I am sorry to worry you and Dan continually, but I am
sure both of you know why I am so anxious, with the
trial date set for January 16, 2000.
Dan and I talk nearly everyday. . . . I wrote Dan a
Fedex letter, last Saturday, to explain my ideas of how
we can handle everything.
You and Dan can make final plans. We will go on and
transfer the stock share over to Dan now. This will
allow you and your group some time to see if anyone
owes you a favor that needs to be repaid. If you find
that something good develops, we will work and get the
rest of the stock for you at a reasonable price.
I have suggested a way that Dan can own your stock, and
there is no way any outsider can every [sic] know the
true owners. Also, no one can ever get their hands on
any of your money. And it is TAX FREE!
* * *
Robert will need your proxy so he will still have the
51% majority vote, as he does now.
With your help, we can work out a way to postpone
everything until between November 8, 2000; and January
19, 2001.\684\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\684\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0011 (Letter from J.T.
Lundy, to Roger Clinton (Nov. 10, 1999)) (Exhibit 95).
On November 30, 1999, J.T. Lundy sent another letter to Roger
Clinton with almost the exact same wording but with a more
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
frantic tone:
You will make a great deal of money. Dan can give you
an idea of the amounts you will get.
With you and Dan's help, a way can be worked out to
postpone everything until after the November 8
election, and before the date you all leave office in
2001.
PLEASE get in touch with Dan soon. He has all the
details of what you will received and he is willing to
take care of everything for you all. Time is getting
short! PLEASE HELP ME NOW! \685\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\685\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0012 (Letter from J.T.
Lundy, to Roger Clinton (Nov. 30, 1999)) (Exhibit 96)
These documents demonstrate that, as Lundy's trial date
neared, he was more and more urgently seeking Lasater's and
Clinton's participation in the Venezuelan coal deal. They also
demonstrate that Lasater was intimately involved in the deal
and that Lundy clearly expected the deal to have some impact on
his legal troubles. Together with Lasater's admission to
Committee staff that he and Lundy discussed obtaining a pardon
for Lundy through Roger Clinton, the documents strongly suggest
that Lundy was providing Roger Clinton a sweetheart business
deal in exchange for his help in trying to obtain a pardon.
First, the repeated reference to timing ``everything'' so as to
occur after the presidential election but before the end of the
Clinton Administration suggests that whatever Roger's part in
the deal involved, it would be politically damaging if
discovered just before the election. It also suggests Roger's
part in the deal would require some official, presidential act,
which could not occur after President Clinton left office.
Second, the repeated references to Lundy's rapidly approaching
trial date suggest that Roger's part in the deal would have
some impact on Lundy's legal jeopardy. The most likely
explanation is that Lundy was seeking some form of executive
clemency through Roger Clinton.
When questioned about these matters, Dan Lasater was less
than forthcoming.\686\ Lasater at first claimed that other than
some matters related to horseracing, he and Lundy did not have
any business dealings together.\687\ His denial directly
contradicted the extensive documentary evidence discussed
above; Lasater was presumably unaware the Committee possessed
those documents. Regarding pardon discussions, Lasater said he
had asked Roger Clinton about a pardon for Lundy on one
occasion but that Roger had said he thought a pardon was not
appropriate before someone had gone to prison.\688\ Lasater did
not recall any discussions of a commutation for Lundy and did
not know when the meeting between Lundy and Clinton
occurred.\689\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\686\ Lasater has also lied to federal authorities in the past. In
1986, a federal judge found that he lied under oath in the course of
the bankruptcy trial of his partner George Locke. Investigation of
Whitewater Development Corporation and Related Matters, S. Rep. No.
104-280, at 362. Moreover, the Senate Special Committee on Whitewater
noted in its final report that Lasater did not disclose the judge's
finding to the Committee. Instead Lasater falsely claimed, ``it has
never been alleged that I committed any fraudulent act or lied in the
course of any investigation.'' Id.
\687\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001).
\688\ Id. This remark is similar to what Dickey Morton told Garland
Lincecum. See Section III.A.6., ``Lincecum's Attempts to Receive the
Pardon.''
\689\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When asked if Clinton was doing any business with Lundy,
Lasater said not to his knowledge, and ``I don't know how they
could have.'' \690\ When asked whether he had ever discussed
holding Clinton's interest in an investment, Lasater said he
had not.\691\ Lasater's denial directly contradicted the
statement in Robert Lundy's letter to Roger: ``Dan has told
J.T., He [sic] agreed to put the stock in his name for the
group's interest. This way there will be no hassles or
worries.'' \692\ After denying he had agreed to hold stock for
Clinton, Lasater said that Lundy was ``really at his wits end
the nearer he got to actually going into prison.'' \693\
Lasater said Lundy mentioned ``some things'' to him but that he
did not pass them on to Roger. Lasater said Lundy was ``asking
a question out of desperation'' and mentioned helping Roger
with proceeds of a coal deal in Venezuela.\694\ Lasater said
Lundy did not mention a number or an estimate of how much Roger
could make and that he just ``blew it off.'' \695\ However,
Lasater had in fact received a letter from Robert Lundy
estimating the deal's total worth at nearly $41 million, and
J.T. Lundy had written to Roger (and sent a copy to Lasater),
saying: ``You will make a great deal of money. Dan can give you
an idea of the amounts you will get.'' \696\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\690\ Id.
\691\ Id.
\692\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0010 (Letter from Robert
Lundy, to Roger Clinton (Oct. 11, 1999)) (Exhibit 94).
\693\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001).
\694\ Id.
\695\ Id.
\696\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0007 (Letter from Robert
Lundy, to Dan Lasater (Sept. 14, 1999)) (Exhibit 93); Roger Clinton
Document Production RCC0011 (Letter from J.T. Lundy, to Roger Clinton
(Nov. 10, 1999)) (Exhibit 95).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When confronted with questions about specific documents,
Lasater's answers became less responsive and more vague.
Committee staff asked about the letters to Roger Clinton from
J.T. Lundy and copied to Lasater stating, ``With you and Dan's
help, a way can be worked out to postpone everything until
after the November 8 election, and before the date you all
leave office in 2001.'' \697\ In response, Lasater claimed that
he had merely invested money and lost it. He stated that the
``only thing'' he did ``on the Venezuela coal deal'' was to put
in money.\698\ Lasater said that Lundy thought the whole deal
would make $10 million of which Lasater owned 20 percent, but
Lasater said he had made no money.\699\ Lasater's admission to
owning 20 percent of the coal deal contradicted his earlier
claim to have no non-horse-related business dealings with
Lundy. Moreover, his admission came only after he learned that
Committee staff had reviewed documents related to the deal.
Lasater went on to deny that he ever discussed the coal deal
with Roger Clinton, repeating that he merely ``blew it off.''
\700\ Given that Lasater invested his own money and owned 20
percent of the venture, this statement presumably refers to the
idea of involving Roger Clinton in the deal. Apparently still
referring to Clinton's involvement, Lasater went on to say that
``it was too far out'' and ``you just don't do those things.''
\701\ Then, Lasater declared: ``there is nothing in the coal
deal. I guarantee it.'' \702\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\697\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0012 (Letter from J.T.
Lundy, to Roger Clinton (Nov. 30, 1999)) (Exhibit 96)
\698\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001).
\699\ Id.
\700\ Id.
\701\ Id.
\702\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is unclear whether Roger Clinton asked President Clinton
to grant executive clemency to J.T. Lundy. Regardless, Lundy
did not receive clemency. It is also uncertain whether Roger
Clinton received any financial benefits from Lundy. Clinton did
receive tens of thousands of dollars in travelers checks
purchased in Venezuela in 1999 and 2000, but it is not clear if
any of those checks have a connection to the Lundy matter.
C. Blume Loe
On August 10, 1999, Blume Loe was convicted on charges of
tax fraud.\703\ Loe was the manager of High Port Marina, a
complex of boat slips, restaurants, and other businesses on
Lake Texoma at the Texas-Oklahoma border.\704\ The lake is
owned by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and was leased by
Loe's family.\705\ At the time of his conviction, Loe's parents
were already serving time in prison on charges of mail fraud,
wire fraud, and defrauding the Corps of Engineers, which was
entitled to a portion of gross sales under the terms of the
lease.\706\ Blume Loe failed to report $450,000 of income on
his tax returns and claimed that the money was a series of
loans from his mother.\707\ However, Loe was found to have been
a knowing participant in a scheme to hide the money from the
Corps of Engineers and the IRS.\708\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\703\ Bill Lodge, Manager of Lake Texoma Marina Convicted of Fraud,
Dallas Morning News, Aug. 11, 1999.
\704\ Id.
\705\ Id.
\706\ Id.
\707\ Id.
\708\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Blume Loe had worked for Dan Lasater in the 1980s as a
salesman at his bond firm and presumably knew Roger Clinton
through their mutual association with Lasater.\709\ On May 30,
2000, Loe wrote to Roger Clinton seeking his assistance in
obtaining a pardon:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\709\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). When
Loe's wife spoke to the media, she indicated that Loe had met Roger
Clinton ``in the late 1970's when they were students at University of
Arkansas.'' Alison Leigh Cowan, House Committee Asks Roger Clinton to
Explain Some Ties to Pardon Requests, N.Y. Times, June 29, 2001.
I thought I would be direct. Yes, this is me, and yes,
this is Blume Loe asking you to get with brother Bill,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and get me PARDONED.
As you know I was convicted on some tax charges. I
never believed your brother's Government would get a
conviction, but they did. I was sentenced to prison,
and I know you know what that means. Seems now I am
going through all those things that I never believed I
would have to do to get this thing taken care of. For
one, I am sitting in this goddamn law library typing a
letter like a prison writ-writer. If these guys around
me knew what I was writing, or who I was writing to,
[G]od knows what would happen. So anyway, it's me, and
I need your help.\710\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\710\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0002 (Letter from Blume
Loe, to Roger Clinton (May, 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 97).
Loe had attempted to contact Clinton through some mutual
friends, David Burnett and David Crews. According to Dan
Lasater, David Crews' sister, Lana Crews, had once been Roger
Clinton's girlfriend.\711\ Loe's letter describes his previous
attempts to contact Clinton:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\711\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001).
I talked to Dave [Burnett], and we discussed how this
could get this done. Dave talked to David Cruse, [sic]
and David Cruse [sic] says he talked to you about this
deal. I hope all this happened like I was told, but if
it did not I would not be surprised. I learned in here
that things are not always like they have been told.
However, whether you have talked to anyone about me, to
date, or not, I am now reaching out to you
personally.\712\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\712\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0002 (Letter from Blume
Loe, to Roger Clinton (May, 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 97).
David Crews confirmed that David Burnett contacted him
about helping to secure Roger Clinton's help in obtaining a
pardon for Blume Loe.\713\ Crews knew Roger Clinton and
estimated that he probably saw him once a year.\714\ However,
Crews said he did not want to approach Roger with ``something
like this.'' \715\ Crews denied that he did anything to assist
Loe in his effort to obtain a pardon.\716\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\713\ Telephone Interview with David Crews (May 29, 2001).
\714\ Id.
\715\ Id.
\716\ Id.
Loe's letter also refers to contacts between his lawyer
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and Roger Clinton:
You will be receiving a package from my attorney on
appeal about the pardon issue. Her name is Cindy
Goosen, and all the paperwork on my side should be in
that package. She's a good lawyer, and you can talk to
her. She knows what time it is. She ain't no idiot,
like my trial lawyer was. Talking to her is talking to
me.
* * *
I also know that what I am requesting is extraordinary.
While I know that you are trying to get one, I hope
yours comes, if at all, at about the same time mine
comes . . . if you know what I mean. I would not be
approaching you with this if I was not desperate with
no where else to turn. I need your help on this.\717\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\717\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0002-3 (Letter from
Blume Loe, to Roger Clinton (May, 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 97).
When Committee staff contacted Loe's lawyer, Cynthia
Goosen, and attempted to arrange an interview, she first
responded by claiming that she could not discuss any matters
related to Loe because of the attorney-client privilege.\718\
After being informed that any contacts with Roger Clinton, whom
she did not represent, would not fall within the attorney-
client privilege, Goosen then claimed that ``any work done
pursuant to any attempt to obtain clemency would have been
protected by the attorney work product privilege'' and that
``as to any related matters which may not fall strictly within
the privilege, it is my policy as an attorney to treat same as
confidential and not to disclose same unless compelled to do so
by judicial process.'' \719\ The refusal of Blume Loe and his
lawyer to cooperate with the Committee's investigation limits
what can be known about Loe's efforts to obtain a pardon.\720\
Likewise, because of Roger Clinton's refusal to cooperate, it
is unclear whether Loe was one of the names Clinton submitted
to his brother for consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\718\ Letter from David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt.
Reform, to Cynthia S. Goosen, Cooper & Scully (May 14, 2001) (within
Appendix I).
\719\ Letter from Cynthia S. Goosen, Cooper & Scully, to David
Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 22, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
\720\ Despite Loe's refusal to speak to Committee staff, his wife's
comments on the matter were reported in the press: ``She said she and
her husband may have discussed going to Roger Clinton for help, `but we
didn't know how to contact him,' said Ms. Loe. `I wouldn't call us a
dear friend,' she said. `We haven't talked to him in over 20 years.' ''
Alison Leigh Cowan, House Committee Asks Roger Clinton to Explain Some
Ties to Pardon Requests, N.Y. Times, June 29, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Rita Lavelle
Roger Clinton did not limit his pardon lobbying to personal
friends. He also agreed to assist Rita Lavelle, an
Environmental Protection Agency Assistant Administrator for
Solid Waste and Emergency Response in the Reagan
Administration. In 1983, Lavelle was convicted of making false
statements, obstructing a Congressional Committee, perjury
before a Senate Committee and perjury before a House
Committee.\721\ She was sentenced to six months in prison, five
years of probation, and a $10,000 fine.\722\ The charges
against Lavelle stemmed from an investigation of allegations
that she had continued to work on matters relating to a
Superfund clean-up site despite formerly being employed by one
of the alleged polluters of the site. Lavelle was convicted of
lying about precisely when Justice Department and EPA lawyers
had advised her to recuse herself.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\721\ Rita Lavelle Document Production 005 (Petition for Pardon,
Jan. 7, 2001) (Exhibit 98).
\722\ Id. at 005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lavelle has maintained her innocence, appealing her
conviction and attempting since the Reagan Administration to
obtain executive clemency.\723\ She argues first that her
former employer, Aerojet, was not charged with dumping at the
Superfund site in question, Stringfellow, because ``they never
did.'' \724\ Secondly, she contends that she was under no
obligation to recuse herself but that she had merely made ``a
personal promise'' to the Senate Confirmation and Oversight
Committee not to work on matters ``directly involving'' her
former employer.\725\ And thirdly, she alleges that her
accusers had received campaign contributions or had other
connections with named Stringfellow dumpers who ``would
economically benefit by stalling and de-railing EPA's cleanup
orders[.]'' \726\ She has also implied that political
corruption tainted the appellate review of her conviction:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\723\ Telephone Interview with Rita Lavelle (July 11, 2001).
\724\ Rita Lavelle Document Production 013 (Petition for Pardon,
Jan. 7, 2001) (Exhibit 98).
\725\ Id. at 014.
\726\ Id.
Approximately three weeks after the Appellate Court
Hearing, Senators Metzenbaum and Kennedy asked me to
come to Kennedy's Office. They were on the Judiciary
Committee and they wished me to testify against Ed
Meese who was nominated for the new Attorney General.
Having worked for Mr. Meese and President Reagan since
the early days in California when Reagan was Governor,
it was obvious to them I could evoke some
``tantalizing'' memories. At first they were charming
then they got down to threats if I didn't co-operate.
Finally Kennedy told me either I appear before his
committee and testify against Meese or I would lose the
Appeal and go to Jail. My Irish Pride and Catholic
Optimism took over and after informing them there was
only one innocent person in the room and she was
leaving, Kennedy screamed the prophetic ``and she is
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
going to jail.''
Several months later (to be specific the Friday before
the Inauguration of Reagan for his second term) the
Court made a ``small'' announcement that they were
denying the Appeal with NO Comment. The three member
Appellate Court Hearing was now reduced to two
Democrats who had ``No Comment.'' The one Republican
Member had accepted a Sabbatical to England and had not
provided comment prior to leaving.\727\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\727\ Id.
Sometime in 2000, Lavelle decided to seek to obtain
clemency from the Clinton administration. She first approached
a friend, Michael Dodds, who was a contract security provider
who frequently traveled with Roger Clinton overseas.\728\
Lavelle told Committee staff that Dodds knew that she was
having trouble finding work because of her felony conviction
and that he helped her contact Roger Clinton to request that
Roger hand-carry her pardon petition to President Clinton.\729\
At one point, she spoke to Dodds and Clinton on the phone
simultaneously about her request.\730\ Later, Lavelle said
that, through Michael Dodds, Roger Clinton asked for ``$10,000
or $30,000'' to hand carry the petition for her.\731\ Although
Dodds claimed that he ``never supposed that [Clinton] might
want payment'' and that Clinton merely thought Lavelle's case
was deserving, Lavelle's memory on this point is clear.\732\ In
fact, Lavelle said that such a fee request ``was to be
expected'' and that it ``was not a quid pro quo.'' \733\
Lavelle explained that she was bankrupt and that, although she
could not afford to pay, Roger Clinton ``was kind enough'' to
carry it without payment.\734\ Dodds denied the allegation that
Clinton asked Lavelle for money.\735\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\728\ Telephone Interview with Rita Lavelle (July 11, 2001).
\729\ Id.
\730\ Id.
\731\ Id.
\732\ Telephone Interview with Michael Dodds (July 31, 2001).
\733\ Telephone Interview with Rita Lavelle (July 11, 2001).
\734\ Id.
\735\ Telephone Interview with Michael Dodds (July 31, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clinton instructed Lavelle to send her petition to an
address at the White House Usher's office. Lavelle did so.\736\
She also spoke to Roger Clinton by phone about her pardon
petition several times.\737\ In the first contact after Clinton
had agreed to deliver her petition, he called to say that the
President was ``favorably disposed'' to granting her
clemency.\738\ But, on the Friday night before the
inauguration, Roger Clinton called again and asked Lavelle,
``Do you have $100,000 to get this through?'' \739\ Lavelle
said she interpreted the comment as a joke because she was
bankrupt and could not possibly raise $100,000 so quickly.\740\
Also, Clinton had already told her that it was probably too
late to get her petition granted.\741\ Nevertheless, Roger
Clinton did ask Lavelle if she had $100,000 in connection with
the pardon effort. Clinton went on to explain that ``the
President is under a lot of pressure'' and asked ``what can you
do with the Bush team?'' \742\ Lavelle replied that she was
``close to the conservative elements.'' \743\ Roger told her
that ``political equity was more important than money at this
point.'' \744\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\736\ Telephone Interview with Rita Lavelle (July 11, 2001).
\737\ Id.
\738\ Id.
\739\ Id.
\740\ Id.
\741\ Id.
\742\ Id.
\743\ Id.
\744\ Id. Lavelle also claims that Clinton then asked her, ``Who do
you know at Pepperdine?'' Lavelle said she realized later that this was
a reference to former Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's aborted
departure to become Dean of Pepperdine Law School. Lavelle understood
Roger Clinton to be probing to see if she could assist in obtaining a
deal or if her pardon could become part of a deal between President
Clinton and the Office of Independent Counsel. The President was
engaged in last-minute negotiations that ultimately led to the
agreement not to prosecute that was announced hours before Clinton left
office. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lavelle did not receive clemency on inauguration day and,
much as he apparently did with others for whom he had lobbied,
Roger Clinton called to tell her that he was upset and
embarrassed that his requests for pardons were not
granted.\745\ Lavelle spoke to Clinton one more time after his
brother was out of office, but she could recall only that the
conversation focused on his claim that he was framed on a drunk
driving charge that had recently received a lot of press
attention.\746\ Lavelle's account provides a disturbingly
cynical view of politics and the pardon process. It also
illustrates that Roger Clinton was willing to use his
relationship and access to the President to help not only dear
friends, as he has claimed in the press, but also any stranger
who might possibly provide money or ``political equity''
beneficial to the Clintons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\745\ Id.
\746\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. John Ballis
In 1990, Houston real estate developer John Ballis pled
guilty to paying a savings and loan president $371,000 in
kickback money ($300,000 of which was provided in the form of a
cash-stuffed duffel bag delivered via helicopter) in exchange
for $6.7 million in loans.\747\ As part of the plea
arrangement, Ballis provided authorities with details about the
bribe and was given immunity from further prosecution arising
out of the investigation.\748\ Ballis was sentenced to two
years' probation and 160 hours of community service.\749\
Shortly after completing his community service, however, Ballis
was indicted again for the crime to which he had earlier pled
guilty as well as obstruction of justice.\750\ Prosecutors had
cancelled the plea agreement on the grounds that Ballis had not
met his obligation under the bargain to be complete and
truthful in his debriefing.\751\ Ballis was tried, convicted,
and sentenced to 12 and a half years in prison.\752\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\747\ Steve McVicker, Bad Deal; John Ballis Was a Crook. But He
Expected the Federal Government to Keep Its End of a Bargain, Houston
Press, Dec. 4, 1997.
\748\ Id.
\749\ Id; Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0016 (Letter from
John Ballis, to Roger Clinton (Jan. 9, 1999)) (Exhibit 99).
\750\ Id.
\751\ Steve McVicker, Bad Deal; John Ballis Was a Crook. But He
Expected the Federal Government to Keep Its End of a Bargain, Houston
Press, Dec. 4, 1997.
\752\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0016 (Letter from John
Ballis, to Roger Clinton (Jan. 9, 1999)) (Exhibit 99).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1989, Ballis married Joni Anderson.\753\ Anderson-Ballis
had been a reporter for KTHV television in Little Rock,
Arkansas, as well as an employee of Lasater and Co., a Little
Rock-based securities company owned by Dan Lasater.\754\
Anderson-Ballis said she knew Bill Clinton, Roger Clinton,
Bruce Lindsey, and Virginia Kelly (President Clinton's mother)
``fairly well.'' \755\ She said John Ballis began seeking
executive clemency soon after the revocation of his plea
agreement in 1994.\756\ Anderson-Ballis wrote to President
Clinton seeking clemency for her husband in November 1994:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\753\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0022 (Letter from Joni
Anderson-Ballis, to President William J. Clinton, the White House (Nov.
21, 1994)) (Exhibit 100).
\754\ George Wells, Former Reporter Appears, Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, Sept. 19, 1986. Anderson-Ballis appeared as a witness before a
grand jury investigating Dan Lasater for cocaine distribution. Id.
\755\ Telephone Interview with Joni Anderson-Ballis (June 12,
2001).
\756\ Id; Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0022 (Letter from
Joni Anderson-Ballis, to President William J. Clinton, the White House
(Nov. 21, 1994)) (Exhibit 100).
I have met with Bruce Lindsey on this matter. He can
show you the documents and fill you in on the details.
He can also tell you about Representative Jack Brooks'
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
interest and involvement in the case.
* * *
I'm aware the demands on your time are overwhelming and
if it were not for our friendship, you'd probably never
see this letter. However, friendship aside, this
situation is one that warrants your consideration.\757\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\757\ Id. See also Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0025
(Letter from Joni Anderson-Ballis, to Bruce Lindsey, Special Counsel to
the President, the White House (Nov. 21, 1994)) (Exhibit 101).
The request did receive attention early on, according to
Anderson-Ballis. She met with Webster Hubbell about the issue
when he was Associate Attorney General and with Bruce Lindsey
for two hours once when President Clinton was in Houston to
attend a fundraiser.\758\ She also wrote letters to Roger
Clinton and Bruce Lindsey. Her letter to Roger suggests he
played an active role in advocating for Ballis:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\758\ Telephone Interview with Joni Anderson-Ballis (June 12,
2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Roger the Dodger--
I can't tell you how much your help means to me. I'm
sure you understand.
* * *
Please ask Bill if he got the letter and also get any
advice on how I should proceed with this. Mention to
him that Primetime Live is interested in doing a piece
at this point (Rick Nelson is the contact there)--I'm
sending them documents today.\759\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\759\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0021 (Letter from Joni
Anderson-Ballis, to Roger Clinton) (Exhibit 102).
Despite Ballis' connections, and even though the federal judge
who initially sentenced Ballis wrote a letter supporting a
grant of clemency,\760\ no executive action was taken on
Ballis' case. One reason cited at the time was that Ballis had
not yet exhausted his judicial appeals.\761\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\760\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0019 (Letter from the
Honorable Lynn N. Hughes, U.S. District Judge, District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, to President William J. Clinton, the White
House (Oct. 28, 1994)) (Exhibit 103).
\761\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0028 (Letter from
Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice, to the
Honorable Lynn N. Hughes, U.S. District Judge, District Court for the
Southern District of Texas (Jan. 6, 1995)) (Exhibit 104).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Roger Clinton did not stop trying to help Ballis, however.
In December 1997, when he was lobbying the U.S. Parole
Commission for the release of organized crime figure Rosario
Gambino, he also inquired about a furlough for John
Ballis.\762\ According to Parole Commission staffers Marie
Ragghianti and Tom Kowalski, Roger Clinton knew that Ballis had
recently received a tentative release decision from a Parole
Commission hearing examiner and was merely inquiring about the
possibility of a furlough release for the holidays. Ragghianti
and Kowalski referred him to the warden of Ballis' prison on
the furlough issue and emphasized that the hearing examiner's
decision was merely a recommendation and had to be approved
before becoming final.\763\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\762\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC
(July 27, 2001).
\763\ USPC Document Production 00889 (Exhibit 40). Other documents,
however, indicate that during his December meeting with Parole
Commission staff, Clinton did more than merely ask about a holiday
furlough. Clinton also provided copies of correspondence from Lois
Franco, a criminal justice consultant apparently hired by Ballis. The
correspondence consists of a fax from Franco to Clinton detailing the
procedural status of Ballis' case and attached letter to the
Commissioners arguing for Ballis' early release. USPC Document
Production 00961 (Exhibit 105). The fax indicates that Ballis had
instructed Franco to provide the information at Clinton's request and
thanks Clinton for his assistance. Id. at 00961-63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clinton was successful, at least according to Ballis, in
helping him obtain a parole date of March 26, 1998, after
serving 40 months of his 12-year prison term. Upon learning in
January 1998 of the parole date, Ballis wrote a letter to
Roger: \764\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\764\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0014-015 (Letter from
John Ballis, to Roger Clinton (Jan. 15, 1998)) (Exhibit 106).
I finally got my copy of the Notice of Action--it was
here the whole time--they just couldn't locate it--if
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
you believe that bullsh*t.
But anyway I thought you might like to see the result
of your help & work.
I can't thank you enough. I sure hope your meeting w/
Disney went OK & that you have a good trip to
Korea.\765\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\765\ Id. at RCC0014.
While Ballis' letter credits Clinton with helping him obtain
his release, it is unclear exactly what, if anything, he did
for Ballis before meeting with Parole Commission personnel in
December 1997.
After Ballis was released from prison, Roger Clinton
continued to help him in his effort to obtain executive
clemency. Oddly enough, with all the help Clinton had given
John Ballis through the years, they did not meet in person
until 1999. Ballis wrote to Clinton in January 1999:
It was so nice to finally get to meet you. I trust you
had a nice trip home and are getting ready to go to
D.C. I wanted to get you the information on my
commutation request so you would be able to familiarize
yourself with it before your trip.
* * *
As you know, I have served my prison time and am
currently in the half-way house until March 10, 1999. I
will remain under the jurisdiction of the justice
system until 2004 when my sentence ends. I am also
required to pay fines and restitution in excess of 4
\1/2\ million dollars.
* * *
I could go on and on about the injustices in my case,
but, I'd rather put it all behind me and rebuild my
life. I'm hoping you can help me do this by assisting
me in getting Executive Clemency. This would eliminate
future parole supervision--which lasts until 2004--and
do away with the fine and restitution portion of my
sentence.\766\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\766\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0016 (Letter from John
Ballis, to Roger Clinton (Jan. 9, 1999)) (Exhibit 99).
Joni Anderson-Ballis told Committee staff that she met with
Roger Clinton about her husband's case about a week before the
end of the Clinton Administration.\767\ Clinton told her that
he was making a list of people that he planned to give to his
brother and ask that they be granted executive clemency.\768\
Clinton also told her that he was trying to obtain a pardon for
himself but did not know whether he was going to receive one.
Anderson-Ballis told Clinton to tell the President to ``please
take another look at the Ballis case.'' \769\ She also said
that she doubted that Roger actually asked the President to
grant a pardon to her husband.\770\ However, there is
documentary evidence suggesting that Roger Clinton did indeed
present Ballis' name to the President. The National Archives
produced to the Committee a document with the name ``John
Ballis'' printed on it, and next to it, in President Clinton's
handwriting was the following note, ``Meredith call him on this
I think there's a different option than the one we discussed--
BC.'' \771\ While this document does not contain Roger
Clinton's name, it was produced to the Committee in the middle
of a number of documents relating to Roger Clinton, so it is
possible that Roger provided Ballis' name to the President.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\767\ Telephone Interview with Joni Anderson-Ballis (June 12,
2001).
\768\ Id.
\769\ Id.
\770\ Id.
\771\ NARA Document Production (Handwritten Note) (Exhibit 107).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although it is not certain whether Roger Clinton lobbied
the White House on the Ballis pardon, the Ballis case
apparently did receive serious consideration in the closing
days of the Clinton Administration. Ballis' name appears on
three White House documents, in addition to the note from
President Clinton to Meredith Cabe: a table of cases being
tracked by Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe and two
draft memos to the President.\772\ In the entry for Ballis, the
Meredith Cabe table notes, ``Atty. Don Clark of Houston,
dropped of [sic] papers personally; BRL?'' \773\ Joni Anderson-
Ballis said that Clark was the last lawyer they hired to work
on the case.\774\ According to the draft memos dated December
17 and December 20, 2000, White House Counsels Beth Nolan,
Bruce Lindsey, and Meredith Cabe all recommended to the
President that he grant clemency to Ballis.\775\ The December
20, 2000, memo recommends that the President, ``Commute
remaining period of sentence of confinement (for which he is
currently paroled), and remit fine, leaving intact the
obligation to pay restitution.'' \776\ Anderson-Ballis said
that their attorney, Don Clark, had traveled to Washington to
meet with Administration officials regarding the Ballis request
and also that Clark received a call two nights before the
inauguration from Associate White House Counsel Eric
Angel.\777\ Apparently, Angel was pursuing the ``different
option'' suggested by the President in his note to Meredith
Cabe. Angel asked Clark if there was any piece of the clemency
request that Ballis would accept such as having the probation
commuted but the restitution left intact.\778\ Clark replied
that they would accept whatever was granted but that they
preferred to receive a ``complete pardon.'' \779\ After the
call from Angel, Ballis was optimistic about the prospects, but
in the end, he received no commutation.\780\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\772\ NARA Document Production (Exhibits 108, 109, 110).
\773\ NARA Document Production (Exhibit 108).
\774\ Telephone Interview with Joni Anderson-Ballis (June 12,
2001).
\775\ NARA Document Production (Exhibits 109, 110).
\776\ NARA Document Production (Exhibits 110).
\777\ Telephone Interview with Joni Anderson-Ballis (June 12,
2001).
\778\ Id.
\779\ Id.
\780\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anderson-Ballis said that she had not spoken to Roger
Clinton since the end of the Clinton Administration.\781\
Anderson-Ballis stated that she was initially mad at Roger when
no commutation was granted but not any longer because she
realized that ``Bill loves his brother, but he does not respect
him.'' \782\ When asked if Roger was paid for his work on the
clemency request, Anderson-Ballis stated that he was not, and
that anything that Roger did was out of friendship.\783\
Anderson-Ballis stated that ``Roger is a good guy, but he is a
lost soul.'' \784\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\781\ Id.
\782\ Id.
\783\ Id.
\784\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. Steven Griggs
In 1992, Steven M. Griggs pled guilty in the Eastern
District of Missouri to conspiracy to manufacture and possess
100 grams or more of methamphetamine.\785\ Before being
sentenced, however, he fled and remained a fugitive until being
captured over a year later.\786\ Griggs was sentenced to over
24 years in prison and will not be released until 2013.\787\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\785\ Steven Griggs Document Production (Petition for Commutation,
June 20, 2000) (Exhibit 111); Alison Leigh Cowan, Plea Mailed to Roger
Clinton Was Flagged by President, N.Y. Times, June 30, 2001.
\786\ Id.
\787\ Steven Griggs Document Production (Petition for Commutation,
June 20, 2000) (Exhibit 111).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In June 2000, Griggs submitted a commutation petition to
the White House and Justice Department.\788\ Griggs' request
for a commutation was based on the argument that a 24-year
prison sentence was too harsh for a first-time nonviolent
offender, even one engaged in large-scale methamphetamine
manufacture.\789\ In an effort to ensure that the petition
would be granted, Griggs' father sought Roger Clinton's help
through an old family friend. Griggs' father is Chief Carl
``Grey Owl'' Griggs of the Northern Cherokee Nation of Missouri
and Arkansas, an American Indian tribe, which is not recognized
by the United States.\790\ The Clinton family friend is Daley
McDaniel, the owner of a moving company in Hot Springs,
Arkansas.\791\ McDaniel knew Chief Griggs because McDaniel had
been seeking admission into the tribe.\792\ McDaniel told
Committee staff that he also knew Roger Clinton very well, that
he ``helped raise Roger.'' \793\ At one point, Roger Clinton
had dated McDaniel's daughter.\794\ McDaniel described how he
had suggested to Chief Griggs that Roger might be able to help
the Northern Cherokee Nation obtain official recognition by the
U.S. government.\795\ McDaniel said that, when Bill Clinton was
governor of Arkansas, McDaniel could leave a message and his
call would always be returned within a few days.\796\ But,
McDaniel did not enjoy the same access to Bill Clinton after he
became President.\797\ So, McDaniel decided to try to use Roger
Clinton to gain the President's attention on the Northern
Cherokee Nation recognition issue.\798\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\788\ Id.
\789\ Id.
\790\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Plea Mailed to Roger Clinton Was Flagged
by President, N.Y. Times, June 30, 2001; Telephone Interview with Daley
McDaniel (July 9, 2001).
\791\ Id.
\792\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Plea Mailed to Roger Clinton Was Flagged
by President, N.Y. Times, June 30, 2001.
\793\ Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001).
\794\ Id.
\795\ Id.
\796\ Id.
\797\ Id.
\798\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When McDaniel told Chief Griggs about his plans to obtain
federal recognition for the tribe, Griggs raised the issue of
his son's imprisonment.\799\ McDaniel could not recall whose
idea it was initially, but together they decided to also enlist
Roger's help in getting Steven Griggs out of prison.\800\
According to McDaniel, the Chief told him that his son was in
prison for marijuana.\801\ Not until after a New York Times
article \802\ on the Griggs case was published did McDaniel
learn that Steven Griggs was actually in prison for
methamphetamines and that Griggs had been a fugitive for a
year.\803\ McDaniel said he had not spoken to the Chief since
the article was printed and that he felt like the Chief had
misled him about the merits of his son's case.\804\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\799\ Id.
\800\ Id.
\801\ Id.
\802\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Plea Mailed to Roger Clinton Was Flagged
by President, N.Y. Times, June 30, 2001.
\803\ Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001).
\804\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
About six months before the end of the Clinton
Administration, McDaniel called Roger Clinton to discuss the
tribal recognition issue and the Steven Griggs case.\805\
McDaniel told Roger that Griggs was in prison for drug
possession and ``needed a pardon from Bill.'' \806\ Roger said,
``sure.'' \807\ McDaniel gave Roger the Chief's phone number
and believes that Roger spoke with the Chief two or three times
by phone, beginning that evening.\808\ However, McDaniel was
never privy to their conversations, and he did not believe
Roger ever met the Chief in person.\809\ McDaniel said Roger
helped ``by running messages back and forth to his brother.''
\810\ McDaniel and Chief Griggs sent faxes about the case to
Roger who would then forward them to the President.\811\
McDaniel also said he had a lot of interaction with Associate
White House Counsel Meredith Cabe related to the Griggs
case.\812\ Cabe even called him on his cell phone to ask him
questions about the case.\813\ Documents substantiate
McDaniel's account of Cabe's involvement. One of the tables
used by Cabe to track pardon cases contains an entry for
Stephen M. Griggs and notes under the heading, ``Referred/
Contacted by'' that ``Daley McDaniel strongly supports; acc. to
McDaniel, Roger Clinton also supports[.]'' \814\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\805\ Id.
\806\ Id.
\807\ Id.
\808\ Id.
\809\ Id.
\810\ Id.
\811\ Id.
\812\ Id.
\813\ Id.
\814\ NARA Document Production (Exhibit 108). This table was
located in a file identified as belonging to Bruce Lindsey labeled
``General Pardon File.'' This document's reference to Roger Clinton
raises questions about the veracity of Bruce Lindsey's testimony before
the Committee at its March 1, 2001, hearing where Lindsey was asked,
``were you aware at the time the pardons were being considered at the
White House in January of this year that the President's brother [Roger
Clinton] was advocating on behalf of certain individuals?'' Lindsey
replied, ``No, sir, I don't believe so.'' ``The Controversial Pardon of
International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt.
Reform, 106th Cong. 418-19 (Mar. 1, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Gary Krupkin, attorney for the Griggs family,
one motive for Chief Griggs' and McDaniel's efforts seeking
recognition for the tribe was to be able to establish a casino
under the tribe's auspices.\815\ Daley McDaniel said he never
discussed any exchange of money with Roger Clinton or Chief
Griggs.\816\ McDaniel also denies that he discussed a potential
casino with Clinton or Griggs.\817\ McDaniel did admit to one
reference to a casino in discussions with Roger Clinton. On
December 25, 2000, McDaniel was speaking to Roger Clinton about
the Griggs commutation while Roger was in the Oval Office.\818\
McDaniel said he heard the President in the background saying:
``Ask Daley if there are any casinos involved in this thing. I
don't want any surprises.'' \819\ McDaniel told Roger that
there were no casinos involved and offered to have Chief Griggs
write a letter ``saying there were no plans to build any
casinos.'' \820\ Roger told McDaniel that no such letter was
necessary.\821\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\815\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Plea Mailed to Roger Clinton Was Flagged
by President, N.Y. Times, June 30, 2001.
\816\ Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001).
\817\ Id.
\818\ Id.
\819\ Id.
\820\ Id.
\821\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following day, McDaniel spoke to Roger again. Roger
called and said ``Big Brother wants you to send him everything
about Steven.'' \822\ According to McDaniel, the President had
instructed that the materials be sent by overnight mail.\823\
McDaniel called Chief Griggs who worked through the night to
prepare and send a packet about Steven Griggs' accomplishments
in prison.\824\ Roger Clinton provided a new fax number and a
new address, which McDaniel said ``had something to do with
ushers.'' Soon afterward, Roger Clinton called McDaniel to say
that the information packet had been lost for a time but had
now been found.\825\ Clinton told McDaniel he was ``heading to
Big Brother's office to deliver it.'' \826\ Again, documents
substantiate this account. The National Archives produced to
the Committee a copy of an envelope sent by the Northern
Cherokee Nation to Roger Clinton at the White House.\827\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\822\ Id.
\823\ Id.
\824\ Id.
\825\ Id.
\826\ Id.
\827\ NARA Document Production (Envelope from Northern Cherokee
Nation to Roger Clinton) (Exhibit 112).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clinton's call led McDaniel and Griggs to believe ``it was
a done deal.'' \828\ McDaniel said the prison put Griggs ``in
protective custody'' just before the end of the administration,
leading the family to believe his sentence was going to be
commuted.\829\ They thought he was being protected from other
inmates who might be jealous of his being suddenly
released.\830\ McDaniel said that, on the last day of the
administration, Griggs was ``on pins and needles'' expecting
the pardon to come down.\831\ Indeed, Clinton had delivered the
packet to the President, and the President appears to have been
favorably disposed to granting a commutation. The President
wrote a note to Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe on
the outside of the envelope containing the Griggs material,
``Meredith, looks like a case for commutation pls check out--
BC.'' \832\ Despite the apparent support from the President
himself and despite the assistance of Roger Clinton in moving
Griggs' last-minute petition to the head of the line, Griggs
did not receive clemency. Daley McDaniel suspected that the
President had learned something ``at the last minute'' that
stopped him from granting the pardon.\833\ McDaniel speculated
that it might be the fact that Steven Griggs had been a
fugitive, which McDaniel himself did not learn until later
\834\ and which had not been referenced in the petition. After
the announcement of who had received pardons, McDaniel called
Roger to find out what happened.\835\ Clinton told McDaniel
that he and his brother had ``a bad argument.'' \836\ Roger
told McDaniel that ``it got rough'' and that even the pardons
for Roger's personal friends that he had wanted most were
denied.\837\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\828\ Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001).
\829\ Id.
\830\ Id.
\831\ Id.
\832\ NARA Document Production (Envelope from Northern Cherokee
Nation to Roger Clinton) (Exhibit 112).
\833\ Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001).
\834\ Id.
\835\ Id.
\836\ Id.
\837\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committee staff made numerous attempts to interview Chief
Griggs and Steven Griggs regarding these matters. After
initially indicating a willingness to allow Chief Griggs to be
interviewed, Griggs' attorney then indicated that he could not
allow the Chief to participate in an interview. The attorney
also indicated that if Chief Griggs were subpoenaed to testify,
he would invoke his Fifth Amendment rights.
G. Phillip Young
Phillip Young along with his family operates Catfish
Young's, a catering business and restaurant in North Little
Rock, Arkansas.\838\ In 1992, Young pled guilty to illegally
transporting federally protected game fish across state
lines.\839\ Young had bought approximately 4,000 crappie in
Louisiana for use in his family restaurant.\840\ It was a
felony offense, and he was sentenced to 10 months in
prison.\841\ In November 1998, with the help of his attorney,
Gene O'Daniel, Young began the process of applying for a
pardon.\842\ Young brought O'Daniel copies of the Justice
Department pardon forms and asked him to help file a
petition.\843\ O'Daniel said he did not know what prompted
Young to request a pardon, but he filled out the forms and
worked with the Pardon Attorney's Office to submit, correct,
supplement, and finalize the application.\844\ It was final and
complete at some point in 1999.\845\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\838\ Telephone Interview with Phillip Young (Apr. 26, 2001).
\839\ Gene O'Daniel Document Production (Phillip Young's Petition
for Pardon, Nov. 13, 1998) (Exhibit 113).
\840\ Id.
\841\ Id.
\842\ Telephone Interview with Gene O'Daniel, former Counsel for
Phillip Young (Mar. 29, 2001).
\843\ Id.
\844\ Id.
\845\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to O'Daniel, Young asked him for a copy of his
pardon petition so that he could give it to Roger Clinton.\846\
Afterwards, in early January 2001, he learned from Young that
someone had offered to obtain a pardon for Young if Young would
pay Roger Clinton $30,000. Young told O'Daniel that he had
rejected this offer and that the unnamed person had come back
and offered to obtain the pardon in exchange for a $15,000
payment to Roger Clinton.\847\ Young refused to tell O'Daniel
who made the offer, and O'Daniel told Young not to accept
it.\848\ O'Daniel said he based his advice on his previous
experience with Roger Clinton.\849\ In 1985, O'Daniel had
represented Sam Andrews, Jr., who was convicted on cocaine
charges on the testimony of Roger Clinton.\850\ In the course
of the trial, O'Daniel had seen surveillance tapes of Roger
that convinced him that Roger Clinton was a ``bullsh*tter'' who
could not be trusted to deliver a pardon.\851\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\846\ Id.
\847\ Id. Young mentioned to O'Daniel that there was a ``Hollywood
producer,'' Harry Thomason, who could help get a pardon, but O'Daniel
did not think Young made any effort to contact Thomason. Id. Dan
Lasater also reported that he ``was told that Patsy Thomason had helped
Jimmy Manning get a pardon'' and that he had ``heard that Sony Tucker
of Hamburg, Arkansas, was trying to get pardon with Patsy Thomason's
help.'' Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001).
\848\ Telephone Interview with Gene O'Daniel, former Counsel for
Phillip Young (Mar. 29, 2001).
\849\ Id.
\850\ Id.
\851\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When interviewed by Committee staff, Phillip Young provided
a conflicting account. According to Young, in late 2000, his
brother Carey suggested that John Burkhalter, a friend of
Carey's, might be able to help Young obtain a pardon because
Burkhalter knew Roger Clinton.\852\ Carey Young had met
Burkhalter while in college and had remained friends
since.\853\ Carey Young knew that Burkhalter was friends with
Roger Clinton.\854\ Phillip Young said that he and his brother
Carey discussed between themselves whether Clinton would charge
a fee to help him obtain pardon.\855\ Phillip Young claims
that, between themselves, they surmised that Roger would want
between $10,000 and $15,000.\856\ Carey Young then approached
Burkhalter about getting Clinton to work on Young's
pardon.\857\ He called Burkhalter in October or November 2000
to determine whether Burkhalter would be willing to ask Clinton
to deliver a copy of the pardon petition directly to the
President.\858\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\852\ Telephone Interview with Phillip Young (Apr. 26, 2001).
\853\ Telephone Interview with Carey Young (Apr. 30, 2001).
\854\ Id.
\855\ Telephone Interview with Phillip Young (Apr. 26, 2001).
\856\ Id.
\857\ Id.
\858\ Telephone Interview with Carey Young (Apr. 30, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the meantime, Phillip Young discussed the situation with
his lawyer, Gene O'Daniel.\859\ Without naming Burkhalter,
Young told O'Daniel he knew someone who knew Roger Clinton and
that he was considering asking Clinton to help with the
pardon.\860\ Young said that O'Daniel's reaction was to advise
against getting Roger Clinton involved.\861\ While Carey Young
was waiting to hear back from Burkhalter, Young said O'Daniel
called him repeatedly to ask whether he had gone through with
his plan to involve Clinton in the pardon effort.\862\ Young
told O'Daniel he had spoken with Clinton but decided not to use
his help.\863\ Young told Committee staff, however, that his
claim to have spoken with Clinton was a lie fabricated merely
to ``get O'Daniel off of his back'' and that he had not
actually spoken to Clinton.\864\ Given Young's claim to have
lied in order to deflect questions from O'Daniel, it is odd
that O'Daniel did not even recall the supposed lie. Instead,
O'Daniel said that he did not know whether Young ever spoke
directly to Roger.\865\ After he told O'Daniel that he was not
going to use Clinton, Young heard back from Burkhalter.\866\
Burkhalter had spoken with Roger Clinton, who told him it was
too late to help Young obtain a pardon.\867\ Carey Young
confirmed this aspect of his brother's story, saying he had a
total of two discussions with Burkhalter about the pardon: one
to ask him to contact Roger Clinton and one in which Burkhalter
reported Clinton's answer that it was too late.\868\ Carey
Young also insisted that there was no mention of money during
either of these conversations.\869\ John Burkhalter likewise
said he never discussed money with Roger Clinton, Carey Young,
or Phillip Young in connection with Clinton's possible
assistance.\870\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\859\ Telephone Interview with Phillip Young (Apr. 26, 2001).
\860\ Id.
\861\ Id.
\862\ Id.
\863\ Id.
\864\ Id.
\865\ Telephone Interview with Gene O'Daniel, former Counsel for
Phillip Young (Mar. 29, 2001).
\866\ Telephone Interview with Phillip Young (Apr. 26, 2001).
\867\ Id.
\868\ Telephone Interview with Carey Young (Apr. 30, 2001).
\869\ Id.
\870\ Telephone Interview with John Burkhalter (May 8, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
O'Daniel's and Young's accounts of their conversations
about Roger Clinton are fundamentally incompatible. While both
agreed that Young mentioned the possibility of enlisting Roger
Clinton's help through an unnamed intermediary (presumably
Burkhalter), they disagreed about the crucial facts regarding
discussions of a fee. O'Daniel provided a more detailed account
about an initial price of $30,000, which was rejected and then
discounted to $15,000. Also O'Daniel clearly understood the
price to have originated with either Roger Clinton or the
intermediary rather than with Young. O'Daniel was certain on
this point because, he said, Young told him that the
intermediary had asked Roger whether he could ``guarantee''
that if Young paid the money that he would get the pardon.\871\
Roger reportedly said ``no,'' and then Young refused to
pay.\872\ In Young's account, no amount of money was ever
discussed with anyone other than in speculation with his
brother. Carey Young supports his brother's account, saying
that he and his brother had conversations about whether they
might have to pay Roger Clinton a ``lobbying fee.'' \873\ He
said they did guess at some numbers but could not recall the
numbers.\874\ However, Carey Young could not corroborate his
brother's version of the conversations with his attorney. When
asked if his brother had ever discussed conversations with his
lawyer, Young said he had not.\875\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\871\ Telephone Interview with Gene O'Daniel, former Counsel for
Phillip Young (Mar. 29, 2001).
\872\ Id.
\873\ Telephone Interview with Carey Young (Apr. 30, 2001).
\874\ Id.
\875\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
O'Daniel's understanding of what his client had said led
him to report the matter to the Office of the Pardon Attorney.
He said he felt an ethical obligation to inform the Justice
Department and that he was also trying to protect his
client.\876\ He didn't want Young to get into more trouble or
to have the application denied because of Roger Clinton.\877\
Sometime in January 2001, O'Daniel called Sam Morison in the
Pardon Attorney's Office and told him that there were people
trying to sell pardons and were using Roger Clinton's
name.\878\ Morison replied that he was aware that people were
trying to get around the Justice Department and go directly to
the White House.\879\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\876\ Telephone Interview with Gene O'Daniel, former Counsel for
Phillip Young (Mar. 29, 2001).
\877\ Id.
\878\ Id.
\879\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phillip Young did receive a pardon from President Clinton.
There is no evidence, however, that Roger Clinton actually
intervened in the Young case. Rather, Associate White House
Counsel Meredith Cabe recalls that the Justice Department
recommended denial of Young's pardon request but that President
Clinton granted it because it seemed like a minor offense.\880\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\880\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan
Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan was sentenced to three years
imprisonment in July 1984 on charges of possession with intent
to distribute four and a half pounds of cocaine.\881\ While in
prison, McKernan met and became friends with Roger
Clinton.\882\ McKernan served one year of his three-year
sentence and was paroled.\883\ He had become such close friends
with Clinton that, after being released, they continued to
speak by phone on a weekly basis.\884\ McKernan even attended
Clinton's wedding.\885\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\881\ Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan Document Production (Petition for
Pardon, July 10, 1998) (Exhibit 114).
\882\ Telephone Interview with Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan (Apr. 10,
2001).
\883\ Id.
\884\ Id.
\885\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1995, McKernan received a Louisiana state pardon, and in
1998, petitioned for a federal pardon. McKernan argued that he
deserved a pardon because he had turned his life around and his
criminal record negatively impacted his ability to become a
lawyer or own a firearm.
McKernan said he did not discuss his pardon application
with Roger Clinton when he filed it. Later though, he did
discuss it with Roger, and Roger said he would urge his brother
to grant it. Although Clinton also told McKernan that he would
``get Bill Clinton to look at it,'' McKernan said he did not
give Roger Clinton a copy of the petition.\886\ McKernan said
he asked Roger Clinton about the application on a number of
occasions, and Roger told him the pardon would likely be
granted at the end of the administration.\887\ McKernan said
that Roger never gave him any assurance that the pardon would
be granted but said he thought that McKernan had ``a good
shot'' because he was an ``ideal candidate.'' \888\ On initial
inspection, it does appear that McKernan fit the profile that
President Clinton had outlined to the White House Counsel's
Office for the type of cases that he most wanted to review for
potential pardons: non-violent drug offenders ``who had
convictions from an abuse problem and who had kicked the habit
and had been clean since then.'' \889\ Yet despite his
friendship with Roger Clinton and despite fitting the profile
the President was interested in pardoning, McKernan's petition
was denied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\886\ Id.
\887\ Id.
\888\ Id.
\889\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the last day of the Clinton Administration, when the
list of those pardoned was released to the media, McKernan
learned that he did not receive a pardon.\890\ According to
McKernan, he spoke to Roger Clinton twice that day about
whether he had received a pardon.\891\ Phone records confirm
that Roger Clinton placed two calls to McKernan on January 20,
2001, each lasting 11 minutes.\892\ The records also indicate
that, in between these two contacts with McKernan, Clinton
twice called former President Clinton's number in Chappaqua,
New York.\893\ The first call to McKernan occurred at 8:02
p.m.\894\ During this conversation, McKernan asked whether he
had received a pardon.\895\ Roger said that ``it doesn't look
good'' but that he would check.\896\ Immediately after ending
the call to McKernan, Roger Clinton called his brother's number
at 8:13 p.m. for two minutes. Roger later called Bill Clinton's
number again at 11:06 p.m. for one minute. At 11:07 p.m., Roger
called McKernan for the second time.\897\ Roger told McKernan
that McKernan's pardon had been signed and that it was the only
one among those Roger had requested that was granted.\898\
According to McKernan, Clinton said, ``I don't want to get your
hopes up, but I was told that yours was signed.'' \899\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\890\ Telephone Interview with Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan (Apr. 10,
2001).
\891\ Id.
\892\ Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Feb.
1, 2001, at 9).
\893\ Id.
\894\ Id.
\895\ Telephone Interview with Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan (Apr. 10,
2001).
\896\ Id.
\897\ Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Feb.
1, 2001, at 9).
\898\ Telephone Interview with Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan (Apr. 10,
2001).
\899\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The next business day, January 22, 2001, Richard Crane,
McKernan's lawyer, contacted Hope McGowan at the Pardon
Attorney's Office and told her what Roger had said.\900\ He
asked if there could be some kind of clerical error or mistake
that could have improperly kept McKernan's name off the public
list of pardons issued by President Clinton.\901\ McGowan told
Crane that Meredith Cabe was the person handling pardons at the
White House Counsel's Office and she would know for
certain.\902\ Crane said his sense was that McGowan ``didn't
care enough about the issue to even write it down,'' and
therefore, he was surprised to see his contact written about in
the newspapers.\903\ Contrary to what Roger Clinton had told
McKernan, the President had not granted his clemency request.
Because Roger Clinton refused to cooperate with the Committee's
investigation, it is unclear why Roger Clinton believed that
President Clinton had granted the McKernan pardon. There is
strong circumstantial evidence, though, that the President
himself told Roger that he had granted the McKernan pardon. It
is unclear why the President would do this. The case of
Mitchell Wood, as described below, offers one plausible theory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\900\ Id.
\901\ Id.
\902\ Id.
\903\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Mitchell Wood
The Mitchell Wood story is the opposite of the Jay McKernan
story. While McKernan's pardon was supposedly granted but never
actually issued, Wood's pardon was issued unexpectedly. In
December 1986, Mitchell Wood pled guilty and was sentenced to
four months in prison on cocaine charges resulting from the
investigation of Dan Lasater, David Collins, George Locke, and
Roger Clinton.\904\ Wood was an employee of the Arkansas
Industrial Development Commission who said he had obtained
cocaine from Lasater, Collins, and Clinton, but never sold
it.\905\ At his sentencing, Wood told the judge that he had
already ``overcome a cocaine habit about two and a half years
ago. He also said he had nearly paid off heavy debts he
incurred because of his habit and had returned to normal
health.'' \906\ The sentencing judge said ``he believed Wood
`has learned his lesson,' but said that `some imprisonment'
should be imposed `if fairness all around is to be achieved.'
'' \907\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\904\ George Wells, More Sentenced in Lasater Case, Arkansas
Democrat-Gazette, Dec. 23, 1986.
\905\ Id.
\906\ Id.
\907\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wood informed the Committee that, after his imprisonment,
he underwent a major lifestyle change. Impressed by this
change, his friends, and even his probation officer, encouraged
Wood to seek a pardon.\908\ Wood applied for a pardon through
the Justice Department in December 1995 but was denied by
President Clinton on December 28, 1998.\909\ It is unclear how
or why the Wood case came to be considered a second time
despite having already been rejected by the President once
before. When interviewed by Committee staff, Meredith Cabe
indicated that the Justice Department had recommended against
granting clemency to Wood but that his ``was the type of case
the President would want to consider.'' \910\ Cabe indicated
that the President wanted to review the Wood case despite the
Justice Department's negative recommendation.\911\ Cabe
recalled that Wood's conviction was ``at the same time as Roger
Clinton's'' but was apparently unaware that Wood had admitted
to actually receiving cocaine from Clinton.\912\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\908\ Telephone Interview with Mitchell Wood (Apr. 4, 2001).
\909\ Fax from Dave Blake, Office of Legislative Affairs,
Department of Justice, to James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on
Govt. Reform 8 (Feb. 15, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\910\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\911\ Id.
\912\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wood stated that he never asked for help from Roger
Clinton, Dan Lasater, or George Locke in obtaining the
pardon.\913\ Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe stated
that she had no indication that Clinton had lobbied for Wood's
pardon.\914\ Likewise, none of the documents reviewed and none
of the witnesses questioned in the Committee's investigation
provide any indication that Roger Clinton lobbied for Mitchell
Wood's pardon. Dan Lasater said he had not seen Mitchell Wood
in 10 to 15 years.\915\ According to George Locke, who
described himself as a close friend of Wood's, he ``thought
that he had been denied and was surprised to hear the news that
he had been pardoned.'' \916\ Locke also said, however, that he
had never discussed Wood's pardon request with Roger
Clinton.\917\ Wood himself was surprised and baffled that his
petition was granted after having been previously denied. He
said, ``I have no earthly idea how it happened. I didn't know
anybody. I'm just blessed[.]'' \918\
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\913\ Telephone Interview with Mitchell Wood (Apr. 4, 2001).
\914\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\915\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001).
\916\ Telephone Interview with George Locke (Mar. 27, 2001).
\917\ Id.
\918\ Brian Blomquist, Pardon Probe: Clinton Library Books Will Be
Checked Out, N.Y. Post, Feb. 10, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The McKernan and Wood cases present a decidedly odd
coincidence. The cases are similar in that both men knew Roger
Clinton around the time of his conviction and both were non-
violent drug offenders. Yet, McKernan received an unexpected
denial after being informed that the President had granted his
petition, and Wood received an unexpected pardon after an
initial denial. While no final conclusion can be drawn from
this coincidence, it suggests a possibility that perhaps there
was some miscommunication about the precise identity of Roger
Clinton's old friend with the non-violent drug conviction. It
is also possible that President Clinton granted a pardon to
Mitchell Wood when, in fact, he intended to grant a pardon to
Joseph McKernan. Without the complete cooperation of Roger
Clinton and officials from the Clinton Administration, however,
the truth about what exactly happened in these two cases
remains in question.
J. Mark St. Pe
On January 2, 2001, Mark St. Pe's lawyer, Walter Wiggins,
transmitted a letter to Roger Clinton addressed to him at the
White House Usher's Office. The letter states:
As we have discussed previously, the case of Mark St.
Pe is a sympathetic one for the reasons outlined
exhaustively in the materials transmitted herewith for
your immediate review and consideration. Please bring
this case to the attention of your brother, Bill
Clinton, the President of the United States. This is
truly an opportunity for you to have a direct impact in
the cause of justice for Mr. St. Pe.\919\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\919\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Walter F. Wiggins, Jr.,
Counsel for Mark St. Pe, to Roger Clinton (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit
115).
Wiggins told Committee staff he was both a ``friend of a
friend'' of Mark St. Pe and a friend of Roger Clinton.\920\
According to Wiggins, however, Clinton and St. Pe did not know
each other.\921\ Wiggins said he submitted St. Pe's clemency
application to the Justice Department at the same time that he
gave it to Roger Clinton, in January 2001.\922\ In addition to
the clemency application, Wiggins had been in contact with the
U.S. Attorney in Little Rock in an attempt to reduce St. Pe's
sentence (St. Pe is from Louisiana but is currently imprisoned
in Forrest City, Arkansas).\923\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\920\ Telephone Interview with Walter F. Wiggins, Jr., Attorney for
Mark St. Pe (June 12, 2001).
\921\ Id.
\922\ Id.
\923\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wiggins said he contacted Roger Clinton because he was
exploring all possible avenues to obtain clemency for St.
Pe.\924\ He said he turned to Roger as an obvious way of
getting attention for the clemency petition.\925\ Wiggins had
not heard that Roger was presenting other clemency petitions to
the President but assumed that Roger would have been doing
so.\926\ Wiggins said that there was absolutely no monetary
inducement of any kind for Roger Clinton to help St. Pe and
that Roger did whatever he did out of friendship with
Wiggins.\927\ Wiggins agreed to cooperate with the Committee
and offered to send a copy of St. Pe's clemency petition to the
Committee.\928\ Wiggins did not, however, actually send any
documents despite several follow-up phone calls attempting to
arrange for their production to the Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\924\ Id.
\925\ Id.
\926\ Id.
\927\ Id.
\928\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wiggins sent a copy of St. Pe's commutation petition to
Roger Clinton at the White House. While the Committee is unable
to conclude definitively what happened in the St. Pe case, it
appears that Roger Clinton provided materials on the St. Pe
case to President Clinton. The National Archives produced to
the Committee a copy of the envelope Wiggins used to send the
St. Pe clemency petition to Roger Clinton at the White
House.\929\ Under the address, in what appears to be the
President's handwriting, there is a note stating ``To M Cabe.''
\930\ This note, if it is indeed in the President's
handwriting, would indicate that Roger Clinton provided the St.
Pe petition to President Clinton, who then provided it to
Meredith Cabe for review. However, what happened after that
point is unknown. It is unclear how seriously the St. Pe
petition was considered. However, it was ultimately denied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\929\ NARA Document Production (Envelope from Walter Wiggins to
Roger Clinton) (Exhibit 116).
\930\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
K. William D. McCord
When Dan Lasater was convicted on cocaine distribution
charges, his Little Rock bond company was taken over and
renamed by William D. McCord.\931\ George Locke, co-conspirator
in the Lasater cocaine distribution ring, is McCord's father-
in-law.\932\ In 1995, McCord was convicted on federal gambling
charges, pled guilty, and received probation.\933\ The National
Archives produced to the Committee a handwritten cover page
reading: ``Meredith Cabe, William Doyne McCord, Petition for
Pardon'' in the midst of other Roger Clinton- and clemency-
related documents from the files of the Clinton White
House.\934\ However, the National Archives did not produce an
actual petition for clemency. Because of its placement in the
files, this cover page suggests that the consideration of
McCord's petition had some relationship to Roger Clinton.
Moreover, the Committee received an uncorroborated allegation
that George Locke believed McCord had paid Roger Clinton
$10,000 in late 2000 or early 2001 in exchange for Clinton's
help with his clemency petition. While Clinton's bank records
do indicate several large cash deposits in that time frame,
McCord denied that he paid Roger Clinton any money.\935\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\931\ Julian E. Barnes, McCord Admits He Helped Run Gambling House,
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, May 2, 1995.
\932\ Telephone Interview with William D. McCord (Feb. 27, 2002).
\933\ Id.
\934\ NARA Document Production (McCord Petition Cover Page)
(Exhibit 117).
\935\ Telephone Interview with William D. McCord (Feb. 27, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
McCord sent a petition to the Justice Department's Pardon
Attorney in early 1999.\936\ He also sent one to the White
House at some point but could not recall when or to whom he
directed it.\937\ McCord completed and filed the forms himself
with some informal help from his probation officer and a friend
who is an attorney.\938\ McCord said he met Roger Clinton 25
years ago when he had a box next to Clinton's mother's at the
Oaklawn Park race track.\939\ However, now they are merely
casual acquaintances.\940\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\936\ Id.
\937\ Id.
\938\ Id.
\939\ Id.
\940\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When asked about his most recent contacts with Roger
Clinton, McCord recalled that they had met by chance at a Hot
Springs Golf Tournament sometime after McCord had filed his
clemency petition.\941\ Around the same time, McCord also had a
drink with Clinton at a restaurant in Hot Springs.\942\ He was
uncertain, but McCord thought he may have discussed his pardon
petition with Clinton briefly during one of these
meetings.\943\ McCord said that he ``may have'' asked if Roger
could help him but claimed that he could not remember Clinton's
reply.\944\ He said Clinton ``didn't offer any favors'' and
that he left with the impression that Clinton would not be
assisting him.\945\ Asked explicitly whether he had paid anyone
any money in connection with seeking a pardon, McCord said,
``no.'' \946\ He also said that no one asked for money for
anything else of value to help him obtain a pardon.\947\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\941\ Id.
\942\ Id.
\943\ Id.
\944\ Id.
\945\ Id.
\946\ Id.
\947\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
McCord did admit to discussing his petition with George
Locke, who was also seeking a pardon. McCord said Locke asked
him for a copy of McCord's application on more than one
occasion, ostensibly so that Locke could use it to learn by
comparison how to complete his own application.\948\ However,
McCord maintained that he did not ask for help from Locke
because he knew that, after his conviction, ``Locke had lost
all his contacts.'' \949\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\948\ Id. Locke made a similar request for a copy of Dan Lasater's
petition as well. Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001).
\949\ Telephone Interview with William D. McCord (Feb. 27, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE ROGER CLINTON
INVESTIGATION
A. Roger Clinton
Roger Clinton was at the center of a number of allegations
investigated by the Committee. Early in the Committee's
investigation, Chairman Burton requested that Roger Clinton
participate in an interview with Committee staff, but he
declined.\950\ When Committee staff discussed with Clinton's
attorney, Bart Williams, the possibility that Clinton would be
called to testify before the Committee, Williams stated that it
was likely that Clinton would invoke his Fifth Amendment rights
if called to testify. Despite his unwillingness to speak to
Committee staff, Roger Clinton used his access to the media to
deceive the public about matters the Committee was
investigating by appearing on Larry King Live and making
several false statements. Clinton did, however, comply with a
number of document subpoenas served upon him by the Committee.
However, Clinton's refusal to provide testimony to the
Committee voluntarily regarding his efforts to obtain pardons
for his friends and associates has hampered the Committee's
investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\950\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Roger C. Clinton (Mar. 13, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, on March 23, 2001, while the Committee was
attempting to obtain the cooperation of Roger Clinton, he
received a wire transfer of $15,000 from a Citibank account
entitled ``E.C. 934(A) c/o Eric Hothem.'' \951\ Eric Hothem was
an aide to First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton. When contacted
about this transfer, Hothem's lawyer referred the Committee to
the President's lawyer, David Kendall.\952\ The Chairman then
sought from Mr. Kendall an explanation of the account and the
transfer.\953\ According to Kendall's reply: ``The account is a
personal Citibank account of former President and Senator
Clinton. The transfer you inquire about was a loan by President
Clinton to his brother so that he might retain counsel to
represent him in the Committee's and other investigations.''
\954\ It is unclear whether Roger Clinton has repaid or intends
to repay the money.\955\ The payment occurred at the height of
public outcry and investigative activity regarding the pardons
and at a time when Roger Clinton was deciding whether to
provide testimony to the Committee and to authorities in the
Southern District of New York. The media also reported that
Roger Clinton had fought bitterly with his brother about the
denial of his clemency requests. It is unknown whether Roger
Clinton's acceptance of $15,000 for his legal fees from his
brother made him any less likely to provide testimony adverse
to his brother to the Committee or to law enforcement agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\951\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to David E. Kendall, Counsel for Bill and Hillary
Clinton, Williams & Connolly, Attachment #1 (July 30, 2001) (within
Appendix I).
\952\ Id. at 1.
\953\ Id.
\954\ Letter from David E. Kendall, Counsel for Bill and Hillary
Clinton, Williams & Connolly, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel,
Comm. on Govt. Reform (Aug. 20, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\955\ Records indicate that shortly after the wire transfer, Roger
Clinton paid his attorney only $10,000 as a retainer, not $15,000. Bank
of America Document Production (Exhibit 118).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Tommaso Gambino
When the Committee discovered that Tommaso Gambino had a
financial relationship with Roger Clinton, and that Clinton had
tried to obtain a commutation for his father, Rosario Gambino,
the Committee attempted to interview Tommaso Gambino. Gambino
refused to participate in an interview. Gambino did, however,
comply with a document subpoena.
C. Lisa Gambino
Committee staff attempted to interview Lisa Gambino about
her role in providing $227,889 to Anna Gambino, funds which
were used to provide at least $50,000 to Roger Clinton. Ms.
Gambino refused to respond to repeated requests for an
interview.
D. Victoria Crawford and Kathy Vieth
Victoria Crawford is Roger Clinton's manager and
bookkeeper. Because Crawford managed Clinton's money, and
apparently his travel as well, the Committee attempted to
interview Crawford. Crawford refused to participate in an
interview. Then, the Committee issued subpoenas to Crawford and
her company, Crawford Management.\956\ Upon receiving this
subpoena, Crawford and her partner, Kathy Vieth, invoked their
Fifth Amendment rights rather than comply with the Committee's
subpoena.\957\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\956\ Subpoena duces tecum to Victoria Crawford (Aug. 29, 2001)
(within Appendix II); Subpoena duces tecum to Crawford Management (Aug.
29, 2001) (within Appendix II).
\957\ Letter from Bruce F. Black, Counsel for Vicki Crawford and
Kathy Vieth, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform
(Sept. 6, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. George Locke
After learning of George Locke's involvement in trying to
obtain pardons through Roger Clinton, Committee staff
interviewed Locke. Locke participated in an hour-long telephone
interview on March 27, 2001. Locke also responded to a request
for documents by informing the Committee that he had no
responsive documents.\958\ However, after his interview with
Committee staff, Locke retained a lawyer (the same lawyer
representing Dickey Morton) and invoked his Fifth Amendment
rights rather than cooperate further with the Committee.\959\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\958\ Letter from George Locke to the Honorable Dan Burton,
Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (received Apr. 9, 2001) (within
Appendix I).
\959\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and
George Locke, Hampton and Larkowski, to the Honorable Dan Burton,
Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 3, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. Dickey Morton
Shortly after interviewing George Locke, Committee staff
attempted to interview Dickey Morton.\960\ Morton refused to
participate in an interview and invoked his Fifth Amendment
rights against self-incrimination.\961\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\960\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Dickey Morton (Mar. 14, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\961\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and
George Locke, Hampton and Larkowski, to the Honorable Dan Burton,
Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 3, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. Richard Cayce
When the Committee learned of Richard Cayce's central role
in the Lincecum matter, Committee staff attempted to interview
Cayce. However, Cayce's attorney, Jay Ethington, informed the
Committee that Cayce would not participate in a voluntary
interview and would assert his Fifth Amendment rights if
subpoenaed to testify.\962\ Cayce did provide the Committee
with a proffer detailing his potential testimony if he were
immunized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\962\ Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to
David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. J.T. Lundy
Committee staff attempted to interview J.T. Lundy regarding
his efforts to obtain a pardon through Roger Clinton. Lundy is
currently in federal prison, so Committee staff attempted to
arrange an interview through Lundy's attorney, David McGee. Mr.
McGee informed Committee staff, though, that Mr. Lundy would
invoke his Fifth Amendment rights rather than cooperate with
the Committee.
I. Robert Lundy
Committee staff also attempted to interview Robert Lundy,
the son of J.T. Lundy. Robert Lundy was also involved in the
effort to obtain a pardon for J.T. Lundy. However, David McGee,
who also represented Robert Lundy, informed the Committee that
Mr. Lundy would invoke his Fifth Amendment rights rather than
cooperate with the Committee.
J. Chief Carl Griggs
As part of its investigation of Roger Clinton's efforts to
obtain a commutation for Steven Griggs, the Committee attempted
to interview Chief Carl Griggs, Steven Griggs' father. Chief
Griggs' attorney, Gary Krupkin, initially indicated a
willingness to allow the Chief to participate in an interview.
However, when Committee staff attempted to schedule the
interview, Krupkin expressed concern about allowing the Chief
to participate in an interview while the criminal investigation
of Roger Clinton was pending. Accordingly, Chief Griggs refused
to participate in an interview with Committee staff.
K. Blume Loe and Cynthia Goosen
When the Committee learned of Blume Loe's request that
Roger Clinton help him obtain a pardon, the Committee attempted
to arrange an interview of Loe and his attorney, Cynthia
Goosen.\963\ According to documents obtained from Roger
Clinton, Goosen may have had contact with Roger Clinton about
the Blume Loe pardon request. However, Goosen refused to
participate in an interview with Committee staff, citing
attorney-client privilege.\964\ Goosen made this claim despite
the fact that much of the information sought by the Committee,
for example, her contacts with Roger Clinton, would not be
covered by the attorney-client privilege.\965\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\963\ Letter from David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Cynthia S. Goosen, Cooper & Scully (May 14, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
\964\ Letter from Cynthia S. Goosen, Cooper & Scully, to David A.
Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 22, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
\965\ Letter from David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Cynthia S. Goosen, Cooper & Scully (May 30, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
L. Bruce Lindsey
Bruce Lindsey testified at a Committee hearing on March 1,
2001, regarding the Marc Rich pardon. After the hearing, the
Committee discovered that Roger Clinton had lobbied for parole
and executive clemency for Rosario Gambino. It appears that
Roger Clinton had contacts with Lindsey on the parole matter
and perhaps on the clemency request as well. Accordingly, the
Committee asked Lindsey to participate in an interview with
Committee staff regarding his role in the Gambino matter.
Through his attorney, William Murphy, Lindsey informed the
Committee that he would not participate in the requested
interview.
M. Meredith Cabe
Meredith Cabe participated in a voluntary interview with
Committee staff on March 16, 2001. However, after the
interview, Committee staff learned of Roger Clinton's role in
the Gambino matter. The evidence obtained by the Committee
indicated that Cabe handled Gambino's clemency request at the
White House. Therefore, Committee staff requested a new
interview with Cabe. However, the Committee was informed by
Cabe's attorney, William Murphy, that Cabe would not
participate in an interview with Committee staff regarding the
Gambino matter.
N. Department of Justice
The Department of Justice initially provided the Committee
with records regarding two investigative matters related to
Roger Clinton: first, records relating to the FBI's
investigation of the effort to force John Katopodis to hire
Clinton; and second, records relating to the FBI's
investigation of Roger Clinton's relationship with the Gambino
family. However, after providing the Committee with hundreds of
pages relating to the Gambino matter, including sensitive
Parole Commission files and the summary of Roger Clinton's
interview with the FBI, the Justice Department suddenly stopped
producing Gambino records to the Committee. The only reason the
Justice Department gave for its decision was concern that
Congressional access to the records would jeopardize the
Department's ongoing criminal investigation of Roger Clinton.
However, the records sought by the Committee related to the
1999 and 2000 investigation of Clinton and Gambino which was
reportedly closed in 2000, not the Southern District of New
York's investigation, which was commenced in 2001. The refusal
of the Justice Department to provide these records prevented
the Committee from developing any true understanding of the
reasons for the Department's failure to pursue criminal charges
against Roger Clinton.
O. The White House
Notwithstanding President Clinton's decision to refrain
from invoking a privilege, the Bush Administration refused to
provide the Committee with a number of key documents relating
to the clemency process in the Clinton White House. As
described previously, the only documents provided to the
Committee regarding the consideration of clemency requests at
the Clinton White House were produced by accident. Were it not
for this inadvertent production, the Committee would not have
had access to any documents at all from the Clinton White House
related to the Gambino commutation effort. Despite the
accidental production, the Bush Administration managed to
withhold four additional Clinton White House records related to
the Gambino commutation request.\966\ According to the National
Archives, these four records contain internal White House
deliberations regarding the Gambino matter.\967\ These records
would potentially inform the Committee about how seriously the
Gambino commutation was considered and why it was ultimately
rejected. The Bush Administration's decision to withhold these
records from the Committee is deeply troubling. In effect, it
is keeping Congress and the American public from learning the
full truth about the efforts of a major organized crime figure
to obtain executive clemency through the paid efforts of
President Clinton's brother.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\966\ See Letter from Gary M. Stern, General Counsel, National
Archives and Records Administration, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief
Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Aug. 2, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\967\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Exhibits referred to follow:]