[House Report 107-592]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
107th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 107-592
======================================================================
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003
_______
July 18, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 4628]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 4628) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2003 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose.......................................................... 10
Overall perspective on the intelligence budget and committee
intent......................................................... 11
Scope of committee review........................................ 11
Committee findings and recommendations........................... 12
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill as Reported.............. 22
Title I--Intelligence Activities............................. 22
Section 101--Authorization of Appropriations............. 22
Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations....... 23
Section 103--Personnel Ceiling Adjustments............... 23
Section 104--Community Management Account................ 23
Section 105--Authorization of emergency supplemental
appropriations for fiscal year 2002.................... 23
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System.......................................... 25
Section 201--Authorization of Appropriations............. 25
Title III--General Provisions................................ 25
Section 301--Increase in Employee Compensation and
Benefits Authorized by Law............................. 25
Section 302--Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence
Activities............................................. 25
Section 303--Sense of Congress on intelligence Community
Contracting............................................ 25
Section 304--Semiannual reports on financial intelligence
on terrorist assets (FITA)............................. 25
Section 305--Modification of excepted agency voluntary
leave transfer authority............................... 26
Section 306--Additional one-year suspension of
reorganization of Diplomatic Telecommunications Service
Program Office......................................... 26
Section 307--Prohibition on compliance with requests for
information submitted by foreign governments........... 27
Section 308--Cooperative relationship between the
National Security Education Program and the Foreign
Language Center of the Defense Language Institute...... 27
Section 309--Establishment of National Flagship Language
Initiative within the National Security Education
Program................................................ 28
Section 310--Deadline for submittal of various overdue
reports................................................ 30
Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency........................ 31
Section 401--Two-year extension of CIA Voluntary
Separation Program..................................... 31
Section 402--Prohibition on implementation of
Intelligence Community compensation reform plans....... 31
Title V--Department of Defense............................... 32
Section 501--Use of funds for counter-drug and counter-
terrorism activities for Colombia...................... 32
Section 502--Protection of operational files of the
National Reconnaissance Office......................... 32
Section 503--Eligibility of employees in intelligence
senior level positions for Presidential Rank Awards.... 33
Committee position............................................... 33
Oversight findings and recommendations........................... 33
Fiscal year cost projections..................................... 34
Congressional Budget Office estimates............................ 34
Committee cost estimates......................................... 38
Specific Constitutional authority for Congressional enactment of
this legislation............................................... 38
Changes to existing law.......................................... 38
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Authorization of emergency supplemental appropriations for
fiscal year 2002.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Sense of Congress on intelligence community contracting.
Sec. 304. Semiannual report on financial intelligence on terrorist
assets (FITA).
Sec. 305. Modification of excepted agency voluntary leave transfer
authority.
Sec. 306. Additional one-year suspension of reorganization of
Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office.
Sec. 307. Prohibition on compliance with requests for information
submitted by foreign governments.
Sec. 308. Cooperative relationship between the National Security
Education Program and the Foreign Language Center of the Defense
Language Institute.
Sec. 309. Establishment of National Flagship Language Initiative within
the National Security Education Program.
Sec. 310. Deadline for submittal of various overdue reports.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Two-year extension of Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary
Separation Pay Act.
Sec. 402. Prohibition on implementation of compensation reform plan.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 501. Use of funds for counter-drug and counterterrorism activities
for Colombia.
Sec. 502. Protection of operational files of the National
Reconnaissance Office.
Sec. 503. Eligibility of employees in intelligence senior level
positions for Presidential Rank Awards.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2003
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
(12) The Coast Guard.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2003, for the conduct of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4628 of the One
Hundred Seventh Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the
executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess
of the number authorized for fiscal year 2003 under section 102 when
the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions,
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian
personnel authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the
authority granted by this section.
SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of
Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2003 the sum of $176,179,000.
Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research
and Development Committee shall remain available until September 30,
2004.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Community
Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are
authorized 350 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2003. Personnel
serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Community
Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the
United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be
appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal
year 2003 such additional amounts as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section
102(a). Such additional amounts shall remain available until
September 30, 2004.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel
authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Community
Management Account as of September 30, 2003, there are hereby
authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of
that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2003 any
officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed
Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Community Management Account
from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed
on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or
member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less
than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by
the Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated
in subsection (a), $34,100,000 shall be available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds
provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2003, and
funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available
until September 30, 2004.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence
shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The
Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the
activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the
provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
SEC. 105. AUTHORIZATION OF EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2002.
(a) Authorization.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2002 under section 101 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-108) for the conduct of the
intelligence activities of elements of the United States Government
listed in such section are hereby increased, with respect to any such
authorized amount, by the amount by which appropriations pursuant to
such authorization were increased by the following:
(1) The Emergency Supplemental Act, 2002 (contained in
division B of Public Law 107-117), including section 304 of
such Act (115 Stat. 2300).
(2) An emergency supplemental appropriation in a supplemental
appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002 that is enacted after
May 1, 2002, amounts as are designated by Congress as an
emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2
U.S.C. 901(b)(2)(A)).
(b) Ratification.--For purposes of section 504 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any obligation or expenditure of
those amounts deemed to have been specifically authorized by the Act
referred to in subsection (a)(1) and by the supplemental appropriations
Act referred to in subsection (a)(2) is hereby ratified and confirmed.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2003 the sum of
$351,300,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of
the United States.
SEC. 303. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING.
It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence
should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence community,
whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United
States and consistent with operational and security concerns related to
the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound,
should competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the
procurement of products properly designated as having been made in the
United States.
SEC. 304. SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST
ASSETS (FITA).
(a) Semiannual Report.--
(1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``semiannual report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets
``Sec. 118. (a) Semiannual Report.--On a semiannual basis, the
Secretary of the Treasury (acting through the head of the Office of
Intelligence Support) shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees (as defined in subsection (c)) that fully
informs the committees concerning operations against terrorist
financial networks. Each such report shall include with respect to the
preceding six-month period--
``(1) the total number of asset seizures, designations, and
other actions against individuals or entities found to have
engaged in financial support of terrorism;
``(2) the total number of applications for asset seizure and
designations of individuals or entities suspected of having
engaged in financial support of terrorist activities, that were
granted, modified, or denied;
``(3) the total number of physical searches of offices,
residences, or financial records of individuals or entities
suspected of having engaged in financial support for terrorist
activity; and
``(4) whether the financial intelligence information seized
in these cases has been shared on a full and timely basis with
the all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United
States Government involved in intelligence activities
participating in the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Unit
(managed and coordinated by the Counterterrorism Center of the
Central Intelligence Agency).
``(b) Immediate Notification for Emergency Designation.--In the case
of a designation of an individual or entity, or the assets of an
individual or entity, as having been found to have engaged in terrorist
activities, the Secretary of the Treasury shall report such designation
within 24 hours of such a designation to the appropriate congressional
committees.
``(c) Definition.--In this section, the term `appropriate
congressional committees' means the following:
``(1) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Financial
Services of the House of Representatives.
``(2) The Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Appropriations, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the Senate.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents contained in
the first section of such Act is amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 117 the following new item:
``Sec. 118. Semiannual report on financial intelligence on terrorist
assets.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 501(f) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(f)) is amended by inserting before the
period the following: ``, and includes financial intelligence
activities''.
SEC. 305. MODIFICATION OF EXCEPTED AGENCY VOLUNTARY LEAVE TRANSFER
AUTHORITY.
(a) In General.--Section 6339 of title 5, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking subsection (b);
(2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (b); and
(3) by inserting after subsection (b) (as so redesignated by
paragraph (2)) the following:
``(c)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of subsection (b), the head of
an excepted agency may, at his sole discretion, by regulation establish
a program under which an individual employed in or under such excepted
agency may participate in a leave transfer program established under
the provisions of this subchapter outside of this section, including
provisions permitting the transfer of annual leave accrued or
accumulated by such employee to, or permitting such employee to receive
transferred leave from, an employee of any other agency (including
another excepted agency having a program under this subsection).
``(2) To the extent practicable and consistent with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods, any program established under
paragraph (1) shall be consistent with the provisions of this
subchapter outside of this section and with any regulations issued by
the Office of Personnel Management implementing this subchapter.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 6339 of such title is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) (as so redesignated by
subsection (a)(2)), by striking ``under this section'' and
inserting ``under this subsection''; and
(2) in subsection (d), by striking ``of Personnel
Management''.
SEC. 306. ADDITIONAL ONE-YEAR SUSPENSION OF REORGANIZATION OF
DIPLOMATIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROGRAM
OFFICE.
Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2002 (Public Law 107-108; 22 U.S.C. 7301 note; 115 Stat. 1401) is
amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``ONE-YEAR'' and inserting
``TWO-YEAR''; and
(2) in the text, by striking ``October 1, 2002'' and
inserting ``October 1, 2003''.
SEC. 307. PROHIBITION ON COMPLIANCE WITH REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION
SUBMITTED BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.
Section 552(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A) by inserting ``and except as provided
in subparagraph (E),'' after ``of this subsection,''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(E) An agency, or part of an agency, that is an element of the
intelligence community (as that term is defined in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) shall not make any
record available under this paragraph to--
``(i) any government entity, other than a State, territory,
commonwealth, or district of the United States, or any
subdivision thereof; or
``(ii) a representative of a government entity described in
clause (i).''.
SEC. 308. COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NATIONAL SECURITY
EDUCATION PROGRAM AND THE FOREIGN LANGUAGE CENTER
OF THE DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE.
Section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of
1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(h) Use of Awards To Attend the Foreign Language Center of the
Defense Language Institute.--(1) The Secretary shall provide for the
admission of award recipients to the Foreign Language Center of the
Defense Language Institute (hereinafter in this subsection referred to
as the `Center'). An award recipient may apply a portion of the
applicable scholarship or fellowship award for instruction at the
Center on a space-available basis as a Department of Defense sponsored
program to defray the additive instructional costs.
``(2) Except as the Secretary determines necessary, an award
recipient who receives instruction at the Center shall be subject to
the same regulations with respect to attendance, discipline, discharge,
and dismissal as apply to other persons attending the Center.
``(3) In this subsection, the term `award recipient' means an
undergraduate student who has been awarded a scholarship under
subsection (a)(1)(A) or a graduate student who has been a fellowship
under subsection (a)(1)(B) who--
``(A) is in good standing;
``(B) has completed all academic study in a foreign country,
as provided for under the scholarship or fellowship; and
``(C) would benefit from instruction provided at the
Center.''.
SEC. 309. ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL FLAGSHIP LANGUAGE INITIATIVE WITHIN
THE NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM.
(a) National Flagship Language Initiative.--
(1) Expansion of grant program authority.--Subsection (a)(1)
of section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security
Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended--
(A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph
(B)(ii);
(B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph
(C) and inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new
subparagraph:
``(D) awarding grants to institutions of higher
education to carry out a National Flagship Language
Initiative (described in subsection (i)).''.
(2) Provisions of national flagship language initiative.--
Such section, as amended by section 308, is further amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(i) National Flagship Language Initiative.--(1) Under the National
Flagship Language Initiative, institutions of higher learning shall
establish, operate, or improve activities designed to train students in
programs in a range of disciplines to achieve advanced levels of
proficiency in those foreign languages that the Secretary identifies as
being the most critical in the interests of the national security of
the United States.
``(2) An undergraduate student who has been awarded a scholarship
under subsection (a)(1)(A) or a graduate student who has been awarded a
fellowship under subsection (a)(1)(B) may participate in the activities
carried out under the National Flagship Language Initiative.
``(3) An institution of higher education that receives a grant
pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(D) shall give special consideration to
applicants who are employees of the Federal Government.
``(4) For purposes of this subsection, the Foreign Language Center of
the Defense Language Institute and any other educational institution
that provides training in foreign languages operated by the Department
of Defense or an agency in the intelligence community is deemed to be
an institution of higher education, and may carry out the types of
activities permitted under the National Flagship Language
Initiative.''.
(3) Waiver of funding allocation rules.--Subsection (a)(2) of
such section is amended by adding at the end the following
flush sentences:
``The funding allocation under this paragraph shall not apply
to grants under paragraph (1)(D) for the National Flagship
Language Initiative described in subsection (i). For the
authorization of appropriations for the National Flagship
Language Initiative, see section 811.''.
(4) Board requirement.--Section 803(d)(4) of such Act (50
U.S.C. 1904(d)(4)) is amended--
(A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph
(C);
(B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph
(D) and inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new
subparagraph:
``(E) which foreign languages are critical to the
national security interests of the United States for
purposes of section 802(a)(1)(D) (relating to grants
for the National Flagship Language Initiative).''.
(b) Funding.--The David L. Boren National Security Education Act of
1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``SEC. 811. ADDITIONAL ANNUAL AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
``(a) In General.--In addition to amounts that may be made available
to the Secretary under the National Security Education Trust Fund
(under section 804 of this Act) for a fiscal year, there is authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary for each fiscal year, beginning
with fiscal year 2003, $10,000,000, to carry out the grant program for
the National Flagship Language Initiative under section 802(a)(1)(D).
``(b) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Amounts appropriated
pursuant to the authorization under subsection (a) shall remain
available until expended.''.
SEC. 310. DEADLINE FOR SUBMITTAL OF VARIOUS OVERDUE REPORTS.
(a) Deadline.--The reports described in subsection (c) shall be
submitted to Congress not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(b) Noncompliance.--(1) If all the reports described in subsection
(c) are not submitted to Congress by the date specified in subsection
(a), amounts available to be obligated or expended after that date to
carry out the functions or duties of the following offices shall be
reduced by \1/3\:
(A) The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
(B) The Office of Community Management Staff.
(2) The reduction applicable under paragraph (1) shall not apply if
the Director of Central Intelligence certifies to Congress by the date
referred to in subsection (a) that all reports referred to in
subsection (c) have been submitted to Congress.
(c) Reports Described.--The reports referred to in subsection (a) are
reports mandated by law for which the Director of Central Intelligence
has sole or primary responsibility to prepare, or coordinate, and
submit to Congress which, as of the date of the enactment of this Act,
have not been submitted to Congress by the date mandated by law.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. TWO-YEAR EXTENSION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VOLUNTARY
SEPARATION PAY ACT.
Section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay
Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (f), by striking ``September 30, 2003'' and
inserting ``September 30, 2005''; and
(2) in subsection (i), by striking ``or 2003'' and inserting
``2003, 2004, or 2005''.
SEC. 402. PROHIBITION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPENSATION REFORM PLAN.
No plan by the Director of Central Intelligence that would revise the
manner in which employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, or
employees of other elements of the United States Government that
conduct intelligence and intelligence-related activities, are
compensated may be implemented until the plan has been specifically
authorized by statute.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. USE OF FUNDS FOR COUNTER-DRUG AND COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITIES
FOR COLOMBIA.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds designated for
intelligence or intelligence-related purposes for assistance to the
Government of Colombia for counter-drug activities for fiscal years
2002 and 2003, and any unobligated funds available to any element of
the intelligence community for such activities for a prior fiscal year,
shall be available to support a unified campaign against narcotics
trafficking and against activities by organizations designated as
terrorist organizations (such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)), and to take actions to protect
human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, including
undertaking rescue operations.
SEC. 502. PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES OF THE NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 105C (50
U.S.C. 403-5c) the following new section:
``protection of operational files of the national reconnaissance office
``Sec. 105D. (a) Exemption of Certain Operational Files From Search,
Review, Publication, or Disclosure.--(1) The Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office, with the coordination of the Director of Central
Intelligence, may exempt operational files of the National
Reconnaissance Office from the provisions of section 552 of title 5,
United States Code, which require publication, disclosure, search, or
review in connection therewith.
``(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), for the purposes of this
section, the term `operational files' means files of the National
Reconnaissance Office (hereafter in this section referred to as `NRO')
that document the means by which foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence is collected through scientific and technical
systems.
``(B) Files which are the sole repository of disseminated
intelligence are not operational files.
``(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), exempted operational files shall
continue to be subject to search and review for information
concerning--
``(A) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for
permanent residence who have requested information on
themselves pursuant to the provisions of section 552 or 552a of
title 5, United States Code;
``(B) any special activity the existence of which is not
exempt from disclosure under the provisions of section 552 of
title 5, United States Code; or
``(C) the specific subject matter of an investigation by any
of the following for any impropriety, or violation of law,
Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the conduct of
an intelligence activity:
``(i) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives.
``(ii) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate.
``(iii) The Intelligence Oversight Board.
``(iv) The Department of Justice.
``(v) The Office of General Counsel of NRO.
``(vi) The Office of the Director of NRO.
``(4)(A) Files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) which
contain information derived or disseminated from exempted operational
files shall be subject to search and review.
``(B) The inclusion of information from exempted operational files in
files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) shall not affect the
exemption under paragraph (1) of the originating operational files from
search, review, publication, or disclosure.
``(C) The declassification of some of the information contained in
exempted operational files shall not affect the status of the
operational file as being exempt from search, review, publication, or
disclosure.
``(D) Records from exempted operational files which have been
disseminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted under
paragraph (1) and which have been returned to exempted operational
files for sole retention shall be subject to search and review.
``(5) The provisions of paragraph (1) may not be superseded except by
a provision of law which is enacted after the date of the enactment of
this section, and which specifically cites and repeals or modifies its
provisions.
``(6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), whenever any person
who has requested agency records under section 552 of title 5, United
States Code, alleges that NRO has withheld records improperly because
of failure to comply with any provision of this section, judicial
review shall be available under the terms set forth in section
552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code.
``(B) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner provided
for under subparagraph (A) as follows:
``(i) In any case in which information specifically
authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to
be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign
relations is filed with, or produced for, the court by NRO,
such information shall be examined ex parte, in camera by the
court.
``(ii) The court shall, to the fullest extent practicable,
determine the issues of fact based on sworn written submissions
of the parties.
``(iii) When a complainant alleges that requested records are
improperly withheld because of improper placement solely in
exempted operational files, the complainant shall support such
allegation with a sworn written submission based upon personal
knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence.
``(iv)(I) When a complainant alleges that requested records
were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of
operational files, NRO shall meet its burden under section
552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, by demonstrating
to the court by sworn written submission that exempted
operational files likely to contain responsible records
currently perform the functions set forth in paragraph (2).
``(II) The court may not order NRO to review the content of
any exempted operational file or files in order to make the
demonstration required under subclause (I), unless the
complainant disputes NRO's showing with a sworn written
submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise admissible
evidence.
``(v) In proceedings under clauses (iii) and (iv), the
parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through
36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that
requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and
36.
``(vi) If the court finds under this paragraph that NRO has
improperly withheld requested records because of failure to
comply with any provision of this subsection, the court shall
order NRO to search and review the appropriate exempted
operational file or files for the requested records and make
such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance with
the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code,
and such order shall be the exclusive remedy for failure to
comply with this subsection.
``(vii) If at any time following the filing of a complaint
pursuant to this paragraph NRO agrees to search the appropriate
exempted operational file or files for the requested records,
the court shall dismiss the claim based upon such complaint.
``(viii) Any information filed with, or produced for the
court pursuant to clauses (i) and (iv) shall be coordinated
with the Director of Central Intelligence prior to submission
to the court.
``(b) Decennial Review of Exempted Operational Files.--(1) Not less
than once every 10 years, the Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office and the Director of Central Intelligence shall review the
exemptions in force under subsection (a)(1) to determine whether such
exemptions may be removed from the category of exempted files or any
portion thereof. The Director of Central Intelligence must approve any
determination to remove such exemptions.
``(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include
consideration of the historical value or other public interest in the
subject matter of the particular category of files or portions thereof
and the potential for declassifying a significant part of the
information contained therein.
``(3) A complainant that alleges that NRO has improperly withheld
records because of failure to comply with this subsection may seek
judicial review in the district court of the United States of the
district in which any of the parties reside, or in the District of
Columbia. In such a proceeding, the court's review shall be limited to
determining the following:
``(A) Whether NRO has conducted the review required by
paragraph (1) before the expiration of the 10-year period
beginning on the date of the enactment of this section or
before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the
date of the most recent review.
``(B) Whether NRO, in fact, considered the criteria set forth
in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents contained in the first
section of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 105C the following new item:
``Sec. 105D. Protection of operational files of the National
Reconnaissance Office.''.
SEC. 503. ELIGIBILITY OF EMPLOYEES IN INTELLIGENCE SENIOR LEVEL
POSITIONS FOR PRESIDENTIAL RANK AWARDS.
Section 1607 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end the following new subsection:
``(c) Award of Rank to Employees in Intelligence Senior Level
Positions.--The President, based on the recommendations of the
Secretary of Defense, may award a rank referred to in section 4507a of
title 5 to employees in Intelligence Senior Level positions designated
under subsection (a). The award of such rank shall be made in a manner
consistent with the provisions of that section.''.
Purpose
The bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003 for
(a) the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the U.S. Government, (b) the Community
Management Account, and (c) the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30,
2003 for the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the U.S. Government and permit the
Director of Central Intelligence to authorize personnel
ceilings in Fiscal year 2003 for any intelligence
element up to two percent above the authorized levels,
with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget;
(3) Authorize intelligence and intelligence-related
activities funded within the FY 2002 Emergency
Supplemental Act and the FY 2002 Defense Department
Appropriations supplemental bill now under
Congressional consideration;
(4) Authorize $351.3 million for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund
(CIARDS) in order to fully fund the accruing cost of
retirement benefits for individuals in the Civil
Service Retirement System, CIARDS, and other federal
retirement systems;
(5) Establish an ongoing notification procedure with
respect to Financial Intelligence on Terrorist Assets
(FITA), so as to assure timely Congressional oversight
of national-security-related financial enforcement
actions by the executive branch;
(6) Amend U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(A), with respect to
elements of the Intelligence Community, by limiting the
application of this paragraph of the Freedom of
Information Act such that agencies would be prohibited
from complying with the requests of foreign governments
to make records available;
(7) Authorize $10 million for the National Security
Education Program to establish a National Flagship
Language Initiative whereby institutions of higher
learning would be awarded grants to establish, operate
or improve foreign language training programs that are
identified by the Secretary of Defense as most critical
to U.S. national security interests;
(8) Prohibit the implementation of any compensation
reform plan within the Intelligence Community until
such plans have been specifically authorized by
statute; and
(9) Authorize the use of funds designated for
intelligence and intelligence-related purposes for
assistance to the Government of Colombia for counter-
drug activities for fiscal year 2002 and 2003 to also
be used to fund counterterrorism activities in
Colombia.
Overall Perspective on the Intelligence Budget and Committee Intent
The classified annex to this public report includes the
classified Schedule of Authorizations and its associated
language. The committee views the classified Annex as an
integral part of this legislation. The classified Annex
contains a thorough discussion of all budget issues considered
by the committee, which underlies the funding authorization
found in the Schedule of Authorizations. The committee intends
that all intelligence programs discussed in the classified
Annex to this report be conducted in accord with the guidance
and limitations set forth as associated language therein. The
classified Schedule is incorporated directly into this
legislation by virtue of section 102 of the bill. The
classified Annex is available for review by all Members of the
House of Representatives, subject to the requirements of clause
13 of rule XXII of the House.
Scope of Committee Review
U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under
the jurisdiction of the committee include the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities (TIARA) and the Joint Military Intelligence
Program (JMIP) of the Department of Defense.
The NFIP consists of all programs of the Central
Intelligence Agency, as well as those national foreign
intelligence and/or counterintelligence programs conducted by:
(1) the Department of Defense; (2) the Defense Intelligence
Agency; (3) the National Security Agency; (4) the Departments
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (5) the Department of State;
(6) the Department of the Treasury; (7) the Department of
Energy; (8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (9) the
National Reconnaissance Office; and (10) the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency.
The Department of Defense TIARA are a diverse array of
reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a
functional part of the basic military force structure and
provide direct information support to military operations.
TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense, include those military intelligence
activities outside the General Defense Intelligence Program
that respond to the needs of military commanders for
operational support information, as well as to national
command, control, and intelligence requirements. The Armed
Services Committee in the House of Representatives has joint
oversight and authorizing jurisdiction of the programs
comprising TIARA.
The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated
program management of defense intelligence elements that
support defense-wide or theater-level consumers. Included
within JMIP are aggregations created for management efficiency
and characterized by similarity either in intelligence
discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery
Intelligence (IMINT)), or function (e.g., satellite support,
aerial reconnaissance). The following aggregations are included
in the JMIP: (1) the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP); (2) the
Defense Imagery and Mapping Program (DIMAP); (3) the Defense
General Intelligence Applications Program (DGIAP), which itself
includes (a) the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program
(DARP), (b) the Defense Intelligence Tactical Program (DITP),
(c) the Defense Intelligence Special Technologies Program
(DISTP), (d) the Defense Intelligence Counterdrug Program
(DICP), and (e) the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program
(DSRP). As with TIARA programs, the Armed Services Committee in
the House of Representatives has joint oversight and
authorizing jurisdiction of the programs comprising the JMIP.
Committee Findings and Recommendations
In the following several pages, the Committee highlights
areas of concern that it believes must be addressed with a high
priority by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), as the
leader of the Intelligence Community, and by administration if
intelligence sufficient to protect our national security is to
be provided. The Committee places particular emphasis on issues
that impact the Intelligence Community as a whole or that
involve several various programs.
The Committee notes that this is the first budget to be
compiled after the horrific events of September 11th. The
Committee wishes to acknowledge and thank all of the men and
women working in the Intelligence Community. Members have been
uniformly impressed during their travels, at home and abroad,
by the work being done by these individuals to further U.S.
goals, protect U.S. interests, enable policymakers, and reduce
the risk of future terrorist attacks. As is often noted, the
successes of the Intelligence Community normally go unnoticed,
for obvious and correct reasons, while ``failures'' seem to be
immediately brought into the public eye. Given its unique
position, the Committee wants to make sure that those
associated with the Intelligence Community know that the
successes that are happening every day at varying levels are
recognized and appreciated.
That said, the Committee is also uniquely positioned to
understand the ``failures.'' In any enterprise that involves
operations in a hostile environment, the risk of failure is
always present and must be accepted. In some cases, a failure
may be the result of a lack of risk taking or a lack of
adequate planning. In both cases, the question the Committee
must assess is whether the failures were avoidable. In the
context of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the Committee,
through the Joint Inquiry it is conducting, seeks to determine
whether there were avoidable failures and, if so, how they may
be prevented in the future.
The effects on our nation's intelligence resources by the
terrorist attacks are many and varied. On the one hand, the
terrorist attacks and the responses to them in the Global War
on Terrorism (GWOT) have justified the Committee's stated
belief that the need for intelligence during times of relative
``peace'' is as, if not more, important than in times of war,
and that strategic and tactical intelligence must have similar
emphasis. On the other hand, the attacks have also highlighted
the fact that our intelligence resources have been stretched
too thin, that the Community has analytical weaknesses, and
that the management decisions about those resources did not
take into account sufficiently the complexity and importance of
the growing threat from terrorism associated with Islamic
fundamentalism. Moreover, the lessons learned post-September
11th have, once again, emphasized the need for the Intelligence
Community to work as a whole, not as individual ``stove-piped''
agencies.
These observations are made as the basis for justification
for actions taken within this bill. These actions are taken not
only based on the events of September 11th, but also from the
extensive work that the Committee has done previously. The
Committee intends to focus on the future, but to do so the
Committee believes that the DCI and the Administration must
understand that the issues highlighted here must be addressed
quickly and thoroughly.
INVESTMENT--BUT IN AN OLD STRUCTURE
The Committee has repeatedly endorsed the need to invest
significantly in intelligence, lest the nation be confronted
with unexpected events. Such concerns, were reinforced on
several occasions prior to September 11th, including the
bombing of the U.S. embassy and Marinebarracks in Beirut, the
destruction of Pan Am 103, the ``surprise'' testing of nuclear weapons
by India and Pakistan that went undetected by U.S. intelligence. In the
past, the Committee has at least attempted to sustain funding for
intelligence, if not enhance funding where and when possible in an
attempt to preclude such future surprise. This year, the administration
has proposed substantial increases for intelligence. This is most
appropriate given the situation. Moreover, the indications are that the
administration understands that single-year investments are not as
effective as sustained significant funding over at least the next five-
to-ten years. The Committee is greatly encouraged by this apparent
commitment.
Unfortunately, however, these investments are being made
into an organizational framework that gives little indication
of being prepared to produce intelligence capabilities that can
address the national security demands of the future. Except for
significant efforts on the GWOT, most of the other investments
emphasize collection systems that are of questionable
flexibility compared to the needs, that underemphasize
analysis, language capabilities and other shortfalls, and that
continue a stove-pipe mentality of decision-making and
planning. Put simply, integrated intelligence operations and
community-wide information sharing are the exception rather
than the norm. Even the significant and inventive efforts on
the GWOT are being accomplished in somewhat of a vacuum, with
enormous amounts of resources being shifted to terrorism that
create gaps in coverage and understanding in other areas of
national security interest.
The Committee does not criticize the administration for the
size of the proposed investment. The Committee must emphasize,
however, that investment alone, without reorganization and/or
reform of some of the basic components and practices of the
Intelligence Community, will not provide effective national
intelligence capabilities. Therefore, although the Committee
endorses the President's request for a significant investment
in intelligence, it does so with reservation and notes that the
administration must, especially during this time of war,
evaluate and make necessary changes, including organizational,
to the Intelligence Community, lest we find ourselves surprised
in additional areas.
Moreover, as the Committee has consistently noted, some of
the needed changes to the Intelligence Community are likely to
be structural, in order for the DCI to better plan and manage
Community resources to ensure a balance of capabilities and
requirements. Although at the beginning of the 107th Congress,
the Committee intended to address significant structural
issues, the events of September 11th resulted in a decision to
postpone consideration of many potential changes. Reviews of
the terrorist attacks must come first, and are underway.
Notably, the interim report to the Speaker of the House from
the Committee's Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland
Security, is in preparation, and the review from the bicameral,
bi-partisan Joint Inquiry into September 11th is being
conducted by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees and a
report will follow later. It is the Committee's belief that
these reports will provide additional substantive basis and
rationale for changes that may be warranted. Moreover the
President's own review resulting from NSPD-5 will also aid in
assessing the nation's intelligence effectiveness and what
barriers impinge on that effectiveness. The Committee implores
the President, in particular, to receive the findings from the
NSPD-5 review and act upon them with expediency.
BUDGETING BY SUPPLEMENTAL
Having stated the need for investment, and the support for
the amounts in this year's request, the Committee must also
highlight a growing concern related to how the investment is
being requested.
Perhaps the most disturbing budgetary trend in the United
States Intelligence Community is its increasing reliance on
supplemental appropriations. In fairness, Congress began the
current round of supplemental largess with a $1.5 billion
intelligence supplemental funding bill in fiscal year 1999 in
order to try cover intelligence needs not being met through the
regular budget requests. The practice was continued in the wake
of the millennium terrorist threats, and sustained to address
the initial phases in the war on terrorism. However, in any
sustained ``crisis'' action, there comes a point where short-
term stopgap practices must be phased out and long-term
strategic plans put into place. This year's fiscal year 2002
budget supplemental is $1.694 billion.
The ``advantage'' of the supplemental appropriations
process to the Intelligence Community is that pressing
budgetary demands can be met in a shorter time (and with fewer
bureaucratic hurdles) than the regular yearly process. However,
by continuing to rely on supplemental appropriations year after
year, the Intelligence Community risks fostering a budget
process that is ripe for abuse and long-term funding gaps.
One potential complicating factor is the creation of the
Defense Emergency Response Fund (or DERF). The DERF was
originally created to pay for emergency items that arose due to
the war on terrorism. However, it has been increasingly obvious
that the DERF has turned into just another vehicle to fund
items that the Intelligence Community did not get through the
regular budget and planning process. In fact, the Committee
notes that, in the fiscal year 2003 request for the JMIP and
TIARA programs, some funding lines were duplicative of entries
in the fiscal year 2002 supplemental, and the DERF request for
fiscal year 2001 and 2003. The Committee does not believe the
DERF is an appropriate vehicle for Intelligence Community
funding, except perhaps for truly unforeseen emergency items.
A subtler, yet no less problematic set of issues arises
when programs are forced to rely on supplemental funding for
core mission support.
The Committee acknowledges that in the war on terrorism
plans will continue to be in a constant state of flux and
dollar amounts in spend plans are really just guesses that can
( and probably will) change day-to-day. But the apparent lack
of a long-term, strategic planning effort is troubling. This
presents a number of problems:
It is bad budget practice and bad government. By
failing to build the ``tail'' for these programs into
the Future Year Defense Program (to the extent
possible), the executive branch is perpetuating the
need for large, mid-stream supplemental infusions of
cash. The need for flexibility in the execution of funds
can and should be addressed rationally, and with an eye
towards better long-term planning.
Congressional oversight is minimized--creating the
potential for serious problems down the road. Given the
history of intelligence in the United States, an
erosion of robust, effective oversight could lead to
erosion in the integrity and credibility of the
Intelligence Community.
Finally, the committee believes that the supplemental
gravy train won't last--and without long term planning
and investment, the United States may be left with too
little to show for all of its spending on intelligence.
BACK TO BASICS--GLOBAL COVERAGE AND HUMINT
Of all of the lessons that should be learned in the wake of
September 11th, the importance of having reliable and timely
human intelligence is among the most important. The information
most important to the nation's national security is identifying
and understanding the plans and intentions of those who would
harm our interests. Some of this information may be obtainable
only through HUMINT. In today's environment, however, HUMINT
must not only be able to provide information on governments,
states, and entities, but also be able to acquire information
on small, independent groups of individuals or single persons,
as we have seen with the terrorist target.
The breadth of HUMINT resource needs and capabilities is
far-reaching and complex. HUMINT must provide ``boots on the
ground'' assessments and evaluations of foreign environments
and targets to support not only ongoing, but future national
and military operations--operations that now range from full-
scale combat to peacekeeping. HUMINT must be positioned to
collect against terrorist threats and the more traditional
information on government, political and the regional stability
of countries that influence our policies and security. Equally
important are the types of HUMINT accesses and skills that are
required, particularly language capabilities and regional
expertise. Coupled with the abilities to recruit assets and,
when necessary to intensively interrogate detained persons.
The Committee emphasizes these points for some very basic
reasons. In reviewing the budget request and various witness
testimonies, the Committee is not confident that the rebuilding
effort that the Committee has been calling for an now sees
beginning is headed in the right direction. The Committee is
concerned, for example, that there is an over-reliance on
assistance from allies to collect information. Clearly, the
post-September 11th environment has proven the necessity and
value of having close and continuing allies supporting the
Global War on Terrorism. However, the U.S. Intelligence
Community must have a robust unilateral collection capability
to ensure it has the necessary efforts to best preclude any
future attacks on America.
Finally, the Committee to be concerned about the current
HUMINT career structure both within the CIA and within the
Department of Defense's HUNINT service. At a time when regional
expertise, including language capabilities, have again proven
critical, the current civilian and military personnel and
career structures do not emphasize or incentivize these
factors. Currently, individuals get promoted based on their
broad, and often general knowledge in wide-ranging areas, while
those who would appear to stay focused on one area or even one
country are not, in the Committee's view, being given the
credit or rewards deserved. This includes the age-old issue of
having senior promotion opportunities weighted toward those
with experience in management positions. The Committee
acknowledges that this issue is not unique to the HUMINT area--
in fact it is also most acute in the area of analysis--but,
given that HUMINT requires direct operational experience in the
countries or regions containing intelligence targets and
equities, it seems to the Committee that the ability to reward
and incentivize those working in this field is critical.
GLOBAL COVERAGE AND ANALYSIS
As important as having a robust and global HUMINT service,
the need to have analytical capabilities that are dynamic,
wide-ranging and, collectively, cover the globe, is critical to
national security. Too often, investments in analytical
capabilities are secondary to collection assets and systems,
when, at the end of the day the policy maker takes an
analytical assessment as a key part of decisionmaking.
Additionally, collected intelligence in the technical fields of
SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT, are, by and large, useless (except
in certain and selective tactical situations) unless the data
collected is processed and analyzed in a timely fashion, then
placed into context in consideration of other all-source
information. Although these issues are not new to the
Committee, as it has written about such needs for several years
now, it is important to raise them again in light of September
11th and the current national security environment.
Prior to the terrorist attacks in September, the Committee
was concerned that there were significant gaps in the
Community's analytical capabilities, especially in areas that
were not perceived as having immediate national security
concerns. Although our analytic depth in some areas was strong,
in other areas it was virtually non-existent.
After September 11th, Herculean efforts have been made to
enhance our analytical wherewithal on the various aspects of
the terrorist target. For example, a number of analysts were
shifted to focus on this threat. Additionally, there are plans
to shift additional resources to the FBI, in order to assist in
building up the Bureau's capabilities to understand information
being collected domestically on the terrorist target. There has
also been an exponential growth of staff required to support
production of the President's Daily Brief and the Senior
Executive Intelligence Brief. The effects of these shifts are
somewhat alarming. Some analytic cadres were moved in their
entirety to Counterterrorism Center. Similar, though not as
dramatic, analytic impacts have been experienced as a result of
the movement of analysts to support the establishment of the
DCI's Office of Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and
Arms Control (WINPAC). This is not to say that areas of
counterterrorism and counterproliferation are not critically
important; they clearly are. The Committee must point out,
however, that significant gaps in the Community's analytical
capabilities are widening, and present opportunity for further
surprise in national security areas.
Along with all-source analysis capabilities, technical
analysis capabilities are also wanting. Still today, after
repeated warnings and encouragement to invest now in
appropriate tasking, processing, exploiting and dissemination
capabilities for future imagery collection capabilities, the
amount of investment and planning appeals, to the Committee, to
be minimal in relation to the attention paid to the ability to
collect large volumes of data. In the SIGINT area, the events
of September 11th highlight the critical nature of SIGINT
analysis to understand the terrorist target, and moreover the
need to be able to quickly exploit intercepted communications.
The Committee questions whether the senior management of
the Community is fully understanding of the critical need to
rebuild analytical resources. At a time when new investments in
intelligence collection are significant, the apparent lack of
priority or interest in strategic, global analysis to ensure
that the nation is not caught off-guard, while it is focused on
conducting the GWOT is both puzzling and disturbing.
As with HUMINT, career progression for all-source analysts
must be reviewed and changed. The Committee is concerned that
the current pathways to promotion favor generalists, and force
career tracks into management, rather than providing incentives
for country, regional and language expertise, with a clear
senior promotion track within the analytic workforce.
THE MISSING INTELLIGENCE LINK--LANGUAGE SKILLS
One of the most disappointing elements of this budget
request is the inattention paid to investment in language
capabilities. Of all the shortfalls identified thus far in the
GWOT, the lack of skilled linguists has been universal. This,
again, is not a new issue, and is one that the Committee has
significantly highlighted for many years. Yet, even in this
budget request, only minimal efforts within individual agencies
are presented. Language capabilities and skills are Community-
wide concerns and must be addressed accordingly. Trying to
address language deficiencies within the current structures and
with the current priority system is simply unworkable.
Therefore, the Committee has taken steps to begin to
significantly address these issues. In some of the programs,
the Committee has added money into existing language accounts,
and in at least one case has added positions. A a hallmark of
this effort, the Committee intends that an Intelligence
Community Language University be created. It is the intent of
the Committee that this University would be committed to
providing basic and advanced language training and regional
studies to any analyst, operations officer, or collector within
the Intelligence Community. Such training would include all
languages necessary for global coverage capabilities, not just
those of the highest priority of the moment. Attendees could
include both civilian and military personnel. The intent is not
to replace current language schools within the Intelligence
Community or Department of Defense, but to augment those
capabilities, perhaps at the current locations of those
schools.
GUANTANAMO BAY INTERROGATION EFFORT
The Committee is very concerned that the intelligence
collection effort at Guantanamo Bay (GITMO) is exhibiting, in a
microcosm, a number of problems that have plagued the
Intelligence Community writ large over a number of years.
Specifically, the problems highlighted include shortages of
analytic resources, linguists, interrogators and human
intelligence officers. Interagency cooperation has also, at
times, been an issue. Finally, and perhaps most troublesome, is
the low priority and low regard that the intelligence mission
is afforded.
The Committee has closely followed the Department of
Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Community's (IC) planning,
establishment and conduct of the intelligence interrogation
efforts at the GITMO detention facilities. The Committee's
concerns are focused specifically on the need to collect
actionable intelligence for national security. The IC and DoD
must ensure that any and all actionable intelligence that may
aid in averting potential terrorist attacks is gained. If
problems in doing so exist, they must be corrected quickly.
Once before the start of the detainee interrogations and twice
since the interrogations have been underway the Committee sent
delegations to visit the GTMO operations. The Committee
observed that the interrogation efforts have been hampered by a
lack of appropriate training, a dearth of language-skilled
personnel, and a lack of depth and breadth of analytic
expertise. Further, the Committee notes that the organizational
construct of the GITMO detention facilities/operations may also
be impeding collection efforts. A full discussion of these
issues is included in the classified annex to this report.
NSA'S ``BUY VERSUS MAKE'' POLICY
Some time ago, the Director of NSA directed that NSA
emphasize buying SIGINT capabilities versus developing them
internally. This directive specified that, within 60 days, a
detailed policy would be issued outlining related procedures.
Nearly two years later the ``buy versus make'' policy was
issued, stating that ``NSA will give first consideration to
buying products, services's and capabilities,'' and that NSA
will maintain ``strategic stronghold'' expertise necessary to
understand target use of technologies.'' This ``strategic
stronghold'' includes 32 separate activities that encompass
virtually all SIGINT mission functions, including broad
categories like basic and applied research and advanced
technology development. The current policy allows NSA to
develop capabilities in-house whenever ``strategic stronghold''
categories have no commercial industry skills base or whenever
``the NSA/CSS Strategic Stronghold must be maintained.'' The
Committee believes that, unfortunately, the Agency has
repeatedly used a liberal interpretation to find that no skills
reside in industry, when, in fact, expertise does reside in
industry. This allows for a continued emphasis on in-house
developments. the Committee firmly believes there are niche
areas that indeed need to be maintained as strategic
strongholds. However, most other categories include
technologies and functions that are routinely developed or done
in industry and often for other intelligence agencies.
The DIRNSA has repeatedly assured the Committee that NSA
would be emphasizing buying capabilities versus making them in-
house. However, the implementation of the current ``buy versus
make'' policy appears to justify far too many in-house
acquisition activities. The perception is that the current
policy was written by NSA management to actually perpetuate in-
house development. In fact, there is little evidence that would
suggest otherwise. For example, the hiring statistics presented
by the DIRNSA at the first year 2003 budget hearing showed that
NSA continues to hire more computer scientists and engineers
than any other skill category. TheCommittee continues to
believe that the institution of an aggressive ``buy versus make''
policy would result in the availability of billets in critical mission
areas.
The Committee therefore requests that the Intelligence
Community's System Acquisition Executive (SAE) and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence) review NSA's Buy verses Make
Policy and provide a report to the intelligence and defense
authorization committees by 30 December 2002. This review
should include a comparison of NSA's policy with similar
policies at other intelligence and defense agencies, and should
provide recommendations for change.
DOD'S SIGINT ARCHITECTURE
The Committee maintains that it is the responsibility of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command Control
Communication and Intelligence (ASD(C31)) to provide guidance,
management and technical oversight, and to establish policy and
practices for the Department of Defense (DoD) and its
components on all aspects of information exchange networks,
surveillance, warning and reconnaissance architectures, and
data information systems standardization programs, particularly
with respect to their readiness to support military operations.
The Committee notes that the National Security Agency is
charged with the operational control and the authority for the
development of prescriptive uniform techniques and standards by
which Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) information is collected,
processed, and reported.
The Committee is concerned that the ASD(C3I) and the NSA
have been deficient in their duties to the DoD, and its
components, in the execution of their roles to create a
cohesive SIGINT architecture. There appears to be insufficient
support by both principals for establishing collective
practices and for promoting coordinated efforts and cross-
service oversight of joint intelligence surveillance and
reconnaissance SIGINT activities.
This concern was noted in the report accompanying the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. This
report identified specific instances, including the impact of
the termination of the Joint SIGINT Avionics Family's (JSAF)
Low-band Sub System (LBSS) on relying on this program to
fulfill the Services' low frequency SIGINT needs. The Act has
also identified significant problems in systems that are
incompatible and not interoperable within the DoD's current
architectures, and directed the Secretary of the Air Force
(SECAF), in his capacity an acquisition executive, to prepare a
report on non-space SIGINT system architecture planning by May
31, 2002. The Congress still awaits this report.
The Committee instructs ASD(C3I) and the NSA to consider
the findings of the SECAF's report, along with any other
credible service inputs observed, as an expert assessment of
current process and available technologies, and their abilities
to fulfill the urgent need for non-proprietary, software
definable, open and commercially based standards in which to
establish an overall DoD SIGINT architecture.
The Committee acknowledges that the Services have
acquisition authority under Title X, U.S.C. subject to the
guidance and direction of ASD(C3I), and under the expertise of
the NSA of the SIGINT functional manager. ASD(C3I) has an
oversight function; and the Committee believes the service
systems are to be built by the services based on specific
mission/platform needs, but in strict compliance with standards
and technical architectures designed and promulgated by NSA.
Therefore, the Committee directs the ASD(C3I) and the NSA
establish a SIGINT architecture that is evolutionary in nature.
This architectural strategy shall be well conceived, efficient
and economical and based on practical, generally accepted
standards used throughout industry and the military. The
architecture shall be flexible enough to accommodate changes as
technology improves and as mission-specific requirements
evolve.
The Committee directs that this initiative be delivered to
the congressional defense and intelligence committees by 31 May
2003. The Committee expects interim briefings so the status of
this high interest project can be monitored.
GLOBAL HAWK
The Committee is very concerned about the management and
cost growth of the Global Hawk endurance UAV program. This
program was originally justified to the Congress as a $10
million per copy collection platform that could be put in
harm's way and potentially lost to hostile fire without
endangering pilots. Over the last several years, however, the
program has undergone a metamorphosis. Instead of an
``attritable'' platform with austere avionics, this has become
an expensive system. The Air Force has proposed integrating
costly sensor suites that are robust and highly reliable, and
has proposed that the aircraft operate according to the
airspace navigation and management standards applicable to
manned aircraft. These changes have made the platform, quite
simply, too expensive to risk losing, and it must therefore be
considered, like the U-2, a standoff collection system that
needs to be protected. Once this threshold was crossed, the
requirements and acquisition process began to feed on itself:
an expensive standoff collector requires higher fidelity,
longer-range and wide-area sensors. As a result, new missions
are proposed, which in turn require higher-capacity
communications for data relay. The more costly platform should
be protected and therefore equipped with a defensive
electronics suite, and so on--all of which drive up the cost of
the system even further. Today, a $10 million per copy Global
Hawk platform has become at least a $30-40 million aircraft,
and the cost will increase substantially further as additional
and improved sensors, and corresponding power/payload upgrades,
are added. In fact, the Air Force projects that the average
total unit cost (including all program costs) will exceed $75
million per copy.
During the initial Global Hawk development, the program was
conducted as an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration. At
that time, the platform clearly had limited capabilities (power
levels, payload, sensor performance, communications relay
capacity, long mission planning times, reliability, and so
forth). Despite this limited capability, there were repeated,
irresponsible assertions that the Global Hawk would ``soon''
replace the U-2. In fact, elements within the Defense
Department, without careful analysis, proposed direct funding
trades betweenthe development Global Hawk and the operational
U-2 that provides critical support to warfighters. In some sense, the
Committee sees some of this same inadequate planning, but from the
opposite perspective: there is now an effort to flood the Global Hawk
program with money, there are ad hoc plans for rapid, major upgrades
before requirements have been established, and no sign of serious
examination of where and how Global Hawk fits into an overall
collection architecture. As noted elsewhere in this report, to cite but
one example, DoD has taken no serious steps to be able to relay and
process the huge amounts of data from Global Hawk, or to process,
exploit, and disseminate all the data that a fleet of 51 Global Hawks
with highly capable sensors will generate.
The Committee has complained for years that the Defense
Department has suffered from an acute shortage of airborne
collection systems. The Committee understands the Department's
eagerness to address the shortage by investing heavily in the
Global Hawk program and transforming it into a highly capable
collection system. But the Committee is concerned that the
Department is engaged in this process on an ad hoc basis,
without a clear idea of what is to be produced and at what
cost. The Committee is not persuaded that the Department, in
its rush to identify transformational possibilities, has made
the case for a complete makeover of the Global Hawk system in
the space of a few years. Moreover, the Committee notes that
the historical genesis of the Global Hawk program was
intertwined in an agreement by the Congress to a DoD request to
terminate the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft. The Congress
agreed to the SR-71 termination based on the DoD's promise of a
replacement aircraft that would provide, as did the SR-71, a
long-range aircraft that could penetrate hostile airspace with
impunity. This was the `survivable, penetrating aircraft'
concept. The Global Hawk program was to provide the long-range
portion of that replacement. However, the DoD terminated the
Dark Star UAV that would have provided the survivable,
penetrating reconnaissance role. Therefore, even with a
successful Global Hawk air vehicle, the survivable, penetrating
reconnaissance mission remains unfilled.
Finally, the Committee is concerned that some cost growth
in the program is not attributable solely to increases in
capability and production volume. The Committee notes, with
approval, efforts by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Acquisition to methodically investigate ways to reduce the
costs of the Global Hawk air vehicle. The Committee notes that
these efforts can only be successful if the constantly evolving
mission issues addressed above are dealt with effectively. If
the Under Secretary's efforts result in a re-baselining of the
Global Hawk program, the Committee suggests that the process
must be thorough and include a comprehensive, but achievable
set of requirements, that can result in well-structured
production of a militarily useful aircraft. The Committee must
note that if the cost of the air vehicle continues to escalate,
making mission accomplishment tenuous, the Secretary of Defense
will have to be accountable to making the necessary decisions
as to continuing the program or replacing it with other
existing alternatives.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101--Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists the departments, agencies, and other
elements of the United States Government for whose intelligence
and intelligence-related activities the Act authorizes
appropriations for fiscal year 2003.
Section 102--Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and applicable personnel
ceilings covered under this title for fiscal year 2003 are
contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives and to the President.
Section 103--Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI), with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), in fiscal year 2003 to authorize
employment of civilian personnel in excess of the personnel
ceilings applicable to the components of the Intelligence
Community under section 102 by an amount not to exceed two
percent of the total of the ceilings applicable under section
102. The DCI may exercise this authority only if necessary to
the performance of important intelligence functions. Any
exercise of this authority must be reported to the intelligence
committees of the Congress.
Section 104--Community Management Account
Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Community
Management Account (CMA) of the DCI and sets the personnel end-
strength for the Community Management staff for fiscal year
2003.
Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$176,179,000 for fiscal year 2003 for the activities of the CMA
of the DCI. Subsection (a) also authorizes funds identified for
the Advanced Research and Development Committee to remain
available for two years.
Subsection (b) authorizes 350 full-time personnel for
elements within the CMA for fiscal year 2003 and provides that
such personnel may be permanent employees of the CMA element or
detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
Subsection (c) authorizes additional appropriations and
personnel for the CMA as specified in the classified Schedule
of Authorizations.
Subsection (d) requires that, except as provided in Section
113 of the National Security Act of 1947, personnel from
another element of the United States Government be detailed to
an element of the CMA on a reimbursable basis, or for temporary
situations of less than one year on a non-reimbursable basis.
Subsection (e) authorizes $34,100,000 of the amount
authorized in subsection (a) to be made available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). Subsection (e)
requires the DCI to transfer these funds to the Department of
Justice to be used for NDIC activities under the authority of
the Attorney General, and subject to section 103(d)(1) of the
National Security Act.
Section 105--Authorization of emergency supplemental appropriations for
fiscal year 2002
Section 105 authorizes intelligence and intelligence-
related activities funded within the FY2002 Emergency
Supplemental Act and the FY2002 Defense Department
Appropriations bill that is now under congressional
consideration.
Perhaps the most disturbing budgetary trend in the United
States intelligence community is its increasing reliance on
supplemental appropriations. In fairness, Congress began the
current round of supplemental largess with a sizeable
intelligence supplemental in fiscal year 1998. The practice has
been continued in the succeeding years, primarily to address
additional intelligence spending to address terrorist threats.
However, in any sustained crisis action, there comes a point
where short-term practices must be phased out and long-term
strategic plans put into place.
The ``advantage'' of the supplemental appropriations
process to the intelligence community is that the process can
address pressing budgetary demands in a shorter time (and with
fewer Administration and Congressional bureaucratic hurdles)
than the regular process. However, by continuing to rely on
supplemental appropriations year after year, the intelligence
community risks fostering a budget process that is ripe for
abuse and long-term funding gaps.
Abuse of the process comes mainly in the form of redundant
budget requests. The committee has noted many places in the
fiscal year 2003 budget requests where specific items have been
``funded'' two or even three times, especially in the
Department of Defense activities under the Joint Military
Intelligence and the tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities programs. These two programs had funding lines that
appeared as duplicative entries in the FY02 supplemental, the
President's request for FY03 and the Defense Emergency Response
Fund FY01, FY02, and FY03. While the Committee recognizes the
Administration was under significant time pressure to compile
these budget requests, there should have been special effort to
methodically review them before they were submitted to
Congress.
One potential complicating factor for the Administration
and the Department of Defense is the creation of the Defense
Emergency Response Fund (or DERF). The DERF was originally
created to pay for emergency items that arise during the war on
terrorism. However, it has been increasingly obvious that the
DERF has turned into just another vehicle to fund items that
the intelligence community did not get through the regular
budget and planning process. The Committee does not believe the
DERF is an appropriate source for intelligence community
funding.
A subtler, yet no less problematic set of issues arises
when programs are forced to rely on supplemental funding for
core mission support. This is increasingly the case for those
intelligence community operations supporting the war on
terrorism. The Committee acknowledges the war's dynamic
environment, and the day-to-day adjustments to intelligence
operations that this war requires. But the intelligence
community's apparent lack of a long-term, strategic planning
effort is troubling.
The committee directs that the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence fully fund all anticipated
intelligence activities in their fiscal year 2004 budget
requests.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201--Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$351,300,000 for fiscal year 2003 for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund. The Administration has
proposed legislation requiring agencies, beginning in FY 2003,
to fully fund the accruing cost of retirement benefits for
individuals in the Civil Service Retirement System, CIARDS, and
other federal retirement systems. The legislation also would
require agencies to pay the full accruing cost of post-
retirement health benefits for current civilian employees and
the post retirement health costs of all retirees (and their
dependents/survivors) of the Uniformed Service. $129 million of
the $139.3 million increase from the FY 2002 authorization
level represents the additional funds CIA will require to meet
these requirements within the CIARDS program.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 301--Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 301 provides that appropriations authorized by this
Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal
employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental
amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation
or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302--Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
Section 303--Sense of the Congress regarding Intelligence Community
contracting
Section 303 is a Sense of the Congress provision to
encourage the Intelligence Community to maximize the
procurement of US-made products.
Section 304--Semiannual reports on financial intelligence on terrorist
assets (FITA)
Section 304 of the bill, establishing an ongoing
notification procedure with respect to Financial Intelligence
on Terrorist Assets (FITA), is intended to assure timely
Congressional oversight of national security-related financial
enforcement actions by the executive branch, andis meant to
mirror the reporting practices followed under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA).
On a semiannual basis, the Secretary of Treasury shall
provide the intelligence committees, together with the
Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives
and the Senate Banking Committee and the Senate and House
Appropriations Committees, a report setting forth with respect
to the preceding six-month period: (1) the total number of
asset seizures, designations, and other actions against
individuals or entities found to have engaged in financial
support for terrorism; (2) the total number of applications for
asset seizure and designation of individuals or entities
suspected of having engaged in financial support of terrorist
activities, that were granted, modified, or denied; (3) the
total number of physical searches of offices, residences, or
financial records of individuals or entities suspected of
financial support for terrorist activity; and, (4) whether the
financial intelligence information seized in these cases has
been shared on a full and timely basis with all departments,
agencies, and other entities of the United States Government
involved in intelligence activities in the Foreign Terrorist
Asset Tracking Unit (FTAT).
Although the Committee anticipates that the semiannual FITA
reports will better inform its understanding of the actions of
the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Unit and of the FTAT's
participating agencies in the US intelligence and law
enforcement communities, the Committee is also requiring
enhanced notification procedures concerning urgent financial
intelligence actions of the executive branch, including covert
actions and intelligence activities other than covert actions,
which are derived from financial intelligence on terrorist
assets and fundraising activities.
Section 305--Modification of excepted agency voluntary leave transfer
authority
Section 305 amends section 6339 of title 5, United States
Code, to permit the head of an ``excepted agency'' to establish
a voluntary leave transfer program for employees of such
agency. This program would permit employees of the excepted
agency to transfer accrued or accumulated annual leave to, or
receive transferred leave from, employees of different
agencies. Currently, employees of certain ``excepted
agencies''--i.e., the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency
(NSA), FBI, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and,
when designated by the President, any other agency whose
primary mission is the conduct of foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence--are not permitted to participate in
interagency leave sharing programs. This restriction often
places unnecessary restrictions on employees who may wish to
transfer leave to a qualified employee at another agency, or
vice versa. This provision permits the head of an excepted
agency to establish an interagency leave-sharing program. Any
such program must be consistent, to the extent practicable and
with due regard for the protection of intelligence sources and
methods, with applicable laws and regulation governing similar
programs. Regardless of the discretionary decision to establish
an interagency leave-sharing program, an excepted agency must
still maintain an intra-agency program for an employee to
transfer leave to or receive leave from an employee in the same
agency.
Section 306--Additional one-year suspension of reorganization of
Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office
Section 306 extends the effective date of the suspension
authorized in Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-108 (Dec. 28, 2001)).
Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002 suspended the provision of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C. 7301 et seq.)
that required reorganization of the Diplomatic
Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTS-PO). This
provision extends the suspension until October 1, 2003.
Section 307--Prohibition on compliance with requests for information
submitted by foreign governments
Section 307 amends 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(A), with respect to
elements of the Intelligence Community, by limiting the
application of this paragraph of the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) such that agencies would be prohibited from complying
with the requests of foreign governments or their
representatives to make records available. Section 307
prohibits making records available ``under this paragraph''
(i.e. under 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3), rather than ``under this
section'' (i.e. 5 U.S.C. 552). It is the Committee's intent to
not restrict making records available under 552(a)(1) or (2),
since first, those matters are in the nature of general public
records that are widely available, and second, it might be
difficult or impractical to restrict their availability to the
public.
As currently structured, FOIA provides to any person a
broad right of access to declassified Intelligence Community
records, whatever the purpose of his or her request. As a
result, foreign persons and governments (including those that
may support or participate in terrorist activities) have
generated requests that require a significant commitment of
Intelligence Community resources to process. CIA estimates that
requests from foreign governments and foreign nationals
comprise approximately 10 percent of the FOIA requests received
annually based on the last three years. From FY 1999 through FY
2001, these foreign government FOIA requests increased at the
rate of one percent per annum. Elements of the Intelligence
Community are required by law to process these requests without
regard to the nationality of the individual making the request.
Because elements of the Intelligency Community routinely handle
classified national security information, the resources
required to perform the painstaking, line-by-line reviews
necessary to ensure the proper protection of such classified
information are substantial. This section will prevent the
diversion of the Intelligence Community's limited
declassification resources for this purpose.
Section 308--Cooperative relationship between the National Security
Education Program and the Foreign Language Center of the
Defense Language Institute
Section 308 encourages an enhanced cooperative relationship
between the National Security Education Program and the Defense
Language Institute Foreign Language Center.
Secion 308 authorizes the Foreign Language Center of the
Defense Language Institute to provide instruction on a space-
available basis to recipients of scholarships and fellowships
of the National Security Education Program (NSEP) as a
Department of Defense sponsored program. Award recipients may
apply a portion of their applicable scholarship or fellowship
award at the Center to defray the additive instructional costs
of their attendance. Award recipients must be in good standing;
have completed all academic study in a foreign country, as
provided for undertheir NSEP scholarship or fellowship; and be
able to benefit from the instruction provided at the Center.
Section 308 is intended to improve national foreign
language capabilities and enhance cooperative efforts among
federal programs. The Foreign Language Center of DLI provides
intensive language instruction in a large number of foreign
languages, primarily to members of the United States armed
forces. The NSEP is focused on promoting the study of foreign
cultures and foreign languages critical to the national
security interests of the United States. The authority provided
in this section should provide flexibility of benefit to each
program, and enhance the development of national security
professionals and foreign area experts with high levels of
foreign language proficiency.
The Committee anticipates that only a very small number of
NSEP recipients would attend the FLCDLI over the course of a
year. NSEP recipients are only to be admitted to a position in
a language course at the FLC when there is no Department of
Defense civilian or military personnel available to take that
position in that course at the Center. NSEP recipients are to
receive no preference for space in FLC instructional programs
over Department of Defense civilian and military personnel.
Section 309--Establishment of National Flagship Language Initiative
within the National Security Education Program
Section 309 authorizes $10 million for the National
Security Education Program, established pursuant to the David
L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991, to establish
a National Flagship Language Initiative whereby institutions of
higher learning would be awarded grants to establish, operate
or improve activities designed to train students in programs in
a range of disciplines to achieve advanced levels of
proficiency in those foreign languages that the Secretary
identifies as being the most critical in the interests of the
national security of the United States.
The Committee is strongly interested in improving the
quality and availability of advanced language education and
training to support U.S. national security requirements. The
Committee urges that the National Security Education Program
apply rigorous standards and metrics to ensure that the NSEP's
participating academic institutions are regularly evaluated by
language training experts in the Defense Department and the
Intelligence Community to ensure that the training provided by
these institutions meets the U.S. Government's language
standards. Students who have been awarded scholarships or
fellowships under the NSEP would be eligible to participate in
the activities carried out under the National Flagship Language
Initiative. The Committee intends that Flagship Initiative
grants be awarded competitively according to rigorous
standards. The Defense Language Institute and other
institutions of higher education that are operated by the
Department of Defense and by agencies of the Intelligence
Community are specifically authorized to participate in the
Flagship program. The Committee intends that these institutions
be treated equally in the grant competition process.
Under current law, in selecting recipients of awards of
scholarships, fellowships or grants, the Secretary or
contracting organizations that administer aspects of the
program are to take into consideration the extent to which
program participants reflect the cultural, racial and ethnic
diversity of the population of the United States, as well as an
equitable geographic distribution. This requirement is
especially important as the National Security Education Program
evolves to face the new national security challenges of the
21st century.
The intelligence community shares in a government-wide
problem of insufficient language and area expertise among
officials working on national security and foreign policy
issues. Government is not alone: American multinational
corporations and non-governmental organizations also do not
have the people with the language abilities and cultural
exposure that are needed.
The problem stems from at least three larger societal
challenges: general international isolation of the majority of
the American population, limited study abroad beyond Western
Europe, and limited foreign language study.
First, according to 2000 Census data, 82% of the US
population of 255 million people speaks only English. There are
very few US households where languages critical for supporting
US national security are spoken. For example, only 0.23%, or
596,000 of the US population, speaks Arabic at home, 0.13% for
Hindi, 0.11% for Urdu, 0.09% for Serbo-Croatian, 0.27% for
Russian, 0.18% for Japanese, and 0.78% for Chinese.
Second, less than 1% (about 144,000 in calendar year 2000)
of all US students in higher education study abroad. Study
abroad program data also show that US students historically
have not studied in areas that are emerging as critical to
national security. In 2000, 60% of US study abroad students
studied in Western Europe. Less than 2.9% studied in the Middle
East (a mere 4,100 students, with 3,900 of these studying in
Israel). 2.7% studied in Africa (3,900 students), and 6% in
Asia (8,800, with 5,600 of these in China and Japan).
Third, modern foreign language class registrations in US
higher education are down from a high in 1965 of 16.5 foreign
language class registrations per 100 overall class
registrations to 7.9 registrations per 100 in 1998. Spanish
accounts for 55% of foreign language registrations, while
Arabic accounts for 0.5% (5,500 registrations), Chinese for
2.4% (28,000), and Russian for 2% (24,000).
Some promising trends nevertheless are apparent. The number
of US students studying abroad doubled from 1994 to 2000, and a
higher percentage are studying in non-European countries than
in the past. Foreign language enrollments in universities grew
by 5% in the late 1990s, and critical languages are seeing
increases in enrollments. For example, Arabic language
enrollments increased by 24% and Chinese by 8% in the late
1990s. Preliminary statistics from the National Security
Education Program (NSEP) indicate that post-September 11th
undergraduate applications to the program are up more than 50%
and graduate applications up by 33%. Moreover, among NSEP
applicants, Arabic and Chinese show the largest rise in
proposed languages for study among undergraduates, and almost
one of four graduate applicants proposes to study in the Middle
East.
The US government needs to do all it can both to encourage
foreign language and area expertise and to utilize this
expertise in the service of national security and foreign
policy. The NSEP uniquely facilitates these goals. The bill
also supports developing additional foreign language and area
expertise across the intelligence community. It adds funds
within the intelligence community to improve language training,
provide additional linguists, enhance incentive pay for
language training, and support language-related advanced
research and development. The bill also adds funds for
curriculum development and infrastructure at the Defense
Language Institute.
Section 310--Deadline for submittal of various overdue reports
The Committee is increasingly concerned about the DCI's
ability to properly facilitate congressional oversight
activities. This community-wide reporting and coordination
problem has been repeatedly identified to the Intelligence
Community's leadership, yet little has been done to correct the
IC's poor performance in fulfilling its responsibility to fully
and currently inform the Congressional oversight committees.
During the past year, various components of the
Intelligence Community have not provided Congress with
coordinated responses for numerous Congressionally Directed
Actions (CDAs). Although the Committee understands the
Intelligence Community's argument that wartime requirements
have hampered its ability to respond to CDAs, such responses
have not been limited to the period following the 11 September
terrorist attacks. The Office of the DCI, the Community
Management Staff (CMS), the CIA's Office of General Counsel
(OGC), and the CIA's Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) have
been unable to fulfill the Intelligence Community's legally
mandated CDA reporting requirements during the past year.
The Committee recognizes there has been an increase in
reporting requirements since 1990, and is willing to engage
with the IC's leadership on the number and scope of CDAs once
the Intelligence Committees have received the CDA reports that
are required by law and overdue. Among the issues that should
be discussed are: (1) consolidation of CDAs addressing related
subject matter (for example, numerous CDAs cover China,
proliferation, and terrorism); (2) repeal of outdated CDAs; (3)
more realistic CDA deadlines; (4) replacing semiannual
reporting deadlines with annual due dates; (5) annual
sunsetting of CDAs in the intelligence authorization bill to
ensure continuing Member interest in the subject matter; (6)
greater programmatic and financial details in the annual
Congressional Budget Justification Books (CBJB); and (7)
submission of the Intelligence Community's annual legislative
proposal in conjunction with the CBJBs in February of each
year.
To address these Intelligence Community-wide reporting and
coordination deficiencies, the Committee recommends a fence of
33% of available funds against each of the following offices
six months after enactment of this legislation: (1) Office of
the DCI; and (2) the Office of the Community Management Staff.
The reports referred to in this section are reports mandated by
law for which the DCI has sole or primary responsibility to
prepare or coordinate and submit to Congress, which, as of the
date of enactment, have not been submitted to Congress by the
date mandated by law. The fences will be lifted when the DCI
certifies in writing to the committees that all overdue reports
specified in Section 310 are completed. The SSCI has also
addressed this issue in substantial detail in its bill and has
also made recommendations to force compliance with the CDA
reporting requirements.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Section 401--Two-year extension of Central Intelligence Agency
Voluntary Separation Pay Act
Section 401 extends the CIA Voluntary Separations Pay Act
(VSPA) for two years, to September 30, 2005.
CIA has used CIA VSPA authority over the past several years
to restructure and ``re-skill'' its workforce to support the
Strategic Direction that the DCI has outlined. The use of
incentives, and early-outs, has contributed greatly to CIA
efforts to re-tool the workforce for the challenges of the 21st
century and is a critical tool in providing the DCI the
flexibility to adapt the workforce as priorities change. The
changes in the workforce required to support the DCI's
direction have an impact on a number of areas within the CIA.
Authority to offer separation incentives to targeted groups of
employees, therefore, remains important to the success of CIA
restructuring. Data from the CIA's exit survey indicate that
the separation incentive pay has accelerated the departure of
employees in targeted groups.
Of continuing importance is the ability to redirect middle
and senior level management positions in the Directorate of
Intelligence and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Reductions in managerial ranks will make available positions
for senior substantive experts in the analysis and technology
fields. Separation incentive authority will substantially
assist in achieving this transition without serious adverse
impact on the managerial workforce.
Section 402--Prohibition on implementation of Intelligence Community
compensation reform plans
CIA's proposed compensation reform proposal appears to be
causing more anxiety in CIA's workforce than any other recent
Agency administrative issue. Although the reform plans' authors
have performed a useful service in identifying deficiencies of
the GS system and proposing some much-needed solutions, there
has been insufficient discussion and input on the compensation
reform plan outside senior management circles. Rank and file
employees are by no means convinced that a ``market-based''
compensation system is a perfect fit in an organization whose
be-all and end-all is service to the American people, not
profits for ``the firm'' or its individual employees.
Reform is nevertheless overdue. The current pay system
inadequately rewards its most skilled and productive members,
inadequately motivates its least productive members, and
encourages individuals with sorely needed special skills to
take management positions, in order to advance in the ranks and
increase their income. Skilled professionals are hard to find
and make in any profession--especially in the arcane
disciplines of the intelligence profession. Retention of
skills, and skilled employees, can be improved by compensation
reform. The Committee commends the compensation plan's authors
for recognizing the skill retention problem and proposing a
remedy. Like CIA, NSA's leadership has developed a
somewhatsimilar compensation reform proposal and is moving toward full
implementation of this approach.
To give the CIA and NSA compensation reform projects more
transparency and to ensure that there is full and informed
participation by their respective workforces, the Committee
prohibits the implementation of any compensation reform plan
within the Intelligence Community until such plans have been
specifically authorized by statute.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 501--Use of funds for counter-drug and counter-terrorism
activities for Colombia
Section 501 authorizes the use of funds designated for
intelligence and intelligence-related purposes for assistance
to the Government of Colombia for counter-drug activities for
fiscal years 2002 and 2003 (and any unobligated funds
designated for such purposes from prior years) to be utilized
to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and
against activities by organizations designated as terrorist
organizations (such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the
United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)), and to take
actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency
circumstances, including undertaking rescue actions.
During the past year, Members of the Committee who have
visited Colombia have become increasingly troubled that the
effectiveness of U.S. policy in Colombia has been undermined by
restrictions on what activities in the field are allowed under
current law and policy. The Committee is concerned that the
Intelligence Community lacks the necessary legal authority to
prosecute the Global War On Terrorism against the FARC, the
AUC, and the ELN in Colombia effectively and expeditiously.
Just as the FARC, the AUC, and the ELN have improved their
capabilities to conduct terrorist operations in Colombia and
elsewhere in the Andean Region, the Intelligence Community
needs to have additional tools and strategies to deal with this
growing threat to our hemisphere's security. The Administration
should give serious consideration to developing new policy
guidance to reflect current conditions in Colombia, and should
provide appropriate support to U.S. intelligence efforts in
Colombia.
Section 501 is intended to be consistent with similar
language included in the FY 2002 Defense Department
supplemental appropriations bill under consideration by the
Congress to enhance the legal authorities of the Departments of
State and Defense with respect to their activities in Colombia.
This language is intended to similarly enhance the legal
authorities needed by the Intelligence Community to
appropriately support U.S. policy objectives in Colombia.
Section 502--Protection of operational files of the National
Reconnaissance Office
Section 502 allows the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the DCI, to exempt certain operational files
of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) from search and
review under the FOIA. The bill would allow exemptions for
files concerning the activities of the NRO that document the
means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is
collected through scientific and technical systems. This
exemption would also require a decennial review under rules and
procedures similar to those governing operational files of the
CIA.
Section 503--Eligibility of employees in intelligence senior level
positions for Presidential Rank Awards
Section 503 would make Intelligence Senior Level employees
eligible for Presidential Rank Awards, as are senior career
employees under section 4507a of title 5, United States Code.
Section 4507 of title 5, United States Code, authorizes the
President to award the rank of either Meritorious Executive or
Distinguished Executive career appointee. Similarly, section
1606 of title 10, United States Code, which provides for the
establishment of a Defense Intelligence Senior Executive
Service, authorizes the President to award these ranks to
members of the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service.
Such awards are an important means of recognizing sustained
extraordinary accomplishment, and they represent a valuable
management tool for motivating and recognizing truly
exceptional performers among senior career employees.
Public Law 107-67 makes senior career employees, including
Senior Level employees, eligible for these rank awards. Given
that Congress has extended eligibility to senior career
employees, the same should be extended to Intelligence senior-
level employees and managers. This section makes Intelligence
Senior Level employees and managers eligible for the
Presidential Rank Awards, similar to that which was recently
done for senior career employees.
Committee Position and Recorded Votes Taken
On May 15, 2002, in open session, a quorum being present,
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, by a recorded
vote of 16 ayes to 0 noes, approved the bill, H.R. 4628, as
amended. By that vote, the committee ordered the bill reported
favorably to the House. On that vote, the Members present
recorded their votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--aye; Mr.
Bereuter--aye; Mr. Castle--aye; Mr. Boehlert--aye; Mr.
Gibbons--aye; Mr. LaHood--aye; Mr. Hoekstra--aye; Mr. Burr--
aye; Mr. Chambliss--aye; Ms. Pelosi--aye; Mr. Bishop--aye; Ms.
Harman--aye; Mr. Condit--aye; Mr. Roemer--aye; Mr. Reyes--aye;
Mr. Boswell--aye.
Findings and Recommendations of the Committee on Government Reform
With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the House of
Representatives, the committee is not subject to this
requirement; therefore, the committee has not received a report
from the Committee on Government Reform pertaining to the
subject of this bill.
Oversight Findings
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the committee held various
hearings and numerous briefings on the classified budgetary
issues raised by H.R. 4628. Testimony was taken from senior
officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the National Reconnaissance Office,
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Department of
Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Treasury,
the Department of Justice, and the Department of Transportation
regarding the activities and plans of the Intelligence
Community covered by the provisions and authorizations, both
classified and unclassified, of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003. The bill, as reported by the
committee, reflects conclusions reached by the committee in
light of this oversight activity.
Fiscal Year Cost Projections
The committee has attempted, pursuant to clause 3(d)(2) of
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, to
ascertain the outlays that will occur in fiscal year 2003 and
the five years following, if the amounts authorized are
appropriated. These estimates are contained in the classified
annex and are in accordance with those of the Executive Branch.
Congressional Budget Office Estimates
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, May 16, 2002.
Mr. Dan L. Crippen,
Director, Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Crippen: In compliance with the Rules of the House
of Representatives, I am writing to request a cost estimate of
H.R. 4628, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003,'' pursuant to sections 308 and 403 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974. I have attached a copy of the bill as
approved by the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence on April 15, 2002.
As I hope to bring this legislation to the House floor in
the very near term, I would very much appreciate an expedited
response to this request by the CBO's staff. Should you have
any questions related to this request, please contact
Christopher Barton, the Committee's Chief Counsel. Thank you in
advance for your assistance with this request.
Sincerely,
Porter J. Goss,
Chairman.
Attachment.
------
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, May 20, 2002.
Hon. Porter J. Goss,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: As you requested, the Congressional
Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R.
4628, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew
Schmit.
Sincerely,
Barry B. Anderson
(For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
Enclosure.
H.R. 4628--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003
Summary: H.R. 4628 would authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2003 for intelligence activities of the United
States government, the Intelligence Community Management
Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System (CIARDS).
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of
the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that
implementing certain provisions of the bill would cost $221
million over the 2003-2007 period, assuming appropriation of
the necessary funds. CBO cannot estimate the direct spending
effects of H.R. 4628 because the data necessary for an estimate
are classified.
H.R. 4628 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal
governments.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of H.R. 4628 is shown in the following table.
CBO cannot obtain the necessary information to estimate the
costs for the entire bill because parts are classified at a
level above clearances held by CBO employees. For purposes of
this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill will be enacted by
October 1, 2002, and that the necessary amounts will be
appropriated for fiscal year 2003. Estimated outlays are based
on historical spending patterns. The costs of this legislation
fall within budget function 050 (national defense).
ESTIMATED SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION FOR H.R. 4628
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-----------------------------------------------------
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT
Spending Under Current Law for the Intelligence:
Community Management Account:
Budget Authority \1\.................................. 161 0 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays..................................... 166 63 14 2 0 0
Proposed Changes:
Authorization Level................................... 0 176 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays..................................... 0 110 53 9 3 0
Spending Under H.R. 4628 for the Intelligence:
Community Management Account:
Authorization Level \1\............................... 161 176 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays..................................... 166 173 67 11 3 0
NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION TRUST FUND
Spending Under Current Law for the National:
Security Education Trust Fund:
Budget Authority \2\.................................. 8 8 8 8 9 9
Estimated Outlays..................................... 8 8 8 8 9 9
Proposed Changes:
Authorization Level................................... 0 10 10 10 10 10
Estimated Outlays..................................... 0 6 10 10 10 10
Spending Under H.R. 4628 for the National:
Security Education Trust Fund:
Estimated Authorization Level \2\..................... 8 18 18 18 19 19
Estimated Outlays..................................... 8 14 18 18 19 19
SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION \3\
Authorization Level \1\............................... 0 186 10 10 10 10
Estimated Outlays..................................... 0 116 63 19 13 10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 2002 level is the amount appropriated for that year.
\2\ The 2002 level is the amount appropriated for that year. The current law amounts for the 2003-2007 period
assume appropriations remain at the 2002 level with adjustments for inflation.
\3\ In addition to effects on spending subject to appropriation, H.R. 4628 would affect direct spending.
However, CBO cannot estimate the total direct spending effects because the necessary data are classified.
Spending subject to appropriation: H.R. 4628 would
authorize appropriations of $176 million for the Intelligence
Community Management Account, which funds the coordination of
programs, budget oversight, and management of the intelligence
agencies. The bill also would earmark $34 million for the
National Drug Intelligence Center from the funds authorized for
the Intelligence Community Management Account. Finally, H.R.
4628 would authorize an additional $10 million a year beginning
in 2003 for the National Security Education Trust Fund. These
funds would be used to carry out the National Flagship Language
Initiative, which would be established under section 309 of the
bill to improve higher education in foreign languages that the
Secretary of Defense identifies as most critical to the
interests of the national security of the United States.
Direct spending and revenues: The bill would authorize $351
million for CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable to
military service and various unfunded liabilities. The payment
to CIARDS is considered mandatory. The CBO budget baseline
currently includes only $223 million for these payments. The
additional $128 million authorized in this bill would be used
to implement an Administration proposal that federal agencies
pay the full cost of benefits for their employees as such
benefits accrue. That change would depend on the enactment of
other legislation. The additional $128 million would be an
intergovernmental transfer and would have no effect on the
budget.
Section 401 would extend the authority of the CIA to offer
incentive payments to employees who voluntarily retire or
resign. The authority, which will expire on September 30, 2003,
would be extended through fiscal year 2005. Section 401 also
would require the CIA to make a deposit to the Civil Service
Retirement and Disability Fund equal to 15 percent of final pay
for each employee who accepts an incentive payment. Although
the timing of agency payments and the additional benefit
payments would not match on a yearly basis, CBO believes that
these deposits would be sufficient to cover the cost of any
long-term increase in benefits that would result from induced
retirements. CBO cannot provide a precise estimate of the
direct spending effects because the data necessary for an
estimate are classified.
Pay-as-you-go considerations: The Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act set up pay-as-you-go procedures
for legislation affecting direct spending or receipts. CBO
cannot estimate the precise direct spending effects of section
401 because the necessary data are classified.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 4628
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or
tribal governments.
Previous CBO estimates: On May 16, 2002, CBO transmitted a
cost estimate for the unclassified portion of S. 2506, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, as
reported by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on May
13, 2002. The differences in the estimated costs reflect
differences in the bills. In particular, H.R. 4628 would
authorize $176 million for the Intelligence Community
Management Account, while S. 2506 would authorize $158 million
for that account. H.R. 4628 would also authorize $10 million a
year for the National Flagship Language Initiative. In
addition, H.R. 4628 would authorize $351 million for CIARDS,
while S. 2506 would authorize only $223 million for the
account. The additional $128 million authorized for CIARDS by
H.R. 4628 would be used to implement an administration proposal
that federal agencies pay the full cost of benefits for their
employees as such benefits accrue.
Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Matthew Schmit; impact
on state, local, and tribal governments: Elyse Goldman; impact
on the private sector: Zachary Seldon.
Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
------
Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, July 18, 2002.
Hon. Porter J. Goss,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I understand the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence has recently ordered reported H.R.
4628, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.
The bill addresses subject matter that falls within the
legislative jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services
pursuant to House Rule X.
In recognition of your committee's desire to bring this
legislation expeditiously before the House of Representatives,
the Committee on Armed Services will forego a request for
sequential referral of the bill. This action in no way alters
the Committee on Armed Services' jurisdiction over the
provisions in question, and the committee will seek the
appointment of conferees during any conference on the bill.
Thank you for your continued assistance in working through
the many issues of shared jurisdiction and interest, and I look
forward to supporting H.R. 4628 on the House floor.
Sincerely,
Bob Stump,
Chairman.
Committee Cost Estimates
The committee agrees with the estimate of the Congressional
Budget Office.
Specific Constitutional Authority for Congressional Enactment of This
Legislation
The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
United States government are carried out to support the
national security interests of the United States, to support
and assist the armed forces of the United Forces, and to
support and assist the armed forces of the United States, and
to support the President in execution of the foreign policy of
the United States. Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution of
the United States provides, in pertinent part, that
``Congress shall have power * * * to pay the debts
and provide for the common defense and general welfare
of the United States; * * *''; ``to raise and support
Armies, * * *'' ``to provide and maintain a Navy; * *
*'' and ``to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into extinction * * * all other
powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.'' Therefore, pursuant to such authority,
Congress is empowered to enact this legislation.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
* * * * * * *
SHORT TITLE
That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of
1947''.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
* * * * * * *
Title I--Coordination for National Security
Sec. 101. National Security Council.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 105D. Protection of operational files of the National
Reconnaissance Office.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 118. Semiannual report on financial intelligence on terrorist
assets.
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
Sec. 105D. (a) Exemption of Certain Operational Files From
Search, Review, Publication, or Disclosure.--(1) The Director
of the National Reconnaissance Office, with the coordination of
the Director of Central Intelligence, may exempt operational
files of the National Reconnaissance Office from the provisions
of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, which require
publication, disclosure, search, or review in connection
therewith.
(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), for the purposes of this
section, the term ``operational files'' means files of the
National Reconnaissance Office (hereafter in this section
referred to as ``NRO'') that document the means by which
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected
through scientific and technical systems.
(B) Files which are the sole repository of disseminated
intelligence are not operational files.
(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), exempted operational files
shall continue to be subject to search and review for
information concerning--
(A) United States citizens or aliens lawfully
admitted for permanent residence who have requested
information on themselves pursuant to the provisions of
section 552 or 552a of title 5, United States Code;
(B) any special activity the existence of which is
not exempt from disclosure under the provisions of
section 552 of title 5, United States Code; or
(C) the specific subject matter of an investigation
by any of the following for any impropriety, or
violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential
directive, in the conduct of an intelligence activity:
(i) The Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(ii) The Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate.
(iii) The Intelligence Oversight Board.
(iv) The Department of Justice.
(v) The Office of General Counsel of NRO.
(vi) The Office of the Director of NRO.
(4)(A) Files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) which
contain information derived or disseminated from exempted
operational files shall be subject to search and review.
(B) The inclusion of information from exempted operational
files in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) shall
not affect the exemption under paragraph (1) of the originating
operational files from search, review, publication, or
disclosure.
(C) The declassification of some of the information contained
in exempted operational files shall not affect the status of
the operational file as being exempt from search, review,
publication, or disclosure.
(D) Records from exempted operational files which have been
disseminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted
under paragraph (1) and which have been returned to exempted
operational files for sole retention shall be subject to search
and review.
(5) The provisions of paragraph (1) may not be superseded
except by a provision of law which is enacted after the date of
the enactment of this section, and which specifically cites and
repeals or modifies its provisions.
(6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), whenever any
person who has requested agency records under section 552 of
title 5, United States Code, alleges that NRO has withheld
records improperly because of failure to comply with any
provision of this section, judicial review shall be available
under the terms set forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5,
United States Code.
(B) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner
provided for under subparagraph (A) as follows:
(i) In any case in which information specifically
authorized under criteria established by an Executive
order to be kept secret in the interests of national
defense or foreign relations is filed with, or produced
for, the court by NRO, such information shall be
examined ex parte, in camera by the court.
(ii) The court shall, to the fullest extent
practicable, determine the issues of fact based on
sworn written submissions of the parties.
(iii) When a complainant alleges that requested
records are improperly withheld because of improper
placement solely in exempted operational files, the
complainant shall support such allegation with a sworn
written submission based upon personal knowledge or
otherwise admissible evidence.
(iv)(I) When a complainant alleges that requested
records were improperly withheld because of improper
exemption of operational files, NRO shall meet its
burden under section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United
States Code, by demonstrating to the court by sworn
written submission that exempted operational files
likely to contain responsible records currently perform
the functions set forth in paragraph (2).
(II) The court may not order NRO to review the
content of any exempted operational file or files in
order to make the demonstration required under
subclause (I), unless the complainant disputes NRO's
showing with a sworn written submission based on
personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence.
(v) In proceedings under clauses (iii) and (iv), the
parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26
through 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
except that requests for admissions may be made
pursuant to rules 26 and 36.
(vi) If the court finds under this paragraph that NRO
has improperly withheld requested records because of
failure to comply with any provision of this
subsection, the court shall order NRO to search and
review the appropriate exempted operational file or
files for the requested records and make such records,
or portions thereof, available in accordance with the
provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States
Code, and such order shall be the exclusive remedy for
failure to comply with this subsection.
(vii) If at any time following the filing of a
complaint pursuant to this paragraph NRO agrees to
search the appropriate exempted operational file or
files for the requested records, the court shall
dismiss the claim based upon such complaint.
(viii) Any information filed with, or produced for
the court pursuant to clauses (i) and (iv) shall be
coordinated with the Director of Central Intelligence
prior to submission to the court.
(b) Decennial Review of Exempted Operational Files.--(1) Not
less than once every 10 years, the Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office and the Director of Central Intelligence
shall review the exemptions in force under subsection (a)(1) to
determine whether such exemptions may be removed from the
category of exempted files or any portion thereof. The Director
of Central Intelligence must approve any determination to
remove such exemptions.
(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include
consideration of the historical value or other public interest
in the subject matter of the particular category of files or
portions thereof and the potential for declassifying a
significant part of the information contained therein.
(3) A complainant that alleges that NRO has improperly
withheld records because of failure to comply with this
subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of
the United States of the district in which any of the parties
reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding,
the court's review shall be limited to determining the
following:
(A) Whether NRO has conducted the review required by
paragraph (1) before the expiration of the 10-year
period beginning on the date of the enactment of this
section or before the expiration of the 10-year period
beginning on the date of the most recent review.
(B) Whether NRO, in fact, considered the criteria set
forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required
review.
* * * * * * *
SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST ASSETS
Sec. 118. (a) Semiannual Report.--On a semiannual basis, the
Secretary of the Treasury (acting through the head of the
Office of Intelligence Support) shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees (as defined in subsection
(c)) that fully informs the committees concerning operations
against terrorist financial networks. Each such report shall
include with respect to the preceding six-month period--
(1) the total number of asset seizures, designations,
and other actions against individuals or entities found
to have engaged in financial support of terrorism;
(2) the total number of applications for asset
seizure and designations of individuals or entities
suspected of having engaged in financial support of
terrorist activities, that were granted, modified, or
denied;
(3) the total number of physical searches of offices,
residences, or financial records of individuals or
entities suspected of having engaged in financial
support for terrorist activity; and
(4) whether the financial intelligence information
seized in these cases has been shared on a full and
timely basis with the all departments, agencies, and
other entities of the United States Government involved
in intelligence activities participating in the Foreign
Terrorist Asset Tracking Unit (managed and coordinated
by the Counterterrorism Center of the Central
Intelligence Agency).
(b) Immediate Notification for Emergency Designation.--In the
case of a designation of an individual or entity, or the assets
of an individual or entity, as having been found to have
engaged in terrorist activities, the Secretary of the Treasury
shall report such designation within 24 hours of such a
designation to the appropriate congressional committees.
(c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means the following:
(1) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
(2) The Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
GENERAL CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PROVISIONS
Sec. 501. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(f) As used in this section, the term ``intelligence
activities'' includes covert actions as defined in section
503(e), and includes financial intelligence activities.
* * * * * * *
----------
TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
PART I--THE AGENCIES GENERALLY
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 5--ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER II--ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
* * * * * * *
Sec. 552. Public information; agency rules, opinions, orders, records,
and proceedings
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public
information as follows:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3)(A) Except with respect to the records made available
under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, and except as
provided in subparagraph (E), each agency, upon any request for
records which (i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is
made in accordance with published rules stating the time,
place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make
the records promptly available to any person.
* * * * * * *
(E) An agency, or part of an agency, that is an element of
the intelligence community (as that term is defined in section
3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)))
shall not make any record available under this paragraph to--
(i) any government entity, other than a State,
territory, commonwealth, or district of the United
States, or any subdivision thereof; or
(ii) a representative of a government entity
described in clause (i).
* * * * * * *
PART III--EMPLOYEES
* * * * * * *
Subpart E--Attendance and Leave
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 63--LEAVE
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER III--VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS OF LEAVE
* * * * * * *
Sec. 6339. Additional leave transfer programs
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter,
neither an excepted agency nor any individual employed in or
under an excepted agency may be included in a leave transfer
program established under any of the preceding provisions of
this subchapter.]
[(c)] (b)(1) * * *
(2) To the extent practicable, and consistent with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods (if applicable),
each program [under this section] under this subsection shall
be established--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of subsection (b), the
head of an excepted agency may, at his sole discretion, by
regulation establish a program under which an individual
employed in or under such excepted agency may participate in a
leave transfer program established under the provisions of this
subchapter outside of this section, including provisions
permitting the transfer of annual leave accrued or accumulated
by such employee to, or permitting such employee to receive
transferred leave from, an employee of any other agency
(including another excepted agency having a program under this
subsection).
(2) To the extent practicable and consistent with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods, any program
established under paragraph (1) shall be consistent with the
provisions of this subchapter outside of this section and with
any regulations issued by the Office of Personnel Management
implementing this subchapter.
(d) The Office [of Personnel Management] shall provide the
head of an excepted agency with such advice and assistance as
the head of such agency may request in order to carry out the
purposes of this section.
* * * * * * *
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SECTION 311 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002
SEC. 311. [ONE-YEAR] TWO-YEAR SUSPENSION OF REORGANIZATION OF
DIPLOMATIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROGRAM
OFFICE.
Notwithstanding any provision of subtitle B of title III of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public
Law 106-567; 114 Stat. 2843; 22 U.S.C. 7301 et seq.), relating
to the reorganization of the Diplomatic Telecommunications
Service Program Office, no provision of that subtitle shall be
effective during the period beginning on the date of the
enactment of this Act and ending on October 1, [2002] 2003.
* * * * * * *
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DAVID L. BOREN NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION ACT OF 1991
* * * * * * *
SEC. 802. SCHOLARSHIP, FELLOWSHIP, AND GRANT PROGRAM.
(a) Program Required.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry
out a program for--
(A) * * *
(B) awarding fellowships to graduate students
who--
(i) * * *
(ii) pursuant to subsection
(b)(2)(B), enter into an agreement to
work in a national security position or
work in the field of education in the
area of study for which the fellowship
was awarded; [and]
(C) awarding grants to institutions of higher
education to enable such institutions to
establish, operate, or improve programs in
foreign languages, area studies,
counterproliferation studies, and other
international fields that are critical areas of
those disciplines (as determined under section
803(d)(4)(C))[.]; and
(D) awarding grants to institutions of higher
education to carry out a National Flagship
Language Initiative (described in subsection
(i)).
(2) Funding allocations.--Of the amount available for
obligation out of the National Security Education Trust
Fund for any fiscal year for the purposes stated in
paragraph (1), the Secretary shall have a goal of
allocating--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
The funding allocation under this paragraph shall not
apply to grants under paragraph (1)(D) for the National
Flagship Language Initiative described in subsection
(i). For the authorization of appropriations for the
National Flagship Language Initiative, see section 811.
* * * * * * *
(h) Use of Awards To Attend the Foreign Language Center of
the Defense Language Institute.--(1) The Secretary shall
provide for the admission of award recipients to the Foreign
Language Center of the Defense Language Institute (hereinafter
in this subsection referred to as the ``Center''). An award
recipient may apply a portion of the applicable scholarship or
fellowship award for instruction at the Center on a space-
available basis as a Department of Defense sponsored program to
defray the additive instructional costs.
(2) Except as the Secretary determines necessary, an award
recipient who receives instruction at the Center shall be
subject to the same regulations with respect to attendance,
discipline, discharge, and dismissal as apply to other persons
attending the Center.
(3) In this subsection, the term ``award recipient'' means an
undergraduate student who has been awarded a scholarship under
subsection (a)(1)(A) or a graduate student who has been a
fellowship under subsection (a)(1)(B) who--
(A) is in good standing;
(B) has completed all academic study in a foreign
country, as provided for under the scholarship or
fellowship; and
(C) would benefit from instruction provided at the
Center.
(i) National Flagship Language Initiative.--(1) Under the
National Flagship Language Initiative, institutions of higher
learning shall establish, operate, or improve activities
designed to train students in programs in a range of
disciplines to achieve advanced levels of proficiency in those
foreign languages that the Secretary identifies as being the
most critical in the interests of the national security of the
United States.
(2) An undergraduate student who has been awarded a
scholarship under subsection (a)(1)(A) or a graduate student
who has been awarded a fellowship under subsection (a)(1)(B)
may participate in the activities carried out under the
National Flagship Language Initiative.
(3) An institution of higher education that receives a grant
pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(D) shall give special
consideration to applicants who are employees of the Federal
Government.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the Foreign Language
Center of the Defense Language Institute and any other
educational institution that provides training in foreign
languages operated by the Department of Defense or an agency in
the intelligence community is deemed to be an institution of
higher education, and may carry out the types of activities
permitted under the National Flagship Language Initiative.
SEC. 803. NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION BOARD.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Functions.--The Board shall perform the following
functions:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) After taking into account the annual analyses of
trends in language, international, area, and
counterproliferation studies under section 806(b)(1),
make recommendations to the Secretary regarding--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(C) which areas within the disciplines
described in section 802(a)(1)(C) are areas in
which United States students, educators, and
Government employees are deficient in learning
and in which insubstantial numbers of United
States institutions of higher education provide
training and are, therefore, critical areas
within those disciplines for the purposes of
that section; [and]
(D) how students desiring scholarships or
fellowships can be encouraged to work for an
agency or office of the Federal Government
involved in national security affairs or
national security policy upon completion of
their education[.]; and
(E) which foreign languages are critical to
the national security interests of the United
States for purposes of section 802(a)(1)(D)
(relating to grants for the National Flagship
Language Initiative).
* * * * * * *
SEC. 811. ADDITIONAL ANNUAL AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) In General.--In addition to amounts that may be made
available to the Secretary under the National Security
Education Trust Fund (under section 804 of this Act) for a
fiscal year, there is authorized to be appropriated to the
Secretary for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year
2003, $10,000,000, to carry out the grant program for the
National Flagship Language Initiative under section
802(a)(1)(D).
(b) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Amounts appropriated
pursuant to the authorization under subsection (a) shall remain
available until expended.
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SECTION 2 OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY
ACT
SEC. 2. SEPARATION PAY.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(f) Termination.--No amount shall be payable under this
section based on any separation occurring after September 30,
[2003] 2005.
* * * * * * *
(i) Remittance of Funds.--The Director shall remit to the
Office of Personnel Management for deposit in the Treasury of
the United States to the credit of the Civil Service Retirement
and Disability Fund (in addition to any other payments which
the Director is required to make under subchapter III of
chapter 83 and subchapter II of chapter 84 of title 5, United
States Code), an amount equal to 15 percent of the final basic
pay of each employee who, in fiscal year 1998, 1999, 2000,
2001, 2002, [or 2003] 2003, 2004, or 2005, retires voluntarily
under section 8336, 8412, or 8414 of such title or resigns and
to whom a voluntary separation incentive payment has been or is
to be paid under this section. The remittance required by this
subsection shall be in lieu of any remittance required by
section 4(a) of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994
(5 U.S.C. 8331 note).
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SECTION 1607 OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
Sec. 1607. Intelligence Senior Level positions
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Award of Rank to Employees in Intelligence Senior Level
Positions.--The President, based on the recommendations of the
Secretary of Defense, may award a rank referred to in section
4507a of title 5 to employees in Intelligence Senior Level
positions designated under subsection (a). The award of such
rank shall be made in a manner consistent with the provisions
of that section.