Senate Report 107-133 - PHONY IDENTIFICATION AND CREDENTIALS VIA THE INTERNET

[Senate Report 107-133]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

107th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 107-133
_______________________________________________________________________

PHONY IDENTIFICATION AND CREDENTIALS VIA THE INTERNET

__________

REPORT

PREPARED BY THE

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

February 4, 2002.--Ordered to be printed

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MAX CLELAND, Georgia PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel
Hannah S. Sistare, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk

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PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
MAX CLELAND, Georgia THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
Linda J. Gustitus, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Kim Corthell, Minority Staff Director
Eileen M. Fisher, Investigator to the Minority
Mary D. Robertson, Chief Clerk

C O N T E N T S

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Executive Summary................................................ 1

I. Introduction.................................................. 5
A. Summary of Investigation.................................... 5
B. Methods of Using the Internet to Find False Identification
Materials...................................................... 7
C. Earliest Websites Offering False Identification Information. 8
D. Legal Framework............................................. 9
(1) Federal Legislative History............................. 9
(2) Loopholes Caused by Advances in Technology.............. 11
(3) Internet False Identification Prevention Act of 2000.... 12

II. The Subcommittee Investigation............................... 13
A. Methods of Providing False Identification Materials by
Internet Sites................................................. 13
(1) Some Websites Offer False Identification Information and
Tools.......................................................... 14
(2) Some Websites Offer to Manufacture False Identification. 14
B. Types of False Identification Materials Available on the
Internet....................................................... 15
(1) Templates and Other Tools............................... 15
(2) False Identification Documents.......................... 17
(a) State Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards..... 17
(b) Other Identity Documents............................. 18
(c) ``Breeder'' Documents................................ 20
C. Marketing Practices......................................... 20
(1) Message Boards and Chat Rooms........................... 20
(2) Deceptive Practices..................................... 22
(3) Search Engine Placement and Keywords.................... 24
D. Disclaimers Have Little or No Legal Impact.................. 25
(1) Claims of Novelty....................................... 25
(2) Disclaimers Do Not Discourage Sales..................... 26
(3) Operators Use Disclaimers as a Shield................... 27
(4) Legal Challenges to Disclaimers......................... 29
E. Role of the Internet........................................ 30
(1) GThe Internet Allows Instantaneous and Anonymous Sales
and Transfers of False Identification.......................... 30
(2) Website Operators Disguise Their Names and Locations.... 33
F. Websites Offering False Identification Materials Facilitate
Other Crimes................................................... 35
(1) Identity Theft.......................................... 37
(2) GRecent Terrorist Acts May Have Been Facilitated by
False Identification........................................... 38
(3) Infiltration of Federal Facilities Using Phony
Identification................................................. 39

III. Case Studies................................................ 40
A. The Sellers................................................. 40
(1) Robert Sek: theidshop.com............................... 40
(a) Business............................................. 40
(b) Products............................................. 41
(c) Subcommittee Purchase................................ 41
(d) Disclaimer........................................... 41
(2) Brett Carreras: fakeid.net.............................. 43
(a) Business............................................. 43
(b) Products............................................. 43
(c) Disclaimer........................................... 44
(d) Related Websites..................................... 44
(3) Tim Beachum: bestfakeids.com............................ 45
(a) Business............................................. 45
(b) Products............................................. 45
(c) Subcommittee Purchase................................ 46
(d) Disclaimer........................................... 50
(4) Tim Catron: fakeidzone.com.............................. 50
(a) Business............................................. 50
(b) Products............................................. 50
(c) Disclaimer........................................... 51
(d) Other Online Activities.............................. 51
(5) Josh Dansereau.......................................... 52
(a) Business............................................. 52
(b) Products............................................. 52
(c) Disclaimer........................................... 53
(d) Legal Situation...................................... 53
B. The Buyers.................................................. 54
(1) Thomas Seitz............................................ 54
(a) Legal Situation...................................... 54
(b) Internet Activities.................................. 54
(c) Creating False Documents............................. 56
(2) Thana Barlee............................................ 57
(a) Background........................................... 57
(b) Internet Activities.................................. 57
C. Referrals................................................... 58

IV. Conclusion................................................... 59
A. GGeneral Services Administration Smart Card Technology for
Federal Facilities............................................. 59
B. Law Enforcement's Response to Crimes Using False
Identification................................................. 60
C. Implementing New Legislation................................ 61

PHONY IDENTIFICATION AND CREDENTIALS VIA THE INTERNET

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Executive Summary

The proliferation of false identification has become a
serious public safety issue. False identification documents and
credentials can enable criminals to commit a host of crimes
ranging from identity theft to bank and credit card fraud and
allow them to fund larger and more dangerous criminal
activities. Phony identification can also enable criminals to
obtain bona fide, yet unsupported and unauthorized,
identification documents such as driver's licenses. Moreover,
criminals may be able to evade law enforcement by hiding behind
their false identities. Failing to curb the spread of false
identification can have grave consequences, in fact, evidence
indicates that some associates of the Al Qaeda terrorist
organization may have used false identification and immigration
documents.
Also alarming is the ease with which General Accounting
Office (GAO) investigators were able to breach security at 21
of the most secure buildings in the United States, including
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and several airports by claiming--falsely,
using easily-obtained phony identification--that they were
armed law enforcement officers. GAO investigators displayed
fake law enforcement badges and phony credentials that they
themselves had crafted using graphics software and images
culled from Internet websites, and which bore little
resemblance to the genuine articles. When the investigators
presented themselves at security checkpoints, they were waved
around metal detectors and were not screened.
In a similar operation at sensitive Defense Department
facilities in May 2001 commissioned by Senator Susan M.
Collins, GAO investigators easily penetrated the sites using
readily-obtainable false identification--thus demonstrating
their vulnerability to unauthorized access by criminals and
terrorists. GAO's findings in these multiple penetration tests
demonstrate that, in addition to the lax security measures in
place at Federal facilities and airports, the Internet and
computer technology allow nearly anyone easily to create
convincing identification cards and credentials.
In December 1999, under the chairmanship of Senator Susan
M. Collins, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations began
a 5-month investigation into the availability of false
identification via the Internet. The Subcommittee's
investigation was prompted in part by an e-mail message
received by a Subcommittee investigator that solicited her to
purchase counterfeit driver's licenses. The Subcommittee began
investigating to determine the extent to which false
identification could be obtained via the Internet and found
that there are a myriad of websites offering false
identification materials.
The Subcommittee examined more than 60 websites offering
false identification materials, issued 11 subpoenas for
documents and depositions, and interviewed more than 40
witnesses. The Subcommittee also conducted an undercover
operation to purchase false identification materials--and
received, in turn, several high quality products, including a
counterfeit Oklahoma driver's license. Based on the results of
this undercover operation, the Subcommittee focused its
attention on three website operators each of whom offered high
quality products that could be used to produce credible false
identification and credentials.
The Subcommittee's investigation found that false
identification materials are distributed over the Internet
through a number of methods. Some websites offer to make
identification documents for customers which are then delivered
by mail. Others offer the computer files, known as
``templates,'' necessary to manufacture false identification
documents. Customers may purchase access to the templates and
download them to their own computers, or purchase a computer
disk containing the template files. Still other operators
simply offer the templates for free.
Templates are typically graphic files which can be
manipulated to hide and/or reveal images and text. Individuals
can also add images and text, such as photographs or
signatures, to templates in order to customize them. To make a
driver's license, for example, an individual would insert a
photo and signature, and type in the desired name and address.
The individual would then print the document, and laminate it,
thereby creating a highly realistic false identification
document. A single software template can be used an infinite
number of times, by an infinite number of individuals, and can
be transmitted via computer disk, or in an instant via the
Internet.
As a result of its investigation, the Subcommittee has
drawn three general conclusions. First, many Internet sites
offer a wide variety of phony identification documents, some of
which are of very high quality and include security features
commonly used by government agencies to deter counterfeiting.
These include driver's licenses from all 50 States, birth
certificates, Social Security cards, military identification
cards, student identifications, diplomas, press credentials,
and Federal agency credentials such as those used by the FBI
and CIA. The Subcommittee also found products such as Social
Security number generators, bar code generators, and
instructions for creating holograms.
Second, the disclaimers that can be found on many websites
are at odds with the marketing strategy pursued by the
operators of those websites. The Subcommittee found that
operators frequently attempted to shield themselves by claiming
that their products were ``for novelty purposes only.'' At the
same time, however, operators commonly implied that their
products were so authentic in appearance as to be illegal--
something they clearly considered to be a marketing asset. For
example, the Subcommittee found one website that offered a
``New Identity Kit'' purporting to contain ``[e]verything you
need to create a new identity for fun!!'' yet which encouraged
Internet users to order quickly, ``before we are shut down by
the authorities.'' Another website operator informed his
customers that his products were for ``entertainment and
educational purposes only,'' yet urged them to use the
documents on his website to get a job.
Third, the Internet has played a leading role in fostering
the manufacture and the sale of high quality false
identification, and has made these products available to a vast
customer base with virtual anonymity for both the sellers and
the buyers. This has, in turn, presented significant challenges
for law enforcement. For example, one operator, in an attempt
to disguise his true location, registered his website in the
Philippines and provided an e-mail address that appeared to
originate from another small country in the South Pacific. (The
Subcommittee determined through his billing records, however,
that he was actually located in Kansas.)
The Subcommittee's investigation culminated in a hearing,
entitled Phony IDs and Credentials Via the Internet--An
Emerging Problem, which was held on May 19, 2000. The hearing
witnesses were K. Lee Blalack, II, then-Chief Counsel and Staff
Director of the Subcommittee; Agent David C. Myers from the
Identification Fraud Coordinator for the State of Florida's
Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (now Lieutenant
Myers); Thomas Seitz, a convicted felon; and the Hon. Brian
Stafford, Director of the U.S. Secret Service.
In his hearing testimony, Mr. Blalack outlined the scope of
the Subcommittee's investigation, and discussed the
Subcommittee's case studies of Brett Carreras, Tim Beachum and
Tim Catron, who sold false identification materials over the
Internet. Lieutenant Myers provided an overview of Internet
sales of false identification documents, and detailed several
investigations of website operators that he and his team had
led, and that the Subcommittee also examined. Thomas Seitz
testified about the false identification documents he was able
to obtain over the Internet, and the crimes he was able to
commit using these phony documents. (These actions resulted in
his conviction on four felony counts, a 3-year State sentence
and a 7-month Federal sentence.) Finally, Director Stafford
testified about the proliferation of Internet crime and how the
Internet facilitates identity theft and other serious crimes
through the use of false identification documents. He also
outlined the role of the U.S. Secret Service in trying to curb
such activity.
The Subcommittee's hearing made clear that technological
developments during the past few years have significantly
increased the dangers associated with the production and
marketing of phony identification documents. Today, both the
necessary skills and materials are well within the reach of a
growing number of people. As then-Chairman Collins noted in her
opening statement:

``These counterfeit documents are relatively easy to
manufacture. With only a modest understanding of the
Internet and $50 worth of supplies purchased from an
arts and crafts store, one can design authentic-looking
identification documents within a few hours or even
minutes.'' \1\
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\1\ Phony IDs and Credentials Via the Internet: An Emerging
Problem: Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 106th Congress, 2nd Session
(May 19, 2000) [hereinafter ``Hearing record''], at 2 (remarks of
Senator Collins).

Moreover, it is becoming even easier to obtain and create false
identification documents, which can then be used for a wide
variety of improper and illegal purposes. Senator Carl Levin
noted in his opening statement, for example, that false
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identification documents are

``often now being used to carry out improper or
criminal activities--to obtain fraudulent loans, to
evade taxes, to establish a new identity, to steal
another individual's identity, to defraud Federal and
State Governments, to misrepresent one's residence or
place of birth or age for any variety of purposes.''
\2\
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\2\ Id. at 4 (remarks of Senator Carl Levin).

Indeed, a criminal can use phony identification documents
and credentials as so-called ``breeder'' documents, as a means
of gaining access to bona fide identification materials. Seitz
obtained a phony birth certificate, for instance, to obtain a
State identification card, which while itself authentic
(insofar as it was properly issued by the relevant
authorities), was based on false supporting documents and
contained false information. Through these means, Seitz
obtained unauthorized yet ``authentic'' documents, which are
particularly difficult to detect. These ``authentic'' documents
can then be used to commit a host of crimes, including bank
fraud, as Seitz unfortunately demonstrated. Although at the
time of this report investigations into the terrorist
atrocities of September 11, 2001, are still in the early
stages, it appears that some individuals associated with these
acts may also have used false supporting documents to obtain
``authentic'' false identification.
The Internet has visibly changed the false identification
industry. In his testimony before the Subcommittee, Lieutenant
Myers estimated that 30 percent of the false identification
documents his office seized during the year 2000 had been
obtained via the Internet--up from only about 1 percent just 2
years previously. Moreover, Lieutenant Myers expected this
figure to rise to between 60 and 70 percent for 2001.\3\
Indeed, Trent Sands, the author of a recent book on false
identification, claims that the Internet should be credited
with reviving the false identification business:
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\3\ Id. at 20 (testimony of Lieutenant David C. Myers).

``The Internet has breathed new life into the world of
false identification. Many new companies are springing
up to meet the needs of those who want documentation
saying they are someone else. * * * The robust health
of the mail-order and Internet identification business
is in stark contrast to the situation of just a few
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years ago.''

Since the Subcommittee began its investigation and began
contacting website operators, most of the individuals examined,
including Tim Catron and Tim Beachum, have removed their
websites from the Internet. Others, such as Brett Carreras,
have curtailed their activities. The Subcommittee has also made
referrals of potential violations of Federal and State law to
the appropriate members of the law enforcement community,
urging authorities to investigate further the activities of
several individuals involved with manufacturing and
distributing false identification documents. Nevertheless,
operators continue to spring up to take the places of those who
have closed their websites and offer false identification and
credentials over the Internet, although most of these new
operators are located abroad.
Accordingly, the Subcommittee considered means of curbing
this emerging problem, and in July 2000, then-Chairman Collins
introduced legislation designed to address the problem of
counterfeit identification documents. This legislation, the
Internet False Identification Prevention Act of 2000 passed the
Senate and the House of Representatives and was signed into law
on December 28, 2000. This statute, Public Law 106-578,
effected a number of changes in current law, including: (1)
establishing a multi-agency coordinating committee charged with
encouraging more enforcement of existing criminal laws by
dedicating investigative and prosecutorial resources
exclusively to this emerging problem; (2) modernizing several
portions of existing Federal law to ensure that it is suited to
the Internet age and the technology that is associated with it;
and (3) making it easier to prosecute those criminals who
manufacture, distribute, or sell counterfeit identification
documents by closing the legal loophole that had allowed them
to use easily-removable disclaimers in an attempt to shield
their illegal conduct from prosecution through a claim of
``novelty.'' Through aggressive law enforcement activity, and
continued Congressional attention and oversight, the
Subcommittee hopes and anticipates that it will be possible
dramatically to decrease the number of crimes committed using
false documents.
I. Introduction
A. Summary of Investigation
The Subcommittee's investigation was prompted in part by an
e-mail message received by a Subcommittee investigator that
solicited her to purchase counterfeit driver's licenses.\4\ The
Subcommittee began investigating to determine the extent to
which false identification could be obtained via the Internet.
Unfortunately, it quickly became apparent that there are a
myriad of websites offering false identification materials.
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\4\ This issue first came to the Subcommittee's attention when
Subcommittee Investigator Eileen Fisher received an unsolicited e-mail
message entitled, ``Authentic Confidential ID's!!'' The e-mail message
stated as follows:

L``Ever wanted a driver's license that pases [sic] all the
``tests''? Now you can have a Driver's License from any State no
questions asked! Former employees of the Department of Motor Vehicles
are now making Driver's licenses exactly 100% like the ones the DMV
makes, complete with Holgrams [sic] and Magnetic Strips.''

The message asked Investigator Fisher to send $15 in payment for
the fake driver's license. See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 22.
The individual responsible for this e-mail, Greg Dodson, agreed to a
consent judgment on May 19, 2000, in a lawsuit brought by ASD.com in
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The terms
of the consent judgment require Dodson to pay statutory damages under
the Tennessee anti-spamming statute of $10,000 plus attorney's fees.
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From mid-December 1999 to mid-May 2000, the Subcommittee
discovered approximately 60 websites offering to manufacture
and sell false identification documents or to provide the means
to manufacture false identification documents. These sites were
not hard to find: the Subcommittee located them by using major
search engines, examining the links on websites, and reviewing
messages posted on several discussion boards. The websites
primarily offered to manufacture or provide information about
State driver's licenses, with some operations offering to
manufacture or provide information about birth certificates,
government identification cards, Social Security cards, college
transcripts, and other identification documents.
The Subcommittee then reviewed in great detail
approximately 15 websites that offered false identification
information. These websites were selected based on the type and
quality of documents offered, the methods used to sell such
documents, and the physical location of website operations. As
part of the Subcommittee's review, the Subcommittee placed
orders under an assumed name to seven websites for the false
identification products that they offered. The Subcommittee
received materials from three of the websites. A summary of
these orders and results is provided in Table 1:

Table 1--Orders of False Identification Materials
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Company/Individual Product Ordered Cost Result
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
American Photo Company ^a................. Georgia driver's license $225 No product received.
with hologram.
NoveltyID4U^a............................. Social Security card........ $58 No product received.
Mike Burton.............................. Maine driver's $75 No product received.^b
license
The ID Shop/Robert Sek................... Oklahoma driver's license... $100 Received false
identification card closely
resembling an Oklahoma
driver's license.
J&J Enterprises/Josh Dansereau........... Connecticut driver's license $58 No product received.^c
Bestfakeids/Tim Beachum.................. Novelty ID Kit $30 Downloaded files containing
identification documents.
Fakeid.net/Brett Carreras................ Monthly access to premium $12.95/ The Subcommittee had access
files. month for several months to these
materials, which included
templates for 13 State
driver's licenses, the seal
of the Department of Health
and Human Services (which
is used on a Social
Security card), and a
template for a Canadian
driver's license.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
^a It appears that the same individual, John Carroll, operates both companies, and possibly several others
including phonyid.com.

^b When Subcommittee investigators contacted Burton, he admitted that he did not send the requested fake driver's
license because he was attempting to defraud customers by taking their money without shipping the goods
promised. Following the Subcommittee's referral of this case to the appropriate law enforcement authorities in
Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, Burton was charged with petty theft by fraud and fined approximately $200. He also
disestablished a website he had operated offering instructions on how to alter a driver's license, shredded
his own altered Wisconsin driver's license at the direction of authorities, and returned $75 to the
Subcommittee.

^c Dansereau was arrested by Florida agents in November 1999. Nevertheless, the Subcommittee's money order was
deposited into his account in February 2000. In June 2000, Dansereau signed a notarized affidavit confirming
his statement to the Subcommittee that since his arrest he has returned all orders for false identification
documents.

The identification materials the Subcommittee received took
different forms. After the Subcommittee mailed to the operator
of one website a photograph representing a fictitious person
with an address in Oklahoma, asking that the false
identification document be delivered to an address in Maryland,
the Subcommittee received a high quality identification card
\5\ that closely resembled a driver's license of the State of
Oklahoma. (This false identification document is further
described in Section III.A.(1).) The Subcommittee used a credit
card to purchase access to templates \6\ and information from
two other websites that can be used to manufacture false
identification documents. These websites are described in
Sections III.A. (2) and (3) of this report. The Subcommittee
also obtained templates and other information on false
identification from websites that did not charge for their
products.
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\5\ See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 9 (false Oklahoma
driver's license).
\6\ Templates are computer files that are frequently used to
manufacture false identification documents. See Section II.B.(1).
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The Subcommittee experienced difficulty in locating and
obtaining the cooperation of the operators of several of the
websites under review. As detailed in Section III.E.(2) of this
report, many of those responsible for these websites hid their
associations with the website or, when identified, were
unwilling to provide verifiable information to the
Subcommittee. Some websites appear to be operated by
individuals or companies located outside the United States,
making it difficult for the Subcommittee to compel the
production of information.
In the cases of several websites, the Subcommittee found
the sales of false identification materials to be significant,
as illustrated in Table 2:

Table 2--Revenues/Orders of Websites Offering False Identification Materials
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates of Revenue/
Company/Individual Est. Dates of Order Revenues Orders
Operation Information
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ID Shop/Robert Sek............................ 11/30/99-2/00 11/30/99-2/00 $1,000,000 21,000 ^a
^a
fakeid.net/Brett Carreras......................... 7/28/98-present 10/18/98-12/22/98 $8,239 ^b 621^b
Bestfakeids/Tim Beachum........................... 3/17/99-5/00 ^c 3/17/99-3/24/00 $31,305 ^d 1,294 ^d
Infoworld/Jeremy Martinez......................... 10/99-5/00 ^c 1/1/99-3/30/00 $23,728 ^d 1,177 ^d
fakeidzone/Tim Catron............................. 10/98-2/00 11/99-1/00 $12,250 ^b 652 ^b
J&J Enterprises/Josh Dansereau.................... 6/99-9/99 6/99-9/99 $3,000 ^d - 100 ^e
$250,000 ^a

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
^a Estimates from law enforcement reports.
^b Information provided by Verotel, the company recording billing information.
^c Website was operational as of May 19, 2000. However, it appears to have been taken down at some point between
the Subcommittee's hearing and the release of this report.
^d Company-supplied information.
^e Dansereau claimed that he manufactured about 100 false identification documents. Law enforcement officials
believe Dansereau failed to provide products to many customers.

B. Methods of Using the Internet to Find False Identification
Materials
The Internet offers users an ever expanding multitude of
information.\7\ With over 35 million domain names registered as
of June 4, 2001,\8\ the Internet provides users with an
opportunity to find information on virtually any subject.
Individuals across the world are using the Internet in ever
increasing numbers, with one source estimating the number of
Internet users worldwide as 414 million in 2000 and predicting
an increase to 1.17 billion by the year 2005.\9\
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\7\ The Internet is also called the World Wide Web, a term which is
often shortened to simply ``the Web.'' It is a linked collection of
electronic documents stored on computers called servers.
\8\ Netnames Int'l Ltd., Netnames (visited June 4, 2001) http://
www.netnames.com.
\9\ Computer Industry Almanac, Internet Users/Wireless Users
(visited June 4, 2001) http://cyberatlas.internet.com.
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The vast array of information sources on the Internet means
that most Internet users do not know the location of websites
that may contain information on a topic of interest to
them.\10\ Internet users thus routinely search for information
using ``search engines,'' \11\ programs which automatically
search large sections of the Internet in order to provide the
user with a list of websites likely to contain information
relevant to the user's request. After the user has entered one
or more words describing the subject matter of interest, these
search engines use different techniques to identify websites
with a high probability of containing the requested
information. Search engines may identify relevant websites
through comparison of the user's word description with terms on
a website or with descriptive terms, frequently called
``keywords,'' provided by the creator of the website in order
to guide or attract users to the website. Based on this
comparison, search engines provide an Internet user with a list
of websites. This list is often arranged in order of likelihood
of containing relevant information, and may provide a short
description of the information included on each site. The
search engine results page displays the address of each page
found as a result of the search, and allows the user to move
directly to each site with a simple click of the mouse.\12\ As
the Subcommittee demonstrated, these user-friendly and often
very powerful search techniques make it easy for Internet users
to discover and access websites offering a variety of false
identification documents.
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\10\ Websites, or pages, are located by an ``address'' known as a
domain name, an Internet Protocol (IP) address, or a Universal Resource
Locator (URL). This address is sometimes called the name of the site,
its address, or its location. Entering the URL of a web page through a
web browser or clicking on a link allows the user to access that page
through its server.
\11\ A ``search engine'' is a web page that uses computer
technology to find and display other web pages relating to the
information requested.
\12\ See e.g., Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 28 (search results
for term ``fake ID'' when using Excite.com search engine, http://
www.Excite.com).
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C. Earliest Websites Offering False Identification Information
The ever-changing nature of the Internet, and the fact that
web pages are often not preserved for later retrieval, prevent
documentation by the Subcommittee of the earliest websites
created containing information about false identification
materials. Website ``domain names'' are often sold or
transferred to different individuals or companies, and may be
used for an entirely different purpose at different times. The
Subcommittee's investigation was thus unable to determine with
great certainty which operators first used the Internet to
offer false identification information.
The earliest information about manufacturing false
identification appears to originate from three websites. A site
named ``Blur of Insanity,'' which currently describes itself as
``The #1 College Entertainment Website,'' \13\ is mentioned on
an Internet discussion board \14\ as having been one of the
first sites to display identification templates.\15\ According
to other messages on a discussion board,\16\ an individual
using the name ``Cycore'' provided information about false
identification materials on a site offered on a web page
provided through America OnLine (AOL)--at least until that
company allegedly dismantled the site. A third site, ``fake-
id.com,'' operated by John DeMayo, was registered with Network
Solutions on October 2, 1997. This site reportedly contained a
variety of templates and information about the driver's
licenses of many different States. Individuals obtaining these
templates and information about the formats of State driver's
licenses would then have the ingredients needed to manufacture
false identification. Although the Subcommittee was unable to
obtain specific information about the false identification
information presented on these early websites, it does appear
that the use of the Internet to manufacture and market
counterfeit identification documents dates at least to the mid-
1990s.
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\13\ See ``Blur of Insanity,'' (last visited Dec. 15, 2000), at
http://www.blurofinsanity.com.
\14\ See ``Fake ID Conversation,'' http://www.carreras.net/discus
(post by ``Allfree'' on Oct. 15, 1999).
\15\ A ``template'' is the term given to a document, often in the
form of a computer file that is able to be manipulated, and may contain
both graphic images and text, and that closely resembles the common
features of an official identification document.
\16\ See ``Fake ID Conversation,'' http://www.carreras.net/discus
(post by ``Webhost'' on Oct. 16, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Legal Framework
(1) Federal Legislative History
Almost 20 years ago, in the fall of 1982, the Subcommittee
held 3 days of public hearings examining the use of counterfeit
identity documents to defraud Federal benefit programs.\17\
These hearings came on the heels of a series of reports
demonstrating the growing problems caused by false
identification. Following the hearings, Congress enacted 18
U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1028 and 1738. These two laws are the primary
Federal statutes that relate to the availability of false
identification on the Internet. Section 1028 imposes penalties
for the production or use of false identification documents, as
well as for the possession of document making implements with
the intent to use them for an illegal purpose. Section 1738,
which was repealed in 2000, imposed a misdemeanor penalty for
possessing certain identification documents that do not bear a
specified disclaimer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ See generally, Federal Identification Fraud: Hearings before
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 97th Congress, 2nd Session (June 15-16, Sept. 23,
1982).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 1028 imposes felony sanctions of between 3 to 25
years in jail, depending how the false identification document
is used, for:

Lthe knowing, unauthorized production of an
identification document, or false identification
document;

Lthe transfer of an identification document
or false identification document, knowing that it was
stolen or produced without lawful authority;

Lthe possession with intent to use
unlawfully or to transfer unlawfully five or more
identification documents (other than those issued
lawfully for the use of the possessor) or false
identification documents;

Lthe possession of an identification
document (other than one issued lawfully for the use of
the possessor) or a false identification document with
the intent that such document be used to defraud the
United States;

Lthe possession, production, or transfer of
a document-making implement with the intent that the
implement be used in the production of a false
identification document or another document-making
implement;

Lthe possession of an identification
document that is or appears to be an identification
document of the United States, which is stolen or
produced without lawful authority, knowing that the
document was stolen or that its production was
unauthorized; and

Lthe unauthorized transfer of a means of
identification of another person with the intent to
commit, aid, or abet any unlawful activity that
violates Federal law or is a felony under State law.

Section 1028 applies only where (1) the identification document
or false identification document is or appears to be issued by
or under the authority of the United States, or the document-
making implement is designed or suited to making such an
identification document; (2) the offense involves the knowing
possession of an identification document (other than one
lawfully issued for the use of the possessor) or a false
identification document intended to be used to defraud the
United States; (3) the prohibited production, transfer,
possession or use is in or affects interstate or foreign
commerce; or (4) the means of identification, identification
document, false identification document, or document-making
implement is transported in the mail.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1028.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 1738 made it a misdemeanor punishable by up to 1
year in jail for anyone in the business of furnishing
identification documents, acting in furtherance of that
business, to use the mails for the

``mailing, carriage in the mails, or delivery of, or
[transportation] in interstate or foreign commerce, any
identification document * * * (1) which bears a birth
date or age purported to be that of the person named in
such identification document; * * * (2) knowing that
such document fails to carry diagonally printed clearly
and indelibly on both the front and back ``NOT A
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT'' in capital letters in not less
than 12-point type.'' \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1738(a).

An ``identification document'' is defined as ``a document which
is of a type intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of
identification of individuals and which is not issued by or
under the authority of a government.'' \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Id. at Sec. 1738(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Loopholes Caused by Advances in Technology
The Subcommittee found that the substantial majority of
false identification prosecutions have been brought under
Sec. 1028, while no prosecutions have been brought specifically
under Sec. 1738, perhaps because Sec. 1738 provided only for
misdemeanor penalties. Moreover, the Subcommittee's review of
the case law under Sec. 1028 did not find any prosecutions
involving the sale of false identification documents over the
Internet. Witness testimony at the Subcommittee's hearing
indicated, however, that the number of crimes committed
involving false identification is growing, and that the number
of prosecutions has not kept pace. Not only did the statute
need updating, the Subcommittee concluded, but law
enforcement's attention also needed to be refocused on this
crime.
Under Sec. 1028, the courts have looked to statutory
language, past decisions, and legislative history to determine
the appropriate scope of the terms ``identification document''
and ``document-making implement.'' The cases indicate that the
term ``identification document'' applied to completed and blank
birth certificates, driver's licenses, and Federal and State
identification cards.\21\ The statutory definition of a
``document-making implement'' included
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ See generally United States v. Alejandro, 118 F.3d 1518 (11th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Rohn, 964 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1992).

``any implement, impression, electronic device, or
computer hardware or software, that is specifically
configured or primarily used for making an
identification document, a false identification
document, or another document-making implement.'' \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1028(d)(1).

The case law suggests that this language has been applied to a
wide range of materials outside the Internet context, but it is
unclear whether the existing statutes would cover computer
files or false-identification software template files.
Specifically, it was unclear whether templates, which are used
in a large number of those false identification documents
transmitted over the Internet, constitute a document or a
document-making implement--or whether they were covered at all
under the original statutory definitions. The Subcommittee
concluded that new legislation was needed to ensure that such
computer technology is within the ambit of the statute,
particularly because it is the method of choice of today's
false identification manufacturers.
The Subcommittee found that people producing false
identification cited the disclaimer language in Sec. 1738 in
claiming to be operating in compliance with the law. For
example, Robert Sek of ``theidshop'' required that his
customers sign an agreement not to tamper with the product he
sent them. He then mailed his customers an identification card
sealed in an easily-removable plastic pouch that bore the
requisite disclaimers. The identification card inside the pouch
bore merely a disclaimer in tiny print.\23\ Through these
means, Sek sought to insulate himself from liability by
creating a product that appeared to comply with Sec. 1738, but
in fact was easily alterable to circumvent the statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 10 (Fake ID Man Message
Board http://pages.eidosnet.co.uk/fakeidman/ (post by ``Mexican311'' on
Mar. 17, 2000)). This post details the ease with which the disclaimer
on the identification card may be removed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For these reasons, it was apparent following the
Subcommittee hearing that the statutory definitions of
prohibited items needed to be updated to cover today's
technology, and that law enforcement's attention need to be
refocused on false identification crimes. Speaking from his
position as one on the front lines of the effort to curb phony
identification documents, for example, Lieutenant David C.
Myers, the Identification Fraud Coordinator for the State of
Florida's Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco,
testified to the difficulties he encountered, noting that false
identification website operators keep reappearing on the
Internet, a problem he suspected rises from loopholes in the
current legal code.\24\ After hearing this, Senator Collins
noted:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Id. at 22 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).

``I am more convinced than ever that we need a crack-
down by all levels of law enforcement on this area and
that we need to evaluate very closely whether Federal
law and penalties are sufficient to deter the
proliferation of these websites.'' \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Id. at 30 (remarks of Senator Collins).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Internet False Identification Prevention Act of 2000
On July 26, 2000, Senator Collins introduced S. 2924, the
Internet False Identification Prevention Act of 2000, in an
effort to curb the proliferation of websites that distribute
counterfeit identification documents and credentials over the
Internet. The bill was intended to accomplish this by promoting
a coordinated effort to improve the Federal Government's
ability to stem the use of false identification documents,
creating a law enforcement coordinating committee to focus on
false identification, updating existing law to reflect
technological advances, and encouraging law enforcement to
prosecute this serious and growing problem. On December 15,
2000, after incorporating several minor modifications to the
version that had previously passed the Senate, the U.S. House
of Representatives passed the Internet False Identification
Prevention Act of 2000. Thereafter signed by the President,
this bill became Public Law 106-578 on December 28, 2000. It
entered into effect on March 28, 2001.
Among its provisions, the new law authorizes a multi-agency
coordinating committee to investigate and prosecute the
manufacture and distribution of false identification documents.
The coordinating committee includes representatives from the
Treasury Department, the Justice Department, the U.S. Secret
Service, the FBI, the Social Security Administration, and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). This coordinating
committee is expected to operate like the Office of Internet
Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
except that it would file criminal rather than civil actions
and would be a multi-agency organization. This coordinating
committee shall exist for at least 2 years, with the President
having the authority to continue it for such additional time as
may be deemed necessary. At the end of each year of the
coordinating committee's existence, the Attorney General and
Secretary of the Treasury shall report to the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees on the investigation and prosecution of
crimes involving false identification, and make recommendations
for more effective investigation and prosecution.
Second, the new law was designed to amend Sec. 1028 in
order to bring this primary law on false identification in line
with current technology in several ways. The legislation
modifies the existing definition of ``document-making
implement,'' for example, to include computer templates and
files that are now frequently used to create counterfeit
identification documents from the Internet.
Third, the new law aims to close a loophole which allowed a
person to transfer (e.g., through a website or e-mail), either
false identification software templates or actual finished
documents. The law's new provision thus expands the definition
of ``transfer'' to include selecting, placing, or directing the
placement of an identification document, false identification
document, or document-making implement in an online location
where it is available to others. This should ensure that
offering a false identification document or template for
download on a website is considered an illegal act.
Fourth, the new law repeals Sec. 1738, thus ending
individuals' ability to use alterable disclaimers in legally
producing identification documents that include the age or
birth date of an individual. The effect of repeal of Sec. 1738
is that it will no longer be legal to manufacture and sell
false identification products even if they display the
previously-required ``NOT A GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT'' disclaimer.
As the Subcommittee's hearing revealed, this type of disclaimer
can be fashioned so as to be easily removable on both computer
templates and counterfeit identification documents. It is now
illegal to produce, possess, or sell any identification
document that resembles an identification document issued by
any government entity; any such activity will be a felony.
It is the Subcommittee's hope that this new law will also
focus attention on the growing problem of Internet-facilitated
false identification. This alone may help rein in the more
visible operators, for shedding light on this industry does
appear to be at least a temporary deterrent. Lieutenant Myers
testified at the hearing, for example, that:

``Probably the biggest impact that we have had on the
Internet as I monitor it and have for many years is the
work done by your own Subcommittee's investigators.
They had a dramatic impact on those on the Internet.
Not even knowing their investigation was going on, I
could see that the activity on the Internet as it
related to false ID was going through some changes.''
\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Id. at 21-22 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).

The Subcommittee hopes that the combination of its work on the
subject and the legislation to curb the manufacture and
distribution of false identification documents over the
Internet, along with renewed attention from law enforcement
will decrease the number of crimes committed using the false
documents.
II. The Subcommittee Investigation
A. Methods Of Providing False Identification Materials By Internet
Sites
The Subcommittee's investigation found two primary methods
by which the operators of websites provide false identification
materials: some simply provide their customers with the tools
they need to produce their own false identification. These
products are generally mailed in disk form to the customer, or
more frequently, transmitted via the Internet, or available for
downloading. Other website operators produce a completed false
identification document for their customers themselves, which
they deliver to the customer through the mail.
(1) LSome Websites Offer False Identification Information and Tools
Some website operators offer to mail customers a disk
containing computer files. The operator of fakeidzone.com, Tim
Catron, used the following language to promote his products:

``Our novelty id kit's allows anyone to make a new
identity. Maybe you would like to be able to spot fake
id's [sic] for your job, or you need a new novelty
birth certificate, or maybe you want to make some money
selling novelty id's. Everything you need is right
here! You will get full instructions with details on
how to use your kit--as well as hundreds of templates,
and tech support if needed.'' \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 32b (Tim Catron, Fake ID
Zone (visited Jan. 3, 2000) http://www.digitalhideout.com/idkit.html)
(original punctuation and spelling preserved).

These website operators usually require payment by mail and
provide the disk via return mail. Such sites are frequently
unable or unwilling to use a third party for billing, and
customers using such sites may not have credit cards or prefer
to send their payment using untraceable methods such as cash or
money order.
The operator of the website fakeid.net, Brett Carreras,
promoted his site as ``[t]he world's first and finest site
devoted solely to fake ID information.'' This website contained
free information such as State seals, coded numeric information
on State issued identification, and templates that would assist
an individual to create false identification. Fakeid.net also
sold membership access to ``premium'' files containing high
quality templates of State driver's licenses. Website operators
offer files for the customer to download, maintain accounts
with credit card or billing companies, and customers charge
their purchase to a credit card, pay by telecheck, or pay
through their telephone bill. Once the billing company has
confirmed the purchase, an authorization code is provided to
the customer for access to the files containing the information
about false identification documents.
Other websites offer, without charge, files available for
downloading that contain false identification materials. For
example, one website operator promoted the products offered
with the following statement: ``Welcome to the Fake ID Archive!
Here you will find everything you will need to make your own
Fake ID.'' \28\ The Fake ID archive's product list included
high quality, layered templates that customers could use to
manufacture false identification. While the operators of these
websites appear to be offering their products for free, their
sites may generate income by linking to other web pages whose
owners pay a fee for directing potential customers to them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Fake ID Archive (visited Apr. 21, 2000) http://
www.fakeids.cjb.net.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Some Websites Offer to Manufacture False Identification
Some websites offer to make identification documents for
customers. The operator of theidshop.com, Robert Sek, offered
to provide customers with PVC plastic identification cards \29\
that closely resembled State driver's licenses. The
Subcommittee purchased a phony Oklahoma driver's license from
Sek, and found that the identification was high quality, and
closely replicated a bona fide Oklahoma driver's license. The
Subcommittee's purchase is detailed in Section III.A.(1). Sek's
web page described his products as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Polyvinylchloride, commonly known as PVC, is a widely used
type of plastic. PVC is frequently used to make cards such as
identification badges and credit cards.

``The ID Shop is proud to be the first Id website to
ever offer PVC plastic holographic ID's. These are the
highest quality novelty ID's money can buy. They also
come with many added security options such as
holograms.'' \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 31 (Robert Sek, PVC
Plastic Id's (visited Jan. 27, 2000) http://www.theidshop.com).

The operator of fakeids.org, Josh Dansereau, similarly promoted
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
his products as follows:

All of are ID's are the new plastic credit card style,
they come with a working magnetic strip at no extra
charge. No one will question these Ids, even put to the
book test * * * they pass. We get e-mails everyday
about how great they work. Our Ids are made to very
strict standards, you will be completely satisfied.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Josh Dansereau, Gallery (visited Nov. 9, 1999) http://
www.fakeid1.com/gallery.htm (original punctuation and spelling
preserved).

These websites ask the customer to send the information
that he or she wants on the identification document along with
a picture, signature, and payment. The operator of the website
manufactures the new identification, makes no attempt to verify
that the information is true, and sends the customer the false
identification document via return mail.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Identification documents are sent by return mail, at least,
when the operator of the website is not simply defrauding customers of
their money by providing no product whatsoever. As noted in Table 1,
for example, the website operated by Mike Burton was designed to elicit
orders for false identification products that Burton never intended to
provide. Such activity is not a false identification crime, but instead
constitutes simple fraud.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. LTypes of False Identification Materials Available on the Internet
(1) Templates and Other Tools
Some websites offer template and other tools that aid
individuals in the manufacture of false identification
documents. Templates are computer files that are frequently
used to manufacture false identification documents. Templates
are typically layered graphic files that can be manipulated to
hide and reveal images and text. Layering a template enables
the customer to replicate closely a feature on a State driver's
license, such as a signature or seal, that appears to cover a
portion of a picture, as each layer contains a portion of the
entire image, such as the seal or signature. Individuals can
also add images and text such as photographs or signatures to
templates in order to customize them. To make a driver's
license, for example, an individual would insert a scanned
photograph and signature, and type in the correct name and
address. Then the individual would print the document and
laminate it. Because templates are merely electronic code
indicating the graphic patterns of the desired document, one
template can effectively be used an infinite number of times,
by an infinite number of individuals, and can be transmitted
easily via computer disk, or virtually instantaneously over
telephone lines via the Internet.
In the case of the older versions of the Maine driver's
license, for example, both the State seal and the signature of
the Secretary of State overlap the picture of the license
holder. This is a security feature that helps prevent the
physical alteration of an actual license by the simple
expedient of replacing the original picture, since such
tampering would cover a portion of the seal and signature. A
layered computer template allows a new picture to be inserted
``under'' the seal and signature so that it duplicates an
official license. A simple ``mouse click'' in the program
deletes the seal and signature block. After the user inserts
the desired picture, the seal and signature block are simply
reapplied as a layer above the picture.\33\ In this manner,
users are able to defeat many of the security features that
authorities have put in place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibits 4 and 5. Exhibits 4 and
5 show, respectively, a template for a Maine driver's license without a
photo in the photo layer, and a template for a Maine driver's license
with a photo in the photo layer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With sophisticated templates and printers available, it is
within the reach of a growing number of people to produce false
identification and credentials. As Senator Collins noted in her
opening statement at the Subcommittee hearing:

Some websites offer other security features or devices
that, when added to a template, result in a more realistic
identification document. Websites provide bar codes, or
computer programs that generate a bar code, which may then be
used as part of a counterfeit driver's license. Lieutenant
Myers noted in his testimony at the hearing that website
operators are keeping pace with the security features that
States have been adding to their identification documents.
``Things like bar codes and even two-dimensional bar codes that
some States are going to,'' he noted, ``are easily generated
off the Internet. There are several sites that assist you in
generating these security features.'' \35\ Other websites
reproduce the seal or flag used by States on their driver's
licenses.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Id. at 20-21 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers); see also, e.g.,
Jeremy Martinez, New Identity Kit (visited Dec. 10, 1999) http://
www.newid.ultramailweb.com.
\36\ See e.g., Brett Carreras, Fake ID.Net (visited May 12, 2000)
http://www.fakeid.net.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other websites provide a computer program that enables the
user to generate a realistic driver's license number. Many
States use special coding in their driver's license numbers,
allowing verification of the license by matching the driver's
license number with certain characteristics of the owner. For
example, the first letter of the driver's license number may
correspond to the first letter of the owner's last name. Other
digits may correspond to the month and year of birth, sex, or
eye color. These websites offer a program that replicates a
driver's license number that corresponds to the code of the
State selected for a phony driver's license.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ See e.g., Tim Catron, Fake ID Zone
http:www.digitalhideout.com/idkit.html; Jeremy Martinez, New Identity
Kit http://internetwebhosting.com/newid/iddownload; Novelty Fake ID
Info CD (item 286156827) http://www.ebay.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other websites offer Social Security number generators or
explain the method used by the Social Security Administration
in issuing actual Social Security numbers. This numerical
coding, corresponding to the State and year of birth, provides
another method to verify the apparent identity of an
individual. Such information, when available and used by those
manufacturing false identification documents, can be used to
create a Social Security number that appears to match a
counterfeit identity.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ See e.g., Jeremy Martinez, New Identity Kit (visited Dec. 10,
1999) http://www. newid.ultramailweb.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) False Identification Documents
(a) State Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards
The Subcommittee found that many websites offer to
manufacture, or provide information that would allow the
customer to manufacture, a document that would closely
replicate the driver's licenses of various States. Most such
websites are illustrated by pictures of the products that they
offer,\39\ usually images of State driver's licenses. These
images often include the picture of an individual or appear to
be actual licenses, with either the picture or name of the
individual removed. In other instances, the images shown are
copied from samples appearing in a book published for law
enforcement and private sector businesses that describes the
features of State driver's licenses and identification cards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ See, e.g., Hearing record at Exhibit 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Subcommittee's investigation found that the quality of
the materials manufactured or offered by each website varied
considerably. Some websites produced documents that closely
replicated the driver's license of a State in graphic images,
size, shape, format, color, typeface, and placement of features
such as State seals and signatures, while others clearly bore
little resemblance to the genuine article. Lieutenant Myers
noted in his testimony that phony identification documents are
available via the Internet for all 50 U.S. States and many
government agencies.\40\ Websites manufacturing high quality
identification documents frequently attempt to duplicate
security features such as ``ghost'' pictures, holograms, and
bar codes or magnetic stripes. These security features are very
valuable to manufacturers, as they contribute to the realistic
look of the counterfeit document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Hearing record, supra, at 13 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Lieutenant Myers testified at the hearing, these
security features now pose little difficulty to counterfeiters:

``Some of the features on the license * * * such as the
what we call a ghost image picture, those were very,
very difficult to reproduce in years past due to the
technology that we had at that time. Now it is very
simple.'' \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Id. at 20 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).

In fact, Lieutenant Myers added, ``our [law enforcement]
training programs have to be updated virtually every month to
come up with new technologies that are being used.'' \42\ No
longer are individuals who devote many hours of study and
practice the only ones able to reproduce these once effective
security features. Senator Collins observed during the hearing
that
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Id. at 21 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).

``Many States, such as Connecticut, have added * * *
security features * * * for example, one of the
security features is the shadow picture and the bar
code. But my staff was able to replicate that in a way
that makes it virtually indistinguishable from a real
Connecticut license.'' \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Id. at 20 (remarks of Senator Collins).

Some websites also offer documents that closely resemble a
State driver's license, but are missing one or more security
features. Such documents are still quite effective for
commercial activities and also might be used to obtain other
authentic documents, because only trained personnel are likely
to notice the subtle differences. Trent Sands, author of the
book, Fake ID by Mail and Modem, advises his readers to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
capitalize on this lack of training:

``Mail order documents can be used effectively in
situations where the ID cannot be verified by the
person you are presenting it to. Consider the case of
where an individual wants to open a bank account * * *.
The bank clerk will accept the document without any
problem if it looks real.'' \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Trent Sands, Fake ID by Mail and Modem, at 23 (2000).

Moreover, there are a multitude of State identification cards
in circulation, employing a wide variety of security features.
This is a serious problem about which Lieutenant Myers
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified at the hearing, noting that

``there are over 200 active State identification cards
and driver's licenses due to the fact that most States
have an ID card and driver's license and have valid
older formats also. So in order for a law enforcement
person to be able to recognize all these features in
areas like Florida, where we have a lot of out-of-State
people, it is almost impossible to have everyone at the
expert status in order to identify all these types of
legal identification.'' \45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Hearing record, supra, at 20 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Other Identity Documents
Some websites actually offer to manufacture a counterfeit
Social Security card. The card issued by the Social Security
Administration is not intended to be an identification
document, and thus contains only an individual's name and
Social Security number. Older Social Security cards feature no
real security features, although recently issued cards are more
resistant to forgery.\46\ The Subcommittee also found a wide
range of other identity documents available from websites, such
as press credentials, a travel agent card, a tax exempt card, a
gun owner's permit, and a resident activity coordinator
certificate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Chris Hibbert, What to do When They Ask for Your Social
Security Number (Apr. 5, 1997) http://www.faqs.org/ (Internet FAQ
Consortium, Internet FAQ Archives, Usenet FAQs, Filename privacy/ssn-
faq).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even more alarming is the availability online of government
agency credentials. Lieutenant Myers noted that most law
enforcement credentials are ``much easier to copy and
counterfeit than driver's licenses.'' Unlike driver's licenses,
most law enforcement credentials are ``merely a picture stuck
on a card and laminated.'' \47\ The Subcommittee learned that
in general, law enforcement credentials frequently use fewer
security features than do State driver's licenses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Hearing record, supra, at 13 and 22 (testimony of Lieutenant
Myers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several investigations have shown the ease with which such
technology can be used to gain unauthorized access to a variety
of sensitive areas. This problem was highlighted at a House
Judiciary Subcommittee hearing held on May 25, 2000,\48\ for
example, which detailed how investigators from the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) Office of Special Investigations (OSI)
used credentials they had made using the method described above
by Lieutenant Myers to gain easy access to 19 secure Federal
sites and 2 commercial airports.\49\ In a similar operation at
certain sensitive Defense Department facilities in May 2001
commissioned by Senator Collins, GAO/OSI investigators
penetrated the sites using easily-obtainable false
identification--thus demonstrating their potentially
catastrophic vulnerability to unauthorized access by criminals
or terrorists.\50\ GAO's findings in these multiple penetration
tests demonstrate that, in addition to the lax security
measures in place at Federal facilities and airports, the
Internet and computer technology allow nearly anyone easily to
create convincing identification cards and credentials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ See generally, Breaches of Security at Federal Agencies and
Airports: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime, House Committee on
The Judiciary, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess. (May 25, 2000).
\49\ See U.S. General Accounting Office, Security: Breaches at
Federal Agencies and Airports, GAO/T-OSI-00-10 (May 25, 2000)
(statement of Robert H. Hast) [hereinafter ``Hast statement''].
\50\ This investigation demonstrated such a serious security
vulnerability that the Defense Department classified the previously-
unclassified GAO report at the SECRET level in the wake of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks upon New York City and Washington,
D.C. For this reason, it is not possible to provide any more details of
the operation here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Various reviews of the security of identification documents
have long noted the problems caused by the variety of different
identification documents used in the United States. Reverend
Theodore Hesburgh, past chairman of the Select Commission on
Immigration and Refuge Policy, once described the United States
as a ``document forgers'' paradise.'' \51\ According to one
1989 estimate, basic civil documents are issued by over 7,000
jurisdictions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ David Simcox, Secure Information: The Weak Link in Immigration
Control (May 1989) http://www.npg.org/forms/secure--id.htm (quoting
Rev. Theodore Hesburgh).

``The lack of uniformity, uneven quality, and relaxed
rules of issuance of many of these documents guarantees
widespread abuse. Falsified or stolen vital statistics
records become ``breeder documents'' for a chain of
false documents that open the doors to highly prized
entitlements--legal resident status for illegal aliens,
social security, food stamps, unemployment
compensation, and guaranteed student loans.'' \52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) ``Breeder'' Documents
The Subcommittee found various Internet sites that offer a
variety of other types of identification documents or
information that could be used to create other false
identification documents. Several websites offer to provide
false birth certificates, for example, which can be then
completed to create a new identity or be used for identity
theft. Sands cautioned his readers in Fake ID by Mail and
Modem,

``The smart use of a fake ID is as a stepping stone to
a new identity with REAL documents. It may be necessary
to use high quality fake ID in the interim to rent a
mailing address or open a bank account, but the final
goal should be to dispense with the fake ID as soon as
possible.'' \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Sands, supra, at 5.

Birth certificates, when accepted as authentic, can thus be
what are called ``breeder'' documents,\54\ allowing the
individual who creates a false birth certificate to obtain
authentic identification documents from an authorized
government agency. In one case reviewed by the Subcommittee,
which is explained in further detail in Section III.B.(1),
Thomas Seitz obtained a blank birth certificate from a website,
completed the birth certificate with the biographical
information of another person, and used it to obtain a valid
identification card from the State of New Jersey. Seitz
explained his reasons at the Subcommittee hearing:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ A breeder document is a document that can be used to obtain
other valid forms of identification.

``[T]he birth certificate is sort of the key. That is
the preferred document of identity that most agencies,
DMV and other government agencies, like to see. That,
coupled with a second form, the W-2, enabled me to go
to the New Jersey Department of Motor Vehicles and
present those documents and they would, in turn give me
the top document there, which is a genuine photo
identification card.'' \55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ Hearing record, supra, at 18 (testimony of Thomas W. Seitz);
see also id. at Exhibit 12 (Seitz's fake birth certificate, W-2 form,
and New Jersey identification card).

The Subcommittee found a number of templates for documents
that are not typically issued by government organizations.
These supporting identification documents, while not as
universally accepted as a driver's license or birth
certificate, allow individuals to obtain other legitimate
identification documents. For example, an individual could use
a false press pass or travel agent card to obtain a legitimate
library card or account with a telephone company bearing the
desired false identification. With those cards and account
information, or the names and addresses that appear on bills,
the individual could then obtain other more universally
accepted forms of identification.
C. Marketing Practices
(1) Message Boards and Chat Rooms
Websites that offer false identification materials or
documents market their products in a variety of ways. Some
appeal to those seeking to change their identity. For example,
the home page of photoidcards.com offers customers the
opportunity to ``[d]isappear completely and start a new life!''
Some sites tout the ability of the customer, using the
materials supplied by the company, to create a wide variety of
false identification materials. The site fakeidzone.com markets
products to younger age groups, offering not only driver's
licenses that would allow a juvenile to purchase alcohol, but
also college transcripts and college diplomas.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 6 (Tim Catron, Fake ID
Zone http://www.digitalhideout.com/idkit.html).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Internet discussion boards are a free and easy means of
advertising both products and websites. A posting to the
newsgroup ``alt.2600.fake-id'' by an operator of phonyid.com,
referring to himself as ``Cybersario,'' stated as follows:

``Don't get ripped off ordering from those scam sites
on the net, order from the company that has been
selling online since 1994. Phonyid.Com has been
featured in everything from High Times to ABC News. We
supply the highest quality ids and we are the only site
which offers actual State holograms. Before you
purchase a fake id do a little research and you will
find that Phonyid.Com is the most trustworthy supplier
of fake ids on the net.'' \57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Forum alt.2600.fake-id http://www.deja.com/group/
alt.2600.fake-id (post by ``Cybersario'' on Dec. 15, 1999). This
individual presented him/herself as a Phonyid.com customer.

The Subcommittee's investigation indicated that the operators
of Phonyid.com posted as many as 600 messages on a variety of
topics on news group message boards.\58\ Messages posted on
discussion boards reach large numbers of people quickly at
minimal or no cost to the individual posting the message.
Moreover, they target the desired audience of people who are
Internet and computer savvy, and who may be interested in
purchasing products online, or in using computer files such as
templates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ See Domain Watch (visited Dec. 17, 1999) http://
www.domainwatch.com (posting history for [email protected]).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most of the individuals posting comments on the discussion
boards sign their messages ``anonymous'' or make use of obvious
pseudonyms. This allows individuals who sell false
identification products to post messages purporting to be from
their own ``satisfied customers.'' Again using the
``Cybersario'' pseudonym, for example, the operators of
Phonyid.com posted a number of messages in an attempt to assure
potential buyers of their site's authenticity. In one instance,
they posted a message saying ``http//www/phonyid.com. The ids
cost about $200.00 but they are realistic.'' \59\ In another
case, a posted message read:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Forum alt.2600.fake-id http://www.deja.com/group/
alt.private.investigator (post by ``Cybersario'' on Aug. 25, 1999)

``Phonyid.com has really good ids. I use them when I
need to pick up something when I am carding....has
worked everytime [sic] so far. I think the price is
high but what i use them for it doesn't really matter,
i am getting rich anyway.'' \60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Forum alt.2600.fake-id http://www.deja.com/group/
alt.2600.fake-id (post by ``Cybersario'' on Nov. 30, 1999).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a third instance, a message was posted saying:

``This site has the best id cards. Just got my id with
hologram and it is the [deleted]. Cards only $150.00
but the hologram makes it worth it. I back these guys
100%.'' \61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ Id. (Post by ``Cybersario'' on Jan. 5, 2000).

Using similar tactics, an individual styling himself ``IMO''
posted comments about several of the websites that had recently
closed, again, possibly in an effort to boost the legitimacy of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the sites:

``Perhaps you people are unaware but all the major id
sites have had their offices raid [sic] within the past
few months. I would hold off on ordering for a little
while, because the site you order from might be the
next one busted. It started with Noveltyid4u.com, they
got busted about 2\1/2\ months ago when the secret
service raided them for making false government
documents. Phonyid.com got busted about 2 months ago
for making counterfeit driver's licenses and
passports.'' \62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Fakeidman's Discussion Forum http://network54.com/Hide?Forum
(re-post entitled ``You were not scammed, THEY WERE BUSTED!!,'' posted
on Apr. 3, 2000).

The Subcommittee believes that the individual or group of
individuals responsible for the above series of postings are
the operators of the website. Furthermore, the Subcommittee
placed orders with two websites, American Photo Company and
Noveltyid4u.com, that the Subcommittee now believes were
operated by a small group of individuals and may have been
wholly fraudulent. The Subcommittee never received any product
in return for the $283 it sent these two websites, nor, it
suspects, did many other of these sites' would-be customers.
(2) Deceptive Practices
Website operators frequently use deceptive advertising to
entice potential customers. Some make claims about the
credentials of their employees, while others tout features of
their cards that are likely to be untrue. Experience at a State
department of motor vehicles (DMV) is one of the main lures the
website operators employ. For example, photoidcards.com, a
company based in Canada, claims that ``all id cards are
professionally designed by an ex-DMV staff,'' and that
photoidcards.com has ``25 years of experience working with DMV
offices worldwide.'' \63\ In fact, photoidcards.com includes
commentary from the aforementioned alleged ``former DMV''
employee, who says of the photoidcards.com products that ``the
finish and design of virtually every aspect is outstanding.''
\64\ Website operators tout the services of ``former DMV''
staff to attract customers, since many of the security features
of State issued driver's licenses and the methods of making
them are known only to DMV employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ Loren Marceau, Home Page (visited Dec. 12, 2000) http://
www.photoidcards.com.
\64\ Loren Marceau, Frequently Asked Questions (visited Feb. 4,
2000) www.photoidcards.com/faq.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Website operators also claim that their products have
certain hard-to-duplicate security features that are in high
demand and lend authenticity to the counterfeit documents. For
example, many websites boast that their fraudulent
identification documents bear holograms, working magnetic
strips, and markings that appear under ultra violet light. Josh
Dansereau of Fakeids.org, for example, promoted his products by
stating on his home page that ``all id's are digital id cards*
with working mag stripes that really scan.'' \65\ In his
``Frequently Asked Questions'' section, however, Dansereau
admitted that the magnetic strips are not functional: ``Do you
have the credit card type of id with the magnetic stripe on the
back? Yes, our ID's are the credit card style. The magnetic
stripe on the back is for looks only, it does not really scan,
it just makes the id more realistic.'' \66\ Many States now
encode a magnetic strip on the back of their driver's licenses
with an individual's biographical information. This is of only
limited utility, however, as most bars, banks and retail stores
do not possess the equipment to test the authenticity of the
magnetic strip on an identification card--and thus to tell a
false identification with a non-functional strip from a real
one.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 30 (Josh Dansereau, Home
Page (visited Jan. 3, 2000) http://www.freehosting2.at.webjump.com/
413a62646/fa/fakeids-org/gallery.htm).
\66\ Josh Dansereau, Frequently Asked Questions (visited Jan. 27,
2000) http://www.freehosting2.at.webjump.com/413a62646/fa/fakeids-org/
faqhelp.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another prized security feature is the hologram. IDnow.com,
for example, states that ``the holograms we use are DMV issued
meaning they will match exactly with an original ID.'' \67\
Theidshop.com notes in the description of its PVC plastic
identification documents:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ Welcome to Idnow.com (visited Jan. 3, 2000) http://
www.idnow.com/faq.html.

``The ID Shop is proud to be the first ID website to
ever offer PVC plastic holographic ID's. These ID's are
the highest quality novelty ID's money can buy. They
also come with many added security options such as
holograms.'' \68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ See Hearing record, Exhibit 31.

The difficult nature of obtaining realistic holograms is
demonstrated by the high volume of postings on message boards
concerning holograms. Most of these postings focus upon how to
craft them or obtain them. Moreover, instructions on how to
make a hologram are also frequently included on the
identification kits that are marketed by many websites. (These
instructions offer advice on what sort of reflective gold paint
to buy, and how to craft stencils. Some suggest using gold eye
shadow.)
Another deceptive marketing technique frequently employed
by false identification website operators is to urge potential
customers to order before the website is closed down by
authorities--thus building market appeal upon the suggestion
that the documents provided are so realistic that the site is
operating illegally. In the advertising copy designed to
promote his ``New Identity Kit,'' for example, Jeremy Martinez
stated that ``We are revealing the secrets that they don't want
you to know. Order now, before we are shut down by
authorities.'' \69\ Martinez offered products titled, ``99 Ways
to Disappear,'' and ``Better Ways to Disappear.'' \70\
Promaster Cards, a website based in the United Kingdom,
similarly boasts about the illegality of its products, noting
that ``we continue to be a major headache to several DMV and
Law Enforcement Agencies from around the world.'' \71\
Promaster Cards also states that ``we have been shut down
several times by the FBI and Treasury Department under various
forgery acts of US law.'' \72\ Finally, the website boldly
adds,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ Jeremy Martinez, New Identity Kit (visited Jan. 20, 2000)
www.vsub.com/newid./htm. Martinez ultimately was shut down by the
authorities.
\70\ Id.
\71\ Promaster Cards (visited Dec. 20, 1999) http://
members.xoom.it/--XOOM/driverid/page2.html.
\72\ Id.

``We are openly admitting that we are breaking State,
Federal and several European law [sic] by providing ID
that are exact replicas in every detail of the current
IDs provided from the countries in our list.'' \73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 13 (About Promastercard
(visited Dec. 20, 1999) http://members.xooPromasm.it/--XOOM/driverid/
index.html).

Statements of this type are obviously designed to entice people
into buying products that appear so real that they are
outlawed.\74\ This, they clearly feel, is precisely what their
customers seek.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ On bestfakeids.com/splash/splash.html, Tim Beachum also used
the ploy that the product price will soon rise: ``The street price on
our novelty fake id kit is $99.00, we sell the same kit online at a
discount price of $39.97. If you order our kit before midnight [of a
specific date] you only pay $29.97.'' The end-of-sale date changes
automatically every day so that no matter when a would-be customer sees
the site, the promotion will always appear to be nearly over.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Search Engine Placement and Keywords
Many websites operators rely on the skillful use of
keywords to place their websites high on search engine results
lists. High search engine placement results in more visitors
and, therefore, more customers. In his written response to a
Subcommittee questionnaire, Jeremy Martinez explained the
importance of using keywords effectively:

``Since I am good at web promotion in the search
engines, I am able to obtain prime spots in search
engines, whereby surfers find me first and purchase
from me instead of downloading [templates], from the
free sites.'' \75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 17 (Martinez questionnaire
response, at 3 (Mar. 30, 2000)). See Federal Trade Commission v. Jeremy
Martinez, individually and d/b/a Info World, Case No. 00-12701,
Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief (U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Dec. 5, 2000); ``Fake Ids'' City News
Service (May 18, 2001). Martinez's use of keywords, or ``meta tags'' to
lure in potential customers did not go unnoticed by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). In December 2000, the FTC filed a complaint in the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California alleging
that Martinez deliberately marketed his website to consumers who were
searching the Internet to find false identification documents. The
complaint noted Martinez's use of such meta-tags as ``illegal id,''
``fake id fraud,'' and ``forging documents.
Pursuant to a May 2001 agreement approved by U.S. District Judge
Christina A. Snyder to settle the FTC lawsuit, Martinez will pay
$20,000. He also agreed permanently to shut down his website, which
sold 45 days of access to fake ID templates for $29.99, and contained
``high quality'' templates for the creation of fake California,
Georgia, Florida, Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Utah,
Wisconsin, and New York driver's licenses. (Martinez's website also
contained a birth certificate template, programs to generate bar
codes--required in some States to authenticate driver's licenses--and a
program to falsify Social Security numbers.)

Tim Beachum, operator of bestfakeids.com, reinforced this point
during his Subcommittee deposition, noting that keywords affect
``relevancy and a search engine ranking.'' \76\ When asked
which keywords he uses to market his site, Beachum suggested
that he had found the words ``Novelty Ids, Ids, Ids spelled
with different cases, apostrophe-S, without the apostrophe-S,
noveltyfakeIDs as one word, hyphenated, press pass'' to be
high-return keywords. Beachum acknowledged under cross-
examination that he also used the simple keyword ``fake IDs.''
\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ Subcommittee deposition of Timothy Beachum, at 11 (Apr. 5,
2000) (``Beachum deposition'').
\77\ Id. at 141.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, the Subcommittee examined the key words that
several of the website operators used, and discovered that the
use of the word ``fake'' and its variants appeared much more
frequently than the word ``novelty,'' despite the website
operators' claims that their products were solely for
``novelty,'' ``entertainment,'' or ``educational'' purposes.
Dansereau, for example, used approximately 22 keywords or
phrases to advertise his website. The word ``fake'' (or a
variant such as ``false'') appeared 12 times. Dansereau, in
fact, did not use the word ``novelty'' to advertise his website
at all.\78\ Similarly, Brett Carreras, operator of fakeid.net,
used approximately 37 keywords to market his website. The
keyword ``fake'' or its variants appear 9 times in Carreras'
usage, and the word ``novelty'' appears only twice.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ Josh Dansereau, Gallery (visited Nov. 9, 1999) http://
www.fakeid1.com/gallery.htm. Dansereau also used the keywords ``False,
Forging and Illegal'' to advertise his website.
\79\ Brett Carreras, fakeid.net (visited Dec. 21, 1999)
www.fakeid.net/free.html. The keywords ``forge'' (or variants) and
``phony'' (or variants) are each used twice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tim Catron, the operator of fakeidzone.com, illustrated the
effectiveness of keywords such as ``fake'' by making the
results of his eXTReMe Tracking service available to the
public.\80\ While nearly 36 percent of the visitors to Catron's
website used the keyword ``fake'' when searching for false
identification on the Internet, less than two-tenths of one
percent used the keyword ``novelty.'' \81\ Despite the fact
that the advertising copy on these websites may contain the
word ``novelty,'' the websites clearly target those customers
who are in search of authentic-looking false identification
documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ See Extreme Digital (visited Jan. 24, 2000) http://
www.eXTRemeTracking. Extreme Tracking is a service offered by Extreme
Digital that tracks visitor traffic to a client's website. The
information gathered includes the numbers of visitors, geographical and
domain information about the visitors, and the keywords visitors used
in a search engine to find the client's website. Catron made these
records public in an attempt to demonstrate the profitability of his
website to potential buyers in connection with his effort to sell the
site through an online auction.
\81\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Disclaimers Have Little or No Legal Impact
(1) Claims of Novelty
Websites offering to produce false identification documents
occasionally post disclaimers stating that the documents they
sell are for ``novelty'' use only and should not be used for
illegal purposes. Companies providing templates also frequently
require users of their products to ``agree'' that they will not
use the materials for illegal purposes. Sites may also require
those accessing the information to waive liability against the
company for any illegal acts, and to state that the individual
using the site is not a law enforcement officer and will not
use the material offered on the site as evidence for any charge
of violating Federal, State, or local laws. One website
providing templates seeks to avoid liability by asserting that
the consumer is the one who actually produces the fraudulent
document.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ See Tim Beachum, Best Fake ID's (visited Mar. 13, 2000) http:/
/www.bestfakeids.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many websites purport to sell ``novelty'' or ``fun''
products despite marketing that undermines their claims. For
example, Martinez offered a ``New Identity Kit'' that contains
``[e]verything you need to create a new identity for fun!!''
yet he encouraged Internet users to order ``before we are shut
down by the authorities.'' \83\ On his website,
Bestfakeids.com, Beachum continually referred to his product as
a ``Novelty fake id kit,'' but adds as a selling point: ``Get a
job as a Resident Activity Coordinator Guaranteed--good jobs
are so hard to find and the system doesn't make it any
easier.'' \84\ In his Subcommittee deposition, Beachum noted
that it was not his intention that customers use the
certificate to get a job. He claimed that although ``the whole
site is a joke,'' \85\ he wanted his customers to think that
the certificate ``looked like the real thing.'' \86\
Contradictory statements such as these undermine the website
operators' contentions that they do not intend their products
to be usable as authentic identification documents and clearly
suggest that they wish to give regulators (and the
Subcommittee) a rather different impression than would-be
customers. Another example is Robert Sek, who operated
``Theidshop,'' a producer of high-quality false identification
documents ``with many added security options such as
holograms.'' Sek frequently referred to his products as
``novelty Ids.'' However, he also stated that ``Theidshop'' was
no longer accepting or processing orders from the State of
Florida because of the statewide false identification program
there.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ Jeremy Martinez, New Identity Kit (visited Jan. 20, 2000)
www.vsub.com/newid./a.htm.
\84\ Beachum deposition, Exhibit 15.
\85\ Id. at 30.
\86\ Id. at 74.
\87\ Robert Sek, TheIDShop.com (visited Dec. 21, 1999) http://
www.theidshop.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Disclaimers Do Not Discourage Sales
Obviously, the disclaimers on these websites do nothing to
prevent illegal use. Many websites have an initial page that
states that users must read the disclaimer in its entirety and
agree to its terms before entering the site. Frequently,
however, very little of the fine print disclaimer is visible
without extensive screen ``scrolling,'' and nothing prevents
users from simply hitting the ``agree'' button and proceeding
directly to the main website pages without reading the
disclaimer at all--although this is not uncommon with on-line
software licensing and use agreements.
Many Internet users are conditioned to accept or agree to
posted disclaimers without reading them, and may believe that
disclaimers are of minimal importance. For example, university
student Thana Barlee, who was arrested for making false
identification documents for university classmates, noted in an
interview with the Subcommittee that when he originally began
searching the Internet for materials to use, he routinely
ignored the disclaimers he read on the various false
identification websites. Barlee added that he would see the
disclaimers first, and then move to the main pages. Barlee told
the Subcommittee that he was aware of the penalties associated
with creating false identification but that, when he was making
the documents, he paid no heed to them.\88\ Seitz also recalled
spotting a small disclaimer, and testified that
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ Subcommittee staff interview with Thana Barlee in Washington,
D.C. (Mar. 23, 2000) (hereinafter ``Barlee interview'').

``I frequently came across disclaimers on the
individual sites stating, `For novelty use only.' I
cannot think of any reason why a statement like that
would be there. It did not deter my actions in any
way.'' \89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ Hearing record, supra, at 16 (testimony of Thomas Seitz).

Not only do website visitors attach little importance to
the disclaimers, but some websites openly mock the disclaimers.
The following is a disclaimer on the drink.to/idtemps website,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
operated by an individual identified as ``Rustheriddler'':

``All information or files found on this site are for
informational, entertainment, or educational purposes
only. What you do with it is your responsibility and
only yours, no one else! If you are a government
employee or have anything to do with the government or
law or anything at all, then you can't enter this site.
You must be at least 3945 years old and may not be
either male, female, or both. If you have purple skin,
red hair with pink stripes, and wear pink leather pants
made from whale skin then you may enter.'' \90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ Rustheriddler, Temps (visited Dec. 1, 2000) http://
hammer.prohosting.com/idtemps/.

Some operators reacted to Subcommittee scrutiny by quickly
providing additional disclaimers. Until the Subcommittee
contacted Beachum, for example, his website contained only the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
briefest of disclaimers:

``Because our novelty fake id kit is distributed in a
digital format we do not of [sic] refunds. Our kit is
sold as is. All images found on this site is [sic]
copyrighted, and can not be used by any other web site
without the written consent of Best Fake ID's.'' \91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ Tim Beachum, Activity Coordinator Training Project (visited
Jan. 6, 2000) http://www. Bestfakeids.com.

After he first spoke with Subcommittee staff, however, Beachum
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
quickly expanded his disclaimer to note that

``[t]he information contained in this website is
strictly for academic use alone. BEST FAKE ID's will
bear no responsibility for any use otherwise. All
information on this web site is for entertainment and
educational purposes only.'' \92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ Tim Beachum, Best Fake ID's (visited Mar. 13, 2000) http://
www.bestfakeids.com.

The Subcommittee found that both the website operators and the
users attach very little importance to these disclaimers--
unless, that is, they realize their activities are being
studied by authorities.
(3) Operators Use Disclaimers as a Shield
Some website operators try to protect themselves from any
sort of liability by using disclaimers on the materials they
produce. Robert Sek, for example, shipped his false
identification documents in a laminated and sealed pouch
printed with the words ``not a government document'' in red ink
on both sides. The document could be removed intact from this
pouch easily and quickly. Sek's false identification cards also
included a fine print disclaimer stating that the card was
intended for novelty purposes only and that the card is in no
way affiliated or associated with any government entity--but
this was printed in a nearly unreadable approximately 2-point
font, and placed it in such a way as to resemble the
boilerplate explanation of restrictions found on the backs of
many genuine ID cards. Moreover, in some cases, the disclaimer
may be present, yet remain undetected. As Lieutenant Myers
testified at the hearing:

``The word `novelty' we find on a large percentage of
identification cards that come off the Internet. It may
be printed so small that you need a magnifying glass to
read it, or it may be just part of the disclaimer that
comes across. I know of no lawful purpose for someone
to use a supposed novelty ID, and in hundreds and
hundreds of cases that we have investigated, we find
that the word `novelty' is right on the license
somewhere. It is just no one can take the time or has
the ability to even detect it.'' \93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ Hearing record, supra, at 23 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).

Clearly, these types of illegible or easily removable
disclaimers violate the terms set out in Sec. 1738. As
explained in Section I.(D) of this report, Federal law defines,
for practical purposes, what a novelty identification card must
look like. Under Sec. 1738, any identification document bearing
a birth date or age must ``carry diagonally printed clearly and
indelibly on both the front and back `NOT A GOVERNMENT
DOCUMENT' in capital letters in not less than 12-point type.''
\94\ The term ``identification document'' is defined as ``a
type intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of
identification of individuals and which is not issued by or
under the authority of a government.'' \95\ The statute
provides for imposition of a penalty of up to 1 year's
imprisonment for transporting in interstate or foreign commerce
identification documents that do not meet these statutory
requirements.\96\ Because it was apparent that technology
allowed some individuals to skirt this law, Sec. 1738 was
repealed by the Internet False Identification Act of 2000.
Criminals can no longer hide behind the shield of such
disclaimers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1738 (a)(1)-(2).
\95\ Id. at Sec. 1738(b).
\96\ See id. at Sec. 1738(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Virtually all of the identification documents that the
Subcommittee examined over the course of its investigation did
not satisfy the above definition of novelty identification
under Federal law. Accordingly, the unilateral efforts of the
distributors of such products to characterize them as
``novelty'' identification in order to shield themselves from
criminal liability are likely to be ineffective as a legal
defense. Seitz, who used false identification documents to
commit a crime, agreed that website operators post disclaimers
merely in an attempt to protect themselves and mask their true
intentions:

``They are pretty much trying to cover themselves, in
my opinion, because they do not necessarily go out of
their way to say, go use this for an illegal purpose,
but [by posting] the disclaimer, they are probably, in
my opinion, trying to cover themselves. It does not
discourage anyone.'' \97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ Hearing record, supra, at 19 (testimony of Thomas Seitz).

To be sure, there are true novelty identification sites on
the Internet.\98\ The Subcommittee's investigation, however,
did not focus upon such sites because of their obviously
novelty nature. For example, a ``Super Secret Agent'' card or a
``Backseat Driver's License'' is unlikely to assist anyone in
committing bank fraud. The products that these sites offer bear
little, if any, resemblance to the bona fide documents on which
they are based. The sites that the Subcommittee targeted, by
contrast, promote their products as being virtual, if not
exact, replicas of bona fide identification documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ See e.g., Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 23 (Coolcards--
Postcards from the Net (visited Nov. 29, 2000) http://
www.coolcards.com).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is also worth noting that some false identification
websites do not carry any disclaimers whatsoever.\99\ The
Subcommittee examined a number of such sites, but could not
gain much information about the operators because, in large
part, they appear to be located abroad. (As a result, the
Subcommittee was unable to compel their compliance with a
subpoena.) Other sites operating without disclaimers use
anonymous e-mail and free web hosting services, which do not
verify their customers' contact information. Many persons using
such services submit false contact information, making it--as
intended--more difficult to track down the true operators
behind such websites. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that some
false identification sites made no effort to shield themselves
from scrutiny by a false claim of novelty. (The fact that many
such websites appeared to be located overseas also illustrates
the wisdom of repealing Sec. 1738, which clearly seems to have
functioned principally to provide United States-based false
identification sites with a patina of legality through the use
of ostensible ``novelty'' disclaimers.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ See e.g., Hearing record, Exhibit 3 (Idsolution.com (visited
Jan. 4, 2000) http://www. idsolution.com).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) Legal Challenges to Disclaimers
Several Internet discussion boards that the Subcommittee
reviewed included messages on ``novelty'' identification.\100\
The Subcommittee found that assertions of ``novelty'' with
regard to the type of websites the Subcommittee investigated
are often understood to be thinly veiled attempts to hide the
sites' true illicit nature. Clearly, the marketing of these
websites is very much at odds with the disclaimers that they
post. Tim Beachum's site was a prime example. Prior to the time
the Subcommittee contacted Beachum, he had only a single
disclaimer posted in fine print on his website. This disclaimer
stood in stark contrast to his more general claim that, by
purchasing his products, customers could ``create fake ids so
real that you could fool your own mother.'' \101\ As noted
above, it was only after the Subcommittee had contacted Beachum
that he added a clearly worded and prominently displayed
disclaimer. Nevertheless, even such prominent disclaimers would
not insulate Beachum from liability even before the repeal of
Sec. 1738, because the birth certificate and driver's licenses
that he offered do not bear disclaimers within the parameters
of the statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ See e.g., Hearing record, Exhibit 27 (FakeID.NetDiscussion
Board http://www. carreras.net/discus (post by ``Webhost'' on Oct. 13,
1999).
\101\ Tim Beachum, Best Fake ID's (visited Mar. 13, 2000) http://
www.bestfakeids.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Law enforcement has investigated and prosecuted website
operators who rely on these disclaimers. For example, State and
Federal law enforcement officials have investigated at least
two operators of Internet websites--Josh Dansereau \102\ and
Robert Sek \103\--despite lengthy and prominently displayed
disclaimers on their sites and the presence of at least
notional disclaimers on Sek's product and on the plastic
pouches in which it was delivered. The U.S. Secret Service's
investigation of Sek, which was conducted jointly with the
Texas Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, resulted in the
execution of search warrants at Sek's Austin residence on March
10, 2000. Dansereau was sentenced to a term of probation after
pleading guilty to violating a Florida statute criminalizing
the distribution of false identification documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ See Josh Dansereau, Fake Id One http://wwwfakeidl.com.
\103\ See Robert Sek, The ID Shop http://www.theidshop.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two of the website operators that the Subcommittee examined
closely, Carreras and Catron, invoked their Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination as the basis for refusing
to answer any deposition or interrogatory questions. Both of
these witnesses posted disclaimers on their websites similar to
those Beachum utilized.
All in all, the Subcommittee considers the posting of these
disclaimers to be a disingenuous and ineffective effort to
conceal the true purpose of such websites--namely, to
distribute false identification documents by taking advantage
of the speed, relative anonymity, and enormous client base the
Internet offers.
E. Role of the Internet
(1) LThe Internet Allows Instantaneous and Anonymous Sales and
Transfers of False Identification
Before the use of the Internet for commerce, businesses
were largely limited to customers who could contact them (or
whom they could contact) in person, by telephone, or through
the mail. This placed some practical limits upon the size of
one's customer base and imposed some largely unavoidable
capital investment requirements. The Internet, however, makes
geographic boundaries and overhead costs largely insignificant.
Particularly in conjunction with credit-card-based payment
systems, a customer in a remote location in one part of the
world may now purchase materials from a business in a remote
location in another part of the world, provided that both
parties have access to the Internet. Indeed, the customer may
not necessarily ever even know where the business is located,
or anything more about it than the address of its website and
whatever information happens to have been posted there. (As the
Subcommittee also found in trying to track down the operators
of false identification websites, the Internet provides
powerful means by which to hide information about site
operators.)
Unfortunately, these developments have proven to be a great
boon for the false identification business. When the product
purchased over the Internet consists only of computer files
such as a false identification template, for example, it can be
delivered almost instantaneously, increasing the advantages of
such transactions as compared to traditional methods of
marketing and distribution. According to U.S. Secret Service
Director Brian Stafford:

``Most of the false identifications either come from *
* * the template on the Internet or they actually come
from true identities that are scanned and then desktop
publishing is utilized and it is ultimately placed on
the Internet, where, as you know, a button can be
pushed and it can be sent anywhere in the world.''
\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\ Hearing record, supra, at 26 (testimony of Director
Stafford).

Moreover, the quality of the product is not affected by
this transmission. As Lieutenant Myers testified at the
hearing, ``The graphics that can be produced on the computer,
they can be electronically transmitted to anyone in the world
in that same quality.'' \105\ (Use of such readily-obtainable
templates, of course, is decidedly superior to traditional
false-identification techniques, which may have involved such
crude expedients as using a razor blade or other instrument to
alter identification documents individually.) For businesses
promoting false identification materials, and for customers
seeking such products, the Internet also allows an almost
instantaneous transaction. An individual who uses the Internet
can locate and produce the desired false identification
document in an amazingly short period of time. Thomas Seitz
testified during the hearing that he found the templates and
created the fraudulent birth certificates that he utilized in
``a matter of minutes.'' \106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ Id. at 20 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).
\106\ Id. at 18 (testimony of Thomas Seitz).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using the Internet thus enables operators to keep their
costs and risks at a minimum, while offering a product of
consistently high quality with unprecedented rapidity and
efficiency. All in all, this has proven to be a business
bonanza. In fact, Trent Sands wrote in Fake ID by Mail and
Modem that:

The Internet has breathed new life into the world of
false identification. Many new companies are springing
up to meet the needs of those who want documentation
saying they are someone else. * * * The robust health
of the mail-order and Internet identification business
is in stark contrast to the situation of just a few
years ago.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ Sands, supra, at 1.

Websites selling ``memberships'' or access to password
protected information may acquire customers who purchase
continuing memberships using credit cards that are billed
monthly by a third party with the understanding that the
website operator will provide new information or additional
services through the website. One Website offering access only
to ``members'' promised, ``More Updates Coming Soon! More being
added all the time!'' \108\ Such up-to-date information can be
useful in circumstances where a State modifies the design of or
adds security features to a driver's license.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\ Jeremy Martinez, Homepage (visited Jan. 5, 2000)
newid.ultramailweb.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Elimination of the distance barriers for transactions
involving false identification materials presents new
challenges for law enforcement. Bruce Schneider, Chief
Technology Officer at Counterpane Internet Security, observed,
``The Net changes the nature of crime. * * * This is the death
of distance: Crime is no longer based on proximity.'' \109\ Law
enforcement agencies in the United States face particular
jurisdictional and other obstacles when criminal activity based
in another country affects United States citizens. The Internet
compounds these problems because of its ability to promote
commerce and communication between distant locations, combined
with the ability to conceal users' identities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\ ``Foil the Hackers? A Security Maven Discusses the
Impossible,'' Business Week (Mar. 6, 2000), at 32F-32J (interview of
Bruce Schneider, Chief Technology Officer, Counterpane Internet
Security Inc., San Jose, California).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A report of the President's Working Group on Unlawful
Conduct on the Internet described the jurisdictional problems
facing law enforcement agencies seeking to investigate crimes
committed using the Internet:

``The challenge to law enforcement is identifying that
location [of a computer] and deciding which laws apply
to what conduct. The question is how sovereign nations
can meaningfully enforce national laws and procedures
on a global Internet. Inconsistent substantive criminal
laws are only part of the problem, for investigative
techniques are also controlled by national (or local)
law. For example, law enforcement agencies must
consider such issues as transborder execution of search
warrants.'' \110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\ U.S. Department of Justice's, Report of the President's
Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet, at 20 (Mar. 9,
2000).

Concealment of one's identity provides those engaging in
criminal activities another tool to avoid detection by law
enforcement. In a statement delivered to the Senate Judiciary
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committee, a Justice Department official noted that a

``fundamental issue facing law enforcement involves
proving a criminal's identity in a networked
environment. In all crimes--including cybercrimes--we
must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, but global networks lack effective
identification mechanisms. Indeed, individuals on the
Internet can be anonymous, and even those individuals
who identify themselves can adopt false identities by
providing inaccurate biographical information and
misleading screen names. Even if a criminal does not
intentionally use anonymity as a shield, it is easy to
see how difficult it could be for law enforcement to
prove who was actually sitting at the keyboard and
committing the illegal act. This is particularly true
because identifiable physical attributes such as
fingerprints, voices, or faces are absent from
cyberspace, and there are few mechanisms for proving
identity in an electronic environment.'' \111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\ Internet Crimes Affecting Consumers: Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 105th Congress, 1st Session (Mar. 19, 1997)
(statement of Robert S. Litt, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Website Operators Disguise Their Names and Locations
The Subcommittee found that several websites use a variety
of tactics to make it difficult for law enforcement to discover
their identities. Most websites on the Internet use simple
addresses, such as yahoo.com, that allow companies to be easily
identified through Network Solutions, the company responsible
for registering most commercial websites in the United States.
Domain names are usually accompanied by registration
information that is publically available. This information
normally contains the name of the company or individuals
registering the website, their address, telephone number, and
e-mail address.
Some operators of websites that offer false identification
materials cloak their identities by providing false or
erroneous information when their domain name is registered. For
example, one website offering false identification materials
registered its domain name listing a fictitious address and
telephone number in Mexico.\112\ Other sites operate using free
server space from a web host, usually placing advertisements on
the screens of users of such pages. For example, one website
offering false identification material, Promaster Cards,\113\
uses a web hosting service called Xoom,\114\ which prevents
public identification of the company or persons responsible for
the site through Network Solutions. Such actions make it more
difficult for law enforcement to contact such companies about
their activities and, if the operations are run from foreign
countries, render apprehension even more difficult.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ Network Solutions, Registration of idsolution.com (visited
Dec. 12, 1999) http://www.networksolutions.com.
\113\ See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 13.
\114\ Xoom is owned by NBCi.com. Promaster Cards actually uses an
Italian subsidiary of Xoom. See http://members.xoom.it/--XOOM/driverid/
index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Companies or individuals may also use a series of different
web hosts and e-mail addresses to remain hidden from detection,
akin to moving the location of a business every few weeks. This
practice would be impossible for conventional businesses with
physical locations because the cost would be prohibitive. It is
simple to accomplish, however, on the Internet. Lieutenant
Myers testified that on many occasions he has shut down a
website, only to find the same site reappear at a new web
address: ``these people will be right back, and we have found
in many cases that we have even arrested people for [violations
of false identification statutes], then we find them back on
the Internet.'' \115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ Hearing record, supra, at 22 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Websites offering false identification materials also
frequently use post office boxes or the address of a commercial
mail-receiving agency to receive mail. Such addresses can be
established using intermediaries, thus masking the identity as
well as the location of the actual operator of the business. In
addition, such addresses can be quickly changed, and the
address change can be made on the web page in a matter of
minutes, allowing website operators to avoid detection by law
enforcement. This method of preserving anonymity works for
customers as well. Trent Sands, in his book on false
identification, advises his readers to ``[a]lways use a mail-
receiving service to order any document from a false ID vendor.
Never use your real name when ordering documents. Always pay by
money order.'' He suggests that this safeguard will help
protect the customer from law enforcement crackdowns on false
identification manufacturers--which may lead to authorities'
acquisition of the names of and contact information for illegal
manufacturers' customers.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\ Sands, supra, at 8 (emphasis in original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many operators of websites offering false identification
materials use e-mail accounts that can be obtained anonymously,
and thus hinder easy identification of the operator. An
individual may obtain a virtually unlimited number of e-mail
accounts from sources that are free, and may avoid detection by
frequently changing e-mail accounts.
Persons using the Internet to distribute false
identification documents often use computer technology and
features unique to the Internet to protect their anonymity and
avoid law enforcement. For instance, one individual posted a
message on the discussion board at fakeid.net, advising those
who manufacture counterfeit documents how to avoid detection:

``Never work at home, if possible and you have the
means, never work in your own State or sell to people
in your own State. Keep moving. Work out of hotels,
your car or an Apartment in another name. (Laptops
essential) Encrypt. They don't really need hard
evidence, but you damn sure don't need to give them
any.Keep nothing on hard drives and clean your free
space often. * * * Keep business dealings separate. Ten
people don't need to know you and each other. You
should be known as a different name to each person.
Have a new ID (a real one) on standby. Don't use it for
[deleted] until you need it. Mandatory.Self
explanatory. When you get out of jail you are now a
convicted felon, life is now a [deleted].'' \117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 25 (FakeIDNet Message Board
http://www.carreras.net/discus (post by ``Risingson'' on Oct. 13,
1999)) (original punctuation and spelling preserved).

As the Subcommittee has found with other Internet-related
investigations, anonymity is a key element for many of the
operators of websites conducting illegal activities. During
this investigation, the Subcommittee found websites offering
false identification documents that never stated the company's
name, address, or telephone number.\118\ Some operators of
websites request customers to communicate only by e-mail \119\
or require a purchase to be made by credit card over the
Internet. Some companies intentionally locate outside of the
United States or use mailing addresses in Canada or an overseas
location in order to insulate themselves from investigation by
law enforcement agencies in the United States. The web page of
one company, Promaster Cards, stated as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\ For example, the web page of fakeid.net has no company name,
address, or phone number. See FakeID.Net http://www.fakeid.net.
\119\ Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 25.

``Already we have been shut down several times by the
FBI and Treasury Department under various forgery acts
of US law. * * * We have now moved our web site to the
UK but continue to process orders for our clients from
around the world from our studios in the New York area.
In the next few months we expect to be shut down again
but we will bound back as always from another part of
the net. Hopefully in the UK they will take a little
bit longer to catch on.'' \120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ Id. at Exhibit 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. Websites Offering False Identification Materials Facilitate Other
Crimes
While it is a crime in and of itself to manufacture and
sell a counterfeit identification document, false
identification documents can also be used to further engage in
other illegal activities. Indeed, this is presumably the
principal source of demand for such documents. When the
Subcommittee commenced its investigation into the increasing
availability of false identification and credentials over the
Internet, it aimed to curb the use of false identification
principally because of the host of other crimes ranging from
underage drinking to credit card and bank fraud to identity
theft that are facilitated by false identification. Senator
Levin noted in his opening statement, for example, that false
identification documents are:

``often now being used to carry out improper or
criminal activities--to obtain fraudulent loans, to
evade taxes, to establish a new identity, to steal
another individual's identity, to defraud Federal and
State Governments, to misrepresent one's residence or
place of birth or age for any variety of purposes.''
\121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\ Id. at 4 (remarks of Senator Carl Levin).

This sentiment was confirmed by Director Stafford, who noted
that there is a false identification component to nearly every
financial crimes arrest the Secret Service makes, including
bank fraud, credit card fraud, telecommunications fraud and
computer fraud.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\ Hearing record, supra, at 26 (testimony of Director
Stafford).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bank fraud and identity theft may be more serious crimes
than the manufacture of false identification, however, it is
often the manufacture of phony identification that allows bank
fraud or identity theft to occur. Moreover, as worrisome as
crimes such as bank fraud and identity theft clearly are, in
the wake of the terrorist atrocities of September 11, 2001, it
now appears that the dangers of false identification are
greater than most observers have imagined.
The Subcommittee found significant evidence of the criminal
motivations of users of false identification from messages
posted on various Internet discussion boards, a forum that has
blossomed as the Internet itself has grown. For example, the
following messages were exchanged on an Internet discussion
board about false identification on March 15-16, 2000:

``Who would pay 225$ for an Id with a holo[gram]???
thats just a waste of money and only losers would pay
for it. And who would buy an id withouht a holo? only
losers who just suck. Wizz is a good guy but if u wanna
make money you should get authentic looking holos and
not some crappy ones that are not part of the state and
then mad people gonna buy. and whoever is stupid enough
to buy an Id without a Holo then you're gonna be
[deleted] cause u will get caught.

Will

Will,

I would have to disagree with you. When i can get them,
i pay $300.00 for them with true holo's all the time. I
have to have holo's on mine. Just to give you an idea,
i am closer to being 40 years old than being 21 years
old. So I am not using them to buy alcohol or get into
clubs. I am using them at banks.(they have to pass the
book check) So to pay $300.00 for one that looks exact
is a no brainer. I would feel more comfortable paying
$300.00 for a quality one, then trying to save myself
some money by buying one for $25.00 and get nailed.
This is one of those things that i truly believe that
you get what you pay for. I do agree with you regarding
the holo's though, if they are not the correct ones for
that State then don't even bother putting them on, you
will end up getting your [deleted] thrown in jail.

--Ed'' \123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\ Id., Exhibit 26 (Fakeidman Is ID List http://
www.pages.eidosnet.co.uk/fakeidman/ (post by ``Will'' and ``Ed'' on
Mar. 17, 2000)) (original punctuation and spelling preserved).

The Subcommittee discovered the following posting on a
website containing a discussion boards that center on false
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
identification materials:

``+++URGENT+++

``I need an american or canadian fake id, birth
certificate and social security card that will get me
from canada to the u.s. and will make it through
immigration and border patrol

--any State will work

--high priority, money no problem, must be very well
done and professional

--please email me right away at [e-mail address
deleted]'' \124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ Fake ID Zone http://www.fakeidzone.com (post by ``tulip'' on
Feb. 21, 2000).

Another post by the web host of one site offering false
identification materials stated as follows: ``There are people
out there that aren't 17 years old, snaking past that 80-year-
old bar guy to snag a 40 oz. [beer]. There are people out there
that craft stuff better than DMVs and more untraceable.'' \125\
This same post advises others about tricks to avoid legal
problems: ``Use your language appropriately * * * integrate
words like ``novelty'', ``educational'' and ``informational''
as often as possible.'' \126\ Such users are clearly
anticipating using their phony identification for a host of
illegal activities, and are not intending to use their phony
identification and credentials ``for novelty purposes only,''
as the website operators suggest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 27.
\126\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Identity Theft
Identity theft is reported to be one of the fastest growing
crimes in the United States, and led to the introduction of S.
1399, the Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2001 by Senators
Feinstein, Shelby, Corzine, Kyl, and Grassley in September
2001. Identity theft is possible without false identification
documents, but it is much more difficult.
Individuals who seek to engage in identity theft may find
the Internet a valuable tool. In addition to using the Internet
to gain personal information about an individual whose identity
they may wish to steal, the Internet facilitates identity theft
through the production of quality counterfeit identification
documents. According to Norman A. Willox, Jr., Chief Executive
Officer of the National Fraud Center,

``The computer and, more recently, the Internet have
brought identity theft to a much more insidious level.
They have allowed the identity thief to obtain personal
identifiers of multiple persons quicker; to access
higher quality fake identification tools (driver's
licenses, birth certificates, social security cards,
etc.) and, through e-commerce, to render the credit
transaction completely impersonal. The potential harm
caused by an identity thief using the Internet is
exponential.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\ National Fraud Center, Inc. and Norman A. Willox, Jr., White
Paper: Identity Theft: Authentication As a Solution 5 (Mar. 16, 2000)
(presented at National Summit on Identity Theft).

Not only was Thomas Seitz, who testified at the hearing
about his use of false identification to commit identity theft,
able to gather information on his potential victims by
searching the Internet, but he was also able to obtain online
the false identity documents he needed to commit identity
theft. Seitz testified that it was largely because he was able
to find personal information about other people, as well as the
means to create false identification, that he committed the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
criminal acts for which he has been convicted:

``Although at first I did not have the intent to
defraud anyone, I started searching the Internet again
and determined that there were a large number of sites
that offered the means to make false identification and
the opportunity presented itself.'' \128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\ Hearing record, supra, at 15 (testimony of Thomas Seitz).

In July 2000, the Subcommittee learned of a case in which
an individual used false identification that he very likely
obtained from website operator Robert Sek to perpetrate
identity theft and a host of financial crimes. After finding a
wallet belonging to Dr. Charles Glueck, Benito Castro used
false identification in Glueck's name to commit bank fraud,
credit card fraud, and insurance fraud, eventually racking up
$35,000 in debt on ten credit cards that Castro obtained in
Glueck's name. Castro told Louisiana State Police Lieutenant
Kermit Smith, who investigated the crime, that after he bought
the identification over the Internet, the seller offered him a
job as a sales representative. The Subcommittee examined
Castro's fake identification and found it to be virtually
identical to the one the Subcommittee bought undercover from
Robert Sek, right down to the disclaimer-bearing plastic pouch
in which the identification was packaged.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\ For more information on the Subcommittee's undercover
purchase, see Section III.A.(1)(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Castro's document, like the Oklahoma identification
document the Subcommittee obtained from Sek directly, was
printed on stiff white plastic, and closely resembled in its
design, coloring and fonts, a Louisiana driver's license.
Again, like the Subcommittee's document, this false
identification document omitted the words ``driver's license''
and included a fine print disclaimer on the back. On August 9,
2000, in the 19th Judicial District Court of Louisiana, Benito
Castro pled guilty to 10 counts of identity theft, one count of
theft, and one count of bank fraud.\130\ Castro, who is the
first man sentenced under Louisiana's 1999 Identity Theft law,
is currently serving a 10-year term of incarceration at hard
labor without possibility of parole at a Louisiana State
correctional facility.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ State of Louisiana v. Benito Castro, Case No. 09-00-680
(Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge,
State of Louisiana, Aug. 9, 2000) (Information). More specifically,
Castro was convicted of 10 counts of identity theft under Louisiana
Revised Statute 14:67.16(C)(1), one count of theft of over $500 under
Louisiana Revised Statute 14:67(B)(1), and one count of bank fraud
under Louisiana Revised Statute 14:71.1.
\131\ Keith O'Brien, ``Identity Thief Gets 10 Years in Jail'' Times
Picayune (Aug. 10, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Recent Terrorist Acts May Have Been Facilitated by False
Identification
The consequences of failing to curb the spread of false
identification are grave indeed, and go potentially far beyond
simply facilitating under-age drinking--in fact, evidence
indicates that some associates of the Al Qaeda terrorist
organization may have used false identification and immigration
documents. False identification documents and credentials can
enable criminals to gain unauthorized access to secure areas in
airports and to open bank and credit card accounts under false
identities in order to finance their activities. In addition,
phony identification enables criminals to obtain bona fide, yet
unsupported and unauthorized, identification documents such as
driver's licenses. Their efforts to hide behind such false
identities makes it much harder for law enforcement and
intelligence officials to identify them.
One week after the horrific September 11 attacks, Federal
agents arrested three men who may be associated with the
terrorists' network on charges of possessing false
identification. The identification documents, which are in the
name of another individual alleged to be an associate of bin
Laden who was arrested later, include a U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service Form I-94 and a U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service alien identification card (both of which
have been confirmed as false by the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service), and a United States visa (which has
been confirmed as false by a State Department Diplomatic
Service agent). The documents, which the suspects told agents
were false, also included a U.S. Social Security Administration
card, and a ``World Service Authority'' passport.\132\ In
addition, two of the individuals are alleged to have obtained
driver's licenses in both Ohio and Michigan, apparently using
false supporting documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\ See United States of America v. Ahmed Hannan, Case No. 01-
80778; United States of America v. Karim Koubriti, Case No. 01-80779;
United States of America v. Farouk Ali-Hamoud, Case No. 01-80780 (each
in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Sept. 18, 2001)
(affidavit of Special Agent Robert Pertuso in support of Criminal
Complaints), and Tamar Lewin, ``A Nation Challenged: The Charges:
Accusations Against 93 Vary Widely,'' New York Times (Nov. 28, 2001),
at B6. ``World Service Authority'' passports are not government-issued.
See www.worldservice.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FBI is investigating whether some of the terrorists who
crashed American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon obtained
bona fide Virginia identification cards using false supporting
documents, such as false sworn statements attesting to their
Virginia residency.\133\ In a case that was opened prior to
September 11, 2001, investigators are looking into how
approximately 20 individuals in seven States obtained licenses
that permitted them to haul explosives and hazardous materials
such as dynamite, gases, and toxic or radioactive waste. It is
unclear what they may have intended to do using these
credentials.\134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ Brooke A. Masters, ``Hijackers Exploited DMV Loophole,''
Washington Post (Sept. 21, 2001), at A15, and Tamar Lewin, ``A Nation
Challenged: The Charges: Accusations Against 93 Vary Widely,'' New York
Times (Nov. 28, 2001), at B6, and Matthew Barakat, ``Fourth Person
Charged With Helping Hijackers Gain Fake Ids,'' Associated Press (Oct.
25, 2001), and Alexandra R. Moses, ``Attacks Investigation Points to
Pocket of Terrorist Support,'' Associated Press (Nov. 17, 2001).
\134\ John Mintz and Allan Lengel, ``FBI Arrests Liquor Store
Clerk,'' Washington Post (September 21, 2001) at A14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Infiltration of Federal Facilities Using Phony Identification
Shortly after the Subcommittee's hearing on false
identification, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime held
a hearing on May 25, 2000, which detailed the results of a GAO
undercover operation and underscored the Subcommittee's
findings about the dangers posed by the widespread availability
of false identification. GAO investigators from the Office of
Special Investigations (OSI) were able to breach security at 21
of the most secure buildings in the United States, including
the CIA, the FBI, and several airports by claiming that they
were armed law enforcement officers. The investigators
displayed phony law enforcement badges and phony credentials
that they had crafted themselves using graphics software and
images culled from Internet websites, and which bore little
resemblance to the genuine articles. When the investigators
presented themselves at security checkpoints, they were waved
around metal detectors and were not screened.
In a similar operation at certain sensitive Defense
Department facilities on May 10, 2001 commissioned by Senator
Collins, GAO/OSI investigators penetrated the sites using
easily-obtainable false identification--thus demonstrating
their potentially catastrophic vulnerability to unauthorized
access by criminals or terrorists.\135\ Upon learning that OSI
had confirmed the suspected vulnerability of these facilities,
Senator Collins immediately contacted Deputy Defense Secretary
Paul Wolfowitz to notify him of these problems so that the
Department could promptly begin corrective action. Though such
improvements are now underway, GAO's findings in these multiple
penetration tests demonstrate that Internet and computer
technologies allow nearly anyone easily to create dangerously
convincing identification cards and credentials.\136\ (This
problem is compounded by the vast array of law enforcement
identification cards currently in use.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\135\ As noted above, this investigation demonstrated such a
serious security vulnerability that the Defense Department classified
the previously-unclassified GAO report at the SECRET level.
\136\ Hast statement, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Case Studies
The pages that follow contain brief summaries of the
evidence that the Subcommittee collected over the course of its
5-month investigation about specific websites that manufacture
and market counterfeit identification documents. This report
also includes a brief summary of two instances that the
Subcommittee examined where criminals went online to obtain
false identification materials to further other illegal
behavior.
A. The Sellers
1. Robert Sek: theidshop.com
(a) Business
Robert Sek, of Austin, Texas, was born in 1979. In April
1998 Sek used the alias Arthur Biscay (a combination of his
middle name and his parent's street address) to register the
domain name theidshop.com.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\ Network Solutions http://www.networksolutions.com/whois/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sek told Lieutenant Myers that he owned approximately
$30,000 worth of equipment which he used to manufacture false
identification documents.\138\ In March 2000, while executing a
search warrant at Sek's Austin residence, authorities seized a
computer, photographic quality printer, lamination machine,
identification booklets, printed identification cards, customer
orders for identification products, money orders,\139\ and
other evidence--including a Century United safe containing
hologram film and approximately $16,000 in cash.\140\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\ Affidavit of Clarke Skoby, Special Agent, U.S. Secret
Service, at 1 (Mar. 9, 2000) [hereinafter ``First Skoby affidavit''].
\139\ Affidavit of Clarke Skoby, Special Agent, U.S. Secret
Service, at 1 (Mar. 13, 2000) [hereinafter ``Second Skoby affidavit''].
\140\ In re A Black Century Fire Safe, Case No. A-00-111M (W. D.
Tex. Mar. 13, 2000) (affidavit of Special Agent Clarke Skoby submitted
in support of application for search warrant).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sek told Lieutenant Myers that he sold his products for
approximately $50 each, and that he generated approximately
$600,000 in revenue annually. In addition, Sek told Lieutenant
Myers that he made approximately 1,000 false identification
documents each month.\141\ Indeed, after searching Sek's trash
on January 19 and February 7, 2000, investigators retrieved
approximately 300 envelopes addressed to the ID Shop.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\141\ First Skoby affidavit, supra, at 1.
\142\ Id. at 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, Sek told Lieutenant Myers that his operation
was extensive, employing at least 17 sales representatives
across the United States. In fact, Sek advertised for employees
on the ``job openings'' page of his website, which stated that

``if you are the type of person who likes easy money,
then this job is for you. We currently have 70 sales
reps all over the United States making salaries ranging
from $200 to $2000 a WEEK. The majority of our current
sales rep's [sic] are college or high [school]
students.'' \143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\ Robert Sek, The ID Shop Job Openings http://
www.theidshop.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Products
On his website, Sek advertised identification documents for
the following States: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut,
Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming.\144\
Customers had a choice of two types of identification cards: a
PVC card which cost $100, with an optional hologram for an
additional $20, or a 3M process card which cost $60. The PVC
cards all bore State-specific backings, while the 3M Process
cards all used an identical backing. (Sek did not offer
holograms on the 3M Process cards.) \145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\ First Skoby affidavit, supra, at 2.
\145\ See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 31; Robert Sek, The ID
Shop (visited Dec. 21, 1999) http://www.theidshop.com/products.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Subcommittee Purchase
During its investigation, the Subcommittee purchased
undercover a phony Oklahoma driver's license from ``The ID
Shop'' for $100, using a false name and the photograph of
Subcommittee Investigator Kirk Walder. The fake license arrived
approximately 3 weeks later in a plain white envelope with a
return address of ID Enterprises, located at a postal mail box
in Austin, Texas. The document itself appeared to be made of
stiff, white plastic measuring 3\3/8\ by 2\1/8\ inches on which
was printed the photograph of Investigator Walder, along with a
virtually identical representation of an Oklahoma driver's
license, including the State seal, but omitting the words
``driver's license'' on its face. The document arrived encased
in a clear, flexible plastic pouch which was sealed on all four
sides, but not physically attached to the document. The pouch
measured 3 by 2\1/2\ inches. Lining the inside walls of the
pouch were two clear plastic sheets on which were printed
diagonally in red ink ``NOT A GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT'' in
approximately 20-point type and in capital letters.
Investigator Walder was able to remove the document from the
pouch bearing this disclaimer, however, simply by snipping open
the pouch with a pair of scissors. This removal process took no
more than a few seconds.
(d) Disclaimer
As noted previously, Robert Sek took several calculated
steps in an effort to insulate himself from criminal liability.
As part of the ordering process, Sek's customers had to sign a
contract stating that they

``understand fully that this instrument (novelty ID) is
not representative of any State government affiliation,
either local, State, or Federal, and is not issued or
endorsed by any State or Federal Government agencies or
departments.'' \146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\ See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 24 (Robert Sek,
Ordering (visited Jan. 27, 2000) http://www.theidshop.com/ordering).

Moreover, the customers had to promise ``not [to] alter or
deface the ID in any way (from its' [sic] original State when
it was mailed***).'' \147\ In addition, as described above, Sek
packaged his products in the laminated pouches described above
bearing the ``NOT A GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT'' disclaimer. Sek also
included a disclaimer in approximately 2-point type on the back
of the identification cards themselves. This tiny disclaimer
provided:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\ Id.

``I, without reservation or restriction understand
fully that this instrument is not representative of any
government affiliation, either local or State, or
Federal, and is not issued or endorsed by any State or
Federal Government agencies or departments. I
understand that this instrument's sole purpose is for
novelty use only. I agree to accept complete
responsibility for any fraudulent use of this
instrument as states in the original agreement between
myself and the manufacturer/vendor. The vendor does not
provide any warranties of merchantability for a
particular purpose of noninfringement. The vendor shall
not be liable under any theory or for any damages
suffered by the bearer of this instrument. I further
attest and affirm that my signature on the front of
this instrument serves as evidence that I, the bearer/
purchase, agree to the aforementioned agreement in its
entirety.'' \148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\ Id.

Each of these purported safeguards was easily circumvented.
The customer's promise to behave appropriately, of course,
provided no guarantee that Sek's customers would not misuse his
products--particularly since, as we have seen, the market for
false identification is apparently based upon their value in
facilitating illicit activity. As described above, the plastic
pouch bearing the disclaimer was easily removed. In addition,
the fine print disclaimer on the reverse side of the
identification card is itself easily removable, perhaps by
design, as a message posted on an Internet discussion board
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
demonstrated:

``OK, the IDShop sends their ID in a white envelope,
exactly as they describe on their Web page. When you
open this envelope, the ID has a laminated wrap,
extending well over the edge of the ID. It also has
printed, NOT A GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT printed across the
lamination in Red. This slip is easy to remove with a
scissors, and takes less than a minute. Next the ID
itself has a paragraph on the back explaining how the
ID is not a government document and cannot be used as
such, etc. Now everybody is telling you that this is
hard to get rid of, but let me tell you, from firsthand
experience I simply took a tough eraser, one found on
the back of a pencil would do fine, and rubbed it
tightly against the words. After a few mins, the
writing starts to fade and in less than 5 minutes the
writing is completely gone.'' \149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\ Id, supra, at Exhibit 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Brett Carreras: fakeid.net
(a) Business
Brett Carreras, a graduate of Loyola College in Baltimore,
Maryland, was born in 1978. The Subcommittee's investigation
indicates that Carreras registered the domain name fakeid.net
on July 28, 1998. At that time, John DeMayo, a self-professed
pioneer in the Internet false identification business, began
directing Internet users to Carreras' new site, as DeMayo
claimed to be leaving the false identification business.\150\
Carreras paid DeMayo a fee for every thus-referred customer who
purchased a product from Carreras's site. In late December 1999
or early January 2000, Carreras bought an additional domain
name, fake-id.com, from DeMayo for $10,000. DeMayo estimated
that Carreras earned between $5,000 and $10,000 per month from
the website fakeid.net. (DeMayo told the Subcommittee that
fake-id.com was a popular site and that he had received between
50 and 100 e-mail messages each day before he sold the site to
Carreras.) \151\ Billing records obtained by the Subcommittee
indicate that, between mid-October 1999 and mid-December 1999,
Carreras received 621 orders at his fakeid.net website that
generated roughly $8,239 in revenue.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ Subcommittee staff telephone interview with John DeMayo (Mar.
30, 2000) [hereinafter ``DeMayo interview''].
\151\ Id.
\152\ Letter from Paul Kraaijvanger, Co-founder/Director, and Matt
Walker, Controller, Verotel, to Kirk Walder, Investigator, Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Jan. 6, 1999), at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Products
As a free service, fakeid.net offered low quality driver's
license templates in a format compatible with Adobe
Photoshop \153\ for all 50 U.S. States. However, the
site offered ``premium'' templates designed to be used with
Adobe Photoshop, including an ``ultimate''
New Jersey license, an ``ultimate'' Maine license, as well as
templates for Wisconsin, Utah, Ohio, Arizona, Connecticut,
Michigan, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, New York, and the Canadian
province of Saskatchewan. These ``premium'' templates \154\
were available to members for a monthly fee payable by credit
card of $14.95.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\ Adobe Photoshop is graphic design
software that allows users to edit and create images. The software uses
a system of layers, each containing a different portion of the image.
Layers allow users to overlay one portion of an image over another; for
example, a signature can overlay a photograph. Users can also remove or
hide layers. Users are able to edit almost all aspects of an image,
including color, size, and transparency, as well as add text.
\154\ These templates are layered, and therefore, able to be
manipulated relatively easily using software such as Adobe
Photoshop.
\155\ Brett Carreras, States (visited Dec. 9, 1999) http://
www.fakeid.net/states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the Subcommittee contacted Carreras, he modified the
site, advising visitors that the templates had been removed and
that he would not answer questions about them. It appears that
Carreras made this statement in an attempt to convince both the
Subcommittee and law enforcement that the premium templates,
which were the only revenue-earning portion of the website, had
been removed and that the website was out of business. In fact,
however, the templates were still accessible on the fakeid.net
website through a different series of links for several more
months, although many paying customers may have been unaware
that the templates were still available. Following customer
complaints posted on the fakeid.net message board,\156\
Carreras posted information on the message board informing
regular customers of this ``back door'' to the templates:
``There are all types of members services availiable [sic] to
users who paid and were not able to download the files. Go to
members services, and click on all of the links. take care.''
\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\ See e.g., Fake ID Net Message Board http://
carreras.netldiscus (post by ``Anonymous'' on Mar. 24, 2000; post by
``Reaper'' on Mar. 25, 2000).
\157\ Id. (post by ``Webhost'' on Mar. 27, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Disclaimer
Initial access to Carreras' website was through a page
containing the following advisory: ``For my protection, and
yours, you MUST read the below disclaimer BEFORE entering.
Thank You.'' The referenced disclaimer is in a small box, and
the only readily visible portion of the text reads:

``1. LThis page is to be used purely for reference/
education/novelty purposes.
2. LI am at least 18 years of age, and realize that I
am individually responsible for my actions.
3. LI understand that the act of downloading
information * * *.'' \158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\ Brett Carreras, FakeID.Net (visited Dec. 17, 1999) http://
www.fakeid.net/intro.htm.

Although the viewer may scroll down the text to read it in its
entirety, it is not necessary to do so in order to gain access
to the rest of the website. Instead, the visitor may simply
click on the following statement: ``LET ME IN!'' \159\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) Related Websites
In February 2000 the Subcommittee discovered that the
fakeid.net web host was planning to introduce two new websites
in the near future: Illegalimmigrant.com and fake-id.com. Both
domain names are registered to Carreras. Illegalimmigrant.com
would purportedly specialize in ``identity documents such as
passports, social security cards, green cards, SSN lists,
generators, prove-it cards, resident alien cards, birth
cirtificates [sic] . . . and many more!'' \160\ At fake-id.com,
it was said,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\ Brett Carreras, Power Point Presentation (visited Feb. 15,
2000) http://carreras.net/welcome.

``professionals will create licenses from any State you
choose, based on our custom-made templates, These will
be the finest ID documents on the planet, and will be
backed by the professionalism of FakeID.Net!'' \161\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\ Id.

Notably, these ventures stand in sharp contrast to the
information posted on the ``frequently asked questions'' page
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of fakeid.net, where it was claimed that

``We do NOT sell IDs from this site, nor do we know of
places which sell IDs. Be wary of any site that says
you can buy an ID from them. No site on the internet is
endorsed by this site, or recommended by this site's
proprietors. Furthermore the proprietor of this site
has NEVER created a fake and/or novelty ID.'' \162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\162\ Brett Carreras, Frequently Asked Questions (visited Dec. 17,
1999) http://www.fakeid.net/faq.htm.

Carreras declined to answer the Subcommittee's
questionnaire after invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. In addition, at his Subcommittee
deposition, Carreras invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to
every question except his name, date of birth, and current
address.
(3) Tim Beachum: bestfakeids.com
(a) Business
Tim Beachum, who was born in 1969, registered
bestfakeids.com on May 25, 1999, using the company name
Executive Computer Designs, which is located in Virginia Beach,
Virginia. As of May 19, 2000, the website was still active, but
Beachum had changed some of the content. By November 2000,
however, the website appeared to have been taken down.
On April 5, 2000, Beachum voluntarily submitted to a
Subcommittee deposition. Beachum testified that he established
bestfakeids.com with an unnamed friend after they had a
discussion about websites that sell novelty identification
documents.\163\ Beachum had discovered that there were more
than 100,000 webpages referring to the subject of false
identification. Beachum opined that, if there were that many
websites pertaining to false identification, there must be a
market for the service.\164\ Throughout his deposition, Beachum
provided limited information and changed some of the answers he
had previously provided to the Subcommittee during telephone
interviews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\ Beachum deposition, supra, at 26.
\164\ Id. at 44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to bestfakeids.com, Beachum owned ECD Inc.,
which he said offered ``electronic information'' and
``marketing products,'' Payless Web Hosting, and Bulletproof
Marketing, which Beachum said were not yet operational.\165\
Beachum could or would not break down the approximate monthly
income that he receives from each of his websites, although he
estimated in his response to the Subcommittee's questionnaire
that bestfakeids.com provided 90 percent of his website
revenue.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\ Id. at 16-20; see ECD Inc. http://www.ecdinc.com/mb/.
\166\ See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Products
The home page of bestfakeids.com contained a smaller
version of the same logo used by fakeidzone.com. The site
promoted its sole product--online access to a ``fake id kit''--
as follows:

``Novelty fake id's are quickly becoming a big business
online. Although our competitors spend most of the time
claiming to have the best fake id's, and slandering the
competitions [sic] name. We have decided to take a
different approach and let our product speak for
itself. We sell 40+ kits a day--that's almost 3 times
what any other fake id site sells. Here is why the all
new and improved ``Best Fake ID's'' site out sells the
competition 3 to 1: We don't sell novelty fake ids we
show you how to create your own using your home
computer. We provide you with templates and step by
step instructions on what you need to create fake ids
so real you could fool your own mother. As a BONUS you
will receive a super high quality birth certificate
that can be printed in the privacy of your own home.
You will be given access to download 50+ templates that
you can use to create your own fake ids. Our templates
consist of drivers license, gun license, back stage
passes, and much more. As of 12/1/1999 our collection
of templates has been totally updated. Templates are
created and added upon your request! (No other site on
the Internet offers this service). No shipping and
handling . . . You will be given instant access to your
fake id kit, and your bonus birth certificate as well
as our online threaded message board.'' \167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\ Beachum deposition, supra, at Exhibit 15.

Beachum supplemented the copy cited above with numerous
illustrations of his products, as well as lengthy testimonials,
complete with photos, from what purported to be ``satisfied
customers.''
(c) Subcommittee Purchase
The Subcommittee purchased undercover access to Beachum's
``kit'' on February 9, 2000. The kit consisted of several
scanned State driver's licenses from various States; templates
for driver's licenses from Wyoming, Alabama, and ``Pureto [sic]
Rico;'' a press pass template; a blank birth certificate from
Victory Memorial Hospital in Waukegan, Illinois; and two
resident activity coordinator certificate files.\168\ Despite
the representation on his website, however, the kit did not
contain a template for a gun license.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\ See id. at Exhibits 16-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The driver's license templates allowed an individual to
produce his own driver's license by filling in the blanks. The
Subcommittee found that it would indeed be possible to produce
credible driver's licenses from the templates on Beachum's
site.
The press pass template included space for an individual's
photograph and personal information. It also bore a bar code
and a background reflecting the legend ``American Press
Association.'' \169\ Beachum promoted the press pass on his
website with testimonials from three ``satisfied customers''
who had supposedly created press passes for themselves using
Beachum's template, and then used the passes to gain access to
backstage areas at various events. Under questioning during his
deposition, Beachum admitted that the testimonials were
fictitious:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\ See id. at Ex's. 8-11.

``Q: LWhat is that?
A: LIt's a novelty testimonial page for the press
pass.
Q: LOkay. Are you familiar with the text?
A: LYes. Yes. It looks familiar.
Q: LIs any of it true?
A: LNo.
Q: LNone of it's true?
A: LNo.'' \170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\ See id. at 91-92.

Beachum also claimed during his deposition that the press pass
template, like the other files in the kit, was not capable of
producing a physical press pass because he had ``pixelated''
\171\ the template so that when it was printed out, the image
would be distorted. The following exchange is excerpted from
his Subcommittee deposition:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\171\ A pixel (from ``picture element'') is the basic unit of
visual information on a computer display or in a computer image. The
more pixels an image contains, the clearer the image will be, and the
higher the resolution is said to be. Images that contain few pixels,
and thus less visual information, tend to appear granulated when they
are enlarged. Although Beachum never explained fully what he meant by
``pixelated,'' the Subcommittee understood him to mean that he had
lowered the resolution, and that the image would thus appear on screen,
or in print, in a granulated manner when enlarged.

``Q: LDo you think it's possible for anyone to actually
use that, your press pass, to get into a concert?
A: LNo. For a fact, no.
Q: LWhy not?
A: LWell, especially when I printed it, it's too
small. I mean, you can't manipulate that.
Q: LThat cannot be manipulated?
A: LNot into a larger format, no.
Q: LAgain, why not?
A: LIt would become pixelated.'' \172\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\ Beachum deposition, supra, at Exhibits 86-88.

Beachum's claims that the template would become useless if
actually printed, however, were false: The Subcommittee was
easily able to print a press pass that was not distorted.
The Subcommittee learned from officials at Victory Memorial
Hospital in Waukegan, Illinois, that the birth certificate
Beachum offered is an exact replica of a birth certificate
format used by the hospital before 1990.\173\ The birth
certificate depicted a sketch of the hospital and calligraphic
text preceding blanks for the infant's name, the doctor's name,
and dates to be filled in by hand after printing the
certificate. The kit included a text file which offered
specific instructions on how best to replicate an authentic
birth certificate from Victory Memorial Hospital, including the
type of paper on which to print the certificate, and what types
of gold seals to use. For example, the text notes that:

\173\ See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 7a.

``* LThe Administrators [sic] name during the era this
certificate was issued was Donald Wasson. The Attending
Physician's name was W. M. Smith.
* LDonald Wasson's signature is signed with a blue
inked fountain pen.
* LAll ohter [sic] handwriting is done in black ink
with a fine point pen (i.e. Bic).
* * *

``Now in case you missed it, to the left and right of
the picture of the hospital, are BLACK INKED FOOTPRINTS
OF AN INFANT. These foot prints of course are not on
the scan (get you [sic] own damn baby!). The foot
prints each face inward toward the horizontal center of
the document, and lie adjacent to either horizontal
side of the picture of the hospital. Remeber [sic], the
footprints face inward (as in heel near the edge of the
document, with toes closest to the picture.'' \174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\ Beachum deposition, supra, at Exhibit 7.

Beachum testified that he intentionally corrupted the
background of the birth certificate by adding a ``digital
watermark'' \175\ to the certificate file that would cause it
to print in a distorted manner, which he claimed would prevent
customers from actually using it. In the following dialogue
excerpted from his Subcommittee deposition, Beachum explained
this purported distortion process:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\ A digital watermark is digital data embedded either visibly
or invisibly into an image or other type of digital document (film,
photograph, etc.) which is designed to make counterfeiting the document
more difficult.

``Q: LAfter receiving that certificate from that site,
did you make any changes or alterations--
A: LNo.
Q: L--to the certificate?
A: LYes, yes, yes. I digitally encrypted the
background of the certificate.
Q: LHow did you do that?
A: LI forget, but it's a plug-in from Photo Shop that
does it.
Q: LWhy did you do that?
A: LIn case someone tried to increase the dpi, it
would pixelate the picture, the image.
Q: LAnd the purpose of causing the picture to be
pixelated is what?
A: LTo keep someone from trying to pass it off as a
real thing.'' \176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\176\ See Beachum deposition, supra, at 78-79.

In addition, Beachum testified that the certificate had been
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
pixelated the entire time it was on his website:

``Q: LSo for the entire time that that file has been on
your website and offered to customers on your website,
it's had the distortion element you described?
A: LYes.'' \177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\177\ See id.

The Subcommittee subsequently determined that Beachum's
testimony was possibly perjurious, since the certificate files
on the kit which the Subcommittee had purchased undercover
before Beachum's deposition generated actual hard copy
documents that did not bear a digital watermark. Computer
experts consulted by the Subcommittee confirmed that the
certificate files had not been altered in the fashion described
by Beachum.
The kit included two activity coordinator certificate
files, which Beachum testified that he created by digitally
scanning the original certificates awarded to his mother.\178\
One certificate appeared to be issued by Kent State
University,\179\ while the other was purportedly issued by the
Ohio Health Care Association.\180\ Both certificates bore
blanks for the user to record the name of the person who had
obtained the certificates, and the date on which the
certificates had been issued. Beachum's site claimed that the
completed certificates would enhance one's ability to obtain
employment as an activity coordinator, which the site described
as a person who plans activities for individuals in nursing
homes or for pre-school children. The site claimed that, in
order to obtain a genuine certificate, an individual must take
a course costing ``a thousand plus dollars.'' \181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\178\ Id. at 48.
\179\ See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 8a (Tim Beachum, Kent
State University Certificate).
\180\ See id. at Exhibit 8b (Tim Beachum, Ohio Resident Activity
Coordinator Training Project Certificate of Attendance).
\181\ Beachum deposition, supra, at Exhibit 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite these representations on his website, Beachum
testified that the activity coordinator certificate files were
for ``novelty'' purposes only. Beachum explained that the
certificates were offered only in ``thumbnail'' \182\ format,
and could not be downloaded in their full sizes. In the
following exchange, Beachum insisted that if a customer were to
download and enlarge the certificates, they would be useless
because they would be hopelessly distorted:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\ A thumbnail is a picture of a graphic image. Thumbnails do
not contain enough pixels, or picture information, to be enlarged or
altered without significant distortion. Thumbnails are only used to
indicate what an image looks like, and are not layered templates as
described earlier.

``Q: LIs it your testimony that those documents,
Exhibits 3 and 4, then could not be made to look like
authentic documents?
A: LNo. No way they could be.
* * *
Q: LWhy not?
A: LI intentionally corrupted the background of all
the documents so that they couldn't be used.
Q: LHow did you corrupt the background of the
documents?
A: LI put a watermark, what is called a digital
watermark in the background to give the paper an
intentional crinkle or wrinkled look.
Q: LSo it is your testimony that is someone--well,
maybe you could explain for me, if someone tried to
print out these documents, what would happen?
A: LIt would have a distorted look, like--the
background of this has like a yellow tint to it and
it's a real distorted look in the background. In my
opinion, there's no way it would look authentic.
Q: LHow long have you had that distortion on these
products?
A: LAlways.'' \183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\ See Beachum deposition, supra, at 70-71.

Despite these protestations, however, the Subcommittee
successfully printed full-size certificates with the use of
software such as Adobe Photoshop. Thus, it
appears as if Beachum may have committed perjury during his
deposition testimony in this respect as well.
(d) Disclaimer
Until the Subcommittee contacted Beachum, his website
contained only the briefest of disclaimers:

``Because our novelty fake id kit is distributed in a
digital format we do not of [sic] refunds. Our kit is
sold as is. All images found on this site is [sic]
copyrighted and can not be used by any other web site
without the written consent of Best Fake ID's.'' \184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\184\ Id. at Exhibit 11.

After he first spoke with Subcommittee staff, Beachum expanded
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
his disclaimer to include the following:

``The information contained in this website is strictly
for academic use alone. BEST FAKE ID'S will bear no
responsibility for any use otherwise. All information
on this web site is for entertainment and educational
purposes only.'' \185\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\185\ Id. at Exhibit 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) Tim Catron: fakeidzone.com
(a) Business
Tim Catron is a Kansas resident who registered the domain
name fakeidzone.com on October 2, 1998, providing as contact
information an address in the Philippines. At this website,
Catron offered a kit on a CD-ROM that he called ``Fake ID Kit
Ver. 2.0.'' He told the Subcommitte that he was reselling this
kit for Brett Carreras.\186\ Catron also said that he had
previously ``partnered up'' with Carreras, the operator of
fakeid.net, and Tim Beachum, the operator of bestfakeids.com,
but that he had recently ceased all contact with those
individuals.\187\ Catron sold the CD-ROM kit for between
approximately $19.95 and $39.95, payable by cash or money
order. For a 2-month period, however, Catron accepted payment
by credit card. Billing records obtained by the Subcommittee
from his credit card processor indicate that, from November
1999 to January 2000, Catron earned $12,250 from 652
transactions.\188\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\186\ Subcommittee staff telephone interview with Tim Catron (Mar.
23, 2000).
\187\ Id.
\188\ Letter from Paul Kraaijvanger, Co-founder/Director, and Matt
Walker, Controller, Verotel, to Kirk Walder, Investigator, Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Jan. 6, 1999), at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Products
The CD-ROM disk that Catron marketed on his website
contained more than 100 templates for a wide variety of
identification documents, including driver's licenses, Social
Security cards, green cards, and high school and college
diplomas and transcripts, as well as what Catron referred to as
``novelty templates'' for documents such as a concealed weapons
permit.\189\ Catron's kit also included ``step by step
instructions on what you need to create fake ids so real you
could fool your own mother,'' \190\ as well as instructions for
making both ``a fake drivers [sic] license'' and a hologram for
the driver's license.\191\ In addition to such tools as a bar
code generator and a Social Security number verifier, the kit
included instructions on how to ``get a New ID: Complete report
shows you how to do this by adopting the identity of a deceased
child or infant.'' \192\ To complete the kit, Catron sold paper
designed for printing diplomas and birth certificates.\193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\189\ See Hearing record, Exhibit 6.
\190\ See id.
\191\ Tim Catron, Fake ID Zone (visited Jan. 3, 2000) http://
www.digitalhideout.com/idkit.html.
\192\ Id.
\193\ See Tim Catron, Placing a Order [sic] (visited Jan. 5, 2000)
http://www. digitalhideout.com/cashorder.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Disclaimer
Catron posted the following disclaimer at the bottom of his
home page, in fine print:

``Although our fake id kit gives you step by step
instructions along with templates on how to produce
realistic looking fake drivers license, birth
certificates, back stage passes, and much more. It is
only meant to be a novelty item. Do not under any
circumstances try to pass them for the real thing. That
would be illegal.'' \194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\ See Hearing record, Exhibit 6.

In addition, Catron referenced the above disclaimer on his
order form, and requested that customers sign the order form as
an acknowledgment that they had read and understood the
disclaimer.
Despite his novelty claim in the disclaimer, Catron refused
to answer the Subcommittee's questionnaire by invoking his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. He also
stated in an affidavit that he would invoke the Fifth Amendment
in response to every question except his name and address if
the Subcommittee chose to depose him.\195\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\ See id. at Exhibit 18 (affidavit of Tim Catron, Apr. 21,
2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) Other Online Activities
In January 2000, Catron attempted to sell his two websites,
fakeidzone.com and fakeid.cc,\196\ through an online auction at
an offering price of $5,000. He noted in the auction
description that the winning bidder would receive the domain
names as well as the graphics and designs for his sites. Catron
explained that although the site had been very profitable, he
had decided to sell it in order to dedicate time to other
(unidentified) sites.\197\ Although it is not clear whether
Catron successfully sold the websites, it does appear that he
is no longer the owner of the domain names.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\196\ Subcommittee staff was unable to find evidence that fakeid.cc
was ever operational.
\197\ See E-Bay http://www.ebay.com (description of auction item
244333201, posted Jan. 23, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(5) Josh Dansereau: fake-ids.com
(a) Business
Josh Dansereau is a resident of Tallahassee, Florida, who
was born in 1979. He originally became involved in the false
identification business after he created a fake driver's
license for himself.\198\ In mid-April 1999, Dansereau
registered the domain names fake-ids.com, fakeidshop.com, and
fakeids.org. In mid-September 1999 he registered fakeidone.com
and fakeid1.com.\199\ Dansereau used these five websites, which
were mirror sites containing the same information, in an effort
to gain more website traffic.\200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\ Subcommittee staff telephone interview with Joshua Dansereau
(Apr. 4, 2000) [hereinafter ``Second Dansereau interview''].
\199\ Network Solutions http://www.networksolutions.com/whois/; see
also Hearing record, Exhibit 17 (Dansereau Questionnaire Response, at 1
(undated; returned to Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
Mar. 27, 2000)).
\200\ Second Dansereau interview, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dansereau began selling false identification documents from
fakeids.com in June 1999. He sold approximately 10 to 12 false
identification documents per week at a price of approximately
$30 to $35 each.\201\ Dansereau used a high speed computer and
monitor, a state of the art card printer, and a scanner to
manufacture these documents.\202\ Dansereau told the
Subcommittee that he had made a total of 100 to 200 false
identification documents, and as many as 50 in one peak month
alone. Dansereau added that he had earned a total of
approximately $3,000 to $5,000.\203\ Lieutenant Myers believes
that Dansereau earned closer to $250,000 from his false
identification operation, and noted in his testimony during the
hearing that when his team searched Dansereau's home, they
found 85 fake identification documents ready to be mailed to
customers. Lieutenant Myers noted that these 85 phony
identification documents represented approximately $7,000 in
income for Dansereau.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\201\ David Myers, Draft Training Materials: Joshua Dansereau Case
Report 3 (Nov. 12, 1999) (unpublished report on file with Florida
Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Fraudulent Identification
Unit, Enforcement and Training) [hereinafter ``Dansereau Case
Report''].
\202\ Dansereau Case Report, supra, at 3.
\203\ Second Dansereau interview, supra.
\204\ Hearing record, supra, at 15 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Products
Dansereau offered driver's licenses from all U.S. States
with the exception of Florida.\205\ Lieutenant Myers described
the cards as high quality and noted that, of the 85 false
identification documents his office confiscated from Dansereau,
many were for older adults from a variety of States, including
Florida.\206\ On his website, Dansereau described his products
as
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\205\ See Joshua Dansereau, Gallery (visited Jan. 3, 2000) http://
www.freehosting2.at. webjump.com/413a62646/fa/fakeids-org/gallery.htm.
\206\ Dansereau Case Report, supra, at 3.

``The best novelty fake ID's you can buy. When held up
to real State ID's, it's hard to tell the difference!
You can be any age you want and you can be whomever you
want. If you're looking for the most realistic fake
ID's you can buy that will pass the book test, you have
come to the right place.'' \207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\207\ Joshua Dansereau, Fake ID One Home Page (visited Jan. 3,
2000) http://www. freehosting2.at.webjump.com/413a62646/fa/fakeids-org/
gallery.htm.

Dansereau distinguished his false identification documents from
that of his competitors by noting that ``all of are [sic] ID's
are the new plastic credit card style, they come with a working
magnetic strip at no extra charge.'' \208\ In the ``Frequently
Asked Questions'' section of the website, however, Dansereau
acknowledged that the magnetic strips were not actually
functional.\209\ Dansereau accepted cash and money orders for
his products, and suggested that customers wishing to pay with
cash ``wrap the money in a couple pieces of paper or
something.'' \210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\ Joshua Dansereau, Gallery (visited Jan. 3, 2000) http://
www.freehosting2.at. webjump.com/413a62646/fa/fakeids-org/gallery.htm.
\209\ Josh Dansereau, Frequently Asked Questions (visited Jan. 3,
2000) http://www. freehosting2.at.webjump.com/462b02686/fa/fakeids-org/
faqhelp.htm.
\210\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Disclaimer
Dansereau posted a lengthy disclaimer in fine print on the
doorway page of his websites. The disclaimer was the same as
that which was posted on Robert Sek's website, theidshop.com,
see Section III.A.(1)(d). In addition, Dansereau posted the
following statement on his home page:

``Note: we are not recommending the use of the novelty
ids to purchase alcohol or tobacco. That is illegal.
When you purchase a novelty id. You assume all
responsibility for the misuse of the product.'' \211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\ Josh Dansereau, Fake ID One Home Page (visited Jan. 3, 2000)
http://www. freehosting2.at.webjump.com/413a62646/fa/fakeids-org/
gallery.htm.

These disclaimers, however, did not prevent Dansereau's
prosecution by the State of Florida.
(d) Legal Situation
On November 12, 1999, Dansereau was charged with a felony
for violating a Florida State law prohibiting the falsification
of identification cards or documents purporting to contain an
applicant's age or date of birth.\212\ Dansereau pled guilty of
the felony charge and, pursuant to a pretrial intervention
agreement,\213\ was sentenced to serve a 6-month term of
probation starting in January 2000. He also forfeited the
equipment he used to manufacture the false identification
documents.\214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\ See Florida Stat. ch. 877.18.
\213\ See Florida Stat. ch. 948.08.
\214\ Dansereau Case Report, supra, at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dansereau told the Subcommittee that he voluntarily shut
down his false identification websites in either January or
February 2000,\215\ although one site, fakeid1.com, appeared
still to be functional as of April 2000. Dansereau swore in an
affidavit to the Subcommittee that when he shut down his false
identification websites, he began returning orders that he had
received to potential customers without opening them.\216\ On
February 4, 2000, as part of the Subcommittee's undercover
operation, however, the Subcommittee mailed to Dansereau an
order for a fake Connecticut driver's license. Despite two e-
mail messages sent to addresses posted on Dansereau's website
inquiring about the order, the Subcommittee did not receive the
card and the money has not been returned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\ Telephone Interview with Joshua Dansereau (Mar. 17, 2000)
[hereinafter ``First Dansereau interview''].
\216\ See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 19 (affidavit of Joshua
Dansereau, June 7, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In July 2000, because the Florida Division of Alcoholic
Beverages and Tobacco Fraudulent Identification Unit (Florida
ABT) suspected that Dansereau was still involved in producing
or promoting false identification documents, his probation was
extended until August 2000. As part of its ongoing monitoring
of false identification on the Internet, Florida ABT determined
that Dansereau had not shut down fakeid1.com, despite his
assurances to the Subcommittee. Florida ABT then found that
Dansereau had continued cashing and depositing money orders and
cashiers checks that he received from individuals wishing to
purchase false identification from fakeid1.com. As a result,
Dansereau was arrested and again charged with a felony for
violating Florida's false identification statute in August
2000.\217\ Dansereau pleaded no contest to one count of failure
to comply with requirements for sale of identification on May
23, 2001.\218\ He was sentenced to a 3-year term of probation,
ordered to pay $808 in court costs, and sentenced to perform 15
days of county work.\219\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\217\ Affidavit of Jeff Yonce, Special Agent, Florida Division of
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Fraudulent Identification Unit, at 1-2
(Aug. 16, 2000) [hereinafter ``Yonce affidavit''].
\218\ See Florida Stat. ch. 877.18.
\219\ Florida v. Joshua Dansereau, Case No. 00-3279 (Florida 2nd
Judicial Circuit Court, May 23, 2001), and telephone interview with
Special Agent Jeff Yonce, Florida Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco Fraudulent Identification Unit (Dec. 1, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. The Buyers
(1) Thomas Seitz
(a) Legal Situation
Thomas Seitz, born in 1977, is a resident of New Jersey. In
April 1999 local police in New Jersey arrested Seitz on charges
of theft by deception and presentation of false information
after he purchased a car on credit using an assumed identity.
After pleading guilty, he was convicted in New Jersey State
court of one count of theft by deception, two counts of
forgery, and one count of uttering forged instruments.\220\
Seitz was sentenced to a 3-year State term of incarceration for
these four felony convictions.\221\ On February 22, 2000, Seitz
entered a plea of guilty to one count of bank fraud in the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Florida for the same
conduct that gave rise to the State charge. In June 2000, Seitz
was duly sentenced to a 7-month term of incarceration to be
served concurrently with his New Jersey State sentence,
followed by a 60-month term of supervised release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\220\ See New Jersey Stat. ANN. Sec. Sec. 2C:1a(2),(3).
\221\ See New Jersey v. Thomas W. Seitz, Case No. 99-06-00613-1
(New Jersey Superior Court Law Division, Sept. 27, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Internet Activities
In an interview with the Subcommittee, Seitz said that he
is very experienced with computers and the Internet. Seitz
added that he has been using computers since the sixth grade,
that he has worked as a computer network engineer, and that he
was certified in the use of Microsoft products.\222\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\222\ Subcommittee staff interview with Thomas Seitz at the Baker
County Jail, Macclenny, Florida (Apr. 6, 2000) [hereinafter ``Seitz
interview''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the hearing, Seitz testified that he was looking at
various websites and discovered that he could obtain the names
and Social Security numbers of other people from the Internet.
Seitz knew that bank, credit, and tax information is tied often
to an individual's Social Security number,\223\ and that this
information that can be put to many uses, including identity
theft. Accordingly, he found names and Social Security numbers
on the websites for Congress and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). By using search engines on the congressional
website, Seitz was able to access the Congressional Record,
where he found names, Social Security numbers, and military
branches and ranks of members of the United States military
being considered for promotion.\224\ Seitz also found names and
Social Security numbers of many individuals in the quarterly
reports of publicly traded companies on the SEC's website. He
focused his information-gathering efforts on at least two
individuals, Joseph A. Parisi and Richard D. Clasen, both of
California. He obtained these individuals' addresses and
telephone numbers through online directories.\225\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\223\ Seitz interview, supra.
\224\ Names, complete Social Security numbers, and military branch
and rank information of United States military officers under
consideration for promotion were available through the Congressional
Record until 1995. Since 1996, most entries--and since 1997,
apparently, all entries--have contained only the last four digits of
the Social Security number in addition to name, rank, and military
branch information.
\225\ Seitz interview, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seitz then used Internet search engines to obtain
information on fake identification documents, including birth
certificates, Social Security cards, and driver's license or
identification cards. Seitz recalled to the Subcommittee that
while he was searching for false identification materials that
he could use in conjunction with the personal information he
had collected on Clasen and Parisi, he visited one site that
posed the question: ``Do you need a new identity?'' Seitz
downloaded templates including a birth certificate template
from three or four free sites. Although one website Seitz
visited stated that its products were for novelty purposes
only, and another posted a small disclaimer, Seitz testified
that he ignored both statements. Indeed, he wondered why anyone
would put such templates on the web in the first place except
in order to facilitate precisely the sort of illegal uses the
disclaimers purported to disclaim--and for which he himself
sought access to them. Seitz could see, for instance, no
legitimate ``novelty'' use for a false birth certificate.\226\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\226\ Id., see also Hearing record, supra, at 16 (testimony of
Thomas Seitz).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seitz conducted these Internet searches at a local library
in an effort to avoid detection. He told the Subcommittee that
he knew that the Internet Protocol address of a computer that
had been used to visit a particular website could be traced. He
explained, however, that

``I used the computer in a public library to conduct my
search. Dozens of people use the computers there every
day and they also do not necessarily keep logs of who
is using the computer. I had no fear of detection as I
was searching.'' \227\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\227\ Hearing record, supra, at 19 (testimony of Thomas Seitz).

Using the stolen personal identification data that he had
obtained from the SEC website, Seitz submitted 14 fraudulent
car loan applications to Nations Bank via the Internet,
including applications in the names of Clasen and Parisi. Seitz
sought to obtain fraudulently a total of $540,000 in loan
proceeds, but he received checks for only the two loans for
which he had applied in the names of Parisi and Clasen.
(c) Creating False Documents
After the loans were approved, Seitz used his home computer
to complete a fake New Jersey birth certificate template that
he had obtained from the Internet using the library computer.
He made two different birth certificates using the identities
of Parisi and Clasen, printing them on heavy green paper, but
omitting the raised seal that the certificates were supposed to
contain. The entire process took approximately 30 minutes.
Seitz also obtained blank W-2 forms from the Internal Revenues
Service website, and completed these documents using the stolen
identities.
Seitz then used the counterfeit birth certificate to obtain
an identification card in Parisi's name at the New Jersey
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). He chose to obtain an
identification card instead of a driver's license because he
knew that only two pieces of identification were required for
an identification card, and that he would not, in applying for
one, have to wait long or take a driving test. As he
anticipated, the DMV issued Seitz an authorized identification
card in Parisi's name very quickly: It took about 30 minutes.
Seitz also told the Subcommittee that DMV did not examine the
W-2 forms that he provided as additional support.\228\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\228\ Seitz interview, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seitz attempted to use his false identification card in
Parisi's name to buy a car at a dealership in North Brunswick,
New Jersey, but was unsuccessful because the dealership
required an actual driver's license in order to make a
purchase. Because Seitz did not possess a driver's license in
Parisi's name, he abandoned his attempt to buy a car at that
dealership.\229\ Instead, Seitz scanned his New Jersey license
into a computer, and used a software program to change the
identifying information to that of Richard Clasen. This process
took approximately 30 minutes. Seitz did not laminate this
card, but simply printed it and photocopied the printout.\230\
Armed with this merely photocopied driver's license, Seitz went
to a different car dealership, located in the Township of Old
Bridge, New Jersey, and selected a new car to purchase. Seitz
presented to the dealership a photocopy of his altered driver's
license, and recited aloud the Social Security number of an
individual residing in California that he had obtained from the
Internet. The dealership employees did not ask to see his W-2
forms or his birth certificate.\231\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\229\ Id.
\230\ Id.
\231\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seitz was thus able to buy a car and drive it off the
dealership lot successfully because the dealership employees
did not verify his documents immediately. Although Seitz
applied for, and received loans from Nations Bank, he was also
able to finance the car through the dealership itself at a
lower interest rate. New Jersey police discovered Seitz's crime
in less than 2 weeks, however, because the number that Seitz
inserted into the phony driver's license he manufactured in
Clasen's name did not match an actual New Jersey driver's
license number.\232\ As a result, Seitz's fraudulent scheme was
exposed when the dealership submitted the phony license number
to the DMV to obtain the vehicle's registration. State police
apprehended Seitz shortly thereafter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\232\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Thana Barlee
(a) Background
Thana Barlee entered a community college in Maryland after
he was expelled from George Washington University during his
freshman year in 1999 for manufacturing and selling counterfeit
Maine and New Jersey driver's licenses in his dormitory room.
(b) Internet Activities
Barlee initially decided to create false identification
documents in September 1999, after he was turned away from a
local nightclub because he was not old enough to gain
admission. Upon his return to campus, he started searching the
Internet and discovered a wealth of information and resources
related to false identification materials. Barlee found free,
layered templates and instructions on a website operated by an
individual whom he recalled as ``Mo Mann.'' \233\ Using these
templates and such materials as reflective paint, paper, and
lamination packs that he bought for about $40 to $60 at an
office supply store, Barlee was able to create a fake driver's
license that same weekend. Although this first fake license was
sufficiently realistic to enable him to purchase alcohol at a
nearby liquor store, Barlee worked to perfect his techniques
over the next few weeks. He already owned a functional printer,
but with investment backing from several other students, he
upgraded to a higher-quality $600 printer, and bought a
lamination machine as well. Barlee also used the Internet to
purchase additional supplies for his operation, such as gold
ink for making holograms.\234\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\233\ See http://yohello.freeyellow.com/index.html.
\234\ Barlee interview, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Barlee initially manufactured New Jersey driver's licenses
because the general consensus on Internet discussion boards was
that New Jersey licenses were the easiest to duplicate. The
first weekend that Barlee was in business he sold approximately
15 to 20 phony driver's licenses to fellow students. He charged
$20 to $100 for each license; the price he charged depended
upon such factors as whether he knew the buyer and how quickly
the buyer wanted the license. Barlee decided to diversify his
manufacturing operation to include Maine driver's licenses
because he thought it would look suspicious for so many college
students to present New Jersey driver's licenses to a bouncer
at a night club. He chose to duplicate Maine licenses because,
like New Jersey licenses, they then had a reputation for being
among the easiest to replicate.\235\ With only about 20 minutes
of experimentation, Barlee produced a high quality Maine
driver's license.\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\235\ Maine has since changed the appearance of its driver's
licenses.
\236\ Barlee interview, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Barlee told the Subcommittee that he would not have
manufactured and sold false identification documents had it not
been for the ease with which the Internet enabled him to do so.
On the ``Mo Mann'' website, he found templates he could use to
manufacture phony driver's licenses; step-by-step instructions
for how to make and improve the quality of false identification
documents; and a list of materials that he would need. Barlee
saw the disclaimers on the websites but ignored them because
such disclaimers are commonplace on the Internet.\237\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\237\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Referrals
Following the hearing, the Subcommittee referred several of
the individuals and websites it investigated to proper law
enforcement agencies pursuant to Rule 19 of the Subcommittee's
rules of procedure--which provides that when there is

``reasonable cause to believe that a violation of law
may have occurred, the Chairman and Ranking Minority
Member by letter, or the Subcommittee by resolution,
are authorized to report such violation to the proper
State, local and/or Federal authorities.'' \238\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\238\ Rules of Procedure, for the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs as Adopted
(March 8, 2001), S. Prt. 107-16 (March 2001), at Rule 19.

The individuals thus referred include Mike Burton, Josh
Dansereau, and the operators of NoveltyID4U.com and
Phonyid.com--all of whom accepted orders and payment from the
Subcommittee yet did not deliver a product. In addition, it is
the Subcommittee's opinion that the activities of other
individuals, including Robert Sek, Brett Carreras, Tim Beachum,
and Tim Catron, warrant further investigation by law
enforcement, as these individuals may have violated United
States law. The offenses these individuals may have committed
range from violations of Sec. 1028 to perjury and mail fraud.
Unfortunately, little has been done in terms of
prosecutions, although Josh Dansereau's term of probation was
extended after Florida law enforcement learned that he had
continued cashing customers' checks, including the
Subcommittee's. In addition, the Fond du Lac, Wisconsin Police
Department retrieved the $75 that the Subcommittee had sent
Mike Burton for a false driver's license, and fined Burton
approximately $200. However, it appears that the law at the
time that Brett Carreras, Tim Catron, Tim Beachum, Robert Sek,
and other individuals were operating their websites was not
sufficient to prosecute them. With the exception of Brett
Carreras, the individuals appear to have closed their websites
and moved on to different ventures.
During the course of the Subcommittee investigation of
false identification websites and their operators, at least
seven websites closed down, including bestfakeids.com,\239\
fakeidzone.com,\240\ ultimate-id.com,\241\
newid.ultramailweb.com,\242\ noveltyid4u.com,\243\ the
``Fakeidman'' message board, and promasteridcards.com. \244\ In
fact, hours after the hearing concluded, Promasteridcards.com
posted the following message on its website:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\239\ Bestfakeids (last visited Nov. 30, 2000) http://
www.bestfakeids.com.
\240\ Fake ID Zone (last visited Nov. 30, 2000) http://
wwwfakeidzon.com.
\241\ Ultimate Id (last visited Nov. 30, 2000) http://www.ultimate-
id.com.
\242\ New Identity Kit (last visited Nov. 30, 2000) http://
www.newid.ultramailweb.com.
\243\ Novelty ID 4U (last visited Dec. 10, 1999) http://
www.noveltyid4u.com.
\244\ Fakeidman (last visited Nov. 30, 2000) http://
pages.eidosnet.co.uk/fakeidman.

``PromasterCards Ltd creased [sic] trading following
the outcome of the Senate Governmental Affairs
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on: ``False
ID's and the Internet'' [sic] Any orders will be
``returned to sender'' 19th May 2000.'' \245\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\245\ Promaster Cards (last visited May 19, 2000) http://
www.promastidcards.mcmail.com.
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IV. Conclusion
A. General Services Administration Smart Card Technology for Federal
Facilities
In response to the results of the Subcommittee's
investigation, coupled with recent terrorist assaults on the
United States by individuals whose acts, and the preparation
therefor, may have been facilitated by false identification,
and GAO's findings that detail the weaknesses of security
measures at Federal facilities, the Subcommittee has begun
exploring methods of providing identification that cannot be so
readily counterfeited. This exploration led the Subcommittee to
the General Services Administration (GSA), which is currently
in the final stages of developing so-called ``smart card''
technology.
Smart cards are credit card sized cards that contain a
microprocessor. This computer chip is able to store, retrieve
and process a variety of information that may be used for
security purposes, including identification, entrance to
buildings, and access to computers. The smart card can allow
use of a range of biometric measurements for identification
purposes, including fingerprints, hand geometry, iris (eye)
scan, face measurements, and voice verification. Once an
individual has enrolled his or her features, they are stored in
a template that may be verified when the individual presents
himself or herself at a security checkpoint. Smart cards can be
used for many military applications as well as Federal
employment applications such as equipment tracking, training
updates, medical information, and accounting functions, thus
eliminating the need for many different cards or forms. Smart
cards may contain magnetic stripes, bar codes, and digitized
photos.
At the request of the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), GSA first began working on coordinating a government
wide adoption of smart cards in 1996. President Clinton's
Fiscal Year 1998 budget demonstrated the administration's
intention that every Federal employee be able to use a single
card for building access, travel, small purchases, and other
purposes. At this time, OMB directed GSA to work with Federal
agencies, including the Department of Treasury and the
Department of Defense, to develop a smart card. The GSA team
responsible for this project met with representatives from
industry and government agencies, then began conducting a pilot
program within GSA and other agencies. On May 19, 2000, GSA
awarded a Common Access ID Contract worth a total of $1.5
billion over 10 years to five firms. Several Federal agencies
have expressed interest in the smart card, including the
Veterans Administration, the Department of State, and the
Department of Defense, which has stated that it intends to use
smart card technology for both military and civilian
identification purposes.
One of the smart card's main strengths is its government-
wide interoperability. It is GSA's intention that the cards be
accepted at any participating Federal facility, so that, for
example, cards issued by the Department of Defense will be
compatible with the security measures at the Department of
State. This should eliminate much of the confusion and
potential for counterfeiting that stems from the multitude of
cards used by Federal agencies, which has been highlighted by
GAO's recent undercover operations. GSA's smart card
incorporates cryptographic and biometric technology to encode
an individual's information in a computer chip.
B. Law Enforcement's Response to Crimes Using False Identification
It is impossible to quantify the criminal activities that
have been committed using false identification documents
obtained via the Internet. The Subcommittee met with officials
from the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, the Social Security
Administration, and various State law enforcement agencies.
These officials indicated that, when they encounter cases
involving false identification documents, they usually do not
investigate the source of the documents, and frequently do not
prosecute the false-identity crime itself because they
concentrate instead on the offense that resulted from the use
of the counterfeit documents. Director Stafford acknowledged
that investigating the source of false identification is not
the Secret Service's primary tactic in curbing the use of false
identification:

``We do not monitor specifically for false
identification. We feel that we prioritize and focus
our investigations primarily on crimes that involve
false identification, primarily our core violations. We
feel that through prioritizing, through addressing
large dollar amount, high-impact cases that affect our
community, whether it be credit cards or bank fraud or
bank loans, all of which possess some form of
counterfeit or fraudulent identification, that we can
make an impact even with our limited funding and
resources in this area.'' \246\
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\246\ Id., at 27 (testimony of Director Stafford).

Moreover, anecdotal evidence exists indicating that the
Internet has become a significant source of the false
identification documents that are used illegally. Lieutenant
Myers estimated that about 30 percent of the fraudulent
identification documents that he reviewed in 2000 had been
created via the Internet.\247\ This figure, he said, had risen
from slightly less than 1 percent in 1998, and approximately 5
percent in 1999. In addition, Lieutenant Myers testified that
he expects that 60 to 70 percent of the false identification
documents that his office will seize in 2001 will have come
from the Internet.\248\ (This includes identification documents
produced by website operators and identification documents
produced through files transmitted over the Internet.)
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\247\ Subcommittee staff interview with David Myers, Lead Fraud
Investigator, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, State of
Florida, in Jacksonville, Florida (Apr. 7, 2000) [hereinafter ``Myers
interview''].
\248\ Hearing record, supra, at 20 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).
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As shown by the case study of Thomas Seitz, explained in
Section III.B.(1), individuals seeking false identification to
further criminal activities are increasingly likely to use the
Internet to obtain false identification documents. In fact,
Seitz testified that were it not for the ease of the Internet,
he may not have searched for another source of false
identification, adding, ``I do not know any other places to go
to get fake identification as good as on the Internet.'' \249\
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\249\ Id. at 18 (testimony of Thomas Seitz).
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It is vital that law enforcement focus its attention on
this serious and growing problem, and in particular make every
effort to curb the manufacture and distribution of false
identification documents because, as K. Lee Blalack, II, then-
Chief Counsel and Staff Director of the Subcommittee,
testified:

``the distribution of these counterfeit identification
materials is growing because of the expanding
technology of the Internet. This new technology could
very well result in a flood of phony identification
documents and counterfeit credentials if steps are not
taken to curb this emerging problem. It will be no easy
task to maintain the integrity of the identification
documents on which both the government and the private
sector rely.'' \250\
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\250\ Id. at 12 (testimony of K. Lee Blalack, II).
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C. Implementing New Legislation
It is the Subcommittee's hope that the Internet False
Identification Prevention Act of 2000, as well the
Subcommittee's hearing, will focus attention on this emerging
problem. Indeed, focusing attention upon this industry can
itself help impede its operations. Lieutenant Myers testified
at the Subcommittee's hearing, for example, that

``Probably the biggest impact that we have had on the
Internet as I monitor it and have for many years is the
work done by your own Subcommittee's investigators.
They had a dramatic impact on those on the Internet.
Not even knowing their investigation was going on, I
could see that the activity on the Internet as it
related to false ID was going through some changes.''
\251\
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\251\ Hearing record, at 21-22 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).

Welcome though it is, however, such dissuasion through
scrutiny and public attention is far from enough. The Internet
False Identification Prevention Act of 2000 should help arm law
enforcement officials with the tools needed to curb the
manufacture and distribution of false identification documents
over the Internet. Diligent efforts by the U.S. law enforcement
community to employ these tools are now needed. As then-
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Chairman Collins noted during the Subcommittee's hearing:

``One of the troubling findings of this investigation
is that law enforcement officials, perhaps
understandably, have focused on the crime committed
with the phony IDs, but if we could somehow crack down
on the manufacture and marketing of those IDs, some of
the subsequent crimes would never be committed.'' \252\
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\252\ Hearing record, at 27 (statement by Senator Collins).

Through aggressive law enforcement activity, and continued
Congressional attention and oversight, the Subcommittee hopes
and anticipates that it will be possible dramatically to
decrease the number of crimes committed using false documents.
The following Senators, who are Members of the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, have approved this report:

Carl Levin Susan M. Collins
Daniel K. Akaka Ted Stevens
Richard J. Durbin George V. Voinovich
Robert G. Torricelli Pete V. Domenici
Max Cleland Thad Cochran
Thomas R. Carper Robert F. Bennett
Jean Carnahan Jim Bunning
Mark Dayton

Other Senators, who are Members of the Committee on
Governmental Affairs, approving this report are:

Senator Lieberman Fred Thompson