[Senate Executive Report 108-6]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
108th Congress Exec. Rpt.
1st Session SENATE 108-6
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PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF
BULGARIA, ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, ROMANIA, SLOVAKIA, AND SLOVENIA
_______
April 30, 2003.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Lugar, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany Treaty Doc. 108-04]
The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession
of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia, which were opened for signature at Brussels on March
26, 2003, and signed on behalf of the United States of America
and other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, having
considered the same, reports favorably thereon and recommends
that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification
thereof subject to 9 declarations and 3 conditions as set forth
in this report and the accompanying resolution of ratification.
CONTENTS
Page
I. The Future of NATO and the Enlargement of the Alliance...........2
II. Qualifications of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia for NATO membership.......................9
III. The Cost of NATO Enlargement....................................27
IV. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimates of NATO Enlargement..28
V. NATO-Russia Relations...........................................41
VI. The Balkan Wars.................................................43
VII. NATO Transformation.............................................43
VIII.Senate Action...................................................47
IX. Resolution of Ratification......................................53
X. Letter from Senate Armed Services Committee.....................64
I. The Future of NATO and the Enlargement of the Alliance
UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was
established as an alliance of common defense among democratic
and market oriented governments in North America and Western
Europe on August 24, 1949, with the entry into force of the
North Atlantic Treaty. Original members included the United
States, Canada, and ten European countries emerging from the
destruction of World War II (Great Britain, France, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Iceland
and Italy). Subsequently, the Alliance has been enlarged on
four separate occasions--to include Greece and Turkey in 1952,
the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982, and
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999. NATO has been
central to peace and stability in Europe for more than fifty
years and provides the United States with an ongoing and direct
leadership role in European security affairs.
During the Cold War, NATO served as a bulwark against the
threat of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites. The
U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee served as a deterrent to
Soviet aggression, and U.S. conventional forces stationed in
Europe, reaching over 300,000 at their peak, were evidence that
the United States would meet its commitment to collective
defense under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO members have made
significant cuts in their military forces, including a
substantial reduction in U.S. forces stationed in Europe. Since
1991, NATO has shifted from its Cold War strategy of mounting a
massive, static defense against a significant military threat
from a single direction. Instead, NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept
revised the strategy to provide mobile response to diverse and
multi-directional risks to the North Atlantic area. The
Committee welcomes Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's
statement about NATO's continuing relevance that he provided in
testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on April 29,
2003. In explaining the continuing relevance of the Alliance
and enduring transatlantic relationship, Secretary Powell
stated that:
For over half a century NATO was indispensable to
security on both sides of the Atlantic. That has not
changed. Today, the Alliance remains indispensable to
our security, and to meeting the security challenges in
a world of diverse threats, multiple challenges, and
unprecedented opportunities. The Alliance remains
crucial to the link that binds North America to Europe
and Europe to North America.
At the 1999 Washington Summit, the NATO allies approved a
new Strategic Concept to ``equip the Alliance for the security
challenges and opportunities of the 21st century and to guide
its future political and military development.'' In response to
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and NATO's
subsequent decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty, the allies ``approved a comprehensive package of
measures, based on NATO's [1999] Strategic Concept, to
strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security
of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they
may come,'' including ``. . . the threat posed by terrorism and
by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
means of delivery.''
And most recently, at the November 2002 Prague summit, NATO
Heads of State committed the Alliance to transform NATO with
new members, new capabilities and new relationships with its
partners. The Alliance invited Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to begin accession
talks to join the Alliance and considered the membership of
these seven countries as part of the Alliance's transforming
role for the 21st century. The Alliance also defined part of
its new mission as combating terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, matched by pledges to obtain the
military capabilities to accomplish that mission.
NATO first established a forum for constructive dialogue
and cooperation with the Russian Federation in the Permanent
Joint Council in 1997, and in 2002 established the NATO-Russia
Council to provide a forum for strengthening peace and security
in the Euro-Atlantic area, and where appropriate, consensus
building, consultations and joint decisions. NATO has also
forged a relationship with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine
Commission. Within the guidelines of its Resolution of
Ratification, as in 1998, the Committee supports these
initiatives as a way to demonstrate the defensive and
stabilizing intentions of NATO. Nonetheless, the core purpose
of the Alliance must remain the defense of its members. In
order to fulfill this purpose, the forces of Alliance members
must remain capable of defending against a significant military
threat, and all members of the Alliance must fully meet their
commitments as defined at the Prague summit.
During the Cold War, NATO played an important role. After
two World Wars in the first half of the 20th century into which
the United States was drawn, the close relationship among NATO
members allowed countries to lay aside historical grievances
and develop democratic traditions and market economies to the
enormous benefit of themselves, their neighbors, and the United
States. Under NATO's security umbrella, old enemies have not
only been reconciled but now stand side by side as allies;
national defense policies are coordinated; and, on a daily
basis, consultation, joint planning, joint training and
cooperation reinforce the trust and commitment to common
principles that are the very essence of the Alliance.
As Poland and Germany, and Hungary and Romania, and several
other former antagonists in Central and Eastern Europe build
constructive, friendly relations in the post-Cold War era, the
stabilizing influence of NATO membership, and potential
membership, is illustrated yet again. The defensive nature of
the Alliance, the democratic nature of its decision-making, and
membership based not upon force of arms or coercion, but the
willing choice of democratic governments, are the central
reasons that association with the Alliance, and even
membership, is a foreign policy priority for many European
nations previously denied the rights of self-determination,
freedom, and democracy. And for this reason, no country in
Europe, with the exception of Belarus, has objected to the
enlargement of the Alliance. Russia appears to accept
enlargement as inevitable and has put NATO-Russia and U.S.-
Russia relations in a broader context rather than making
enlargement a focal point as it did in the 1990s. In December
2001, NATO and Russian Foreign Ministers announced their
intention to create a NATO-Russia Council, on the principle of
``NATO at 20.'' In May 2002, NATO and Russian leaders meeting
in Rome signed the ``NATO at 20'' agreement, in which Russia
and NATO members participate as equals on certain issues. This
new body replaces the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.
With NATO's continued importance to European stability, and
a new mission, as defined in Prague, to combat terrorism and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, matched by
pledges to obtain the military capabilities to accomplish that
mission, as in 1998, the Committee supports a continued United
States commitment to, and leadership of, NATO. The Committee
welcomes the strategic rationale for NATO that was provided by
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman in
testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on April 8,
2003. In explaining the continuing relevance and purpose of the
Alliance, and in referring to comments earlier in the hearing
by Senators Lugar and Biden, Secretary Grossman stated that:
NATO [is] the central organizing agent for
transatlantic cooperation. It represents, as you both
said, not just a military alliance, but a political-
military alliance, a community of common values and
shared commitments to democracy, free markets and the
rule of law. NATO is key to the defense of the United
States, and so therefore, as you both said, NATO must
continue to lead and to adapt. [The] NATO Prague summit
launched a transformation of NATO with a three-part
agenda: new members, new capabilities and new
relationships. The job you've given me today, Senator,
is to discuss enlargement, which is key to that
transformation.
THE STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT
Notwithstanding the collapse of communism in most of Europe
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States and
its allies face continuing threats to their stability and
territorial integrity, including the potential, if lessened
threat of the emergence of a hegemonic power in or around
Europe, conflict stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the
revival of historic disputes, or the actions of undemocratic
leaders. Furthermore, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
in New York and Washington, DC heightened NATO's awareness of
emerging capabilities to use and deliver weapons of mass
destruction, as well as transnational threats such as
terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime that threaten
both the new and old democracies in the transatlantic region.
By providing a defense against many of these threats, NATO
membership for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia will expand the area in Europe where
peace and democracy are not only present, but secure.
Through much of its history, Europe has seen many insecure
and small powers, a few great powers, and far too many
nationalist defense policies--a dangerous catalyst for
collusion and conflagration. Twice in the last century these
dynamics have pulled the United States into conflict on the
European continent. With the enlargement of NATO, the United
States and its allies have an opportunity to build a more
stable Europe, to lock in that stability, and to replace the
dynamics of confrontation and conflict with trust and
cooperation. NATO membership will extend to Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia the
institutions, practices, and traditions that have made NATO an
effective military alliance for the last half century. This
structure has proven that vital U.S. interests in Europe can be
guaranteed by a stable architecture of security and cooperation
based upon a common commitment to the defense of democracy.
The Committee finds that the accession of Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to
NATO will make the Alliance stronger and more cohesive. Each of
the seven countries is an established democracy with a growing
market economy. Each shares the commitment to democracy that
unites the transatlantic community. Their militaries are firmly
under civilian control. In addition, these seven countries have
proven themselves ready to bear a share of the burden in
support of American and Allied interests beyond their borders.
Each has contributed to the peacekeeping missions in the
Balkans, and more recently, contributed to Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. All seven
have contributed to the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Afghanistan and have pledged contributions for post-
conflict reconstruction of Iraq.
NATO enlargement is not a reaction to any single event or
threat; rather it is a strategic opportunity for the expansion
of a zone of peace and democracy in a continent that is of
vital interest to the United States. As in 1998, the view of
the Committee is that this is the best way to minimize the
possibility that U.S. troops will be called upon again to fight
in a major war in Europe. The invasion or military
destabilization of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia would threaten the stability of
Europe, jeopardize vital United Sates national security
interests, and would quite likely lead to the engagement of
United States forces. NATO enlargement is a prudent step to
ensure that this does not happen.
NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT
The Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and the subsequent
disarray of the Russian military have significantly reduced any
immediate, conventional threat to Western Europe and the United
States. Consequently, in 1991, NATO members agreed to their
first Strategic Concept, reiterating the central importance of
collective defense to the Alliance, but also noting that, with
the emergence of independent democratic states in Central
Europe, ``the political division of Europe that was the source
of the military confrontation of the Cold War period has . . .
been overcome.'' At the 1999 Washington Summit, the NATO allies
approved a new Strategic Concept to ``equip the Alliance for
the security challenges and opportunities of the 21st century
and to guide its future political and military development.''
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and
NATO's subsequent decision to invoke Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty, the allies ``approved a comprehensive
package of measures, based on NATO's [1999] Strategic Concept,
to strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the
security of our forces, populations and territory, from
wherever they may come,'' including ``. . . the threat posed by
terrorism and by the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery.''
The Committee Resolution of Ratification declares that, in
order for NATO to serve the security interests of the United
States, the core purpose of NATO must remain the collective
defense of the territory of all Alliance members but NATO must
develop the capabilities to go beyond the treaty area to combat
weapons of mass production proliferation and terrorism if
necessary. With that focus, the Committee supports the 1999
Strategic Concept's leaner approach to security for the post-
Cold War environment, provided that NATO's forces become more
mobile and capable for high intensity conflict beyond the
Treaty area.
The Committee supports the 1999 Strategic Concept's
realistic force adjustments to meet new threats to the
territory of NATO. The Committee considers some positional
forces to have continued importance as an element of static
defense, but emphasizes the importance of more mobile,
expeditionary forces. As in 1998, the Committee Resolution of
Ratification declares that as NATO develops forces with
enhanced flexibility and mobility, it must continue to pursue
defense planning, command structures, and force goals first and
foremost to meet the requirements of Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty. The 1999 Strategic Concept continues to
provide guidance for the development of detailed policies and
military plans. It examines the Alliance's strategic
perspectives in the light of the evolving strategic environment
and security challenges and risks, and reconfirms the
importance of the transatlantic link and of maintaining the
Alliance's military capabilities, and examines the role of
other key elements in the Alliance's broad approach to
stability and security, namely the European Security and
Defense Identity; conflict prevention and crisis management;
partnership, cooperation and dialogue; enlargement; and arms
control, disarmament and non-proliferation. But in keeping with
the Kyl amendment of 1998, NATO should develop forces for high-
intensity conflict to confront the threats of terrorism and
proliferation. In 1998, Senator Kyl presented an amendment to
the Resolution of Ratification for amendment of the North
Atlantic Treaty to admit new countries to the Alliance. The
amendment, which passed overwhelmingly, describes the principal
threats to the Alliance as being the potential revival of a
hostile Russia, ``rogue states and non-state actors'' that
might develop weapons of mass destruction; terrorism;
disruption of the flow of vital resources; and ethnic conflict.
As in 1998, the Committee strongly advises the Executive
Branch to consult extensively with the Senate before
undertaking any interpretation, reinterpretation, expansion, or
revision of NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept.
Finally, as in 1998, the Committee finds that the Strategic
Concept and burdensharing are inextricably linked. Because the
United States is the leading military power in NATO and has
force projection capabilities far superior to those of its
allies, the costs associated with a mission to respond to
diverse and multi-directional risks falls disproportionately
upon the United States military. Active development of the
Combined Joint Task Force concept, in which European forces
would undertake some NATO missions on their own, with support
from the United States, also will reduce the burden on the U.S.
military. However, differences exist among Alliance members
over the extent and purpose of such missions, and there is some
question of how well the European allies can accomplish such
new missions on their own, with only limited U.S. involvement.
The current disparities between the United States and its
NATO allies in transport, logistics, communications, and
intelligence capabilities (made apparent in the first Persian
Gulf War, in the Kosovo conflict, in the ongoing Balkans
operations, and in Afghanistan) indicate that NATO is moving
toward a two-tiered Alliance in which the United States and its
NATO allies have vast differences in capabilities. The
Committee notes, as it did in 1998, that in a February 1997
report to Congress on the rationale, benefits, costs, and
implications of NATO enlargement, the Department of Defense
concluded that in order to prevent such disparities the current
allies would have to spend some $8-10 billion for force
modernization by the year 2010.
At a NATO ministerial meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002, the
allies agreed that they must be able ``to carry out the full
range of . . . missions, . . . to field forces wherever they
are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and
achieve their objectives.'' While not all member states have
sufficiently mobile or appropriately trained forces for the
current tasks in Afghanistan and Iraq, a number of allies have
an intelligence capability, transport, medical units, and
political influence that might assist in such conflicts.
The Committee Resolution of Ratification requires a
specific and detailed report on progress by members of the
Alliance to meet their commitments in fulfilling force goals.
FUTURE NATO ENLARGEMENT
Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that NATO
members, by unanimous agreement, may invite any other European
state in a position to further the principles of the North
Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North
Atlantic area. The Committee emphasizes, however, that in the
process of considering the qualifications and purpose for the
admission of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia into NATO, the Committee did not state a
view on when, or whether, the United States should invite any
additional countries to join NATO. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia have been invited by
NATO members to join the Alliance. No other agreement or
document should be construed otherwise.
As in 1998, the Committee points out that the Executive
Branch must first consult the Senate before inviting any new
aspirant countries to join the Alliance. The proposed
candidates must be able to fulfill the obligations and
responsibilities of membership, and their inclusion must
contribute to the overall political and strategic interests of
the United States. The Executive Branch has stated its
understanding of the need for consultation with the Senate.
The Committee Resolution of Ratification reiterates that no
action or agreement other than a consensus decision by the full
membership of NATO, approved by the national procedures of each
NATO member, including, in the case of the United States, the
requirements of Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the
Constitution of the United States (regarding the advice and
consent of the Senate to the making of treaties), will
constitute a security commitment pursuant to the North Atlantic
Treaty.
SENATE ADVICE ON NATO ENLARGEMENT
On October 24, 2001, Senator Jesse Helms introduced to the
Committee the Freedom Consolidation Act (S. 1572), which
reaffirms support for continued enlargement of the NATO;
designates Slovakia for participation in PfP and states that it
is eligible to receive certain security assistance under the
NATO Participation Act of 1994; and authorizes specified
amounts of security assistance for FY 2002 for Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. (an
identical bill, H.R. 3167, was introduced in the House on the
same day and passed on November 6, 2001). The Committee
reported out the legislation on December 12, 2001. Cosponsors
included Senators Durbin, Lieberman, Lott, Lugar and McCain.
Unfortunately, consideration and passage could not be completed
until the following year. The Senate took up S. 1572 again on
May 16, 2002, and passed it the next day by a vote of 85-6.
President Bush signed the bill into Public Law 107-187 on June
10, 2002.
An August 2002 report by the Republican staff of the
Foreign Relations Committee recommended that Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia be invited to
join NATO at the Prague summit if they continue to carry out
political, economic and military reforms. The report stressed
the importance of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) program
during the ratification process in preventing backsliding on
reforms among the invitees, and that the MAP process would also
help to implement policies announced in Prague to fight the
threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
NATO members preliminarily endorsed the expansion of the
Alliance at a November 2002 summit in Prague, setting in motion
a process to expand NATO for the fifth time since 1949. In the
view of the Committee, the Executive Branch has consulted and
sought the advice of the Senate, consistent with the
requirements of Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the
Constitution of the United States, as the membership of
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia in NATO has been proposed and considered. Indeed, this
consultation is a model of how the two branches should
cooperate in exercising their treaty-making power.
As is evident in the Senate Action portion of this report,
the Bush Administration and the Senate have been in constant
dialog on this policy for two years. NATO foreign ministers
signed the protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty to admit
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia on March 26, 2003. The President transmitted the
protocols to the Senate on April 10, 2003 for Senate action.
LAST ROUND OF ENLARGEMENT
During the Clinton Administration, the Senate debated and
approved legislation in support of NATO enlargement in 1994,
1995, and 1996. On July 25, 1996, by an 81-16 vote, the Senate
approved legislation stating that:
The admission to NATO of emerging democracies in
Central and Eastern Europe which are found to be in a
position to further the principles of the North
Atlantic Treaty would contribute to international peace
and contribute to the security of the region.
Throughout 1996 and 1997 the Executive Branch worked
closely with the Foreign Relations Committee as this policy was
pursued in NATO. NATO foreign ministers signed the protocols to
the North Atlantic Treaty to admit Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic on December 16, 1997. President Clinton
transmitted the protocols to the Senate on February 11, 1998
for Senate action. On April 30, 1998, the Senate voted 80-19 in
favor of admitting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to
NATO.
II. Qualfications of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia for NATO Menbership
Countries in Central and Eastern Europe first gained
institutional access to NATO in late 1991 through the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a forum which includes all
former Warsaw Pact members. At the January 1994 NATO summit,
the Alliance launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a U.S.
initiative designed to develop military cooperation among NATO
members and interested countries in Europe. By August of that
year, each of the seven aspirants had signed the PfP framework
agreement. Since 1994, the seven nations have actively
participated in PfP military exercises, which have provided
their militaries the opportunity to work with NATO military
headquarters, and alongside NATO allies, in the field, and have
contributed to increasing the interoperability between
prospective new members and the Alliance.
However, while all PfP countries seek some degree of
interoperability with NATO, not all of them desire NATO
membership. At the April 1999 NATO summit in Washington, NATO
leaders announced a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to provide
``advice, assistance and practical support'' to countries
seeking membership in the Alliance. Each NATO aspirant country
submits an annual program on its preparations for possible
future membership, and NATO provides feedback on aspirant
countries' progress. All of the aspirants joined the MAP
program and set Partnership Goals to help them prepare for NATO
membership. In February 2002, U.S. Ambassador to NATO R.
Nicholas Burns led an interagency team to visit Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, as
well as Albania and Macedonia (which were not invited to join
NATO at the Prague summit in November 2002) to assess their
progress toward meeting NATO standards. He held detailed
discussions with officials from these countries on their
military reform efforts and their ability to contribute
militarily to the Alliance. In July 2002, Ambassador Burns
again led the interagency team to Riga for the V-10 summit, and
in October 2002, he led the team to the aspirant countries to
evaluate their progress. The Committee supports the
Administration's assessment of the readiness of Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to
join NATO that was provided by Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State Robert Bradtke in testimony before the Foreign Relations
Committee on March 27, 2003. In explaining the Administration's
engagement in working with the candidate countries to prepare
for NATO membership, Secretary Bradtke stated that:
We have held literally hundreds of meetings and
traveled thousands of miles to learn as much as we
could about the aspirant countries and to encourage
their preparations to join NATO. By issuing the
invitation at Prague to the seven countries we are
talking about today to join the Alliance, President
Bush and his fellow leaders signaled their belief that
these intensive efforts to promote and encourage reform
had been a success.
Mr. Chairman, nothing has happened since Prague that
should cause us to question their judgment. The
evidence shows that all seven invitees have made an
enduring commitment to the core values of NATO and that
each is ready, both politically and militarily, to
contribute to the defense of the Alliance.
. . . All of the countries, as you mentioned, Mr.
Chairman, are parliamentary democracies that have had
free and fair elections, that have open market
economies, and that respect the principles of free
speech and free press. All have taken steps to improve
governance by bolstering judicial independence and
adopting anti-corruption measures. All have improved
their protection of human rights, including minority
rights and civil liberties. And all have taken steps to
restitute property and to deal with complex and
difficult issues from the past.
An important issue NATO countries confront is whether it is
necessary for the new members to contribute substantially to
NATO's collective defense or collective security functions in
the near term. Indeed, many current NATO members need to
upgrade their capabilities to carry out NATO's new missions.
U.S. and NATO officials have dealt with this difficulty by
urging aspirants to develop as quickly as possible specialized
``niche'' capabilities that the Alliance needs most. NATO's key
priority for both current and future members is to develop
capabilities to strike terrorism and other threats anywhere in
the world.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, each of the
seven aspirants declared its determination to act as an ally of
the United States in the fight against terror. Since then, all
seven countries have provided support for Operation Enduring
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, and have contributed to
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan. At a May 1, 2002 hearing of the Foreign Relations
Committee, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc
Grossman and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas
Feith said that enlargement was needed to extend the zone of
security and stability in Europe through the expansion of a
united Euro-Atlantic community based on democratic values.
Grossman asserted that enlargement was still relevant in the
wake of the September 11 attacks because ``if we are to meet
new threats to our security, we need to build the broadest and
strongest coalition possible of countries that share our values
and are able to act effectively with us.'' He noted that the
aspirants declared their determination to act as allies of the
United States in the fight against terror. Feith added that
``an enlarged Alliance of democratic states with improved
capabilities and interoperability, joint defense and
operational planning, and realistic training will be better
able to fulfill the Alliance's main purpose: to increase the
security of its members and provide for the common defense
against terrorism and other threats.''
In considering the qualifications of the seven countries,
the Committee has examined the degree to which each has
satisfied the Membership Action Plan (MAP). The Committee
believes that Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia have overcome obstacles to their
candidacies. And of the seven aspirants, the Baltic states have
made the most progress in meeting MAP requirements.
BULGARIA \1\
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\1\ The facts and figures in Qualifications, section II, are based
on several memoranda by Carl Ek, Paul Gallis and Steve Woehrel of the
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional
Research Service of The Library of Congress.
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Democratic Reform
Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic ruled by a
democratically elected government. Bulgaria's process of reform
since 1989 from communism to an open, market-oriented democracy
accelerated after 1997. The Bulgarian government generally
respects the human rights of its citizens, but has problems
with rampant corruption, as well as trafficking in persons and
drugs, and mistreatment of its Roma (Gypsy) minority. The
government is working to reform the judicial system and has
taken anti-corruption initiatives. Implementation of these
reforms remains an issue.
Free Market Economy
Bulgaria is a functioning market economy, and has made
progress in privatization and structural reforms. Bulgaria's
GDP was $13.6 billion in 2001 and $15.5 billion in 2002. The
economy remains troubled by high unemployment, low living
standards, and low levels of foreign investment. Economic
priorities for the government include keeping tight controls
over spending, completing delayed privatization, and combating
corruption. The October 2002 European Commission report lauded
Bulgaria's macroeconomic stability and progress in
privatization and in structural reforms. Due to its late start
in making economic reforms, however, it was not invited to join
the European Union (EU) in December 2002, unlike all of the
other candidate states, except Romania. EU leaders hold out
hope that Bulgaria could reach its goal of achieving EU
membership by 2007 if it continues its reforms.
Foreign Policy
Bulgaria's primary foreign policy goals are membership in
NATO and the European Union. Bulgaria is a member of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and
the Council of Europe and has been a member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) since 1996.
Located in an unstable region, Bulgaria has actively
supported and, in some cases, led regional cooperation
initiatives such as the Black Sea Economic Conference, regional
summit and defense ministerial meetings, and the Stability Pact
for Southeastern Europe. Bulgaria maintains favorable relations
with its neighboring states.
Military Capabilities & Defense Issues
In the last few years, the Bulgarian armed forces
(comprising the army, navy, and air force) have embarked on a
comprehensive reform and restructuring process focused on
moving away from large, offensively-oriented and top-heavy
structures and toward smaller, flexible, and NATO-compatible
forces. The process of downsizing the armed forces, while
important for cost savings in the long run, has imposed short-
term burdens on the budget, limiting available resources for
modernization and training. Bulgaria plans to continue
implementing its armed forces reform program and participating
in international peace missions.
Bulgaria has developed and adapted several plans for
reforming the armed forces, including reducing the strength of
the armed forces. The goal of the reforms is to achieve a small
but combat-ready army. In 2002, Bulgaria's armed forces
numbered 53,400, and by the end of 2003, it expects to reduce
the armed forces to 46,500 with 8,281 professionals. Its ``Plan
2004,'' which is based on recommendations included in a U.S.
study on the Bulgarian armed forces, calls for the armed forces
to be reduced to about 45,000 by 2004, with 25,447 in the army
and 2,569 in the army reserves, 12,116 in the air force, and
4,868 in the navy with 100,000 personnel in the reserves. The
armed forces are being restructured into rapid reaction forces,
main defense forces, territorial defense forces, and reserves.
The term of conscription has been reduced to nine months, and
the army will convert to a fully professional force by 2010.
Other key reform priorities include increased interoperability
with NATO in areas such as air defense, command and control,
logistics, and training. Bulgaria signed a bilateral agreement
with the United States on the destruction of its SS-23 SCUD,
and FROG missiles. On October 31, 2002, Bulgaria announced that
it had destroyed all of the missiles.
Bulgaria's defense budget has been increasing since 1999,
and it is committed to sustaining over 3.0% of GDP for defense
spending. Most of the defense budget goes toward personnel
costs. Bulgaria has active and reserve forces, but only the
army has reserves in activity during peace time. Bulgaria also
has paramilitary personnel serving as border guards, security
police, or railway/construction troops. Bulgaria remains
saddled with equipment from the Warsaw Pact era, with attendant
high costs of maintenance and repair. Bulgaria has no immediate
plans to purchase expensive Western fighter aircraft, and has
decided instead to upgrade most of its fleet of MiG-29 tactical
fighter aircraft.
Bulgaria has participated in and hosted numerous NATO
Partnership for Peace training exercises designed to improve
interoperability with NATO forces. It has also participated in
the Planning and Review Process under PfP, and agreed to work
on Partnership Goals. Bulgaria participates in the NATO
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, contributed to
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and has deployed
nuclear, biological and chemical decontamination units to ISAF
in Afghanistan. On February 5, 2003, Bulgaria joined the V-10
Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm, joined the coalition
for the immediate disarmament of Iraq, and has indicated it
will provide support for post-conflict and reconstruction in
Iraq.
Illicit arms sales is a problem throughout southeastern
Europe, and the so-called Terem case in Bulgaria has raised
many questions about its commitment to tackle the issue of grey
arms. The Terem case involved the sale of dual-use materials
that, according to some reports, could have ended up in Iraq.
The U.S. brought it to the attention of the Bulgarian
government, which acted swiftly to stop the sale of the illicit
arms, fire officials, and initiate investigation and
prosecutions with respect to the Terem case. At the time of
this report, the investigation into the Terem case is
continuing. The United States is assisting the Bulgarian
government, with a view to helping it get a firmer grip on grey
arms sales in general.
Civilian Control of the Military & Oversight of
Intelligence Agencies Under the Bulgarian constitution, the
role of the armed forces is to guarantee the sovereignty,
security, and independence of the country and to defend its
territorial integrity. The President is commander-in-chief of
the armed forces and appoints or dismisses the higher command
of the armed forces. Civilian government and parliamentary
authorities exercise administrative and budgetary control over
the armed forces. As outlined in Plan 2004 and the MAP Annual
National Programs, parliament has also adopted several other
related laws and amendments to the Defense and Armed Forces
Act.
Protection of Classified Information
NATO has expressed concern to Bulgaria about its procedures
for ensuring the security of classified information. It is the
hope of the Committee that Bulgaria will continue to improve
these procedures for ensuring the security of classified
information. The Committee urges the Executive Branch to assist
the Government of Bulgaria to swiftly bring its protection of
classified information into conformity with NATO standards.
ESTONIA
Democratic Reform
Estonia is a parliamentary democracy with a free market
economy. It has held free and fair elections since the
restoration of its independence in 1991. Estonia respects the
human rights of its citizens, including the large ethnic
Russian non-citizen community, and enjoys the rule of law.
Problems exist in some areas, including the treatment of
prisoners and the use of excessive force by police.
Free Market Economy
Estonia is a functioning market economy. Estonia's GDP was
$5.5 billion in 2001, and an estimated $6.3 billion in 2002.
Many experts believe Estonia has one of the strongest records
on economic reform in Central Europe. It has pursued sound
fiscal and monetary policies and has privatized much of its
economy; the private sector accounts for 75% of GDP, one of the
highest percentages in the region. Unemployment is low, at 5.4%
of the labor force in 2002. However, Estonia still needs to
restructure its energy sector, including the oil shale
industry. In 2002, the central government had a budget surplus
of 1.9% of GDP and average consumer price inflation was 3.6%.
However, Estonia suffers from a high current account deficit,
which reached 12.4% of GDP in 2002. On April 16, 2003, Slovenia
signed an accession agreement with the EU. It is expected to
join the EU in 2004.
Foreign Policy
Estonia is a member of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, NATO's PfP
and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). It enjoys
excellent relations with most of its neighbors, and has no
ethnic or territorial disputes with them. It has very good ties
with the Nordic countries, which are enshrined in a number of
institutional frameworks. Links between Finland and Estonia are
especially close. Estonia has also increased cooperation with
Lithuania and Latvia in security, economic and political
matters through the Baltic council, the Baltic Assembly and
other intergovernmental organizations.
Estonia's relations with Russia have been strained at
times, but both countries have initialed a border agreement.
Military Capabilities & Defense Issues
Estonia has about 7,200 men in its regular armed forces. In
addition, it has about 8,300 men in the Defense League, a
volunteer reserve force. Estonia's armed forces do not possess
tanks or combat aircraft. It has 7 BRDM-2 reconnaissance
vehicles, 32 armored personnel carriers, 19 105 mm artillery
pieces, 44 81 mm mortars and 14 120 mm mortars. Estonia is
building its armed forces around a light infantry brigade,
supplemented by territorial defense troops. Estonia plans to
have one battalion of this force equipped and trained by May
2003. Estonia is concentrating its efforts on developing
specialized capabilities in air surveillance and naval
minesweeping.
Estonia's defense spending in 2002 was about $125 million,
or about 2.0% of Estonia GDP. Small in number, Estonia's armed
forces can make a modest contribution to future NATO
peacekeeping efforts, similar to that of smaller current NATO
members.
Baltic defense cooperation is an important part of
Estonia's efforts to improve its qualifications for NATO
membership. Estonia joins Latvia and Lithuania in a range of
regional defense forces and institutions, along with Latvia and
Lithuania, agreed to form a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion with
the help of NATO countries, which have supplied equipment and
training for the force. BALTBAT has not been deployed as a
whole unit, although parts of the force have participated in
the NATO-led force in Bosnia. By 2005, each of the three states
plans to create its own professional infantry battalions from
BALTBAT, which will form the core of its armed forces. These
forces would be able to engage in a full range of international
deployments, as well as to contribute to the self-defense
capabilities of the Baltic states.
A Baltic naval squadron (BALTRON) is another joint Baltic
military project. Since 1998, this five-vessel minesweeping
unit has participated in exercises with NATO forces. A third
important Baltic military program is BALTNET, a joint air
surveillance network. BALTNET became operational in 2000, but
it will need additional, more modern equipment before it will
be full effective. It is planned that BALTNET will eventually
be integrated in NATO's air defense system. Finally, the Baltic
states have established a joint Baltic Defense College
(BALTDEFCOL) in Tartu, Estonia. BALTDEFCOL educates staff
officers from the three states in NATO-based staff procedures,
defense planning and management.
Estonia has made progress in achieving interoperability
with NATO and from 1997-2002, had a company of soldiers serving
as part of the Danish battalion of SFOR on several occasions,
rotating with units from Latvia and Lithuania. A 22-man
Estonian military police unit is deployed as part of an
Italian-led Multinational Specialized Unit in KFOR in Kosovo.
In February 2003, an Estonian infantry company was deployed to
KFOR, where it will rotate with companies from Latvia and
Lithuania. Estonia sent an explosives detection unit to assist
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in July 2002. An
ordinance disposal unit was assigned to the ISAF peacekeeping
force in March 2003. On February 5, 2003, Estonia joined the V-
10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm and offered
overflight and transit of U.S. coalition forces for Operation
Iraqi Freedom.
Civilian control of the Military & Oversight of Intelligence Agencies
Legal mechanisms exist in Estonia to guarantee civilian
control of Estonia's military and intelligence services. The
President of Estonia is the Supreme Commander of National
Defense. He can declare war and issue mobilization orders in
case of an attack against Estonia. He also appoints and
dismisses the leadership of the armed forces, and approves
officer promotions, on the proposal of the government and the
commander of the regular armed forces. The parliament approves
the defense budget as well as defense policy guidelines and
priorities. The parliament also approves the nomination by the
President of the commander of Estonia's armed forces. The
Estonian defense minister, a civilian, exercises control over
the development and organization of the armed forces through
the commander of the Regular Armed Forces. The President of the
Republic is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and
appoints top military officers.
LATVIA
Democratic Reform
Latvia is a parliamentary democracy that has held free and
fair elections since it achieved full independence in 1991.
Latvia has a democratic political system, the rule of law,
respect for human rights and for the rights of minorities,
including integrating the Russian-speaking minority. Latvia has
problems with police brutality, an inefficient judiciary, poor
prison conditions, and trafficking in women and children.
Free Market Economy
Latvia has a functioning market economy. Its GDP was $7.6
billion in 2001 and $8.4 billion in 2002. Average consumer
price inflation was 1.8% and the unemployment rate was 7.6% in
2002. Privatization in Latvia accelerated in early 2003,
particularly in the banking sector. Latvia needs to privatize
several companies in its vitally important energy sector,
including the oil transit firm Ventspils Nafta, and the state
energy company Latvenergo. Privatization of these firms has
been hindered by a conflict with Russia, which is demanding a
share of Ventspils Nafta, and by charges of corruption at
Latvenergo. According to the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD), Latvia needs to make progress in
improving transparency, corporate governance and fighting
corruption. On April 16, 2003, Latvia signed an accession
agreement with the EU. It is expected to join the European
Union in 2004.
Foreign Policy
Latvia is a member of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, NATO's PfP
and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). It enjoys
good relations with most of its neighbors and has increased
cooperation with Estonia and Lithuania in security, economic
and political matters through the Baltic Council, the Baltic
Assembly and other inter-governmental organizations. While
Latvia's relations with Russia have been difficult at times,
Latvia and Russia have completed negotiations on a border
agreement, but have yet to sign it.
Military Capabilities & Defense Issues
Latvia has about 6,500 men in its active-duty armed forces,
and 14,400 men in the National Guard reserves. It has 3 T-55
tanks, 13 armored personnel carriers, 2 reconnaissance
vehicles, 26 100 mm artillery pieces, as well as five 82 mm
mortars and 26 120 mm mortars, and no combat aircraft. Latvia
spent $144.4 million on defense in 2002, or 1.75% of GDP. In
2003, It plans to increase defense spending to $184 million, or
2.0% of GDP,, the informal target set by NATO for the applicant
states. Small in number, Latvia's armed forces will provide a
modest contribution to future NATO peacekeeping efforts,
similar to that of smaller current NATO members.
Latvia has had a company of soldiers serving as part of the
Danish battalion of SFOR on several occasions, rotating with
units from Estonia and Lithuania. Fifteen Latvian soldiers are
deployed to KFOR in Kosovo. In March 2003, Latvia sent eight
military medics to serve in the ISAF peacekeeping force in
Afghanistan. On February 5, 2003, Latvia joined the V-10
Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm. On March 20, 2003, the
Latvian parliament passed a resolution supporting U.S. military
action in Iraq. Latvia has contributed overflight and transit
of U.S. and coalition forces to Operation Iraqi Freedom; and
the Parliament has approved allowing forces to deploy to Iraq
for peace operations.
The main priorities of Latvia's defense policy are to
enhance the country's ability to defend itself, develop
interoperability with NATO, and participate in international
peacekeeping efforts. In 2003, Latvia plans to equip and train
a light infantry battalion that would form the core of the
country's army as well as be fully capable of participation in
NATO-led peacekeeping missions. Latvia also plans to train and
equip three additional mobile reserve battalions.
A key part of Latvia's cooperation with NATO is the effort
of the three Baltic states to develop joint defense projects.
In 1994, Latvia, along with Estonia and Lithuania, agreed to
form a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion with the help of NATO
countries, which have supplied equipment and training for the
force. BALTBAT has not been deployed as a whole unit, although
parts of the force have participated in the NATO-led force in
Bosnia. By 2005, each of the three states plans to create its
own professional infantry battalion from BALTBAT, which will
form the core of its armed forces. These forces would be able
to engage in a full range of international deployments, as well
as to contribute to the self-defense capabilities of the Baltic
states.
A Baltic naval squadron (BALTRON) is another joint Baltic
military project. Since 1998, this five-vessel minesweeping
unit has participated in exercises with NATO forces. A third
important Baltic military program is BALTNET, a joint air
surveillance network. BALTNET became operational in 2000, but
it will need additional, more modern equipment before it will
be fully effective. It is planned that BALTNET will eventually
be integrated in NATO's air defense system. Finally, the Baltic
states have established a joint Baltic Defense College
(BALTDEFCOL) in Tartu, Estonia. BALTDEFCOL educates staff
officers from the three states in NATO-based staff procedures,
defense planning and management.
At NATO's urging, Latvia is focusing its efforts on
developing specialized capabilities in air surveillance (as
part of BALTNET), military medics, explosive ordnance disposal
experts, military police, and nuclear, chemical and biological
decontamination units.
Civilian Control of the Military & Oversight of Intelligence Agencies
Legal mechanisms exist to provide for civilian control of
Latvia's military and intelligence services. The Latvian
parliament adopts the defense budget and approves laws on
national defense. The commander of Latvia's armed forces is
subordinated to a civilian Minister of Defense.
Protection of Classified Information
NATO has expressed concern to Latvia about its procedures
for ensuring the security of classified information. It is the
hope of the Committee that Latvia will continue to improve
these procedures for ensuring the security of classified
information. The Committee urges the Executive Branch to assist
the Government of Latvia to swiftly bring its protection of
classified information into conformity with NATO standards,
particularly its procedures for vetting individuals for access
to the most sensitive materials.
LITHUANIA
Democratic Reform
Lithuania is a parliamentary democracy, which has held free
and fair elections since achieving independence in 1991.
Lithuania has a democratic political system and respects the
human rights of its citizens, including the rights of national
minorities. Lithuania has an independent judiciary, but police
brutality and corruption and poor prison conditions remain
problems.
Free Market Economy
Lithuania is a functioning market economy. Lithuania's GDP
was $12 billion in 2001 and $13.9 billion in 2002. In 2002,
average consumer price inflation was 0.3%, and unemployment was
10.7%. In February 2003, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
praised Lithuania's stringent fiscal and monetary policies and
its excellent macroeconomic performance. Lithuania has
privatized most of its industries. However, several key sectors
remain to be privatized, including the natural gas company
Lietuvos Dujos (delayed due to protracted negotiations with the
main bidder, the Russian gas giant Gazprom), the national
airline, and the power distribution networks. The European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) notes that Lithuania
has privatized its banking sector, but needs to bolster other
parts of its financial sector, including the stock market and
insurance companies. On April 16, 2003, Lithuania signed an
accession agreement with the EU. It is expected to join the
European Union in 2004.
Foreign Policy
Lithuania is a member of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, NATO's PfP
and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). It enjoys
good relations with neighboring countries, and has no major
territorial or ethnic disputes with them. Lithuania has
increased cooperation with Estonia and Latvia in security,
economic and political matters through the Baltic Council, the
Baltic Assembly and other inter-governmental organizations.
Lithuania has forged highly successful ties with Poland, a
country with which Lithuania has historically had a complex and
sometimes difficult relationship.
Lithuania has a generally good relationship with Russia.
Russia and Lithuania signed a border treaty in October 1997.
While Russia no longer opposes Lithuania's membership in NATO,
a point of contention is Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave in
eastern Europe, which would be surrounded by NATO member states
if Lithuania gained membership in the Alliance. NATO and Latvia
have said that this issue should be resolved through the
European Union. Lithuania currently permits Russian military
traffic to transit Lithuania on its way to Kaliningrad.
Military Capabilities & Defense Issues
Lithuania currently has about 6,900 men in its active-duty
army. Lithuania possesses no tanks, combat aircraft or heavy
artillery, and has 10 reconnaissance vehicles, 81 armored
personnel carriers and 42 120 mm mortars.
Lithuania is making the transition from a force based on
territorial forces to one based more on professional, better-
equipped, rapidly-deployable ones. Lithuania is developing a
Rapid Reaction Brigade that will form the core of its forces.
This force, which will be composed of about 3,800 men in
peacetime when it is completed by 2008, will be supplemented by
territorial units, which are being reduced. When the Rapid
Reaction Brigade is ready, Lithuania expects to provide a
battalion-sized unit that can deploy with NATO forces overseas
for combat missions.
In 2001, Lithuania spent $230.2 million on defense, or
about 1.96% GDP. In 2002, Lithuania increased its defense
spending to 2% of GDP. Small in number, Lithuania's armed
forces will provide a modest contribution to future NATO
peacekeeping efforts, similar to that of smaller current NATO
members.
On a rotating basis, Lithuania contributes a company of 100
personnel with the Danish contingent to SFOR and maintains 30
Lithuanian soldiers in KFOR as part of a Polish battalion.
Lithuania offered use of Lithuanian airspace and airfields and
other support for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan,
and in November 2002, the Lithuanian government sent 40 special
forces soldiers to Afghanistan to assist U.S. and allied
efforts, and these troops have participated in combat
operations there. A team of Lithuanian military medics has also
been deployed to ISAF in Afghanistan. On February 5, 2003,
Lithuania joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to
disarm, and on March 17 expressed support for the U.S. military
campaign in Iraq. The Lithuanian parliament voted on March 25,
2003 to deploy cargo handlers and medical personnel to support
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Lithuania has offered medical and
logistic support to a post-war peacekeeping force in Iraq.
Baltic defense cooperation is an important part of
Lithuania's efforts to improve its qualifications for NATO
membership. Along with Latvia and Estonia, agreed to form a
Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion with the help of NATO countries,
which have supplied equipment and training for the force.
BALTBAT has not been deployed as a whole unit, although parts
of the force have participated in the NATO-led force in Bosnia.
By 2005, each of the three states plan to create its own
professional infantry battalion from BALTBAT, which will form
the core of its armed forces. These forces would be able to
engage in a full range of international deployments, as well as
to contribute to the self-defense capabilities of the Baltic
states.
The Baltic naval squadron (BALTRON) is another joint Baltic
military project. Since 1998, this five-vessel minesweeping
unit has participated in exercises with NATO forces. A third
important Baltic military program is BALTNET, a joint air
surveillance network. BALTNET became operational in 2000, but
it will need additional, more modern equipment before it will
be full effective. It is planned that BALTNET will eventually
be integrated in NATO's air defense system. Finally, the Baltic
states have established a joint Baltic Defense College
(BALTDEFCOL) in Tartu, Estonia. BALTDEFCOL educates staff
officers from the three states in NATO-based staff procedures,
defense planning and management.
At NATO's urging, Lithuania is attempting to develop
specialized capabilities useful to the Alliance, such as air
surveillance (as part of BALTNET), special forces, explosive
ordnance disposal experts, and engineers.
Civilian Control of the Military & Oversight of Intelligence Agencies
Legal mechanisms exist to guarantee civilian control of
Lithuania's military and intelligence services. The President
of Lithuania is the Supreme Commander of the Lithuanian Armed
Forces. Lithuania's parliament approves the defense budget. The
Defense Ministry prepares plans and budget requests and
supervises their execution.
ROMANIA
Democratic Reform
Romania is a constitutional democracy with a bicameral
legislature. It has held four elections, deemed free and fair
by outside observers, since the fall of communism. Romania's
political life has been relatively stable since President Ion
Iliescu and his Party of Social Democracy (PSD) were
reinstalled in the 2000 elections. The PSD has ruled as a
minority government, with the support of the ethnic Hungarian
party.
The Romanian government generally respects the rights of
its citizens, and the situation of the ethnic Hungarian
minority has improved considerably over the past years.
Nonetheless, the Greater Romania Party, a xenophobic
organization, continues to command the support of about one-
sixth of the electorate, and the notorious bias against ethnic
Hungarians of a few local officials stands in opposition to the
more enlightened policies of the national government. Other
problems continue, such as police mistreatment of detainees,
discrimination and violence against women, juvenile
homelessness, and discrimination against religious minorities
and its Roma (Gypsy) population. A major concern is corruption.
Prime Minister Nastase has said that reduction of corruption is
a top priority, and the government has initiated an anti-
corruption campaign.
Free Market Economy
Over the last several years, Romania has continued to make
progress towards being a functioning market economy. While GDP
declined sharply during 1997-1999, it rose by 1.8% in 2000 and
5.3% in 2001; the 2002 growth rate was 4.9%. Inflation, which
averaged 45% in 1999 and 2000, dropped to 30.3% in 2001 and was
about 18% at the end of 2002. Unemployment for 2002 is expected
to be 8.3%. Romania has natural resources and may prosper with
successful market-oriented reforms, including taxation,
investment and privatization. Pervasive corruption has been a
continuing problem in Romania, and the government has created a
new National Anti-corruption Prosecutor's Office and has
recently introduced a clutch of laws to combat graft. Foreign
observers are watching for signs of aggressive implementation
of the legislation once it is passed, as well as for continuing
privatization of large-scale enterprises, especially in the
financial and energy sectors.
Romania continues to receive much-needed assistance from
international organizations, including the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the European Union
(EU). Romania is expected to join the EU in 2004.
Foreign Policy
Romania is a member of the Council of Europe, as well as
NATO's PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). In
2001, it was judged to have done an excellent job in the
revolving chairmanship of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Through a series of bilateral treaties and multilateral
agreements, Romania has been seeking to normalize its relations
with neighboring states and to increase regional cooperation.
It has concluded agreements intended to improve relations with
Hungary and Ukraine, and has signed treaties that address
disputes with Bulgaria, former Yugoslavia and Slovakia. Romania
has also been working in cooperation with Moldova, Turkey,
Greece, and other countries in the region on matters affecting
trade, security, the environment, and law enforcement.
Military Capabilities & Defense Issues
In 1995, Romania started to take more active participation
in the United Nations. It sent a battalion of troops and
medical staff to Angola, and has military observers in Central
Africa and the Persian Gulf, and has provided troops for the
humanitarian assistance effort in Albania. It has participated
in numerous NATO PfP exercises, and has contributed personnel
to SFOR and KFOR. The Committee commends Romania's unusual
airlift capability, as demonstrated in July 2002 when it used
its own airlift to send a battalion to Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. As President Bush stated in his
March 25, 2003 Report to Congress on the Enlargement of NATO,
``In support of OEF, Romania used its own C-130 aircraft to
self-deploy an infantry battalion of 400 troops, the `Red
Scorpions,' to Kandahar, where the mission was recently
extended until mid-2003.'' Since that Report, the ``Red
Scorpions'' have been replaced by the ``Carpathian Hawks.'' For
ISAF, the peace keeping mission in Afghanistan, Romania has
deployed military police, personnel and troops. On February 5,
2003, Romania joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to
disarm, and offered the use of its territory for military
action in Iraq. Romania has offered public support for all
U.S.-led post-conflict and reconstruction initiatives in Iraq.
Romania's 2002 defense budget was 2.38 % of GDP. The
defense minister announced in October 2002 that the 2003 budget
would allocate 2.3% of GDP to the military. Romania is doing
well on military personnel reform; it has been reorganizing its
military structure in accordance with Western standards, and
has created a rapid reaction force. The force size was reduced
to 121,693 in September 2002, with a goal of 75,000 by 2007. In
addition, the top-heavy officer ranks are being culled. The
Defense Ministry also intends to move toward a more
professional military.
Romania has been making progress in terms of NATO
interoperability. It has been modernizing its military
equipment and adding new weapons systems. Romania's MIG-21
fighter aircraft are being upgraded, as are navy ships,
communications facilities, and missile launching systems.
Romania has been developing ``niche capabilities'' to offer
NATO, including airlift, minesweeping, UAVs, counter-NBC
warfare, mountain combat troops, and special forces. With
relatively large armed forces, Romania has the potential of
significant military contributions and could serve as a
geostrategic partner.
Civilian Control of the Military & Oversight of Intelligence Agencies
Romania has made progress in the area of civilian
management of the military and intelligence services, though
some problems remain from the Ceausescu era, including the
presence of former Securitate officials in senior positions in
the intelligence services, Romania has enacted legislation to
ensure civilian control over the military and intelligence
agencies--the 1991 constitution declares the president to be
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Romania has had a
civilian defense minster since mid-1994, and has sought to
consolidate civilian control since then.
SLOVAKIA
Democratic Reform
Slovakia and the Czech Republic peacefully split from union
in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in 1993. From a
starting point generally equal to that of the Czech Republic,
Slovakia's international standing quickly diminished during the
controversial leadership of Vladimir Meciar and his party, the
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HzDS). In the 1998
elections, a broad coalition of four opposition parties
defeated Meciar's HzDS and its coalition partners, and Mikulas
Dzurinda of the Slovak Democratic Coalition became Prime
Minister. Meciar also lost to Rudolf Schuster in Slovakia's
first direct presidential elections in May 1999.
Slovakia's most recent parliamentary elections were held on
September 20-21, 2002, shortly before the NATO Prague Summit.
Meciar's party won a plurality, but was unable to attract
coalition partners. Dzurinda's party finished second in the
voting and teamed up with three center-right parties to form a
government. During his first term in office, Dzurinda focused
on accelerating economic reforms, consolidating democratic
development, combating corruption, and advancing accession
negotiations with the European Union.
Slovakia has improved its human rights situation, but
continues to have problems related to the treatment of its Roma
(Gypsy) population in Slovakia. The government also passed
amendments to its constitution that strengthened the judicial
branch and constitutional court, facilitated public
administration reform, and established an ombudsman's function
for the public defense of citizens' rights.
Free Market Economy
Slovakia is a functioning market economy able to cope with
the competitive pressures of European Union (EU) membership and
market forces in the EU in the near term. Slovakia's GDP rose
by 3.3% in 2001, 4.4% in 2002, and the outlook for 2003 and
beyond is favorable, buoyed by increasing foreign investment
and domestic consumption. Inflation is expected to rise
temporarily to nearly 8% in 2003, mainly as a result of the
passage of needed reforms in fiscal policy. Unemployment in
Slovakia is currently at 17.1% (below the 2002 level by 2.5%),
but remains a serious concern for the government. Joblessness
is concentrated mainly in rural areas and among Roma
settlements. Corruption, particularly in public procurement,
has been identified as a problem. On April 16, 2003, Slovakia
signed an accession agreement with the EU.
Foreign Policy
Slovakia was among the first countries to sign up for
NATO's PfP program in 1994, and has since participated in
numerous PfP exercises. Slovakia is a member of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the
Council of Europe, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In
December 2000, Slovakia also joined the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Slovakia consults
regularly with its ``Visegrad partners'' (Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic).
Military Capabilities & Defense Issues
Since 1998, the Dzurinda government has given priority to
reforming, restructuring, and developing the Slovak armed
forces, ultimately to become fully compatible with NATO. The
Slovak armed forces have been downsizing steadily, moving
toward a smaller, more flexible, and less top-heavy force. In
2002, the Slovak armed forces numbered about 26,200 troops,
including 10,400 conscripts; 13,000 served in the army and
10,200 in the air force. The government also has nearly 4,700
paramilitary troops serving in internal security and civil
defense capacities. Current reform and restructuring plans call
for the Slovak armed forces to reduce its personnel strength to
24,500 land force, air force, and civilian personnel by 2006.
The term of conscription is currently 9 months. Compulsory
military service is to be phased out as the army becomes fully
professional by 2006.
After several years of decline, defense spending has
increased in the last few years. Slovakia's defense budget in
2002 was $370 million, or about 1.89 GDP, most of which was
designated for operations and support.
Slovakia's military reform programs call for the gradual
modernization of armed forces equipment to enhance
interoperability and standardization. The Dzurinda government
has adopted numerous armed forces reform programs that have
subsequently been adapted to take into account feedback from
the annual MAP process and a U.S. defense assessment from 2000.
In early 2000, the armed forces general staff was integrated
into the defense ministry. In early 2001, parliament approved a
constitutional amendment to facilitate joining collective
defense alliances. Later, the government adopted and parliament
approved legislation on a national security strategy, a defense
strategy, and a military strategy. Also in 2001, the government
prepared a long-term defense review and planning process for
the structure and development of the armed forces. The process
resulted in a long-term reform plan referred to as Slovak
Republic (SR) Force 2010, which aims to establish by the year
2010 a small, well-equipped and trained armed force that is
integrated into NATO military structures and capable of
operating in allied military operations. SR Force 2010 calls
for a streamlined force structure comprised of ground and air
forces, a consolidated training and support element, and
command and control through the integrated general staff and
defense ministry.
Slovakia has provided troops to SFOR and KFOR, and
immediately offered support and granted overflight, landing and
refueling rights to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
It has also budgeted for and initiated preparation of an Afghan
Assistance Program. On February 5, 2003, Slovakia joined the V-
10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm, and has contributed
to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Slovakia has indicated that it will
contribute to post-conflict and reconstruction in Iraq.
Civilian Control of the Military
Under the Slovak constitution, the President is supreme
commander of the armed forces and is able to declare a state of
emergency in the republic. The Slovak parliament considers all
defense-related acts and provides financial support for the
armed services. The parliament has been active and engaged in
developing and shaping defense policy. Civilian control was
enhanced with the integration of the armed forces general staff
into the defense ministry in 2000. The establishment of a new
legal framework for national security issues and strategy and
the role fo the armed forces has been a priority under the MAP
process. In response, parliament passed by wide voting margins
three major pieces of legislation in 2001 relating to national
security, defense, and the armed forces.
In December 2002, a Western media report severely
criticized the Slovak Security Services for alleged
undemocratic behavior, a charge which was vigorously denied by
the Slovaks. The Committee urges the Executive Branch to work
with the Government of Slovakia to assure that all remaining
doubts about the activities of the Security Services are put to
rest.
SLOVENIA
Democratic Reform
Slovenia has a democratic political system. It is a
parliamentary democracy and has held free and fair elections
since winning independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Slovenia
has an independent judiciary, the rule of law, and respects the
human rights of its citizens and minorities.
Free Market Economy
Slovenia has a functioning market economy. Its GDP in 2001
was $18.7 billion, and $21.7 billion in 2002. Average consumer
price inflation was 7.5% in 2002, which Slovenia needs to
reduce to be in line with European Union (EU) requirements.
Slovenia is the wealthiest of the candidate states, with a per
capita GDP of $9,500 in 2001, but has suffered from low foreign
direct investment (FDI). However, Slovenia has liberalized
capital flows since 1999. Net FDI has surged from $110 million
in 2000 to an estimated $553 million in 2002, and after a slow
start, Slovenia has accelerated privatization of its
industries. In 2003 and 2004, it plans to sell off parts of
Slovenian Steelworks, the oil company Nafta Lendava, stakes in
the Port of Koper and Ljubljana airport, and other assets.
According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), Slovenia needs to make further progress in
privatizing the financial sector. On April 16, 2003, Slovenia
signed an accession agreement with the EU. It is expected to
join the EU in 2004.
Foreign Policy
Slovenia is a member of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, NATO's PfP
and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank. Slovenia is a member of Central European
Free Trade Area and the U.S.-sponsored Southeast European
Cooperative Initiative. It participates in the Stability Pact
for Southeastern Europe.
Although Slovenia has had some political disputes with
Italy and Croatia in the past, Slovenia has made progress in
improving relations with its neighbors, and has demonstrated
good faith in attempts to resolve outstanding issues.
Military Capabilities & Defense Issues
Slovenia's armed forces are engaged in a reform and
restructuring effort. At the time of Slovenia's declaration of
independence in June 1991, Slovenia's armed forces consisted of
territorial defense forces, somewhat similar in nature to U.S.
National Guard units. In 2002, Slovenia decided to move rapidly
toward wholly professional armed forces, to abolish
conscription by 2004, and to step up efforts to recruit
professional solders. The peacetime strength of Slovenia's
armed forces in August 2002 was 5,346 men. This number is
expected to rise to 6,300 troops by the end of 2004 and 7,900
by 2008, all of whom will be professional soldiers. It is also
working on a concept for volunteer reserve forces. Total
wartime strength, including reserves, will be less than 18,000
men. An important part of Slovenian army reform efforts has
been the creation of ``reaction forces.'' These are composed of
two battalions which can be deployed abroad within 30 days to
conduct combat or peacekeeping operations. Slovenia is in the
process of moving from a militia-based force to a professional
one.
Slovenia inherited a significant amount of the former
Yugoslavia's weaponry, much of which is obsolete, including
tanks, APCs and artillery. Aside from equipping the
peacekeeping battalion, other procurement priorities for
Slovenia are air defense, anti-armor weapons and NATO-
compatible communications systems. In 2000, U.S. military
experts noted that Slovenia needed to better relate its
procurement priorities to the country's overall national
security strategy. In response, Slovenia has adopted or is
currently working on a hierarchy of documents that will govern
its defense planning. These include a new national security
strategy, a national threat assessment, a long-term development
plan for the armed forces, a document on force structure, and
other documents. Slovenia has amended its Defense Law in order
to make it easier for the Slovene government to send forces out
of the country to assist an ally and permit the stationing of
allied forces on Slovene territory.
Although it plans to continue to make equipment purchases
according to the priorities listed above, Slovenia does not
plan to undertake major increases in such spending over the
next few years, but will focus on maintenance of current
stocks.
Slovenia's 2001 defense spending was $274.5 million, about
1.46% of Slovenia's GDP. Slovenia's defense spending in 2002
amounted to about 1.5% of GDP. Slovenia plans to increase
defense spending by 0.1% of GDP each year until it reaches 2%
GDP by 2008. The Committee hopes that given Slovenia's position
as the wealthiest of the post-communist countries of Central
and Eastern Europe, it could accelerate this timetable.
Slovenia is working hard to increase interoperability with
NATO within PfP. It participates in the NATO/PfP Planning and
Review Process and has adopted Partnership Goals, aimed at
increasing its ability to participate in future operations with
NATO. Small in number, Slovenia's armed forces will be able to
make a modest contribution to future NATO peacekeeping efforts,
similar to that of smaller current NATO members. Slovenia would
also provide a strategic land link between current NATO members
Italy and Hungary. Slovenia is providing troops and equipment
to SFOR and KFOR. Slovenia granted overflight, landing and
refueling rights to Operation Enduring Freedom, and has
provided humanitarian and demining assistance to Afghanistan,
as well as a police officer for training and assisting the
Afghan Police. On February 5, 2003, Slovenia joined the V-10
Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm, and has indicated its
willingness to look for ways it could contribute to post-
conflict reconstruction in Iraq.
Civilian Control of the Military & Oversight of Intelligence Agencies
Legal mechanisms exist in Slovenia to provide for civilian
control of the military and intelligence services. According to
the Slovenian constitution, the National Assembly approves the
defense budget and conducts oversight of military and
intelligence programs. The Slovenian defense minister, a
civilian, exercises control over the development and
organization of the armed forces through the General Staff. The
President of Slovenia is commander-in-chief of the armed
forces, and appoints top military officers.
III. The Cost of NATO Enlargement
BACKGROUND \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The Cost of NATO Enlargement, section III, is based on a
Memorandum by Carl Ek of the Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade
Division of the Congressional Research Service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The cost of NATO enlargement was an important, and at times
contentious, issue during the last round of enlargement, when
the Alliance was considering membership of Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic. NATO had taken in new members several times
since its creation in 1949, but this round was different for
two reasons: less than a decade earlier, the countries under
consideration had belonged to the Warsaw Pact; and they were,
for the most part, weaker economically than earlier new
entrants.
After NATO's 1997 Madrid Summit, during which Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic were invited to begin accession
negotiations, three major budget estimates--ranging to more
than $100 billion--were prepared, but the need for large
outlays failed to materialize. In fact, the cost of bringing in
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic appears to have been
relatively modest. The budget issue has almost disappeared
during discussions of the current round of enlargement--even
though some of the current invitees, particularly Romania and
Bulgaria, are even less economically developed than the three
former communist countries brought in during the last round.
After their admission to NATO, Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic began making payments into NATO's three common
budgets and the prorated contributions of the other member
states fell accordingly. The total U.S. share dropped by
approximately 1%.
CURRENT ENVIRONMENT
Since the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic, NATO has moved even further away from the Cold War
concept of maintaining a static defensive force--heavy ground
forces prepared to repel a large-scale armored attack. The
Committee notes, however, that although the conventional threat
may have faded and new threats have emerged, were a
conventional threat to emerge, the cost to NATO would be
substantial regardless. As the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks demonstrated, non-state actors such as al-Qaeda may
seek to conduct asymmetric warfare on NATO member states. The
Committee believes that the threat of weapons of mass
destruction is a growing concern for the United States and its
allies, and commends the Alliance's pledge at the Prague Summit
to strengthen its ability to meet the challenges to the
security of NATO forces, populations and territory, from
wherever they may come, and to ``go out of area'' to fight
terrorism and proliferation and to develop more mobile
capabilities.
NEW MEMBER COST CONSIDERATIONS
The seven countries currently under consideration for
membership present a different set of issues militarily than
did the last round of new members. The two largest countries,
Romania and Bulgaria, are much less affluent than Hungary,
Poland, and the Czech Republic, and will therefore need to
stretch out their procurement. On the other hand, the three
Baltic states were left with virtually no armed forces after
the Soviets withdrew.
Since 1999, the United States and many of the NATO allies
have participated in wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
These conflicts have pointed up the need for greater troop and
asset mobility as well as the value of new capabilities, such
as having special operations forces working in concert with
aircraft capable of delivering precision-guided munitions. The
MAP process in effect compels the invitees to take specific
steps to reform and upgrade their militaries. The new states
have also been strongly encouraged to commit to maintaining
their defense spending at or near 2% GDP--a level higher than
that of several current allies.
Rather than dollars and cents, policymakers have been
focusing this time around on military capabilities; emphasis is
being placed not on how long it will take for new members to
become interoperable with current NATO members, but rather on
what their militaries are able to offer. To complement the NATO
Response Force, and ensure that it has the proper tools to
conduct a range of operations, the Alliance at its last summit
approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment, under which
members obligate themselves to acquire specific military
assets. The seven countries that have been invited to join have
already begun developing ``niche'' capabilities that NATO can
draw on to fulfill its new missions. There is also a growing
recognition of the value of having countries pool their
resources to develop big-ticket procurement items such as
strategic airlift.
IV. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimates of NATO Enlargement \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The information in section IV is taken directly from an April
28, 2003 report by the Congressional Budget Office entitled ``Cost
Implications of Implementing the March 26, 2003, NATO Accession
Protocols.''
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
April 28, 2003.
Honorable Richard G. Lugar, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In response to your request, the Congressional Budget
Office has prepared the attached report on the costs associated
with ratifying the protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of
1949 on the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (Treaty Document 108-4). CBO estimates that
integrating those seven countries into NATO would cost the 19
current NATO members about $2.7 billion dollars over the 2004-
2013 period; the U.S. share of that amount would be about $650
million and would be subject to appropriation action. In
addition, the seven prospective NATO members could incur
significant costs to upgrade and modernize their militaries.
The United States might help those countries in that process
through the use of foreign military financing and other
assistance. However, such assistance would be discretionary and
would probably not be significantly larger than current levels
of aid to those countries. CBO does not anticipate any direct
spending to result from the ratification of the protocols.
If you would like further information about this analysis,
we would be pleased to provide it. The CBO staff contacts are
Matthew Schmit (in the Budget Analysis Division), and Robie
Samanta Roy (in the National Security Division).
Sincerely,
Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director.
[Attachment.]
Cost Implications of Implementing the March 26, 2003, NATO Accession
Protocols
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
On March 26, 2003, the United States and the other 18
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) signed
Protocols of Accession. Once ratified by the governments of the
19 NATO members, those protocols would allow seven more
countries--Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia--to join the alliance.\1\ The original
North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 by 12 countries. Since
then, seven other members have joined NATO, on four separate
occasions: Greece and Turkey in 1952; the Federal Republic of
Germany in 1955; Spain in 1982; and, most recently, Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Those seven countries were formally invited to join NATO at the
Prague summit in November 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Member countries bear the direct costs of maintaining the
alliance through the contributions that all of them make to
NATO's three common budgets--the civil, military, and
infrastructure budgets. Those budgets fund NATO headquarters
activities as well as common infrastructure projects needed to
maintain interoperability between the forces of the member
nations. Each member is obligated to pay a prenegotiated share
of the common budgets. Last year, those three budgets together
totaled about $1.7 billion; the U.S. share of that amount was
just under 27 percent, or $442 million.
On the basis of data from NATO and the Department of
Defense (DOD), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates
that admitting the seven prospective members into NATO would
increase overall costs associated with the common budgets for
the 19 current NATO members by about $2.7 billion over the
2004-2013 period. The U.S. share of those costs would total
about $650 million over 10 years (assuming appropriation of the
necessary amounts)--or about 12 percent more than the United
States would otherwise spend to support NATO's common budgets
over that period.
Besides costs, another important consideration in enlarging
NATO is whether the seven prospective members could meet their
obligations to the alliance to provide certain military
capabilities (obligations commonly referred to as
burdensharing). Those obligations include such things as
providing a certain level of air-defense capability and being
able to deploy military forces rapidly during crises. Although
NATO members agree in principle to meet all burdensharing
obligations, each country's military programs and level of
defense spending are generally left to the country's
discretion. Each member's funding depends to a great extent on
its long-term military modernization strategy and overall
economic situation. One indirect measure of burdensharing is
the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) that a member
nation allocates to defense. By that measure, each of the seven
prospective members already funds, or is planning to fund,
defense at or near the average level of current NATO countries.
In recent years, the United States has attempted to help
new members modernize their militaries by providing them with
grants and loans to purchase military hardware and training.
Such assistance is not required, however, and would be subject
to the annual authorization and appropriation process of the
U.S. Congress.
NATO'S COMMON BUDGETS
Generally speaking, each NATO member is responsible for the
costs associated with maintaining and operating its military
forces, even when those forces operate under NATO's command
structure. However, certain common costs--such as those
associated with headquarters staff and command-and-control
capabilities--are financed through the alliance's three common
budgets:
The civil budget ($174 million in 2002), which pays
the cost of NATO's civil headquarters and personnel in
Brussels;
The military budget ($790 million in 2002), which
funds the alliance's military headquarters and
activities (including the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium), the NATO Airborne
Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) program, and the NATO
command structure for peace keeping activities in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo; and
The infrastructure budget ($693 million in 2002)--
also known as the NATO Security Investment Program
(NSIP)--which underwrites the costs of common support
facilities, including command, control, communications,
and intelligence facilities; transportation; storage
facilities; and investments in airfields, fuel
pipelines, harbors, and navigational aids.
Taken together, NATO's common budgets totaled almost $1.7
billion in 2002 (see Table 1). The United States paid nearly 27
percent of that amount, or $442 million. The share that each
member pays of each budget is determined by consensus among the
members and is periodically renegotiated, particularly when new
members join the alliance. The U.S. share of the civil and
military budgets has remained fairly constant at around 25
percent since those budgets were established in 1951. Member
contributions to the NSIP are more variable, since shares are
frequently adjusted to take into account the location and
national importance of individual infrastructure projects.
Within the U.S. Federal budget, contributions to the three
NATO common budgets are provided through three separate
appropriations each year. The U.S. contribution to NATO's civil
budget is made from the ``Contributions to International
Organizations'' account in budget function 150 (international
affairs), which is funded through annual appropriations to the
Department of State. Similarly, the U.S. contribution to NATO's
military budget is made through the ``Operations and
Maintenance, Army'' account in the annual Department of Defense
appropriation act; and the U.S. contribution to the NSIP is
made through a specific appropriation in the annual military
construction appropriation act.
TABLE 1.--ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO'S COMMON BUDGETS IN 2002
[In millions of dollars]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Military Percentage of
Civil Budget Budget (Minus \1\ AEW&C Infrastructure Total Total NATO
AEW&C) Program Budget (NSIP) Budget
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Belgium........................................... 4.8 16.2 8.2 27.9 57.1 3.4
Canada............................................ 9.3 30.0 23.0 25.6 87.9 5.3
Czech Republic.................................... 1.6 5.2 0 6.8 13.6 0.8
Denmark........................................... 2.6 9.6 4.9 22.6 39.7 2.4
France............................................ 26.8 47.8 0 37.2 111.8 6.7
Germany........................................... 27.1 89.5 68.5 152.0 337.1 20.3
Greece............................................ 0.7 2.2 1.5 7.1 11.5 0.7
Hungary........................................... 1.1 3.8 0 4.9 9.8 0.6
Iceland........................................... 0.1 0.2 0 0 0.3 (*)
Italy............................................. 10.0 34.4 17.7 59.2 121.3 7.3
Luxembourg........................................ 0.1 0.5 0.3 1.3 2.2 0.1
Netherlands....................................... 4.8 16.2 9.1 31.1 61.2 3.7
Norway............................................ 1.9 6.7 3.6 19.2 31.4 1.9
Poland............................................ 4.3 14.4 0 18.7 37.4 2.3
Portugal.......................................... 1.1 3.7 1.7 2.6 9.1 0.5
Spain............................................. 6.1 20.4 8.8 24.8 60.1 3.6
Turkey............................................ 2.8 9.2 4.0 7.6 23.6 1.4
United Kingdom.................................... 30.1 93.3 0.2 76.8 200.4 12.1
United States..................................... 39.1 134.1 101.1 167.7 442.0 26.7
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total......................................... 174.4 537.4 252.6 693.1 1,657.5 100.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.
Note: AEW&C = Airborne Early Warning and Control; NSIP = NATO Security Investment Program; (*) = between zero and 0.05 percent.
\1\ NATO's Airborne Early Warning and Control program is part of the military budget. However, it is shown separately here because not all countries
contribute to the program, and therefore it has different sharing percentages.
COST IMPLICATIONS OF THE LATEST ROUND OF NATO ENLARGEMENT
Adding new members to NATO could affect costs to the United
States in several ways. First, it would allow current NATO
members, including the United States, to spread the costs of
the common NATO budgets over more countries. Second,
integrating the new members into NATO's military command
structure would require up-front costs. Most of those costs
would be eligible for funding from NATO's common budgets and
therefore would increase costs for current members. Third, the
United States might choose to assist the new member countries
in modernizing and upgrading their military capabilities.
Impact on the U.S. Share of the Common Budgets
CBO estimates that adding the seven new members to NATO
would most likely reduce the cost share that each country pays
to support the three common budgets but the impact of that
reduction would be insignificant in percentage terms. When
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined the alliance in
1999, the U.S. share of the common budgets declined slightly--
from 28.5 percent overall in 1997 to 26.7 percent in 2002. In
that instance, the new members' cost shares were established by
NATO's Senior Resource Board and were largely based on each
country's GDP. Together, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic currently pay about 3.7 percent of NATO's common
budgets.
CBO does not expect the U.S. share of the common budgets to
decline significantly with the addition of the seven
prospective members. Those countries have a combined gross
domestic product that is about 40 percent of the total GDP of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Assuming that the
seven new members would together contribute about 40 percent of
what Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic now pay, CBO
estimates that their combined share would amount to about 1.5
percent of the common budgets. In that case, the resulting
reduction in the U.S. share would probably be about 0.4
percent.
That reduction in the United States' cost share would not
necessarily reduce U.S. payments to the common budgets,
however. The reason is that the costs of those budgets,
especially the NSIP budget, would most likely increase if the
seven new members joined NATO. In other words, the slightly
smaller percentage share of a larger base amount would probably
require current NATO members to contribute more than they do
now.
TABLE 2.--ESTIMATED COST TO THE NATO COMMON BUDGETS OF ADMITTING THE SEVEN NEW MEMBERS IDENTIFIED IN THE
PROTOCOLS OF ACCESSION
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ten-Year Total (2004-2013)
---------------------------------------------
Estimated Additional
Estimated NATO Budget Costs from
Without Enlargement Enlargement
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security Investment Program....................................... $7,950 $2,750
Military Budget................................................... 6,500 200
AEW&C Program..................................................... 3,050 0
Civil Budget...................................................... 2,100 (\1\)
---------------------------------------------
Subtotal........................................................ 19,550 2,950
Contributions from the Seven New Members.......................... n.a. -300
---------------------------------------------
Total Cost to Current NATO Members............................ 19,550 2,650
Memorandum:
Cost to the United States......................................... 5,250 \2\ 650
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The seven prospective members identified in the accession protocols are Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
AEW&C = Airborne Early Warning and Control; n.a. = not applicable.
\1\ In addition to costs to the Security Investment Program and military budget, there would be costs to the
civil budget. However, those costs would be insignificant and would be offset by the new members' financial
contributions to that budget.
\2\ Includes the costs of integrating the seven new members into NATO as well as savings from the reduction in
the U.S. cost share of the common budgets.
Estimated Increase in Costs to the Common Budgets
As was the case with the 1999 round of NATO enlargement,
CBO expects that if Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the alliance, the costs
associated with the three common budgets would increase. (For a
discussion of the costs associated with the 1999 enlargement,
see the appendix.) Admitting those seven countries would cost
the 19 current NATO members an additional $2.7 billion in all
during the 2004-2013 period, CBO estimates. The increase in
costs to the United States would be $650 million, or about 24
percent of the additional expense to current members (see Table
2).
To estimate the costs of incorporating the seven
prospective members, CBO assumed that their infrastructure
requirements--such as upgrades to airfields, port facilities,
and air-defense radars--would be analogous to the requirements
that NATO identified for the three countries that joined the
alliance in 1999. CBO's estimate of the costs of those
requirements is based on information contained in cost
estimates prepared by NATO's Senior Resource Board in 1997 for
the 1999 round of NATO enlargement (adjusted for inflation) as
well as on data provided by DOD. Although the costs and
assumptions in the 1997 estimates are several years old, they
represent NATO's only official statement about the minimum
infrastructure that new members require to achieve the goals of
the NATO defense strategy. (The details of those requirements
are classified.) CBO compared the cost factors in the 1997
estimates with actual costs to date and concluded that they
provide a reasonable basis for projecting future costs.
On the basis of those assumptions, CBO estimates that the
total cost of integrating the seven new members into NATO would
be about $3 billion over the 2004-2013 period. The new members
would begin paying a share of the common budgets--about $300
million over 10 years, CBO estimates--leaving a net cost to the
19 current members of about $2.7 billion.
Under NATO's current membership, the NSIP and military
budgets (not including the NATO AEW&C program) would cost about
$14.4 billion over the 2004-2013 period, CBO estimates (see
Table 2). The U.S. share of that amount would be about 24.5
percent, or $3.5 billion.\2\ Integrating seven new members into
NATO would raise the costs of those budgets to about $17.4
billion over 10 years. With the seven new members making
contributions to the common budgets, the shares that NATO's
current members pay would decline in percentage terms. In the
case of the United States, CBO estimates that its share of the
NSIP and military budgets would drop by about 0.4 percentage
points, to 24.1 percent. Thus, the United States would
contribute about $4.2 billion to NATO's NSIP and military
budgets over the 2004-2013 period--about $650 million more than
it would pay without enlargement.\3\ That sum represents an
increase of roughly 18 percent over what the United States
would other wise contribute to the NSIP and military budgets
(excluding the AEW&C program) during that period and a roughly
12 percent increase over what the United States would
contribute to the entire NATO budget.\4\
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\2\ The United States' overall cost share (just under 27 percent)
is higher than the shares that the United States pays to the NSIP and
military budgets because of the larger share that it contributes to the
NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control program (about 40 percent).
That program is technically part of the military budget, but not all
member nations contribute to it, which is why this analysis treats it
separately. The three NATO members admitted in 1999 do not contribute
to that program, and CBO assumes that the same would be true for the
seven prospective members.
\3\ Enlargement would also increase some costs for NATO's civil
budget. However, the net effect of those costs would be insignificant;
thus, they are not included in this analysis.
\4\ CBO estimates that without enlargement, U.S. contributions to
all of NATO's common budgets (including the NSIP, civil budget,
military budget, and the AEW&C portion of the military budget) would
total $5.2 billion over the 2004-2013 period. With enlargement, those
contributions would total $5.9 billion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBO's estimate is very similar to the preliminary estimate
that the Administration released on March 25, 2003, in its
report to the Congress on the seven new members' status and
eligibility to meet NATO obligations. In that report, the
Administration estimated that the additional cost to the common
budgets from this round of NATO enlargement would total about
$2.6 billion over 10 years (in 2002 dollars) and that the U.S.
share of that increase would amount to about $584 million. When
converted from current dollars into 2002 dollars, CBO's
estimate of costs to the NATO common budgets (before
contributions from new members) is about $2.5 billion. The
similarity between those estimates is not unexpected since the
Administration and CBO used the same sources of data and
similar methods in preparing their estimates. CBO's estimate of
the U.S. share of that cost, about $600 million in 2002
dollars, is also similar to an estimate by DOD.
Other Potential Costs to the United States
The United States could incur other costs related to the
admission of new members to NATO. For example, in the past, the
U.S. government has helped new NATO members upgrade their
defense capabilities by providing them with grants and loans
for military equipment, training, and participation in joint
exercises. However, none of that assistance results from
prenegotiated commitments or obligations made on behalf of the
United States; it is provided through the annual Congressional
authorization and appropriation process.
The most common form of U.S. military assistance is grants
from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Over the
past four years, the three newest NATO members--the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland--have received FMF grants worth a
total of around $30 million a year, and the Administration has
requested a similar amount for 2004 (see Table 3). In
comparison, the seven NATO candidates have received a total of
around $50 million a year in FMF grants. (Those amounts are
comparable given the size of the two groups' militaries and
populations.) Although the seven potential members have not yet
joined NATO, they have been receiving grants through the Warsaw
Initiative (which provides assistance to countries that
participate in the Partnership for Peace program) at levels
somewhat comparable to those of the three newest NATO members.
Since the seven prospective members already receive similar
amounts of FMF grants as the three NATO members admitted in
1999, they might not receive a larger share of FMF resources
once they joined NATO.
TABLE 3.--U.S. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING GRANTS FOR THE THREE NEWEST MEMBERS OF NATO AND THE SEVEN PROSPECTIVE MENBERS
[In millions of dollars]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 2001 2002 2003 (Estimate) 2004 (Request)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Members Admitted in 1999
Czech Republic..................................................... 6 9 10 11 10
Hungary............................................................ 6 9 10 11 10
Poland............................................................. 8 12 12 13 12
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................................................... 20 30 32 35 32
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seven New Members Identified in the Accession Protocols
Bulgaria........................................................... 5 14 9 10 9
Estonia............................................................ 4 6 6 7 6
Latvia............................................................. 4 5 6 7 6
Lithuania.......................................................... 4 7 7 8 7
Romania............................................................ 6 17 9 10 9
Slovakia........................................................... 3 11 8 9 8
Slovenia........................................................... 2 6 4 5 4
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................................................... 28 65 48 55 49
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the U.S. Department of State.
Foreign military financing can also take the form of loans,
some of which can be substantial. For example, Poland recently
finalized a $3.5 billion loan agreement with the U.S.
government to help fund the purchase of 48 F-16 fighter
aircraft from a U.S. manufacturer, and other NATO countries
have received those types of loans in the past, although not
frequently. Under the Federal Credit Reform Act, only the
estimated net costs of such a loan need to be appropriated in
advance. Those costs include the risk of nonpayment and any
interest subsidy provided by the government. Whether such loans
would be offered to the seven prospective NATO members would be
a decision for the U.S. government.
ENLARGEMENT AND NATO BURDENSHARING
In addition to the possible budgetary impact, another issue
to consider in evaluating this round of enlargement is whether
the seven prospective members of NATO could meet their
burdensharing obligations to the alliance. In the NATO context,
``burden sharing'' generally applies to the amount of spending
and defense capability that each member country provides toward
NATO's common defense. The overall level of NATO's collective
defense is an issue that is discussed and debated among the
members of the alliance, but it is not defined as a
quantitative level of defense capability to be provided by each
NATO country. Burdensharing has historically been an issue
raised by the Congress as it seeks to understand whether the
United States has been or is bearing an appropriate share of
the burden of NATO membership.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ For a more complete discussion of the issue of NATO
burdensharing, see Congressional Budget Office, NATO Burdensharing
After Enlargement (August 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common indirect indicator of burdensharing
is a country's defense spending, often expressed as a
percentage of its GDP. Other standard measures include defense
spending per capita and the proportion of the population in the
military. Another potential measure, increasingly important
today, is contributions to global multinational peacekeeping
operations.
On an unweighted average basis, NATO countries currently
spend about 2 percent of their GDPs on defense (see Table 4).
That average is slightly skewed by Greece and Turkey, which
each spend more than 4 percent of their respective GDPs on
defense, and by Iceland, which has no defense expenditures.
(The United States is the third highest at 3.4 percent of GDP.)
Without Greece, Turkey, and Iceland, the unweighted average for
current NATO members would be 1.8 percent. Five of the seven
prospective members are already at or above that average, and
they have stated that they intend to maintain or increase their
level of defense spending. The exceptions are Latvia and
Slovenia, whose defense expenditures equal about 1.2 percent
\6\ and 1.7 percent of GDP, respectively. However, both
countries have indicated that they plan to increase defense
expenditures in the near future. The Latvian parliament has
approved spending at least 2 percent of GDP on defense through
2008, and the Slovenian government has committed itself to
boosting defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2008. It
should be noted, however, that although defense spending as a
percentage of GDP is comparable among the current and
prospective members, the latter have much smaller GDPs.\7\
Thus, their defense spending is far lower in dollar and per
capita terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The Committee notes that, in 2002, Latvia spent 1.75 percent of
GDP on defense and the Latvian Government has enacted a law to require
that 2 percent of GDP be spent on defense beginning this year (2003).
\7\ The total GDP of both the 1999 and 2003 NATO expansion
countries is only 2.3 percent of the total GDP of the other NATO
countries.
TABLE 4.--MEASURES OF DEFENSE SPENDING FOR CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE NATO MEMBERS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense Spending Defense Spending Defense Spending
Population GDP (Billions of (Billions of as a Percentage per Capita
(Millions) dollars) dollars) of GDP (Dollars)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Members Admitted Between 1949 and 1982
Belgium.................................................. 10.3 248 3.2 1.3 312
Canada................................................... 31.9 727 8.2 1.1 256
Denmark.................................................. 5.4 175 2.7 1.5 502
France................................................... 59.8 1,418 35.5 2.5 594
Germany.................................................. 83.3 1,987 29.4 1.5 353
Greece................................................... 10.6 132 5.8 4.4 542
Iceland.................................................. 0.3 8 0 0 0
Italy.................................................... 57.7 1,175 22.6 1.9 392
Luxembourg............................................... 0.4 20 0.2 0.9 402
Netherlands.............................................. 16.1 420 6.9 1.6 425
Norway................................................... 4.5 192 3.6 1.9 804
Portugal................................................. 10.1 121 2.8 2.3 273
Spain.................................................... 40.1 643 7.7 1.2 193
Turkey................................................... 67.3 186 9.0 4.9 134
United Kingdom........................................... 59.8 1,549 36.8 2.4 616
United States............................................ 280.6 10,430 350.9 3.4 1,251
---------------------------------------------------------
Total................................................ 737.9 19,422 525.3 2.7 712
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999 Round of NATO Enlargement
Czech Republic........................................... 10.3 69 1.5 2.1 144
Hungary.................................................. 10.1 64 1.1 1.8 113
Poland................................................... 38.6 182 3.6 2.0 93
---------------------------------------------------------
Total................................................ 59.0 316 6.2 2.0 105
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Round of NATO Enlargement
Bulgaria................................................. 7.6 13 0.4 2.7 47
Estonia.................................................. 1.4 8 0.2 2.0 111
Latvia................................................... 2.4 7 0.1 1.2 37
Lithuania................................................ 3.6 12 0.2 1.9 64
Romania.................................................. 22.3 40 1.0 2.5 44
Slovakia................................................. 5.4 22 0.4 1.9 75
Slovenia................................................. 1.9 22 0.4 1.7 192
---------------------------------------------------------
Total................................................ 44.6 124 2.6 2.1 58
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on information from the Department of Defense; Central Intelligence Agency, ``The World Factbook, 2002''; and
International Institute for Strategic Studies, ``The Military Balance, 2002-2003'' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Note: For the most part, the above data are current as of calendar year 2002. Where 2002 data were not available, data for 2000 or 2001 were used.
The defense capabilities of the current and prospective
NATO countries can also be compared using various broad
measures, such as the total number of personnel in their armed
services and the number of airfields they have with runways
longer than 2.4 kilometers (7,600 feet). Airfields are a key
asset for military operations, including NATO Airborne Early
Warning and Control operations, air defense, forward basing,
and troop entry and exit points. Other broad measures of
capability include the percentage of conscripts in a military
force, which gives an indication of the professional quality of
the force, and the number of military personnel employed in
global multinational peace support operations (see Table 5).
(All of the prospective NATO members have contributed troops
for such operations.)
Comparing the seven prospective members with the three NATO
countries admitted in 1999 shows similarities and differences.
Although the total population of the seven prospective members
is about 25 percent smaller than the total population of the
three newest members, the number of people in their military
forces is only 8 percent smaller. The military forces of the
seven prospective members also have similar proportions of
professional soldiers, with 49 percent of their forces being
conscripts, compared with 52 percent for the members admitted
in 1999. (However, those levels are generally higher than the
number of conscripts employed by NATO members admitted before
1999.) In addition, both sets of countries have roughly the
same number of airfields with long runways. Overall, it appears
that the seven prospective members would expand NATO's military
forces by 6 percent and increase the number of airfields with
long runways available to the alliance by 6 percent (and the
number available in Europe by 13 percent).
Each of the prospective NATO members has been asked to
follow a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), which lays out
broad political, economic, defense, resource, security, and
legal objectives. The MAP is not specific in defining what
capabilities each country is expected to contribute, aside from
calling on members to provide ``forces and capabilities for
collective defense and other Alliance missions.'' However, each
of the prospective members has certain specialized capabilities
that NATO believes would contribute to the alliance (see Table
6). Those capabilities include light infantry; special forces;
units to defend against nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons; explosive ordinance disposal teams; military police;
medical units; small naval units; limited airlift; and engineer
or logistics units. In addition, Romania possesses unmanned
aerial vehicles, and Slovakia has air-to-ground training
ranges. Geographically, Bulgaria offers the Black Sea port of
Burgas, and Slovakia connects the three most recent members,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.
In short, from the perspective of burdensharing, the seven
prospective members are committed to levels of defense spending
that are equal to, or close to, the current NATO per-country
average in terms of percentage of GDP. In addition, the
military forces of those countries are relatively professional
and could contribute some specialized capabilities that would
enhance NATO's military mission.
TABLE 5.--BROAD MEASURES OF MILITARY CAPABILITY FOR CURRENT AND PRPSPECTIVE NATO MEMBERS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military
Active as a Active- Conscripts Number of Percentage
Country Population Military Percentage Force as a Troops of Military \1\ Number
(Millions) Force of Conscripts Percentage Involved Involved in of Airports
(Thousands) Population (Thousands) of Force in MPSOs MPSOs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Members Admitted Between 1949 and 1982
Belgium............................................ 10.3 39 0.4 0 0 646 1.6 14
Canada............................................. 31.9 52 0.2 0 0 1,457 2.8 33
Denmark............................................ 5.4 23 0.4 6 25 869 3.8 9
France............................................. 59.8 260 0.4 0 0 6,624 2.5 41
Germany............................................ 83.3 296 0.4 107 36 6,841 2.3 65
Greece............................................. 10.6 178 1.7 98 55 1,382 0.8 21
Iceland............................................ 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Italy.............................................. 57.7 217 0.4 70 32 6,295 2.9 39
Luxembourg......................................... 0.4 1 0.2 0 0 25 2.8 1
Netherlands........................................ 16.1 50 0.3 0 0 1,348 2.7 9
Norway............................................. 4.5 27 0.6 15 57 994 3.7 14
Portugal........................................... 10.1 44 0.4 8 19 1,048 2.4 14
Spain.............................................. 40.1 178 0.4 0 0 2,180 1.2 25
Turkey............................................. 67.3 515 0.8 391 76 2,731 0.5 46
United Kingdom..................................... 59.8 211 0.4 0 0 3,554 1.7 41
United States...................................... 280.6 1,414 0.5 0 0 5,312 0.4 405
-------------------------- ------------- ----------- ------------
Total.......................................... 737.9 3,503 0.5 696 20 41,306 1.2 777
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999 Round of NATO Enlargement
Czech Republic..................................... 10.3 50 0.5 25 51 604 1.2 11
Hungary............................................ 10.1 33 0.3 23 69 668 2.0 10
Poland............................................. 38.6 163 0.4 81 50 1,575 1.0 32
-------------------------- ------------- ----------- ------------
Total.......................................... 59.0 246 0.4 129 52 2,847 1.2 53
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Round of NATO Enlargement
Bulgaria........................................... 7.6 69 0.9 49 72 40 0.1 20
Estonia............................................ 1.4 6 0.4 1 24 3 0.1 7
Latvia............................................. 2.4 6 0.2 2 29 112 2.0 7
Lithuania.......................................... 3.6 14 0.4 4 31 125 0.9 2
Romania............................................ 22.3 99 0.4 35 35 905 0.9 13
Slovakia........................................... 5.4 26 0.5 15 57 641 2.4 4
Slovenia........................................... 1.9 9 0.5 5 50 86 1.0 2
-------------------------- ------------- ----------- ------------
Total.......................................... 44.6 227 0.5 111 49 1,912 0.8 55
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on information from the Department of Defense; Central Intelligence Agency, ``The World Factbook, 2002''; and
International Institute for Strategic Studies, ``The Military Balance, 2002-2003'' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Notes: MPSOs = multinational peace support operations. Numbers for population, troops in MPSOs, and airports reflect 2002 data. Numbers for active
military personnel and conscripts reflect 2001 data.
\1\ Specifically, the number of airports that have paved runways larger than 2.4 kilometers.
TABLE 6.--SPECIALIZED MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF PROSPECTIVE NATO MEMEBERS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explosive
Light Special NBC Defense Ordinance Military Medical Small Limited Engineer or
Infantry Forces Units Disposal Police Units Naval Airlift Logistics
Units Units Units
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bulgaria........................ X X X ............ ............ ........... X X X
Estonia......................... X ............ ........... X X ........... ......... ........... ............
Latvia.......................... X X ........... X X X ......... ........... ............
Lithuania....................... ............ X ........... ............ ............ X ......... X X
Romania......................... X X ........... ............ X ........... ......... X ............
Slovakia........................ ............ X X ............ ............ ........... ......... ........... X
Slovenia........................ X X ........... X X X ......... X ............
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on information from the Department of Defense.
Note: NBC = nuclear, biological, and chemical.
APPENDIX: COST INSIGHTS FROM THE 1999 ROUND OF NATO ENLARGEMENT
One method of estimating the impact on NATO's common
budgets of admitting Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia into the alliance is to examine
the estimated costs for the previous round of NATO enlargement.
Those costs are estimated because the integration of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the NATO infrastructure is
still a work in progress, whose total cost will not be known
for some time. NATO's Senior Resource Board (SRB) estimated in
1997 that integrating Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
into NATO would increase the common budgets by about $1.5
billion over 10 years. The board has not officially updated
that estimate. But according to data provided by the Department
of Defense (DOD) and NATO, it appears that spending to date is
in line with previous estimates, although the final cost will
be somewhat less than originally anticipated, around $1.2
billion to $1.3 billion over the 1999-2008 period.
The 1997 SRB estimate was based on an evaluation of the
infrastructure projects that were identified as necessary to
maintain a minimum level of military interoperability between
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and the other NATO
members. Those projects had to be vital to the collective
defense of all member nations to be deemed worthy of funding
from the common budgets. The requirements were grouped and
estimated in four categories:
Consultation, command, and control (C3), which
includes projects to link the communications of the new
members' military headquarters into the NATO command
structure;
Air defense, which involves integration into the
NATO Integrated Air Defense System as well as
procurement and operation of common radars;
Infrastructure needed to transport reinforcements
and military supplies, which includes upgrades so that
ports and air bases can receive cargo ships and
aircraft from various member nations; and
Training and exercises, which includes expenses
related to common NATO exercises.
Through 2002, NATO had authorized about $497 million worth
of commonly funded infrastructure projects in Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic through the NATO Security Investment
Program (see the Table A-1). According to DOD, that $497
million figure represents a best estimate of the final value of
the authorized projects. Because funds for many of the larger
infrastructure projects are provided incrementally, the final
value will not be known for some time. So far, NATO has
provided about $236 million for those projects through 2002
(with the United States contributing about $52 million of that
amount). On the basis of data from DOD and NATO on the total
cost of the 1999 enlargement round, CBO expects that about $1
billion in funding from the Security Investment Program will
eventually be dedicated to projects in Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic.
TABLE A-1.--ESTIMATED COSTS TO THE 19 CURRENT NATO MEMBERS FOR THE 1999 ENLARGEMENT ROUND
[By calendar year, in millions of U.S. dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Actual
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999-2002 Future
1999 2000 2001 2002 (Estimate) Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated Cost of Authorized 180 41 124 152 497 793 1,290
Projects \1\.....................
Funding Provided to Date and 18 16 58 144 236 1,054 1,290
Estimated Future Funding.........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense
\1\ Authorized projects reflect projects that have been approved by NATO for common funding. Many larger
projects are funded incrementally or may be cancelled altogether on the basis of the changing security
environment.
Given the relatively large estimated 10-year cost of the
1999 round of NATO en largement ($1.3 billion), one might have
expected to see more funding committed for projects in those
countries over the past few years than has actually been
committed. There are several reasons why that has not been the
case. First, the original 1997 SRB estimate projected that most
of the costs would occur during the latter half of the 10-year
period. Comparing actual funding to date with the SRB estimate
shows that the year-by-year amounts are very similar, which
implies that the bulk of funding is still to come. Second, some
of the more expensive projects, such as radar installations and
upgrades to port facilities, are only starting to be
constructed, and significant funds will be authorized for them
in coming years. It is also possible that the SRB's $1.3
billion estimate may ultimately prove too high. Because the
decision to proceed with commonly funded infrastructure
projects is driven by financial resources as well as by the
security environment that exists when funding decisions are
made, it is possible that NATO could decide to reduce the
requirements postulated in 1997. In that case, not only would
the 1999 enlargement round cost less than originally
anticipated but future rounds could cost less as well.
V. NATO-Russia Relations
The Committee does not find NATO enlargement and the
development of a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship to be
mutually exclusive. NATO enlargement and cooperative NATO-
Russian relations both have immense value for the United States
and for the nations of Europe, if they are pursued properly.
They are complementary and reinforcing objectives. The
challenge for the United States, and for NATO, is to do both
correctly. Toward this end, the Committee Resolution of
Ratification supports NATO's policy to continue developing a
constructive relationship with the Russian Federation as it
pursues democratization, market reforms, and peaceful relations
with its neighbors.
The enlargement of NATO, a defensive alliance comprised of
democratic nations, does not threaten any country in Europe. In
the view of the Committee, all of Europe benefits from the
existence of NATO, including Russia. The Committee finds that
admitting Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia into NATO will multiply this benefit, not
only by securing seven countries that embrace democracy and
free markets, but also by calling upon those countries to lead
in the defense of democracy and stability in Central and
Eastern Europe. In appreciation of this fact, democracies
throughout Europe--including those that are not seeking NATO
membership--have endorsed NATO's plans to extend its membership
to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia.
In comparison to the Russian government's caustic rhetoric
during the last round of NATO enlargement, when the Alliance
invited Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Moscow's
message has softened. It is possible that President Putin now
views a unified front against terrorism, in part due to
Moscow's ongoing conflict in Chechnya, as more important than
potential divisions with the allies over enlargement. The
Committee notes that the Russian Duma and much of Russia's
military and intelligence bureaucracy remain adamantly opposed
to enlargement, which they view as a U.S.-led effort to move a
military alliance closer to their territory. As in 1998, the
Committee rejects any suggestion that by enlarging, NATO is
encroaching upon Russia's legitimate space and that any
sovereign state in Europe is within any other country's sphere
of influence. It is also the view of the Committee that the
proposed NATO membership of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia is unrelated to
recent disagreement over taking military action in Iraq, the
brutal massacre of civilians in Chechnya, as well as ongoing
transfers of Russian technology and weapons to rogue states.
To provide a forum for confidence building and information
exchange, NATO and Russia formalized consultative procedures in
a document called the Founding Act, which was signed on May 27,
1997. The Founding Act established a Permanent Joint Council
(PJC) for NATO-Russia consultations. Four years later, in
December 2001, NATO and Russian Foreign Ministers announced
their intention to create a NATO-Russia Council, on the
principle of ``NATO at 20.'' In May 2002, NATO and Russian
leaders meeting in Rome signed the ``NATO at 20'' agreement, in
which Russia and NATO members participate as equals on certain
issues. This replaces the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.
Spurred by the tragic events of September 11, 2001, this
decision demonstrates the shared resolve to work closely
together as equal partners in areas of common interest and to
stand together against common threats and risks to security.
The Committee Resolution of Ratification reiterates the
outlines of the consultation and defense-related cooperation as
set out in the NATO-Russia Council.
The Committee notes that while there was a tendency during
the last round of enlargement among opponents of NATO
enlargement to lay every problem in the U.S.-Russia
relationship--and every example of Russian misbehavior--at the
doorstep of NATO enlargement, there have been few such examples
during this round of enlargement. In the three years that
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have been NATO members,
there have been no aggressive moves toward Russia, and Russia
has seen that enlargement to Europe's east is not directed
against Moscow's interests. Yet there are some concerns that
the membership of the three Baltic states, which the Soviet
Union illegally annexed in 1940 and occupied for a half-
century, will bring new problems along NATO's eastern edge. It
is the view of the Committee that Russia should respect the
NATO membership of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and perhaps
even be motivated to improve relations with those countries.
The enlargement of NATO would secure its members against
domination by larger powers. Likewise, the ongoing development
of a constructive relationship between NATO and Russia, as
endorsed in the Committee Resolution of Ratification, may
provide an avenue for Russia to contribute to the security and
stability of Europe. The Committee notes that these goals are
fully consistent with the effort the Alliance and Moscow are
undertaking together to forge a new partnership through the
NATO-Russia Council, designed to ensure that Russia is
constructively and legitimately engaged in transatlantic
affairs.
VI. The Balkan Wars
In the last decade, NATO has been involved in major
peacemaking and peacekeeping roles in the Balkans. The
Alliance's first major involvement in operational peacekeeping
was in Bosnia and Herzegovina, beginning in December 1995 with
the Implementation Force (IFOR), and continuing from December
1996 through today where NATO leads a peacekeeping mission,
called the Stabilization Force (SFOR), that includes Partner
countries and Russian troops. In 1996, the United States
stationed about 16,500 troops in Bosnia, and roughly 6,000
support personnel in Croatia, Hungary, and Italy. All NATO
members contributed personnel, along with 18 non-NATO nations,
for a total of about 54,000 peacekeeping troops. Since that
time, the size of SFOR has been reduced to a force of about
12,000 troops. The Committee recognizes that Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia continue to
provide support for the SFOR operation. SFOR continues the
mission of monitoring and enforcing the military aspects of the
Dayton Peace accords--demilitarized zones and weapon
containment. SFOR has also made some efforts to detain war
crimes suspects, provide both logistical support for
internationally monitored elections, and to give limited
assistance for refugee resettlement.
To the south, NATO forms the core of the international
peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, called Kosovo Force (KFOR), in
which some 46,000 military personnel from 39 countries are
deployed. NATO intervened in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 to
halt a humanitarian catastrophe and restore stability in a
strategic region lying between Alliance member states. NATO
action was underway during the Alliance's 50th Anniversary
summit in Washington. The air campaign lasted 78 days during
which more than 38,000 sorties were flown without a single
Allied fatality. The Committee recognizes that Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia
continue to provide support for the KFOR operation.
VII. NATO Transformation
PRAGUE SUMMIT
At the November 2002 Prague summit, NATO Heads of State
committed the Alliance to transform NATO with new members, new
capabilities and new relationships with its partners. The
Alliance invited Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia to begin accession talks to join the
Alliance and considered the membership of these seven countries
as part of the Alliance's transforming role for the 21st
century. In its Prague Summit Declaration, NATO stated that the
Alliance will keep its door open ``to European democracies
willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations
of membership, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington
Treaty.'' The Committee commends the Administration's
commitment to NATO's open door, which President George W. Bush
articulated at his address to faculty and students of Warsaw
University on June 15, 2001:
All of Europe's new democracies, from the Baltic to
the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the
same chance for security and freedom--and the same
chance to join the institutions of Europe--as Europe's
old democracies have.
I believe in NATO membership for all of Europe's
democracies that seek it and are ready to share the
responsibilities that NATO brings. The question of
``when'' may still be up for debate within NATO; the
question of ``whether'' should not be. As we plan to
enlarge NATO, no nation should be used as a pawn in the
agendas of others. We will not trade away the fate of
free European peoples. No more Munichs. No more Yaltas.
Let us tell all those who have struggled to build
democracy and free markets what we have told the Poles:
from now on, what you build, you keep. No one can take
away your freedom or your country.
Next year, NATO's leaders will meet in Prague. The
United States will be prepared to make concrete,
historic decisions with its allies to advance NATO
enlargement. Poland and America share a vision. As we
plan the Prague Summit, we should not calculate how
little we can get away with, but how much we can do to
advance the cause of freedom.
The Alliance also defined part of its new mission as
combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, matched by pledges to obtain the military
capabilities to accomplish that mission. Recalling the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the Alliance's
subsequent decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty, the Alliance approved a comprehensive package of
measures, based on NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept, to strengthen
its ability to meet the challenges to the security of NATO
forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come.
The allies agreed to a communique that acknowledged in
principle the need to go ``out of area'' to fight terrorism and
proliferation and to develop more mobile combat capabilities.
In order to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO
decided to create a NATO Response Force (NRF) consisting of a
technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable
and sustainable force including land, sea and air elements
ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the
Council. NATO Heads of State also approved the Prague
Capabilities Commitment (PCC) as part of the continuing
Alliance effort to improve and develop new military
capabilities for modern warfare in a high threat environment.
In the view of the Committee, the NRF and PCC are vital
components to NATO continuing to play a viable role in
transatlantic security. The Alliance also endorsed the agreed
military concept for defense against terrorism, which is part
of a package of measures to strengthen NATO's capabilities in
this area. The Committee notes that the Prague summit helped to
reconfirm U.S.-European ties.
In the view of the Committee, the transformation of NATO to
meet new threats is at the center of its agenda. As U.S.
Ambassador to NATO R. Nicholas Burns stated in his testimony
before the Foreign Relations Committee on April 1, 2003:
If NATO's past were centered in countering the Soviet
threat to western Europe, its future must be devoted to
meeting the greatest security challenge of this
generation and that is the toxic mix of terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction far from Europe's shores.
NATO needs to pivot from an inward focus on Europe,
which was necessary and appropriate during the Cold
War, to an outward focus on the arc of countries where
most of the threats are today, in the Middle East and
Central Asia.
Ambassador Burns concluded that as NATO looks to the
future, the United States and its allies have major challenges
ahead. The Committee concurs with the six priorities for NATO
as defined Ambassador Burns' testimony before the Foreign
Relations Committee on April 8, 2003:
First, we need to strengthen NATO's role in meeting
threats outside of Europe, thus our wish that NAO play
a larger role, as I have said, in Afghanistan and in
Iraq post-conflict.
Second, we need to complete the transformation of the
military side of the alliance that we began at Prague--
and Senator Voinovich was there with us at the Prague
summit--a new command structure, NATO Response Force,
asking the European allies to do more, to spend more
and to spend more wisely to create a better and
stronger military capability.
Third, we will need to integrate these allies into
the alliance if the Senate gives its advice and
consent, and we need to keep our door open to future
enlargement in the years ahead as other European
countries seek membership and are capable of meeting
the obligations.
Fourth, Senator Lugar, you mentioned Russia. Russia,
Ukraine, and the countries of Central Asia are on the
front lines of the war against terrorism. We have new
NATO relationships with them and we have to give them
our full support.
Fifth, Senator Biden mentioned the issue of NATO and
the European Union. We have had some success. We now
have a new NATO-EU arrangement which allowed the EU to
take over yesterday NATO's peacekeeping mission in
Macedonia, which is a step forward, and we would like
to see the European Union continue to cooperate with
us, use NATO resources, not to build their own on their
own missions . . .
Our sixth priority should be to maintain our
commitments that we have got in Bosnia and in Kosovo.
They are still commitments we have to meet ant there is
still a transition that has not been completed.
WAR ON TERRORISM
The Committee commends the ambitious agenda NATO heads of
state set out at Prague, and in particular the recognition that
the Alliance must adapt and respond to the very ripe threats of
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, as clearly stated by
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for NATO and Europe Ian
Brzezinski on April 8, 2003. In reviewing the principles that
serve as the foundation for the Administration's support for
enlargement and more broadly the United States' relationship
with Europe, Secretary Brzezinski stated that:
The second principle is that the United States and
Europe exist in the same global security environment.
Before them lie the same opportunities, challenges, and
dangers. Of the latter, none is more urgent and lethal
than the nexus of weapons of mass destruction,
terrorist organizations, and terrorist states.
Cooperation with Europe is vital to the global endeavor
under way to disrupt and destroy terrorist
organizations, their leadership, their communications,
and their sources of financial and material support.
The Committee commends the Alliance's decision on September
12, 2001, to invoke Article 5, the mutual defense clause of
NATO's North Atlantic Treaty, in response to the terrorist
attacks of September 11 on the United States. This action
marked the first time that NATO has invoked Article 5. The war
in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, was not a NATO
operation but did use some NATO assets and was under U.S.
command. The peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, called the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), is also not a
NATO operation but NATO member states are taking leading roles
in the force, which is keeping the peace in Kabul. ISAF has a
U.N. mandate, but U.S. Central Command has ultimate authority
over operations. NATO will take over formal command of ISAF in
the second half of 2003. The United States is not contributing
troops to ISAF but is supplying lift and intelligence, despite
appeals from some allies and the interim Afghan government both
to provide forces and to expand ISAF beyond Kabul. The
Committee recognizes that Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia have contributed to the war in
Afghanistan and to ISAF.
Beginning in late 2002, the Alliance experienced sharp
division over whether to use military force against Iraq should
it fail to destroy stocks of weapons of mass destruction. In
January 2003, Bush Administration officials applauded the
decision of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia to sign a letter that endorsed the U.S.
position on Iraq. The Administration at the same time
criticized France, Germany and Belgium for blocking NATO
efforts to provide preliminary allied assistance to Turkey, in
the event of an attack by Iraq. The failure to achieve
consensus in the North Atlantic Council over how and whether to
aid Turkey in the event of an attack by Iraq exposed serious
divisions in the Alliance. But the Alliance persevered and
successfully moved the vote on Turkey assistance to be taken in
the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) at 18 (without France).
The Committee commends the Alliance for working through this
difficult period and supports NATO participation in post-war
reconstruction Iraq. All seven of the candidate countries have
indicated they would support NATO involvement in post-conflict
Iraq.
VIII. Senate Action
On March 26, 2003, in Brussels, Belgium, U.S. Ambassador to
NATO R. Nicholas Burns, on behalf of the United States, signed
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession
of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia. The Protocols were transmitted to the Senate and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on April 10,
2003.
The Committee held two public hearings in 1999; one public
hearing in 2000; one public hearing in 2001; one public hearing
in 2002; and five public hearings in 2003. Both Administration
and private sector witness appeared at these hearings.
April 21, 1999
NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit
Hon. Jon Kyl, U.S. Senator (R-AZ)
Hon. Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs
Hon. Franklin D. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
October 6, 1999
The Conduct of the NATO Air Campaign in Yugoslavia
Hon. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Counselor, Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Hon. William H. Taft, IV, Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson
Dr. Eliot Cohen, Professor and Director of Strategic Studies,
The School for Advanced International Studies, The
Johns Hopkins University
March 9, 2000
NATO and the EU's European Security and Defense Policy
Hon. Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs
Hon. Franklin D. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
Dr. Jeffrey Gedmin, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise
Institute; and Executive Director, The New Atlantic
Initiative
Dr. F. Stephen Larrabee, Senior Staff Member, the RAND
Corporation
Hon. Robert E. Hunter, Senior Advisor, the RAND Corporation
February 27, 2001
State of the NATO Alliance
Gen. Wesley K. Clark, USA (Ret.), Former Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR)
Dr. Jeffrey Gedmin, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise
Institute and Executive Director, New Atlantic
Initiative
Dr. Ronald D. Asmus, Senior Fellow, European Studies, Council
on Foreign Relations
May 1, 2002
The Future of NATO
Hon. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs
Hon. Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Gen. Wesley K. Clark, USA (Ret.), Former Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR)
Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, USA (Ret.), Former Director,
National Security Agency
March 27, 2003
NATO Enlargement: Qualifications & Contributions (Part I)
Robert Bradtke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe
and Eurasian Affairs
Janet Bogue, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and
Eurasian Affairs
Heather Conley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe
and Eurasian Affairs
Ian Brzezinski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Europe and NATO
April 1, 2003
NATO Enlargement
Hon. R. Nicholas Burns, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO
Dr. Ronald Asmus, Senior Transatlantic Fellow German Marshall
Fund
Mr. Bruce Jackson, President Project on Transitional
Democracies
April 3, 2003
NATO Enlargement: Qualifications & Contributions (Part II)
Dr. F. Stephen Larrabee, Senior Staff Member, the RAND
Corporation
Mr. Janusz Bugajski, Director, Eastern Europe Project, Center
for Strategic & International Studies
Dr. Jeff Simon, Senior Fellow, National Defense University
April 8, 2003
NATO Enlargement: New Members, New Missions and The Future of
NATO
Hon. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs
Gen. Wesley K. Clark, USA (Ret.), Former Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR)
Mr. William Kristol, Editor, The Weekly Standard and Chairman,
Project for the New American Century
April 29, 2003
The Enlarged NATO: Mending Fences and Moving Forward on Iraq
Hon. Colin Powell, Secretary of State
On October 24, 2001, Senator Jesse Helms introduced to the
Committee the Freedom Consolidation Act (S. 1572), which
reaffirms support for continued enlargement of the NATO;
designates Slovakia for participation in PfP and states that it
is eligible to receive certain security assistance under the
NATO Participation Act of 1994; and authorizes specified
amounts of security assistance for FY 2002 for Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. (an
identical bill, H.R. 3167, was introduced in the House on the
same day and passed on November 6, 2001). The Committee
reported out the legislation on December 12, 2001. Cosponsors
included Senators Durbin, Lieberman, Lott, Lugar and McCain.
Unfortunately, consideration and passage could not be completed
until the following year. The Senate took up S. 1572 again on
May 16, 2002, and passed it the next day by a vote of 85-6.
President Bush signed the bill into Public Law 107-187 on June
10, 2002.
On November 15, 2001, Senator Richard Lugar, ranking member
of the Foreign Relations Committee, co-chaired a study group
with Dr. Ronald D. Asmus, Senior Fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations, to provide a focal point for addressing NATO
issues that cut across Senate committee and Administration
jurisdictions to help bridge the gap between Capitol Hill and
the White House. The study group enjoyed the participation of
Senator Biden, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee;
Senator Levin, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee;
Senator Warner, Ranking Member of the Armed Services Committee;
and Senator Graham, Chairman of the Intelligence Committees,
and Administration officials from the State and Defense
Departments, as well as the National Security Council, and
former Administration officials. The group met six times:
October 20, 2001, November 15, 2001, April 10, 2001, September
10, 2001, December 10, 2001 and March 7, 2003.
Other than Foreign Relations Committee action, the Senate
Armed Services Committee since 1999 has held several hearings
on NATO enlargement.
At a markup on April 30, 2003, the Committee considered a
Resolution of Ratification including 9 declarations and 3
conditions. The Resolution was agreed to by a unanimous roll
call vote of 19-0 by all members of the Committee.
The conditions and declarations and the rationale for
approving them are as follows:
Declaration 1: Reaffirmation that Membership in NATO Remains a Vital
National Security Interest of the United States.
Declaration 1 reiterates that NATO membership is a vital
national security interest for the United States. For more than
fifty years, NATO has served as the preeminent organization to
defend the territory of the countries in the North Atlantic
area against all external threats. NATO prevailed in the task
of ensuring the survival of democratic governments throughout
the Cold War, NATO succeeded in maintaining the peace in
disputes among NATO members, and NATO has established a process
of cooperative planning that enhances the security of the
United States and its allies while distributing the financial
burden of defending the democracies of Europe and North America
among the Allies.
Declaration 2: Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement
Declaration 2 lays out the strategic rationale for the
inclusion of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia in NATO. NATO members have determined
that, consistent with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty,
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia are in a position to further the principles of the
North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area. This step has been taken with the
acknowledgment that, notwithstanding the collapse of communism
in most of Europe, NATO allies continue to face threats to
their stability and territorial integrity. These threats stem
from the possibility of the emergence of a hegemonic power in
or around Europe, resumed conflict caused by ethnic and
religious enmity, or the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and increased terrorist activity in or around
Europe. Extending NATO membership to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia will strengthen NATO
by extending the zone of security cooperation, serve as a
deterrent to potential aggressors, and advance the interests of
the United States and its NATO allies.
Declaration 3: Full Membership for New NATO Members
Declaration 3 emphasizes that, upon completion of the
accession process, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia will have all the rights,
privileges, obligations, responsibilities, and protections that
are afforded to all other NATO members. In particular, the
Committee would view unfavorably any legally binding
requirement arising from the adaptation talks of the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) that would have the
effect of constraining the ability of NATO to fulfill its
Article 5 guarantee to new member states. This provision also
endorses the political commitments made by NATO to the Russian
Federation in the NATO-Russia Council, including pursuing
cooperative anti-terrorism efforts, crisis management, non-
proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures,
theatre missile defense, search and rescue at sea, military-to-
military cooperation and defense reform, civil emergencies and
new threats and challenges. This provision emphasizes that the
NATO-Russia Council is not legally binding and cannot preclude
any decisions made by the North Atlantic Council or NATO's
Defense Planning Committee.
Declaration 4: The Importance of European Integration
Declaration 4 emphasizes the important role that other
European institutions such as the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, the European Union and the Council of
Europe must play in advancing the political, economic, and
social stability of Europe.
Declaration 5: Future Consideration of Candidates for Membership in
NATO
Declaration 5 declares that Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are the only
countries in Europe that have been invited to join NATO, and
that the consideration of future members in NATO provided for
under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty is subject to the
requirement for the Senate's advice and consent under Article
II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.
Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides for an open
door to the admission into NATO of other European countries
that are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty
and that can contribute to the security of the North Atlantic
area. The United States will not support any subsequent
invitation for admission to NATO if the prospective member
cannot fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of NATO
membership in a manner that serves the overall political and
strategic interests of the United States. The Senate emphasizes
that no state will be invited to become a member of NATO unless
the Executive Branch fulfills the Constitutional requirement
for seeking the advice of the Senate, a consensus decision to
proceed is reached in NATO, and ratification is achieved
according to the national procedures of each NATO member,
including the consent to ratification by the Senate.
Declaration 6: Partnership for Peace
Declaration 6 expresses the Senate's support for the
Partnership for Peace (PfP) between NATO members and the PfP
countries, which complements NATO in maintaining and enhancing
regional security. The Partnership also helps aspirant
countries improve their military force capabilities and
interoperability with NATO members.
Declaration 7: The NATO-Russia Council
Declaration 7 reiterates Russia's role under the NATO-
Russia Council, as well as the firewalls between the
deliberations of the North Atlantic Council and the NATO-Russia
Council, to preserve the integrity of decision-making and the
security of NATO. The Senate declares that the NATO-Russia
Council provides an important forum for strengthening peace and
security in the Euro-Atlantic area, and where appropriate, for
consensus building, consultations, joint decisions, and joint
actions.
The Senate states that any discussions will be for
explanatory, not decision-making purposes, and that these
discussions will not extend to a level of detail that could in
any way compromise the security of NATO. Within the NATO-Russia
Council, the members of NATO and Russia work as equal partners
in areas of common interest. But it is the understanding of the
Senate that no issue will be discussed in the NATO-Russia
Council until after NATO has reached consensus on its position.
The Senate explicitly states that under no circumstances will
the Russian Federation have a veto over NATO policy or any role
in NATO decision-making under the auspices of the NATO-Russia
Council.
Declaration 8: Compensation for Victims of the Holocaust and of
Communism
Declaration 8 declares that Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia have implemented
mechanisms for the compensation for property confiscated during
the Holocaust and the communist era, and have expressed their
openness and willingness to active dialogue, including with the
United States, and with non-governmental organizations, on
coming to grips with the past.
Declaration 9: Treaty Interpretation
The Foreign Relations Committee has taken pains to maintain
the constitutional role of the United States Senate in the
treaty-making process. To that end, the resolution of
ratification of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,
approved by the Senate on May 27, 1998, included an important
condition (1) that has been cited by reference in every
subsequent resolution of ratification of an arms control
treaty:
(A) the United States shall interpret a treaty in
accordance with the common understanding of the Treaty shared
by the President and the Senate at the time the Senate gave its
advice and consent to ratification;
(B) Such common understanding is based on:
(i) first, the text of the Treaty and the
provisions of this resolution of ratification; and
(ii) second, the authoritative representations
which were provided by the President and his
representatives to the Senate and its Committees, in
seeking Senate consent to ratification, insofar as such
representations were directed to the meaning and legal
effect of the text of the Treaty;
(C) the United States shall not agree to or adopt an
interpretation different from that common understanding except
pursuant to Senate advice and consent to a subsequent treaty or
protocol, or the enactment of a statute; and
(D) if, subsequent to ratification of the Treaty, a
question arises as to the interpretation of a provision of the
Treaty on which no common understanding was reached in
accordance with paragraph (B), that provision shall be
interpreted in accordance with applicable United States law.
In 1997, a similarly important condition was added to the
resolution of ratification of the Flank Document Agreement to
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which condition
has also been cited by reference in subsequent resolutions of
ratification for arms control treaties:
Nothing in condition (1) of the resolution of ratification
of the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1998,
shall be construed as authorizing the President to obtain
legislative approval for modifications or amendments to
treaties through majority approval of both Houses.
Each of these conditions applies to all treaties. For this
reason, the Senate has not needed to restate them as conditions
in subsequent resolutions of ratification. Rather, it has cited
them by reference in declarations of its intent, as Declaration
(1) does, so as to remind subsequent administrations of the
continuing obligations imposed by the Senate's treaty-making
role under the United States Constitution.
Condition 1: Cost, Benefits, Burden sharing, and Military Implications
of the Enlargement of NATO
Condition 1 requires the President to reaffirm
understandings on the cost, benefits, and military implications
of NATO enlargement. Prior to depositing the instrument of
ratification, the President is required to certify to the
Senate that the inclusion of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in NATO will not
increase the United States' overall percentage share of the
NATO common budget. Similarly, the President is required to
certify that the United States is under no obligation to
subsidize the national expenses necessary for Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to
meet those countries' NATO commitments, and that the membership
of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia in NATO will not detract in any way from the ability
of the United States to meet its military commitments outside
the North Atlantic area. This provision does not prohibit
voluntary assistance programs by the United States such as the
ongoing Warsaw Initiative.
Condition 1 further directs the President to submit an
annual report to the Senate during the three- year period
following the entry into force of the protocols. The report is
to include detailed information on the annual defense budgets
of all NATO members, their contributions to the common budget
and cost-sharing arrangements of NATO, and an itemization of
costs incurred by the United States in support of Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia
membership in NATO.
Condition 2: Reports on Intelligence Matters
Condition 2 requires the President to submit a report to
the Congressional intelligence committees on the progress of
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia for the protection of intelligence sources and
methods.
Condition 3: Accounting of Captured and Missing U.S. Personnel
Condition 3 requires the President to certify to Congress
that each of the governments of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia is fully cooperating
with United States efforts to obtain the fullest possible
accounting of captured and missing U.S. personnel from past
military conflicts or Cold War incidents.
IX. Resolution of Ratification
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein),
SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO DECLARATIONS AND
CONDITIONS.
The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the
Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession
of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia (as defined in section 4(6)), which were opened for
signature at Brussels on March 26, 2003, and signed on behalf
of the United States of America and other parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty, subject to the declarations of section 2 and
the conditions of section 3.
SEC. 2. DECLARATIONS.
The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the
Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession
of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia is subject to the following declarations:
(1) Reaffirmation that united states membership in
nato remains a vital national security interest of the
united states.--The Senate declares that--
(A) for more than 50 years the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) has served as the
preeminent organization to defend the countries
in the North Atlantic area against all external
threats;
(B) through common action, the established
democracies of North America and Europe that
were joined in NATO persevered and prevailed in
the task of ensuring the survival of democratic
government in Europe and North America
throughout the Cold War;
(C) NATO enhances the security of the United
States by embedding European states in a
process of cooperative security planning, by
preventing the destabilizing re-nationalization
of European military policies, and by ensuring
an ongoing and direct leadership role for the
United States in European security affairs;
(D) the responsibility and financial burden
of defending the democracies of Europe and
North America can be more equitably shared
through an alliance in which specific
obligations and force goals are met by its
members;
(E) the security and prosperity of the United
States is enhanced by NATO's collective defense
against aggression that may threaten the
security of NATO members;
(F) with the advice and consent of the United
States Senate, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech
Republic became members of NATO on March 12,
1999;
(G) on May 17, 2002, the Senate adopted the
Freedom Consolidation Act of 2001 (S. 1572 of
the 107th Congress), and President George W.
Bush signed that bill into law on June 10,
2002, which ``reaffirms support for continued
enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Alliance; designates
Slovakia for participation in the Partnership
for Peace and eligible to receive certain
security assistance under the NATO
Participation Act of 1994; [and] authorizes
specified amounts of security assistance for
[fiscal year] 2002 for Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and
Romania''; and
(H) United States membership in NATO remains
a vital national security interest of the
United States.
(2) Strategic rationale for nato enlargement.--The
Senate finds that--
(A) notwithstanding the collapse of communism
in most of Europe and the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, the United States and its NATO
allies face threats to their stability and
territorial integrity;
(B) an attack against Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, or
Slovenia, or their destabilization arising from
external subversion, would threaten the
stability of Europe and jeopardize vital United
States national security interests;
(C) Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, having
established democratic governments and having
demonstrated a willingness to meet all
requirements of membership, including those
necessary to contribute to the defense of all
NATO members, are in a position to further the
principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the North
Atlantic area; and
(D) extending NATO membership to Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia,
and Slovenia will strengthen NATO, enhance
security and stability in Central Europe, deter
potential aggressors, and advance the interests
of the United States and its NATO allies.
(3) Full membership for new nato members.--The Senate
understands that Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, in becoming NATO
members, will have all the rights, obligations,
responsibilities, and protections that are afforded to
all other NATO members.
(4) The importance of european integration.--
(A) Sense of the senate.--It is the sense of
the Senate that--
(i) the central purpose of NATO is to
provide for the collective defense of
its members;
(ii) the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe is an
institution for the promotion of
democracy, the rule of law, crisis
prevention, and post-conflict
rehabilitation and, as such, is an
essential forum for the discussion and
resolution of political disputes among
European members, Canada, and the
United States; and
(iii) the European Union is an
essential organization for the
economic, political, and social
integration of all qualified European
countries into an undivided Europe.
(B) Policy of the united states.--The policy
of the United States is--
(i) to utilize fully the institutions
of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe to reach
political solutions for disputes in
Europe; and
(ii) to encourage actively the
efforts of the European Union to
continue to expand its membership,
which will help to strengthen the
democracies of Central and Eastern
Europe.
(5) Future consideration of candidates for membership
in nato.--
(A) Senate findings.--The Senate finds that--
(i) Article 10 of the North Atlantic
Treaty provides that NATO members by
unanimous agreement may invite the
accession to the North Atlantic Treaty
of any other European state in a
position to further the principles of
the North Atlantic Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the North
Atlantic area;
(ii) in its Prague Summit Declaration
of November 21, 2002, NATO stated that
the Alliance--
(I)(aa) will keep its door
open ``to European democracies
willing and able to assume the
responsibilities and
obligations of membership, in
accordance with Article 10 of
the Washington Treaty'';
(bb) will keep under review
through the Membership Action
Plan (MAP) the progress of
those democracies, including
Albania, Croatia, and the
Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, that seek NATO
membership, and continue to use
the MAP as the vehicle to
measure progress in future
rounds of NATO enlargement;
(cc) will consider the MAP as
a means for those nations that
seek NATO membership to develop
military capabilities to enable
such nations to undertake
operations ranging from
peacekeeping to high-intensity
conflict, and help aspirant
countries achieve political
reform that includes
strengthened democratic
structures and progress in
curbing corruption;
(dd) concurs that Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia
have successfully used the MAP
to address issues important to
NATO membership; and
(ee) maintains that the
nations invited to join NATO at
the Prague Summit ``will not be
the last'';
(II)(aa) in response to the
terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001, and its subsequent
decision to invoke Article 5 of
the Washington Treaty, will
implement the approved
``comprehensive package of
measures, based on NATO's
Strategic Concept, to
strengthen our ability to meet
the challenges to the security
of our forces, populations and
territory, from wherever they
may come''; and
(bb) recognizes that the
governments of Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia
have successfully used the MAP
to address important issues and
have showed solidarity with the
United States after the
terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001;
(III) will create `` . . . a
NATO Response Force (NRF)
consisting of a technologically
advanced, flexible, deployable,
interoperable, and sustainable
force including land, sea, and
air elements ready to move
quickly to wherever needed, as
decided by the Council'';
(IV) will streamline its
``military command
arrangements'' for ``a leaner,
more efficient, effective, and
deployable command structure,
with a view to meeting the
operational requirements for
the full range of Alliance
missions'';
(V) will ``approve the Prague
Capabilities Commitment (PCC)
as part of the continuing
Alliance effort to improve and
develop new military
capabilities for modern warfare
in a high threat environment'';
and
(VI) will ``examine options
for addressing the increasing
missile threat to Alliance
territory, forces and
populations centres'' and
tackle the threat of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) by
enhancing the role of the WMD
Centre within the International
Staff;
(iii) as stated in the Prague Summit
Declaration, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia have ``demonstrated their
commitment to the basic principles and
values set out in the Washington
Treaty, the ability to contribute to
the Alliance's full range of missions
including collective defence, and a
firm commitment to contribute to
stability and security, especially in
regions of crisis and conflict'';
(iv) Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia have been acting as de facto
NATO allies through their contributions
and participation in peacekeeping
operations in the Balkans, Operation
Enduring Freedom, and the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF);
(v) Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia, together with Albania,
Croatia, and the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, issued joint
statements on November 21, 2002, and
February 5, 2003, expressing their
support for the international
community's efforts to disarm Iraq; and
(vi) the United States will not
support the accession to the North
Atlantic Treaty of, or the invitation
to begin accession talks with, any
European state (other than Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia), unless--
(I) the President consults
with the Senate consistent with
Article II, section 2, clause 2
of the Constitution of the
United States (relating to the
advice and consent of the
Senate to the making of
treaties); and
(II) the prospective NATO
member can fulfill the
obligations and
responsibilities of membership,
and the inclusion of such state
in NATO would serve the overall
political and strategic
interests of NATO and the
United States.
(B) Requirement for consensus and
ratification.--The Senate declares that no
action or agreement other than a consensus
decision by the full membership of NATO,
approved by the national procedures of each
NATO member, including, in the case of the
United States, the requirements of Article II,
section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the
United States (relating to the advice and
consent of the Senate to the making of
treaties), will constitute a commitment to
collective defense and consultations pursuant
to Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty.
(6) Partnership for peace.--The Senate declares
that--
(A)(i) the Partnership for Peace between NATO
members and the Partnership for Peace countries
is an important and enduring complement to NATO
in maintaining and enhancing regional security;
and
(ii) the Partnership for Peace has greatly
enhanced security and stability throughout the
Euro-Atlantic area, with Partnership for Peace
countries, especially countries that seek NATO
membership, and has encouraged them to
strengthen political dialogue with NATO allies
and to undertake all efforts to work with NATO
allies, as appropriate, in the planning,
conduct, and oversight of those activities and
projects in which they participate and to which
they contribute, including combating terrorism;
(B) the Partnership for Peace serves a
critical role in promoting common objectives of
NATO members and the Partnership for Peace
countries, including--
(i) increasing the transparency of
national defense planning and budgeting
processes;
(ii) ensuring democratic control of
defense forces;
(iii) maintaining the capability and
readiness of Partnership for Peace
countries to contribute to operations
of the United Nations and the
Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe;
(iv) developing cooperative military
relations with NATO;
(v) enhancing the interoperability
between forces of the Partnership for
Peace countries and forces of NATO
members; and
(vi) facilitating cooperation of NATO
members with countries from Central
Asia, the Caucasus, and eastern and
southeastern Europe.
(7) The nato-russia council.--The Senate declares
that--
(A) it is in the interest of the United
States for NATO to continue to develop a new
and constructive relationship with the Russian
Federation as the Russian Federation pursues
democratization, market reforms, and peaceful
relations with its neighbors; and
(B) the NATO-Russia Council, established by
the Heads of State and Government of NATO and
the Russian Federation on May 28, 2002, will--
(i) provide an important forum for
strengthening peace and security in the
Euro-Atlantic area, and where
appropriate for consensus building,
consultations, joint decisions, and
joint actions;
(ii) permit the members of NATO and
Russia to work as equal partners in
areas of common interest;
(iii) participate in joint decisions
and joint actions only after NATO
members have consulted, in advance,
among themselves about what degree any
issue should be subject to the NATO-
Russia Council;
(iv) not provide the Russian
Federation with a voice or veto in
NATO's decisions or freedom of action
through the North Atlantic Council, the
Defense Planning Committee, or the
Nuclear Planning Committee; and
(v) not provide the Russian
Federation with a veto over NATO
policy.
(8) Compensation for victims of the holocaust and of
communism.--The Senate finds that--
(A) individuals and communal entities whose
property was seized during the Holocaust or the
communist period should receive appropriate
compensations;
(B) Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have put in
place publicly declared mechanisms for
compensation for property confiscated during
the Holocaust and the communist era, including
the passage of statutes, and for the opening of
archives and public reckoning with the past;
(C) Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have each
adjudicated and resolved numerous specific
claims for compensation for property
confiscated during the Holocaust or the
communist era over the past several years;
(D) Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have each
established active historical commissions or
other bodies to study and report on their
government's and society's role in the
Holocaust or the communist era; and
(E) the governments of Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia have made clear their openness to
active dialogue with other governments,
including the United States Government, and
with nongovernmental organizations, on coming
to grips with the past.
(9) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate reaffirms
condition (8) of the resolution of ratification of the
Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of
November 19, 1990 (adopted at Vienna on May 31, 1996),
approved by the Senate on May 14, 1997, relating to
condition (1) of the resolution of ratification of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty approved
by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
SEC. 3. CONDITIONS.
The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the
Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia is subject to the following conditions,
which shall be binding upon the President:
(1) Costs, benefits, burden-sharing, and military
implications of the enlargement of nato.--
(A) Presidential certification.--Prior to the
deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall certify to
the Senate that--
(i) the inclusion of Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia in NATO will not
have the effect of increasing the
overall percentage share of the United
States in the common budgets of NATO;
and
(ii) the inclusion of Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia in NATO does not
detract from the ability of the United
States to meet or to fund its military
requirements outside the North Atlantic
area.
(B) Annual reports.--Not later than April 1
of each year during the 3-year period following
the date of entry into force of the Protocols
to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the
Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, the
President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report, which may be
submitted in an unclassified and classified
form, and which shall contain the following
information:
(i) The amount contributed to the
common budgets of NATO by each NATO
member during the preceding calendar
year.
(ii) The proportional share assigned
to, and paid by, each NATO member under
NATO's cost-sharing arrangements.
(iii) The national defense budget of
each NATO member, the steps taken by
each NATO member to meet NATO force
goals, and the adequacy of the national
defense budget of each NATO member in
meeting common defense and security
obligations.
(C) Reports on future enlargement of nato.--
(i) Reports prior to commencement of
accession talks.-- Prior to any
decision by the North Atlantic Council
to invite any country (other than
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) to
begin accession talks with NATO, the
President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a
detailed report regarding each country
being actively considered for NATO
membership, including--
(I) an evaluation of how that
country will further the
principles of the North
Atlantic Treaty and contribute
to the security of the North
Atlantic area;
(II) an evaluation of the
eligibility of that country for
membership based on the
principles and criteria
identified by NATO and the
United States, including the
military readiness of that
country;
(III) an explanation of how
an invitation to that country
would affect the national
security interests of the
United States;
(IV) a United States
Government analysis of the
common-funded military
requirements and costs
associated with integrating
that country into NATO, and an
analysis of the shares of those
costs to be borne by NATO
members, including the United
States; and
(V) a preliminary analysis of
the implications for the United
States defense budget and other
United States budgets of
integrating that country into
NATO.
(ii) Updated reports prior to signing
protocols of accession.--Prior to the
signing of any protocol to the North
Atlantic Treaty on the accession of any
country, the President shall submit to
the appropriate congressional
committees a report, in classified and
unclassified forms--
(I) updating the information
contained in the report
required under clause (i) with
respect to that country; and
(II) including an analysis of
that country's ability to meet
the full range of the financial
burdens of NATO membership, and
the likely impact upon the
military effectiveness of NATO
of the country invited for
accession talks, if the country
were to be admitted to NATO.
(D) Review and reports by the general
accounting office.-- The Comptroller General of
the United States shall conduct a review and
assessment of the evaluations and analyses
contained in all reports submitted under
subparagraph (C) and, not later than 90 days
after the date of submission of any report
under subparagraph (C)(ii), shall submit a
report to the appropriate congressional
committees setting forth the assessment
resulting from that review.
(2) Reports on intelligence matters.--
(A) Progress report.--Not later than January
1, 2004, the President shall submit a report to
the congressional intelligence committees on
the progress of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in
satisfying the security sector and security
vetting requirements for membership in NATO.
(B) Reports regarding protection of
intelligence sources and methods.--Not later
than January 1, 2004, and again not later than
the date that is 90 days after the date of
accession to the North Atlantic Treaty by
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia, the Director of Central
Intelligence shall submit a detailed report to
the congressional intelligence committees--
(i) identifying the latest procedures
and requirements established by
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia for the
protection of intelligence sources and
methods; and
(ii) including an assessment of how
the overall procedures and requirements
of such countries for the protection of
intelligence sources and methods
compare with the procedures and
requirements of other NATO members for
the protection of intelligence sources
and methods.
(C) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
(i) Congressional intelligence
committees.--The term ``congressional
intelligence committees'' means the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives.
(ii) Date of accession to the north
atlantic treaty by bulgaria, estonia,
latvia, lithuania, romania, slovakia,
and slovenia.--The term ``date of
accession to the North Atlantic Treaty
by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia'' means the latest of the
following dates:
(I) The date on which
Bulgaria accedes to the North
Atlantic Treaty.
(II) The date on which
Estonia accedes to the North
Atlantic Treaty.
(III) The date on which
Latvia accedes to the North
Atlantic Treaty.
(IV) The date on which
Lithuania accedes to the North
Atlantic Treaty.
(V) The date on which Romania
accedes to the North Atlantic
Treaty.
(VI) The date on which
Slovakia accedes to the North
Atlantic Treaty.
(VII) The date on which
Slovenia accedes to the North
Atlantic Treaty.
(3) Requirement of full cooperation with united
states efforts to obtain the fullest possible
accounting of captured and missing united states
personnel from past military conflicts or cold war
incidents.--Prior to the deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification, the President shall certify
to Congress that each of the governments of Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia are fully cooperating with United States
efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting of
captured or missing United States personnel from past
military conflicts or Cold War incidents, to include--
(A) facilitating full access to relevant
archival material; and
(B) identifying individuals who may possess
knowledge relative to captured or missing
United States personnel, and encouraging such
individuals to speak with United States
Government officials.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this resolution:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the
Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed
Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate and the Committee on International Relations,
the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) NATO.--The term ``NATO'' means the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.
(3) NATO members.--The term ``NATO members'' means
all countries that are parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty.
(4) North atlantic area.--The term ``North Atlantic
area'' means the area covered by Article 6 of the North
Atlantic Treaty, as applied by the North Atlantic
Council.
(5) North atlantic treaty.--The term ``North Atlantic
Treaty'' means the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at
Washington on April 4, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964),
as amended.
(6) Protocols to the north atlantic treaty of 1949 on
the accession of bulgaria, estonia, latvia, lithuania,
romania, slovakia, and slovenia.--The term ``Protocols
to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession
of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia'' refers to the following
protocols transmitted by the President to the Senate on
April 10, 2003 (Treaty Document No. 108-4):
(A) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty
on the Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria,
signed at Brussels on March 26, 2003.
(B) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty
on the Accession of the Republic of Estonia,
signed at Brussels on March 26, 2003.
(C) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty
on the Accession of the Republic of Latvia,
signed at Brussels on March 26, 2003.
(D) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty
on the Accession of the Republic of Lithuania,
signed at Brussels on March 26, 2003.
(E) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty
on the Accession of the Republic of Romania,
signed at Brussels on March 26, 2003.
(F) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty
on the Accession of the Republic of Slovakia,
signed at Brussels on March 26, 2003.
(G) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty
on the Accession of the Republic of Slovenia,
signed at Brussels on March 26, 2003.
(7) United states instrument of ratification.--The
term ``United States instrument of ratification'' means
the instrument of ratification of the United States of
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on
the Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
(8) Washington treaty.--The term ``Washington
Treaty'' means the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at
Washington on April 4, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964),
as amended.
X. Letter From Senate Armed Services Committee
United States Senate,
Armed Services Committee,
April 30, 2003.
Honorable Richard G. Lugar, Chairman
Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Lugar and Senator Biden:
Traditionally, the Senate Armed Services Committee has
provided to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee its views on
the military implications of national security treaties. We are
writing to express our views concerning the military
implications of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of
1949 on Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
While we support the enlargement of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) to include Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, we note that
NATO is still in the process of defining its future role and
mission in an international security environment which is very
different from that which existed when NATO was founded in
1949. We are concerned about how NATO will evolve and continue
to function as an effective military organization in the
future, and what the effect will be of further enlargement as
NATO continues to adapt to a changing security environment.
Therefore, we would like to suggest some items for inclusion in
the resolution of ratification regarding these Protocols to
address our concerns.
The Senate Armed Services Committee has a long tradition of
strong support for the NATO alliance, and has played an
important role in the Senate's consideration of the North
Atlantic Treaty and its subsequent amendments. In March and
April 2003, the Armed Services Committee conducted two hearings
on the future of NATO and on NATO enlargement. The
Administration witnesses at these hearings have direct
responsibility for national security issues and policies
related to NATO and its proposed enlargement. These witnesses
included Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz; Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace,
USMC; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander, U.S.
European Command, General James L. Jones, Jr., USMC; Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc I. Grossman; and
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith.
The witnesses at the Armed Services Committee hearings
unanimously supported ratification of the Protocols to the
North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
According to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz in testimony before the
Committee on April 10, 2003, ``As we look to the future of
NATO, we might see its further enlargement in terms of two
imperatives: moral and strategic. The moral imperative calls us
to help new democracies, formerly subjected to the yoke of
tyranny, consolidate and secure their own freedom and
sovereignty. The strategic imperatives suggest that a united
Europe of common values will help avoid the major wars as
experienced in the 20th Century. A united Europe will be a
better partner to the United States in dealing with world
affairs. A united Europe will provide a context of security
that will encourage reform in Ukraine and Russia. A Europe so
united is revitalized by nations who've recently thrown off the
yoke of authoritarianism by their fresh commitment to freedom
and democracy through NATO's responsibilities. And further
enlargement of NATO remains based on sound reform of any
aspiring nation--including military reforms of national
strategy, secure communications systems, upgrading airfields
and ports to NATO standards, improved training, logistical
support, personnel, and military spending at a minimum level of
2% of gross domestic product.''
While recognizing the moral and strategic imperatives
stated by Secretary Wolfowitz, we note that NATO remains, first
and foremost, a military alliance--the most successful military
alliance in history. NATO's enlargement by seven additional
nations--the largest enlargement in Alliance history--could
have dramatic implications for NATO's ability to function as an
effective military organization.
Today, the threats to NATO member nations do not come from
NATO's periphery. There is no Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact. The
threats--such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction--are transnational in nature, and they emanate
from regions outside of Europe. This was recognized in the
Strategic Concept adopted at the 50th Anniversary Summit held
in Washington in 1999. The Strategic Concept envisioned ``out
of area'' operations for NATO and specifically noted the
emergence of non-traditional threats, including terrorism and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
To remain a viable military alliance, NATO must remain
relevant to these current threats. More than a decade after the
fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO remains an organization in
transition. NATO faces political and technical challenges as it
seeks to define its role for the future and simultaneously
expand its membership.
Although NATO faces very different threats today than it
did in the past, we are mindful that the admission of seven
additional nations into NATO would mean that the United States
has made the commitment to treat an armed attack on any one of
these seven as an attack on the United States--as called for by
Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. This is a solemn commitment that
we must not undertake lightly.
At the Armed Services Committee hearings, Committee Members
examined a number of key questions. First, will these seven
nations enhance the military effectiveness of the alliance? How
would their entry into NATO affect the growing ``capabilities
gap'' between the United States and many of the other NATO
members that NATO has been facing for years? Second, should
NATO consider changing its operating procedures so that it is
not, in all cases, bound to act by consensus? Third, does NATO
need a process for suspending the membership of a nation that
is no longer committed to upholding NATO's basic principles and
values?
The witnesses who appeared before our Committee testified
to the efforts NATO is making to address the continuing problem
of a capabilities and technology gap between the United States
and many alliance members. The witnesses pointed to the
decisions taken by NATO's leaders at the Prague Summit in
November, 2002, to launch the Prague Capabilities Commitment
and to create a NATO Response Force. Through the Prague
Capabilities Commitment, NATO members agreed to spend smarter,
pool their resources and pursue ``niche'' specializations. For
example, Germany is leading a 10-nation consortium to acquire
more airlift. The Netherlands is taking the lead on acquiring
precision-guided missiles and smart bombs.
The NATO Response Force is intended to enhance NATO's
ability to undertake out-of-area military operations with
capabilities relevant to today's threats. The Response Force is
envisioned to be a highly-ready force of approximately 25,000
troops with land, sea and air capability, deployable on short
notice and able to carry out missions anywhere in the world.
General James Jones, USMC, stated in testimony before the
Committee on April 10, 2003, ``I believe that it is quite
possible that within a very short period of time that the NATO
Response Force will become a transformational capability that
will finally take the Cold War force that NATO is and has been,
composed of 2.3 million people under arms with a vast array of
legacy systems that are in dire need of transformation and
modernization, to become a more capable force that will be more
useful to respond to the array of asymmetric threats that not
only face the United States, but face all freedom-loving people
who comprise the alliance.'' We share the view of our witnesses
that NATO members must fulfill their commitments with respect
to the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the NATO Response
Force.
Regarding the military capabilities of the prospective new
members, we note the testimony of our witnesses that each
prospective member is engaged in a process of military reform,
upgrading its secure communication systems and facilities to
NATO standards, improving training, logistical support, and
personnel capabilities, and establishing military spending at a
minimum level of 2 percent of gross domestic product. In
addition, prospective members, similar to some current members,
are being encouraged to focus on specific ``niche''
capabilities where they can achieve a high level of expertise
and procure high quality equipment to make a substantial
contribution to NATO's military capabilities overall. Some
invitees already possess specialized capabilities that have
served the alliance in the Balkan operations and in the global
war on terrorism, including: special forces; nuclear,
biological, and chemical defense; mountain fighting; and
demining. Each of the seven invitees has provided direct
military support for the global war on terrorism, acting as de
facto allies by contributing transit and basing privileges,
military and police forces, medical units, transport support to
U.S. and coalition efforts, and/or overflight rights. Many of
the invitees have participated in the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and contributed
actively to NATO efforts to stabilize the Balkans.
Two other issues that dominated the Committee's recent
hearings on NATO were the so-called ``consensus rule'' by which
NATO operates, and the question of whether NATO needs a process
for suspending the membership of a nation that is no longer
committed to upholding NATO's basic principles. With respect to
the consensus rule, the recent divisive debate over planning
for the defense of Turkey in the event of war with Iraq
demonstrated that achieving consensus in NATO has become more
difficult. Agreement was reached only by moving the discussion
out of NATO's political body (the North Atlantic Council, or
NAC) and into its Defense Planning Committee (DPC), in which
France does not participate. Another example of this problem
occurred with respect to NATO operations in Kosovo, when
``command by committee'' hampered NATO's military leaders'
ability to wage the most effective, rapidly responsive military
campaign. Target lists, weapons used, and forces deployed were
all subject to prior approval by all NATO governments. This
slowed decision-making and constrained operations. Such
difficulties in reaching consensus are occurring in part
because respective NATO members have different views about
today's threats and how best to respond to them. Achieving
consensus is likely to become even more complex as NATO
enlarges its membership. This consensus rule must be reexamined
to ensure that NATO will remain an effective military
organization.
Regarding the issue of a suspension mechanism, some
Committee members are concerned about the lack of a mechanism
to suspend a NATO member if a member no longer complies with
the fundamental tenets of NATO--democracy, individual liberty
and the rule of law. This issued was examined at the
Committee's recent NATO hearings.
We have received a letter from Under Secretary of State
Marc Grossman dated April 21, 2003, indicating that, as a
result of the questions raised at our Committee's hearings,
U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns raised the matters of
the consensus rule and an expulsion mechanism with our NATO
allies and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson on April 8,
2003. Secretary Grossman's letter stated that there was no
support from NATO members for amending the Treaty on either the
consensus rule or the question of expulsion. In this letter,
Secretary Grossman underscored his belief, shared by Ambassador
Burns, that the consensus rule works more in the U.S. favor
than against it, and that compromise and persuasion, and use of
the Defense Planning Committee, remain effective tools to
enable NATO action today. The letter also asserted that NATO
has ways other than expulsion to deal effectively with allies
that ``go bad,'' for instance by isolating them or excluding
them from sensitive NATO discussions. The matters were raised
only informally so far and given the tremendous interest and
lingering concerns about these two subjects expressed by
virtually all of our Committee's members, we recommend the
inclusion of the following conditions, which would require two
reports, in the resolution of ratification for these Protocols:
Begin text of proposed conditions:
The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the
Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia is subject to the following conditions,
which shall be binding upon the President:
(1) Report: Appropriate officials of the executive
branch of government shall place on the agenda of the
North Atlantic Council the issue of the consensus rule;
and
Not later than 180 days after the date of adoption of
this resolution, the President shall submit to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives a report that: (1) describes the steps
the United States has taken to place the issue
described above on the agenda of the North Atlantic
Council; (2) describes the views of the President as
communicated by his representatives at the North
Atlantic Council on this issue; and (3) characterizes
the discussion of this issue in the North Atlantic
Council, including any decisions taken to modify the
consensus rule, or consider this issue further. The
report shall also address methods of streamlining
NATO's decision-making processes for conducting
military campaigns.
(2) Report: Appropriate officials of the executive
branch of government shall place on the agenda of the
North Atlantic Council the issue of establishing a
process for suspending the membership of a nation that
is no longer upholding NATO principles; and
Not later than 180 days after the date of adoption of
this resolution, the President shall submit to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives a report that: (1) describes the steps
the United States has taken to place the issue
described above on the agenda of the North Atlantic
Council; (2) describes the views of the President as
communicated by his representatives at the North
Atlantic Council on this issue; and (3) characterizes
the discussion of this issue in the North Atlantic
Council, including any decisions taken to establish a
process for suspending membership, or to consider this
issue further.
End text of proposed conditions.
Finally, with respect to the anticipated costs to the
United States associated with this proposed round of NATO
enlargement, we note the Administration's estimate that, over
ten years, U.S. NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) costs
will increase by $574 million, and U.S. NATO military budget
costs will increase by $10 million. An estimate for the U.S.
NATO civil budget costs is not currently available. The
Committee has a long-standing concern about the costs of any
proposed enlargement of NATO, and about how the military and
financial burdens are shared among the NATO members. Condition
2 (B) of the April 30, 1998, resolution of ratification of the
Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on accession of
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, contains an annual
reporting requirement pertaining to the costs, benefits,
burdensharing and military implications of the enlargement of
NATO. We recommend that a similar reporting requirement be
included in the resolution of ratification for this proposed
round of NATO enlargement.
Based on the hearings conducted by the Senate Armed
Services Committee, and subsequent analysis, we believe the
Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia advance the national security interests of the United
States and deserve the Senate's support. We ask your
consideration of our recommendations as you draft the
resolution of ratification for these Protocols, and ask that
this letter be included in the official report of your
Committee's consideration of these Protocols. We appreciate the
opportunity to share our views with you.
Sincerely,
John Warner, Chairman.
Carl Levin, Ranking Member.
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