[Senate Report 109-288]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 527
109th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 109-288
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UNITED STATES-INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION AND U.S.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION ACT
__________
R E P O R T
of the
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
[to accompany s. 3709]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
July 20, 2006, Ordered to be printed
_____
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON: 2006
28-789
UNITED STATES-INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION AND
U.S. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION ACT
Calendar No. 527
109th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 109-288
======================================================================
UNITED STATES-INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY
COOPERATION AND U.S. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
IMPLEMENTATION ACT
_______
July 20, 2006.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Lugar, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
submitted the following
REPORT
[To accompany S. 3709]
The Committee on Foreign Relations, having had under
consideration an original bill (S. 3709) to exempt from certain
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, United States
exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to
India, and to implement the United States Additional Protocol,
reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
II. Committee Action................................................12
III. Summary of Legislation..........................................14
IV. Cost Estimate...................................................44
V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact.................................44
VI. Changes in Existing Law.........................................47
VII. Annex: Additional Documents and Information.....................51
I. Purpose and Summary
The United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation
Act would exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 USC 2011 et seq.), exports of nuclear material,
equipment and technology from the United States, and reexports
of such U.S.-origin items, to India. Such items have not been
transferred to India by the United States since India's
detonation of a nuclear explosive device in the 1970s and the
subsequent decision by the United States to cease nuclear
cooperation with India.
On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh of India issued a Joint Statement. The Joint
Statement covered a range of issues and common interests
between the two leaders and their nations, and in it both
leaders also committed to re-establishing civil nuclear
commerce between the United States and India, and between other
nations of the world and India, if India completed a set of
steps that would result in greater adherence to the global
nonproliferation regime of multilateral export control groups
and treaties. President Bush committed that he would ``work to
achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as it
realizes its goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving
energy security'' and to ``seek agreement from Congress to
adjust U.S. laws and policies'' to permit that cooperation.\1\
President Bush also promised to ``work with friends and allies
to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear
energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not
limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for
safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.''\2\
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\1\Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/
20040921-18.html. The full text is reproduced in the annex to this
report.
\2\Ibid.
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Prime Minister Singh also made commitments on the part of
India:
The Prime Minister conveyed that for his part, India would
reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same
responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits
and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear
technology, such as the United States. These responsibilities
and practices consist of identifying and separating civilian
and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner
and filing a declaration regarding its civilian facilities with
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a
decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional
Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities;
continuing India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing;
working with the United States for the conclusion of a
multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from
transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states
that do not have them and supporting international efforts to
limit their spread; and ensuring that the necessary steps have
been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through
comprehensive export control legislation and through
harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.\3\
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\3\Ibid.
Strategic Rationale:
The India agreement is perhaps the most important strategic
diplomatic initiative undertaken by this administration, and it
represents a fundamental departure from the crisis management
mentality that has dominated foreign policy in recent years. By
concluding this pact and the far-reaching set of cooperative
agreements that accompany it, the President has embraced a
long-term outlook that seeks to strengthen our foreign policy
in a way that will give us new diplomatic options and improve
global stability. With this agreement, the administration is
asking Congress to see the opportunities that lie beyond the
horizon of the current presidential term.
The committee studied carefully the implications of the
nuclear pact on non-proliferation policy. It was concerned
about the precedent set by this action, and worked to ensure
that this agreement does not undercut U.S. compliance with its
responsibilities under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The committee believes that its bill achieves a proper balance
and will help solidify New Delhi's commitments to implement
strong export controls, separate its civilian nuclear
infrastructure from its weapons program, and place civilian
facilities under IAEA safeguards. This agreement also would be
a powerful incentive for India to cooperate closely with the
United States in stopping proliferation and to abstain from
further nuclear weapons tests.
The administration's declaration that we would welcome
India's advancement as a major economic and political player on
the world stage represents a strategic decision to invest
political capital in a country with a vibrant democracy,
rapidly growing economy, and increasing clout. With a well-
educated middle class that is larger than the entire U.S.
population, India can be an anchor of stability in Asia and an
engine of global economic growth.
It can also be a key partner in countering global extremist
trends. Both the United States and India understand the
importance of opposing violent movements through the promotion
of religious pluralism, tolerance, and democratic freedoms. As
a country with well-entrenched democratic traditions and the
world's second largest Muslim population, India can set an
example of a multi-religious and multi-cultural democracy in an
otherwise volatile region.
India is already assuming a new role in world affairs. Its
votes at the IAEA on the Iran issue in September 2005 and
February 2006 demonstrate that New Delhi is able and willing to
adopt a more constructive role on international non-
proliferation issues. India continues to prize its strategic
autonomy, but this agreement will give it increasing incentives
to use its influence to bring about international stability and
global economic progress.
Historical Background:
The committee notes that the administration had, even
before the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement, already significantly
revised certain U.S. laws and policies regarding sensitive
technology exports to India. Under the ``Next Steps in
Strategic Partnership'' (NSSP), a substantial number of changes
to the Export Administration Regulations (the EAR, 15 CFR 730-
744) were made for India. The NSSP began with the November 2001
statements between President Bush and then-Indian Prime
Minister Vajpayee and was formally announced in a statement by
President Bush on January 12, 2004.\4\ The NSSP apparently
culminated in the July 18, 2005 Joint statement. The items that
have had new treatment extended to them in respect of their
export to India from the United States have included
technologies in sensitive areas such as space launch, advanced
computing, and information on certain missile defense systems.
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\4\Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/
20040112-1.html.
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In September 2004, and again in each of August and December
2005, the administration substantially revised the EAR for
exports of certain items to India, including the export or
reexport of nuclear items which were unilaterally controlled by
the United States for proliferation reasons. These were
restricted to the ``balance of plant'' portions of facilities
in India already under IAEA safeguards. These amended rules
also removed several Indian entities from the Commerce
Department's Entities List.\5\ The amended regulations,
however, did not affect items that were and are subject to NSG
controls.
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\5\Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 to the EAR (15 C.F.R. Part 744,
Supp. No. 4).
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Thus, by early 2006, the administration had made a number
of changes to U.S. regulations and policies for India. But
those changes had brought the United States to the end of what
could be done unilaterally. Additional changes to U.S. law
would violate international controls, in particular those of
the NSG. For any additional changes, particularly in respect of
exports of nuclear materials, equipment and sensitive nuclear
technology to India, agreement would be needed among the
members of the NSG to permit such trade with India.
Since the enactment of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of
1978 (NNPA), it has been a requirement of U.S. law that, to
continue nuclear supply to a non-nuclear weapon state (i.e.,
any state other than the five nuclear weapon states recognized
by the NPT), ``IAEA safeguards be maintained with respect to
all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within
the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried
out under its control anywhere.''\6\ This requirement, known as
the ``full-scope safeguards'' provision, was also subsequently
incorporated into the ``Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines'' at a
meeting of the NSG in Warsaw, Poland, on April 3, 1992.\7\ The
committee notes that this requirement was achieved largely
through the direct efforts of the United States. Under
Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Reginald
Bartholomew testified before the Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations of the House Appropriations Committee on April 8,
1992 that:
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\6\At section 123.a(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 USC
2153.a(2)).
\7\``Press Statement of the Nuclear Suppliers Meeting,'' Warsaw.
Poland, April 3, 1992, available at http://
www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/PRESS/1992-Press.pdf, hereinafter
``Warsaw NSG Statement.'' The specific requirement rests at paragraph
4(a) of the NSG Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/
Part I, and states that ``Suppliers should transfer trigger list items
or related technology to a non-nuclear-weapon State only when the
receiving State has brought into force an agreement with the IAEA
requiring the application of safeguards on all source and special
fissionable material in its current and future peaceful activities.''
There has been significant progress over the past couple of
years on a key nuclear export policy long supported by the
U.S., i.e., requiring full-scope IAEA safeguards in non-
nuclear-weapons states as a condition for any significant, new
nuclear supply commitment. All 27 members of the Nuclear
Suppliers Agreement issued a statement calling for full-scope
safeguards as a condition of significant nuclear supply.\8\
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\8\``Text of Statement Prepared for Delivery by Reginald
Bartholomew, Under Secretary for International Security Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of
the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC,'' April 8, 1992,
available on LexisNexis, hereinafter, ``Bartholomew Statement.''
The committee notes that another important U.S. goal was
achieved at the 1992 Warsaw meeting, as well. In ``recognition
of the growing problems posed by the potential use of nuclear-
related dual-use materials, equipment and technology in un-
safeguarded nuclear programs or in nuclear weapons programs,''
the NSG decided to adopt ``a comprehensive arrangement to
control these items. . . . which consist[ed] of a set of
guidelines and a list of some 65 items to be controlled . . .
[which where] incorporated into the Nuclear Suppliers
Guidelines.''\9\ The committee believes that the achievements
of the United States at the 1992 Warsaw NSG meeting were
substantial. They increased the strength of international
nuclear export controls and extended to the international
community the controls already embodied in U.S. law. The
committee notes that the NSG has since grown to include more
than 40 Participating Governments,\10\ making the scope of its
controls even more important. In addition, after enactment of
the requirement for full-scope safeguards in U.S. law, many
other countries specified this requirement in their own
bilateral agreements and laws regarding international
cooperation in atomic energy.
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\9\Warsaw NSG Statement.
\10\The current Participating Governments are: Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, the
Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the
Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, at http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/member.htm.
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The requirement for full-scope safeguards in the NSG arose
out of the 1990 Review Conference on the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which made important
recommendations in respect of Article III of the NPT (which
requires all non-nuclear weapon States Parties to accept IAEA
safeguards and verification activities ``with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices),''\11\ one
of which was ``That nuclear supplier States require, as a
necessary condition for the transfer of relevant nuclear
supplies to non-nuclear weapon States, the acceptance of IAEA
safeguards on all their current and future nuclear activities
(i.e. full-scope safeguards or comprehensive safeguards).''\12\
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\11\Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at
Washington, London and Moscow, July 1, 1968, and entered into force
March 5, 1970 (21 USC 483) and in IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRC)
140, at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/
infcirc140.pdf.
\12\``Communication of 10 May 2005 received from the Government of
Sweden on behalf of the participating Government of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group,'' The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origins, Roles and
Activities, IAEA INFCIRC/539/Rev.3, 30 May 2005, available at http://
www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/PDF/infcirc539r3.pdf.
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Existing U.S. Law:
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2153)
requires an agreement for cooperation as a prerequisite for
significant nuclear exports. The State Department, with the
advice of the Department of Energy, negotiates such agreements,
which spell out the terms, conditions, duration, nature, and
scope of cooperation. The NNPA added a set of nine criteria to
section 123 a. of the Atomic Energy Act (42 USC 2153(a)) which
agreements for cooperation (called ``peaceful nuclear
cooperation agreements'' and expected to meet.
These include guarantees that: (1) safeguards on nuclear
material and equipment transferred continue in perpetuity; (2)
full-scope safeguards are applied in non-nuclear weapon states;
(3) nothing transferred is used for any nuclear explosive
device or for any other military purpose; (4) the United States
has the right to seek the return of exported items if the
cooperating state detonates a nuclear explosive device or
terminates or abrogates an IAEA safeguards agreement; (5) there
is no transfer of material or classified data without U.S.
consent; (6) physical security is maintained; (7) no enrichment
or reprocessing of United States-origin nuclear materials and
fuel may be done without prior U.S. approval; (8) storage must
first be approved by the United States for plutonium and highly
enriched uranium; and (9) anything subsequently produced
through cooperation is subject to all of the above
requirements.
If an agreement does not meet one or more of the
requirements of Section 123 a., then the President presents the
agreement to Congress as exempt from those requirements. Such
an agreement cannot enter into force unless Congress passes a
joint resolution of approval. In a case in which such an
agreement was exempted because the recipient non-nuclear weapon
state did not have full-scope safeguards, Congress could review
one export license annually, and could, by enacting a
resolution of disapproval, terminate exports for the remainder
of that Congress under provisions of Section 128 (42 USC 2157).
The United States currently has about two dozen 123
agreements in force. A Section 123 agreement is presented to
Congress, whereupon it is reviewed for 90 days of continuous
session. If it meets all 9 criteria in Section 123 and Congress
does not enact a resolution of disapproval of the agreement,
the agreement enters into force. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) reviews licenses for nuclear exports\13\
according to the criteria of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). If
met, licenses are authorized, and if not, the President may
authorize exports by executive order.\14\
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\13\10 CFR 110, et seq.
\14\See CRS Report RL 33016, ``U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India:
Issues for Congress,'' for further detail.
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The NNPA also included a provision for halting exports if a
country were to test a nuclear device, violate safeguards
agreements, proliferate to another non-nuclear weapon state, or
continue nuclear weapons-related activities (now section 129 of
the AEA (42 USC 2157)).
In order for the United States to be able to export nuclear
fuel, reactors and sensitive technology to India, U.S. laws and
policies, which served as the basis for international nuclear
export controls, and those controls as well, would need to be
modified to permit such commerce.
India's Separation Plan:
The administration stated that before changes in the law
would be sought by the United States for India, India was to
undertake certain of its commitments under the July 18, 2005
Joint Statement. The most important was the Indian promise to
identify and separate its ``civilian and military nuclear
facilities and programs in a phased manner.''\15\ Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
Robert G. Joseph testified before the committee on November 2,
2005:
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\15\See Joint Statement text in the annex to this report.
We expect--and have indicated to the Government of India--
that India's separation of its civil and military nuclear
infrastructure must be conducted in a credible and transparent
manner, and be defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint.
In other words, the separation and the resultant safeguards
must contribute to our nonproliferation goals. Many of our
international partners have similarly indicated that they view
this as a necessary precondition, and will not be able to
support civil nuclear cooperation with India otherwise. We
believe that the Indian government understands this.\16\
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\16\Prepared Remarks of Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary of State
for Arms Control and International Security, at a hearing of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on ``U.S.-Indian Nuclear Energy
Cooperation: Security and Nonproliferation Implications,'' November 2,
2005, S. Hrg. 109-384, and available at http://foreign.senate.gov/
testimony/2005/JosephTestimony051102.pdf. Hereinafter ``November 2
Hearing.''
The administration did not specify what standards would be
used by the United States to evaluate India's separation plan
to establish that it is credible, transparent and defensible
from a nonproliferation standpoint. The committee did receive
testimony from the Honorable Ronald F. Lehman, the former
Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which
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put the present U.S.-Indian separation proposal in context:
Over the years, various Indian interlocutors have floated the
idea of separating civilian from military facilities and
applying safeguards to them. We have never known the scale of
the separation or the quality of the safeguards. If India is
serious about nuclear power, then its infrastructure should be
declared predominantly civilian with permanent IAEA safeguards.
To clarify the separation may take some time, and full
implementation of IAEA safeguards could take years. A major
shift to safeguard civilian activity would be a positive step
worthy of considerable movement on the part of the U.S. and the
international community. A token step would be
counterproductive.\17\
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\17\November 2 Hearing.
With regard to the Indian Separation Plan which was
presented by Prime Minister Singh in the Indian Parliament on
March 2, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice testified
that it was indeed credible and defensible from a
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nonproliferation standpoint because:
. . . it had to capture more than just a token number of
Indian nuclear facilities, which it did by encompassing nearly
two-thirds of India's current and planned thermal power
reactors as well as all future civil thermal and breeder
reactors. Importantly, for the safeguards to be meaningful,
India had to commit to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity; it
did so. Once a reactor is under IAEA safeguards, those
safeguards will remain there permanently and on an
unconditional basis. Further, in our view, the plan also needed
to include upstream and downstream facilities associated with
the safeguarded reactors to provide a true separation of civil
and military programs. India committed to these steps, and we
have concluded that its separation plan meets the criteria
established: it is credible, transparent, and defensible from a
nonproliferation standpoint.\18\
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\18\``Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice by Chairman Richard G. Lugar, April 5, 2006,''
hereinafter ``April 5 QFRs'' see annex to this report.
The committee has carefully reviewed the text of the March
2, 2006 Indian Government's Separation Plan and its further
clarification of that document on May 6, 2006.\19\ The
committee commends India for placing additional facilities and
materials under the IAEA safeguards system. Such actions can
contribute to the ability of the IAEA to fulfill its mandate to
better ``apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to
any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of
a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of
atomic energy.''\20\ The committee is also aware, however, of
the general limitations that exist with respect to the
implementation of the IAEA safeguards system. This stems from
the fact that, like any large international organization with
responsibilities around the globe, the IAEA has finite
resources with which to tackle its many verification tasks, at
both the physical and political levels, and in many countries
where it is tasked with particularly significant and intense
verification responsibilities, such as Iran, those activities
can quickly absorb most of the available personnel and the
necessary funds in the IAEA's Safeguards Division.
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\19\Both the March 2 and May 6 documents are appended to this
report.
\20\Article III, paragraph 5 of the Statute of the Agency,
available at http://www.iaea.org/About/statute--text.html.
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The committee's views regarding the IAEA and its safeguards
system are contained in the report it made with its recommended
resolution of ratification of the U.S. Additional Protocol to
its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA,\21\ which the Senate
passed on March 31, 2004.\22\
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\21\Senate Executive Report 108-12.
\22\Resolution of advice and consent to ratification agreed to in
Senate by Division Vote. (5291)
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The limitations which apply generally to IAEA activities
are further complicated by the fact that India has nuclear
weapons and is not a State Party to the NPT. There is,
therefore, little for the IAEA to discover in the way of
diversion of nuclear materials to an undeclared nuclear weapons
program, as in a non-nuclear weapon State Party to the NPT.
Given that the IAEA is already faced with resource limitations
in states where it has an absolute imperative to detect such
diversion, the Agency has little to gain from closely
monitoring India's civil nuclear facilities, rather, safeguards
in India will be a favor to countries that engage in nuclear
commerce with India, to help assure that their trade with India
does not assist India's nuclear weapons program. The committee
expects the administration to ensure that safeguards in India
do not come at the expense of other IAEA safeguards activities.
India's March 2, 2006 separation plan has been criticized
by many nonproliferation experts who have stated it does not
constitute a true separation of civilian and military nuclear
facilities.
On the question of how facilities were identified, India's
separation documents provide few assurances. India's March
separation document states, ``Identification of purely civilian
facilities and programmes that have no strategic implications
poses a particular challenge'' in India.\23\ Instead, India
identified its ``overarching criterion'' as whether
``subjecting a facility to IAEA safeguards would impact
adversely on India's national security.'' Moreover, facilities
were excluded from the civilian list if they were located in a
larger hub of strategic significance (e.g., the Bhabha Atomic
Research Center (BARC)), even if they were not normally engaged
in activities of strategic significance. In addition, the March
document states that ``Concepts such as grid connectivity are
not relevant to the separation exercise,''\24\ and that
reactors would be connected to the electricity grid
``irrespective of whether the reactor concerned is civilian or
not civilian.''\25\ It is thus complicated to discern which
reactors, facilities and materials in India are truly for
civilian power production and which of them are truly for a
weapons program.
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\23\See annex to this report, hereinafter ``March Separation
Document.''
\24\Ibid.
\25\Ibid.
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India has stated that it will ``include in the civilian
list only those facilities offered for safeguards that, after
separation, will no longer be engaged in activities of
strategic significance.''\26\ It is difficult to tell whether
this approach will place more facilities under safeguards in
the future, or when such facilities might cease to be engaged
in nuclear weapons activities, and presumably be available for
placement under safeguards.
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\26\Ibid.
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The administration has asserted that India's separation
document captures the majority of India's nuclear complex by
taking in ``nearly two-thirds of India's current and planned
thermal power reactors as well as all future civil thermal and
breeder reactors.''\27\ While the committee commends India's
efforts at separation, it remains concerned about the kinds of
reactors which were not identified as civilian.
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\27\April 5 Hearing, hereinafter ``April 5 Hearing,'' see annex to
this report.
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In the March 2 separation document, India said it would
place 14 of India's 22 extant reactors under safeguards.
India's present nuclear complex consists of three research
reactors; many power reactors, including 15 operating reactors,
with another eight under construction and three planned; two
breeder reactors (one operating and one under construction); a
single uranium enrichment facility; three spent fuel
reprocessing facilities; six heavy water production plants; a
uranium mining and processing complex, which includes three
mines and two copper-mine tailing extraction units plus one
mill for uranium ore, as well as numerous uranium conversion
facilities; and three to four fuel fabrication plants.\28\
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\28\See Sharon Squassoni, ``India's Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues
and Views,'' March 2, 2006, CRS Report For Congress, March 2, 2006, p.
8, hereinafter ``Squassoni.'' See also ``Questions and Answers in
Parliament,'' Indian Department of Atomic Energy, Monsoon Session,
2003, available at http://www.dae.gov.in/parlqa/lokm03.pdf, which
states ``The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) a Public
Sector Undertaking, is responsible for the design, construction and
operation of nuclear power reactors. There are fourteen (14) nuclear
power reactors with a total nuclear power capacity of 2720 MWe in
operation and 8 reactors are under construction in the country.
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India did not identify the following facilities as
civilian:
8 indigenous Indian power reactors (Kaiga 1, 2, 3,
4; MAPS 1, 2; TAPS 3, 4);
the Fast Breeder test Reactor (FTBR) and the
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactors (PFBR) under
construction
enrichment facilities;
spent fuel reprocessing facilities (except for the
existing safeguards on the Power Reactor Fuel
Reprocessing (PREFRE) plant);
research reactors--CIRUS (which will be shut down in
2010), Dhruva, Advanced Heavy Water Reactor;
heavy water plants; nor
various military-related plants (e.g., the prototype
naval reactor).
India has not declared either of its breeder reactors to be
civilian. Some U.S. experts have suggested that ``power
reactors, regardless of their potential to produce plutonium
for weapons, have a civilian use and should be declared as
civilian and safeguarded, as well as their associated fuel
fabrication and reprocessing and spent fuel storage
facilities,''\29\ particularly if they are intended to be used
for peaceful purposes, and not as fissile material production
centers. The fact that India did not decide to place its
breeder reactors under safeguards has complicated the picture
with regard to its having declared a majority of its program to
be civilian since it appears to have excluded the second stage
of its three-stage nuclear fuel cycle from safeguards. On April
5, 2006, Secretary Rice did not offer a specific reason for
India's not having included its breeder program in its civilian
declaration:
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\29\Ibid., p. 14.
Chairman Lugar. What reason did India give for not declaring
its extant 40 MWth Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) to be
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civilian?
Secretary Rice. We cannot speak for the Government of India,
of course, but in our discussions Indian officials argued that
since the FBTR was still in the experimental stage, India not
in a position to accept safeguards on the reactor at this time.
Chairman Lugar. What reason did India give for not declaring
the 500 MWe fast breeder reactor it currently has under
construction to be part of its civilian program?
Secretary Rice. The reactor is not yet complete. India stated
that it was not in a position to place reactors which it
considers experimental under safeguards. India committed to
placing all future civil power and breeder reactors under
safeguards.\30\
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\30\April 5 QFRs.
The sizes and types of reactors under safeguards in India
are directly related to the credibility of its separation plan,
and the committee hopes that India will, in the future, place
its breeder program under IAEA safeguards.
The committee's concerns regarding India's breeder program
are magnified when it considers that India has announced its
intention to build five 500MWe breeder reactors, none of which
have been included in the separation plan as available for
safeguards.\31\ The committee also notes that it has been
administration policy since 2002 to regard un-safeguarded
stockpiles of plutonium as a danger to U.S. national security.
As the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction notes, ``the United States will continue to
discourage the worldwide accumulation of separated
plutonium.''\32\ As Secretary Rice stated in answers to the
committee, ``The production of plutonium and other fuels as a
byproduct of [a breeder] reactor's operation adds to the world
net stock of potential fuel for a nuclear explosive device.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\M.R. Srinivasan, R.B. Grover, S.A. Bhardwaj, ``Nuclear Power in
India: Winds of Change,'' Economic and Political Weekly, December 3,
2005.
\32\``National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,'' in
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17, December 2002,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/
WMDStrategy.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
India's present nuclear fuel cycle consists of a three-
stage process to produce and recycle plutonium and thorium as a
reactor fuel, and to produce fissile materials for weapons:
The first stage would rely on natural uranium-fueled reactors
to make plutonium; the second stage would use that plutonium in
fast reactors blanketed with thorium to produce U-233 (and more
plutonium); and the third stage would use U-233 fuel and
thorium fuel in fast reactors blanketed with thorium to produce
more U-233 for use for future fuel. India has not advanced
beyond the first stage of the fuel cycle, aside from running a
fast breeder test reactor (40 MWth Fast Breeder Test Reactor or
FBTR) based on a French design and a small research reactor
that uses U-233 fuel (Kamini).\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\Squassoni, p. 4.
As the Secretary stated in answers to the committee, this
process requires that ``thorium . . . be converted into U-233
in a breeder reactor. The fuel cycle requires considerable
handling of fissile material in the various loading, unloading,
and transfers associated with the stages of the fuel cycle.
Each time fissile material is handled, there is a risk of
diversion.'' The committee believes that India's nuclear plans
highlight the need for stringent security regarding all fissile
material, and it urges the administration to share best
practices in that regard with India.
Safeguards:
The effectiveness of a new safeguards agreement which India
will negotiate with the IAEA is not yet known, and the text of
India's March and May separation documents raises many
questions. Secretary Rice stated before the committee on April
5, 2006, that ``The safeguards required by this initiative are
designed to help detect, and thereby help to prevent, the
diversion to military use of any materials, technologies, or
equipment provided to India's civil nuclear facilities.''\34\
The committee notes that IAEA safeguards, which combine nuclear
material accountancy with inspections, generally apply only to
nuclear materials, not to technology. Equipment supplied under
a bilateral agreement can also be subject to a safeguards
agreement, but the practice is to link the safeguards to the
use of nuclear material with the equipment (versus constant
safeguards). It is not clear whether the safeguards agreement
will be a hybrid of existing approaches or something totally
unique.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\``Remarks of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Initiative, April 5, 2006,'' see April 5 Hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In November 2005, with respect to India's future safeguards
agreement, Under Secretary Joseph wrote:
Safeguards agreements are modeled after INFCIRC/153 (the NPT
safeguards agreement) or INFCIRC/66 (the Agency's safeguards
system predating the NPT). India will not likely sign a
safeguards agreement based strictly on INFCIRC/153, as this
would require safeguards on India's nuclear weapons program.
NPT-acknowledged nuclear weapon states have so- called
``voluntary'' safeguards agreements . . . [that] do not
obligate the IAEA to actually apply safeguards and do allow for
the removal of facilities or material from safeguards. We heard
from other states at the recent NSG meeting that they would not
support a ``voluntary offer'' arrangement as, in their view, it
would be tantamount to granting de facto nuclear weapon state
status to India. We have similarly indicated to India that we
would not view such an arrangement as defensible from a
nonproliferation standpoint. We therefore believe that the
logical approach to . . . a safeguards agreement for India is
to use INFCIRC/66, which is currently used at India's four
safeguarded reactors.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\November 2 Hearing.
Paragraph 15.c of India's March separation document states
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that
[A]n India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated
between India and the IAEA providing for safeguards to guard
against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from
civilian use at any time as well as providing for corrective
measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation
of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of
foreign fuel supplies.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\See annex to this report.
The committee is concerned by this language, as it implies
that IAEA safeguards might not continue to apply to India's
civil power reactors in the event of a cutoff of foreign fuel
supply. The phrase ``guard against withdrawal of safeguarded
nuclear material from civilian use at any time'' is is
consistent with application of safeguards to material in
perpetuity. However, the phrase ``corrective measures that
India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its
civilian nuclear reactors'' is troublesome because it suggests
a more voluntary approach to safeguarding India's reactors than
has been asserted by administration officials, including
Secretary of State Rice. Other aspects of the separation plan
are discussed in the committee's section-by-section analysis.
The committee notes that there is one area of separation
where neither India's March nor its May documents mention
anything--personnel. India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE)
employs some 50,000 personnel.\37\ The Secretary of State noted
in April 2006 that ``While the specific issue of DAE personnel
has not yet been discussed in detail, we would consider
routine, frequent rotation of personnel between civil and
military programs as being inconsistent with Indian commitments
on separation,''\38\ and that ``We would consider the term
``programs'' to include both program-related activities and the
personnel involved in those activities.''\39\ The committee
hopes that as cooperation in atomic energy with India is
implemented the Government of India will further clarify this
aspect of separation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\See http://www.dae.gov.in.
\38\April 5 Hearing.
\39\Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Committee Action
The committee conducted an extensive review of the July 18,
2005 Joint Statement and its attendant results.
The committee met and received testimony from two panels on
``United States-Indian Nuclear Energy Cooperation: Security and
Nonproliferation Implications,'' on November 2, 2005. Witnesses
for this hearing were: on the first panel, the Honorable R.
Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
and the Honorable Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary of State
for Arms Control and International Security; on the second
panel, the Honorable Ronald F. Lehman, II, Director, Center for
Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, and formerly Director of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency; the Honorable Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director
of the Preventive Defense Project of Harvard's Kennedy School
of Government and Stanford University, Ford Foundation
Professor of Science and International Affairs at Harvard
University's Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, and formerly Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy; Henry D. Sokolski, Director of
the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Washington, D.C.;
and Michael Krepon, Co-Founder and President Emeritus of the
Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC.
On March 16, 2006, Chairman Lugar introduced S. 2429, the
administration's legislation to waive the application of
certain requirements under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
USC 2011, et seq.) with respect to India. S. 2429 was referred
to the committee on that day.
On March 29, 2006, the committee met in closed session for
a briefing by the Honorable R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary
of State for Political Affairs, and the Honorable Robert G.
Joseph, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, on ``U.S.-India Atomic Energy
Cooperation: The Indian Separation Plan and the
Administration's Legislative Proposal.''
On April 5, 2006, the committee met to receive testimony at
a hearing with the Honorable Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of
State, on ``U.S.-India Atomic Energy Cooperation: The Indian
Separation Plan and the Administration's Legislative
Proposal.''
On April 26, 2006, the committee met to receive testimony
from two panels on ``U.S.-India Atomic Energy Cooperation:
Strategic and Nonproliferation Implications.'' On panel one,
the committee heard testimony from The Honorable William J.
Perry, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford
University, Stanford, CA, and formerly U.S. Secretary of
Defense; The Honorable Robert L. Gallucci, Dean of the Edmund
A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C., and formerly chief U.S. negotiator during the
1994 North Korean nuclear talks; the Honorable Ashton B.
Carter, Co-Director of the Preventive Defense Project of
Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and Stanford University,
Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International Affairs
at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, and formerly Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Policy; and Dr. Ashley J.
Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, D.C. On panel two, the
committee heard testimony from the Honorable Ronald F. Lehman,
II, Director, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, and formerly Director of the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; The Honorable Robert
J. Einhorn, Senior Adviser at the International Security
Program of the Center for Strategic & International Studies,
Washington, D.C., and formerly Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation; Dr. Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin
Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Washington, D.C.; and Dr.
Stephen P. Cohen, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Studies
Program of the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
At a business meeting on June 29, 2006, by a roll call vote
of 16 in favor and 2 against (Voting in favor: Senators Lugar,
Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu,
Murkowski, Martinez, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Nelson, and
Obama; Voting against: Senators Feingold and Boxer), the
committee ordered reported an original bill to exempt from
certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 U.S.
exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology to
India, and to implement the U.S. Additional Protocol. At the
business meeting, the following members indicated that they
wished to be cosponsors of the committee's legislation:
Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Voinovich,
Alexander, Sununu, Murkowski, Martinez, Biden, Dodd, Kerry,
Nelson, and Obama. The committee agreed to an amendment by
Senator Chafee by a voice vote, and agreed to an amendment by
Senator Obama by a voice vote. An amendment by Senator Feingold
failed by a roll call vote of 13 against and 5 in favor.
III. Summary of Legislation
Chairman Lugar introduced S. 2429, the administration's
India bill, by request, on March 15, 2006. The language of that
bill is reproduced here, in full:
A BILL
To authorize the President to waive the application of certain
requirements under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 with respect to India.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. WAIVER AUTHORITY.
(a) Waiver Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
if the President makes the determination described in subsection (b),
the President may--
(1) exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation with India
(arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)) from the requirement in section
123(a)(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and such agreement
for cooperation shall be subject to the same congressional
review procedures under sections 123(b) and 123(d) of such Act
as an agreement for cooperation that has not been exempted from
any requirement contained in section 123(a) of such Act;
(2) waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect to India; and
(3) waive the application of any sanction under section 129
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158) with respect
to India.
(b) Determination.--The determination referred to in subsection (a)
is a determination by the President that the following actions have
occurred:
(1) India has provided the United States and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a credible plan
to separate civil and military facilities, materials, and
programs, and has filed a declaration regarding its civil
facilities with the IAEA.
(2) An agreement has entered into force between India and the
IAEA requiring the application of safeguards in accordance with
IAEA practices to India's civil nuclear facilities as declared
in the plan described in paragraph (1).
(3) India and the IAEA are making satisfactory progress
toward implementing an Additional Protocol that would apply to
India's civil nuclear program.
(4) India is working with the United States for the
conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
(5) India is supporting international efforts to prevent the
spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology.
(6) India is ensuring that the necessary steps are being
taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through the
application of comprehensive export control legislation and
regulations, and through harmonization and adherence to Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) guidelines.
(7) Supply to India by the United States under an agreement
for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 is consistent with United States
participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
(c) Report.--Any determination pursuant to subsection (b) shall be
reported to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives,
and such report shall describe the basis for the President's
determination.
(d) Subsequent Determination.--A determination under subsection (b)
shall not be effective if the President determines that India has
detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of enactment of
this Act.
The committee examined the provisions of S. 2429 in detail,
and found that, while containing a number of important
provisions, which the committee retained in its own bill, S.
2429 lacked a number of important features the committee
believes are necessary in a measure which would substantially
change U.S. nuclear export control law and policy.
The bill reported by the committee, the United States-India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act (hereinafter ``the
Act'') would implement the President's policy as contained in
the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement by providing a procedure
under which certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(AEA), as amended by the NNPA of 1978, will not be applicable
to authorized exports or reexports to India of U.S.-origin
nuclear fuel and sensitive nuclear technology. The committee
retained, while slightly modifying, the determination
requirements the President would need to meet to make use of
the authority provided in the Act to make inapplicable those
provisions of the AEA which are specified. The Act also would
accomplish several other important goals, notably: to protect
the Congress's oversight role, and to ensure that expanded U.S.
civilian nuclear commerce with India will be implemented in a
manner that maintains U.S. nonproliferation laws, policies, and
regulations and that complies with U.S. obligations under the
NPT. The committee supports an improved relationship with
India, which it believes will not be hampered by including
these modifications, which, in its view, are wholly consistent
with the administration's policy and with long-standing
policies of the United States.
Another important objective will be secured by the second
title of the Act, which would provide needed authority to
implement the U.S. Additional Protocol with the IAEA. This
title is identical to S. 2489, the U.S. Additional Protocol
Implementation Act, which the committee reported to the Senate
on April 3, 2006. In view of the fact that signing and adhering
to an additional protocol is one of the specific Indian
commitments under the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement, the
committee believes that it is in the national security and
nonproliferation interests of the United States to ensure in
this Act the U.S., too, meets this important nonproliferation
commitment, which President Bush called on the Senate to meet
in February 2004:
I propose that by next year, only states that have signed the
Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their
civilian nuclear programs. Nations that are serious about
fighting proliferation will approve and implement the
Additional Protocol. I've submitted the Additional Protocol to
the Senate. I urge the Senate to consent immediately to its
ratification.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\``President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of
WMD,'' Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation, Fort Lesley J. McNair--National Defense University,
Washington, D.C., February 11, 2004, available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html, hereinafter,
``NDU Speech.''
The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of
the Additional Protocol on March 31, 2004, but the President
cannot submit an instrument of ratification until Congress
passes implementing legislation giving him authority to
promulgate necessary regulations and the like.\41\ Thus
President Bush's challenge to the Senate, and to Congress as a
whole, has not been met with necessary action. Committee staff
began discussions with the administration regarding
implementing legislation in the spring and summer of 2004, and
did not conclude those talks until early in 2006. Given the
time that has now passed between Senate action in 2004 on the
Additional Protocol itself, and its importance in such cases as
Iran's nuclear activities, the committee finds ample reason to
include the U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act with
this measure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\The provisions of S. 2489 are explained in the committee's
Senate Report 109-226, filed on April 3, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TITLE I--UNITED STATES-INDIA PEACEFUL
ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION
Title I contains the committee-recommended legislation to
permit civilian nuclear energy cooperation between the United
States and India.
Section 101
Sections 101, 102 and 103 set forth the short title,
stipulate a Sense of Congress with six provisions relating to
U.S.-Indian nuclear energy cooperation, and provide a
declaration of policy that touches on nine important areas.
Section 101 provides that this title be cited as the
``United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act.''
Section 102
Section 102 contains a broad sense of Congress that covers
six areas. Subsection (1) states that strong bilateral
relations with India are in the national interest of the United
States. Subsection (2) states that the United States and India
share common democratic values and the potential for increasing
and sustained economic engagement. Subsection (3) states that
commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the United
States and other countries has the potential to benefit the
people of all countries. The committee views these findings as
underlying the effort to forge a new nuclear relationship with
India.
Subsection (4) states that civil nuclear commerce with
India represents a significant change in U.S. policy toward
countries not parties to the NPT and stresses that the NPT
remains the foundation of the international non-proliferation
regime. Several later provisions of this Act are intended to
maintain the effectiveness of the NPT and the overall non-
proliferation regime. The first of these are subsections (5)
and (6) of section 102.
Subsections (5) and (6) state that it is the sense of
Congress that:
(5) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the
United States and other countries must be achieved in a manner
that minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or regional
arms races and maximizes India's adherence to international
non-proliferation regimes, including, in particular, the
guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group; and
(6) the United States should not seek to facilitate or
encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any
other party if such exports are terminated under United States
law.
With regard to subsection (5), the committee commends the
Government of India for issuing on February 1, 2006, its
``Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (Exports).''\42\ The
committee further commends the Government of India for
promulgating its WMD law, which was published in the summer of
2005. The committee notes that, while the administration has
referred to that law as a part of India's commitments under
both the Joint Statement and the NSSP, that law was passed
during the May 2005 NPT Review Conference (before the July 18
Joint Statement) in fulfillment of India's obligation under
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 (April 28, 2004).
Similarly, Prime Minister Singh told the Indian parliament in
August 2005 that there were no new Indian commitments contained
in the July 18 Joint Statement, but only reaffirmations of
positions established by the previous Indian government.\43\
The committee believes that the implementation and enforcement
of India's export controls will constitute, as it would for any
nation, a true test of its adherence to the NSG and MTCR
guidelines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\No.AEA/27(1)/2005-ER, Government of India (Bharat Sarkar),
Department of Atomic Energy (Parmanu Oorja Vibhag), Mumbai, the
February 01, 2006, ``Resolution: Subject: Guidelines for Nuclear
Transfers (Exports),'' available at http://www.dae.gov.in/sectt/im/
gazfeb06.htm.
\43\August Reply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The task of minimizing the risk of regional arms races as a
result of civil nuclear commerce will fall in large measure to
the Government of India. Many critics have warned that this
nuclear deal will permit, or even indirectly assist, India in
producing more plutonium for its nuclear weapons program, and
Indian officials have publicly stated that India will be able
to produce as much fissile material for weapons purposes as it
desires. At the same time, however, many have said that there
is no reason why India would want to increase significantly its
production of fissile material. The committee hopes that India
will demonstrate needed restraint and not increase
significantly its production of fissile material. If civil
nuclear commerce were to be seen, some years from now, as
having in fact contributed to India's nuclear weapons program,
there could be severe consequences for the nuclear deal, for
U.S.-Indian relations, and for the nuclear non-proliferation
regime.
An amendment proposed by Senator Obama, and accepted by
voice vote, added subsection (6) of section 102. It expresses
the concern of Congress that sanctions imposed under U.S. law
not be undermined by other countries. The committee is
particularly concerned that the United States not facilitate or
encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India if U.S.
exports were to be terminated pursuant to section 129 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 USC 2157) because India had
resumed nuclear testing, abrogated or materially violated a
safeguards agreement, or engaged in nuclear proliferation. The
committee certainly does not expect any such actions to occur,
but it has a duty to maintain the integrity of U.S. law if its
expectations were to prove incorrect.
Section 103
The Declaration of Policy provided in section 103 is
particularly important, and several of the areas of policy
highlighted in the provision are also addressed later in the
Act.
Subsection (1) of section 103 states that it shall be the
policy of the United States ``to achieve as quickly as possible
a cessation of the production by India and Pakistan of fissile
materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive
devices.'' The administration has recently stated that
``International pressure over a period of decades has had only
marginal impact on the attitudes of India and Pakistan
concerning nuclear weapons.''\44\ The committee believes,
however, that it is incumbent upon the United States to
encourage India and Pakistan to reduce tensions in the nuclear
sphere, as well as in other areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\``Report on nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia for the
period April 1, 2005 to March 31, 2006,'' June 26, 2006, report
pursuant to section 620F(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, PL 87-195.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
India and Pakistan have espoused a policy to achieve a
``minimum credible deterrent,'' and India reiterated in the
July 18, 2005 Joint Statement its support for a Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). There are nevertheless reasons
to ensure that as nuclear trade, in particular trade in nuclear
fuel, to India from other nations increases, the United States
elevates the priority it has placed on South Asian arms control
and regional nonproliferation initiatives. Critics have argued
that foreign provision of nuclear fuel to India will increase
India's ability to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons,
either directly or at least by increasing the overall
availability of nuclear fuel for India's reactors and thereby
reducing the opportunity costs of plutonium production. Whether
they are accurate or not, the United States has a national
security interest in ensuring that civil nuclear commerce with
India does not lead to a nuclear arms race.
Secretary of State Rice testified before the committee
that:
. . . civil nuclear cooperation with India will not lead to an
arms race in South Asia. Nothing we or any other potential
international suppliers provide to India under this initiative
will enhance its military capacity or add to its military
stockpile. Moreover, the nuclear balance in the region is a
function of the political and military situation in the region.
We are far more likely to be able to influence those regional
dynamics from a position of strong relations with India and,
indeed, with Pakistan.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\April 5 Hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Secretary has also argued that:
India would never accept a unilateral freeze or cap on its
nuclear arsenal. We raised this with India, but India said that
its plans and policies must take into account regional
realities. No one can credibly assert that India would accept
what would amount to an arms control agreement that did not
include other key countries like China and Pakistan.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\Ibid.
The committee accepts the Secretary's comments, but
likewise believes that given the need to avoid even
misperceptions that could lead to an arms race, the United
States must now use the influence it has gained through efforts
in both India and Pakistan, and with India in particular
through its nuclear trade with that nation, to help them
transition from nuclear build-ups to stability and arms
reductions. This is nowhere more relevant than in the area of
fissile material production.
The Secretary also noted in testimony before the committee
that ``India's incentives or disincentives. . . . to grow its
nuclear weapons program, its strategic program, are more
related to the . . . political/military conditions in the
region, than to any quantity of available nuclear material. And
the program for India has been restrained over the number of
years. I think most people would argue that it's a relatively
restrained, kind of, minimum-deterrent program.''\47\ The
Secretary additionally answered that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\Ibid.
India has some 50,000, give or take, tons of uranium
available to it in its reserves, and it would need a very small
percentage of that on the military nuclear side. . . . we do
not believe that the absence of uranium is really the
constraint on the nuclear weapons program. . . . the amount of
fuel that one would need to run a civil program for years and
years and years is far in excess of what India can mine
indigenously. So, we think the incentives, or the crunch, if
you will, is really on the civil side.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\April 5 Hearing.
While it is true that only a small amount of fissile
material is required to make a nuclear weapon, the fact is that
fissile materials can be used both for weapons and for reactor
fuel. The Secretary is right to suggest that India faces a
supply problem, particularly given its expectations for growing
its nuclear power sector. While it would be difficult to
establish a causal relation between U.S. or foreign exports to
India and a consonant increase in India's fissile materials
production for nuclear weapons, the committee believes that
U.S. nuclear trade with India must not even be seen as leading
to any increase in India's fissile material stockpile. The U.S.
must work to end, both in South Asia and everywhere, the
production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other
nuclear explosive devices, and an increase in such production
in India would only hinder such efforts.
Subsection (2) of section 103 states that it shall be the
policy of the United States with respect to any peaceful atomic
energy cooperation between the United States and India:
to achieve as quickly as possible the Government of India's
adherence to, and cooperation in, the full range of
international non-proliferation regimes and activities,
including India's--
(A) full participation in the Proliferation Security
Initiative;
(B) formal commitment to the Statement of
Interdiction Principles;
(C) public announcement of its decision to conform
its export control laws, regulations, and policies with
the Australia Group and with the Guidelines,
Procedures, Criteria, and Controls List of the
Wassenaar Arrangement; and
(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward
implementing the decision described in subparagraph
(C).
In his testimony before the committee in November 2005,
Under Secretary Joseph stated that ``In our ongoing dialogues,
we strongly encourage India to take additional steps to
strengthen nonproliferation, such as joining PSI, and
harmonizing its national control lists with those of the
Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement.''\49\ Under
Secretary Burns stated at a press briefing on March 16, 2006,
that ``India has also agreed to align itself with the other
international regimes concerning proliferation--the Australia
group, the Wassenaar arrangement.''\50\ The committee has seen
no Indian statements, however, that would suggest any success
in this regard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\November 2 Hearing.
\50\``Ongoing Efforts To Implement the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear
Agreement,'' press briefing by R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs, March 16, 2006, available at http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/63270.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the committee notes India's commitments in the July
18, 2005 Joint Statement to ``to secure nuclear materials and
technology through comprehensive export control legislation and
through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
guidelines,'' it nevertheless believes that India should be
similarly involved in other multilateral nonproliferation and
export control regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement
(WA) and the Australia Group (AG). The committee notes that
even as the administration proceeded to implement the July 18,
2005 Joint Statement, and previously the NSSP, it sanctioned
several Indian entities and persons for transfers of items to
Iran under the authority of the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation
Act (Public Law 106-178). On September 23, 2004, the
administration sanctioned two Indian scientists for their
activities in Iran,\51\ Dr. R. C. Surendar and Dr. Y. S. R.
Prasad, both of whom have extensive ties to India's nuclear
power sector. On December 21, 2005,\52\ the administration
sanctioned Sabero Organic Chemicals Gujarat Ltd., and any
successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof, and Sandhya Organic
Chemicals PVT Ltd., and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary
thereof, both of India, and again, under the Iran and Syria
Nonproliferation Act, for transfers of certain chemicals to
Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\69 FR 58212.
\52\70 FR 77441.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reacting to the 2005 sanctions, the Government of India
stated:
We . . . have seen reports about imposition of sanctions on
two Indian firms. . . . [and] the removal of sanctions on R. C.
Surendar vindicates [the] Government's position on this matter.
Since the imposition of sanctions in September 2004, [the
Indian] Government has maintained that this had no
justification. Accordingly, we had urged the U.S. Government to
review the issue and withdraw the sanctions. The Government
also reiterates that sanctions again Dr. Y.S.R Prasad should be
removed. The sanctions imposed by the U.S. Government on the
two Indian firms relate to transfer of some chemicals to Iran.
Our preliminary assessment is that the transfer of such
chemicals is not in violation of our regulations or our
international obligations. [The] Government of India's
commitment to prevent onward proliferation is second to none.
We have instituted a rigorous system of export controls and our
track record in this regard is well known. India is working
with the international community including with the U.S. as a
partner against proliferation. In this context the imposition
of sanctions by the U.S. on our firms, which in our view have
not acted in violation of our laws or regulations, is not
justified.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\``MEA Official Spokesperson's reaction to news reports about
imposition of sanctions on two Indian firms under the U.S.-Iran
Proliferation Act,'' New Delhi, December 28, 2005, available at http://
www.indianembassy.org/newsite/press--release/5.asp.
The December 2005 sanctions for chemical transfers to Iran
were for exports of chemicals which are controlled on the
control list of the Australia Group. The committee notes
India's statement that such transfers to Iran were ``not in
violation of our regulations or our international obligations''
and believes that the United States must therefore continue to
work to ensure that India does not undertake such transfers in
the future, to Iran or any other dangerous regimes. This could
best be done by working with India to secure its adherence to
the AG Guidelines. That would make India a full partner in
world-wide non-proliferation efforts, rather than a country
that holds back from assuming that responsibility.
Since India is now a producer of increasingly modern
weapons systems, the committee believes that India should also
bring its laws, regulations, and policies into conformity with
the WA Guidelines. Joining the WA, or at a minimum adhering to
Guidelines, is another commitment that most of the world's
major powers have made, in the interests of world peace and
stability.
The committee has been routinely assured that India would
join the administration's Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI). In November 2005, Under Secretary Joseph informed the
committee that:
The United States has encouraged India to join PSI, given its
geographic location along several key routes for proliferation
trafficking and its significant operational capabilities in the
region. Officials of the Government of India have told us that
they are continuing their internal review of PSI, including an
examination of the international and national legal
underpinnings for their possible participation in PSI. We are
hopeful that India will soon endorse PSI, and join the more
than 70 countries around the world--and United Nations
Secretary General Kofi Annan--that have expressed their support
for PSI.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\November 2 Hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, Secretary Rice stated in April 2006 that:
India has stated that its participation remains under
consideration. India committed in 2005 to participate in the
PSI if it was able to join the Core Group of PSI participants
that had developed and agreed to the PSI Statement of
Principles, or if the Core Group was disbanded. In the summer
of 2005, the United States and its partners in the Core Group
agreed that the Core Group had served an important function in
the process of starting up the PSI, but was no longer necessary
and so was disbanded.
More recently, India has linked its decision on PSI
participation to its concerns with recently agreed amendments
to the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea
(the SUA Convention).
The United States position is that endorsement of the PSI
Statement of Interdiction Principles is a political commitment
carrying no legal rights or obligations. Therefore, the United
States does not accept India's linkage of the SUA Convention to
the PSI. As the PSI is a voluntary initiative, India is free to
choose to participate or not participate. We continue to
discuss this issue with India and encourage India's
participation.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\April 5 QFRs.
The committee believes that India should participate
actively in the PSI. India's apparent reticence to join other
countries in this activity is unfortunate given the key role
India could play regarding interdiction efforts in and around
its territory.
Subsections (3) and (4) of section 103 state that it shall
be the policy of the United States with respect to any peaceful
atomic energy cooperation between the United States and India:
(3) to ensure that India remains in full compliance with its
non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament agreements,
obligations, and commitments; [and]
(4) to ensure that any safeguards agreement or additional
protocol thereto to which India is a party with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can reliably
safeguard any export or reexport to India of any nuclear
materials and equipment[.]
Compliance with all of India's non-proliferation
commitments, including those in the July 18, 2005 Joint
Statement and the safeguards agreements it is negotiating with
the IAEA, will be essential to the implementation of the U.S.-
India nuclear deal. The committee's policy concern in this
regard leads later in the Act to significant reporting
requirements in section 108. Equally important will be the
assurance that IAEA safeguards provide against the diversion of
foreign material, equipment or technology. The committee
expects the administration to work diligently to ensure that
India's agreements with the IAEA provide for both effective and
permanent safeguards. This will lessen any need for additional
U.S. monitoring and will also provide a necessary level of
assurance regarding other countries' nuclear exports to India.
Subsection (5) of section 103 makes it the policy of the
United States to ensure that India meets all the requirements
for nuclear cooperation laid out in section 123 a. of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 USC 2153), other than the
requirement that India have full-scope safeguards.
Subsections (6) and (7) of section 103 are of critical
importance to the committee. They make it the policy of the
United States in nuclear trade with India:
(6) to act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines
for Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of
Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and
Related Technology developed by the multilateral Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) and the rules and practices regarding NSG
decision-making; [and]
(7) given the special sensitivity of equipment and
technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy
water, to work with members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
individually and collectively, to further restrict the
transfers of such equipment and technologies, including to
India[.]
The Nuclear Suppliers Group, although not an organization
that can issue binding directives, is nonetheless one of the
most effective elements of the nuclear non-proliferation
regime. For a generation, U.S. Presidents have forged in this
forum an important international consensus on the need to
prevent nuclear proliferation by controlling the export of
sensitive nuclear material, equipment and technology. The
committee believes strongly that no bilateral objective, even
the important objective of a new relationship with India,
should be allowed to undermine the NSG's effectiveness. The
United States must continue to abide by the NSG Guidelines,
which it has worked so diligently to achieve. Equally, the
United States must maintain the consensus decision mechanism of
the NSG, and not look for any way around that requirement. The
committee was pleased by the Secretary of State's assurances in
this regard at the committee's hearing on April 5, 2006.
The committee believes also that the United States must
work with other nations to prevent the export of potentially
harmful technologies. NSG Guidelines are not as strict as they
ought to be regarding exports of enrichment and reprocessing
equipment and technology, and the committee supports the
administration's efforts to achieve consensus on tightening
those Guidelines. In addition, the committee intends that the
administration work with individual states to encourage them to
refrain from sensitive exports.
Subsections (8) and (9) of section 103 make it the policy
of the United States in nuclear trade with India:
(8) to maintain the fullest possible international support
for, adherence to, and compliance with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty; and
(9) that exports of nuclear fuel to India should not
contribute to, or in any way encourage, increases in the
production by India of fissile material for non-civilian
purposes.
Subsection (8) applies first and foremost to actions of the
United States Government. In its implementation of civil
nuclear commerce with India, the United States will have to
take care to abide by Article I of the NPT, which requires each
nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty ``not in any way to
assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices.''
Critics have argued that the sale of nuclear reactor fuel,
by supplementing India's limited domestic supply of refined
uranium ore, will enable India to avoid having to choose
between using its domestic uranium for power generation or for
plutonium production. In this way, they argue, such sales by
the United States (or by any other nuclear weapon state) will
necessarily assist indirectly India's nuclear weapons program
and, thus, violate Article I of the NPT.
The administration rejects that argument and contends that
India's plutonium production needs are a small proportion of
its overall uranium requirements and, in any case, have always
received first priority. The administration adds that India's
safeguarded nuclear reactors have received foreign fuel several
times in the years since India's first nuclear test, without it
being alleged that such exports violated the NPT.
The committee accepts the administration's argument in
terms of history, but cautions that the impact, if any, of
civil nuclear commerce on India's nuclear weapons program is an
empirical question that will require attention in the years to
come. India does not appear to have had to choose between civil
and military uses of its uranium until recently, if at all, yet
some Indian officials have warned of the need for such trade-
offs in coming years unless foreign reactor fuel can be
obtained. If it should become evident that U.S. civil nuclear
commerce with India is indirectly assisting India's nuclear
weapons program by freeing up uranium for nuclear weapons
purposes that would otherwise have been devoted to civil
pursuits (or through technical transfer to India's
unsafeguarded nuclear activities), then it would be incumbent
upon the United States, under the NPT, to cease those
contributing elements of its civil nuclear commerce with India.
This requirement is stated more specifically in subparagraph
(9) with respect to exports of nuclear reactor fuel to India.
The requirement to cease any commerce that would otherwise
violate Article I of the NPT is separate from and in addition
to any requirements that might flow from other aspects of U.S.
law, such as section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Subsection 8 is meant also as a reminder of the need to
maintain support for the NPT world-wide. The committee does not
believe that civil nuclear commerce with India will undermine
world-wide support for the NPT or for nuclear non-proliferation
in general. The United States must exercise continued
leadership, however, to avert any such impact. If the NPT is to
remain effective, the United States must make clear through its
own actions that nuclear non-proliferation applies across the
board, and not merely with respect to governments that the
United States dislikes. The United States must also work
diligently to ensure that other countries live up to their NPT
(and NSG) obligations.
Section 104
Section 104 of the committee's bill contains substantially
the same waiver authority that the administration had requested
from provisions in the Atomic Energy Act for nuclear trade with
India, with a few differences.
The existing and relevant provisions in the Atomic Energy
Act--sections 123, 128 and 129--all have waiver or exemption
authorities that could be used with respect to a future 123
agreement with India.
As stated above, S. 2429 contained a provision allowing the
President to:
. . . exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation with India
(arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)) from the requirement in section
123(a)(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and such agreement
for cooperation shall be subject to the same congressional
review procedures under sections 123(b) and 123(d) of such Act
as an agreement for cooperation that has not been exempted from
any requirement contained in section 123(a) of such Act. . . .
In explaining why the administration requested this
authority, Secretary Rice stated that the desire was ``to treat
nuclear cooperation with India similar to nuclear cooperation
with various other trading partners''\56\ The Secretary also
stated that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\April 5 Hearing.
An additional factor involves the exception/waiver standard
under Sections 123, 128, and 129 of the AEA. The existing
standard is a determination by the Executive Branch that
failure to make the proposed exception/waiver would be
``seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States
nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common
defense and security.'' In our view, the decision to facilitate
nuclear cooperation with India should be based instead on the
nonproliferation measures that India committed to in the Joint
Statement, which are reflected in the required Presidential
determination under subsection 1(b) of S. 2429.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\Ibid.
The committee notes that under existing law, an exempted
agreement with India would require the affirmative assent of
Congress before taking effect. At the time when such an exempt
agreement is submitted to Congress, though, the President must
determine that holding India to the statutory criteria would be
``seriously prejudicial to achievement of United States non-
proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common
defense and security.'' The President apparently cannot make
such a determination for India at the present time, thus the
Secretary's answer above.
The committee concurs with the administration regarding the
determination standard and the need for relief from the
requirement. Instead of this rigid requirement, the committee's
bill would allow the President to submit an exempt agreement
with India without this determination. The committee notes,
however, that while India's nonproliferation commitments are a
basis for proceeding to cooperation in nuclear energy, the Act
still requires the administration to coordinate and submit to
Congress a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment (NPASS) under
section 123. It is not clear that under the administration's
proposed legislation an NPASS would be submitted to Congress.
The administration also provided another basis for its
decision to seek legislative relief from parts of section 123.
The Secretary stated that the administration's language:
. . . takes into account the difficulty of putting into
place all the pieces necessary for U.S.-India nuclear
cooperation--particularly, the U.S.-India agreement for
peaceful nuclear cooperation, the India-IAEA Safeguards
Agreement, and Nuclear Suppliers Group action to accommodate
nuclear trade with India--without knowing whether Congress, in
the end, would support the Initiative and vote affirmatively to
approve the agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. We
believe it is important that Congress participate as a partner
early in the process.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\Ibid.
The committee agrees that there are many aspects of nuclear
cooperation with India which require negotiation and formal
decisions, and it is pleased to demonstrate at an early stage
congressional support in principle for the U.S.-India nuclear
deal. Under S. 2429, however, Congress would have been ``a
partner early in the process,'' and only early in that process.
Once a 123 agreement was submitted, Congress would have had
only two options: enacting a resolution of disapproval (over a
likely presidential veto); or allowing the agreement to enter
into force after 90 days of continuous session. This procedure
is followed under existing law only for 123 agreements that
meet all the requirements of section 123 a. of the Atomic
Energy Act. An agreement that does not meet the standards in
section 123 a. cannot enter into force unless and until
Congress passes a resolution of approval.
Congress has not seen the text of the 123 agreement with
India (which has yet to be negotiated and submitted to it), the
new safeguards agreement that India is negotiating with the
IAEA, or an NSG decision to permit civil nuclear commerce with
India (which must be adopted by consensus of the NSG's 45
Participating Governments). The committee believes that, in
view of the many special circumstances surrounding the U.S.-
India 123 agreement and the importance of the agreements and
decisions that must still be promulgated, the United States is
better served if Congress maintains its existing role regarding
123 agreements that do not meet the standards of section 123.
Subsection 104(b) provides that an agreement for
cooperation exempted by the President under subsection (a)(1)
shall be subject to the second proviso of subsection d. of
section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. The purpose of the
provision is to make plain that any agreement for nuclear
cooperation with India may not enter into force until Congress
approves, and the President signs, a joint resolution stating
that Congress favors the agreement.
Under current law, the President may waive any requirement
of subsection a. of section 123 if he determines that inclusion
of such requirement ``would be seriously prejudicial to the
achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or
otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.''
Subsection 104(a)(1) of the committee's bill gives the
President an alternative waiver authority: to exempt the
proposed agreement with India from the requirement of section
123 a.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act, after submitting the
determination specified in section 105 of the committee's bill.
But the granting of this alternative authority does not alter
or affect any other requirement of section 123, including the
requirement that any agreement exempted from a requirement of
subsection a. of section 123 be approved by Congress before it
takes effect. Subsection (b) is designed to ensure that there
is no legal ambiguity about the effect of subsection (a)(1).
Section 104(a)(2) is identical to the provision in section
1(a)(2) of S. 2429 regarding waiving the application of section
128 of the Atomic Energy Act with respect to India. Section 128
would have required that, as India will not maintain full-scope
safeguards, the first license issued for any export to India be
submitted to Congress for 60 days of continuous session, during
which Congress could disapprove the export by joint resolution.
Were Congress not to enact such a joint resolution, another
export would have to be submitted to Congress a year later.
The committee finds that the application of section 128
would have achieved little in respect of true oversight, as
enactment of a resolution of disapproval over a presidential
veto would require a two-thirds vote in each house. The
committee agrees with the administration, moreover, that the
need to submit one export each year to Congress would inhibit
U.S. companies in their efforts to obtain Indian contracts for
nuclear equipment or fuel and to raise capital for major
projects in India. The committee did include, in section 108, a
provision requiring annual reporting on all nuclear export and
re-export licenses to India.
Section 104(a)(3) would allow the President to waive the
application of section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act with
respect to India, but differently than the administration's
proposed such waiver. S. 2429 would have allowed the President
to ``waive the application of any sanction under section 129 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158) with respect to
India.'' The committee's recommended waiver authority is
similar in effect to the waiver the administration requested in
that it allows for nuclear cooperation with India in spite of
India's weapons tests in 1974 and 1998 (129 (1)(A)), and its
ongoing weapons activities (129 (1)(D)).
For other conduct that, under section 129, would result in
termination of cooperation, section 129 would continue to
apply. Thus, if India were to terminate or abrogate IAEA
safeguards (129(1)(B)); materially violate IAEA safeguards
(129(1)(C)); violate an agreement for cooperation with the
United States (129(2)(A)); encourage a non-nuclear weapon state
to engage in proliferation activities involving source and
special nuclear material (129(2)(B)); or engage in unauthorized
proliferation of reprocessing technology (129(2)(C)), the
committee's bill would terminate cooperation. The
administration's bill would have made section 129 inapplicable
to such future actions on the part of India.
Section 104(a) also requires that the president submit the
written determination and report contained in section 105 to
the committee prior to his making use of the waivers in section
104.
Section 105
Section 105 specifies the terms of the determination that
the President must make in order to take advantage of any of
the waiver authorities afforded by section 104 of the Act. All
of these requirements are rooted in the July 18, 2005 Joint
Statement between President Bush and Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh. Section 105 provides that the determination
shall be written, section 104 provides that it shall be
submitted to the appropriate congressional committees (i.e.,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House
International Relations Committee), and section 105 provides
that it shall be accompanied by a report to those committees.
The committee intends that the report contain the President's
justification for making each element of the determination.
Subsection (1) requires a presidential determination that
India has provided to the IAEA and the United States a credible
plan to separate its civil nuclear facilities, materials, and
programs from its military facilities, materials, and programs.
Credibility is a somewhat imprecise test, but it is one that
the administration has used as a matter of policy and that it
proposed for this element of the determination. The President
must determine that India's separation plan is credible and
provide a report on his reasons for that determination.
The committee notes that while the Government of India has
proposed in the Lok Sabha (India's lower house of parliament) a
separation plan relating to nuclear facilities, and while a
logical application of that plan to nuclear materials would
include all materials used in or produced by such facilities,
two aspects of the Indian separation plan are less clear: how
it will apply to the production of nuclear materials for use in
civil nuclear facilities; and how civil nuclear programs (as
opposed to merely the facilities and nuclear materials
associated with them) will be separated from military ones. The
second version of the separation plan proposed in the Lok Sabha
includes a list of ``upstream facilities'' that are declared as
civil, but the President must determine whether this list
provides a credible separation between civil and military
facilities and streams of material.
The President must also determine whether India has
provided a credible plan for separation of its civil nuclear
program from its military one. This requirement is rooted in
the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement, in which India committed to
``identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear
facilities and programs.'' The committee notes that this could
be a complicated enterprise, as the Government of India's
separation plan states that grid connectivity will not
determine whether a facility is civil or military and that an
otherwise civil facility will be excluded from that list if it
is located in a larger hub of strategic significance. This
means that India's generation of electricity for civilian
purposes will make use of both civil and military nuclear
facilities. Some of its military reactors will be physically
the same as its civil reactors, moreover, and there might be a
temptation to use common personnel or logistics in the
management and operation of those reactors. The committee
believes, however, that a credible separation of nuclear
programs would have to extend to such functions as management,
operation, safety, personnel, finance and planning. The
committee expects the President to examine these factors before
determining that India has provided such a credible separation
plan.
Subsection 2 requires a presidential determination that
India has filed a complete declaration regarding its civil
nuclear facilities and materials with the IAEA. The Government
of India has changed its separation plan once already, adding
additional facilities and specifying which reactors will be
declared civilian facilities. The committee recognizes that the
choice of facilities to declare as civilian is a decision for
India to make, and it fully expects that additional facilities
will be added as India builds its civil nuclear power program.
The word ``complete'' was included in subsection (2) not to
imply finality in India's declaration, but rather to require
the President to determine: (a) that the declaration is not in
significant flux at the time of the determination; and (b) that
India has not withheld from IAEA safeguards facilities that it
has elsewhere declared as civilian.
Subsection (3) requires a presidential determination that:
. . . an agreement between India and the IAEA requiring the
application of safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA
standards, principles, and practices to civil nuclear
facilities, programs, and materials described in paragraph (2)
has entered into force and the text of such agreement has been
made available to the appropriate congressional committees.
This subsection requires that the text of the India-IAEA
safeguards agreement ``has been made available to the
appropriate congressional committees'' because the
determination detailed in section 105 will likely be submitted
just before a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement is
submitted to Congress. Congress will consider the safeguards
agreement integral to a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement
with India, as the administration has stated that IAEA
safeguards are intended ``to help detect, and thereby help to
prevent, the diversion to military use of any materials,
technologies, or equipment provided to India's civil nuclear
facilities.''\59\ In response to a Question for the Record from
Chairman Lugar, Under Secretary Joseph stated: ``The safeguards
must effectively cover India's civil nuclear fuel cycle and
provide strong assurances to supplier states and the IAEA that
material and technology provided or created through civil
cooperation will not be diverted to the military sphere.''\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\April 5 Hearing.
\60\November 2 Hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsection (3) adds the words ``in perpetuity'' to the
language proposed by the administration in section 1(b)(2) of
S. 2429 because permanent safeguards are vital to any assurance
that civil nuclear commerce with a facility will not assist
India's nuclear weapons program. Safeguards in perpetuity are
also key to not according India the status of a nuclear weapon
state under the NPT, since only the NPT-recognized nuclear
weapon states have heretofore been allowed to exclude (or
selectively apply) the application of safeguards, in time or
scope, to any facilities, materials and programs under their
control. India will be allowed to determine which facilities
are to be safeguarded, but will not be allowed later to remove
those facilities from safeguards, as the recognized nuclear
weapon states are permitted to do.
The requirement that the President determine that India's
safeguards agreement is ``in accord with IAEA standards,
principles, and practices'' was proposed by a former State
Department official as a means of assuring that the agreement
creates a credible safeguards regime for India's declared civil
nuclear facilities.\61\ The committee understands that India
already has nuclear weapons and that no safeguards regime will
keep India from maintaining or even increasing its stock of
nuclear weapons. Article I of the NPT bars even indirect U.S.
assistance to India's nuclear weapons program, however, so
safeguards are needed to guard against any misuse of civil
nuclear commerce for nuclear weapons purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\``The U.S.-Indian Civil Nuclear Deal,'' prepared testimony of
Fred McGoldrick before the House International Relations Committee, May
11, 2006, page 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The separation plan proposed in its parliament by the
Government of India speaks of ``India-specific safeguards,'' a
concept that has not been further defined. The administration
assured the committee that the United States intends that
India's safeguards be of the sort that the IAEA would normally
institute pursuant to a safeguards agreement with a state that
has not agreed to full-scope safeguards, e.g., of the sort
commonly governed by IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRC/) 66.
The committee intends that subsection (3) require the President
to determine that India's safeguards do, in fact, conform to
INFCIRC/66. The committee notes that this is consistent with
India's intent to maintain its Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel
Reprocessing Plant under safeguards ``in the `campaign' mode,''
i.e., under safeguards only when the plant is processing spent
fuel from a safeguarded facility.
India's separation plan also speaks of a ``safeguards
agreement . . . providing for corrective measures that India
may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian
nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel
supplies.'' This concept also has not been defined further. The
committee does not intend that the President be able to make
the determination in subsection (3) if India's safeguards
agreement allows it to remove a reactor or storage site from
safeguards in order to use unsafeguarded nuclear fuel in that
reactor or storage site. Rather, any fuel that is used in a
safeguarded facility should itself become safeguarded in
perpetuity, as well as the resulting spent fuel or other
byproducts.
Subsection (4) requires a presidential determination that
India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward
implementing an Additional Protocol. The administration
proposed a determination that they are making ``satisfactory''
progress, which the committee believes is too imprecise a test.
The committee recognizes that Additional Protocol negotiations
may not proceed in earnest until after the underlying
safeguards agreement has been negotiated. As subsection (3)
requires that the safeguards agreement has already entered into
force, however, and as IAEA procedures for approval of
safeguards agreements by its Board of Governors (BOG) generally
impose a delay of several months between the completion of
negotiations and entry into force, there should be ample time
for negotiations on an Additional Protocol before the President
will be in a position to submit the determination specified in
this section of the Act. Subsection (4) does not require that
India and the IAEA have completed negotiations on an Additional
Protocol or already be implementing such Protocol. The
committee intends the requirement of ``substantial progress''
to mean that negotiations are proceeding at a steady pace and
that there is sufficient understanding of the language the
Additional Protocol contains to be confident that the BOG will
approve it.
Subsection (5) requires a presidential determination that
India is working with the United States to conclude a
multilateral treaty on the cessation of the production of
fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices. For many years, negotiation and conclusion
of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) has been a U.S.
objective in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. The
current administration has concluded that a verifiable FMCT is
infeasible, however, and that the existing CD mandate to
negotiate an effectively verifiable treaty is thus
unacceptable. The CD has been unable to agree on a work
program, moreover, as some other countries (notably China) have
refused to approve the beginning of FMCT negotiations unless
the CD also approved discussions of other issues, such as
nuclear disarmament and banning weapons in outer space. Earlier
this year, the United States presented a draft FMCT text and
proposed a negotiating mandate that would not take a stand on
whether the treaty need be verifiable.
India has long supported conclusion of an effectively
verifiable FMCT. This position reflects India's concern
regarding fissile material production by its nuclear-armed
neighbors, and it would be unrealistic to expect a precipitous
change in India's position. The committee does intend, however,
that subsection (5) require India to continue its support for
an FMCT and not to prevent adoption of a negotiating mandate
that leaves the issue of verification to be decided in the
negotiations.
Subsection (5) refers to a ``treaty,'' rather than to the
FMCT. The committee adopted this language to allow for the
possibility of a multilateral treaty other than a universal
FMCT. An agreement might be pursued, for example, among the 7
states known to have tested nuclear weapons or among the
somewhat larger number known or believed to have produced
nuclear weapons quantities of fissile material. If India were
to work with the United States to conclude such a treaty, that
would justify a presidential determination under subsection (5)
even in the absence of FMCT efforts.
Subsection (6) requires a presidential determination that
India is supporting international efforts to prevent the spread
of enrichment and reprocessing technology to any state that
does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment or
reprocessing plants. India's commitment in the July 18, 2005
Joint Statement refers to ``refraining from transfer of
enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not
have them.'' The committee believes that the language of
subsection (6), which is drawn from the President's speech to
the National Defense University of February 11, 2004, more
precisely describes U.S. policy objectives and will not present
any difficulty for India.
Subsection (7) requires a presidential determination that:
India has secured nuclear and other sensitive materials and
technology through the application of comprehensive export
control legislation and regulations, including through
effective enforcement actions, and through harmonization of its
control lists with, and adherence to, the guidelines of the
Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group.
This language tracks closely India's commitment in the July
18, 2005 Joint Statement and section 1(b)(6) of the
administration's proposed legislation. The committee added a
reference to ``effective enforcement actions'' because it
believes that laws and regulations go only so far. The real
test is in implementation. The committee is confident that the
Government of India will meet this test.
Subsection (8) requires a presidential determination that:
. . . the Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided to permit
civil nuclear commerce with India pursuant to a decision taken
by the Nuclear Suppliers Group that--
(A) was made by consensus; and
(B) does not permit nuclear commerce with any
nonnuclear weapon state other than India that
does not have IAEA safeguards on all nuclear materials
and all peaceful nuclear activities within the
territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or
carried out under its control anywhere.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group, with consistent American
leadership over a generation, has played a major role in
combating nuclear proliferation by encouraging states not to
export nuclear technology, equipment and materials to non-
nuclear weapon states without strong safeguards against misuse
of those exports. The committee believes strongly that it is
critical to maintain the vitality and effectiveness of the NSG.
This could be a challenge as the United States seeks an
exception to the Guidelines for exports to India that will
differ from the current NSG requirement for full-scope
safeguards.
The NSG, like many international organizations, makes
decisions by consensus, rather than through a formal vote.
Consensus decisions by the NSG's Participating Governments have
strengthened international nuclear export controls and provided
a forum in which the decisions of those governments to export
nuclear materials and equipment are examined in light of the
NSG Guidelines.
The committee is concerned that some Participating
Governments may enter into nuclear commerce with India that
does not reflect rules laid out in the NSG Guidelines or that
such export decisions may not reflect agreement among supplier
states regarding whether India has met or is meeting its
nonproliferation obligations and commitments, including those
in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement.
One important means to maintain the role and effectiveness
of the NSG will be to change the rules for India only in
accordance with the NSG Guidelines and its procedures for such
changes. Paragraph 17 of those Guidelines states: ``Unanimous
consent is required for any changes in these Guidelines.''\62\
Subsection (8) therefore requires that the NSG decision
regarding India be ``made by consensus.'' This is consistent
with the intent of the administration, as indicated in a
response by Secretary Rice to a Question for the Record from
the Chairman, in which she refers to actions ``after a
consensus decision is reached by the NSG to accommodate civil
nuclear cooperation with India.''\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\Note verbale to the IAEA, INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1, February
2006, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/
2006/infcirc254r8p1.pdf.
\63\April 5 Hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Likewise, the committee desires that the decisions of NSG
Participating Governments regarding nuclear exports to India,
or to any other nation be consistent with the consultative and
nonproliferation commitments made by such states, in particular
for any exports in ``sensitive cases,'' as noted in the
``Consultations'' provisions at paragraph 16(b) of the NSG
Guidelines.
The NSG's decision on India should not erode its ability to
maintain its basic Guidelines. Subsection (8)(B) is included,
therefore, to ensure that the President must determine that the
decision does not have the practical effect of permitting
nuclear exports to other states without full-scope safeguards,
even if it is worded in a manner that does not specify that
such exports to India are acceptable.
Section 106
Section 106 generally prohibits the transfer to India of
enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy-water technologies. It
allows such items to be sent to India only as part of efforts
aimed at making such technologies proliferation-resistant, such
as under the administration's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GNEP)\64\ or under an international fuel-cycle project
approved by the IAEA. The provision is consistent with the
administration's policy regarding the proliferation of
enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies and with the
answers the committee received from various administration
officials regarding their policy with respect to such transfers
to India.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\http://www.gnep.energy.gov/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee believes that section 106 is necessary to
ensure that no sensitive nuclear technologies related to the
enrichment of uranium (which can be used to make highly-
enriched uranium for weapons), the reprocessing of spent
nuclear fuel (which can provide plutonium for weapons), or the
production of heavy water (heavy water-moderated reactors
produce weapons-grade plutonium and tritium as a byproduct) are
given to India, unless under international cooperation or as
special, proliferation-resistant versions of these dual-use
technologies.
India currently produces heavy water, operates heavy-water
moderated reactors, reprocesses spent nuclear fuel and has a
limited uranium enrichment capability. Only a portion of
India's facilities will be under IAEA safeguards, and sensitive
nuclear technologies will reside in India in both safeguarded
and un-safeguarded facilities. Consequently, the committee
desires to ensure that the United States does not provide, even
inadvertently, assistance to India that could further India's
development of these technologies for non-civilian purposes.
Such assistance could be viewed as a violation of U.S.
obligations under Article I of the NPT.
Subsection (a) provides a Sense of Congress on licensing
policy that would apply generally to all exports and reexports
authorized under 10 CFR Part 110 by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) and under 10 CFR Part 810 by the Secretary of
Energy. The provision states the sense of Congress that it is
in the interest of the United States to permit the timely
consideration of such license applications for the export and
reexport to India of any nuclear materials and sensitive
nuclear technology requiring such authorizations, to the extent
that such exports and reexports are consistent with United
States laws, regulations, and policies in effect at the time
such export or reexport applications are to be considered. The
committee intends that this provision not result in any change
to the process that is required within the interagency for such
licenses--procedures which were mandated in the NNPA.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\See Title III of Public Law 95-242, ``Export Organizations and
Criteria,'' (42 USC 2155a et seq.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsection (b)(1) would prohibit the export or reexport to
India of any equipment, materials, or technology related to the
enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel,
or to the production of heavy water. With respect to
enrichment, materials, equipment and technology that are used
for separating the isotopes of uranium or enriching uranium in
the isotope 235 may not be exported to India, and no equipment
or device, nor any important component or part especially
designed for such equipment or such a device, may be exported
to India, except as provided under subsection 106(b)(2). With
respect to reprocessing, the provision would bar similar
transfers to India of materials, equipment and technology that
are particularly useful for the separation of actinides in
spent nuclear fuel.
The committee does not intend that the provision bar, in
any manner, the export of reactor fuel to India, and does not
interpret the inclusion of the term ``materials'' to prohibit
such transfers.
The prohibition is balanced with a narrow exception
providing that such materials, equipment and technology may be
approved to be exported or reexported to India if the end user:
(i) is a multinational facility participating in an
IAEA-approved program to provide alternatives to
national fuel cycle capabilities; or
(ii) is a facility participating in, and the export
or reexport is associated with, a bilateral or
multinational program to develop a proliferation-
resistant fuel cycle; and
(B) the President determines that the export or reexport will
not improve India's ability to produce nuclear weapons or
fissile material for military uses.
On February 11, 2004, the President stated his policy:
``The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse
to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies
to any state that does not already possess full-scale,
functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants.''\66\ The
President also noted that ``enrichment and reprocessing are not
necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes.''\67\ This is particularly true in the case
of India and its potential use of enrichment technology. India
has developed its nuclear fuel cycle around the use of natural
uranium in heavy water reactors. For its few foreign-built
light water reactors, India relies on foreign-supplied fuel,
currently provided by Russia. The committee believes that
enrichment technology transfers would most likely serve either
to improve India's ability to enrich fuel for military purposes
(as fuel for submarine reactors) or to create more
sophisticated nuclear weapons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\NDU Speech.
\67\Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration also stated, in answers to the
committee's questions, that it would not give enrichment,
reprocessing or heavy-water technology to India. For example,
in response to a Question for the Record in November 2005,
Under Secretary Joseph clarified the meaning of the phrase
``full civil nuclear energy'' in the July 18 Joint Statement:
Chairman Lugar. The Joint Statement commits the United States
to ``full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India.'' As the
United States has different forms of nuclear energy cooperation
with many nations, differing even among NPT Parties, what is
the meaning of this phrase in relation to U.S. law and
regulation regarding nuclear commerce with India?
Under Secretary Joseph. For the United States, ``full civil
nuclear cooperation'' with India means trade in most civil
nuclear technologies, including fuel and reactors. But we do
not intend to provide enrichment or reprocessing technology to
India. As the President said in February 2004, ``enrichment and
reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.'' We do not currently
provide enrichment or reprocessing equipment to any country.
We will also need to ensure that any cooperation is fully
consistent with U.S. obligations under the NPT not to ``in any
way'' assist India's nuclear weapons program, and with
provisions of U.S. law.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\November 2 Hearing.
Furthermore, both Under Secretary Joseph and Under
Secretary Burns stated that the United States would not export
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
enrichment and reprocessing to India:
Chairman Lugar. Presuming Congressional approval of statutory
amendments and Nuclear Suppliers Group approval of an exception
to its Guidelines for India, when would the United States
Government begin to approve the export of nuclear items or
technical data to India, and what are those items or technical
data likely to be?
Under Secretaries Burns and Joseph. We cannot say precisely
which nuclear technologies the U.S. (or other suppliers) would
export to India, except that we would exclude reprocessing and
enrichment technologies from our list.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\Ibid.
Chairman Lugar also sought the administration's view of a
provision in legislation that would prohibit such technologies
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
from being exported to India:
Chairman Lugar. Could you please provide me with your views
with regard to [a] distinction between India and NPT parties
that would provide different treatment in terms of the nuclear
exports for non-NPT parties, i.e. India would be eligible for
most U.S. exports except equipment, materials, or technology
related to enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water
production[?]
Under Secretary Joseph. We do not export enrichment or
reprocessing technology to any state. Therefore, ``full civil
nuclear cooperation'' with India will not include enrichment or
reprocessing technology. We have not yet determined whether
such a prohibition would extend to heavy water production.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\Ibid.
The committee notes that Under Secretary Joseph's answer did
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
not oppose inclusion of such a provision in law.
Regarding heavy-water production technologies, the Chairman
sought further clarification from Secretary Rice in April 2006:
Chairman Lugar. Has the administration determined whether or
not heavy water could be exported to India from the United
States?
Secretary Rice. The U.S. does not foresee transferring heavy
water production equipment or technology to India, and the
draft bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement
accordingly makes no provisions for such transfers.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\April 5 QFRs.
Thus, it was clearly stated, without any qualifications or
reservations, that the United States would not export such
technologies to India.
The committee believes that section 106 would not inhibit,
in any way, India's full participation in GNEP. As Secretary
Rice stated:
U.S. negotiators told India that India's decision not to
designate its fast breeder reactors and associated fuel cycle
research and development facilities as civil and place those
facilities under IAEA safeguards would preclude our ability to
collaborate on issues related to the fast burner reactors
contemplated under GNEP at this time. If India places breeder
reactors under safeguards in the future, the United States has
indicated that, as appropriate, it is willing to explore
potential areas for civil cooperation in this context.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\April 5 QFRs.
Section 107
Section 107 of the Act contains broad requirements for an
end-use monitoring program to be carried out with respect to
U.S. exports and re-exports of nuclear materials, equipment,
and technology sold, leased, exported, or reexported to India.
Such a program can provide increased confidence in India's
separation of its civilian from its military nuclear programs,
facilities, materials and personnel, and also would further
ensure United States compliance with Article I of the NPT. The
provision, though, is not intended to ensure U.S. compliance,
nor is it intended to reflect poorly on India's July 18, 2005
Joint Statement commitments and its March and May 2006
separation documents. Rather, the committee believes that the
resulting and regular cooperation between U.S. regulatory
agencies, in particular with the NRC, can provide a basis for
even greater cooperation between the two nations.
Section 107 provides a large degree of flexibility to the
President. Paragraphs 107(b)(1) and (2) require sufficient
measures to ensure that all the assurances and conditions of
any licenses issued for exports and reexports to India by the
NRC under 10 CFR Part 110, and by the Secretary of Energy
pursuant to 10 CFR Part 810, are being met and complied with in
India. Paragraph 107 (b)(2) would require that, with respect to
any authorizations issued by the Secretary of Energy pursuant
to section 57 b. of the Atomic Energy Act (42 USC 2077(b)),
(A) the identified recipients of the nuclear technology are
authorized to receive the nuclear technology;
(B) the nuclear technology identified for transfer will be
used only for peaceful safeguarded nuclear activities and will
not be used for any military or nuclear explosive purpose; and
(C) the nuclear technology identified for transfer will not
be retransferred without the prior consent of the United
States, and facilities, equipment, or materials derived through
the use of transferred technology will not be transferred
without the prior consent of the United States.
The committee notes that much of what is required by
section 107 is already in place. Thus, there are provisions in
the applicable regulations (10 CFR Part 110) dealing with end
use assurances and certain diligence requirements on the
applicant in situations having significant implications for
public health and safety or the common defense and security.
There are also reporting and information requirements in export
or re-export authorizations.
10 CFR Part 110.2 adds that section 123 agreements may
require:
an exchange of information on imports, exports, [and]
retransfers with foreign governments, peaceful end-use
assurances, and other conditions placed on the transfer of the
material or equipment.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\10 CFR 110.2.
Similarly, both 10 CFR Part 810.6 and section 57 b. of the
Atomic Energy Act stipulate that the Secretary of Energy must
grant specific approval for certain activities, in particular
those involving the production of special nuclear material
outside the United States.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\See also 10 CFR 810.7 and 810.8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For authorizations of transfers and retransfers to India of
U.S.-origin nuclear materials, equipment and technology, and in
particular any sensitive nuclear technology, to India the
committee believes that there is a special need for a program
to ensure, as a requirement for all relevant U.S. regulatory
agencies, that the conditions that relate to the scope of
authorized activities and approved end users, under any form of
authorization issued by such agencies, are met and recorded.
These requirements could be met by implementing those
measures already applied in respect of U.S.-China atomic energy
cooperation under the 123 agreement with China.\75\ These
requirements have resulted in record-keeping requirements, in
particular for sensitive nuclear technology, to which IAEA
safeguards would not apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\Approved in Public Law 99-183 of December 16, 1985.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under Secretary Joseph testified before the committee that
while the 123 agreement with India will not provide for full-
scope safeguards, it ``will allow for appropriate controls to
help ensure that material or goods provided for civilian
purposes remain within the civilian sector.''\76\ The committee
is aware that for many years as a result of the enactment of
section 123 a.(1) of the AEA, the United States has required
that safeguards be maintained on U.S.-origin items exported to
the cooperating party, even in the event that the IAEA cannot
do so. This requirement for bilateral or ``fall-back''
safeguards enables such safeguards to truly exist in
perpetuity. While the committee accepts that both IAEA and
fall-back safeguards could safeguard nuclear materials in
India's civilian program, there is no legal requirement for the
IAEA to safeguard anything other than nuclear materials.
Paragraphs 107(b)(3)(A) to (C) are designed to ensure that end-
use monitoring under fall-back safeguards would continue for
U.S.-origin items.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\November 2 Hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 108
Section 108 requires the President to provide important
information to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the
House International Relations Committee regarding the
Government of India's fulfillment of its non-proliferation
commitments. The committee commonly includes such requirements
when it recommends approval of non-proliferation agreements.
Subsection (a) of section 108 requires the President to
keep the committees fully and currently informed of:
(1) any material non-compliance on the part of the Government
of India with--
(A) the non-proliferation commitments undertaken in
the Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, between the
President of the United States and the Prime Minister
of India;
(B) the separation plan presented in the national
parliament of India on March 7, 2006, and in greater
detail on May 11, 2006;
(C) a safeguards agreement between the Government of
India and the IAEA;
(D) an Additional Protocol between the Government of
India and the IAEA;
(E) a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement between
the Government of India and the United States
Government pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) or any subsequent
arrangement under section 131 of such Act (42 U.S.C.
2160);
(F) the terms and conditions of any approved
licenses; and
(G) United States laws and regulations regarding the
export or reexport of nuclear material or dual-use
material, equipment, or technology;
(2) the construction of a nuclear facility in India after the
date of the enactment of this Act;
(3) significant changes in the production by India of nuclear
weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile material
produced; and
(4) changes in the purpose or operational status of any
unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in India.
Most of the reporting required by paragraph (a)(1) would
relate to any material violation of India's nuclear non-
proliferation commitments. The committee certainly does not
expect any such material violations to occur, but were there
such a violation would be of serious concern and the two
committees should be informed promptly. In some cases, such an
occurrence would also trigger the termination of nuclear
exports pursuant to section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954.
Subparagraph (a)(1)(G) relates not to an Indian non-
proliferation commitment, but rather to compliance with U.S.
laws and regulations. Some experts have cited reasons to
believe that the Government of India engages in covert
procurement for its nuclear weapons program. If India were to
do that in violation of U.S. laws and regulations, such
activity would be of serious concern to the committee and would
call into question the new bilateral relationship that
underlies any agreement to resume civil nuclear commerce with
India.
Paragraphs (a)(2)-(4) relate to India's nuclear facilities
under its separation plan and in a world where civil nuclear
commerce with India is permitted. As India builds new nuclear
facilities, the committee will want to be made aware of those
facilities so that it can monitor their eventual use and
whether they are declared as civil nuclear facilities. The
committee does not expect frequent information on long-term
construction projects, but does expect to be informed promptly
when the United States learns about such projects and to be
updated occasionally regarding their status.
The committee will also want to be kept abreast of changes
in India's use of its non-declared facilities. The Government
of India's decision not to declare a nuclear facility as a
civil facility does not necessarily mean that it will be used
for military purposes. Indian officials made clear, in
describing its separation plan, that India had excluded some
power generation facilities merely because they were located in
proximity to military facilities or because they represented
advanced technology efforts that could eventually be used for
either civil or military purposes. The actual use of non-
declared nuclear facilities will be a matter of continuing
interest to the committee. So will any changes in India's
production of nuclear weapons or of fissile materials for
military purposes. As noted earlier, the committee hopes that
India will continue to exercise great restraint in its nuclear
weapons program, looking to a day when India and its nuclear-
armed neighbors can agree to stabilize or reduce their nuclear
arsenals. If India were to significantly increase its nuclear
weapons or fissile materials production, then the committee
might well question whether civil nuclear commerce with India
had become inimical to regional security and U.S. national
security.
Subsection (b) of section 108 requires the President to
report annually to the committees regarding implementation of
civil nuclear commerce with India and the Government of India's
compliance with its non-proliferation commitments. The first
report shall be submitted not later than 180 days after a
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement between the United
States and India enters into force.
Paragraph (b)(1) requires a description of any additional
nuclear facilities and nuclear materials that the Government of
India has placed or intends to place under IAEA safeguards. The
Secretary of State testified to the committee on April 5, 2006,
that ``India has agreed to place all future civil reactors--
both breeder and thermal--under permanent International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards'' and that up to 90 percent of
India's reactors could be under safeguards in 15 years. At the
same time, Indian officials have emphasized that all decisions
regarding future reactors are for the Government of India to
make and that, at least initially, no breeder reactors will be
declared as civil nuclear facilities. The committee hopes that
the availability of foreign reactor technology and nuclear fuel
will lead India to put more and more reactors under permanent
IAEA safeguards--including breeder reactors.
Paragraph (b)(2) requires a listing of, and various
information on, each license or other authorization for the
export or reexport to India of nuclear materials and equipment.
The committee understands that the data required by this
paragraph are already collected routinely by the agencies that
license nuclear exports.
Paragraph (b)(3) requires that the annual report include:
. . . any significant nuclear commerce between India and
other countries, including any such trade that--
(A) does not comply with applicable guidelines or
decisions of the Nuclear Suppliers Group; or
(B) would not meet the standards applied to exports
or reexports of such material, equipment, or technology
of United States origin.
Administration officials have told the committee that
although the United States will maintain its non-proliferation
policies in its licensing decisions regarding exports or
reexports to India, not all of those standards will be imposed
by the Nuclear Suppliers Group regarding civil nuclear commerce
with India. In particular, the administration says that the NSG
will not require other countries to refrain from exporting
equipment or technology relating to uranium enrichment or spent
fuel reprocessing. NSG Guidelines are not formal requirements,
moreover, so much as recommendations that NSG members and
adherents are expected either to honor or to overrule only
after consulting with other NSG members.
As discussed in the summary of section 103, the committee
believes that the United States should encourage other
countries not to engage in especially sensitive exports to
India, such as those relating to uranium enrichment or spent
fuel reprocessing. The committee will be especially interested
to learn, therefore, whether other countries are honoring the
NSG Guidelines and whether they are approving exports to India
that the United States would not have approved.
Subparagraph (b)(4)(A) calls upon the President to certify,
in this annual report, that India is in full compliance with
its non-proliferation commitments and obligations, i.e., with
its pledges cited in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of
subsection (a)(1). The committee expects that the President
will be able to make that annual certification.
If the President cannot make the certification required in
subparagraph (b)(4)(A), then subparagraph (b)(4)(B) requires
the President to provide:
. . . an identification and assessment of all
compliance issues arising with regard to the adherence
by India to its commitments and obligations,
including--
(i) the steps the United States Government
has taken to remedy or otherwise respond to
such compliance issues;
(ii) the responses of the Government of India
to such steps; and
(iii) an assessment of the implications of
any continued noncompliance, including whether
nuclear commerce with India, if not already
terminated under section 129 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158), remains in
the national security interest of the United
States.
As noted above, the committee does not expect that
subparagraph (b)(4)(B) will ever have to be invoked. If that
should occur, however, the committee will consider it a matter
of utmost gravity. The decision to resume civil nuclear
commerce with India is based upon America's trust that the
Government of India will be fully committed to the cause of
non-proliferation, despite the fact that it remains outside the
NPT. Were that trust to be violated in a material way, the
committee would have to ask itself, just as subparagraph (iii)
asks the President, whether nuclear commerce with India
remained in the national security interest of the United
States.
Paragraph (b)(5) requires that the annual report include a
detailed description of:
(A) United States efforts to promote national or
regional progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing,
securing, capping, and reducing their fissile material
stockpiles, pending creation of a world-wide fissile
material cut-off regime, including the institution of a
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty;
(B) the reactions of India and Pakistan to such
efforts; and
(C) assistance that the United States is providing,
or would be able to provide, to India and Pakistan to
promote the objectives in subparagraph (A), consistent
with its obligations under international law and
existing agreements.
The committee believes strongly that the United States has
a national security interest in ensuring that India and
Pakistan's nuclear weapons are never used, and that their
fissile material stockpiles remain secure from diversion and
eventually are stabilized and then reduced. The committee urges
the administration to make this a high and continuing priority,
even in the absence of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The
intent of the committee in mandating an annual report on U.S.
efforts, including a description of assistance that the United
States is prepared to offer to India and Pakistan (consistent
with its NPT and other obligations), is to encourage sustained
and creative approaches to achieving this important objective.
Paragraph (b)(6) requires that the annual report include a
description of U.S. efforts and progress toward the objective
of achieving India's full participation in the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI), formal commitment to the PSI
Statement of Interdiction Principles, public announcement of
its decision to conform its export control laws, regulations,
and policies with the Australia Group and with the Guidelines,
Procedures, Criteria, and Controls List of the Wassenaar
Arrangement, and demonstration of satisfactory progress toward
implementing that decision. The administration has assured the
committee that it shares this objective and is pursuing it.
The intent of the committee in mandating an annual report
on U.S. efforts is to maintain attention to the objective that
India become a participant in, or adherent to, the full range
of non-proliferation regimes is that, were India to participate
in the PSI and adhere to the Australia Group and Wassenaar
Arrangement Guidelines, it would demonstrate--and receive due
credit for--having the same broad commitment to non-
proliferation that other advanced states have undertaken.
Subsection (c) of section 108 permits the annual report,
after the initial report, to be submitted with an existing
annual report on proliferation prevention. It also permits the
President to submit the information required by paragraph
(b)(5) with an existing annual report on progress toward South
Asian regional non-proliferation. The committee's intent is to
provide options to the Executive branch, not to dictate how the
annual report will be submitted. The President may continue to
submit a separate annual report, put it in the proliferation
prevention report, or submit most of it in one of those ways
and place the information required in paragraph (b)(5) in the
South Asian non-proliferation report.
Subsection (d) of section 108 requires that each report
submitted under this section be submitted in unclassified form,
but allows for a classified annex.
Section 109
Section 109 provides that nothing in the Act may constitute
authority for any action in violation of any obligation of the
United States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Secretary Rice has stated that
While India has nuclear weapons and we must deal with this
fact in realistic, pragmatic manner, we do not recognize India
as a nuclear weapon state or seek to legitimize India's nuclear
weapons program.
The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) defines a ``Nuclear Weapon State'' as ``one which has
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.'' India does not
meet this definition, and we do not seek to amend the Treaty to
provide otherwise. U.S. law adopts the NPT definition, so India
is a non-nuclear weapon state for purposes of U.S. law.\77\
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\77\April 5 QFRs.
The committee is unaware of any formal compliance
assessment done by the Department of State regarding U.S. NPT
obligations and cooperation in atomic energy with India.
The NPT has been the most successful multilateral
nonproliferation treaty in history. It has, indeed, created an
international norm against the spread of nuclear weapons, and
its success has led to the adoption of other nonproliferation
treaties, agreements, instruments, regimes, organizations and
activities. The committee believes that the NPT has been and is
the foundation of international nonproliferation. The
administration has called the NPT:
. . . one of the great success stories of arms control. It
has made major contributions to global security and economic
well being. It has been remarkably successful in achieving its
main goals and--with nearly 190 parties--has become the most
widely-adhered to arms control treaty in history. The NPT is an
indispensable tool in preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons.\78\
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\78\U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation, Fact
Sheet: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: A Global
Success (Jan. 20, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/
16281.htm.
President Bush has said that ``The NPT represents a key
legal barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation and makes a
critical contribution to international security. . . . The
United States remains firmly committed to its obligations under
the NPT.''\79\
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\79\The White House, President's Statement on Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons Treaty (Mar. 7, 2005), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee on Foreign Relations reported the NPT to the
Senate in 1968 and 1969.\80\ As the committee of the Senate
with jurisdiction over international aspects of nuclear energy,
including nuclear transfer policy,\81\ the committee believes
there must be no infringement of any U.S. obligation under the
NPT in any phase of renewed cooperation in atomic energy with
India.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\Executive Reports 90-2 and 91-1, September 27, 1968 and March
6, 1969.
\81\Clause (7) of Paragraph (j) (1) of Rule XXV of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, available at http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/
rule25.php.
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Section 110
Section 110 would render any determination under section
105 and any waiver under section 104 ineffective if the
President determines that India has detonated a nuclear
explosive device after the date of the enactment of the Act.
The committee notes that section 123 a.(4) of the Atomic
Energy Act (42 USC 2153(a)(4)) requires any peaceful nuclear
cooperation agreement with India to provide that, should India
detonate a nuclear explosive device for any reason, the United
States shall have the right to demand the return of ``any
nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant'' to the
agreement for cooperation as well as any ``special nuclear
material produced through the use thereof if the cooperating
party detonates a nuclear explosive device[.]'' The President
may exempt an agreement from that requirement, but, as noted
earlier, administration officials have informed the committee
that they do not believe they could meet the legal standard for
invoking such an exemption.
The committee fully expects the administration to negotiate
an agreement with India that meets the standard set out in
section 123 a.(4) of the Atomic Energy Act, in particular since
the administration's legislative proposal (S. 2429) contained
no exemption for India from any requirement other than that for
full-scope safeguards. Failure to meet this standard would make
it difficult for the committee to favor any agreement with
India, even if the exemption standard in section 123 were met.
The committee notes that under the Act, U.S. nuclear
cooperation with India would also be terminated should India
detonate a nuclear explosive device, for any reason, as, under
subparagraph 104(a)(3)(B) of the Act, section 129(1)(A) of the
Atomic Energy Act fully applies to any detonation on or after
July 18, 2005. Section 110 thus clarifies an issue that was
more ambiguous in section 1(d) of S. 2429.
The committee notes that, with regard to India's 1974
detonation of a nuclear explosive device, the administration
cannot state whether India violated its 1956 heavy water
contract with the United States and its 1963 agreement for
cooperation in atomic energy with the United States:
After India detonated a nuclear device in 1974, the U.S.
Government examined whether India's actions were inconsistent
with a clause under the 1956 contract stating that the heavy
water would be used for ``research into and the use of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes.'' The outcome was that a
conclusive answer was not possible due to both the factual
uncertainty as to whether U.S.-supplied heavy water contributed
to the production of the plutonium used for the device and the
lack of a mutual understanding of scope of the 1956 contract
language.\82\
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\82\November 2 Hearing.
The committee believes that there should be absolutely no
ambiguity regarding the legal and policy implications of any
future Indian nuclear detonation. The President must terminate
all U.S.-origin exports and reexports of nuclear materials and
equipment or sensitive nuclear technology to India, and the
committee expects the President to make full and immediate use
of U.S. rights to demand the return of all exports and
reexports to India, if India tests or detonates, or otherwise
causes the test or detonation of a nuclear explosive device,
for any reason, including such instances in which India
describes its actions as being ``for peaceful purposes.'' The
committee believes that termination would include the
suspension and revocation of any current or pending export or
reexport licenses, and that the return of U.S.-origin items and
materials should extend to any special nuclear material
produced by India through the use of any nuclear materials and
equipment or sensitive nuclear technology exported or
reexported to India by the United States.
Section 111
Section 111 of the Act states that ``Congress finds that
India is not an MTCR adherent for the purposes of section 73 of
the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b).''
The committee included this provision to clarify the status
accorded to India. Section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA) mandates sanctions on transfers of MTCR equipment or
technology if the President determines that a foreign person
knowingly exports, transfers, or otherwise engages in the trade
of any MTCR equipment or technology that contributes to the
acquisition, design, development, or production of missiles in
a country that is not an MTCR adherent and would be, if it were
United States-origin equipment or technology, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States under the AECA; or if a
foreign person conspires to or attempts to engage in such
export, transfer, or trade; or if a foreign person facilitates
such an export, transfer, or trade by any other person; or if
the President has made a determination with respect to a
foreign person under section 11B(b)(1) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 USC App. 2410b(b)(1)).
Section 73 of AECA is, however, inapplicable to MTCR
adherents if the export in question is ``any export, transfer,
or trading activity that is authorized by the laws of an MTCR
adherent, if such authorization is not obtained by
misrepresentation or fraud'' or if the export, transfer, or
trade of an item is to an end user in a country that is an MTCR
adherent (section 73(b)). Section 73 also provides for the
termination of sanctions when an MTCR adherent takes steps
towards effective judicial enforcement against persons
violating the prohibitions in section 73, if such actions are
``comprehensive'' and are ``performed to the satisfaction of
the United States'' and the findings of such proceedings are
satisfactory to the United States (section 73(c)(1)(A) and (B)
and section 73(c)(2)).
When Congress created section 73, it did so specifically to
make clear that a country will enjoy substantial protection
from the MTCR sanctions law only if it specifically agrees not
to transfer any missile-related equipment or technology that
would be subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the AECA (if it
were U.S.-origin equipment or technology). Any country that has
not agreed to take this step--perhaps having only agreed to
control production equipment, for instance--should be aware
that it still may be sanctioned under the AECA even if it
concludes a bilateral understanding with the United States.\83\
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\83\Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 3194, ``Making
Appropriations for the Government of the District of Columbia and Other
Activities Chargeable in Whole or in Part Against Revenues of Said
District for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2000, and for Other
Purposes,'' p. 1076. Sec. 1136(c) of the Arms Control and
Nonproliferation Act of 1999 (title XI of the Admiral James W. Nance
and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000
and 2001 (H.R. 3427, which was enacted by reference in sec. 1000(a)(7)
of Public Law 106-113; 113 Stat. 1536)).
In April 2006, Chairman Lugar inquired of Secretary Rice
whether India's July 18 Joint Statement commitment to harmonize
and adhere to the MTCR guidelines would render it an adherent
for the purposes of Section 73 such that missile sanctions
would generally not apply in the future to India or to
countries which sell missile technology to India. The Secretary
found that ``India would not be considered an `MTCR Adherent'
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
as defined under Section 73'' because:
India has committed to unilaterally adhere to the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Guidelines. The missile
sanctions law would generally still apply to a ``unilateral
adherent'' to the MTCR.
Unilateral adherence to the MTCR Guidelines means that a
country makes a unilateral political commitment to abide by the
Guidelines and Annex of the MTCR. In particular, an MTCR
unilateral adherent commits to control exports of missile-
related equipment and technology according the MTCR Guidelines,
including any subsequent changes to the MTCR Guidelines and
Annex. Inter alia, this means that MTCR unilateral adherent
countries need to have in place laws and regulations that
permit them to control the export of MTCR Annex equipment and
technology consistent with the MTCR Guidelines.
An ``MTCR Adherent'' is a specially defined status in terms
of Section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (also referred to
as the missile sanctions law). An ``MTCR Adherent,'' as defined
in Section 73 of the missile sanctions law, is a country that
``participates'' in the MTCR or that, ``pursuant to an
international understanding to which the United States is a
party, controls MTCR equipment and technology in accordance
with the criteria and standards set forth in the MTCR.''
India's ``unilateral adherence'' to the MTCR would not meet
this requirement.\84\
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\84\April 5 Hearing.
Since India's unilateral adherence does not qualify it as
an MTCR adherent under section 73 of AECA, the committee
included section 111 to clarify this point. While the provision
accomplishes this, it is also drafted in such a manner as to
permit India, should it so decide in the future, to enjoy the
benefits of AECA section 73 by becoming a full adherent to the
MTCR. Because the provision states a factual finding by
Congress, the provision would no longer have effect if India
were to meet the requirements laid out as in Secretary Rice's
answer. Under section 111, however, India's transfers of
missile or missile-related equipment, technology and technical
data, remain for now subject to U.S. sanctions if they should
violate subsection 73(a) of AECA.
Section 112
Section 112 is a technical amendment to section 1112(c)(4)
of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1999 to make
clear that the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification
and Compliance has responsibility, within the Department of
State, for so much of the reports required by section 108 of
the Act recommended by the committee as relates to verification
or compliance matters. This is in keeping with existing law,
which gives that official such responsibility for ``other
reports being prepared by the Department of State . . .
relating to . . . nonproliferation verification or compliance
matters.''
Earlier this year, the Department adjusted the
responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for Verification
and Compliance and changed the position title to Assistant
Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and
Implementation. The committee intends and understands that all
the authorities provided in section 1112 of the Arms Control
and Nonproliferation Act of 1999 are now vested in the
Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and
Implementation.
Section 113
Section 113 provides definitions of terms used throughout
Title I of the Act.
IV. Cost Estimate
Rule XXVI, paragraph 11(a) of the Standing Rules of the
Senate requires that the committee reports on bills or joint
resolutions contain a cost estimate for such legislation. The
Committee on Foreign Relations reported this legislation on
June 29, 2006, providing the Congressional Budget Office more
than four weeks to provide this cost estimate. To date, the
committee has not received the Congressional Budget Office's
cost estimate.
V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with rule XXVI, paragraph 11(b) of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the committee makes the following
evaluation of the regulatory impact which would be incurred in
carrying out the provisions of S. 2429 under the committee's
jurisdiction.
The committee inquired with the administration which
regulatory requirements would need changes in order to permit
peaceful civilian atomic energy cooperation with India. The
committee notes, as above, that there are many U.S. regulations
and laws implicated in nuclear trade, including the Export
Administration Act and the Export Administration Regulations;
the Arms Export Control Act; the Atomic Energy Act and Parts
110 and 810 of 10 CFR.
In November of 2005, Chairman Lugar inquired ``What
regulatory changes (beyond those already made under the Next
Steps in Strategic Partnership or NSSP) would need to be made
to implement full civil nuclear energy cooperation with
India?'' The administration responded that:
Many of the specifics of required regulatory changes to
implement full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India have
yet to be determined by the administration. U.S. regulations
that incorporate or reflect statutory language will need to be
modified or waived in order to permit civil nuclear cooperation
consistent with the Joint Statement, and will need to be
addressed along with modification or waiver of the related
statute. No Department of Commerce regulatory changes will be
required in order to implement full civil nuclear cooperation,
except as facilities are put under IAEA safeguards, they could
in principle be removed from the Entity List.\85\
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\85\November 2 QFRs.
In April 2006, the Chairman requested that the committee be
provided with a coordinated, interagency examination of all
regulatory changes the administration would make to implement
U.S.-Indian atomic energy cooperation if its exception to
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, as introduced in S. 2429,
were enacted, and that such examination be particular with
regard to any relevant portion of 10 CFR 110 and 810.
Secretary Rice, for the administration, responded by
stating:
[We have] noted that the proposed legislation would change
the process of NRC licensing under 10 CFR 110.42(a)(6), which
currently requires full-scope safeguards as a condition of
issuing a license for export to a non-nuclear weapon state,
unless waived by the President, in which case the provisions of
Section 128 regarding congressional review would apply. The NRC
would presumably amend this regulation to reflect the new
legislation. Similarly, depending on the final wording of the
new legislation, the NRC might have to modify 10 CFR 110.46,
which would otherwise bar issuance of a license to a country
found by the President to have detonated a nuclear explosive
device, unless the President has waived the corresponding
provision of Section 129 of the AEA.
Also . . . the consideration, evaluation, coordination and
reporting of DOE authorizations under 10 CFR Part 810 would not
be affected with respect to the range of cooperation provided
for under the proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation. To
the extent that an authorization under Part 810 involved
sensitive nuclear technology (SNT), the proposed legislation
(unlike current law) would not require full-scope safeguards as
a condition of supply. However, the proposed agreement for
peaceful nuclear cooperation will not provide for exports of
SNT; the agreement would have to be amended (and the amendment
submitted to Congress for review) to allow for such exports.
Depending on the final wording of the new legislation, DOE
might have to consider whether amendments to its regulations
would be required.
The Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
and the Department of Commerce would conduct a thorough review
of their regulations to determine whether any changes would be
required if the proposed legislation became law.\86\
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\86\April 5 Hearing.
The committee believes the Act reported in Title I largely
conforms with S. 2429, and so presumes that most of the
regulatory changes that would be implemented under the Act
would be similar to those that would be required for S. 2429.
The committee does not intend that section 106, which would bar
the export of equipment, materials and technology related to
the enrichment of uranium, and such items as are used in the
production of heavy water, to result in regulatory amendments.
The committee notes that, with regard to 10 CFR Part 810, the
specific approval of the Secretary of Energy would already be
required to engage in the production of special nuclear
material outside the United States as India is a country listed
in Part 810.8(a).
Likewise, engaging in or providing assistance or training
to any foreign country that involves facilities for the
separation of isotopes of source material or special nuclear
material (enrichment) and the chemical processing of irradiated
special nuclear material (reprocessing) also would require a
specific approval from the Secretary of Energy. While it is, of
course, up to the Department of Energy to determine what it
must do to implement the provisions of section 106, it would
appear to the committee that no major rule need be made nor a
substantial amendment to the existing rules since section 106's
effect would be to instruct the Secretary not to approve such
activities unless they met the requirements of subsection
106(b)(2)(A)(i) and (ii) and the President was able to make a
determination under subsection 106(b)(2)(B).
Regarding the NRC regulations at 10 CFR Part 110, the NRC
would already have to issue a specific license for any of the
technology that is implicated in section 106, so is likely the
NRC would similarly decline or reject such export and reexport
applications, or approve them subject to 106(b). More
generally, the NRC would likely have to revise the treatment
extended to India, which is now listed on the Restricted
Destination List at Part 110.29, thus also changing certain
treatment that would be extended to export or reexport
authorizations of both a general and specific nature to India.
Section 107 of the Act, which requires an end use
monitoring program to verify that all U.S. exports and
reexports to India are used as strictly for peaceful purposes
and as stipulated in the licensure of the relevant agencies.
Section 107 could result in certain regulatory adjustments, but
the committee does not intend that they would be major in scope
since the provision should not result in additional duties on
the applicants but rather on the regulatory agencies themselves
to verify most of the diligence requirements and assurances
already required on such licenses. This is true in particular
because existing similar procedures for U.S. nuclear
cooperation with China have not resulted in any regulatory
amendments.
Rule XXVI requires that the committee evaluate and include
(A) an estimate of the numbers of individuals and businesses
who would be regulated and a determination of the groups and
classes of such individuals and businesses; (B) a determination
of the economic impact of such regulation on the individuals,
consumers, and businesses affected; (C) a determination of the
impact on the personal privacy of the individuals affected; and
(D), a determination of the amount of additional paperwork that
will result from the regulations to be promulgated pursuant to
the bill.
The committee's recommended Title I provisions on U.S.-
India civilian nuclear commerce, as noted above, would
implicate any person or entity seeking to export or re-export
nuclear items to India subject to pertinent authorities
(statutory and administrative) for which licenses are required.
This would be the case with or without enactment of the Act,
since such regulations will need to be modified in any case for
such trade with India, and would apply to the information in
Rule 26 (11)(b)(1) (B), (C) and (D). Therefore, pursuant to
Rule 26 (11)(b)(2), the committee finds that it is impractical
to include particular information regarding the regulatory
impact at this time.
Regarding Title II, the U.S. Additional Protocol
Implementation Act, the committee included its regulatory
impact assessment with S. 2489 when it reported that measure to
the Senate.
VI. Changes in Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of Rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman).
Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1999
* * * * * * *
Subtitle A--Arms Control
CHAPTER 1--EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL
AGREEMENTS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1112. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR VERIFICATION AND
COMPLIANCE.
(a) Designation of Position.--The Secretary of State shall
designate one of the Assistant Secretaries of State authorized
by section 1(c)(1) of the State Department Basic Authorities
Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(c)(1)) as the Assistant Secretary
of State for Verification and Compliance. The Assistant
Secretary shall report to the Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security.
(b) Directive Governing the Assistant Secretary of State.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
shall issue a directive governing the position of the
Assistant Secretary.
(2) Elements of the directive.--The directive issued
under paragraph (1) shall set forth, consistent with
this section--
(A) the duties of the Assistant Secretary;
(B) the relationships between the Assistant
Secretary and other officials of the Department
of State;
(C) any delegation of authority from the
Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary;
and
(D) such matters as the Secretary considers
appropriate.
(c) Duties.--
(1) In general.--The Assistant Secretary shall have
as his principal responsibility the overall supervision
(including oversight of policy and resources) within
the Department of State of all matters relating to
verification and compliance with international arms
control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements
or commitments.
(2) Participation of the assistant secretary.--
(A) Primary role.--Except as provided in
subparagraphs (B) and (C), the Assistant
Secretary, or his designee, shall participate
in all interagency groups or organizations
within the executive branch of Government that
assess, analyze, or review United States
planned or ongoing policies, programs, or
actions that have a direct bearing on
verification or compliance matters, including
interagency intelligence committees concerned
with the development or exploitation of
measurement or signals intelligence or other
national technical means of verification.
(B) Requirement for designation.--
Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to groups or
organizations on which the Secretary of State
or the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security sits, unless such
official designates the Assistant Secretary to
attend in his stead.
(C) National security limitation.--
(i) Waiver by president.--The
President may waive the provisions of
subparagraph (A) if inclusion of the
Assistant Secretary would not be in the
national security interests of the
United States.
(ii) Waiver by others.--With respect
to an interagency group or
organization, or meeting thereof,
working with exceptionally sensitive
information contained in compartments
under the control of the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Secretary of
Defense, or the Secretary of Energy,
such Director or Secretary, as the case
may be, may waive the provision of
subparagraph (A) if inclusion of the
Assistant Secretary would not be in the
national security interests of the
United States.
(iii) Transmission of waiver to
congress.--Any waiver of participation
under clause (i) or (ii) shall be
transmitted in writing to the
appropriate committees of Congress.
(3) Relationship to the intelligence community.--The
Assistant Secretary shall be the principal policy
community representative to the intelligence community
on verification and compliance matters.
(4) Reporting responsibilities.--The Assistant
Secretary shall have responsibility within the
Department of State for--
(A) all reports required pursuant to section
306 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22
U.S.C. 2577);
(B) so much of the report required under
paragraphs (4) through (6) of section 403(a) of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C.
2593a(a)(4) through (6)) as relates to
verification or compliance matters; [and]
(C) so much of the reports required under
section 108 of the United States-India Peaceful
Atomic Energy Cooperation Act as relates to
verification or compliance matters; and
[(C)] (D) other reports being prepared by the
Department of State as of the date of enactment
of this Act relating to arms control,
nonproliferation, or disarmament verification
or compliance matters.
* * * * * * *
ANNEX
----------
I.--Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh
For Immediate Release,
Office of the Press Secretary,
July 18, 2005
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush today
declare their resolve to transform the relationship between
their countries and establish a global partnership. As leaders
of nations committed to the values of human freedom, democracy
and rule of law, the new relationship between India and the
United States will promote stability, democracy, prosperity and
peace throughout the world. It will enhance our ability to work
together to provide global leadership in areas of mutual
concern and interest.
Building on their common values and interests, the two leaders resolve:
To create an international environment conducive to
promotion of democratic values, and to strengthen
democratic practices in societies which wish to become
more open and pluralistic.
To combat terrorism relentlessly. They applaud the
active and vigorous counterterrorism cooperation
between the two countries and support more
international efforts in this direction. Terrorism is a
global scourge and the one we will fight everywhere.
The two leaders strongly affirm their commitment to the
conclusion by September of a UN comprehensive
convention against international terrorism.
The Prime Minister's visit coincides with the completion of
the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative,
launched in January 2004. The two leaders agree that this
provides the basis for expanding bilateral activities and
commerce in space, civil nuclear energy and dual-use
technology.
Drawing on their mutual vision for the U.S.-India relationship, and our
joint objectives as strong long-standing democracies, the two
leaders agree on the following:
FOR THE ECONOMY
Revitalize the U.S.-India Economic Dialogue and
launch a CEO Forum to harness private sector energy and
ideas to deepen the bilateral economic relationship.
Support and accelerate economic growth in both
countries through greater trade, investment, and
technology collaboration.
Promote modernization of India's infrastructure as a
prerequisite for the continued growth of the Indian
economy. As India enhances its investment climate,
opportunities for investment will increase.
Launch a U.S.-India Knowledge Initiative on
Agriculture focused on promoting teaching, research,
service and commercial linkages.
FOR ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Strengthen energy security and promote the
development of stable and efficient energy markets in
India with a view to ensuring adequate, affordable
energy supplies and conscious of the need for
sustainable development. These issues will be addressed
through the U.S.-India Energy Dialogue.
Agree on the need to promote the imperatives of
development and safeguarding the environment, commit to
developing and deploying cleaner, more efficient,
affordable, and diversified energy technologies.
FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT
Develop and support, through the new U.S.-India
Global Democracy Initiative in countries that seek such
assistance, institutions and resources that strengthen
the foundations that make democracies credible and
effective. India and the U.S. will work together to
strengthen democratic practices and capacities and
contribute to the new U.N. Democracy Fund.
Commit to strengthen cooperation and combat HIV/AIDs
at a global level through an initiative that mobilizes
private sector and government resources, knowledge, and
expertise.
FOR NON-PROLIFERATION AND SECURITY
Express satisfaction at the New Framework for the
U.S.-India Defense Relationship as a basis for future
cooperation, including in the field of defense
technology.
Commit to play a leading role in international
efforts to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction. The U.S. welcomed the adoption by India of
legislation on WMD (Prevention of Unlawful Activities
Bill).
Launch a new U.S.-India Disaster Relief Initiative
that builds on the experience of the Tsunami Core
Group, to strengthen cooperation to prepare for and
conduct disaster relief operations.
FOR HIGH-TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE
Sign a Science and Technology Framework Agreement,
building on the U.S.-India High-Technology Cooperation
Group (HTCG), to provide for joint research and
training, and the establishment of public-private
partnerships.
Build closer ties in space exploration, satellite
navigation and launch, and in the commercial space
arena through mechanisms such as the U.S.-India Working
Group on Civil Space Cooperation.
Building on the strengthened nonproliferation
commitments undertaken in the NSSP, to remove certain
Indian organizations from the Department of Commerce's
Entity List.
Recognizing the significance of civilian nuclear energy for
meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more
efficient manner, the two leaders discussed India's plans to
develop its civilian nuclear energy program.
President Bush conveyed his appreciation to the Prime
Minister over India's strong commitment to preventing WMD
proliferation and stated that as a responsible state with
advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same
benefits and advantages as other such states. The President
told the Prime Minister that he will work to achieve full civil
nuclear energy cooperation with India as it realizes its goals
of promoting nuclear power and achieving energy security. The
President would also seek agreement from Congress to adjust
U.S. laws and policies, and the United States will work with
friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable
full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India,
including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel
supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur. In the
meantime, the United States will encourage its partners to also
consider this request expeditiously. India has expressed its
interest in ITER and a willingness to contribute. The United
States will consult with its partners considering India's
participation. The United States will consult with the other
participants in the Generation IV International Forum with a
view toward India's inclusion.
The Prime Minister conveyed that for his part, India would
reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same
responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits
and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear
technology, such as the United States. These responsibilities
and practices consist of identifying and separating civilian
and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner
and filing a declaration regarding its civilians facilities
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a
decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional
Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities;
continuing India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing;
working with the United States for the conclusion of a
multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from
transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states
that do not have them and supporting international efforts to
limit their spread; and ensuring that the necessary steps have
been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through
comprehensive export control legislation and through
harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.
The President welcomed the Prime Minister's assurance. The
two leaders agreed to establish a working group to undertake on
a phased basis in the months ahead the necessary actions
mentioned above to fulfill these commitments. The President and
Prime Minister also agreed that they would review this progress
when the President visits India in 2006.
The two leaders also reiterated their commitment that their
countries would play a leading role in international efforts to
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
including nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological
weapons.
In light of this closer relationship, and the recognition
of India's growing role in enhancing regional and global
security, the Prime Minister and the President agree that
international institutions must fully reflect changes in the
global scenario that have taken place since 1945. The President
reiterated his view that international institutions are going
to have to adapt to reflect India's central and growing role.
The two leaders state their expectations that India and the
United States will strengthen their cooperation in global
forums.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh thanks President Bush for the
warmth of his reception and the generosity of his hospitality.
He extends an invitation to President Bush to visit India at
his convenience and the President accepts that invitation.
----------
II.--Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation With India
1.At the ____________ Plenary meeting on ____________ the
Participating Governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
agreed that they:
a.Desire to contribute to an effective non-proliferation
regime, and to the widest possible implementation of
the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons;
b.Seek to limit the further spread of nuclear weapons;
c.Wish to pursue mechanisms to affect positively the conduct
of those outside the Treaty;
d.Seek to promote international cooperation in the research,
development and the safe use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes; and
e.Recognize the promise of nuclear power in India as a clean
source of energy for sustained economic growth and
prosperity.
2.In this respect, Participating Governments have taken note of
steps that India has taken to contribute to the non-
proliferation regime and they welcome India's efforts with
respect to the following commitments and actions:
a.Has publicly designated civil nuclear facilities which will
be submitted to IAEA safeguards in perpetuity;
b.Has committed to continue its moratorium on nuclear
testing, and to work with others towards achievement of
a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty;
c.Has committed to sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol
covering designated civil nuclear facilities;
d.Has committed to support international efforts to restrain
the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies;
e.Has adopted a national export control system capable of
effectively controlling transfers of multilaterally
controlled nuclear and nuclear-related material,
equipment and technology;
f.Has committed to adhere to the Nuclear Supplier Group
Guidelines.
3.For these reasons, Participating Governments have adopted the
following policy on civil nuclear cooperation by
Participating Governments with the peaceful safeguarded
Indian civil nuclear power program.
4.Notwithstanding paragraphs 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c), of INFCIRC/
254/Part 1 as revised (the NSG Guidelines), Participating
Governments may transfer trigger list items and/or related
technology for use in civil nuclear facilities in India, in
accordance with paragraph 4(d) as long as the
[Participating Government] intending to make the transfer
is satisfied that India is continuing to meet all of the
aforementioned non-proliferation and safeguards
commitments, and that the contemplated transfer complies
with all of the other conditions of the NSG Guidelines.
5.Participating Governments, in accordance with paragraph 4(d),
of the NSG Guidelines, will continue to strive for the
earliest possible implementation of the policy referred to
in paragraph 4(a) with respect to transfers of trigger list
items and related technology to India.
6.The NSG Point of Contact is requested to submit this
Statement to the IAEA Director General with a request that
he circulate it to all Member States.
----------
III.--Implementation of the India--United States Joint Statement of
July 18, 2005: India's Separation Plan
MARCH 2, 2006
The resumption of full civilian nuclear energy cooperation
between India and the United States arose in the context of
India's requirement for adequate and affordable energy supplies
to sustain its accelerating economic growth rate and as
recognition of its growing technological prowess. It was
preceded by discussions between the two Governments,
particularly between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh, of the global energy scenario and the long-term
implications of increasing pressure on hydrocarbon resources
and rising oil prices. These developments led to the
announcement in April 2005 of an Indo-U.S. Energy Dialogue that
encompassed the entire spectrum of energy options ranging from
oil and gas to coal, alternative fuels and civilian nuclear
energy. Through the initiation of a sustained dialogue to
address energy security concerns, the two countries sought to
promote stable, efficient, predictable and cost effective
solutions for India's growing requirements. At the same time,
they also agreed on the need to develop and deploy cleaner,
more efficient, affordable and diversified energy technologies
to deal with the environmental implications of energy
consumption. India had developed proven and wide-ranging
capabilities in the nuclear sector, including over the entire
nuclear fuel cycle. It is internationally recognized that India
has unique contributions to make to international efforts
towards meeting these objectives. India has become a full
partner in ITER, with the full support of the U.S. and other
partners. India also accepted the U.S. invitation to join the
initiative on Clean Development Partnership.
2. Noting the centrality of civilian nuclear energy to the
twin challenges of energy security and safeguarding the
environment, the two Governments agreed on 18 July 2005 to
undertake reciprocal commitments and responsibilities that
would create a framework for the resumption of full cooperation
in this field. On its part, the United States undertook to:
Seek agreement from the Congress to adjust U.S. laws
and policies to achieve full civil nuclear energy
cooperation.
Work with friends and allies to adjust international
regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation
and trade with India, including but not limited to
expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for
safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.
In the meantime, encourage its partners to consider
fuel supply to Tarapur expeditiously.
To consult with its partners to consider India's
participation in ITER.
To consult with other participants in the
Generation-IV International Forum with a view towards
India's inclusion.
3. India had conveyed its readiness to assume the same
responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits
and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear
technology, such as the United States. Accordingly, India for
its part undertook the following commitments:
Identifying and separating civilian and military
nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner.
Filing a declaration regarding its civilian
facilities with the IAEA.
Taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian
nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and
Signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with
respect to civilian nuclear facilities.
4. Other commitments undertaken by India have already been
fulfilled in the last year. Among them are:
India's responsible non-proliferation record,
recognized by the U.S., continues and is reflected in
its policies and actions.
The harmonization of India's export controls with
NSG and MTCR Guidelines even though India is not a
member of either group. These guidelines and control
lists have been notified and are being implemented.
A significant upgrading of India's non-proliferation
regulations and export controls has taken place as a
result of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of May
2005. Inter-Ministerial consultations are ongoing to
examine and amend other relevant Acts as well as
framing appropriate rules and regulations.
Refrain from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing
technologies to states that do not have them and
supporting international efforts to limit their spread.
This has guided our policy on non-proliferation.
Continued unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing,
and
Willingness to work with the United States for the
conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty.
5. The Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, recognized that
India is ready to assume the same responsibilities and
practices as other leading countries with advanced nuclear
technology, such as the United States. India has an impeccable
record in non-proliferation. The Joint Statement acknowledges
that India's nuclear programme has both a military and a
civilian component. Both sides had agreed that the purpose was
not to constrain India's strategic programme but to enable
resumption of full civil nuclear energy cooperation in order to
enhance global energy and environmental security. Such
cooperation was predicated on the assumption that any
international civil nuclear energy cooperation (including by
the U.S.) offered to India in the civilian sector should,
firstly, not be diverted away from civilian purposes, and
secondly, should not be transferred from India to third
countries without safeguards. These concepts will be reflected
in the Safeguards Agreement to be negotiated by India with
IAEA.
6. India's nuclear programme is unique as it is the only
state with nuclear weapons not to have begun with a dedicated
military programme. It must be appreciated that the strategic
programme is an offshoot of research on nuclear power programme
and consequently, it is embedded in a larger undifferentiated
programme. Identification of purely civilian facilities and
programmes that have no strategic implications poses a
particular challenge. Therefore, facilities identified as
civilian in the Separation Plan will be offered for safeguards
in phases to be decided by India. The nature of the facility
concerned, the activities undertaken in it, the national
security significance of materials and the location of the
facilities are factors taken into account in undertaking the
separation process. This is solely an Indian determination.
7. The nuclear establishment in India not only built
nuclear reactors but promoted the growth of a national
industrial infrastructure. Nuclear power generation was
envisaged as a three-stage programme with PHWRs chosen for
deployment in the first stage. As indigenous reactors were set
up, several innovative design improvements were carried out
based on Indian R&D and a standardized design was evolved. The
research and technology development spanned the entire spectrum
of the nuclear fuel cycle including the front end and the back
end. Success in the technologies for the back end of the fuel
cycle allowed us to launch the second stage of the programme by
constructing a Fast Breeder Test Reactor. This reactor has
operated for 20 years based on a unique carbide fuel and has
achieved all technology objectives. We have now proceeded
further and are constructing a 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder
Reactor. Simultaneously, we have launched design and
development of reactors aimed at thorium utilization and
incorporating inherent safety features.
8. Concepts such as grid connectivity are not relevant to
the separation exercise. Issues related to fuel resource
sustainability, technical design and economic viability, as
well as smooth operation of reactors are relevant factors. This
would necessitate grid connectivity irrespective of whether the
reactor concerned is civilian or not civilian.
9. It must be recognized that the Indian nuclear programme
still has a relatively narrow base and cannot be expected to
adopt solutions that might be deemed viable by much larger
programmes. A comparison of the number of reactors and the
total installed capacity between India and the P-5 brings this
out graphically:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total installed
Country Number of reactors capacity
------------------------------------------------------------------------
India 15 3.04 GWe (2.8% of the
total production)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USA 104 (103 operational) 99.21 GWe (19.9% of
the total production)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
France 59 63.36 GWe (78.1% of
the total production)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UK 23 11.85 GWe (19.4% of
the total production)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia 31 21.74 GWe (15.6% of
the total production)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
China 9 6.602 GWe (2.2% of the
total production)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Nuclear Energy Institute, Washington DC
10. Another factor to be taken into account is the small
capacity of the reactors produced indigenously by India, some
of which would remain outside safeguards. Therefore, in
assessing the extent of safeguards coverage, it would be
important to look at both the number of reactors and the
percentage of installed capacity covered. An average Indian
reactor is of 220 MW and its output is significantly smaller
than the standard reactor in a P-5 economy. The chart below
illustrates this aspect:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Country Most Common Reactor Number of Such Reactors
------------------------------------------------------------------------
India PHWRs 220 MWe 12
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USA 69 PWRs and 34 BWRs. 51 Reactors in the range
Most plants are in the of 1000 MWe to 1250 MWe
range of 1000-1250 MWe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
France PWRs of 900 MWe and 1300 34 PWRs of 900 MWe and
MWe size 20 PWRs of 1300 MWe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UK No standard size. AGR is 14 AGRs
the most common in the
range of 600-700 MWe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia 3rd Generation VVER-1000 9 3rd Generation VVER-
PWRs and RBMK 1000 1000 PWRs and 11 RBMK
Light Water Graphite 1000 Light Water
Reactors Graphite Reactors
------------------------------------------------------------------------
China PWRs 984 MWe Four
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Uranium Information Centre, Melbourne
11. The complexity of the separation process is further
enhanced by the limited resources that India has devoted to its
nuclear programme as compared to P-5 nations. Moreover, as
India expands international cooperation, the percentage of its
thermal power reactor installed capacity under safeguards would
rise significantly as fresh capacity is added through such
cooperation.
12. India's approach to the separation of its civilian
nuclear facilities is guided by the following principles:
Credible, feasible and implementable in a
transparent manner;
Consistent with the understandings of the 18 July
Statement;
Consistent with India's national security and R&D
requirements as well as not prejudicial to the three-
stage nuclear programme in India;
Must be cost effective in its implementation; and
Must be acceptable to Parliament and public opinion.
13. Based on these principles, India will:
Include in the civilian list only those facilities
offered for safeguards that, after separation, will no
longer be engaged in activities of strategic
significance.
The overarching criterion would be a judgment
whether subjecting a facility to IAEA safeguards would
impact adversely on India's national security.
However, a facility will be excluded from the
civilian list if it is located in a larger hub of
strategic significance, notwithstanding the fact that
it may not be normally engaged in activities of
strategic significance.
A civilian facility would, therefore, be one that
India has determined not to be relevant to its
strategic programme.
14. Taking the above into account, India, on the basis of
reciprocal actions by the U.S., will adopt the following
approach:
(i) Thermal Power Reactors: India will identify and
offer for safeguards 14 thermal power reactors between
2006 and 2014. This will include the 4 presently
safeguarded reactors (TAPS 1&2, RAPS 1&2) and in
addition KK 1&2 that are under construction. 8 other
PHWRs, each of a capacity of 220 MW, will also be
offered. Phasing of specific thermal power reactors,
being offered for safeguards would be indicated
separately by India. Such an offer would, in effect,
cover 14 out of the 22 thermal power reactors in
operation or currently under construction to be placed
under safeguards, and would raise the total installed
Thermal Power capacity by MWs under safeguards from the
present 19% to 65% by 2014.
(ii) Fast Breeder Reactors: India is not in a
position to accept safeguards on the Prototype Fast
Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and the Fast Breeder Test
Reactor (FBTR), both located at Kalpakkam. The Fast
Breeder Programme is at the R&D stage and its
technology will take time to mature and reach an
advanced stage of development.
(iii) Future Reactors: India has decided to place
under safeguards all future civilian thermal power
reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the
Government of India retains the sole right to determine
such reactors as civilian.
(iv) Research Reactors: India will permanently shut
down the CIRUS reactor, in 2010. It will also be
prepared to shift the fuel core of the APSARA reactor
that was purchased from France outside BARC and make
the fuel core available to be placed under safeguards
in 2010.
(v) Upstream Facilities: The following upstream
facilities would be identified and separated as
civilian:
List of those specific facilities in the
Nuclear Fuel Complex, which will be offered for
safeguards by 2008 will be indicated
separately.
The Heavy Water Production plants at Thal,
Tuticorin and Hazira are proposed to be
designated for civilian use between 2006-2009.
We do not consider these plants as relevant for
safeguards purposes.
(vi) Downstream Facilities: The following downstream
facilities would be identified and separated as
civilian:
India is willing to accept safeguards in the
``campaign'' mode after 2010 in respect of the
Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant.
The Tarapur and Rajasthan ``Away From
Reactors'' spent fuel storage pools would be
made available for safeguards with appropriate
phasing between 2006-2009.
(vii) Research Facilities: India will declare the
following facilities as civilian:
(a) Tata Institute of Fundamental Research
(c) Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre
(d) Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics
(e) Institute for Plasma Research
(f) Institute of Mathematics Sciences
(g) Institute of Physics
(h) Tata Memorial Centre
(i) Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology
(j) Harish Chandra Research Institute
These facilities are safeguards-irrelevant. It is our
expectation that they will play a prominent role in
international cooperation.
15. Safeguards:
(a) The United States has conveyed its commitment to
the reliable supply of fuel to India. Consistent with
the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States
has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the
necessary conditions for India to have assured and full
access to fuel for its reactors. As part of its
implementation of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement
the United States is committed to seeking agreement
from the U.S. Congress to amend its domestic laws and
to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary
conditions for India to obtain full access to the
international fuel market, including reliable,
uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies
from firms in several nations.
(b) To further guard against any disruption of fuel
supplies, the United States is prepared to take the
following additional steps:
(i) The United States is willing to
incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in
the bilateral U.S.-India agreement on peaceful
uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the
U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which would be
submitted to the U.S. Congress.
(ii) The United States will join India in
seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-
specific fuel supply agreement.
(iii) The United States will support an
Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of
nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of
supply over the lifetime of India's reactors.
(iv) If despite these arrangements, a
disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs,
the United States and India would jointly
convene a group of friendly supplier countries
to include countries such as Russia, France and
the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as
would restore fuel supply to India.
(c) In light of the above understandings with the
United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement
will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing
for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of
safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any
time as well as providing for corrective measures that
India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its
civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of
foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India
will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-
specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an
appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the
IAEA.
16. This plan is in conformity with the commitments made to
Parliament by the Government.
March 2, 2006
----------
IV.--Implementation of the India--United States Joint Statement of July
18, 2005: India's Separation Plan
MAY 6, 2006
The resumption of full civilian nuclear energy cooperation
between India and the United States arose in the context of
India's requirement for adequate and affordable energy supplies
to sustain its accelerating economic growth rate and as
recognition of its growing technological prowess. It was
preceded by discussions between the two Governments,
particularly between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh, of the global energy scenario and the long-term
implications of increasing pressure on hydrocarbon resources
and rising oil prices. These developments led to the
announcement in April 2005 of an Indo-U.S. Energy Dialogue that
encompassed the entire spectrum of energy options ranging from
oil and gas to coal, alternative fuels and civilian nuclear
energy. Through the initiation of a sustained dialogue to
address energy security concerns, the two countries sought to
promote stable, efficient, predictable and cost effective
solutions for India's growing requirements. At the same time,
they also agreed on the need to develop and deploy cleaner,
more efficient, affordable and diversified energy technologies
to deal with the environmental implications of energy
consumption. India had developed proven and wide-ranging
capabilities in the nuclear sector, including over the entire
nuclear fuel cycle. It is internationally recognized that India
has unique contributions to make to international efforts
towards meeting these objectives. India has become a full
partner in ITER, with the full support of the U.S. and other
partners. India also accepted the U.S. invitation to join the
initiative on Clean Development Partnership.
2. Noting the centrality of civilian nuclear energy to the
twin challenges of energy security and safeguarding the
environment, the two Governments agreed on 18 July 2005 to
undertake reciprocal commitments and responsibilities that
would create a framework for the resumption of full cooperation
in this field. On its part, the United States undertook to:
Seek agreement from the Congress to adjust U.S. laws
and policies to achieve full civil nuclear energy
cooperation.
Work with friends and allies to adjust international
regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation
and trade with India, including but not limited to
expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for
safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.
In the meantime, encourage its partners to consider
fuel supply to Tarapur expeditiously.
To consult with its partners to consider India's
participation in ITER.
To consult with other participants in the Generation
IV International Forum with a view towards India's
inclusion.
3. India had conveyed its readiness to assume the same
responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits
and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear
technology, such as the United States. Accordingly, India for
its part undertook the following commitments:
Identifying and separating civilian and military
nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner.
Filing a declaration regarding its civilian
facilities with the IAEA.
Taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian
nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and
Signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with
respect to civilian nuclear facilities.
4. Other commitments undertaken by India have already been
fulfilled in the last year. Among them are:
India's responsible non-proliferation record,
recognized by the U.S., continues and is reflected in
its policies and actions.
The harmonization of India's export controls with
NSG and MTCR Guidelines even though India is not a
member of either group. These guidelines and control
lists have been notified and are being implemented.
A significant upgrading of India's non-proliferation
regulations and export controls has taken place as a
result of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of May
2005. Inter-Ministerial consultations are ongoing to
examine and amend other relevant Acts as well as
framing appropriate rules and regulations.
Refrain from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing
technologies to states that do not have them and
supporting international efforts to limit their spread.
This has guided our policy on non-proliferation.
Continued unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing,
and
Willingness to work with the United States for the
conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off
Treaty.
5. The Joint Statement of 18 July 2005, recognized that
India is ready to assume the same responsibilities and
practices as other leading countries with advanced nuclear
technology, such as the United States. India has an impeccable
record in non-proliferation. The Joint Statement acknowledges
that India's nuclear programme has both a military and a
civilian component. Both sides had agreed that the purpose was
not to constrain India's strategic programme but to enable
resumption of full civil nuclear energy cooperation in order to
enhance global energy and environmental security. Such
cooperation was predicated on the assumption that any
international civil nuclear energy cooperation (including by
the U.S.) offered to India in the civilian sector should,
firstly, not be diverted away from civilian purposes, and
secondly, should not be transferred from India to third
countries without safeguards. These concepts will be reflected
in the Safeguards Agreement to be negotiated by India with
IAEA.
6. India's nuclear programme is unique as it is the only
state with nuclear weapons not to have begun with a dedicated
military programme. It must be appreciated that the strategic
programme is an offshoot of research on nuclear power programme
and consequently, it is embedded in a larger undifferentiated
programme. Identification of purely civilian facilities and
programmes that have no strategic implications poses a
particular challenge. Therefore, facilities identified as
civilian in the Separation Plan will be offered for safeguards
in phases to be decided by India. The nature of the facility
concerned, the activities undertaken in it, the national
security significance of materials and the location of the
facilities are factors taken into account in undertaking the
separation process. This is solely an Indian determination.
7. The nuclear establishment in India not only built
nuclear reactors but promoted the growth of a national
industrial infrastructure. Nuclear power generation was
envisaged as a three-stage programme with PHWRs chosen for
deployment in the first stage. As indigenous reactors were set
up, several innovative design improvements were carried out
based on Indian R&D and a standardized design was evolved. The
research and technology development spanned the entire spectrum
of the nuclear fuel cycle including the front end and the back
end. Success in the technologies for the back end of the fuel
cycle allowed us to launch the second stage of the programme by
constructing a Fast Breeder Test Reactor. This reactor has
operated for 20 years based on a unique carbide fuel and has
achieved all technology objectives. We have now proceeded
further and are constructing a 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder
Reactor. Simultaneously, we have launched design and
development of reactors aimed at thorium utilization and
incorporating inherent safety features.
8. Concepts such as grid connectivity are not relevant to
the separation exercise. Issues related to fuel resource
sustainability, technical design and economic viability, as
well as smooth operation of reactors are relevant factors. This
would necessitate grid connectivity irrespective of whether the
reactor concerned is civilian or not civilian.
9. It must be recognized that the Indian nuclear programme
still has a relatively narrow base and cannot be expected to
adopt solutions that might be deemed viable by much larger
programmes. A comparison of the number of reactors and the
total installed capacity between India and the P-5 brings this
out graphically:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total installed
Country Number of reactors capacity
------------------------------------------------------------------------
India 15 3.04 GWe (2.8% of the
total production)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USA 104 (103 operational) 99.21 GWe (19.9% of
the total production)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
France 59 63.36 GWe (78.1% of
the total production)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UK 23 11.85 GWe (19.4% of
the total production)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia 31 21.74 GWe (15.6% of
the total production)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
China 9 6.602 GWe (2.2% of the
total production)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Nuclear Energy Institute, Washington DC
10. Another factor to be taken into account is the small
capacity of the reactors produced indigenously by India, some
of which would remain outside safeguards. Therefore, in
assessing the extent of safeguards coverage, it would be
important to look at both the number of reactors and the
percentage of installed capacity covered. An average Indian
reactor is of 220 MW and its output is significantly smaller
than the standard reactor in a P-5 economy. The chart below
illustrates this aspect:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Country Most Common Reactor Number of Such Reactors
------------------------------------------------------------------------
India PHWRs 220 MWe 12
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USA 69 PWRs and 34 BWRs. 51 Reactors in the range
Most plants are in the of 1000 MWe to 1250 MWe
range of 1000-1250 MWe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
France PWRs of 900 MWe and 1300 34 PWRs of 900 MWe and
MWe size 20 PWRs of 1300 MWe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UK No standard size. AGR is 14 AGRs
the most common in the
range of 600-700 MWe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia 3rd Generation VVER-1000 9 3rd Generation VVER-
PWRs and RBMK 1000 1000 PWRs and 11 RBMK
Light Water Graphite 1000 Light Water
Reactors Graphite Reactors
------------------------------------------------------------------------
China PWRs 984 MWe Four
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Uranium Information Centre, Melbourne
11. The complexity of the separation process is further
enhanced by the limited resources that India has devoted to its
nuclear programme as compared to P-5 nations. Moreover, as
India expands international cooperation, the percentage of its
thermal power reactor installed capacity under safeguards would
rise significantly as fresh capacity is added through such
cooperation.
12. India's approach to the separation of its civilian
nuclear facilities is guided by the following principles:
Credible, feasible and implementable in a
transparent manner;
Consistent with the understandings of the 18 July
Statement;
Consistent with India's national security and R&D
requirements as well as not prejudicial to the three-
stage nuclear programme in India;
Must be cost effective in its implementation; and
Must be acceptable to Parliament and public opinion.
13. Based on these principles, India will:
Include in the civilian list only those facilities
offered for safeguards that, after separation, will no
longer be engaged in activities of strategic
significance.
The overarching criterion would be a judgment
whether subjecting a facility to IAEA safeguards would
impact adversely on India's national security.
However, a facility will be excluded from the
civilian list if it is located in a larger hub of
strategic significance, notwithstanding the fact that
it may not be normally engaged in activities of
strategic significance.
A civilian facility would, therefore, be one that
India has determined not to be relevant to its
strategic programme.
14. Taking the above into account, India, on the basis of
reciprocal actions by the U.S., will adopt the following
approach:
(i) Thermal Power Reactors: India will identify and
offer for safeguards 14 thermal power reactors between
2006 and 2014. This will include the 4 presently
safeguarded reactors (TAPS 1&2, RAPS 1&2) and in
addition KK1&2 that are under construction. 8 other
PHWRs, each of a capacity of 220 MWe, will also be
offered. The overall plan will be as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
S. No. Facility Year offered for safeguards
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. TAPS 1 2006
2. TAPS 2 2006
3. RAPS 1 2006
4. RAPS 2 2006
5. KK 1 2006
6. KK 2 2006
7. RAPS 5 2007
8. RAPS 6 2008
9. RAPS 3 2010
10. RAPS 4 2010
11. KAPS 1 2012
12. KAPS 2 2012
13. NAPS 1 2014
14. NAPS 2 2014
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The above offer would in effect, cover 14 out of the 22
thermal power reactors in operation or currently under
construction to be placed under sadfeguards, and would raise
the total installed Thermal Power capacity by Mwe under
safeguards from the present 19% to 65% by 2012.
(ii) Fast Breeder Reactors: India is not in a
position to accept safeguards on the Prototype Fast
Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and the Fast Breeder Test
Reactor (FBTR), both located at Kalpakkam. The Fast
Breeder Programme is at the R&D stage and its
technology will take time to mature and reach an
advanced stage of development.
(iii) Future Reactors: India has decided to place
under safeguards all future civilian thermal power
reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the
Government of India retains the sole right to determine
such reactors as civilian.
(iv) Research Reactors: India will permanently shut
down the CIRUS reactor, in 2010. It will also be
prepared to shift the fuel core of the APSARA reactor
that was purchased from France outside BARC and make
the fuel core available to be placed under safeguards
in 2010.
(v) Upstream Facilities: The following upstream
facilities would be identified and separated as
civilian:
List of specific facilities in the Nuclear Fuel
Complex, Hyderabad, which will be offered for
safeguards by 2008 is given below:
--Uranium Oxide Plant (Block A)
--Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant
(Pelletizing) (Block A)
--Enriched Uranium Oxide Plant
--Enriched Fuel Fabrication Plant
--Gadolinla Facility
The Heavy Water Production plants at Thal,
Tuticorin and Hazira are proposed to be
designated for civilian use between 2006-2009.
We do not consider these plants as relevant for
safeguards purposes.
(vi) Downstream Facilities: The following downstream
facilities would be identified and separated as
civilian:
India is willing to accept safeguards in the
``campaign'' mode after 2010 in respect of the
Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant.
The Tarapur and Rajasthan ``Away From
Reactors'' spent fuel storage pools would be
made available for safeguards with appropriate
phasing between 2006-2009.
(vii) Research Facilities: India will declare the
following facilities as civilian:
(a) Tata Institute of Fundamental Research
(c) Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre
(d) Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics
(e) Institute for Plasma Research
(f) Institute of Mathematics Sciences
(g) Institute of Physics
(h) Tata Memorial Centre
(i) Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology
(j) Harish Chandra Research Institute
These facilities are safeguards-irrelevant. It is our
expectation that they will play a prominent role in
international cooperation.
15. Safeguards:
(a) The United States has conveyed its commitment to
the reliable supply of fuel to India. Consistent with
the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States
has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the
necessary conditions for India to have assured and full
access to fuel for its reactors. As part of its
implementation of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement
the United States is committed to seeking agreement
from the U.S. Congress to amend its domestic laws and
to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary
conditions for India to obtain full access to the
international fuel market, including reliable,
uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies
from firms in several nations.
(b) To further guard against any disruption of fuel
supplies, the United States is prepared to take the
following additional steps:
(i) The United States is willing to
incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in
the bilateral U.S.-India agreement on peaceful
uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the
U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which would be
submitted to the U.S. Congress.
(ii) The United States will join India in
seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-
specific fuel supply agreement.
(iii) The United States will support an
Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of
nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of
supply over the lifetime of India's reactors.
(iv) If despite these arrangements, a
disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs,
the United States and India would jointly
convene a group of friendly supplier countries
to include countries such as Russia, France and
the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as
would restore fuel supply to India.
(c) In light of the above understandings with the
United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement
will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing
for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of
safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any
time as well as providing for corrective measures that
India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its
civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of
foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India
will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-
specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an
appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the
IAEA.
16. This plan is in conformity with the commitments made to
Parliament by the Government.
May 6, 2006
----------
V.--Communication From Secretary Rice to Chairman Lugar, June 28, 2006
The Secretary of State,
Washington, DC,
June 28, 2006.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar, Chairman,
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to confirm that, in
carrying out the laws and regulations of the United States
governing the export of nuclear-related items, the United
States Government will continue to act in accordance with IAEA
INFCIRC/254, as amended, the Guidelines and Annexes of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group. The U.S. will also continue to act
within the policies and practices of the decisions taken by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group with respect to any exports to India.
We intend to do so notwithstanding any contrary actions by any
other participating countries in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
We appreciate the committee's prompt action on this
important legislation.
Sincerely,
Condoleezza Rice,
Secretary of State.
----------
VI.--Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to
Under Secretaries Nicholas Burns and Robert Joseph by Senator Biden,
March 29, 2006\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Senator Biden submitted these questions following a Closed
Session hearing held by the committee on March 29, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
INDIA'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES SEPARATION OFFER
Question (1)(a). India has decided to declare as
``military'' 8 of the 22 power reactors that it currently
possesses or is building. Perhaps all of those 8 reactors will
be Canadian-type reactors that can be used to produce weapons-
grade plutonium.
How much weapons-grade plutonium has India been producing
annually, in recent years?
Answer. We would be happy to discuss India's plutonium
production, and other aspects of its nuclear weapons program,
in an appropriate classified setting.
Question (1)(b). India has decided to declare as
``military'' 8 of the 22 power reactors that it currently
possesses or is building. Perhaps all of those 8 reactors will
be Canadian-type reactors that can be used to produce weapons-
grade plutonium.
Which power reactors will India declare as ``military?''
Answer. India's separation plan calls for 14 of 22 thermal
power reactors--both existing and presently under
construction--to be declared civil and placed under IAEA
safeguards. To date, the 8 not declared civil have not yet been
identified publicly.
Question (1)(c). India has decided to declare as
``military'' 8 of the 22 power reactors that it currently
possesses or is building. Perhaps all of those 8 reactors will
be Canadian-type reactors that can be used to produce weapons-
grade plutonium.
How much plutonium could India make if the 8 reactors
declared ``military'' were devoted to that mission?
Answer. We would be happy to discuss India's plutonium
production, and other aspects of its nuclear weapons program,
in an appropriate classified setting.
Question (1)(d). India has decided to declare as
``military'' 8 of the 22 power reactors that it currently
possesses or is building. Perhaps all of those 8 reactors will
be Canadian-type reactors that can be used to produce weapons-
grade plutonium.
How many nuclear weapons can India produce each year, using
its annual plutonium production? And how many could it make if
the 8 reactors declared ``military'' were devoted to that
mission?
Answer. We would be happy to discuss India's plutonium
production, and other aspects of its nuclear weapons program,
in an appropriate classified setting.
Question (2)(a). India already has a large stockpile of
unseparated plutonium in its spent nuclear reactor fuel.
How much plutonium does India have, and how much
unseparated plutonium is in its unsafeguarded spent nuclear
fuel? How many nuclear weapons could it produce with this
stockpiled plutonium?
Answer. We would be happy to discuss India's plutonium
production, and other aspects of its nuclear weapons program,
in an appropriate classified setting.
Question (2)(b). India already has a large stockpile of
unseparated plutonium in its spent nuclear reactor fuel.
Is that plutonium less useful for nuclear weapons than the
plutonium that India might produce using the 8 reactors it will
declare as ``military?'' If so, please explain.
Answer. India has existing stocks of both reactor-grade and
weapons-grade plutonium. The heavy water power reactors that
India has not declared as civil in its separation plan could
produce either weapons-grade or reactor-grade plutonium,
depending on how they were operated. In principle, either grade
of plutonium could be used in a nuclear explosive device.
Question (3)(a). India will declare its pilot ``fast
breeder'' reactor as ``military.'' And while it may declare
some future ``fast breeder'' reactors as ``civil,'' it did not
promise to do so.
Were there any side promises in this regard, either formal
or informal? If so, please provide them.
Answer. India has said publicly that it will declare and
safeguard all future civil fast breeder reactors. There were no
``side promises'' in this regard.
While India retains the sovereign right to determine
whether future indigenous reactors serve a civil or military
function--as it does today--neither we nor our international
partners will cooperate with non-civil or non-safeguarded
facilities. All externally-supplied reactors and other
controlled technologies will by necessity be civil and subject
to IAEA safeguards.
We would also note that India has indicated repeatedly that
it intends to increase significantly its nuclear energy
production. As such, India has a strong incentive to declare
future reactors, including fast breeder reactors, as civil and
thus to bring them under safeguards, as this is the only way
that foreign material and technology could be made available
for the construction and operation of such facilities.
Moreover, India has expressed an interest in participating in
the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which is designed
to enhance civil nuclear energy production while advancing
nonproliferation objectives. As we have indicated to the
government of India, India's decision not to designate its fast
breeder reactors as civil and place under IAEA safeguards
limits our ability to collaborate on issues related to the fast
burner reactors contemplated under GNEP.
Question (3)(b). India will declare its pilot ``fast
breeder'' reactor as ``military.'' And while it may declare
some future ``fast breeder'' reactors as ``civil,'' it did not
promise to do so.
Are there any understandings regarding future power
reactors, or agreed criteria by which to determine whether a
future power reactor is to be ``civil'' or ``military?''
Answer. India has said publicly that it will declare and
safeguard all future civil thermal and breeder reactors. India
retains the sovereign right to determine whether future
indigenous reactors serve a civil or military function--as it
does today. However, neither we nor our international partners
will cooperate with non-civil or non-safeguarded facilities.
All externally-supplied reactors and other controlled
technologies will by necessity be civil and subject to IAEA
safeguards. We would also note that India has indicated
repeatedly that it intends to significantly increase its
nuclear energy production. As such, it has a strong incentive
to declare future reactors, including its thermal reactors, as
civil and thus bring them under safeguards, as this is the only
way that foreign material and technology could be made
available for the construction and operation of such
facilities.
Question (4)(a). Aside from agreeing to subject an
additional 8 civil reactors to international safeguards, what
specific Indian actions/commitments from the July 18 Joint
Statement were something that India had not or was not already
committed to doing?
Answer. Prior to the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement, India
had undertaken some nonproliferation measures that provided a
solid foundation for the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative.
For example, it had passed new legislation, consistent with
India's obligation under UN Security Council Resolution 1540,
to enhance controls over the export and transit of weapons of
mass destruction, associated delivery systems, and related
technology. Moreover, the U.S.-India Next Steps in Strategic
Partnership (NSSP) sought, inter alia, India's harmonization of
its control lists with and unilateral adherence to the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR). This commitment by India was reflected in the July 18,
2005 Joint Statement. Under the July 18 Joint Statement, India
made the following new commitments:
Identifying and separating its civil and military
nuclear facilities and programs;
Accepting IAEA safeguards in perpetuity on its civil
nuclear facilities (including not only the 8 facilities
noted in this Question, but also all future civil
reactors--both breeder and thermal);
Signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with
the IAEA;
Strengthening its national export control system
through harmonization with and unilateral adherence to
the NSG and MTCR Guidelines;
Refraining from the transfer of enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to states that do not have
them and supporting international efforts to limit
their spread;
Working with the U.S. for the conclusion of a
multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
While UN Security Council Resolution 1540 required India to
establish appropriate and effective export control measures, it
did not specifically require harmonization of national export
controls with specific regimes, such as the NSG and MTCR.
Adherence to these regimes is a significant step. It not only
indicates the seriousness of India's commitment to prevent
onward proliferation, but it represents a commitment on India's
part to implement the export controls on sensitive items in the
same manner as the members of the NSG and the MTCR.
In addition, prior to the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear
Cooperation Initiative, India had undertaken a unilateral
moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. India has committed
under this Initiative to continue this unilateral moratorium.
Including the testing moratorium among India's commitments
under this Initiative will create substantial new economic and
energy incentives for India to maintain that moratorium.
Each of these commitments is significant in its own right.
Taken together, we believe these commitments represent a net
gain for global nonproliferation efforts.
Question (4)(b). Which of these does the administration
believe India will not implement if Congress does not approve
the deal as currently configured?
Answer. We believe that the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear
Cooperation Initiative is a sound arrangement that Congress
should support. The commitments India has made will, when
implemented, align India more closely than at any previous time
with international nuclear nonproliferation standards and
practices and thereby strengthen the global nonproliferation
regime.
We cannot speculate on what India might or might not do if
Congress does not approve legislation to facilitate the
implementation of this Initiative, but firmly believe that if
Congress does not permit the Initiative to proceed, the U.S.-
India strategic relationship would suffer. We believe the best
course is to lock-in the significant gains reached and then
seek to achieve further nonproliferation results as our
strategic partnership advances. We would urge that Congress
resist the temptation to take actions that will prejudice our
ability to realize the important and long-standing
nonproliferation objectives embodied in the Initiative. The
commitments India has made under the Initiative are a
significant gain over the status quo.
Question (5)(a). India refused to declare the CIRUS reactor
as either ``civil'' or ``military.'' Instead, it will continue
to use the reactor as a military facility until sometime in
2010, when it will shut down the reactor.
Did India violate its prior pledges to the United States
and Canada when it used the CIRUS reactor to supply plutonium
for its nuclear weapons program?
Answer. In response to a United States request, the Indian
government committed to taking the CIRUS reactor out of
commission by 2010 as part of its plan to separate civil and
military nuclear facilities and programs.
With respect to CIRUS, the U.S. Government examined this
matter around the time of India's 1974 test and was unable to
reach a conclusive answer whether or not India had violated the
1956 contract for heavy water supply to the CIRUS reactor.
Legally, there was a lack of mutual understanding between the
U.S. and India on the scope of the language of the 1956
contract. Factually, there was uncertainty as to whether U.S.-
supplied heavy water contributed to the production of the
plutonium used for India's nuclear explosive device.
Question (5)(b). India refused to declare the CIRUS reactor
as either ``civil'' or ``military.'' Instead, it will continue
to use the reactor as a military facility until sometime in
2010, when it will shut down the reactor.
Even though the State Department did not declare India in
violation of its pledges at the time, don't we know now that:
-- the 1974 test was a nuclear weapon test;
-- it used plutonium produced in a reactor that used U.S.-
supplied heavy water; and
-- the United States had made clear to India, well before the
test, that the use of that heavy water to produce a so-
called ``peaceful nuclear explosive device'' would be
in contravention of Indian commitments?
Answer. While the United States does not accept the concept
of a ``peaceful nuclear explosion,'' India maintained in 1974
that its test was a peaceful nuclear explosion rather than a
nuclear weapon test. At the time, there was a disagreement
between the United States and India on the scope of the
language in the 1956 contract to supply heavy water to the
CIRUS Reactor. The U.S. made its view clear to India before the
test; India responded that it had a different view. Agreements
for peaceful nuclear cooperation subsequent to India's 1974
test have referred to ``nuclear explosive device'' without
regard to the purported distinction between ``peaceful'' and
``military'' purposes.
Even in 1976, just two years after the test, it was not
possible to reach a definitive determination as to whether
U.S.-supplied heavy water contributed to the production of the
plutonium used in the 1974 detonation. U.S. experts concluded
at that time that India was not dependent upon the U.S. for the
heavy water used in the CIRUS reactor during much of the period
leading up to the 1974 test. Since the exact time at which the
plutonium utilized in the test was produced remained
undetermined, there was no basis for determining irrefutably
that U.S.-supplied heavy water was present in the reactor when
the plutonium was produced.
Question (5)(c). India refused to declare the CIRUS reactor
as either ``civil'' or ``military.'' Instead, it will continue
to use the reactor as a military facility until sometime in
2010, when it will shut down the reactor.
How will you guard against similar conduct by India in the
future?
Answer. All bilateral agreements for peaceful nuclear
cooperation with non-nuclear weapon states (as India is treated
under U.S. law consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty) now specify that U.S.-exported items cannot be used for
any ``nuclear explosive device.'' Under the U.S.-India Civil
Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, the United States will not
transfer nuclear technology, equipment, or material to an
Indian nuclear facility that is not under IAEA safeguards, in
accordance with our NPT obligations. Moreover, the Joint
Statement provides for effective measures to minimize any risk
of diversion, including commitments by India to accept IAEA
safeguards in perpetuity on its civil nuclear facilities and
activities and to sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol.
The IAEA safeguards required by this Initiative are designed to
detect--and thereby prevent--the diversion to military use of
any materials, technologies, or equipment provided to India's
civil nuclear facilities.
In the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement, India committed to
continuing its nuclear testing moratorium and we believe that
India takes this commitment seriously. Should India nonetheless
decide at some future time to revisit this commitment, in our
view it will face a number of disincentives to detonate another
nuclear explosive device.
If India detonated a nuclear explosive device after the
proposed legislation was enacted, the Presidential
determination under that law would no longer be effective.
Peaceful nuclear cooperation with India would be subject to the
prohibition in section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act. In
addition, the broad sanctions under the Glenn Amendment
(section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act) would be
reinstated, as the waiver authority for those sanctions (under
the Brownback II amendment) would lapse upon India's detonation
of a nuclear explosive device. Sanctions would also apply under
the Export-Import Bank Act (section 2(b)(4)). Finally, section
123(a)(4) of the Atomic Energy Act provides that any agreement
for cooperation with a non-nuclear weapon state shall include
``a stipulation that the United States shall have the right to
require the return of any nuclear materials and equipment
transferred pursuant thereto and any special nuclear material
produced through the use thereof if the cooperating party
detonates a nuclear explosive device.''
Question (5)(d). India refused to declare the CIRUS reactor
as either ``civil'' or ``military.'' Instead, it will continue
to use the reactor as a military facility until sometime in
2010, when it will shut down the reactor.
By letting India finesse this issue, do we set a precedent
that other states could cite in the future?
Answer. We would not describe the CIRUS matter as a case of
India ``finessing'' the issue. Nor do we believe that the CIRUS
matter sets a precedent. The disagreement over the scope of the
language in the 1956 contract was specific to the language of
that contract. As a result of lessons learned after India's
1974 test, the U.S. adopted language in its agreements for
peaceful nuclear cooperation that eliminates any ambiguity over
the permissible uses of U.S.-supplied nuclear items. We do not
believe that this dispute from 30 years ago over the 1956
contract will have a negative effect on the current actions of
India or any other state.
Question (6)(a). India says that it adheres to a ``minimum
credible deterrent'' policy regarding its nuclear weapons.
How many nuclear weapons does India have now? How many does
it think it needs?
Answer. Unclassified estimates on the number of warheads
possessed by India vary considerably; none of these are
authoritative. We would be happy to discuss India's nuclear
weapons program, including these specific queries, in an
appropriate classified setting.
Question (6)(b). India says that it adheres to a ``minimum
credible deterrent'' policy regarding its nuclear weapons.
Is India committed to building a triad of nuclear forces
(land, sea and air) to match the force structures of China,
Russia and the United States?
Answer. India has been open about its pursuit of land- and
sea-based nuclear-capable ballistic missiles based on the
Prithvi (liquid fuel) and the Agni (solid fuel).
We would be happy to discuss India's nuclear weapons
program, including these specific queries, in an appropriate
classified setting.
Question (6)(c). India says that it adheres to a ``minimum
credible deterrent'' policy regarding its nuclear weapons.
How ``minimal'' can its deterrent be, if India is unwilling
to stop its fissile material production or to set a future cap?
Answer. What constitutes a ``minimal'' deterrence for India
can only be determined by the Government of India. We would be
happy to discuss India's nuclear weapons program, including
these specific queries, in an appropriate classified setting.
Question (6)(d). India says that it adheres to a ``minimum
credible deterrent'' policy regarding its nuclear weapons.
Would Indian announcement of a conditional fissile material
cap (e.g., tied to its neighbors' weapons numbers) be a useful
step?
Answer. While in theory such an announcement could be a
``useful step,'' it would be unwise to hold up the significant
nonproliferation gains afforded by this Initiative in order to
seek a fissile material cap that India indicates it cannot
agree to absent a similar commitment by Pakistan and China.
The curtailment of the production of fissile material for
weapons was discussed as part of the Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Initiative, but India maintained that it could not agree to a
unilateral cap at this time. The U.S. has achieved an important
objective by obtaining India's commitment to work toward the
conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
(FMCT). Moreover, we remain willing to explore other
intermediate options that might also serve such an objective.
We also continue to call on all states that produce fissile
material for weapons purposes to observe a voluntary production
moratorium, as the United States has done for many years.
Question (7)(a). India agreed to safeguards in perpetuity,
but also said that they would be ``India-specific'' safeguards.
India added that safeguards on its spent fuel reprocessing
facility would be ``in a campaign mode.''
What are ``India-specific'' safeguards?
Answer. It will be incumbent on India to clarify what it
means by ``India-specific'' safeguards in the context of its
negotiations with the IAEA. In our view, the safeguards
agreement for India will be unique to India because India
presents a unique set of circumstances. India has agreed to
place all its civil nuclear facilities under safeguards in a
phased manner, along with future civil facilities, but India is
not an NPT party and will have non-civil facilities and
material outside of safeguards. However, there is an accepted
IAEA framework for safeguards (INFCIRC/66) that pre-dates the
NPT and is suited to safeguarding material in a non-NPT party
without full-scope safeguards. In its separation plan, India
has committed to safeguards in perpetuity.
Question (7)(b). India agreed to safeguards in perpetuity,
but also said that they would be ``India-specific'' safeguards.
India added that safeguards on its spent fuel reprocessing
facility would be ``in a campaign mode.''
If we don't know yet, how can Congress be expected to
approve an ``India exemption'' from Atomic Energy Act
requirements?
Answer. The details of the Indian commitment to place
facilities under safeguards, and the basic principles and
technical means by which the IAEA will carry out safeguards for
those facilities and the materials they produce, are known. The
IAEA and India will negotiate and agree upon a safeguards
regime covering the facilities that India identifies as civil.
In our view, that safeguards agreement best conforms to
existing safeguards standards incorporated in the Agency's
safeguards system (INFCIRC/66). The safeguards agreement must
be approved by the IAEA Board of Governors, including, of
course, the United States.
Question (7)(c). India agreed to safeguards in perpetuity,
but also said that they would be ``India-specific'' safeguards.
India added that safeguards on its spent fuel reprocessing
facility would be ``in a campaign mode.''
If India plans to allow its spent fuel reprocessing plant
to be safeguarded only intermittently, and safeguards will be
lifted whenever the plant is used for military work, how
effective will those safeguards be?
Answer. Safeguards have been applied by the IAEA
successfully in this manner to the PREFRE reprocessing plant at
Tarapur before. Such temporary safeguards are foreseen in non-
NPT (INFCIRC/66) safeguards arrangements. When safeguards are
applied in a campaign mode, the facility is safeguarded while
safeguarded material is in the facility. The IAEA will monitor
the spent fuel that arrives at the plant, take independent
measurements of the amount of material fed into the process,
account for all nuclear material in the process, and measure
the product material, which will remain under safeguards.
It is true that this is not the most efficient way to
operate for the facility or for safeguards implementation, but
``campaign mode'' safeguards on associated upstream and
downstream facilities can be applied effectively based on
agreed IAEA procedures.
Question (7)(d). India agreed to safeguards in perpetuity,
but also said that they would be ``India-specific'' safeguards.
India added that safeguards on its spent fuel reprocessing
facility would be ``in a campaign mode.''
If the same facility is used for both civil and military
purposes, how can any nuclear commerce involving that facility
be considered strictly ``civil'' and peaceful?
Answer. As noted in the answer to (e) below, any
cooperation would occur only while the facility is being
safeguarded by the IAEA. For practical purposes this precludes
meaningful cooperation with the facility itself. The United
States does not intend to supply reprocessing (or, for that
matter, enrichment) technology, equipment, or components to
India.
Question (7)(e). India agreed to safeguards in perpetuity,
but also said that they would be ``India-specific'' safeguards.
India added that safeguards on its spent fuel reprocessing
facility would be ``in a campaign mode.''
Would either the administration's proposed legislation or
its proposed NSG resolution prevent the United States or other
countries from providing assistance to this facility?
Answer. The NPT, NSG Guidelines, and, in the case of the
United States, provisions of U.S. domestic law which the
proposed legislation does not seek to waive, permit the supply
of equipment and components only to facilities under IAEA
safeguards in India.
The current NSG Guidelines only allow for transfers of
Trigger List items for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear weapon
states with full-scope IAEA safeguards in place, unless there
is an imminent radiological hazard that cannot be otherwise met
(the safety exemption), or if the arrangement is grandfathered.
Even in those rare cases, the facility would still have to be
safeguarded.
Thus, supply of such items to the PREFRE reprocessing
facility could only take place if PREFRE were under IAEA
safeguards at the time of supply. If India wished to then
reprocess unsafeguarded spent fuel in an unsafeguarded campaign
mode, it would have an obligation to the supplier under the
terms of supply to remove any such supplied components or
equipment from PREFRE before operating the facility in that
mode. Removal would not appear to be a practical option if the
components or equipment were important to the operation of the
plant. Moreover, as a matter of policy, the United States does
not intend to supply enrichment or reprocessing technology,
equipment, or components to India. We expect that the bilateral
agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with India will
reflect this.
Question (8)(a). In response to a question for the record
from the committee's hearing of November 2, 2005, regarding the
CIRUS reactor, you stated: ``Were the plant to be placed under
safeguards, those safeguards would be applicable in perpetuity
to any material produced by, used by, or stored in the plant
after the effective date of the agreement.'' This principle
would appear to be called into question, however, by the
discussion (in the separation plan document tabled in the
Indian Parliament on March 7, 2006) of a tie between safeguards
and uninterrupted foreign fuel supply.
Will all spent fuel from safeguarded reactors be
safeguarded?
Answer. While India has indicated that it intends to
continue campaign mode operation of particular downstream
facilities, it has agreed to safeguards in perpetuity on its
civil reactors, including on nuclear material used or produced
in those facilities.
Question (8)(b). In response to a question for the record
from the committee's hearing of November 2, 2005, regarding the
CIRUS reactor, you stated: ``Were the plant to be placed under
safeguards, those safeguards would be applicable in perpetuity
to any material produced by, used by, or stored in the plant
after the effective date of the agreement.'' This principle
would appear to be called into question, however, by the
discussion (in the separation plan document tabled in the
Indian Parliament on March 7, 2006) of a tie between safeguards
and uninterrupted foreign fuel supply.
What prior approval rights will the United States have
regarding the disposition of spent fuel derived from U.S.-
provided reactor fuel?
Answer. We are proposing to waive only section 123(a)(2)--
the full-scope IAEA safeguards requirement--of the conditions
and controls required by Section 123(a) of the Atomic Energy
Act (AEA) to be included in an agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation. We are seeking to include in the agreement to be
negotiated with India the approval rights required, inter alia,
by AEA section 123(a)(7), which would include a U.S. right to
approve the reprocessing or other alteration in form or content
of spent fuel subject to the agreement, and by AEA section
123(a)(5), which would include a U.S right to approve the
retransfer of U.S.-obligated spent fuel from India to a third
country for reprocessing or other disposition. It should be
noted that these U.S. consent rights would apply not just to
spent fuel derived from U.S.-provided reactor fuel, but to any
spent fuel in a U.S.-supplied reactor, even if the fresh fuel
had been India's own or supplied by a third party. (Strictly
speaking, the U.S. retransfer approval right would apply only
to the special nuclear material produced in the non-U.S.-
obligated fresh fuel through the use of the U.S.-supplied
reactor; but as a practical matter it would affect the entirety
of the spent fuel prior to reprocessing.)
Question (9)(a). India's separation plan document also said
that safeguards would be tied to an uninterrupted supply of
reactor fuel and provide ``for corrective measures that India
may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian
nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel
supplies,'' and that the United States would help India to
create a nuclear fuel reserve for use in case there was any
interruption in supply.
What, exactly, did the United States agree to, regarding
reactor fuel supplies for India? Is the separation plan
document tabled in the Indian Parliament on March 7, 2006, an
accurate record of the agreement?
Answer. The Indian separation plan presented to the Indian
Parliament on March 7 is India's plan. While that is not a
U.S.-origin document, and while we would have presented
particular issues somewhat differently, that document
accurately reflects the general discussions between the United
States and India. Our negotiators were very clear that, while
the U.S. would be willing to provide reasonable fuel assurances
designed to counter market imperfections, fuel assurances are
not a ``condition'' to any of India's commitments under the
plan--including, in particular, safeguards in perpetuity.
Specific details in some areas of the separation plan, for
example, on an implementation schedule, have not yet been
released by India. Other issues have not yet been finally
determined, such as those issues which require negotiation with
the IAEA. Moreover, particular concerns, such as fuel supply
assurances, have been discussed but no detailed agreement has
yet been reached; the Indian plan accurately reflects the types
of issues we have discussed in this area. Finally, the initial
discussions on the bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation have only just begun.
Question (9)(b). India's separation plan document also said
that safeguards would be tied to an uninterrupted supply of
reactor fuel and provide ``for corrective measures that India
may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian
nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel
supplies,'' and that the United States would help India to
create a nuclear fuel reserve for use in case there was any
interruption in supply.
How can safeguards be ``in perpetuity,'' if they can be
lifted whenever there is an interruption in reactor fuel
supply? How does India's approach comport with your answer to a
question for the record from the committee's hearing of
November 2, 2005, in which you stated: ``We do not view a
safeguards agreement that would allow India to withdraw
facilities or material from safeguards as acceptable?''
Answer. It will be incumbent on India to clarify what it
means by the ``corrective measures'' it claims it may seek
should fuel supply become disrupted. India will need to clarify
its intent in this respect in its discussions with the IAEA.
While India has indicated that it intends to continue campaign
mode operation of particular downstream facilities, it has
agreed to safeguards in perpetuity on its civil reactors. The
U.S. position remains that safeguards must be applied in
perpetuity, including on nuclear material used or produced in
those facilities. We have just begun to engage with India
regarding the details of the question of fuel supplies. We
believe that India can be provided with the assurances it seeks
for fuel supply without compromising the need for safeguards in
perpetuity.
Question (9)(c). India's separation plan document also said
that safeguards would be tied to an uninterrupted supply of
reactor fuel and provide ``for corrective measures that India
may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian
nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel
supplies,'' and that the United States would help India to
create a nuclear fuel reserve for use in case there was any
interruption in supply.
Wouldn't a reactor fuel reserve enable India to ride out
any U.S. or international sanctions that might be imposed if
some future Indian government were to test or use nuclear
weapons, divert U.S. equipment for military purposes, or
proliferate nuclear weapons technology? Would it make sense to
impose limits on India's use of any fuel reserve?
Answer. Secretary Rice has noted clearly that we ``reserve
the right'' to take appropriate action should India violate our
understanding. As we have made clear to the Indian government,
the Initiative is contingent on India's continued testing
moratorium and compliance with its safeguards arrangements. We
believe that the Indian government intends to uphold the
continuation of the test moratorium it committed to in the July
18, 2005 Joint Statement, and that it will act in good faith to
uphold the safeguards agreements it has committed to undertake
with the IAEA.
As indicated above, we have just begun to engage with India
regarding the details of any fuel supplies. Any U.S. exports of
fuel to India would require an export license from the NRC, the
issuance of which must be based in part on a judgment by the
Executive Branch that the proposed export will not be inimical
to the common defense and security, in accordance with the
provisions of the AEA. Such a license could be denied,
suspended, or terminated if such a result is legally required
or circumstances otherwise warrant.
INDIA'S ``URANIUM CRUNCH'' AND U.S. NPT OBLIGATIONS
Question (10)(a). K. Subrahmanyam, a prominent Indian
strategist, wrote in December that ``the country is short of
uranium'' and that it was necessary to ``get imported uranium
for'' India's power reactors, so as ``to conserve all our
indigenous uranium for weapon production purposes.'' But some
commentators have questioned this.
To what extent does India lack enough uranium to meet both
its civil and military needs over the next 20 years?
Answer. The IAEA recently reported India's estimated
uranium stocks to be approximately 95,000 metric tons,
predicated on data provided by the Indian government. Of this
sum, scientists from India's Department of Atomic Energy
estimate that about 54,600 metric tons are reasonably-assured
uranium resources, and roughly 40,000 metric tons in probable
(but unproven) reserves. A definitive response to the specific
question of whether India has enough uranium to meet both its
civil and military needs, and when it might run out, can only
be provided by the Government of India.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ IAEA-TECDOC-1463, September 2005.
\2\ A.B. Awati and R.B. Grover, ``Demand and Availability of
Uranium Resources in India,'' in Recent Developments in Uranium
Exploration, Production, and Environmental Issues (Vienna, Austria:
International Atomic Energy Agency, September 2005).
Question (10)(b). K. Subrahmanyam, a prominent Indian
strategist, wrote in December that ``the country is short of
uranium'' and that it was necessary to ``get imported uranium
for'' India's power reactors, so as ``to conserve all our
indigenous uranium for weapon production purposes.'' But some
commentators have questioned this.
Is it true that plutonium production for nuclear weapons
requires more uranium than does power production?
Answer. Megawatt for megawatt--yes. Operating a reactor for
production of weapons-grade plutonium generally uses more
uranium than operating a reactor optimized for production of
electricity. But in terms of entire national programs--no. A
modest nuclear power program would use far more uranium than a
modest nuclear weapons program. Whereas a modest nuclear power
program of several gigawatts electric would require hundreds of
tons of uranium per year, a nuclear weapons program may require
on the order of several tens of tons of uranium per year to
produce several nuclear weapons per year.
Question (10)(c). K. Subrahmanyam, a prominent Indian
strategist, wrote in December that ``the country is short of
uranium'' and that it was necessary to ``get imported uranium
for'' India's power reactors, so as ``to conserve all our
indigenous uranium for weapon production purposes.'' But some
commentators have questioned this.
Won't the U.S. nuclear deal and foreign suppliers of
``civil'' reactor fuel thus be helping India's nuclear weapons
program, by enabling it to conserve its domestic uranium
supplies for that purpose?
Answer. The Initiative does not cap Indian nuclear weapons
production, but nothing to be provided to India under the
Initiative will be used to enhance India's military capability
or add to its military stockpile. With or without this
Initiative, India is capable of maintaining its existing
nuclear arsenal. It has a functioning fuel cycle and
demonstrated competence with nuclear technologies.
Based on our discussions with the Indian government, we do
not believe that India plans to increase significantly its
nuclear weapon production. India seeks to maintain what it
calls a ``credible minimum deterrent.'' Relative to its current
capabilities, India seeks a much larger civil nuclear energy
program to meet its real and growing energy needs. Moreover, a
successfully-implemented Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative
adds considerable incentives to grow its civil nuclear energy
sector, since international cooperation will be allowed only
with safeguarded facilities.
Question (10)(d). K. Subrahmanyam, a prominent Indian
strategist, wrote in December that ``the country is short of
uranium'' and that it was necessary to ``get imported uranium
for'' India's power reactors, so as ``to conserve all our
indigenous uranium for weapon production purposes.'' But some
commentators have questioned this.
During the negotiations leading up to the July 18 Joint
Statement and the March 2 separation offer, did the Department
of State seek intelligence estimates of the status of India's
nuclear weapons program and the likely impact of this agreement
on that program? If so, please arrange for the committee to
receive copies of those estimates.
Answer. The Department of State, together with other
Executive branch departments and agencies, engaged as
appropriate with the Intelligence Community on issues relating
to India's nuclear program--both its nuclear energy- and
nuclear weapons-related dimensions. These interactions were not
in the nature of a National Intelligence Estimate, but rather
topical briefings, discussions, and reports.
Question (11)(a). Arguably, the India deal and proposed NSG
guidelines changes will enable India to devote all its domestic
uranium to military purposes.
What are the implications of that for U.S. compliance with
its obligation, under Article I of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, ``not in any way to assist, encourage, or
induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices?''
Answer. The U.S.-India Initiative is about civil nuclear
cooperation, not about India's strategic weapons program.
Nothing that we are proposing would violate our NPT
obligations, including the Article I obligations cited above.
We remain fully committed to upholding all of our NPT
obligations.
Under Article I of the NPT, nuclear-weapon states such as
the U.S. undertake, inter alia: ``. . . not in any way to
assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.'' Under Article III(2) of the NPT,
all state parties undertake not to provide certain nuclear
material and equipment to any non-nuclear weapon state (which
includes non-parties, such as India) for peaceful purposes
unless the nuclear material will be subject to safeguards.
The NPT does not treat peaceful nuclear cooperation under
safeguards as assisting a non-nuclear weapon state to
manufacture nuclear weapons. Indeed, Article III(2) establishes
the basis under which NPT parties may engage in nuclear
cooperation with safeguarded facilities in countries that are
not parties and do not have full-scope safeguards. The practice
of the parties confirms this view, as a number of countries--
the United States, Canada, Russia, France, China--have provided
fuel to India's safeguarded facilities, both before and after
the NPT entered into force (and before and after India's 1974
detonation of a nuclear explosive device). Russia is also
currently providing two light water reactors for India's civil
nuclear energy program.
In The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the leading
treatise on the negotiation of the NPT), Mohamed Shaker reached
the same conclusion: ``Almost any kind of international nuclear
assistance is potentially useful to a nuclear-weapon program.
However, the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear
assistance to non-nuclear weapon States, as required by Article
III, provides a means to establish and clarify the peaceful
purposes of most international nuclear assistance.''
This conclusion is also supported by the practice of the
parties to the NPT. The U.S. and Canada engaged in nuclear
cooperation with India before and after the NPT entered into
force. The supply of fuel under facility-specific (INFCIRC/66)
safeguards agreements was understood to satisfy our obligations
under the NPT. Even after India's 1974 detonation, fuel was
provided to India's safeguarded Tarapur reactors by the United
States, France, and Russia. Such fuel supply was understood to
be consistent with the NPT. The Nuclear Suppliers Group did not
make the political decision to adopt full-scope safeguards as a
condition of supply until 1992.
The argument that foreign fuel supply could allow India to
devote its domestic uranium substantially or even exclusively
to its weapons program, should India so desire, does not change
this legal conclusion. As previously noted, nothing in the NPT,
its negotiating history, or the practice of the parties
supports the notion that fuel supply to safeguarded reactors
for peaceful purposes could be construed as ``assisting in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons'' for purposes of Article I.
Nuclear material and equipment exported by the U.S. would not
be involved in any stage of the process of manufacturing
nuclear weapons.
In essence, nuclear cooperation under safeguards does not
fundamentally differ from other forms of energy cooperation
(e.g., oil supply, clean coal technology, alternative fuels).
All such energy assistance would arguably relieve India of its
reliance on domestic uranium for energy production. Yet such
energy assistance clearly could not be viewed as assisting
India in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
Question (11)(b). Arguably, the India deal and proposed NSG
guidelines changes will enable India to devote all its domestic
uranium to military purposes.
Has the Department prepared or acquired any legal analysis
of the implications of this deal for our NPT obligations? If
so, please provide copies of such analyses to the committee. If
not, please commission such an analysis and provide the
results.
Answer. The answer to 11(a) above sets forth the
Department's conclusions as to whether the proposed peaceful
nuclear cooperation with India is compatible with our NPT
obligations. Nothing that we are proposing under this
Initiative would violate our NPT obligations.
REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Question (12)(a). Indian production of more nuclear weapons
could have repercussions in Pakistan and China.
Isn't Pakistan likely to see India's declaration of 8
``military'' reactors as a threat? Won't that increase the
pressure on Pakistan to increase its own nuclear weapons
production?
Answer. We do not believe that enhanced cooperation with
India in the civil nuclear area or greater use of nuclear
reactors to produce energy for the Indian people will
contribute to or accelerate a regional arms race. Indeed, by
bringing nearly two-thirds of India's nuclear facilities under
safeguards and increasing transparency, the Initiative in
effect restricts certain Indian facilities to only producing
civil energy--facilities that could otherwise be used for
nuclear weapons-related purposes. Without this Initiative,
India could use all of its current and planned unsafeguarded
reactors for military purposes. With this Initiative, 8 of the
22 thermal power reactors could be used for this purpose.
We have kept the Pakistani government informed about our
discussions with India at every appropriate stage. Moreover,
both India and Pakistan have publicly and privately indicated
their unilateral commitments to pursue only what they term
credible minimum deterrents.
Any potential for an Indo-Pakistani arms competition will
be determined by bilateral relations between India and
Pakistan. We would note that their current bilateral relations
appear to be improving. Indian Prime Minister Singh recently
offered a treaty of peace, security, and friendship to
Pakistan. Pakistan's Foreign Office immediately welcomed the
offer as a ``positive acknowledgement'' of the need to move
forward on Kashmir and other bilateral issues, and said that
both countries needed to take ``bold steps to resolve the
outstanding issues.'' As part of their Composite Dialogue,
India and Pakistan are discussing an agreement concerning
prevention of nuclear accidents and other confidence building
measures.
Question (12)(b). Indian production of more nuclear weapons
could have repercussions in Pakistan and China.
Won't India's protection of its nuclear weapons program
make it more difficult for China to refrain from assisting
Pakistan again?
Answer. China became a party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty in 1992; it is obligated under Article I
not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-
weapon state to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. China
pledged in 1996 not to provide assistance to any unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities in any country. As part of its joining the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004, China disclosed its
intention to continue cooperation with Pakistan under the
grandfathering exception to the NSG Guideline provisions
requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear
supply. This cooperation would include life time support and
fuel supply for the safeguarded Chasma I and II nuclear power
plants, supply of heavy water and operational safety service to
the safeguarded Karachi nuclear power plant, and supply of fuel
and operational safety service to the two safeguarded research
reactors at PINSTECH. As a member of the NSG, China has
pledged--and is expected--to abide by the NSG Guidelines on the
transfers of nuclear equipment, technology and material.
If China did seek to provide additional reactors to
Pakistan, it would need NSG accommodation. The NSG operates by
consensus, so China would need the support of all other
participating governments to proceed. We do not believe that
the 45 member states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group would agree
to such an accommodation, and we do not support such an
Initiative with Pakistan.
Question (13)(a). Pakistan has reacted adversely to the
notion that India will get civil nuclear commerce, while
Pakistan is denied that benefit.
What repercussions will this have in other policy areas,
such as our effort to get Pakistan to crack down on all
terrorist groups in that country (rather than just on al
Qaeda)?
Answer. There are no indications that the Civil Nuclear
Cooperation Initiative will have an impact on other policy
areas related to Pakistan. We have kept the Pakistani
government informed about our ongoing discussions with India,
and explained our reasons for not exploring a similar
arrangement with Pakistan. At the same time, we continue to
build upon a strong counterterrorism foundation to further
extend our relationship with Pakistan. Foreign Secretary Riaz
Khan and a delegation will visit Washington in the last week of
April to initiate the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue. The
parties will discuss a broad range of areas for cooperation,
including in education, energy, economics, nonproliferation,
and other issues.
Pakistan continues to maintain its unilateral commitment to
undertake what it calls a ``credible minimum deterrent.''
Question (13)(b). Pakistan has reacted adversely to the
notion that India will get civil nuclear commerce, while
Pakistan is denied that benefit.
How will the United States act if China presses for a
``Pakistan exception'' similar to the ``India exception'' that
the United States proposes in the Nuclear Suppliers Group?
Answer. Of the three states that have never been parties to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, India's circumstances are
unique. It faces real and growing energy needs; it has an
advanced civil nuclear infrastructure and program; it has a
solid record in refraining from nuclear exports; and it has
made enhanced nonproliferation commitments that, when
implemented, will more closely align it with the global
nonproliferation mainstream than at any previous time.
The United States is joined by other states, such as
France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Australia, in viewing
India as a special case. Because the NSG works on the basis of
consensus, any participating government, including the United
States, can block consensus on actions by the group. There must
be a consensus of all 45 NSG countries in order for there to be
an accommodation to the NSG Guidelines for India, or for any
other state that may seek such treatment.
Thus, any other NSG participating government that might
seek similar accommodations for a partner state--for example,
as some have suggested, the hypothetical case of China seeking
an accommodation for Pakistan--would need the support of all
other participating governments to implement such
accommodation. We do not believe that the 45 member states of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group would reach consensus on such an
accommodation, and we do not support such an Initiative with
Pakistan.
While news reports have cited Pakistani officials as also
seeking normalization of nuclear trade and commerce, the
factors that make the Joint Statement appropriate in India's
case are not present in either Pakistan or Israel--and
certainly not in NPT violators such as North Korea or Iran.
Question (13)(c). Pakistan has reacted adversely to the
notion that India will get civil nuclear commerce, while
Pakistan is denied that benefit.
How will the United States act if China makes such a
``Pakistan exception'' its price for approval of an ``India
exception'' in the NSG?
Answer. We have no information to indicate that the Chinese
government is The Proposed Legislation even considering such a
position and it would not be prudent to speculate.
THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Question (14)(a). Section 1(a) of the proposed legislation
begins: ``Notwithstanding any other provision of law. . . . ''
Why was that phrase included?
Answer. That phrase was used because the provisions of the
proposed legislation are intended to supplant certain
provisions of existing law that would otherwise apply to
peaceful nuclear cooperation with India.
Question (14)(b). Section 1(a) of the proposed legislation
begins: ``Notwithstanding any other provision of law. . . . ''
What other laws do you wish to supersede? Please be
specific.
Answer. (1) Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(AEA) with respect to the congressional action necessary to
bring into effect a bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation exempted by the President from one or more of the
provisions of section 123(a);
(2) Section 128 of the AEA with respect to the requirement
for a waiver annually of the requirement that the country to
receive a nuclear export under NRC license have IAEA full-scope
safeguards; and
(3) Section 129 of the AEA with respect to the procedure
and standard for Presidential waiver of the any of the
sanctions in section 129.
We have not identified any other current statutory
provisions that would be superseded by this provision, but
nonetheless wish to ensure that these modifications to the
procedures under section 123 and the waiver authority under
sections 128 and 129 are effective notwithstanding any
provisions of law that would require otherwise.
Question (15)(a). In response to a question for the record
from the committee's hearing of November 2, 2005, you stated
that `` `full civil nuclear cooperation' with India will not
include enrichment or reprocessing technology. We have not yet
determined whether such a prohibition would extend to heavy
water production.''
Why does the administration's proposed legislation not
reflect the enrichment and reprocessing limitation?
Answer. The determination in the proposed legislation
incorporates elements of the U.S.-India Joint Statement; this
was not one of those elements. Moreover, it is not necessary
for the legislation to reflect that limitation, which will be
embodied in the bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation.
Question (15)(b). In response to a question for the record
from the committee's hearing of November 2, 2005, you stated
that `` `full civil nuclear cooperation' with India will not
include enrichment or reprocessing technology. We have not yet
determined whether such a prohibition would extend to heavy
water production.''
Why does its proposed NSG resolution not include such a
limit, either?
Answer. The transfer of enrichment and reprocessing
equipment and technology is addressed in the NSG Guidelines,
INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 1. Therefore, it was not deemed
necessary for the proposed resolution to address the matter. We
have indicated to our NSG partners that we do not intend to
supply enrichment and reprocessing technologies.
Question (15)(c). In response to a question for the record
from the committee's hearing of November 2, 2005, you stated
that ```full civil nuclear cooperation'' with India will not
include enrichment or reprocessing technology. We have not yet
determined whether such a prohibition would extend to heavy
water production.''
What was the final decision regarding heavy water
production?
Answer. The U.S. does not foresee transferring heavy water
production equipment or technology to India, and the draft
bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement accordingly
makes no provisions for such transfers.
While we seek consensus on an accommodation to allow NSG
suppliers to enter into peaceful nuclear cooperation with
India, including supply of civil nuclear reactors and fuel for
nuclear power production, we have no indication of current
plans on the part of any of the NSG Participating Governments
to transfer heavy water production equipment or technology to
India.
Question (16)(a). Paragraph 1(b)(1) of the proposed
legislation requires the President to certify that India has
provided ``a credible plan'' for separating civil and military
facilities ``and has filed a declaration regarding its civil
facilities with the IAEA.''
Does the administration believe that the March 2 plan meets
the first test of that paragraph, even though it does not list
all facilities to be declared ``civil?''
Answer. With respect to 1(b)(1), India's plan to separate
its civil and military facilities and plans has been submitted
to the U.S. Government and in our view meets this criterion.
For it to be credible and defensible from a nonproliferation
standpoint, it had to capture more than just a token number of
Indian nuclear facilities, which it did by encompassing nearly
two-thirds of India's current and planned thermal power
reactors as well as all future civil thermal and breeder
reactors. Importantly, for the safeguards to be meaningful,
India had to agree to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity; it
did so. Once a reactor is under IAEA safeguards, it will remain
there permanently and without any conditions. Further, in our
view the plan also needed to include the upstream and
downstream facilities associated with the safeguarded reactors
to provide a true separation of civil and military programs.
India committed to these steps, and we have concluded that its
separation plan meets the criteria established: it is credible,
transparent, and defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint.
Question (16)(b). Paragraph 1(b)(1) of the proposed
legislation requires the President to certify that India has
provided ``a credible plan'' for separating civil and military
facilities ``and has filed a declaration regarding its civil
facilities with the IAEA.''
Will a declaration filed with the IAEA meet the second
test, if it is not yet complete?
Answer. We fully expect that India in the near future will
provide the IAEA with a detailed list of all civil facilities,
along with anticipated timelines for the application of
safeguards to those facilities. Senator Joseph R. Biden (#17a)
Question:The Proposed Legislation
Question (17)(a). Paragraph 1(b)(2) of the proposed
legislation requires the President to certify that an agreement
between India and the IAEA has entered into force ``requiring
the application of safeguards in accordance with IAEA practices
to India's civil nuclear facilities....''
Would safeguards ``in a campaign mode'' be ``in accordance
with IAEA practices?''
Answer. As noted in the answer to 7c, safeguards have been
applied in this mode before to the Tarapur reprocessing plant.
Question (17)(b). Paragraph 1(b)(2) of the proposed
legislation requires the President to certify that an agreement
between India and the IAEA has entered into force ``requiring
the application of safeguards in accordance with IAEA practices
to India's civil nuclear facilities....''
Would safeguards tied to uninterrupted reactor fuel supply
be ``in accordance with IAEA practices?''
Answer. Except for the facility-specific agreements already
in place, India's safeguards agreement has not yet been
negotiated with the IAEA. The U.S. position remains that
safeguards must be applied to India's civil nuclear facilities
in perpetuity. We have had discussions with India regarding the
question of fuel supplies, and those discussions will continue.
We believe that India can be provided with appropriate fuel
supply assurances without compromising the requirement that
there be safeguards in perpetuity.
Question (18)(a). Paragraph 1(b)(3) of the proposed
legislation requires the President to certify that ``India and
the IAEA are making satisfactory progress toward implementing
an Additional Protocol that would apply to India's civil
nuclear program.''
Does the administration interpret that paragraph as
requiring that an Additional Protocol have been signed or
ratified? Or would ongoing negotiations suffice?
Answer. The administration would prefer that India sign an
Additional Protocol with the IAEA prior to the initiation of
civil nuclear cooperation, but does not expect an Additional
Protocol to be signed prior to submitting the bilateral
agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation to the U.S.
Congress. Under the language of paragraph 1(b)(3), it would be
a judgment call for the President whether the progress achieved
by India and the IAEA in working out the terms of an Additional
Protocol was satisfactory. This approach takes account of the
fact that India's Additional Protocol will necessarily be
tailored to its safeguards agreement, and therefore is likely
to be negotiated after that safeguards agreement.
Implementation of the Additional Protocol may also take some
time.
Question (18)(b). Paragraph 1(b)(3) of the proposed
legislation requires the President to certify that ``India and
the IAEA are making satisfactory progress toward implementing
an Additional Protocol that would apply to India's civil
nuclear program.''
What standards has the administration suggested for an
Indian Additional Protocol with the IAEA?
Answer. The negotiation of the terms of an Additional
Protocol will be a matter between India and the IAEA. The
negotiated document will need to be approved by the IAEA Board
of Governors, which includes the United States.
Since India will have a military nuclear program that it
does not declare to the IAEA, its Additional Protocol would
differ from the Model Additional Protocol. Nevertheless, it
should advance the IAEA's ability to track potential nuclear
proliferation worldwide. In that regard, reporting of exports
listed in Annex II of the Model Additional Protocol would be of
greatest value. India has pledged to conclude an Additional
Protocol with respect to its civil facilities, and the Model
Additional Protocol has provisions that deal with the ``sites''
of nuclear facilities. India has also listed as civil a number
of research and development and other facilities that would not
normally be subject to safeguards, but could be subject to the
reporting and access provisions of an Additional Protocol.
Question (18)(c). Paragraph 1(b)(3) of the proposed
legislation requires the President to certify that ``India and
the IAEA are making satisfactory progress toward implementing
an Additional Protocol that would apply to India's civil
nuclear program.''
Could ``satisfactory progress'' be achieved if the
Additional Protocol were similar to China's very limited
protocol, rather than to the one the United States has signed?
Answer. India pledged in the July 2005 Joint Statement to
conclude an Additional Protocol with respect to its civil
nuclear facilities. This goes beyond what is included in
China's Additional Protocol, which covers only certain
cooperation with other countries. China, of course, is
recognized as a nuclear weapon state, while India is not. The
details of India's Additional Protocol remain to be determined
and negotiated between India and the IAEA. Like India's
safeguards agreement, the Additional Protocol to that agreement
would be tailored to India's specific circumstances.
Question (19). Paragraph 1(b)(5) of the proposed
legislation requires the President to certify only that ``India
is supporting international efforts to prevent the spread of
enrichment and reprocessing technology.'' Don't we want India
to commit more specifically not to provide enrichment or
reprocessing technology to any country that does not already
have a full-up capability?
Answer. Paragraph 1(b)(5) captures part of the Indian
commitment with regard to enrichment and reprocessing
technology as expressed in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement
(i.e., to ``support international efforts to prevent the spread
of enrichment and reprocessing technology.'') We expect India
to fulfill the other part of this Joint Statement commitment as
well by refraining from the transfer of enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to states that do not already have
them.
Question (20)(a)-(c). David Albright of the Institute for
Science and International Security warns that Indian
procurement tenders for equipment to be used in its own uranium
enrichment facility can be used by other countries to learn how
to produce components for such a facility.
(a) What do you make of his findings?
(b) What are the implications of the fact that one or
more firms in the A.Q. Khan network also assisted
India?
(c) What is the administration doing to convince
India to act more responsibly in its procurement of
equipment for its nuclear weapons program?
Answer. We would be happy to discuss these allegations in a
classified setting, as appropriate.
Question (21)(a). Paragraph 1(b)(6) of the proposed
legislation requires the President to certify that India ``is
ensuring that the necessary steps are being taken to secure
nuclear materials and technology'' through ``the application''
of new laws and regulations and through ``harmonization and
adherence to'' NSG and MTCR guidelines.
Why not require that India's laws and regulations be as
good as ours?
Answer. The practice of states is to seek conformity to
established international standards, and India has agreed to
meet those international standards with respect to the NSG and
MTCR. This approach is reflected in the guidelines of the
various supplier groups, including the NSG and MTCR. UN
Security Council Resolution 1540 establishes a mechanism for
achieving this goal. This widely accepted approach was taken
with India.
Question (21)(b). Paragraph 1(b)(6) of the proposed
legislation requires the President to certify that India ``is
ensuring that the necessary steps are being taken to secure
nuclear materials and technology'' through ``the application''
of new laws and regulations and through ``harmonization and
adherence to'' NSG and MTCR guidelines.
Why is there no mention of ``enforcement,'' as opposed to
the more ambiguous word ``application?''
Answer. In the context of this Presidential determination,
the term ``application'' would have the same meaning and effect
as ``enforcement.''
Question (22)(a). Paragraph 1(b)(7) of the proposed
legislation requires the President to certify that supply to
India ``is consistent with United States participation in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group.''
What does that mean?
Answer. The language of 1(b)(7) requires an objective
determination that peaceful nuclear cooperation with India is
consistent with our status as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), including our commitment to adhere to the NSG
Guidelines. This means that the NSG will have to have made a
policy decision to accommodate such civil nuclear cooperation
with India. Such decisions are taken by consensus of all 45
member states.
Question (22)(b). Paragraph 1(b)(7) of the proposed
legislation requires the President to certify that supply to
India ``is consistent with United States participation in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group.''
Would the administration be able to make such a
certification absent a formal NSG decision, adopted by
consensus, to permit such supply to India?
Answer. We will not undercut the NSG. Consistent with NSG
Guidelines, Participating Governments of the NSG act by
consensus. It would not be appropriate to speculate on the
nature or timing of members' action to address the question of
nuclear supply to India. Paragraph 1(b)(7) reflects this
context, including the understanding that the NSG will operate
on a consensus basis.
Question (22)(c). Paragraph 1(b)(7) of the proposed
legislation requires the President to certify that supply to
India ``is consistent with United States participation in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group.''
If one or more countries were to hold out against a change
in the guidelines, could the administration (perhaps with the
support of other countries) reinterpret NSG rules to allow an
informal ``India exception'' to go into effect?
Answer. As previously noted, paragraph 1(b)(7) is based on
the understanding that the NSG operates on a consensus basis.
Question (23)(a). Subsection 1(d) of the proposed
legislation says: ``A determination under subsection (b) shall
not be effective if the President determines that India has
detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of
enactment of this Act.''
What is the effect of this provision?
Answer. Under the proposed legislation, if the President
made the determination in subsection 1(b), the operation of
certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act would be modified
with respect to U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation. However,
subsection 1(d) provides that the President's determination
``shall not be effective'' in modifying the operation of these
legal requirements if India is found to have detonated a
nuclear explosive device after enactment of the legislation. In
other words, if India detonated a device after enactment of the
legislation, U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation would be
subject to the Atomic Energy Act without modification. However,
previously completed transactions (e.g., nuclear exports that
were legal when made) would not be rendered invalid. Issues
relating to the ``right of return'' of any such exports would
be subject to the bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation.
Detonation would also invalidate the waiver under Brownback
II (P.L. 106-79, section 9001). This would reinstate a wide
range of sanctions under the Glenn amendment (Arms Export
Control Act, section 102(b)), as well as sanctions under the
Export-Import Bank Act (section 2(b)(4)).
Question (23)(b). Subsection 1(d) of the proposed
legislation says: ``A determination under subsection (b) shall
not be effective if the President determines that India has
detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of
enactment of this Act.''
If India were to conduct a nuclear test after the date of
enactment, but before the submission to Congress of a peaceful
nuclear cooperation agreement, would such an agreement once
again require a Presidential waiver under section 128 of the
Atomic Energy Act?
Answer. Any waiver of section 128 based on the proposed
legislation would become ineffective upon a finding of
detonation. Any subsequent NRC licensing of nuclear exports to
India would be subject to section 128 without modification, as
set forth in the Atomic Energy Act. The timing of any Indian
nuclear test (before or after submission of the agreement for
nuclear cooperation) would not affect this outcome.
Question (23)(c. Subsection 1(d) of the proposed
legislation says: ``A determination under subsection (b) shall
not be effective if the President determines that India has
detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of
enactment of this Act.''
If India were to conduct a nuclear test after the
submission to Congress of a peaceful nuclear cooperation
agreement, but before its entry into force, would that
agreement require the approval of both houses of Congress?
Answer. Indian detonation of a nuclear explosive device
would be inconsistent with the fundamental premises of the
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, including
India's commitment under the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement to
continue its unilateral nuclear testing moratorium which India
has had in place since 1998. We believe India takes this
commitment seriously, and that it intends to uphold it.
Should India nonetheless take such action while Congress
was engaged in reviewing the bilateral peaceful nuclear
cooperation agreement, the political conditions necessary to
bring that agreement into force would no longer exist. In
addition, as a legal matter, Congressional review of the
agreement would no longer be subject to the proposed
legislation, but would be subject to section 123 of the Atomic
Energy Act without modification.
Question (23)(d). Subsection 1(d) of the proposed
legislation says: ``A determination under subsection (b) shall
not be effective if the President determines that India has
detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of
enactment of this Act.''
If India were to conduct a nuclear test after a peaceful
nuclear cooperation agreement had entered into force, would the
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement be null and void? Or
would it remain in effect?
Answer. The bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation
agreement would remain in effect as a matter of international
law. However, exports of nuclear equipment and material to
India under that agreement would be prohibited under section
129 of the Atomic Energy Act (which provides for such a
prohibition if a country detonates a nuclear explosive device);
any prior waiver of section 129 based on a Presidential
determination under the proposed legislation would no longer be
effective.
Question (24)(a)-(c) How would the implementation of a
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement be affected if India
were to engage in other conduct of concern, such as diversion
of U.S. equipment or proliferation of nuclear weapons
technology, if India were to suspend or end its phased
separation of nuclear facilities, which will stretch out until
2014, or if India were to end or suspend its acceptance of IAEA
safeguards?
(a) Would all nuclear-related export licenses be
suspended?
(b) Would equipment or material received from the
United States have to be returned?
(c) Would India become subject to any fines or other
penalties?
Answer. Since the U.S.-India agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation is under negotiation, it is premature to discuss
how specifically it will be implemented. However,
administration officials have told Congress that we are seeking
an agreement that satisfies all current requirements of U.S.
law except for the full-scope IAEA safeguards requirement in
section 123(a)(2) of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Section
123(a)(4) of the AEA--hich will be applicable--rovides that any
agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with a non-nuclear
weapon state (which an agreement with India would be, in
accordance with U.S. law) must include ``a stipulation that the
United States shall have the right to require the return of any
nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant thereto
and any special nuclear material produced through the use
thereof if the cooperating party detonates a nuclear explosive
device or terminates or abrogates an agreement providing for
IAEA safeguards.''
In addition, such activities by India would likely trigger
a cut-off of nuclear cooperation under section 129 of the AEA.
The proposed legislation would allow for waiver of this
prohibition based on the Presidential determination in
subsection 1(b). In this regard, the President would take into
account that the activities described in the question would
likely call into question the fundamental premises upon which
the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative is based.
In addition, several nonproliferation sanctions laws
provide for measures against countries that: detonate a nuclear
explosive device; terminate, abrogate, or materially violate a
safeguards agreement with the IAEA; or materially violate a
nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S. (See section 102(b)
of Arms Export Control Act; section 2(b)(4) of Export-Import
Bank Act; section 530 of Foreign Relations Authorization Act
(P.L. 103-236)).
Question (25)(a). The administration's proposed legislation
would exempt India from the provisions of section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act. Under current law, given that the President
would have to waive the requirement of section 123.a(2) of that
Act, such an agreement would require approval by both houses of
Congress.
Under this proposed legislation, could Congress stop such
an agreement unless, within 60 days of continuous session, it
enacted a joint resolution of disapproval, including voting to
override a Presidential veto?
Answer. Congress would have 90 days of continuous session
to enact legislation disapproving the agreement for
cooperation. If the President vetoed the legislation and
Congress wanted nonetheless to disapprove, it would be able to
vote on whether to override.
Question (25)(b). The administration's proposed legislation
would exempt India from the provisions of section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act. Under current law, given that the President
would have to waive the requirement of section 123.a(2) of that
Act, such an agreement would require approval by both houses of
Congress.
Does the administration intend to submit a peaceful nuclear
cooperation agreement that would require the waiver of any
requirement other than that in section 123.a(2)? If so, please
explain.
Answer. No. The administration intends to submit an
agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation that satisfies the
requirements set forth in section 123(a) of the AEA with the
sole exception of section 123(a)(2). The draft legislation
proposed by the administration would also provide for a
Presidential waiver, on the basis of specified determinations,
of provisions of AEA sections 128 and 129 in the specific case
of India.
GUARDING AGAINST DIVERSION OF CIVIL COMMERCE TO MILITARY PURPOSES
Question (26)(a). The Indian separation offer puts some
Canadian-type reactors under safeguards and leaves others of
the same type declared ``military.'' It also proposes only
intermittent safeguards over the spent fuel reprocessing
facility and perhaps, if there were imported fuel
interruptions, over reactors as well.
Under these circumstances, how can the United States ensure
that nuclear equipment or technology sold to India is not
diverted or otherwise assists its nuclear weapons program?
Answer. The IAEA safeguards required by this Initiative are
designed to detect, with a view to preventing, the diversion to
military use of any materials, technologies, or equipment
provided to India's civil nuclear facilities.
The United States and other suppliers will insist that
nuclear items supplied to India, and special nuclear material
produced through their use, remain under IAEA safeguards. This
is a separate issue from whether India will maintain IAEA
safeguards in perpetuity on the facilities on its civil list.
While India has not yet completed negotiations with the IAEA,
the U.S. position is well-known.
Question (26)(b). The Indian separation offer puts some
Canadian-type reactors under safeguards and leaves others of
the same type declared ``military.'' It also proposes only
intermittent safeguards over the spent fuel reprocessing
facility and perhaps, if there were imported fuel
interruptions, over reactors as well.
Did the administration obtain any intelligence analysis on
this matter? If so, please arrange for the committee to receive
copies of such analysis.
Answer. The Intelligence Community has considered this
issue, and has already briefed Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and other Congressional staff. We would be happy to
further discuss this and other related issues in a classified
session, as appropriate.
Question (26)(c).The Indian separation offer puts some
Canadian-type reactors under safeguards and leaves others of
the same type declared ``military.'' It also proposes only
intermittent safeguards over the spent fuel reprocessing
facility and perhaps, if there were imported fuel
interruptions, over reactors as well.
Will the United States have clear rights to inspect Indian
use of U.S. exports? Should there be similar requirements in an
NSG context?
Answer. The U.S. and other NSG members rely on IAEA
inspection and monitoring at facilities where IAEA safeguards
are being applied, which will be the only facilities to which
U.S. or internationally-supplied nuclear technology, equipment,
and material will be transferred. Moreover, an Additional
Protocol will provide for broadened IAEA access to facilities
and information regarding nuclear-related activities. These
steps are designed to detect, with a view to preventing,
diversion of any civil nuclear cooperation to India's military
program.
Question (26)(d). The Indian separation offer puts some
Canadian-type reactors under safeguards and leaves others of
the same type declared ``military.'' It also proposes only
intermittent safeguards over the spent fuel reprocessing
facility and perhaps, if there were imported fuel
interruptions, over reactors as well.
How much additional funds will the IAEA need for
safeguards? How much of that amount will India pay? Will the
United States have to put up more money for this?
Answer. Under the Indian separation plan announced in
March, the major additional facilities that would come under
safeguards will be 10 reactors: 8 heavy-water reactors and 2
Russian-supplied light-water reactors, which will be placed
under safeguards between 2006 and 2014. Moreover, while no
specific plans have been announced, the Indian government has
indicated that it will also seek to purchase additional civil
reactors over the next several years and all such reactors will
come under safeguards.
Safeguards costs are difficult to estimate precisely, but
in the past the IAEA has ascribed direct safeguards costs
(staff time, cost of travel, cost of equipment used in
inspections, cost of sample analysis) to similar heavy water
reactors of about $200,000--250,000 per year per facility, and
about $50,000 per year per facility for light water reactors.
The total safeguards budget of the IAEA for 2004 was about
$100 million. As a general rule, safeguards applied subject to
legally binding agreements are paid for out of the IAEA's
general budget, to which all member states contribute. In a
number of cases states, or groups of states such as EURATOM,
have voluntarily shared some safeguards costs with the Agency,
for example by purchasing equipment installed in facilities in
those states.
THE NSG AND ASSURING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD FOR AMERICAN COMPANIES
Question (27)(a). What was China's reaction to the U.S.
proposal at the NSG consultative group meeting in Vienna?
Answer. Since NSG deliberations are generally of a
confidential nature, we would be happy to brief the committee
in an appropriate setting on our discussions with NSG partners,
including China, regarding the U.S. proposal to accommodate
civil nuclear cooperation with India.
Question (27)(b). Is it true that some states suggested not
lifting restrictions on nuclear trade with India until it stops
fissile material production for weapons and signs the
Comprehensive Test-Ban treaty? If so, which states were these?
Answer. NSG members have discussed many specific issues in
this context, including the prospect for India suspending
fissile material production or signing the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty. Since NSG deliberations are generally of a
confidential nature, we would be happy to brief the committee
in an appropriate setting on our discussions with NSG partners
regarding the U.S. proposal to accommodate civil nuclear
cooperation with India.
Question (28). The draft proposal that the United States
submitted to the NSG experts meeting would enter into force as
soon as it was adopted by the NSG. But U.S. firms would be
unable to sell to India until a peaceful nuclear cooperation
agreement entered into force. That could give foreign firms a
head start of many months, considering that an agreement with
India has not even been negotiated. How should the timing of
U.S. action and NSG action be adjusted so that companies from
all countries get to make sales at about the same time?
Answer. In part to ensure that U.S. firms are not
disadvantaged with respect to their foreign competitors, we are
moving forward in parallel on the measures that are required
for the civil nuclear cooperation to commence: (a) obtaining
NSG consensus on civil nuclear cooperation with India, (b) the
negotiation of a U.S.-India agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation, and (c) Congressional consideration of the
Initiative and any necessary legislative changes. While it is
not possible to ensure that these separate actions occur at the
same time, in order to ensure a level playing field for U.S.
business, we believe in principle that Congressional action
should precede NSG action.
Question (29)(a). The U.S. proposal to the NSG would allow
each member to approve sales to ``safeguarded civil nuclear
facilities in India as long as the participating Government
intending to make the transfer is satisfied that India
continues to fully meet'' its commitments under the July 18
Joint Statement.
Why should other countries become independent judges of how
faithfully India was fulfilling commitments made to the United
States? Why not require suppliers to consult with the United
States, or with the NSG, on the question of whether India
continues to fully meet its commitments?
Answer. As is the case with all of the multilateral
nonproliferation regimes, implementation of the NSG Guidelines
by Participating Governments, including nuclear export
approvals, is a matter of national discretion, and subject to
each Participating Government's national laws, regulations, and
policies. Participating Governments make a political commitment
to have in place laws and regulations that ensure effective
implementation of the NSG Guidelines. The NSG Guidelines also
call for consultations regarding implementation of the
Guidelines, especially in sensitive cases.
After a consensus policy decision is reached in the NSG
context to allow nuclear cooperation with India, it would be up
to each supplier to continue to satisfy itself that India
continued to meet its various nonproliferation and safeguards
commitments. If a supplier developed a concern that the
criteria were not being met, then the supplier would be
expected to raise the issue in the NSG with other partners.
Question (29)(b). The U.S. proposal to the NSG would allow
each member to approve sales to ``safeguarded civil nuclear
facilities in India as long as the participating Government
intending to make the transfer is satisfied that India
continues to fully meet'' its commitments under the July 18
Joint Statement.
Why did you not exclude enrichment and reprocessing
facilities from those to which sales could be made? Under this
NSG proposal, could sales be made to the reprocessing facility
that is used for both civil and military purposes?
Answer. Within the NSG, there has been no discussion of
possible transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology to
India or any Indian requests for such technology. As indicated
above, we do not intend to transfer such technology, and our
bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation will
reflect this. Moreover, NSG Participating Governments have made
clear that they currently are not contemplating any new
transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology and in fact
have been considering strengthening controls over such
transfers.
Transfers of reprocessing equipment or technology for use
in an unsafeguarded Indian reprocessing facility that is used
for military purposes would not be permissible under the NPT,
the NSG Guidelines, or U.S. law.
With respect to possible transfers to an Indian
reprocessing facility that is used alternately for military and
civil purposes, and that is intermittently under IAEA
safeguards (i.e., when being used for a civil purpose), as
noted in our answer to question 7(e), the supply of items could
only take place if the facility were under safeguards at the
time of supply. Therefore, if India wished to then reprocess
unsafeguarded spent fuel in an unsafeguarded campaign mode, it
would have an obligation to the supplier under the terms of
supply to remove any such supplied components or equipment from
the facility before operating the facility in that mode.
Removal would not appear to be a practical option if the
components or equipment were important to the operation of the
plant. Moreover, as a matter of policy, the United States does
not intend to supply enrichment or reprocessing technology,
equipment, or components to India.
Question (30). What is the administration's position on
Russia's recent proposal to supply fuel to the Tarapur
reactors, which the administration opposed in 2001?
Answer. We expressed our strong disappointment to both
Russia and India regarding the Russian decision to once again,
as in 2001, supply nuclear fuel to the Tarapur reactors. The
United States and the great majority of other NSG Participating
Governments strongly disagreed with the Russian position that
the safety exemption to the full-scope safeguards supply policy
in the NSG Guidelines applied to Tarapur. We also expressed
concern to both Russia and India that the Russian decision to
supply without prior NSG consultation would lead NSG
Participating Governments to be less open-minded when
considering the U.S. proposal for civil nuclear cooperation
with India.
STATEMENTS BY UNDER SECRETARY BURNS
Question (31)(a). Secretary Burns, you told the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce on March 14 that ``India has . . . promised
that all of the upstream and downstream nuclear research
facilities . . . shall come under safeguards.'' But the
separation plan document tabled in the Indian Parliament on
March 7, 2006, did not contain a full list of such facilities.
Where is India's promise made clear?
Answer. In paragraph 14 of India's separation plan,
sections (v) and (vi) address the issue of upstream and
downstream facilities. To date, a full list of the facilities
to be safeguarded has not been made public by the Indian
government. We fully expect that India will make such a list
available in the near future.
Question (31)(b). Secretary Burns, you told the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce on March 14 that ``India has . . . promised
that all of the upstream and downstream nuclear research
facilities . . . shall come under safeguards.'' But the
separation plan document tabled in the Indian Parliament on
March 7, 2006, did not contain a full list of such facilities.
Will you provide the committee with the negotiating record
of this agreement, so that we can understand precisely what the
two parties have agreed to?
Answer. We would be happy to brief the committee on our
understanding of the scope of the undertakings in the U.S.-
India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, including
discussions between the U.S. and India related to it.
Question (31)(c). Secretary Burns, you told the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce on March 14 that ``India has . . . promised
that all of the upstream and downstream nuclear research
facilities . . . shall come under safeguards.'' But the
separation plan document tabled in the Indian Parliament on
March 7, 2006, did not contain a full list of such facilities.
Has India also promised that the fuel used in its civil
reactors and the spent fuel removed from them will be under
safeguards?
Answer. Under the Initiative, India has committed to place
its current and planned civil reactors under IAEA safeguards.
The fuel used in all the reactors designated as civil will be
safeguarded after entry into force of the safeguards agreement
with respect to that facility, and the safeguards will follow
the material if it is removed from the reactor facility (for
example, to a repository). Under current arrangements, India's
four safeguarded reactors and associated spent fuel are already
under IAEA safeguards. We would not expect that spent fuel that
was removed from civil reactors before the Initiative goes into
effect and IAEA safeguards are applied would be safeguarded.
Question (31)(d). Secretary Burns, you told the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce on March 14 that ``India has . . . promised
that all of the upstream and downstream nuclear research
facilities . . . shall come under safeguards.'' But the
separation plan document tabled in the Indian Parliament on
March 7, 2006, did not contain a full list of such facilities.
If so, why is only one spent fuel repository noted in the
plan tabled in India's Parliament?
Answer. Spent fuel pools are for temporary storage of spent
fuel. Most spent fuel pools are located at reactors and
considered part of the reactor facility, but the two
specifically identified in India's separation plan--paragraph
14, section (vi)--are ``away from reactor'' spent fuel storage
pools that would also be safeguarded. We would expect that
spent fuel storage pools of reactors declared as civil would be
safeguarded, consistent with IAEA practice. (Separate, away-
from-reactor spent fuel storage facilities would be safeguarded
if they contain safeguarded spent fuel from civil reactors.)
Question (32)(1). Secretary Burns, you told the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce that ``India has decided--to adhere to the
Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement.'' That would be
an important, positive step; India has previously declined to
bar chemical weapons-usable exports unless the items were on
the smaller lists in the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Has any Indian official announced this decision?
Answer. We have discussed with India the importance of
India harmonizing its control lists with those of the Australia
Group and Wassenaar Arrangement. To date, we have not received
an official announcement by the Indian government indicating it
has harmonized its control lists or unilaterally adhered. We
continue to discuss these issues with the Indian government in
the context of our bilateral discussions.
Question (32)(b). Secretary Burns, you told the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce that ``India has decided--to adhere to the
Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement.'' That would be
an important, positive step; India has previously declined to
bar chemical weapons-usable exports unless the items were on
the smaller lists in the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Can you provide the committee any paper that documents this
decision?
Answer. We will inform Congress of any developments
concerning India's harmonization or unilateral adherence as
they occur.
Question (32)(c). Secretary Burns, you told the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce that ``India has decided--to adhere to the
Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement.'' That would be
an important, positive step; India has previously declined to
bar chemical weapons-usable exports unless the items were on
the smaller lists in the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Has India prepared legislation to conform its export
control law to those regimes? Are you assisting India in that
regard?
Answer. India's May of 2005 ``Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities)
Act'' (WMD Act) and subsequent implementing regulations greatly
strengthen India's export control capabilities. On the whole,
the Act and implementing regulations bring Indian export
controls closer in line with widely accepted export control
standards for preventing WMD proliferation and are consistent
with the kinds of measures that UNSCR 1540 requires states to
implement. We continue to discuss with the Indian government
the steps for bringing its export control standards and
practices fully in line with those of the international
regimes, including issues relating to implementation and
enforcement. We also continue to engage with India in
cooperative programs under the Export Control and Related
Border Security (EXBS) program.
TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS
Question (33)(a). Please provide to the committee copies of
any signed or initialed documents between the United States and
India on this matter.
Please provide also any agreed minutes, exchanges of
letters, or memoranda documenting each country's understanding
of the agreements that have been reached.
Answer. The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative
is set out in the July 18, 2005 and March 2, 2006 Joint
Statements, which are political statements and were neither
signed nor initialed. The separation plan was not a bilateral
document, but a unilateral document issued by India, following
discussions with the United States. There are no other
documents of the sort described in the question.
Question (33)(b). Please provide to the committee copies of
any signed or initialed documents between the United States and
India on this matter.
Please also provide, and up-date periodically, the rolling
text of the U.S.-India peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement.
Answer. We have begun initial discussions on the bilateral
agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with India. We would
be happy to arrange briefings for the committee on the outlines
of what is contained in the text. In this regard, we note that
the texts of the section 123 agreements with non-nuclear weapon
states that are currently in force and previously reviewed by
Congress are illustrative of the content we are seeking in an
agreement with India (with the exception of a provision for
full-scope IAEA safeguards in India). Congress will have an
opportunity to fully review the agreement once negotiations are
complete and the agreement has been submitted for congressional
review.
----------
VII.--Hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April
5, 2006
----------
U.S.-INDIA ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION:
THE INDIAN SEPARATION PLAN AND THE
ADMINISTRATION'S LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 2006,
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in Room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar [presiding], Chafee, Allen,
Alexander, Biden, Sarbanes, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Bill
Nelson, and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
The Chairman. This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
The committee meets today to examine the United States-
India Civilian Nuclear Agreement. The Indian Nuclear Agreement
is one of the most ambitious foreign policy initiatives to come
before Congress in many years. In view of the importance of the
committee's work on this agreement, we're especially pleased to
welcome Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. We look forward to
this public opportunity to explore, in depth, the agreement and
its implications.
Last Wednesday, the committee met in closed session with
Under Secretary Nick Burns and Under Secretary Bob Joseph to
hear the Bush administration's views with regard to the India
Nuclear Agreement. The briefing was well attended, and members
listened carefully to the presentation. The briefing
encompassed a broad range of topics, but I believe we have only
scratched the surface of this intricate agreement and the
national security questions it has raised. Indeed, some months
ago, I submitted to the State Department 82 questions related
to the agreement as the initial step toward establishing a
dialogue that would help Congress make an informed decision.
The State Department has provided answers to all 82 of these
questions. A copy of this lengthy exchange has been provided to
members of the committee, and it can be accessed on my office
Web site by the public.
I expect, however, that this hearing will generate many
additional questions from members. Given the complexity and
importance of the issue, the administration must continue to be
responsive to this committee and to the entire Congress.
The committee is cognizant of how valuable a closer
relationship with India could be for the United States. I
believe we will find little argument in Congress with the
general premise that the national security and economic future
of the United States would be enhanced by a strong and enduring
partnership with India. Our nations share common democratic
values, and the potential of our economic engagement is
limitless. The progress made by India in the last decade is one
of the world's major success stories. With a well-educated
middle class that is larger than the entire United States
population, India can be an anchor of stability in Asia and an
engine of global economic growth.
Despite this success, the Indian Government recognizes that
much of its growing population still lives in poverty; and to
overcome these conditions, it will need more trade, more
scientific and technical cooperation, and, most of all, more
energy.
India's energy needs are expected to double by 2025. The
United States has an interest in expanding energy cooperation
with India to develop new technologies, cushion supply
disruptions, cut greenhouse gas emissions, and prepare for
declining global fossil-fuel reserves.
The United States' own energy problems will be exacerbated
if we do not forge energy partnerships with India, with China
and other nations experiencing rampant economic growth. That is
why I've introduced Senate bill 2435, the Energy, Diplomacy,
and Security Act, which would encourage international energy
dialogues and advance a broad range of energy diplomacy goals.
But in pursing a nuclear relationship with India, we must
deal with some fundamental facts. India has not signed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has built and tested
nuclear weapons, and it has declared its intention to continue
its nuclear weapons programs and the production of fissile
material. Although the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement
would move India into a closer relationship with the
International Atomic Energy Agency, and would put more Indian
reactors under safeguards, it would not prevent India from
expanding its nuclear arsenal. If Congress approves this
agreement, we'll be establishing a new course after decades of
declining any cooperation with India's nuclear program.
It was apparent, from our earlier briefing, that the Bush
administration considered the implications of this agreement on
our international nonproliferation posture. After weighing many
factors, the President and his team came down on the side of
concluding the agreement with the Indian Government. They
judged that the deal could be implemented without undercutting
our nonproliferation advocacy and that its benefits included
stronger Indian cooperation with international nonproliferation
efforts.
Now Congress must undertake its own exhaustive
deliberations, and we must reach our own conclusions. No one
should suggest that the answers to our questions are either
easy or obvious. What is required is a thorough bipartisan
review of this agreement in the context of nonproliferation
goals, global energy requirements, environmental concerns, and
our geostrategic relationship with India.
We especially thank Secretary Rice for joining us today
after a long and successful trip, and for this opportunity to
engage with her on this very important agreement.
And, indeed, Secretary Rice, we are honored that you are
here. I'll recognize my distinguished colleague Senator Biden
for his opening statement, at the time that he comes to the
hearing this morning. But, for the moment, we would like to
proceed with your testimony, and we ask that it be as
comprehensive as you wish. Do not worry about time limits. We
are here to hear you, and then to have an opportunity to raise
questions with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF STATE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Rice. Well, thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you very much
for this opportunity to come and discuss with you this, indeed,
pathbreaking U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.
And it obviously deserves the support of the U.S. Senate, but
we also understand that it deserves the thorough review of the
Senate before giving that support. And so, that is why I'm
here. And I want to note that we are prepared to continue our
discussions and our briefings to the point that you feel that
you have the information that you need to make this
determination.
Let me note that I have longer, more--a fuller testimony
that I would like to have entered into the record.
The Chairman. It will be made part of the record in full.
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much.
India's society is open and free. It is transparent and
stable. It is multiethnic. It is multi---a multireligious
democracy that is characterized by individual freedom and the
rule of law. It is a country with which we share common values.
India will soon be the world's most populous nation, and
America's exports to India have doubled in only the past 4
years. And, of course, India is a rising global power that we
believe can be a pillar of stability in a rapidly changing
Asia. In other words, in short, India is a natural partner for
the United States.
But, for too long during the past half century, during the
cold war, in particular, because of both domestic policies and
foreign policies, India and the United States were estranged.
And one element of this estrangement was India's complete
disregard--or India's complete isolation from the policies that
the United States was concerned about concerning proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction.
Now, as a result of India's decision to have a nuclear
program, to test nuclear weapons, to build a nuclear program,
as did Pakistan, India's adversary in that region, we adopted
nonproliferation policies to try and constrain and change
Indian behavior. But I think that it is entirely clear now that
those past nonproliferation policies did not achieve their
goals. In fact, they had no effect on India's development of
nuclear weapons. They didn't prevent India and Pakistan from
testing nuclear weapons in 1998. They contributed little to
lessening regional tensions, which brought India and Pakistan
repeatedly to the brink of war. And all of this simply resulted
in a more isolated India, especially isolated from the
standards and practices of the nuclear nonproliferation
establishment that have been development and maturing over the
last decades?
Now let us consider the future that we could have instead.
The initiative that we are putting before you and asking for
legislation to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 will advance
international security, enhance energy security, further
environmental protection, and increase business opportunities
for both our countries. All of these benefits must be viewed in
this larger context, of course, of how the initiative itself
elevates the U.S.-India relationship to the new strategic level
that we desire.
The initiative, first and foremost, will deepen that
strategic partnership. The United States and India are laying
the foundation for cooperation on major issues in the region
and beyond, building on and building up a broad relationship
between our peoples and governments.
I was just with President Bush in India, and I can tell you
that the discussion was broad and multifaceted. It was a
discussion not just between governments, but between peoples,
discussions about how to improve agriculture in India, much as
we helped to spur the Green Revolution in India of the '60s. We
talked about the ability for India to access the new
technologies to increase its agricultural production. There
were discussions about Indian education and the desire for all
of India's people to be able to access the new knowledge-based
economy that is growing so rapidly in India. And, of course,
there were discussions between CEOs of Indian companies and
American companies, showing that this is a broad relationship
that is not just government-to-government relationship, but one
that is fundamentally affecting our societies.
Now, in order to fully realize the potential of this vision
for India, we do have to deal with the longstanding impediments
associated with civil nuclear cooperation, and we need to
resolve them once and for all. We believe that this initiative
will unlock the progress of our expanding relationship in other
areas.
The initiative will clearly enhance energy security. India
is a nation of over a billion people, with an economy growing
at approximately 8 percent each year. It has a massive and
rapidly growing appetite for energy. It is now the world's
sixth largest consumer of energy. Diversifying energy's--
India's energy sector will help it to meet its ever increasing
needs and, more importantly, ease its reliance on hydrocarbons
and unstable sources, like Iran. This is good for the United
States.
Secondly, the initiative will benefit the environment.
Nuclear energy is, after all, clean energy. And providing India
with an environmentally friendly energy source like nuclear
energy is an important goal. India's carbon emissions increased
61 percent between 1990 and 2001. That number is surpassed only
by China.
This initiative will create opportunities for American
jobs. Nuclear cooperation will provide a new market for
American nuclear firms, as well as assist India's economic
development. The initiative may add as many as three to five
thousand new direct jobs in the United States, and about 10,000
to 15,000 indirect jobs in the United States, as the United
States is able to engage in nuclear commerce and trade with
India. By helping India's economy to grow, we would, thus, be
helping our own.
Finally, this initiative does strengthen the international
nuclear nonproliferation regime. I know that there has been a
lot of concern about the Non-Proliferation Treaty and India's
refusal to join, and, indeed, the view that India should not
join as a nuclear-weapons state, a view that we continue to
hold.
I want to say to the chairman and to the committee that the
United States values greatly the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It
is one of the cornerstones of our nonproliferation policy. But,
of course, there is a broader nonproliferation regime, as well.
And we believe that the continued isolation of our strategic
partner from that regime is the wrong policy choice. The
initiative is, thus, a strong net gain for nonproliferation, in
general.
I might just note that the custodian of the
nonproliferation regime, Mohammed ElBaradei, has been, from the
very beginning, a strong supporter of this initiative, and he
remains so. I should note, also, that Great Britain and France
are strong supporters, and Russia supports it, as well. Both
Prime Minister Blair and President Chirac have issued
statements in that regard.
Now, I want to take just a moment to take, head-on, if you
will, several criticisms that have been made of the initiative.
And let me associate myself with what the chairman said, it is
a pathbreaking agreement, and, of course, one always has to
balance the various factors in deciding whether or not it is
worth pursuing. We believe that the criticisms can be
addressed. And I will address them here.
First, India would never accept a unilateral freeze or cap
on its nuclear arsenal. We raised this with the Indians, but
the Indians said that its plans and policies must take into
account regional realities. No one can credibly assert that
India would accept what would amount to an arms control
agreement that did not include other key countries, like China
and Pakistan.
Second, the initiative with India does not seek to
renegotiate or amend the NPT. India is not, and is not going to
become, a member of the NPT as a nuclear-weapons state. We are
simply seeking to address an untenable situation. India has
never been party to the NPT, and this agreement does not
bring--but this agreement does bring India into the
nonproliferation framework, and thus strengthen the regime.
Third, civil nuclear cooperation with India will not lead
to an arms race in South Asia. Nothing we or any other
potential international suppliers provide to India under this
initiative will enhance its military capacity or add to its
military stockpile. Moreover, the nuclear balance in the region
is a function of political and military--the political and
military situation in the region. We are far more likely to be
able to influence those regional dynamics from a position of
strong relations with India, and, indeed, with Pakistan.
Fourth, this initiative does not complicate our policies
toward countries like North Korea or Iran. It is simply not
credible to compare India to North Korea or to Iran. While Iran
and North Korea are violating their IAEA obligations, India is
making new obligations by bringing it--the IAEA into the Indian
program and seeking peaceful international cooperation. Iran,
and especially North Korea, are, of course, closed,
nondemocratic societies. India is a democracy. In fact, India
is increasingly doing its part to support the international
community's efforts to curb the dangerous nuclear ambitions of
Iran.
In sum, the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative
is a strategic achievement. It's good for America. It's good
for India. And it's good for the international community.
I know that there is a history that we are trying to
overcome. But the time comes when you must deal with the
realities and, indeed, overcome that history. President Bush
and I look forward to Congress as a full partner in this
initiative. Your support for this legislation is crucial, and
we ask you to lend it.
Together, we can seize this tremendous opportunity to
solidify a key partnership that will advance American
interests, the ideals of peace and prosperity and liberty, for
which we stand.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much look forward to
answering the questions of the distinguished members of the
committee.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rice follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today. I am pleased to discuss with you why
President Bush and I think that the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear
Cooperation Initiative deserves the support of the United States
Senate.
On March 2 in New Delhi, the United States and India reached a
historic understanding on civil nuclear cooperation. This strategic
achievement will advance energy security, further environmental
protection, foster economic and technological development in both of
our countries, bolster international security, and strengthen the
global nonproliferation regime. All of these benefits, however, must be
viewed in a still larger, still greater context: What this initiative
does to elevate the U.S.-India relationship to a new, strategic height.
Recall for a moment where we were before this initiative. For too
long during the past half century, differences over domestic policies
and international objectives kept India and the United States
estranged. We had a bedeviled relationship, a structural ambivalence
between the world's leading democracy and the world's largest
democracy. For years, relations between our two countries were
constrained, thereby limiting America's ability to shape a productive
future for South and Central Asia, which will be one of the most
dynamic regions in the 21st century.
Our past nonproliferation policies toward India had not achieved
their purposes. They had no effect on India's development of nuclear
weapons. Nor did they prevent India and Pakistan from testing nuclear
weapons in 1998. They had contributed little to lessening regional
tensions, which brought India and Pakistan repeatedly to the brink of
war.
These policies also left us with a more dangerous energy future.
They effectively forced India to rely on oil and gas from Iran and the
Persian Gulf, or on destabilizing competition over waterways to produce
hydroelectric power.
All of this resulted in a more isolated India--isolated especially
from the standards of the nuclear nonproliferation establishment,
prevented from reaping the benefits of a long history of global
cooperation. This left India fostering insular and resentful attitudes,
protecting a sheltered nuclear industry.
When President Bush came into office, he judged that our relations
with India would be central to the future success of U.S. foreign
policy in South Asia and around the world. He resolved to transform our
relationship with India, and in the past five years, that is exactly
what we have done. The world's oldest democracy is now building a
global partnership with the world's largest democracy. As the President
said in New Delhi: ``India in the 21st century is a natural partner of
the United States because we are partners in the cause of human
liberty.''
This partnership is founded on common interests and shared ideals:
Democracy: India's society is open and free, transparent and
stable. It is a vibrant, multi-ethnic, multi-religious
democracy characterized by individual freedom, the rule of law,
and a constitutional government that owes its power to free and
fair elections. It is a positive model in the international
community.
Security: India is a rising global power and a pillar of
stability in a rapidly changing Asia. India will continue to
possess sophisticated military forces that, just like our own,
remain strongly committed to the principle of civilian control,
and will in the future help to promote peace in Asia and across
the world.
Prosperity: India is committed to economic liberty and
strong growth. It has an immense, skilled, and youthful
workforce. It will soon be the world's most populous nation,
with the world's largest and fastest growing middle class. By
2025, India will most likely rank among the world's five
largest economies. American exports to India have doubled in
only the last four years.
Developing civil nuclear cooperation with India represents the
promise of this new partnership--a partnership that will become one of
the most important we have with any country in the 21st century. Recall
again where we were with India before we launched this initiative: a
conflicted relationship, the wrong energy incentives, and a failed
nonproliferation policy. Today, I want to discuss what we can have
instead: a strategic partnership, enhanced energy security, greater
environmental protections, increased business opportunities, and of
course, a more secure future.
Taken together, the before and after comparison is compelling: This
initiative is good for America. It is good for India. And it is good
for the international community. So let us move forward with it.
the u.s.-india civil nuclear cooperation initiative
Before I turn to the benefits of our Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Initiative, let me first run through the specifics of the initiative
itself. The basic agreement is this: India has pledged, for the first
time in 30 years, to submit its entire civil nuclear program to
international inspection and to take on significant new
nonproliferation commitments in exchange for full civil nuclear
cooperation with the international community. With this initiative, the
world is expecting India to be a full partner in nonproliferation, and
India is expecting the world to help it meet its growing energy needs.
Specifically, India has agreed to place all future civil reactors--
both breeder and thermal--under permanent International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards and to continue its unilateral moratorium on
nuclear testing. India will also place a majority (14 out of 22) of its
existing and planned power reactors under safeguards by 2014. Under
this initiative, 65 percent of India's thermal reactors will be brought
under safeguards, a figure that the Indian government has said could
rise as high as 90 percent as India procures more civil reactors in the
next 15 years. To put this in perspective, imagine the alternative:
Without this initiative, 81 percent of India's current power reactors--
and its future power and breeder reactors--would continue to remain
outside of IAEA safeguards. The Indian nuclear power program would
remain opaque, a nuclear black box.
Once this initiative is implemented, potential American and
international suppliers will be able to invest in India's safeguarded
civil facilities solely for energy production and other peaceful
purposes. The safeguards required by this initiative are designed to
help detect, and thereby help prevent, the diversion to military use of
any materials, technologies, or equipment provided to India's civil
nuclear facilities. Once a reactor is under IAEA oversight, safeguards
will be in place permanently and without any conditions.
But that is not all. The Indian government will negotiate and sign
an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and it will work with the United
States to conclude a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. India
has also agreed to create a robust national export control system that
includes harmonization with and adherence to the Missile Technology
Control Regime and Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. Finally, India
will continue its unilateral moratorium on testing and refrain from
transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do
not possess them. Just last June, as part of our ongoing discussions on
civil nuclear cooperation, India's parliament passed a landmark WMD
export control law that significantly upgraded and improved India's
ability to counter the proliferation of materials related to weapons of
mass destruction. This law makes such proliferation a crime in India,
just as it is in the United States.
For this initiative to go forward now, both parties must meet their
obligations. For our part, President Bush is committed to work with the
U.S. Congress to amend relevant domestic laws--the Atomic Energy Act of
1954--and to seek agreement within the Nuclear Suppliers Group to
accommodate this cooperation. The United States will also negotiate an
agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with India, which we will
submit to the Congress, and seek to assure the reliable supply of
nuclear fuel to India through multiple avenues and instruments.
India has commitments as well, and it is already acting on them. In
fact, the Chairman of India's atomic energy commission is traveling to
Vienna this week to begin negotiations with the IAEA on both a
safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol. India has delivered to
us a list of specific reactors to be placed under safeguards and a
general timeline for doing so. Under this plan, all 14 reactors will be
offered for safeguards by 2014. In addition, India will place
associated upstream and downstream facilities under safeguards and has
declared nine research facilities as civilian. India has also provided
initial verbal comments on our draft agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation.
In the coming months, we hope that India will also take a number of
additional measures to further strengthen its commitment to global
nonproliferation. In addition to adhering to the Missile Technology
Control Regime and Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines, as India
committed in the July 18 Joint Statement, these additional measures
include, for example, announcing its intention to participate in the
Proliferation Security Initiative and harmonizing its export control
lists with the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group. We are in
constant discussion with our Indian counterparts and will continue to
press these and other nonproliferation measures through the course of
our strategic partnership.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, implementing this initiative will
require a carefully orchestrated series of events involving the
coordination of not only the two governments, including the U.S.
Congress, but also the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It is our
vision and our hope that progress can be achieved on several fronts
simultaneously.
Once implemented, this initiative with India will benefit the
United States in five important and linked ways.
1. The Initiative Will Deepen Our Strategic Partnership
This initiative is a key element of our growing strategic
partnership with India: we believe it will help make India one of our
most valuable global partners and help make possible significant
achievements in many other areas of cooperation.
More than two million Indians, many of them now U.S. citizens, live
in the United States. More Indians study in our universities than
students from any other foreign country. India is the largest source of
skilled temporary workers coming to the United States and the second
largest source of legal migration. The United States and India have
committed to doubling bilateral trade within three years.
The explosive growth of private ties between our peoples is
magnified by new initiatives between our governments. Last summer's
historic summit between the President Bush and Prime Minister Singh
embodied the strategic achievements of the first four years of our
nations' new relationship. The President's recent visit to India has
shown how much more can be accomplished. Both leaders committed
themselves to fostering a second Green Revolution in agriculture, to
advancing space exploration, and to establishing a new science and
technology partnership. They pledged to increase democracy promotion
efforts, to invest in energy security, and to double bilateral trade
within three years. And they decided to expand defense cooperation
through a new maritime security initiative.
In other words, the United States and India are laying the
foundation for cooperation on major issues in the region and beyond,
building on and building up a broad relationship between our peoples
and our governments. We will not fully realize this vision, however,
unless the impediments associated with civil nuclear cooperation, which
have complicated all efforts to improve bilateral relations during the
last thirty years, are resolved once and for all. The structural
ambivalence must be resolved. This initiative is the key that will
unlock the progress of our expanding relationship.
And imagine, Mr. Chairman, what would happen if this initiative
were defeated, or changed in a way that fundamentally alters its
substance. All the hostility and suspicion of the past would be
redoubled. And think of Prime Minister Singh, who has braved the
shouted dissent of his anti-American critics. We would hand the enemies
of this new relationship a great victory--We would slide backward when
we should be striding forward.
2. The Initiative Will Enhance Energy Security
The global search for new and stable sources of energy is now a
defining issue in all aspects of international life. Civil nuclear
cooperation with India will help it meet its rising energy needs
without increasing its reliance on unstable foreign sources of oil and
gas, such as nearby Iran. Diversifying India's energy sector will help
to alleviate the competition among India, the United States, and other
rapidly expanding economies for scarce carbon-based energy resources,
thereby lessening pressure on global energy prices.
India--a nation of over a billion people, with an economy growing
at approximately 8 percent each year--has a massive and rapidly growing
appetite for energy. Huge population growth, expanding industrial
production, economic development, urbanization, and increased motor
vehicle ownership are all driving this insatiable energy demand.
Between 1980 and 2001, demand increased by 208 percent. By contrast,
China, often thought of as the next big energy consumer, saw a 130
percent increase over the same period. In 2003, India was the sixth
largest consumer of energy in the world behind only the United States,
China, Russia, Japan, and Germany.
To meet its mounting power demands, the Indian government plans to
double its capacity to produce electricity within the next eight years.
With Congressional endorsement of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear
Cooperation Initiative, a large proportion of that growth would be in
clean nuclear technology.
Currently, over 50 percent of India's total energy, and 70 percent
of India's electric power generation, is derived from coal. Of the
remaining 50 percent, nearly 35 percent is derived from oil; seven
percent from natural gas; five percent from hydro-electric power; and
about one percent from renewable sources like solar and wind. Only two
percent of India's total power generation comes from nuclear energy. To
put this in perspective, even the United States, which has historically
limited nuclear energy use, derives over 20 percent of its power from
nuclear energy. Japan derives 30 percent, and France roughly 78
percent.
India's operating civil nuclear power plants currently have
approximately 3,310 megawatts of installed capacity. Given the
opportunity, India plans to invest quickly in additional civil nuclear
reactors so that, by 2020, its capacity to produce electricity from
clean nuclear technology would reach 20,000 megawatts--a six-fold
increase. Under this plan and further long-term objectives,
approximately 20 percent of India's total energy production would
eventually be met by nuclear technology, thus significantly decreasing
the growth in its reliance on fossil fuels.
Since the historic March 2 announcement, senior officials in
India's atomic energy establishment have indicated their desire to
exceed the 20,000 megawatts target through the accelerated import of
high-unit capacity foreign reactors to further reduce their dependence
on dirty coal and fossil fuels. This decrease will be welcome, as
India's demand for oil and natural gas is immense and will only
increase as its economy grows and industrializes. In 2005, India's net
imports of oil totaled approximately 1.7 million barrels per day. Even
with conservative estimates, these imports are predicted to grow to 2
million barrels per day within only the next four years. Much of that
oil is imported from unstable sources. As part of the newly launched,
U.S.-India Energy Dialogue, the United States has committed to help
India secure other stable sources of energy. The Civil Nuclear
Cooperation Initiative is one significant element of that commitment.
3. The Initiative Will Benefit The Environment
Civil nuclear cooperation, along with the deployment of cleaner
fossil fuel technologies, will not only help India meet its energy
needs, but it will do so in an environmentally-friendly way. India's
heavy dependence on coal and oil for electricity generation has another
negative side effect: high levels of carbon emissions, which have made
India a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions and global
climate change. Between 1990 and 2001, India's carbon emissions
increased by 61 percent, a rate of growth surpassed only by China.
Extrapolating from these trends, scientists expect that this will only
get worse. According to the Department of Energy, between 2001 and
2025, India's carbon emissions will grow by 3 percent annually, twice
the predicted emissions growth in the United States. Air pollution and
growth in greenhouse gases is a visible and significant fact of life in
India's major cities.
India's dependence on its domestically-produced coal raises many
other environmental concerns. Indian coal is extremely energy
inefficient. It produces about twice as much ash and particulate matter
as American coal. And it emits far more nitrogen oxide (an element in
photochemical smog) and carbon monoxide (a poisonous gas) than American
coal does. Power plants are also the main source of Indian emissions of
carbon dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas. In addition, mercury
emissions from India's inefficient coal-fired plants can enter the food
chain.
These high emissions, along with emissions from other sources, have
made all four of India's largest cities--New Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai and
Kolkata--among the most polluted in the world. Emissions from power
plants are thought to be the prime contributor to the Atmospheric Brown
Cloud now hovering over the Bay of Bengal and polluting many coastal
areas. if this cloud grows and moves overland, as is currently
expected, the resulting effects on public health would be disastrous.
The health risks associated with India's pollution are thus negatively
affecting not only the Indian population, but the population of the
entire region.
While the United States is working with India to integrate cleaner,
more efficient, coal-burning technologies into its power plants, a
rapid expansion of India's coal-fired generating capacity, just to meet
basic energy needs, would make that work much more challenging. Slowing
this expansion will help us achieve our aggressive objectives for
slowing the growth in Indian pollution.
To the extent that India expands its use of cleaner energy
technology, the result will be reduced air pollution locally,
regionally, and globally. Nuclear plants do not emit greenhouse gases.
While some opponents of nuclear energy point to the problems associated
with disposing of spent nuclear waste, the technology is readily
available to store nuclear waste safely for thousands of years and
prevent it from contaminating the surrounding environment. India's
commitment to a closed cycle also permits it to manage its nuclear
waste far more effectively while simultaneously utilizing the energy
potential of its feedstock far more effectively.
Of course, the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative alone will not
fully address Indian emissions of air pollution and greenhouse gases.
It does, however, take a sizeable step in the right direction. Civil
nuclear cooperation will advance the goals of the Asia-Pacific
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate and is also an important
piece of our Energy Dialogue, which aims to address India's energy
needs from every perspective. As a critical step in reducing the growth
of India's heavy dependence on coal and its greenhouse gas emissions,
our civil nuclear initiative would be one of the greenest parts of
India's new Green Revolution.
4. The Initiative Will Create Opportunities For U.S. Business
This is a time of renaissance in the Indian-American relationship,
punctuated by our tremendous growth in trade. In the past year alone,
Boeing announced a $13 billion sale to India, and Cisco, Intel, and
Microsoft all made major investments in India's high-tech sector. In
July, when Prime Minister Singh visited Washington, he and President
Bush announced the most ambitious strategic leap ever undertaken by our
two governments, illustrated by joint ventures in 18 different fields,
including the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative.
At its core, our initiative with India is not simply a government-
to-government effort. It was crafted with the private sector firmly in
mind. Because it will fully open the door to civil nuclear trade and
cooperation, this initiative is good for American business.
India currently has 15 operating thermal power reactors, with seven
under construction, but it intends to increase this number
significantly. Meeting this ramp-up in demand for civil nuclear
technology, fuel, and support services holds the promise of opening new
business opportunities for American firms, which translates into new
jobs, new incomes, and new markets for the United States. Indian
officials indicate they plan to import at least eight new 1,000
megawatt power reactors by 2012, as well as additional reactors in the
years ahead. Preliminary private studies suggest that if American
vendors win just two of these reactor contracts, American industry
estimates it may add 3,000-5,000 new direct jobs and about 10,000-
15,000 indirect jobs in the United States.
At the same time, participation in India's market will help make
the American nuclear industry globally competitive, thereby benefiting
our own domestic nuclear power sector. This legislation, and the
associated bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement now being
negotiated, will permit U.S. companies to enter the lucrative and
growing Indian market--something they are currently prohibited from
doing.
An expanded Indian civil nuclear power industry will also help to
take the pressure off the long-term global demand for energy.
Increasing demand for natural resources causes our own energy prices to
rise as well. To the extent that we can reduce the demand for fossil
fuels, it will help the American consumer.
Furthermore, this initiative will also significantly help India's
economic development. Human development and economic growth depend on
the reliable, affordable, and environmentally-friendly supply of energy
to allow for the full production of goods and services. India is
struggling to keep up with its energy demands, with many urban areas
currently subject to unscheduled black-outs and routine daily
interruptions of power. In 2005, there was an average electricity
shortage of 10 percent and a peak excessive power demand of 15 percent.
These shortages are expected to become more severe, thus preventing
India's growing business and industry from functioning effectively.
Such unreliability is detrimental to India's economic growth and its
prospects for greater foreign investment. The Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Initiative would provide India access to a privatized and more
efficient nuclear energy market, enabling its economy to grow to its
full potential. Needless to say, as India grows, it provides an ever
bigger market for American exports. So by helping India's economy, we
are in turn helping our own.
5. The Initiative Will Enhance The International Nuclear
Nonproliferation Regime
Mr. Chairman, let me address the issue that has received the most
attention since this initiative was announced: nuclear
nonproliferation. I will start by saying unequivocally that this
initiative is a net gain for global nonproliferation efforts. We better
secure our future by bringing India into the international
nonproliferation system, not by allowing India to remain isolated for
the next thirty years the way it has been for the last thirty. We are
clearly better off having India most of the way in rather than all the
way out.
There are some who doubt this, and I would now like to discuss some
of the questions that have been raised about this initiative.
First, I must address the belief that somehow this initiative could
have been used to force India to accept a unilateral freeze or cap on
its nuclear arsenal. The U.S. has achieved an important strategic
objective by obtaining India's commitment to work toward a multilateral
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. But India's plans and politics must
take into account regional realities. No one can credibly assert that
India would accept an arms control agreement that did not include the
other key countries, namely China and Pakistan. Therefore trying to use
American leverage to get India to make this unilateral move is an idea
that is certain to fail. It is a poison pill to kill any possibility
for change.
Second, some have expressed concern that civil nuclear cooperation
with India will weaken the NPT, or undermine global nonproliferation
efforts. Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA--the
agency responsible for applying safeguards - does not share this
concern. Just the opposite. Dr. ElBaradei publicly praised the
initiative the day it was announced, stating that it will ``bring India
closer as an important partner in the nonproliferation regime. . . . It
would be a milestone, timely for ongoing efforts to consolidate the
nonproliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen
nuclear safety.'' Four of the five NPT-defined nuclear weapon states
have also endorsed the initiative. In fact, British Prime Minister Tony
Blair and French President Jacques Chirac even released public
statements in which both refer to the benefits that this initiative has
for international nonproliferation efforts.
The global nonproliferation regime is a remarkable diplomatic
achievement. Since its inception, the NPT and related international
mechanisms have helped keep the number of nuclear-armed states to a
minimum while spreading the benefits of civil nuclear technology to all
who joined the treaty. We want India to participate more fully in
sharing this global responsibility. This initiative aligns India more
closely with international nuclear nonproliferation standards.
Our initiative with India does not seek to renegotiate or amend the
NPT. India is not, and is not going to become, a member of the NPT as a
nuclear weapon state. Nothing we are proposing would violate our NPT
obligations that we not ``in any way assist'' India's nuclear weapons
program. We are seeking to address an untenable situation: India has
never been a party to the NPT. It did not cheat. It simply developed
nuclear weapons outside this context, a long time ago, finishing a
program that was well underway before the NPT had been signed. India
then found itself frozen for a generation in this anomalous state. It
now faces substantial energy needs ahead that can be partly met through
nuclear energy.
Despite India's strong nuclear nonproliferation export record, its
continued existence outside the global nonproliferation regime
undermines the regime's interests and U.S. security goals over the long
term. The real choice is this: do we want a state that intends to
expand significantly its civil nuclear power production in the years
ahead to remain outside the international nonproliferation regime? Or
do we instead want it to adopt global nonproliferation practices while
increasing our insight into its civil nuclear program? President Bush
has made his choice, and it is the correct one.
Third, others have asserted that this initiative permits India to
expand its nuclear arsenal significantly. This is just not the case.
The initiative does not cap Indian nuclear weapons production, but
nothing under this initiative will directly enhance its military
capability or add to its military stockpile. India could already build
additional weapons within the limits of its capabilities if it so
desired, with or without this deal. But the Indian government has
repeatedly confirmed in public that it intends to expand its civil
nuclear energy capability.
Fourth, we believe that civil nuclear cooperation with India will
not lead to an arms race in South Asia. In our view, the prospects for
such an arms race will be determined by bilateral relations between
India and Pakistan, not the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. It
should be noted that these relations have been consistently improving
for the past three years. The ongoing Composite Dialogue between India
and Pakistan has significantly reduced tensions and built confidence on
both sides. Just last week, Prime Minister Singh spoke of the
desirability of a treaty of peace, security, and friendship between
India and Pakistan, which Pakistan immediately welcomed.
To further improve relations and ensure strategic restraint on both
sides, the United States is prepared to intensify significantly our
diplomatic effort with both India and Pakistan. Continuing to improve
our relations with both India and Pakistan will allow us to promote
peace and counsel restraint in their military procurement plans.
Fifth, some have argued that the initiative with India will
undermine our efforts to curb Iran and North Korea's nuclear ambitions,
because it creates an alleged ``double standard.'' This is simply not
credible, because comparing India to the North Korean or the Iranian
regime is not credible. India is a democracy, transparent and
accountable to its people, which works within the international system
to promote peace and stability and has a responsible nuclear
nonproliferation record. The regime in Iran is a state sponsor of
terrorism, with a long record of cheating on its nuclear obligations to
the international community, and it is violating its own nuclear
obligations at present. North Korea is the least transparent government
in the world, which threatens its neighbors and proliferates dangerous
weapons. While Iran and North Korea are violating their IAEA
obligations, India is making new ones and seeking peaceful
international cooperation. So we do indeed treat India differently from
the way we, and the international community, treat Iran and North
Korea.
France, the United Kingdom, and Russia support our initiative with
India, and we are all working closely together to curb the dangerous
nuclear ambitions of the Iranian regime. India is increasingly doing
its part to support the international community's efforts. Recall that
India not once, but twice, stood with the United States and other
nations against illegal proliferation by voting in the IAEA to find
Iran not in compliance with its obligations and, later, to report
Iran's nuclear violations to the UN Security Council. Prime Minister
Singh faced down his anti-American critics at home to take these
actions.
It's important to keep in mind that this initiative was not easy
for Prime Minister Singh, though he has won support for it across
India's major parties. But it is worth thinking about why this was
tough for him. It was not because of the concerns mentioned here. The
opposition in India wants to keep more distance from America. It wants
to keep India's industry sheltered and protected. Surely those are not
our goals. Surely Congress will not want to inadvertently miss this
opportunity to make this strategic leap forward.
seizing our opportunity with india
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for introducing S. 2429, which
represents President Bush's proposed legislation to facilitate
authorization of civil nuclear cooperation with India. This legislation
asks Congress to amend the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. This will let
American firms provide nuclear goods and services to India's civil
nuclear program, something that is prohibited by current law. In
addition, we will ask the Nuclear Suppliers Group to make a special
exception for India to allow for full civil nuclear cooperation.
Congressional action on this legislation is critical in our efforts
to secure broader international support for this new relationship with
India. Foreign governments are looking to Congress to determine whether
the United States stands solidly behind a new relationship with India.
Prompt Congressional action will ensure that there is a solid basis for
reliable, long-term cooperation with India. It will also assure U.S.
industry of a solid framework for civil nuclear trade with India, at no
competitive disadvantage with other nations.
Mr. Chairman: During his speech in New Delhi last month, President
Bush spoke of his desire to ``strengthen the bonds of trust between our
two great nations.'' As we forge this bond, President Bush and I look
to the Congress as a full partner in this initiative. Your support is
crucial for this legislation. And we ask that you offer it. Together,
we can seize this tremendous opportunity to solidify a key partnership
that will advance American interests, and the ideals of peace,
prosperity, and liberty for which we stand.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee. I
would now be eager to respond to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Rice, for your
statement and for your reaching out to meet objections that
have been offered publicly and constructively.
I wanted to recognize, at this moment, the distinguished
ranking member of our committee, Senator Biden, for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, I apologize. As I came
down today on the train, unfortunately, someone was struck on
the tracks. And so, we switched to an automobile and drove, and
I apologize for being late for such an important hearing.
The President and you have built on, I think, the good work
that our former President made, in making a major strategic
decision to develop a close partnership with India. And I
believe most Members of the United States Senate embrace that
effort. But many of us have questions about the wisdom of
creating an Indian exception to the existing law on nuclear
exports.
I sympathize with what the President is trying to do. India
has maintained its democracy for more than half a century in a
land of great religious and political diversity. India has
built a dynamic middle class in the last 15 years, and embraced
a global economy. And India is a dominant regional power and a
respected international voice, and it's working to improve
relations with China, as well as Pakistan. And India soon will
become, as you know better than I, the most populous country in
the world.
I can think of no relationship that's more important to
develop than the U.S.-Indian relationship. I think it's good
for both of us. It's not a zero-sum game.
But India's nuclear weapons raise difficult questions.
India refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and
then built nuclear weapons. And the question we're going to ask
you about, to state the obvious, is, What impact will India's
nuclear deal have on the NPT regime?
The plutonium for India's first weapons came from a
Canadian reactor, using heavy water from the United States,
that India had promised to use only for peaceful purposes. The
question is, Will the current deal lead to a diversion from
civil to military uses? I would hope, and expect, that may not
be the case, but I think we're obliged to plumb that.
There are allegations India has engaged in covert
procurement of equipment for its nuclear weapons program. If
so, then is India really prepared to crack down on
proliferation? I'd like to talk about those reports.
Isolating India's nuclear program for over 30 years failed
to make India give up its nuclear weapons, but I take some
issue with your comment in your opening statement saying our
nonproliferation policies had been no affect on India's
development of nuclear weapons. I would argue they succeeded in
limiting the size and sophistication of India's nuclear weapons
program and nuclear power programs. And the question is, What
impact will this deal have on India's nuclear weapons program?
I had the opportunity to spend some considerable time with
India's Foreign Secretary, and I asked him that question
directly. After all these years, it's probably time we admit,
in my view, that India will keep its nuclear weapons, and to
help India find a new relationship in the world in nuclear
matters.
But the India nuclear deal was made by the administration,
acting often in understandable haste, as I understand it, I'm
not sure you yet had a deal when you got to India. And there
are certain lines that can't be crossed. We must not assist
India's nuclear weapons program, to state the obvious, not
because India's an adversary, which it is not, but because
nuclear nonproliferation is a vital U.S. interest, as well as a
formal treaty obligation. And we must not undermine the world's
support for a nuclear nonproliferation regime by saying that
nuclear weapons are fine for our friends.
I would point out that Nick Burns came to see us. He made a
very compelling case on each of these points. But I think we
should be talking about them in public.
We must not encourage rogue states--and I know that's not
your intention, and I stress that India is not a rogue state--
by creating a sense that we only oppose proliferation until it
succeeds, and then make our peace with the new nuclear power.
Congress should not give up its power under existing law
without knowing what the U.S.-India peaceful nuclear
cooperation agreement and India's safeguards agreement with the
IAEA will contain, which is something that I do want to talk a
little bit about, as well.
I'd like to be clear: the India nuclear deal could go
forward without changing the law. Peaceful nuclear cooperation
agreement with India would simply require approval of a joint
resolution, by a majority of each of the houses. But the
administration seeks a special exemption from the law to allow
the agreement to proceed, unless Congress enacts a resolution
of disapproval, which would require a two-thirds vote in each
house to override a presidential veto. I realize this is
procedure, and many of the listeners will get lost in this. But
the question I'm going to ask you is, Why does the President
want to change the law? Does he doubt that he could get a
majority to approve the agreement? And, if so, why?
I look forward to having an exchange with you, Madam
Secretary, and, again, apologize to you for being late. I will
read your statement as the questions are being asked. America
needs to, and should, pursue close relations with India. It has
been in the offing for decades. We should build that friendship
on a firm foundation of mutual interest and trust and
international support. But we should do it right.
And one of the things I should tell you now, in conclusion,
Madam Secretary, that I said to the Indian Foreign Secretary--
although this is not required in a sequence in the deal that
has been made, to the degree that India moves forward on these
side agreements that they have, while I'm not suggesting we
mandate this, but ideally if they could work that out before we
went to a final vote, it would enhance the sense of confidence,
I think, here, that, in fact, the deal was as good as you say.
But I will get into that, as well.
Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to, in a
sense, go out of order here.
And I thank you, Madam Secretary, for being here. You've
had long travels. And we ought to see if we can get you two
cots on that plane--so you don't have to be on the floor.
[Laughter.]
Senator Biden. Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.
We'll have a round of questioning, and we'll have a 10-
minute time for each Senator. And I'll ask each of my
colleagues to try to be careful in observing that time, because
we might be joined by other Senators during the course of this
questioning, and we want to make certain that all are heard and
their questions are answered.
Let me just amplify, again, our admiration, as a committee,
for your committed diplomacy. I think that the travels you have
undertaken, on specific missions, maybe even involving changes
in schedule as you proceeded, were tremendously important. The
dialogue, certainly with the Iraqi leadership, is critically
important. And, likewise--and I don't mean to demean any of
your stops--but I noted your own willingness to go with Jack
Straw into the hustings of Great Britain, an arduous procedure,
one with which many of us, as campaigners, are acquainted, and
you are, too. You handled those chores admirably. It was
important.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, a lot of people on my side
are wondering whether she's getting in practice.
[Laughter.]
Senator Biden. I don't know what to--what the----
The Chairman. Well, let's----
Senator Biden. She'd be a formidable presidential
candidate, I----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Let's not go there, this morning.
Senator Biden. Okay.
The Chairman. We'll continue with India and the
relationship we're forging that is even stronger there.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Let me just say, at the outset, that we've
had a moment of conversation about Senate bill 1949, the so-
called Lugar-Obama Arms Control bill. We share, obviously, both
in the Senate and the administration, some problems with regard
to budget and money. But we're looking, really, at this point,
toward the State Department's support for what is essentially
an authorization of additional activity. And would you affirm
that the Department supports those efforts and will continue to
work with us in refining the legislation?
Secretary Rice. I do, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
And we do support----
The Chairman. I appreciate that.
Now, I've mentioned, also, in my opening statement, another
piece of legislation, Senate bill 2545. This originates because
of our mutual discussion of the problems of energy in this
world, and suggests, among other things, that the State
Department, as a major focus, will want to take a look at the
diplomatic possibilities in the energy field dealing with
India, with China, with Brazil, with a number of countries. As
I mentioned to you in our conversation, Under Secretary
Zoellick, knowing my interest in this and the comments that
I've made, had affirmed that this is an interest of his and of
the Department. At the same time, you had not had a chance,
during your travels, to undertake study of this specific
legislation, but I would encourage you and the Under Secretary,
and those that you might delegate, to lift this, as you have
been doing in reorganizing the Department, maybe to a proper
focus, as you can.
Secretary Rice. Absolutely. Thank you very much. We will
do that, yes.
The Chairman. Now, let me just say, for the record, that I
want to put two pieces in the record--one, a letter from our
former colleague, Senator Bill Cohen of Maine, who has written
to me, understanding we were going to have this important
hearing today.
Essentially, Secretary Cohen mentions that he believes that
this particular bill we're discussing today will enhance the
nonproliferation regime in a major way. I ask that we'll put
that letter into the record, because that's an important
affirmation.
[The information previously referred to appears in the
appendix to this hearing.]
The Chairman. Likewise, and this is not necessarily an
affirmation, but I think seven salient questions have been
raised by a memo given to me by the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies in Monterey. This is a group with which you're well
acquainted, and I am, too, as a member of their advisory
committee, with Dr. Bill Potter and my former colleague Sam
Nunn. They have raised, it seems to me, not in a benign
fashion, but, nevertheless, in an objective fashion, seven
considerations
I'm going to put those in the record and ask, at your
disposal, to try to respond to those specific questions, which
I think are emblematic of the nonproliferation community.
[The information previously referred to appears in the
appendix to this hearing.]
The Chairman. For my own part, let me just say that I
believe that the undertaking, as I said in the opening
statement, of a new relationship with India is a cardinal
point. That, all by itself, has to be considered. It has not
been a good relationship, on some occasions, or at least only
mildly satisfying, for reasons that we all understand. After 9/
11 of 2001, Secretary Powell called some of the members that
are here today to S-407 and said, ``As a point of national
policy, you, ladies and gentlemen, must lift all the sanctions
that we have imposed, political and economic, with regard to
India and Pakistan, both--and now.'' And some members said,
``Forever?'' And he said, ``Forever. It is a new world.''
Now, this was a tall order, for many, who had been watching
the India nuclear tests, and those followed quickly by
Pakistan. Some members around this table will recall meetings
around the Cabinet table with President Clinton, as we all
thought, together, ``What can we say to Pakistan that might
forestall that?'' And even as we were talking, word came that
it was too late. So, that occurred. And it led to a number of
sanctions being imposed, which many of us voted for and
supported. Now, suddenly all these were removed, because we
had, in fact, a new world and a new set of strategic
relationships, vis-a-vis Afghanistan and our allies that we
were working with.
Now, from that rather difficult start, much has happened.
And I compliment you and the President for your initiatives. I
suspect the dilemma for all of us will be to weigh this factor:
How important is the relationship with India? How important is
India? And, therefore, we're all in an educational experience,
understanding how big India is, how extraordinary the growth
is, what the promise may be, what our relationships may be. But
this is a big experience for each one of us, trying to discover
India and the importance. I think you understand that, and your
advocacy hopefully will continue to help us.
Now, one way in which India is very important, leaving
aside all of the commercial transactions often mentioned--and
they are substantial--is in the field of energy. I suppose
that's the second point that I tried to make in my opening
statement. I'm not the only person in the Congress who has been
involved in nonproliferation work, and deeply concerned about
this. With my former colleague, Senator Nunn, we have explored
the hinterlands of Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, quite apart
from most of the stretches of Russia, even up into the
mountains in Albania recently, and so forth. So, at least I'm a
reasonable competitor for anybody who is interested in
nonproliferation, finding it and trying to get rid of it.
This is why I have referenced Bill Potter's group, for
example, a responsible group, trying to think through, Where
are we with the NPT, with India and the assurances that we
believe it has given?
Now, having said that, I've become equally enthusiastic
about what we must be doing in the world with regard to energy
resources. I believe this is the source, presently, of
potential conflict as great as the nonproliferation danger.
This may not seen by all. But I've advocated that,
inadvertently, perhaps, Russia, by shutting off the gas to
Ukraine, has indicated to the world that countries can be
hobbled by turning off the gas--without nuclear weapons,
without anybody coming across the lines with tanks or guns or
so forth. Now, this is the new security strategic weapon, and
it is powerful.
As I visited in Libya this summer, I saw, in the Corinthia
Hotel, a hotel relatively filled with Chinese and Indians, and
they all had one objective, to pin down the last acre in Libya.
We may not be that avid, but they are. And throughout Africa, I
saw this. This is not news to you. But the fact is that the
search, for a dynamic economy like India, which is talking
about doubling its energy needs, for a billion people or more
in just a very short period of time, less than a generation--
and that may understate it--means that there are going to have
to be alternative supplies.
Now, one may say, well, there's surely easier ways of
finding energy for India than getting into nuclear power. Well,
I'm not certain I see them. It appears to me that, leaving
aside the strategic problems of proliferation, the problems of
energy are extraordinarily important here.
I would comment that, just nearby, while we've been
discussing this, Russia and China have been talking about oil
and gas lines from Russia to China. There has been further talk
about lines from Russia to Japan, even Russia to Korea, but all
with the same characteristics of Russia to Ukraine, for
example, or Russia to Germany.
We're going to have to think about these things. And I
don't demean, for a moment, my friends in the nonproliferation
community, who are busy still working through the fine points
of that. But this is a world of a dynamic India, and dynamic
energy needs for India, for us, in the United States, for
Russia, for everybody. So, those two areas are important as I
take a look at it.
You have to judge this, and you have, and the President's
visited there--but the question is, Is there a sense of mutual
trust that we are both on the path of nonproliferation? We
trust, as a matter of fact, that even if India has to have, in
their judgment, a nuclear deterrent, vis-a-vis Pakistan, China,
Russia, whoever else in the world, that we all understand that
the course of history is not going to be kind to us if we are
involved in an arms race. And the Indians, in their offering of
assurances to us, begin to offer assurances to the rest of the
world.
I will cease fire at this point, having exhausted my 10
minutes, but I just simply wanted to take this opportunity to
express what I think are important arguments, or, for that
matter, affirmations. And I suspect you would agree with most
of that. So, I will not ask for a simple yes or no, but if you
have a short comment, I would like it.
Secretary Rice. Well, thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
Let me just underscore a couple of things that you have
mentioned.
First of all, we do have a growing strategic relationship
with India, and I think it is one that is increasingly based on
trust and mutual interest, and common values. It's a trifecta,
if you will. And I think that that's an important foundation
for the relationship to move forward.
We do have to do something about the energy problem. I can
tell you that nothing has really taken me aback more, as
Secretary of State, than the way that the politics of energy
is--I will use the word ``warping'' diplomacy around the world.
It has given extraordinary power to some states that are using
that power in not very good ways for the international system,
states that would otherwise have very little power.
It is sending some states that are growing very rapidly in
an all-out search for energy, states like China, states like
India, that is really sending them into parts of the world
where they've not been seen before, and challenging, in--I
think, for our diplomacy.
It is, of course, an energy supply that is still heavily
dependent on hydrocarbons, which makes more difficult our
desire to have growth, environmental protection, and reliable
energy supply, all in a package.
We've tried, in our diplomacy, to be attentive to that. For
instance, we have a new Asia-Pacific Partnership on Energy and
Climate, of which India is a member. We are looking to
technological solutions for the energy appetite of growing
countries. And, of course, being able to cooperate with India
on civil nuclear cooperation would help us to pursue that goal.
And, finally, I'll just note that we also are looking very
hard for good partners in the nonproliferation work. I, myself,
Senator, come from the arms-control community. You know that. I
know the people of the nonproliferation community very well. I
consider myself part of the nonproliferation-concerned
community. So, you have to recognize that the NPT is the
cornerstone, but one part of a maturing nonproliferation
framework in which we are also working to have rules of the
game that the Nuclear Suppliers Group has on certain standards
of behavior--India is agreeing to adhere to those unilaterally-
- to the missile control technology regime, which India is
agreeing to adhere to unilaterally, efforts to get states to
give up enrichment and reprocessing for assured fuel supplies,
something that we are working with the IAEA on, and--and I
might just notice--note here, making certain that those who
signed the NPT and then violate it and disregard it are really
the ones who come under punishment from the international
system. And there, I have to say, there's a very big difference
between the behavior of Iran and North Korea, who callously
signed the NPT and then have not been in compliance with it.
India never signed the NPT, but we are asking India to adhere
to many of the important elements of the guidelines that are
making up the nonproliferation regime.
And so, I have--I think we have to think about the energy
and nonproliferation as two halves of this same walnut. But I
would be very much in agreement with you that, on the energy
side, we have simply got to do something about the warping,
now, of diplomatic effort by the all-out rush for energy
supply.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Biden?
Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, to those of us who have
spent our careers, as at least the three of us have--we're the
oldtimers here--not referring to you--on matters relating to
nonproliferation and arms control, this is a big deal. No pun
intended. This is a big deal. And I think if we cut through it
all, it comes down to a simple bet we're making. It's a bet
that India appreciates, as much as we do, that our two nations
have the potential to be the anchors for stability and security
in the world going into the 21st century. Not alone, but two of
the anchors. And I tried to communicate to the Foreign
Secretary how fundamental an impact India's reaction to this
deal would be--how much is based upon our trusting them not to
be seeking this deal for purpose of advancing their nuclear
weapons capability.
I'd respectfully suggest, if this goes through and we are
wrong about their intentions, that they will have mortgaged the
21st century, literally, in a way that few nations will be held
accountable for having done. They will have squandered--I don't
anticipate this, but they will have squandered what I think to
be an opportunity to begin to build a new century. I literally
think it's that fundamental. And it relates to trust, as
implied, or stated, by my chairman.
We are faced with a dilemma all the time here, to state the
obvious, but for the record, that sometimes administrations--
and I've had the pleasure of serving with seven Presidents--
administrations and Presidents bring agreements to us that we
would have done differently, we think, that we would not have
moved forward with in the same way. And we're faced with a
dilemma. The dilemma is, although the deal we're presented
with, and required under the Constitution to ratify or reject,
may not be one that we like, the downside of failing to ratify
it, because of the circumstances created by the negotiation,
sometimes is greater than any downside might come from the
mistakes that the agreement may embody.
And so, I just want to state, at the outset here, that I am
probably going to support this. I'm going to ask you some very
specific questions, in this round and next, mainly for the
record, but I want you to know that I believe and appreciate
that this is much bigger than the sum of the questions I'm
going to ask you. And it really does--and I hope our Indian
friends are listening--it requires not a leap, but a jump of
faith here. This is a step of faith that they, in fact, are
going to adhere to many of the things they heretofore have said
they would not sign onto, that they're voluntarily going to do
it. And the bottom line is, at the end of the day, they are not
going, 5 years or 10 years from now, to have increased their
nuclear capacity and sophistication in a significant way that
begins to unravel the prospects of peace and security in the
21st century.
So, let me ask a couple of questions, if I may.
I am concerned, because members of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group have contacted me, I've met with some of them--and
they're concerned. They are not opposed, but they are very
concerned. The NPT obliges us not, in any way, to assist,
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapons states to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, yet there is a uranium shortage in
India now. This agreement would open up the ability, for the
first time, for the world's suppliers of uranium to be
available for the civilian nuclear reactors India plans on
building. But based on the information I've been given, it will
ease India's uranium crunch--they have one now--and thereby
enable India to take that uranium, rather than, the argument
goes, having to choose between using the limited amounts they
have for their civil nuclear reactors or for their weapons
program.
W hat's your response to the international community in
saying that this doesn't, at least indirectly, assist or
provide the avenue for India to be able to further enhance its
nuclear weapons capability?
Secretary Rice. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.
And thank you also for the context in which you put this,
because we do believe that this is a very big deal. And we have
also said to the Indian Government that this is more about its
relationship not just with us, but with the international
system. And that's something to be valued and safeguarded. And
in a great democracy like India, I'm sure there are going to be
plenty of people watching to see how this is carried out.
On the question of the Indian nuclear weapons program,
first of all, the Indian program, we believe, just in terms of
what India's incentives or disincentives are to grow its
nuclear weapons program, its strategic program, are more
related to the conditions in the region, the political/military
conditions in the region, than to any quantity of available
nuclear material. And the program for India has been restrained
over the number of years. I think most people would argue that
it's a relatively restrained, kind of, minimum-deterrent
program. Their words, not mine.
Secondly, the region is one in which the political
situation has improved and, we hope, is going to continue to
improve. There's no doubt that when, I'm sure, Colin Powell was
briefing all of you about the near nuclear--near war experience
in 2001, and then later in 2002, none of us would have foreseen
where we are now with a comprehensive dialogue between Pakistan
and India, talks of a peace treaty, even discussions about the
future of Kashmir. And so, we believe that by strengthening our
relationships with these countries, we can actually contribute
to that environment. And that's the real guarantor of trying to
stop an arms race.
But, third, I think it's the assessment that we have that
India has some 50,000, give or take, tons of uranium available
to it in its reserves, and it would need a very small
percentage of that on the military nuclear side. And, in fact,
we do not believe that the absence of uranium is really the
constraint on the nuclear weapons program. On the other hand,
on the civil side, the amount of fuel that one would need to
run a civil program for years and years and years is far in
excess of what India can mine indigenously. So, we think the
incentives, or the crunch, if you will, is really on the civil
side. And it, therefore, gives India incentives to safeguard
future reactors. It gives India incentives to safeguard fuel
supply, and to get that fuel supply under a nonproliferation--
international nonproliferation regime.
Senator Biden. If I could interrupt you, because you've
answered the question, I'd like to go to one last question, in
the 2 minutes or so I have left.
Secretary Burns, for whom I have an inordinately high
regard, told the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, that, quote, ``India
has decided to adhere to the Australia Group, the Wassenaar
Agreement''--and let me make sure I quote this exactly--``The
Australia Group established joint controls over CW and BW
materials, equipment, and technology. The Wassenaar Agreement
works to limit the sales of advanced conventional weapons.
Adhering to these groups would be an important positive step.
In the past, India has refused to bar chemical weapons exports
unless the terms were listed in the Chemical Weapons
Convention.''
Now, here's my question. The Under Secretary has stated
that. Has India officially announced that it will adhere to the
Australia Group? Have you gotten a guarantee?
Secretary Rice. India has told us that it wishes to adhere
to the Wassenaar Group, also to the MTCR guidelines, to the NSG
guidelines. We are still discussing with India its potential
participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative. And so,
yes, they have told us that they wish to adhere.
Senator Biden. Well, my time is up, 35 seconds up. I would
send a message, if anybody in India is listening, that to the
degree to which that can be solidified and made as an
assertion, in terms of Indian policy, it would enhance the
prospects of smoother sailing for this agreement here in this
body now.
But I thank the Secretary.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Senator Chafee?
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
good to join you. Madam Secretary.
In your opening statement, you said that--and throughout
your comments, you mentioned, frequently, the reliance on
Iranian energy. And you said they effectively force India to
rely on oil and gas from Iran. What confidence do we have that
if this amendment of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act occurs, that
that reliance on Iranian energy won't go forward anyway, that a
pipeline won't be built anyway?
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
Well, I can't be assured that it will not. But let me just
note that India is, of course, not the only country with a oil
and gas relationship with Iran. Some of our closest allies--
Japan has an oil and gas relationship with Iran. The
Europeans--Italy is Iran's largest trading partner. So, most
countries have a different relationship with Iran than we do.
But what we are saying to everyone--and I think it is now
getting--gaining resonance--is that Iran is not really a
reliable, in the long run, supplier, because of the behavior of
Iran in--concerning the entire international community about
what its intentions are toward a nuclear program. The
unreliability of that Iranian oil and gas supply has got to be
taken into account. The nature of Iranian policies have got to
be taken into account.
And the one point that I would make is that I think you
will see everybody taking a harder and harder look at their
relationships and reliances on some of these states that from
time to time talk about using oil and gas as a weapon when they
are confronted with policies that they do not like. And so,
while I can't tell you that if India has access to civil
nuclear they are going to forgo other relationships, it does
give them, in many ways, a better option for a more reliable
energy supply than being dependent on states that from time to
time brandish the oil and gas weapon when they don't like the
behavior of other states.
Senator Chafee. Would you--since this--you had talked
about the lack of reliability of Iranian energy. Was this our
initiative or an Indian initiative?
Secretary Rice. I'm sorry, the----
Senator Chafee. This proposed amendments to the 1954
Atomic Energy Act.
Secretary Rice. This----
Senator Chafee. Because it seems as though it's our
initiative. If they are concerned about the reliance and the
sustainability of Iranian energy, that it would be their
initiative. But that doesn't seem to be the case.
Secretary Rice. Well, the initiative to amend the law is
simply because we need to change American law, so it comes from
the American administration. But the civil nuclear----
Senator Chafee. Who approached whom on this?
Secretary Rice. On the civil nuclear cooperation?
Senator Chafee. Yes.
Secretary Rice. Oh. Well, this goes back to our
discussions with India, going all back--almost back to the
beginning of the administration, where they began to talk about
their energy needs, about their desire to be able to engage in
civil nuclear cooperation. At the time, we were not ready to
discuss that, and we had next steps in the strategic
partnership that allowed us to talk about some other aspects of
energy. But the Indians raised, some time ago, their desire to
begin to diversify their energy, because right now they are
very heavily dependent either on oil and gas or on coal, which,
for the environment, of course, is a real problem.
Senator Chafee. My question has to do with in whose best
interest is this? It seems as though we want to break the
association between India and Iran and their oil, that the
driving force behind----
Secretary Rice. Oh----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. These amendments to the 1954
Atomic Energy Act.
Secretary Rice. Senator, it's not the driving force. The
driving force is the strategic partnership with India and
having a full-scale partnership with India that can fully deal
with technological cooperation, energy cooperation, economic
cooperation, all of which, we believe, are hindered by the
absence of our ability to do civil nuclear cooperation.
I only make the Iran point as one, among many, that
reliable energy supply is a problem for countries like India
that are growing at 8 percent, that need energy supply, and
they're looking for it anywhere that they can. And, from our
point of view, for states first to be less reliant on
hydrocarbons, including ourselves, is a good thing, because of
environment and energy supply, but it is also a good thing,
because many of these hydrocarbon sources, these oil and gas
sources, are in states that I think we would consider to have
problematic foreign policies.
Senator Chafee. From us, in the Congress, it seems to me
we're abdicating a lot of power in these amendments. And if
they're--if that relationship between India and Iran is going
to continue anyway--there's no guarantee the pipeline won't be
built--we've abdicated power to--what? A game.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, I don't--I don't think
you're--
Senator Chafee. Most of these amendments give more power
to the President and take away congressional oversight.
Secretary Rice. Well, the amendment to the Atomic Energy
Act, we believe, is necessary so that we can have a reliable
and predictable nuclear commercial trade with India. The
Congress, of course, can--the Congress has, up front--and
that's why we're coming to you now--the ability to assess the
deal, to look at its upsides and downsides, and then to affirm,
in a vote, yes or no, to amend the legislation that you wish to
do so. We will also submit the bilateral nuclear cooperation
agreement that we would make with India in support of this
civil nuclear cooperation, so-called 123 Agreement, would come
to the Congress even before the legislation. We have offered to
brief the Congress on where we are in the negotiation of this
bilateral deal, which is a technical deal to try and implement
this civil nuclear cooperation agreement.
So, we believe that there is a lot of congressional
oversight. We've tried to come up and do briefings. But we are
making a rather fundamental choice, as a country. And that's
why we thought that it was important to make the choice up
front, in terms of amending the legislation.
Senator Chafee. And you mentioned in your statement that
Great Britain, France, and Russia have expressed support for
this agreement. And you said there's letters from Tony Blair
and Jacques Chirac. How about the Russians? Is there any----
Secretary Rice. There were----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. Copies of support?
Secretary Rice. Well, there was--there were actually
public statements.
Senator Chafee. In follow-up, also how about China, also?
Secretary Rice. Yes. There were actually----
Senator Chafee. Where are they----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Public statements----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. On this?
Secretary Rice. Oh, certainly, Senator. There were public
statements from President Chirac and Prime Minister Blair. The
Russians have told us that they support.
The Chinese have said that they have some questions. I
would note that, of course, there is a history of Chinese/
Indian relations to take into account here, not just China's
relationship to the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It is, of course,
the case that we engage in the--in civil nuclear cooperation
with China, despite our many differences with China, but we are
not currently able to engage in civil nuclear cooperation with
India, despite our considerable interests in common. And so,
that is perhaps one of the explanations for China's concerns.
They have not said that they will not support it. They have
said that they have some concerns.
I've also talked, Senator, for instance, with the
Australians, who--Prime Minister Howard has said that he
supports the deal, believes it's a--on balance, a good deal.
And I would just point, again, to Mohamed ElBaradei, who is the
guardian of the nonproliferation regime and the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, who's been a strong supporter of it.
Senator Chafee. And how hard did you try to negotiate a
deal that could possibly keep the 1954 Atomic Energy Act
intact, that would--you don't have to amend it? Was there an
effort to negotiate some kind of deal to accomplish that?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, the nuclear trade and
commerce with India, because India is a--not a member of the
NPT, we would have had to do something with the legislation.
Now, it's true, as Senator Biden was saying, we could have
relied on a year-to-year licensing, which we think would simply
disrupt the predictability that is needed for, for instance,
companies that wish to deal in the nuclear trade with India.
But our goal here was to negotiate an agreement that kept us
firmly in compliance with our Nuclear Supplier Group
obligations, that kept us firmly in compliance with our IAEA
obligations, that did not run afoul of our obligations to the--
as members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And we were
particularly concerned about the permanence of these
safeguards. I can tell you that the Indians wanted to negotiate
safeguards, for instance, that were not necessarily permanent.
That was a red line for us.
So, the negotiation of the deal was in regards to being
able to firmly be able to say to you, ``We are maintaining our
obligations under all of these very important arrangements that
we have and treaties that we have, but there will need to be
some change made to existing laws and regulations in order for
us to be able to engage in nuclear commerce with India.''
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
Senator Chafee. The buzzer has sounded.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Sarbanes?
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I join my colleagues in welcoming you back
before the committee.
I want to try to understand more clearly some aspects of
this understanding you've reached. As I understand it, there
will be a safeguards regime arrived at with the IAEA, is that
correct----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. For civilian nuclear
facilities?
Secretary Rice. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, that's an important dimension, I
take it, of this agreement, is that correct?
Secretary Rice. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. Are we in a position to examine those
safeguards and see what's been agreed to?
Secretary Rice. Well, at this point----
Senator Sarbanes. This is going to be an India-unique set
of safeguards, is that correct?
Secretary Rice. There will be, but it--it will be India-
unique, in the sense that the Indian case is unique. I might
just note that the negotiations we--will begin shortly with the
IAEA. There are three kinds of safeguards available. They're
voluntary safeguards. We've made very clear that we do not--
would not favor, in our role in the NSG, voluntary safeguards,
because we believe they need to be permanent. Secondly, there
are safeguards that are full-scope safeguards. But because
India will maintain a strategic program, that is not a civilian
program, full-scope safeguards would not apply. And then there
is a--this third category, which the Indians and the IAEA will
have to negotiate. But I would expect that there--one of the,
kind of, indicators of what they might look like is, there are
actually four civilian reactors that are currently under IAEA
safeguards. We might look to those. But we fully expect these
negotiations to take place. And since we are members of the
Board of Governors of the IAEA, we would have to approve them
in that framework, as well.
Senator Sarbanes. But you're not in a position today to
spell out for us what the safeguard regime will be, is that
correct?
Secretary Rice. That's correct, Senator. We do have to
have the safeguards, though. We have to have an agreement on
the safeguards--or the Indians and the IAEA have to have an
agreement--before this legislation would actually go into
effect.
Senator Sarbanes. What about before it was passed?
Secretary Rice. We believe that the----
Senator Sarbanes. You want us to pass it, not knowing what
the safeguards are?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, we would like to have the
legislation passed. We think that the timing----
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. The sequence----
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Understand that, but we're
trying to get a full picture here, and do a proper evaluation.
Secretary Rice. We do think that the safeguards
negotiation could take some time. Those safeguards will be
clear to everyone at the time that they're undertaken. And,
again, nothing in this legislation can take effect until the
President determines that there is an acceptable agreement with
the IAEA.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I understand that, but that's the
President's determination, not a congressional determination,
as to the adequacy of the safeguards, is that correct?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, it is a presidential
determination as to the safeguards. But, again, the safeguards
will have to pass not just IAEA muster of the technical
negotiations, but also the IAEA Board of Governors. We think
there are plenty of----
Senator Sarbanes. You're prepared to substitute----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Safeguards on the safeguards.
Senator Sarbanes. You're prepared to substitute the IAEA
Board of Governors for the Congress, is that correct?
Secretary Rice. We believe, Senator, you will have a
very--we will keep you apprised of the safeguards as they are
being negotiated. But we think it could take some time. And we
believe that the proper sequence is to go ahead and pass the
legislation, to negotiate the bilateral agreement, which will
be submitted to the Congress, and will then give you a very
strong sense of what is being done, in terms of the nuclear
cooperation, and then to have the IAEA safeguards fully
negotiated before this could go into effect.
Senator Sarbanes. I would like to try to understand why
you didn't proceed down the path of using the waiver authority
which the President has under the existing Atomic Energy Act,
and why you are seeking legislation. As I understand the Atomic
Energy Act, the President has a waiver authority, which would
enable him to move ahead on this proposal.
Secretary Rice. Well, our understanding, Senator, is that
in order to engage in the nuclear commerce--that is, the trade
and the transactions--there would have to be congressional
action if we didn't amend the law. There would actually have to
be congressional action each time a transaction was going to
occur. And we think that would actually undermine the stability
or the regularity that is needed in developing trade, nuclear
trade.
Senator Sarbanes. You mean congressional action to approve
the waiver?
Secretary Rice. To approve each transaction.
Senator Sarbanes. The waiver that would go with each
transaction----
Secretary Rice. With each transaction.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, under your proposed legislation, is
congressional action part of the arrangement?
Secretary Rice. It is, Senator, because we have to submit
to the Congress, after it is negotiated, a so-called 123
Agreement, which is an agreement that is a bilateral agreement
between the United States and India on civil nuclear
cooperation that comes to the Congress for assent. As I
understand it, it's 90 continuous days that the Congress can
object, in joint session. But it is--there will be a submission
of that document to the Congress. In addition, we are--we want
to continue to brief the Congress as this goes forward, so that
you are fully apprised of what we are doing in the bilateral
agreement. But the bilateral agreement does have to come to
Congress. And it would come in conformance with the way that
this has been done with others, because of the amendment to the
law.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I want to pursue that for a
moment. The congressional power, then, would be to disapprove
the bilateral agreement?
Secretary Rice. The congressional power would be to either
assent or, by two-thirds--is that correct?--or by two-thirds,
to disapprove within the 90 days, although the 90 days has to
be in continuous session, so that's probably not 90 days----
Senator Sarbanes. I don't----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. But much longer.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Understand this two-thirds
disapproval requirement.
Secretary Rice. Senator, the----
Senator Sarbanes. I think you're going to get some----
Secretary Rice. Yeah, let me----
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Help on this issue.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Let me just read it here. Yes.
Right. So, effectively, it's a two-thirds--yes, they're just
going to refine it for me. The--there would have to be a
disapproval. And then, of course, the President could override.
So, that's----
Senator Sarbanes. So, what you've done, or what you're
proposing to do, is to shift from the Atomic Energy Act, in
which the President could give a waiver to move ahead, but that
would require approval by the Congress, to a situation in which
the Congress would have to disapprove, in which case the
President could veto the disapproval, thereby requiring a two-
thirds vote in both houses of the Congress. Is that correct?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, the first approval, of
course, has to be to amend the act. And so----
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I understand that. But I'm looking
at the consequences of amending the Act.
Secretary Rice. Well, we thought that the--we think that
the proper sequence is that, first of all, up front, Congress
has the decision before it to approve the amendment to the Act,
or not. At that point, once the Act is either amended or not,
we would submit the 123 Agreement to Congress. If we do not
amend the Act, then every transaction has to come for
congressional approval. And we think that that will disrupt the
very basis and the very--the very need here, on an annual
basis, of the trade that is actually needed.
Senator Sarbanes. I thought the waiver and its approval
was on a----
Secretary Rice. An annual basis.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. On an annual basis----
Secretary Rice. Right.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Not every transaction.
Secretary Rice. No, an annual basis. The list of
transactions----
Senator Sarbanes. You just said every----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. On an annual----
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Transaction.
Secretary Rice. Well, let me rephrase. An annual--on an
annual basis, the list of transactions.
Now, the problem with that, Senator, is that what we're
trying to do is to free up the capacity of India and the United
States to cooperate in civil nuclear cooperation. Almost all of
that is in the private sector, not in the government sector.
And the very unreliability and unpredictability of an annual
process of the approval of all transactions, we think, would be
a pall over the ability of the commercial entities to actually
engage. That's not how commercial entities plan. It's not how
commercial entities work.
Senator Sarbanes. So, your solution to that problem is to
move Congress out of the decisionmaking process.
Secretary Rice. No, Senator----
Senator Sarbanes. I mean, except for the one decision
right at the outset.
Secretary Rice. Well, the decision at the outset really is
the critical decision, because, at the outset, I think, what
we're deciding, as a country, is, Do we believe that the
benefits of having civil nuclear cooperation and civil nuclear
trade with India outweigh the downsides?
Senator Sarbanes. I'm sympathetic to that point of view.
And it's one of the things I'm trying to wrestle with here. But
you just told me, a moment ago, that you're backing the
Congress out of this process. As----
Secretary Rice. Senator----
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. I understand it, for
example, you want the agreement approved before we know what
the safeguard arrangements are.
Secretary Rice. Senator----
Senator Sarbanes. And your answer to that is, ``Well, the
President will know what the safeguards arrangements are,
because it can't go into place until he makes the determination
that the safeguard regime is adequate.'' But shouldn't there be
a congressional determination that the safeguard regime is
adequate?
Secretary Rice. Senator, the IAEA safeguards that are
negotiated with the--between India and the IAEA----
Senator Sarbanes. Has to be approved by the Board of
Directors of the IAEA----
Secretary Rice. Well----
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Correct?
Secretary Rice. That's right. But----
Senator Sarbanes. Well----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Of course, that's----
Senator Sarbanes. I don't know that they should be
substituted for the Congress.
Secretary Rice. But, of course, Senator, in any agreement
that we engage in civil nuclear cooperation or bilateral
cooperation, the process is the same. The safeguards are IAEA's
safeguards. The 123 Agreement is by assent, not by a vote. And
so, the difference here is that we are asking Congress, up
front, to treat India as we treat other partners in civil
nuclear cooperation. So, the decision is, Are we going to treat
India as we treat other partners in civil nuclear cooperation?
At the point that that determination----
Senator Sarbanes. This----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Is made, we would treat----
Senator Sarbanes. This is----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. India----
Senator Sarbanes. This is further complicated, because
other partners, as I understand it now, have undertaken not to
produce fissile materials. Is that correct?
Secretary Rice. Other partners are, of course, nuclear--
non-nuclear-weapons states, at this point.
Senator Sarbanes. Right.
Secretary Rice. But, Senator----
Senator Sarbanes. And the nuclear-weapons states have
undertaken not to produce additional fissile material?
Secretary Rice. No, Senator. As a matter of fact, there is
a--an international effort underway for a Fissile Material
Cutoff Treaty, which the United States supports. But we have a
moratorium, that's right, on fissile-material production, and
we've encouraged others to do that.
But the fact is that we are not asking--once the law is
amended, we are not asking for special treatment for--or for a
different role for Congress once the change in the law is
taking place. Once you change the law, then we are asking for
the same process that we would use with any bilateral agreement
to do civil nuclear cooperation. The decision, up front, is
whether or not to treat India as a so-called ``conforming
state''--in other words, whether to treat India as we treat
others in civil nuclear cooperation. And we thought that this
was the right discussion to have, as a country, up front,
whether or not we wish to pursue this arrangement.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Allen?
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary, for being with us. The ranking
member, earlier on characterized this as whether or not this
would be a ``good bet'' for us to secure this protocol with
India. And when one is thinking of betting, I look at this as a
good bet. Two things you look at when you're betting. Number
one is past performance. You always like to look at a track
record. If it's a horse, obviously its starts and finishes,
times, track conditions, and so forth. And then you also want
to look at, What's the benefit, what's the payoff in it? And I
think when you look at India's past performance, and you look
at the benefits to India and to the United States, and, indeed,
the--Asia and the world, I think this is a very good bet for
our country.
One, as a partnership with a country that is the world's
largest representative democracy with us, who is the oldest
representative democracy. There's a shared desire for peace in
Asia. There's a shared sense of the importance of religious
tolerance, individual rights. I think it makes sense for our
security, as well.
The energy demand, which has been brought up back and forth
here, I think is very important. I was in India last November.
The air quality there is just awful. It made me appreciate our
clean air here in the----
Senator Boxer. Come to Los Angeles.
Senator Allen. Fine. I've been there. My mother lives
there. India is worse than Los Angeles.
Senator Boxer. I would hope so.
Senator Allen. The people in India have dirty coal, high-
sulphur coal. They import a lot of coal. And I think clean coal
technology needs to be part of the solution here in the United
States, as we're the Saudi Arabia of the world in coal. In
India, though, their coal is a very dirty coal. It's a high-
sulphur coal. Nuclear power is part of a way for them to clean
up their environment.
There also is the realization that our energy, particularly
oil, which doesn't necessarily come from this country, but from
hostile areas in the Middle East and elsewhere, that the demand
for oil, and whether it's in Central Europe, strengthening the
economy, India's growing economy, China's growing economy, all
that increases the price of oil. And to the extent that oil or
clean-burning natural gas is being used for electricity
generation, as opposed to transportation or for manufacturing,
that affects the United States, as well.
The other aspect--it's tertiary, in my view, but it is
important, and that's the economic benefits to U.S. companies,
U.S. jobs, and others.
And the question that comes up, Is this going to undermine,
somehow, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? And why is India
being treated differently? Well, India has an exemplary record
of nonproliferating materials. Other countries--North Korea,
Iran--certainly do not have that record.
I think this is actually bringing them into the regime.
There's going to be greater scrutiny, greater transparency, as
most of their nuclear power plants will be under that regime.
So, I look at the energy and the economic benefits of this
as being important. And most importantly is having India as a
partner. We are not going to win the war on terror, we are not
going to be able to advance freedom just on our own. We have,
throughout our history, whether it's from the secession from
Britain to World War I, World War II, the cold war, it could
not be the U.S. alone. And India, I think, is a country that
can positively impact these goals for our country, and our
values. And it's not just going to be a short-term matter. I
think this is going to be beneficial for generations to come.
Now, let me ask you, Madam Secretary--and as you know, I've
sponsored this, so I'm obviously in favor it, thinking it's a
good bet. I think it's an ideal bet, and I'm glad we have the
chance to get this done. And I congratulate you and the
administration on this, I think, historic breakthrough
agreement.
One thing that I've asked, in the past, though, is--India,
while they're nonconforming in many respects, I think it would
be desirable for India and their government to join the
Proliferation Security Initiative. I'd like to pose this
question to you. Are you, or is our administration,
encouraging, prodding, cajoling--respectfully, of course--India
to join the Proliferation Security Initiative? And do you
believe it would be helpful for India to join?
Secretary Rice. We are, in fact, prodding the Indians to
do so. And they've shown great interest in the Proliferation
Security Initiative. They've had some questions concerning how
it might affect certain interpretations that they have about
the Law of the Sea. But we have, I think, been answering those
for them. And we think they could be a tremendous asset in the
Proliferation Security Initiative, given their naval assets and
given the geographic location of India. And so, yes, we are
very much prodding them. And I hope they're going to
participate.
Senator Allen. Do you know if that's on their schedule.
We're asking about sequencing here, which I do want to follow
up on, but where are they in any sort of deliberation?
Secretary Rice. They have told us that they are
deliberating it seriously. And we have asked them to deliberate
it expeditiously, because we do believe that it would be a
helpful signal to not just us, but also to the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and to other concerned states about
nonproliferation, were they to join the PSI. So, we've asked
them to look at it expeditiously. They've promised that they
will.
Senator Allen. Do you think they would get it done in the
next month or so, 2 months or so?
Secretary Rice. We can work with them on that. I think it
would really help, particularly here, but also with other
members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. And so, we're making
that case with them.
Senator Allen. When I was over there, meeting with Prime
Minister Singh, naturally, this issue came up, and I brought up
the Proliferation Security Initiative. And I think that would
be helpful, as we do our due diligence here, that you see that
sort of action on the part of India's government in this
respect.
On finalizing this U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
and the changes here, trying to get the sequencing, we had a
previous classified hearing, and I actually asked the same
questions, similar to Senator Sarbanes. The sequencing, as I
understood it, that--they have to enter into an agreement with
the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, with its protocol
for safeguards for India. You are suggesting that we have
action here in the U.S. Senate before that agreement is
reached. Is that correct?
Secretary Rice. That is correct, because we think that the
negotiation of the IAEA safeguards, although they've--it will
have begun before this--the bill is passed here, or before the
bill is considered here--it would have begun between India and
the IAEA. Again, they already do have a safeguards agreement on
four of their reactors. And so, there's some indication as to
what one might look like. But, yes, we believe the negotiation
might take some longer time; and so, we would like to pass the
legislation and make the entry into force of the legislation
contingent on the negotiation of the completion of the
safeguards agreement.
Senator Allen. All right, you mention there's four of
them. Would that be a template that Senators could look at as--
the sort of protocol safeguards--the balance?
Secretary Rice. Well, certainly, although, of course, this
is much broader. They're now, instead of just--I think 81
percent of their reactors are now outside, they're now going to
put two-thirds inside. And so, we're talking about something
much broader. We're talking about, also, safeguards on storage
facilities for nuclear fuel. So, this is a lot that they're
taking on, and we believe that getting the legislation passed
and then monitoring and watching the IAEA negotiations will be
very important.
Let me just make one further point on that. We rely on the
IAEA to determine safeguards around the world. We don't sit in
the State Department or in the Defense Department or in the
Energy Department, making safeguards agreements with countries.
That's why we have an International Atomic Energy Agency. And
so, of course we rely on their judgment as to what constitutes
a proper set of safeguards. We play a role. We have a lot of
personnel who are seconded to the IAEA. But there is nothing
unusual about having the IAEA be the negotiator and, in
effect--in a sense, the validator of the reliability and
significance of--suitability of safeguards.
Senator Allen. All right. Assuming the sequencing goes,
and this action is taken by the U.S. Senate not disapproving,
IAEA approves it. Then it's contingent on them settling an
agreement. One thing with India, they do respect the rule of
law. That's part of their tradition, which is another
similarity with our country. Ultimately, though, after all our
action, would not the Nuclear Suppliers Group--that's about 45
countries--then want to act? Would they not have to then act,
as well?
Secretary Rice. Yes, this would then have to be submitted
to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which works by consensus. So,
yes, it would have to be submitted to them. We have several
steps ahead of us.
Senator Allen. Thank you. My time's up. Thank you, and
congratulations.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.
Senator Boxer?
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you very
much, Secretary Rice.
I share your view that a strong bilateral relationship with
India is important. India's a thriving democracy with a growing
economy, and developing closer ties between our nations is
something I strongly support, in most everything I do. But I do
not share the view that closer U.S./India ties will be a
counterweight to China, which seems to be one of the unstated,
yet driving, forces behind this deal. And I think this type of
thinking is not only outdated and dangerous, but it really
flies in the face of reality.
Last April, India and China signed 12 separate agreements
on trade, security, and transportation. India and Chinese
leaders have declared 2006 the year of India/China friendship.
And it doesn't appear to me that India has any interest in
being a hedge against China. And I believe it's naive to think
otherwise. I think it's old-fashioned. I think it's that cold-
war thinking.
So, efforts to improve U.S./India relations should be a
standalone policy, not tied to a China card. And I don't fault
the administration for seeking an agreement on nuclear
cooperation with India. But I think that agreement should be a
win for America, and a win for nonproliferation. I don't
believe this agreement is.
So, I want to lay out my concerns, and I'll question you
about just one of them. I do have five areas.
First, it rewards a nation for not signing the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
Second, it will give India the capability to produce more
nuclear weapons than it otherwise could. I have information to
place in the record from experts that claim it could be that
the ability of India to produce nuclear weapons could go up
from 6 a year to 50.
Third, it requires a change in current law. And I think
Senator Sarbanes was really in--making his point, that the
checks and balances of the Congress will be so weakened that
suddenly the IAEA, you know, becomes more important to this
administration than the Congress, which is putting us in a very
strange position, indeed.
And, fifth, I believe the United States gave away more than
it received in this deal.
So, I'm going to expand briefly on these points.
First, the deal rewards India for not signing the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970. As we all know, the NPT is
the keystone of international nonproliferation efforts. And
thanks to the NPT, more than 180 nations have not developed
nuclear weapons. One of the great incentives of the NPT is that
non-nuclear-weapons nations are given access to civil nuclear
assistance. By allowing India to receive civil nuclear
assistance while it continues production of weapons, India is
being rewarded.
Second, this deal will give India the capability to expand
its arsenal of weapons, as I mentioned before. While U.S.
nuclear assistance will only be used for civilian purposes,
uranium fuel imports from the U.S. will allow India to dedicate
more of its scarce uranium ore for military use.
And this isn't just me saying it. Let's go to a expert in
India, who--a strategist, who wrote, in December, the country
is short of uranium. It was necessary to, quote, ``get imported
uranium for India's power reactors so as to conserve all our
indigenous uranium for weapons-production purposes.'' I will
spell the name of the gentleman who said that, S-u-b-r-a-h-m-a-
n-y-a-m.
Experts believe this deal could allow, again, India to
vastly increase its production of nuclear weapons from 6 to 50
a year, and this could touch off an unintended arms race in the
region.
Third, the draft legislation proposed by the administration
requests that Congress exempt the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear
Agreement from several key sections of the Atomic Nuclear Act,
including one that prohibits the export of nuclear material or
technology to any non-nuclear-weapons state which has detonated
a nuclear device. India needs an exemption, because, in 1974,
it detonated a nuclear device, and it did so by improperly
using U.S. and Canadian civil nuclear technology.
In addition, there is a troubling report that the Institute
for Science and International Security has uncovered, quote,
``a well-developed, active, and secret Indian program to outfit
its uranium enrichment program and circumvent other countries'
export control efforts,'' unquote.
Fourth, the timing of this deal negatively impacts our
policy in Iran. And this is what I really--going to ask you
about. Now I understand that there is no comparison between
India and Iran. But we still have to be consistent, in terms of
our policy. Either we want to limit the threat of nuclear
weapons or we don't. There's growing evidence that the timing
of the U.S.-India agreement is complicating our efforts to
pressure Iran.
Just last Wednesday, Germany's foreign minister said the
timing of the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement was, quote,
``certainly not helpful to attempts to ensure that Iran does
not develop a nuclear bomb.'' As the Los Angeles Times
editorialized last month, quote, ``The message to Iran and
other nuclear wannabees couldn't be clearer or more
destructive. These regimes and others will rightly conclude
that the U.S. is interested in stopping the spread of nuclear
knowhow only to regimes it dislikes. This undermines U.S. moral
leadership on the single most dangerous threat to humankind,
the spread of nuclear weapons,'' unquote.
And I want to take a minute to ask you about Iran, because
we are all in agreement about the threat of Iran. I don't think
there is a disagreement between anyone here. And you said--in
your recent editorial in favor of this deal, you said something
that I agreed with about Iran, that they're a sponsor of
terrorism, and they have violated their own commitments in
defying the international community's efforts to contain its
nuclear ambitions. I agree.
So, today we read--or March 27th, excuse me--in a Defense
News headline, ``India Navy Trains Iranian Sailors.'' This is
very disturbing. You go out of your way, in your op-ed in favor
of this deal, to tell us all what we need to know about Iran,
and then we have this circumstance. And my question is--this is
a 3-year agreement--if they are training Iranian sailors, did
you make a condition of this deal their ending this support of
Iran's military?
Secretary Rice. Well, thank you, Senator.
First let me just address the first----
Senator Boxer. Would you just answer that question first?
Secretary Rice. Well, first of all, the Indians say that
they do have some low-level, military-to-military contacts with
Iran. I might just note that they're not the only country that
has a strong relationship with--a long-term and strong
relationship with Iran. So do many of our best allies. We are,
in fact, the ones that did not have diplomatic relations with
Iran. But I would just underscore what I said earlier to
Senator Chafee, people are reviewing now, and looking under a
microscope at what they have been doing with Iran, because
Iran's behavior over the last couple of years, which we've
noted for a long time, has simply now given people a lot
greater pause about their relations with Iran than they had in
the past.
I would note, for instance, that India was the only member
of the nonaligned movement to vote for the referral of the
Iranian nuclear program to the IAEA. So----
Senator Boxer. Madam Secretary, my time is so limited, and
I don't--I don't want to interrupt you, but to get you to
answer the question. Did you make the ending of this program as
part of the deal that you struck? Did you say, ``Before we go
forward with this, we want this ended''? I mean, this is the
Defense News of the United States of America.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator----
Senator Boxer. ``India Navy Trains Iranian Soldiers.''
The--two of their ships were in the headquarters of Indian
navy's southern command. So, you've got Iranian--you are
saying, on the one hand, we're going to allow fuel--nuclear
fuel to go from this country to their country, and they've got
Iranian ships in port.
Secretary Rice. Senator, there are----
Senator Boxer. So, have you----
Secretary Rice. The Iranians----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Made this----
Secretary Rice. There are----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Part of the----
Secretary Rice. There have----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Deal?
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Been, and probably will be,
Iranian port calls in a number of countries----
Senator Boxer. No, this isn't----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. In the world.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Port calls. This is training of
their military. Did you make this part of the deal, yes----
Secretary Rice. Well----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Or no----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Senator----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Because the reason I'm asking
is, I think some of us would like to make it a condition.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I'm trying to distinguish for you
what is right in that article from what is wrong. There have
been Iranian ship port calls in India. The assertion, We
understand that they train Iranian sailors,'' is not right.
That is----
Senator Boxer. So, you say that----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Well, not----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. When they----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Everything in----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Say that----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Is right.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ``Two Iranian warships were
docked in a town''--I don't want to pronounce it wrong----
Secretary Rice. In----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. K-o-c-h-l.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. In Kochi?
Senator Boxer. Kochi?
Secretary Rice. Correct.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ``The headquarters of Indian
navy's southern command for a training program under a 3-year-
old military cooperation agreement with Tehran.''
And all I'm asking you is, Don't you think it's in the best
interests of America, when we're going to do this extraordinary
special deal, to make, as a condition, that they end that
relationship?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I think that--again, let me
distinguish. There are port calls that have taken place between
Iran and India, yes. The Indians say that they do not train
Iranian sailors and soldiers. And so, there are military-to-
military contacts. But, again, let me put it in context. India
is not the only country in the world that has relationships
with Iran. Many of our friends----
Senator Boxer. This is a country we're going to give
nuclear technology to. That's what this is about. Lots of other
countries do a lot of things. You're not sitting here
suggesting that we give them the components to greatly increase
their development----
Secretary Rice. Senator, some of the countries----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Of building nuclear bombs.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Some of the countries that
have relations with Iran, we already do U.S. cooperation on
civil nuclear power with.
Senator Boxer. Well, you want a special deal for this
country, and that's why it's important--and let, just, the
record show that the Secretary--I'm assuming, by her answer,
this wasn't even an issue that was brought up. And it's of deep
concern to me, and, I'm sure, to others in the Senate.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, let me correct the record.
The United States has made very clear to India that we have
concerns about their relationship with Iran. We've made clear
to them we had concerns about the pipeline. We have made clear
to them that we had concerns about their initial vote in the
IAEA. So, of course we have concerns about----
Senator Boxer. That's not my----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Their relationship with Iran.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Question whether we have
concerns.
Secretary Rice. But on this----
Senator Boxer. Did we make it part of the condition of the
deal? I have concerns when my kids to the wrong things, but I
don't just tell them; I have some action that follows it up.
So, I just think your words are a bit hollow; specifically on
this matter. And if you put it together with what Senator
Sarbanes was able to ascertain, that you're really, in many
ways, ducking around the Congress, I think this deal has to
have more checks and balances. That's it.
And I know my time's expired. And I appreciate your being
lenient with me, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. May I just, for the record,
again, Senator, state that the Defense News article, as it is
written, is not, we believe, correct about the military-to-
military relationship between Iran and India.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Senator Alexander?
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is this on
now?
Madam Secretary, thank you for coming and being well
informed and answering our questions.
As we look ahead, would you suggest that, for our country,
if we were thinking about the emergence of three great powers
or influences in the world, that it--one might say one might be
China, one might be India, and one might be political Islam?
Secretary Rice. I think that would be fair, Senator.
Senator Alexander. And if we were to look at those three,
would you say that our prospects for a mutual relationship or
partnership might be better with India than it might be with
China or political Islam?
Secretary Rice. Well, I think our possibilities for a deep
strategic relationship with India are particularly strong,
because of our shared values.
Senator Alexander. And I assume you wouldn't suggest that
we should think of India, a country of--that will be the
largest country in the world, as one of our children----
Secretary Rice. Absolutely not.
Senator Alexander [continuing]. But as a partner that we
would try to respect and understand their differences in where
they are today and where we are today, and where we both hope
to go and see if we have mutual interests.
Secretary Rice. That's right.
Senator Alexander. I would like to focus more on nuclear
power and clean air and the environment. Senator Allen talked
about energy. And he and I have talked a good deal about in.
Senator Chafee and I have worked together on clean air in this
country.
And one of the things I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that
we might want to explore, although it's a little bit out of our
jurisdiction, is the impact of dirty air in India and China
over the next 30 or 40 years on the air we breathe in the
United States.
Have you any--I mean, if I'm correct, only about 2 percent
of the current power in India is nuclear. Is that about right?
Secretary Rice. That's correct. About 2 percent, yes.
Senator Alexander. Of producing electricity. And in Japan
it would be--well, in France, it would be 78----
Secretary Rice. It would be 78 percent in France. And
it's, I think, in Japan, about 30 percent, at this point----
Senator Alexander [continuing]. And in the United States,
what we have learned in our hearings, in Energy, is that while
nuclear power only produces 20 percent of our electricity in
the United States, and we use about 25 percent of all the
energy in the world, it produces 70 percent of the carbon-free
electricity, even though we haven't built a new nuclear power
plant in 30 years. So, increasingly, those who are concerned
about global warming, about mercury, which is a new pollutant
in the air, which we're just now beginning to regulate in the
United States, about sulphur and nitrogen, are recognizing that
to produce large amounts of clean carbon-free energy, there
really is only one technology available today, and that's
nuclear power.
Secretary Rice. Right.
Senator Alexander. Do you have any estimate of to what
extent the pollutants that might come from dirty coal plants in
India and China over the next 30-40 years might end up in the
air that Americans breathe?
Secretary Rice. I don't have an estimate of that, Senator.
But, obviously, because the particulates that are being
released by this dirty air are contributing to greenhouse gas
emissions quite significantly--in fact, the emissions in India
have increased about 3 percent a year; that's about twice the
rate as in the United States--it's obviously contributing to
the global problem that we are having with greenhouse gas
emissions. And that, for the United States, of course, is a
very bad thing.
Senator Alexander. The Senator from California mentioned
the unclean air in Los Angeles. We have a similar problem in
Tennessee, around the Great Smoky Mountains. I wonder if you
have any idea of what percent of the dirty air in Los Angeles
comes from India and China, or will, over the next 30 or 40
years, if they were to build coal plants instead of civilian
nuclear reactors?
Secretary Rice. I don't have that estimate, Senator, but,
obviously, contributing to the global problem with greenhouse
gas emissions is a problem for us, as well as it is for the
Indians themselves.
Senator Alexander. I know I'm asking you questions that,
in some cases, might be best asked of the Environmental--of the
EPA and the Energy Department, but I think they're questions
that are relevant to our weighing of these balances here. Such
a question would be, Madam Secretary--and perhaps if you don't
have the answer to this, someone within the administration
could--do you have any idea--we've become increasingly
concerned about the amounts of mercury that are in the air in
the United States--do you have any idea how much of that
mercury comes from other countries--in effect, blown around the
world and blown into the United States?
Secretary Rice. I don't, Senator, but I'll seek to get an
answer for you.
Senator Alexander. As I look at India--and we talk about
partnerships--are--is it not true that the United States
Senate, last year, approved a $5 billion credit to help a
British company, Westinghouse, owned by British, although
Westinghouse is in Pittsburgh, to help build civilian nuclear
power plants in China? And what were the considerations----
Secretary Rice. Right.
Senator Alexander [continuing]. There?
Secretary Rice. We do--we did, in fact, do exactly that,
because we believe that civil nuclear cooperation with China, a
country with which we have cooperation, but, of course, we have
significant differences, including, I might say, on Iran, for
instance, that the need for civil nuclear energy in China,
given China's incredible appetite for growth and appetite for
energy, was in the best interest of this country, not to
mention in the commercial interest of those who could build the
power plants. But, yes, we absolutely did agree to that.
Senator Alexander. Is it true, or not true, that if the
United States did not help India and China build nuclear
reactors for civilian power, that Russia or France or some
other country might do that, and, in the process, develop a
massive new technology and business that could then be helpful
in their own countries in having clean air?
Secretary Rice. Well, Russia already has some activity
with China that they've grandfathered in under certain Nuclear
Supplier Group decisions. We do note that India's ability to
acquire civil nuclear cooperation on a large scale is
constrained by their absence of a relationship with the IAEA,
which is why we think that getting them a relationship with the
IAEA, getting them to agree to certain of the standards that
all of us are adhering to, which they've said they are going to
do, puts them in a position to get this clean source of energy
for an economy that's growing at 8 percent. They're simply
either going to have to do it through dirty coal--and, as you
and Senator Allen have been noting, their coal is particularly
dirty--or through some other means. They're not going to stop
growing to do it, they're going to do it one way or another.
And we think that civil nuclear is the--by far, the best path
for them.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Mr. Chairman, I think that what I will do is submit, if
it's appropriate, to the Secretary a short series of questions
that might require some answers from the Department of Energy
or the Environmental Protection Agency, so that all of us can
consider that. And they will be aimed at trying to understand
what the consequences are if we don't help India and China
especially with civilian nuclear power.
[The information previously referred to appears in the
appendix to this hearing.]
Senator Alexander. One of the leading natural--or
environmental groups, the Natural Resources Defense Council,
for example, is deeply concerned about the impact of dirty coal
plants in India and China on the clean air in the United States
and the rest of the world. That's just mercury, nitrogen, and
sulphur. Add to that the global warming issues. So, I think
it's important for us to understand that, and understand how
that might not just affect the rest of the world, but to what
extent that air blows into Los Angeles and into the Great Smoky
Mountains and makes it impossible for us to deal with that.
Thank you for the time.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, would you give me 10 seconds?
The Chairman. Yes, Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. I'd like to put in the record the CRS
report on that issue, and quote from one portion of this,
``However, such reductions--the totality of the reductions that
would be accomplished by their full-blown nuclear program''--
civil--``such a reduction would constitute 2 percent of India's
current CO2 emissions and 3.6 percent of India's
energy-related emissions.''
It's real, but it's not very significant.
[The information previously referred to appears in the
appendix to this hearing.]
Senator Alexander. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would submit
that, in place of three or four thousand megawatts--well--or
30--the number of megawatts of nuclear power that India is
thinking about building--20-, 30-, 40,000 megawatts, would be
40, 50, or 60 conventional coal plants. That's a lot of
sulphur. That's a lot of nitrogen. That's a lot of mercury. And
that's a lot of carbon.
The Chairman. We would appreciate responses from the
administration to the Senator's questions.
Secretary Rice. I'd be most happy to get responses for
you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Alexander.
Senator Kerry?
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is that--I have to
deal with this thing.
Senator Boxer. I think it's on.
Senator Kerry. Thank you.
Welcome, Madam Secretary.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
Senator Kerry. Glad to see you.
Madam Secretary, I was in India, as I think you know--and I
thank Secretary Burns for briefing me before I went, having a
good discussion about this issue--in January, and I had the
opportunity to meet with Prime Minister Singh and his national
security advisor and the nuclear--head of the Nuclear Power
Commission. And our discussions focused not just on India's
nuclear needs, energy needs, as a whole, but also the way that
this deal might be helpful to them in the long run, and,
needless to say, how this deal is important to the relationship
between our two countries. I understand that. I think we all
understand that.
I heard a couple of colleagues talking about, sort of,
rewarding India for not being a member of the NPT. I think we
have to get over this notion that because of what's happened in
past history, we can't deal with new realities that are on the
table. If we always stay stuck in the same place, we never
advance any ball. That is not to say that I think you have
advanced the ball as far as you could have.
I've said this with Secretary Burns, I--this--I'm inclined
to support this agreement. And I said that in India, I support
it in principle, because I think it's important to our
countries, I think it's important to bring more of India's
program under the IAEA safeguards. That is important. You have
to ask yourself a simple question. If you want to sit there and
say, ``Gee, they stayed out of the NPT for all these years,
and, therefore, we're going do something--we ought to get
something for it.``
Now, some people think we ought to have gotten more for it.
I happen to believe that. It's not where we are. It's not the
deal I would have negotiated, personally. I think there was a
great opportunity here to deal with the overall proliferation
issue of the region, including Pakistan and China. And
proliferation is not just the movement of information and
technology to other countries, it is also the building of
weapons. And this clearly allows that continued building of
weapons. But, you know, the perfect world is not, sort of,
what's in our hand here. And I understand that. I do think you
could have gotten closer to that. And I wish you had.
But the fact is, it is better to build this relationship.
It is better to move us forward, in terms of the controls that
will exist on the rest of what is defined as the civilian
program.
Now, India has the right to define what's going to be in
the civilian and what's out. And some people have issues with
that. I would hope that in the next days--and I've suggested
this to Secretary Burns, and I think it would help you
enormously with Congress, and I hope India is listening to
this, and they're hearing some of the reluctance of some
members--if we could try to find a way to advance the fissile
material cutoff efforts, and if India itself could be helpful
in these next days in perhaps helping us to rapidly define the
IAEA safeguards standards--I am very uncomfortable, though I
want to help--and I think I'm inclined to say we should--we
have to move forward here--I think you all have a
responsibility to try to do the best we can in the next days to
make that an evenhanded process between the Congress and
yourselves and India.
I think Senator Sarbanes asked very important questions
with respect to that. I heard them from back in my office. I am
uncomfortable voting to change the overall structure without
seeing those safeguards, knowing what they're going to be. And
it seems to me reasonable, eminently reasonable, for you to
press this process, given the concerns many members have, to
help us to see those, to share that. And I think you'll find a
Congress far more prepared to move forward more easily and with
greater confidence if we were to do that.
So, I would ask you whether or not it's not possible,
really, to try to guarantee to the Congress--I know, in the
briefing with Secretary Burns, I think his opinion was that
that was important and might be done. And I wonder if you
might, sort of, give us that confidence here today.
Secretary Rice. Well, we will certainly press it, Senator,
both the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and the IAEA
safeguards. During the recent visit of Mr. Saran, I told him,
in no uncertain terms, that this was going to be an issue with
Congress and that they ought to negotiate with the IAEA as
quickly as possible. I'd be--it would be a problem to undertake
a guarantee, but what I can guarantee you is that we will make
every effort that we can to accelerate and push that process
forward.
Senator Kerry. And what about the--what about the notion
of advancing some of these other issues that were left off the
table that might give----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Congress greater confidence
with respect to the fissile material cutoff or even the broader
nonproliferation regime itself, which really needs an infusion
of restructuring----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. And greater urgency?
Secretary Rice. Well, on the FMCT, absolutely. We are
trying to get the work done on that, ourselves. We've told the
Indians they need to be helpful in that. They've promised that
they will, and we will press them very hard to help us on the--
and they should know, too, that, by the way, it's one of the
determinations that the President will have to make. So, we
have that leverage.
Secondly, on the broader proliferation regime, I agree with
you, Senator. One of the reasons, I think, that Mohamed
ElBaradei has been in favor of this is that there is much that
India can do, as a big state with nuclear technology, to
enhance our ability to, for instance, criminalize the behavior
of those who trade in nuclear technologies. They have just
passed a very strong act against this kind of activity, in
2005, which would criminalize--it's much more like our law--
criminalize, in a much more comprehensive way, any behavior
that is betting the trade in weapons of mass destruction
technology. I think that's the kind of thing that they can do.
Also, by adhering to these various regimes--the missile
technology control regime, the NSG guidelines--they can help us
to expand the concept of what is the nuclear proliferation
regime, because the NPT is an important part of it, but we
clearly need more than the NPT. And I want to emphasize, again,
that, on the Proliferation Security Initiative, we will press
very hard.
I should just mention, Senator--you are well aware of these
efforts, but--because they started not with our administration,
but go back to other administrations--we would like to see,
obviously, in the regional sense, in the relationship between
India and Pakistan and others, look at regional moratorium on
fissile material production. We've made it very clear that we
would encourage that, that we would encourage India and
Pakistan to look at their nuclear relationship in the way that,
in some of the earlier days, people were concerned about safety
and security between the U.S. and Soviet arsenal. So, there are
lots----
Senator Kerry. Let me ask you----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. A lot of things that we could
do.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Did you explore--I mean, one of
my concerns--I raised this issue with both the prime minister
of Pakistan and President Musharraf, and there seemed to be a
spark of interest--maybe they were just--maybe they were being
kind, but there seemed to be a genuine spark of interest in the
notion of trying to arrive at some agreement regionally on the
numbers of nuclear weapons. And it seems to me that that's a
place where the United States could have offered real
leadership, is trying to bring the parties together. It's hard
to understand why they would need to continue to build levels
beyond an adequate deterrent between each other and China. Did
you explore that?
Secretary Rice. Well, what we couldn't achieve, and I
think it was unlikely, was a constraint unilaterally by any one
state. But the idea that has been pursued in some second-track
arrangements, some second-track discussions, of discussions
between the parties about not just absolute levels, but also
safety and security and confidence-building measures, because
it's something we're very interested in and we'd like to
pursue.
I think, Senator, we now have the kind of relationship with
the two that might make it worthwhile. I can't say that it's
going to have an immediate payoff. These things are hard. But--
--
Senator Kerry. This--you know, this really shouldn't----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Very interested.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. That hard. The United States
and Russia, under the leadership of President Reagan, came out
at Reykjavik, if I call, and said, ``We're going to go down to
zero.'' Now, we backed off of that, and I think we're going to
2500, from tens of thousands. If we could do it, the two great
superpowers on the face of the planet, and everyone understands
the absurdity of that kind of a conflict, so the adequacy of
deterrence is defined--China has gotten along for 40 years
quite effectively with, I think, in the double-digits numbers.
I'm not going to go into classified areas here, but we all know
that it has been a meager program compared to both the former
Soviet Union and the United States. And they've been content to
feel they have a sufficient deterrent.
So, it is absurd to believe that they have an interest in
building up. And certainly India, if China has not, and is
relatively even with respect to--Pakistan doesn't--the entire
nonproliferation structure could have been advanced if the
United States had put on the table that notion, and pushed for
it.
Now, it's not within this agreement. And I understand that.
That doesn't mean we shouldn't move forward here. But I would
love to see the administration be more aggressive. I mean, even
the last meetings that took place, we were not particularly
engaged. We need to lead on this. And, I might add, it is hard
to lead when we have, in our own budget, money for a new
nuclear weapon, a so-called bunker-busting nuclear weapon. I
mean, as other countries make judgments about their own
deterrents and their own threat-response needs, they measure
what other countries are doing. And if we, indeed, are the ones
who are moving forward with a new concept, it sends shivers
down their spine, and their defense establish, just like ours,
comes to them and says, ``Hey, boys, better start to respond.''
So, I would hope you would really have a larger vision with
respect to how we could ratchet this down. And, within that
context, I don't think you'd find many Senators saying no to
this.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator. We obviously would
like to see the tensions in the region continue to abate, as
they have been. I think we believe that we've built
relationships with India and Pakistan that allow us to pursue
some of the ideas that you're talking about. And they are
certainly much like the ideas we'd like to pursue.
Thank you.
Senator Kerry. Could I just ask quickly, How will the
United States react is China presses for a Pakistan exception
similar to the India exception?
Secretary Rice. We've been very clear, publicly,
privately, with China, with Pakistan itself, that Pakistan is
not an appropriate state for this kind of an exception. It's
just a different history----
Senator Kerry. What if they make that the price for
approval of the India exception?
Secretary Rice. It can't be the price for approval of the
India exception. Simply can't be.
Senator Kerry. Could that be a showstopper?
Secretary Rice. I don't believe so, Senator. Nothing that
we've had discussions would suggest that. And Pakistan itself
understands its own special history.
Senator Kerry. And in keeping with Senator Sarbanes's
concern, you would not react badly if Congress didn't write
itself out of this process?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, we believe very strongly
that Congress is not writing itself out of this. We are only
asking that, by amendment of the law, we would follow the
procedures that Congress would normally follow to approve
nuclear commerce with any state.
Senator Kerry. Okay. Well, thank you very much, Madam
Secretary. I appreciate it.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
Senator Kerry. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Kerry.
Now, just as a management problem here, I've been advised
the Secretary needs to leave at 12:05. I would ask the
Secretary's indulgence for a moment, as I try to parse, now, 10
minutes to each of three Senators who have not been heard. And
I hope the Senators will respect the 10 minutes, because we
will be taking a little bit more of the Secretary's time, and
she faces testimony before our House colleagues very shortly.
But if we may proceed--Senator Feingold?
Senator Feingold. Chairman, I will try to keep it under 10
minutes, out of respect for my colleagues. But let me thank you
for holding today's hearing with Secretary Rice on the proposed
United States/India Nuclear Energy Agreement. This is obviously
a very important subject, and--as shown by the attendance here
at the hearing.
Madam Secretary, I appreciate your spending time with us
today.
And I'd just ask that my full statement be placed in the
record.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record in full.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's hearing with Secretary
Rice on the proposed United States-Indian nuclear energy agreement.
This subject is extremely important and I am pleased that this
committee is continuing to take a close look at this complex issue.
Madam Secretary, I appreciate you spending time with us today on this
very important issue.
I've been troubled by the way the administration has handled this
issue from the start: not consulting with Congress prior to announcing
a deal that requires changes to U.S. law; submitting legislation asking
Congress to remove itself from any oversight; and, pushing Congress to
approve this legislation without the benefit of seeing the agreement.
The process problems are not my main concern, however. After
reviewing what is known about the deal, which admittedly is not much at
this time, I would be hard pressed to explain to my constituents why
this agreement is so vital to our national interests, and why it has to
be done now. I agree that India is an increasingly important partner
and player on the world stage. I also agree that U.S.-India relations
are extremely important. Increased efforts to enhance our relationship
with India are important. However, our relationship with India does not
rest on this one deal, nor should it. Whether this deal goes through or
not, India will likely continue to pursue its relationships with China
and Iran in ways that won't always be in our interest. I also find the
energy arguments for this deal unconvincing. India has tremendous and
growing energy needs but nuclear energy is not necessarily the answer.
There are far more cost-effective, responsible and immediate ways to
tackle that problem. Finally, this deal is not guaranteed to promise
direct financial opportunities for U.S. companies. India has promised
no preferential treatment for the United States and companies from
countries such as Russia and France may be better situated to benefit
financially.
In addition to providing us with a better rationale for this
agreement, the administration must also provide us with a more detailed
analysis of the potential negative impact it could have on the
nonproliferation coalitions and policy we've painstakingly put together
over the last 30 years. The proliferation of nuclear technology, know
how, and material may be the top national security threat we face. How
does this deal impact that threat? How does this deal impact fragile
relationships with countries like Pakistan, South Africa, or China? The
answers we've received thus far--mostly assurances that this deal is
``strategically important''--do not suffice.
Today will be an opportunity for us all to discuss and make some
progress on these very serious issues. I appreciate that Secretary Rice
has come before the committee today and I hope that she will provide us
with much needed clarity on the proposed agreement with India.
Senator Feingold. I'll be blunt that I've been troubled by
the way the administration has handled this issue from the
start, not consulting with Congress prior to announcing a deal
that requires changes to U.S. law, submitting legislation that
asks Congress to remove itself from any oversight, and pushing
Congress to approve this legislation without the benefit of
seeing the agreement.
The process problems are not, however, my first concern.
After reviewing what is known about the deal, which,
admittedly, is not much at this time, I would be sort of hard-
pressed to explain to my constituents why this agreement is so
vital to our national interests. In addition to providing us
with a better rationale for the agreement, I urge the
administration to provide us with a more detailed analysis of
the potential negative impact this agreement could have on the
nonproliferation coalitions and policies we've painstakingly
put together over the last 30 years.
The proliferation of nuclear technology, knowhow, and
material may be the top national security threat we face, and I
fear that this deal could end up making our world less safe,
rather than more safe.
But I am glad you're here. And I obviously understand this
is a very complex issue. I would just want to ask a few more
questions.
Under Secretary Burns has publicly noted that all future
civilian reactors built in India will be subject to safeguards;
thus, arguing that an increasing percentage of India's nuclear
program will be under international controls. But doesn't India
get to decide whether a given reactor is classified as civilian
or military? So, what's to prevent India from designating all
future reactors as military in order to avoid international
safeguards?
Secretary Rice. It is true that India makes that
determination as to sovereign states. We make that
determination, for instance. But the Indians--we believe the
incentives, the powerful incentives for them, are on the
civilian side, not on the strategic nuclear side. They have
50,000 tons of uranium reserves, more than enough if they
wished to use the small percentage of that, that would be
required for a military program. It's on the civilian side that
you need a lot of nuclear material to fuel a civilian program
over a long period of time.
So, we simply think the incentives are in the other
direction, and that the Indians are trying to get civil nuclear
energy, and that this is something that, of course, people will
be able to watch. But it's--I think someone said--maybe it was
Senator Biden who said that the Indians are also taking on a
set of obligations here with the world, and people will be
watching.
Senator Feingold. But you concede that this is entirely
within their discretion----
Secretary Rice. It----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. This designation.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Is, indeed, within their
discretion.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Madam Secretary. You said
that the safeguards will be permanent, but India emphasized
that these, quote, ``permanent safeguards would be predicated
on an uninterrupted supply of fuel for civilian reactors.''
Doesn't that tie our hands, down the road? If, in the future,
India tests or uses nuclear weapons or proliferates nuclear
technology, will the United States continue to supply fuel for
India's nuclear reactors?
Secretary Rice. We've been very clear with the Indians
that the permanence of the safeguard is permanence of the
safeguards, without condition. In fact, we reserve the right,
should India test, as it has agreed not to do, or should India
in any way violate the IAEA safeguards agreements to which it
would be adhering, that the deal, from our point of view,
would, at that point, be off.
Senator Feingold. As you noted, with the world's second
largest population and a fast-growing economy, we all have to
be concerned about India's energy consumption and production of
greenhouse gases. You've said that this deal will reduce
India's reliance on coal and oil, but I would argue that there
are more effective means of doing so than selling a few nuclear
reactors. India's Bureau of Energy Efficiency estimates that
improving energy efficiency could save 80 to 20 gigawatts per
year, which is more than all the future output from nuclear
reactors now being planned. If improving India's energy mix is
a primary motivation of this deal, have you considered other
non-nuclear approaches, like a cooperation agreement that would
help India improve its energy efficiency?
Secretary Rice. We intend to do all of that. In fact, on a
multilateral basis, through the Asia-Pacific Partnership, which
is India, South Korea, the United States, Australia, we are
engaged also in questions about energy efficiency, about other
kinds of energy technology, trying to use other sources of
renewables. So, that piece, we are doing. But it doesn't
obviate India's growing need for nuclear energy as a part of
the mix.
Senator Feingold. Finally, according to an article by Dr.
Leonard Weiss for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, only 1
percent of India's electrical capacity is fueled by oil. So,
replacing this tiny amount with nuclear power won't even
register on the world oil market. Do you maintain that this
deal will have a major impact on India's oil consumption and on
the price that U.S. consumers would pay for oil?
Secretary Rice. Well, India does need to change its mix.
I--the point--of course, they use principally coal, which is
very, very bad for the environment, given the nature of their
coal. But because they are trying to diversify away from coal,
they are looking at other sources, and right now, while the
percentage from oil is somewhere in the 30 to--some people say
as much as 50 percent, but let's say it's at the 35 percent--as
they diversify, you would like that diversification from coal
not to go to oil, which is one way that it could go, but,
rather, from that diversification for coal--from coal to go to
multiple other sources that are clean and that do not require
further hydrocarbons, and that do not require their dependence
on what we consider to be, and we believe we are convincing
them, are unreliable suppliers.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Madam Secretary. In order to
give my colleagues a chance, Mr. Chairman, I'll defer, at this
point.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Feingold,
for your thoughtfulness. I appreciate that.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Bill Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm going to be brief because I want my colleague to have
plenty of time also.
Madam Secretary, I might say that you have a very fine
representative in Secretary Burns, whom I have talked to
extensively about this issue.
I'm concerned--earlier, it came up with Senator Boxer--
about this article that appeared in the Post today about the
Indian port call by an Iranian warship. And so, in following up
on the earlier discussion, is the Indian military cooperating
in any way with the Iranian military?
Secretary Rice. The Indians have told us that they have
some, as they characterized them, low-level military-to-
military contacts. But, again, Senator, I would just note that
there are a number of countries that have relations with Iran,
and it's, of course, the sovereign right of a country to have
relations with whomever they would like to have relations. I
believe we're not going to do better in pulling India toward us
by insisting that they cut off relations with other states. I
don't think that's going to work very effectively. But the
entire world is coming to think differently about its
relationships with Iran. We see it in the exodus of banking and
financial institutions from Iran. We see it in the vote that
India took in the IAEA Board of Governors. This is a
relationship that goes back a very, very long way. But as Iran
changes its relationship with the rest of the international
community, I think you're going go to see more and more states
reassessing their relationships with Iran.
Senator Bill Nelson: Well, I certainly hope that's the
case, that the entire world is reassessing and will do
something about it afterwards because, at least from this
Senator's point of view, the nuclearization of Iran would be
one of the greatest destabilizing threats to the interests of
the United States.
Secretary Rice. I could not agree more, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson: I'm interested in the implications of
this agreement with India, with regard to that. What do you
think are the implications of this agreement for our diplomatic
efforts to convince Iran to give up its nuclear processing?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I just returned from a very long
meeting with the other members of the ``P5 plus Germany,'' and
I can tell you, the India deal did not come up in this long,
long meeting on Iran.
Now, I know that there are those who say, ``Well, you're
treating India differently than you are proposing to treat Iran
and North Korea.'' Yes. India is a democracy, a transparent
society. Iran is the central banker of terrorism, a
nontransparent society. North Korea, even less transparent than
Iran. North Korea and Iran have, of course, broken their--first
of all, signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but then have not
lived up to those obligations, flaunted those obligations.
India is trying, having never signed the NPT, to move toward
the taking on voluntarily of obligations that are similar to
those of NPT states. And so, the situations are just very
different. And I think if we allow the Iranians and the North
Koreans to say that we cannot have civil nuclear cooperation
with a good actor like India because we have to deal with their
bad behavior, then that would be a very bad thing for U.S.
policy. And so, I don't think it has an effect.
I should just note, too, that, by the way, the civil
nuclear--the possibility of civil nuclear power is something
that the world is offering to Iran. But what has been said is,
``You can't have civil nuclear cooperation that has enrichment
and reprocessing on Iranian territory because of your very bad
past history over the last 18 years in violating your IAEA
agreements.``
So, on the one hand, we have a democratic, transparent
state that has not violated agreements that it signed onto--it
didn't sign onto the NPT--and states that are wantonly
violating those agreements, supporting terrorism,
nontransparent, repressing their people. I just think there is
any comparison, and I don't think we should allow one to be
made.
Senator Bill Nelson: Mr. Chairman, I want to give my
colleague plenty of time to ask his questions.
I will follow up with you in further discussion about how
we can bring China and Russia around to our point of view, how
it's in their interest to have a non-nuclear Iran, and what
more we can do in Europe to get those who are resistant there
to achieving that goal. This ought to be an all-out effort.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator. I look forward to the
conversation, yes..
Senator Bill Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson, for your
thoughtfulness to the committee and to your colleague.
And now, the colleague that you have mentioned, Senator
Obama?
Senator Obama. Senator Nelson is a fine man. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. I agree.
Senator Obama. Madam Secretary, thanks. You know, I'm
always batting last in the line-up, so I don't always know if
I'm being redundant in some of my questioning. Forgive me if
some of these questions were posed earlier and you already
answered them.
Just a brief statement, at the opening. I personally think
that the geopolitics of this agreement make a lot of sense. And
I suspect that's shared by many at this table. I think that
India is a critical long-term partner for the United States. As
you've noted, they share our values. There are deep commercial
and personal relationships between the two countries that I
think need to continue to grow. India is only going to continue
to be a larger player on the world stage, and they occupy an
important piece of real estate, in addition to having a billion
or so people.
So, there is really no argument with respect to the
geopolitical issues. I also think that it's legitimate to say
that India--the nature of the society and its democracy and its
government are different from Iran. We can make easy
distinctions, I think, between India and other nations that
might be pursuing nuclear arms. They've shown themselves to be
responsible, so I think we can concede that, as well.
Having said all that, there are specifics to the agreement
that I have concern about. So, let me just be clear--if I'm
understanding this properly. You've got 22 nuclear plants, 14
now under the agreement would be subject to IAEA safeguards, 8
would be off limits from IAEA inspection. My understanding, is
that the eight that are off limits will be producing large
amounts of nuclear material; that, as a consequence of those
eight not being under the inspection regime, that this
agreement could free additional weapons-grade material to India
that they can use, should they decide. Now, it's a question as
to whether it would be in their interest to do so or not, but
should they decide they want to produce more weapons, this
agreement could free up additional material that would allow
them to build more weapons. Do you think that that is a
accurate characterization or an inaccurate characterization?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I don't think it's accurate, for
the following reason. Of course, currently 81 percent are
outside, so we will now have 65 percent inside. And the--of the
reactors inside safeguards--but the Indians have very large
stores of uranium--large reserves of uranium, maybe 50,000----
Senator Obama. So, you think it matters.
Secretary Rice. It doesn't matter. And if I could----
Senator Obama. Because they've got enough nuclear----
Secretary Rice. They--if they wanted to build more----
Senator Obama. Okay.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Nuclear weapons, they can do
it.
Senator Obama. All right.
Secretary Rice. The incentives are on the other side. But
the constraint is actually on the civil side, because you need
more material on the civil side----
Senator Obama. Okay.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Because of the--it takes much
more material on the civil side than on the military side.
Senator Obama. No, I understand. So, let me restate the
point, then. Precisely because the Government of India needs
more material on the civil side, they're confronted with a
choice as to, ``Do we use more nuclear material on the military
side or the civilian side?'' I may be wrong on this, so----
Secretary Rice. It's just----
Senator Obama [continuing]. Explain.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Such a small percentage that
you need on the military side. That's really the point. It's a
very small percentage that you need on the military side.
Senator Obama. Okay.
Senator Obama. My understanding, though, is that we are
transferring technology or training to them, to the civilian
side, but that the 14 that are within the inspection regime and
the eight that are not are more or less identical. So, whatever
we're giving to them is going to be made available--it is
transferable to the eight that are not.
Secretary Rice. Well, the fact is, they know how to make
nuclear weapons. We know that.
Senator Obama. Right.
Secretary Rice. And so, there isn't a technology transfer
issue here. This isn't----
Senator Obama. Okay.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. A knowhow issue, as it is with
the Iranians. And, again, I would just emphasize that the
pressures are on the civilian side. The amount of material that
you need on the military side is pretty small.
Senator Obama. Okay. So, the basic argument that the
administration making--is making, then, is that this doesn't
really matter.
Secretary Rice. It doesn't constrain their----
Senator Obama. It doesn't constrain them. If that's the
case----
Secretary Rice. But it also--it doesn't also----
Senator Obama. If that--if that's--if it doesn't constrain
them, why bother checking on the 14?
Secretary Rice. Well, because----
Senator Obama. Why are we going to make a bunch of IAEA
inspectors wander around 14 power plants if what you're arguing
is, ``They've already got the technology, they've got enough
material, they're entirely trustworthy``? What is it that we're
gaining as a consequence of putting them under this inspection
regime?
Secretary Rice. Well, let me just make the point and
complete a sentence. It doesn't constrain their program. We
don't constrain it now. This agreement does not constrain it.
It also doesn't enable it in any way.
Senator Obama. Right.
Secretary Rice. And so, those who are arguing that somehow
because of this agreement you're enabling a larger program,
we--is simply not right.
Senator Obama. Okay, but----
Secretary Rice. Now, as to what you gain, the IAEA, right
now, has very little access to the Indian program at all. There
are four Russian reactors that are safeguarded. That's it. It
also has no access to the future development of the Indian
nuclear program. And as India puts more and more nuclear power
online, you will capture now a much larger percentage of the
Indian civil nuclear program. The Indians themselves estimate
as much as perhaps 90 percent over the next decade or so. So,
you're getting more and more of the program under safeguard.
You're also engaging----
Senator Obama. What does that mean, specifically?
Secretary Rice. It means, specifically, that as new
civilian reactors come online, and others are decommissioned,
you are getting more and more of the Indian higher-and--higher-
technology reactors under safeguard. So, the program is moving
from unsafeguarded to the middle, where we are now, which is 65
percent of it's safeguarded, to getting more and more of them
under safeguard over the next decade or so, where we believe
it'll be as much as 90 percent of the program.
Senator Obama. But even if it's 90 percent--I mean, when
it--what you've just argued is that as long as the--they've got
the technology and they've got the material, that they can
produce as many weapons as they want. What is it that we are
gaining--specifically?
Secretary Rice. You're gaining IAEA access. And this is
the point that Mohamed ElBaradei made. You're gaining IAEA
access, to the Indian program, that has not been there in the
past. You're also getting them to separate. One of the things
that the IAEA very much likes to see--and, by the way, we went
through this process, the French went through this process--is
the separation of military and civilian facilities. It's a very
important step, to separate those, and to safeguard those. You
are getting the Indians into a regime where they may be able to
share in technologies that will produce reactors that do not
have the high-byproduct nuclear--or nuclear materials----
Senator Obama. On the civilian side.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Byproducts on the civilian
side. That's very important. And let me just say, Senator, I
think those who concentrate on the strategic program and the
issue of how much weapons material they have, really that's not
the point of the Indian strategic program. The Indian strategic
program, I believe, if you look at the restraint that it has
demonstrated, is more a factor of the political and military
factors that they face, in terms of what their other, as they
would see them, adversaries in the region are doing, what
military balances they are facing. And that which--is what
drives the numbers of Indian nuclear weapons, not how much
material they do or do not have.
Senator Obama. Well, if that's the case, why don't they
put it all under IAEA inspection?
Secretary Rice. They want to reserve the possibility,
given the neighborhood that they live in, and given the----
Senator Obama. Yeah.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Politics that they have
engaged in, the politically adversarial relationships that
they've had in that region, to increase their strategic
program. But I would, again, note that the restraint has been
considerable. It remains a relatively small program----
Senator Obama. I understand. I guess--I don't mean to
interrupt you, Madam Secretary, because I'm running out of
time, and you've got to get going in a minute--my simple point
is this. I mean, you sort of can't have it both ways. You can't
say that the--on the one hand, the strategic issues really are
not relevant here, they're not going to be increasing their
nuclear stockpiles, there's not serious technology transfer, et
cetera, et cetera, but it's real important, nevertheless, for
them to keep these eight uninspected and to remain outside of--
to remain outside the regime.
Secretary Rice. Senator, we didn't set out--we discussed,
initially, but we didn't set out to constrain the strategic
program in this agreement. There are other things that
constrain their program, including just the politics and
military balance of the region. That's really the issue with
their strategic program.
What this agreement sets out to do is--in the broad
framework of U.S./India relations and India's emergence as a
major power, is to give them relatively unconstrained access to
civil nuclear power, which we think is a very good thing. They
do need fuel for their civil nuclear reactors. They don't have
indigenous supplies that can fuel a civilian program of the
size that they need to meet their energy needs. Since we think
meeting their energy needs with civilian power is a good thing,
we would like to see them have access on the civilian side, but
that requires IAEA safeguards.
Senator Obama. Let's shift gears. I have--I'm out of time,
but I think you have 2 minutes before you have to leave, and I
want to see if I can get one more question in.
Australia signed an agreement with China on Monday to sell
uranium for use in China's nuclear power plants. When asked
about possible U.S. opposition to the deal, senior Australian
official in the Department of Foreign Affairs said that the
U.S. was, quote, ``hardly in a position to criticize the sale
of the uranium for peaceful purposes to China after announcing
that it would seek an exemption from Congress to sell fuel to
India for its civilian nuclear plants.``
Pakistan's foreign minister was quoted as saying, quote,
``Nuclear weapons are the currency of power, and many countries
would like to use it. Once this goes through, the NPT will be
finished. It's not just Iran and North Korea. Brazil,
Argentina, and Pakistan will all think differently.``
Are you suggesting that there's not going to be any
consequences, in terms of the NPT regime, and that people's
basic attitude is that we're now going to, on a case-by-case
basis, make determinations?
Secretary Rice. Well, first of all, I think you have to
take those each separately. In Australia, yes, they're going to
sell uranium to China. We have civil nuclear cooperation with
China. China is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a
member of the NPT. I don't think we have, in fact, criticized
this deal. And Prime Minister Howard has made clear that he
thinks the U.S./India civil nuclear deal is a good deal.
As to what the Pakistani foreign minister said, we were in
Pakistan shortly after this deal was announced. The Pakistanis
understand their special circumstances----
Senator Obama. Well, but because we have enough leverage
on them at the moment, but we--
Secretary Rice. Well----
Senator Obama [continuing]. We may not, always.
Secretary Rice. Well, but they also understand that they
have a particular history that they're trying to overcome with
the international system.
No, Senator, I really don't think that it is going to have
an effect on the--on people's willingness to adhere to the NPT,
or not.
Senator Obama. So, you think the NPT remains the----
Secretary Rice. I----
Senator Obama [continuing]. This will have no impact on NPT
or the Suppliers Group.
Secretary Rice. I think that, if anything, what it does is
to broaden the nonproliferation regime to include what has been
one huge anomaly out there, which is an India that is not an
NPT member, but has been in substantial compliance with NPT
standards, that has been a responsible party. And that takes
care of an anomaly. And, again, I think it's why the guardian
of the NPT and the regime, Dr. ElBaradei, has been so
supportive of this.
We have to find a way to modernize the nonproliferation
regime. And that means keeping the NPT strong, but it also
means dealing with anomalies. It means issues like assured fuel
supply that countries that forgo--for countries that forgo
enrichment and reprocessing. It's a broader regime than just
the NPT. And dealing with the anomaly of India, I think, in
fact, will strengthen that broader regime.
Senator Obama. Unless other countries decide they want
their own anomalies.
Secretary Rice. Well, we haven't seen----
Senator Obama [continuing]. If this is an anomaly, China
may have other views in terms of what constitutes an anomaly--
such as Pakistan.
Secretary Rice. Of course we will resist those, but I will
just say that this is a deal that is broadly--people are
broadly in agreement with who are very concerned about
nonproliferation.
Senator Obama. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
forbearance.
Thank you, Madam Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Obama.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. And, Senator Boxer, I understand you have a
request.
Senator Boxer. I do. And I thank you.
I would ask unanimous consent to place the following
documents in the record: an article from the Washington Post on
March 21 in which Senator--former Senator Sam Nunn says,
``India was a lot better negotiator than we were``; the Los
Angeles Times editorial that I referred to, dated March 1; the
article in Defense News entitled ``India Navy Trains Iranian
Sailors.'' We did contact the editors there, and they stand by
their story. But we will continue to speak with them.
And then, just--this is important. I think that the
Secretary just said that the people in the nonproliferation
community support this. Well, we already know that Senator Nunn
told us to please work on changing this deal. And we also know
that we got a letter--the Senators did--from 16 people in--who
are very well-known experts--a couple from Stanford, by the
way--who really worry about this very much. At the bottom line,
they say, ``India's commitment under the current terms of this
arrangement do not justify making far-reaching exceptions to
U.S. law.''
And then, lastly, you'll be happy to know, Mr. Chairman, is
an article from today's USA Today in which, ``In 2004, the
State Department sanctioned an Indian scientist because he said
that the Indian scientist was giving Iran information about
tritium.'' And this, again, is a troubling link between India
and Iran.
And so, I'd like to place all these in the record.
And I thank you.
The Chairman. That's fine. We'll place them in the record.
[The information previously referred to appears in the
Appendix to this hearing.]
Secretary Rice. Senator, I need to respond to the last
point, however, for the record.
The Chairman. Please respond.
Secretary Rice. Yes, for the record.
First of all, Senator, I think I was talking about Mr.
ElBaradei when I talked about people who were in support. That
was the lineage of the question.
But, secondly, on the Indian scientist that the Senator
cites, under our law there was a violation, and we raised that
with the Indian Government. They investigated it. I would note
that under their new law, the 2005 law, we believe that this
kind of activity would, indeed, be illegal under Indian law.
And so, I would just make the point that it's just another
example of the Indians moving further into compliance with laws
that, frankly, we would like to see a lot of other states have.
Senator Boxer. Well, I'd say to the Secretary, that's very
good news. If you could provide me with the law and your
analysis of it. Because this was our own State Department, in
'04, sanctioning an Indian scientist. But----
Secretary Rice. I----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. But we know what happened in
Pakistan with Dr. Khan, so we need to be sure. But what you're
telling me is good news, and I'd like to see that in writing.
Secretary Rice. Absolutely. We'll get that----
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. For you, Senator.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Secretary Rice. It's a 2005 law. We will do that.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Madam Secretary, let me just mention that to the extent
that you or your colleagues can supplement our information
about the total energy picture, including climate change, and
various other aspects that arose, that would be helpful.
The Chairman. Likewise, we've heard much about the NPT and
the Suppliers Group. You've made a good number of points as to
how they're enhanced, but this is an area of concern for many
of us.
Third, the Iranian issues, how they sort out. We could have
several hearings on Iran itself, but, still, this is the world
in which we live, to the extent to which those issues can be
addressed.
The Chairman. And, finally, the issue of congressional
oversight, assurances of how the administration plans to work
with the Congress so that fears that this committee or others
might be overlooked might be assuaged.
[The information previously referred to appears in the
appendix to this hearing.]
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. And thank you, so much, for your testimony.
Secretary Rice. We will respond.
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
----------
Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice by Senator Lugar, April 5, 2006
the president's visit to india
Question (1)(a). Secretary Rice, during the course of the
President's visit to India, and afterward, U.S. officials commented
that some 18 agreements were reached with India regarding cooperation
in a host of spheres.
With regard to each such agreement, could you furnish the committee
with the text of those agreements, if texts exist?
Answer. The relevant documents pertaining to the 18 initiatives
undertaken during the President's visit to India are the March 2 Joint
Statement, as issued by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh, as
well as more detailed Fact Sheets released by the State Department.
These documents are included with this package.
In addition, the 18 initiatives are outlined on the attached list
of official deliverables for the President's visit.
Question (1)(b). Secretary Rice, during the course of the
President's visit to India, and afterward, U.S. officials commented
that some 18 agreements were reached with India regarding cooperation
in a host of spheres.
Was anything signed by the President while he was in India?
Answer. As these initiatives are not formal agreements or treaties,
but rather political commitments that both sides have undertaken,
nothing was signed by the President while he was in India.
Question (1)(c). Secretary Rice, during the course of the
President's visit to India, and afterward, U.S. officials commented
that some 18 agreements were reached with India regarding cooperation
in a host of spheres.
Would any of these understandings require Congressional involvement
through statutory amendments?
Answer. Only the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative requires
legislative changes. As they are currently structured, none of the
other initiatives that we have undertaken with the Indian government
will require such changes.
the indian separation plan
Question (1). Secretary Rice, how will the safeguards applied to
India's declared sites, facilities, locations and materials, verify
that no activities of a military nature are being carried out at any
such site, facility or location or with any such materials?
Answer. This Initiative will only allow for nuclear cooperation to
proceed with civil facilities and programs that are safeguarded by the
IAEA. The Government of India has agreed that these safeguards will be
in place in perpetuity. Under the Initiative, India has committed to
place all its current and future civil nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards, including monitoring and inspections. These procedures are
designed to detect--and thereby prevent--the diversion to military use
of any nuclear materials, technologies, or equipment provided to
India's civil nuclear facilities. India has also committed to sign and
adhere to an Additional Protocol, which provides for even broader IAEA
access to facilities and information regarding nuclear related
activities.
Question (2). The Separation Plan tabled by the Indian Government
with its Parliament states nothing about the future bureaucratic
structure of its Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in respect of
removing from that organization any personnel involved in any military
activities. To what extent will DAE personnel working at any declared
sites, facilities and locations continue to have access to military
programs in India?
Answer. In the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement and under India's
March 2, 2006 separation plan, the Government of India committed to
separate its civil and military facilities and programs. While the
specific issue of DAE personnel has not yet been discussed in detail,
we would consider routine, frequent rotation of personnel between civil
and military programs as being inconsistent with Indian commitments on
separation. In our view, such a rotation would be inconsistent with
India's commitment to identify and separate its civil and military
nuclear facilities and programs. We have made this position clear to
the Indian government.
Question (3). According to India's Implementation Document,
facilities were excluded from the civilian list if they were located in
a larger hub of strategic significance (e.g., BARC), even if they were
not normally engaged in activities of strategic significance. Moreover,
the document noted that reactors would be connected to the electricity
grid ``irrespective of whether the reactor concerned is civilian or not
civilian.''
(a) Do these two positions of India's negatively affect the
extent of separation of civilian and military nuclear
facilities in India?
(b) Which facilities (or how many) not engaged in strategic
activities were left off the civilian list because they were
located in a larger hub of strategic significance?
(c) How many of India's existing eight indigenous PHWRs that
are declared as military reactors will remain connected to the
electricity grid?
Answer. India's positions on these issues do not negatively affect
the extent of separation of civil and military nuclear facilities. The
number of facilities declared civil by the Indian government is
unrelated to its ability to achieve an effective separation and to
place those facilities under safeguards. Regardless of whether they
might be used to generate electric power or not, reactors that are not
declared civil, and thus are not under IAEA safeguards, cannot
legitimately receive nuclear fuel or other nuclear cooperation from any
State party to the NPT.
India has committed to providing a declaration to the IAEA of its
civil nuclear program; it has not publicly committed to filing such a
declaration with respect to its strategic facilities. As such, India
may chose not to provide to the IAEA information to answer subpoints
(b) and (c).
Question (4). Will Indian officials involved in India's strategic
programs have access to India's declared civilian sites, facilities,
locations and materials?
Answer. In the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement and as provided for
under the March 2, 2006 separation plan, India committed to separate
its civil and military facilities and programs. We would consider the
term ``programs'' to include both program-related activities and the
personnel involved in those activities. Routine rotation of personnel
between civil and military programs would be inconsistent with Indian
commitments on civil-military separation.
Question (5)(a). Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Robert Joseph told members of the committee on
November 2, 2005, that India's separation of facilities must be
credible, transparent, meaningful, and defensible from a
nonproliferation standpoint. He also told members that a separation
plan and resultant safeguards must contribute to U.S. nonproliferation
goals.
Please describe in detail the criteria U.S. officials used for
determining that India's Separation Plan is credible; transparent;
meaningful; and defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint; and, . . .
Answer. The criteria were based on the totality of India's
separation plan and its commitment on future civil facilities. For the
plan to be transparent, it had to be articulated publicly, which it has
been. For it to be credible and defensible from a nonproliferation
standpoint, it had to capture more than just a token number of Indian
nuclear facilities, which it did by encompassing nearly two-thirds of
India's current and planned thermal power reactors as well as all
future civil thermal and breeder reactors. Importantly, for the
safeguards to be meaningful, India had to commit to apply IAEA
safeguards in perpetuity; it did so. Once a reactor is under IAEA
safeguards, those safeguards will remain there permanently and on an
unconditional basis. Further, in our view, the plan also needed to
include upstream and downstream facilities associated with the
safeguarded reactors to provide a true separation of civil and military
programs. India committed to these steps, and we have concluded that
its separation plan meets the criteria established: it is credible,
transparent, and defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint.
Question (5)(b). Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Robert Joseph told members of the committee on
November 2, 2005, that India's separation of facilities must be
credible, transparent, meaningful, and defensible from a
nonproliferation standpoint. He also told members that a separation
plan and resultant safeguards must contribute to U.S. nonproliferation
goals.
Please describe the U.S. nonproliferation goals to which the
separation plan and resultant safeguards contribute, including where
those nonproliferation goals are articulated (e.g., the 2002 National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction or the President's 2004
NDU speech).
Answer. The Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative contributes to
U.S. nonproliferation goals and represents a net gain for
nonproliferation because it will, once implemented, more closely align
India with the international nonproliferation mainstream than at any
previous time. India has pledged to submit its civil nuclear program to
international inspection and take on significant new nonproliferation
commitments in exchange for full civil nuclear cooperation with the
international community.
As Under Secretary Joseph testified in November, there is no viable
cookie-cutter approach to nonproliferation; we need tailored approaches
that solve real-world problems. This has been a premise of
administration policy since the outset of President Bush's first term,
in which he established nonproliferation and counter-proliferation as
top national security priorities.
The Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative is one such approach. It
is consistent with the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction which noted, with an eye to ``strengthening''
nonproliferation, that ``[c]onsistent with other policy priorities, we
will promote new agreements and arrangements that serve our
nonproliferation goals.'' This strategy, inter alia, underscored that
the United States will support existing nonproliferation regimes and
work to improve the effectiveness of, and compliance with, those
regimes. The nonproliferation-related commitments India has made serve
to strengthen the international regime.
In this context, India's commitments also advance key efforts
contained in President Bush's 2004 National Defense University speech.
In particular, as part of this Initiative, India committed to conclude
an Additional Protocol. It also committed to refrain from transfers of
enrichment and reprocessing technology to countries that do not already
have those capabilities, and to support international efforts to limit
their spread. Moreover, India's implementation of its enhanced export
controls and of its acceptance of IAEA safeguards will contribute to
fulfillment of the objectives of UN Security Council Resolution 1540.
Question (6)(a). Secretary Rice, in November 2005, U/S Joseph
stated that ``We have sought India's curtailment of fissile material
production but have not reached agreement on this issue.'' Prior to the
President's March visit to India, experts who testified before Congress
stated that they believed you were seeking to ensure that India's
breeder reactors were placed under safeguards in order to establish an
``effective'' but not explicit cap on Indian fissile materials
production.
Since no breeder reactor, electric or thermal, was declared
civilian and placed under safeguards in India's March 7, 2006,
Separation Plan, do you believe that the administration's proposal for
atomic energy cooperation with India could still constitute an
``effective cap'' on Indian fissile materials production?
Answer. As I testified on April 5, 2006, the ``Initiative does not
cap India's nuclear weapons production, but nothing under this
Initiative will directly enhance its military capability or add to its
military stockpile.''
The United States successfully obtained India's commitment to work
toward the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
(FMCT). We continue to call on all states that produce fissile material
for weapons purposes to observe a voluntary production moratorium, as
the United States has done for many years. Moreover, we also remain
willing to explore other intermediate objectives that might also serve
such an objective. Finally, as part of our discussions with both India
and Pakistan, we continue to encourage strategic restraint.
Question (6)(b). Secretary Rice, in November 2005, U/S Joseph
stated that ``We have sought India's curtailment of fissile material
production but have not reached agreement on this issue.'' Prior to the
President's March visit to India, experts who testified before Congress
stated that they believed you were seeking to ensure that India's
breeder reactors were placed under safeguards in order to establish an
``effective'' but not explicit cap on Indian fissile materials
production.
What reason did India give for not declaring its extant 40 MWth
Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) to be civilian?
Answer. We cannot speak for the Government of India, of course, but
in our discussions Indian officials argued that since the FBTR was
still in the experimental stage, India not in a position to accept
safeguards on the reactor at this time.
Question (6)(c). Secretary Rice, in November 2005, U/S Joseph
stated that ``We have sought India's curtailment of fissile material
production but have not reached agreement on this issue.'' Prior to the
President's March visit to India, experts who testified before Congress
stated that they believed you were seeking to ensure that India's
breeder reactors were placed under safeguards in order to establish an
``effective'' but not explicit cap on Indian fissile materials
production.
What reason did India give for not declaring the 500 MWe fast
breeder reactor it currently has under construction to be part of its
civilian program?
Answer. The reactor is not yet complete. India stated that it was
not in a position to place reactors which it considers experimental
under safeguards. India committed to placing all future civil power and
breeder reactors under safeguards.
Question (6)(d). Secretary Rice, in November 2005, U/S Joseph
stated that ``We have sought India's curtailment of fissile material
production but have not reached agreement on this issue.'' Prior to the
President's March visit to India, experts who testified before Congress
stated that they believed you were seeking to ensure that India's
breeder reactors were placed under safeguards in order to establish an
``effective'' but not explicit cap on Indian fissile materials
production.
Why does the IAEA list the prototype fast breeder reactor as a
civilian power reactor in its Power Reactor Information System
database?
Answer. We cannot speak for the IAEA. We note, however, that this
may be a matter of semantics. Breeder reactors are neither
intrinsically military nor civil. The IAEA's Power Reactor Information
System is a database of nuclear power plants around the world, whether
they are under construction, in operation, or shut down. The Prototype
Fast Breeder Reactor is included in the database, as it could generate
up to 500 megawatts of electric power. The IAEA's website lists the
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor as a ``power plant,'' but not as
``civil.'' The IAEA's characterization would have no legal bearing, in
any case, on India's decision on how it chooses to characterize the
reactor for purposes of its separation plan.
Question (6)(e). Secretary Rice, in November 2005, U/S Joseph
stated that ``We have sought India's curtailment of fissile material
production but have not reached agreement on this issue.'' Prior to the
President's March visit to India, experts who testified before Congress
stated that they believed you were seeking to ensure that India's
breeder reactors were placed under safeguards in order to establish an
``effective'' but not explicit cap on Indian fissile materials
production.
How many breeder reactors, and of which type, does India plan to
build in the future?
Answer. We cannot speak for the Government of India, of course, but
in our discussions Indian officials indicated that they may build an
additional four breeder reactors. India committed, in its separation
plan of March 2006, to place under IAEA safeguards all future civil
breeder and civil thermal reactors. While India retains the sovereign
right to determine whether future indigenous reactors serve a civil or
military function--as it does today--neither we nor our international
partners will cooperate with non-civil or non-safeguarded facilities.
As such, all externally-supplied reactors and other controlled
technologies will necessarily be civil and subject to IAEA safeguards.
nuclear suppliers group (nsg) guidelines proposal
Question (1). A publicly-available version of the Department's
draft NSG decision, which was circulated at the NSG Experts Meeting in
Vienna, Austria, last March, states
Notwithstanding paragraphs 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c), of INFCIRC/
254/Part 1 as revised, Participating Governments may transfer
trigger list items and/or related technology to the safeguarded
civil nuclear facilities in India (a State not party, and never
having been a party, to the NPT) as long as the participating
Government intending to make the transfer is satisfied that
India continues to fully meet all of the aforementioned
nonproliferation and safeguards commitments, and all other
requirements of the NSG Guidelines.
Does the notwithstanding of paragraphs 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) of
INFCIRC/254 Part I mean that as long as any Participating Government of
the NSG is satisfied that India is meeting the criteria in the
administration's proposed language, they can export any trigger list
items they wish to India?
Answer. The administration's proposed language envisions that,
after a consensus decision is reached by the NSG to accommodate civil
nuclear cooperation with India, it will be up to each supplier to
satisfy itself that India is continuing to meet its various
nonproliferation and safeguards commitments. If a supplier has a
concern that the criteria are not being met, that supplier would be
expected to raise the issue in the NSG. In addition, the other
provisions of the NSG Guidelines would continue to apply, and NSG
Participating Governments would need to take those into account in
considering any possible Trigger List exports.
Question (2). What consultation would apply before such exports
would be made by Participating Governments, either bilaterally or
within the NSG?
Answer. The NSG Guidelines call for consultations among
Participating Governments as appropriate in certain circumstances,
either on a bilateral or multilateral basis, regarding implementation
of the Guidelines and specifically in ``sensitive cases.''
Question (3). What are the ``other requirements'' of the NSG
Guidelines that would apply to India that are referenced in the draft
decision?
Answer. The exception we have discussed relates to the full-scope
safeguards requirement of the NSG Guidelines. Transfers to India would
still have to meet all the other requirements of the NSG Guidelines,
including:
Formal recipient government assurances ``explicitly
excluding uses of any nuclear transfer which would result in
any nuclear explosive device'';
Effective physical protection of all nuclear materials and
facilities to prevent unauthorized use and handling;
Transfer of trigger list items or related technology only
when covered by IAEA safeguards, with duration and coverage
provisions in conformity with IAEA document GOV/1621 (i.e.,
safeguards in perpetuity);
Restraint in transferring to India sensitive facilities,
technology, and material usable for nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices (including enrichment and
reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology);
Government assurances that any retransfer of a Trigger List
item or any item derived from the transferred Trigger List item
would be subject to the same conditions and assurances as the
original transfer.
Question (4). What information does the administration have
regarding the views of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic
of China concerning the draft NSG decision?
Answer. The Russian Government supports the Initiative. China has
not yet declared a formal position. Since NSG deliberations are
generally of a confidential nature, we would be happy to brief the
committee in more detail in an appropriate setting on our discussions
with NSG partners, including the Russian Federation and the People's
Republic of China, regarding the U.S. proposal to accommodate civil
nuclear cooperation with India.
Question (5). Do you anticipate that China might seek additional
reactor exports to Pakistan as a result of the US-Indian nuclear
initiative and the proposed exception to the NSG Guidelines you are
seeking for India?
Answer. While occasional news articles have speculated in this
respect, we are not aware at this time of any plans on the part of
China to seek additional reactor exports to Pakistan.
China became a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in
1992; it is obligated under Article I not in any way to assist,
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or
acquire nuclear weapons. China pledged in 1996 not to provide
assistance to any unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in any country. As
part of its joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004, China
disclosed its intention to continue cooperation with Pakistan under the
grandfathering exception to the NSG Guideline provisions requiring
full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply. This
cooperation would include life-time support and fuel supply for the
safeguarded Chasma I and II nuclear power plants, supply of heavy water
and operational safety service to the safeguarded Karachi nuclear power
plant, and supply of fuel and operational safety service to the two
safeguarded research reactors at PINSTECH. As a member of the NSG,
China has pledged--and is expected--to abide by the NSG Guidelines on
the transfers of nuclear equipment, technology, and material.
If China did seek to provide additional reactors to Pakistan, it
would need NSG accommodation. The NSG operates by consensus, so China
would need the support of all other participating governments to
proceed. We do not believe that the 45 member states of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group would agree to such an accommodation, and we do not
support such an initiative with Pakistan.
enrichment and reprocessing technology
Question (1). Secretary Rice, the administration has been rightly
concerned about the proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing
technology. The President's February 2004 NDU speech demonstrated the
high priority he places on this issue.
India, as part of its Joint Statement commitments, has stated that
it supports ``international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment
and reprocessing technology''.
Will India not export enrichment and reprocessing technology to any
state without a functioning, full-scale enrichment or reprocessing
capability?
Answer. As part of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Initiative, India has committed to refrain from the transfer of
enrichment and reprocessing technology to states that do not already
have them. India also committed to support international efforts to
limit the spread of these technologies.
Question (2). Why does the draft NSG decision circulated last month
not limit the export of enrichment and reprocessing technology to
India?--Have all NSG Participating Governments already agreed not to
transfer enrichment, reprocessing and related technology to India, in
particular the Russian Federation?
Answer. The transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and
technology is already addressed in the NSG Guidelines, INFCIRC/254/
Rev.7/Part 1. Therefore, it was not deemed necessary for the proposed
resolution to also address the matter. In this context, we have also
indicated to our NSG partners that we do not intend to supply
enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Our bilateral agreement for
peaceful nuclear cooperation will not permit such transfers to be made
under it.
There has been no discussion of possible transfers of enrichment
and reprocessing technology to India or any Indian requests for such
technology. NSG Participating Governments have made clear that they
currently are not contemplating any new transfers of enrichment and
reprocessing and in fact have been considering strengthening controls
over such transfers.
additional nonproliferation measures
Question (1)(a)/(b). Secretary Rice, in November 2005, U/S Joseph
stated that ``In our ongoing dialogues, we strongly encourage India to
take additional steps to strengthen nonproliferation, such as joining
PSI, and harmonizing its national control lists with those of the
Australia Group [AG] and the Wassenaar Arrangement [WA].''
On December 30, 2005, the administration sanctioned Sabero Organic
Chemicals Gujarat Limited of India and Sandhya Organic Chemicals PVT
Limited, also of India, under the authority of the Iran and Syria
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (PL 106-178) for the transfer to Iran of
equipment and technology on the Australia Group list.\1\
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\1\ 70 FR 77441.
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(a) What is the status of India's consideration of PSI membership?
(b) What are the policy and legal reasons India has given for not
becoming a PSI participant?
Answer. India has stated that its participation remains under
consideration.
India committed in 2005 to participate in the PSI if it was able to
join the Core Group of PSI participants that had developed and agreed
to the PSI Statement of Principles, or if the Core Group was disbanded.
In the summer of 2005, the United States and its partners in the Core
Group agreed that the Core Group had served an important function in
the process of starting up the PSI, but was no longer necessary and so
was disbanded.
More recently, India has linked its decision on PSI participation
to its concerns with recently agreed amendments to the Convention on
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea (the SUA Convention).
The United States position is that endorsement of the PSI Statement
of Interdiction Principles is a political commitment carrying no legal
rights or obligations. Therefore, the United States does not accept
India's linkage of the SUA Convention to the PSI. As the PSI is a
voluntary initiative, India is free to choose to participate or not
participate. We continue to discuss this issue with India and encourage
India's participation.
Question (1)(c). Secretary Rice, in November 2005, U/S Joseph
stated that ``In our ongoing dialogues, we strongly encourage India to
take additional steps to strengthen nonproliferation, such as joining
PSI, and harmonizing its national control lists with those of the
Australia Group [AG] and the Wassenaar Arrangement [WA].''
On December 30, 2005, the administration sanctioned Sabero Organic
Chemicals Gujarat Limited of India and Sandhya Organic Chemicals PVT
Limited, also of India, under the authority of the Iran and Syria
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (PL 106-178) for the transfer to Iran of
equipment and technology on the Australia Group list.\2\
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\2\ 70 FR 77441.
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(c) Has India decided to become an adherent to either the WA or the
AG (including through harmonizing its export control lists with those
of the AG and the WA), and if so, will India announce this decision
publicly, and if not, what are India's legal and policy reasons for not
joining or adhering to them?
Answer. We have discussed with India the importance of it
harmonizing its control lists with those of the Australia Group and
Wassenaar Arrangement. To date, we have not received an official
announcement by the Indian Government of a decision to harmonize its
control lists or to unilaterally adhere to these regimes. We continue
to discuss these issues with the Indian Government in the context of
our bilateral discussions.
Question (1)(d). Secretary Rice, in November 2005, U/S Joseph
stated that ``In our ongoing dialogues, we strongly encourage India to
take additional steps to strengthen nonproliferation, such as joining
PSI, and harmonizing its national control lists with those of the
Australia Group [AG] and the Wassenaar Arrangement [WA].''
On December 30, 2005, the administration sanctioned Sabero Organic
Chemicals Gujarat Limited of India and Sandhya Organic Chemicals PVT
Limited, also of India, under the authority of the Iran and Syria
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (PL 106-178) for the transfer to Iran of
equipment and technology on the Australia Group list.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ 70 FR 77441.
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Why will India not adopt controls on items on the control list of
the AG?
Answer. India has long argued that it has sufficient controls since
its national export control list--the Special Chemicals, Organisms,
Materials, Equipment and Technologies (SCOMET) List--is in line with
the standards of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which India
is a party. We have discussed with India the importance of controlling
the full range of chemicals, agents, toxins, and equipment in line with
the Australia Group (AG).
Question (2). Does India's adherence to the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) mean that it will be considered an ``adherent''
for purposes of section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act, such that
U.S. missile sanctions would generally not apply in the future to India
or to countries which sell missile technology to India?
Answer. India would not be considered an ``MTCR Adherent'' as
defined under Section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (also referred
to as the missile sanctions law). Rather, as part of this Initiative,
India has committed to unilaterally adhere to the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) Guidelines. The missile sanctions law would
generally still apply to a ``unilateral adherent'' to the MTCR.
Unilateral adherence to the MTCR Guidelines means that a country
makes a unilateral political commitment to abide by the Guidelines and
Annex of the MTCR. In particular, an MTCR unilateral adherent commits
to control exports of missile-related equipment and technology
according the MTCR Guidelines, including any subsequent changes to the
MTCR Guidelines and Annex. Inter alia, this means that MTCR unilateral
adherent countries need to have in place laws and regulations that
permit them to control the export of MTCR Annex equipment and
technology consistent with the MTCR Guidelines.An ``MTCR Adherent'' is
a specially defined status in terms of Section 73 of the Arms Export
Control Act (also referred to as the missile sanctions law). An ``MTCR
Adherent,'' as defined in Section 73 of the missile sanctions law, is a
country that ``participates'' in the MTCR or that, ``pursuant to an
international understanding to which the United States is a party,
controls MTCR equipment and technology in accordance with the criteria
and standards set forth in the MTCR.'' India's ``unilateral adherence''
to the MTCR would not meet this requirement.
the legislative proposal
Question (1). Secretary Rice, in November 2005, U/S Joseph stated
that ``the administration prefers stand-alone, India-specific
legislation, but could envision alternatives as well.'' What would be
some of the alternatives you would envision if they were not specific
to India?
Answer. At the time Under Secretary Joseph testified, the
administration had also considered alternatives that were criteria-
based or that amended the Atomic Energy Act more broadly. Based on our
assessment, and following consultations with Congress, we believe that
the India-specific approach embodied in S.2429 would be most
appropriate.
Question (2). Why did the administration decide to ask Congress to
except India from certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(AEA) instead of using the existing authority to exempt a future
Peaceful Nuclear Cooperative Agreement with India from the requirements
of section 123.a (1)-(9) of the AEA?
Answer. The objectives of the legislation include (1) to be able to
treat nuclear cooperation with India similar to nuclear cooperation
with various other trading partners and (2) to bring Congress into the
process at the front end rather than only at the back end.
To achieve the first objective, we are seeking a change to Section
128 so that future nuclear exports to India will not be subject to
annual congressional review. Without the change, this provision would
risk disrupting nuclear commerce with India and, in addition, might put
U.S. exporters at a competitive disadvantage.
The second objective takes into account the difficulty of putting
into place all the pieces necessary for U.S.-India nuclear
cooperation--particularly, the U.S.-India agreement for peaceful
nuclear cooperation, the India-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and Nuclear
Suppliers Group action to accommodate nuclear trade with India--without
knowing whether Congress, in the end, would support the Initiative and
vote affirmatively to approve the agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation. We believe it is important that Congress participate as a
partner early in the process.
An additional factor involves the exception/waiver standard under
Sections 123, 128, and 129 of the AEA. The existing standard is a
determination by the Executive Branch that failure to make the proposed
exception/waiver would be ``seriously prejudicial to the achievement of
United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the
common defense and security.'' In our view, the decision to facilitate
nuclear cooperation with India should be based instead on the
nonproliferation measures that India committed to in the Joint
Statement, which are reflected in the required Presidential
determination under subsection 1(b) of S. 2429.
Question (3). Why did the administration decide to ask Congress to
allow the President to waive the application of sections 128 and 129 of
AEA with respect to India instead of using the existing waiver
authorities available to the President in both sections 128 and 129?
Answer. As noted in the previous answer, Section 128 would require
congressional review of the first license in each 12-month period after
waiver of the full-scope safeguards requirement of that Section; India
would not be on the same footing as other cooperative partners, and
U.S. exporters to India could be disadvantaged.
Also as noted in the previous answer, we believe that waivers under
Sections 128 and 129 should be based on the India-specific
determination in subsection 1(b) of S. 2429 rather than on the generic
standard in current law.
Question (4). Please explain how any license under 10 CFR Part 110
and 10 CFR Part 810 would be considered, evaluated, coordinated, and,
if applicable, reported to Congress under existing law and under the
administration's proposed amendment to the AEA for India (as introduced
in S. 2429) with respect to exports to India.
Answer. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) transmits
applications for exports of nuclear facilities and for the initial
exports of source or special nuclear material for use as reactor fuel
under 10 CFR Part 110 to the Department of State, which is responsible
for coordinating Executive Branch Agency (Departments of Commerce,
Defense, Energy, and State) reviews of such applications in accordance
with the Procedures Established Pursuant to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978, originally published in the Federal Register
June 7, 1978, and subsequently amended (the ``Procedures''). The
Executive Branch is asked to provide the NRC with its judgment as to
whether the proposed export would be inimical to the ``common defense
and security,'' to confirm that the proposed export will be subject to
the terms of an agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation, and to
address the extent to which the applicable export criteria in Section
110.42 are met, as well as the extent to which the recipient country or
group of countries has adhered to the provisions of the applicable
agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
In reviewing an application for a license to export nuclear
facilities or materials, the Executive Branch asks the recipient
government to provide assurances confirming that upon receipt the
export will be subject to the terms and conditions of a Section 123
agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and the
recipient country, the ultimate consignee and any intermediate
consignee identified in the license application are authorized to
receive the export, and appropriate physical security measures will be
applied to protect the export.
Applications requiring longer than 60 days for Executive Branch
review would be reported to the Congress in accordance with the
provisions of Section 126 of the AEA. In addition, Section 1523 of the
Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999,
as amended, requires the President to notify the Congress of nuclear
exports to non-NATO countries known to have detonated a nuclear
explosive device. Non-NATO countries that have detonated nuclear
explosive devices are: China, India, Pakistan, and Russia. The
President has delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of State,
who in turn has delegated the responsibility to the Under Secretary for
Political Affairs.
If, after receiving the Executive Branch judgment, the NRC has not
completed action on a license application within 60 days, it must
inform the applicant in writing of the reason for delay and, as
appropriate, provide follow-up reports. The NRC will issue an export
license if it has been notified by the Department of State that it is
the judgment of the Executive Branch that the proposed export will not
be ``inimical to the common defense and security''; and finds, based
upon a reasonable judgment of the assurances provided and other
information available to the Federal government, that the applicable
statutory criteria or their equivalent are met.
If, after receiving the Executive Branch judgment, the Commission
does not issue the license requested on a timely basis because it is
unable to make the statutory determinations required, the Commission
will publicly issue a decision to that effect and will submit the
license application to the President. The Commission will deny any
export license application for which the Executive Branch judgment does
not recommend approval.
The proposed legislation would change this process as Section
110.42(a)(6) currently requires full-scope safeguards as a condition of
issuing a license for export to a non-nuclear weapon state, unless
waived by the President, in which case the provisions of Section 128
regarding congressional review would apply. The proposed legislation
would allow for NRC-licensed exports to India notwithstanding the
absence of full-scope safeguards and without triggering the
congressional review requirements of Section 128. It would also permit
the issuance of a license notwithstanding the provisions of 10 CFR
110.46, which would otherwise bar issuance of a license to a country
found by the President to have detonated a nuclear explosive device,
unless the President has waived the corresponding provision of Section
129 of the AEA.
In accordance with 10 CFR Part 810 and the Procedures, an
application to the Department of Energy for authorization to transfer
nuclear technology under 10 CFR 810 (Section 57b of the AEA) may be
approved by the Secretary of Energy if he determines, with the
concurrence of the Department of State and after consultation with the
Departments of Commerce and Defense and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, that the activity will not be inimical to the interests of
the United States. In making this determination, the Secretary of
Energy must take into account a number of factors, including: (1) the
nonproliferation obligations entered into by the recipient government,
including the NPT and safeguards agreements with the IAEA; (2) whether
the country has a Section 123 agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation with the U.S.; and (3) recipient government assurances
confirming no nuclear explosive use and the right of U.S. Government
prior consent to any retransfer of the technology or items produced
through the use of that technology.
One of the factors that the Secretary of Energy is directed to
consider in determining whether to grant a part 810 authorization is
whether the recipient country has full-scope safeguards, but that
criterion is not mandatory for the issuance of an authorization (except
to the extent required pursuant to Section 128 in the case of sensitive
nuclear technology). The proposed legislation would not affect
consideration, evaluation, coordination, or reporting of DOE
authorizations under 10 CFR part 810 with respect to the range of
cooperation provided for under the proposed agreement for nuclear
cooperation. To the extent that an authorization under Part 810
involved sensitive nuclear technology (SNT), the proposed legislation
(unlike current law) would not require full-scope safeguards as a
condition of supply. However, the proposed agreement for peaceful
nuclear cooperation will not provide for exports of SNT; the agreement
would have to be amended (and the amendment submitted to Congress for
review) to allow for such exports.
Question (5). What effect would S. 2429 have on the requirements of
sections 126 and 127 of the AEA?
Answer. Section 126 establishes procedures for licensing nuclear
exports. Section 127 establishes nuclear export criteria that mirror
some of the elements required in an agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation under Section 123. The provisions in S.2429 would not alter
these requirements.
Question (6). What effect would the provisions of S. 2429 have on
the Congressional review requirements of section 130 of the AEA?
Answer. Section 130 establishes the congressional review procedures
with respect to submissions by the President under Sections 123,
126a.(2), 126b.(2), 128b., 129, 131a.(3), and 131f.(1)(A). Section 130
would be affected by the provisions of S. 2429 in that it would not
apply to Presidential actions with respect to India under Sections
128b. and 129; the provisions of the proposed legislation would govern.
(Note that both Section 128b. and Section 129 currently provide for
congressional disapproval of the President's action by concurrent
resolution. In view of the Supreme Court's decision in the Chadha case,
Congress would have to enact new legislation to disapprove the
President's actions under Sections 128b. and 129; in that sense, the
situation is the same under current procedures as it would be under S.
2429.)
Question (7). What effect would the provisions of S. 2429 have on
the requirements of section 131 of the AEA?
Answer. Section 131 establishes the requirements relating to
subsequent arrangements (as that term is defined in that Section). In
particular, alterations in form or content--including reprocessing--of
nuclear material subject to the agreement would require consent through
a subsequent arrangement. The provisions in S. 2429 would not alter
these requirements, with one possible exception. Paragraph 131a.(4)
provides that ``all other statutory requirements under other Sections
of [the AEA] for the approval or conduct of any arrangement subject to
this subsection'' must be satisfied before the subsequent arrangement
may take effect. S. 2429 would affect this provision to the extent that
it might otherwise require that Sections 123 or 128 (as set forth in
current law) must be satisfied for a subsequent arrangement with India.
Question (8). What effect would the provisions of S. 2429 have on
the preparation of a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement with
respect to a peaceful nuclear cooperative agreement with India as
required under section 123 of the AEA?
Answer. S. 2429 would not affect the requirement for a Nuclear
Proliferation Assessment Statement nor the preparation thereof.
Question (9). Under S. 2429, what would trigger termination of
U.S.-Indian atomic energy cooperation or nuclear exports, and how do
those circumstances compare with the existing statutory language
regarding termination of nuclear exports under section 129 0f the AEA?
Answer. Under S. 2429, detonation of a nuclear explosive device by
India would render ineffective any Presidential determination there
under and, accordingly, any waiver of Section 129 of the AEA based on
such determination. That detonation would also trigger the requirement
under Section 129(1)(A) to terminate nuclear cooperation with India.S.
2429 would not change the various grounds in Section 129 that trigger
the termination of nuclear cooperation with respect to India. It would,
however, change the standard for waiving the application of the
sanctions. Under current law, the waiver standard is ``seriously
prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation
objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.''
Under S. 2429, the standard would be based on the nonproliferation
measures that India committed to in the Joint Statement as reflected in
the Presidential determination under subsection 1(b). In addition, as
noted in the answer to question 6 above, the provisions of Section 129
and Section 130 regarding congressional review would not apply to a
waiver under S. 2429.
Question (10). Would sections 101 and 102 of the Arms Export
Control Act apply to any agreement for cooperation in atomic energy
with India under S. 2429, and if so, how?
Answer. The proposed legislation would not affect the application
to India of Sections 101 and 102 of the Arms Export Control Act.
Question (11). Under subsection (d) of S. 2429, what effect would a
Presidential determination that India has detonated a nuclear explosive
device after the date of enactment have on--
(a) nuclear exports by the United States;
(b) the nuclear cooperation agreement itself; and
(c) nuclear exports by other states?
Answer. Nuclear exports from the United States to India would be
terminated pursuant to Section 129(1)(A), unless waived by the
President pursuant to the waiver standard in current law. This waiver
would be subject to congressional review for 60 continuous session
days.
The nuclear cooperation agreement would remain in effect as a
matter of international law. However, as noted above, exports of
nuclear equipment and material to India under that agreement would be
prohibited under Section 129; any waiver of Section 129 based on a
Presidential determination under S. 2429 would no longer be effective.
The U.S. would also have the right to request the return of any nuclear
material transferred to India under the terms of the nuclear
cooperation agreement.
U.S. law would not affect nuclear exports by other states. Each
state's response would presumably be governed by the terms of its
domestic law and international obligations, its agreement for
cooperation with India, any relevant actions by the NSG (if the state
were a member), and its own policy judgment.
Question (12). Under S. 2429, if the President determines that
India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of its
enactment, his previous determination regarding the section 123
agreement between the United States and India under section (1)(b)
``shall not be effective.'' Do you interpret that language to mean that
all U.S. licenses for the export to India of any items requiring a
license under 10 CFR Part 110 and 10 CFR Part 810 would be suspended or
terminated and that no new licenses would be granted, nor any previous
licenses renewed, after the determination in section (1)(d) is made?
Answer. As previously noted, a detonation by India would trigger
Section 129, which states that ``no nuclear materials and equipment or
sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported to . . . any non-nuclear
weapon state that is found by the President to have . . . detonated a
nuclear explosive device'' (emphasis added). This prohibition on
exports of ``nuclear materials and equipment'' and ``sensitive nuclear
technology'' would necessitate suspension or revocation of NRC licenses
and DOE authorizations (under 10 CFR Part 110 and 10 CFR Part 810,
respectively) to the extent that the licenses or authorizations
involved such exports (unless the authorized activity had already taken
place).
The term ``nuclear materials and equipment'' is defined in the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) to mean ``source
material, special nuclear material, production facilities, utilization
facilities, and components, items or substances determined to have
significance for nuclear explosive purposes pursuant to Section 109b.
of the Atomic Energy Act.'' The term ``sensitive nuclear technology''
is defined in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act to mean any information
``which is important to the design, construction, fabrication,
operation, or maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel
reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of heavy water
[but excluding Restricted Data].''
``Sensitive nuclear technology'' could not be exported or imported
under the proposed agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation without
an amendment.
Question (13). What is the effect of including the phrase
``notwithstanding any other provision of law'' in section 1 (a) of S.
2429 on other statutes such as the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act,
sections 101 and 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, or any other
relevant U.S. statutes or Executive Orders that would terminate nuclear
commerce or impose sanctions for proliferation activities?
Answer. The phrase ``notwithstanding any other provision of law''
would affect the operation of other statutes or other provisions of the
Atomic Energy Act only to the extent that such provisions would affect
the modifications to Sections 123, 128, and 129 that are embodied in S.
2429. Thus, if another law established ``competing'' modifications to
the waiver standard for Sections 128 or 129, the modifications in S.
2429 would apply ``notwithstanding'' that other law.
Accordingly, S. 2429 would not have any effect on the operation of
the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act, Sections 101 and 102 of the
Arms Export Control Act, or other nonproliferation sanctions provisions
(except of course Section 129).
Question (14). If the violations in section 129 of the AEA, and the
termination of nuclear commerce for such violations, are not to apply
to any agreement for atomic energy cooperation with India, as the
administration's legislative proposal states in section 1 (a)(3) of S.
2429, which penalties in other relevant laws would apply to atomic
energy cooperation with India if India were to engage in activities
that would terminate nuclear cooperation under section 129?--
Specifically which other laws would terminate cooperation if India were
to--
(a) Terminate or abrogate IAEA safeguards;
(b) Materially violate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA;
(c) Materially violate an agreement for cooperation with the
United States as stipulated in section 129(2)(A);
(d) Assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon state
to engage in activities stipulated in section 129 (2)(B); and,
(e) Engage in cooperation that would result in termination of
exports as a result of India's having exported reprocessing
technology to a non-nuclear weapon state, except under an
evaluation and agreement with the United States, as specified
in section 129(2)(C).
Answer. As noted in the answer to question 9 above, S. 2429 would
not change the various grounds in Section 129 that trigger the
termination of nuclear cooperation with respect to India, but rather
would change the standard and process for waiving the application of
the sanctions. Thus, Section 129 would still apply to nuclear exports
to India under an agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation, and it
would be within the discretion of the President whether to exercise the
waiver authority in S. 2429 (assuming he could make the requisite
determinations and assuming no detonation after the date of enactment).
With respect to the specific elements of the question above:
(a) The standard U.S. agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation establishes a right to cease nuclear cooperation
and seek the return of transferred items if the other party
terminates or abrogates an IAEA safeguards agreement. The right
of return is required by Section 123 under these circumstances.
In addition, the Export-Import Bank Act provides for a cutoff
of Ex-Im Bank programs in support of exports to a country that
terminates or abrogates IAEA safeguards (Section 2(b)(4)).
(b) The standard U.S. agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation establishes a right to cease nuclear cooperation
and seek the return of transferred items if the other party
materially violates an IAEA safeguards agreement. In addition,
the Export-Import Bank Act provides for a cutoff of Ex-Im Bank
programs in support of exports to a country that materially
violates an IAEA safeguards agreement (Section 2(b)(4)).
(c) The standard U.S. agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation establishes a right to cease nuclear cooperation
and seek the return of transferred items if the other party
does not comply with the central nonproliferation provisions of
the agreement for cooperation. In addition, (1) the Export-
Import Bank Act provides for a cutoff of Ex-Im Bank programs in
support of exports to a country that materially violates any
guarantee or other undertaking to the U.S. in an agreement for
nuclear cooperation (Section 2(b)(4)); (2) Section 530 of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act (FY 1994-95) provides for
the cutoff of certain assistance to any country that materially
violates an agreement for cooperation (P.L. 103-236); and (3)
Section 3(f) of the Arms Export Control Act prohibits sales or
leases to a country that is in material breach of binding
commitments to the U.S. under agreements concerning the
nonproliferation of nuclear explosive devices.
(d) The Export-Import Bank Act provides for a cutoff of Ex-Im
Bank programs in support of exports to a country that willfully
aids or abets a non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear
explosive device or unsafeguarded special nuclear material
(Section 2(b)(4)).
(e) Section 102(a) of the Arms Export Control Act provides
for a cutoff of certain assistance to a country that transfers
reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology.
Question (15). What standard would the Department use to evaluate
the phrase ``making satisfactory progress'' in section 1 (b)(3) of S.
2429?
Answer. The administration is seeking to have India sign an
Additional Protocol with the IAEA prior to the initiation of civil
nuclear cooperation, but does not expect an Additional Protocol to be
signed prior to submitting the bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation to the U.S. Congress. Under the language of paragraph
1(b)(3), it would be a judgment for the President whether the progress
achieved by India and the IAEA in working out the terms of an
Additional Protocol was satisfactory. This approach takes account of
the fact that India's Additional Protocol will necessarily be tailored
to its safeguards agreement, and therefore is likely to be negotiated
after that safeguards agreement. Subsequent preparations for
implementation of an Additional Protocol may also take some time.
Question (16). Why did the administration not include a specified
period of time in which the President would submit his subsequent
determination under section 1(d) of S. 2429 to Congress after an Indian
detonation?
Answer. Provisions of this kind typically do not establish a
deadline by which the President must make a determination. Depending on
the circumstances, it may not be clear that a detonation has occurred,
and thus there would be no clear beginning to the statutory time
period. In addition, based on long-standing interpretations of
provisions of this kind, if the facts demonstrated that an Indian
detonation had occurred, the President would not have the discretion to
avoid the legal consequences of a determination by simply refraining
from making the determination.
Question (17). Would the subsequent Presidential determination
under section 1(d) of S. 2429 apply even if India insisted that such a
detonation was a peaceful nuclear explosion?
Answer. The President's determination under Section 1(d) addresses
India's detonation of a ``nuclear explosive device.'' This term is used
in the NPT and U.S. law to encompass all nuclear explosions, including
so-called ``peaceful nuclear explosions.''
Question (18). How would a subsequent Presidential determination
under section 1(d) of S. 2429 be sent to Congress and to which
committees would it be sent--would it be a written determination?
Answer. Section 1(d) does not specify. The determination would be
notified to relevant agencies and published in the Federal Register for
implementation purposes. This approach is consistent with Section 129
and other mandatory nonproliferation sanctions provisions, which do not
require a report to Congress upon a determination being made, but
rather require a report to Congress in the event of waiver (which would
also be the case here, if the President waived under existing
procedures of Sections 128 or 129).
Question (19). Are sections 123.a(2), 128 and 129 the only sections
of the AEA that are implicated in U.S.-Indian atomic energy
cooperation, and if they are not, which other sections of the AEA will
apply to U.S.-Indian atomic energy cooperation?
Answer. As described in the answers to previous questions, numerous
provisions of the AEA apply or, under particular circumstances, might
apply to U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation in addition to Sections
123, 128, and 129. These provisions include Sections 53, 54a., 57, 64,
82, 103, 104, 109, 126, 127, 130, and 131, but could include other
provisions of the AEA.
Question (20). Secretary Rice, in November 2005, U/S Joseph stated
that ``We will also need to ensure that any cooperation is fully
consistent with U.S. obligations under the NPT not to `in any way'
assist India's nuclear weapons program, and with provisions of U.S.
law.''
Could you please provide this committee with a legal analysis that
sets forth a detailed examination by the State Department establishing
that nothing the administration is undertaking regarding changes to US
law, an exception to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for India,
or any exports of nuclear material or reactors to India from the United
States, or from other nations as a result of U.S. policy and legal
changes for India, would in any way assist India's nuclear weapons
program or in any way break U.S. obligations under the NPT?
Answer. Under this Initiative, all nuclear transfers from the
United States to India will be subject to IAEA safeguards. These
safeguards will be applied to any source or special nuclear material
transferred to India and to any source or special nuclear ``used in or
produced through the use of'' material or equipment transferred to
India. The application of IAEA safeguards is designed to ensure that
U.S.-origin nuclear items remain exclusively on the civil side of the
Indian nuclear program and do not in any way contribute to India's
military nuclear program. Implementation of an Additional Protocol is
designed to give further assurance of this.
Under Article I of the NPT, nuclear-weapon states such as the
United States undertake, inter alia: ``. . . not in any way to assist,
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.''
Under Article III(2) of the NPT, all state parties undertake not to
provide certain nuclear material and equipment to any non-nuclear
weapon state (which includes non-parties) for peaceful purposes unless
the nuclear material will be subject to safeguards.
The NPT does not treat peaceful nuclear cooperation under
safeguards as assisting a non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture
nuclear weapons. Specifically, Article III(2) establishes the basis
under which NPT parties may engage in nuclear cooperation with
safeguarded facilities in countries that are not parties and do not
have full-scope safeguards.
In The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the leading treatise on
the negotiation of the NPT), Mohamed Shaker reached the same
conclusion: ``Almost any kind of international nuclear assistance is
potentially useful to a nuclear-weapon program. However, the
application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear assistance to non-
nuclear weapon States, as required by Article III, provides a means to
establish and clarify the peaceful purposes of most international
nuclear assistance.''
This conclusion is also supported by the practice of the parties to
the NPT. The U.S. and Canada engaged in nuclear cooperation with India
before and after the NPT entered into force. The supply of fuel under
facility-specific (INFCIRC/66) safeguards agreements was understood to
satisfy our obligations under the NPT. Even after India's 1974
detonation, fuel was provided to India's safeguarded Tarapur reactors
by the United States, France, and Russia. Such fuel supply was
understood to be consistent with the NPT. The Nuclear Suppliers Group
did not make the political decision to adopt full-scope safeguards as a
condition of supply until 1992, reflecting the fact that nuclear supply
to a country without full-scope safeguards was not prohibited under the
NPT.
The argument that foreign fuel supply could allow India to devote
its domestic uranium substantially or even exclusively to its weapons
program, should India so desire, does not change this legal conclusion.
As previously noted, nothing in the NPT, its negotiating history, or
the practice of the parties supports the notion that fuel supply to
safeguarded reactors for peaceful purposes could be construed as
``assisting in the manufacture of nuclear weapons'' for purposes of
Article I. Nuclear material and equipment exported by the U.S. to
safeguarded activities would not be involved in any stage of the
process of manufacturing nuclear weapons.
In essence, nuclear cooperation under safeguards does not
fundamentally differ from other forms of energy cooperation (e.g., oil
supply, clean coal technology, alternative fuels). All such energy
assistance would arguably relieve India of its reliance on domestic
uranium for energy production. Yet such energy assistance clearly could
not be viewed as assisting India in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
Question (21). Secretary Rice, U/S Joseph stated in November 2005,
that ``Many of the specifics of required regulatory changes to
implement full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India have yet to
be determined by the administration.'' Additionally, he noted that
``U.S. regulations that incorporate or reflect statutory language will
need to be modified or waived in order to permit civil nuclear
cooperation consistent with the Joint Statement, and will need to be
addressed along with modification or waiver of the related statute.''
Please provide the committee with a coordinated, interagency
examination of all regulatory changes the administration would make to
implement US-Indian atomic energy cooperation if its exception to
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, as introduced in S. 2429, were
enacted. Such examination should be particular with regard to any
relevant portion of 10 CFR Parts 110 and 810.
Answer. In response to question 4 under the heading ``The
Legislative Proposal,'' we noted that the proposed legislation would
change the process of NRC licensing under 10 CFR 110.42(a)(6), which
currently requires full-scope safeguards as a condition of issuing a
license for export to a non-nuclear weapon state, unless waived by the
President, in which case the provisions of Section 128 regarding
congressional review would apply. The NRC would presumably amend this
regulation to reflect the new legislation. Similarly, depending on the
final wording of the new legislation, the NRC might have to modify 10
CFR 110.46, which would otherwise bar issuance of a license to a
country found by the President to have detonated a nuclear explosive
device, unless the President has waived the corresponding provision of
Section 129 of the AEA.
Also, as discussed in the answer to question 4 under the heading
``The Legislative Proposal,'' the consideration, evaluation,
coordination and reporting of DOE authorizations under 10 CFR Part 810
would not be affected with respect to the range of cooperation provided
for under the proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation. To the extent
that an authorization under Part 810 involved sensitive nuclear
technology (SNT), the proposed legislation (unlike current law) would
not require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. However,
the proposed agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation will not
provide for exports of SNT; the agreement would have to be amended (and
the amendment submitted to Congress for review) to allow for such
exports. Depending on the final wording of the new legislation, DOE
might have to consider whether amendments to its regulations would be
required.
The Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and
the Department of Commerce would conduct a thorough review of their
regulations to determine whether any changes would be required if the
proposed legislation became law.
Question (22)(a). Secretary Rice, in November 2005, U/S Joseph
stated that ``once India develops a transparent and credible civil-
military separation plan for its nuclear facilities and programs and
begins to implement it, we will then seek appropriate legislative
solutions.''
What additional steps toward implementation has the Government of
India taken since tabling its Separation Plan; and, . . .
Answer. Since India's separation plan was tabled in the Indian
Parliament on March 7, 2006, the Indian Government has begun its
implementation. During the week of April 3, the chairman of India's
Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Anil Kakodkar, traveled to Vienna to
begin informal discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) on India's safeguards agreement. While there, Dr. Kakodkar met
with IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei. In addition, we fully
expect that India in the near future will both provide the IAEA with a
detailed list of all civil facilities, along with anticipated timelines
for the application of safeguards to those facilities, and conduct
extensive safeguards negotiations with the IAEA.
Question (22)(b). Secretary Rice, in November 2005, U/S Joseph
stated that ``once India develops a transparent and credible civil-
military separation plan for its nuclear facilities and programs and
begins to implement it, we will then seek appropriate legislative
solutions.''
What additional steps in respect of the Separation Plan need to be
taken by India before its Separation Plan can be considered to be in
force?
Answer. To fully implement the separation plan, the Indian
government will identify specific reactors to be offered for safeguards
and provide a timeline for doing so. In addition, India will identify
which upstream and downstream nuclear facilities it will declare to the
IAEA as civil and offer for IAEA safeguards. Once the separation and
declaration are complete, India must conclude and bring into force a
safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as well as sign and adhere to an
Additional Protocol.
Question (23). Secretary Rice, administration officials have stated
that it would be ``ideal'' to have U.S. law adjusted before the Nuclear
Suppliers Group Guidelines are changed. Why, in your view, is it
``ideal'' to have U.S. law change before NSG Guidelines are changed?
Answer. For those countries that do not have domestic laws
preventing nuclear commerce with India, the NSG Guidelines may
constitute the only restrictions on the transfer of nuclear material
and technology to that country. Enterprises engaged in various aspects
of the nuclear industry in those countries would most likely be free to
engage in nuclear commerce as soon as the NSG adopted a resolution
allowing civil nuclear cooperation with India. If the NSG were to adopt
such a resolution before the proposed U.S. legislation is enacted, U.S.
businesses could be at a competitive disadvantage. Additionally, some
NSG partners have indicated that they are looking to the U.S. for
leadership on this issue and are not prepared to act before Congress
indicates its intent.
Question (24). Could you please furnish the committee with an
analysis of the extant laws of the Russian Federation, France and China
that are comparable in respect of nuclear export controls, in
particular whether such laws contain a requirement for full-scope
safeguards similar to the U.S. requirement at section 123.a(2) of the
AEA?
Answer. As Participating Governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG), Russia, France, and China have each undertaken a political
commitment that its national laws and regulations would be at least as
stringent as the standards set forth in the NSG Guidelines and control
lists. This includes the requirement for full-scope safeguards as a
condition of supply to non-nuclear weapon states (as all states other
than the NPT-defined nuclear weapon states are treated in this
context). We have not compiled the laws of all NSG participants to
determine how they satisfy this undertaking.Q04
assurances of supply
Question (1). Secretary Rice, other than the United States, who
would be the principal nations that are capable of selling India
nuclear fuel, nuclear materials and reactor technology?
Answer. The world's largest producers of uranium (outside the
United States) are, in order, Canada, Australia, Kazakhstan, Russia,
Namibia, Niger, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and South Africa. All export
uranium.
China, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, and the UK are all
capable of supplying uranium enrichment services. Japan also has
significant uranium enrichment capability that it uses for its domestic
market.
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Kazakhstan, Russia, Spain,
Sweden, and the UK are the principal nuclear fuel exporters. Argentina,
Brazil, Japan, and the Republic of Korea have significant nuclear fuel
manufacturing capability that they use for their domestic markets.
France, Germany (in partnership with France), Canada, Russia, and
China are all capable of supplying nuclear reactors. Japan and the
Republic of Korea have significant reactor/component manufacturing
capability, but have not yet supplied complete reactor systems, only
reactor components. The Czech Republic also has a significant reactor/
component manufacturing capability.
Any or all of the above countries could be major suppliers of
nuclear material and equipment to India. Numerous other countries have
limited supply capabilities. However, each would need to make its own
national decision about whether supply to India would be consistent
with domestic and international obligations.
Question (2). Has the United States obtained for India assurances
of fuel supply from other supplier nations?--If so, which?
Answer. The United States has not yet discussed fuel supply
assurances for India's civil nuclear reactors with any third country.
We believe that it is premature to do so at this time. Timely and
effective Indian safeguards and Additional Protocol negotiations with
the IAEA are important next steps.
Question (3). Have all potential nuclear suppliers to India agreed
to terminate the supply of fuel or reactors and related sensitive
technology to India if it detonates a nuclear explosive device?
Answer. Our interlocutors in the NSG have made it clear that their
support for accommodating civil nuclear cooperation with India hinges
upon India's successful implementation of its commitments in the July
2005 Joint Statement, including India's commitment to continue its
moratorium on nuclear testing. We do not have the official views of
potential nuclear suppliers regarding a termination of transfers of
nuclear material, including fuel and technology, to India should India
detonate a nuclear explosive device. However, we expect that there
would be irresistible political pressure for NSG participants to
terminate any transfers of nuclear material and technology to India
should India detonate a nuclear explosive device.
Moreover, there is a provision in the NSG Guidelines calling for
suppliers to meet and consult if a supplier believes there has been a
violation of the supplier/recipient understandings resulting from the
Guidelines, particularly in the event of, among other things, an
explosion of a nuclear device. India's 1998 nuclear tests prompted the
NSG to meet in an extraordinary plenary for such consultations. The
Guidelines further reference the possibility of a common response,
which could include the termination of nuclear transfers.
We have made it clear to the Government of India that the Civil
Nuclear Cooperation Initiative relies on India's commitment to continue
its unilateral nuclear testing moratorium. This gives India clear
economic and energy incentives not to test.
india's safeguards agreement
Question (1). Secretary Rice, in November of last year, U/S Joseph
stated that
Safeguards agreements are modeled after INFCIRC/153 (the NPT
safeguards agreement) or INFCIRC/66 (the Agency's safeguards
system predating the NPT). India will not likely sign a
safeguards agreement based strictly on INFCIRC/153, as this
would require safeguards on India's nuclear weapons program.
NPT-acknowledged nuclear weapon states have so-called
``voluntary'' safeguards agreements that draw on INFCIRC/153
language, but do not obligate the IAEA to actually apply
safeguards and do allow for the removal of facilities or
material from safeguards. We heard from other states at the
recent NSG meeting that they would not support a ``voluntary
offer'' arrangement as, in their view, it would be tantamount
to granting de facto nuclear weapon state status to India. We
have similarly indicated to India that we would not view such
an arrangement as defensible from a nonproliferation
standpoint. We therefore believe that the logical approach to
formulating a safeguards agreement for India is to use INFCIRC/
66, which is currently used at India's four safeguarded
reactors. For the most part, INFCIRC/66 and INFCIRC/153
agreements result in very similar technical measures actually
applied at nuclear facilities.
Please clarify, with regard to INFCIRC/66 (presumably /Rev. 2),
where in that document does the requirement appear that once a facility
is declared it must remain declared and under inspection in perpetuity?
Answer. Unlike INFCIRC/153, the model safeguards agreement for non-
nuclear weapon states under the NPT, INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 is not a model
safeguards agreement. Rather, it is a general description of how
safeguards are to apply to nuclear material and facilities under the
IAEA safeguards system that predates the NPT. Therefore it does not
contain every provision that may be included in a safeguards agreement.
In particular, the scope and duration of safeguards are normally
spelled out in the safeguards agreement.
The principle that safeguards should be applied in perpetuity in
INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2 safeguards agreements was embodied in a Memorandum
from the IAEA Director General to the IAEA Board of Governors in 1973
(IAEA GOV/1621). We expect any safeguards agreement India negotiates
with the IAEA to be consistent with its pledge to place its civil
nuclear facilities under safeguards in perpetuity. As Secretary Rice
testified before the SFRC, ``We've been very clear with the Indians
that the permanence of the safeguard is permanence of the safeguards
without condition.''
Question (2). With regard to India's indigenous reactors that are
not submitted to safeguards as a result of a project agreement, but
rather voluntarily submitted, is there a requirement in INFCIRC/66 that
safeguards must be applied in perpetuity to such reactors?
Answer. As noted above, the scope and duration of safeguards are
not set for the INFCIRC/66, but rather are normally spelled out in the
safeguards agreements. In its separation plan, India has committed to
safeguards in perpetuity. As Secretary Rice testified before the SFRC,
``We've been very clear with the Indians that the permanence of the
safeguard is permanence of the safeguards without condition.''
Question (3). What, in your view, does India mean when in its
Separation Plan it states that the safeguards agreement will provide
for ``corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted
operation of its civilian reactors in the event of disruption of
foreign fuel supplies''?
Answer. We cannot speak for the Government of India, of course;
India will need to clarify its intent in this respect in its
discussions with the IAEA. India has agreed to safeguards in perpetuity
on its declared civil facilities and on all future civil reactors.
Safeguards in perpetuity would also apply to nuclear material used or
produced in those facilities. Thus, safeguards would continue to be
required in a campaign mode on downstream facilities processing
safeguarded material from declared civil facilities.
We have had only initial, conceptual discussions with India
regarding the question of assured fuel supplies. We believe that India
can be provided with the assurances it seeks for fuel supply consistent
with safeguards in perpetuity.
Question (4). Would India be under any obligation, if it concluded
an agreement with the IAEA using the INFCIRC/66 model, to keep
safeguards on its eight indigenously built civil PHWRs in perpetuity?
Answer. India has committed to place its civil nuclear facilities,
including its eight indigenously built civil PHWRs, under safeguards in
perpetuity.
Question (5). Would India's safeguards obligation apply only to
foreign fuel supplied to its indigenously built PHWRs?
Answer. India has committed to place its civil nuclear facilities
under safeguards in perpetuity. Safeguards would apply to any fuel,
indigenous or foreign, that is in a civil reactor at the point that
safeguards go into effect for that facility.
In addition to India's unilateral safeguards commitment, any
foreign-supplied fuel would be subject to safeguards by virtue of the
supply arrangement for that material. Supplier states will require
safeguards in perpetuity with respect to supplied items in order to
satisfy the requirements of NPT Article III.2.
Question (6). If India stopped using foreign fuel in those
reactors, would its envisioned safeguards, as outlined in its
implementation document, impose an obligation to continue to apply
safeguards on the reactors themselves?
Answer. For the reasons described in answers above, safeguards
would continue to be required on all declared civil nuclear facilities
and on all nuclear material produced, processed, or used in those
facilities.
Question (7). Generally, how are safeguards terminated under the
provisions of INFCIRC/66/Rev.2?
Answer. With respect to facilities and equipment covered by a
safeguards agreement, in general it is the safeguards agreement, not
INFCIRC/66, which specifies whether and how safeguards may be
terminated. As noted above, INFCIRC/66 is not a model safeguards
agreement, and its provisions apply to the extent they are incorporated
into a particular safeguards agreement. The provisions for termination
of safeguards on nuclear material are set forth in paragraphs 26-28 of
INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. These provisions allow for safeguards to be
terminated on material that is exported, consumed, diluted so that it
is no longer usable, or practicably irrecoverable. These conditions are
essentially the same as under a comprehensive safeguards agreement
based on INFCIRC/153.
INFCIRC/66 also has some conditions that are unique to cases where
the state is not subject to comprehensive safeguards. In particular, it
allows for placing under safeguards as a substitute material of at
least the same quality and quantity that was not previously under
safeguards, and for the termination of safeguards on the previously
safeguarded material, if the IAEA agrees to such substitution. It also
allows the withdrawal of material that was subject to safeguards only
because it was used in a safeguarded nuclear facility; however, this
does not apply to material that was produced while under safeguards.
Question (8). What, in your view, are the most important provisions
that any Indian safeguards agreement and additional protocol with the
IAEA must contain?
Answer. India's safeguards agreement with the IAEA must require
that safeguards be maintained with respect to all nuclear material and
equipment supplied to India and any special nuclear material used in or
produced through the use of such material and equipment. Further, it
must satisfy India's commitment to place its civil nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards in perpetuity. These provisions are essential to
provide a strong assurance to the United States and its NSG partners
that nuclear cooperation with India will not ``in any way'' assist
India's nuclear weapons program and will not be improperly diverted to
third parties.
Since India will have a military nuclear program that it does not
declare to the IAEA, its Additional Protocol would differ from the
Model Additional Protocol. Nevertheless, this Protocol should advance
the IAEA's ability to track potential nuclear proliferation worldwide.
In that regard, reporting of exports listed in Annex II of the Model
Additional Protocol would arguably be of greatest value. India has
pledged to conclude an Additional Protocol with respect to its civil
facilities, and the Model Additional Protocol has provisions that deal
with the ``sites'' of nuclear facilities. India has also listed as
civil a number of research and development and other facilities that
would not normally be subject to safeguards, but could be subject to
the reporting and access provisions of an Additional Protocol.
Question (9). What would be the frequency of inspections conducted
in India by the IAEA under a safeguards agreement and additional
protocol?
Answer. A safeguards agreement usually does not specify the
frequency of inspections, but rather sets limits on the number of
routine inspections. The frequency of inspections at a particular
facility is usually agreed in a separate ``facility attachment.'' We
expect the implementation of safeguards in India would be generally
consistent with the implementation of safeguards on similar facilities
in other countries.
india's fuel cycle
Question (1)(a). Secretary Rice, last November, U/S Burns stated
that,
Because of the current international restrictions on nuclear
commerce with India, India's plan for its nuclear power sector
seeks to provide for a 20-fold increase in nuclear-generated
electricity by 2020 without reactors from foreign suppliers. In
support of this objective, India's Department of Atomic Energy
(DAE) has committed extensive resources to develop a three-
stage nuclear fuel cycle, based on its plentiful domestic
thorium reserves, that involves fast-breeder reactors, which
could pose proliferation risks. Moreover, some specialists
assess that such an approach would not prove cost-effective,
and there are clear technical challenges to overcome.
Has India decided to end, or expressed a desire to end, its pursuit
of a three-stage fuel cycle?
Answer. Only the Government of India can provide a definitive
answer to the question of whether it has decided to end its pursuit of
a three-stage fuel cycle. Although the concept was mentioned in India's
separation plan, it has had less prominence in our discussions of civil
nuclear cooperation.
Question (1)(b). Secretary Rice, last November, U/S Burns stated
that,
Because of the current international restrictions on nuclear
commerce with India, India's plan for its nuclear power sector
seeks to provide for a 20-fold increase in nuclear-generated
electricity by 2020 without reactors from foreign suppliers. In
support of this objective, India's Department of Atomic Energy
(DAE) has committed extensive resources to develop a three-
stage nuclear fuel cycle, based on its plentiful domestic
thorium reserves, that involves fast-breeder reactors, which
could pose proliferation risks. Moreover, some specialists
assess that such an approach would not prove cost-effective,
and there are clear technical challenges to overcome.
What are the ``proliferation risks'' posed by India's intended fuel
cycle, in particular its breeder reactors?
Answer. The use of thorium requires a complex fuel cycle, although
its use as reactor fuel may produce less fissile material as a
byproduct than does the use of uranium as a fuel.
To be useful as reactor fuel, thorium must be converted into U-233
in a breeder reactor. The fuel cycle requires considerable handling of
fissile material in the various loading, unloading, and transfers
associated with the stages of the fuel cycle. Each time fissile
material is handled, there is a risk of diversion.
Question (1)(c). Secretary Rice, last November, U/S Burns stated
that,
Because of the current international restrictions on nuclear
commerce with India, India's plan for its nuclear power sector
seeks to provide for a 20-fold increase in nuclear-generated
electricity by 2020 without reactors from foreign suppliers. In
support of this objective, India's Department of Atomic Energy
(DAE) has committed extensive resources to develop a three-
stage nuclear fuel cycle, based on its plentiful domestic
thorium reserves, that involves fast-breeder reactors, which
could pose proliferation risks. Moreover, some specialists
assess that such an approach would not prove cost-effective,
and there are clear technical challenges to overcome.
What are the proliferation risks associated with breeder reactor
technology, generally?
Answer. Unlike a typical commercial reactor, a breeder reactor
creates more usable fuel (i.e., plutonium) than it uses. The production
of plutonium and other fuels as a byproduct of the reactor's operation
adds to the world net stock of potential fuel for a nuclear explosive
device.
heavy water exports/production
Question (1). Secretary Rice, in November of last year, I asked U/S
Joseph if creating in law a distinction between India and NPT parties
that would provide different treatment in terms of authorized exports
for non-NPT parties--i.e., that India would be eligible for most U.S.
exports except equipment, materials, or technology related to
enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production--would be
acceptable to the administration. Secretary Joseph stated that ``We do
not export enrichment or reprocessing technology to any state.
Therefore, `full civil nuclear cooperation' with India will not include
enrichment or reprocessing technology. We have not yet determined
whether such a prohibition would extend to heavy water production.''
Last March, while on a visit to India, Commissioner Peter Lyons of
the NRC is quoted as having stated that ``[The NRC] and [the Indian
Atomic Energy Research Board] will have greater cooperation in the near
future and this is important in the global market place reality and
also when the U.S. nuclear industry is exploring the options other than
Light Water Reactors (LWRs).''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``USNRC for Greater Cooperation with AERB,'' The Press Trust of
India, March 27, 2006.
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Has the administration determined whether or not heavy water could
be exported to India from the United States?
Answer. The U.S. does not foresee transferring heavy water
production equipment or technology to India, and the draft bilateral
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement accordingly makes no provisions
for such transfers.
Question (2). Does the administration contemplate allowing India
full participation in its Global Nuclear Energy Program (GNEP)?
Answer. U.S. negotiators told India that India's decision not to
designate its fast breeder reactors and associated fuel cycle research
and development facilities as civil and place those facilities under
IAEA safeguards would preclude our ability to collaborate on issues
related to the fast burner reactors contemplated under GNEP at this
time. If India places breeder reactors under safeguards in the future,
the United States has indicated that, as appropriate, it is willing to
explore potential areas for civil cooperation in this context.
Question (3). Does the administration contemplate authorizing the
export to India from the United States of reactors other than LWRs' if
so, of which type?
Answer. The United States has no current plans to export any power
reactors other than LWRs to any country.
the nuclear cooperative agreement
Question (1)(a)/(b). Secretary Rice, U/S Joseph previously stated
that, regarding the Peaceful Nuclear Cooperative Agreement (PNCA) with
India, it will not provide for full-scope safeguards, but rather ``will
allow for appropriate controls to help ensure that material or goods
provided for civilian purposes remain within the civilian sector.''
(a) Has the administration prepared a draft text of a PNCA
with India?
(b) If so, could you furnish this committee with a copy?
Answer. The administration has prepared a draft text of a proposed
U.S.-India agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. It was conveyed
to the Government of India by the American Embassy in New Delhi on
March 16, 2006.
We have begun initial discussions with India on a bilateral
agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. We have already briefed
staff in detail on that agreement, and would be happy to arrange
additional briefings for the committee on the outlines of what is
contained in the text. Texts of the Section 123 agreements with non-
nuclear weapon states that are currently in force and previously
reviewed by Congress are illustrative of the content we are seeking in
an agreement with India (with the exception of a provision for full-
scope IAEA safeguards in India). Congress will have an opportunity to
fully review the agreement once negotiations are complete and the
agreement has been submitted for congressional review.
Question (1)(c)/(d). Secretary Rice, U/S Joseph previously stated
that, regarding the Peaceful Nuclear Cooperative Agreement (PNCA) with
India, it will not provide for full-scope safeguards, but rather ``will
allow for appropriate controls to help ensure that material or goods
provided for civilian purposes remain within the civilian sector.''
(c) Will the State Department prepare or issue a Circular 175
pursuant to 11 FAM 720 for a PNCA with India?
(d) If so, could you furnish a copy of either the draft or
final Circular 175 to this committee?
Answer. The Department of State prepared a Circular 175 memorandum
requesting authority to negotiate an Atomic Energy Act Section 123
agreement with India and obtained the concurrence of other interested
Executive Branch agencies and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Under
Secretary of State Joseph, under authority delegated by the Secretary
of State, approved the request for authority to negotiate on March 13,
2006.
We would be happy to brief the committee or its staff on the
matters addressed in the Circular 175 process, which relate directly to
our current negotiations with India.
Question (1)(e). Secretary Rice, U/S Joseph previously stated that,
regarding the Peaceful Nuclear Cooperative Agreement (PNCA) with India,
it will not provide for full-scope safeguards, but rather ``will allow
for appropriate controls to help ensure that material or goods provided
for civilian purposes remain within the civilian sector.''
What verification mechanisms would be included in the U.S.-India
nuclear cooperative agreement?--For example, would the United States be
able to conduct any special verification visits at Indian facilities to
which US materials and technology had been exported?
Answer. The administration is seeking an agreement for peaceful
nuclear cooperation with India that will provide for IAEA safeguards on
all source or special nuclear material transferred by the United States
to India and on any source or special nuclear material used in or
produced through the use of material, equipment, or components so
transferred. This provision will implement Section 123(a)(1) of the
Atomic Energy Act (AEA) with respect to the content of the agreement
and Section 127(1) of the AEA with respect to U.S. exports pursuant to
the agreement. It is also necessary if U.S. nuclear exports to India
are to comply with U.S. obligations under the NPT.
In addition, in accordance with normal practice, the administration
is seeking a provision in the agreement for ``fall-back'' safeguards
(i.e., direct verification by the United States of material, equipment
and components subject to the agreement) if for any reason IAEA
safeguards are not being applied to those items as provided in the
agreement. This is necessary to satisfy the requirement in Section
123(a)(1) of the AEA that the safeguards provided for in the agreement
will be maintained ``so long as the material or equipment remains under
the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party, irrespective of
the duration of other provisions of the agreement'' (such as the
provision for IAEA safeguards).
In general, the United States (like other NSG participants) relies
upon IAEA inspections and monitoring. However, the United States would
in fact be able to conduct ``special verification visits'' in the form
of fall-back safeguards as required by the U.S.-India agreement for
peaceful nuclear cooperation in the event that IAEA safeguards were not
being applied.
iaea process
Question (1). Secretary Rice, has India submitted a declaration to
the IAEA of its civilian nuclear sites, facilities, locations and
materials?
Answer. India has not yet submitted such a declaration to the IAEA.
We fully expect that India in the near future will provide the IAEA
with a detailed list of all civil facilities, along with anticipated
timelines for the application of safeguards to those facilities.
Question (2). Secretary Rice, how long do you anticipate that it
will take for India to negotiate a declaration of civilian nuclear
facilities, locations, information and materials, and its associated
safeguards agreement and additional protocol, with the IAEA?
Answer. We have encouraged India to conclude its safeguards
agreement with the IAEA as soon as possible. India will submit its
unilateral declaration of its civil facilities and programs as part of
that process. India has conducted initial, informal safeguards
discussions with the IAEA, but neither party has yet publicized a
specific negotiation timeline. In our view, an ``India-specific''
safeguards agreement should generally conform with INFCIRC/66. Rev. 2.
If it does so, we see no fundamental obstacle to concluding such an
agreement in a reasonable timeframe.
India's Additional Protocol will be appropriate to its safeguards
agreement. In principle, the safeguards agreement and the Additional
Protocol could be negotiated in parallel. However, in the interest of
concluding the safeguards agreement as soon as possible, India may seek
to defer negotiation of an Additional Protocol until negotiations on
the safeguards agreement are complete.
Question (3). Secretary Rice, what are the steps with regard to
both IAEA process and Indian law through which an Indian safeguards
agreement and additional protocol with the IAEA would need to pass
before they would be in force, and which of those steps have been
completed?
Answer. For both the safeguards agreement and the Additional
Protocol, the process involves the following steps:
1. India and the IAEA Secretariat negotiate the agreement
and/or protocol.
2. The IAEA Secretariat presents the agreement and/or
protocol to the IAEA Board of Governors for approval. The
United States has a designated seat on the 35-member Board,
which normally decides such matters by consensus.
3. Once the Board approves, India and the IAEA may sign the
agreement and/or protocol.
4. India must then complete its statutory and constitutional
requirements for ratification or approval of the agreement and/
or protocol. The agreement and/or protocol enters into force
once India informs the IAEA that these requirements for entry
into force have been met.
To date, India has conducted initial, informal consultations with
the IAEA, but none of the steps listed above has yet been completed.
Question (4). Secretary Rice, would India's existing agreements
with the IAEA (INFCIRC/211, INFCIRC 260, INFCIRC/360, INFCIRC/374, and
INFCIRC /433) need to be changed or withdrawn when an Indian
declaration, safeguards agreement and additional protocol are
negotiated?
Answer. There is no legal requirement to modify any of India's
existing safeguards agreements in order for a new safeguards agreement
and Additional Protocol to be negotiated and enter into force. However,
it is not uncommon for one safeguards agreement to be suspended when
another agreement of broader scope enters into force. In principle, the
pre-existing safeguards agreement would in such a case not be
terminated, but its implementation would be suspended as long as the
new safeguards agreement is in force.
It is up to India and the IAEA whether, consistent with their
international obligations, to seek to suspend other safeguards
agreements in favor of a new, more comprehensive one. There may be
advantages to having safeguards applied under the terms of a single
agreement, particularly in terms of administrative simplicity. However,
many of India's existing safeguards agreements are safeguards transfer
agreements. These are agreements between India and the IAEA that are
linked to supply arrangements between various supplier states. They
provide for the IAEA to apply safeguards with respect to a particular
supply arrangement. In general, the consent of the supplier state would
be required in order for any such agreement to be suspended.
recent sanctions
Note: Accompanying these QFRs is an unclassified report
compiled by the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industrial
Security (DOC/BIS). The answers to the QFRs below do not
include information regarding ongoing, open investigations due
to the sensitivity of such investigations.
Question (1)(a). Secretary Rice, on March 9, 2006, the Department
of Commerce sanctioned two Indian persons for transactions with North
Korea.\5\ Please provide this committee, in classified form if
necessary but in open form if possible, with an interagency-coordinated
list regarding the following:
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\5\ 71 FR 12168 and 12170.
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With respect to the Arms Export Control Act, the Export
Administration Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
and related legislation governing imports, exports or improper
financial transactions--
any criminal investigation involving India or any Indian
entity or other person, including any Indian national, since
May 1998, and whether each such investigation is open or closed
and, if closed, the disposition; and
Answer. Information on investigations by the Customs Department,
due to the sensitivity of the information, will be provided separately.
DOC/BIS's Investigative Management System (IMS) indicates that
during the period February 2003 to present, BIS opened 63 cases
involving possible Export Administration Regulations (EAR) violations
by U.S. firms violating U.S. laws, with India as the ultimate consignee
of the exported items. There are currently 33 open cases in IMS with
India listed as the ultimate consignee.
Note: IMS was activated in February 2003. Although prior automated
investigative files were migrated to IMS, data in these prior files
cannot be queried electronically; thus, BIS cannot reliably report on
case statistics prior to February 2003. The current review covers
investigations input into IMS since February 2003 identified as
involving possible illegal exports to India in violation of the EAR.
Regarding closed criminal cases:
Materials International--On November 18, 2005, Fiber
Materials Inc. of Maine; its wholly owned subsidiary, Materials
International of Massachusetts; and the companies' two top
officers, Walter Lachman and Maurice Subilia, were sentenced
for conspiracy and export violations related to the unlicensed
export to India of equipment used to manufacture carbon-carbon
components with applications in ballistic missiles. All four
defendants had been convicted of one count of violating the
Export Administration Act (EAA) and one count of conspiracy by
a federal trial jury on March 31, 1995. The equipment, a
specially designed control panel for operation of a hot
isostatic press used to produce carbon-carbon items, was
exported to India's Defense Research Development Laboratory
(DRDL), the defense laboratory developing India's principal
nuclear-capable ballistic missile, the Agni. Lachman was
sentenced to three years probation, the first year of which is
to be spent in home detention. Subilia was sentenced to three
years probation, the first six months of which was to be spent
in community confinement to be followed by one year of home
detention. A criminal fine of $250,000 was imposed on Lachman,
Subilia, and Fiber Materials; no fine was imposed on Materials
International because it is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fiber
Materials. OEE and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
jointly conducted this investigation.
Berkeley Nucleonics--On June 6, 2004, BNC Corp. of San
Rafael, California (previously Berkeley Nucleonics Corporation)
was sentenced to five years probation and a $300,000 criminal
fine for illegally exporting pulse generators to two entities
in India without required export licenses. The end-users were
listed on BIS's entity list for nuclear nonproliferation
reasons. Two former employees of BNC, Richard Hamilton and
Vincent Delfino, were convicted in December 2003, for their
role in these exports. Each was sentenced to two years
probation, a $1,000 fine, and 100 hours of community service,
and was prohibited from engaging in or facilitating export
transactions. BIS assessed BNC a $55,000 administrative penalty
and a five-year suspended denial of export privileges as part
of an agreement with BNC to settle charges related to these
unlicensed exports.
DirecTV/Hughes Network Systems--in 2005, DirecTV/Hughes
Network Systems entered into a consent agreement with the
Department of State to settle alleged violations of the
International Trafficking in Arms Regulations related to the
unauthorized export of U.S. Military List hardware and services
to end users in a number of countries, including India.
Multigen Paradigm--in 2003, Multigen Paradigm entered into a
consent agreement with the Department of State to settle
alleged violations of the International Trafficking in Arms
Regulations related to unauthorized exports to a number of
countries, including India.
Question (1)(b). Secretary Rice, on March 9, 2006, the Department
of Commerce sanctioned two Indian persons for transactions with North
Korea.\6\ Please provide this committee, in classified form if
necessary but in open form if possible, with an interagency-coordinated
list regarding the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ 71 FR 12168 and 12170.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the Arms Export Control Act, the Export
Administration Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
and related legislation governing imports, exports or improper
financial transactions--
any civil or administration investigation involving India or any
Indian entity or other person, including any Indian national, since May
1998, and whether each such investigation is open or closed and, if
closed, the disposition; and
Answer. Information on investigations by the Customs Department,
due to the sensitivity of the information, will be provided separately.
The following are administrative investigations conducted by DOC/
BIS since February 2003 identified as involving possible illegal
exports to India in violation of the EAR. (Note: As noted above,
Commerce could only report on case statistics prior to February 2003.)
State Bank of India--In 2003, the Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control imposed a civil
penalty in the amount of $5,500 on the State Bank of India, New
York for a funds transfer made in violation of Executive Order
13121 of April 30, 1999. E.O. 13121, issued pursuant to IEEPA,
imposed sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a
result of the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo.
Orcas International--On March 2, 2006, Assistant Secretary
Darryl Jackson signed four Final Orders in connection with the
attempted un-licensed export of toxins (Aflatoxin and
Staphlyloccocal Enterotoxins) classified as ECCN 1C351, to end-
users in North Korea. Orcas International, of Flanders New
Jersey agreed to pay an administrative penalty of $19,800 and
have its export privileges denied for four years. Mr.
Graneshawar K. Rao, President of Orcas International, will have
his export privileges denied for four years. Dolphin
International of New Delhi, India, agreed to pay a $22,000
administrative penalty and have its export privileges denied
for four years. Vishwanath Kakade Rao, president of Dolphin
International, agreed to have his export privileges denied for
four years.
Becton Dickinson--On December 28, 2005, Assistant Secretary
Jackson signed a Final Order against Becton, Dickinson, & Co.,
of Franklin Lakes, New Jersey. Becton, Dickinson & Co was
ordered to pay a $123,000 administrative penalty, and was
subjected to an audit requirement. Becton, Dickinson, & Co.,
and their Singapore subsidiary, committed a total of thirty-six
violations of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by
exporting various life sciences research products to listed
entities from the Indian Department of Atomic Energy and Indian
Department of Defense.
Teledyne Technology--On April 15, 2005, Teledyne Energy
Systems Inc. (TES), Hunt Valley, Maryland, agreed to pay a
$16,500 administrative penalty. On three occasions in 1999 and
2000, TES exported technical information on proposed power
plants, items subject to the EAR, from the United States to
Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd (BHEL) in New Delhi, India,
without the required Commerce Department export licenses. At
the time of the export, BHEL was listed on BIS's Entity List,
which is a compilation of end-users who have been determined to
present an unacceptable risk of diversion to programs for the
development of weapons of mass destruction or their means of
delivery. TES voluntarily self-disclosed the violations and
cooperated fully in the investigation.
Yarde Metals--On April 12, 2005 Yarde Metals (Yarde) of
Happauge, New York, was ordered to pay a $10,000 administrative
penalty in connection with the unlicensed export of an aluminum
heat treatable plate to an organization in India on Commerce's
Entity List. On or about May 5, 2003, Yarde engaged in conduct
prohibited by the EAR when it exported an aluminum plate from
the United States to the Vikram Sarabhai Space Center.
Air Tiger Express)On March 30, 2005, Air Tiger Express, a
freight forwarder located in El Segundo, California, agreed to
pay a $49,500 administrative penalty to settle charges that on
nine occasions in 1998 and 1999, it aided and abetted the
unlicensed export of items subject to the EAR to organizations
in India that were on the Department's Entity List.
Datum Inc.--On October 28, 2004, Symmetricom, Inc. of San
Jose, California, as the successor to Datum, Inc. of Beverly,
Massachusetts, agreed to pay a $35,500 administrative penalty
to settle charges that Datum exported of a 10 MHz oscillator to
the Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy,
Directorate of Purchase and Stores in Mumbai, India.
New Brunswick Scientific--On August 30, 2004, New Brunswick
Scientific was ordered to pay a $51,000 administrative penalty
for the export of lab equipment, software and a fermentor to an
Entity List end-user, the Directorate of Purchase and Stores of
the Indian Department of Atomic Energy.
Chyron Corporation--On August 30, 2004, Chyron Corporation
was ordered to pay a $15,300 administrative penalty for the
export of an animation system to and Entity List end-user, the
Space Application Center in Ahmedabad, India.
The Sentry Company--On June 24, 2004, The Sentry Company was
ordered to pay a $25,000 administrative penalty for the export
of heat treating containers to an Entity List end-user, Bharat
Dynamics Ltd. in Hydrabad, India.
General Monitors--On June 14, 2004, General Monitors was
ordered to pay a $40,000 administrative penalty for the export
of gas and fire detection equipment to an Entity List end-user,
Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd. in Hyderabad, India.
RLC Electronics--On April 14, 2004, RLC Electronics was
ordered to pay a $30,000 administrative penalty for the export
of power dividers and low pass filters to the Indian Space
Research Organization, Telemetry, Tracking, and Command Network
in Bangalore, India, and the export of position switches
Sriharikota Space Center in Bangalore, India. Both of the
organizations were on the Entity List.
Atlas Copco--On March 10, 2004, Atlas Copco was ordered to
pay a $13,000 administrative penalty for the export of o-rings
and seals to an Entity List end-user, Bharat Heavy Electrical
Ltd. in Hyderabad, India.
Alicat Scientific--On March 4, 2004, Alicat Scientific was
ordered to pay a $7,000 ($2,000 suspended) administrative
penalty for the export of mass flow meters and power supplies
to an Entity List end-user, the Department of Atomic Energy in
Mumbai India.
Massive International--On January 15, 2004, Massive
International was ordered to pay a $13,000 administrative
penalty for the attempted export of hydraulic stud tensioners
to an Entity List end-user, Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd. in
Tiruchirapalli, India.
Denton Vacuum--On January 30, 2004, Denton Vacuum LLC was
ordered to pay a $7,000 administrative penalty for exporting a
sputtering system to an Entity List end-user, the Solid State
Physics Laboratory in New Delhi, India.
Future Metals--On November 12, 2003, Future Metals of Fort
Lauderdale, Florida, was ordered to pay a $180,000
administrative penalty for the export of aluminum sheets and
stainless steel tubes to an Entity List end-user, Hindustan
Aeronautics Ltd., Engine Division, and also for the export of
aluminum bars to another Indian end-user.
Astro-Med, Inc.--On September 26, 2003, the Commerce
Department issued an order implementing the terms of a
settlement agreement under which Astro-Med, Inc. of Warwick,
Rhode Island agreed to pay a $5,000 administrative penalty to
settle charges that it attempted to export a Dash 10M data
recorder to the Nuclear Power Corporation of India without the
required Department of Commerce license. BIS charged that
Astro-Med knew or had reason to know that the item to be
exported would be used directly or indirectly in an
unsafeguarded nuclear activity.
DSV Samson Transport, Inc.--On July 17, 2003, DSV Samson
Transport, Inc., a freight forwarding company based in New
Jersey, pled guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia, and was sentenced to pay a $250,000 criminal fine
and serve five years corporate probation for violations of U.S.
export laws. DSV Samson also agreed to pay a $399,000
administrative penalty to the Department of Commerce to settle
the administrative case relating to these illegal exports.
Between November 1999 and May 12, 2001, DSV Samson made 30
exports to organizations on the Entity List in India without
the required Department of Commerce export licenses. Despite
being informed by Special Agents from the Office of Export
Enforcement on at least three occasions about the regulations
controlling such shipments, DSV Samson forwarded these
shipments and caused violations of Department of Commerce
export controls designed to prevent nuclear proliferation.
Quest Technologies--On April 26, 2001, Quest Technologies
was ordered to pay a $225,000 administrative penalty ($135,000
suspended) for the illegal export of chlorine and sulfur
detectors to India, Vietnam, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
the United Arab Emirates.
Detector Electronics Corporation--On November 8, 2001, BIS
imposed a $15,000 administrative penalty on Detector
Electronics Corporation of Minneapolis, Minnesota, to settle
charges that the company exported U.S.-origin ultraviolet fire
detection systems to Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd. without the
required BIS license. Bharat was a company in India that was
identified on Commerce's Entity List. BIS alleged that Detector
Electronics Corporation exported the fire detection systems to
India on two occasions between November and December 1998.
Optical Associates, Inc.--On September 20, 2000, Optical
Associates, Inc., of Milpitas, California, pled guilty in the
U.S. District Court in the Northern District of California to
the charge that the company illegally exported a mask aligner
and related parts, in violation of the EAR, to the State Bank
of India with knowledge that the end-user would be Bhaba Atomic
Research Center (BARC), a prohibited entity in India. The mask
aligner is controlled for antiterrorism under the EAR. BARC is
a division of the Department of Atomic Energy of the Government
of India. Unlicensed exports to BARC have been prohibited since
June 30, 1997.
Coherent Inc.--On February 2, 1998, Coherent Inc. was
ordered to pay a $20,000 administrative penalty for the export
of plasma tubes for use in argon ion lasers to the Indian
Department of Atomic Energy.
Question (2). Secretary Rice, on March 9, 2006, the Department of
Commerce sanctioned two Indian persons for transactions with North
Korea.\7\ Please provide this committee, in classified form if
necessary but in open form if possible, with an interagency-coordinated
list regarding the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ 71 FR 12168 and 12170.
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With respect to any U.S. law providing for the imposition of
sanctions related to weapons of mass destruction, their means of
delivery, or conventional weapons, a summary of any internal
investigation, review or other examination undertaken by the Department
of State or the President of any Indian entities or other persons,
including any Indian national, whether the investigation, review or
other examination is open or closed and, if closed, the disposition of
each such investigation, review or examination.
Answer. We take seriously all reports of potential proliferation
activities and take appropriate action, including imposing sanctions
required or authorized under U.S. law, when evidence warrants. For
example, the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act (ISNA), formerly the
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (INPA), requires a bi-annual review
of information for possible sanctions actions and is a rolling process.
Other sanctions pursuant to U.S. legal authorities are considered
whenever evidence meets the legal criteria.
Since May 1998, the U.S. has imposed nonproliferation sanctions on
a number of different Indian entities pursuant to U.S. legal
authorities.
Owing to the nature of the information used for making sanctions
determinations and ongoing diplomatic exchanges with the Government of
India, further details of these particular sanctions cases would need
to be provided in a classified setting. We would be happy to brief the
committee as appropriate.
In July 2002, the U.S. imposed sanctions on the Indian
entity Hans Raj Shiv pursuant to the Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation
Act for the transfer to Iraq of equipment and technology
controlled by the Australia Group. The U.S. also sanctioned
Shiv pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control
and Warfare Elimination Act in February 2003.
In February 2003, the U.S. imposed sanctions on the Indian
entity NEC Engineers Pvt. Ltd. pursuant to Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act.
In February 2003, the U.S. imposed sanctions on the Indian
entity Protech Consultants, Pvt. Ltd. pursuant to the Iran-Iraq
Arms Nonproliferation Act for the transfer to Iraq of equipment
and technology controlled by the Australia Group.
Pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (INPA),
the U.S. has imposed sanctions four times on Indian entities.
In September 2004, the U.S. imposed INPA penalties on Dr. C.
Surendar and Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad; penalties on Dr. Surendar were
rescinded in December 2005. Also in December 2005, the U.S.
imposed INPA penalties on the Indian entities Sabero Organic
Chemicals Gujarat Ltd. and Sandhya Organic Chemicals Pvt. Ltd.
India's new Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their Delivery
Systems (Prohibitions of Unlawful Activities) Act, enacted in May 2005,
with its stronger ``catch-all'' provisions, strengthens considerably
the government's regulatory ability to control transfers of otherwise
uncontrolled items that could contribute to a WMD or missile program of
concern.
india's export control law
Question (1). Secretary Rice, in November of last year, U/S Joseph
stated with regard to India's new export control law (Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful
Activities) Act, adopted in 2005), that ``Department of State and
Commerce lawyers and export control experts have reviewed'' that law
but that ``no consolidated analytical document representing an
interagency assessment of India's export control law and regulations''
was available. Additionally, I asked whether the Department would
furnish questions it had sent to the Indian Government concerning that
law to this committee, and was informed that ``[g]iven the
sensitivities of the diplomatic communications involved, we cannot
provide the information for the record.''
Could you please provide me in classified form the questions the
Department asked the Indian Government regarding its WMD law?
Answer. We would be happy to provide a classified briefing to the
committee on the questions raised with the Indian government regarding
its WMD law.
Question (2). Please provide this committee with a consolidated
analytical document representing an interagency assessment of India's
export control laws and regulations.
Answer. No such consolidated analytical document representing an
interagency assessment of Indian export controls and regulations
currently exists. We would be happy to brief the committee on India's
export control laws and regulations.
Question (3). Secretary Rice, on March 10, 2006, the Washington,
DC-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)
released a report which concluded that India has ``a well-developed,
active, and secret Indian program to outfit its uranium enrichment
program and circumvent other countries' export control efforts'' and
that ``Indian procurement methods for its nuclear program leak
sensitive nuclear technology.''\8\
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\8\ Available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/
indianprocurement.pdf.
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In classified form if necessary, but in open form if possible,
please provide me with the Department's assessment of the allegations
raised in the ISIS report on Indian procurement, particularly with
regard to the alleged instances of illegal acquisition of equipment,
diversion of such equipment from stated end uses and/or end users, and
any risk of onward proliferation arising out of such activities.
Answer. We would be happy to discuss these allegations in
classified session.
Question (4). How would the requirements of relevant U.S. licenses
assure that any U.S. exports to Indian companies and trading agents
that are alleged to have promulgated or purchased sensitive tender
documents relating to uranium enrichment or other sensitive parts of
the nuclear fuel cycle do not transfer the know-how or items exported
from the United States to India to other companies or countries?
Answer. To clarify the scope of the question, the ``sensitive parts
of the nuclear fuel cycle'' will not be included in U.S.-India civil
nuclear cooperation. Our draft agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation provides that ``sensitive nuclear technology'' may not be
transferred without an amendment to the agreement, which would be
subject to congressional review.
India's safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA
will provide the IAEA with access to Indian facilities and programs,
including documentation, which will provide assurances against internal
diversion and re-transfer of controlled technology.
The details of licensing requirements are within the purview of the
licensing agencies, generally the Department of Commerce, the
Department of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
For dual-use nuclear exports administered by the Department of
Commerce, there are several ways the U.S. is assured that exports are
going to reliable recipients of U.S. origin items and have not been
diverted to unauthorized end user or end uses. As part of the license
application package we require nuclear certification that the item(s)
will not be used in any of the prohibited activities described in
744.2(a) of the EAR. Through the licensing process, the
intelligence and enforcement communities provide information on the
bona fides of prospective end-users. Commerce determines the bona fides
of the transaction and suitability of the end-user through the use of
pre-license checks. This information is then used to make licensing
decisions. As part of the approval process, export license normally
have conditions attached that prohibit reexport, retransfer, or use in
sensitive nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile end uses. We
require applicants to inform end-users of the licensing conditions. In
addition, the U.S. has an end use assurance letter from the Government
of India that commits to ensure that items are not transferred from or
through India for use in prohibited unsafeguarded nuclear, WMD, or WMD
delivery programs. Also through post-shipment verifications, the U.S.
visits recipients of U.S.-origin items to ensure that the items have
actually been delivered to the authorized ultimate consignee or end-
user and those items are being used as stated on the export license
application.
The transfer of uranium enrichment or other nuclear fuel technology
requires authorization by the Secretary of Energy under Section 57(b)
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The regulations that implement
Section 57(b) are found in 10 CFR Part 810 which requires that, prior
to such approval, government-to-government assurances outlining the
controls/conditions that will be used for securing this technology must
be in place. This includes the requirement that the transfer, anything
derived from the transfer, and anything that is produced or modified in
a facility constructed as a result of the transfer will be used for
peaceful purposes. Further, the United States places additional
conditions on the authorization to transfer the technology that limits
access and prohibits the retransfer of the technology.
india's status
Question (1). Secretary Rice, the July 2005 Joint Statement terms
India ``a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology.''\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-
6.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the purposes of U.S. compliance with the NPT, and under
relevant U.S. laws making reference to a non-nuclear weapon state or
states, does India remain a non-nuclear weapon state?
Answer. While India has nuclear weapons and we must deal with this
fact in a realistic, pragmatic manner, we do not recognize India as a
nuclear weapon state or seek to legitimize India's nuclear weapons
program.
The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
defines a ``Nuclear Weapon State'' as ``one which has manufactured and
exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to
January 1, 1967.'' India does not meet this definition, and we do not
seek to amend the Treaty to provide otherwise. U.S. law adopts the NPT
definition, so India is a non-nuclear weapon state for purposes of U.S.
law.
ANNEX--RECENT INDIA CASES
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sections Criminal
Order Date Respondent OEE Case Name Charges Violated VSD Result Case
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
03/17/06....................... Tech Pro, Inc. In the Matter of Exported software upgrades to the Vikram Sarabhai 764.2(a)[1] No Settlement No
Tech Pro, Inc. Space Center of Thiruvanthapuram, India, an Agreement--civil
organization on the Entity list penalty of $7,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
03/02/06....................... Orcas In the Matter of Conspired and acted in concert with others, known and 764.2(d)[1] No Settlement No
International, Orcas unknown, to export and attempted to export toxins 764.2(b)[1] Agreement--civil
Inc. International, from the United States to North Korea without the penalty of
Inc. required license $19,800; export
privileges denied
for four years for
items specified on
the Commerce
Control List
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
03/02/06....................... Vishwanath Kakade In the Matter of Conspired and acted in concert with others, known and 764.2(d)[1] No Settlement No
Rao Orcas unknown, to export and soliciting an export of toxins 764.2(c)[1] Agreement--export
International, from the United States to North Korea without the privileges denied
Inc. required license for four years
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
03/02/06....................... Graneshawar K. Rao In the Matter of Conspired and acted in concert with others, known and 764.2(d)[1] No Settlement No
Orcas unknown, to export and attempted to export toxins 764.2(b)[1] Agreement--export
International, from the United States to North Korea without the privileges denied
Inc. required license for four years for
items specified on
the Commerce
Control List
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
03/02/06....................... Dolphin In the Matter of Conspired and acted in concert with others, known and 764.2(d)[1] No Settlement No
International, Orcas unknown, to export and soliciting an export of toxins 764.2(c)[1] Agreement--civil
Ltd. International, from the United States to North Korea without the penalty of
Inc. required license $22,000; export
privileges denied
for four years
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12/28/05....................... Becton, Dickinson In the Matter of Exported biomedical research products, labware for 764.2(a)[36] Yes Settlement No
and Company Becton, Dickinson tissue culture and fluid handling and reagent systems Agreement--civil
and Company for life sciences research to organizations in India penalty of
on the Entity List without the required licenses $123,000; perform
audit of internal
compliance program
within 24 months
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
08/10/05....................... Quantachrome In the Matter of Exported an Automated Surface Area and Pore Size 764.2(a)[1] No Settlement No
Instruments Quantachrome Analyzer and related scientific instruments to the Agreement--civil
Instruments Department of Atomic Energy, Bhabha Atomic Research penalty of $6,000
Center, an organization on the BIS Entity List
without obtaining the required license
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
07/13/05....................... Gould Pumps, Inc. In the Matter of Exported magnetic drive and double mechanical seal 764.2(a)[13] Yes Settlement No
Gould Pumps, Inc. industrial pumps and parts to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 764.2(g)[13] Agreement--civil
India, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China penalty of
without the required licenses; made false statements $123,500
on SEDs
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
06/13/05....................... Lufthansa German In the Matter of Aided and abetted the export and attempted export of 764.2(b)[1] No Settlement No
Airlines Lufthansa German Cobalt-57 to the Department of Atomic Energy, 764.2(b)[1] Agreement--civil
Airlines Directorate of Purchase and Stores, India, an 764.2(e)[1] penalty of $18,000
organization on the BIS Entity List without the
required licenses and with knowledge that a violation
would occur
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
03/31/05....................... Teledyne Energy In the Matter of Exported technical information on proposed power 764.2(a)[3] Yes Settlement No
Systems, Inc. Teledyne plants to Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd (``BHEL'') in Agreement--civil
Technologies, Inc. New Delhi, India, an organization on the BIS Entity penalty of $16,500
List without the required licenses
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
03/30/05....................... Air Tiger Express In the Matter of Aided and abetted the unlicensed exports of items 764.2(b)[9] No Settlement No
Air Tiger Express subject to the EAR to organizations in India that Agreement--civil
were on the Entity List penalty of $49,500
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
03/14/05....................... Rockwell In the Matter of Exported balancing machines to Malaysia, Mexico, 764.2(a)[11] Yes Settlement No
Automation, Inc. Rockwell Venezuela without obtaining the required licenses; 764.2(g)[6] Agreement--civil
Automation, Inc. made false statements on SED concerning authority to penalty of $46,750
export; exported computer software and accessories to
Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited, Hardwar, an
organization on the BIS Entity List, without the
required license; reexported software, data
collectors and vibration monitors and associated
parts from the United Kingdom to organizations listed
on the Entity List without the required licenses
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
02/25/05....................... Yarde Metals, Inc. In the Matter of Exported one aluminum plate to Vikram Sarahbai Space 764.2(a)[1] No Settlement No
Yarde Metals, Inc. Center (VSSC) in India, an organization on the Entity Agreement--civil
List without the required license penalty of $10,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12/06/04....................... Terra Universal In the Matter of Exported EAR99 items (12 stainless steel pass-through 764.2(a)[1] No Settlement No
Inc. Terra Universal chambers and accessories) to the Solid State Physics Agreement--civil
Inc. Laboratory, an organization on the BIS Entity List penalty of $6,000
without the required license
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11/29/04....................... E.A. Fischione In the Matter of Attempted to export EAR99 item (a plasma cleaner) to 764.2(c)[1] No Settlement No
Instruments, Inc. E.A. Fischione an organization in India on the BIS Entity List Agreement--civil
Instruments, Inc. without the required license penalty of $6,300
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11/24/04....................... Shivram Rao In the Matter of Conspiracy to export EAR99 items (a thermal mechanical 764.2(d)[1] No Export privileges No
MTS Systems fatigue test system and a universal testing machine) 764.2(h)[2] denied for 10
Corporation to the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research 764.2(g)[1] years for each
(``IGCAR''), an organization on the BIS Entity List (Default Judgment)
without the required license; took actions to evade
the Regulations by diverting the true ultimate
consignee; made false statements in the course of an
investigation
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11/24/04....................... Technology Options In the Matter of Conspiracy to export EAR99 items (a thermal mechanical 764.2(d)[1] No Export privileges No
(India) Pvt. Ltd. MTS Systems fatigue test system and a universal testing machine) 764.2(h)[2] denied for 10
Corporation to the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research 764.2(g)[1] years for each
(``IGCAR''), an organization on the BIS Entity List (Default Judgment)
without the required license; took actions to evade
the Regulations by diverting the true ultimate
consignee; made false statements in the course of an
investigation
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11/18/04....................... Bernard A. Spear In the Matter of Exported EAR99 items (an amplifier, connector socket 764.2(a)[3] No Settlement No
Preston and spare parts) to an organization in India on BIS 764.2(e)[3] Agreement--export
Scientific, Inc. Entity List without the required licenses and with 764.2(g)[3] privileges denied
knowledge that violations would occur; made false for three years
statements on SED; made false statement to OEE
Special Agent in the course of an investigation
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11/18/04....................... Halear, Inc. In the Matter of Exported EAR99 items (an amplifier, connector socket, 764.2(a)[3] No Settlement No
Preston and spare parts) to an organization in India on BIS 764.2(e)[3] Agreement--civil
Scientific, Inc. Entity List without the required licenses and with 764.2(g)[3] penalty of
knowledge that violations would occur; made false $60,000; export
statements on SEDs; made false statement to OEE privileges denied
Special Agent in the course of an investigation for three years
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11/12/04....................... Bristol-Myers In the Matter of DuPont Merck exported and attempted to export Cobalt- 764.2(a)[1] No Settlement No
Squibb Medical DuPont Merck 57, iron foil, and potassium ferrocyanide to the 764.2(c)[1] Agreement--civil
Imaging, Inc., Pharmaceutical Department of Atomic Energy, Directorate of Purchase 764.2(e)[1] penalty of $16,200
successor to Company and Stores, an organization on the Entity List
Duport Merck without the required licenses and with knowledge that
Pharmaceutical a violation would occur
Company
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11/09/04....................... PartMiner, Inc. In the Matter of Exported electronic components to organizations in 764.2(a)[14] Yes Settlement No
PartMiner, Inc. India on the BIS Entity List without the required 764.2(g)[4] Agreement--civil
licenses; failed to file SED; made false statements penalty of $50,000
on SED
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10/27/04....................... Symmetricom, Inc., In the Matter of Exported cesium frequency standard equipment to 764.2(a)[2] No Settlement No
successor to Datum, Inc. Malaysia without the required license; made false 764.2(g)[2] Agreement--civil
Datum, Inc. statements on SEDs concerning the authority to 764.2(e)[1] penalty of $35,500
export; exported ovenized quartz crystal oscillator
to an organization in India on the Entity List
without the required license and with knowledge that
a violation would occur
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RECENT INDIA CASES
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sections
Order Date Cases Charges Violated Respondents Result
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
08/30/04....................... In the Matter of Exported animation system to the Space 764.2(a)[1]..... Chyron Corporation Settlement
Chyron Corporation Application Center in Ahmedabad, 764.2(e)[1]..... Agreement--civil
India, an organization on the Entity 764.2(g)[1]..... penalty of
List, without the required license $15,300
with knowledge that a violation of the
EAR would occur; made false or
misleading statement of material fact
in connection with the preparation of
an export control document
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
08/30/04....................... In the Matter of Exported lab equipment, software and 764.2(a)[8]..... New Brunswick Settlement
New Brunswick fermentor to the Directorate of 764.2(g)[2]..... Scientific Co., Agreement--civil
Scientific Co., Purchase and Stores, Department of Inc penalty of
Inc. Atomic Energy (DPS) in India, an $51,000
organization on the Entity List,
without the required license; failed
to file a SEDs; exported fermentors to
Taiwan and Israel without the required
licenses; made false or misleading
statements of material fact in
connection with the preparation of an
export control documents
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
06/24/04....................... In the Mater of Exported pulse generators to the 764.2(a)[5]..... Berkeley Nucleonics Settlement
Berkeley Directorate of Purchase and Stores, 764.2(e)[5]..... Corporation Agreement--civil
Nucleonics Department of Atomic Energy (DPS) in 764.2(g)[3]..... Administrative penalty of
Corporation India and the Nuclear Power 764.2(c)[1]..... Penalty: $40,000
Corporation, organizations on the
Entity List without the required Criminal Penalty:
licenses, with knowledge that
violations of the Act would occur; BNC: Five years'
made false or misleading statements of probation and
material fact in connection with the $300,000 criminal
preparation and submission of an fine
export control document; failed to
file a SED; attempted to export from Hamilton: Two
the United States to the DPS in India; years' probation,
former BNC employees Richard Hamilton a $1,000 criminal
and Vincent Delfino were also charged fine, and 100
with export control violations hours of
community
service, and
prohibited from
engaging in or
facilitating
export
transactions
Delfino: Two
years' probation,
a $1,000 criminal
fine, and 100
hours of
community
service, and
prohibited from
engaging in or
facilitating
export
transactions
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
06/24/04....................... In the Mater of The Exported heat treating containers to 764.2(a)[4]..... The Sentry Company Settlement
Sentry Company Bharat Dynamics Ltd., Hyderabad, Agreement--civil
India, an organization on the Entity penalty of
List without the required licenses $25,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
06/24/04....................... In the Matter of Exported nickel powder to Israel, 764.2(a)[45].... Kennametal Inc. Settlement
Kennametal Inc. Chile, Mexico, Peru, Taiwan, and India 764.2(g)[27].... Agreement--civil
without the required licenses; made 764.2(i)[3]..... penalty of
false or misleading representation on $262,500
SED concerning authority to export;
failed to retain export control
documents
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
06/04/04....................... In the Matter of Caused the shipment of gas and fire 764.2(a)[6]..... General Monitors, Settlement
General Monitors, detection equipment from the United 764.2(g)[12].... Inc. Agreement--civil
Inc. States to Bharat Heavy Electrical penalty of
Limited of Hyderabad, India (BHEL), an $40,000
organization on the Entity List
without the required licenses; made
false statements on Shippers Export
Declarations (SEDs)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
04/14/04....................... In the Matter of Exported power dividers and low pass 764.2(a)[4]..... RLC Electronis, Settlement
RLC Electronics, filters to the Indian Space Research 764.2(g)[1]..... Inc. Agreement--civil
Inc. Organization (``ISRO''), Telemetry, penalty of
Tracking and Command Network $30,000
(``ISTRAC''), Bangalore, India, an
organization on the Entity List
without the required licenses; filed a
Shippers Export Declaration with the
U.S. Government that represented
falsely that the power dividers
exported to ISRO were eligible for
export as NLR
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
03/10/04....................... In the Matter of Caused the shipment of items subject to 764.2(a)[2]..... Atlas Copco Settlement
Atlas Copco the EAR (seals and o-rings) to Bhrat Compressors Inc. Agreement--civil
Compressors Inc. Heavy Electrical Limited, Hyderabad, penalty of
Inda (BHEL), an organization on the $13,000
Entity List; engaged in prohibited
conduct by submitting an export
license application to BIS that sought
authorization to ship items that had
already been shipped
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
03/04/04....................... In the Matter of Caused the export of mass flow meters 764.2(a)[1]..... Alicat Scientific, Settlement
Alicat Scientific, and power supplies to the Department Inc. Agreement--civil
Inc. of Atomic Energy, Mumbia, India, an penalty of
organization on the Entity List $7,000, $2,000
suspended
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
02/26/04....................... In the Matter of Exported metallized polyimide films to 764.2(a)[4]..... Dunmore Corporation Settlement
Dunmore India without obtaining the required Agreement--civil
Corporation authorization penalty of
$27,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
01/15/04....................... In the Matter of Attempted to export hydraulic stud 764.2(c)[1]..... Massive Settlement
Massive tensioners to Bharat Heavy Electrical 764.2(e)[1]..... International Agreement--civil
International Limited of Tiruchirapalli, India, an Incorporated penalty of
Incorporated organization on the Entity List, $13,000
without the required license with
knowledge that a violation of the EAR
would occur
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
01/30/04....................... In the Matter of Exported a sputtering system to Solid 764.2(a)[1]..... Denton Vacuum, LLC Settlement
Denton Vacuum, LLC State Physics Laboratory, New Delhi, 764.2(g)[1]..... Agreement--civil
India, an organization of the Entity penalty of $7,000
List; filed or caused to be filed a
SED that represented falsely that the
sputtering system was eligible for
export under the authority of GDEST
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11/12/03....................... In the Matter of Exported aluminum bars to India without 764.2(a)[17].... Future Metals, Inc. Settlement
Future Metals, the required export licenses, with 764.2(e)[17].... Agreement--civil
Inc. knowledge that a violation of the Act, 764.2(i)[6]..... penalty of
the Regulations, or any other, license $180,000
or authorization; exported stainless
steel tubes to Hindustan Aeronautics
Limited, Engine Division, in India, an
organization of the Department of
Commerce Entity List; failed to retain
certain export control documents
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
09/26/03....................... In the Matter of Attempted to export a Dash 10M data 764.2(c)[1]..... Astro-Med, Inc. Settlement
Astro-Med, Inc. recorder to the Nuclear Power Agreement--civil
Corporation of India, an organization penalty of $5,000
listed on BIS's Entity List, without
the required license
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
07/17/03....................... In the Matter of Caused the export of items to 764.2(b)[33].... DSV Samson Administrative
DSV Samson organizations listed on the BIS Entity 764.2(e)[23].... Transport, Inc. Penalty:
Transport, Inc. List without the required license, 764.2(g)[3]..... Settlement
with knowledge that the goods would be Agreement--civil
exported in violation of the penalty of
Regulations; made false and misleading $399,000
material misrepresentations on
Shipper's Export Declaration Criminal Penalty:
concerning the authority to export $250,000
criminal fine and
five years'
corporate
probation
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11/08/01....................... In the Matter of Exported U.S.-origin ultraviolet fire 764.2(a)[2]..... Detector Settlement
Detector detection systems to Bharat Heavy Electronics Agreement--civil
Electronics Electrical Limited, an organization on Corporation penalty of
Corporation the Entity List, without obtaining the $15,000
required licenses
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
04/26/01....................... In the Matter of Exported from the United States 764.2(a)[45].... Quest Technologies, Settlement
Quest chlorine and sulphur dioxide gas Inc. Agreement--civil
Technologies, Inc. sensors to Vietnam, Taiwan, India, the penalty of
United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Saudi $225,000,
Arabia without obtaining the required $135,000
licenses suspended for one
year
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
03/15/01....................... In the Matter of Exported U.S.-origin Mask Aligner and 764.2(a)[1]..... Optical Associates, Export privileges
Optical parts from the United States to Bhaba Inc. denied to India
Associates, Inc. Atomic Research Center, an entity on for three years
the Department of Commerce Entity List
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
02/02/98....................... In the Matter of Exported to the Department of Atomic 787.6[2]........ Coherent, Inc. Settlement
Coherent, Inc. Energy, in India, U.S.-origin plasma Agreement--civil
tubes for use in argon ion lasers penalty of
without the required validated export $20,000
licenses
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RECENT INDIA CASES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Order Date Parties Charges Sentences
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11/18/05 Fiber Materials, Walter Conspiracy and violation of the Lachman: Three years'
Lachman, Maurice Export Administration Act probation (first year
Subilia related to the unlicensed in home detention);
export to India of equipment $250,000 criminal fine
to manufacture carbon-carbon Subilia: Three years'
components with applications probation (first six
in ballistic missiles months in community
confinement, followed
by one year in home
detention); $250,000
criminal fine
Fiber Materials:
$250,000 criminal fine
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
06/06/04 In the Matter of Exported to the Department of Coherent, Inc.
Coherent, Inc. Atomic Energy, in India, U.S.-
origin plasma tubes for use in
argon ion lasers without the
required validated export
licenses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Information Submitted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies
nonproliferation issues raised by u.s.-india nuclear deal, march 2,
2006
With few details yet known regarding the content of the agreement
signed by U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh, it is too early to provide a comprehensive
authoritative analysis and evaluation of the accord. Nonetheless, what
has been initially disclosed about the pact raises a range of important
issues, which will require further attention as the agreement is
assessed by the U.S. Congress, the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group,
and the broader international community.
A fundamental question raised by the agreement is whether it
strengthens or weakens efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons.
Issue I: In explaining the agreement the Bush administration has
stressed that India has enacted tough export control regulations,
agreed to continue its moratorium on nuclear testing, agreed not to
export sensitive uranium enrichment and plutonium separation
(reprocessing) technologies, and to work with the United States on
negotiating a global ban on the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons.
An assessment will be needed of which of these undertakings
were already Indian policy prior to the July 18, 2005, Bush-
Singh summit, where the contours of the March 2 agreement were
endorsed; which are required by international law, irrespective
of the March 2 agreement; and which are the product,
specifically of the March 2 agreement.
Issue II: Under the agreement India will undertake to divide its
nuclear facilities into civilian and military installations and to
place the civilian facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) inspection, precluding their use for nuclear weapons.
Information released on March 2 indicated that India will place
approximately two-thirds of its nuclear installations under IAEA
monitoring.
An assessment will be needed as to whether the division
between civilian and military facilities constrains Indian
nuclear weapons production capabilities or leaves such
capabilities intact, or actually facilitates India's ability to
produce more fissile material.
Issue III: Based on available information, a number of nuclear
power reactors, using Canadian-supplied technology, will not be placed
under IAEA inspection, but will be placed on India's military list,
intended for use in the country's nuclear weapons program. These
facilities can be used both to produce electricity and weapons-quality
plutonium.
An assessment will be needed as to whether the division
means that technology originally supplied by outside states
that was intended for peaceful uses will now be used for
military purposes. If India has now declared a diversion of
technology from peaceful to military use, an assessment will be
required as to whether India can be expected to reliably abide
by future civil nuclear trade agreements.
Issue IV: It appears that plutonium (separated and in spent fuel)
that was created previously in reactors that will now be placed under
IAEA inspection will not, itself, be subject to inspection. This will
provide a substantial stockpile of material for the enlargement of the
Indian nuclear weapons arsenal.
An assessment will be needed of the impact of this
uninspected stockpile of material on the overall dimensions of
the March 2 agreement.
Issue V: It appears that new civil nuclear cooperation by the
United States and other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group could
provide uranium supplies for the Indian nuclear power program that will
enable India to use more limited indigenous uranium supplies for
nuclear weapons.
An assessment will be needed of whether such assistance from
the United States would violate its obligation under the
nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to ``not in any way to assist,
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices. . . .'' Other nuclear supplier
states have similar obligations.
Issue VI: Ending the nuclear trade embargo against India could
create important precedents.
An assessment will be needed as to whether the United
States-India agreement: Will encourage other similarly situated
states, such as Pakistan, to seek comparable exceptions from
existing international rules of nuclear commerce; will
encourage other states, such as Iran, to leave the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty; will encourage states like Brazil,
which joined the NPT in the expectation that this would provide
access to civil nuclear technology denied to states outside the
treaty, to reconsider their support for the treaty.
Issue VII: More broadly, in promoting the agreement, the Bush
administration has emphasized that it is a key factor in cementing
United States-Indian relations on such important issues as meeting the
threat of radical Islam and serving as a military counterweight to
China.
With United States-Indian relations already flourishing,
including in the area of defense cooperation, an assessment
will be needed as to whether the agreement is central to the
enhancement of United States-Indian strategic relations or
merely an additional, nonessential element in improving ties
between the two nations.
__________
India and the New Look of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy\1\
(By William C. Potter, Center for Nonproliferation Studies)
The old football adage ``You can't tell the players without a
program'' applies increasingly to the international politics of
nonproliferation. Gone are the days when the United States routinely
lined up on the side of those pursuing the goal of halting and
reversing the spread of nuclear weapons. This change in Washington's
nonproliferation game plan has been underway for some time, but was
most clearly expressed in the July 18, 2005, India-United States Joint
Statement. This extraordinary document, which reverses more than a
quarter century of U.S. declaratory policy, suggests that the national
security team of George W. Bush regards nuclear proliferation to be
both inevitable and not necessarily a bad thing.
In light of the magnitude of this policy shift and its potential to
impact negatively on the NPT, associated nonproliferation institutions,
and even elements of the President's own nonproliferation initiatives,
one would have expected the policy announcement to follow a careful and
systematic review of the costs and benefits of the proposed change. A
rational decision would have required input from all of the major
governmental players with nonproliferation responsibilities, including
the senior officials in charge of nonproliferation policy in the
Departments of State and Energy. In fact, however, the new policy
appears to have been formulated without a comprehensive high-level
review of its potential impact on nonproliferation, the significant
engagement of many of the government's most senior nonproliferation
experts, or a clear plan for achieving its implementation. Indeed, the
policy shift bears all the signs of a top-down administrative directive
specifically designed to circumvent the interagency review process and
to minimize input from any remnants of the traditional
``nonproliferation lobby.''\2\
what precisely has changed?
U.S. nuclear export policy has undergone at least three major
transformations since 1945. An initial emphasis on secrecy and denial,
highlighted by the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, gave way in 1954 to the
active promotion internationally of peaceful uses of atomic energy.
This phase came to an end in 1974 following the Indian detonation of a
``peaceful nuclear explosion'' and the adoption by the United States of
an export policy emphasizing technology control. Although Washington's
public rebuke of India was mild, the Indian explosion not only led to a
major revision in U.S. thinking about nuclear exports, but it had the
effect of moving nonproliferation from the periphery toward center
stage on Washington's foreign policy agenda. One consequence of the
change in priority was intensification of U.S. diplomatic efforts to
establish strict guidelines for the major nuclear exporting states
covering the transfer of nuclear fuel and sensitive technology. An
important multinational initiative--the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)--
was mobilized for this purpose.
The NSG politically obligates its 45 members to pursue two sets of
guidelines for nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports. Central to
the guidelines, which like other aspects of NSG policy were adopted by
consensus, is the principle that only NPT parties or other states with
comprehensive (``full-scope'') safeguards in place should benefit from
nuclear transfers. It is this principle of comprehensive safeguards as
a condition for export, which the United States labored long and hard
to persuade the NSG to adopt, that will have to be abandoned if the
India-United States Joint Statement is implemented.
The key provision of the joint statement that will necessitate a
fundamental change in U.S. nuclear export policy is the promise by the
U.S. President that he will seek to adjust U.S. laws and policies, as
well as international regimes, to enable full civil nuclear energy
cooperation and trade with India. These adjustments are necessary since
India does not have full-scope safeguards in place and is one of only
four states (along with Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea) that remain
outside of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
By promising that the United States will work to achieve full civil
nuclear cooperation with India, President Bush has announced, for all
practical purposes, that technology control is no longer the
cornerstone of U.S. nuclear export and nonproliferation policy.
Instead, it has given way to a strategy in which politics has primacy
and regional security and international economic objectives trump those
of nonproliferation. Although this shift is not the first time
nonproliferation objectives have been subordinated to other U.S.
foreign policy considerations, it represents the most radical change in
recent nuclear export policy.
the underpinnings of the new policy
It always is dangerous to attribute much rationality to the process
by which policy changes or to assume that policy will be internally
consistent. Moreover, as suggested above, it is not obvious that
nonproliferation considerations were given much weight in the decision
to alter U.S. policy toward India. Nevertheless, to the extent that
assumptions about proliferation influenced the shift in U.S. policy,
they would appear to include the following perspectives:\3\
1. Nuclear proliferation is inevitable; at best it can be managed,
not prevented. According to this perspective, nuclearization of the
Indian subcontinent should have been anticipated and cannot be
reversed. Although the pace of nuclear weapons spread globally has been
much slower than predicted, we are approaching a new ``tipping point''
in which a number of second tier states may ``go nuclear.'' U.S. policy
to counter proliferation must be selective. In those instances in which
the United States cannot prevent nuclear weapons spread, it can and
should seek to influence the development of responsible nuclear weapons
policies on the part of new nuclear nations that are consistent with
U.S. national interests, including the adoption of enhanced safety and
security procedures and practices.
2. There are good proliferators and bad proliferators. U.S.
decisionmakers and scholars generally have viewed the spread of nuclear
weapons negatively. This perspective has persisted for most of the
post-World War II period and has not varied greatly regardless of the
orientation of the prospective proliferator. Throughout most of the
1970s and 1980s, for example, U.S. nonproliferation declaratory policy
remained adamantly opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons despite the
fact that many of the countries of greatest proliferation concern--
states such as Argentina, Brazil, Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, South
Korea, and even India and Pakistan--were either friends of the United
States, or at least not its adversaries. This prevailing perspective
continued during the 1990s at a time when the number of states of
proliferation concern diminished but were seen to be more anti-American
in orientation (e.g., Iraq and Iran). A minority viewpoint, however,
has long questioned the assumption that proliferation necessarily was
undesirable. Kenneth Waltz, in particular, popularized the view that
the spread of nuclear weapons may promote regional stability, reduce
the likelihood of war, and make wars harder to start.\4\ Although it is
not obvious that the proponents of a reorientation in U.S. policy
toward India have been directly influenced by Waltz's arguments, the
India-United States Joint Statement indicates more clearly than ever
before that Washington is not opposed to the possession of nuclear
weapons by some states, including those outside of the NPT.\5\ This new
policy of nonproliferation exceptionalism is far more explicit and
pronounced than prior routine efforts by the United States and its
allies to deflect criticism of Israel's nuclear policies in different
international fora. As one defense expert close to the administration
reportedly put it, unlike the Clinton administration which ``had an
undifferentiated concern about proliferation,'' the Bush administration
is not afraid to distinguish between friends and foes.\6\
3. Multilateral mechanisms to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
are ineffectual. The Bush administration has consistently exhibited a
strong preference for foreign policy and military tools that are
unconstrained by the need to seek approval from international
organizations or multilateral bodies be they the IAEA, the U.N.
Security Council, or even NATO. This general orientation applies with
equal force to the nonproliferation sphere, and was in evidence at the
2005 NPT Review Conference in which the United States invested few
resources, was ill-prepared, and lacked even a realistic vision about
what would constitute a productive outcome. For those inclined to be
dismissive of the utility of multilateral instruments, the inability of
the unwieldy NPT body to agree on any nonproliferation measures must
have reinforced their prior conviction that nonproliferation progress
will only be achieved by unilateral action or streamlined ``coalitions
of the willing.'' Ironically, in light of the changes it has promised
to seek pursuant to the joint statement, the one established
multilateral nonproliferation body that the Bush administration had
sought to strengthen recently was the NSG.
4. Regional security and economic considerations trump those of
global nonproliferation. Diplomats and scholars have long struggled
with the problem of how best to enhance nuclear stability in South Asia
without appearing to reward those few states not party to the NPT--the
most widely subscribed-to treaty in the world. Compounding this dilemma
is the difficulty of reconciling the reality that India, Israel, and
Pakistan possess nuclear weapons with the language of Article IX of the
NPT that explicitly restricts nuclear weapon status to those five
states which manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to
January 1, 1967. The India-United States Joint Statement essentially
resolves the dilemma by ignoring how other states may interpret the
repudiation by the United States of existing domestic law and
international political obligations regarding nuclear trade with a non-
NPT state. It does so, presumably, because the powers that be in
Washington have determined that a combination of international
political and economic objectives takes precedence over
nonproliferation considerations. Although these objectives have not yet
been publicly enunciated by the administration, there is good reason to
believe that they include the conviction that a substantial Indian
nuclear arsenal will serve U.S. interests in Asia in the future vis-a-
vis a more assertive and powerful China.
The convergence of United States and Indian national security
interests vis-a-vis China is emphasized by Robert Blackwill, U.S.
Ambassador to India during President Bush's first term and often cited
as the most influential proponent of the shift in U.S. policy toward
lndia.\7\ According to Blackwill, there are ``no two [other] countries
which share equally the challenge of trying to shape the rise of
Chinese power.''\8\
This argument is made even more explicitly by Ashley Tellis in a
report issued by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace four
days before the joint statement by President Bush and Prime Minister
Singh.\9\ According to Tellis, who served as Senior Policy Advisor to
Blackwill during his tenure in India and is also credited to be one of
the principal intellectual architects of the new U.S. policy, it would
be a mistake to attempt to integrate India ``into the nonproliferation
order at the cost of capping the size of its eventual nuclear
deterrent.''\10\ To do so would be ``to place New Delhi at a serious
disadvantage vis-a-vis Beijing, a situation that could not only
undermine Indian security but also U.S. interests in Asia in the face
of the prospective rise of Chinese power over the long term.''\11\ To
his credit, Tellis openly acknowledges the fundamental danger to the
global nonproliferation regime posed by the shift in U.S. policy that
his report anticipated. However, he believes the risk is manageable and
is justified by U.S. geopolitical interests that transcend
nonproliferation.
In this regard, it should be noted that some elements of the new
U.S. policy toward India have antecedents in which nonproliferation
considerations in South Asia also took a back seat to other foreign
policy and national security objectives. This situation prevailed vis-
a-vis Pakistan throughout most of the 1980s following the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. It also can be discerned after 9/11 in the
less than forceful manner in which the United States has pressed
Pakistan to reveal the full scope of the AQ Khan network. Prior to the
July 18 joint statement, however, the tradeoffs between pursuing global
nonproliferation objectives and those of regional security were never
linked as directly or publicly.
what are the likely consequences?
It is difficult to isolate the nonproliferation impact of the
India-United States Joint Statement from a number of other
developments. It also is premature to assess the longer term
nonproliferation consequences of the reorientation in U.S. policy
toward India. To some extent, the impact of the July statement will
depend on its implementation by Washington and New Delhi, how widely it
is emulated and/or supported by other major states, and the degree to
which it is reflected in further departures from traditional U.S.
nonproliferation policy. Nevertheless, one can venture a number of
hypotheses about how the turn in U.S. policy may affect the
international dynamics of nonproliferation.
Erode the NPT
One of the most influential studies of U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation policy adopted as a guiding principle Florence
Nightingale's admonition that ``Whatever else hospitals do they should
not spread disease.''\12\ Although the joint statement purports to
encourage more prudent nonproliferation behavior by India, it is far
more likely to promote the further spread of nuclear weapons by eroding
the norm of nonproliferation embodied in the NPT. It is apt to have
this effect by reinforcing doubts by many NPT members about the
commitments by the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to their treaty
obligations and the benefits the nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS) derive
from the treaty.
The timing of the joint statement, coming on the heels of the
disappointing and largely unproductive 2005 NPT Review Conference, will
be perceived by many states as further evidence that the United States
cannot be counted on to honor its nonproliferation obligations.
Contributing to this view is the not unrealistic assessment on the part
of many NPT members that U.S. policy in the leadup to the Review
Conference and during its negotiation was characterized by relatively
low-level and inexperienced representation, inadequate preparation,
little interagency coordination, inconsistent policy implementation,
and little concern for the consequences of a failed conference. NPT
members also will not overlook the parallels between the U.S. readiness
to disavow political commitments it undertook with respect to arms
control and disarmament at the 2000 NPT Review Conference (i.e., the
``13 Practical Steps'') and the further disavowals that the joint
statement will require if it is implemented. These pertain to the
Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament taken at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference that
``New supply arrangements . . . should require as a necessary
precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and
internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'' (paragraph 12), and the
reaffirmation of this principle at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
Given this recent proclivity by the United States to interpret
selectively its NPT and NSG obligations, other NPT members may
reasonably question the value Washington attaches to the current fabric
of nonproliferation treaties, regimes, and guidelines and reduce their
own investments in nonproliferation accordingly. How, one may ask, does
the United States persuade Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, or
China to strengthen their nuclear export controls when it announces its
intention to weaken its own nuclear export regulations?
The joint statement also is apt to be reviewed particularly closely
and critically by a number of NPT members who themselves previously
possessed nuclear weapons or pursued their acquisition. Although the
United States did not formally recognize India as an nuclear weapon
state in the joint statement, the voluntary nature of IAEA safeguards
that the Indian Prime Minister agreed to accept and the limitation of
these safeguards to India's civilian nuclear program convey the
impression that the United States is prepared to treat India for some
purposes as it does other nuclear weapons states recognized by the NPT.
This change in posture, which will almost certainly be viewed by most
states as a reward to India for its nuclear weapons tests, is apt to be
resented strongly by countries such as South Africa and Ukraine that
previously claimed nuclear weapons but relinquished them in order to
join the NPT as NNWS. It will be regarded with equal resentment by
regional powers such as Argentina, Brazil, and Egypt that explored a
nuclear weapons option, but voluntarily chose to forego that
possibility in favor of membership in the NPT.
It is reasonable to assume that these and other states that at one
time or another seriously contemplated and/or pursued military nuclear
programs may reconsider the wisdom of their prior nonproliferation
decisions in light of the new U.S. posture toward India. A similar
reassessment of the value of the NPT for their national security may be
undertaken by a set of NNWS that have not actively pursued a nuclear
weapons option, but made explicit the conditionality of their NPT
membership on assurances that the international community would not
recognize any additional NWS. Japan is perhaps the best example of this
group. Not only has it has been the most consistent and outspoken
critic of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, but its senior
officials repeatedly have emphasized that if the assurances Japan
received prior to joining the NPT were not honored, it would have to
reconsider the role of the treaty in promoting its security. The point
to emphasize in this regard is not that Japan or any other state
necessarily will repudiate their NPT membership as a direct consequence
of the shift in U.S. policy toward India, but rather to acknowledge
that decisionmaking about nonproliferation is a dynamic process that
does not end with accession to the NPT. Just as U.S. policy preferences
regarding nonproliferation may change over time, so may of those
countries that currently adhere to the NPT as nonnuclear weapon states.
The shift in U.S. policy toward India also coincides with growing
frustration by many nonnuclear weapons states with the pace of nuclear
disarmament and the commitment on the part of the nuclear weapon states
to their Article VI legal obligations, as well as those political
commitments assumed under the 1995 Decision on Principles and
Objectives and the 13 Practical Steps of the 2000 NPT Review Conference
final declaration. If, as is likely, the reorientation in U.S. policy
toward India is embraced, or at least accepted, by the four other NWS
parties to the treaty, one or more NNWS may decide that dramatic action
is required to demonstrate the erosion of the NPT and its diminished
value as a means to achieve disarmament. Although the joint statement
by itself is unlikely to lead directly to the defection by one of these
disenchanted NNWS, it could provide further impetus for such an act by
a country such as Mexico or Egypt. In the case of Mexico, the defiant
action almost certainly would be only symbolic. In the Egyptian case,
however, a desire to highlight the disarmament shortcomings of the NPT
may coincide with other less symbolic reasons for leaving the treaty,
including dissatisfaction with the lack of implementation of the 1995
resolution on the Middle East and wariness in Cairo that Iran has
embarked on a dedicated nuclear weapons program. If, as a consequence
of the joint statement, Egyptian decisionmakers perceive the costs of
leaving the NPT to be diminished, their overall nonproliferation
calculus could be significantly altered.
Undermine Efforts To Strengthen Export Controls
On February 11, 2004, President Bush gave a major address at
National Defense University in which he outlined a new nonproliferation
strategy. A key component of his proposal was to close a perceived
loophole in Article IV of the NPT that enables NNWS to acquire all
forms of nuclear technology, including sensitive uranium enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing facilities, as long as they are under IAEA
safeguards and are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. In
particular, President Bush called on the Nuclear Suppliers Group to
tighten its export control guidelines by prohibiting the export of
enrichment and reprocessing technology and equipment to countries that
do not already operate enrichment and reprocessing plants. This
initiative, prompted in particular by Iran's pursuit of a uranium
enrichment capability, appeared to attach increasing importance to the
NSG as a primary antiproliferation mechanism that might compensate in
part for deficiencies in the less flexible NPT. The President's 2004
proposal also was consistent with U.S. efforts to strengthen the NSG
throughout much of its existence, including successful efforts to fend
off attempts by Russia in recent years to dilute the body's guidelines
by creating a special nuclear export exception for India. The tough
U.S. stance on exports, apparent as late as the last NSG meeting in
June 2005, actually appeared to yield some results as Russia, in what
one commentator described as a ``fit of lawabidingness,'' reluctantly
told India in late 2004 that it could no longer supply nuclear fuel for
two reactors at Tarapur because of NSG constraints.\13\
No doubt, policymakers in Russia feel vindicated by the shift in
U.S. policy signaled by the July 2005 joint statement. Nuclear vendors
in France and a number of other NSG states that have long eyed the
market opportunities in India also will applaud the new U.S. approach
and can be expected to encourage their governments to support the
creation of a special export regime for India under the NSG even if it
means establishing the principle of exceptionalism.\14\ Although
numerous NSG members are likely to have major reservations about the
negative nonproliferation impact of nuclear exports to a non-NPT state,
most are likely to hold their noses and not overtly oppose Washington's
efforts to modify the NSG export guidelines. According to several U.S.
officials who asked not to be named, ultimately the NSG will adopt the
change in policy advocated by the United States, although at the cost
of undermining the ability of President Bush to achieve what had been
the priority objective of limiting exports of uranium enrichment
technology and equipment.\15\
Already Iranian nuclear negotiators have pointed out the
inconsistency of U.S. efforts to deny enrichment technology to a NNWS
party to the NPT while supporting nuclear trade with a non-NPT state
that has a dedicated and demonstrated nuclear weapons program. The
tenuous logic of the new U.S. position also is not apt to be lost on
the DPRK or some NPT NNWS that would like to acquire dual use
technology capable of producing weapons grade fissile material under
the guise of a civilian nuclear energy program. In addition, one must
assume that new NSG members such as China will find it much more
difficult to internalize the argument about the importance of stringent
nuclear exports when U.S. policy is applied in an exceptionalist
fashion. A Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, for
example, observes that the United States-India nuclear cooperation
could prompt other suppliers, like China, to justify nuclear exports to
Pakistan.\16\
can one limit the damage?
It is unrealistic to assume that the Bush administration will
acknowledge that nonproliferation instruments and norms have been
weakened as a result of the India-United States Joint Statement or
attempt to repair the damage that already has been done. It also is
unlikely that Congress will challenge the President directly on his
initiative, particularly if it is cast in terms of power politics vis-
a-vis China. The administration, however, does not yet appear to have a
clear plan about how to obtain the changes in, or waivers of, complex
U.S. domestic law governing nuclear exports; nor can it be assured that
Congress will be prepared to support either Presidential waivers or
amendments to relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act prior to
implementation by India of the safeguards commitments Prime Minister
Singh pledged to undertake under the terms of the joint statement.\17\
At a minimum, before acting on the administration's request, Congress
should insist that India implement its safeguards commitments and
pledge to continue to honor all prior legal understandings regarding
U.S. nuclear transfers, including U.S. prior consent.\18\ Although the
administration is apt to resist an attempt by Congress to attach any
additional conditions to the joint statement, it would be appropriate
for Congress to call attention to the conspicuous absence in the joint
statement of any commitment by India to cease production of fissile
material for weapons purposes and to express the sense of Congress that
such a pledge should be forthcoming before the United States is
prepared to resume nuclear trade.
The Bush administration is apt to meet resistance initially at the
NSG, which operates on the principle of consensus, to create a separate
export control regime for India. Critics of the new approach will
remind Washington of its own powerful arguments against such a move,
and some NNWS members of the NSG, such as South Africa, Germany, and
Canada, may oppose an exceptionalist approach as it will appear to
devalue the benefits of NNWS membership in the NPT. Although it would
be desirable for the NSG to resist the Bush administration's new plan,
ultimately Washington is apt to get its way, particularly given the
support its proposal will have from Russia, France, and possibly other
NWS. This victory, however, is likely to be at the cost of losing any
prospect for obtaining the restrictions it previously sought on the
export of uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology and equipment.
The best that can be hoped for from a nonproliferation perspective, is
that NSG members can be persuaded that indeed India is an exceptional
case and that similar exceptions should not be granted to other states
that are outside of the NPT and do not subscribe to full-scope
safeguards. Ashley Tellis, for example, argues that ``[s]eeking
exceptions while still trying to maintain universal goals need not
weaken the larger nonproliferation order if the United States uses its
power artfully to bring along leading countries within the regime. . .
.''\19\ That expectation, however, probably is unrealistic given the
less than artful exercise of power typically displayed by the United
States, the precedent that the Indian case will set, and the history of
nuclear trade between other NSG and non-NPT members (e.g., China and
Pakistan).
The Bush administration has avoided commentary on the possible
impact of the joint statement on Indian-Pakistani relations. Although
it is not obvious how the new U.S. stance toward India will enhance
regional stability in South Asia, that objective needs to be pursued as
a priority, as does the goal of improving the security of both nuclear
weapons and fissile material. If the joint statement provides the
United States with additional leverage to influence the nuclear posture
of India and to reinforce prudent practices with respect to securing
nuclear weapons and material, that opportunity should be exploited. In
particular, the United States should discourage strongly any further
expansion of the Indian nuclear arsenal and the production of
additional fissile material for that purpose. India and Pakistan also
both should be encouraged to refrain from nuclear weapon practices that
could reduce crisis stability and prompt rapid employment of nuclear
arms. Although the joint statement also should be utilized to reinforce
India's prior good behavior in the nuclear export sphere, the far
greater risk of imprudent exports resides in Pakistan, and it is not
apparent how the new U.S. approach to India will improve Pakistani
practices with respect to either nuclear exports or the safeguarding of
its nuclear assets.
A number of the more harmful nonproliferation outcomes identified
above could be mitigated were India and the United States to
demonstrate that as part of their new strategic relationship they also
were committing themselves or strengthening their existing commitments
to a number of disarmament and nonproliferation measures highly valued
by most members of the international community. Although there is no
prospect that either state will undertake what would be the most
powerful and significant gesture--ratification of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty--it is conceivable, if unlikely, that several more
modest but important measures could be supported. Both countries, for
example, should express their support for an indefinite moratorium on
nuclear testing. India also should agree to a moratorium, already in
place for the United States, on the production of fissile material for
military purposes, and both countries should support the conclusion of
a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. In addition, Washington
should initiate the return to the United States of the small number of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons currently deployed in Europe and propose
steps to reduce its stockpile of nuclear warheads in addition to its
deployed weapons.\20\ Although implementation of these measures by
India and the United States would not rectify all of the negative
nonproliferation consequences of the joint statement, it would help to
replenish what currently is a serious disarmament and nonproliferation
credibility deficit in both countries.
conclusions
In terms of nonproliferation, the best that reasonably can be
expected to result from the India-United States Joint Statement is a
one-time detour by the United States on the road toward promoting
universal adherence to the objectives of the NPT. Sadly, this ``best
case'' interpretation is more likely to be correct if, in fact, the
recent decision to reverse policy on India was made in haste without
due input from senior officials with nonproliferation responsibilities
and with little regard to nonproliferation considerations. In that
case, it is possible that the course of U.S. nonproliferation policy
has not yet been fully determined and may constitute less of a break
with traditional policy than has been suggested in this article. One
indication of this tendency would be a disavowal by the Bush
administration of its commitments under the joint statement if there is
inaction or backsliding by India in its promised undertakings.
Some backsliding by both the United States and India is probably
inevitable given complaints in both countries about who has to do what
first. If treated as a target of opportunity, this slippage actually
might be a good thing. It could afford the United States the
opportunity to refurbish its nonproliferation credentials while still
offering India the prospect of greater cooperation in the realm of
nuclear safety and security, as well as research in nuclear fusion for
power generation. Such a package could be crafted creatively so as not
to collide directly with the NPT and the NSG, and could serve as a
basis for similar arrangements with Pakistan.
To return to the football analogy, it is now an appropriate moment
to call timeout. It is not too late to change the game plan. The stakes
are very high and neither the United States nor the international
community can afford to lose this nonproliferation match.
------------
Endnotes:
\1\The author is grateful to Gaurav Kampani, Jean duPreez, Scott
Parrish, Lawrence Scheinman, Nikolai Sokov, Leonard Spector, and
Jonathan Tucker for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
\2\Telephone interviews by the author and other CNS staff with U.S.
government officials (names withheld by request), July 19, 2005, and
July 25, 2005. Gaurav Kampani compares the strategic shift and the
manner in which it was accomplished to Kissinger's opening with China.
Gaurav Kampani, correspondence with author, August 13, 2005.
\3\A number of these assumptions are shared by actors other than
those wielding power in the Bush administration and several variants of
them also found expression during the Clinton administration.
\4\See Kenneth N. Waltz, ``The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May
Be Better,'' Adelphi Paper 171 (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1981). For an updated version of Waltz' argument see
Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, ``The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A
Debate Renewed'' (New York: Norton, 2003).
\5\One prominent advocate for the new policy who is familiar with
Waltz' arguments is Ashley J. Tellis. See his important study,
``India's Emerging Nuclear Posture'' (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).
\6\Defense Science Board Chairman William Schneider quoted by
Edward Alden and Edward Luce, ``A New Friend is Asia,'' The Financial
Times (August 21, 2001), http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/
articles.html.
\7\See, for example, Dana Milbank and Dafna Linzer, ``U.S., India
May Share Nuclear Technology,'' Washington Post (July 19, 2005) and
Zlatica Hoke, ``U.S. and India Getting Closer Than Ever,'' Voice of
America New Analysis (July 22, 2005).
\8\Robert Blackwill quoted in Hoke, ``U.S. and India Getting
Closer.'' See also, the Honorable Robert Blackwill, ``Why is India
America's Natural Ally?'' In the National Interest (May 2005), http://
www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/May%202005/
May2005BIackwill.html.
\9\See Ashley J. Tellis, ``India As a New Global Power''
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).
\10\Ibid, p. 25: For relevance to Tellis' role in the plan to
change U.S. policy, see Milbank and Linzer.
\11\Ibid. Consistent with this perspective is the absence in the
Joint Statement of any commitment by India to stop production of
fissile material for weapons.
\12\ Albert Wohlstetter et al., ``Moving Toward Life in a Nuclear
Armed Crowd?'' Report to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(Los Angeles: Pan Heuristics, 1976, p. 1. A revised version of the
report was published as ``Swords from Plowshares'' (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1979).
\13\See Henry Sokolski, ``The India Syndrome: U.S. Nonproliferation
Policy Melts Down,'' The Weekly Standard (August 1, 2005).
\14\Great Britain already has moved in this direction by announcing
its intent to alter its nuclear export laws consistent with
Washington's wishes. See ``Britain To Ease Sanctions Against India,''
The Hindu (8-12-05) and Ashish Kumar Sen, ``Nuclear Battle Lines
Drawing,'' India Monitor (August 14, 2005).
\15\Telephone and personal interviews by CNS staff in the week
following the July 18th Joint Statement.
\16\See Sharon Squassoni, ``U.S. Nuclear Cooperation With India:
Issues for Congress,'' CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: The
Library of Congress, July 29, 2005), p. 7, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
row/RL33016.pdf.
\17\See Dennis M. Gormley and Lawrence Scheinman, ``Implications of
Proposed India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation,'' NTI Issue Brief, July
2005, www.nti.orq.
\18\On the issue of prior consent, see Sokolski, ``The India
Syndrome.''
\19\Tellis, ``India As a New Global Power,'' p. 27.
\20\These recommendations are consistent with the concept of a
global ``disarmament roadmap'' for both NPT and non-NPT parties
proposed by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. See Mohamed
ElBaradei, ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Global Security in a Rapidly
Changing World,'' Carnegie Endowment Non-Proliferation Conference,
Washington DC (June 21, 2004).
The U.S.-India Deal ``Separation Plan''
OPEN LETTER TO CONGRESS
(Experts in Support of the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Initiative)
congress should enact enabling legislation authorizing the sharing of
civilian nuclear technology with india
Executive Summary
Congress should enact enabling legislation authorizing the
sharing of civilian nuclear technology with India to implement
the agreement reached between President George W. Bush and
Manmohan Singh.
The enabling legislation is key to consummating a strategic
partnership with India that would solidify military
cooperation, a stable balance of power in Asia; mutually
beneficial trade, investment and technological collaboration,
the energy security of both countries and environmental
protection.
Failure to enact the legislation would be a body blow to the
improvement now taking place in relations with India.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) does not bar U.S.
civilian nuclear cooperation with India. Existing United States
law, however, goes beyond the NPT.
The nuclear sharing initiative would make the world safer by
bringing India within the international non-proliferation
framework. India would place all its civilian nuclear reactors
under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in
perpetuity, thus barring the diversion of any nuclear materials
for military use; continue its moratorium on nuclear testing;
upgrade export controls on nuclear sensitive items; and,
participate in the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty.
NPT signatories will not withdraw from the treaty and build
nuclear arsenals because the United States helps India to meet
its electricity needs through civilian nuclear power. Whether a
country develops nuclear weapons depends on how it perceives
its national security interests. India has pointed to nuclear-
armed China and Pakistan in seeking to justify nuclear weapons.
By contrast, Brazil and Argentina are not likely to make
nuclear weapons because they do not perceive them to be
necessary. South Korea and Japan are protected by a U.S.
nuclear deterrent, and if they were to develop nuclear weapons,
it would be in response to the threat posed by a nuclear-armed
North Korea. Civilian nuclear cooperation with India would not
set a precedent applicable to Iran, North Korea or Pakistan
because they have either violated the NPT or proliferated to
other nations.
India's surging energy needs will lead it to construct more
civilian nuclear facilities irrespective of the cooperation of
the United States.
Civilian nuclear energy is a major tool in combating global
warming.
No agreement is without risk. But the advantages of civilian
nuclear sharing with India outweigh any plausible negative
ramifications. The good should not be sacrificed on the altar
of the perfect.
______
The administration will soon present to the Congress a request for
action to implement the agreement between President Bush and Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh providing for civilian nuclear cooperation with
India. The signatories to this letter urge your support for the
necessary legislation. This recommendation is based on our extensive
experience and expertise relating to non-proliferation policy, security
issues in Asia, the domestic economic and political environment in
India and India-U.S. relations.
Congress should support the agreement to promote U.S. strategic
interests, U.S. non-proliferation goals, U.S. energy security and
global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions leading to global
warming. Failure to implement it would be a body blow to the
development of the strong relationship with India so important to
achieving U.S. goals in Asia and beyond. We present herewith the case
for the agreement and our response to the arguments put forward in
Congressional testimony by critics of the accord.
As Mohammed El Baradei, Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, said following the President's visit to New
Delhi, ``this agreement is an important step towards satisfying India's
growing need for energy. It would also bring India closer as an
important partner in the non-proliferation regime . . . It would be a
step forward toward universalization of the international safeguards
regime.''
The Strategic Case
The implementation of this agreement is necessary to promote a
strategic partnership with a dynamic, self-reliant India that is
playing an increasingly significant regional and global security role.
Such a partnership has already begun to develop as a natural
consequence of shared democratic values, compatible market economies,
growing technological interdependence and a congruence of geopolitical
interests. Extending this partnership to cooperation in civilian
nuclear technology has now become urgent. With its population now past
one billion, India needs a massive expansion of its civilian nuclear
program in order to cope with an escalating energy shortage that could
in time threaten its economic and political stability.
Against the background of China's rise, including the projected
expansion of its naval reach in the South China Sea and the Indian
Ocean, a strong, stable India will advance the traditional U.S.
objective of an Asian balance of power in which no one nation is able
to exercise overwhelming dominance. Since both the United States and
India are seeking constructive relations with China, neither Washington
nor New Delhi wants their new partnership to become an anti-Beijing
security alliance. At the same time, as a series of joint naval
exercises have shown, the U.S. and Indian navies are positioned for
growing cooperation from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca. In
the event of disruptions in the movement of critical energy supplies
through Asian sealanes resulting from wars or piracy, this cooperation
will enhance the ability of the United States to respond effectively.
Apart from such direct military cooperation, the United States and
India have a common strategic stake in combating Islamic extremism in
Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and Central Asia.
Two previous administrations have attempted to move toward a
strategic partnership with India while keeping in quarantine any
dealings related to civilian nuclear technology or dual-use technology
with possible applications to Indian nuclear or missile programs. This
approach has failed because India, a subcontinental giant with a middle
class larger than the combined population of France, Germany and
Britain, is endowed with a wealth of indigenous talent in science and
technology and feels confident that it will achieve major power status
with or without external help.
The Non-Proliferation Case
Implementation of the US-India civil nuclear agreement will advance
the objectives of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) by opening
the door to India's participation in the global non-proliferation
regime. Contrary to the Congressional testimony of some specialists:
The NPT does not bar the United States and other signatory
nations from providing civilian nuclear technology under
safeguards to non-signatories such as India. It is for this
reason that the United Kingdom, France and Russia have endorsed
the agreement. Congress went beyond the NPT by requiring
safeguards on all of a country's nuclear installations as a
condition for U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation. This has had
consequences that conflict directly with U.S. nonproliferation
goals. The United States can sell civilian nuclear reactors to
China, which signed the NPT but has supplied nuclear weapons
technology to Pakistan. At the same time, the United States has
barred such sales to India, which did not sign the NPT but has
never transferred nuclear technology to others. The
justification put forward for this paradoxical result is based
on a legal technicality: that China's 1964 test took place
before the cutoff date for classification as a ``nuclear
weapons state'' specified in the NPT, while India's 1974 and
1998 tests did not.
We recognize that critics ofthe agreement have legitimate concerns
about possible unintended consequences that cannot be foreseen.
On balance, however, we believe that such concerns are less
compelling than the clear, tangible, immediate benefits to the
non-proliferation regime that will result from the agreement.
The agreement will expand safeguards coverage ofthe Indian
nuclear program by requiring India to place all existing and
projected reactors designated by India as civilian under
international safeguards in perpetuity. Initially, India
insisted that reactors built without foreign involvement be
exempt from safeguards, but withdrew this proviso during the
negotiations with President Bush. These safeguards will remain
in force in perpetuity. With or without U.S. help, India will
be forced by burgeoning population growth to expand civilian
nuclear power exponentially for electricity generation, and it
is important to bring this expanded capacity under
international inspection.
Prime Minister Singh has fulfilled his commitment in the
accord that India would ``identify and separate civilian and
nuclear facilities in a phased manner.'' After bitter internal
battles with nuclear nationalists in India, the Prime Minister
has presented a credible eight-year timetable designating which
of India's existing nuclear facilities are now restricted to
nuclear power generation, which ones will be shifted over to
civilian purposes at specified stages, and which ones will be
left for military use. India's nuclear hawks wanted a much
shorter civilian list. By 2014, 65 percent of India's existing
installed thermal nuclear capacity, 14 of 22 reactors, will be
restricted to civilian purposes. As Undersecretary of State
Nicholas Burns stated on March 2, safeguards will apply to all
future civilian power reactors and ``breeder reactors that are
classified as civilian'' by India. The reactors to be placed
under safeguards include several that India built with its own
know-how and resources. In the past it has refused to place
them under safeguards, but will do so now in order to be able
to get foreign fuel and components.
Critics object to the fact that the agreement gives India the
freedom to build new military reactors and exempts key research
and development facilities with a military potential from
safeguards, such as any breeder reactors not classified as
civilian. Given the magnitude and projected growth of its
energy needs, however, India appears likely in its own self-
interest to use fast-breeder reactors it may subsequently build
for civilian purposes, as its current plans envisage.
Another often-expressed objection is that the agreement will
enable India to use its indigenous uranium for military
reactors, since civilian reactors will be able to rely
increasingly on imported uranium fuel. But as The Washington
Post has pointed out, ``leaving a potentially large plutonium-
making program outside the scope of multilateral inspections is
not a setback relative to the status quo,'' since India would
have been free to continue making as many nuclear weapons as it
deemed necessary regardless of the July accord, using breeder
reactors as well as uranium-fueled reactors.
The critics object to the very concept of a civilian-military
separation plan that implicitly acknowledges the military
component of the Indian nuclear program. But this
acknowledgement was long-overdue. India has been a de facto
nuclear weapons state since 1974, and U.S. policy under two
administrations has already given de facto recognition to this
reality.
Critics also argue that the accord will lead countries that
accepted the NPT and gave up their own nuclear aspirations to
consider reactivating their weapons programs. In our view, what
could put pressure on these countries is not the deal with
India but the geopolitical situation in their own regions.
Thus, Brazil and Argentina would appear unlikely to reopen
their NPT adherence, and should, in any case, have access to
nuclear technology, given their compliance to date with Article
One.
By contrast, North Korea, an NPT signatory, says it has developed
nuclear weapons, pointing to perceived security threats that
have nothing to do with the U.S.-India agreement. Similarly, if
South Korea, Taiwan or Japan were to convert their U.S.-aided
civilian nuclear programs to weapons development, it would be
in response not to the agreement but to changing geopolitical
factors.
Finally, critics believe that the bargain with India may invite
countries that already have nuclear weapons, like North Korea
and Pakistan, or are seeking to develop a nuclear weapons
option, like Iran, to demand equal treatment. But India's
record of observing Article One stands in sharp contrast to
Pakistan's role as a wholesale proliferator and to the failure
of Iran and North Korea to abide by their NPT commitments.
The agreement will strengthen India's commitment to
participating in international efforts to prevent
proliferation. India has not exported nuclear material or
technology, but because it has been treated as an object of
suspicion by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other
nonproliferation institutions, it has not directly participated
in their work. The agreement not only commits India formally to
align its export rules and practices with those of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group: it also opens the way for Indian participation
in the Proliferation Security Initiative, and in efforts to
guard against nuclear leakage. India's decision to support the
majority in the International Atomic Energy Agency's recent
vote to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council shows how
important this enhanced nonproliferation posture can be.
The Energy Security Case
The agreement opens the way for India to meet its energy needs in
ways that will advance long-term U.S. energy security goals. At present
India gets only 2.6 percent of its electricity from nuclear power, but
it is likely to increase this percentage at least ten fold in the next
two decades. Even if it only gets part way toward this goal, this would
be a significant reduction in its potential need for oil and gas, most
of it now obtained from the Persian Gulf.
As more and more Indians drive automobiles, its demand for oil is
rapidly growing. India will increasingly be competing with the United
States and other consumers for petroleum from the Gulf and other
sources. President Bush emphasized energy security in his press
conference with Prime Minister Singh at the conclusion of his recent
visit to India. ``Congress has got to understand,'' he said, ``that it
is in our economic interest that India have a civilian nuclear power
industry to help take the pressure offthe global demand for energy.
Increasing demand for oil from America, from India and China, related
to a supply that is not keeping up with the demand, causes our fuel
prices to go up and so to the extent that we can reduce the demand for
fossil fuels, it will help the American consumer. This is what I'll be
telling our Congress.''
The Global Warming Case
As India industrializes, its greenhouse gas emissions are steadily
increasing, making it one of the world's major polluters, albeit far
behind the United States. India, like China, argues that it is in a
developmental stage, seeking to catch up with more advanced industrial
powers, and cannot be held to the same standard as the developed
countries in any global warming agreement. To the extent that India
shifts away from fossil fuels, its negative impact on global warming
will be reduced, and the prospects for international limitations on
greenhouse gas emissions will improve.
To sum up, the arguments made against the agreement are outweighed
by the arguments in its favor. Civilian nuclear cooperation with India
will strengthen its political and economic stability; further U.S.
strategic interests, U.S. non-proliferation goals and U.S. energy
security, and help to combat the growing danger posed to mankind by
global warming.
This letter reflects the personal views of the undersigned and does
not represent the views of the institutions with which they are
affiliated.
Selig S. Harrison, Convenor--Director, Asia Program,Center for
International Policy; Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars
Walter Andersen--Associate Director, South Asia Studies School of
Advanced International Studies Johns Hopkins University; Former
Director for South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State; Former Special Assistant to U.S. Ambassador to
India William Clark
Gary K. Bertsch--Director, Center for International Trade and
Security University of Georgia; University Professor of Public and
International Affairs, University of Georgia
Daniel Blumenthal--Resident Fellow in Asian Studies, American
Enterprise Institute; Former Senior Director, China, Taiwan, Mongolia,
and Hong Kong, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Marshall Bouton--President, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations;
Former Director for Policy Analysis, Near East and South Asia,
Department of Defense
Honorable Richard Celeste--Former U.S. Ambassador to India; Former
Governor of Ohio
Honorable William Clark--Former U.S. Ambassador to India; Former
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Stephen P. Cohen--Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution; Former
Member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State
Thomas Donnelly--Resident Fellow in Defense and National Security,
American Enterprise Institute; Member, U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission
Ainslee Embree--Professor Emeritus of History and former Director
of the Southern Asian Institute, Columbia University; Former Special
Consultant to U.S. Ambassador to India Frank Wisner
Harold Gould--Visiting Scholar, Center for South Asian Studies,
University of Virginia
Leonard G. Gordon--Senior Research Associate, Southern Asian
Institute, Columbia University
Frederic Grare--Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace; Former Counselor for Cooperation and Culture,
Embassy of France, Islamabad, Pakistan
Robert M. Hathaway--Director, Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars; Former South Asia Specialist,
Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. House of Representatives
Walter Hauser--Professor Emeritus of South Asian History,
University of Virginia
Honorable Karl F. Inderfurth--Director, International Affairs
Program Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington
University; Former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs
Robert Kagan--Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace; Former Member of the Policy Planning Staff,
Department of State; Principal Speech Writer to Secretary of State
George P. Shultz
Honorable Dennis Kux--Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars; Former U.S. Ambassador to the Ivory Coast
Edward Luttwak--Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and
International Studies; Former Consultant, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the National Security Council, the State Department, and
the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force
McKim Mamuott--Professor Emeritus of Anthropology, University of
Chicago; Former Consultant, the Ford Foundation and the U.S. Embassy,
New Delhi
Thomas R. Pickering--Senior Vice President for International
Relations, The Boeing Company; Former Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
Honorable John B. Ritch--Director General, World Nuclear
Association; Former U.S. Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy
Agency; Former Staff Adviser on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Arms
Control, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Lloyd Rudolph--Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University
of Chicago; Former Chair, South Asian Studies and Chair, Committee on
International Relations, University of Chicago
Susanne Rudolph--William Benton Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science Emerita, University of Chicago; Former Director, The
Center for International Studies and Chair of the South Asia Center,
University of Chicago
Honorable Howard Schaffer--Deputy Director, Institute for the Study
of Diplomacy Georgetown University; Former U.S. Ambassador to
Bangladesh
Honorable Teresita C. Schaffer--Director, South Asia Program,
Center for Strategic and International Studies; Former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs; Former U.S.
Ambassador to Sri Lanka
Honorable Frank Wisner, Vice-President, American International
Group; Former U.S. Ambassador to India
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC. 20520,
April 27, 2006.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar, Chairman,
U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your questions on the impact of
the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Initiative in the context
of climate change and energy problems in the U.S. and the advantages of
energy partnerships with countries like India. The Secretary asked that
I respond to the questions that you asked during her recent testimony
at the SFRC on April 5.
Greater access to civilian nuclear energy will help to meet India's
growing demand for energy. India--with an economy growing at
approximately 8 percent each year--has a rapidly growing appetite for
energy. Huge population growth, expanding industrial production,
economic development, urbanization, and increased motor vehicle
ownership are all driving this energy demand. Between 1980 and 2001,
demand increased by 208 percent. Only 2% of India's power generation
needs are currently met by nuclear energy. India plans on investing in
additional civilian nuclear reactors in order to expand this percentage
to 20% by 2020, helping to meet the needs of its growing economy while
reducing its reliance on fossil fuels. The U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear
Cooperation Initiative will open up U.S.-India trade and investment in
nuclear energy for the first time in three decades. It will also help
meet India's energy needs in an environmentally friendly manner.
We view the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Initiative and
the rest of the U.S.-India Energy Dialogue as a process for
strengthening India's total energy security. Our efforts to assist
India in its effort to increase domestic energy production, reduce the
environmental impact of energy production, transport and use, improve
the efficiency of energy use, and develop energy technologies will
ultimately work to strengthen India's energy security and meet its
growing demand. I have attached a memorandum outlining in detail the
various activities we are undertaking with India to resolve these
urgent issues.
Diversifying India's energy sector will help to alleviate the
competition among India, the United States, and other rapidly expanding
economies for scarce carbon-based energy resources, thereby lessening
pressure on global energy prices. Civil nuclear cooperation with India
will help it meet its rising energy needs without increasing its
reliance on unstable foreign sources of oil and gas, such as nearby
Iran. An India that can meet its energy needs efficiently and
rationally ultimately strengthens global and U.S. energy security.
The U.S. and India are cooperating on energy initiatives through
five working groups: The Civil Nuclear Working Group, the Coal Working
Group, the Power and Energy Efficiency Working Group, the Oil and Gas
Working Group, and the New Technology and Renewable Energy Working
Group. These DOE-led groups have been actively meeting since the
formation of the U.S.-India Energy Dialogue in May 2005, and plan a
full range of activities in the near term (enclosure).
The Coal Working Group has been meeting since July 2005 with
several key goals: increased collaboration on clean fossil energy
technologies; creating an attractive investment climate for domestic
and foreign investment in the energy sector; and developing an
efficient and environmentally sound energy infrastructure. India has
the third largest reserves of coal in the world and coal remains the
mainstay of India's energy sector, comprising 70% of their power
generation capacity. Indian coal produces about twice as much ash and
particulate matter, and emits far more nitrogen oxide (an element in
photochemical smog) and carbon monoxide (a poisonous gas) than
*American coal. India's agreement to take part in the FutureGen Project
is important since the project will create the technology to produce a
near-zero emissions coal-fired power plant that will produce hydrogen
and sequester carbon dioxide underground, enabling greater use of coal
in an environmentally sustainable way when the technology is eventually
used in other coal-fired power plants.
Other initiatives to jointly research other forms of alternative
energy like biofuels, solar and wind energy are also opportunities to
expand the range of environmentally friendly technologies available to
India. The President's Advanced Energy Initiative, announced during the
State of the Union, highlights our own interest in pursuing expanded
research in biofuels and solar energy. India is the fourth largest
producer of wind power in world, with annual production of 4,300
megwatts. It hopes to expand this amount through more cooperation with
the U.S. in mapping exercises and resource assessments. Our New
Technology and Renewable Energy Working Group hopes to further promote
dialogue on these technologies through cooperation with DOE's National
Renewable Energy Laboratory. We also feel that U.S.-India cooperation
through the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate
along with other countries in the region will promote the development
of cleaner, cost-effective, and more efficient technologies. The
expected reduction of greenhouse gases from the use of these
technologies, cleaner coal emissions, and expanded use of civilian
nuclear energy are positive steps for India, the U.S. and the global
community.
The U.S.-India Energy Dialogue and the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear
Cooperation Initiative benefit the energy interests of both India and
the United States. We hope this information is useful. Please do not
hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey T. Bergner,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs,
Enclosure: As stated.
__________
Fact Sheet: U.S.-India Energy Cooperation
Under the U.S.-India Energy Dialogue, the United States and India
are working together to meet the demands of rapid economic development
and current population growth rates, both globally and within India, by
increasing the availability of sustainable energy resources.
Initiatives under this dialogue seek to increase India's domestic
energy production, reduce the environmental impact of energy
production, transport and use, improve the efficiency of energy use,
and develop both incremental and transformational energy technologies.
The U.S. and India have pursued these energy initiatives through five
main tracks: The Civil Nuclear Working Group, the Coal Working Group,
the Power and Energy Efficiency Working Group, the Oil and Gas Working
Group, and the New Technology and Renewable Energy Working Group.
Listed below are the major outcomes of these working groups, and the
highlights of key new initiatives:
1. futuregen
India will join as an international partner for the
FutureGen project to create a near-zero emissions coal-fired
power plant that will produce hydrogen and sequester carbon
dioxide underground, enabling greater use of coal in an
environmentally sustainable way.
India plans to participate in the Government Steering
Committee of FutureGen and the FutureGen Industry Alliance. The
Government of India will contribute $10 million to the project
to join the government steering committee.
The U.S. and India signed a framework agreement on FutureGen
during President Bush's visit.
2. the international thermonuclear experimental reactor (iter)
In December 2005, the U.S. and its ITER partners, the
European Union, Russia, Japan, South Korea and China, agreed to
invite India as a full partner. The Indian government is making
the agreed-upon contribution to the project for membership.
American support was instrumental in ensuring the final
agreement. The partnership represents the first tangible and
concrete step towards greater cooperation between the USA and
India in civilian nuclear energy.
3. the integrated ocean drilling program
India and the U.S. will work toward India's membership in
the Integrated Ocean Drilling Program (IODP), a scientific
research program conducting ocean sediment sampling and
monitoring.
ndia has leased the ocean research ship Aides Resolution for
a three-month expedition to study gas hydrates beginning in
March 2006. DOE owns specialized equipment on this ship that
Indians would like to use.
Because the Indian hydrate expedition and follow-on studies
will include many U.S. research scientists, our involvement
will accelerate commercial production of U.S. hydrates.
Therefore, DOE has facilitated the export authorization for use
of the equipment.
4. increased energy cooperation
The Civil Nuclear Working Group
A Joint Technical workshop was held January 9-12, 2006 in
Mumbai, India. The purpose of the January workshop was to
advance dialogue and cooperation between the United States and
India on technical issues associated with civilian nuclear
energy. A second workshop will likely take place in the U.S.
during 2006.
Power and Energy Efficiency Working Group
U.S.-India Energy Efficiency Conference will take place
early May 2006 in India. The focus of the conference will be on
industrial and building energy efficiency.
A proposed strategic partnership between India's National
Thermal Power Corporation and the U.S. Department of Energy's
National Energy Technology Laboratory will work to advance
research and development of clean and efficient power
generation.
USAID recently launched a public-private partnership with
the General Electric Company (GE) to increase access to clean
and affordable energy services in rural communities in India.
The partnership will span a two-year period and provide up to
four communities in India with access to clean energy.
A Clean Coal Business Development Council will likely be
launched during the Clean Coal Summit in July 2006.
A workshop is planned in India in May 2006 to discuss the
results of a study supported by USAID on the feasibility of
Integrated Gas Combined Cycle (MCC) power plants in India.
Continued cooperation on energy efficient buildings and on
the development of building codes. A U.S. team is expected to
conduct training in India in March/April 2006.
The Distribution Reform Upgrades and Management program has
completed detailed project reports on four model projects an
efficient power distribution in the states of Karnataka,
Maharashtra, Gujarat and Delhi.
The development of a graduate degree program in.power
distribution management is currently underway.
Coal Working Group
Establishment of a Business Advisory Council to serve as a
resource to the CWG, consisting of representatives from
business, industry, academia and other non-governmental
organizations.
Workshop in India in April 2006 to discuss investment
opportunities, particularly in the areas of exploration, coal
beneficiation, and power generation.
Planning underway to have information/technical expertise
exchanges between U.S. and India, as well as the potential for
pilot projects in India in the areas of underground coal
gasification; coal liquefaction; coal mine reclamation; and
coal beneficiation/coal washeries.
The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) has provided a
$360,000 Feasibility Study grant for the Neyveli coal mine
expansion project.
Oil and Gas Working Group
A joint conference on natural gas, including coal bed
methane (CBM) and involving the business community, is
currently being planned for May 2006 in New Delhi.
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Energy Information
Exchange between U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)--
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MPNG) was signed on
February 9, 2005.
A MOU between the U.S. Minerals Management Service and
India's Oil Industry Safety Directorate is expected to be
signed soon.
A MOU between the U.S. Geological Survey and MPNG's
Directorate General for Hydrocarbons is expected to be signed.
The USTDA and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency are
working with the Government of India to establish of a CBM
Clearinghouse.
USTDA is working with the Government of India to finalizing
a grant for a limited feasibility study of a national pipeline
grid.
New Technology and Renewable Energy Working Group
Several areas have been identified for potential cooperation on
research and development. Potential collaborations include:
The Indian Oil Company (IOC) has proposed a MOU with DOE's
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) on hydrogen.
NREL has also proposed collaborative projects with IOC on
biofuels, including joint research and information sharing
focus on biodiesel fuels and production.
The Indian Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources
(MNES) and NREL are looking into joint research projects on
solar thermal power generation, low wind speed technology
research & development, renewable energy resource assessment
and use of resource data in relevant analysis tools.
Excerpt From CRS Memorandum, ``Assessment of Potential Benefits of U.S.
Civil Nuclear Cooperation With India''\1\
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\1\Memorandum prepared by the Congressional Research Service, K.
Alan Kronstadt (Coordinator), Sharon Squassoni (Foreign Affairs,
Defense, and Trade Division), and Mark Holt (Resources, Science, and
Industry Division), March 29, 2006
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Potential Benefits For Global Energy Markets, the Environment, and U.S.
Business Interests\2\
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\2\This section written by Mark Holt, Specialist in Energy Policy,
Resources, Science, and Industry Division.
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Because India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and has used its nuclear power program to develop nuclear
weapons, the United States and other nuclear supplier nations have
restricted India's access to foreign nuclear technology and materials
since the early 1970s. As a result, India's nuclear power program has
relied on indigenous heavy water reactor designs based on small,
imported reactors that were supplied before the international cutoff.
India had set a goal of 10,000 megawatts of nuclear generating capacity
by 2000,\3\ but by 2005 only 2,550 megawatts of nuclear capacity was on
line.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\``Datafile: India.'' Nuclear Engineering International. Feb.
1995. p. 17.
\4\``World List of Nuclear Power Plants.'' Nuclear News. Mar. 2005.
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Proponents of the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation proposal contend
that allowing India to import U.S. reactors would allow India's nuclear
generating capacity to expand much more rapidly: ``The agreement also
is good for the American economy because it will help meet India's
surging energy needs--and that will lessen India's growing demand for
other energy supplies and help restrain energy prices for American
consumers,'' according to a White House statement.\5\ Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice has also contended that the proposed nuclear
agreement could significantly reduce India's projected carbon dioxide
emissions and create U.S. jobs related to reactor exports to India.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. ``India Civil
Nuclear Cooperation: Responding to Critics.'' Mar. 8, 2006.
\6\Rice, Condoleezza. ``Our Opportunity With India.'' Washington
Post. Mar. 13, 2006. p. A15.
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The extent to which the U.S.-India nuclear agreement would help
restrain U.S. energy prices and reduce CO2 emissions would
depend primarily on the amount of new Indian nuclear generating
capacity resulting from the agreement and the amount of Indian fossil
fuel consumption displaced by any such nuclear capacity. U.S. job
creation would additionally depend on the ability of U.S. reactor
vendors to compete with foreign suppliers for Indian contracts and the
U.S. content of any resulting reactor projects. The White House has not
yet provided a detailed analysis to support its contentions about the
potential energy, environmental, and economic benefits of the proposed
nuclear agreement. As indicated by the following discussion, the energy
benefits to U.S. consumers are likely to be negligible for at least the
next 20 years, although longer-term benefits could be significant under
some imaginable scenarios. Any exports of U.S. reactors to India would
almost certainly create U.S. jobs, although the magnitude of such
employment growth is difficult to estimate.
A recently released draft of India's first Integrated Energy Policy
calls for India to order 6,000 megawatts of foreign-supplied nuclear
generating capacity (six or seven large commercial reactors) during the
next ten years, in addition to a two-reactor Russian nuclear power
plant already under construction. The draft plan calls for Indian
nuclear capacity to reach 9,000-11,000 megawatts in 2010, 21,000-29,000
megawatts in 2020, and double each decade thereafter through 2050. The
upper range of the projections assumes imports of technology and
nuclear fuel.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\Saraf, Sunil. ``Indian Energy Policy Stresses Indigenous Nuclear
Development.'' Nucleonics Week. Jan. 26, 2006. p. 8.
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Far more modest nuclear growth is predicted by the International
Energy Agency (IEA), which estimates that India's nuclear generating
capacity will reach 6,000 megawatts in 2010, 9,000 megawatts in 2020,
and 14,000 megawatts in 2030.\8\ Given India's past shortfalls in
meeting its nuclear power targets, the IEA projections may be more
realistic than those in the Indian energy plan. However, because the
IEA estimates were issued in 2004, they do not consider any potential
boost from reactor imports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\International Energy Agency. World Energy Outlook 2004. p. 500.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even if legal barriers to nuclear sales to India were lifted, the
potential difficulty in financing such sales would pose a significant
obstacle to Indian nuclear power expansion. Nuclear power plants are
far more capital-intensive than competing technologies; the higher
construction costs are supposed to be recouped by lower fuel and other
operating costs. However, the overall economic viability of nuclear
power has been inconsistent throughout the world, and worldwide nuclear
growth has been slow since the 1980s. The relatively few nuclear power
plants that have been completed in recent years have experienced such a
wide variety of construction circumstances and are of so many designs
and sizes that no clear track record on capital costs has been
demonstrated. Costs reported in the news media for reactors completed
since 2000 range from less than $1,000 per kilowatt of capacity for
Russia's Rostov 1\9\ to about $4,400 per kilowatt for Brazil's Angra
2.\10\ Costs toward the lower end of that range will probably be
necessary for a worldwide resurgence in nuclear power plant
construction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\Weekly Business Report, Mar. 13, 2001; Interfax, July 1, 1999
(from Nuclear Threat Initiative web site, www.nti.org).
\10\Dow Jones, July 14, 2000.
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In the United States, no commercial reactors have been ordered
since 1978 (and all orders since 1973 have been cancelled). About a
dozen nuclear power plants are currently under consideration in the
United States, but the Energy Information Administration calculates
that new reactors would not be financially feasible without tax credits
provided by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58).\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\Energy Information Administration, Analysis of Five Selected
Tax Provisions of the Conference Energy Bill of 2003, Feb. 2004.
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Nuclear power's relatively high up-front costs, in addition to
hindering nuclear energy expansion throughout the world, pose
particular problems for India. IEA estimates that India will need to
invest $665 billion in its electricity sector over the next 30 years
and concludes, ``Given the extremely poor financial situation of the
Indian power sector, the availability of the necessary finance remains
very uncertain.'' Most Indian power plants are government-owned, with
about two-thirds owned by State Electricity Boards (SEBs). Revenues to
the SEBs cover only about 70% of their costs, and about 40% of their
revenues come from subsidies. Power theft, non-billing, and non-
payments are widespread.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\International Energy Agency. World Energy Investment Outlook
2003. p. 388.
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Private-sector financing in India remains problematic as well.
India opened the electricity sector to independent power producers
(IPPs) in 1991, but ten years later only 10,000 megawatts of such
capacity had been constructed. According to IEA, ``The time and effort
required to develop new IPP projects in India proved too great for some
foreign investors, and many reduced their Indian exposure. Among
recurring difficulties are the lack of prior clearance of the projects
by the authorities, problems in securing fuel supply agreements and the
bankruptcy of the SEBs.''\13\ The relatively high up-front risk of
nuclear generation would appear to make private-sector financing
especially difficult for Indian nuclear projects, although some
interest has recently been expressed by Indian firms.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\International Energy Agency. Electricity in India: Providing
Power for the Millions. 2002. p. 25.
\14\AsiaPulse. ``India's Tata Group Expresses Interest in Nuclear
Power.'' Mar. 6, 2006.
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Nuclear power in India is currently owned and operated by the
central government through the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd.
(NPCIL). Because of the financing obstacles facing the SEBs and private
sector, it appears likely that nuclear power expansion in the
foreseeable future would have to continue to be undertaken by the
central government. However, some Indian industry observers have
questioned whether NPCIL has the resources to expand India's nuclear
capacity at the rate envisioned by India's draft energy plan without
private-sector assistance.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\Hindu Business Line. ``India Nuclear Power Generation Sector.''
Mar. 3, 2006.
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If a U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is implemented and
adequate financing for new nuclear power plants can be arranged, any
resulting energy and environmental benefits would not be realized
immediately. Reactor projects currently under consideration in the
United States are expected to require at least ten years of design,
licensing, and construction before operation can begin.\16\ For Indian
reactors, additional time would probably be needed to negotiate a deal,
including price, financing, and local content and technology transfer
requirements. After China began serious negotiations in 1984 for its
first foreign reactors, from France, the first two units began
operating in 1994, and four additional foreign-supplied reactors have
been completed since.\17\ (Two Russian-supplied reactors are currently
under construction, and China is expected to soon award foreign
contracts for four more nuclear units.) A case could be made that
India's nuclear program might follow a similar pace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\Weil, Jenny, and Margaret Ryan. ``New Plants Entice Utilities,
Investors, But Risks Loom Large.'' Nucleonics Week. Feb. 16, 2006. p.
1.
\17\MacLachlan, Ann. ``Framatome and Chinese Sign Letter of Intent
for Daya Bay Units.'' Nucleonics Week. Mar. 20, 1986. p. 1; ``World
List of Nuclear Power Plants.'' Nuclear News. Mar. 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If India began operating six new commercial reactors by 2025
resulting from the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement, the
additional nuclear generating capacity would total about 7,200
megawatts (about 1,200 megawatts each). Any additional Indian nuclear
power capacity would be expected to displace some of the growth that
would otherwise have taken place in electricity generation fueled by
coal, natural gas, and oil. IEA projects that by 2025, coal-fired
generating capacity will grow by 94,000 megawatts, natural gas-fired
capacity will grow by 45,000 megawatts, and oil-fired capacity will
grow by 7,000 megawatts.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\IEA, World Energy Outlook 2004. p. 500. (Average of 2020 and
2030 capacity projections.)
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impact on oil and natural gas consumption
If U.S.-supplied reactors displaced those three fuels in proportion
to their expected growth, then the displacement would be 4,636
megawatts of coal-fired capacity, 2,219 megawatts of natural gas-fired
generation, and 345 megawatts of oil-fired generation. India's
projected natural gas consumption in 2025 would be reduced by 119
billion cubic feet per year and annual oil consumption reduced by 2.9
million barrels.
With world oil consumption projected to reach 119 million barrels
per day by 2025,\19\ the reduction in India's oil consumption
calculated above would have little or no impact on world oil markets.
The calculated natural gas reduction would also be a small proportion
of the projected world annual total consumption of 156 trillion cubic
feet by 2025. Natural gas prices are currently set primarily in
regional markets, but it is possible that by 2025 a world market could
develop and that Indian imports could directly affect U.S. prices
(although not the small amount of gas in the calculation above).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\Energy Information Administration. International Energy Outlook
2005. p. 93.
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potential co2 reductions\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\Carbon dioxide emissions analysis prepared by Larry Parker,
Specialist in Energy Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 7,200 megawatts of displaced fossil-fuel generating capacity
estimated above would have produced about 37 million metric tons of
carbon dioxide per year. Carbon dioxide reductions of 37 million metric
tons per year would be similarly small in comparison to total worldwide
carbon dioxide emissions. However, such reductions would constitute 2%
of India's current annual CO2 emissions and 3.6% of India's
current energy-related emissions,\21\ which could help India meet
future reduction goals that might be required by international
agreements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\World Resources Institute. Climate Analysis Indicators Tool.
[cait.wri.org].
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If faster nuclear growth than described above were assumed, the
displacement of fossils fuels and carbon dioxide emissions would
increase proportionately. Future advances in technology, such as
commercially viable electric vehicles or vehicles powered by hydrogen
from nuclear reactors, could further increase nuclear power's potential
displacement of oil consumption in the long run. However, the timing
and possible commercial impact of such technologies remains highly
speculative.
nuclear job creation in the united states
The number of U.S. jobs that might result from the proposed India
agreement would depend on the number of reactors imported by India
(which, as noted above, may be limited by available financing), the
ability of U.S. reactor vendors to compete with foreign suppliers for
any such orders, and the U.S. content of any reactors supplied by U.S.
vendors.
Secretary Rice's Washington Post article cited above contends that
even if India ordered only two U.S. reactors, ``it will mean thousands
of new jobs for American workers.'' However, even such a minimal order
is far from guaranteed, as shown by the U.S. experience with China,
which has ordered no U.S. reactors since a U.S.-China nuclear
cooperation agreement was implemented in 1997. China is considering a
proposal for four reactors by Pittsburgh-based Westinghouse Electric
Company, which is currently owned by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. (BNFL)
and being sold to the Japanese conglomerate Toshiba. However,
Westinghouse faces strong competition for the order from the French
supplier Areva, which has already built four reactors in China.
U.S. reactor vendors (Westinghouse and General Electric Co.) might
face a competitive disadvantage in India if the Nuclear Suppliers Group
allows sales to India before a U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement
can be implemented under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (42
U.S.C. 2153). Analysts have also noted that India has not signed any
international nuclear liability agreements, a situation that could put
private-sector U.S. reactor vendors at a further disadvantage against
competitors owned by foreign governments, such as Areva and Russia's
Atomstroy Export, although BNFL is also government-owned.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\Poe, Sheryll. ``Non-Proliferation Advocates Question Trade
Benefits of India Nuke Deal.'' Inside U.S. Trade. Mar. 24, 2006.
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If U.S. firms do receive future reactor orders from India, many of
the components and services related to such orders would probably be
procured from non-U.S. sources. Westinghouse has stated that the
largest reactor components for its proposed sale to China would be
foreign-supplied, although design, instrumentation and control, and
other U.S.-supplied portions of the four-reactor deal would support
5,000 U.S. jobs.\23\ General Electric contends that the U.S. content in
two reactors the company is currently building in Taiwan totals more
than 60%.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\Wald, Matthew L. ``U.S. Loans for Reactors in China Draw
Objections.'' New York Times. Feb. 28, 2005.
\24\E-mail communication from Rob Wallace, GE Energy, Feb. 15,
2006.
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Another factor is that, over time, the Indian content of nuclear
power plants imported by India would probably increase, because a major
element of such import deals is usually technology transfer. For
example, Areva's original reactor technology was licensed from
Westinghouse, and Japan and South Korean reactors are based on U.S.
designs as well. Much of the cost of even the first nuclear power
plants ordered by India would be expected to go toward Indian
materials, labor, and non-nuclear components.
A U.S.-India nuclear agreement would open up other potential
business besides reactor sales, possibly increasing the deal's impact
on U.S. jobs. Contracts related to nuclear fuel, maintenance, and other
services could potentially be signed by U.S. firms or foreign firms
with U.S. nuclear operations.
According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ``India's nuclear power
requirements are projected to generate as many as 27,000 high quality
jobs each year for the next ten years in the U.S. nuclear industry
alone.'' However, given the uncertainties discussed above, that
estimate appears to be highly optimistic.
Material Inserted Into the Record by Senator Boxer
Nunn Urges Congress to Set Conditions on U.S.-India Nuclear Pact\1\
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\1\Copyright 2006 The Washington Post, March 21, 2006
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by glenn kessler, washington post staff writer
In a setback for the administration's efforts to win approval of a
landmark nuclear pact with India, former senator Sam Nunn said
yesterday that he has serious concerns the deal would harm the ``United
States' vital interest'' in preventing nuclear proliferation and urged
Congress to set conditions for its support.
``Congress has a duty to look at the broader framework,'' Nunn, a
moderate and highly respected Georgia Democrat who still has broad
influence in both parties on proliferation and military matters, said
in an interview. ``If I were still in Congress, I would be skeptical
and looking at conditions that could be attached.''
Undersecretary of State R. Nicholas Burns warned lawmakers last
week that congressionally mandated conditions could cause the agreement
to unravel. He and other administration officials say the agreement is
a groundbreaking achievement that will bring India, which has not
signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, into the nonproliferation
mainstream, while bolstering U.S.-India ties and adding jobs to the
U.S. economy.
But Nunn, who was briefed on the deal by State Department officials
last week, said he is concerned it would lead to the spread of weapons-
grade nuclear material, unleash a regional arms race with China and
Pakistan, and make it more difficult for the United States to win
support for sanctions against nuclear renegades such as Iran and North
Korea. Nunn is a board member of General Electric Co.--which built
nuclear power reactors in India before New Delhi conducted its first
nuclear test in 1974--but he said he thinks the economic benefits are
overstated.
The administration last week proposed legislation that would exempt
India from sections of the Atomic Energy Act that restrict trade with
countries that are not party to nuclear treaties. The proposal already
faces an uphill battle in Congress, where key lawmakers such as Sen.
Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, and Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.), chairman of the House
International Relations Committee, have remained neutral. The
administration has actively sought, without much success, the support
of moderate opinion leaders such as Nunn.
Under the pact, India is to separate its civilian and military
nuclear programs over the next eight years to gain U.S. expertise and
nuclear fuel to meet its rapidly rising energy needs. India's civilian
facilities would be subject for the first time to permanent
international inspections, but the agreement does not require oversight
of India's prototype fast-breeder reactors, which can produce
significant amounts of weapons-grade plutonium when fully operational.
The Bush administration originally sought a plan that would have
allowed India to continue producing material for six to 10 weapons each
year, but the new plan would allow India enough fissile material for as
many as 50 weapons a year. Experts said this would far exceed what is
believed to be its current capacity.
Nunn said that among the conditions he would attach to the
legislation is the requirement it could not take effect until the
president certifies that India pledges not to produce nuclear
materials, such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium, for weapons.
The current agreement ``certainly does not curb in any way the
proliferation of weapons-grade nuclear material,'' Nunn said.
``India was a lot better negotiator than we were,'' Nunn asserted.
While the administration has said it has no intention of aiding India's
nuclear weapons program, ``the reality could be the opposite,'' he
said. ``The administration has a high burden to explain this.''
Nunn added that suggestions by some former and current
administration officials that it might be in the United States'
interest to allow India to build up its strategic capabilities is
``totally counterproductive and dangerous reasoning.''
Nunn, who served in the Senate for 24 years, is co-chairman and
chief executive of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nonprofit
organization that seeks to reduce the global threats from nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons. Lugar is also a board member of NTI,
and the two men wrote the Nunn-Lugar Act, which has helped destroy
thousands of nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union.
In an interview published yesterday in the Indianapolis Star, Lugar
said he might favor the legislation if he were convinced that the new
relationship was in the United States' best interests, that there were
``considerable if not complete'' safeguards on the spread of nuclear
fuel and that it would lead to a reduction of oil consumption.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has vowed an all-out push to win
approval of the agreement, saying it would be a boon for U.S. business.
But it has also sparked a backlash from nonproliferation experts who
believe it will lead to the unraveling of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
which sought to limit the number of nuclear weapons states. ``Nunn's
voice carries weight,'' said Henry D. Sokolski, executive director of
the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and a Pentagon official in
the George H.W. Bush administration, who opposes the agreement. ``We
have waited for a moderate, respected voice to speak clear sense on
these matters. Now that he's spoken, it would be very strange if
Congress doesn't listen.''
__________
Issues and Questions on July 18 Proposal for
Nuclear Cooperation with India
November 18, 2005
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Member of Congress, We are writing to urge you and your
colleagues to critically examine the July 18 proposal to allow for
``full'' U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear cooperation, which would require
significant changes to U.S. nonproliferation laws and longstanding
international nonproliferation policy that have been supported and
advanced by past Republican and Democratic administrations.
We believe that the United States and India can and should expand
their ties and common interests as free democracies through expanded
cooperation in trade and human development, scientific and medical
research, energy technology, humanitarian relief, and military-to-
military contacts. In addition, both the United States and India have a
vital interest in reducing the global dangers posed by nuclear weapons
through effective nonproliferation and disarmament endeavors.
Unfortunately, the proposal for civil nuclear cooperation with
India poses far-reaching and potentially adverse implications for U.S.
nuclear nonproliferation objectives and promises to do little in the
long-run to bring India into closer alignment with other U.S. strategic
objectives.President Bush pledged to seek changes in the Atomic Energy
Act (AEA) of 1954 as amended by the 1978 Nonproliferation Act, which
bars civilian nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon states as
defined by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
that do not allow full-scope IAEA safeguards. This includes India. The
President also pledged to seek changes to relevant Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) guidelines, which make full-scope safeguards a condition of
civil nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon states as defined by
the NPT--a U.S. policy objective adopted by NSG consensus during the
George H. W. Bush administration.
We have read the statements of the President and administration
officials concerning the proposed agreement, but key details needed to
help the Congress fully understand the implications of the proposal, in
our view, have not yet been provided. Accordingly, we urge that before
any action is taken on any legislation sent up by the administration to
implement the proposal, Congress should obtain detailed answers to a
number of questions. (See attached list.)
Based on what is known, the nonproliferation benefits of the July
18 proposal are vastly overstated by its proponents and the damage to
the nonproliferation regime is potentially very high. Contrary to
assertions by the administration, the current proposal would not bring
India sufficiently into conformance with nonproliferation behavior
expected of responsible states.
So far, India has pledged only to accept voluntary safeguards over
``civilian'' nuclear facilities of its choosing. This could allow India
to withdraw any nuclear facility from (IAEA) safeguards for national
security reasons. Such an arrangement would be purely symbolic and
would do nothing to prevent the continued production of fissile
material for weapons by India.The supply of nuclear fuel to India would
free-up its existing stockpile and capacity to produce highly enriched
uranium and plutonium for weapons. To help ensure that U.S. civilian
nuclear cooperation is not in any way advancing India's weapons
program, it would be essential to apply permanent, facility-specific
safeguards on a mutually agreed and broad list of current and future
Indian nuclear facilities involved in civilian activities and
electricity production in combination with a cutoff of Indian fissile
material production for weapons.
Unfortunately, the communique does not call for any additional
measures that would constrain India's nuclear arsenal. Specifically,
civilian nuclear assistance should not be extended to India until it
implements a cessation of the production of fissile material for
weapons, which has been adopted by the five original nuclear-weapon
states.
In the July 18 communique India also pledged to a set of export
control measures that it had already committed to or is obligated to
pursue under UN Security Council Resolution 1540.
The proposed arrangement could also trigger a significant erosion
of the guidelines of the 45-member NSG, which are an important barrier
against the transfer of nuclear material, equipment, and technologies
for weapons purposes. No civilian assistance should be extended to
India without the full concurrence of the NSG and approval of India's
safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
Non-nuclear-weapon states have for decades remained true to the
original NPT bargain and forsworn nuclear weapons and accepted full-
scope IAEA safeguards in return for access to peaceful nuclear
technology under strict and verifiable control. Many of these states
made this choice despite strong pressure to spurn the NPT and pursue
the nuclear weapons path. They might make a different choice in the
future if non-NPT members receive civil nuclear assistance under less
rigorous terms. The proposed civil nuclear cooperation arrangement may
also undermine our ability to win necessary international support for
persuading Iran to abandon its fuel cycle plans and to make its nuclear
program fully transparent to the IAEA.
On balance, India's commitments under the current terms of the
proposed arrangement do not justify making far-reaching exc eptions to
U.S. law and international non proliferation norms.
We urge you to consider the full implications of the proposed
agreement for cooperation between the United States and India, and
pursue additional stipulations that might result in a positive outcome
to U.S. and international security. Congress must also ensure it
retains the authority to review whether the terms of any such
arrangement are being implemented and take appropriate action if they
are not.
Building upon the already strong U.S.-Indian partnership is an
important goal, and we remain convinced that it can be achieved without
undermining the U.S. leadership efforts to prevent the proliferation of
the world's most dangerous weapons.
Sincerely,
Hal Bengelsdorf--Consultant, and former Director of the Office for
Nonproliferation Policy at the Energy Department and former Office
Director for Nuclear Affairs at the State Department
Amb. George Bunn--Consulting Professor, Stanford University Center
for International Security and Cooperation; First General Counsel for
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and negotiator of the NPT
Joseph Cirincione--Senior Associate and Director of the
Nonproliferation Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Robert J. Einhorn--Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and
International Studies; former Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation
Lt. Gen. Robert Gard, USA (Ret.)--Senior Military Fellow, Center
for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Victor Gilinsky--Energy Consultant, and former U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commissioner
Amb. Thomas Graham Jr.--Chairman, Cypress Fund for Peace and
Security, and former Acting Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Amb. Robert Grey--Director, Bipartisan Security Working Group, and
former U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament
John Holum--former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Affairs and former director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency
Daryl G. Kimball--Executive Director, Arms Control Association
Lawrence Korb--Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress, and
former Asst. Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs,
Installations and Logistics
Paul Leventhal--Founding President of the Nuclear Control
Institute, and former Special Counsel of the U.S. Senate Committee on
Government Operations
Fred McGoldrick-- 1Consultant, and former Director of
Nonproliferation and Export Policy at the State Department
Kelly Motz--Associate Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control
Henry S. Rowen--Professor of Public Policy and Management
emeritus,Graduate School of Business, Senior Fellow, the Hoover
Institution Stanford University, and former Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs
Lawrence Scheinman--Distinguished Professor at the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, and former Assistant Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency
Henry Sokolski--President, Nonproliferation Education Policy
Center, and former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense
Len Weiss--Consultant and former Staff Director of the U.S. Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs
______
key issues for consideration on proposed nuclear
cooperation with india
We cannot overestimate the long-term unintentional damage that
could be done to the world's nonproliferation effort if the current
proposal is allowed to go through as is without a complete vetting of
its possible consequences.
Accordingly, we urge that before any action is taken on any
legislation sent up by the administration to implement the proposal,
Congress should obtain from the administration detailed answers to a
number of questions.
These include:
1. How reliable is India as a nuclear trading partner based
on its past record and how might the proposed deal affect
efforts to stop trade to and from states of concern?
a. Is there any prospect that there could be a
negative impact on attempts to stop Iran and North
Korea from obtaining assistance for their nuclear
programs?
b. How will assistance to Pakistan's nuclear program
by China and others be affected by this proposal if
implemented?
c. Is there any evidence of Indian violations since
1998 of U.S. and other export laws involving nuclear
weapons related technology and/or delivery systems,
including missiles?
d. To what extent might the current proposal
stimulate China's and Pakistan's production of nuclear
weapons or nuclear weapons material?
e. How effective are India's nuclear and missile
export laws and enforcement capabilities vis-a-vis
those of the NPT nuclear-weapon states and the
requirements of Resolution 1540?
2. Will the delivery of U.S. technology or nuclear fuel for
the reactors in India free-up indigenous Indian nuclear fuel
for its weapons program?
a. Could such an action damage the NPT and our
ability to help enforce compliance with it?
b. What verifiable restrictions on India's use of its
own fuel will the United States insist upon?
c. Will the U.S. insist on case-by-case consent
rights or rights of disapproval on reprocessing and
enrichment and retransfers of U.S. origin items?
d. Is the administration considering the transfer of
uranium enrichment or reprocessing technology to India
as part of the U.S.-Indian accord?
3. What kind of IAEA safeguards will be applied to Indian
civilian nuclear facilities?
a. Will they be INFCIRC 66 Rev.2 safeguards which are
applied in perpetuity?
b. If other safeguards are contemplated that are not
permanent, how would they prevent the diversion of
civilian materials or technologies to weapon use once
the putative U.S.-India agreement expires or is
otherwise terminated?
c. Will India be allowed to withdraw a civilian
facility from safeguards and declare it a military
facility?
d. What criteria would be used by the U.S. government
to determine which nuclear facilities and materials
should be subject to safeguards?
e. How much additional funding will the IAEA need in
order to meet the additional safeguards requirements?
4. How will the United States verify Indian nonproliferation
commitments beyond safeguards under the proposed agreement?
a. Will the U.S. be able to determine independently
which Indian facilities are civilian and which are
military? If not, how will we know whether India's
declaration is appropriate?
b. What mechanisms are in place to monitor Indian
implementation of its export laws, and how long would
it take to ensure that the appropriate Indian laws are
in place and are working effectively?
5. Does the administration consider India's 1974 nuclear
explosion in which U.S. heavy water was used in the production
of the bomb's plutonium a violation of the sale agreement
between India and the United States? If so, does India agree
with our interpretation of that agreement? If they don't, how
can we assure that similar disagreements won't happen with the
current proposal? Should the proposal be amended to provide for
return of all delivered materials in the event of such a
disagreement?
6. Both U.S. and Indian spokesmen have referred to a
``phased'' approach to implementation of the proposal if
approved. If so, what are the steps and what is the sequence?
Is the U.S. government working on a plan with a timetable that
would phase in our cooperation with India in accordance with
India's meeting its obligations?
7. Has the administration obtained any evidence of
Pakistani, Israeli, or North Korean interest in
civilian nuclear cooperation on terms similar to those
proposed for India. What is the argument for doing this
favor for India and not for these other states? How
will the administration respond if other states, like
China or Russia, seek exemptions for their preferred
political or commercial partners?
8. What specific proposals, if any, has the U.S. discussed
with NSG partners to alter its guidelines so that civilian
nuclear trade with India might proceed and what are the
specific reactions of other NSG members? Will the
administration proceed with ``full'' civil nuclear cooperation
with India if the NSG does not unanimously support such an
exception to NSG rules for India? How will the proposed rule
changes relating to India affect President Bush's proposal to
the NSG to make the Additional Protocol a condition of supply?
These questions suggest that the proposal by the administration
requires much more discussion and examination before any legislative
action is taken.
__________
Many Skeptical Eyes Are on U.S.-India Nuclear Deal; Congress, Critics
Want Answers About the Risks\1\
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\1\Copyright 2006, Gannett Company, Inc., All Rights Reserved, USA
TODAY, April 5, 2006
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by: barbara slavin
WASHINGTON--The Bush administration's plan to sell nuclear
technology to India for the first time in three decades is under
scrutiny from lawmakers on Capitol Hill and critics who say the deal
will increase the risk that dangerous materials will spread.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is to testify today before both
houses of Congress in support of the deal, finalized last month when
President Bush was in New Delhi.
``The intention is to do due diligence, and there are a lot of
questions members want answered,'' said Rep. Henry Hyde, R-Ill.,
chairman of the House International Relations Committee.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, R-Ind.,
suggested that Congress is in no hurry to move. ``I believe that we
have only scratched the surface of this intricate agreement and the
national security questions it has raised,'' he said in a statement.
Rep. Tom Lantos of California, the ranking Democrat on the House
International Relations Committee, said the administration has not yet
given Congress details of how it intends to cooperate with India's
nuclear industry.
The administration is requesting an exception to a 1954 law that
bans U.S. nuclear cooperation with any country that has not allowed the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations' nuclear
watchdog, to monitor all its nuclear facilities.
The Bush administration has portrayed the deal as a major
breakthrough for U.S.-India relations and for global efforts to stop
nuclear proliferation. If Congress approves, the United States would
end a three-decade embargo on selling nuclear technology to India.
India exploded a nuclear device in 1974 that it had developed under the
guise of a civilian program. Under the U.S.-India agreement, India
would separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and let the
IAEA inspect civilian sites.
``We are far better off working with the Indians and having the
IAEA place safeguards on India's civil nuclear program than we are if
India is isolated,'' Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, the prime
negotiator of the deal, said recently. Burns said the deal will cement
a strategic relationship with the world's most populous democracy.
Critics say the agreement could encourage the spread of nuclear
technology.
Seven proliferation experts led by Henry Sokolski, executive
director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington,
sent a letter Tuesday to the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate
and House foreign relations committees urging Congress not to approve
the deal until the administration ``has specified what further steps it
is planning to take'' to ensure that the agreement does not increase
proliferation risks.
David Albright, a former IAEA inspector who now heads the Institute
for Science and International Security, a Washington think tank, said
his institute has documented worrisome Indian practices. For more than
20 years, he said, a uranium-enrichment plant outside Mysore, India,
has placed ads in newspapers to buy sensitive nuclear technology. The
content of the ads revealed sensitive information, Albright said. The
plant and trading companies acting on its behalf have also failed to
identify the end-user for such equipment, he said.
In 2004, the State Department sanctioned an Indian scientist,
Y.S.R. Prasad, for aiding Iran's nuclear program. Prasad is a former
head of India's Nuclear Power Corporation and an expert on the
extraction of tritium from heavy-water reactors. Tritium is used to
make small, compact nuclear warheads.
Prasad has denied giving Iran information about tritium, and the
Indian government has asked that the State Department restrictions on
U.S. dealings with the scientist be lifted, said Venu Rajamony,
spokesman for the Indian Embassy.
__________
Indian Navy Trains Iranian Sailors; U.S., India Straddle
Foreign Policy Line\1\
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\1\Copyright 2006 Defense News and Army Times Publishing Co. and
Army Times Publishing Co., All Rights Reserved, March 27, 2006
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by: by vivek raghuvanshi, new delhi and gopal ratnam, washington
While U.S. President George W. Bush was in New Delhi earlier this
month to sign a historic deal to supply nuclear fuel and technologies
to India, two Iranian warships were in Kochi, the headquarters of
Indian Navy's Southern Command, for a training program under a three-
year-old military-cooperation agreement with Tehran.
The confluence of events illustrates the fine foreign-policy lines
that U.S. and Indian officials are straddling.
The Bush administration is trying to slow Iran's nuclear-weapon
program but also seeking Tehran's help in stabilizing Iraq. New Delhi
appears to be striking a similar balance between closer strategic ties
with Washington while seeking an independent relationship with oil-
producing Iran.
The March 3-8 visit to Kochi by the IRIS Bandar Abbas, a fleet-
supply-turned-training ship, and IRIS Lavan, an amphibious ship, was
the first Iranian naval visit to India in many years, Indian Navy
officials told local newspapers.
Indian naval instructors briefed nearly 220 Iranian sailors on the
Indian Navy's training approach and course details, said Capt. M.
Nambiar, spokesman for the Indian Navy's Southern Command.
The visit could be part of a larger Indo-Iranian naval training
program, local press reports said. In 2003, India and Iran signed a
strategic agreement to cooperate in defense and other matters. The deal
was cemented by the visit of then-Iranian President Mohammed Khatami to
the Republic Day parade in New Delhi, an honor usually reserved for key
allies.
But Indian officials tried to downplay the significance of the
ships' visit, saying that it was a routine call by foreign training
vessels at India's main naval training port.
``There is no particular significance to the timing of the call.
This was a matter decided upon through normal diplomatic channels
several months back and such visits are part of usual courtesies
extended by navies of the world to their counterparts,'' one Indian
diplomat said. ``India's cooperation with Iran in the defense field is
extremely limited.''
Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Barry Venable declined to comment on
India's training of Iranian sailors.
State Department officials also declined to comment by press time,
saying they were seeking more details about the Iranian ship visit.
Concern in Washington
But the India-Iran relationship is of serious concern to policy-
makers in Washington.
``India's relationship with Iran is a sensitive area that will
shape how far we can go in our relationship with India, that's for
sure,'' said Michael Green, who until recently directed Asia affairs at
the White House National Security Council. Now an Asia specialist at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, Green
he said he didn't know details of the Iranian ship visit.
The Bush administration, citing India's democracy and fast-growing
economy, has highlighted the relationship as the cornerstone of a
strategic push to build strong ties in Asia. A recent agreement settled
by Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh would allow India to
import nuclear fuel and technologies to meet India's energy needs.
The Pentagon and the American defense industry also are hoping to
sell several billion dollars worth of high-tech weapons to India,
including fighter planes, transport and surveillance aircraft, radar
and naval vessels.
But key members of Congress--including Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind.,
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Rep. Henry
Hyde, R-Ill., chairman of the House International Relations Committee--
have yet to throw their support behind the proposed nuclear agreement,
which would require changes to U.S. law.
Both are staunch advocates of nonproliferation measures, and are
concerned that the proposed deal could hurt international efforts to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
Former U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn, another such advocate, has said the
U.S.-India nuclear cooperation could harm ``United States' vital
interests'' and urged Congress not to support the deal without
substantial modifications.
Seeking Balance
India and Pakistan have been discussing proposals for a $4.5
billion pipeline to import Iranian natural gas. U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice opposed the deal at a press conference in New Delhi in
March 2005, saying it would encourage Tehran to defy the international
community.
But Indian officials refused to abandon the project, and the White
House has apparently changed its mind.
``Our beef with Iran is not the pipeline,'' Bush said in Islamabad
March 4. ``Our beef with Iran is in fact, they want to develop a
nuclear weapon, and I believe a nuclear weapon in the hands of the
Iranians will be very dangerous for all of us.''
India reversed a long-standing position of its own in recent months
by supporting Washington's effort to send the issue of Iran's nuclear-
weapon program to the U.N. Security Council.
A top national-security official in India's previous government
urged New Delhi to balance its ties to Washington and its neighborhood.
``India, by forging nuclear cooperation ties with the United
States, should not adopt an American line on dealing with Iran,'' said
Brijesh Mishra, who was national security adviser in the National
Democratic Alliance government led by Prime Minister Atal Behari
Vajpayee.
Mishra said ties to Iran could secure oil for energy-thirsty India
as well as be ``an important gateway'' to improving relations with
central Asian states.
India's vote against Iran ``got the government into trouble with
its own communist party allies'' who saw it as a betrayal of the
county's policies, said Salman Haidar, a senior fellow at the U.S.
Institute of Peace, Washington, and a former foreign secretary of
India.
The current government, led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh ,is
supported by communist parties known for their anti-American views.
Countries seeking closer relationship with the United States always
face the problem of balancing their regional interests with those of
Washington, Haidar said.
``India's strategic interest drives us toward Iran, but a different
strategic calculation makes us wary of Iran. But we are certainly not
going to treat Iran as a hostile power. If there is military action
against Iran, I would not be surprised if India stays away from it. Not
being looked upon as an American auxiliary is important for India.
That's the way we are going.''
__________
Rethinking India\1\
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\1\Copyright 2006 Los Angeles Times, All Rights Reserved, March 1,
2006
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editorial
PRESIDENT BUSH ARRIVES in India today to pursue one of his longtime
foreign policy objectives: bringing the United States and India closer.
It's a worthy goal. India is the world's largest democracy, and its
economy is growing. And although the White House doesn't want to draw
too much attention to old-school realpolitik, India is in a
strategically important neighborhood, sharing borders with China and
Pakistan.
But the price Bush has paid for closer ties with India is too high.
The deal he struck last summer for nuclear cooperation with New Delhi
would undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It would reward
India, which never signed the treaty, cheated on an earlier technology
deal with the United States, then went on to test a nuclear bomb.
The message to Iran, North Korea and other nuclear wannabes
couldn't be clearer or more destructive. These regimes and others will
rightly conclude that the United States is interested in stopping the
spread of nuclear know-how and technology only to regimes it dislikes.
This perceived double standard only confirms the view that the Bush
administration doesn't really believe in nonproliferation or any other
treaty-based form of arms control or security. It just believes in
changing hostile regimes whose aspirations threaten ours. This
undermines U.S. moral leadership on the single most dangerous threat to
humankind: the spread of nuclear weapons.
But there's still hope. The nuclear deal requires approval from
both nations' legislatures, and it's in deep trouble in Washington and
New Delhi.
In Washington, the administration has failed to secure the support
of Congress, notably Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), whose views
deserve particular respect because of his decades of work on nuclear
disarmament and risk reduction. In India's Parliament, the deal is also
under fire. The nationalist right thinks Washington should recognize
that India is already an independent nuclear power that need make no
concessions. There may be no way to avoid a collision here, but Bush
should try to convince Indian officials that the deal needs to be
renegotiated if it is to gain congressional approval.
One interesting idea for a revamped deal comes from Daniel Poneman,
a former National Security Council official. He proposes that India
sign on to a plan similar to the one that Russia is offering Iran:
lease nuclear fuel from abroad for its civilian reactors instead of
making its own. The spent fuel, which can be used to make nuclear
weapons, could be safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
India's sensitivity about its sovereignty may make the idea a non-
starter; after all, the reason India didn't sign the nonproliferation
treaty in the first place is because it does not believe its nuclear
plans should be subject to conditions set by others. Still, an effort
by Bush to pull back will help restore the global credibility of the
nonproliferation ideal.
VIII.--Hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April
26, 2006
----------
U.S.-INDIA ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION: STRATEGIC AND NONPROLIFERATION
IMPLICATIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G.
Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Voinovich,
Martinez, Biden, Boxer, Nelson, and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
The committee meets today to continue its examination of
the United States-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement. On April 5,
the committee met in open session with Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice. On March 29, we examined the agreement in
closed session with Under Secretaries Nick Burns and Bob
Joseph. Today, we'll have the opportunity to hear the views of
the eight esteemed experts from outside the U.S. Government.
Now, some months ago, I submitted 82 questions, related to
the agreement, to the State Department as an initial step
toward establishing a dialog that would help Congress make an
informed decision. The State Department provided answers to all
those 82 questions. After the hearing with Secretary Rice, I
submitted about 90 additional questions for the record. The
ranking member and several other members of this committee have
also submitted questions after these hearings. We appreciate
the administration's attention to these questions as the
committee carefully works through the intricacies of the
nuclear agreement with India.
The committee is cognizant of how valuable a closer
relationship with India could be for the United States. At our
last hearing, many members commented on the importance of
improving ties with India. Our nations share common democratic
values, and the potential of our economic engagement is
limitless.
Energy cooperation between the United States and India is
particularly important. India's energy needs are expected to
double by 2025. The United States has an interest in expanding
energy cooperation with India to develop new technologies, to
cushion supply disruptions, to cut greenhouse gas emissions,
and to prepare for declining global fossil fuel reserves. The
United States own energy problems will be exacerbated if we do
not forge energy partnerships with India, China, and other
nations experiencing rapid economic growth. That is why I have
introduced S. 2435, the Energy Diplomacy and Security Act,
which would encourage international energy dialogs and advance
a broad range of energy diplomacy goals.
But even as we pursue closer ties with India, we must
examine the implications and risks of initiating a cooperative
nuclear relationship. India has not signed the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty; it has built and tested nuclear weapons;
it has declared its intention to continue its nuclear weapons
programs and the production of fissile material. If Congress
approves this agreement, we will be establishing a new course
after decades of declining any cooperation with India's nuclear
program. Consequently, our committee has spent much time
probing the details of the United States-India Civilian Nuclear
Agreement.
Among many questions, we are attempting to evaluate the
potential benefits of drawing India into a deeper relationship
with the International Atomic Energy Agency and placing more
Indian reactors under safeguards. The committee has also
expressed great interest in the timing and sequence of how the
India Nuclear Agreement would be implemented. Since the
committee last met with Secretary Rice, India has initiated
discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency on a
safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. This is a
welcome development, but I urge India and the IAEA to work hard
to conclude an effective agreement in a timely fashion. All
parties involved in the negotiations, including the Bush
administration, should facilitate the maximum amount of
transparency possible so that Congress is better equipped to
make informed judgments.
Today we will hear from two panels of highly knowledgeable
experts. Our first panel will focus on the strategic dynamics
of the agreement, and the second panel will take up the
question of nonproliferation implications of nuclear
cooperation between the United States and India.
On our first panel, we welcome the distinguished former
Secretary of Defense, William Perry. Presently, he is
codirector of the Preventive Defense Project. He is joined by
Dr. Ashton Carter, also a codirector of the Preventive Defense
Project and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy. Joining them will be Dr. Robert
Gallucci, dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service, at Georgetown. Dr. Gallucci served as a chief U.S.
negotiator during the 1994 crisis over North Korea's nuclear
program. And, finally, Dr. Ashley Tellis is with us, from the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dr. Tellis played a
leading role in the formulation of the United States-India
Nuclear Agreement, serving in key State Department positions.
On our second panel, we will welcome Dr. Ronald Lehman,
director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory and formerly the head of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Mr. Robert Einhorn, a
senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies and formerly Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation; Dr. Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin
Project on Nuclear Arms Control; and Dr. Stephen Cohen, a
senior fellow at Brookings Institution.
We are pleased to have with us so many good friends of this
committee. Most of our witnesses have provided invaluable
service to the Foreign Relations Committee over the years as we
have struggled with nonproliferation and other geopolitical
issues. We thank each of them in advance for their willingness
to again lend a hand to us with their extraordinary expertise.
I would like now to call upon the distinguished ranking
member of the committee for his opening statement.
Senator Biden.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I'd
ask unanimous consent that my entire opening statement be
placed in the record, and I'll try to----
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record in full.
Senator Biden [continuing]. Truncate it a bit, because I
know we're up against a vote later on, and we have some very
important witnesses.
And I'd also say, at the outset, that I have a number of
questions that at least I deem to be important, and it would
take some time for the witnesses to respond to all of them. So,
what I may do is submit them in writing to the witnesses, so
that we can get through everyone, and shorten the question
period so everybody gets a chance to ask questions.
But I want to begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing, actually a series of hearings we're going
to have, on this--the administration's nuclear deal with India.
The administration didn't consult with us, at least didn't
consult with me, as it negotiated its July 18 Joint Statement
between President Bush and Prime Minister Singh. And, in my
view, it's paid little attention to our concerns as it
negotiated with India, regarding plans for separating India's
civil nuclear facilities from its military ones. And it
submitted a legislative proposal to us, and a decision proposal
to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, that I would argue is poorly
drafted enough to cast doubt on the administration's approach.
But, despite this, as I indicated 3 weeks ago, I think
we're in a quandary here. Quite frankly, this is not a treaty I
would have suggested that we negotiate the way it was
negotiated. But the downside and the impact on our strategic
relationships in the region, I think, at least as this hearing
starts, I start from the premise--that it would do serious
damage if we rejected this treaty. But the upsides of the
treaty are not nearly as positive as I think they could or
should be, which leads me, Mr. Chairman, to suggest that I--
like many others, I suspect--am considering amendments that
might deal with some of what I believe to be the shortcomings
in this negotiated agreement, primarily not demanding positions
from India, but assurances from the administration as to how
they'll proceed.
And we need a lot more answers, Mr. Chairman. Although
you've indicated that the administration answered a lot of your
questions, I don't know that many questions that have been
submitted have been answered since the separation agreement has
been submitted to us, in March; and it has yet to share the
negotiating record or explain just what it agreed to when it
accepted the idea of ``India-specific'' safeguards or
``corrective measures that India may take in the event of
disruption of foreign fuel supplies'' or assurances regarding
fuel supplies or strategic reserves of nuclear fuel for India.
I'm still uncertain as to what all that means. The
administration has yet to share with us the full list of
India's civil nuclear facilities, even in a classified forum.
And it has not met what I thought was a commitment to share
drafts of the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement that it is
negotiating with India. I think all of this is worth us being
able to look at and see.
But, as I said, Mr. Chairman--I must stay up front--this
new deal for India makes more sense than it does harm. But I
don't think it is, to use the phrase of a famous American
formerly in the administration, I don't think it's a slam dunk.
And that's why we're here today, to take the testimony from
some of our country's best thinkers on nuclear policy.
I will submit, as I said, the rest of my statement for the
record, but I'm anxious to hear from our witnesses, and I will,
as I said, Mr. Chairman, in addition to the few questions I
might ask, have a number of very specific questions I'd like to
ask them to consider responding to in writing. I realize, in a
sense, that makes more work for them. I apologize for that. But
it would be helpful.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement and addition material of Senator
Biden follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator From
Delaware
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for chairing this series of
hearings on the administration's nuclear deal with India.
The administration did not consult us as it negotiated the July 18
Joint Statement between President Bush and Prime Minister Singh.
It paid little attention to our concerns as it negotiated with
India regarding India's plan for separating its civil nuclear
facilities from its military ones.
And it submitted a legislative proposal to us and a decision
proposal to the Nuclear Suppliers Group that were so poorly drafted as
to cast doubt on the administration's seriousness of purpose.
Despite this, I indicated 3 weeks ago that I will probably support
the agreement at the end of the day. I did so because I agree that the
time has come to develop a new relationship between India and the
parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
And I did so also because undoing this deal could do more damage--
in terms of our relationship with India--than approving it, with
carefully drafted conditions.
This deal brings risks, and I believe the administration and
Congress must minimize those risks.
So far, Mr. Chairman, the administration has done a lot more to
lobby us than to work with us.
It has yet to answer our questions for the record.
It has yet to share its negotiating record or explain just
what it agreed to when it accepted the idea of ``India-specific
safeguards,'' or ``corrective measures that India may take . .
. in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies,'' or
U.S. ``assurances regarding fuel supply,'' or ``a strategic
reserve of nuclear fuel'' for India.
The administration has yet to share with us the full list of
India's civil nuclear facilities--even in classified form.
And it has reneged on an earlier promise to share drafts of
the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement that it is
negotiating with India.
Mr. Chairman, I still think that a new deal for India makes sense.
But it isn't a ``slam dunk,'' as they say, and that is why we are here
today to take testimony from some of our country's best thinkers on
nuclear policy.
Today's witnesses all have impressive backgrounds, and I have
relied upon the wisdom of many of them over the years. I look forward
to hearing their insights today.
I want to especially thank Bill Perry for coming in from California
and for upsetting his schedule in Washington in order to help us today.
Dr. Perry is a man who answers his country's call, just as he did
regarding North Korea policy after he had retired as Secretary of
Defense.
I would recommend that we also schedule a follow-up hearing with
experts on the Atomic Energy Act, to discuss possible amendments to S.
2429, and experts on India who could tell us what the consequences of
enacting those amendments might be.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I hope that you will make clear to the
administration that the Senate and this committee should not be taken
for granted.
We expect the administration to answer our questions, to provide us
the details on the related agreements that India is negotiating with
the United States and with the IAEA, and to work with us to make S.
2429 a respectable bill.
Until the administration does that, we simply should not act on its
proposed legislation.
Mr. Chairman, we recently received a letter from Ambassador John
Ritch, a former staff member of this committee, in support of the India
nuclear deal. I ask that his letter and an attached op-ed from the
International Herald Tribune be included in today's hearing record.
Thank you.
______
23 April 2006.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar, Chairman,
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Ranking Member,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Subject: Submission on U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation
Dear Senators Lugar and Biden: For the committee's consideration
and record in connection with the 26 April hearing on proposed U.S.-
India nuclear cooperation, I offer the attached summary of my views, as
published recently in the International Herald Tribune. My perspective
derives from:
22 years of service on the staff of the Foreign Relations
Committee;
7 years as U.S. representative to the IAEA and other U.N.
agencies in Vienna; and
5 years interacting with the Indian nuclear establishment in
my current capcity.
With respect and warm regards,
John B. Ritch,
Director General, World Nuclear Association.
______
[From the International Herald Tribune, Apr. 6, 2006]
It Makes Sense To End India's Nuclear Isolation
(By John B. Ritch)
London.--President George W. Bush has taken a momentous step in
shelving a U.S. policy that for three decades cast India as a nuclear
pariah-state and isolated the world's largest democracy from nuclear
commerce, even for the peaceful purpose of generating electricity.
In Washington a fierce debate has erupted over the impact on the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
The U.S.-India deal conforms to the treaty by ensuring that nuclear
commerce remains in the civil realm. But critics say it jeopardizes the
treaty by legitimizing India's nuclear deterrent. Supporters counter
that India's weapon is a long-standing fact, that India has used
nuclear technology responsibly and that it is time to close ranks with
a democracy.
Before the Bush initiative, two truths coexisted uneasily. First,
the nonproliferation regime is one of history's great diplomatic
achievements. Since its inception in 1970, the treaty has kept the
number of nuclear-armed nations under 10.
Episodes of non-compliance have shown the treaty's value. After the
first Gulf War revealed Iraq's covert nuclear efforts, the treaty
regime gained strength as the International Atomic Energy Agency
acquired new detection capabilities and broader authority for its
inspectors. Treaty inspections ``caught'' both North Korea and Iran,
and have spurred collective diplomacy against these violations.
A second, less convenient truth is that the treaty was, from the
outset, unfair to India as a great nation. The treaty drew a line in
time, recognizing only the UN Security Council's five permanent members
as ``nuclear-weapon states.'' Thus, when India became the world's sixth
nuclear power in 1974, it faced Hobson's choice: Disarm or remain
outside the treaty.
For reasons of principle and strategic interest India remained
outside, declaring that it would eliminate its small deterrent as soon
as the five favored ``weapon states'' fulfilled a treaty pledge to
dismantle their own much larger nuclear arsenals.
Indians went on, for three decades, to become proud developers and
careful custodians of their own sophisticated nuclear technologies. To
supply power for economic growth, India now plans to build hundreds of
reactors by mid-century, even without the new agreement.
The Bush initiative would accept India's reality. Critics complain
that the accord leaves India's military program ``unconstrained.''
Advocates counter that India's civil power reactors will fall under
inspection safeguards.
This debate is sterile. Inspections on India's civil facilities
cannot affect its military program. But neither will civil nuclear
trade with India spur an Asian arms race. India's leaders have no
motive to abandon India's long-standing policy of maintaining minimal
nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis Pakistan's smaller nuclear force and
China's larger one.
Although legal under the nonproliferation treaty, the deal will
require change in a U.S. law enacted in 1978 that made treaty
membership a condition of nuclear trade. In 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers
Group of nations embraced the same coercive approach. Now these
countries are set to follow the U.S. lead, with only China expressing
resistance.
The new policy would revert--in the unique case of India--to the
basic treaty requirement of confining nuclear trade to the civil realm.
It would also welcome India as a partner in world nuclear trade
controls and collaborative projects to develop nuclear technology.
Some say that ending India's nuclear isolation sends a dangerous
message to potential proliferators. This charge does not withstand
analysis. How will the ambitions of Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan be
inflamed by the principle now being affirmed?
The principle is this: In sensitive nuclear technology, we will
trade legally--and with nations that have earned the world's trust. As
a practical matter, no nation appears likely to ``proliferate'' because
India is allowed civil nuclear commerce.
Thus has the new policy been endorsed by Hans Blix and Mohamed
Elbaradei, the IAEA leaders entrusted over the last quarter century to
oversee the nonproliferation regime.
Nuclear cooperation with India offers some economic opportunity--
and potentially enormous environmental value. India has recognized the
urgency of a worldwide clean-energy revolution if humankind is to avoid
unleashing devastating climate change.
The U.S.-India deal promises a partnership between the two largest
democracies to deliver this environmental benefit--within India and to
a wider world--on a scale that can make a difference.
With a strong legal, strategic and environmental rationale, this is
a Bush initiative that has gained a broad coalition of support abroad.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.
And I appreciate your sentiments. And we're all probing.
And hopefully witnesses will be able to answer our questions
today, as well as additional questions as we seek more
information.
Let me suggest, as a format for our hearing, Senator Biden
has mentioned, and I talked to him a moment before the meeting,
about the fact that we will have rollcall votes at noon. We
have two distinguished panels, and many Senators who wanted to
ask questions. So, I'm going to ask if the witnesses could try
to summarize their initial comments in approximately 7 minutes
or so, plus or minus a minute or two, and then ask members, in
our round of questioning, to confine their questions to 5
minutes. At least arithmetically, I think we can make it, that
way. And if we don't, why, the world will not come to an end--
[Laughter.]
The Chairman [continuing]. And we will do the best that we
can to honor the opportunities for both witnesses and members
to ask their questions.
I'd like to ask for the testimony, on the first panel, to
commence in this order. First of all, Dr. Carter, then
Secretary Perry, then Dr. Gallucci, and then Dr. Tellis.
Dr. Carter, we're delighted, once again, to have you here,
and if you would proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, CODIRECTOR, PREVENTIVE
DEFENSE PROJECT, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MA
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members.
Mr. Chairman, I have a written statement, which takes the
form of an article that will appear in the forthcoming issue of
Foreign Affairs, which is dedicated to the emergence of India
onto the world stage. They've not released it yet for me to
enter it into the record, but, with your permission, when it
does get released, I'd like to make that my written statement.
The Chairman. It will be placed as a part of the record.
And let me just say, the prepared statements each of you made
will be made a part of the record. You need not ask for
permission. That will occur.
Dr. Carter. Thank you.
I would like to offer my three-part assessment of both the
nuclear and nonnuclear aspects of the India deal. First, I will
assess what the United States gave, and the implications of
what it gave, for the nonproliferation regime; second, I will
examine what the United States stands to get from India in
return; and, third, I will assess the likelihood that we will
actually get what we are seeking as our side of the bargain.
Today I will argue that the deal, as negotiated by the
United States, is quite uneven, but I will not be recommending
that the United States attempt to rebalance the deal by seeking
more technical nuclear steps by India. Instead, I think that
rebalancing should be done by clarifying that the strategic
partnership inaugurated by this deal carries very high
expectations of India, especially in connection with Iran and
its nuclear program.
I judge the damage to the nonproliferation regime
occasioned by this deal to be palpable, but quite manageable.
This is not a torpedo amidships, as some have said, but
American efforts to seek additional technical measures will not
appreciably repair whatever damage has already been done.
Mr. Chairman and members, most of the controversy about the
India deal has swirled around its nuclear aspects. This is
understandable, since preventing nuclear war and terrorism is
the highest American national security priority in this era, as
Bush himself has acknowledged. The decade has already witnessed
a stunning defeat for the United States in North Korea's
runaway nuclear program. The same could be unfolding more
slowly in Iran. Meanwhile, an unbowed Osama bin Laden has
declared to his followers that obtaining weapons of mass
destruction is a ``religious duty.''
Indeed, if the nuclear aspects of the India deal are
assessed in isolation, one must conclude that the deal was a
very unbalanced one, and a bad one for the United States.
Washington recognized Delhi's nuclear status in return for
little in the way of new steps by India to combat nuclear
proliferation and terrorism that Delhi was not already
committed or inclined to give, and for almost no technical
restraints on India's growing nuclear arsenal.
Through the U.S. concession, the nonproliferation regime
also paid a palpable, although probably manageable, price to
its integrity and support. But it would be a mistake to assess
the India deal in a nuclear-only frame.
President Bush and his key advisors were clearly looking
through a wider lens, and so should the public and the U.S.
Congress. Viewed through such a wider geopolitical lens, the
deal has the United States giving the Indians what they have
craved for so long--nuclear recognition--in return for a
strategic partnership between Washington and Delhi, as the two
democracies face similar potential challenges from China,
Pakistan, Iran, and elsewhere in the coming decades. In short,
Washington ``gave'' on the nuclear front to ``get'' something
on the nonnuclear front.
Powerful arguments can be made that strategic partnership
with India will prove to be in the deep and long-term U.S.
security interest. A nuclear-recognition quid for a strategic-
partnership quo is, therefore, a reasonable framework for an
India deal.
However, as a diplomatic transaction the India deal as
negotiated by President Bush is quite uneven. First of all, a
United States-Indian strategic partnership would seem to be in
Delhi's interest as well as America's. So why pay them for it?
Second, the deal is uneven in its specifics. What the United
States gives is spelled out quite clearly, but what India gives
in return is vaguer. Third, the deal is uneven in timing. The
United States gave its big quid of nuclear recognition up
front, as we essentially already gave it last summer, but what
we stand to get in return from partnership with India lies
further out in an uncertain future.
Despite the deal's flaws, Congress should not attempt to
renegotiate the deal to win a more balanced version than the
Bush administration obtained. The big U.S. card of nuclear
recognition has already been played, and cannot be taken back
by Congress at this point, without casting a lasting cloud over
the whole idea of Indo-U.S. partnership.
Haggling over some of the details of the implementation of
the nuclear parts of the deal is unlikely to restore much of
whatever lost reputation for nonproliferation consistency the
United States has already suffered, and would probably be
viewed as grudging and punitive in Delhi. The result would be
to undermine the goodwill that was supposedly the whole purpose
of giving nuclear recognition to India in the first place.
Rather than subtracting from the Indian side of the ledger
in an effort to rebalance the India deal, Congress should,
instead, emphasize what the United States expects on its side
of the ledger to give meaning to the new ``strategic
partnership.'' The United States should expect India to join it
in countering any destabilizing effects China's future rise
might have on Asian security; assisting in any emergency in
Pakistan, such as radicalization of its government or loss of
control of its nuclear weapons; reversing traditional Indian
opposition to controls on transfer of nuclear technology, and
especially using its diplomatic clout against potential
proliferators like Iran; growing its military-to-military
relationships, including arms cooperation, to match, in time,
those the United States has with its closest allies; and giving
preferential treatment to United States defense and nuclear
industries when the Indian Government makes investments in
these sectors. That would rebalance the ledger. That's the kind
of rebalancing I think we should be seeking.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, there are two particular issues I
wanted to address in the assessment.
The first is the question of how much damage nuclear
recognition for India did to the nuclear nonproliferation
regime. The United States has declined to recognize India's
nuclear arsenal over time for two reasons. First, India's
nuclear arsenal is watched closely by arch rival and nuclear-
armed Pakistan and by China, with which India has fought no
fewer than three wars since its independence from Great
Britain. Recognizing the Indian arsenal, the argument went,
might spar its open growth and thus an arms race in South Asia.
The second reason had to do with the integrity of the NPT
regime, and that is the point I'd like to touch on briefly, if
I may.
It is inconceivable to me that North Korea's Kim Jong Il
pays much heed to the internal consistency of the NPT regime as
he calculates how far he can get with his nuclear breakout.
North Korea's governing ideology is less communism than a
fanatical embrace of autarky and ``self-reliance,'' including
open defiance of international norms like the nonproliferation
regime. North Korea's tolerance for international ostracism is
legendary. If Kim's nuclear program can be stopped at all at
this point, it will be through a tough and focused diplomacy of
sticks and carrots in which the NPT will play little part.
Likewise, after 1998 Saddam Hussein simply ceased paying
attention to the NPT.
Iran's cat-and-mouse game with the EU-3, the United States,
and the IAEA over its recently revealed nuclear program
bespeaks at least a smidgen of sensitivity to international
opinion as embodied in the NPT. Nuclear recognition for India
gives Tehran a new talking point: If India gets a free pass,
why not Iran? But, like North Korea, Iran's nuclear program has
deeper roots, and against these the NPT will not weigh in very
heavily. Besides, for now, Tehran denies it is seeking a
nuclear arsenal at all but only nuclear power, so it will be
hard-pressed to use India as a precedent for its current
diplomatic situation.
The impact of the Bush-Singh deal on the ``rogues'' is
therefore minimal. Its main impact will be felt on two other
groups of countries. First, there are the ``in-betweens'':
States that are not rogues, but that flirt with nuclear status.
In the recent past, the in-betweens have included South Africa,
Argentina and Brazil, the post-Soviet States of Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus--which you, Mr. Chairman, did so much
to denuclearize, as did Secretary Perry--South Korea, Taiwan,
and, only recently joining this category, Libya. These in-
betweens turned away from nuclear weapons for many reasons
specific to their own individual circumstances, but in each
case, the lasting international ostracism threatening them if
they stood outside the NPT regime, was an influential factor
for both governments and their people. Nuclear recognition for
India suggests that forgiveness will eventually come to
proliferators who wait, and tomorrow's in-betweens might be
tempted by the Bush-Singh precedent.
The most nonproliferation damage, curiously, might be done
among the stalwarts of the regime: Governments that have no
nuclear ambitions at all, but that faithfully uphold the rules,
and also the nuclear powers that already enjoy a privileged
place in it. These groups not only provide political support to
discourage in-betweens and confront rogues, they provide vital
and direct technical support by denying critical exports to
those who infringe the NPT's rules.
Damage limitation from this Bush-Singh deal must,
therefore, center on the in-betweens and the stalwarts, not the
rogues. A plan for doing so was a logical part of the U.S.
diplomatic initiative, but it is clear that the Bush
administration did not have one until after the deal was
concluded, still less did it consult widely before Bush made
his dramatic volte-face in July 2005.
But most of the nations whose adherence to the NPT regime
is critical will either support the deal or acquiesce in it.
First, most accept the United States argument that India's
nuclear nonproliferation behavior has been good--there have
apparently been no Indian AQ Khans--and that India's possession
of nuclear weapons is an established fact and cannot be
reversed. Second, all can see that India is hardly a rogue
state, but a stable democracy likely to play a large and
constructive role in the world of the 21st century. Third, many
will regard India's 30 years in the ``penalty box,'' which
exacted a heavy price from Delhi in both prestige and
technology, as sufficient to make the point that the regime's
adherents are serious about enforcing its norms.
These arguments have won over many in the international
nonproliferation community, notably IAEA Director General and
Nobel laureate, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei. And so, while there is
some grumbling within the NPT regime over the deal, a revolt or
collapse is not likely, and the damage to the regime can, in my
judgment, be limited.
The final point I'd like to make is that even as critics
have exaggerated the nonproliferation costs of the nuclear part
of the deal, so also its proponents have exaggerated its
benefits in terms of energy security and nuclear security.
Bush administration spokesmen have defended the deal's
nuclear power provisions as critical to stopping India's rise
from posing an oil and environmental crisis. But this claim
does not survive close scrutiny. Energy security is terribly
important to both India and the United States. All want India's
huge population to satisfy its energy needs, which will grow
faster than its GDP, increasing as much as fourfold within 25
years, without contributing further to dependence on Middle
East oil, pollution, and global warming. But the arithmetic
does not support the case that nuclear power will add up to
make the critical difference for India, though it can, and
should, play a role. For the foreseeable future, electricity
generation in India will be dominated by coal burning, whereas,
nuclear plants--which today produce only 3 percent of India's
electricity--will remain a single-digit contributor even under
the most extravagant projections of United States-assisted
nuclear expansion in India.
Indian coal is plentiful, but of poor quality and highly
polluting. Burning coal more cheaply and more cleanly will do
more than any conceivable expansion of nuclear power to aid
India's economy and the environment.
India's share of world oil consumption will grow from 3 to
4 percent over the next 20 years. But nuclear power does
nothing to address the principal Indian oil-consuming sector--
cars and trucks--since these don't run off the electrical grid,
and won't for a long time.
Finally, the type of assistance the United States is best
positioned to provide to India's nuclear generation capacity--
light water reactors operating on low-enriched uranium fuel--is
at odds with the Indian establishment's uneconomical vision of
a civil nuclear power program built primarily around breeder
reactors. Indeed, much of what has been said on the energy
front just doesn't survive the numbers.
The administration also claims the deal will require India
to improve its laws and procedures for controlling exports or
diversions of sensitive nuclear technology--preventing an
Indian AQ Khan. But at the same time, the administration
acknowledges India's apparently excellent record of controlling
nuclear exports--though not always ballistic missile exports.
India is already bound by the United States-sponsored U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires such good
conduct, so on paper at least, Delhi has sold the same horse a
second time in the deal.
In any event, the United States is justifying the deal's
nuclear recognition to other nations around the world on the
grounds that India's nuclear proliferation behavior is already
exemplary. It will be difficult for the United States to argue
this point both ways at the same time.
What is it then, that the United States should expect to
get from the ``strategic partnership'' if a lot of these other
things we're supposed to get don't hold up? There are five
principal benefits the United States should seek to
appropriately rebalance the deal. Some of those are future and
hypothetical, but ones that we can fully expect we might need
from strategic partnership from India in the future. I
mentioned these five objectives earlier. The first two have to
do with China and with Pakistan. Though no one wants to see
either of the scenarios come to fruition in the future, neither
can anyone rule them out. In either case, having India as a
partner of the United States will strengthen our hand. Third,
and most urgently, India should truly join the nuclear club,
reversing old nonaligned habits and putting its diplomatic
shoulder to the wheel in the case of Iran and other urgent
counterproliferation efforts. Fourth, the United States should
expect a continued intensification of Indo-U.S. military-to-
military contacts. Much more could be said about that, and Dr.
Perry knows more about this issue than anybody else. Fifth and
finally, as I said earlier, the United States should expect
preferential treatment for United States industry in India's
civil nuclear expansion and modernization of its military.
Will we get all that? To fulfill all of these objectives
will require India to change many of its longstanding
positions, and that is not likely to happen all at once. Those
who say that India's longstanding diplomatic positions will
yield to this grand gesture the United States has now made of
nuclear recognition are naive.
Americans view the change of longstanding and principled
nonproliferation policy to accommodate India as a concession,
but Indians view it as an acknowledgment of something to which
they have long been entitled. This is not a durable basis for a
diplomatic transaction, and thus as a transaction, the deal was
unbalanced. Still, in all, I think that the United States
stands to enjoy tremendous gains from the strategic partnership
with India. To the extent damage was done to the
nonproliferation regime, it is manageable and was done when
recognition was granted, and small measures cannot repair it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Carter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ashton B. Carter, Codirector, Preventive
Defense Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
assessing the india deal\1\
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\1\An edited version of this statement appeared in the July/August
issue of Foreign Affairs.
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During a state visit to Washington in July of 2005, Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President George W. Bush announced a
potentially far-reaching ``strategic partnership'' between what will
probably be the 21st century's most powerful democracies. To inaugurate
what came to be known as the India Deal, Bush abruptly fulfilled a
thirty-year quest by Delhi to be recognized as a sixth ``legitimate''
nuclear power, alongside the five victors of World War II. In March of
2006, in a reciprocal visit to India, Bush settled most of the
remaining details of the nuclear part of the India Deal in Delhi's
favor.
Debate in both Washington and Delhi has swirled around the nuclear
aspects of the India Deal. This is understandable, since preventing
nuclear war and terrorism is the highest American national security
priority in this era, as Bush himself has acknowledged. The decade has
already witnessed a stunning defeat for the United States in North
Korea's runaway nuclear program. The same could be unfolding more
slowly in Iran. Meanwhile, an unbowed Osama bin Laden has declared to
his followers that obtaining weapons of mass destruction is a
``religious duty.''
Indeed, if the nuclear aspects of the India Deal are assessed in
isolation, one must conclude that the Deal was a bad one for the United
States. Washington recognized Delhi's nuclear status in return for
little in the way of new steps by India to combat nuclear proliferation
and terrorism that Delhi was not already committed or inclined to give,
and for almost no technical restraints on India's growing nuclear
arsenal. Through the U.S. concession, the nonproliferation regime also
paid a palpable, although probably manageable, price to its integrity
and support.
But it would be a mistake to assess the India Deal in a nuclear-
only frame. President Bush and his key advisors were clearly looking
through a wider lens, and so should the public and the U.S. Congress,
which must amend U.S. nonproliferation laws that forbid the policies
Bush agreed to. Viewed through such a wider geopolitical lens, the Deal
has the United States giving the Indians what they have craved for so
long--nuclear recognition--in return for a strategic partnership
between Washington and Delhi as the two democracies face similar
potential challenges from China, Pakistan, Iran, and elsewhere in the
coming decades. In short, Washington gave on the nuclear front to get
something on the non-nuclear front. Powerful arguments can be made that
strategic partnership with India will prove to be in the deep and long-
term U.S. security interest. Indo-U.S. partnership seems not only
logical but eminently achievable in India's democracy: in an
influential 2005 Pew Research Center poll of 15 leading nations, India
reported the highest proportion of favorable views of the United States
at 71 percent. A nuclear-recognition quid for a strategic-partnership
quo is therefore a reasonable framework for an India Deal.
However, as a diplomatic transaction the India Deal as negotiated
by President Bush is quite uneven. First of all, a U.S.-Indian
strategic partnership would seem to be in Delhi's interest as well as
America's. So why pay them for it? Second, the Deal is uneven in its
specifics--what the U.S. gives is spelled out quite clearly, but what
India gives in return is vaguer. Third, the Deal is uneven in timing--
the United States gave its big quid of nuclear recognition up front,
but what it stands to get in return from partnership with India lies
further out in the uncertain future.
Rebalancing the Deal
Despite the Deal's flaws, Congress should not attempt to
renegotiate the Deal to win a more balanced version than the Bush
administration obtained. The big U.S. card of nuclear recognition has
already been played and cannot be taken back by Congress at this point
without casting a lasting cloud over the whole idea of Indo-U.S.
partnership. Haggling over some of the details of the implementation of
the nuclear parts of the Deal is unlikely to restore much of whatever
lost reputation for nonproliferation consistency that the U.S. has
already suffered, and would probably be viewed as grudging and punitive
in Delhi. The result would be to undermine the goodwill that was
supposedly the whole purpose of giving nuclear recognition in the first
place.
Rather than subtracting from the Indian side of the ledger in an
effort to rebalance the India Deal, Congress should instead emphasize
what the U.S. expects on its side of the ledger to give meaning to the
new ``strategic partnership.'' The United States should expect India to
join it in countering any destabilizing effects China's future rise
might have on Asian security; assisting in any emergency in Pakistan
such as radicalization of its government or loss of control of its
nuclear weapons; reversing traditional Indian opposition to controls on
transfer of nuclear technology and especially using its diplomatic
clout against potential proliferators like Iran; growing its military-
to-military relationships, including arms cooperation, to match in time
those the United States has with its closest allies; and giving
preferential treatment to the U.S. defense and nuclear industries when
the Indian government makes investments in these sectors.
To see how the ledger can be rebalanced over time, one needs first
to consider what India already got from the Deal on the nuclear front,
and its repercussions for the nonproliferation regime; second, to
prescribe the broader benefits the United States should aim to get from
strategic partnership from India in coming decades; and third, to
assess the chances that U.S. expectations will actually be met.
What Delhi Got
India obtained defacto recognition of its nuclear weapons status:
the United States will behave, and urge others to behave, as if India
were a nuclear weapons state under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT). The U.S. will not deny it most civil nuclear technology or
commerce, nor require it to put all of its nuclear facilities under
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards--only those it
declares to be civil. India can now import uranium, which has been a
bottleneck in its nuclear program. It is worth noting that even if the
Bush administration wished to make India a formal Nuclear Weapons State
under the NPT (which it refused to do), it probably could not persuade
all the other signatories of the NPT to agree to the change (such
amendments require unanimity).
Besides the new access to technology, nuclear recognition grants an
enormous political benefit to India. With one stroke India joins the
United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France as
``legitimate'' wielders of the power and influence that nuclear weapons
confer. The Deal allows India to transcend the nuclear box that has for
so long defined and constrained its place in the international order,
hopefully jettison at last its outdated Non-Aligned Movement stances
and rhetoric, and occupy a more normal and modern place in the
diplomatic world. Critics of the Deal contend that India's past and
likely future behavior do not warrant this free pass. Proponents
predict that with the nuclear issue (which the Bush administration
describes as the ``basic irritant'' in Indo-U.S. relations) out of its
psychological way, India will pivot from detractor of much of the
international order, including especially the nonproliferation regime,
to responsible stakeholder. Both sides agree that nuclear recognition
is huge.
The Deal has naturally been popular in India. Supporters of
Congress Party Prime Minister Singh have emphasized Bush's nuclear
recognition and downplayed any sense that India has taken on important
obligations in return. Criticism from the opposition Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) has been narrow and technical and probably reflects chagrin
that a Congress Party government and not the BJP secured the Deal. The
other source of criticism has been leftists in the Left Front parties.
They are wedded to the old politics of the Non-Aligned Movement which
was overtaken by the end of the Cold War, but they are unlikely to be
able to block the Deal.
Measuring the Impact of Nuclear Recognition for India
Previous U.S. administrations have adopted the stance that India's
nuclear arsenal, first tested in 1974, is illegitimate and should be
eliminated, or at least sharply constrained. They have done so for two
reasons: First, India's nuclear arsenal is watched closely by arch-
rival and nuclear-armed Pakistan and by China, with which India has
fought no fewer than three wars since its independence from Great
Britain. Recognizing the Indian arsenal, the argument went, might spur
its open growth and thus an arms race in South Asia. Second, Washington
wanted to stick strictly to the principles underlying the NPT: that
signatories would get the benefits of international standing and
peaceful nuclear commerce, but those like India that stood outside the
regime would not. Compromising these principles would, it was feared,
give heart to nuclear aspirants that they could ``end run'' the NPT if
only they waited thirty years like India; it would also dishearten the
many countries that were not about to go nuclear but which loyally
supported the NPT against new proliferators.
But a stance is not a policy. As policy, elimination of India's
arsenal became increasingly unrealistic as Pakistan went nuclear in the
1980s, and then more so when India tested five bombs underground and
openly declared itself a nuclear power in 1998. As the Bush
administration conducted its nuclear negotiations with India in the
fall of 2005 and spring of 2006, it ultimately abandoned efforts by
nonproliferation specialists to attach further conditions to the Deal
that would constrain India from increasing its nuclear arsenal further.
The U.S. insisted that the Deal is a broad strategic agreement, not an
arms control treaty. For example, some have argued that India should be
required to stop making fissile material for bombs now like the other
acknowledged nuclear powers have done rather than wait for the
negotiation of an international Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Others
contend that India should have to place more of its nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards, to prevent diversion of fissile materials from
its nuclear power program to its nuclear weapons program. Yet others
would have India sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty rather than
abide, as it has since 1998, by a unilateral moratorium on further
underground testing of its nuclear arsenal.
The Indian government, with strong public support, has resisted all
these efforts to constrain its future nuclear arsenal in technical
ways. If the objective of U.S. proponents of these ways of rebalancing
the India Deal is to prevent Indian arms racing with Pakistan and
China, then that important goal would be better pursued in non-
technical ways. India has stated its intention to pursue a ``minimum
deterrent'' rather than an all-out arms race. The Bush administration
has encouraged this path, and can now make it an expectation of India
as a responsible member of the nuclear club. But if the objective of
seeking additional constraints on India's nuclear program is to ``take
back'' some of the gain India got from nuclear recognition, then such a
grudging move is likely to backfire. Indians will understandably view
such a move as inconsistent with Bush's whole intent to use nuclear
forgiveness as a way to open the way for strategic partnership.
The second impact of nuclear recognition for India has to do with
the integrity of the NPT regime and is more serious, though probably
manageable. It is inconceivable that North Korea's Kim Jong Il pays
much heed to the internal consistency of the NPT regime as he
calculates how far he can get with his nuclear breakout. North Korea's
governing ideology is less communism than a fanatical embrace of
autarky and ``self-reliance,'' including open defiance of international
norms like the nonproliferation regime. North Korea's tolerance for
international ostracism is legendary. If Kim's nuclear program can be
stopped at all at this point, it will be through a tough and focused
diplomacy of sticks and carrots in which the NPT will play little part.
Likewise, after 1995 Saddam Hussein simply ceased paying attention to
the NPT.
Iran's cat-and-mouse game with the EU-3, the U.S., and the IAEA
over its recently-revealed nuclear program bespeaks at least a smidgen
of sensitivity to international opinion as embodied in the NPT. Nuclear
recognition for India gives Teheran a new talking point: If India gets
a free pass, why not Iran which is also an important nation with an
ancient culture? But like North Korea, Iran's nuclear program has
deeper roots in its sense of security threat and Persian pride. Against
these the NPT will not weigh in very heavily. Besides, for now Teheran
denies it is seeking a nuclear arsenal at all but only nuclear power,
so it will be hard-pressed to use India as a precedent for its current
diplomatic position.
The impact of the Bush-Singh deal on the ``rogues'' is therefore
minimal. Its main impact will be felt among two other groups of
countries. First, there are the ``in-betweens''--states that are not
rogues but that flirt with nuclear status. In the recent past the in-
betweens have included South Africa, Argentina and Brazil, the post-
Soviet states of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, South Korea, Taiwan,
and (only recently joining this category) Libya. These in-betweens
turned away from nuclear weapons for many reasons specific to their own
individual circumstances, but in each of these cases the lasting
international ostracism threatening them if they stood outside the NPT
regime was an influential factor for both governments and their people.
Nuclear recognition for India suggests that forgiveness will eventually
come to proliferators who wait, and tomorrow's in-betweens--Brazil
comes to mind--might be tempted by the Bush-Singh precedent.
The most nonproliferation damage, curiously, might be done among
the stalwarts of the regime: governments that have no nuclear ambitions
at all but that faithfully uphold the rules, and the nuclear powers
that already enjoy a privileged place in it. These groups not only
provide political support to discourage in-betweens and confront
rogues, they provide vital and direct technical support by denying
critical exports to those who infringe the NPT's rules. The Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG), in particular, coordinates controls on exports
by the nations with advanced nuclear power technology. The NSG was
created through U.S. leadership, and it is the U.S. that has long stood
against backsliding by member governments that come under pressure from
their nuclear industries to sell technology abroad more liberally,
including especially to India. Now all of a sudden the United States
has decided to change policy, and others too might consider themselves
free to pick and choose where they apply the nonproliferation rules--
the Chinese with Pakistan, the Russians with Iran, and some European
vendors everywhere.
Damage-limitation from the Bush-Singh deal must therefore center on
the in-betweens and stalwarts. A plan for doing so was a logical part
of the U.S. diplomatic initiative, but it is clear that the Bush
administration did not have one until after the Deal was concluded,
still less did it consult widely before Bush made his dramatic volte-
face in July 2005. But most of the nations whose adherence to the NPT
regime is critical will either support the Deal or acquiesce in it.
First, most accept the U.S. argument that India's nuclear
nonproliferation behavior has been good--there have apparently been no
Indian A.Q. Khans--and that India's possession of nuclear weapons is an
established fact and cannot be reversed. Second, all can see that India
is hardly a rogue state, but a stable democracy likely to play a large
and constructive role in the world of the 21st century. Third, many
will regard India's thirty years in the ``penalty box,'' which exacted
a heavy price from Delhi in both prestige and technology, as sufficient
to make the point that the regime's adherents are serious about
enforcing its norms. These arguments have won over many in the
international nonproliferation community, notably IAEA Director General
and Nobel Laureate Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei And so while there is some
grumbling within the NPT regime over the Deal, a revolt or collapse is
not likely, and the damage to the regime can be limited.
As critics have exaggerated the nonproliferation costs of the
nuclear part of the India Deal, so also its proponents have exaggerated
its benefits in terms of energy security and nuclear security. Bush
administration spokesmen have defended the Deal's nuclear power
provisions as critical to stopping India's rise from posing an oil and
environmental crisis. But this claim does not survive close scrutiny.
Energy security is terribly important to both India and the United
States. All want India's huge population to satisfy its energy needs,
which will grow faster than its GDP, increasing as much as fourfold
within 25 years, without contributing further to dependence on Middle
East oil, pollution, and global warming. But the arithmetic does not
support the case that nuclear power will add up to make the critical
difference for India, though it can and should play a role. For the
foreseeable future, electricity generation in India will be dominated
by coal burning whereas nuclear plants (which today produce only 3% of
India's electricity) will remain a single-digit contributor even under
the most extravagant projections of U.S.-assisted nuclear expansion in
India. Indian coal is plentiful but of poor quality and highly
polluting. Burning coal more cheaply and more cleanly will do more than
any conceivable expansion of nuclear power to aid India's economy and
the environment. India's share of world oil consumption will grow from
3% to 4% over the next twenty years. But nuclear power does nothing to
address the principal Indian oil consuming sector--cars and trucks--
since these don't run off the electrical grid and won't for a long
time. Finally, the type of assistance the United States is best
positioned to provide to India's nuclear generation capacity (light
water reactors operating on low-enriched uranium fuel) is at odds with
the Indian establishment's uneconomical vision of a civil nuclear power
program built primarily around breeder reactors.
The administration also claims the Deal will require India to
improve its laws and procedures for controlling exports or diversions
of sensitive nuclear technology--preventing an Indian A.Q. Khan. But at
the same time, the administration acknowledges India's apparently
excellent record of controlling nuclear exports (though not always
ballistic missile exports). India is already bound by the U.S.-
sponsored U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 which requires such
good conduct, so on paper at least Delhi has sold the same horse a
second time in the Deal. In any event, the United States is justifying
the Deal's nuclear recognition to other nations around the world on the
grounds that India's nuclear proliferation behavior is already
exemplary, It will be difficult for the U.S. to argue this point both
ways at the same time.
What Washington Should Get
What is it then that the United States might expect from the
``strategic partnership'' in return for the nuclear recognition it
conferred upon India?
First and foremost, the United States should expect India to serve
as a potential future Asian counterweight to China. Though no one wants
to see China and the United States fall into strategic competition,
neither can anyone rule this out. The evolution of U.S.-China relations
will depend on the attitudes of China's younger generation and new
leaders, on Chinese and U.S. policies, and on unpredictable events like
a crisis over Taiwan. It is reasonable for the United States to hedge
against a downturn in relations with China by improving its relations
with India, and for India to do the same. But for now both are intent
on improving their relations and trade with China, not antagonizing
China. Neither government will wish to talk publicly, let alone take
actions now, pursuant to this shared--but hypothetical and future--
common interest.
Second, the U.S. will want Indian assistance in a range of possible
contingencies involving neighboring Pakistan--another common interest
that is awkward for either party to the Deal to acknowledge. Pakistan,
alongside Russia, belongs at the very center of urgent concern about
nuclear terrorism. Terrorists cannot make nuclear bombs unless they
obtain enriched uranium or plutonium from governments that have made
these materials. The exposure of the A.Q. Khan network in Pakistan
makes clear that Pakistan has to be regarded as a potential source of
such materials--whether by theft, sale, diversion by internal radical
elements with access to bombs or materials, change of government from
Mushanaf to a radical regime, or some sort of internal chaos. Which
version of the A.Q. Khan story is more alarming--that the government
and military of Pakistan was unaware of what he was doing, or that they
were aware and permitted it? Either way it illustrates a serious
danger. Were there to be a threat or incident of nuclear terrorism
originating in Pakistan, the United States would want to act in concert
with as many regional players as possible, including India.
The Pakistan contingency is even more difficult than the China
counterweight contingency for the newly-minted strategic partners in
Washington and Delhi to acknowledge. India seems intent on improving
its relations with Pakistan--despite last year's bombings in Delhi and
their impact on Indian public opinion--and a rapprochement between
these long-time antagonists is in the U.S. interest. The United States,
for its part, has important interests at stake with the Musharraf
government--among them supporting the search for Osama bin Laden and
other terrorists on Pakistani territory, arresting the growth of
radicalism in Pakistan's population, and stabilizing Afghanistan--and
can ill afford the perception of a ``tilt towards India.'' For now,
therefore, the Pakistan contingency, like the China counterweight,
remains a hypothetical and future benefit of the India Deal.
Third, and most urgently, India should be expected to weigh in
against Iran's nuclear ambitions and to compromise to a considerable
extent its friendly relations with Iran in the interests of
nonproliferation. Whether Delhi does this will be the clearest test of
whether nuclear recognition ``brings India into the nuclear
mainstream,'' as the Bush administration predicts, or whether India
persists in its pre-Deal (actually, Cold war) positions of rhetorical
support for the spread of nuclear fuel-cycle activities (uranium
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing). India's September 24, 2005 and
February 4, 2006 votes with the United States and its European partners
in the IAEA Board of Governors, finding Iran in noncompliance with its
NPT obligations and referring the matter to the United National
Security Council were a welcome suggestion that India will support the
international campaign to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions. But India's
willingness truly to join the nuclear club, reversing old non-aligned
habits and putting its diplomatic shoulder to the wheel in the case of
Iran and other urgent counter-proliferation efforts will be an early
and major test of the value of strategic partnership and its new
status.
Fourth, the United States should expect a continued intensification
of Indo-U.S. military-to-military contacts, ultimately envisioning
joint action in operations outside of a United Nations context. India
has historically refused to join the United States military in
operations that were not mandated and commanded by the United Nations.
In the future, when the United States needs partners in disaster
relief, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping missions, or stability
operations, the United States can reasonably expect India to cooperate.
Judging from the evolution of U.S. security partnerships in Asia and
Europe (especially NATO's expanded membership and Partnership for
Peace), anticipation of joint action can lead first to joint military
planning, then progressively to joint exercises, intelligence sharing
and forging of a common threat assessment, and finally to joint
capabilities. This is the path foreseen for a deepening U.S.-India
strategic partnership in the defense field. Additionally, there could
be occasions when access for and, if needed, basing of U.S. military
forces on Indian territory would be desirable. At first this might be
limited to port access for U.S. naval vessels transiting the Indian
Ocean and overflight rights for U.S. military aircraft, but in time it
could lead to such steps as use of Indian training facilities for U.S.
forces deploying to locations with similar climate (the way German
training areas were used for forces deploying to the Balkans).
Ultimately, India could provide U.S. forces with ``over-the-horizon''
basing for Middle East contingencies of the sort preferred by Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf states.
Fifth, the United States will expect preferential treatment for
U.S. industry in India's civil nuclear expansion and modernization of
its military. The authors of the India Deal might have anticipated
preferential treatment for U.S. industry in construction of Indian
nuclear reactors and other civil power infrastructure made possible by
the Deal. But there are two barriers to realization of this U.S.
benefit. First, the United States must secure preferential access for
its nuclear industry at the expense of Russian and European suppliers
who are also seeking access to the Indian market. Second, the United
States will also need to persuade India to focus its nuclear power
expansion on light water reactors, not the exotic and uneconomical
technologies (e.g., fast breeders) that the Indian nuclear scientific
community favors. This benefit should therefore not be exaggerated.
India is expected to increase the scale and sophistication of its
military, in part by purchasing weapons systems abroad. In view of its
concessions in the India Deal, the United States can reasonably expect
preferential treatment for U.S. vendors relative to Russian or European
vendors. Early discussions have included the F-16 and F-18 tactical
aircraft and the P-3C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft.
Will the United States Get the Benefits of the India Deal?
The list above is a very substantial--even breathtaking--set of
potential benefits to the United States of a strategic partnership with
India. How realistic is it?
Some of the items on this list reflect common national interests of
India and the United States. The United States might therefore have had
many of these benefits without having to pay the nonproliferation costs
associated with nuclear recognition for India. Most of the items on the
list are also hypothetical and lie in a future that neither side can
predict--this is certainly the case with regard to the China
counterweight and Pakistan contingency items. Other items on the list,
like Iran's nuclear program, will unfold sooner. The United States can
certainly hope that India will behave as a true ``strategic partner''
in the future across all the items on this list. But there is a risk
that when the United States comes to ask India to do something it is
reluctant to do, that it comes to regret having played its big
diplomatic card--nuclear recognition--so early in the process.
India, as befits a great nation on its way to global prominence,
will have its own opinions about this list. Some American proponents of
the India Deal have compared it to Nixon's opening to China--a bold
move based on a firm foundation of mutual interest, but more a leap of
trust than a shrewd bargain. Mao and Nixon, however, had a clear and
present common enemy--the Soviet Union--not a hypothetical set of
possible future opponents. But the real difference between the Nixon/
Kissinger deal and the India Deal is that India, unlike Mao's China, is
a democracy. No government in Delhi can turn decades of Indian policy
on a dime or commit it to a broad set of actions in support of U.S.
interests--only a profound and probably slow change in the views of
India's elites can do this. India's bureaucracies and diplomats are
fabled for their stubborn adherence to independent positions regarding
the world order, economic development, and nuclear security. Proponents
of the India Deal suggest that these positions will yield to the grand
gesture of nuclear recognition by the United States. This expectation
is naive. Americans view the change of long-standing and principled
nonproliferation policy to accommodate India as a concession. Indians
view it as acknowledgement of something to which they have long been
entitled. This is not a durable basis for a diplomatic transaction.
It is therefore premature to judge whether the expectations of this
strategic partnership as apparently foreseen on the U.S. side are
shared by India and will, in fact, materialize. The Deal itself was
premature. The risk with a hastily prepared diplomatic initiative is
that disenchantment will set in on both sides. At this point, the
United States, including the Congress, can only do its best to ensure
that its benefits are fully realized--by both parties.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very, very much, Secretary
Carter.
Let me just mention, as a personal reference, Ash Carter
provided a--it was longer than a memo--really, a tract that was
the basis for the Senate meeting of, in a bipartisan way,
Republicans and Democrats, that brought about the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act. And after not much occurred
during the previous Bush administration, that of George Herbert
Walker Bush, we took an airplane trip to Russia and Ukraine
early in 1992, and both Ash Carter and Bill Perry were onboard,
in their private capacities. They were later to come into the
Government in the service of President Clinton's administration
in distinguished ways. But I simply pay tribute to them, to
begin with, in the spirit of strong bipartisanship, but
especially for their interest in nonproliferation that impelled
that kind of leadership then, as well as the administration's.
That is why you're valued as witnesses today. We listen to you
with a great deal of respect.
I'd like to now recognize Secretary Perry for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. PERRY, SENIOR FELLOW, HOOVER
INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, STANFORD, CA
Dr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief, and I
will organize my views in three related points.
The first point is, I enthusiastically support the
development of a strategic partnership between the United
States and India, of which this agreement could be an important
step. The benefits of a strategic partnership were convincingly
outlined in the earlier testimony of Secretary Rice to this
committee. I associate myself with her views on the importance
of a strategic partnership. In particular, I expect that this
could include a robust military-to-military partnership,
including, for example, joint exercises in humanitarian relief
operations, in responding to emergencies at sea, and in
peacekeeping operations. Those exercises could be modeled after
the comparable exercises conducted in Europe by the Partnership
for Peace.
My second point, I understand the need of India to
aggressively develop nuclear power for their growing industrial
base, and I believe that the United States should support India
in that development.
The importance of nuclear power to India and to the global
environment were convincingly outlined by Dr. David Victor in
his op-ed piece in the International Herald Tribune on 17
March. And I commend this to the committee. I associate myself
with Dr. Victor's views on this subject.
My third point, I am disappointed that the United States
did not seize the opportunity presented in the formulation of
this agreement to undertake a joint program with India directed
at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Stopping nuclear
proliferation is an important American objective. It is an
important international objective. And it should be an
important Indian objective. I believe that it is not too late
to join forces with India to further this critical objective.
I'd like to highlight four actions that India could take
that would make a significant difference in preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons.
First, India could join other nuclear powers in
implementing strong controls on the transfer of nuclear
technology and materials.
Second, India could take a leadership position in promoting
an international cutoff in the production of fissile material.
Third, India could cooperate with the United States and the
EU-3 in pressuring Iran to stop the programs that are
facilitating an Iranian nuclear bomb.
And, fourth, India could explicitly reaffirm its intention
of limiting its nuclear arsenal to minimal deterrence levels.
Secretary Rice, in her testimony, has suggested that India
is prepared to take many of these actions, but they are not an
explicit part of the agreement. I do not recommend that the
Senate try to modify the agreement to include them. Instead, I
recommend that the Senate task the administration to vigorously
pursue continuing diplomacy to facilitate these actions, and
that should be as a follow-on to the agreement. Indeed, I
believe that these actions are strongly in the interest of
India, and I believe that the Indian Government understands
that.
What is the motivation--what is the incentive that the
administration would have to actually carry out this diplomacy?
First of all, they are in India's interest. And, second, only--
only if India moves aggressively to carry out these actions
will they be providing the foundation on which the strategic
partnership desired by both countries can, in fact, be
achieved.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Perry follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. William J. Perry, Senior Fellow, Hoover
Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, CA
My views on the recently concluded Civilian Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement between India and the United States can be summarized in
three points.
First, I enthusiastically support the development of a strategic
partnership between the United States and India, of which this
agreement could be an important step. The benefits of a strategic
partnership were convincingly outlined in the earlier testimony of
Secretary Rice to this committee. I associate myself with her views on
the importance of a strategic partnership. In particular, I expect that
this could include a robust military-to-military partnership,
including, for example, joint exercises in humanitarian relief
operations, in responding to emergencies at sea, and in peacekeeping
operations. Those exercises could be modeled after the comparable
exercises conducted in Europe by the Partnership for Peace.
Second, I understand the need of India to aggressively develop
nuclear power for its growing industrial base, and I believe that the
United States should support India in that development. The importance
of nuclear power to India and to the global environment were
convincingly outlined by Dr. David Victor in his op-ed piece in the
International Herald Tribune on 17 March. And I commend this to the
committee. I associate myself with Dr. Victor's views on this subject.
Third, I am disappointed that the United States did not seize the
opportunity presented in the formulation of this agreement to undertake
a joint program with India directed at preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons. Stopping nuclear proliferation is an important American
objective. It is an important international objective. And it should be
an important Indian objective. I believe that it is not too late to
join forces with India to further this critical objective.
I'd like to highlight four actions that India could take that would
make a significant difference in preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons:
First, India could join other nuclear powers in implementing
strong controls on the transfer of nuclear technology and
materials.
Second, India could take a leadership position in promoting
an international cutoff in the production of fissile material.
Third, India could cooperate with the United States and the
EU-3 in pressuring Iran to stop the programs that are
facilitating an Iranian nuclear bomb.
And, fourth, India could explicitly reaffirm its intention of
limiting its nuclear arsenal to minimal deterrence levels.
Secretary Rice, in her testimony, has suggested that India is
prepared to take many of these actions, but they are not an explicit
part of the agreement. I do not recommend that the Senate try to modify
the agreement to include them. Instead, I recommend that the Senate
task the administration to vigorously pursue continuing diplomacy to
facilitate these actions, and that should be as a follow-on to the
agreement. Indeed, I believe that these actions are strongly in the
interest of India, and I believe that the Indian Government understands
that.
What is the motivation--what is the incentive that the
administration would have to actually carry out this diplomacy? First
of all, they are in India's interest. And, second, only if India moves
aggressively to carry out these actions will they be providing the
foundation on which the strategic partnership desired by both countries
can, in fact, be achieved.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Perry.
I want to recognize, now, Dr. Gallucci, who has had a long
career in public service, and particularly in dealing with the
problems in North Korea.
We really look forward to your testimony. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT L. GALLUCCI, DEAN, EDMUND A. WALSH
SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON,
DC
Ambassador Gallucci. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for this opportunity to testify on the national security
implications of the proposed United States-India agreement on
civil nuclear cooperation.
Mr. Chairman, in this brief statement, I wish to make only
three points. The first is that those who advocate making this
special arrangement to permit nuclear cooperation with India
ought to be clear and honest about why they are doing so. The
second is that the reasons for making the particular deal they
proposed, while important, do not justify the cost to the
national security of doing so. And, third, that there is an
arrangement which would, in fact, strike the right balance
between competing national security interests, an arrangement
that may be negotiable at some future time, if not now.
The United States has good reasons for improving its
relations with India, both political and economic. If this is
obvious, so, also, is the chronic irritant that our
nonproliferation policy has been to United States-India
relations over the last 30 years.
We should acknowledge the importance that India attaches to
American willingness to change that policy so that the United
States can begin to sell its nuclear equipment, material, and
technology. We should also admit that the proposed deal would
grant what New Delhi values most, namely, our acceptance of
India as a nuclear weapons state. And, while we're at it, we
should admit that, although the deal would be critically
important to our goal of improving relations with India, it
will really do nothing to help us deal with the risks posed by
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Assertions to the
contrary, I think, are less than forthright.
There is no reason why we should attach any positive value
to India's willingness to submit a few additional nuclear
facilities of its choosing to international safeguards, so long
as other fissile material producing facilities are free from
safeguards. This move has been called symbolic by critics, but
it is not at all clear what useful purpose it symbolizes. The
other elements of the deal that are supposed to contribute to
its nonproliferation value were in place before the deal was
struck.
The first point, then, is that the administration proposes
this deal to address a genuine regional security objective, and
not because it helps, in any way, our global security concern
over nuclear proliferation.
The second point is that the proposed arrangement will be
too costly to the national security to be justified by the gain
in relations with India.
Mr. Chairman, since the dawn of the nuclear age and the
arrival of intercontinental ballistic missiles, our Nation has
been defenseless against devastating attack, leaving us to rely
on deterrents--the promise of retaliation--to deal with
nuclear-armed enemies. From the beginning, we recognized that
this left us vulnerable to anyone who could not be deterred;
and so, in some basic way, our security depended on limiting
the number of countries who ultimately acquired nuclear
weapons. Most analysts believe that 50 years of
nonproliferation policy has something to do with explaining why
the spread of nuclear technology has not led to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, why we live in a world of
eight or nine nuclear weapons states, rather than 80 or 90.
A key part of that policy has been our support for an
international norm captured in the very nearly universally
adhered to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The norm is
simple. In the interest of international security, no more
states should acquire nuclear weapons. There are many
provisions in the treaty, and details to be understood, to
fully appreciate the norm, but that is its essence.
Certainly, the fact that we have eight or nine states with
nuclear weapons, rather than only the original five, means that
the norm has not held perfectly well, but it has had
substantial force in the face of widespread acquisition of
critical nuclear technologies, and that has been vital to
America's security. Simply put, the administration now proposes
to destroy that norm.
Some claim the deal would only recognize the reality of
India's nuclear weapons program. But that's not accurate.
Recognizing that India and a few additional countries have
acquired nuclear weapons over the last three decades is not the
issue. The damage will be done to the nonproliferation norm by
legitimizing India's condition, by exempting it from a policy
that has held for decades. And we would do this, we assert, I
think less than honestly because of India's exceptionally good
behavior. In truth, we would reward India with nuclear
cooperation, because we now place such a high value on improved
relations with New Delhi, not because of its uniquely good
behavior.
Critics ask: If we do this deal, how will we explain,
defend, and promote our policy of stopping Iran's proposed
uranium enrichment program? Iran is, after all, a party to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has, as far as we know,
no fissile material outside of international safeguards and has
never detonated a nuclear explosive device. A good question,
but not the best one, because India has arguably been a more
responsible member of the international community than Iran.
Rather, if we do this deal, ask how we will avoid offering a
similar one to Brazil or Argentina, if they decide on a nuclear
weapons acquisition, or our treaty ally, South Korea. Dozens of
countries around the world have exhibited good behavior in
nuclear matters and have the capability to produce nuclear
weapons, but chose not to, at least in part because of the
international norm against nuclear weapons acquisition,
reinforced by a policy we would now propose to abandon.
Will we legitimize only India because it never joined the
NPT, and thus did not have to withdraw from it to pursue
nuclear weapons? No, if India was truly unique, there might not
be much risk to that nonproliferation norm we so depend upon.
But it is not unique. The deal would set a dangerous precedent.
If we do this, we will put at risk a world of very few nuclear
weapons states and open the door to the true proliferation of
nuclear weapons in the years ahead.
Finally, if there are two national security objectives in
conflict here--one regional and one global--the question is: Is
it possible to reconcile them? The answer, I think, is
probably, ``Yes''; but not now, not in the current context.
Clearly, and, I think, regrettably, if the administration's
proposal does not succeed in much the same form in which it has
been put forth, United States-India relations will deteriorate,
for a time. But acknowledging that does not mean that we should
go ahead with a deal that would do irreparable damage to our
long-term national security interests. Instead, we should put
forth a proposal that more clearly balances regional and global
security interests, recognizing that it will be some time, at
best, before it will appeal to New Delhi.
The proposal would permit nuclear cooperation with India,
if India accepts reasonably verifiable ban on the production of
any more fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes. The
approach would permit India reprocessing and enrichment
facilities, but effectively require international safeguards on
all its nuclear facilities and any nuclear material produced in
the future.
Its appeal, in regional terms, is that it would allow India
to pursue nuclear energy without restrictions of any kind, more
than we are willing to do, by the way, for Iran, at the moment.
From the global security perspective, we will have
succeeded in capping a nuclear weapons program, a substantive
achievement which arguably offsets a breach of the longstanding
policy against nuclear cooperation with a state such as India
that does not accept full-scope safeguards. The deal would have
to have other provisions, such as rigorous nuclear export
control policies, a ban on export of enrichment and
reprocessing technology, and a permanent prohibition on nuclear
explosive testing. But that would be its essence.
The deal described above would require India to choose
between the opportunity to expand its nuclear energy program,
on the one hand, and the expansion of its nuclear weapons
arsenal, on the other. The administration proposes to allow
India to do both. And that would be a mistake. Our security
depends on maintaining that norm against the proliferation of
nuclear weapons.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Gallucci follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert L. Gallucci, Dean, Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC
In this brief statement, I wish to make only three points. The
first is that those who advocate making this special arrangements to
permit nuclear cooperation with India ought to be clear--and honest--
about why they are doing so. The second is that the reasons for making
the particular deal they propose, while important, do not justify the
cost to the national security of doing so. And third, that there is an
arrangement which would, in fact, strike the right balance between
competing national security interests, an arrangement that may be
negotiable at some future time, if not now.
The United States has good reasons for improving its relations with
India, both political and economic. Part of the calculation must turn
on our uncertainties about China, about whether Beijing will turn out
to be more of a strategic competitor than partner in the decades ahead.
If internal developments in China do not proceed as we hope, and if
Chinese foreign policy turns out to be more hegemonic than we expect, a
solid political relationship with India could be important to our
security. Moreover, independent of such considerations, India's
enormous and growing economic and political importance make the
improvement of relations with New Delhi a prudent objective for the
United States.
If this is obvious, so also is the chronic irritant that our
nonproliferation policy has been to U.S.-India relations over the last
30 years. We should acknowledge the importance that India attaches to
American willingness to change that policy so that the United States
can begin to sell it nuclear equipment, material and technology. We
should also admit that the proposed deal would grant what New Delhi
values most, namely our acceptance of India as a nuclear weapons state.
And while we are at it, we should admit that although the deal would be
critically important to our goal of improving relations with India, it
will really do nothing to help us deal with the risks posed by the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Assertions to the contrary are less
than honest.
There is no reason why we should attach any positive value to
India's willingness to submit a few additional nuclear facilities of
its choosing to international safeguards, so long as other fissile
material producing facilities are free from safeguards. This move has
been called ``symbolic'' by critics, but it is not at all clear what
useful purpose it symbolizes. The other elements of the deal that are
supposed to contribute to its nonproliferation value were in place
before the deal was struck. The first point then, is that the
administration proposes this deal to address a genuine regional
security objective and not because it helps in any way our global
security concern over nuclear proliferation.
The second point is that the proposed arrangement will be too
costly to the national security to be justified by the gain in
relations with India.
Since the dawn of the nuclear age and the arrival of
intercontinental ballistic missiles, our nation has been defenseless
against devastating attack--leaving us to rely on deterrence, the
promise of retaliation, to deal with nuclear armed enemies. From the
beginning, we recognized that this left us vulnerable to anyone who
could not be deterred, and so, in some basic way, our security depended
on limiting the number of countries who ultimately acquired nuclear
weapons. Most analysts believe that 50 years of nonproliferation policy
has something to do with explaining why the spread of nuclear
technology has not led to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, why we
live in a world of 8 or 9 nuclear weapons states, rather then 80 or 90.
A key part of that policy has been our support for an international
norm captured in the very nearly universally adhered to Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The norm is simple: In the interest of
international security, no more states should acquire nuclear weapons.
There are many provisions in the treaty and details to be understood to
fully appreciate the norm, but that is its essence. Certainly the fact
that we have eight or nine states with nuclear weapons rather than only
the original five, means that the norm has not held perfectly well. But
it has had substantial force in the face of widespread acquisition of
critical nuclear technologies, and that has been of vital importance to
America's security. Simply put, the administration now proposes to
destroy that norm.
Some claim the deal would only recognize the reality of India's
nuclear weapons program. But that is not accurate. Recognizing that
India and a few additional countries have acquired nuclear weapons over
the last three decades is not the issue. The damage will be done to the
nonproliferation norm by legitimatizing India's condition, by exempting
it from a policy that has held for decades. And we would do this, we
assert less than honestly, because of its exceptionally good behavior.
In truth, we would reward India with nuclear cooperation because we now
place such a high value on improved relations with New Delhi, not
because of its uniquely good behavior.
Critics ask, if we do this deal, how will we explain, defend, and
promote our policy of stopping Iran's proposed uranium enrichment
program? Iran is, after all, a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and as far as we know, has no fissile material outside of
international safeguards and has never detonated a nuclear explosive
device. A good question, but not the best one because India has
arguably been a more responsible member of the international community
than Iran. Rather, if we do this deal, ask how we will avoid offering a
similar one to Brazil or Argentina if they decide on nuclear weapons
acquisition, or our treaty ally, South Korea. Dozens of countries
around the world have exhibited good behavior in nuclear matters, and
have the capability to produce nuclear weapons but choose not to, at
least in part, because of the international norm against nuclear
weapons acquisition reinforced by a policy we would now propose to
abandon. Will we legitimatize only India because it never joined the
NPT and thus did not have to withdraw from it to pursue nuclear
weapons? No, if India was truly unique, there might not be much risk to
that nonproliferation norm we so depend upon, but it is not unique: The
deal would set a dangerous precedent. If we do this, we will put at
risk a world of very few nuclear weapons states, and open the door to
the true proliferation of nuclear weapons in the years ahead.
Finally, if there are two national security objectives in conflict
here, one regional and the other global, is it possible to reconcile
them? The answer is probably yes, but not now, not in the current
context. Clearly and regrettably, if the administration's proposal does
not succeed in much the same form in which it has been put forth, U.S.-
India relations will deteriorate for a time. But acknowledging that
does not mean that we should go ahead with a deal that would do
irreparable damage to our long-term national security interests.
Instead, we should put forth a proposal that more nearly balances
regional and global security interests, recognizing that it will be
some time, at best, before it will appeal to New Delhi.
In looking for that balance, we should understand that there is
something of a continuum to be considered in terms of nonproliferation
provisions. At one end, for purists, is nothing less than Indian
adherence to the NPT. This is nearly impossible to foresee. Next, for
nonproliferation realists, is an Indian commitment to end fissile
material production for any purpose and forego those facilities,
enrichment and reprocessing, that yield it. This would leave India with
nuclear weapons, but no means to produce the material to make more.
Significantly, it would also deny India the option of exploring breeder
reactor technology, something the Indian nuclear energy establishment
very much wants to do.
Finally, there is a more practical posture, which is to permit
nuclear cooperation with India if it accepts a reasonably verifiable
ban on the production of any more fissile material for nuclear weapons
purposes. This approach would permit India reprocessing and enrichment
facilities, but effectively require international safeguards on all its
nuclear facilities and any nuclear material produced in the future. Its
appeal in regional terms is that it would allow India to pursue nuclear
energy without restrictions of any kind--more than we are willing to do
for Iran at the moment. From the global security perspective, we will
have succeeded in capping a nuclear weapons program, a substantive
achievement which arguably offsets a breach of the longstanding policy
against nuclear cooperation with a state such as India that does not
accept full-scope safeguards. The deal would have to have other
provisions, such as rigorous nuclear export control policies, a ban on
export of enrichment or reprocessing technology, and a permanent
prohibition on nuclear explosive testing, but this is its essence.
The deal described above would require India to choose between the
opportunity to expand its nuclear energy program on the one hand, and
the expansion of its nuclear weapons arsenal on the other. The
administration proposes to allow India to do both, and that would be a
mistake. Our security depends on maintaining the norm against nuclear
weapons proliferation.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Gallucci.
We now look forward to the testimony of Dr. Ashley Tellis.
Would you please proceed?
STATEMENT OF DR. ASHLEY J. TELLIS, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Tellis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for inviting me to testify this morning on the
issue of atomic energy cooperation between the United States
and India. This is a complex subject, and I have written
extensively about it.
What I want to do this morning is really focus on just one
aspect of the agreement, which is the strategic logic that
underlies the President's initiative and its importance for
transforming the relationship between our two countries.
I think the United States and India today are confronted by
a tremendous opportunity to craft a new global partnership, an
opportunity that eluded us throughout the cold war and eluded
us, in large measure, because both our countries were unable to
reconcile the problems caused by India's anomalous status in
the global nonproliferation order.
I think it's really to the Clinton administration's credit
that it tried to improve United States-India relations in order
to serve American national interests by first trying to
quarantine the nuclear issue while improving relations in all
other areas to the degree possible. When this approach did not
bear much fruit, the administration then shifted to a strategy
of trying to cap, roll back, and eventually eliminate India's
nuclear program. Both these approaches, unfortunately, were
less than successful.
I remind the committee of this history only because it
underlines two important realities that we must keep in mind
when we think about how we can engage India in a new
relationship.
The first is that the transformation of the bilateral
relationship will not occur unless we find a solution to
resolving India's anomalous status in the global
nonproliferation order, to make it part of the regime that
serves our common interests.
The second is that we cannot transform the bilateral
relationship so long as, on one hand, we seek to make India a
partner of the United States, while, on the other hand, it
continues to remain a target of our nonproliferation efforts.
It is these two elements that essentially have caused the
tension in our inability to transform the relationship in the
last two decades. And, for that reason, I believe Secretary
Rice, in her recent testimony to this committee, emphasized the
fact that civilian nuclear cooperation today now becomes the
key to unlock the progress in our expanding relationship.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told Under Secretary Burns,
in Delhi, during our negotiations on the separation plan, that
the most important reason for this agreement, in his mind, was
that it would signify a historic reconciliation between the
United States and India, and a new concord after many decades
of anxiety, distrust, and suspicion in our bilateral relations.
I think these are noble thoughts, but I want to emphasize
something else, that the reason why I believe Congress ought to
support the agreement, ultimately, is because it advances, not
simply a reconciliation with India, but three very important
American national security interests.
The first of these is that it is in America's interest to
have a strong democratic India that serves as a full partner in
an Asia that threatens to become more and more important to the
United States over time. Civil nuclear cooperation is just one
element in our effort to increase the growth of Indian power,
to strengthen the economic foundations of India's democracy,
and help it play the partnership role that we want in
establishing a stable Asian order. This is part, I believe, of
a larger U.S. effort to deepen our relations with all Asian
countries, but particularly the democratic states in that
continent.
The second reason for why I hope Congress will endorse the
President's initiative is because it is an integral part of
constructing an effective nonproliferation regime.
The civil nuclear agreement here is important for a very
critical reason, because it embodies a bargain which allows
India to become part of the nonproliferation order through
formal commitments to the international system. I agree with
all my preceding panelists this morning when they urge us to
consider the fact that India's record of nonproliferation has
been good. That is true. But it is a good record that has been
undertaken purely as a result of unilateral actions.
What this agreement seeks to do is transform those
unilateral commitments into binding international obligations;
in effect, shutting the door for any future Indian Government
to change its mind were circumstances to provoke such choices.
The third, and final, I think, why we ought to support this
agreement with India is because it is part of a process to
create a global order that protects liberal societies and
advances freedom in so many ways: Promoting democracy,
defeating terrorism, collaborating to protect energy routes,
expanding trade and the international economic system. All
these are objectives where Indian partnership with the United
States is critical to successful outcomes.
I think the President's proposal for full nuclear
cooperation is driven ultimately by a conviction that it is
time to remove the last remaining impediment to closer
relations between our two countries. The question is often
asked whether, in the absence of such an agreement, the United
States-Indian partnership, on all other issues, would decay.
The unfortunate answer to that question is, ``Yes.'' This is
not to say that United States-Indian collaboration will
suddenly evaporate if civil nuclear cooperation cannot be
consummated, but it does emphasize that such cooperation would
turn out to be hesitant, troubled, episodic, and unable to
realize its full potential, in much the same way as we have
seen our relationship for the last 30 years.
I think what this initiative in final represents, is really
a bold and decisive step. It is possible to conceive of many
other agreements with India which might have turned out to be
better than the one we have. But, in my judgment, the agreement
that we finally reached is really the best possible deal that
protects both core American and Indian vital national
interests. No other deal was possible.
And, therefore, comparing this deal, which is the best deal
we can enjoy, in reality with other agreements that might have
been possible, in principle I'm afraid would not take us to
where we want to go, which is a closer relationship with a
democratic power that has a trustworthy record and will become
an important partner for the United States in the coming
century.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Tellis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the committee. Thank you
for inviting me to testify on the proposed cooperation between the
United States and India in regards to atomic energy. This is obviously
a complex subject with different facets stretching from the political
to the technical. It is also a subject I have given some thought to and
have written about in the past.\1\ As requested in your letter, I will
focus my oral and written remarks this morning mainly on the strategic
logic underlying the President's initiative on civil nuclear
cooperation and its importance for the transforming U. S.-Indian
relationship. I will be happy, however, to cover those aspects that I
have not touched on in my formal testimony during the discussion that
follows. I respectfully request that my statement be entered into the
record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\My previous reflections on different aspects of the U.S.-Indian
nuclear cooperation initiative can be found in Ashley J. Tellis,
``South Asian Seesaw: A New U.S. Policy on the Subcontinent,'' Policy
Brief, 38 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, May 2005); Ashley J. Tellis, ``India as a New Global Power: An
Action Agenda for the United States'' (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, June 2005); Ashley J. Tellis,
Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, on ``The United States and South
Asia,'' June 14, 2005; Ashley J. Tellis, ``Should the US Sell Nuclear
Technology to India?--Part II,'' YaleGlobal Online, November 10, 2005;
and, Ashley J. Tellis, Prepared Testimony to the House Committee on
International Relations on ``The U.S.-India `Global Partnership': How
Significant for American Interests?'' November 16, 2005.
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The United States and India today are confronted by an incredible
opportunity to craft a new global partnership that promises to advance
a range of common interests in a way that was simply impossible during
the Cold War. These interests encompass a wide variety of issues
ranging from the preservation of peace and stability in a resurgent
Asia over the long term, through the current exigencies relating to the
global war on terror, to promoting complex collective goods such as
arresting the spread of weapons of mass destruction, managing climate
change, and promoting liberal democracy and an open trading system.
Thanks to the tight bipolarity of the Cold War, U.S.-Indian
relations during that entire epoch were characterized by alternation:
in almost every decade, troughs of estrangement invariably followed
peaks of strong cooperation. Despite the desires of leaders on both
sides, the quest for a strong bilateral relationship was repeatedly
frustrated, which from an American perspective appeared to be the case
for at least three reasons unique to India: first, New Delhi's emphatic
determination to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy at a time when
liberal states were under threat from global communism; second, India's
relative weakness during much of the Cold War caused by its pervasive
economic underperformance that, in turn, sealed its strategic
irrelevance to the global system; and, third, India's anomalous nuclear
status since 1974 when, in becoming ``a state with nuclear weapons, but
not a nuclear weapon state,'' New Delhi found itself cast into a
netherworld where it soon became the most important target of global
anti-proliferation efforts.
By the time the Cold War ended, the first two impediments were on
their way to being resolved. The demise of the Soviet Union destroyed
the international system that made non-alignment structurally relevant
and freed both the United States and India to seek better relations
undistracted by the pressures of Cold War geopolitics. By 1991--and
although it was difficult to see this clearly at the time because of
New Delhi's financial crisis--the Indian economy was also on its way to
becoming a star performer, having left behind the abysmal 3.5 percent
``Hindu rate of growth'' that had characterized its productive
performance since independence.
To its credit, the Clinton administration, perceiving both these
realities, made an initial effort to construct a new relationship with
India. A wide-ranging diplomatic dialogue was instituted in the hope
that the two democracies could find common ground, and India was
designated a ``big emerging market'' worthy of special U.S. commercial
attention. But, despite its good intentions, the Clinton administration
could not redress the third impediment that had by now come to haunt
U.S.-Indian relations, namely India's anomalous nuclear status which
made it the single most important target of U.S. anti-proliferation
activities worldwide. Confronted by this challenge, the administration
attempted to implement two different policies towards India. It began
with an effort to improve ties with New Delhi across the board, while
simply quarantining the nuclear issue in the hope of preventing it from
contaminating improvements that might be realized in other areas of the
bilateral relationship. This approach, however, quickly reached the
limits of its success because the U.S.-led anti-proliferation efforts
since 1974 had effectively succeeded in institutionalizing a complex
global technology denial regime that prevented India from getting
access even to important non-strategic technologies because of fears
that these might eventually leach into its nuclear programs. India's
irregular nuclear status under the Non-Proliferation Treaty had in fact
become such an impediment that the Clinton administration's strategy of
quarantining the nuclear issue failed either to resolve the nuclear
disagreement or to transform the bilateral relationship.
By the second term, the Clinton administration emphasized an
alternative strategy, driven largely by its efforts to tighten the
global nonproliferation regime. While continuing its previous effort to
improve relations with India in a variety of areas such as diplomatic
engagement and defense cooperation, the administration focused its
energies simultaneously on capping, rolling back, and eventually
eliminating India's nuclear weapons program. This shift in emphasis,
unfortunately, turned out to be unsuccessful: not only did it
exacerbate the already high Indian frustration with the U.S.-led
technology denial regime, but it finally provoked New Delhi into a
spectacular act of defiance through the nuclear test series of 1998
when India in a deliberate challenge to the international order
declared itself to be a ``nuclear weapon state.''
Although much of this story may sound like ancient history, it is
worth remembering for two important reasons that are critical to
understanding the strategic wisdom underlying President Bush's decision
to initiate civilian nuclear cooperation with India.
First, the transformation of U.S.-Indian relations, as desired by
the President and which enjoys bipartisan support in Congress, cannot
be consummated without resolving the problems caused by India's
anomalous status in the nuclear non-proliferation order. The Clinton
administration spent eight long years trying to improve U.S. relations
with India, while at the same time avoiding any effort to alter India's
status as an outlier in the global non-proliferation system. The
historical record shows conclusively that well intentioned though it
was--and perhaps even necessary--this strategy ultimately failed. An
old maxim of military strategy calls on leaders to ``reinforce success,
abandon failure.'' President Bush's initiative on civil nuclear
cooperation with India is an effort to do just that, given that all
other U.S. policies since at least 1974 have by now proven to be less
than successful.
Second, the transformation of U.S.-Indian relations, as desired by
the President and which enjoys bipartisan support in Congress, cannot
be inherently schizophrenic if it is to be successful enough to advance
common American and Indian interests in this new century. As our ties
with friends and allies in Europe and Asia demonstrate, the United
States has a variety of bilateral relationships defined by different
degrees of intensity and intimacy. What all these relationships have in
common, however, is that in no case is any U.S. partner made the
deliberate target of a punitive policy concertedly pursued by
Washington. Through his proposal for full civil nuclear cooperation
with India, President Bush has in effect conveyed his belief that if
India is to become a full strategic partner of the United States in
this new century, a comparable courtesy must be extended to New Delhi
as well. Stated in a different way, the President has recognized that
it is impossible to pursue a policy that simultaneously seeks to
transform New Delhi into a strategic partner of the United States on
the one hand, even as India remains permanently anchored as
Washington's nonproliferation target on the other.
These two reasons combine to underscore the point that Secretary
Rice made in her recent testimony to this committee. Far from being an
appendage to growing U.S.-Indian ties, bilateral civilian nuclear
cooperation promises to become ``the key that will unlock the progress
of our expanding relationship.'' Congressional action to implement this
initiative is therefore critical not simply because it will help
address India's vast and growing energy needs--though it will certainly
do that--or because it will mitigate the burdens of environmental
pollution and climate change in South Asia--though those must be
counted among its benefits as well--but because it symbolizes, first
and foremost, a renewed American commitment to assisting India meet its
enormous developmental goals and thereby take its place in the
community of nations as a true great power.
Renewed civilian nuclear cooperation thus becomes the vehicle by
which the Indian people are reassured that the United States is a true
friend and ally responsive to their deepest aspirations. By altering
the existing web of legal constraints on civilian nuclear cooperation
with India, Congress would also expand simultaneously India's access to
a wide range of controlled technologies that are useful for numerous
peaceful economic endeavors going beyond merely the production of
electricity. The successful implementation of the civilian nuclear
cooperation agreement would therefore epitomize'as Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh told Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns in New
Delhi in February 2006--``a historic reconciliation between the United
States and India and a new concord after many decades of anxiety,
distrust, and suspicion in our bilateral relations.''
The increasing value of this transforming bilateral relationship
with India for the United States will be manifested most clearly in
three areas that will be vitally important to American security in this
century.
To begin with, a strong American partnership with a democratic
India will be essential if we are to be able to construct a stable
geopolitical order in Asia that is conducive to peace and prosperity.
There is little doubt today that the Asian continent is poised to
become the new center of gravity in international politics. Most
analyses suggest that although national growth rates in several key
Asian states--in particular Japan, South Korea, and possibly China--are
likely to decline in comparison to the latter half of the Cold War
period, the spurt in Indian growth rates, coupled with the relatively
high though still marginally declining growth rates in China, will
propel Asia's share of the global economy to some 43 percent by 2025,
thus making the continent the largest single locus of economic power
worldwide. An Asia that hosts economic power of such magnitude, along
with its strong and growing connectivity to the American economy, will
become an arena vital to the United States--in much the same way that
Europe was the grand prize during the Cold War. In such circumstances,
the administration's policy of developing a new global partnership with
India represents a considered effort at ``shaping'' the emerging Asian
environment to suit American interests in the twenty-first century.
This should not be interpreted as some kind of thinly veiled code
signifying the polite containment of China, which many argue is in fact
the administration's secret intention. Such claims are, in my judgment,
erroneous. A policy of containing China is neither feasible nor
necessary for the United States at this point in time. Further, it is
not at all obvious that India, currently, has any interest in becoming
part of any coalition aimed at containing China. Rather, the objective
of strengthening ties with India is part of a larger--and sensible--
administration strategy of developing good relations with all the major
Asian states. As part of this general effort, it is eminently
reasonable for the United States not only to invest additional
resources in strengthening the continent's democratic powers but also
to deepen the bilateral relationship enjoyed with each of these
countries--on the assumption that the proliferation of strong
democratic states in Asia represents the best insurance against intra-
continental instability as well as threats that may emerge against the
United States and its regional presence. Strengthening New Delhi and
transforming U.S-Indian ties, therefore, has everything to do with
American confidence in Indian democracy and the conviction that its
growing strength, tempered by its liberal values, brings only benefits
for Asian stability and American security. As Under Secretary of State
Nicholas Burns succinctly stated in his testimony before the House
International Relations Committee, ``By cooperating with India now, we
accelerate the arrival of the benefits that India's rise brings to the
region and the world.''
Further, a strong American partnership with a democratic India will
be essential if we are to succeed in preserving an efective non-
proliferation system that stems the difusion of nuclear materials and
technologies required for the creation of nuclear weapons. The central
component of civilian nuclear cooperation is critical in this regard
because it formalizes a bargain that gives India access to nuclear
fuel, technology, and knowledge on the condition that New Delhi
institutionalizes stringent export controls, separates its civilian
from its strategic facilities and places the former under safeguards,
and assists the United States in preventing further proliferation.
Bringing India into the global non-proliferation regime in this way
produces vital benefits both for the United States and for all non-
nuclear weapons states insofar as it transforms India's hitherto
commendable nonproliferation record, which is owed entirely to
voluntary sovereign decisions made by successive Indian governments,
into a formal and binding adherence through a set of international
agreements. Thanks to the President's initiative, India has now agreed
to obligations that in fact go beyond those ordinarily required of NPT
signatories, such as refraining from transfers of enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to states that do not already possess them
and supporting efforts to limit their spread; working with the United
States to conclude a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty;
continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; and adhering
to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.
Bringing India into the global nonproliferation regime through a
lasting international agreement that defines clearly enforceable
benefits and obligations not only strengthens American efforts to stem
further proliferation but also enhances U.S. national security. The
President's accord with India advances these objectives in a fair and
direct way. It recognizes that it is unreasonable to ask India to
continue to bear the burdens of contributing towards ensuring the
viability of the global nonproliferation regime in perpetuity, while it
suffers stiff and encompassing sanctions from that same regime. And so
the President has asked the Congress to support his proposal to give
India access to nuclear fuel, technology, and knowledge in exchange for
New Delhi formally becoming part of the global coalition to defeat the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In other words, he offers
India the benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation in exchange for
transforming what is currently a unilateral Indian commitment to
nonproliferation into a formally verifiable and permanent international
responsibility.
The fruits of this initiative are already in evidence, for example,
in connection with India's strong support for the U.S.-led efforts to
persuade Iran to live up to its freely accepted non-proliferation
obligations. This Indian decision has not been easy because of New
Delhi's otherwise good relations with Tehran. India and Iran share
historical links that go back thousands of years; India and Iran played
a pivotal role in ensuring the viability of the Northern Alliance in
Afghanistan during the darkest days of Taliban rule; India remains one
of Iran's most important customers for oil and natural gas, and it
continues discussions with Islamabad and Tehran about the construction
of a gas pipeline that would link the three countries and help meet
India's large and growing energy needs. Many voices in the American
debate on the civilian nuclear initiative have demanded that India
curtail its economic and diplomatic links to Iran as the price of
securing U.S. cooperation in regards to civilian nuclear energy. Such
demands are unreasonable. The negotiations over the Iranian-Pakistani-
Indian gas pipeline are unlikely to succeed simply because of economic
considerations, but New Delhi is unlikely to concede to any demands
that rupture its diplomatic and economic relationship with Tehran if
these are seen to have no relationship with the issue of nuclear
proliferation. On this score, India is likely to behave in a fashion
identical to that of our close allies such as Japan and Italy. It will
demand--as it has done thus far--that Tehran live up to its
international non-proliferation commitments and obligations, and it
will abide by any decisions made by the international community to
enforce these responsibilities, but it is unlikely to unilaterally
sacrifice its bilateral relationship with Iran in areas that are not
perceived to have any connection with non-proliferation and which do
not pose a threat to common security.
Finally, a strong American partnership with a democratic India will
be essential if we are to successfully preserve a global order that
protects liberal societies and advances freedom in myriad ways. This
objective encompasses a congeries of diverse goals, including promoting
democracy, defeating terrorism and religious extremism, collaborating
to protect the energy routes and lines of communication supporting free
trade and commerce, expanding the liberal international economic order,
and managing climate change--each of which is critical to the well
being of the United States. It does not take a great deal of
imagination to recognize that for the first time in recent memory
Indian and American interests on each of these issues are strongly
convergent and that India's contribution ranges from important to
indispensable as far as achieving U.S. objectives is concerned.
The President's intention in proposing civilian nuclear cooperation
with India is fundamentally driven by his conviction that every
impediment to a closer relationship ought to be eliminated, so that
both our countries can enjoy the fullest fruits of an ever-tighter
partnership in regards to each of the issues above. It is also driven
by his desire to assist New Delhi's growth in power on the assumption
that a strong democratic India would ultimately advance America's own
global interests far better than a weak and failing India would. The
key word, which the administration understands very well in this
context, is ``partnership.'' A strengthened bilateral relationship does
not imply that India will become a treaty-bound ally of the United
States at some point in the future. It also does not imply that India
will become a meek, compliant and uncritical collaborator of the United
States in all its global endeavors. Rather, India's large size, its
proud history, and its great ambitions, ensure that it will always
pursue its own interests--just like any other great power.
During his recent visit to the United States in March this year,
India's Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, appealed to his American
interlocutors to recognize that ``when an open society like India
pursues its own interests, this is more likely than not to be of
benefit to the United States.'' If the President's views on India going
back to the campaign in 2000 are any indication, George W. Bush had
already reached this conclusion at least five years ago. In fact, every
initiative involving India, beginning with the Next Steps in Strategic
Partnership in the first term and ending up with the proposal on
civilian nuclear cooperation in the second, suggest that the President
has concluded--correctly--that a strong and independent India
represents a strategic asset, even when it remains only a partner and
not a formal ally. This judgment is rooted in the belief that there are
no intrinsic conflicts of interest between India and the United States.
And, consequently, transformed ties that enhance the prospect for
consistent ``strategic coordination'' between Washington and New Delhi
on all the issues of global order identified above serve U.S. interests
just as well as any recognized alliance.
The question that is sometimes asked in this connection is whether
a close U.S.-Indian partnership would be impossible in the absence of
civilian nuclear cooperation. The considered answer to this question is
``Yes.'' This is not to say that U.S.-Indian collaboration will
evaporate if civilian nuclear cooperation between the two countries
cannot be consummated, but merely that such collaboration would be
hesitant, troubled, episodic, and unable to realize its full potential
without final resolution of the one issue that symbolically,
substantively, and materially kept the two sides apart for over thirty
years. At a time when U.S.-Indian cooperation promises to become more
important than ever, given the threats and uncertainties looming in the
international system, the risk of unsatisfactory collaboration is one
that both countries ought not to take.
Through the civilian nuclear cooperation initiative, President Bush
has embarked on a bold and decisive step to eliminate those long-
standing impediments between Washington and New Delhi and to place the
evolving U.S-Indian relationship on a firm footing guided by a clear
understanding of the geo-strategic challenges likely to confront the
United States in the twenty-first century. Recognizing that a new
global partnership would require engaging New Delhi not only on issues
important to the United States, the administration has moved rapidly to
expand bilateral collaboration on a wide range of subjects, including
those of greatest importance to India. The proposal pertaining to
extending civilian atomic energy cooperation to India is, thus, part of
a larger set of Presidential initiatives involving agriculture,
cybersecurity, education, energy, health, science and technology,
space, dual-use high technology, advanced military equipment, and
trade.
Irrespective of the issues involved in each of these realms, the
President has approached them through an entirely new prism, viewing
India, in contrast to the past, as part of the solution rather than as
part of the problem. He has judged the growth of Indian power to be
beneficial to America and its geopolitical interests in Asia and,
hence, worthy of strong support. And, he is convinced that the success
of Indian democracy, the common interests shared with the United
States, and the human ties that bind our two societies together, offer
a sufficiently lasting assurance of New Delhi's responsible behavior so
as to justify the burdens of requesting Congress to amend the relevant
U.S. laws (and the international community, the relevant regimes)
pertaining to peaceful nuclear trade. On all these matters, I believe--
without any qualification--that the President has made the right
judgment with respect to India and its importance to the United States.
I hope that Congress will agree.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your attention and consideration.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Tellis. As I
mentioned at the beginning of the hearing, we will try to have
a 5-minute round so that we respect the rights of all Senators
to ask questions. Likewise, we will have another panel, another
round of questions, and two votes at 12 o'clock.
So, I will start the questioning, and start the 5 minutes,
by indicating that I would observe, as you have, that, for 32
years, the United States, in one form or other, has expressed
disapproval of India's nuclear weapons program--with a sense of
shock and outrage, to begin with, followed by a number of
sanctions. These, likewise, were levied on Pakistan after it
commenced a nuclear program, and remained in place for quite a
long while.
Many Senators around the table today were a part of a
meeting with Secretary Powell shortly after 9/11/2001, in which
we were summoned to S-407. Secretary Powell said, ``You must
lift all the sanctions on India and Pakistan immediately.'' And
there were many authors of all sorts of sanctions over the
years, people thinking of other ways that somehow we might make
our point, and they said, ``All of them?'' And he said,
``Yes.'' And he said, ``Furthermore, forever, permanently, not
just for a year or a trial situation. This is a new world. It's
a new relationship. We all have to get used to that fact.''
Now, that was quite a cold drink of water for many people, but,
nevertheless, it happened, and we proceeded into a different
relationship.
In the case of India, I'm one who applauds the fact that
the relationship has moved very, very steadily, in a commercial
sense, in an intellectual sense, as we talk about the students
coming and going. Tom Friedman's book, ``The World is Flat,''
about his experiences, illustrates a very, very important
aspect of it. But, at the same time, we also have been working
our way through the problems of AQ Khan and testimony with
regard to Libya, North Korea, Iran, elsewhere, where his
minions, or he personally, have worked.
So, it's still a dangerous world. And, likewise, in the
talks with the Chinese last week or previously, we really
didn't get into winding up their program, or inspecting anybody
in China. It's a given that whatever they have to do, they are
planning to do.
The Indians recognize that, too, and they've made that
point to us. They are two huge countries. It is all well and
good to talk about a whole raft of countries around the world
who might entertain nuclear situations. I remember going to
Brazil in the mid-1980s, and the Defense Minister revealing to
me that they were working on a program. Why he did so, I have
no idea, except that he wanted to tell somebody, I suppose,
about all of it. Now, they decided they didn't want to do that,
after a while. Ditto for South Africa. I saw Qaddafi in Libya
in September, and he explained why he didn't do it. But,
nevertheless, he wants defense from us and the United Kingdom.
If he's not going to have nuclear weapons, he wants
conventional people to defend him. These are the realities. And
I think you gentlemen have expressed that.
I've asked you, Dr. Carter, for more information. You
indicate that whatever may be the aspirations of many of us for
a dialog with India on energy--and this is an attractive aspect
of this--nuclear power might satisfy a part of India's energy
needs, to a greater extent. You've indicated you suspect that
in the next 10-20 years or so, that this is not de minimis, but
nevertheless, not a substantial change in the percentage of
power, and that, with regard to oil, they'll still increase
their demands for that, which is a very big problem. During my
visit in Libya last summer, I saw a hotel filled with Indian
and Chinese oilmen, pinning down every last acre in the place.
Ditto for the rest of Africa. We need to take that seriously
and have that dialog.
Why do you feel there will be so little substitution, given
nuclear energy? Should our dialog really be more on clean-coal
technology or other hybrid cars? How do we get into it with
India on what I believe is likely to be as crucial a problem as
nuclear proliferation--namely, the potential conflicts over the
energy resources of the world? Could you respond to that for a
moment?
Dr. Carter. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you. I think you
captured it exactly right. Nuclear power is an important part
of the Indian energy future. I don't mean to say that I would
like to see it constrained in any way, but one can't exaggerate
the extent to which it is going to spell a difference for
India.
India's energy future will be determined by its strategies
for both electricity generation and oil consumption. India's
electricity generation is currently dominated by coal, but
Indian coal is of poor quality and highly polluting. The idea
of cooperating with India on clean coal is adumbrated somewhat
in the Bush-Singh deal, and burning Indian coal more cleanly
will do more than anything we are talking about here to address
global warming, the Indian local environment and the Indian
economy.
With respect to oil, what you said is also exactly right.
This initiative won't have much effect on Indian oil
consumption, which is a huge problem. Sadly, neither India nor
the United States is likely to achieve substantial substitution
between nuclear power and oil consumption in the near future. I
am a big supporter of more nuclear power in the United States,
as well, and I think it is unfortunate that we have not built
any additional nuclear plants in the last couple of decades.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you for the answer and will
look forward to more dialog on that subject. It just appears to
me that the agreement--not the nuclear part, but other parts of
the agreement--touch upon the energy issues. Hopefully, in our
new relationship, that dialog will become more intense and
constructive in both countries.
Dr. Tellis. Mr. Chairman, could I add something to that?
The Chairman. Oh, yes.
Dr. Tellis. I think Dr. Carter is right about the near-term
consequences. The biggest difference that nuclear energy will
make is between what the Indians call a ``coal optimal'' and a
``coal maximal'' regime. It does make the difference to whether
the Indians go full steam in the direction of coal, versus some
component of nuclear. But that is really a near-term problem.
Over the longer term, their biggest constraint with respect
to nuclear energy has been that they have not had access to
international nuclear cooperation. And so, all the goals, all
the objectives that they have defined for themselves with
respect to nuclear energy were premised on the assumption that
they would have to develop this technology and build it
indigenously.
If this agreement goes through, the rules of the game
change. India gets access to foreign nuclear technology, which
does change the quality of the energy mix that they seek.
The Chairman. I would advertise, again, Senate bill 1950,
which staff reminds me was introduced last year, the India-
United States Energy Security Act. And I really feel this is a
tremendous thing to get into, but that would be another
hearing, I suspect.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Let me apologize to the last two witnesses for not being
here for your testimony. I have a bill in the Judiciary
Committee, and there is a group of witnesses who flew in from
around the country, as well, and the hearing is taking place at
the same time. That's the reason I absented myself.
Let me get right to my questions.
Is there any reason why, in your view--obviously, you
cannot speak for India--but why India should not join the PSI
and adhere to the guidelines of the Australia Group and the
Wassenaar Agreement? Is there any reason, from their
perspective, that you could see, why they should not sign onto
those three agreements? Anyone.
Dr. Tellis. I think there is no--there's no reason, in
principle, Senator. And, in fact, we have been, in our
conversations with India, urging them to adhere to both the
Australia Group and the Wassenaar Agreement. There is a
specific issue with respect to PSI, and it has to do with the
Suppression of Unlawful Activities at Sea Act. The way the SUA
Convention has been framed, it offers protections to legitimate
nuclear weapons states and to nonnuclear weapons states under
the terms of the NPT Treaty. By definition, India does not fall
in either of those two categories. And so, at the moment, what
they appear to be doing is conducting a legal review to see how
they can, without prejudice to their national interests, get
some kind of----
Senator Biden. How would their national interests be
prejudiced, from their perspective?
Dr. Tellis. I think their fear is that the SUA protects
cargoes that come from nuclear weapons states and nonnuclear
weapons states. It has nothing to say about cargoes involving
countries that fall into this netherworld, which is India,
Pakistan, and Israel. And so, they are working out, legally,
some kind of formulation that would allow them to join PSI.
Senator Biden. Is there any reason, gentlemen, why Congress
shouldn't insist that India sign onto these agreements before
we move forward with this agreement? Anyone. That's a question
any and all of you, or none of you, or anyone in the back of
the room, or anybody who wants to speak up. [Laughter.]
Senator Biden. Ash.
Dr. Carter. After India works through some of the legal
issues, there is no reason why Delhi should not be able to sign
on to any of these agreements. Your question is whether they
should be required to do so, and that depends on what our
intention is in requiring them to do so. I fully expect that,
over time, they will join the PSI and adhere to the guidelines
of the Australia Group and Wassenaar Agreement. The question
is: Why, at this point, require them to do so?
This gets to the question of whether what I described as
the imbalance in the deal--in which India got something very
big in nuclear recognition, and we got a lot of things that are
future and hypothetical, but also potentially quite big--can be
rebalanced in some way. The measures you described do not go
very far toward rebalancing the deal, as they are perfectly
useful things to require of India in the long run.
If our intention in getting more from India on the nuclear
front is to undo or mitigate the damage done by nuclear
recognition, this cannot be achieved with any technical----
Senator Biden. Yeah.
Dr. Carter [continuing]. Measure.
Senator Biden. The intention would be--and I'm not at all
sure we should do it, but I'm investigating that--would be to
demonstrate, less to us than to the rest of the world, that
what we're really relying on here is Indian intentions. We're
really taking, on faith, that India has no intention to break
out, in any way, with regard to their nuclear capability, that
they have peaceful intentions and require this recognition in
order to be able to generate a civilian industry. And, second,
what is really a rock-bottom distinction we make between India
and other nations is that they're a democracy, they're acting
in good faith, and that's why they are opted out, in a way,
that we're not opting out anyone else who has previously gone
down this road. That would be the rationale, if there was one.
And, Dean, you're shaking your head and nodding. You remind
me of some of my staff. Why don't you just say what the hell
you think, instead of nod. Okay? [Laughter.]
Ambassador Gallucci. Senator, thank you for recognizing me.
[Laughter.]
Senator Biden. Thank you for seeking recognition by the
grimace on your face. [Laughter.]
Ambassador Gallucci. Senator, I didn't leap to try to
answer your question, because I oppose the approval of this
deal, so the idea of, you know, working on how to improve it at
the margins was not something that appealed to me. And, I agree
with Ash, given the concerns that I have about this deal, they
are not going to be met by that marginal improvement.
The grimace, which you correctly picked up on, was at the
idea that we are trusting India to proceed with a civil program
when, in fact, I think the deal is structured entirely to
protect its opportunities to pursue a nuclear weapons program
and expand it. We contribute to that as we provide uranium--
there's a replacement principle here, there's more uranium
available. Facilities that would be useful for the weapons
program, the Indians explicitly exclude from safeguards.
So, I think what we're trusting here is that they're going
to continue to be a nuclear weapons state, and we are going to
be legitimizing that, at our great peril.
Senator Biden. I realize my time's up. We clearly are
legitimizing that, and they're going to remain a nuclear
weapons state. They're going to do that, no matter what. But
the question--and I'm not asking a question, but the question
raised from that, Mr. Chairman--is whether or not they are
using this as an opportunity to be able to significantly expand
their nuclear program, and, at the same time, their civilian
program. Because you accurately point out there's a limitation
on the amount of uranium available to them, and now they have
to make a hard choice. They have to make a hard choice whether
to reserve that for their weapons program or their civilian
program. But there's not enough for their civilian program
anyway, as I'm told. And so, it does get down a basis of trust,
but--it seems to me. But I understand your point.
And I'm over my time, and I thank the Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you for your continued
contributions to our country and this testimony, this morning,
which is so very important.
I spent a week in India and Pakistan, over the last 2
weeks, during the Easter break, and had an opportunity to visit
facilities and speak with the--both government and civilian
leaders in both countries. And here's a question I'd like to
put to each of you. In light of the testimony we've heard this
morning, what my colleagues have noted, one of the references
that Chairman Lugar made to Secretary Powell's comments after
September 11, 2001--and I was one of those in that room that
day that Secretary Powell noted that we should drop sanctions
on Pakistan, India--not just for the year, but for a long time,
but--always--because we have now entered a new age. It's just
incidental, I suspect, that it's a new century. But the fact
is, we have entered a new age. And I'd like to get your sense
of--in light of all that we have heard this morning, your years
of experience and expertise in nonproliferation, defense,
diplomacy, economics, all that are woven into this same fabric
of a nation's interest, of a world's interest--should we be
reframing, should we be readjusting the entire framework of
nonproliferation issues, including NPT, everything that has
been the standard and the base and the foundation over the last
50 years?
When we look at the reality of the world that we live in
and the continued reprocessing technology of uranium--who may
have it, who probably will get it, who does have it--it's
interesting to make policy, but unless that policy is relevant
to the times and the challenges, it's nonsense. And I think we,
too often in this town--I suspect, all nations' capitals--love
to sit and listen and make policy, and especially listen to
ourselves in these great echo chambers of wisdom--but we come
up with completely irrelevant statements and issues when you
try to connect those to the reality of what's actually going on
in the world.
So, my question is: Should we be just reassessing,
reframing the entire nuclear framework that we have really come
to rely on over the last 50 years?
Secretary Perry.
Dr. Perry. Thank you very much, Senator. I think that's a
very important question, and I'd like to give you at least my
version of that.
We have entered a new age, in my judgment, and in this new
age, the spread of nuclear weapons is an even more important
problem than it was before. And I would think our policies
ought to be designed to increase the actions we take to prevent
the spread of nuclear weapons. In that sense, I am completely
in accord with the point that Dr. Gallucci made in his
testimony about the importance of this.
The issue, in my mind, relative to this agreement, is: Does
the agreement help us in that cause or deter us in that cause?
In my judgment, the success in preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons absolutely requires the cooperation of other major
nations in the world; in particular, all of the nuclear powers
of the world. India is a nuclear power. And I think we have a
better chance of getting that cooperation if we work with them
as strategic partners, than not. And it's for that reason alone
that I support this agreement--reluctantly, but still support
it.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Secretary Carter.
Dr. Carter. I agree with what Dr. Perry just said. Your
question also raises the issue of whether there are fundamental
problems with the NPT regime. I'd say two things in response to
that.
The first is that the NPT is only one arrow in our quiver
in protecting ourselves from nuclear weapons. The NPT is an
important tool, but we should never think that the NPT alone is
going to save us. The rogues pay no attention. They don't join,
or they join and cheat. In this way, the effectiveness of the
NPT is somewhat limited.
The treaty's principal value is with respect to those who
are not at all rogues, but might be tempted to develop a
nuclear capability. As Bob Gallucci has indicated, the NPT has
been an effective barrier to further proliferations, but it is
not the only tool at our disposal.
There is a tendency to say, ``Since the NPT doesn't do
everything, maybe we ought to tear it up and throw it out.''
This approach underestimates the value of the treaty.
There is one aspect of the NPT that I think we need to
address going forward, and this is probably implied in what Dr.
Perry said. In essence, the NPT allows states to develop
nuclear power, but not the bomb. We all know that the boundary
between a nuclear power program and a bomb program is not an
impermeable one. Over time, we are going to have to try to
expand the norm of the NPT to include not just nuclear weapons
programs, but enrichment and reprocessing, as well. That is the
next frontier for the NPT. You see it at work with respect to
the Iranian program. You see it at work with respect to the
Brazilian program. Just as we can't have a world where the bomb
is in 80 or 90 countries, we really can't have a world in which
enrichment and reprocessing is in 80 or 90 countries either. As
additional states acquire enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities, there is an increased risk that these programs
will be abused or that these materials will fall into the wrong
hands.
The solution is not to tear up and abandon the NPT because
it fails to do everything. Instead, we must expand the treaty
to cover fissile materials as well as bombs.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Dr. Gallucci.
Ambassador Gallucci. Senator, I think, for a long time, the
issue of proliferation was a matter of states, nation-states.
And the NPT is aimed at nation-states. And we have been
remarkably successful in limiting the number of countries that
have acquired nuclear weapons, compared to the countries that
could, if they wished. And that's one of the reasons, and the
principal reason, why I worry about this particular proposal,
because I think it'll do damage to our efforts to limit the
number of countries that have nuclear weapons.
What's new--because you asked the question about whether we
should be reconsidering all this--what's new is not the threat
that would come from widespread proliferation to nation-states,
but the additional threat over the last 10 years or so that we
have now come to recognize, the quintessential threat, the
ultimate threat of a real nondeterrable actor, al-Qaeda, with
nuclear weapons. What do we do about that? And that goes to
what Ash was talking about, a world in which plutonium moves
around as a fuel, enrichment facilities are everywhere, and a
switch can be turned to produce fissile material. That's a
world we don't want to live in. That's a world in which the
access to this material is going to get easier and easier over
time. And that's a very dangerous one.
It's related, here, because the Indian energy program does
envision a breeder reactor fuel of cycle thorium-uranium-233.
And I think it makes no more sense than anybody else's breeder
fuel cycle, but it's out there; and it involves reprocessing
and fissile material, as well as enrichment. That's an added
concern I have about this arrangement, that it will involve
fissile material in nuclear power production. It is not my
principal concern, which is legitimizing India as a nuclear
weapons state.
India is, as Dr. Perry said, a nuclear power. And knowing
that is certainly something that we should admit, and there's
no question about that. But I think there is something terribly
important about saying, at this point, we are going to proceed
and accept its status as legitimate, because, as Ash Carter
said, that really does suggest that eventually all will be
forgiven. And I think the norm--I don't want to put it on the
treaty--the norm against additional states acquiring nuclear
weapons is that important. We don't want to leave a world where
we can count on the fingers of two hands, how many states we
have with nuclear weapons. If it gets more complicated than
that, it'll get more dangerous than that.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Dr. Tellis.
Dr. Tellis. The question you asked, Senator, is a very
difficult one to answer. And I think Sir Karl Popper used to
have a phrase, which he used often, called ``piecemeal social
engineering.'' And I think our approach to dealing with what
are the infirmities in the system ought to adopt that approach.
I think the NPT has served us well. It's one of many
instruments that we have. But there are three issues, in my
judgment, that need resolution. One is the whole status of the
fuel cycle and the rights that countries have to the fuel
cycle, which can be used for both benign and malign purposes.
The second is the status of the outliers and what that means
for the future durability of the regime. And I support this
agreement, because it's an effort to at least bring one of the
three, and perhaps the most important outlier, into the regime.
And the third is the whole question of the security of nuclear
materials and nuclear weapons, which is not addressed directly
by the NPT, but is part of the system.
I think our efforts ought to be in each of these three
areas. And if we proceed with gradualism, piecemeal social
engineering, we come out ahead, rather than any bold attempts
to redesign the system from scratch.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much. And I want to apologize
in advance. I have to be somewhere in--5 minutes ago. So, I--
but I stayed, because this is so important.
Mr. Chairman, I wanted to compliment you and Senator Biden.
This panel is so terrific. And they really represent, I think,
all of the views that we have in the Senate, some people who
outright don't like this, some people who outright love this,
and those in between. So, it's been very helpful to me.
I want to ask a question about Iran, because I think
that's, kind of, the unspoken--one of the unspoken issues. The
other is China. So, I have two questions, and I'll make them
fast.
There are those who believe that timing is everything. And
surely all of us would agree, timing is something. And this
isn't coming to us in a vacuum. There are other things going on
in the world. And I think it's fair to say that, whether you're
a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, and wherever you
live, you're worried about Iran's nuclear capabilities in the
future. So, now here's--this comes to us at this particular
time.
One of the members of the second panel, Gary Milhollin,
testified before the House. And this is what he said, and I
want to get your response--and I'll start with Dr. Gallucci--
``If stopping Iran is our first priority, we should shelve the
India deal, at least until the Iranian nuclear crisis is over.
Iranian officials are citing the deal almost every day to argue
that the United States cares less about proliferation than
about using proliferation rules to support its friends and
punish its adversaries. Shelving the deal would prove that this
is not true.''
Do you agree with that statement, Dr. Gallucci?
Ambassador Gallucci. I think there is some truth in it, but
I would be concerned that if you embraced it entirely, you
would be caught on the proposition that we're going to hold our
strategic relationship with India hostage to a timing issue
with Iran. And it is perhaps true that Dr. Milhollin is
thinking we're not going to solve the Iran problem anytime
soon, so it can hang on that hook for a long time. But I think,
in other words, Senator, that we are rhetorically handicapped,
as he suggests, as we go to various fora--U.N. Security
Council, for example--to argue that Iran poses an extraordinary
threat to regional and international security by its program,
which, we are asserting, is aimed at nuclear weapons
acquisition, and they deny, while, at the same time, adopting a
different policy with India. But, as I said in my prepared
remarks, I don't like the comparison, because I, myself, can
see India as a more responsible player in the international
arena than Iran.
Senator Boxer. So, what you're basically saying is, it's a
little bit of a--it's constraining us in our rhetoric at a time
when we should not be so constrained. But you don't think that,
as a premise, it's--we shouldn't base our decision on this. Is
that basically what you're saying?
Ambassador Gallucci. I'd accept that summary, Senator.
Senator Boxer. OK. Anybody--do most people agree with that?
[Witnesses all nodded heads.]
OK. Then let me move on, because, Dr. Tellis, something
confused me. I read that you wrote to the administration, ``If
the United States is serious about advancing its geopolitical
objectives in Asia, it will most--it would almost, by
definition, help New Delhi develop strategic capabilities such
that India's nuclear weaponry and associated delivery systems
could deter against the growing and utterly more capable
nuclear forces Beijing is likely to possess by 2025.'' And
this--according to the Washington Post, you wrote this to
Condoleezza Rice and her folks over at State in arguing for
this.
And I've always believed that's, kind of, the silent, but
moving, force behind this. But then, today, in your statement,
you said, ``A policy of containing China is neither feasible
nor necessary for the United States. And it is not at all
obvious that India has any interest in becoming part of a
coalition aimed at containing China.'' So, which is your view?
Dr. Tellis. Both. Except that they were said in different
contexts. The first was in a publication, when I was
discussing, abstractly, the future of the balance of power in
Asia. The second is really what the policy consequences are. I
have never advocated that we support the Indian nuclear program
as a way of deterring the Chinese. The Indians will buy their
own insurance, make their own investments in that regard.
The only thing I have said is that any agreement that
requires India to constrain its nuclear weapons program is
obviously not going to be acceptable to the Indians. And I
believe, personally, it shouldn't--it will also not be in our
interest.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Doctor. I just don't see how you
can make both those statements. But we don't have time.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for your testimony.
Dean Gallucci, you said in your testimony, ``If we do this
deal, ask how we will avoid offering a similar one to Brazil or
Argentina if they decide on nuclear weapons acquisition, or our
treaty ally South Korea.'' Would you expand on what might occur
in that scenario?
Ambassador Gallucci. That was a shorthand version of what
Ash Carter was arguing to you, I think, unless he denies it.
But I do believe that we're both looking at the same
phenomenon. We're looking not at the rogue states as the issue
here. I didn't mention North Korea. I brought up Iran in, kind
of, a favorable context for India. But the issue here is, when
you have a state that has the capability to move from a
peaceful nuclear program to a nuclear weapons program, a state
with a record of--good behavior--in other words, it looks like
a state of the kind India is right now, and that good behavior
is used as a justification for abandoning the policy that we've
had for decades. I ask here this question: If we abandon the
policy of no nuclear cooperation with states that have nuclear
weapons programs and are not the original five members of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, then what's to stop other states,
like Argentina, Brazil, and South Korea? And I picked those for
the same reason Ash did, because they had nuclear weapons
programs at one point, and they have capable civilian programs
now. If there's no penalty here, they could go through a
calculation--maybe not the current regime or the next one, but
the one after that. And suppose there's no norm in place about
not acquiring nuclear weapons, and the norm is, no more nuclear
weapons states. Well, ``more,'' after what? Well, after the
original five. That's the norm. Right? And if you violate it,
in this case, and say, ``Well, we're doing it, because India is
really good,'' well, we've got other ``really good'' states,
and, before you know it, you'll have a lot of ``really good''
states with nuclear weapons, I fear. And the world is--while
not a safe place, it's safer for the very few numbers of
weapons states that we have, in my view.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much.
And, Secretary Perry--Carter--excuse me--you said that
India has no AQ Khans--there are no AQ Khans in India. Yet, in
2004 and 2005, the United States sanctioned Indian scientists
and chemical companies for transferring Iran--to Iran, WMD-
related equipment and technology. How confident are you that
there are no AQ Khans?
Dr. Carter. That's a very good question. I cannot be
certain, but I am unaware of any evidence that there have been
Indian AQ Khans; that is, networks illicitly transferring the
wherewithal of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. I believe
it is accurate to say, and is in the public record, that Indian
firms have been caught making transfers of technology related
to ballistic missiles and possibly chemical weapons, as well.
Although their transgressions are less severe than those
committed by AQ Khan, the United States should make clear its
expectations that these illicit transfers will stop.
This brings me to a more general point. India has gotten
something huge in its admission to the nuclear club. The United
States must make clear that membership has responsibilities, as
well as privileges. We ought to look very carefully at India's
discharging of its responsibilities as a member of the club.
Particular emphasis should be placed on the need for Indian
cooperation in stopping illicit transfers and any AQ Khan-like
activity, and providing support for the United States position
on Iran. The United States should clarify the expectation that
India will change its policy on the Iranian nuclear issue. We
changed our policy about India, and now we need them to change
their policy about nuclear security in the world, and it starts
with Iran.
Senator Chafee. Well, thank you.
And maybe you've answered this already, but I'll ask. Dr.
Perry, Dean Gallucci says that we should agree to this deal if
India accepts a reasonably verifiable ban on the production of
any more fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes. Why not
make that part of the agreement?
Dr. Perry. I'm very much in favor of India accepting that
ban. A judgment call is that I would not make it part--a
requirement for the agreement, because I think that would be a
poison pill that would kill the agreement. I do think we should
take on, as a vigorous diplomatic measure following the
agreement, working with Iran to try to get--working with India
to try to get such agreement.
Senator Chafee. All right. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, to the panelists. This has been extremely useful. I
apologize that I missed some of the earlier presentations.
I've said before, when Secretary Rice was here, that it
strikes me that the geopolitics of this deal may make sense. In
fact, I think they do. I think there are all sorts of reasons
why we would want to strengthen our alliance with India. It
strikes me that the details are not entirely where we want
them. And, Secretary Perry, it sounded like that's your
assessment of the agreement; Secretary Carter, it appears that
is your assessment, as well. I just wanted to go over, again,
what role you see the Senate playing, at this point, or--is it
your judgment that we essentially have to hold our nose and
vote up or down on this, or do you think that there are still
modifications or improvements that can be made? And I address
this to those who think that conceptually this makes sense.
I'll have a separate question for you, Mr. Gallucci.
Any of you.
Dr. Carter. Senator, I'll start off.
I am in favor of the Senate expressing very clearly what
the United States expects from this arrangement.
Senator Obama. Can you iterate those----
Dr. Carter. Yes; absolutely. One I just named, which is
help on Iran. There are a host of other ways in which India can
be an activist and a leader in nonproliferation. India has
historically been a detractor of the nonproliferation regime,
and we should expect that they will do a 180 in their policy.
We did a 180 in our policy toward India, and we should expect
them to do the same.
Preferential access for United States suppliers of nuclear
and military materiel to India is likewise a fair part of the
transaction. I can make a list--and my statement includes one--
of the expectations that the United States should have. We have
given India a big quid in the nuclear front; we are now looking
for geopolitical quos, as you aptly put it. I think these
objectives should be spelled out quite clearly as the
expectations of this country over time.
Unfortunately, although India received its big payoff up
front, it will be some time before we know if our objectives
have been fulfilled. This is one of the ways in which, as I
said, the deal was unbalanced. They get what we give them now,
and we get what they give us--maybe--later.
Senator Obama. Anyone else? Secretary Perry, you want to
comment on that?
Ambassador Gallucci. Senator, I appreciate you wanting to
give me a pass on this, since I would have the Senate simply
vote it down. But I guess I would say, as several people have
pointed out, that there are apparently a number of ways you can
go in the Senate, and the thought here is that, if you do
proceed, that you wait to vote this up until you actually see
the language of section 123, and you see what happens in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Senator Obama. Go ahead.
Dr. Perry. Senator Obama, I think the--as you said, the
geopolitics rationale is not only a good reason, it's a
powerful reason to go ahead with the agreement. I have
expressed the concerns that Dr. Gallucci concerned about the
weakness on nonproliferation aspects. It's my judgment--and
it's different from Dr. Gallucci's judgment--on this point,
though, it's my judgment that putting amendments on the
agreement, requiring amendments for it, would not substantially
fix that problem, but it would probably kill the agreement, and
it would cause us to lose the geopolitical. For that reason,
therefore, I do not favor crippling amendments.
Senator Obama. OK.
Doctor.
Dr. Tellis. I'm very sympathetic to what Ash Carter said,
but I feel uncomfortable with trying to secure those gains
through legislative vehicles, because I think there is a way in
which we can secure those objectives through a continuing
conversation with India. They understand how the world works.
Senator Obama. Right.
Dr. Tellis. They understand what is it they need to do to
keep United States engagement continuing. I think if you put it
in legislation, what you end up doing is that you box them in,
and then issues of national pride----
Senator Obama. Right.
Dr. Tellis [continuing]. Begin to cut in the way of
rational choices.
Senator Obama. Right.
Mr. Chairman, if I could have the indulgence, I--I want to
pick up on the question that Senator Hagel had asked. I mean,
it strikes me that the nonproliferation regime has worked
modestly well over the last number of years. I think, Secretary
Carter, you put it well, those folks who are basically good
actors on the international stage, they have to make a
calculation: Is it worth weaponizing or not? There are enough
carrots and enough sticks for them to make that decision not to
go. If it's North Korea, they're going to make a different
calculation. But they would have probably made that calculation
anyway. So, net, this regime has been a plus.
There is a concern, though, that--I think the norms that
Dr. Gallucci talks about in his opening statement are being
eroded, to some degree, by this. And as I understood Senator
Hagel's question, it is: How do we prevent the exceptions from
overwhelming the rule? How do we prevent a situation in which
you start off with North Korea and Iran, and then India's
thinking differently, and, after a while, what has been a
useful regime starts fraying at the edges, to the point where
it doesn't serve any useful function?
So, I'm wondering--it may be that this particular agreement
makes sense geopolitically, and we pursue it, but I'm
wondering, for those who are supportive of the India agreement,
what prevents further erosion of the nonproliferation regime
over time?
And, Dr. Gallucci, I assume that that's why you oppose the
deal. But I haven't heard, sort of, a direct answer to: Are
there modifications or ways of shoring up, or making, sort of,
the reality match up with the norms that are out there? In
other words, what changes to the nonproliferation regime should
we be thinking about to make it more effective?
One of the things in law, generally, is that if people are
disregarding laws too often at a certain point it ends up
almost being more damaging, it creates a disrespect for norms,
generally, as opposed to that particular norm. So--please.
Dr. Carter. May I, Senator? I think that is really the
heart of the matter here, and that is whether the compromise of
principle, which we unquestionably did in recognizing India, is
a torpedo amidships to the norm as a whole. I believe that when
you compromise one principle for another objective--in this
case, strategic partnership with India--it matters a great deal
how, to what extent, and why you compromised the principle.
With respect to its damage to the NPT regime, the India
deal cannot be considered a torpedo amidships. The deal
reflects the United States position that India's
nonproliferation behavior has been good, yet this clearly does
not apply to Pakistan. Given AQ Khan, I would be exactly where
Bob Gallucci is on this issue if anybody was even talking about
striking a similar deal with Pakistan.
The second difference between India and Pakistan is that
India is a democracy that is apparently politically stable;
Pakistan is not. India has made representations, which remain
to be borne out, in fact, that it will truly turn from being a
detractor of the nonproliferation regime to being a supporter.
Dr. Perry has made the point that there are many ways that
India can demonstrate its commitment to nonproliferation, and
India has said it will oblige.
India is hardly a rogue state. It is hardly an unstable
state. It is hardly a state that has bad behavior, or, as near
as we can tell, bad intentions. And, therefore, I would judge
it's OK to compromise principle.
Moreover, the view which I just expressed, appears to be
shared by most of the other adherents to the NPT regime. I'd
cite Mohamed ElBaradei, the IAEA director and Nobel laureate,
who essentially came to the same judgment. I do not like to
compromise principle, but, in the case of India, that is about
the best case I can imagine.
Ambassador Gallucci. Senator, you asked, specifically, what
you could do to help the regime as you went ahead and did this
for, as you said, geopolitical reasons. The proposition I've
put forth is that you require that India produce no more
material for nuclear weapons. If you went ahead and made that a
provision of this deal, you would still be abandoning this
principle. But you would have such a good case for having
capped a nuclear weapons program, you could say that this was
not going to do such damage to the regime.
I disagree with Ash. I do think this is--``a torpedo
amidships'' is the metaphor. I yield to no one in their
enthusiasm for a reinvigorated strategic relationship with
India. I do disagree that, for all time, United States-Indian
relations will be limited and damaged by this. I think real
damage will be done. I don't think what I'm proposing could be
negotiated right now. I do believe the negotiators did the best
they could with what they had to work with. But I do not think
we are simply eroding the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime now.
We are trashing it, in my view. When you use the phrase
``geopolitical,'' it has a certain gravitas to it. And
sometimes nonproliferation sounds a little ephemeral, and I
want to give that a little gravitas, too. We are talking about
a change in the character of the international system that
would come about if this regime is trashed as a result of this,
over time.
Senator Obama. Although I--well, let me--I don't want to
take up any more time.
Dr. Tellis.
Dr. Tellis. I think the only solution to the problem that
you raise is a consensus among the international community that
India is the exception, and will be treated as such. There
would be real risks--and the risks that you highlight are
certainly, you know, critical--but there would be real risks if
the United States could both initiate and implement this
agreement unilaterally, because then that would open the door
for exactly the kind of fracturing that we all fear. On the
other hand, if there is a process of consensus-building which
is really what the whole exercise in the NSG is about, then
what we could do is create a new norm, and the new norm is that
India meets certain criteria, not simply in the vision of the
United States, but the international community, more generally,
and that becomes the bulwark that prevents the kind of
fracturing that you refer to.
Senator Obama. That's interesting.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Obama.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm concerned about Mr. Gallucci's concern about this
agreement. Mr. Gallucci, do you think the agreement is going to
torpedo efforts aimed at limiting the proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
About a month ago I was in Vienna, where I met with the
International Atomic Energy Agency. The thing that impressed me
was--and perhaps this is the reason the IAEA has come out in
support of the India agreement--is that the IAEA has had an
ongoing relationship with India. They have communicated back
and forth on a lot of matters over the years, to the extent
that the IAEA has had more communication with India than they
have with some of the other countries that signed the NPT
Treaty. They believe that by entering into this agreement, we
will be moving the ball further down the field, making things
better, rather than making them worse. How do you respond to
that?
Ambassador Gallucci. Senator, I'm going to be making some
deductions here, because I actually haven't talked to Mr.
ElBaradei or anybody from the Agency, so I can't really, based
on experience, talk about motivation.
But I think certainly that when the United States of
America and India, two--one superpower and one very important
power--propose to settle a nuclear issue, there is great
incentive for the Agency to find a way to make this acceptable
to them. So, in basic political terms--I don't mean to impugn
their motivation--they may come to a different calculation. I'm
sitting here with colleagues for whom I have the greatest
respect, and we have come to different judgments. I don't think
that I value the norm or the national security objective of
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons any more than my
colleagues at this table. All right? But we come to different
conclusions here as you balance the regional objective against
the global objective. And I think it's fair to do that. I do
see it of greater damage here, and I do--to the
nonproliferation objectives--than my colleagues. And I don't
see as catastrophic an impact on United States-India relations,
at least not as durable a one. I think, for a time, because of
what the administration has done, there would be that negative
impact. And I don't believe, as--I agree with them--that if you
tinker at the margins with this deal, you may end up with the
worst of all worlds, no deal and bad relations with India. So,
I accept that. And I'm a realist about the damage this would do
to United States-Indian relations, but I don't think it would
be durable or catastrophic.
The important things that India will do with the United
States of America, it will do, not because we ship it uranium,
but it will do because it's in India's interest. And whether we
do this deal or not, over the long term, the real substance of
United States-Indian relations will turn on the mutuality of
interests of our two countries. So, I don't really buy that we
have to do this, or it's all over for us in South Asia. I think
that's an overstatement.
I don't think it's an overstatement to say that we've had a
very clear and consistent policy for decades, and we have a
world that is defined in these terms by a very few number of
nuclear weapons states. And I am very worried about tampering
with that.
Senator Voinovich. My other question involves the issue of
whether this deal would send a signal to other nations who
might want to have nuclear capacity. Do you think that this is
going to set a precedent to cause those countries to say,
``We're good people. We have democracies. And, therefore, we
ought to be able to do what India has done and acquire a
nuclear capacity''? Do you think that's going to happen?
Ambassador Gallucci. No, Senator. I----
Senator Voinovich. I mean to ask any of the witnesses.
Ambassador Gallucci. Well, I'll--since I started, just let
me say, briefly, no, I don't think that the next thing that
will happen if--if this deal is approved on a Monday, I don't
think, on Tuesday morning, in capitals around the world, they
will all now reconsider their positions. I think, as
calculations are made by either current governments or future
governments, it will be important for these countries to know
that it is no longer a matter of clear practice for the United
States and the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the international
community to consider there being only five legitimate nuclear
weapons states, that now you can have six. And there's no
reason, if good behavior is, in fact, the rationale, why you
can't have 7 and 8--9 and 10.
Senator Voinovich. Well, the other one was, out of the
tent, and they had it, and the others haven't started to
develop a nuclear capacity. You had a problem out there, and
you had somebody outside. Now we're trying to bring them into
it. And I guess I'd argue that's a good thing to do.
The last point is the relationship of this agreement to
China. I was at an Aspen Institute 3-day session, and there was
concern among the Chinese about this agreement. The Chinese
were asking, ``Where are we--what are we doing, in terms of
India''? My feeling is that we've been long overdue, in terms
of bettering our relationship with India. We're moving down
that track, with this agreement. And that's good. But do you
think that our agreement will change China's attitude toward
nuclear proliferation? Is China going to be doing something a
year from now that they wouldn't have done if we didn't enter
into this agreement with India?
Mr. Perry.
Dr. Perry. I think what would cause China to alter their
view on what they're doing in the nuclear program would be not
this agreement, but actions that India might take. If India
actually proceeded with a significant buildup of their nuclear
capability, then that would alter China's view. I do not expect
that to happen. And I do not think this agreement would
facilitate it happening. That could have happened in the
absence of the agreement. So, I do not think the agreement
itself is going to have that effect.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Carter.
Dr. Carter. Senator, there is one geopolitical reason for
the United States to foster better relations with India, and it
does have to do with China. This is very difficult for both the
administration and the Indians to talk about, but the fact of
the matter is, we don't know where destiny is going to take
China. I am not a pessimist about that, but we do not know
whether China will be a responsible stakeholder, as Bob
Zoellick would say, or whether a new generation of Chinese
leaders, Chinese nationalism, a dustup with us over Taiwan, or
something else will create the outcome for our relations with
China that neither side wants, which is one of contention.
Should future conflict with China occur, there is no
question that we would benefit from having India as another
counterweight to China in Asia. That's not a benefit of the
deal that I ever wish to harvest, but it is a consideration.
Dr. Tellis. I think all three countries--the United States,
India, and China--are involved in a delicate hedging game at
the moment, and they are hedging precisely because of the
reason that Ash alluded to. We don't know what the future
holds.
One of the ironies of this relationship is that it might
actually lead to Sino-Indian rapprochement--not complete
rapprochement, but, at least, a closening of Sino-Indian ties--
because one of the things that the Chinese are concerned about
in this relationship is that it might pull India even more
permanently and durably into the orbit of American friendship.
And so, you can see this in a whole range of issue areas in the
bilateral Sino-Indian relationship, where China has actually
watched India's gradual closening to the United States with a
certain degree of alarm, but also as a sense of opportunity for
them to change course with respect to their own bilateral
relations with New Delhi.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of
our witnesses for your insights.
I'd like to take a wider view of all of this. And I will
say, at the outset, Dr. Tellis, I appreciate your very frank
answer to Senator Voinovich's question, which is true. And I
associate myself with your insights on this, just so you all
know where I'm coming from.
The issue on energy--talking about how this matters and
what amount it will be, nuclear versus clean-coal technology
and so forth. Having been in India just last Thanksgiving, and
meeting with the India Institutes of Technology folks, the
economic developers in Karnataka and Bangalore, as well as
Prime Minister Singh, it is clear how important this was to
them. India is an even more energy-dependent country than we
are. Right now we're paying these high gasoline prices. Some of
it, obviously, is because of the world demand for oil and
growing economies in Central Europe, India, and China. And even
if production of oil in the world increases, the demand is also
increasing. And so, there are a lot of things we need to do. We
need to be more efficient, use the advancements in
nanotechnology for lighter, stronger materials, maybe lithium-
ion batteries, solar photovoltaics. We need the diversity of
fuels. Not any one fuel will power our economy.
Another area of cooperation with India will be, I believe,
in biofuels. Their rural areas are impoverished. The rural
areas, and it's amazing to me how many large areas of that
country--a prospering, growing country, but with heartbreaking
poverty--how many areas have no electricity at all. And
nuclear's going to be part of it. Clean-coal technology needs
to be part of it; and nuclear, as well.
I actually think, long term for the world, there's going to
be more and more countries that are going to want to use
civilian nuclear power. I think we actually ought to learn a
few things from others, whether it's chemical separation or
reprocessing, which is a much less dangerous, more efficient
way of handling it, or maybe concepts such as thorium added to
the uranium in the beginning, so that it cannot be made into a
weapons-grade uranium. This is going to be a challenge, I
think, around the world. Brazil, of course, has biofuels, but
there's going to be other countries that are going to want to
go to nuclear.
The point of the matter, though, is that India needs
nuclear power. Even their natural gas, they ship it in, mostly
liquified natural gas--an option, but not as good as a pipeline
of natural gas. So, this is going to be necessary for them.
Let's recognize that India, the world's largest democracy,
share the same values. It is a country of diversity. There is
religious tolerance. There's freedom of religion. Large groups
of different religions, and they're not at each other's necks.
We share, it appears to me, the same goals for Asia, which is
peace. And so, I think this is an important strategic
partnership of countries that have basically the same sort of
postulates, or pillars of a free and just society. And so,
that's the wider picture that you mentioned, Mr. Carter.
Now, the question is: How are we going to deal with Iran or
other countries? I think it's very easy to distinguish India
and Iran, to be honest with you, Dean, and that is, no one
considers India a state sponsor of terror. The world recognizes
Iran as a state sponsor of terror. While India and Pakistan
have not had the greatest relations, they haven't said, ``We're
going to wipe Pakistan off the map,'' as Iran has to Israel.
The proliferation into Iran on arms, some from India, but
not nuclear. The Russians are making money off of this deal,
and the Chinese. So, I think it's pretty easy, if you want to
look at someone's past record of performance compared to other
countries that may want nuclear weapons, India has an
outstanding record. And that's how I would, personally, easily
distinguish it.
The question here is, with all these advantages--
economically, diplomatically, a strategic partner--and India's
just a model, I think, for other countries, in many respects--
and while this may not be a perfect deal, and India may have
gotten, in some aspects of it, the better of it; in other
parts, we might have gotten the better--you know, that's where
we are. And I'm glad to hear you all say, ``Well, gosh, to
start tinkering and fouling it all up will be even more
disastrous, and it wouldn't happen.'' But wouldn't you also say
it's actually positive, in that India has been now brought into
the global nuclear mainstream? It's clearly increasing the
transparency of what they're doing. There is now oversight of,
at least, their civilian nuclear capabilities. And, in fact,
the aspect of this being permanent, isn't that a positive that
we didn't have before, even if there might have been some
tweaking and more concessions we might could have obtained from
it?
So, would you not think that having India under the
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards a positive? I'll
ask you, Mr. Carter, since you take the widest view, in your
own words.
Dr. Carter. I think it is positive, but I think it remains
to be seen whether the big benefits from India on the nuclear
front will be realized. I do not think they come so much from
India submitting certain facilities to the IAEA, although these
are important steps. The key is whether India really does
constrain its own behavior, not because we constrain it
technically, but because it realizes that it is not a good
thing for it to build more and cause others to build more.
We'll see whether India puts its shoulder to the wheel with us
against Iran. We'll see whether India stops talking about the
NPT as an unfair thing, and starts talking about it as an
indispensable thing.
I hope all that occurs. I would be opposing this deal if I
thought that that wasn't going to occur, that India was lying
to us, or that India was not inclined to meet our expectations.
But the fact of the matter is, it remains to be seen.
Senator Allen. Yes. Dean Gallucci.
Dr. Carter. If I may also--I apologize, Mr. Chairman and
Senator Allen--excuse myself. I have to depart.
The Chairman. We understand. And we thank you very much for
your testimony.
Dr. Carter. Thank you. I've enjoyed being here, and
appreciate the honor of being here.
Senator Allen. Great having you.
Ambassador Gallucci. Senator, I just briefly wanted to say
that everything you said at the front part of your statement, I
think is exactly right, about the importance of India. And I do
not dissent from any of that.
But I really was enthusiastic about coming here today,
because I really think it's important that we not have an image
here of accomplishing something we're not accomplishing. We are
not bringing India into the regime. We're not bringing India
into the tent. We are building a new tent. We're not trading
them into the arrangement, which I think has worked so well;
we're changing that arrangement. And I just beg you all, as you
do this--and you may decide to do this--and my colleagues here
next to me think it's worth doing because of how important
India is. OK, I think that's a mistake, but at least I think we
should be clear, this is not drawing India into the safeguards
regime.
For me, I take a dimmer view, even than my colleague Ash
does, of having India submit some reactors for safeguards. To
me, that is a distraction. Those inspectors should go someplace
else. Maybe Iran, for example. Because I agree entirely, that's
a problem. I don't want to see the inspectors doing that,
particularly not when they have the other facilities in India
producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. It's not a
demonstration of their willingness to modify or accept a
compromise in their sovereignty, as other states do that accept
full-scope safeguards. They're not doing that. So, I would
encourage you----
Senator Allen. You don't think--go ahead.
Ambassador Gallucci. I'm sorry.
Senator Allen. Dean, do you not think that, insofar as
their civilian nuclear, they will not be in compliance with
international safeguards?
Ambassador Gallucci. No----
Senator Allen. I understand, on the military side. But on
the civilian side?
Ambassador Gallucci. The problem, Senator, is that they
had--before this--well, they have, now, some reactors--and I
think probably about six or so--that were subject to
international safeguards, because they were supplied by
countries under agreements that required that safeguards be
applied. And then they have other facilities that they built.
Some of those facilities, they use for energy. Some are--and
some are used for energy, and the plutonium that's derived is
used to make weapons. What they are doing in this deal is
increasing the number of reactors that would be subject to
international safeguards. They pick the reactors, and they
leave the other ones out, so they can continue building nuclear
weapons.
I don't see this as a plus for the nonproliferation regime,
adding these reactors. It is a gesture, but I think it's an
empty one. I really do believe the international community, and
everybody who understands anything about the way one builds
nuclear weapons understands--that this really doesn't do
anything, in terms of the regime, substantively. To me, it's an
empty gesture. But, again, please, if you look at this deal and
say that--and believe that this is so essential for our
relationship with India, and you decide we must do it--all I'm
saying is, please recognize the sacrifice you're making to the
regime. I can't see this as a plus for the nonproliferation
regime. I can see it as doing damage. And I'd, therefore, on
balance, come out in a different position.
Thank you.
Senator Allen. Dr. Tellis.
Dr. Tellis. I think the distinction is between bringing
India into the treaty and bringing India into the regime. I do
not think this agreement brings India into the treaty, but it
certainly brings India into the regime. And it brings India
into the regime not merely because it brings some reactors
under safeguards, but because it now takes on regime
obligations primarily with respect to the diffusion of nuclear
technology to third parties. That is the real benefit of this
agreement.
I agree with Ambassador Gallucci. I mean, one can have a
discussion about whether a few reactors here or there make a
difference. My own view is that having more reactors is better
for all concerned, compared to having less. But the real
benefits, for me, are that India now takes on regime
obligations with respect to export controls in ways that are
verifiable, in ways that are durable, and which involve
obligations that actually go beyond those taken by NPT
signatories.
India--people forget that India, today, has tremendous
technical competence in more than one fuel cycle. If there were
no such agreement, the only obligation that would prevent India
from diffusing this technology are the voluntary obligations
that India takes, which are entirely reversible at a future
point in time.
What this agreement does is that it binds India
permanently, through a set of international agreements--not
simply with the United States, but with the IAEA, with the
NSG--into adopting a set of norms that not only advance India's
interests--of course they do--but advance our own and the
interests of the international community, especially the
nonnuclear weapons states.
Senator Allen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, unless--Mr. Perry, I--you don't need to say
anything, unless you have something to add to it.
Dr. Perry. I would have made the same point that Dr. Tellis
did.
Senator Allen. Thank----
Dr. Perry. I would have made the same point that Dr. Tellis
already made.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
The Chairman. Well, I thank each one of you very much for
your testimony. We thank you for your responses to our
questions. And we look forward to staying in touch.
Thank you.
The Chair would like to call, now, the second panel, to be
Dr. Lehman, Dr. Einhorn, Dr. Milhollin, and Dr. Cohen.
[Pause.]
The Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your
patience this morning. We've had good dialog, and we look
forward to another important set of testimonies from each of
you.
I'm going to ask you to testify in the order in which I
introduced you. And that would be, first of all, Dr. Lehman, to
be followed by Dr. Einhorn, Dr. Milhollin, and Dr. Cohen.
Your full statements will be made a part of the record. And
if you would summarize, why, we would be pleased.
Dr. Lehman.
STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD F. LEHMAN II, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
GLOBAL SECURITY RESEARCH, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL
LABORATORY, LIVERMORE, CA
Dr. Lehman. Mr. Chairman, you've already had to listen to
four very distinguished friends of ours, and there's three very
good friends to come, so I will be exceedingly brief.
It won't surprise you that the heart of my position is that
the--nonproliferation should not only be integral, it should be
central to our strategic partnership with India. It should not
be viewed as a tradeoff, but, rather, we should have net
benefit in nonproliferation from this endeavor. And I think the
Senate should make it clear that that ought to be a key purpose
of the strategic partnership.
My own view has been that engaging India on civil nuclear
cooperation as a part of our nonproliferation strategy is long
overdue. Only by bringing India into the broader
nonproliferation regime can we strengthen our efforts to combat
WMD and create the conditions under which India can shoulder
the responsibilities that are expected of leading countries
with advanced nuclear technology. But there are challenges, and
there are risks.
The nonproliferation regime has long been under stress
because of the spread of dual-use technology, too much
insistence on one-size-fits-all solutions for very different
circumstances, an inability to work with the nonparties to the
NPT, and the failure to enforce compliance. For 14 years, North
Korea has developed nuclear weapons, after being discovered
secretly working on fissile-material production, in violation
of the NPT. And now, Iran is following the same path.
India could do much to help within its borders, in South
Asia, in other troubled regions, in international fora, and
around the globe. But working with India will not be easy. Over
many years, I have learned that India is a country that has
difficulty taking yes for an answer; in part, because domestic
and regional politics are filled with spoilers.
In the short run, frustration and disappointment will be
common. But if the momentum of the joint statement can be
sustained, the long-run achievements can be significant.
Reasonable people can disagree over what we can achieve and
when we can achieve it. If momentum created by the joint
statement collapses, however, we will not return to the status
quo ante. United States-Indian cooperation will be set back,
but, also, the weaknesses in the existing nonproliferation
regime will be stressed even more.
To keep the momentum going, the administration has proposed
legislation, S. 2429, that seeks to record the principles of a
bipartisan consensus between the executive branch and the
Congress and establish more routine procedures so as to
minimize corrosive developments and counterproductive delays at
home and abroad.
Everyone here understands that easing the procedural
requirements can have an effect on substance. For that reason,
it is all the more important that the Congress have a clear
understanding with the executive branch as to what the general
goals and conditions are for permitting nuclear trade with
India to begin and to continue. Congress must make clear that
it will review, periodically, the Indo-U.S. strategic
partnership, especially its nonproliferation components, and
that failure to meet the conditions at any time in the future
would require that civil nuclear and other cooperation be
revisited. Congress can also help ensure that a sufficiently
ambitious and updated agenda is a part of the partnership.
Most important achievements, such as a fissile-material
cutoff, will take time under any circumstances. To demand now,
as a precondition, a unilateral freeze by India without China
and Pakistan would bring important cooperation to a stop.
Including China, Pakistan, and others will take time, so the
sooner we get on with the requirements for civil nuclear
cooperation, the sooner we can have concrete engagement on
these issues.
As I have explained elsewhere, we need not wait for the
conclusion of the FMCT and the Conference on Disarmament to
begin to engage on fissile material. We will want to work with
Indian policymakers and technical experts on best practices for
safety and security. And this could lead naturally to joint
approaches to material protection control and accountability,
which, in turn, could lead to interim approaches to fissile
material restraint on the way to the FMCT, perhaps involving
other countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as those
involved in Generation IV in ITER.
To promote our nonproliferation goals, we need embedded
engagement with India, rolling up our sleeves and working
closely together in areas such as export control, detection,
interdiction, transparency, material security, diplomatic
strategies, and the like. PSI and U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1540 offer important vehicles.
But I might say that we have had discussion here today that
says, on the one hand, ``India has a good record, and it's now
passed all of this legislation,'' and, on the other hand,
``We're hoping that they will implement some of these
objectives under, for example, U.N. Security Council Resolution
1540.'' That's all good.
But the reality is, in a world in which nuclear technology
is widespread, and where arbitrary categories of whose nuclear
``this'' and whose nuclear weapons state ``that'' are very
misleading. They have their legal importance, they have their
political importance, but the reality is, we have to deal with
the spread of capability and the management of intent. And that
requires that we work closely together in implementation.
In short, keeping the momentum begun by the July 18 joint
statement is essential to achieve our nonproliferation goals,
but the Congress should also insist on clarity of purpose and
commit itself to ongoing oversight. Again, the successful
execution of the partnership, over time, must be the measure of
merit, not the initial ceremonies or even this enabling
legislation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lehman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ronald F. Lehman II, Director, Center for
Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Livermore, CA
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: In November of last year,
the committee asked me to join in its consideration of the July 18,
2005 Joint Statement of President George W. Bush and Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh on civil nuclear cooperation. You have that testimony
before you. Today's hearing considers the strategic and
nonproliferation implications of the Joint Statement in the context of
S. 2429, legislation to advance that agreement.
In the last six months, intense negotiations have taken place.
Uncertainty still exists and warrants caution, but both sides have
taken steps and made clarifications. Nothing has become known, however,
that would cause me to change my basic conclusions and concerns, which
again are my personal views. Let me briefly recall that analysis:
The Joint Statement is an historic milestone for
nonproliferation that creates both great opportunity and great
risk. It creates an opportunity to strengthen a nuclear
nonproliferation regime that is suffering from its own internal
weaknesses such as inadequate enforcement, the threat of
breakout once an advanced nuclear capability has been achieved,
and an inability to engage effectively the non-parties to the
NPT. Because the terms of the Joint Statement, however, also
spotlight those weaknesses, mishandling of the implementation
of its terms can have adverse consequences even when the best
of intentions are involved.
* * * * *
If the basic approach contained in the Joint Statement
collapses, we will not return to the status quo ante. U.S.-
Indian cooperation will be set back, but also the weaknesses in
the existing regime will be exposed to even greater pressure.
Bringing India into a more comprehensive regime of
nonproliferation and restraint, however, could significantly
enhance our ability to reduce the dangers associated with
weapons of mass destruction. Congress can help insure that this
is a sufficiently ambitious agenda. India could do much to help
within its borders, in South Asia, in other troubled regions,
and globally.
* * * * *
I would urge the Congress to focus on the dynamics of the
process and the goals to be achieved as a result of the U.S.-
India Joint Statement rather than attempting to rearrange the
pieces of the initial package. Much that one might have
detailed in the original package may be more successfully
achieved by driving subsequent interactions in the right
direction. This can only be done, I believe, if
nonproliferation is a centerpiece of strategic engagement
rather than a trade-off. It is best achieved by retaining a
viable Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the core of a
broader nonproliferation regime that uses more targeted,
embedded engagement to address the fundamental causes and
conditions of proliferation. In short, widely shared goals
should guide our actions, but implementation will fail if a
``one size fits all'' mentality is applied rigidly to different
circumstances.
The legislation before you is intended to support these goals by
memorializing the principles for a bi-partisan consensus between both
executive and legislative branches that can provide a stable basis over
time for both India and the United States to work together. Such
cohesion and clarity of purpose, as the United States engages India,
would be very valuable, particularly in support of our nonproliferation
efforts.
That is not the same as saying that partnership with India will be
easy. My own view is that the road ahead with India will be rocky,
certainly when measured against the current euphoria about India even
among those who have concerns about civil nuclear cooperation. The
overselling of the new relationship today by many will become more
obvious in the near term, but in the long term, common interests and
steady foreign policy could result in achieving or exceeding
expectations. This is not a certain outcome, however.
At the same time, many of the concerns about the strategic
partnership's impact on nonproliferation are also overstated or
manageable. Too often the friends of the NPT act as if they are
rearranging the deck chairs of what their rhetoric describes as a
sinking nonproliferation ``Titanic.'' The nuclear nonproliferation
regime is under stress, but the Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement did not put it there. Indeed, the agreement offers an
opportunity to strengthen the regime through partnership with India,
especially if India calls a truce in its more than thirty years
guerrilla war against the NPT. Real nonproliferation needs real,
embedded engagement. Again, the successful execution of the partnership
over time must be the measure of merit, not the initial ceremonies or
even enabling legislation.
It is right to take the time now to codify clear nonproliferation
commitments that will guide the strategic partnership, but, in the
future, we must also insure that the parties live up to those
commitments and adjust to new challenges. We must not let time erode
the emphasis on nonproliferation that should be integral to the Indo-
U.S. relationship. This legislation can be consistent with that
approach, but changing circumstances could also undermine our clarity
of purpose over time, particularly in nonproliferation. In the early
1990s erosion of purpose perhaps fatally damaged our nonproliferation
prospects and achievements with respect to North Korea, and one sees
similar developments emerging on Iran among allies, friends, and non-
governmental organizations. In this age of rapidly advancing
technology, time is not always on the side of nonproliferation.
S. 2429 gives emphasis to the nonproliferation objectives of the
new Indo-U.S. partnership. It conditions civil nuclear cooperation on
the President's determination that India:
Has provided the US and the IAEA a credible plan to separate
its civil and military facilities;
Has an IAEA safeguards agreement in force;
Is making progress with the IAEA ``toward implementing'' an
Additional Protocol;
``Is working with the United States for the conclusion of a
multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty'';
``Is supporting international efforts to prevent the spread
of enrichment and reprocessing technology'';
Is securing nuclear materials and technology through export
controls and adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines; and
The Section 123 Agreement between the U.S. and India is
consistent with U.S. ``participation in the Nuclear Suppliers
Group.''
An eighth condition is dealt with separately, differently, and more
emphatically; namely that India not ``have detonated a nuclear
explosive device after the date of enactment.''
All of these are important conditions, not only when we begin going
down this path of partnership, but also in the years ahead. The
Executive Branch seems legitimately concerned that an annual process of
determinations and legislative enactment would be corrosive and
counterproductive over time in the real world of political give and
take at home and abroad. That view is not wrong.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Lehman.
Dr. Einhorn.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. EINHORN, SENIOR ADVISER,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me the
opportunity to testify this morning.
In seeking a special exception for India, I believe the
administration is running some serious risks, in terms of our
nonproliferation objectives. The United States is seen as
bending the rules when they no longer suit us, and the
administration is seen as giving nonproliferation a back seat
relative to other foreign policy and even commercial
considerations. Other countries can be expected to follow our
lead. Indeed, they already are.
Russia recently jumped the gun and delivered a large
shipment of enriched fuel to India, even before the Nuclear
Suppliers Group had changed the rules to allow such a shipment.
I think this is just emblematic of what we're going to see.
There have been discussions between China and Pakistan on,
perhaps, purchase of four or six additional reactors by
Pakistan. It's not clear whether such a purchase would be in
the context of the Nuclear Suppliers' rules or outside that
context. It's hard to imagine that the Russians would have made
this transfer of fuel without the precedent having been
established of the United States-India deal.
In the future--and I agree with comments by Bob Gallucci
earlier--countries considering whether to go nuclear are going
to see lower costs if they decided to proceed in that
direction. And I think that's very unfortunate.
Now, such risks might have been offset, or at least
minimized, if the Bush administration and India had agreed to
steps that, on balance, would have made the deal a net
nonproliferation gain. Unfortunately, I don't think this was
the case.
The actions pledged by India in the nuclear deal were
mainly reaffirmations of existing commitments, codifications of
sound Indian practices, or measures India was already planning
to take before the deal was reached. Where the deal breaks new
ground was India's acceptance of IAEA safeguards at eight
indigenously built nuclear reactors. But, as long as India
insists on keeping substantial fissile-material production
capacity outside safeguards, I think this gain is really only
symbolic.
Now, the aspect of the nuclear deal that involves the
greatest risk, and the one where there's the greatest potential
from turning the deal from a net loss to a net nonproliferation
gain is the area of fissile-material production. As it now
stands, the deal would help India dramatically increase its
stocks of bomb-grade material. If existing nonproliferation
restrictions are lifted, India could import uranium for its
expanding civil program, and free up domestic uranium supplies
for weapons purposes. It would be a windfall gain for India's
nuclear weapons program.
The administration made an attempt to constrain fissile-
material production by proposing that most Indian nuclear
reactors be placed under IAEA safeguards. India rejected that
proposal and insisted on keeping eight current or planned
reactors outside of safeguards and on deciding entirely on its
own which future reactors to put under safeguards.
Now, of course, India will not devote all of its
unsafeguarded reactors to plutonium production. Most of India's
reactors will be used to generate electricity. But even if only
one or two large reactors were used as bomb factories, India
could produce enough plutonium for well over 50 or more nuclear
weapons each year.
Now, why should we care about India's production of fissile
material? After all, India is a friend. It's a responsible
nuclear power. We can't imagine a scenario in which Indian
nuclear weapons would be used against the United States. One
reason we should care is that, especially after 9/11, we have a
vital interest in limiting the availability of bombmaking
materials around the world and preventing such materials from
falling into the hands of terrorists.
If India steps up production--and India ramping up
production is certainly a possibility under this agreement--
then it's very likely, I think, that Pakistan will follow suit,
and China could decide to resume production, and other
countries might be encouraged to seek their own production
capabilities. The more materials produced, the more difficult
and costly it will be to secure those materials, and the
greater the risks of nuclear terrorism.
Another reason we should care is that increased fissile
material and nuclear weapons production could lead to increased
tensions and a destabilizing arms competition in southern Asia
involving India, Pakistan, and China. Pakistani authorities
have already suggested that they may need to adjust their
strategic programs to account for the implications of this
deal.
What can the Congress do, at this stage, to strengthen the
nuclear deal and minimize the risks to the global
nonproliferation regime? Now, the committee will be
deliberating on various steps that the Congress might take, but
I'd like to focus on just one. The Congress should make the
United States-India deal a catalyst for curbing, or even
capping, the worldwide buildup of fissile material. In
particular, it should permit nuclear cooperation with India to
proceed only when India stops producing fissile material for
nuclear weapons, unilaterally pursuant to a multilateral
moratorium, or pursuant to a multilateral fissile-material
cutoff treaty. India has rejected the Bush administration's
proposal that it unilaterally halt the production of fissile
material. Under the approach I'm suggesting, participation in a
multilateral measure that includes Pakistan and China would
make India eligible for nuclear cooperation. I agree with Ron
Lehman, who just mentioned that expecting India to do this
unilaterally is simply not realistic.
Now, India has long supported a multilateral fissile
material cutoff treaty. Indeed, in last July's joint statement
India pledged to work with the United States to achieve an
FMCT. Now, if this is a sincere commitment and not just another
throwaway line, agreement among the key powers should be
possible in a reasonably short period of time. Pakistan's
participation would be crucial, but, with none of the five
original nuclear powers still producing fissile material for
weapons, it should be possible to bring Pakistan onboard if the
United States and India and the other nuclear powers work
resolutely toward this end.
Since its May 1998 nuclear tests, India has often stated
that its strategic requirements are not open-ended, and that it
doesn't seek nuclear parity with China or any other country.
Instead, it's maintained that it requires only what it calls a
credible minimum deterrent capability. If that remains the
case, perhaps it will soon be ready to decide that it has
enough fissile material for its deterrence needs.
Would linking nuclear cooperation to stopping fissile
material production be a deal-breaker? I'm sure this is a
question that's on the minds of members of this committee. Put
another way: Would the Indians walk away from the benefits of
the deal, including the ability to buy uranium on the world
market and acceptance as a nuclear weapons state in all
consequential respects, because the United States asked them to
do something they are already committed to do? I don't know the
answer to that question. And we won't know it until the issue
is explored seriously with the Indian Government. But the right
question to ask is not whether a particular approach is a deal-
breaker, it's whether the approach serves U.S. interests.
At this stage, it's up to the committee and to the U.S.
Congress to adopt an approach that strikes the right balance,
that promotes the U.S. interest in a strong partnership with
India, as well as the vital U.S. interest in preventing nuclear
proliferation and nuclear terrorism. We shouldn't have to
pursue one at the expense of the other.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Einhorn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert J. Einhorn, Senior Adviser,
International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the
committee on the nonproliferation implications of the U.S.-India
agreement on civil nuclear cooperation.
The argument for overcoming the nuclear impasse with India--for
altering the nuclear status quo that cut India off from international
civil nuclear cooperation for over 30 years--has become increasingly
persuasive. It has been clear for many years that maintaining existing
U.S. laws and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines prohibiting such
cooperation would not succeed in inducing New Delhi to join the NPT or
give up nuclear weapons. And as the Bush administration has argued,
modifying those laws and guidelines for India could give a boost to
U.S. relations with a rising democratic world power and assist in
addressing India's growing energy needs.
The dilemma we now face is how to achieve the benefits of changing
the rules without undermining the vital U.S. interest of preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. How, for example, can the United
States seek exceptions to the rules for India without opening the door
to exceptions in less worthy cases--indeed, without weakening the
overall fabric of rules the U.S. worked so hard to create? How would
U.S. allies and friends who had to choose between nuclear weapons and
civil nuclear cooperation (and who made what the U.S. regarded as the
right choice) view giving India the opportunity to have its cake and
eat it too? How can we avoid conveying the impression to countries
contemplating the nuclear option in the future that, if they opted for
nuclear weapons, the world would eventually accept them into the
nuclear club?
Given the inevitable nonproliferation risks involved in reversing
three decades of U.S. law and multilateral policy to permit nuclear
cooperation with India, it is essential that such a major shift be
accompanied by Indian steps that, on balance, strengthen the
nonproliferation regime. Moreover, a policy departure of such magnitude
should be preceded by thorough discussions with the Congress and key
international partners to ensure they are comfortable with the
initiative and share the view that it does not undercut
nonproliferation interests.
But the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation deal negotiated by the
Bush administration doesn't meet those requirements. In the
administration's eagerness for a foreign policy success, the deal was
concluded in great haste, driven by the calendar of Bush-Singh meetings
rather than by the seriousness and complexity of the task at hand. Key
stakeholders in the U.S. Congress and the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) were not consulted in advance. While speed and exclusivity
are often necessary to overcome bureaucratic and international
resistance to major initiatives, this must be balanced against the need
for buy-in, especially when the success of the initiative depends on
approval by both the Congress and NSG. In its desire to show boldness
and demonstrate a clean break with the past, the administration gave
too little weight to the nonproliferation downsides and too much weight
to proving to the Indians its dedication to building a qualitatively
new relationship. In the process, it failed to use the leverage
available to it to achieve U.S. objectives.
As a result, the deal outlined in the Joint Statement concluded
when Prime Minister Singh visited Washington last July, and further
elaborated on March 2nd when President Bush was in Delhi, gave the
Indians virtually all that they wanted--the ability to acquire nuclear
equipment and technology and desperately needed uranium on the world
market, acceptance as a nuclear weapon state in all consequential
respects, and complete freedom to continue and expand production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons. What the U.S. got from the deal
was, for the most part, speculative--the hope that a stronger
partnership with India will pay strategic dividends down the road.
benefits for nonproliferation are modest
Recognizing that much of the criticism of the civil nuclear deal
would be based on its implications for nonproliferation, the
administration has made a special effort to show that the deal
strengthens the global nonproliferation regime. But the arguments are
not very convincing.
Several of the steps promised by India are simply reaffirmations of
existing commitments, including its pledges to continue its unilateral
moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, strengthen its national system
of export controls, and work toward the conclusion of a multilateral
fissile material cutoff treaty. Some other steps--including adherence
to the guidelines of the NSG and the Missile Technology Control
Regime--were actions India was already planning to take before the July
18 th Joint Statement as part of a U.S.-Indian dialogue on technology
transfer and export control. Still others--such as the promise to
refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to
countries that do not yet possess them--were codifications of existing
Indian policies and practices.
The potentially significant new development was India's commitment
in July to separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and put
the civilian facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards, thereby placing them off-limits for the production of
plutonium for India's nuclear weapons program. But the separation plan
insisted upon by India's nuclear establishment, backed by Prime
Minister Singh, and accepted by President Bush in March would put only
14 of 22 existing or planned nuclear power reactors under safeguards
(including the six imported reactors India has no choice but to put
under safeguards) and would allow New Delhi to decide entirely on its
own which future reactors it wished to designate as civilian and submit
to safeguards.
The administration has trumpeted as a major nonproliferation gain
that India will have 65 percent of its thermal reactors under
safeguards. As a gesture of support for the IAEA's safeguards system,
India's putting eight more reactors under safeguards than it would
otherwise be obliged to do is welcome. But strategically, the
percentage of reactors under safeguards is meaningless.
The purpose of IAEA safeguards is to prevent non-nuclear weapon
states from diverting nuclear materials from civilian facilities to a
nuclear weapons program. For nuclear powers like India, which can use
unsafeguarded facilities to produce fissile material for their weapons
programs, safeguards covering only a portion of their facilities serve
primarily a symbolic function--to reduce the perceived discrimination
between countries that are obliged to accept safeguards on all their
facilities (i.e., NPT non-nuclear states) and those that are not. Much
more meaningful than the percentage of reactors covered by safeguards
is the amount of fissile material that could be produced at facilities
not covered by safeguards. Under the separation plan approved on March
2nd, India has kept open plenty of options for producing fissile
material for its weapons program (including at fast breeder reactors
well-suited to producing bomb-grade plutonium).
The administration claims that the nuclear deal is a major
breakthrough because ``for the first time'' it brings India into the
international nonproliferation ``mainstream.'' In her April 5th
testimony, Secretary Rice argued that: ``We better secure our future by
bringing India into the international nonproliferation system, not by
allowing India to remain isolated for the next thirty years the way it
has been for the last thirty. We are clearly better off having India
most of the way in rather than all the way out.''
This statement creates the impression that India today is totally
outside the rules and, because of that, perhaps even a potential source
of proliferation difficulties. But India, to its credit, has been
moving into the nonproliferation ``mainstream'' for quite some time--in
such areas as export controls, physical protection of nuclear
materials, and interdictions of WMD-related shipments. It still has a
distance to go before its export controls meet the highest
international standards (and indeed the U.S. has sanctioned Indian
entities for sensitive assistance to Iraq, Libya, and Iran). But it is
working hard to strengthen its controls--and it will continue to do so
because it is a responsible country that recognizes that
nonproliferation controls are in its own self interest. The civil
nuclear deal would reinforce these positive trends, but they will
continue with or without the deal.
the risks are substantial
While the nonproliferation gains that can be attributed directly to
the civil nuclear deal are modest, the potential downsides are
substantial.
By seeking an exception to the rules for a country with which the
United States wishes to build a special friendship, the nuclear deal
will reinforce the impression internationally that the U.S. approach to
nonproliferation has become selective and self-serving, not consistent
and principled. Rules the U.S. previously championed will be perceived
as less binding and more optional. In general, the deal will send the
signal that the U.S.--the country the world has always looked to as the
leader in the global fight against proliferation--is now de-emphasizing
nonproliferation and giving it a back seat to other foreign policy and
commercial goals.
If the U.S. is seen as changing or bending the rules when they no
longer suit us, others can be expected to follow suit. Indeed, that
already seems to be happening. Russia, which a year ago said it
couldn't provide nuclear fuel to India's Tarapur reactors because of
its Nuclear Suppliers Group obligations, recently sent a large fuel
shipment to those reactors, arguing (over the objections of most NSG
members) that it was entitled to do so under the NSG's ``safety
exception.'' It is highly unlikely that Russia would have played so
fast and loose with the NSG's rules in the absence of the U.S.-India
nuclear deal. It is also not by coincidence that, not long after the
U.S.-India deal, China and Pakistan began discussing additional reactor
sales. It is not clear whether they will await NSG approval for such
sales or simply proceed outside the guidelines of the NSG.
The U.S.-India deal could make it harder to achieve Bush
administration nonproliferation initiatives. The U.S. is now asking the
NSG to permit nuclear cooperation only with countries that adhere to
the IAEA's Additional Protocol and to ban transfers of enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to states that do not already possess fuel-
cycle facilities. But getting NSG partners to tighten the rules in ways
favored by the U.S. will be much harder if they are also being asked to
bend one of their cardinal rules (i.e., no nuclear trade with non-
parties to the NPT) because the U.S. now finds it too constraining.
The civil nuclear deal could also reduce the perceived costs to
states that might consider ``going nuclear'' in the future. In
calculating whether to pursue nuclear weapons, a major factor for most
countries will be how the U.S. is likely to react. Implementation of
the deal with India will inevitably send the signal, especially to
countries with good relations with Washington, that the U.S. will
tolerate and eventually accommodate to a decision to acquire nuclear
weapons.
In the near term, U.S. plans to engage in nuclear cooperation with
India will make it more difficult to address proliferation challenges
such as Iran. Of course, Iran's interest in nuclear weapons long pre-
dated the India deal and its motives for seeking nuclear weapons have
nothing to do with the deal. But the U.S.-India agreement has
strengthened the case Iran can make--and is already making--
internationally and at home. Why, Iranian officials ask publicly,
should Iran give up its right as an NPT party to an enrichment
capability when India, a non-party to the NPT, can keep even its
nuclear weapons and still benefit from nuclear cooperation? It is an
argument, however flawed and disingenuous, that resonates well with the
Iranian public and with developing countries around the world and
weakens the pressures that can be brought to bear on Tehran.
The most serious defect of the U. S.-India nuclear deal is its
failure to constrain the further production of bomb-making fissile
material--plutonium and highly enriched uranium--for nuclear weapons.
Indeed, as it now stands, the deal could actually help India
dramatically increase its fissile material stocks.
India's indigenous uranium supplies are limited. Domestic uranium
ore is of low quality and expensive to mine and process into
yellowcake. Annual production is low and has difficulty keeping up with
demand for both the civil energy and nuclear weapons programs. Under
current nonproliferation restrictions, which prevent India from buying
uranium on the world market, India will soon face serious shortages and
painful trade-offs. Under the Bush administration plan to change U.S.
law and NSG guidelines, India could satisfy the needs of an expanding
civil nuclear energy program through imports, while freeing up its
domestic uranium reserves for military purposes. It would be a windfall
gain for the nuclear weapons program.
In negotiations leading up to the July 18th Joint Statement, the
Bush administration proposed that India stop producing fissile material
for nuclear weapons, which would have prevented India from taking
advantage of freed-up uranium supplies for weapons purposes. India
rejected the proposal. The administration then made a further attempt
to limit fissile material production by proposing that most Indian
nuclear facilities, including its fast breeder reactors, be placed
under IAEA safeguards and therefore made ineligible for weapons
plutonium production.
But India's nuclear establishment dug in its heels, calling
publicly for minimizing safeguards coverage and avoiding constraints on
India's bomb-making capacity. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, already
under attack on the nuclear deal from his left-wing coalition partners,
backed up the nuclear establishment's demands. Anxious to conclude the
nuclear deal lest the Delhi summit be seen as a failure and calculating
that Singh had less political room for maneuver than President Bush,
the administration threw in the towel on placing meaningful limits on
India's fissile material production capacity.
As a result, a third of India's reactors that currently exist or
are under construction will be outside safeguards and available for
plutonium production. Any future reactor, thermal or breeder, can be
designated by India as outside safeguards. Of course, the Indians will
not devote all their unsafeguarded nuclear reactors to weapons
plutonium production. Indeed, given India's ambitious nuclear energy
goals, we would expect most of those reactors to be used for civilian
purposes. But even if only two or three large reactors were used as
bomb factories, India could produce enough plutonium for well over 50
nuclear weapons each year.
Why should the U.S. care about Indian production of fissile
material? After all, India is a friend and a responsible nuclear power.
One reason we should care is that, especially after 9/11, we have a
vital interest in limiting the availability of bomb-making materials
around the world and preventing such materials from falling into the
hands of terrorist groups who, we know, are actively seeking to acquire
them. If India steps up production, Pakistan can be expected to follow
suit, China could decide to resume production, and others may be
encouraged to seek their own production capabilities. The more
materials produced, the more difficult and costly it will be to secure
them, and the greater the risks of nuclear terrorism.
Another reason we should care about stepped up Indian production of
fissile materials is that it could lead to increased tensions and
destabilizing arms competition in southern Asia, involving India,
Pakistan, and China. Pakistani authorities have publicly taken special
note of the failure of the U.S.-India nuclear deal to limit Indian
fissile material production. Reportedly, the Pakistani National Command
Authority recently met to assess the impact of the deal and consider
adjustments Pakistan may need to make to its own strategic plans.
President Musharraf said, ``We cannot remain oblivious to the changes
evolving in the region. All the steps will be taken for the defense,
security, and safety of Pakistan.'' Moreover, China has warned that the
deal threatens to ``undermine global disarmament moves,'' suggesting
that Beijing may also decide that it needs to respond programmatically.
Of course, continued or even stepped up nuclear weapons production
in the region would not necessarily translate into increased tensions.
Relations between Indian and Pakistan and between Indian and China have
both been improving in recent years. But India's insistence on keeping
substantial fissile material production capacity outside of
safeguards--thereby keeping options open for a substantial strategic
build-up--could raise suspicions about its intentions in the minds of
its neighbors and have an adverse effect on the processes of
reconciliation underway in the region.
can the deal be strengthened?
As it currently stands, the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation
deal is a net loss for nonproliferation. Can it be transformed into a
net nonproliferation gain? The answer, at this stage, lies mainly with
the U.S. Congress.
The Bush administration and the Indian Government would naturally
like to see the Congress approve the deal as is, on the basis of the
draft legislation the administration has already submitted, and to do
so as quickly as possible. But especially given the unprecedented
character of the deal and its far-reaching implications, Congress has a
responsibility to scrutinize it carefully before passing judgment and
to adopt any modifications or conditions it deems necessary to protect
U.S. interests, including in preventing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons or fissile materials.
Implementation of the civil nuclear deal will require Congressional
approval of amendments to the Atomic Energy Act as well as a bilateral
U.S.-India agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. In addition,
India and the IAEA will have to conclude an agreement that applies IAEA
safeguards to Indian nuclear facilities as well as an Additional
Protocol to that agreement. And finally, the NSG will have to agree by
consensus to modify its guideline that currently precludes nuclear
cooperation with states outside the NPT. All of these arrangements are
interrelated. For example, the Bush administration's willingness to
seek changes in U.S. law and NSG policies depended on India's
willingness to accept IAEA safeguards on certain Indian nuclear
facilities in perpetuity.
Before deciding to amend the Atomic Energy Act, the Congress should
therefore insist on seeing as much of the overall package as possible,
including the IAEA-India safeguards agreements (concluded but not
necessarily already approved by the IAEA Board) and a concluded U.S.-
India agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. The need to assess
these arrangements as a package is particularly justified because some
of them will be unprecedented. India has put the IAEA on notice that
its safeguards agreement will not follow standard models but will be
``India-specific.'' The meaning of India-specific is not yet clear.
Moreover, because India is a nuclear power that must still be treated
as a non-nuclear state for the purposes of U.S. law, the U.S.-India
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement will be different from any
previous U.S. agreement for cooperation. Negotiations on the IAEA-India
safeguards agreements and the U.S.-India agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation have already gotten underway; and so assuming those
negotiations go smoothly, Congressional insistence on looking at the
package as a whole need not cause significant delays.
Congress should not permit normal approval processes to be short-
circuited. The Atomic Energy Act provides that agreements for peaceful
nuclear cooperation that meet all the requirements of U.S. law will be
approved automatically if the Congress does not pass a joint resolution
of disapproval within 90 days; whereas agreements that do not meet all
the statutory requirements (i.e., in cases where those requirements are
waived) must be approved by both houses of Congress. Although the U.S.-
India agreement for cooperation will not meet all the requirements of
law (it is the first of about 40 such U.S. agreements not to do so) and
will therefore require a waiver (because India will not have safeguards
on all of its nuclear facilities), the administration is nonetheless
proposing that the agreement be fast-tracked with the much less
demanding approval procedure. Clearly, the India case deserves more
scrutiny, not less. Congress should insist that both houses of Congress
get the opportunity to review and vote on the U.S.-India agreement.
In terms of the substantive elements of the U.S.-India civil
nuclear deal, there are several the Congress will want to probe and
understand more clearly. Among them will be whether an Indian nuclear
test explosion--or some other Indian actions--would trigger the
termination of U.S. nuclear cooperation. A related question is whether
the U.S. would be committed to assist India in obtaining reactor fuel
from third parties if U.S. fuel supplies had to be cut off as a result
of an Indian nuclear test or some other action.
Based on its review of the nuclear deal, Congress may wish to adopt
legislation that strengthens the deal and minimizes the risks it poses
to the global nonproliferation regime.
One means of minimizing those risks would be to restrict the scope
of nuclear cooperation with India that would be permitted by the new
legislation. A long-standing element of the nonproliferation regime has
been the ``NPT preference policy,'' which has meant giving NPT parties
benefits in the civil nuclear energy area not available to those
outside the NPT. A way of maintaining some preferential treatment for
NPT parties would be to modify U.S. law (and NSG guidelines) to permit
nuclear-related exports to India except equipment, materials, or
technologies related to sensitive fuel-cycle facilities, including
enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production. Such a
distinction would permit India to acquire uranium, enriched fuel,
nuclear reactors and components, and a wide range of other nuclear
items, but would retain the ban on transfers of those items that are
most closely related to a nuclear weapons program. The British and
French, both of whom are strong supporters of nuclear cooperation with
India, reportedly believe that nuclear cooperation with India should
not include fuel-cycle equipment and technologies.
Another way of reducing nonproliferation risks would be to
implement the nuclear deal in a country-neutral manner--not as a
special exception to the rules for India alone, which is what the
administration has proposed. A problem with the country-specific
approach is that it accentuates concerns that the U.S. is acting
selectively on the basis of foreign policy considerations rather than
on the basis of objective factors related to nonproliferation
performance.
To avoid the pitfalls of making a country-specific exception
without opening the door to nuclear cooperation in cases where it is
clearly not yet merited, the Congress might consider permitting nuclear
cooperation with any state not party to the NPT that meets certain
criteria of responsible nuclear behavior (e.g., moratorium on nuclear
testing, effective export controls, strong nuclear security measures,
cooperation in stopping illicit nuclear trafficking). While such an
approach would be country-neutral, it would still enable the U.S.
Government (and other NSG members) to distinguish among non-parties to
the NPT in terms of whether--and how soon--they would be eligible for
nuclear cooperation.
By far the most important way to reduce nonproliferation risks--and
to turn the civil nuclear deal into a net nonproliferation gain--would
be for Congress to take action that would make the deal a catalyst for
curbing or even capping the worldwide buildup of fissile material. In
particular, Congress should adopt legislation that permits nuclear
cooperation to proceed when India stops producing fissile material for
nuclear weapons, either by ceasing production unilaterally, by joining
other nuclear powers (including China and Pakistan) in a multilateral
moratorium, or by adhering to a multilateral, verifiable treaty banning
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (i.e., a fissile
material cutoff treaty, or FMCT).
In the run-up to the July 18th Joint Statement, India rejected a
Bush administration proposal that it stop producing fissile material
for nuclear weapons. But it is possible New Delhi might take a
different view toward ending production not unilaterally but as part of
a multilateral moratorium or treaty. After all, India has long declared
its support for a multilateral FMCT. Indeed, in their July 18th Joint
Statement, India and the United States agreed to work together to
achieve an FMCT. If that is a serious undertaking and not a throwaway
line, it would not be unrealistic for the key nuclear powers to reach
agreement on a cutoff in a reasonably short period of time. The U.S.,
UK, France, and Russia have all ceased producing fissile material for
nuclear weapons as a matter of policy. China is also believed to have
stopped production. With intensive diplomatic effort, it should be
possible for India and the U.S. to persuade Pakistan to join them and
these other nuclear powers in a multilateral moratorium pending
completion of a formal multilateral treaty. By linking nuclear
cooperation to the termination of fissile material production, Congress
could provide additional incentive for Washington and New Delhi to
reach agreement at an early date.
conclusion
In seeking to make India an exception to longstanding
nonproliferation rules, the Bush administration has given India
virtually all that it wanted and has run major risks with the future of
the nonproliferation regime. It is therefore reasonable to ask India to
take steps to minimize the risks and demonstrate its own strong
commitment to fighting proliferation. But the administration has
settled for far less than what is required to make the civil nuclear
deal a net gain for nonproliferation.
India has long wanted to be regarded as a legitimate member of the
nuclear club, not a pariah or outsider. The administration is right
that it is time that India be brought into the nonproliferation
mainstream. But with membership comes responsibilities--not just in
ensuring against leakage of nuclear equipment or technology to other
countries but also in practicing strategic restraint that can increase
international security generally. India has stated that it is prepared
to assume the same responsibilities and practices as other nuclear
powers. It so happens that the five original nuclear weapons states
have all stopped producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. Should
India not be asked to join them?
Indian leaders might be expected to say that, since the original
five nuclear powers have produced more bomb-grade material than India,
India should be entitled to catch up. But since its May 1998 nuclear
tests, India has often stated that its strategic requirements are not
open-ended and that it doesn't seek nuclear parity with China or any
other country. Instead, it has consistently maintained that it requires
only a ``credible, minimum deterrent capability.'' If that remains the
case, perhaps it can soon decide that it has accumulated sufficient
fissile material for its minimum deterrent needs and can afford to
forgo further production.
A multilateral cap on the accumulation of fissile material would
make a major contribution to fighting nuclear proliferation and
preventing nuclear terrorism. Making a U.S.-India civil nuclear deal a
catalyst for achieving such an outcome would transform the deal from a
substantial loss to a substantial gain. It would enable the U.S. to
advance its strategic interest in a qualitatively improved relationship
with India as well as serve its nonproliferation interests--not promote
one at the expense of the other. Congress can play a key role in
achieving such an outcome.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Einhorn.
Dr. Milhollin.
STATEMENT OF DR. GARY MILHOLLIN, DIRECTOR, WISCONSIN PROJECT ON
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Milhollin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'd like
to thank you for inviting me to testify today on the
administration's plan for nuclear cooperation with India. And I
would like to say that I think the committee is right to focus
on the strategic aspect of the proposed cooperation.
I would recommend to the committee that it ask the
following question. Why, after 9/11, when we should be doing
all we can to fight terrorism, and when we talk almost every
day about states or terrorists getting their hands on an atomic
bomb, should we weaken the controls on the export of nuclear
material? Is this the right time to do that? And, if we do it,
will it make us safer?
We've heard witnesses talk about the diplomatic and trade
aspects of this arrangement, but this is really a change in our
export control laws. That's what's being proposed. And we have
to focus, specifically, on what it is we're trying to do. And
it seems to me clear that if we look at this carefully, we'll
conclude that it doesn't make us more secure, it puts us more
at risk.
Why is that? First, it is impossible to weaken export
controls for India, which is what this deal does, without
weakening them for everyone else. The ``everyone else''
includes Iran, Pakistan, and even terrorist groups who are
trying to get their hands on the means to make weapons of mass
destruction.
The great flaw in the administration's proposal is that it
considers India to be an isolated case. In the world we live in
today, it would be nice to be able to do that, but it's, in
fact, impossible, because export controls are administered
through regimes. The committee is familiar with these regimes,
but it's important to notice that a cardinal principle of all
the regimes is that they are country-neutral, they do not make
exceptions for specific countries. And there is a very good
reason for that. If the United States decides to drop controls
to help one of its friends--in this case, India--other supplier
countries will do the same for their friends. China will drop
controls on its friend Pakistan, and Russia will drop controls
on its friend Iran. There is no way to convince either China or
Russia not do that. This is the way international regimes work.
Once we start tinkering with the regimes, they could
unravel very quickly; and, in my judgment, will unravel. As one
expert in the Pentagon told me once upon a time, ``They're like
a springloaded box; if you raise the lid, you may never get it
back on again.''
So, from a general strategic point of view, with this cost
in mind, why is it that we're helping India? Only three
countries have refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty:
India, Israel, and Pakistan. Of the three, India is the least
important, strategically. Under any calculation of our
strategic interests, Pakistan ranks higher than India. Pakistan
is essential to our ongoing military and political efforts in
Afghanistan. Pakistan is essential to our campaign against al-
Qaeda. Pakistan is a leading power in the Muslim world; a world
with which the United States needs better relations.
Israel has always been a close United States ally, and will
continue to be. Israel would like to have United States nuclear
cooperation. Israel is also located in a part of the world that
is of highest importance to United States foreign-policy
interests.
In any competition for strategic favor from the United
States, India finishes a distant third.
So, why choose India now for preferential treatment? I can
only see one answer. India is no different today than it was in
1998, when it tested nuclear weapons. The answer is, India is
the biggest market.
Secretary Rice, when she testified to this committee on
April 5, said that the agreement with India was crafted with
the private sector in mind. She mentioned a $13 billion deal by
Boeing, purchases of reactors, American reactors, by India, and
opportunities for United States companies to enter the
lucrative and growing Indian market.
If you look at this from the point of view of other
countries, the message is pretty clear. Export controls are now
less important to the United States than money. But a decision
to put money above export controls is precisely what we don't
want China and Russia to do when they sell to Iran. We don't
want China and Russia to tell us that money in their pockets is
more important than stopping Iran's march toward the bomb. Yet
that is exactly what they will tell us.
So, those are the costs of the administration's plan. What
are the benefits?
We've already heard a discussion about the possibility that
India will place 14 of 22 reactors under inspection. It seems
to me that that's a little bit like a person with a 22-room
house who says that the police can inspect 14 rooms, but not
the other 8. Why would any policeman in his right mind accept
that offer? In fact, putting additional reactors under
inspection does not create any benefit, in terms of
nonproliferation, because India has calculated how much
plutonium it's going to need for bombs, and it has kept out a
sufficient number of reactors to make that much plutonium.
The other benefit that the administration cites is that
India may buy American reactors. The precedent is our agreement
with China. I'm sure that the committee remembers the intense
debates we had over the China Cooperation Agreement. After we
finally agreed to cooperate with China, how many reactors did
China buy? The answer is: Zero. Not a single American reactor.
The import orders went to France, Russia, and China. I don't
think this time we're going to do any better. India can already
build domestic reactors that are cheaper than ours. They can
turn to the Russians for imports, because the Russians' will be
cheaper, and there will be fewer conditions. The French and the
Canadians will also compete with us. So, I think the chance
that we're going to defeat this competition is virtually nil.
The last point I'd like to make has to do with the power of
Congress, which I think is very important, and I'm not sure
that it's been covered.
Under present law, the administration must obtain the
consent of Congress before putting into effect an agreement
that does not satisfy our nonproliferation criteria. This
requirement for congressional approval encourages the
administration to make good agreements. But, under the proposed
legislation, such an agreement would automatically go into
effect 90 days after it's presented to Congress, unless
Congress votes to block it. That vote could be vetoed, so
Congress would need a two-thirds majority to block or amend an
agreement under this new legislation.
Congress is also being asked to vote before seeing any
agreement. We've been talking about an agreement with India as
if there were actually an agreement. There is no agreement.
Congress is being asked to vote before it knows what it's
voting on.
There is no rush. I recommend that Congress wait until it
sees the actual agreement before it takes any action. If it
does that, Congress will retain its oversight authority and
will encourage the administration to negotiate an agreement
that protects our strategic interests.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Milhollin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Gary Milhollin, Director, Wisconsin Project
on Nuclear Arms Control, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I would like to thank
you for inviting me to testify today on the administration's plan for
nuclear cooperation with India, and particularly on the plan's
strategic impact.
The committee is right to emphasize the strategic nature of the
plan. The legislation to implement it goes to the heart of our national
security. The bill now before Congress would change our export control
laws--laws that have been in effect for almost thirty years, and that
were adopted in response to India's nuclear test in 1974. It is worth
remembering that India achieved that test by diverting plutonium made
with a peaceful U.S. nuclear export, which is why India had to call the
test a ``peaceful nuclear explosion.''
The broad question before us is this: Why, after 9/11, when we
should be doing all we can to fight terrorism, and when we talk almost
every day about states or terrorists getting their hands on an atomic
bomb, should we weaken the controls on the export of nuclear material?
Is this the right time to do that? And if we do it, will it make us
safer?
These are the questions that Congress should ask. So far, the
debate has emphasized diplomacy and trade. The most important
questions, however, are strategic. The answers, I'm afraid, are that
the legislation will not make us safer. Instead, it will put us more at
risk.
Why? Because it is impossible to weaken export controls for India
without weakening them for everyone else. The ``everyone else''
includes Iran, Pakistan, and even terrorist groups--working through a
national government or not--who might want to buy the means to make
mass destruction weapons. And if we do weaken export controls for
everyone, which is bound to happen if we weaken them for India, we may
hasten the day when a nuclear explosion destroys an American city.
The great flaw in the administration's proposal is that it
considers India an isolated case. This is simply impossible. To do so
contradicts the fundamental principle upon which export controls are
based. The controls today are administered through international
regimes. The regimes include the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the
Missile Technology Control Regime. The first tries to stop the spread
of nuclear arms, the second the missiles to deliver them.
A cardinal principle of both regimes is that they are ``country
neutral.'' That is, they do not make exceptions for specific countries.
The MTCR uses objective criteria to target ``projects of concern'' for
missile proliferation. The NSG requires all non-nuclear weapon states
that import items designed or prepared for nuclear use to accept
comprehensive inspections. Under such inspections, all critical nuclear
material must be accounted for, regardless of the country. In this way,
the regimes have avoided making politically motivated decisions.
There is good reason for this practice. If the United States
decides to drop controls to help one of its friends--in this case
India--other supplier countries will do the same for their friends.
China will drop controls on its friend Pakistan, and Russia will drop
controls on its friend Iran. There will be no way to convince either
China or Russia not to do that. They will say that what is good for
your friend is good for mine. If you want to develop your market in
India, I want just as much to develop my market in Pakistan or Iran. No
country will give up a market unless other countries do the same. That
is the way international regimes work.
The regimes also rely on coordination, and on consensus. The United
States acted unilaterally when it made its deal with India. There was
no reported notification or coordination with the NSG or MTCR before
the deal was concluded. By violating the consensus norm of these
regimes, the United States has invited other members to act the same
way. If they do, they may make unilateral deals with Iran or Pakistan
without informing the United States. This risk has been created by our
own action, and certainly does not make us safer.
The regimes also require enforcement. The member countries are
required to investigate and shut down unauthorized exports by their own
companies. Since the attacks on 9/11, we have been asking the other
countries to do more of this. But can we really ask them to crack down
on companies that are exporting the same kind of goods to Pakistan or
Iran that we are exporting to India? The same kind of technology will
be going to the same kind of projects. What sense will there be in
trying to interdict the one and not the other? Even if we can convince
the other supplier countries to give lip service to an exception for
India, it is unrealistic to expect them to follow through with
enforcement against their own companies.
Once we start tinkering with the regimes, they could unravel
quickly. As one expert in the Pentagon told me, they are like a spring-
loaded box. If you raise the lid, you may never get it closed again.
What he meant was that the United States has always set the standard
for export controls, and other countries have often taken a long time
to follow the U.S. lead in strengthening them. But if the United States
decides to loosen controls, it will take only an instant for other
countries to follow. The lid will fly off, and we may never be able to
get it back on.
I would also like to add a personal note to this point. I have just
returned from trips to Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, where I
helped provide training and information to assist these countries in
improving their export controls. I hope to go to Turkey next. These are
all Muslim countries in which the U.S. government is trying to improve
export control performance. The export control officials in these
countries are now the front-line troops in the fight against terrorism.
They must do their jobs well in order to keep terrorists from getting
their hands on dangerous technology.
In Jordan, one of the first questions I was asked was: ``What about
India? Why has the United States decided to export to India?'' There is
no way I, or any other American, can answer that question in a credible
way in a Muslim country. India, Pakistan and Iran all decided to
develop nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful nuclear
cooperation. From this standpoint, they are indistinguishable. Why
punish Pakistan and Iran but not India? They are all guilty. There is
no persuasive reason for treating them differently. India is no
different today than it was in 1998, when it tested a nuclear weapon.
So, the second question, hiding behind the first, is ``what is the
ground for the discrimination?'' None of us wants to think of the word
religion, but it is a word that is in the mind of Muslim countries. If
the United States is only against proliferation by countries it does
not like, which now appears to be the case after the deal with India,
why does it like some countries but not others?
Congress should look deeply into these questions before approving
the legislation. So far, it does not appear that anyone has done so,
including the administration. The administration's plan was arrived at
hastily, with no consultation with other regime members, and virtually
none with Congress. If the press is to be believed, there was even
little consultation with arms control experts within the administration
itself. The proponents of the deal have presented it as if it were
simply a matter of trade and diplomacy. Congress should insist upon a
full review of the strategic impact.
If one looks at the strategic side, it is hard to see why we should
be helping India. Only three countries have refused to sign the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty: India, Israel and Pakistan. Of the three,
India is the least important strategically.
Under any calculation of America's strategic relations, Pakistan
ranks higher than India. Pakistan is essential to our ongoing military
and political efforts in Afghanistan. Pakistan is also essential to our
campaign against al-Qaeda. Without the aid of General Musharraf, we
would have a much harder time accomplishing our goals in either of
these endeavors. Pakistan is also a leading power in the Muslim world,
a world with which the United States needs better relations. Yet, our
deal with India is a blow to General Musharraf's prestige at best, and
at worst a public humiliation. We should not give General Musharraf
more trouble than he already has.
Israel, of course, has always been a close U.S. ally, and will
continue to be. Israel would like to have U.S. nuclear cooperation. In
addition, Israel is located in a part of the world that is of the
highest importance to U.S. foreign policy interests.
In any competition for strategic favor from the United States,
India finishes a distant third.
Is India nevertheless important because it will become a
counterweight to China? Proponents of the deal so argue. But the notion
that India might assist the United States diplomatically or militarily
in some future conflict is pure speculation. India's long history as
the leader of the ``non-aligned'' movement points in the opposite
direction. India will follow its own interests as it always has. An
example is India's decision to train Iranian sailors and import Iranian
gas. In addition, India shares a border with China, is keen to have
good relations with China, and does have good relations with China. It
will not sour such relations simply from a vague desire to please the
United States.
This India-as-counterweight-to-China theory reminds one of the
argument made by the first Bush administration in the 1980s, when it
contended that the United States should export sensitive dual-use
equipment to Saddam Hussein in order to build up Iraq as a
counterweight to Iran. U.S. pilots were later killed in Iraq trying to
bomb things that U.S. companies had provided. History shows that such
predictions can be dangerous.
Then why choose India for preferential treatment? If it is not
because of our need to fight terrorism, and not because of our desire
to reward a faithful ally, what is it? There seems to be only one
answer: India is the biggest market. Secretary of State Rice readily
admits the commercial interest. On April 5 she testified to this
committee that the agreement with India was ``crafted with the private
sector firmly in mind.'' She cited a 13 billion dollar deal by Boeing;
she cited the hope of reactor sales by our nuclear industry; she cited
the opportunity for ``U.S. companies to enter the lucrative and growing
Indian market.''
She might also have mentioned India's defense market. That market
seems to be the one that is really motivating the deal. India is
shopping for billions of dollars worth of military aircraft, and the
administration is hoping it will buy both the F-16 and the F-18.
According to the American press, officials in the defense industry and
the Pentagon are saying that the main effect of the nuclear deal will
be to remove India from the ranks of violators of international norms.
And once this change in India's status occurs, there will be no
impediment to arms exports. The Russian press is even more explicit. It
complains that in addition to ``recognition of India's nuclear status
by the United States,'' the nuclear deal ``opened the door to the
Indian market for American arms merchants,'' with the result that
Russia may be squeezed out.
Boiled down to the essentials, the message is clear: Export
controls are less important to the United States than money. They are a
messy hindrance, ready to be swept aside for trade. But, a decision to
put money above export controls is precisely what we don't want China
and Russia to do when they sell to Iran. We don't want China and Russia
to tell us that money in their pockets is more important than stopping
Iran's march toward the bomb. But China and Russia are now hearing the
new commercial message coming from America, and they are not stupid. If
they see that we are willing to put money above security, and willing
to take the risk that dangerous exports won't come back to bite us,
they will do the same. Everyone's security will diminish as a result.
Thus, this legislation has clear costs to our security. Are these
outweighed by the benefits? What are the benefits?
The principal benefit cited by the administration is that India
will place 14 of its 22 power reactors under inspection. But, as others
have pointed out, this leaves a great number of reactors off-limits. In
fact, the reactors that are off-limits will be sufficient to produce
enough plutonium for dozens of nuclear weapons per year. This is more
than India will ever need. India is not restricting its nuclear weapon
production in any way. Therefore, there is no ``non-proliferation
benefit'' from such a step.
In effect, India's offer is like that of a counterfeiter with a 22
room house, who offers to let the police look into 14 rooms as long as
they stay out of all the others. Why would any policeman in his right
mind accept such an offer, or want to inspect one of the 14 rooms? It
would be the only place where he was sure not to find anything. It
would waste his time, just as it will waste the time of international
inspectors to look at India's 14 declared reactors. Everyone knows that
it will be the eight undeclared ones that make the bombs. India, in
fact, appears to have calculated the number of reactors to put off-
limits according to how much plutonium they will make. India has
assured itself that the resulting amount of plutonium will be enough to
allow it to continue making bombs at an unfettered pace.
This point about wasting inspection time may seem minor, but it
isn't. The International Atomic Energy Agency has a limited number of
inspectors. They are already having trouble meeting their
responsibilities. To send them to India on a fool's errand will mean
that they won't be going to places like Iran, where something may
really be amiss. Unless the Agency's budget is increased to meet the
new burden in India, the inspection of India's declared reactors will
produce a net loss for the world's non-proliferation effort.
The other major benefit that the administration cites is that India
may buy American reactors. Such a possibility exists, but is remote.
The precedent is our experience with China. Some members of the
committee may remember the intense debate in Congress over the U.S.
nuclear cooperation agreement with China in the 1980's. At the time,
our industry was citing the large number of reactors that China was
planning to buy, and predicting that many of the orders would come to
us. How many American reactors did China actually buy? The answer is:
none. Exactly zero. The main effect of China's agreement with us was to
increase the number of vendors who were in competition. The result was
to drive the price down for the Chinese reactor buyers. That was good
for China, but did nothing for us. The Chinese import orders went to
France, Russia and Canada.
We are not likely to fare any better this time. New Delhi is
already building a string of reactors on its own that are less
expensive to put up than ours. And if India wants to import reactors,
it can turn to the Russians, who will charge less money and attach
fewer conditions, and who are already ahead of us in the Indian market.
It can also turn to the French or even perhaps the Canadians. All of
these countries will compete with us if we sell to India. The chance
that we will defeat this competition is slim.
The administration also argues that India has a great need for
nuclear power to meet its electricity demand. This too is far-fetched.
India has been generating electricity with nuclear reactors for more
than 40 years. Yet, reactors supply only about 2 percent to 3 percent
of its electricity today. If reactors are so vital to India's energy
needs, why hasn't India built more? The answer is that reactors have
not turned out to be as safe, or as clean, or--most important--as
economical as originally thought. Nuclear power has been virtually
insignificant in India's energy mix in the past, and will be no more
important in the future. It is worth noting that the United States
hasn't ordered a new reactor for about thirty years. Why do we expect
India to buy American reactors when even we aren't buying them?
I would also like to comment on the effect that the
administration's new policy will have on missile proliferation.
President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed to
cooperate in ``space exploration,'' including ``satellite navigation
and launch.'' This language is broad enough to allow missile-useable
components and technology to be exported. The United States seem
entirely ready to permit such sales. The U.S. Commerce Department
recently dropped restraints on American exports of missile-related
equipment to three subsidiaries of the Indian Space Research
Organization, despite the fact that all three are active in Indian
missile development. This appears to be only a first step in a general
loosening of U.S. missile export controls for India.
It is difficult to predict where this will lead. One cannot help a
country like India build better space launchers without helping it
build better missiles. Our experience with China is again the
precedent. In the 1990's China got crucial American help in rocket
design, guidance, launch operation, and payload integration, all of
which were directly useable in making intercontinental ballistic
missiles. The help came from American companies that were supposed to
be engaged only in a peaceful space effort.
India will be no different. India, in fact, is the first country to
develop a long-range nuclear missile from a civilian space-launch
program. India's Agni missile, tested in 1989, was built by using the
design of the American ``Scout'' space rocket. India imported the
blueprints from NASA under the cover of peaceful space cooperation.
India has every intention of building nuclear missiles that will
reach the United States. For some years, India has been working to
develop a nuclear submarine, which will be able to threaten every
coastal city in the world with a nuclear payload. India has also been
working on an intercontinental ballistic missile, known as the Surya,
which will fly much farther than any target in China. Two questions
come to mind. Why should India want to reach such targets? And does the
United States really want to make it easier for India to succeed?
The final point I would like to make has to do with the power of
Congress. That power will be greatly reduced if the administration's
legislation passes.
The important question to ask about the power of Congress is this:
Why is this bill necessary? What is wrong with present U.S. law?
Under the present Atomic Energy Act, the president could make an
agreement tomorrow for nuclear cooperation with India. All the
president has to do is submit to Congress what is known as an
``exempt'' agreement--that is, an agreement that does not satisfy the
Act's present criteria for nuclear cooperation.
India does not satisfy the criteria because it has refused to put
all of its nuclear material under international inspection and is, in
fact, running a secret nuclear weapon program. That is why the
president must ``exempt'' the agreement before submitting it to
Congress. After such a submission, Congress must adopt a joint
resolution saying that it favors the agreement. If Congress disagrees,
or does not act, the agreement does not go into effect.
The president must meet a high standard to justify the exemption.
He must find that holding India to the present criteria ``would be
seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-
proliferation objectives'' or that it would ``otherwise jeopardize the
common defense and security.'' He must also persuade Congress that he
is right, because Congress must take action for the agreement to
operate.
Why hasn't the president taken this course of action? Apparently,
because he cannot meet the standard. He cannot find that it ``would be
seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-
proliferation objectives'' to make India meet the existing criteria. To
the contrary, it would advance U.S. non-proliferation objectives if
India met the criteria, because India would be giving up its bomb
program and putting its fissile material under international
inspection. That would be a clear gain for non-proliferation instead of
a loss.
Because the administration cannot meet the present standard, the
administration has asked Congress to lower it. India would only have to
meet a list of weaker criteria that the administration is already
confident India can comply with.
But the administration has not been content to stop there. It also
wants to shift the burden of proof. Under the new legislation, the
burden of proof would shift to Congress. Instead of having to convince
Congress to act after submitting an ``exempt'' agreement, the agreement
would take effect automatically after 90 days unless Congress voted
affirmatively to block it. Any such vote could be vetoed, so Congress
would have to muster a 2/3 majority in both houses in order to have its
view prevail. That is in direct contradiction to present law, under
which an exempted agreement would have to be affirmatively agreed to by
a joint resolution.
Thus, the effect of the bill is twofold: it makes it easier for the
president to exempt an agreement, and it makes it harder for Congress
to prevent an exempted agreement from taking effect. If Congress wishes
to preserve its existing power, it could require that an exempted
agreement still be reviewed under the present process. The
administration has not advanced any persuasive reason why the process
of Congressional review should be changed.
Preserving the existing process would have several advantages.
Congress would have more than 90 days to study the agreement; Congress
would not have to muster a veto-proof majority to block the agreement,
or attach conditions to it; and Congress would be able to see the
actual agreement before taking a vote.
Under the new legislation, Congress is being asked to lower the
standards for nuclear cooperation and to shift the burden of proof
before any agreement with India has been reached. Congress is being
asked to vote without knowing what kind of inspections India will
eventually agree to, without knowing whether India will really improve
its own export controls, and without knowing whether India's plan for
separating its civilian from its military nuclear facilities is
``credible,'' as the new criteria require. Congress would be buying a
pig in a poke. It would be giving the administration carte blanche
authority to make an agreement that, because of Congress' reduced power
of review, there would be little opportunity to change.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Milhollin.
Now, the Chair needs to make a tactical decision; namely,
to vote and to come back. And I apologize for the delay, but
I'm going to recess the hearing for 10 minutes, and then we
will be able to do justice to Dr. Cohen, so he may give his
full testimony, then have a short question period.
I apologize, but this is the nature of our business today.
And the committee is recessed for 10 minutes.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The committee is called to order.
And we'll call now on Dr. Stephen Cohen for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN P. COHEN, SENIOR FELLOW, THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm honored to again
appear before you and the committee. As I have written
testimony, I'll just summarize that so we can get to Q&A.
I did want to mention to Senator Hagel that Brookings is
going to start a bottoms-up examination of nonproliferation
policy. Mike O'Hanlon and I are going to write it, and we're
going to look at these issues, and certainly the vital
distinction between Non-Proliferation Treaty and the
nonproliferation regime. I support this agreement. In a sense,
it builds a spare room onto the NPT house. Since 1990, I've
argued for a halfway house which would accommodate India, and
perhaps other states that met certain criteria. This agreement
does that, although it is not perfect. I certainly see some
minor problems, but I think that, in the long run, it is the
agreement that we should go with.
I was asked by committee staff to talk about history.
Perhaps unique among the panelists, I've been in touch with
this issue and in contact with the Indian debate on nuclear
weapons since 1963, when I first went to India as a graduate
student. And I've lived in India for a total of 6 years, almost
every decade since then, coincidentally during some of the
years when the Indians were in the midst of a major debate
about nuclear strategy and nuclear policy.
I won't go into the details of that debate, but I drew two
conclusions from essentially 45 years of watching the Indians
talk about nuclear weapons.
One is that, in most cases India was responding to nuclear
developments elsewhere. It was sharply divided as to the
utility and morality of nuclear weapons. And until the 1998
tests, India's policy was one of maintaining an option or a
recessed--that is, unannounced--deterrent. I think that could
have been extended, had we not pushed them to sign the CTBT and
the NPT, as a nonnuclear weapons state. In my judgment, the
public policy of urging them to cap, reduce, and eliminate
their nuclear program was an incentive for them to go ahead and
test, to make it an irreversible decision. That's history, and
we don't want to debate that now.
As opponents of this agreement have noted, India simply
lied or diplomatically misled others about its small weapons
program, which was buried within a larger civilian nuclear
energy program, and certainly it violated the spirit of
agreements reached with foreign governments concerning the
peaceful use of their nuclear assistance. For that, India has
been subject to 30 years of sanctions.
Second, in all of these debates among and within--in
among--in India and between Indian groups, military and civil
and others, purely military calculations have been notably
absent. The Indian nuclear program was nurtured by a small
enclave of scientists and bureaucrats, who were largely
responsive, not proactive, in their thinking. As George Tanham
wrote a number of years ago, Indian strategic thought is
characterized by its lack of interest in military things. There
was, and remains, a curious blend of extravagant idealism--
epitomized in the many plans for global nuclear disarmament
generated in India over the years--and Kautilyan-Machiavellian
realism epitomized by the secrecy surrounding the covert
weapons program.
It is my judgment that this initiative need not trigger an
arms race with Pakistan, nor one between India and China. And
it's certainly not a green light to India to built a thousand
or more nuclear weapons. It does provide the United States with
an opportunity to work with India to help prevent a broader
nuclear arms race, something that is certainly not in the
interest of India, Pakistan, China, or America.
Therefore, I would propose the following steps:
First, the agreement with India should be folded into
legislation or policy that would develop criteria that would
allow other states to enter into such a nuclear halfway house.
And that halfway house, as I've written since 1990, would
require a state to fulfill the obligations of a signatory of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, even if it had tested a
nuclear weapon or had possessed a nuclear weapon after the 1968
cutoff date. This halfway house would provide civilian nuclear
assistance and perhaps strategic relationship in exchange for
an impeccable horizontal nonproliferation record. Right now,
India seems to meet most reasonable tests of what this record
should look like, as does Israel; but Pakistan and North Korea
do not.
Second, the administration should undertake an initiative
that would constrain vertical proliferation via a nuclear
restraint regime in Asia. This initiative would include India,
Pakistan, and China. Such a regime need not involve formal
negotiated limits, which would be very difficult to achieve,
but certainly could be based on a fissile-material cutoff,
continued restraint on testing, and limited deployment of
nuclear weapons--the first two feature in the Indo-U.S. Nuclear
Initiative, but they need to be made multilateral, especially
to ward off an arms race between Pakistan and India, or India
and China.
Of course, China's decision on renewing testing will be
shaped by its response to the United States. And I believe that
we can continue our own ban on tests indefinitely without
damaging our nuclear preparedness.
Third, with this agreement in place, New Delhi should feel
less paranoid about discussing its own nuclear capabilities and
their interaction with those of other states. As long as India
felt that the United States was trying to strip it of its
nuclear weapons program, Indian officials talked on and on
about global nuclear disarmament, but they refused to discuss
concrete steps that would enhance India's security through
cooperative agreements with others.
For example, under the auspices of the new Indo-U.S.
Agreement on Science and Technology, the United States should
work with India in setting up a center to study best practices
gleaned from the American, Russian/Soviet, and the experience
of others regarding nuclear and missile technology.
We should also expect that India will eventually join the
process of nuclear arms reduction that began with United States
and Russian nuclear cuts, and, as other panelists have said,
subscribe to the Wassenaar and Australia Group arrangements.
We ourselves do not want to continue down the process of
nuclear arms reduction, only to see some of the new nuclear
weapons states, such as India and Pakistan, pass us on the way
up.
To summarize, while supporting the agreement, I believe
that it should be treated as an initial step in the process of
crafting a diplomacy that addresses wider arms control and
security concerns, not just meeting India's energy needs.
The agreement does much to repair the torn United States-
Indian strategic relationship. It is important in reshaping and
revitalizing India's massive energy shortfall, and it has
already been helpful in our attempt to constrain an Iranian
program. But this administration, and its successor, with
congressional assistance, should regard it as a beginning, not
an end, as far as our nonproliferation and strategic interests
are concerned.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cohen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen P. Cohen, Senior Fellow, The
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to share my knowledge of South Asian security,
nonproliferation and arms control issues as you grapple with this
important initiative. On balance, the initiative should be welcomed. I
have argued in print for a nonproliferation halfway house since 1990--
an admittedly imperfect response to an imperfect situation, but far
better than the status quo. By minor modifications in the proposed
legislation and changes in American policy the nuclear cooperation
agreement could be still further improved.
I am a signatory of a March 10 letter backing the initiative. That
letter argues that the agreement enhances American strategic interests,
and if properly implemented, it will advance, not retard, American
nonproliferation objectives. We also argue that the initiative will
help India move to an energy strategy that makes it less dependant on
imported oil and that it will positively address our global
environmental concerns.
I was resident in India during many of the major Indian debates
over its nuclear weapons policy. In 1964-65 it debated its response to
the Chinese nuclear test at Lop Nor; in 1967-68 it debated whether or
not to sign the NPT, and in 1974, after its phony ``peaceful nuclear
explosion,'' India debated whether to weaponize. In the late 1980s
there was a major debate over the proper response to evidence of a
Chinese-assisted Pakistani nuclear weapons program. The Rajiv Gandhi
``Action Plan'' of 1988 was in part a last-minute attempt to forestall
a response-in-kind to Pakistan's program; in the early 1990s Indians
grappled with the highly publicized American effort to cap, roll back,
and eliminate its nuclear weapons program and that of Pakistan. More
recently, I spent a month in New Delhi observing the Indian debate over
the Bush-Manmohan Singh initiative.
There are two major conclusions to draw from this 40-year history:
First, in most of these cases India was responding to nuclear
developments elsewhere. It's strategic elite was sharply divide as to
the utility and morality of nuclear weapons, and until the 1998 tests
India's policy was one of maintaining an ``option'' or a ``recessed''
(i.e. unannounced) deterrent. As opponents of this agreement have
noted, India simply hid its small weapons program and it certainly
violated the spirit and the letter of agreements reached with foreign
governments concerning the peaceful use of nuclear assistance. For that
India has been subjected to 30 years of sanctions.
Second, in all of these debates the military, and purely military
calculations, have been notably absent. The Indian nuclear program was
nurtured by a small enclave of scientists and bureaucrats who were
largely responsive, not pro-active in their thinking. As George Tanham
wrote, Indian strategic thought is characterized by its lack of
interest in military things. There was (and remains) a curious blend of
extravagant idealism (epitomized in the many plans for global nuclear
disarmament generated in India over the years) and Kautilyan-
Machiavellian realism (epitomized by the secrecy that shrouded the
covert weapons program).
It is my judgment that this initiative need not trigger an arms
race with Pakistan, and it is certainly not a green light to India to
build a thousand or more nuclear weapons. It does provide the United
States with an opportunity to work with India to help prevent a broader
nuclear arms race, something that is certainly not in the interest of
India, Pakistan, China, or America.
Therefore, I would propose the following steps:
First, The agreement with India should eventually be folded into
legislation that would develop criteria that would allow other states
to enter such a nuclear halfway house. This halfway house would provide
civilian nuclear assistance in exchange for impeccable horizontal
nonproliferation record. Right now India seems to meet most reasonable
tests, as does Israel, but Pakistan and North Korea would not.
Second, the administration should undertake an initiative that
would constrain vertical proliferation via a nuclear restraint regime
in Asia, this initiative would include India, Pakistan, and China. Such
a regime need not involve formal, negotiated limits, which would be
very difficult to achieve, but certainly could be based upon a fissile
material cutoff, continued restraint on testing, and limited deployment
of weapons. The first two feature in the United States-India nuclear
initiative, but they need to be made multilateral, especially to ward
off an arms race between Pakistan and India. Of course, China's
decision on renewing testing will be shaped by its response to the
United States, and I believe that we can continue our own ban on tests
indefinitely without damaging nuclear preparedness.
Third, with this agreement in place, New Delhi should feel less
paranoid about discussing its own nuclear capabilities and their
interaction with those of other states. As long as India felt that the
United States was trying to strip it of its weapons program, Indian
officials talked on endlessly about global nuclear disarmament, but
they refused to discuss concrete steps that would enhance India's
security through cooperative agreements with others. Indeed, the
Indians are still reluctant to allow their country to be the venue for
such discussions by nongovernment organizations, unless they are
strictly scripted. Under the auspices of the new Indo-U.S. Agreement on
Science and Technology the United States should assist India in setting
up a center to study ``best practices'' gleaned from the American and
Russian/Soviet nuclear and missile experience, and the experience of
other states. We should also expect that India will eventually join the
process of nuclear arms reduction that began with United States and
Russian nuclear cuts; I am disappointed that such a long-term goal was
not even mentioned in the various United States-Indian communiques, we
do not want to continue down the road of arms reduction only to see
some of the new nuclear weapons states such as India and Pakistan pass
us on their way up.
To summarize, while supporting the agreement I believe that it
should be the initial step in a process of crafting a diplomacy that
addresses wider complex arms control and security concerns, not just
meeting India's energy needs. America has such concerns in an area that
stretches from Israel to China; this includes at least five states that
have nuclear weapons and two that may be trying to acquire them. This
agreement does much to repair the torn United States-Indian strategic
tie, it is important in reshaping and revitalizing India's massive
energy shortfall, and it has already been helpful in our attempt to
constrain an Iranian program, but this administration and its
successor--with congressional assistance--should regard it as a
beginning, not an end as far as our nonproliferation and strategic
interests are concerned.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Cohen.
Let me just indicate that some of you have discussed other
steps that need to be taken, and the sequence of doing this
differs. But what assurance do we have, Dr. Einhorn, that if
India, China, and Pakistan were to attempt to find agreement
that they would not test further, or they would not produce any
further fissile material, that all three would agree to that?
Is it not equally probable that each of the three, on the basis
of its defense situation, maybe against the other two, quite
apart from the rest of the world, would want to have the
option, in terms of national sovereignty, of remaining out of
the picture? In other words, if we're to try to get this
agreement before we satisfy our India-United States situation,
might that not be a long time coming, or might it ever come?
And, in the meanwhile, some have testified that we may not
fracture the relationship with India, but we'd certainly set it
back. We would not be able to get to the status quo ante. How
do you respond to these sequencing situations?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a critical line
of discussion. The only way we're going to know--find the
answer to your question is to test it out diplomatically, to
pursue this, make this an important objective of U.S.
diplomacy.
China, we believe, stopped producing fissile material some
time ago. It hasn't made a commitment that it'll never resume
production, but we believe they are not producing. And they're
not testing. Nobody is testing today.
Pakistan has proposed, to India, a bilateral strategic
restraint regime, one element of which may be a ban on further
production of fissile material. I think their proposal is too
broad. I don't think it's realistic, as a bilateral measure.
But I think one can imagine, if India is genuinely prepared to
say, ``Enough is enough,'' and China is also prepared to say,
``Enough is enough,'' in terms of fissile-material production,
I think it's reasonable to assume that Pakistan would go along.
But I think it would be critical, whether you're talking about
a moratorium on nuclear testing or a suspension of fissile-
material production, that all three of these governments go
along.
I think it's very possible that if the United States were
really serious about pushing this, it could be achieved, and it
could be achieved in a reasonably short period of time.
The Chairman. Well, now, to what extent is there an
interlocking problem with the Six-Party negotiations in dealing
with North Korea now? For example, some have suggested that if
the six are not successful in reaching an agreement--namely,
the North Koreans continue to pursue a program--that perhaps
others, out of self-defense in the area--Japan is often
mentioned; South Korea has been mentioned here today--may want
to develop programs, in their own defense. Well, we've been at
these talks for quite a while. And the President's had, I
gather, brief conversations with President Hu Jintao, when he
was here. Many people characterize the Chinese as not
complacent about the status quo, but, on the other hand, not
totally uncomfortable about that situation. But it could be
that while everybody is not very uncomfortable, that North
Koreans continue to proceed, at which point then it's not just
the problem of signing up India and Pakistan and China, but a
much broader breakout of the whole situation.
I raise this not to deter the thought that North Korea
should stop; that, in essence, China might be more helpful. A
lot of people might be more helpful. But, let's say China
itself misgauges this, and Japan starts a program. The South
Koreans, and perhaps the Chinese, have been quiescent, but they
might not remain that way. I get back to the point: Is there
enough value, in terms of the relationship situation with
India, that has been mentioned before, including the commercial
side, that that should not be denigrated? This is a very large
agreement, the nuclear being, by far, the most interesting
aspect that has generated excitement. But is there enough value
in it, in terms of a relationship, leaving aside the
nonproliferation situations, to, if we are to err, err on the
side of moving toward the acceptance?
Mr. Einhorn. Well----
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. Einhorn. OK. I think there is value in the strategic
relationship. And nobody has disputed that, in either panel.
The question is: What is India prepared to do? You know, India
has achieved all of its objectives in this negotiation. It
can--you know, with this deal, it can buy uranium and nuclear
reactors on the world market, it's gained acceptance as a
nuclear weapons state in all consequential respects, and it's
got freedom of action to produce more plutonium for weapons.
We've had to compromise quite a bit--the United States has
had to compromise its principles quite a bit in order to get
this deal. I think we are entitled to ask India to compromise a
bit, too.
Now, if it really means it when it said it's prepared to
work with the United States to work out a treaty to stop
producing fissile material for nuclear weapons, we should hold
them to that, and we should ask them to accept the same kinds
of restraints that the original five nuclear powers have
accepted.
On the question of North Korea, we could still pursue a
moratorium involving China, Pakistan, India, and the others--
United States, United Kingdom, France, and Russia--without
reference to North Korea. It need not be a moratorium that
would hold for all time. I mean, obviously, China would be
concerned if Japan reacted to the North Korean situation by
requiring a nuclear deterrent of its own. And that might affect
Chinese strategic calculations. But, for the time being, I
think you can separate out the North Korean problem from what
you see in southern Asia. And I think you can pursue, and we
should pursue, restraints, both in nuclear testing and fissile-
material production.
The Chairman. Dr. Milhollin, why would Dr. ElBaradei, in
the IAEA, be supportive of this arrangement? You know,
essentially, they are, apparently. But is this a surprise to
you, or does it make any difference, one way or another?
Dr. Milhollin. Well, I think to evaluate his position you
have to look at the posture of his agency. If somebody in the
world offers to put additional reactors under inspection, he's
not going to stand up and say, ``No, I don't want to inspect
those reactors unless you let me inspect all of your
reactors.'' That's not part of his mandate. His agency is there
to serve, when asked to serve. And so, in this case they're
being asked to inspect additional reactors. Now, that's really
the only role that he properly has.
I must say that it's not really an appropriate question to
ask his agency--that is, whether, from a political, diplomatic,
strategic perspective, he approves or disapproves of this
arrangement. It's not really part of his portfolio. His
portfolio is to do inspections for reactors that countries
agree to put under inspection. And I think if you just look at
it that way, his answer has to be, ``Yes,'' that--``Yes, of
course, we'll inspect them.''
The Chairman. Leaving aside his vocational interest in
inspecting, what about, say, countries, like France or Germany
or England? Why would they be in favor of this new arrangement
with the United States and India?
Dr. Milhollin. Well, you have to look at it after the
United States has made its declaration. That is, if the United
States declares, ``Yes, we're going to trade with India. We're
going to get into the reactor market,'' it's pretty hard to
imagine that the French or the Russians are going to say,
``Well, gee, we're not interested.'' We've always been the
king, in terms of nonproliferation, in the world. We've set the
standard. And so, nobody's going to be more royalist than us.
Once we decide that we're going to trade with somebody,
everybody else has to jump in. They have industries. They don't
want to lose markets. It's just a natural aspect of capitalism.
The Chairman. Well, it sounds like a rather anarchic
situation--
[Laughter.]
The Chairman [continuing]. Almost a growth industry created
by people wanting to furnish all this.
Dr. Milhollin. So far, there's been restraint, because
there has been an international agreement to restrain. But once
somebody breaks that agreement, then it's a free-for-all, as
you very correctly point out.
The Chairman. Secretary Lehman, even if all these countries
suddenly want to supply India, India apparently has taken the
position that they don't want to sign an absolute restraint of
their activities. On the other hand, as many have pointed out,
they have had reasonably good behavior in the regime for
several years, and there would not appear to be particularly
good reasons why they would want to accelerate their
activities. But let's say that there was an inclination of a
few people in India--after all, this is a controversial issue
in India, not just with parliamentarians, but with people who
are nuclear experts and maybe have a vested interest in this--
if we have this new relationship with India--and maybe it's
been overstated, but, nevertheless, the United States and India
really have a rapport now, which is considerable, on many
fronts--is there not greater possibility that we will have some
influence--by that, I mean the United States, quite apart from
the nonproliferation regime--in terms of plans about India? Or
do you feel that, essentially, as has been suggested, India got
all that it wanted from this situation, sort of, freestyle from
here on, and they're delighted that we're moving along with
them, that there's not really a sense here of cooperation or
restraint?
Dr. Lehman. Mr. Chairman, let me consider several cases.
The case in which we--the administration had not negotiated
this new approach that involves civil nuclear cooperation, many
of the strategic partnership elements would probably have
proceeded anyway. Much of the business would be unconstrained.
Some of the strategic interests are so common and so clear that
those would have proceeded.
On the other hand, the negotiation has taken place. There
is an agreement to proceed on a certain path. If this breaks
down, I think we will have a period in which things that would
have receded anyway will be delayed, disrupted, distorted in
the near term, but, in the long run, eventually they'll start
to reemerge.
But that's--neither of those is the case. Where we are now
is that there is an agreement. And the question, then, is: How
do we shape that and optimize it, and, as I've said, and
include nonproliferation as a central element of that goal?
I think that civil nuclear cooperation is important,
because it permits us, then, to have a much closer relationship
in dealing with the implementation details that are very
important.
So, for example, let's take one that's very important to
everybody at this table and the previous panel, the fissile-
material cutoff. India has long said it favors it. It's one of
the godfathers of the program. It's been in practically every
one of their public declarations for many, many years. They
even cosponsored a U.N. resolution with the previous
administration in support of it. Why doesn't it happen? Well,
the answer is that the domestic politics and the regional
situation involving India have really not given--not created
the conditions where they were really prepared to go ahead. I
think now if we engage with them on this, we have an
opportunity to shape those conditions.
Now, I have to tell you that it is wonderful that India is
this great democracy that everybody is talking about, but it
does have its downsides. And one of the downsides is that
partisan politics gets awfully nasty. And often, positions are
defined by parties as, ``Whatever my opponent is for, I must
have to be against.'' That being the case, we have to be a bit
sophisticated in how we proceed. It's--I don't want to quite
say that if the United States says India ought to do something,
that India will automatically do the opposite, but I think you
have to take into account the domestic politics and how we move
ahead.
But Indians have said, for many years, they support an
FMCT. Many Indians have said they've got enough. China says
it's got enough. Do the Pakistanis have enough? Maybe now is
the time.
The Chairman. Well, gentlemen, I thank you very, very much.
Sadly, another vote has intruded. This one is a 10-minute
vote, and we're halfway into it. But you have been very
patient, and given us well over 3 hours of remarkable service.
And I thank you for your testimony and your preparation for
this and your responses. And we look forward to staying closely
in touch with all of you.
Thank you very much, and this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
[Note.--Senator Joseph Biden submitted 15 questions to the witnesses.
Questions 1-13 were addressed to all the witnesses, each of whom was
invited to answer only the questions he wished to answer. Question 14
was addressed only to Secretary Perry, Ambassador Gallucci, Dr. Carter,
and Dr. Einhorn. Question 15 was to Dr. Cohen. If their testimony
already answered a question, there was no need to repeat it.]
Responses of Gary Milhollin to Questions Submitted by Senator Biden
Questions 1 and 2. Are we right, or are we wrong, to seek a new
status for India with respect to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?
If we are right, then should we treat India as a nuclear weapons state
under the treaty, as a nonnuclear weapons state, or as something in
between? If the answer is something in between, then what should that
be? What standards should we set for India, and what rewards should be
provided for India's meeting those standards?
Answer. India is officially a nonnuclear weapon state under the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, which defines such a state as one
that has not ``manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.'' Thus, India's
status cannot be changed without amending the treaty. The United
States, as a member of the treaty, is obliged to recognize the
definition, and to treat India in a manner in accordance with the
treaty--that is, as a nonnuclear weapon state.
Under the administration's plan, India would be treated better than
both nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states. Nuclear weapon
states are forbidden under the treaty (article 1) to assist any
nonnuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear weapon. This is a treaty
obligation that India does not have. Also, nuclear weapon states have
stopped producing fissile material for nuclear weapons, something that
India will not be required to do and does not intend to do. Thus, India
will be treated better than any nuclear weapon state under the
administration's plan.
Nonnuclear weapon states under the treaty are required to forswear
nuclear weapons, something India has not done and does not intend to
do, and nonnuclear weapon states are obliged under the treaty to accept
``full-scope'' inspections that India does not accept and does not
intend to accept. Also, both nuclear weapon and nonnuclear weapon
states are obliged under article 3 of the treaty to restrict their
nuclear exports, an obligation that does not apply to India because
India is not a treaty member. Thus, India will also be treated better
than any nonnuclear weapon state.
It follows from the two points above that under the
administration's plan, the United States will, in nuclear matters,
treat India better than any other country in the world. This treatment
is not justified by India's promise to put a portion of its nuclear
reactors under inspection. The portion exempted from inspection will
produce more plutonium than India will ever need for nuclear weapons.
Thus, India's promise regarding inspections is illusory. Nor is the
favorable U.S. treatment of India justified by India's promise to
refrain from testing nuclear weapons. This promise is not made under
any treaty obligation; it is only voluntary and not binding. Nor is the
favorable treatment justified by India's steps to establish export
controls, which are still new in India and untested. India has
consistently tried to evade export controls when they have been applied
by other countries, including the United States.
Question 3. How great is the risk that the administration's nuclear
deal with India will indirectly help India's nuclear weapons program,
by relieving India of the need to choose between guns and butter in its
use of its domestic uranium resources; lead other countries to decide
that they, too, can develop nuclear weapons and endure the world's
reaction, because it will be only temporary; produce increased
instability in South Asia, due either to India's increased plutonium
production or to its greater capability for plutonium production, even
if it does not make use of that capability; lead other nuclear
suppliers to trade with their clients that have nuclear weapons; or
lead the rest of the world to reject nonproliferation measures that
require any economic sacrifice, because they view nonproliferation as
embodying too great a double standard?
Answer. This question is answered in my testimony, which describes
the risks to worldwide export controls and nonproliferation efforts
that the administration's plan would produce.
Question 4. How can we maximize such benefits of the nuclear deal
as increased energy for India, produced in an economically rational
manner; limiting India's increased demands in world oil and gas
markets; and India's transition from an aggrieved nonaligned state to a
stakeholder in the international system and in the world's
nonproliferation regimes?
Answer. The proposed nuclear deal will not increase India's energy
output to any significant extent. The reason is that nuclear power
supplies only about 2 percent of India's electricity, which in turn is
but a small fraction of India's overall energy consumption. Even if
India's nuclear power output could be increased by 50 percent (which
seems unlikely) such a step would only increase India's overall
electricity output by 1 percent at most, and would only increase
India's overall energy output by a fraction of 1 percent. That is not a
significant increase in the energy available to India, and thus would
not reduce India's demand for oil and gas.
India is not an aggrieved state. India decided to pursue nuclear
weapons with full knowledge of the cost such a decision would have on
its diplomatic standing. India's calculation was that nuclear weapons
would increase its prestige in the world more than it would lower it.
India has been content to live with that decision; so should we.
Question 5. There is some uncertainty as to what India will
actually do under the nuclear agreement. Should Congress hedge against
unexpected Indian behavior? For example, should we require annual
reports on how the deal is going? Should the deal end if India tests a
nuclear device, or diverts nuclear technology to its weapons program,
or violates or ends its safeguards agreements, or proliferates to
another country? Should Congress revisit the agreement every 5 years,
to see whether it is still in our national interest?
Answer. The best, and, in fact, the only way for Congress to learn
the details of what India will actually do, or promise to do, under the
proposed nuclear deal is to wait until an agreement for nuclear
cooperation is made. Once an agreement is presented for consideration,
Congress can add any conditions to the agreement that seem warranted.
Congress has never approved an agreement for cooperation without seeing
the actual agreement. There is no reason to start doing so now.
Question 6. If we go ahead with the India nuclear deal, we will
want to assure a level playing field for U.S. industry. Should we
require that any changes in Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines conform
to the nonproliferation standards that we establish for the United
States? Should we require that NSG guideline changes not enter into
effect until our peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with India
enters into effect, so that firms in other countries don't get to sell
things months before our firms do?
Answer. Other suppliers have already reacted to the
administration's plan. Russia has just sold fissile material to India's
Tarapur reactors without notifying the NSG. Russia dared to do so only
because the United States-India deal had been announced.
The problem of undercutting by other suppliers could have been
avoided if the administration had followed the procedures laid out by
existing U.S. law. Consistent with those procedures, the administration
could have informed other suppliers that the United States would take
no action until an agreement for cooperation with India had been
negotiated, until it had been approved by Congress, and until it had
been blessed by the NSG. That way, the line would be held in the NSG
until American companies were authorized to compete. By trying to short
circuit the process, the administration has made it more likely that
American companies will be outmaneuvered by foreign competition.
Neither Congress nor the administration can require unilaterally
that NSG guidelines conform to changes in U.S. nonproliferation
standards. The only way to reduce the risk of American companies being
caught short is to follow the procedures prescribed by existing law, as
stated above. This can still be done by informing the other NSG members
that no change in U.S. export control behavior will occur until an
agreement for cooperation is made with India, until Congress approves
such an agreement, and until the NSG, itself, decides to change its
guidelines to conform to the agreement. This approach has the best
chance of holding the line in the NSG until American companies are free
to sell.
Question 7. Should we require that the administration obtain any
changes in NSG guidelines through the regular process, which requires
consensus?
Answer. Yes. If the United States changes its export policy without
the consent of the NSG, there will be grave harm to worldwide export
controls. This harm would far exceed any benefit from the deal with
India. In fact, if the administration implements the India deal without
consensus in the NSG, the regime would suffer a loss in credibility
from which it probably could not recover.
Questions 8 and 9. India is willing to cap its fissile material
production in an international treaty, but not unilaterally. Many
people believe that the United States is the party that is holding up
progress on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, by refusing to accept
the existing mandate in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a
treaty with verification provisions. Should Congress require that FMCT
negotiations begin, under a Conference of Disarmament mandate, before
the President can waive the law for India?
Several witnesses suggested that a moratorium on fissile material
production for nuclear weapons purposes, either regional or also
including the five recognized nuclear weapons states, might be a
feasible objective. One witness added that in the context of the United
States-India nuclear deal, India should be more open to transparency
about its nuclear objectives and should look ahead to eventual nuclear
arms reduction. Should Congress require that the executive branch
pursue these initiatives and report regularly on its progress?
Answer. India's statement that it would be willing to cap its
fissile material production is similar to its statement, reiterated
numerous times, that it would be willing to give up nuclear weapons if
everyone else did so. India knows very well that a fissile material
cut-off treaty is not much more likely to happen than everyone giving
up nuclear weapons. Thus, its offer to cap production as part of such a
treaty should be considered as rhetorical.
If India were serious about capping its fissile material production
it could do so unilaterally, as all five nuclear weapon states under
the NPT have done. Nothing stops India from doing so tomorrow. This
would seem a reasonable step for a country that desires to be treated
as a nuclear weapon state, that considers itself to be a nuclear weapon
state, and that claims only to want enough nuclear weapons for a
minimal deterrent. India already has enough weapons for such a
deterrent against China, which has capped its fissile material
production, and against Pakistan, which would probably cap its fissile
material production if India did so. Thus, there is no reason for India
not to agree to such a cap now, unless India has nuclear ambitions that
transcend its region.
Questions 10 and 11. Should Congress limit the scope of U.S.
nuclear fuel assurances to India, so as to maintain U.S. ability to
impose effective nonproliferation sanctions or to abide by sanctions
that the U.N. Security Council might impose someday?
Has India really accepted safeguards in perpetuity, or will
``India-specific safeguards'' turn out to be something less? Should
Congress require that safeguards really be in perpetuity, e.g., that
India not be allowed to suspend safeguards if there is an interruption
in nuclear fuel supplies? Should Congress require that safeguards apply
to a reactor's fuel or spent fuel after its removal from the reactor,
and not just to the reactor itself?
Answer. These two questions concern the rights the United States
should reserve in any agreement for cooperation with India.
Fortunately, an excellent enumeration of such rights is already
contained in the Atomic Energy Act, which presents criteria for nuclear
cooperation that were carefully thought out by the experts who drafted
that law. Those criteria contain the rights, including those specific
to fuel supply and international inspections, the United States should
insist upon in any new agreement with India.
As stated above, the best way for Congress to insure that the
agreement guarantees essential U.S. rights is to withhold approval
until Congress can see the agreement that is actually negotiated. There
are numerous issues of great importance, including the ones the
questions mention, that cannot all be foreseen at this time. It is
prudent for Congress to reserve judgement until it can actually see
whether there are gaps in the actual agreement.
Question 12. India has said that it accepts the responsibilities of
a state with an advanced nuclear program. Should Congress require that
India bind itself to the responsibilities contained in article I of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, not to help other states to get
nuclear weapons?
Answer. Yes. If India is negotiating in good faith, it should be
willing to accept such an obligation.
Question 13. India's nuclear separation plan is to be phased in
over an 8-year period. Should the world's nuclear trade with India be
phased in, as well? If so, how? Should there be no sales involving a
given facility until safeguards have entered into effect, or until
India has provided the plans for a new facility to the IAEA?
Answer. Article 3 of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty forbids
the sale of ``source or special fissionable material,'' or items
``especially designed and prepared'' for producing special fissionable
material to a nonnuclear weapon state such as India unless the sale
triggers international inspection. Thus, no sale by a treaty member of
such ``trigger list'' items to an uninspected facility in India can
take place without breaching the treaty.
Dual-use items are not subject to such a restriction, however, so
once a green light is given to nuclear cooperation, a flood of
previously controlled dual-use items is likely to go to India at once,
regardless of the separation schedule for the reactors.
At India's present stage of development, dual-use items could be of
greater help in making nuclear weapons than will be additional
fissionable material or additional reactors. Dual-use equipment is what
one needs to miniaturize nuclear warheads to fit on longer range
missiles, and to make the missiles themselves more accurate and
powerful. India is now trying to do both, and will profit enormously in
weapon development from being able to buy such equipment--for the first
time--without restriction.
______
Response of Hon. Robert Gallucci to Question Submitted by Senator Biden
Question 14. You have worked on real-world nonproliferation cases,
and you have dealt with the need for other countries to support us on
those cases. Should we worry that the India nuclear deal will undermine
that support on an issue like whether to sanction Iran? How much weight
should we give to European editorials that criticize our so-called
``double standard'' on India and Iran, or to recent reports that
officials in Southeast Asian countries are talking in similar terms.
Answer.
18 May 2006.
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Biden: Thank you for giving me the opportunity to
expand on my testimony before the Senator Foreign Relations Committee
on 25 April 2006 by providing the questions contained in your
memorandum of 2 May 2006.
Some of the questions I had already tried to address in my
testimony, and many of the others, I think, were or would be better
addressed by others. However, in a general way, I do want to comment on
a couple of themes that run through the questions, and then
specifically respond to Question 14, which you address to four of us by
name.
The first theme has to do with the status of India and the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
I think it would be dangerous to ever change the basic
understanding that has been universally accepted in the international
community: There are only five legitimate nuclear weapons states. If
Israel, India, and Pakistan (and perhaps North Korea) have nuclear
weapons, they may not be in violation of the NPT, but they do not have
the standing in the international community that make them eligible for
nuclear cooperation, they have unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and
they are not legitimate nuclear weapons states. To discard that
standard is to open the door to the slow, steady spread of nuclear
weapons around the world.
All the talk about recognizing that the world has changed, and that
the NPT has been overtaken by events in the 21st century is, in my
view, dangerous nonsense that does not stand up to analysis. This
administration and the U.S. Congress, are on the verge of trashing an
international norm that is, at least, partly responsible for preserving
a world with only a few nuclear weapons states, when we could and will
have dozens more if we are not careful.
In my testimony, I advocated undercutting the norm against nuclear
cooperation with a state such as India only if New Delhi accepted a
verified freeze on its fissile material production for weapons,
abandoned nuclear explosive testing and agreed to the highest standards
in its export policies. This would still be short of the full-scope
safeguards standards and thus departs from that critical norm we have
worked so hard to have accepted. However, I think it could be a
justified move because of the material benefits, in the form of
verified restraint on India's nuclear weapons program, that would
result. To make that move for anything less will be correctly seen as a
cynical, short-term calculation by the United States to improve its
bilateral relations with India.
A second theme is the additional provision and requirements that
may be added to the argument with India, from New Delhi's position on
the FMCT to its commitment to forego further nuclear explosive testing.
In general, I would favor all substantive provisions that would tend to
limit India's nuclear weapons development program and bind India to the
various elements of the nonproliferation regime. It is not clear to me
that any truly substantive amendment of the deal as described would be
acceptable to India, but that, in my view, only suggests that the deal
should not stand as negotiated.
Finally, on Question 14, there is the issue of the cost in
credibility and effectiveness that the United States will pay with
other countries on other nuclear proliferation related issues, if it
makes this deal with India. I do not think that there is any question
that we will confront the charge of double standard or, more generally,
that the United States has abandoned the NPT and the international
regime that surrounds it for a unilateralist approach to proliferation,
consistent with its attitude on other issues of international security.
In real political terms, this will likely make it harder for the United
States to lead the international community in efforts to deal with Iran
and North Korea, and certainly handicap us if, as predicted, we find
new countries in Asia, the Middle East, or even Latin America moving to
develop a nuclear weapons option.
Sincerely,
Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci,
Dean, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.
______
Responses of Stephen P. Cohen to Questions Submitted by Senator Biden
Question 1. Are we right or wrong to seek a new status for India
with respect to the NPT?
Answer. We are right to do so, and India should be treated as a
nuclear weapons state (NWS). An analogy is the recent bill for amnesty
and the regularization of illegal immigrants: India has had to wait; it
will have to demonstrate that it will be a responsible NWS; and it will
receive no special advantage, but its fundamental status will change. I
don't think the administration has thought this out carefully, as it
still insists that India will not be a ``nuclear weapons state'' under
the treaty.
Question 2. What standards should India meet?
Answer. The test should not be the safeguarding of reactors (India
will have more reactors under safeguard than all the NWS combined);
that really is an irrelevant issue. We should be more concerned about
India's behavior in terms of cooperation on nonproliferation
(membership and adherence to various regimes), and its restraint in
terms of developing a nuclear arsenal in such a way that it does not
trigger an arms race with its neighbors.
Question 3. What is the risk that the ``deal'' will indirectly help
the Indian military nuclear program, suggest to other countries that
they, too, can develop nuclear weapons, and increase instability in
South Asia?
Answer. There obviously is some risk, but as I noted in my
testimony India is unlikely to build a very big arsenal (its nuclear
policy has been entirely reactive, not based upon some master plan to
become a major NWS). The incentives of other states will be region and
situation specific. India has provided the rhetoric to justify other
states wanting to become NWS (especially for Iran and North Korea), but
their circumstances drive them toward nuclear weapons quite
independently of the Indian example; the South Asian case can be met by
active diplomacy that would urge all states to do what is in their
interest anyway--void an open-ended nuclear arms race. Here India
should be encouraged to take the lead as a ``responsible'' new NWS.
Question 4. How can we maximize energy and economic benefits of the
deal while encouraging India's transition to a stakeholder in the
international system and global nonproliferation regimes?
Answer. It is in India's economic interest to be seen as a
responsible global stakeholder; this will shape, on the margins, the
willingness of many important companies to invest in India (its
democratic politics and internationally moderate positions are part of
its comparative advantage vis-a-vis China for many investors). The
United States should continue to stress the importance of India's
membership in such regimes, and link this to the argument that a
globally engaged and responsible India is a good place to put American
investments. These investments could include civilian nuclear
technology; while the French and Russians may be less concerned about
such matters; Japan certainly is, and there are plans for Japanese
investment in the Indian civilian nuclear industry.
Question 5. There is uncertainty about what India will actually do
if the deal is consummated. What should Congress do to ensure
compliance?
Answer. I'd concur with the suggestion that regular reports be
generated by the executive branch. These could provide information
regarding Indian compliance. India, of course, may do its own reports,
measuring American compliance. There is bound to be slippage and
disagreement on both sides, Congress cannot negotiate these, but it
certainly can seek reassurance that the overall framework is intact. As
for testing, there may be circumstances when we would want to overlook
Indian tests (perhaps following Chinese or Pakistani tests, or American
ones), but at that point the least of our worries will be a small and
still unproven Indian nuclear arsenal. Our arms control and strategic
diplomacy should ensure that we do not reach a point where major (and
minor) states regard nuclear testing as in their interest.
Question 9. Should Congress request that the executive branch
pursue a FMCT moratorium on a regional or five-NWS basis, and report
regularly on its progress.
Answer. Yes, this would be desirable, and I hope that there will be
a more accommodating executive branch on such initiatives in the next
few years.
Question 10. Should Congress limit the scope of U.S. nuclear fuel
assurances to India, or abide by UNSC sanctions that might some day be
imposed?
Answer. Definitely not. I don't expect India to violate the
agreement--there are many ways in which compliance can be assured
through normal diplomacy. A UNSC sanction could only flow from some
catastrophic event (an India-Pakistan nuclear war?), fuel supplies, in
such a case, would be the least of our concerns; we cannot prejudge who
will be right and who will wrong.
Question 11. Should Congress require that safeguards be in
perpetuity and should Congress bind India to article I of the NPT, (not
to help other states get nuclear weapons?)
Answer. Both of these are reasonable requests, and as I read the
two communiques and Indian public statements, it appears that India has
agreed to them. Certainly, adherence to article I, in spirit, is
essential. More broadly, it is our responsibility, as a great power, to
pursue diplomacy which will ensure that a situation in which India
might be tempted to assist another state to go nuclear never arises.
Question 12. Should Congress require that India bind itself to the
responsibilities of article I?
Answer. This, and the policy suggested in Question 11, are
unobjectionable, but largely are ``feel good'' amendments. In my
judgment, India has already made such commitments; it should have no
trouble in reiterating them publicly, but I doubt whether the Indian
Government will want to, itself, report back to Congress. Indian
compliance with its own pledges and promises might best be monitored by
the executive branch, which can periodically report to Congress.
Question 13. India's plan to separate military and civilian
facilities will be phased in over an 8-year period; should civilian
nuclear assistance also be phased in, and should there be no sales
until India has provided plans for a new facility to the IAEA?
Answer. On both questions, yes. It will take at least 5 years to
build a nuclear plant in any case, and I see no reason why sales should
not wait until the IAEA approves the plan for a new facility.
Question 15. Based on your contacts with the Indian nuclear and
strategic community, would you still favor this deal if you did not
have confidence that India is unlikely to exercise its ``maximum
rights'' to increase its production of fissile material?
Answer. I would not favor the deal if I believed that India sought
to become a ``major'' nuclear power, i.e., develop forces larger than
those of, say, China, and were it to build a nuclear delivery system
that would enable it to strike targets in Europe or America. At the
moment, the Indian strategic and nuclear communities would not favor
such a capability, but I would be alarmed if circumstances were to lead
to such a policy. My confidence in the modesty of Indian plans rests
upon some assumptions about India as a state (democratic, secular,
globally interconnected culturally and economically, and not eager to
enter into an arms race with major strategic rivals). A very different
India cannot be ruled out entirely (after all, India was under
authoritarian rule for 18 months during the period of the Emergency
under Mrs. Gandhi), but I would regard such an India as very unlikely
for the foreseeable future. Hence, my conclusion that our recognition
of India as a NWS, and support for its civilian nuclear progam, if
coupled with a renewed arms control diplomacy, will be to our
advantage, especially if we can persuade India to become a partner in
such diplomacy. The deal makes such a partnership possible, although it
does not ensure it.