[Senate Report 115-2]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 4
115th Congress } { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 115-2
======================================================================
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017
_______
January 20, 2017.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Burr, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany S. 133]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, to which was referred
the bill (S. 133) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2017 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the United States Government, the Community Management Account,
and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability
System, and for other purposes, having considered the same,
reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that
the bill do pass.
Classified Annex to the Committee Report
On February 9, 2016, acting pursuant to Section 364 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law
111-259), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) publicly
disclosed that the President's aggregate request for the
National Intelligence Program for Fiscal Year 2017 is $53.5
billion. Other than for limited unclassified appropriations,
primarily the Intelligence Community Management Account, the
classified nature of United States intelligence activities
precludes any further disclosure, including by the Committee,
of the details of its budgetary recommendations. Accordingly,
the Committee has prepared a classified annex to this report
that contains a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated by
reference in the Intelligence Authorization Act (the ``Act'')
and has the legal status of public law. The classified annex is
made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the
Senate and the House of Representatives and to the President.
It is also available for review by any Member of the Senate
subject to the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th
Congress (1976).
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017 that is being reported by the Committee.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists the United States Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for Fiscal Year 2017.
Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel
levels by program for Fiscal Year 2017 are contained in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 provides that the DNI may authorize employment
of civilian personnel in Fiscal Year 2017 in excess of the
number of authorized positions by an amount not exceeding three
percent of the total limit applicable to each IC element under
Section 102, and ten percent of the number of civilian
personnel authorized under such schedule for the purposes of
contractor conversions. The DNI may do so only if necessary to
the performance of important intelligence functions.
Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the DNI and sets the
authorized personnel levels for the elements within the ICMA
for Fiscal Year 2017.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2017 for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Section 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 301 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
Section 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 302 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 303. Support to nonprofit organizations assisting intelligence
community employees
Section 303 permits the DNI to engage in fundraising in an
official capacity for the benefit of nonprofit organizations
that provide support to surviving family members of a deceased
employee of an element of the IC or otherwise provide support
for the welfare, education, or recreation of IC employees,
former employees, or their family members. Section 303 requires
the DNI to issue regulations ensuring that the fundraising
authority is exercised consistent with all relevant ethical
limitations and principles. Section 303 further requires that
the DNI and the Director of the CIA notify the congressional
intelligence committees within seven days after they engage in
such fundraising.
Section 304. Promotion of science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics education in the intelligence community
Section 304 requires the DNI to submit a five-year
investment strategy for outreach and recruiting efforts in the
fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
(STEM), to include cybersecurity and computer literacy. Section
304 further requires elements of the IC to submit STEM
investment plans supporting this strategy for each of the
fiscal years 2018 through 2022, along with the materials
justifying the budget request of each element for these STEM
recruiting and outreach activities.
Section 305. Retention of employees of the intelligence community who
have science, technology, engineering, or mathematics expertise
Section 305 authorizes a new payscale to permit salary
increases for employees in the IC with STEM backgrounds.
Section 305 also requires notifications to individual employees
if a position is removed from this new payscale. Section 305
further requires the head of each IC element to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the new rates
of pay and number of positions authorized under this payscale.
Section 306. Multi-sector workforce
Section 306 prohibits the Congress's use of government
personnel ceilings in the management of the IC civilian
workforce starting in Fiscal Year 2019. Section 306 requires
the DNI to provide a written report and briefing on the
methodology to calculate the full-time equivalent IC positions,
the cost analysis tool used to calculate IC personnel costs,
and the IC's implementation plans. Section 306 further requires
the IC IG to provide a written report on the accuracy of IC
workforce data. This section will bring the IC in line with how
Congress oversees the Department of Defense (DoD) and other
federal agency workforces.
Section 307. Notification of repair or modification of facilities to be
used primarily by the intelligence community
Section 307 clarifies that the requirement to notify the
congressional intelligence committees of improvement projects
with an estimated cost greater than $1,000,000 for facilities
used primarily by IC personnel includes repairs and
modifications.
Section 308. Guidance and reporting requirement regarding interactions
between the intelligence community and entertainment industry
Section 308 requires the DNI to issue public guidance
regarding engagements by elements of the Intelligence Community
with entertainment industry entities. The guidance will include
DNI providing an annual report to the congressional
intelligence committees detailing interactions between the IC
and the entertainment industry. Section 308 also requires the
report to include a description of the nature, duration, costs,
benefits, and results of each engagement, as well as a
determination that each engagement did not result in a
disclosure of classified information and whether any
information was declassified for the disclosure. Section 308
further requires that before an IC element may engage with the
entertainment industry, the head of that element must approve
the proposed engagement. Contractual relationships for
professional services and technical expertise are exempt from
these reporting requirements.
Section 309. Protections for independent inspectors general of elements
of the intelligence community
Section 309 requires the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) to develop and implement a uniform policy
for each identified Inspector General (IG) office in the IC to
better ensure their independence. The provision specifies
elements to be incorporated in such a policy including (a)
guidance regarding conflicts of interest, (b) standards to
ensure independence, and (c) a waiver provision. Section 309
further prohibits the DNI from requiring an employee of an OIG
to rotate to a position in the element for which such office
conducts oversight.
Section 310. Congressional oversight of policy directives and guidance
Section 310 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees notifications and copies of any
classified or unclassified Presidential Policy Directive,
Presidential Policy Guidance, or other similar policy document
issued by the President which assigns tasks, roles, or
responsibilities to the IC, within the specified timeframes.
Section 310 further requires the Director to notify the
congressional intelligence committees of guidance to implement
such policies.
Section 311. Notification of memoranda of understanding
Section 311 requires the head of each element of the IC to
submit to the congressional intelligence committees copies of
each memorandum of understanding or other agreement regarding
significant operational activities or policy entered into
between or among such element and any other entity or entities
of the federal government within specified timeframes.
Section 311 does not require an IC element to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees any memorandum or
agreement that is solely administrative in nature, including a
memorandum or agreement regarding joint duty or other routine
personnel assignments. An IC element also may redact any
personally identifiable information from a memorandum or
agreement which must be submitted to the intelligence
committees.
Section 312. Assistance for nationally significant critical
infrastructure
Section 312 requires the DHS, supported by the appropriate
elements of the IC, to carry out a program to provide
assistance to certain critical infrastructure entities, on a
voluntary basis, for the purpose of reducing the likelihood of
catastrophic harm resulting from a cyber attack.
Section 313. Technical correction to Executive Schedule
Section 313 contains a technical correction regarding the
annual rate of basic pay for the Director of the National
Counter Proliferation Center.
Section 314. Maximum amount charged for declassification reviews
Section 314 prohibits the head of an element of the IC from
charging reproduction fees for a mandatory declassification
review in excess of reproduction fees that the head would
charge for a request for information under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). It also permits agency heads to waive
processing fees for declassification reviews in the same manner
as for FOIA.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 401. Designation of the Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center
Section 401 renames the National Counterintelligence
Executive as the ``National Counterintelligence and Security
Center,'' with conforming amendments.
Section 402. Analyses and impact statements by Director of National
Intelligence regarding proposed investment into the United
States
Section 402 directs the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, after the completion of a review or an
investigation of any proposed investment into the United
States, any analytic materials prepared by the DNI. This
requirement includes, but is not limited to, national security
threat assessments provided to the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in connection with
national security reviews and investigations conducted by CFIUS
pursuant to Section 721(b) of the Defense Production Act of
1950 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 4565). This section is not intended to
limit the ability of the DNI to transmit supplementary
materials to the congressional intelligence committees along
with the threat assessments.
Section 402 also directs the DNI to provide the committees
with impact statements when the DNI determines a proposed
investment into the United States will have an operational
impact on the IC.
Section 403. Assistance for governmental entities and private entities
in recognizing online violent extremist content
Section 403 requires the DNI to publish on a publicly
available Internet website a list of all logos, symbols,
insignia, and other markings commonly associated with, or
adopted by, State Department-designated foreign terrorist
organizations.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Section 411. Enhanced death benefits for personnel of the Central
Intelligence Agency
Section 411 authorizes the Director of the CIA to pay death
benefits substantially similar to those authorized for members
of the Foreign Service, and requires the Director to submit
implementing regulations to the congressional intelligence
committees.
Section 412. Pay and retirement authorities of the Inspector General of
the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 412 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 to authorize the IG of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) to consider certain positions as law enforcement officers
for purposes of calculating retirement eligibility and
entitlements under chapters 83 and 84 of title 5, United States
Code, if such officer or employee is appointed to a position
with responsibility for investigating suspected offenses
against the criminal laws of the United States. Section 412 may
not be construed to confer on the IG of the CIA, or any other
officer or employee of the CIA, any police or law enforcement
or internal security functions or authorities.
Subtitle C--Other Elements
Section 421. Enhancing the technical workforce for the Federal Bureau
of Investigation
Section 421 requires the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) to produce a comprehensive strategic workforce report to
demonstrate progress in expanding initiatives to effectively
integrate information technology expertise in the investigative
process. Section 421 further requires the report to include:
(1) progress on training, recruitment, and retention of cyber-
related personnel; (2) an assessment of whether FBI officers
with these skill sets are fully integrated in the FBI's
workforce; (3)the FBI's collaboration with the private sector
on cyber issues; and (4)an assessment of the utility of
reinstituting and leveraging the FBI Director's Advisory Board.
Section 422. Plan on assumption of certain weather missions by the
National Reconnaissance Office
Section 422 requires the Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to develop a plan to carry out
certain space-based environmental monitoring missions currently
performed by the Air Force. It also authorizes certain pre-
acquisition activities and directs that an independent cost
estimate be submitted to the congressional intelligence and
defense committees. The Director of NRO may waive the
requirement of Section 422 if the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, jointly submit a certification to
the congressional intelligence and defense committees.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Section 501. Committee to counter active measures by the Russian
Federation to exert covert influence over peoples and
governments
Section 501 requires the President to establish an
interagency committee to counter active measures by the Russian
Federation that constitute Russian actions to exert covert
influence over peoples and governments.
Section 502. Strict enforcement of travel protocols and procedures of
accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of the Russian
Federation in the United States
Section 502 requires the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Director of the FBI and the DNI, to
establish an advance notification regime governing all Russian
Federation accredited diplomatic and consular personnel in the
United States, as well as to take action to strictly secure
compliance and address noncompliance with the notification
requirement. Section 502 also requires the Secretary of State,
the Director of the FBI, and the DNI to develop written
mechanisms to share such travel information and address
noncompliance. Section 502 further requires written reporting
to the specified committees detailing the number of
notifications, and the number of known or suspected violations
of such personnel requirements.
Section 503. Study and report on enhanced intelligence and information
sharing with Open Skies Treaty member states
Section 503 requires the DNI, with support of other federal
agencies, to conduct a study to determine the feasibility of
creating an intelligence sharing arrangement and database among
parties to the Open Skies Treaty (OST) with higher frequency,
quality, and efficiency than that currently provided by the
parameters of the OST. Section 503 also requires the Director
to issue a report that includes an intelligence assessment on
Russian Federation warfighting doctrine, the extent to which
Russian Federation flights under the Open Skies Treaty
contribute to the warfighting doctrine, a counterintelligence
analysis as to the Russian Federation's capabilities, and a
list of the covered parties that have been updated with this
information.
TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Section 601. Declassification review with respect to detainees
transferred from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba
Section 601 requires the DNI to complete a declassification
review of intelligence reports prepared by the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) on the past terrorist activities
of each Guantanamo detainee, for a detainee's Periodic Review
Board (PRB) sessions, transfer, or release from Guantanamo. To
the extent a transfer or release preceded the PRB's
establishment, or the NCTC's preparation of intelligence
reports, Section 601 requires the DNI to conduct a
declassification review of intelligence reports containing the
same or similar information as the intelligence reports
prepared by the NCTC for PRB sessions, transfers, or releases.
Section 601 further requires the President to make any
declassified intelligence reports publicly available, including
unclassified summaries of measures being taken by the
transferee countries to monitor the individual and prevent
future terrorist activities. Section 601 requires the DNI to
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report
setting forth the results of the declassification review,
including a description of covered reports that were not
declassified. Section 601 also sets the schedule for such
reviews and further defines past terrorist activities to
include terrorist organization affiliations, terrorist
training, role in terrorist attacks, responsibility for the
death of United States citizens or members of the Armed Forces,
any admission thereof, and a description of the intelligence
supporting the past terrorist activities, including
corroboration, confidence level, and any dissent or
reassessment by the IC.
Section 602. Cyber Center for Education and Innovation--Home of the
National Cryptologic Museum
Section 602 amends 10 U.S.C. Sec. 449 to enable the
establishment of a Cyber Center for Education and Innovation--
Home of the National Cryptologic Museum (the ``Center'').
Section 602 also establishes in the Treasury a fund for the
benefit and operation of the Center.
Section 603. Report on national security systems
Section 603 requires the Director of the National Security
Agency (NSA), in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on national
security systems.
Section 604. Joint facilities certification
Section 604 requires that before an element of the IC
purchases, leases, or constructs a new facility that is 20,000
square feet or larger, the head of that element must first
certify that all prospective joint facilities have been
considered, that it is unable to identify a joint facility that
meets its operational requirements, and it must list the
reasons for not participating in joint facilities in that
instance.
Section 605. Leadership and management of space activities
Section 605 requires the DNI, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, to issue an update to the strategy for a comprehensive
review of the United States national security overhead
satellite architecture required in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. Section 605 requires
the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to
submit a plan to functionally integrate the IC's governance,
operations, analysis, collection, policy, and acquisition
activities related to space and counterspace. The congressional
intelligence committees believe the current fragmented
arrangement across the IC does not provide sufficient coherence
to meet the threat, fosters duplication, hinders integrated
congressional oversight, and impedes effective alignment with
the DoD space activities. Section 605 also requires the DNI to
submit a workforce plan for space and counterspace operations,
policy, and acquisition. Section 605 further requires the
Director of the NRO and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command
to submit a concept of operations and requirements documents
for the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center, and
to conduct quarterly update briefings.
Section 606. Advances in life sciences and biotechnology
The congressional intelligence committees recognize the
rapid advancements in the life sciences and biotechnology and
firmly believes that biology in the twenty-first century will
transform the world as physics did in the twentieth century.
The potential risks associated with these advancements are less
clear. The posture of the IC to follow and predict this rapidly
changing landscape is a matter of concern recognizing the
global diffusion and dual-use nature of life sciences and
biotechnology along with the dispersed responsibility of the
life sciences related issues across several National
Intelligence Officer portfolios.
Section 606 requires the DNI to brief the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees on a proposed plan and actions to monitor advances
in life sciences and biotechnology to be carried out by the
DNI. The Director's plan should include, first, a description
of the IC's approach to leverage the organic life science and
biotechnology expertise both within and outside the
Intelligence Community; second, an assessment of the current
life sciences and biotechnology portfolio, the risks of genetic
editing technologies, and the implications of these advances on
future biodefense requirements; and, third, an analysis of
organizational requirements and responsibilities to include
potentially creating new positions. Section 606 further
requires the DNI to submit a written report and provide a
briefing to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional defense committees on the role of the IC in the
event of a biological attack, including a technical
capabilities assessment to address potential unknown pathogens.
Section 607. Reports on declassification proposals
Section 607 requires the DNI to provide the congressional
intelligence committees with a report and briefing on the IC's
progress in producing four feasibility studies undertaken in
the course of the IC's fundamental classification guidance
review, as required under Executive Order 13526. Section 607
further requires the Director to provide the congressional
intelligence committees with a briefing, interim report, and
final report on the final feasibility studies produced by
elements of the IC and an implementation plan for each
initiative.
Section 608. Improvement in government classification and
declassification
Section 608 assesses government classification and
declassification in a digital era by requiring the DNI to
review the system by which the Government classifies and
declassifies national security information to improve the
protection of such information, enable information sharing with
allies and partners, and support appropriate declassification.
Section 608 requires the DNI to submit a report with its
findings and recommendations to the congressional intelligence
committees. Section 608 further requires the DNI to provide an
annual written notification to the congressional intelligence
committees on the creation, validation, or substantial
modification (to include termination) of existing and proposed
controlled access programs, and the compartments and
subcompartments within each. This certification shall include
the rationale for each controlled access program, compartment,
or subcompartment and how each controlled access program is
being protected.
Section 609. Report on implementation of research and development
recommendations
Section 609 requires the DNI to conduct and provide to the
congressional intelligence committees a current assessment of
the IC's implementation of the recommendations issued in 2013
by the National Commission for the Review of the Research and
Development (R&D) Programs of the IC.
Section 610. Report on Intelligence Community Research and Development
Corps.
Section 610 requires the DNI to develop and brief the
congressional intelligence committees on a plan, with
milestones and benchmarks, to implement a R&D Reserve Corps, as
recommended in 2013 by the bipartisan National Commission for
the Review of the R&D Programs of the IC, including any funding
and potential changes to existing authorities that may be
needed to allow for the Corps' implementation.
Section 611. Report on information relating to academic programs,
scholarships, fellowships, and internships sponsored,
administered, or used by the intelligence community
Section 611 requires the DNI to submit to congressional
intelligence committees a report on information that the IC
collects on certain academic programs, scholarships, and
internships sponsored, administered, or used by the IC.
Section 612. Report on intelligence community employees detailed to
National Security Council
Section 612 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a classified written report listing, by
year, the number of employees of an element of the IC who have
been detailed to the National Security Council during each of
the previous ten years.
Section 613. Intelligence community reporting to Congress on foreign
fighter flows
Section 613 directs DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on foreign fighter flows to
and from terrorist safe havens abroad.
Section 614. Report on cybersecurity threats to seaports of the United
States and maritime shipping.
Section 614 directs the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
cybersecurity threats to seaports of the United States and
maritime shipping.
Section 615. Report on counter-narrative activities
Section 615 directs the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for I&A, in coordination with DHS's Office of
Community Partnerships, to submit to reference committees a
report on the counter-narrative activities of DHS with respect
to the Islamic State and other extremist groups.
Section 616. Report on reprisals against contractors of the
intelligence community
Section 616 directs the IC IG to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on known or
claimed reprisals made against employees of contractors of
elements of the IC during the preceding three-year period.
Section 616 further requires the report to include an
evaluation of the usefulness of establishing a prohibition on
reprisals as a means of encouraging IC contractors to make
protected disclosures, and any recommendations the IC IG deems
appropriate.
Committee Comments
Managing a multi-sector workforce in the intelligence community
The Committee believes that IC elements should have the
flexibility to build, develop, and maintain a workforce
appropriately balanced among its civilian, military and
contractor workforce sectors to meet the missions assigned to
it in law and by the president. It is the Committee's view that
the size and shape of the IC's multi-sector workforce should be
based on activities that are funded, and not arbitrary
government personnel ceilings. It is also the Committee's
continued position that the IC should reduce its reliance on
contractors wherever appropriate, both as a matter of general
policy and as a way to conserve resources. The flexibility
afforded in this provision should support this position. In
addition, section 103 provides an increase in the number of
civilian personnel authorized in the Schedule of Authorizations
for the purposes of such contractor conversions in the interim
for the remainder of fiscal year 2017.
Therefore, the Committee directs that the ODNI provide the
congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the
workforce initiative as directed in section 306, not later than
July 1, 2018, with benchmarks and milestones, for IC elements
managing a multi-sector workforce without personnel ceilings
starting in fiscal year 2019. The ODNI, in coordination with
the IC elements, shall establish a common methodology for
collecting and reporting data, and include new exhibits in the
annual congressional budget justification books that display
full-time equivalents (government civilians, core contractors,
and non-core contractors), by program, expenditure center and
project.
Finally, the transfer of non-personnel service funding in
below-threshold reprogramming is a concern to the Committee.
Therefore, the Committee designates personnel services and non-
personnel service funding at the program level as congressional
special interest items.
Commercial Geospatial Intelligence Strategy
The Committee applauds the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA) for issuing its October 2015 Commercial Geospatial
Intelligence (GEOINT) Strategy, which states a goal of
fostering a ``more diverse, resilient, agile, and responsive
GEOINT program that provides seamless user access to the best
mix of commercial GEOINT . . . to fulfill National System for
Geospatial-Intelligence (NSG) and Allied System for Geospatial-
Intelligence (ASG) mission needs.'' The Committee also finds
merit in the NGA's ``GEOINT Pathfinder'' project, which seeks
to maximize the use of unclassified and commercially available
data sources that can be easily and rapidly shared with a
variety of military, United States and allied government, and
non-government customers, and supports the project's
continuation and expansion.
The Committee further commends the NGA for pursuing new
methods of intelligence collection and analysis to inform,
complement, and add to its support of warfighter requirements
by looking to emerging commercial technology providers,
including small satellite companies, which hold the promise of
rapid technological innovation and potentially significant
future cost savings to the U.S. taxpayer. The Committee further
encourages the Director of the NGA to ensure sufficient funding
is available to acquire new, unclassified sources, including
commercial satellite imagery providing unprecedented global
persistence, as well as products and services that provide
information and context about changes relevant to geospatial
intelligence. The Committee also encourages the NGA to pursue
new business models, including commercial acquisition
practices, to enable the NGA's access to data, products, and
services in ways consistent with best commercial practices.
The Committee fully supports the NGA's course of action in
partnering with the commercial GEOINT industry to meet future
warfighter intelligence requirements, while recognizing the
need to take appropriate steps to protect national security,
and encourage the Director of the NGA and the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence to keep the Committee informed of
their progress in implementing this strategy. Therefore, the
Committee directs the DoD, in building future-year budgets, to
ensure continued funding is provided for implementation,
through at least Fiscal Year 2021, of the Commercial Geospatial
Intelligence Strategy issued by the NGA in October 2015.
Space launch facilities
The Committee continues to believe it is critical to
preserve a variety of launch range capabilities to support
national security space missions. Spaceports or launch and
range complexes may provide capabilities to reach mid-to-low or
polar-to-high inclination orbits. The Committee believes an
important component of this effort may be state-owned and
operated spaceports that are commercially licensed by the
Federal Aviation Administration, which leverage non-federal
public and private investments to bolster U.S. launch
capabilities. Additionally, the Committee believes that these
facilities may be able to provide additional flexibility and
resilience to the Nation's launch infrastructure, especially as
the nation considers concepts such as the reconstitution of
satellites to address the growing foreign counterspace threat.
The Committee notes recent testimony by the Chief of Staff of
the U.S. Air Force, General Mark Welsh, who stated,
As we look at this space enterprise and how we do it
differently in the future, as we look more at
disaggregation, microsats, cube sats, small sats,
things that don't have to go from a large launch
complex all the time, I think proliferating launch
complexes is probably going to be a natural outshoot of
this. I think it's commercially viable, it may be a way
for companies to get into the launch business who could
not afford to get into it or don't see a future in it
and for large national security space launches, but I
think this has got to be part of the strategy that this
whole national team puts together as we look to the
future.
Therefore, the Committee directs the IC, in partnership
with the U.S. Air Force, to consider the role and contribution
of spaceports or launch and range complexes to our national
security space launch capacity, and directs the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the DoD
and the U.S. Air Force, to brief the congressional intelligence
committees on their plans to utilize such facilities within 90
days of enactment of this Act.
National Reconnaissance Office workforce optimization strategy
The Committee has had longstanding interest in, and support
for, a permanent government cadre to provide the NRO with a
stable, expert acquisition workforce. The Committee applauds
the substantial progress that the NRO has made in the past year
in this regard. The Committee has parallel interests in
providing the IC with flexibility to manage a multi-sector
workforce and in continuing the reduction in the reliance on
contractors.
Therefore, the Committee directs the NRO to conduct a
workforce review to optimize the mix between government
civilians and contractors and report to the Committee with a
strategy within 90 days of enactment of this Act.
Guidance and reporting requirement regarding interactions between the
intelligence community and entertainment industry
The Committee believes that there are important, valid
reasons for elements of the IC to engage with the entertainment
industry, among other things to ensure the correction of
inaccuracies, demonstrate the IC's commitment to transparency,
and to ensure that the IC recruits and retains highly qualified
personnel to the fullest extent possible. The Committee further
believes that IC engagement with the entertainment industry
should be conducted in the most cost effective and deliberate
fashion possible, while ensuring that classified information is
protected from unauthorized disclosure.
These engagements--some of which have been described in
partially-declassified inspector general reports--cost taxpayer
dollars, raise potential ethics concerns, increase the risk of
disclosure of classified information, and consume the time and
attention of IC personnel responsible for United States
national security. Neither the production of entertainment nor
the self-promotion of IC entities are legitimate purposes for
these engagements.
Review of the National Intelligence University
The National Intelligence University (NIU) has made
significant progress in recent years in its transition from a
defense intelligence college to a national intelligence
university that provides advanced education in a classified
format. Such advanced education is integral to making
intelligence a profession with recognized standards for
performance and ethics and fostering an integrated IC
workforce. While progress has been significant since the DNI
and Secretary of Defense agreed to redesignate Defense
Intelligence Agency's (DIA) National Defense Intelligence
College as NIU in 2011, the institution must continue to adapt
to functioning as a university with a robust research agenda,
and to serving the entire IC, not just elements of DoD.
Fiscal years 2017 and 2018 are of great significance for
NIU, as it moves its principal facility to the IC Campus at
Bethesda, completes activities associated with its 2018
decennial regional accreditation reaffirmation, and receives a
new president. The Committee believes that these developments
position NIU to make further progress in its vision to become
the center of academic life for the IC.
To guide these next steps, the Committee directs DIA, in
coordination with ODNI and the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, to, no later than 30 days after
enactment of this Act, select a five member, external, and
independent panel to conduct a review of NIU. The panel shall
submit a report detailing the results of such review to the
congressional intelligence and defense committees within 180
days of enactment of this Act. The panel should be composed of
recognized academics, personnel from other DoD joint
professional military education institutions, national security
experts, and at least one member of NIU's Board of Visitors.
This review and the resulting report shall, among other
things, assess:
(1) Methods for ensuring a student body that is more
representative of all IC elements;
(2) Incentives for IC elements to send personnel to
NIU to earn a degree or certificate, to include
designating attendance at NIU as positions reimbursable
by ODNI and requiring IC elements to employ the
workforce concept of ``float'' for personnel enrolled
in higher-education programs;
(3) How certificate programs align with NIU's unique
value as an institution of advanced intelligence
education;
(4) Methods to enhance NIU's research program, to
include publication of a journal, hosting of
conferences and other collaborative fora, and more
formalized relationships with intelligence studies
scholars;
(5) Whether and how educational components of other
IC elements could provide educational offerings as part
of the NIU curriculum;
(6) Potential advantages and risks associated with
alternative governance models for NIU, to include
moving it under the auspices of ODNI; and
(7) The feasibility and resource constraints of NIU
tailoring degree offerings to meet the needs of IC
personnel at different stages in their careers, similar
to DoD's joint professional military education model.
Cost of living consideration
The Committee is concerned with the high cost of living for
military, civilian, and contractor personnel at overseas
Combatant Command intelligence centers. Although the Committee
recognizes the benefits of co-locating intelligence analysts
with the operational commander, the intelligence centers for
both U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and U.S. Africa Command
(USAFRICOM) are located over 600 miles from their Combatant
Command headquarters. Combatant Commanders based in the United
States regularly communicate with forward deployed units, and
the USEUCOM and USAFRICOM intelligence centers have developed
mechanisms to effectively employ various teleconferencing and
virtual communication tools to ensure collaboration across
large distances.
The Committee is concerned that despite the utility of
these virtual collaboration tools, DoD has not taken action to
reduce the number of intelligence personnel stationed in high
cost of living areas. These costs can exceed $65,000 per
person, per year in annual cost of living allowances compared
to the continental United States (CONUS) expenses. The
additional costs associated with stationing intelligence
personnel in high-cost overseas locations detract from other
critical intelligence priorities. The Committee is further
concerned that DoD does not adequately account for the long-run
expense of high costs of living when selecting locations for
intelligence facilities.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DIA to evaluate
alternate mechanisms for staffing overseas Combatant Command
intelligence centers, particularly those that are not co-
located with Combatant Command headquarters, and to identify
cost-savings opportunities by shifting personnel to lower cost
locations, including in the continental United States.
Defense Intelligence Agency education opportunities
DIA presently allows DIA employees to receive pay for a
single year only while attending certain graduate degree
programs on a full-time basis. Employees may pursue such
opportunities at the National Intelligence University and
similar institutions; and, in certain circumstances, also at
public and private civilian universities. However, the one-year
limit discourages DIA personnel from pursuing multi-year
graduate degree programs. Expanding DIA's program to allow
highly qualified DIA employees to pursue multi-year graduate
degree programs from accredited civilian universities would
further improve retention, recruitment, and foster diversity of
thought at DIA.
Therefore, the Committee directs DIA, no later than 180
days after the enactment of this Act, to:
(1) Provide for and fund a program that allows for
DIA employees to attend civilian graduate degree
programs for up to two years each, based on the
standard length of the relevant program, provided that:
(a) Where DIA deems appropriate, employees
may pursue academic programs extending beyond
two years. Consistent with current practices,
the program should be made available to at
least five employees each year, with each
employee receiving a full-time salary while
participating in the program; and
(b) Each DIA participant shall be subject to
any program approvals, service obligations,
repayment obligations, and other requirements
pertaining to academic programs, as prescribed
by applicable laws and policies.
(2) Brief the congressional intelligence committees
on the status of the program's implementation.
Mental health prevalence
The Committee is committed to supporting the men and women
of the IC, who bravely risk their lives serving their country
as civilians in conflict zones and other dangerous locations
around the world. These individuals often serve next to their
military counterparts in areas of active hostilities. As such,
they are often exposed to many of the emotional stresses
generally associated with a tour of duty abroad. The Committee
believes there are deficiencies and inconsistencies in the pre-
and post-deployment mental health and wellness services
available to civilian employees.
Therefore, the Committee directs the NSA, NGA, CIA, and
DIA, no later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, to
provide a joint briefing to the congressional intelligence
committees on the mental health screenings and related services
that these agencies offer employees, both before and after they
deploy to combat zones. Such briefing shall include a
description of:
(1) Existing services available;
(2) Agency resources for and analysis of these
services, including the frequency of use by employees
compared to the total number returning from deployment;
and
(3) How agencies with deployed civilian employees are
sharing best practices and leveraging services or
resources outside their agencies.
Review of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
It has been more than ten years since the Congress
established the position of the DNI in the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, building on its
predecessor, the Director of Central Intelligence. Given this
experience and the evolving security environment, the Committee
believes it appropriate to review the DNI's roles, missions and
functions and adapt its authorities, organization and resources
as needed.
Therefore, the Committee directs the President to form an
independent, external panel of at least five individuals with
significant intelligence and national security expertise to
review ODNI's roles, missions and functions and make
recommendations, as needed, regarding its authorities,
organization and resources. The panel shall:
(1) Evaluate ODNI's ability to fulfill the
responsibilities assigned to it in law given its
current scope and structure;
(2) Assess whether any roles and responsibilities
currently assigned to the DNI could be more effectively
or efficiently executed by other IC components or
government agencies outside the IC;
(3) Analyze the personnel, funding, and authorities
required for each component of ODNI to perform each of
its assigned responsibilities;
(4) Evaluate the organizational structure of ODNI;
(5) Review the size, role, purpose and function of
ODNI's mission centers;
(6) Assess the value of the national intelligence
manager construct;
(7) Review the size and mix of the ODNI workforce--to
include the ratio between cadre and detailees, the
balance between government and contractors, and grade
structure--to perform its roles, missions and
functions; and
(8) Make recommendations regarding the above.
The Committee directs the President, no later than 30 days
after the enactment of this Act, to select the individuals who
will serve on the external panel and notify the congressional
intelligence committees of such selection.
In addition, the Committee directs the panel, no later than
180 days after the enactment of this Act, to provide a report
on this review to the congressional intelligence committees.
This report shall be unclassified, but may contain a classified
annex. The Committee further directs ODNI to reimburse the
Executive Office of the President for any costs associated with
the review.
Improving pre-publication review
The Committee is concerned that current and former IC
personnel have published written material without completing
mandatory pre-publication review procedures or have rejected
changes required by the review process, resulting in the
publication of classified information. The Committee is
particularly troubled by press reports suggesting that
officials are unaware of the existence or scope of pre-
publication review requirements.
The Committee is also aware of the perception that the pre-
publication review process can be unfair, untimely, and unduly
onerous--and that these burdens may be at least partially
responsible for some individuals ``opting out'' of the
mandatory review process. The Committee further understands
that IC agencies' pre-publication review mechanisms vary, and
that there is no binding, IC-wide guidance on the subject.
The Committee believes that all IC personnel must be made
aware of pre-publication review requirements and that the
review process must yield timely, reasoned, and impartial
decisions that are subject to appeal. The Committee also
believes that efficiencies can be identified by limiting the
information subject to pre-publication review, to the fullest
extent possible, to only those materials that might reasonably
contain or be derived from classified information obtained
during the course of an individual's association with the IC.
In short, the pre-publication review process should be improved
to better incentivize compliance and to deter ensure personnel
from violating fulfill their commitments.
Therefore, the Committee directs that, no later than 180
days after the enactment of this Act, the DNI shall issue an
IC-wide policy regarding pre-publication review. The DNI shall
transmit this policy to the congressional intelligence
committees concurrently with its issuance. The policy should
require each IC agency to develop and maintain a pre-
publication policy that contains, at a minimum, the following
elements:
(1) Identification of the individuals subject to pre-
publication review requirements (``covered
individuals'');
(2) Guidance on the types of information that must be
submitted for pre-publication review, including works
(a) unrelated to an individual's IC employment; or (b)
published in cooperation with a third party, e.g.--
(a) Authored jointly by covered individuals
and third parties;
(b) Authored by covered individuals but
published under the name of a third party; or
(c) Authored by a third party but with
substantial input from covered individuals.
(3) Guidance on a process by which covered
individuals can participate in pre-publication reviews,
and communicate openly and frequently with reviewers;
(4) Requirements for timely responses, as well as
reasoned edits and decisions by reviewers;
(5) Requirements for a prompt and transparent appeal
process;
(6) Guidelines for the assertion of interagency
equities in pre-publication review;
(7) A summary of the lawful measures each agency may
take to enforce its policy, to include civil and
criminal referrals; and
(8) A description of procedures for post-publication
review of documents that are alleged or determined to
reveal classified information but were not submitted
for pre-publication review.
Additionally, the Committee directs ODNI, no later than 180
days after the enactment of this Act, to provide to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the adequacy
of IC information technology efforts to improve and expedite
pre-publication review processes, and the resources needed to
ensure that IC elements can meet this direction.
The Committee further directs the DNI, no later than 270
days after the enactment of this Act, to certify to the
congressional intelligence committees that IC elements' pre-
publication review policies, non-disclosure agreements, and any
other agreements imposing pre-publication review obligations
reflect the policy described above.
Student loan debt report
IC components need to be able to recruit talented young
professionals. However, the soaring cost of college and post-
graduate education in the United States is causing many young
people to forgo public service in favor of career opportunities
with more competitive pay or loan forgiveness benefits.
Therefore, the Committee directs ODNI, no later than 180
days after the enactment of this Act, to provide a report to
the congressional intelligence committees on programs that seek
to help IC personnel manage student loan debt. The report shall
include details about each IC element's program, including loan
forgiveness, loan repayment, and financial counseling programs;
efforts to inform prospective and current employees about such
programs; and the number of employees who use such programs.
The report shall also include an analysis of the benefits and
drawbacks of creating new programs and expanding existing
programs, and shall identify any barriers to the establishment
of IC-wide programs.
Workforce development partnership
The Committee has long promoted novel recruiting, hiring,
and retention practices, especially with respect to highly
expert, highly sought-after Science, Technology, Engineering,
and Math (STEM) students and professionals. Despite these
efforts, the IC continues to struggle with meeting STEM
recruitment, hiring, and retention goals inside the IC.
The Committee is therefore encouraged to learn that the IC
is considering new and creative practices in this regard. For
example, the Committee was intrigued by the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory's (PNNL) budding Workforce Development
Partnership with the CIA. Partnerships like this may allow IC
agencies to leverage PNNL's robust employee recruiting network
and seek out STEM students who might not otherwise consider IC
employment.
Similarly, to address concerns that potential hires will
accept other job offers while awaiting clearances, NGA has a
program to allow interim hires to work on unclassified projects
until clearances are adjudicated. In addition, several IC
agencies have instituted a unique pay scale for their junior
STEM workforce. The Committee recognizes the benefits of these
initiatives, and believes that such efforts could have wider
applicability across the IC.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI Chief Human
Capital Officer, no later than 180 days after the enactment of
this Act, to provide to the congressional intelligence
committees an interagency briefing on new approaches, including
outreach and advertising, the IC is considering or conducting
to attract a diverse, robust Science, Technology, Engineering,
and Math and information technology workforce to meet the
increasing demands in the IC.
Distributed Common Ground/Surface System--Army
The Committee believes the Distributed Common Ground/
Surface System--Army (DCGS-A) provides operational and tactical
commanders with enhanced, state-of-the-art intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tasking, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination capabilities and connectivity
to the defense intelligence information enterprise. DCGS-A is a
critical tool for enabling military intelligence warfighters to
process, fuse, and exploit data. In the past, the Army has
struggled to keep pace for pre-deployment and in-theater
training for DCGS-A. However, training for military
intelligence analysts must be prioritized in the pre-deployment
readiness cycle to ensure that those using this intelligence
tool can effectively utilize its capabilities.
The Army has fielded over 95 percent of DCGS-A Increment 1
systems, with mixed results and often negative feedback from
the users. The Army is in the process of fielding Increment 1,
Release 2, which will address many of the initial concerns and
deficiencies of Increment 1. The Committee remains concerned
that the Army has not sufficiently planned for user training in
support of the release of Increment 1, Release 2 to operational
users.
Therefore, the Committee requests that the Army, no later
than 90 days after the enactment of this Act, submit a plan to
the congressional intelligence and defense committees on how
the Army will fully incorporate Distributed Common Ground/
Surface System-Army (DCGS-A) training into the readiness cycle
for Army personnel. The plan should specifically address any
lessons learned from the fielding of DCGS-A Increment 1 and any
ongoing corrective actions to improve the roll-out of Increment
1, Release 2.
Common controller for unmanned aircraft systems
The Committee supports the Army's efforts to develop a
common controller for the RQ-7A/B Shadow and the RQ-11B Raven
tactical unmanned aerial vehicles. However, the Committee is
concerned that the Army is not collaborating with the Marine
Corps on similar efforts to develop a ground controller for the
Marine Corps family of tactical unmanned aerial systems (UAS),
including the RQ-11B Raven, the RQ-12A Wasp, and the RQ-20A
Puma.
Therefore, the Committee requests that the Army and the
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), no later than 90
days after the enactment of this Act, jointly submit a report
to the congressional intelligence and defense committees on the
feasibility of developing a common controller for all Brigade
and Below unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) airframes, as well as
U.S. Marine Corps small unit UAS. The report should address the
potential performance and operational benefits of a common
controller, anticipated development costs, and anticipated
life-cycle cost savings of a common controller.
Review of dual-hatting relationship
The Committee supports further evaluation of the dual-
hatting of a single individual as both Commander of U.S. Cyber
Command (USCYBERCOM) and Director of the National Security
Agency (DIRNSA).
Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
no later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act, to
provide to the congressional intelligence and defense
committees a briefing that reviews and provides an assessment
of the dual-hatting of DIRNSA and Commander, USCYBERCOM. This
briefing should address:
(1) Roles and responsibilities, including
intelligence authorities, of USCYBERCOM and NSA;
(2) Assessment of the current impact of the dual-
hatting relationship, including advantages and
disadvantages;
(3) Plans and recommendations on courses of action
that would be necessary to end the dual-hatting of
DIRNSA and Commander, USCYBERCOM, which satisfy Section
1642 of the conference report accompanying S. 2943, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017;
(4) Suggested timelines for carrying out such courses
of action;
(5) Recommendations for any changes in law that would
be required by the end of dual-hatting; and
(6) Any additional topics as identified by the
intelligence and defense committees.
The Committee further believes that a larger organizational
review of NSA should be conducted with respect to the eventual
termination of the dual-hatting relationship. The Committee
seeks to promote the efficient and effective execution of NSA's
national intelligence mission. Specifically, the Committee
believes that the organization of NSA should be examined to
account for the evolution of its mission since its
establishment, the current structure of the intelligence
community, and the fact that the NSA is predominantly funded
through the NIP.
Therefore, the Committee further directs the DNI, no later
than 120 days after the enactment of this Act, to conduct an
assessment and provide a briefing to the congressional
intelligence committees on options to better align the
structure, budgetary procedures, and oversight of NSA with its
national intelligence mission in the event of a termination of
the dual-hatting relationship. This briefing should include:
(1) An assessment of the feasibility of transitioning
NSA to civilian leadership appointed by the DNI in lieu
of military leadership appointed by the Secretary of
Defense;
(2) How NSA could be organizationally separated from
DoD if USCYBERCOM were elevated to become a unified
combatant command; and
(3) Any challenges, such as those requiring changes
in law, associated with such a separation.
Acquisition security improvement
The Committee remains concerned about supply chain and
cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the IC. The Committee believes
the IC should implement a more comprehensive approach to
address these vulnerabilities, particularly during the
acquisition process. However, ICD 801, the IC guideline
governing the acquisition process, is outdated and must be
revised to reflect current risks. In particular, despite
issuance of ICD 731, Supply Chain Risk Management, in 2013, ICD
801 has not been updated to reflect this policy nor does it
include consideration of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and
mitigation.
Therefore, the Committee directs ODNI, no later than 180
days after the enactment of this Act, to review and consider
amendments to Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 801 to
better reflect and anticipate supply chain and cybersecurity
risks and threats, as well as to outline policies to mitigate
both risks and threats. In particular, the review should
examine whether to:
(1) Expand risk management criteria in the
acquisition process to include cyber and supply chain
threats;
(2) Require counterintelligence and security
assessments as part of the acquisition and procurement
process;
(3) Propose and adopt new education requirements for
acquisition professionals on cyber and supply chain
threats; and
(4) Factor in the cost of cyber and supply chain
security.
The Committee further directs ODNI, no later than 210 days
after the enactment of this Act, to provide to the
congressional intelligence committees a report describing the
review, including ODNI's process for considering amendments to
ICD 801, and specifically addressing ODNI's analysis and
conclusions with respect to paragraphs (1) through (4) above.
Cyber information sharing and customer feedback
The Committee commends NSA's new policies and procedures to
facilitate greater information sharing of cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) at the unclassified level.
With the recent enactment of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015,
which encourages greater information sharing between private
sector stakeholders, as well as with government entities, the
Committee believes the next step is to ensure the entire IC is
working to disseminate timely, actionable information to
private sector stakeholders so they can better protect their
information technology networks. The vast majority of U.S.
networks reside in the private sector, and it is good
governance to ensure that those networks are safe and secure
for the general public.
The Committee appreciates that the IC has begun efforts to
increase unclassified cyber threat sharing. Because an increase
in the quantity of reporting does not necessarily indicate
effectiveness or usefulness, this Committee continues to
monitor the quality of the information distributed.
Therefore, the Committee directs ODNI, no later than 120
days after the enactment of this Act, to brief the
congressional intelligence committees on IC-wide efforts to
share more information with the DHS for further dissemination
to the private sector. This briefing shall specifically address
types of information shared, metrics on output, tabulation of
low output producing agencies, recommendations on how low
output agencies can increase sharing, timeliness of information
shared, and average total time it takes for information to
transit the system.
The Committee also directs ODNI, in coordination with the
DHS I&A, to conduct a survey of government and private sector
participants of the National Cybersecurity and Communications
Integration Center (NCCIC). The survey shall be anonymous,
provide an accurate assessment of the usefulness and timeliness
of the data received, and determine if customers are satisfied
with intelligence briefings on threat actors impacting their
specific industry. The Committee further directs ODNI, no later
than one year after the enactment of this Act, to provide to
the congressional intelligence and homeland security committees
an unclassified report detailing the results of this survey.
Department of Homeland Security utilization of National Labs expertise
The Committee believes that the Department of Energy (DOE)
National Labs represent a unique and invaluable resource for
the government and the IC in particular.
Therefore, the Committee directs, no later than 180 days
after the enactment of this Act, DHS I&A, in coordination with
DOE Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE-IN), to
provide to the congressional intelligence committees a report
on the current utilization of Department of Energy (DOE)
National Labs expertise by DHS I&A. This report should address
opportunities to increase DHS I&A's utilization of
cybersecurity expertise of the National Labs as well as the
budgetary implications of taking advantage of these potential
opportunities.
Cybersecurity courses for Centers of Academic Excellence
The Committee is concerned by a recent analysis from a
security firm, which determined that not one of the nation's
leading undergraduate computer science programs requires
students to take a cybersecurity course before graduating.
Cybersecurity depends on IC professionals having a strong
understanding of the cyber threat and how to mitigate it--which
in turn requires a strong academic background. NSA and DHS co-
sponsor the Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) in Cyber
Defense program, which includes an emphasis on basic
cybersecurity. Nevertheless, even some CAE-designated
institutions lack cybersecurity course prerequisites in their
computer science curricula.
Therefore, the Committee directs ODNI, no later than 180
days after the enactment of this Act, to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on improving
cybersecurity training within NIP-funded undergraduate and
graduate computer science programs. The report should
specifically address:
(1) The potential advantages and disadvantages of
conditioning an institution's receipt of such funds on
its computer science program's requiring cybersecurity
as a precondition to graduation;
(2) How Centers of Academic Excellence programs might
bolster cybersecurity educational requirements; and
(3) Recommendations to support the goal of ensuring
that federally-funded computer science programs
properly equip students to confront future
cybersecurity challenges.
Committee Action
On January 12, 2017, a quorum being present, the Committee
met to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the
following actions:
Vote to report the committee bill
By voice vote, the Committee agreed to report the bill and
adopt the classified annex and Committee report. Senator Harris
was recorded separately as ``present.''
Compliance With Rule XLIV
Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule also
contain no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits.
Estimate of Costs
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On January
12, 2017, the Committee transmitted this bill to the
Congressional Budget Office and requested an estimate of the
costs incurred in carrying out the unclassified provisions.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing
the provisions of this legislation.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN
I am supporting the final version of the Fiscal Year 2017
Intelligence Authorization Act because of the removal of the
objectionable provisions I identified in my June 15, 2016,
Minority Views. I appreciate the efforts of my colleagues in
amending the legislation in two critical areas.
First, the June 2016 bill would have authorized individual
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field offices to obtain
Americans' email and internet records through National Security
Letters, with no court oversight. This expansion of government
surveillance authorities was both far-reaching and intrusive,
potentially covering records related to Americans' email
exchanges as well as their login history, IP addresses, and
internet browsing history. The provision was also unnecessary
in that email and internet records can be obtained through the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court if they are ``relevant
to an investigation.'' Moreover, section 102 of the USA FREEDOM
Act, which I strongly supported, authorizes the FBI to obtain
records immediately in emergency situations and later seek
court approval.
Second, the June 2016 bill would have narrowed the
jurisdiction of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
(PCLOB) to cover only programs that have an impact on the
privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons. Restricting the
Board's purview in this manner could have prevented it from
examining broader programs that may have implications for
Americans. It would also have sent a damaging message to our
allies whose views of U.S. surveillance activities inform both
important data sharing agreements and vital trade relationships
in the tech industry. While I appreciate that this provision
has been removed, I am disappointed that the current version of
the Act also excludes a provision that would have allowed the
Board to hire staff when the Board's chair position is vacant.
The effectiveness of the PCLOB is critical to protecting
Americans' rights and privacy and it is my intent to continue
to support this provision, as well as other reform efforts
designed to strengthen the Board.
Ron Wyden.
[all]