[House Report 118-491]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
118th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session } { 118-491
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COUNTERING CCP DRONES ACT
_______
May 7, 2024.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mrs. Rodgers of Washington, from the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 2864]
The Committee on Energy and Commerce, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 2864) to amend the Secure and Trusted
Communications Networks Act of 2019 to provide for the addition
of certain equipment and services produced or provided by DJI
Technologies to the list of covered communications equipment or
services published under such Act, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 2
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 2
Committee Action................................................. 3
Committee Votes.................................................. 4
Oversight Findings and Recommendations........................... 6
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures 6
Congressional Budget Office Estimate............................. 6
Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 6
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............ 6
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 6
Related Committee and Subcommittee Hearings...................... 6
Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 7
Earmark, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits....... 7
Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 7
Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 7
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 7
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 8
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Countering CCP Drones Act''.
SEC. 2. ADDITION OF CERTAIN EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES OF DJI TECHNOLOGIES
TO COVERED LIST.
(a) In General.--Section 2(c) of the Secure and Trusted
Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1601(c)) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(5) The communications equipment or service being--
``(A) telecommunications or video surveillance
equipment produced by Shenzhen Da-Jiang Innovations
Sciences and Technologies Company Limited (commonly
known as `DJI Technologies') (or any subsidiary or
affiliate thereof); or
``(B) telecommunications or video surveillance
services, including software, provided by an entity
described in subparagraph (A) or using equipment
described in such subparagraph.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 2 of the Secure and Trusted
Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1601) is amended by
striking ``paragraphs (1) through (4)'' each place it appears and
inserting ``paragraphs (1) through (5)''.
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 2864, the ``Countering CCP Drones Act,'' amends the
Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 to add
telecommunications or video surveillance equipment and services
produced or provided by Shenzhen Da-Jiang Innovations Sciences
and Technologies Company Limited (commonly referred to as DJI
Technologies, or DJI) or any subsidiary or affiliate of DJI, to
the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) covered list.
Background and Need for Legislation
The ``Countering CCP Drones Act'' brings into sharp focus a
myriad of complex issues surrounding the utilization of
Chinese-made drones, particularly those produced by DJI, the
world's largest drone manufacturer. DJI's pivotal role in
supplying drones to various sectors, including U.S. law
enforcement agencies, has sparked heightened scrutiny about the
company's ties to the Chinese government and its potential
ramifications for national security and privacy.
Central to these concerns are DJI's ties to the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Collectively, these government entities have significant
influence and control over China-based companies, which they
could use to harm the national security of the United States.
For instance, the PRC's National Intelligence Law of 2017
requires PRC individuals and entities to support PRC
intelligence services, including by providing data without
regard to where that data was collected and without any
mechanism of due process.\1\ Other laws include the 2021 Data
Security Law, which expands the PRC's access to and control of
companies and data within China and imposes strict penalties on
China-based businesses for non-compliance, and the 2021 Cyber
Vulnerability Reporting Law, which requires Chinese-based
companies to disclose cyber vulnerabilities found in their
systems or software to PRC authorities prior to any public
disclosure or sharing overseas.\2\ As the ruling political
party in the PRC, the CCP could use these laws to force China-
based companies to share information these companies collect on
Americans or to sell unsecure equipment in the United States
that the CCP could exploit for cyberattacks or espionage.
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\1\U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Strategy, Policy
& Plans, Data Security Business Advisory: Risks and Considerations for
Businesses Using Data Services and Equipment From Firms Linked to the
People's Republic of China at 6 (December 22, 2020), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_1222_data-security-
business-advisory.pdf.
\2\https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/SafeguardingOurFuture/
FINAL_NCSC_SOF_
Bulletin_PRC_Laws.pdf.
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DJI is subject to these laws because it is headquartered in
Shenzhen, China.\3\ In addition, it has received investment
from the Chinese government: four investment bodies owned or
administered by the CCP ``have invested in [DJI] in recent
years, including a state asset manager that has pledged to play
a key role in promoting partnerships between private
enterprises and the Chinese military.''\4\
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\3\https://www.dji.com/company.
\4\https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/02/01/
china-funding-drones-dji-us-regulators/.
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Numerous federal agencies have highlighted the threat posed
by DJI drones because of the company's ties to the CCP. For
example:
The Department of Homeland Security found
that ``the use of Chinese-manufactured [Unmanned
Aircraft Systems] in critical infrastructure operations
risks exposing sensitive information to PRC
authorities, jeopardizing U.S. national security,
economic security, and public health and safety.'';\5\
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\5\https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/
Cybersecurity%20Guidance%20Chinese-Manufactured%20UAS.pdf.
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The Department of Defense states that
``systems produced by Da Jiang Innovations (DJI) pose
potential threats to national security.'';\6\ and
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\6\https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2706082/
department-statement-on-dji-systems/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department of Justice (DOJ) barred the
use of DOJ funds for drones made by a ``Covered foreign
entity . . . determined or designated, within the
Department of Justice, to be subject to or vulnerable
to extrajudicial direction from a foreign government,''
including DJI.\7\
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\7\https://www.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh241/files/media/
document/ojporderfundingdrones.pdf.
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The threat posed by DJI drones is widely known,
highlighting the need to remove these drones from the U.S.
communications ecosystem. Amending the Secure and Trusted
Communications Networks Act to incorporate DJI's
telecommunications and video surveillance equipment and
services within the roster of covered communications equipment
underscores a concerted endeavor to tackle these mounting
apprehensions head-on.
Committee Action
On January 11, 2024, the Subcommittee on Communications and
Technology held a hearing on cybersecurity matters. The title
of the hearing was ``Safeguarding Americans' Communications:
Strengthening Cybersecurity in a Digital Era.'' The
Subcommittee received testimony from:
Jim Richberg, Head of Cyber Policy,
Fortinet;
Tobin Richardson, President and CEO,
Connectivity Standards Alliance;
Clete Johnson, Senior Fellow, Center for
Strategic and International Studies; and
Alan Butler, Executive Director and
President, Electronic Privacy Information Center.
On February 15, 2024, the Subcommittee on Communications
and Technology held a hearing on multiple bills, including H.R.
2864. The title of the hearing was ``Securing Communications
Networks from Foreign Adversaries.'' The Subcommittee received
testimony from:
James Lewis, Senior Vice President, Center
for Strategic and International Studies;
Craig Singleton, China Program Senior
Director and Senior Fellow, Foundation of Defense of
Democracies; and
Lindsay Gorman, Senior Fellow for Emerging
Technologies, German Marshall Fund's Alliance for
Securing Democracy.
On March 12, 2024, the Subcommittee on Communications and
Technology met in open markup session and forwarded H.R. 2864,
as amended, to the full Committee by vote of 21 yeas and 0
nays.
On March 20, 2024, the full Committee on Energy and
Commerce met in open markup session and ordered H.R. 2864, as
amended, favorably reported to the House by a record vote of 43
yeas and 0 nays.
Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the
record votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments
thereto. The following reflects the record votes taken during
the Committee consideration:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Oversight Findings and Recommendations
Pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X and clause 3(c)(1) of
rule XIII, the Committee held hearings and made findings that
are reflected in this report.
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax
Expenditures
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII, the Committee
finds that H.R. 2864 would result in no new or increased budget
authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or
revenues.
Congressional Budget Office Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII, at the time this
report was filed, the cost estimate prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not available.
Federal Mandates Statement
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act.
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the general
performance goal or objective of this legislation is to add
communications equipment and services produced by DJI to the
FCC's covered list, which would prohibit the FCC from
authorizing the use of such equipment and services.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII, no provision of
H.R. 2864 is known to be duplicative of another Federal
program, including any program that was included in a report to
Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139 or the
most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance.
Related Committee and Subcommittee Hearings
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII, the following
related hearings were used to develop or consider H.R. 2864:
On January 11, 2024, the Subcommittee on
Communications and Technology held a hearing on
cybersecurity matters. The title of the hearing was
``Safeguarding Americans' Communications: Strengthening
Cybersecurity in a Digital Era.'' The Subcommittee
received testimony from:
Jim Richberg, Head of Cyber
Policy, Fortinet;
Tobin Richardson, President and
CEO, Connectivity Standards Alliance;
Clete Johnson, Senior Fellow,
Center for Strategic and International Studies;
and
Alan Butler, Executive Director
and President, Electronic Privacy Information
Center.
On February 15, 2024, the Subcommittee on
Communications and Technology held a hearing on
multiple bills, including H.R. 2864. The title of the
hearing was ``Securing Communications Networks from
Foreign Adversaries.'' The Subcommittee received
testimony from:
James Lewis, Senior Vice
President, Center for Strategic and
International Studies;
Craig Singleton, China Program
Senior Director and Senior Fellow, Foundation
of Defense of Democracies; and
Lindsay Gorman, Senior Fellow
for Emerging Technologies, German Marshall
Fund's Alliance for Securing Democracy.
Committee Cost Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII, at the time this
report was filed, the estimate was not available.
Earmark, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits
Pursuant to clause 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of rule XXI, the
Committee finds that H.R. 2864 contains no earmarks, limited
tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits.
Advisory Committee Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of Section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
Section 1. Short title
This section provides that the Act may be cited as the
``Countering CCP Drones Act.''
Section 2. Addition of certain equipment and services of DJI
technologies to covered list
Subsection (a) would amend the Secure and Trusted
Communications Networks Act by adding a new paragraph (5),
which would add telecommunications or video surveillance
equipment produced by DJI (or any subsidiary or affiliate) to
the FCC's covered list. It would also add telecommunications or
video surveillance services, including software, provided by
DJI (or any subsidiary or affiliate) or using equipment
provided by DJI (or any subsidiary or affiliate).
Subsection (b) would make conforming amendments to the
Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act by updating
references from ``paragraphs (1) through (4)'' to ``paragraphs
(1) through (5)''.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
SECURE AND TRUSTED COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
ACT OF 2019
* * * * * * *
SEC. 2. DETERMINATION OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES
POSING NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS.
(a) Publication of Covered Communications Equipment or
Services List.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Commission shall publish on its
website a list of covered communications equipment or services.
(b) Publication by Commission.--The Commission shall place on
the list published under subsection (a) any communications
equipment or service, if and only if such equipment or
service--
(1) is produced or provided by any entity, if, based
exclusively on the determinations described in
[paragraphs (1) through (4)] paragraphs (1) through (5)
of subsection (c), such equipment or service produced
or provided by such entity poses an unacceptable risk
to the national security of the United States or the
security and safety of United States persons; and
(2) is capable of--
(A) routing or redirecting user data traffic
or permitting visibility into any user data or
packets that such equipment or service
transmits or otherwise handles;
(B) causing the network of a provider of
advanced communications service to be disrupted
remotely; or
(C) otherwise posing an unacceptable risk to
the national security of the United States or
the security and safety of United States
persons.
(c) Reliance on Certain Determinations.--In taking action
under subsection (b)(1), the Commission shall place on the list
any communications equipment or service that poses an
unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States
or the security and safety of United States persons based
solely on one or more of the following determinations:
(1) A specific determination made by any executive
branch interagency body with appropriate national
security expertise, including the Federal Acquisition
Security Council established under section 1322(a) of
title 41, United States Code.
(2) A specific determination made by the Department
of Commerce pursuant to Executive Order No. 13873 (84
Fed. Reg. 22689; relating to securing the information
and communications technology and services supply
chain).
(3) The communications equipment or service being
covered telecommunications equipment or services, as
defined in section 889(f)(3) of the John S. McCain
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019
(Public Law 115-232; 132 Stat. 1918).
(4) A specific determination made by an appropriate
national security agency.
(5) The communications equipment or service being--
(A) telecommunications or video surveillance
equipment produced by Shenzhen Da-Jiang
Innovations Sciences and Technologies Company
Limited (commonly known as ``DJI
Technologies'') (or any subsidiary or affiliate
thereof); or
(B) telecommunications or video surveillance
services, including software, provided by an
entity described in subparagraph (A) or using
equipment described in such subparagraph.
(d) Updating of List.--
(1) In general.--The Commission shall periodically
update the list published under subsection (a) to
address changes in the determinations described in
[paragraphs (1) through (4)] paragraphs (1) through (5)
of subsection (c).
(2) Monitoring of determinations.--The Commission
shall monitor the making or reversing of the
determinations described in [paragraphs (1) through
(4)] paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (c) in
order to place additional communications equipment or
services on the list published under subsection (a) or
to remove communications equipment or services from
such list. If a determination described in any such
paragraph that provided the basis for a determination
by the Commission under subsection (b)(1) with respect
to any communications equipment or service is reversed,
the Commission shall remove such equipment or service
from such list, except that the Commission may not
remove such equipment or service from such list if any
other determination described in any such paragraph
provides a basis for inclusion on such list by the
Commission under subsection (b)(1) with respect to such
equipment or service.
(3) Public notification.--For each 12-month period
during which the list published under subsection (a) is
not updated, the Commission shall notify the public
that no updates were necessary during such period to
protect national security or to address changes in the
determinations described in [paragraphs (1) through
(4)] paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (c).
* * * * * * *
[all]