NACOA retrospective: 1971-1977 a summary of what NACOA has said in the past on some important issues concerning the oceans and the atmosphere

[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]

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A NACOA RETROSPECTIVE:
1971 1977

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A summary of what NACOA has said in
the past on some important issues con-
cerning the oceans and the atmosphere

Prepared by the Staff of the
National Advisory Committee'on
ZZI, Oceans and Atmosphere

GC November 19 77
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28
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1977
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The National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere reports to
the President and to the Congress on national marine and atmospheric
affairs, and to the Secretary of Commerce with respect to the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Its. members are appointed by
the President and serve for a term of 3 years.

Chairmen:

,William A. Nierenberg (1971-1975)
Director
Scripps Institution of Oceanography

William J. Hargis, Jr. (1975-1977)
Director
Virginia Institute of Marine Science

Vice Chairmen:

William J. Hargis, Jr. (1971-1975)
Director
Virginia Institute of Marine Science

Donald L. McKernan (1975-1977)
Director
Institute for Marine Studies
University of Washington

SEP 6 1978

A NACOA RETROSPECTIVE: 1971 1977

A summary of what NACOA has said in
the past on some important issues con-
cerning the oceans and the' atmosphere

COMA ZONE
INFOWFIATIG-H CENTER

Property of CSC,Library

Prepared by the Staff of the

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE

-.0 co
Ilz -
NOVEMBER,1977

U S DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NOAA
COASTAL SERVICES CENTER
2234 SOUTH HOBSON AVENUE
CHARLESTON , SC 29405-2413

PREFACE

In the 6 years of its existence, the National Advisory Committee on
Oceans and Atmosphere (NACOA) has commented or advised on many oceanic
and atmospheric issues of importance. These comments and recommenda-
tions have appeared in NACOA annual reports, special reports, and in
letters and memoranda to the President or to Members of Congress.
Some of these issues have been treated only once. Some have been
treated several.times.

In this series of short papers, the NACOA staff has brought together
material which describes NACOA's past positions on a variety of current
issues. The purpose is to introduce new members of the National Advi-
.sory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere to the work of those who pre-
ceded them. Fuller treatment may be found in the documents themselves,
in detailed minutes, and in staff memoranda. These papers are not meant
to imply a NACOA party line. Since the subjects chosen are lively ones,
a great deal may have happened--or should have happened--since the
original statements were made. References to current documents are
included where possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Coastal Zone Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Environmental Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Law of the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Living Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . 25

Marine Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Ocean Engineering . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Ocean Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Ocean and Atmospheric Policy, Planning, and Organization 55

Weather Modification and Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . 65

COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT

Our Nation's coastal zone contains an increasing concentration of indus-
try, population, and commerce giving rise to a complex interplay among
local, regional, and national interests. This interplay raises policy
issues that are so interdependent that they affect the nature of the
decisionmaking process itself. The issues that arise cannot be resolved
by decentralized local authority nor can they be centralized and made the
exclusive responsibility of the Federal establishment. The decision
process must take into account not only economic factors but also the
changing nature of the values and priorities of U.S. society. Politi,cal
processes must be invented to strike a balance among these new values,
national interests, and local and private interests. One such invention
is the Coastal Zone Management Program.

Developments to Date

The land and waters of the coastal zone support a complex mix of activi-
ties: recreation, commercial fishing, transportation, and perhaps in the
future aquaculture, nonfossil sources of energy, and the mining of seabed
minerals. Moreover,.it seems virtually certain that over the next sev-
eral years there will be accelerated oil and gas development in the
Outer Continental Shelf, particularly in "frontier" areas where there is
not now any production.

When NACOA was established in 1971, the need for action in the coastal
zone had already become the subject of a series of studies, commissions,
and policy proposals which had accumulated over the previous 5 or 6 years.

Two coastal zone management bills were already under active consideration
by the Congress. Also pending, as an Administration initiative, was
legislation which would have established a comprehensive national land-
use policy and program. In its First Annual Report, NACOA strongly sup-
ported legislation to create a management process for the coastal zone,
and advised against the much larger land-use management approach for
which it appeared the Nation was unready. It recommended that coastal
zone legislation also provide for the establishment of research and
technical advisory assistance for each level in the management hierarchy,
which was to include local, State, and Federal elements. The NACOA
recommendations were based in part upon the findings of the Stratton
Commission, which noted the inability on the part of State and local
governments to develop and implement long-range coastal zone-plans on
their own.

In late 1972, Congress passed and the President signed into law P.L.
92-583, the Coastal Zone Management Act, assigning the Secretary of
Commerce the responsibility for providing Federal funds on a matching
basis to assist the States in developing and, after approval by the
Secretary, implementing coastal zone management plans. The Act also
authorized the Secretary to match State funds for acquiring, developing,
and operating estuarine sanctuaries. A significant feature was the so-
called Federal consistency provision, requiring Federal programs affecting
the coastal zone to be consistent with approved State coastal zone
management plans. In 1976, the Act was amended to provide aid to
coastal States in planning how to deal with the coastal impact of Outer
Continental Shelf oil and gas activity and to compensate for adverse
effects.

The program was slow in getting started. Funds were not appropriated
until December 1973. Since then the program has continued to grow,
with planning grants awarded to all 30 coastal States by the end of
FY 1976. In FY 1977, three States had moved from the planning to the
management phase of their coastal programs and others were expected to

follow shortly. The budget had been running about $18 million, but $40
million was appropriated for FY 1978 for the basic: program. In addition
$125 million was appropriated -in FY 1977 for loans, loan guarantees,and
grants which were.authorized under the Coastal Energy Impact Program.

NACOA has periodically reviewed the progress of the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Program and offered recommendations as it felt appropriate. These
have included increased funding, amendments to the Act providing funds
for the research and advisory services needed by the States as a basis
for coastal zone planning, and provisions for drawing on other existing
Federal programs for information services and research support. In 1976,
amendments were enacted that.did much to meet this need and that also
authori zed funding for the specific purpose of helping the States to
integrate into their.plans ways to deal with the onshore impacts of
coastal energy-related projects.

An interesting development parallel to the,Federal program has been the
formation by the States of the Coastal States Organization, also stimu-
lated by the Stratton Commission Report. This organization has served
as a clearinghouse for information and ideas among-the coastal States and
as a coordinating body for policy-recommendations to both Congress and
the executive branch.

Looking Ahead

The so-called "Federal consistency" provision of the Act is one of its
most important features. This provision requires that Federal projects
directly affecting a State's coastal zone must,.to the maximum extent
practicable, be consistent with the State's approved management program.
Converting this into effective practice has been a difficult matter.
.Many Federal agencies have expressed concern that this provision would
seriously impede their activities in coastal areas. OMB has recently
intervened to assure that the regulation of Federal activities in ac-
cordance with approved CZM plans will permit Federal agencies to move

ahead with their coastal-related missions. This is likely to be a
continuing issue, however.

Another continuing issue is the authority of the States to impose coastal
zone plans and regulations on local bodies. This authority is a pre-
condition to Federal approval of a proposed State plan. A number of
coastal States now lacking such authority are finding it difficult to
legislate it into law. The implications of long delay or even failure
of some State governments to acquire this authority should be examined
and fallback policies devised.

Meeting the information needs of coastal zone managers is a continuing
problem to which NACOA has in the past given considerable thought. The
Stratton Commission had suggested the establishment of coastal zone
laboratories for this purpose@ As events developed, Sea Grant College
Programs have stepped in and in some States, such as California, have
apparently done a good job. Nonuniversity research centers also repre-
sent a capabilityand there may be others. The new Regional Fisheries
Management Councils set up by Congress in 1976,,the prospect of Federal
action to establish management bodies for the 200-mile Extended Resource
Zone, and the perennial presence of advocates of land-use management
legislation provide a continually evolving context for coastal zone
management. Finally, the program--now 5 years old--is such an innovative
and complex activitytouching on so many interests, that the Committee
may wish to evaluate its overall impact.

Background

NACOA First Annual Report, June 30, 1972, "The Coastal Zone," pp. 30-39.

NACOA Second Annual Report, June 29, 1973, "Managing the Coastal Zone,"
pp. 24-28.

NACOA Third Annual Report, June 28, 1974, "Coastal Zone Management,"
pp. 30-35.

NACOA Fourth Annual Report, June 30, 1975, "Information Needs of Coastal
Zone Managers," pp. 13-17.

NACOA Fifth Annual Report, June 30, 1976, "Coastal Zone Management," pp. 58-59.

NACOA Sixth Annual'Report, June 30, 1977, "Progress in Coastal Zone Manage-
ment," pp. 77-78.

GAO Report, GGD-76-107, "The Coastal Zone Management Program: An Uncertain
Future," December 10, 1976.

NOAA, OCZM Report, "Report to the Congress on Coastal Zone Management,"
April 1977.

Report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources,
"Our Nation and the Sea," January 1969, Superintendent of Documents.
(Often referred to as The Stratton Report for Julius Stratton,
President Emeritus of MIT, and then the chairman of the Ford Founda-
tion, who was chairman of the Commission which issued the Report.)

ENERGY

The fact that a dwindling f6ssil-fuel energy supply in the face of
rising demand around the world would bring on a period of difficult
transition was well (if not widely) known before the oil embargo in the
fall of 1973. NACOA sought to bring attention to the role of the oceans
in meeting this combination of increasing energy demand and a tightening
supply. First, it pointed out that intensified exploration and drilling
on'the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) is the most promising way to in-
crease the domestic discovery rate of oil and gas. On shore, except for
Alaska, the possibilities on land had been well worked over at the then
economic depths. Second, ft noted that rapidly increasing dependence on
oil importation from foreign sources underscored both the economic and
national security importance of access to the overseas supplies and.to
the shipping to carry it to our own shores.

Developing our own resources raised questions about the relative roles of
government and industry and the tradeoff between environmental safeguards
and resource exploitation. NACOA put it rather simply, in those days.
The government's role was to prescribe environmental norms, make fore-
casts, monitor, and regulate. Industry's role was to finance and carry
out offshore exploration, drilling, and production. There never was a
question, in NACOA's view, of the technical feasibility of doing both,
or the ability to bal ance environmental safeguards with oil and gas pro-
duction. It was simply a matte'r of seeing that it got done.

With an increase in foreign oil,impor,tation inevitable in the near term,
and transportation costs then such a large portion of the total cost,

the Committee felt that development of several single-point mooring
terminals offshore of the continental United States was desirable and
so recommended. These deepwater terminals (not deepwater ports which
are more difficult to build and more expensive) would permit use of
super tankers, of the 300,000 to 500,000 deadweight ton size, an advan-
tage largely denied us because only one U.S. port, San Pedro, Cali-
fornia, could at that time accommodate tankers as large as 120,000 dwt,
although Seattle, Washington,could be adapted and Machiasport and
Eastport in Maine, though undeveloped, had the requisite depth. Long
Beach, California, was deepening its main channel to 62 feet, which
could accommodate 200,000 dwt tankers, but dredging present ports on
the east coast to suitable depths is either impossible or presents many
drawbacks.

The Committee also pointed to the value of the ocean as an absorber of
the waste heat in power production and recommended considering siting
energy-related facilities offshore.

In its Third Annual Report, NACOA made a vigorous exposition on climate
and its relation to the oceans, food, and energy. The energy aspect in
this treatment dealt largely with the effect of climate on energy demand
and the possible effects of increased energy use on climate and weather.

By this time latent anxieties about adverse impacts of expanded oil
operations on the OCS were raising questions more rapidly than satis-
factory answers could be provided, and progress had been effectively
stopped. In its Fourth Report, NACOA proposed the then somewhat subtle
concept of "decoupling" the exploration and development phases in the
resource development. This would allow both developmental and safety
aspects to proceed with greater dispatch and certainty than is the case
when they are lumped together and one tries to know everything at the
beginning, before starting. "Decoupling" meant matching the environ-
mental impact statement requirements with the immediate process planned.
This separated in a formal, licensing, sense the exploration and

production phases. Such decoupling Was intended-to avoid delay of ex-
ploration while,amassing information not required until oil and gas pro-
duction had been proven as a possibility. This was suggested as a way
of removing a major obstacle to accelerated leasing and development,
which the Committee favored. The Committee pressed, at the same time,
@for-environmental safeguards with resource developm ent. It emphasized
the technological feasibility and economic compatibility of the two. It
drew away from the concept that@it was an either-orzproposition. It
also called for greater attention to onshore impact, a relatively fresh
concept then.

A virtual stalemate persisted, and in its Fi fth AnnualtReport in 19769
NACOA emphasized the,need to get the national act.together rather than
.suppose we were fulfilling our citizen's responsibility by stopp'ing the-
other fellow from acting. To quote-
"It h.as pro.ven so easy to'delay the development'.of
needed domestic offshore Gil and gas resources,that,
an essential fact is being lost sight of: enforceable,
environmentally safe procedures can be reconciled with
an-economic atmosphere su.itable for development and, in
the national interest, they must be.."

In a discussion of more technical matters, the Committee atta.cked the
current propensity to put a great deal of effort into far-in-the-future
schemes while, at the same time avoiding doing something about more
practical--and therefore more socially difficult--things. we should be
doing today. Thediscussion brought out the need.,for technical over-
sight of competing but separately-valued energy alternatives (such-as
energy,from fusion or from.solar sources) to establish program priori-
ties. These were.then.arrived.at by an advocacy approach which put a
high premium on presentation. NACOA proposed DOER, a Directorate for
the Oversight of Energy Research "to act as a technical staff and
advisor to the Administrator of ERDA."

NACOA, in addition, reviewed the many proposals for nonfossil-fuel energy
from the oceans such as those having to do with using energy from winds,
waves, tides, ocean thermal and salinity differentials, marine biomass,
etc. The Committee deplored the tendency toward heavy support of long-
term uncertain payoff R&D programs on the basis of possible promise while
neglecting practical short-term ideas for developing energy sources faced
by market infrastructure, distribution, or economic obstacles. An example
was the inattention to demonstration for the use of methanol, whose manu-
facture has been going on for decades, as a gasoline extender and turbine
fuel for peak power production demand.

In the Sixth Annual Report, it treated again the question of safety and
proposed licensing people in the field as well as the field-activity it-
self as one means of reducing human error and ensuring proper observation
of environmental safety precautions during field operations. However,
the major emphasis was on the political, international, economic, and
production aspects of fossil fuels. In particular, the Committee expressed
deep concern over a national policy that relies on the nations of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to furnish ever in-
creasing amounts of oil to industrial nations, noting that we ourselves
have become the largest importer of all. It reiterated its previous '
recommendations for expediting OCS oil and gas exploration and develop-
ment in the context of the ominous worldwide energy trends.

Current Issues

The possibilities here are so rich it is presumptuous to imply priority
by listing. Furthermore, the ocean aspects are deeply embedded in the
even larger issues surrounding the articulation of a national energy
policy 'and plan currently under debate in the Congress and the executiv e
branch. However, they could include:

Expediting development of ocean sources of energy

Stabilizing environmental standards and monitoring

Defining relative roles of government and industry in
particular activities

Improving blowout and spill protection

Resolution of conflict with other uses of the
sea such as fishing and recreation

Background

Second Annual Report, June 29, 1973, "Energy and the Oceans," pp. 16-23.

Third Annual Report, June 28, 1974, "Climate and the Ocean, Food, and
Energy," pp. 5-12.

Fourth Annual Report, June 30, 1975, "Coastal Zone Management and Oil
and Gas Development on the Continental Shelf," pp. 8-12.

Fifth Annual Report, June 30, 1976, "Energy from Offshore Sources,"
pp. 5-10, and "Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration,"
pp. 19-25.

Sixth Annual Report, "Energy and the Sea," pp. 13-19.

The available literature on energy is vast--both general and specialized--
and is increasing constantly. Staff is prepared to develop selected
bibliographies for members based on their expressed interests.

ENVIRONMENTAL INTERACTION

The Federal Government carries on a wide variety of activities aimed at
enhancing effective use of our physical environment, protecting the
Nation from natural disasters such as severe storms and floods, and
minimizing the adverse.environmental, impacts associated with air and
water pollution and their effects on health and on the ecosystem. Among
these activities are:

9 publishing maps and charts to aid in marine and
-aer ial navi'gation;

e issuing weather forecasts to assist in safe and
expeditious air and sea travel;

e disseminating information on climate and climatic
fluctuations to assist agriculture and industry in
planning operations in a manner that takes maximum
advantage of prevailing weather conditions;-

9 issuing warnings of weather conditions which endanger
life and property, and assisting local governments in
developing emergency disaster plans; and

9 issuing and enforc ing regulations designed to minimize
the adverse impacts of air and water pollution on
health and on the environment.

Generally speaking, each such activity involves a host of subsidiary pro-
grams including observation and monitoring, mapping and charting, re-
search, prediction, regulation, enforcement, information dissemination,
education and community planning. Sometimes one or more Of these pro-
grams lag behind the need, or fail to take advantage of available tech-
nological capabilities, or do not appear to have a priority commensurate
with the social and economic importance of the problems they address.
This may be due to poor management, or to insufficient funding, or to
bureaucratic obstacles, or to technological gaps. NACOA has, at various
times, devoted attention to such deficiencies affecting three specific

areas:

* predicting and warning of natural disasters such-as
hurricanes, flash floods, and local weather conditions
which endanger air travel;

* providing long-term forecasts of prevailing weather
conditions to assist planners in agriculture, energy,
and industry; and

e protecting the public from the ill effects of air and
ocean pollution.

Weather Disaster Warnings

In June 1972, Hurricane Agnes battered the eastern seaboard of the United
States, causing 118 deaths and $3.5 billion in damage. At the request of
the Administrator of NOAA, NACOA undertook an independent assessment of
the effectiveness of the forecasts and storm and flood warnings prepared
and disseminated at that time. What NACOA found, then in connection with
Agnes, and later in a review of weather-related aircraft accidents and
forecasts of severe storms, flash floods, and other weather disasters
generally, is essentially that the collection of weather observations
and the preparation of forecasts by the National Weather Service (NWS) is

as good as present technology allows, but that the dissemination of
emergency warnings to the public, and the development of community dis-
aster preparedness plans for coping with such emergencies, leaves much to
be desired. In part, at least, this is because responsibility is dif-
fuse. Observation and forecasting are clearly responsibilities of NWS.
But dissemination and preparedness involve a host of players besides
NWS. These include State and local police, rescue, and civil defense'
agencies; the Defense Civil'Preparedness Agency; the FAA (where air traf-
fic is concerned); theTCC and'the news media for di'ssemination of
warnings. NACOA's recommendations have consistently called for greater
emphasis on the dissemination of weather forecasts and warnings and the
development of greater awareness, on the part of recipients of forecasts
and warnings, of what they mean and how best to respond.

NACOA has also looked into the methods used to locate and track major
storms, and has been concerned,,for example, about possible deficiencies
in the use of weather ships and reconnaissance aircraft for surveillance
of storms over the oceans.

Long-Term Weather Outlooks

NACOA has long felt that not enough was being done to develop means for
improved assessments, on the order of a month to a year ahead, of what
prevailing weather conditions are likely to be and how these might affect.
industry, transportation, energy consumption, and agriculture. With the
shrinking of food-surpluse Is, and the growing scarcity,of energy resources,
the matters have taken on greater urgency .in recent years. Forecasting
of weather and climate on this scale, however, is *not currently possible
with any precision', nor is it known whether it lies within the realm of
possibility. However, because the usefulness of such forecasts would be
great, NACOA has urged a greater research effort in this direction.

Pollution

Minimizing the ill effects of pollution in an industrial society that

produces more waste material and waste energy than it can handle is a
major challenge. Regulations must be made and enforced, and this in it-
self is a demanding task. But more information and understanding is
needed as a basis for regulation than is presently at hand. We must know
the extent to which our environment is polluted, we must know what the
impacts of this pollution are, and we must know what steps will reduce
either the extent or the impact. Basic to all of these is a monitoring
program to continually determine how much of what is where, and a re-
search program aimed at determining what happens to pollutants after they
enter our environment, what damage they cause, and what steps might be
taken to alleviate this.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the primary Federal body re-
sponsible for these matters. But EPA is basically a regulatory body,
and consequently monitoring, technical analysis, and scientific research
must often play subsidiary roles to regulation and enforcement. EPA's
monitoring and research activities are under severe pressure to serve
primarily the agency's short-term regulatory needs, rather than the long-
term goal of understanding the pollution problem and inventing remedies.
To counter this, NACOA has recommended that while EPA should conduct what
long-term research it can, the primary responsibility for such research
should rest with other Federal agencies having health or environment
oriented missions, with the Council on Environmental Quality providing
policy guidance and coordination. NACOA also recommended establishing a
central focus for monitoring responsibility within EPA headquarters to
assure that the myriad monitoring programs now operated by a variety of
Federal, local, and private groups meet standards that permit the data
thus produced to be incorporated into a single body of high quality en-
vironmental data capable of serving research and planning as well as
operational and regulatory purposes.

Looking Ahead

The recent NOAA reorganization is designed, among other things, to increase

the effectiveness of weather and ocean services by combining all service
activities in a single major division of the agency. It must be viewed
in the broader perspective of various proposals for reorganizing the execu-
tive branch currently under study within DOC and OMB and which are expected
to emerge within the next 6 months. NACOA may be asked to comment on how
well these proposals meet the Nation's oceanic and atmospheric needs, or
may wish to do so on its own initiative.

The National Academy of Sciences recently published a multivolume report
for EPA aimed at assisting in the incorporation of scientific information
and procedures in that agency's activities. How EPA responds, over the
next months and yea rs, should be of considerable interest to NACOA.

A bill to establish a National Climate Program has passed the House, and
a similar bill is expected to pass the Senate early next year. The fate
of this legislation, and the shape the new program takes if it is estab-
lished, should be of interest to NACOA.

Background

"The Agnes Floods," NACOA, November 22, 1972.

NACOA Second Annual Report, June 29, 1973, "Atmospheric Activities,"
pp. 29-34.

NACOA Fourth Annual Report, June 30, 1975, "Atmospheric Affairs," pp. 42-45.

NACOA Fifth Annual Report, June 30, 1976, "Air Pollution R&D," pp. 27-35,
and "Weather and Air Safety," pp. 37-44.

NACOA Sixth Annual Report, June 30, 1977, "EPA Management of the Nation's
Air Pollution Monitoring Programs," pp. 55-61, and "Weather Warnings
and Forecasts," pp. 63-72.

"Analytical Studies for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,"
National Academy of Sciences, 1977.

LAW OF THE SEA

The Third United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea convened in
December 1973. In its six sessions, the last of which closed in August
1977, some 155 member nations tried with limited success to develop a new
ocean regime more suited to the rapidly evolving international interplay
of ocean interests than the centuries-old principle of free use of the
high seas beyond a 3-mile territorial limit.

Since World War II this principle had become increasingly inadequate.
Overfishing of many species, growing pollution of some marine regions,
crowded shipping lanes, oil spills and other new problems required new
authority to regulate farflung ocean operations for their own and the gen-
eral good. The increasing determination of the developing nations, both
coastal and landlocked, to influence the use and allocation of the earth's
resources at sea as elsewhere towards a new international economic order
in which they might participate as equal partners could not be ignored.

Malta's Ambassador Arvid Pardo, in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly
in 1967, excited worldwide interest in the possibilities of deriving vast
wealth from deep seabed minerals while at the same time advancing the
cause of world peace through internationalizing their exploitation. His
ringing phrase, "the common heritage of mankind" appealed to many on both
economic and idealistic grounds and provided an irresistible impetus
towards the treaty process. At the same time, many less developed nations

discovered considerable bargaining leverage in the possibility of their
withholding agreement on other jurisdictional issues of great moment to
the developed nations. The result was an agenda for the Conference based
on the objective of universal agreement on a comprehensive treaty covering
all major points of issue.

The issues included the width of the territorial sea, naval transit
through international straits and off foreign coasts, ownership of fish
stocks and mineral resources of the seabed, control and regulation of
shipping and scientific research in offshore waters.

In its First Annual Report, dated June 30, 1972, NACOA expressed mis-
givings about the likelihood of agreement resulting from the Conference,
then about to convene. NACOA noted that the transition being attempted
was "comparable to that which took place in our own country when the
frontier and the open range disappeared." With so many participants and
with many issues technically as well as politically complex, NACOA felt
it should be recogniz ed that, while waiting for a satisfactory treaty,
economic and other pressures could mount to the point where individual
nations, including the United States, would find it necessary to take
unilateral action. NACOA urged the United States to prepare interim
arrangements that would protect U.S. interests but which could mesh with
the international agreements expected eventually from the Conference.
Meanwhile, it recommended that the U.S. "engage other countries, particu-
larly the developing nations, in as many joint projects as possible and
in as great a variety as reasonable." The purpose would be to improve
their understanding of the "harsher realities of oceanic research and
development," give them "a better technical base to protect themselves
in economic negotiations," and help allay unwarranted suspicions-'of uni-
lateral exploitation.

NACOA repeated its recommendation in 1974 with regard to U.S. unilateral
action on coastal fisheries, an active issue domestically, if UNCLOS
failed to reach agreement by the end of the 1975 session. NACOA

strongly supported passage of the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 1976 to accomplish this purpose. Looking back in June of 1977,
it characterized this Act as a good example of how the nature and timing
of unilateral action can serve a.vital domestic need while showing due
regard for the international community..

Status

When UNCLOS reconvened in late May of .1977, the issue of control over
seabed mining beyond the range of national jurisdiction was the dominating
issue of contention, although the right to conduct scientific research
offshore beyond the territorial seas of other nations was also strongly
contested. With regard to:deep seabed mining, the industrialized and
developing countries appeared fixed on divergent and seemingly i,ncompati-
ble courses. The developing nations sought complete control over deep
seabed development by an International Seabed Authority which they.would
dominate. The industrialized nations continued to insist upon some sys-
tem of.guaranteed access to seabed minerals, not only at the start but
into the foreseeable future.

Because of the disparities on this issue,.NACOA saw .1.ittle hope that the
most recent session of the Conference would result in agreement. Hence.,
in its Sixth Annual Report.in June 1977, NACOA urged the President and
the, Congress to support domestic deep seabed mining legislation that
would make it economically feasible for interested companies to proceed
with development and production.

The.less developed countries are striving to share in the presumed
revenues from the seabed. Since they have neither technical capability
nor risk capital to contribute, the Secretary of Commerce recently
offered the following observation:

"Unless we have a commercially-successful seabed mining
industry, there would be no revenues to share. There-
fore, it is in the interest of the United States and the

entire world that the industry proceed with commer-
cial recovery as soon as it is technically, environ-
mentally, and economically feasible."

NACOA took the position that deep seabed mining is technically and en-
vironmentally feasible now. Legislation is needed, however, to make it
economically feasible. This does not require guarantees against finan-
cial loss from all causes. It does require "assurance that a legal regime
laying the foundation for a stable investment climate will exist during
the lifetime of commercial operations." This could be provided either by
financial guarantees or by assuring grandfather rights to operations pre-
dating the passage of a treaty.

NACOA endorsed the Administration's position, "that any seabed mining leg-
islation would have as a minimum the following characteristics: it should
be i.nterim in nature, clearly indicating that it is our intent that it be
superseded by a Law of the Sea treaty; it should reaffirm the legal posi-
tion of the United States that seabed mining is a freedom of the high
,seas, subject to the duty that it be carried out reasonably, with due
regard to other ocean users; it should provide for sound environmental
assessment and management; it should provide duty-free entry of seabed
minerals mined under permits granted by the United States; and it should
encourage harmonization of other nations' seabed mining legislation."

A second issue of special importance to the United States is that of the
right to conduct scientific research within the 200-mile economic re-
source zones beyond the territorial sea. At the time of the NACOA report,
the negotiating text required coastal nation consent but failed, in NACOA's
opinion, to give the applicant sufficient assurance that observing rea-
sonable conditions would result in consent.

On the other hand, the conferees went into the 1977 session with a gen-
eral consensus on a 12-mile territorial sea, unimpeded transit through
straits, a 200-mile exclusive economic resource zone, and general

provisions toprevent pollution from vessels, although many details were
either unclear or undesirable to the United States.

Looking Ahead

In October of this year, Ambassador Elliot Richardson reported on the re.-
sults of the latest UNCLOS session to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, and to the Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources. The United States is now assessing its position on the vari-
ous issues and is formulating,its plans for the upcoming session,
scheduled to meet in.Geneva from March 28 through May 19., 1978, according
to his account.

He noted that prior to the last session of UNCILOSI,he had opposed unilateral
legislation in order to avoid adverse effects on good will and tone at
the meeting. He believed that.there was then a reasonable prospect for
progress on the seabed mining issues.

But since a breakthrough did not materialize, he now advocates unilateral
legislation to authorize U.S. companies to begin development of deep sea-
bed min,ing pending international agreement. It is his view that U.S.
legislation establishing a domestic regime for seabed mining will be
needed whether there is an international agreement or not.

Other issues remain to be resolved. Although some progress was made on
the question of freedom for research in the exclusive economic zones of
coastal nations,@_ the remainirfg restrictions and provisions for impartial
dispute settlement are still unsatisfactory by NACOA's previous standards.
It became clear that the.United States and a few other researching nations
are isolated.on this issue. "The developing,countries and some developed
countries, particularly the'U.S.S.R.,'.favored complete coastal state dis-
cretionary authority over all marine scientific research," he reported.

The nature of the 200-mile.exclusive.economic zone outside of the 12-mile

territorial limits of coastal nations was clarified in the new Informal
Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) and the changes "appear to safeguard
traditional high seas freedoms within the exclusive economic zone except
for specific resource-related rights accorded coastal states." He also
noted impro vements on issues relating to our military and commercial
interests in freedom of navigation and overflight, as well as broadening
support on transit through, over and under straits.

The possibility seems high that no general Law of the Sea treaty will
come into effect. In the absence of a general, multilateral agreement,
NACOA has recommended that in addition to taking judicious and considered
unilateral action to resolve these issues in its own interest, the United
States make full use of present bi- and multilateral agreements and the
special international bodies which oversee those agreements.

The new NACOA is likely to wish to follow closely the development and
progress of these issues.

Background

NACOA First Annual Report, June 30, 1972, "Some International Issues
Related to Law of the Sea," pp. 3-11.

NACOA Third Annual Report, June 28, 1974, "After Caracas/Vienna--What?"
pp. 21-27.

NACOA Sixth Annual Report, June 30, 1977, "Law of the Sea and Inter-
national Cooperation in Marine Affairs," pp. 35-40.

Testimony of the Honorable Juanita Kreps, Secretary of Commerce, before
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, Subcommittee on Oceanography, May 11, 1977, on H.R. 3350,
the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act.

Testimony of Ambassador Richardson before the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation and the Committee 'on Energy and Natural
Resources, October 4, 1977.

LIVING RESOURCES

Fisheries management is not easy. The natural, biological conditions
are difficult enough to understand. Doing something about them is even
harder. Until very recently no authority existed to enforce conserva-
tion on an international level although international agreements for
particular species met with limited success. On a national level the
same situation persisted. State management practices and regulation
exhibit superficial as well as deep-seated differences. The economic
structure of the industry--unlimited entry and no capital stake in the
resource--has encouraged participants to overfish. The driving incen-
tive has been to take what one can while the taking was good or the
other fellow would. This has led to a boom and bust cycle in the United
States where government subsidy and intervention is limited and fishing
is likely to be a small craft entrepreneurial venture, at least in
coastal waters.

While U.S. commercial fish landings have recently been rising slightly,
they had remained essentially level for many years. In 1976, landings
were close to 5.4 billion pounds (live weight) out of a world catch of
154 billion pounds (about 70 million metric tons). The Nation uses--
for food and for industrial products--about 12 billion pounds of fish,
importing the difference. Per capita consumption of-fish (also rising
slightly) was, in 1976, 12.9 pounds (edible meat) per person. (Iceland
holds the record at 86 pounds per person, Japan is close behind at 80
pounds.) The share of U.S. fish consumption caught by U.S. fishermen
fluctuates about the 50 percent mark. Because consumption as food has

been fairly constant, the fluctuation depends on the amount of industrial
fish we import. That, in turn, depends on such things as soybean avail-
ability, with which industrial fish competes as feed protein. The value
of fish products has, of course, gone up markedly in recent years which,
if anything, puts greater pressure on the resource.

U.S. interests in the fish industry are, however, by no means monolithic
and our tangled,interests include many conflicting positions. For example,
competition from lower priced foreign fish imports is detrimental to our
fishermen, depressing the,price they get for what they bring in. But
lower priced imported fish is advantageous to the processors who can
market their product that much more cheaply which, in turn, benefits the
consumer. This kind of conflict extends beyond economics:. it affects
our foreign relations.and was an essential factor in the earlier reluc-
tanc,e to extend our fishing jurisdiction as we are now doing.

Until recently the resources olf the sea appeared limitless, and the
occasional despair of fishermen, such as those of New England, over
ruinous foreign competition seemed isolated. The competition was ruinous
in the short run as a result of the higher foreign productivity born of
modern equipment and production systems stemming from foreign government
support and subsidy, and ruinous in the long run because of disregard for
the long term health of the resouce as when pulse fishing and using other
devastating harvesting practices.

Within the last 2 decades, foreign fishing fleets began to appear off all
our shores--Alaska, the Pacific Northwest, and the Mid-Atlantic as well
as New England. The ground fish catch was declining. Salmon, which
must return to spawn to the streams where they were hatched, were caught
at sea before they fulfilled this reproductive function.

Pressures on fish stocks were thus increasing but the effort of the
Fisheries Service to compensate by discovering new sources and under-
utilized species was bound to run, in time, into diminishing returns. The

race, in effect, was a losing one.

National fisheries policy was in considerable disarray. While our distant
water fishermen benefited from amicable foreign fishing relations, our
coastal fishermen grew hot at foreign "intrusion" into traditional fis,hing
banks off our coast even though i n international waters. Conflicting
State interests caused flareups. There were oyster wars in the not too
distant past between Maryland and Vir ginia, lobster wars still flare up
between Maine and New Hampshire, salmon wars are very much on the current
scene between Indian and non-Indian claimants to the fisheries. Draggers
fouled the lines of strings of bottom gear, tuna fishermen were caught
in conflicting national claims with regard to territorial jurisdiction
and the high seas. Sports and commercial fishermen competed for the same
stocks or for stocks in different parts of the same food chain. Pro cessors,
as mentioned above, wanted an assured supply no matter where it came from
or at what price, whereas those who caught the fish had to do better than
break even. Meanwhile the list of depleted species grew larger.

In 1972, when NACOA was first formed, the approaches to our national
fisheries problem were local,,Stat.e, or at best regional, divided, short-
sighted, species- andfunction-specific, antagonistic, and inconsistent.
The fishing fleet (with the notable exception ofthe tuna fleet and some
shrimpers) was in general old, composed of small and obsolete vessels,
manned by aging crews.

To restore vigor and strength to this industry, the Committee proposed
that the situation be influenced indirectly rather than directly. It
proposed there be developed a sound economic environment but that actual
fisheries development be left to the enterprise of those who would fish.
The basic assumption on which it proceeded was that the first and funda-
mental requirement is to assure the resource. This would allow planning
and investment on more than a year-by-year basis. To assure the resource

meant that first priority attention had to be given to conservation and
biological management. On this everybody agreed. This was not a trivial
agreement. One reason fisheries advocates had not previously been able
to get together was that each segment was preoccupied with a different
top priority. But the danger to all was apparent. To the need for con-
servation of the resource they could agree.

The Committee recommended that a national fisheries plan be developed on
the basis that sound biologic management of fishery resources would take
place. The necessary steps for this plan were to be uncovered by setting
a theoretical share-of-the-market target for the U.S. fishermen, by pro-
posing that the annual increase in fish consumption in this country, as
the population grew, be supplied by increased U.S. fishing effort, and
by working backwards to see what needed to be done to accomplish this
aim--including the specifics of sound biologic management. The proposal
was analogous to a mark et-penetration strategy in private industry. Set
a goal, work backwards, look for choke points. Then decide whether the
goal is realistic or which choke points should be.,dissolved. If neces-
sary, modify the plan, then cycle through it once again.

When published, this recommendation provoked considerable discussion out-
side NACOA. A good bit of the discussion concerned the realism of the
target rather than what it was that prevented reaching it (or something
less). As a result, the recommendation provoked litt le action. The
Committee repeated its pressure the next year for the development of a
linational" plan rather than the species-by-species approach which had
characterized previous Federal efforts, taking care to give its reasoning
in more detail. This time the recommendation took. NOAA formed a task
force which proceeded with the monumental task of gathering ideas and
proposals from all with differing viewpoints in this complex activity,
weighing the alternatives, estimating the consequences, and coming to
some conclusions.

A major element of the approach was to conduct a series of town meetings
throughout the country. This also satisfied some of the needs of the
Eastland Fisheries Survey proposed in response to a Resolution which had
stimulated a grass roots review of United States fisheries problems with
a view toward legislative and programmatic redress of fishing industry
problems. These meetings illuminated the common and special problems to
many of the participants. This allowed the task force to sense the key
issues, key obstacles, desired objectives, and alternative approaches
that might be used.

Congress, however, already impatient with the general stalemate in the
U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, was not inclined to await the results of
a study which was trying for agreement by consensus. It took advantage
of the "American Assembly" effort by the task force, which resulted in
an assemblage of information that proved especially valuable as back-
ground in drafting hallmark conservation legislation and enacted a law.
extending U.S. fisheries jurisdiction out 200 miles from our coasts
covering coastal species.

The "Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1.976," P.L. 94-265, be-
came law on April 13, 1976. The National Plan was published as an
appendix to a "Marine Fisheries Program" in July of 1976.

The extended jurisdiction feature of the draft fisheries bills had been
greeted with considerable reluctance by the Administration because
of its exclusionary implications and possible effect on Law of the Sea
negotiations. But, by now, most fisheries nations of the world, as well
as the several regions of the United States, had come to agree that
without management and conservation, the fishery resources of the ocean
could be drawn down to dangerous lows. However, there was little immediate
prospect of a treaty including fisheries management considerations
emerging from the Conference. The legislation was careful in recognizing
foreign need for access to fish stocks in w .hich the U. S. catch was"less
than that available on a sustained basis. This was co nsistent with one

general approach of the LOS to fisheries matters.

Looking Ahead

Current fishery problems thus have to do with how well the management
scheme is working and with an evaluation of how well the industry is
doing, and what alternative solutions, if unexpected difficulties arise,
would best serve the national interest. It may be early to register on
such issues because the Councils were formed only a year ago and their
staffs had served less than 6 months. They have much organizing and
learning to do.

This retrospective will not go into specific features of the conservation
legislation. It extended United States jurisdiction on fisheries
matters from 12 to 200 miles off our coasts and paved the way for in-
creasing the participation of U.S. fishermen in the permitted harvest. A
significant attribute of the Act was its establishment of regional councils
to develop fishery plans and to provide supporting research and imple-
mentation in partnership with the Department of Commerce. A level of
management was created which was neither so Federal that it was insen-
sitive to local differences and problems, nor so restricted that local
passions would dominate with little regard for the general good. The
regional approach should offer the opportunity to plan fisheries con-
servation measures in a way that would be practical to implement. The
new NACOA may very well want to be informed, from time to time, on how
things are coming out.

NACOA's role was crucial in forcing attention on the necessity of
approaching fisheries problems on a national basis rather than species-
by-s'pecies, and insisting that the common problems be illuminated so that
common courses of action would suggest themselves. The members did
agree that conservation was the matter of top priority. But they didn't
agree on what was next highest. Some felt the most important issue was
preferential access for U.S. fishermen (which now exists under the Act),

some that limited entry was imperative to enlist individual fishermen in
the conservation and good management effort, othersthat the jurisdic-
tional issues of State-Federal relations were'key. Though 90 percent of
commercial.landings and most of the recreational catch are at present
caught 'predominately in the territorial seas, which do not come under
the Secretary's enforcement authority, the bulk of the opportunity,is out-
side the 3-mile limit. Of these.issues,.only that.having to do with
preferential 'access for U.'S. fishermen has gone away. State/Federal jur-
isdictional issues remain,as well as the dangers.of overcapitali,zation in
the U.S. share of the harvest increase s. The question is whether resolu-
tion of these matters by the regional councils is worki.ng or is in some
way blocked and, if so, whether that block can be removed. It is for
this reason that monitoring fisheries affairs could continue to be of
some importance to this Committee.

Background

NACOA First Annual Report, "Rehabilitating United States Fisheries,"
June 30, 1972, pp. 12-18.

NACOA Second Annual Report, "Fisheries Activities," June 29, 1973, pp. 38-44.

NACOA Sixth Annual Report, "Fisheries," June 30, 1977, pp. 29-33.

Entries in NACOA's Annual Reports dealing with Law of the Sea, Coastal
Zone Management, the International Decade of Ocean Exploration, and
Sea Grant also touch on fisheries matters.

"Fisheries of the United States, 1976," Current.Fishery Statistic No. 7200,
National Marine Fisheries Service, April 1977.

"Report of the National Marine Fisheries Service of the Calendar Year 1976,"
July 1977.

"A Marine Fisheries Program for the Nation," U.S. Department of Commerce,
July 1976.

"The U.S. Fishing Industry--Present Condition and Future of Marine
Fisheries," GAO Report dated December 23, 1976.

"Establishing a 200-mile Fisheries Zone," Office of Technology Assess-
ment, May 26, 1977.

The "200-mile Limit," Oceanus, Vol. 20, No. 3, Summer 1977, pp. 7-34.
(This copy of the Woods Hole publication contains articles on the
New England and the North Pacific regional councils and one on marine
problems between the United States and Canada.)

"Eastland Fisheries Survey, A Report to the Congress," in response to
S. Con. Res. 11 of 1973.

MARINE TRANSPORTATION

Seagoing vessels carry practically all of the cargo flow among the con-
tinents. As world commerce has grown, so too has the world's merchant
marine fleet: from 80 million tons in 1948 to more than 550 million tons
in 1977. It is considered likely to quadruple over the next several
decades. Despite this growth, the U.S. position as a maritime power has
steadily deteriorated over the past 25 years.. By 1973, the U.S. fleet
was carrying only 5 percent of U.S. trade and less than 1 percent of our
bulk cargo. I,n,the 25-year period from 1950 to 1975, the.U.S. merchant
fleet dropped from 1,900 privately-owned vessels (22 million tons'dead-
weight) to 583 privately-owned vessels (14.6 million tons deadweight), a
drop of 69 percent in the number of vessels and 34 percent in deadweight
tonnage.

This deterioration has occurred in the face of U.S. policy, as expressed
in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and subsequent amendments, to maintain
a strong merchant marine capable of meeting our needs for waterborne
commerce in times of peace or war.

Status

NACOA has long been disturbedby the continuing national maritime problems.
Recognizing their complexity as well as their importance, NACOA recom-
mended in its First Annual Report that the Secretary of Commerce under-
take a comprehensive review and offered to help. In the absence of a

response, NACOA this last year began a reassessment of the situation. In
addition to reviewing the legislative history and other documents, NACOA
was briefed by leading figures involved in virtually all aspects of
marine transportation. Its views, more fully developed in.its Sixth
Annual Report, are summarized in what follows.

The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, sets forth the present
national policy:

"It is necessary for the national defense and development
of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States
have a merchant marine

(a) sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce
and a substantial portion of the water-borne export
and import foreign commerce of the United States and
to provide shipping service essential for maintaining
the flow of such domestic and foreign water-borne
commerce at all times,

(b) capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary
in time of war or national emergency,

(d) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suit-
able types of vessels, constructed in the United States
and manned with a trained and efficient citizen per-
sonnel, and

(e) supplemented by efficient facilities for shipbuilding
and ship repair.

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States
to foster the development and encourage the maintenance of
such a merchant marine."

The Act requires the Secretary of Commerce to determine what additions
and replacements are needed to enable the merchant marine to meet these
objectives, and to develop a long-range program for their acquisition.
It requires the Secretary to cooperate closely with the Navy Department
concerning national defense needs and the speedy adaptation of the

merchant fleet to national defense requirements if needed.

NACOA's initial review led to these interim conclusions:

e the U.S. merchant marine does not at present meet the goals
laid out by the Congress over 3 decades ago, nor is it real-
istic to expect that these goals will be met under existing
legislation;

e our merchant marine is clearly not carrying a substantial
part of our foreign trade;

a despite $7 billion in Federal funds for various kinds of
support for the merchant marine,since 1936, it is in what
appears to be an extended and continuing decline;

0 the number,' types, and readiness of U.S. merchant vessels
appear inadequate to meet defense goals;

9 the National Defense Reserve (mothball) Fleet is an
important national asset, but it is aging and plans for its
continuation are inadequate for meeting.national needs in
the next 2 decades;

reliance to any significant measure on the Effective U.S.
Controlled (EUSC) Fleet* may be a high risk national policy;

and

9 the program for installation of national defense features
on merchant shi.ps appears inadequate to meet national de-
fense needs.

*A fleet of U.S.-dwned vessels sailing under foreign flags and subject
to contractual agreements placi.ng them under U.S. control in certain
emergency situations.

In short, despite some recent progress resulting from the Merchant
Marine Act amendments of 1970, NACOA views our maritime posture for the
stated purposes of national security and national defense as unsatis-
factory.

The merchant marine is intended to serve both the Nation's commerce and
its defense, but it does not necessarily follow that its importance and
value is the same in both arenas. NACOA believes that we need our own
ships in time of national emergency, but it is not certain to what degree
our commercial interests and peacetime national security are also put in
jeopardy by the present reliance on foreign flag shipping. It may be
that when assessed from a perspective that includes both, the role and
makeup of the merchant marine for augmenting military transportation
capabilities in times of war will turn out to be quite different, with
different characteristics and priorities, from what contributes best to
peacetime commercial strength and economic independence.

Addressing our current maritime objectives in light of these and other
related questions is a complex matterand NACOA has thus far made only a
start. It has not specifically examined such factors as labor/manage-
ment interaction, ship operating costs, and subsidies. It has to date
focused primarily on the' objectives of the merchant marine program and
has found that the various purposes of our merchant marine are being
addressed individually, but not in a way that takes full account of their
cross-impacts. Priority guidelines are needed to assure a purposeful
effort to meet national needs. It is necessary to deal with national
maritime-rel ated questions at a level capable of resolving incompatibili-
ties among the many agency programs.

NACOA has felt that the authority to create a coherent policy which brings
together domestic and military shipping needs, port considerations, and
other similar purposes should be placed at a level high enough to relate
it to the full range of national goals that are dependent on marine
activities. NACOA, in its Sixth Annual Report, suggested a Cabinet-level

Marine Affairs Council chaired by the Vice President to serve as a cen-
tral point of authority for coordinating th full range of marine programs
now scattered amoung 11 Federal departments and independent agencies.
Pending some such arrangement, the Comittee felt that the National
Security Council (NSC) is probably the most suitably body to oversee an
assessment of marine programs needed for national security and defense.
To assure full agency input and to sustain interest, NACOA recommended
that the NSC consider estabishing a standinf interagency commitee on
Federal maritime policy to help it plan and coordinate a coherent Fedral
maritime program.

NACOA also urged the Congress to reexamine the premisis underlying present
merchant marine programs and purposes and to consider legislative remedies
to our present maritime defiencies.

Looking Ahead

Some issues that NACOA may want to examine further include the composi-
tion, condition, and readiness for activation of the National Defense
Reserve Fleet ( the "mothball fleet"), the reliabilty of the Effective
U.S. Controlled Fleet for meeting our emergency logistic requirements,
and the effectiveness of the program to install defense related features
at Federal expense on merchant vessels.

On the commercial side, although the House voted down cargo preference
legislation (H.R. 1037, the Energy Transportation Security Act of 1977)
in October 1977, the subject will probably arise again. The Congress has
shown a continuing concern over rebating practices in U.S. ocean commerce.
Both the House and Senate have recently conducted hearings on bills which
would eliminate these practices.

In March 1977, Senator Inouye, Chairman of the Subcommitee on merchant
Marine and Tourism indicated that his "...subcommitee will be dealing
with a variety of issues concerning the Shipping Act during the course of

Marine Affairs Council chaired by the Vice President to serve as a cen-
tral point of authority for coordinating the full range of marine programs
now scattered among 11 Federal departments and independent agncies.
Pending some such arrangement, the Committee felt that the National
Security Council (NSC) is probably the most suitable body to oversee an
assessment of marine programs needed for national security and defense.
To assure full agency input and to sustain interest, NACOA recommended
that the NSC consider establishing a standing interaency committee on
Federal maritime policy to help it plan and coordinate a coherent Federal
maritime program.

NACOA also urged the Congress to reexamine the premises underlying presen
merchant marine programs and purposes and to consider legislative remedies
to our present maritime deficiencies.

Looking Ahead

Some issues that NACAO may want to examine further include the composi-
tion, condition, and readiness for activation of the National Defense
Reserve Fleet (the "mothball fleet"), the reliablity of the Effective
U.S. Controlled Fleet for meeting our emergency logistic requirements,
and the effectiveness of the program to install defense related features
at Federal expense on merchant vessels.

On the commercial side, although the House voted down cargo preference
legislation (H.R. 10375 the Energy Transportation Security Act of 1977)
in October 1977, the subject will probably arise again.. The Congress has
shown a continuing concern over rebating practices in U.S. ocean commerce.
Both the House and Senate have recently,conducted hearings on bills which
would eliminate these practices.

In March 1977, Senator Inouye, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Merchant
Marine and Tourism indicated that his ". . . subcommittee will be dealing
with a variety of issues concerning the Shipping Act during the course of

this Congress including.rebating.. The House,as Well appears
likely to rev.iew various aspects.of merchantmarine policy during the
Second Session of the 95th Congress.,including the role and effecti,veness
of the Federal Maritime Commiss-ion.

Background

NACOA's Sixth Annual Report, June 30, 1977, "Marine Transportation,"
PP. 21-27.

Co ngress and the Oceans: Marine Affairs in the 94th Congress, Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation and National Ocean Policy
Study, U.S. Senate, June 1977, pp. @141-189.

The Merchant Marine Act, 1936, the Shipping Act, 1916,and Related Acts
of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation,
U.S. Senate; Serial No. 95-A, January 1, 1977.

Report on Oversight.Hearings of the Subcommi@ttee o'n Merchant Marine 'wi th
respect to the U.S. Flag Merchant Marine, U.S. House of Representatives,.
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Serial No. 94-N, 1977.

Maritime Subsidies, U.S. Maritime Administration, October 1976.

The National Defense Reserve Fleet - Can It Respond to Future Contingen-
cies? Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United
States, Report No. LCD-76-226, October 6, 1976.

The U.S. Merchant Marine, A National Asset, Irwin M. Heine, National
Maritime Council, July,1976.

MARAD 1975, Annual Report of the Maritime Administration, U.S. Department
of Commerce, June 1976.

Analysis of the Direct Impact of the Merchant Marine on National Security;
Transportation Institute, Washington, D.C., May 1976.

Maritime Transportation Research Board, National Academy of Sciences,
Toward an Improved U.S. Merchant Marine, June 1976.

Bread Upon the Waters; Gerald R. Jantscher, The Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C., 1975.

A Statement of National Transportation Policy; The Secretary of Tra,nspor-
tation, Washington, D.C., September 17, '1965.

Essential U.S. Foreign Trade Routes, U.S. Maritime Administration,
June 1975.

Lawrence, Samuel A.,'United States Merchant Shipping Policies and
Politics, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., July 1966.

Fair, Marvin L. and Reese, Howard C., Merchant Marine Policy, Cornell
Maritime Press, Inc., 1963.

OCEAN ENGINEERING

In its first meetings, NACOA members who had been involved in the work of
the earlier Marine Council'informed their colleagues that the gap was
widening between current capability for operations at sea and the avail-
able background information on materials, techniques, and ocean-related'
engineeri,ngIcriteria. A specia] panel of the Committee, after study,
recommended an ocean engineering effort within the civil part of the
executive branch--as distinct from the Navy--to pursue these needs. The
ocean engineering section in the Sixth Annual Report is itself a retro-
spective of NACOA's relatively unrewarded efforts in this area, and we
reprint it here with a brief note of future directions of possible in-
terest to the new NACOA added.

OCEAN ENGINEERING
(from-NACOA's Sixth Annual Report to the President
and Congress, June 30, 1977., pages 41-43)

The seA.is intolerant of man's engineering_weaknesses and oversights. It
is a dynamic and difficult operating environment leaving little room for
technical uncertainty. The weather and the biological, physical, and
chemical processes occurring within the oceans severely test structures,.
systems, and,man himself.

The Nation is coming to realize that opportunity for enterprise doesn't
stop at the shoreline, and that we must be as capable of operating in

ocean areas as we are on land. We must be able to monitor and operate
within the full three-dimensional sea space for both civil and defense
@needs; extract resources, both living and nonliving; build structures
safely within the ocean environment; perform research and conduct surveys
on and under the sea; and decide where offshore facilities can be safely
sited.

Federal ocean engineering expertise is distributed widely but unevenly
among the executive agencies charged with marine responsibilities. The
Navy clearly has by far the most advanced capability within the Federal
establishment. It is the largest and most active Federal ocean-related
activity pursuing engineering technology development. Its manpower and
capital investment are significant, as they must be in view'of the Navy's
broad mission. To a lesser degree, ocean engineering capabilities reside
within a number of other Federal agencies to support their in-house pro-
gram needs. A major and sophisticated capability in ocean engineering is
also found in various industries engaged in activities such as oil
drilling, pollution cleanup, construction of ocean structures, naval
architecture, ocean mining, diving, submersibles utilization, and port
development.

The United States leads the world in some areas of technology such as oil
recovery and deep submergence capability. But technical prominence can
be short-lived. If we are to keep our advantage, the U.S. civil program
should be vigorously pressing ahead with ocean technology development on
a broad front. We dare not become dependent on the capabilities developed
by other nations.

Some activities during the next decade that will require a stronger tech-
nical capability and a broader data base than we now have are effective
and safe offshore fossil energy and mineral development, installation
siting, port development, material testing, instrumentation, hardware,
fishery technology, and thermal and dynamic ocean energy extractive sys.-
tems. We need to strengthen our ocean engineering capability to support

these activities.

There are some encouraging signs. We find increased technical interchange
and a growing cooperation (both formal and informal) between groups in the
Department of Defense andthe civil sector. We are encouraged by the
growing use of shared test facilities. We are further encouraged by
NOAA's recent creation of an Office of Ocean Engineering with duties that
include attention to,national ocean engineering concerns.

These encouraging signs, however, should not lead us to believe that we
now have an adequate national effort in techniques, materials, and
developmental programs addressing problems peculiar to.engineering in
the ocean environment. The 1974 NACOA report, "Engineering in the Ocean"*
called for a focal point for our civil endeavors, and for an organization
to serve as a catalyst in stimulating engineering R&D and advanced tech-
nology, focusing on gaps and deficiencies, fostering technical inter-
change, ensuring the common availability of data, enhancing interagency
programs and effective use of facilities, and maintaining a continuing
and mutually purposeful liaison.with industry and the academic community.

NACOA believes that the Department of Commerce, with its present responsi-
bilities in marine resources, ocean mapping, marine environmental assess-
ment, and marine data archiving, comes closer than any other Department
to being a logical Federal focus for civil marine matters to provide the
needed ocean engineering leadership for the Federal and private sectors,
as does DOD in defense matters. It may be that a properly,mandated,
structured, and funded Office of Ocean Engineering within NOAA can evolve
into this role even though it is also assigned-responsibility for support
of NOAA's own engineering needs.

*"Engineering in the Ocean." A report for the Secretary of Commerce by
the National Adviso ry Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, November 15,
1974, 54.pages.

In support of a more coherent and more encompassing program, NACOA rec-
ommends that the Secretary of Commerce foster and selectively support
programs within industry, the universities, and the Federal agencies, to:

@ identify and correct deficiencies in civil ocean
engineering and technology;

9 assure the availability of technical data needed
by the ocean engineering community;

9 develop technical ocean engineering criteria and
material assessments and standards for use by
industry and the Federal Government; and

* encourage the cross-utilization of military and
civil engineering laboratories and test facilities.

There ought to be a continuing close relationship between these civil
ocean engineering efforts and the DOD engi neering programs. The Navy, as
mentioned earlier, has broad competence in ocean technology development.
It possesses advanced technical and operational capabilities that would
help our national civil ocean engineering effort. In addition, the Navy
maintains a range of engineering and test facilities that should be
applied to national tasks. Since this would be a significant departure
from the Navy's primary defense mission, the Navy should be specifically
authorized to undertake this task, either by Presidential directive or by
legislation.

We believe that closer and more formal organizational ties between the
various Federal participants will be required in the future and our
present recommendations should not preclude this possibility. However,
the need for strengthening the civil U.S. ocean engineering effort is
immediate and our recommendation is aimed at accomplishing this promptly
and with minimum disruption of present organizations.

Since the program is an interagency effort, we believe it desirable to
provide an overview from a broader perspective than can be found within
any particular agency. NACOA therefore recommends that the Office of
Science and Technology Policy provide a comprehensive and continuing re-
view of our Federal ocean engineering and undersea technology efforts.
This review should:

* evaluate the ocean engineering and technology capa-
bilities of the U.S. public and private sectors, and
determine how they compare with those of other nations;

a identify significant technological problems in both
defense and civil applications, recommend areas for
improvement, and determine whether a proper focus
and adequate funding are being provided; and

o result in a regular periodic report to the President
on the status of ocean engineering and technology in
the Nation.

Some NACOA members have felt strongly that the advancement of the Federal
civil ocean engineering program would be more rapid if the extensive Navy
capability could be applied directly to civil sector problems. The Navy
without doubt has the greatest Federal ocean engineering capability, but
the problem of using this capability for non-Navy purposes without
adverse impact on DOD missions is,not trivial. Manpower, funding,.and
related management problems must be resolved. As NACOA has suggested
closer and more formal organizational ties between the Federal partici-
pants (including DOD) may be a necessary step. How to solve the adminis-
trative and mission problems to allow effective use of Navy capabilities
for civil needs may be an issue in ocean engineering that the new Committee
will wish to undertake.

S. 2224, a "National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Organic Act,"
was introduced into the Senate in October 1977 by Mr. Magnuson and Mr.
Hollings. The Act addresses in part the area of ocean tech,nology. Sec-
tion 101 states that it is the policy of the Congress that:

11results of civilian and unclassified military atmos-
pheric and oceanographic research and technology,
which is supported by Federal grants, loans, or con-
tracts, should be made promptly available to other
Federal agencies, State and local governments, and
the private sector in a manner which will hasten and
promote the utilization of such knowledge and tech-
nology for the benefit of the United States."

Further, Section 204 includes under the responsibilities of the Adminis-
trator of NOAA:

"environmental research and development activities
that are necessary to advance the Nation's ocean
engineering and technology expertise, including the
development and operation of manned research sub-
mersibles, underwater laboratories, data buoys, and
improved instruments and calibration methods, and
the advancement of undersea diving techniques;" and

))encouraging progress in ocean engineering activities,
in order to implement a wide ranging program to meet
basic ocean engineering needs."

A similar bill (H.R. 9708) has been introduced in the House. Although
these bills do not deal directly with the ocean engineering issues as
developed by NACOA, they do indicate Congressional awareness-of the
significance of ocean technology and engineering to the accomplishment
of our national ocean purposes. The Act may serve to not only assist
in interagency technical information transfer, but stimulate some re-
quired development activities in support of basic national ocean
engineering needs.

Background

"Engineering in the Oceans." NACOA, November 15, 1974, 54 pages.

NACOA Fourth Annual Report, June 30, 1975, "The Institute for Engineering
Research in the Ocean," pp. 26-28.

NACOA Sixth Annual Report, June 30, 1977, "Ocean Engineering," pp. 41-43.

National Research Council, Marine Board, 1976. Seafloor Engineering:
National Needs and Research Requirements, National Academy of Sciences,
Washington, D.C.

National Research Council, Marine, 1975. Mining in the Outer Continental
Shelf and in the Deep Ocean, National Academy of Sciences,
Washington, D.C.

'Directions for Naval Oceanography," National Academy of Sciences,
Washington, D.C., 1976.

"Manned Undersea Science and Technology FY 1976 Report." U.S. Department
of Commerce, NOAA, March 1977.

OCEAN SCIENCE

"Oceanography," the term usually used for ocean science, is generally
considered to be not so much a field in its own right as the application
of a variety of disciplines--physics, chemistry, geology, biology, math-
ematics, and engi'neering--to the ocean. Recently, however, it has be-
come evident that some of the most interest-ing questions about t he ocean
require coordinated investigations involving several disciplines or in-
volve complex phenomena or processes falling between the traditional
disciplines. The global heat balance, climate change, circulation patterns
within the oceans and atmosphere, their relation to living resource pro-
ductivity, the fate Of C02 produced by our industrial society, and the
role of sewage as nutriment for marine life are examples.

Working in the ocean presents a variety of problems not present on land.
The saltwater environment is corrosive. Winds and waves subject vessels,
structures, and crews to considerable strain. Platforms--ships and buoys--
are expensive and require trained crews. Maintaining a fixed position or
course requires intricate navigation and electronics equipment. Con-
ducting an observational program requires care ful planning and coordina-
tion of ships, aircraft, submersible vessels and sensors, etc. Oceanog-
raphy is expensive, and it often requires a combination of facilities and
expertise not normally found collected together in one place.

NACOA's concerns for meeting the Nation's long-term needs for better
understanding of ocean phenomena and processes led it to direct its
9

attention to:

9 Who sponsors American oceanography? For what purpose?

0 Are adequate facilities available?

* Are suitable institutional arrangements available?

a Do the people of the Nation understand the increasing
importance of knowledge and understanding of the oceans
and their resources?

In addition, the Committee has studied two major ocean science programs
in*depth. These are NOAA's National Sea Grant Program and NSF's Inter-
national Decade of Ocea n Exploration (IDOE), the latter at the request
of the Director of the National Science Foundation.

Navy Support for Ocean Research

The Navy--and specifically, the Office of Naval Research--has been one of
the prime sponsors of ocean research since World War II (the other being
the National Science Foundation). ONR support has been responsible for
development of much of the ocean expertise in our universities. Yet in
recent years there have been indications of a shift away from this,
marked by a withdrawal of Navy funds from basic ocean science with no
other sponsor being provided the funds needed to fill the gap. NACOA has
been concerned, believing that long-term basic ocean research is essen-
tial to both the Nation and the Navy--whose operations, after all, are
geared entirely to the oceans--and has urged the Navy to reestablish its
broad ocean research base and its close ties with university researchers.

Facilities for Ocean Research

Research at sea requires ships, and moreover'. ships equipped with laboratories,

winches, special navigation equipment, and other devices which make them
suitable for'oceanographic work. To design and build a ship for this pur-
pose is costly and takes at least several years. Once in operation the
ship's facilities must be continually maintained and upgraded, and when
its useful life is ended, it must be replaced. All of this requires a
coherent and systematic program to assess, plan, and fund for the basic
facilities needed for ocean research. Yet this systematic approach,
though its importance is understood, is lacking.' The 17 universities
operating government-funded oceanographic ships have formed the University
National Oceanographic Laboratory System (UNOLS) to coordinate scheduling
the use of the 29 ships in the academic fleet, and have an interest in
assisting their Federal sponsors in developing an overall long-range
capital investment plan. The sponsors, of whom the National Science
Foundation is the largest followed less and less closely by the Navy,
have serious problems with budget examiners when the talk turns to multi-
year "commitments." NACOA has examined this problem and, notwithstanding
history, recommended the assignment of lead agency responsibility and the
development of a national plan for maintaining an ocean,research fleet.
NACOA has also urged maintaining a very special facility, the GLOMAR
EXPLORER, despite the cost and the absence of an immediate need, because
of the extraordinary capabilities of this unique vessel.

Institutional Arrangements

Often institutional rigidities make it difficult to develop novel programs
designed to meet newly emerging needs. NACOA considered three examples
involving ocean science and technology.

Ocean engineering: Civilian ocean engineering capabilities lag badly
behind the need created by the increase in'offshore oil drilling, the need
for more deepwater ports, and the potential for tapping the ocean's thermal
energy. Vast expertise resides in the Navy, but there has not been any
systematic procedure for fostering the adaptionof thi.s technology to
civilian purposes. NACOA has recommended a new organization to serve as
a catalyst in stimulating the engineering development needed to meet our

future ocean needs., The engineering development issue has a number of
special features and NACOA's involvement is described at greater length
in another "retrospective."

Multidisciplinary, multi-institutional research: In developing the U.S.
program for the International Decade of Ocean Exploration, the National
Science Foundation chose to concentrate on long-term, expensive, multi-
disciplinary research programs requiring the cooperation and facilities
of a number of research institutions. Before IDOE, funds to support such
research were not easily obtained, since the prevailing means for sup-
porting academic research in the United States has been through support
of individual university researchers. The IDOE program developed a mana-
gerial approach for conducting such cooperative endeavors without leading
to the formation of new ongoing organizations with their own rigidities,
an approach that NACOA felt should be continued when the IDOE decade
ended along with the multidisciplinary program growing out of the IDOE
effort itself. NACOA accordingly recommended that NSF continue to pro-
vide a means by which such research projects might be supported.

Research and education to serve local needs: Education, research, and
advisory services related to marine resource development are provided
through the National Sea Grant Program at universities and other research
institutions around the Nation. The program has successfully encouraged
the cooperation of researchers, teachers, and extension agents in meeting
specific and real needs perceived by local industry and government--often
on a small scale, low budget basis markedly different from that discussed
in the preceding paragraph. Sea Grant has proved an effective vehicle for
utilizing the strength and expertise in universities large and small
throughout our land, and NACOA urged its continuation with certain sug-
gestions for improved management and greater responsiveness to nationally
perceived needs.

Public Awareness of the Importance of the Oceans

With the increasing economic and environmental importance of the oceans

and the coastal regions, educators have begun to seek ways to incorporate
marine-related material into both formal and informal educational pro-
grams. NACOA has identified a suitable role for the Federal Government
in this endeavor, and offered suggestions for special approaches that
would reach large segments of the public not easily reached through the
formal education process.

Looking Ahead

The increasing pressure for development of marine-resources--fish, oil and
gas, seabed minerals--and the need to do so with adequate concern for the
marine environment,-have led to an uncomfortable awareness of the many
gaps in our understanding of how the sea behaves. Concern about the
possible adverse impacts.of changes in climate, in which the oceans
play a significant role, gives additional impetus to the drive for more
basic studies of the oceans. These concerns have global implications, yet
recognition of the need for global studies of the sea comes at a time
when, increasingly, other nations are tending to place obstacles in the
path of free and open ocean research--,as manifested in the LOS negotia-
tions. Perhaps the most significant issue facing-us today in ocean sci-
ence is not a.scientific one, but has to do with how to persuade other
nations that they stand to gain, rather than lose, by permitting and par-
ticipating in marine research. It may be timely to return to a suggestion
made by NACOA in its first annual report, calling for increased involve-
ment of scientists and institutions of other nations in our oceanographic
effort, at the working level, as a means of fostering increased under-
standing in the less-developed countries, of the realities of ocean re-
search and development, and the growth of a better technical base to sup-
port their own development and their participation in international
economic negotiations.

Background

NACOA First Annual Report, June 30, 1972: "Recommended Courses of Action"
(related to Law of the Sea), pp. 8-11.

NACOA Third Annual Report, June 28, 1974: "Research Within the. Navy,"
p. 39.

NACOA Fourth Annual Report, June 30, 1975: "Making Ready for Tomorrow,"
pp. 19-36.

NACOA Fifth Annual Report, June 30, 1976: "The Sea Grant Influence,"
pp. 11-18; "Some Marine Matters," pp. 45-48;"GLOMAR EXPLORER," pp. 55-56.

NACOA Sixth Annual Report, June 30, 1977: "Ocean Engineering," pp. 41-43;
"Ocean Research and the Academic Fleet," pp. 45-49; "Educating the
Public on Marine Affairs," pp. 51-53; "GLOMAR EXPLORER," p. 78.

"Engineering in the Ocean." NACOA, November 15, 1974, 54 pp.

"The International Decade of Ocean Exploration: A Mid-Term Review."
NACOA, August 29, 1975, 44 pp-

"The National Sea Grant Program: A Review." NACOA, November 3, 1976,
78 pp.

OCEAN AND ATMOSPHERIC POLICY, PLANNING, AND ORGANIZATION

Ocean programs pervade the Federal structure without being a driving
force in any significant part of it. Some 11 departments and independent
agencies have major programs, running to more than $2 billion per year,
intended to advance the national interest in such areas as marine trans-
portation,_ fisheries, offshore oil and gas and other marine energy sources,
deep seabed mining, ocean and coastal environmental protection, recrea-
tion, research, defense and foreign relations. Private sector marine
interests contribute some $10 billion annually to the GNP. Assuming con-
tinued U.S. access to ocean resources and to other uses of the sea, this
figure is expected to increase approximately fourfold by the year 2000.

Atmospheric programs are carried out in nine departments and independent
agencies and are budgeted at nearly $1.1 billion at the present time. Of
this amount, nearly $400 million is for research and related activities,
while almost $700 million goes toward maintaining and operating the
Nation's civilian and military weather services.

NACOA accepted--and broadened--the viewpoint on national policy, planning,
and organization that led the Congress to establish it in 1971. Specifi-
cally, NACOA has advocated:

centralizing the bulk of the Federal marine affairs programs
in some form of lead agency under the overall policy guid-
ance and coordination of a Cabinet-level body; and

e preserving, and to a degree increasing, the present combined

management responsibility for oceanic and atmospheric
programs related to ocean and coastal engineering
development, environmental technical services, and
supporting research.

The possibility of a major executive branch reorganization involving
marine and atmospheric programs appears more likely now than it has for
several years. The next 6 months could be decisive.

Background

During the middle and late '60's, the Congress, stimulated by National
Academy of Sciences and U.S. Navy studies, set in motion an effort towards
the establishment of a national oceans policy and a well-coordinated
Federal program to carry it out. In 1966, it initiated legislation
setting up two temporary bodies--a White House-level Marine Council,*
chaired by the Vice President, for overall program management and the so-
called Stratton Commission" to recommend national policy and a long-
range plan to carry it out. Commission recommendations led the President
in 1970 to establish the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) within the Department of Commerce for ocean and atmospheric pro-
gram management and the Congress a year later to establish NACOA to re-
port to both the Congress and the executive branch its advice on policy,
planning, programs, and priorities.

The NOAA that came into being was a considerably scaled down version of
the independent agency that the Stratton Commission had recommended.
Furthermore, there was no longer a high level body like the Marine

Full name: The National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering
Development.
"Full name: The Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources.
It was chaired by Julius Stratton, President Emeritus of MIT, and then
chairman of the Ford Foundation. Dr. Stratton served on NACOA from
December 1971 until February 1974.

Council for policy and program coordination that could compensate for
the remaining fragmentation. At the same time, the developments that
had led the Commission to conclude that the "Nation's many diverse
interests require a plan for national action and for orderly develop-
ment of the sea" and that it was urgent "to mobilize and impart energy
to the total undertaking were if anything accelerating.

Among developments external to the program were the widespread sentiment
for extending national or international jurisdiction over what had for
centuries been "high seas," free for anyone's use beyond a 3-mile terri-
torial sea, as was shown on the agenda of the then pending United Nations
Conference on Law of the Sea, the evident overpressure.on many valuable
fish stocks, indications of a coming energy crisis, and misgivings about
the adequacy and economic significance of the U.S. merchant marine.

Within the program, signs of inadequate planning and coordination were
also becoming more manifest. In 1972 and 1973, NACOA*noted a number. For
example, the Coast Guard had had to abandon several multipurpose ocean
vessel stations before NOAA was ready to replace them with buoys to
carry out their important weather and ocean observation function. The
Nation's civil oceanographic research fleet, for which several agencies
were responsible, was headed for a 25 percent cut in FY 1974 without
any overall analysis to judge the long-term impact on the Nation's future
capability nor any plan to prevent undesirable consequences. Much con-
fusion existed over where pending legislation should assign responsibility
to safeguard States from adverse environmental impacts of offshore oil and
gas development, the pipelines to bring it in, and refineries and associated
facilities needed on shore for refining, storage, and distribution. The
President's annual report to the Congress on the Federal Ocean Program,
required by the same law establishing the temporary Marine Council and
Commission, had gradually come to lag its due date by well over a year
and was failing to serve its intended purpose of assisting debate on
pending budget decisions by showing the program's balance and scope. The
last time the President's budget had pulled together all the ocean

programs in a special analysis for this same purpose had been the budget
for FY 1971.

Federal Initiatives

The Congress has tried to move the national marine affairs program ahead
in both specific and general aspects. So far, it has been successful
only in specifics. Among the legislation establishing and assigning re-
sponsibility for one or another emerging aspect of marine affairs are
the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, the Ocean Dumping Act of 1972,
the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 19729 the Ports and Waterways Safety
Act of 1972, the Endangered Species Act of 1974, and the Fisheries
Management Act of 1976. Most of these responsibilities were assigned
to NOAA, considerably enlarging its scope and size, but the Coast Guard,
the State Department, and parts of the Department of the Interior have
also received added responsibilities.

More general and inclusive attempts by the Congress to overhaul the execu-
tive branch organization for marine, or marine and related, activities
have not gone very far. Among the proposals have been the establishment
of a Department of Natural Resources and Environment, a Department of
Environment and Oceans, an Office of Marine Affairs Coordinator in the
Executive Office of the President, and a revived Marine Council con-
sisting of appropriate Cabinet members and heads of agencies to be
chaired by the Vice President.

It has been more successful in laying the groundwork of understanding and
information needed for a comprehensive approach to national marine
affairs. The Senate established in 1973 a National Ocean Policy Study
(NOP5) organization headed by Senator Hollings (D-S.C.), Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Oceans and Atmosphere of the Senate Committee on Com-
merce led by Senator Magnuson (D-Wash.). NOPS included as members the
chairmen of most of the standing Senate committees. It has published a

number of important studie's and reports on subjects ranging from the
economic potential of ocean resources to the apparently higher success-
ful means used by the Shetland Islanders to deal with the shoreside
impact of North Sea oil and gas development.

In the House, Congressman Breaux (D-La.), Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Oceanography of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, chaired
by John Murphy (D-N.Y.), has set up an informal ad hoc group including
people from both the legislative and executive branches and from outside
government which he calls the House Ocean Policy Advisors Committee
(HOPAC). This group meets by invitation to discuss the many aspects of
ocean affairs issues of emerging importance.

There have also been executive branch proposals for major reorganization
efforts involving ocean affairs, a.Department of Natural Resources in
1973 and a Department of Energy and Natural Resources in 1974.

The President has this year directed the Secretary of Commerce, in co-
operation with appropriate Cabinet officers and agency heads, to conduct
a comprehensive ocean policy study. The study is intended to provide a
basis for developing subsequent program budgetary, legislative, and
organi'zatibnal recommendations.

Plans have also been announced for a President's Reorganization Project
study for a Department of Natural Resources and the Environment in which
ocean programs are intended to play a part.

NACOA Views

NACOA's earlier views appeared in each of its annual reports. Though
varying in external detail because they were addressed to the particular
Federal planning and policy context at the time, they have generally held
steady in fundamentals. They have focussed on (1) an oceans policy that
would state national marine goals and establish the procedures or mechan-
isms needed for their implementation, (2) the Federal activities required

for program execution and how these activities might best be grouped for
coordination purposes, and (3) identification of the agencies currently
involved in these activities.

NACOA recommended that the Federal ocean program explicitly be directed
towards two types of goals.

First, goals which imply the need for resolving conflicts primarily in
a global or international context include:

9 access to foreign sources of vital materials and markets;

9 availability of marine transportation to meet our needs
for world commerce;

9 access to and fair-share use of marine resources;

@ protection of the marine environment;

a projection of military capability overseas when required;

* protection of the United States and U.S. offshore activities
from hostile action and attack;

s military marine research and engineering development
efforts to avoid technological' surprise in areas of
military importance; and

a an informed public willing to provide the funds and
support the programs needed.

Second, goals with a potential for major conflicts primarily among
domestic claimants include:

e profitable use of marine resources by U.S. industry;

e public access to marine recreation;

e efficient and safe ports, waterways, and sealanes;

9 waste disposal compatible with other uses;

* offshore siting of power plants and other facilities
where economy and safety permit;

* environmental protection; and

* balanced, multiple-use management of coast and offshore

areas.

The fundamental Federal mechanism needed for the pursuit of national
ocean goals is a coordinated, comprehensive and long-range national pro-
gram in marine and coastal zone affairs and in environmental science and
services. For management purposes--and to provide a rationale for Fed-
eral marine and atmospheric affairs organization--NACOA found it useful
to group the civil, that is non-defense, activities required of the
Federal Government into four functional categories., These are:

e marine resources development, including uses of the
sea for transportation and waste disposal;

e marine and coastal zone activities regulation and
enforcement;

e environmental science, engineering development, and
technical support services; and

9 interagency planning and coordination.

These are described in some detail in NACOA's Third Annual Report. The
activities involved are those currently being carried out by NOAA, MARAD,
the Geological Survey, the marine and coastal zone portion of the civil
planning, policy, and funding activities of the Corps of Engineers, the
submerged lands management and mineral leasing program on the Outer Con-
tinental Shelf presently assigned to the Bureau of Land Management of
the Department of the Interior, marine-related functions of Interior's
Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife, and the U.S. Coast Guard.
Three activities involving the establishment and updating of a national
marine affairs plan, regulating U.S. affairs accordingly, and coordinating
permit and regulatory activities for weather modification are new.

NACOA has suggested that the activities involved in the first three
functions could profitably be brought together in a single agency or De-
partment and organized in an integrated tripartite arrangement. The
reason was that in the Committee's opinion "none can work to maximum
effect without contact with the other two and none could work in the
full public interest were any of them subordinated to the others."

If all the listed activities were collected in a single agency, other
major marine activities would still exist. For example, the Navy, the
State Department, NSF, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Council
on Environmental Quality, and the Department of Energy would also have
marine programs. Noting the limited ability of interagency coordinating
committees to bring all ocean programs into a coherent policy context
and to coordinate their implementation, NACOA proposed formation of a
higher level body at the Cabinet level or within the White House.

What Now?

NACOA did not carry these concepts farther into the form of specific de-
tailed organizational charts, budgets, etc. It was deemed better to pro-
vide a basis for testing the adequacy and completeness of such organiza-
tional proposals as might materialize, since there is almost certain to

be more than a single way of organizing the Federal Government to meet
the purposes the Committee had in mind. The Carter Administration, as
mentioned earlier, is already engagedJn reorganization studies and plans
at various levels involving ocean and atmospheric programs.

If the new NACOA wishes to get prepared to comment on these, it may wish
to reopen questions regarding some of the fundamental assumptions NACOA
has adopted in the past.- For example, does it still make sense to talk
about an oceans program at all? To what extent should organization by
resource such as energy, food, science, etc., dominate the Federal
structure? At what management level should responsibility for encour-
aging marine resource development and for regulating the activities in-
volved in the-light of conservation and environmental factors be brought
together? How about responsibility for establishing regulations and for
their enforcement? Does the Carter Administration's recently expressed
preference for coordinating interdepartmental activities through the
so-called Presidential Review Memorandum process rather than through
White House-level coordinating bodies increase,the need for a compre-
hensive oceans agency? To what extent and to what purpose do atmospheric
and oceans programs belong together organizationally? In view of the
Carter Administration's professed policy of weeding out advisory com-
mittees, does NACOA merit being an exception? Why?

Background

Federal Agencies Administering Programs Related to Marine Science Activi-
ties and Oceanic Affairs, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller
General of the United States, February 25, 1975.

The Economic Value of Ocean Resources to the United States, Report for
the National Ocean Policy Study, Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate
by Robert R. Nathan Associates, September 17, 1974.

National Atmospheric Sciences Program, Fiscal Year 1978, Interdepartmental
Committee for Atmospheric Sciences, Federal Council for Science and
Technology, Executive Office of the President.

The Federal Plan for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research,
Fiscal Year 1978, Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services
and Supporting Research, Department of Commerce.

Public Law 89-454, The Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act,
June 1966.

"Our Nation and the Sea, A Plan for National Action," Report of the Com-
. mission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, January 1969.

Comments by the Secretary of Commerce on the Sixth Annual Report of the
National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, September 1977.

"Work Program Natural Resources/Environment Study," President's Reorgani-
zation Project, Office of Management and Budget, September 1977.

NACOA Second Annual Report, June 29, 1973, "Natural Resources and Marine
Affairs," pp. 4-15.

NACOA Third Annual Report, June 28, 1974, "Ocean Resources, Regulation,
and Research," pp. 13-19.

NACOA Fifth Annual Report, June 30, 1976, "Policy and Planning for
Marine Affairs," pp. 1-4.

NACOA Sixth Annual Report, June 30, 1977, "Uses of the Sea: U.S. Goals
in a Changing World," pp. 1-11.

WEATHER MODIFICATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE

There are dreamlike qualities to the benefits which could result from
controlling weather. Rain would fall where you want it to fall, violent
storms such as hurricanes would blow less strongly, the overabundance
that causes floods would be lessened, hail suppression would reduce crop
damage, fog dissipation would minimize delays at airports, and so on.
There are associated problems of course. The amusement park and the
farmer have different attitudes towards rain. Whose cloud was wrung
out can be a real issue in water rights confrontations. There may be
unknown side effects--an anxiety which arises whenever nature is prodded.

Nevertheless, the ability to control weather would be so welcomed by
those whose fortunes would be affected, that it has tended to force experi-
mental work i-n weather modification into field testing whether or not
rain or snow can be produced rather than into designing experiments to
increase physical understanding, step-by-step, on what happens, and why.
Then the benefits and the risks could both be more accurately assessed,
and the degree of control and predictability improved or the idea
abandoned for good and sufficient cause.

The fact is none of these visions is clearly impossible, but the extent
of control and the ability to separate the beneficial from the neutral
or even harmful results, though differing from one type of weather modi-
fication to another, are far from operational practicability. Despite
this, when NACOA came on the scene, the weather modification research
efforts were scattered throughout the mission agencies,and there was a
lack of emphasis on the research into physical understanding of the basics

so that we could ratchet forward in our knowledge.

Since those days the question of climate change, be it due to natural
causes or arising from people's activities, has also grown in visibi.lity
and taken center stage. It is important to distinguish one from the
other, because there is enough in common between the effects of weather
modification and of climate change to cause some confusion in the way
the two are treated as public policy matters. They are different, and
the research required for each is different, although there is a common
basis in fundamental meteorological knowledge and theory. Understanding
natural fluctuations in each instance must be improved so that inadvertent
modification either of weather or of climate by people's activities can
be sensed and those activities modified to the extent possible and
desirable.

The distinction can be put as follows: Weather is the state-of-the-
atmosphere in one place at one time. Climate is the composite of all
weather conditions in a region over a period of time. These simplified
definitions do not clearly separate one from the other, but the distinc-
tion would be false if they did, for neither does nature. Weather and
climate overlap. Weather merges into climate; climate puts bounds on
weather. Weather is seasonal even though specific; climate fluctuates
even though it is averaged. Thus weather and climate slide into each
other. NACOA started with one and expanded into the other. To describe
what went on, it would be useful to make a further distinction, in this
case by example, between advertent and inadvertent weather modification,
and natural and inadvertent climate change. Each of these examples is
still an open book, though some may be closer to operational use than
others, and the urgency may also vary (though not in the same way) for
other reasons such as energy use, or food production, or for the protec-
tion of life and property.

Advertent weather modification

9 Precipitation enhancement would make rain in particular
regions or increase the mountain snowpack for later use
in irrigation. This is part of water resource management.

@ Hurricane modification would reduce the-maximum force of
the winds thus reducing storm damage.

e Hail suppression would reduce the size of hailstones or
make them so small they would reach the ground as rain
and thus crop damage would be reduced.

* Lightning suppression would reduce the number of lightning
discharges from cloud to the ground and decrease the num-
ber of forest fires.

9 Fog d issipation would disperse fog above airport runways,
reduce air traffic delays, and increase safety.

Inadvertent weather modification

Cloud streets have been seen forming downwind of power parks
where quantities of heat and moisture are vented into the
atmosphere.

e Increased rainfall d,ownwind of cities has been observed by
careful observations. Cities are heat islands and affect
rainfall patterns. Their pollutants affect the quality of
rainwater and make it acid.

0 Smog is a byproduct of driving automobiles, burning trash,
and industrial processes.

Natural Climate Change

9 Records of climate in the earth's recent past are found through
paleoclimatology. This, and other research to elucidate the
characteristics of climatic change, and to seek its causes,
have made remarkable strides in the past few years. The
effort is desirable not only for its intrinsic interest, but
also for establishing the basis on which to try to distinguish
change due to natural causes from climate change which is man-
made in origin, and to help establish an understanding of
climatic patterns. The latter could lead to seasonal, year-
to-year, or longer term projections to the benefit of food pro-
duction, transportation, energy use, and the like.

Inadvertent Climate Change

e This is the effect of human activities, such as an increase of
C02 in the atmosphere, the increase of dust and other particu-
lates in the atmosphere, the increase of chlorofluorocarbon
emissions on the ozone layer, and so forth. These increases
affect the amount of the sun's energy which reaches the
earth's surface and thus the temperature, windfall, and rain-
fall patterns, etc.

The state of affairs when NACOA started up in 1972 was that at least seven
agencies were conducting research or were experimenting (these are not
necessarily synonomous) with one aspect or another of weather modifica-
tion. The scientific community felt that the work was too fragmented
and uncoordinated, and so dispersed as to be below a reasonable thres-
hold for efficiency. Their concern at that time was less with the
amount of effort than with its ineffectiveness in producing scientific
progress and with its unnecessary expensiveness in having field experi-
ments by mission agencies performed in isolation, one from another.

NACOA appealed, as had the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), for the
appointment of a lead agency to coordinate this research and recommended
that greater emphasis be placed on understanding cloud physics, at this
stage of the game, rather than on time-eating and expensive field experi-
ments in the hope of gaining statistical assurance.

The Administration reacted indifferently at first and took the position
that targeted research by each of the mission agencies was desirable in
the particular aspect of weather modification with which it was concerned--
such as Interior in precipitation enhancement, the FAA in fog dissipation,
NOAA in severe storm modification, etc. It also felt that coordinating
mechanisms existed and that agencies such as NSF could emphasize the
basic research. Perhaps there was a reluctance to set up a unified
weather modification juggernaut with swelling budget. At any rate, a
year later Interior got the nod (if not the lead). A program NOAA had.
worked up for the High Plains was transferred on mission grounds, rather
than being left with the agency with the greatest meteorological exper-
tise, as NACOA had recommended. The emphasis on. operations rather.than
research thus continued.

While this was going on, while NACOA was marshalling more arguments for
research, and while efforts to develop legislation to coordinate and
stimulate research in this field began to emerge In the Congress, a
change in emphasis began to take place. This was due to scientific and
public concern with the.possibilities of inadvertent modification of
climate and with the urgency of the needfor improved ability to.fore-
cast climate in managing energy use and food production. In this call
forurgent attention to impact assessment and forming strategies for
miti,gation, NACOA was one early voice. Weather, climate, or weather- and
climate-related matters have appeared in each issue of its annual reports.
NACOA was adding its voice to that of other advisory bodies on the need
to developa comprehensive research plan on climate. In its own right it
underlined the need for greater emphasis on ocean-atmosphere interaction

as a driving force to understanding climate and a way of improving fore-
sight.

The service of preparing a research plan was performed by ICAS, the Inter-
departmental Committee for Atmospheric Sciences (an element of the old
interagency Federal Council on Science and Technology) which formed an
ad hoc working group. After 4 years, and feeding on the work of commit-
tees of the NAS, the American Meteorological Society, a subcommittee of
the Domestic Council, and countless meetings, ICAS published a Climate
Plan a few months ago which is to be used as the basis for a coordinated
Federal effort in climate research. Currently, legislation whose approach
is based on the U.S. Climate Program Plan, is being worked on in the
Congress.

The Climate Plan may, by implication or example, help streamline the
weather modification effort. But a more direct possibility is that such
would occur when a report is published as required by the National Weather
Modification Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-490). It is expected next June.
Weather modification legislation has also been on the books for some years
requiring registration and notification of cloud seeding and other weather
modification activities so that the rather extensive private operations,
in some cases by unlicensed operators, would be sufficiently well known
that the experimental results of field experiments would not be compro-
mised by agents entering from another area.

There is also international activity in the field. The Russians, for
example, have claimed success in hail suppression for years. Stormfury,
a project for reducing winds in the central part of hurricanes, quiescent
for several years while improved research aircraft were acquired and in-
strumented, is about to recommence with a brief foray in the western
Atlantic this year (if suitable storms sufficiently far from land occur).
This is in preparation for a cooperative experiment with Mexico next
year in the eastern Pacific where a greater number of storms occur which,

nevertheless, make i,nfrequent landfall and are therefore suitable for
experimentation.

Looking Ahead

A great deal, therefore, is and will be happening. It could very well
prove useful for NACOA to keep itself sufficiently well informed of what
is happening in the National Climate Program Plan so that it can be of
prompt assistance either to the Congress or to the executive branch in
advising on problems that crop up in this complex enterprise, especially
in seeing that emphasis does not get misplaced nor parochial interests
dominate.

Background

NACOA First Annual Report, June 30, 1972, "Weather Modification," pp. 19-29.

NACOA Second Annual Report, June 29, 1973, "Weather Mod.ification and Con-
trol," pp. 34-37.

NACOA Third Annual Report, June 28, 1974, "Climate and the Oceans, Food,
and Energy," pp. 5-12; and "Weather Modification and Food," pp. 35-36.

NACOA Fourth Annual Report, June 30, 1975, "Weather Modification," pp. 38-42.

NACOA Fifth Annual Report, June 30, 1976, "Some Atmospheric Matters,"
pp. 49-54.

NACOA Sixth Annual Report, June 30, 1977, "Weather Modification Research,"
and "Aflational Climate Program," pp. 76-77.

"The Agnes Floods, a Post-Audit of the Effectiveness of the Storm and
Flood Warning System of NOAA." NACOA Report for the Administrator of
NOAA, November 22, 1972.

Public Law 94-490, National Weather Modification Policy Act of 1976.

A United States Climate Program, ICAS 20b, FCCSET, July 1977.

"Understanding Climate Change," National Academy of Sciences, 1975.

"The Ocean's Role in Climate Prediction," National Academy of Sciences,
1974.

"Climate and Food," National Academy of Sciences, 1976.

"The Atmospheric Sciences and Man's Need," National Academy of Sciences,
1971.

"A Primer on Climatic Variation and Change," Congressional Research
Service, September 1976.

"Weather Modification in the Public Interest," Fleagl e, Crutchfield,
Johnson, and Abdo, American Meteorological Society and University
of Washington Press, 1974.

General Accounting Office, 1974. Need for a National Weather Modification
Research Program.

Staff:

Douglas L. Brooks, Executive Director
David A. Katcher, Senior Staff Assistant
John T. Willis
A. Joseph Heckelman
Robert Gary
Abram B. Bernstein
Samuel H. Walinsky

Suppo rting Staff:

Diane G. Smith

Louise S. Lucas
Delphenia W. Brodie
Debra L. Walker

�r NACOA MEMBERS 1971 - 1977

William C. Ackermann ('74-'77) Edwin A. Link ('74-'77)
Betsy Ancker-Johnson ('73) Harold E. Lokken ('74-'77)
Tim M. Babcock ('74-'75) John W. Luhring ('73-'76)
Charles F. Baird ('71-'75) Ralph A. MacMullan ('71-'72)
,Perkins Bass ('73-'76) Thomas F. Malone ('71-'75)
Robert F. Bauer ('74-'77) Arthur E. Maxwell ('73-'76)
Werner A. Baum ('71-72,76-77) Edith M. McKee ('76-'77)
Charles A. Black ('75-'77) Donald L. McKernan ('75-'77)
Wayne V. Burt ('71-'75) John A. McWilliam ('76-'77)
John C. Calhoun, Jr. ('71-'72) John R. Michels ('77)
William D. Carey ('71-'74) 0. Wilfiam Moody, Jr. ('71-'72)
Robert A. Charpie ('74-'75) Thomas S. Moorman ('74-'77)
E. H. Clark, Jr. (76-'77) Mark Morton ('71,-'74)
Dayton H. Clewell ('71-'74) Grover E. Murray ('75-'77)
Thomas A. Clingan ('74) William A. Nierenberg ('71-'77)
John P. Craven ('71-'74) Oliver L. Peacock, Jr. ('76-'77)
Charles L. Drake ('71-'75) Jim D. Rearden ('76-'77)
Marne A. Dubs ('75-'77) Donald B. Rice ('73-'76)
Michael Raoul-Duval ('77) John J. Royal ('71-'74)
Thomas A. Fulham ('71-'75) Herman T. Schneebeli ('77)
John N. Garner ('77) Kenneth C. Spengler ('76-'77)
Joseph J. George ('71-'75) Julius A. Stratton ('71-'74)
Arthur Godfrey ('73-'76) George,M. Sullivan ('77)
Gilbert M. Grosvenor ('71-'72) Verner E. Suomi ('71-'72)
William J. Hargis, Jr. ('71-'77) Clement Tillion ('71-'76)
Lawrence J. Hogan ('77) Myron Tribus ('71-'72)
Charles L. Hosler, Jr. ('73-'76.) John W. Tukey ('75-'77)
Francis S. Johnson ('71-'74) Winona B. Vernberg ('74-'76)
A. Richard Kassander, Jr. ('76-'77) Odale D. Waters ('71-'72)
Alfred A. Keil ('77) Edward Wenk, Jr. ('71-'72)
Thomas L. Kimball ('75-'77) J. Robinson West (177)
Helmut E. Landsberg ('75-'77) Elmer P. Wheaton ('73-'76)
Laurence W. Lane ('73-'74) Warren S. Wooster ('76-'77)
L. Jay Langfelder ('76-'77)

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