[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]
Puget Sound and the Pipe The Role of CEIP in the Review of the Northern Tier Pipeline Application e4w N A TN 879.5 C87 1983 The State of Washington Department of Ecology Puget Sound and the Pipe The Role of CEIP in the Review of the Northern Tier Pipeline Application The State of Washington Department of Ecology by J. D. Currie Environmental Planner PrOPGrtY Of CS-C Llbra-@y Report 83-10, 11/83 Joseph R. Williams Manager - Coastal Energy Impact Program U - 8 . DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NOAA COASTAL SERVICES CENTER 2234 SOUTH HOBSON AVENUE CHARLESTON , SC 29405-2413 "The preparation of this report was financially aided through a grant from the Washington State Department of Ecology with funds obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and appropriated for Section 308(b) of the Coastal Zone '.1-fanagement Act of 1972." PUGET SOUND AND THE PIPE The Role of CEIP in the'Review of the Northern Tier Pipeline. Application Table of Contents Page 1.0 Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.0 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 2.1 Company Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.2 Market Conditions Affecting the Project . . . . 3 2.3 Environmental Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.4 Project Review and Role of CEIP . . . . . . . . 6 3.0 Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.0 Project Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1 Summary and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2 Washington State Hook-up Provisions . . . . . . 14 5.0 State Review Process - EFSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.0 Resources at Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.1 Select Geological Processes of the Coastal Zone * * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6.2 Marine Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.3 Terrestrial and Aquatic Resources . . . . . . . 23 7.0 CEIP Role in EFSEC Certification Process . . . . . . 29 8.0 NTPC Identification of Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . 31 8.1 Linkages . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 31 8.2 Fire and Explosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 8.3 Tanker and Submarine Pipelines -*Oil Spill Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 8.4 Spill Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 45 8.5 Submarine Geological Hazards . . . . . . . . . 46 8.6 Oil Spill Impacts on Flora and Fauna . . . . . 47 9.0 Intervenor Concerns and Activities . . . . . *. . . . 48 9.1 Counties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 9.2 State Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 10.0 EFSEC Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 10.1 Project Need . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 10.2 Fire and Explosion at Port Angeles . . . . . . 61 10.3 Oil Spill Risk - Tanker Accidents . . . . . . 63 10.4 Resoures at Risk - Marine 64 10.5 Vessel Accident Risks and Spill Migration 65 10.6 Oil Spill Risk - Submarine Lines . . . . . . . 66 10.7 River Crossing Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 10.8 Fishery Impacts- Siltation . . . . . . . . . 69 10.9 Sensitive Terrestrial Habitat and Wetlands. . 70 10.10 Mitigation . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . 72 11.0 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 11.1 Route Description and Project Characteristics. 78 11.2 CEIP Sponsored Testimony and Reports . . . . . 86 11.3 EFSEC FINDINGS - REFERENCE MATRIX . . . . . . . 93 11.4 Stipulated Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 -iV- Abbreviation Symbols and Acronyms Used in Report ANS - Alaska North Slope (oil) bb - barrels bpd - barrels per day BLM - U.S. Bureau of Land Management CCPA - Clallam County and City of Port Angeles CE - Council for the Environment CEIP - Coastal Energy Impact Program DEIS - Draft Environmental Impact Statement EFSEC - Washington State Energy Facilities Site Evaluation Council EIS - Environmental Impact Statement EPA - Environmental Protection Agency HIS - Final Environmental Impact Statement NOAA - National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration NPDES - National Pollution Discharge Elimination System NTPC - Northern Tier Pipeline Company NTPS - Northern Tier Pipeline System OIW - Oceanographic Institute of Washington, an institute affili- ated with the University of Washington that produced studies for NTPC and earlier assessed spill risks for the state. PSD - "Prevention of significant deterioration" (air quality permit issued by EPA) SOHIO - Standard Oil of Ohio TAPS - Trans Alaska Pipeline System USDOT - U.S. Department of Transportation WACs - Provisons of Washington Administrative Code WDOE - Washington State Department of Ecology WDF - Washington State Department of Fisheries WDG - Washington State Department of Game _V_ 1.0 Introduction This report documents the role of the Coastal Energy Impact Program (CEIP) in the review of the Northern Tier Pipeline Application and pro- vides a summary of the key aspects of the certification process by the Washington State Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council (EFSEC). The report identifies elements of the Northern Tier controversy and the key issues in a five and a half year debate which had important implications to Puget Sound and the Washington State coastal zone. Northern Tier proposed to bring supertankers through the Strait of Juan de Fuca and unload Alaska and Middle East crude oil at the existing community of Port Angeles. There, it would pump crude oil underneath the harbor to a nearby tank farm, then through a 42-inch pipeline that would pass eastward, eventually across Puget Sound at Admiralty Inlet. The project raised serious economic and environmental questions to both the state and local jurisdictions. At issue was a multibillion dollar project, potentially having national importance, but at the same time posing distinct, if not well quantified, hazards to the Puget Sound environment. The CEIP program was used to better establish the risks involved and to improve the quality of information placed before EFSEC in ireaching a decision on the project. As this report shows, the issues raised by the project were highly technical and beyond the normal capabilities of existing state and local agencies. They involved engineering questions not normally addressed and impacts on resources and natural processes that were not well inventoried. The report elaborates upon these infor- mation gaps and upon the argument over impacts and resources at risk and demonstrates the highly successful and effective use of CEIP monies. Studies and testimony sponsored by CEIP were not responsible for all the key findings by EFSEC, but they were highly influential, if not criti- cal, in a number of areas. In particular, they supplied an indispens- ible review of submarine geology and submarine engineering questions and were heavily drawn upon in the evaluation of oil spill risk. In addi- tion, they served two other key functions: 1) they provided a site specific and, in some cases, spec .ies specific inventory of resources at risk, and 2) a wide ranging evaluation of impact mitigation measures. The former heightened the council's awareness of resources at risk. Products include maps, inventories, and impact studies which should continue to have value for future project review. Likewise, CEIP miti- gation studies identified important mechanisms and procedures applicable not only to pipelines but any number of other projects affecting marine, aquatic, and terrestrial resources. 2.0 Background 2.1 Company Objectives Northern Tier was originally conceived in the early 1970s as a profit-making venture that would respond to three national and international oil market conditions: 1) a surplus of Alaska North Slope (ANS) crude on the West Coast; 2) expected reductions of -1- KtTiMAT T MOUNT .. ....... ...... ... ...... ....... ...... IGI NOR !!R.E_ /t \_i_ _ - 1 -4 LEGEND 4LLI" tkATH MARINE ROUTES ......... FOREIGN ALTERNATIVE PIPELINE - - - - - - - ROUTES .......... L ALTERNATIVE RAIL ....................... ROUTES T ExISTING CRUDE OIL PI PELI HE NETWORK REFINERY CENTERS TERMINALS SOHI o FOREIGN - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - T&- G. A FROM HORN PANAMA CAPE ANAL To CAPE HORN\. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 2.1.1 Alternative Methods for Supplying Crude Oil to the Northern Tier States. Source: NTPC -2- Canadian crude oil exports to the United States as well as related uncertainties regarding dependable future oil delivery to U.S. refineries; and, 3) an anticipated increase in demand by Midwest and Northern Tier state refineries. From a 1976-1977 perspective, there was some basis for believing that the project would solve a developing crude oil distribution problem. The delivery of Prudhoe Bay oil to the West Coast began in 1977. The immediate effect was a displacement of West Coast imports that was manifested in a sharp increase in oil volume shipped via the Panama Canal to the Gulf Coast. Northern Tier considered this a surplus condition, amounting to an excess of over 500,000 barrels per day, and potentially increasing to 1,200,000 bpd. Implicit in the notion of surplus was a significant Midwest demand for the displaced West Coast oil. Northern Tier asserted that refineries in the Midwest and Northern Tier states would soon experience shortfalls, or, at the minimum, would have to pay unne- cessarily high transshipment prices if the pipeline were not built. The company cited a 1975 CaAadian government announcement to cur- tail oil exports after 199@. Refineries in the Northern Tier states would, asserted N6'rithern Tier,, be particularly affected because of their heavy depOridence on Canadian crude. The demand for oil supplies within th& service a .reas of these refineries was also projected to rise si,gnilficantly. This was the finding of Northern Tier's consultant@.,tkie Pace Corporation, and this was the prediction, of a U.S. Departme"nit. of Energy study based upon "most probable" estimates of crude 611 Price increases. The 1978 Public Utility Reguiatory Act (PURPA), was a reflection of the mid-1970s market conditOns. It authorized the President to make a determination of the need for crude?oil delivery systems and to select one of the competing projects for expedited federal pro- cessing.* Pursuant to these provisions'. President Carter selected Northern Tier over the Trans Mountain ', Company and other pipeline projects for early consideration. Howe'Ver, by 1979, the political and eco- nomic environment was changlfi@ rapidly and called to question the rationale for Northern Tier" ''ehd'.any other west-east oil pipeline with a large throughput, and @eiavy fixed costs@ 2.2 Market Conditions Affecting the Project The Iranian oil boycott and the subsequent rise in world oil prices rendered questionable, if not. totally untenable, the Department of Energy's projections' of future oil demand. According to economic logic, price increases would translate into reductions in consump- tion. Nationwide eVidence was already available that shifts were occurring in demand due to conservation. It began to look as though there might 'actually be a decreased demand in the Northern Tier states. If Northern Tier were built, would anyone want the oil that it delivered? *Whether the act mandated an ea st-we9t 'pipeline is a matter of interpre- tation. See Figure 2.1.1 for:alternative projects and routes. The Midwest supply situation was becoming equally problematic from Northern Tier's perspective. High worldwide prices of oil and natural gas would make continental shale oil production and domes- tic oil exploration more feasible. This would lessen the need to import ANS and Middle East crude oil. Moreover, full deregulation of domestic oil prices was on the horizon. Decontrol began in 1980 and would result in a complete lifting of the government ceiling prices by October 1981, thus providing further incentive to develop Midwest continental sources. Northern Tier insisted that there was still enough demand and still enough West Coast "surplus" to justify the project. Increasingly, however, a change in emphasis was apparent. It was the undevel- oped, yet recoverable, reserves of the North Slope, anywhere from 12-49 billion barrels, that would justify a line having such a high throughput capacity (933,000 bpd). From the company's perspective, no other alternative could deliver these resources to continental refiners as efficiently. Project opponents countered that oil cited by the company was "speculation" oil, that no large new fields had actually been proved. Moreover, the time it would take before any such source could be tapped would be six-eight years. Prudhoe Bay production, on the other hand (the original oil used to justify the project), was expected to decline by 1986. The Canadian situation also became a matter of vigorous debate. At issue was the magnitude of the asserted import reductions. Evi- dence was introduced that the cutoff of Canadian crude might not be as total as first believed. The issue, it seems, was complicated by regional economic relationships between American states and Canadian provinces. Moreover, estimates of Canadian gas reserves were revised dramatically upward in the late 1970s, thereby lessen- ing concern about resource drain to the United States. It became apparent that substitution between oil and natural gas would pro- vide a basis for continued oil export. Equally significant was the lack of American petroleum industry interest in the project. On both ends of the pipeline, commitment remained elusive. SOHIO, the largest holder of ANS crude and developable North Slope sources, was willing to offer no supply assurances. In part, this was a function of the fact that its own refineries were south of the Northern Tier states and had little to gain from a change in the distribution network. The refineries in the Northern Tier states were no more enthusiastic. They were experiencing cutbacks in production and even closing, not because they were thirsty for oil, but because demand was falling drastic- ally. 2.3 Environmental Issues Washington State Benefits and Puget Sound Tanker Traffic Northern Puget Sound refineries currently receiving oil by pipeline and tankers at Cherry Point, near Anacortes, would, according to -4- Potential Pipeline Spur for Existing h, ,, I Puget Sound Ref ineries ..................... ---- POTENTIAL PIPELINE SPUR . ........ TRANSMOUNTAIN PIPELINE PROPOSED NORTHERN TIER PIPELINE /9 Arington r Figure 2.3.1 Source: BLM EIS Potential Pipeline Spur for Existing Puget Sound Refineries the company, also be beneficiaries of the project. These refine- ries would be supplied through spur line connection and thereby secure a reliable flow of oil. Northern Tier projected that Wash- ington State refineries, like their Midwest counterparts, would also experience supply shortages in the 1980s because of Canadian cutbacks. Moreover, there would be a significant environmental derivative: Tanker traffic across the sensitive waters of Puget Sound could be significantly reduced. Tankers would be able to moor and off-load at the Ediz Hook berths at Port Angeles off the Strait of Juan de Fuca and not have to cross the sensitive waters of Admiralty Inlet and the straits between the San Juan Islands and north Whidbey Island. Eliminating this traffic, argued the company, would reduce the oil spill risk to Puget Sound and the San Juan Islands. 1!M1j-. cit was the belief that oceanography of the Sound favored spill migration to the west and that the existing tanker traffic, admit- tedly less than that created by a super port at Port Angeles, was a ticking hazard to the biological resources of Puget Sound. Through the early 1970s, small spills had been on the rise. How soon would it be until a major catastrophe? -5- Ever since the conception of the Trans Alaska Pipeline, there had been discussion of the additional hazard posed to the sound by creating a super port inside the strait. A number of proposals had been advanced for expanding existing port facilities at Cherry Point, and other Puget Sound sites. The resulting political reac- tion was overwhelmingly negative: tankers would be barred from the Sound and there would be no super port east of Port Angeles. The policy was reflected in the state's Coastal Zone Plan in 1976, and more formally established by the Magnuson Amendment to the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1978. Paradoxically, Northern Tier was justified as the vehicle for advancing this policy: more oil would be carried into coastal waters; but the overall environmental risk would be lowered-- lowered in part, because tanker traffic would be reduced in the most sensitive waters. This was the company's response to its environmenta list critics. Environmental organizations in Port Angeles were among the first groups to dispute the company's assertions. A group called No Oil Port contended that the project would cause a wide variety of impacts that were underestimated. These included the socioeconomic impacts to Clallam County and the City of Port Angeles, as well as the larger spill risks to state waters. 2.4 Project Review and the Role of CEIP By 1978, state and local agencies were also expressing strong reservations about the project. These included geological ques- tions relating to the integrity of the submarine line, as well as the reliability of various estimates of fire, tanker spills, and tanker explosions. Now, it seemed, a superport outside the Sound, particularly because it was paired with a submarine crossing, might not be a good risk. It became apparent that a number of important technical issues were involved. At the state level, there was a deficiency in existing information, and in some cases expertise to provide a thorough review. For example, there was little detailed information on the submarine geology of the Admiralty crossing and no specialized staff exper- tise to evaluate the liquefaction hazard of a submarine pipeline. A state body known as the 06eanographic Commission had earlier been funded to evaluate oil port issues and spill risk. However, after sponsoring several studies, several of which were controversial, its funding was eliminated. This capability was available nowhere else. Certainly, no existing state or local agencies had experi- ence dealing with a crude oil marine terminal and pipeline as large as the one proposed by Northern Tier. A meaningful review of the project would therefore require acquisition of considerable outside expertise through staffing or contract arrangements so that line agencies might participate in the site certification process. At the local level, the problem was perhaps even more pronounced. Economic slowdowns and state restrictions on property taxation were causing reductions in staffing which, in turn, reduced local government's ability to devote the needed attention to Northern Tier project review. While the state's energy facility siting law -6- required Northern Tier, as applicant, to pay a permit fee and to cover the costs of the environmental impact statement, no legisla- tive provisions existed which required the company to financially assist local governments in their participation in the project review. The CEIP filled these funding and staffing needs. Beginning in the summer of 1978, the Washington Department of Ecology (WDOE), the state's coastal zone management agency, applied to the Federal Office of Coastal Zone Management for CEIP funds to enhance the ability of state resource management agencies and local governments to participate in the EFSEC process. Through May 1982, approxi- mately one million dollars of federal CEIP funds, together with state and local matching shares, were used to address the environ- mental, social, and economic issues presented by the Northern Tier proposal. Measures to avoid, redress, or mitigate identified impacts were developed. The vast bulk of this joint state-local effort was converted to testimony and presented to the siting coun- cil in its deliberations over the proposal. As pointed out by one local official managing the CEIP subaward, "The CEIP grant was more rapidly converted into products than any other product with which I have been involved. It goes almost without saying that availabil- ity of CEIP funds made a tremendous impact on the-county's ability to defend its interest in the two energy proposals.",r "Steve Rice, Snohomish County Planning Dept. -7- 3.0 Chronology November 21, 1975: Formation of Northern Tier Pipeline Company. The Northern Tier Pipeline Company determines Cherry Point the preferred location for a major oil terminal. June 1976: WDOE issues Washington Coastal Zone Management Plan which includes a statement supporting the siting of a major crude oil handling facility no further east than Port Angeles. July 6, 1976: NTPC files application with EFSEC for a pipe- line around the sound and marine terminal at Port Angeles. July 28, 1976: EFSEC determines need for additional information which is received in August and November 1976. Sept./Oct. 1976: Local land use and zoning hearings are held. November 19, 1976: NTPC supplements application. February 28, 1977: EFSEC finds NPTC proposal consistent with local land use.plans (with the exception of proposed tank farm at Green Point. June 16, 1977: Major deficiencies found in application by CH2M Hill. June 28, 1977: Applicant granted extension of application processing time. July 14, 1977: Supplemental material submitted in reply to CH2M Hill report. September 9, 1977: Applicant submits amendment and major route change. October 20, 1977: Land use and zoning hearings are held on route changes. December 29, 1977: Applicant granted /extension of application pro- cessing time. Jan./June 3.978: Applicant amends application in cluding supple- mental materials and further route change (volumes 2,- 3 and 4). March 1978: The council, acting on behalf of the State of Washington, makes a formal request to the fed- eral government for a decision on whether the proposed facility is needed to provide crude oil to other regions of the nation as a whole. A definitive response is not received. -8- August 18, 1978: NTPC submits amended route in King, Kittitas, Spokane, and Adams counties, largely to avoid alternate water supply hazards. September 1978: Washington State receives CEIP grant aid award for analysis of NTPC proposal. October 1978: Land use and zoning hearings are held on route changes. November 9, 1978: Congress passes the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), expediting federal review and permit processing of a West-to-East Coast crude oil delivery system. December 1978: EFSEC finds recent route changes consistent with local land use plans and zoning ordin- ances. February 9, 1979: Applicant requests extended processing time for revision of proposal. March 26, 1979: NTPC announces cross-sound route and requests delay in completion of the draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) and start of hearings. June 25, 1979: NTPC again makes changes in route, proposing submarine pipeline portions under Puget Sound with a terrestrial route passing through Island and Snohomish counties. Amendments are also made altering berth and submarine unloading configurations. EFSEC initiates hearing in affected counties on land use. July/Aug. 1979: Land use and zoning hearings are held for revised route. September 4, 1979: The Bureau of Land Management -Envi ronmenta I Impact Statement (BLM-EIS) completed and made available. October 23, 1979: Proposed land use order issued by Administra- tive Law Judge. Oct./Nov. 19 79: Topical prehearing conference held. November 13, 1979: EFSEC issues draft EIS which largely echoes statements, conclusions of the June 25 applica- tion. November 26, 1979: EFSEC finds portions of the most recent proposal inconsistent with local land use: portions in Clallam County, at Port Angeles, and in Snohomish County. -9- December 27, 1979: Council approves 12-month extension'of applica- tion processing time. January 3, 1980: Contested case hearings formally open. At end, they will have resulted in a 43,153 page record with 872 exhibits. January 28, 1980: President Carter selects the Northern Tier pro- posal for expedited federal processing. February 6, 1980: Council denies Clallam County, Port Angeles motion for consideration of hookup. March 19, 1980: NTPC requests a supplement to DEIS addressing hookup. (Denied) May 27, 1980: Council issues request for development of the final environmental impact statement (FEIS) to CH2M Hill. June 9, 1980: WDOE (later joined by five other intervenors) files motion for delaying hearing, pending receipt of accurate description of submarine 'pipeline route. In part, this is triggered by NTPC reference to a change in the Admiralty crossing. June 23, 1980: Council adopts schedule for remainder of case, deferring "air quality" until end of intervenor's case. July 14, 1980: Administrative law judge issues order granting motions for supplement of the submarine pipeline portion of the application; council rescinds schedule for remainder of case. July 22, 1980: As required by council, NTPC submits complete legal description of terrestrial pipeline. July 24, 1980: Intervenors file appeals of order by administra- tive law judge. July/Aug. 1980: NPDES hearings held and completed. August 19, 1980: EFSEC issues order that NTPC has failed to adequately des..cribe portions of the submarine and terrestrial pipeline and had not conducted adequate studies for a description of physical, geological, geographical, and hydrological characteristics of the segment. EFSEC forwards list of data deficiencies to NTPC. August 21, 1980: Schedule issued calling for hearings of remainder of applicant's case to commence October 15, 1980. _10- Sept./Oct. 1980. NTPC conducts metering, geologic analysis of altered submarine route pursuant to EFSEC order; does not undertake all the specified studies. December 22, 1980: Applicant completes presentation of its case. January 6, 1981: Intervenors case begins. March 1981: Administrative Law Judge, John von Reis, denies motion for dismissal by intervenor, King County. The county argued that the applicant failed to meet state guidelines by not providing detailed pump station designs and plans and information with respect to state "WACs." Judge von Reis rules that due to the special nature of the project, relative to other fixed site energy facilities, these plans may be provided after certification. May 28, 1981: EPA makes initial determination to issue permit to Northern Tier under the Federal Air Act. At issue is the effect of tanker unloading facilities and the Green Point tank farm on air quality in Clallam County. Feb./May 1981: EFSEC holds public hearings on Northern Tier application in Port Townsend, Moses Lake, Coupeville-, Port Angeles, Friday Harbor, Everett, Spokane, North Bend, and Olympia. In Western Washington, public sentiment is preponderently against the project because of perceived threat9 to the marine and aquatic resources of the state. August 3-6, 1981: All parties provide closing arguments on the application. Intervenors Port Angeles, Clallam County, Jefferson County, Island County, Snoho- mish County, San Juan County, King County, and the state departments of Ecology, Fisheries, and Game call for rejection of the application. They are joined by the Tulalip Tribe and various environmental-groups. September 3,- 1981: Final EIS issued. September 14, 1981: EPA issues PSD permit. October 9, 1981-.' Hearings end. January 27, 1982: EFSEC issues Order No. 636, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Recommendation, regarding the Northern Tier Pipeline Application. The order recommends denial by the Governor. March 2, 1982: Corps of Engineers issues permit 071-OYB-2- 004693 for Washington Rivers/Puget Sound cross- ings and Port Angeles Harbor crossing. April 8, 1982: Governor denies application 76-2 in accordance with the findings and recommendation of Order 636. 4.0 Project Description* 4.1 Summary and Scope Northern Tier proposed to build and operate a 42-inch crude oil pipeline, 1,491 miles in length from a port facility at Port Angeles, Washington to Clearbrook, Minnesota. The planned initial design capacity was 709,000 barrels per day and the ultimate design capacity 933,000 barrels. In the State of Washington, the planned route extended from Port Angeles on the Olympic Peninsula through Clallam, Jefferson, Island, Snohomish, and King counties, then across the Cascades through three Eastern Washington counties. The Washington State portion of the route was 367 miles, including 27 miles of submarine lines in crossings of Port Angeles Harbor (6.5) miles, Admiralty Inlet (18 miles) and Saratoga Passage (4 miles). Figure 4.1.1 Northern Tier Route Sections in Washington State Source: NTPC application *A detailed discussion of the route, the proposed superport facilities, tank farm and overland section is provided in appendix 11.1. -12- Northern Tier estimated a cost of $1.885 billion for the entire system at ultimate design capacity (1981 dollars); while the cost of facilities in Washington would be approximately $818 million. Table 4--l. Construction Cost Estimates, Northern Tier Pipeline System (March 1981 dollars) Cost in Millions of Dollars State of Entire Pipeline Washington System. Tanker Unloading Facilities $154 $ 154 Onshore Storage Facilities 122 122 Pipeline System Port Angeles to Idaho Border 542 Port Angeles to Clearbrook, Minnesota 1,579 Total $818 $1,855 Source: Beasley, July 15, 1981. The system would be supplied by tankers delivering crude oil to a marine terminal constructed in the natural deep water harbor at Port Angeles. Crude oil would be received from Alaskan and other domestic and foreign. sources and transported to inland markets. Northern Tier intended to deliver oil to existing refineries in the Rocky Mountain, upper Midwest, and eastern states. A tank farm at Green Point would be connected to two fixed tanker berths at Ediz Hook via two pipelines underneath Port Angeles Harbor. At Green Point, 11 floating roof tanks would store the offloaded oil. Eventual storage capacity would be 3.8 million barrels. Northern Tier proposed to cross Puget Sound with submarine lines at Admiralty Inlet, 18 miles, and Saratoga Passage (Whidbey Island to Camano Island), 4 miles. These sections would be laid by barges which would lower the pipe into a deep water trench. Northern Tier asserted that the design tolerances of the lines would make them capable of resisting any reasonably expected stresses caused by submarine soil liquefaction, seismic activity, or slides. The pipe would have a minimum specified yield strength of 66,000 pounds per inch and pipe wall thickness up to 1.0 inch. -13- 5 J 'PC@@ t'-'@"J W @"Z Ij A< 'j@ q, W, Figure 4.1.2 Northern Tier planned to lower its 42 inch pipe into a trench using sideboom tractors. The dimen- sions of the trench, including depth and sidewall slopes, were expected to vary, depending upon local soil conditions, trench erosion, and engineering considerations (e.g., protection against river scour). 4.2 Washington State Hook-Up Provisions Under the terms of its federal right-of-way grant, Northern Tier was required to serve the northern Puget Sound refineries. This might entail as much as 350,000 bpd of throughput. In order to make this connection possible, a spur line would be required off the planned route near Arlington. NTPC did not provide details for the construction of that line in its EFSEC application, but indicated the following system needs if hookup were to occur: I. An increase in the number of new tanker berths at Port Angeles from two to three. 2. Possible increase in the number of Port Angeles submarine pipelines from two to three. 3. Construction of seven additional 545,000-barrel storage tanks at Green Point (over the 18 without hookup) 4. A 2.1-million barrel storage facility at Arlington. Details would be developed after initial project certification -(during a second application process). 5.0 State Review Process - EFSEC In 1970, the Washington State Legislature established EFSEC to evaluate and license major energy facilities. Such facilities include pipeline projects as well as a nuclear and coal fired power plants. Prior to 1.970, a number of state and local agencies reviewed particular aspects of energy projects and separately granted or denied permits. This resulted in costly, duplicative paper work and public hearings. More- over, prior to EFSEC, there was no integrated assessment of each proj- ect based upon total impacts to air, water, fisheries, game, human health, and socioeconomic concerns. -14- The council contains representatives from 14 state agencies, appointed by their directors. The members are required to consider and balance the merits and liabilities of each application based upon EFSEC guide- lines and pertinent state laws. Representatives are not limited to the special concerns of their respective agencies. A voting chairman is appointed by the Governor. In the Northern Tier deliberations, this was Nicholas Lewis whose previous agency affilitation was with the Office of Financial Management. A peculiar feature of EFSEC's organization is the role of local govern- ments. Cities and counties are authorized voting representation on the council when issues affecting their jurisdictions are being considered. This may result, as it did in the Northern Tier case, in counties and cities judging the merits of a case on which they have already taken a position. In the final analysis, however, EFSEC does not actually grant or deny a permit. It only makes recommendations to the Governor. In the end, he may choose to disagree with the majority findings and recommendations of the council. When an applicant files a formal application, this initiates a series of procedures which may culminate in contested case hearings. Within one year after an application is received and judged complete, EFSEC is required to make a recommendation to the Governor as to final approval or disapproval. As parties to the hearings, proponents and opponents of a project are allowed to present evidence and expert testimony. Any party so authorized is called an intervenor. In the Northern Tier hear- ings, there were 23 intervenors of which 10 received CEIP assistance. Should EFSEC and the Governor certify a project, local land use control is preempted. That is, the applicant is freed from responsibility to secure health, building, zoning, shoreline, grading, and other related permits. Despite these exemptions, the process does require land use hearings and findings by EFSEC on land use consistency. These must be held in affected jurisdictions. The results are made a part of the EFSEC record and become a :factor in deliberations. By an attorney general's opinion in 1977, the council is not required to reject a proj- ect if it is found inconsistent with land use laws and plans. Stipulations may play a prominent role in the EFSEC process. EFSEC guidelines permit the applicant and intervenors to resolve specific issues of concerns through stipulated agreements and thereby reduce hearing time. During the course of the hearings, Northern Tier nego- tiated with all of the affected jurisdictions attempting to allay con- cerns using this mechanism. The agreements were offered to the council by the company as examples of its commitment to minimize impacts and meet local concerns. CEIP funding was used by the intervenors to develop the agreements. Each agreement included mitigation measures focusing upon local impacts and also typically addressed both plan review and liability questions. A list of stipulated agreements reached between the applicant and intervenor is found in Appendix 11.4. -15- I A number.of documents and studies are used in the project review process and become part of the EFSEC case record. These include the applica- tion, an environmental impact statement, and public testimony- recorded at various public hearings. Testimony includes both prefiled statements and cross-examination of intervenors and council-called witnesses. At the end of the contested case hearings, the council studies the record at length and issues a recommendation to the Governor. During the Northern Tier case, Administrative Law Judge John von Reis was retained to assist the council in the development of a draft order and to rule on matters of law. Judge von Reis played an active role in the evaluation of evidence and worked closely . with the EFSEC staff to develop findings on the most controversial issues. Order 636, the EFSEC order recommending denial by the Governor, bears close resemblance to the Judge von Reis draft report, testifying to the influential role of the judge in shaping the outcome of the certification decision. A key feature of the EFSEC process is its adversarial design. A deci- sion on certification is designed to be the result of a debate over the merits of a project. The debate is played out in the presentation and cross-examination of expert witnesses by the applicant and intervenors. There are limitations in the framework, however. There is no EFSEC mechanism that ensures there will be an equality of financial resources available to project intervenors vis a vis the applicant. EFSEC is only authorized to charge the applicant the cost of preparing an environ- mental impact statement and a site reconnaissance study. Should an intervenor such as county, port district, or city face significant impacts from a project, that jurisdiction, whatever its resources and budgetary constraints, must sponsor its own witnesses without subsidy from the council or charges to the applicant. In some cases, this limitation might arguably have little impact. State and local agencies, for example, commonly enlist existing staff having other functional responsibilities for the review of permit applications; however, with large, highly complex projects requiring significant spe- cialization or detailed technical analysis, this proves to be difficult. The technical issues raised by a project such as Northern Tier simply could not be adequately addressed without a quantum increase in staffing and financial support for supplementary analysis of the presented data. 6.0 Resources at Risk Crude oil comes to the Angeles shore in holds of giant steel boats Bitter black gold from the Prudhoe Bay fields and sweet from the sands of Khayyam What will it do to this land, my friend, where kings and silvers run free In age-old flight from Indian nets and whales that rise from the deep? -16- At the heart of the Northern Tier controversy was the uncertain probability of significant damage to the resources of Puget Sound, the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and interrelated land and coastal resources. Just how much sensitive habitat, how many species, how much biological productivity would be jeopardized by expected worst case impacts? What would be the likelihood of either worst case or less extreme events? Northern Tier lawyers labored strenuously to prove that the project would actually serve environmental protec- tion by reducing tanker traffic to the sound. There was no dispute that the sound, the San Juan Islands, and the inner coastal areas possessed important biological, esthetic, and recreational quali- ties that should be conserved. The central arguments instead turned on the relative sensitivity of habitats and the risks posed by the Northern Tier proposal relative to antecedent conditions. Arguing from similar premises, the intervenors contended that the Puget Sound coastal province was too valuable to be subjected to any heightened oil spill risk; and Northern Tier would heighten that risk. Though the parties would disagree as to the risk and potential severity of damage, given accidents and expected pipeline related occurrences, both sides sustained an appreciation of the resources and habitat sensitivity. In fact, there was significant harmony in the testimony of Northern Tier and state witnesses regarding sensitivity of species to pipe- line oil spills. No small amount of the case hearings was devoted to the inven- tory -- to the stock taking of what was at risk. This included review of and reference to site specific studies of habitat as well as a substantial number of new field investigations. With the possible exception of NOAA's MESA Program, the Northern Tier review resulted in the greatest exercise yet performed by state and local government in assessing its coastal and marine resource sensiti- vity. Puget Sound has been described as a vast river fed marine lake and estuary. It is flooded by 10 major river systems running from the nearby Cascade and Olympic ranges; and, under average conditions, experiences limited hydrological exchange with the marine waters of the Outer Strait of Juan de Fuca and the Pacific Ocean. The Sound is central to the region's commerce and a treasured recreational and biological resource. It is a unique confluence of natural pro- cesses including weather, currents, and tides, as well as geolo- gical, hydrological, and biological forces. The ecosystem includes an array of habitats ranging from rocky islands, sheltered beaches, extensive tide flats and estuaries, and naturally formed spits. The result is a virtually incomprehensible variety of marine life and aquatic flora and fauna. The lowland valleys that border the Sound in Snohomish and King counties, and the Whidbey Island plateau are locally important agricultural areas, particularly noted for the production of dairy products. The harbors, including Everett, Port Angeles, Port Town- send, and Seattle to the south, are important for international -17- commerce, log export, commercial fishing, and industrial transship- ment. The mountainous regions, particularly those on the Olympic Peninsula in the backdrop of the proposed tanker unloading site, are especially important for timber production and recreation. Similar economic values are derived in the Cascades in Snohomish County and King County. The sound and marine waters of the state have long been exploited for commercial and recreational uses and simultaneously conserved for natural habitat value. Puget Sound's commerce and industry have, in fact, long been linked to the integrity and health of the marine and aquatic ecosystems. This relationship predates the flood of environmental legislation of the 1960s. It is reflected by aggressive state and local park acquisitions, and by longstand- ing efforts to maintain water quality. The State of Washington was also a leader in coastal zone conservation, establishing its own shoreline management program one yea-r prior to federal legislation. No better example exists of this concinnity of interest in the con- servation of the sound and related habitat than the regional salmon fishery. Over 2,820 miles of streams in the Puget Sound Basin are used by anadromous fish for spawning and rearing. Out-migration from the waterways generates a renewable stock of fish worth $52 million annually in commercial and recreational catches. The health of the fishery, in turn, is intertwined with that of rare and endangered animal species, including the Northern Bald Eagle and various species of whales, seals, and porpoises. The fishery also provides the foundation to a way of life for local Indian tribes as well as long-e s tabli shed non-Indian commercial fishermen. oil @4 4 0 Figure 6.0.1 Menzies Journal of Vancouver's Voyage to the Strait of Juan de Fuca, 1792. 6.1 Select Geological Processes of the Coastal Zone The Puget Sound region is an active seismic zone which has experi- enced frequent earthquakes of low-to-moderate intensity. Less fre- quent events in the Mercalli VII-VIII range have been recorded within the basin since 1949, and have been noted on the Olympic Peninsula, the Puget Sound Basin, and the Cascade province. Lique- faction, the process by which soils lose their bearing capacity by virtue of shaking and saturation, is a potential hazard in flood- plains and the coastal regime. Submarine landslides and slumps are believed to occur in portions of Puget Sound where there is a com- bination of currents, steep slopes, potentially liquefiable soils, and seismic activity. Under certain circumstances, submarine slides can be initiated where slopes are less than 2 percent. Slopes significantly steeper are common throughout northern Puget Sound, as are other irregularities in bottom terrain such as boulders and sand waves. In parts of northern Puget Sound, the submarine topography is marked by the presence of sand waves, the result of strong currents interacting with bottom deposits. In some areas, the rippled ter- rain may have amplitudes of 20 feet and wave lengths approaching several hundred feet. Because the process is dynamic, a pipeline buried in an active sand wave regime may risk being exposed by current scouring or soil movement and subjected through spanning or flotation to design stresses. WIND ROSE Frequency distribution of wind direction*, at Port Angeles Oceanography N NNW NNE Wind, current, and tides "work together in an intricate, yet NW NE imperfectly understood, manner within the Strait of Juan de Fuca and northern Puget Sound. The WNW ENE marine and shore resources jeopar- dized by Northern Tier would, in T large measure, be a function of W PERCENT E these forces, not only because of CALM geological interactions but because currents would dictate the migra- WSW 5% ESE tion and dispersion of both surface 10% and submarine oil spills. Water 15% movement in the Strait of Juan de SW SE Fuca is influenced by tides, winds, 20% and the large inflows of freshwater SSW 25% SSE in Puget Sound and the Strait. Net S Numerical yalue is in percent of time. flow is out of the strait toward @.,d- h.., V-dd- f- ___ h,,.ghlq52, the ocean; however, it is reversed S-- U.S. C-,Cued for extended periods of time, de- Figure 6.1.1 pending upon variations in hydro- graphic factors. Wind Rose at Port Angeles _19- Currents in the Strait of Juan de Fuca are characterized by a west- ward mean flow at the surface and an eastward flow near the bottom; though these too may be reversed. Such reversals can persist for up to 10 days and may occur in both summer and winter. Currents in the eastern Strait of Juan de Fuca and Admiralty Inlet are more complex than currents in the western strait. Here, a clockwise circulation system often exists with considerable mixing of water strata over the Admiralty Inlet sill. Downwelling at the sill is likely to transport surface waters into the north basin of Puget Sound. Puget Sound waters, like those in the strait, evidence a net out- ward flow, in this case northerly at the surface and southerly at depths. Currents between Port Williams and Protection Island, in the proximity to the major submarine pipeline segment, are highly variable and poorly understood. Winds exert a strong influence on surface waters but, because of high local variability, are difficult to evaluate with respect to impact on surface flows. Westerly winds oppose drift out of the inner Strait and are most dominant at Port Angeles. 6.2 Marine Resources porpoises, and possibly minke whales. Significant numbers of North Puget Sound and Strait these species are found in Haro of Juan de Fuca Strait and Rosario Strait. The marine waters of Puget Sound comprise a complex ecosystem of unusually productivity and diver- sity. Particularly noteworthy are the populations of marine mammals which include several rare, threat- ened and uncommon species, as well as the abundance of waterbirds and commercially important fish and shellfish. Marine Mammals Twenty-one species of marine mammals have been reported within the Strait of Juan de Fuca and northern Puget Sound. Thirteen of Orclnus orca these are considered uncommon, rare or endangered. Humpback, gray, and fin whales are classified "endan- gered," and are known to frequent 'A the Strait of Juan de Fuca. The northern Puget Sound region also possesses resident populations of Figure 6.2.1 killer whales, seals, wintering sea Orcinus orca-"Killer Whale," One of 23 whales lions, dall porpoises, harbor found in Washington State waters. _20- Waterbirds Waterbirds, including predators, waterfowl, and seabirds, are abun- dant throughout the Strait of Juan de Fuca and northern Puget Sound. Over 100 species have been identi- fied. The strait provides roosting and staging areas for resident and migratory species, with the major- ity of nesting sites concentrated at Tatoosh, Protection, and Smith islands. The entire strait is important to common murres during summer and fall, with an estimated population of 150,000 birds. Over 80 species of waterbirds are considered important by state and federal standards. Particularly notable among these are the North- RHINOCeR05 ern Bald Eagle (threatened status AUKLr--T in Washington), the osprey (poten- tially threatened), and the pere- Figure 6.2.2 grine falcon (endangered). The Rhinoceros Auklet is named for its prominent bill. Protection Island supports In the Puget Sound area proper, the major percentage of Washington's important resting, feeding, and breeding population. nesting grounds have been identi- fied for migratory and resident species. These include the south shore of Lopez Island, Rosario Strait, Skagit, Padilla, and Bellingham bays. Peregrine falcon, bald eagle, and osprey are also found in this zone. Brown pelicans (endangered) and snow geese, pro- tected by a treaty with the Soviet Union, are also present. Fish and Shellfish Commercial fish in the strait and north Puget Sound zones include five species of salmon and about 50 species of bottom fish. Among the latter are flatfish, greenling and ling cod, several species of rock fish, sablefish, Pacific cod, hake, tomcod, walleye, pollock, sun perch, skates, dogfish shark, ratfish, and sculpin. The average annual salmonid commercial catch in Puget Sound and the Strait is over 5,000,000 pounds valued at about $39,800,000 (Table 6.2.2). Over $34 million of the recreational salmonid fishery occurs in waters that could be degraded by pipeline spills. In proximity to the terminal and underwater crossings are some of the most productive fishery grounds. -21- All Puget Sound and many Canadian salmon runs pass through the Strait of Juan de Fuca. In addition to supporting locally valuable fisheries, these runs contribute to virtually every salmon fishery in the Pacific from California to southeastern Alaska. The Cana- dian fishery in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Georgia Strait, in proximity to the Northern Tier submarine line and within spill trajectories of tanker traffi1c, has been valued as high as $41 mil- lion per year. Table 6.2.1 Washington State Recreational Salmon Catch Area Average High Number Value Number Value Coastal Waters 800,000 $42,000,000 1,200,000 $64,000,000 Strait of Juan de Fuca 100@000 $10,000,000 200,000 $13,000,000 Puget Sound 100,000 $15,000,000 300,000 $21,000,000 Commercial salmon fishing occurs throughout Puget Sound and the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Recent commercial harvest levels of bottom fish from Washington coastal waters have averaged 24,446,000 lbs. valued at $10.2 million. Table 6.2.2 Washington State Commercial Salmon Catch Area Average High Number Value Number Value Strait of Juan de Fuca $ 2,000,000 $ 3,600,000 West Beach 85,000 64,000 158,000 1,137,000 Point Roberts - San Juan Islands 3,900,000 27,000,000 5,300,000 38,000,000 Bellingham Bay 133,000 2,400,000 220,000 3,600,000 Skagit Bay 74,000 700)000 146,000 1,200)000 Port Susan Port Gardner 88,000 1,000,000 125,000 1,400,000 Discovery Bay Admiralty Inlet 110,000 1,200,000 244,000 2,900,000 Southern Puget Sound 263,000 3,1001000 473,000 6,100@000 Hood Canal 165,000 1,700,000 475,000 4,500,000 Macroinvertebrates, including clams, crabs, oysters and mussels, exist in significant concentration at a number of state identified sites in both the Strait and the Puget Sound proper. Average annual commercial production of all shellfish in the Strait and in Puget Sound (north of Tacoma) is 13,695,724 lbs., valued at $9,684,560. -22- 6.3 Terrestrial and Aquatic Resources Streams Northern Tier identified 11 rivers that would be crossed by the pipeline (see Table 6.3.1). Each of these with their feeder streams produces a large annual supply of economically important fish species. Moreover, most of the crossing would occur below impoundments or barriers that obstruct fish passage. As a result, important spawning and rearing areas could be subjected to impact. Eight of the rivers are utilized by at least three salmonid species at or above the planned crossing. The water quality of each of the rivers is good to excellent, and the discharge of each of the systems makes a,n important contribu- tion to the water quality and productivity of the state's estuaries and marine waters. The river systems also have a significant intangible benefit by virtue of the fact that they support the lifestyle and culture of several Washington Indian tribes. Among those most directly affected would be the Tulalip and the Stillaguamish, whose accus- tomed fisheries are largely dependent on the productivity of King and Snohomish county streams. Table 6.3.1 Eleven Washington State Rivers Crossed By the Northern Tier Pipeline 100 yr. Salmonid/ River County discharge species Water Quality Dungeness Clallam 8,800 cfs yes/3 A N. Fork Snohomish 40,000 cfs yes/4 A Stillaguamish S. Fork Snohomish 42)000 cfs yes/4 A Stillaguamish Pilchuck Snohomish 121000 cfs yes/4 A Creek Pilchuck Snohomish 12,000 cfs yes/4 A River Skykomish Snohomish 120)000 cfs yes/4 A River Tolt River King 20,500 cfs yes/4 AA Snoqualmie King 65,000 cfs yes/4 A S. Fork King 12,000 cfs downstream AA Snoqualmie Yakima Kittitas 31,000 cfs unknown A Columbia Kittitas 740,000 cfs downstream A -23- FRESH WATER LI FE HISTORY PHASES OF SALMON AND SEARUN TROUT TIMING OF SALMON AND SEARUN TROUT FRESH WATER LIFE PHASES IN THE SNOHOMISH BASIN MONTH SPECIES FRESH WATER LIFE PHASE )AN, FEB. ARFAPR MAY I JUNE JULY AUG.1 SEPT. OCT NOV. DEC. Summer fall Upstream migration Spawning ................. ;ntragravel development uvenile rearing juv. out migration Coho Upstream migration Spawning .... ......... ...... ;ntragravel development uvenile rearing juv. out migration Summer Upstream migration stWhead Spawning ............................ Intragravel development ; u outmigration uvenile rearing* Winter "00441111@@@migration steethead Spawning - ....... ....... ....... ............... ...... ........ :ntragravel development ............. uvenile rearing* juv out migration Searun Upstream migration cutthroa I Spawning ............... ....... .... ........ ;ntragravel development __,z uvenile rearing* uv. out mig ration Spring Upstream migration Spawn ng .......... .... ;ntragravel development uvenile rearing Iuv out migration on Spawnt Ing .... ....... ;ntragravel development uvenile rearing juv. out migration Chum Upstream migration Spawning ...... ........ ;ntragravel development uv. out migration uvenile rearing Searun Upstream migration Dolly Spawning ....... ....... @@r' I ntragravel development Va. de@n 3uvenile rearing , I_ir_ j .1r, uv. out migration 'NormalIV extends over a two-year period Figure 6.3.1 Fresh water Life History Phases of Salmon and Sea-run Trout. The debate over fisheries impacts largely revolved around gravel siltation and the timing of Northern Tier stream crossings. -24- Northern Tier proposed the crossing of all rivers with the wet trenching construction method. Under this approach, a trench (a minimum of 4 feet below scour depth in the channel) would be exca- vated by equipment working in the stream or on the banks. , No stream or river would be dewatered, diverted, or flamed prior to excavation. Therefore, water would be free to erode trench mater- ial and carry it downstream. The dimensions of each trench and the specific elevation of the buried pipe would depend upon the com- puted depth of scour based upon estimates of 100-year flood flow. Flooding is common in all of the rivers crossed because of a lack of upstream controls (dams and reservoirs) and limited channel capacity. The result is that channel migration, scour, and bed instability are common. Flood hazards have prompted floodplain residents to construct systems of dikes, generally of makeshift unreliable quality, to protect property values. Annual expected damages due to floods commonly exceed $1 million in the larger rivers (e.g. Snoqualmie, Snohomish, Stillaguamish). Northern Tier would cross segments of these.rivers in areas where flooding, chan- nel migration, and scour have been common in recent history (e.g. Stillaguamish, Skykomish, Snoqualmie crossings). A pipeline break or rupture at such a location would likely cause spilled oil to flow into the numerous adjacent floodplain wetlands and to collect on floodplain farmland. Northern Tier identified 90 additional small stream crossings in the state. These waterways range from intermittent streams to large creeks and are found mostly in Snohomish and King counties. Northern Tier would cross 33 small streams in Snohomish County. Twenty of these produce salmonid. An additional 22 streams would be crossed in King County, of which 12 are utilized by salmonid. Table 6.3.2 Western Washington Small Stream Crossings and Fish Usage Crossings with County Streams Salmon Use Crossed by Centerline Clallam 6 2 Snohomish 33* 20* King 22 12* *Snohomish County data; all other NTPC data. -25- Despite their productivity, most of these streams are under exist- ing stresses due to upland forest practices, loss of riparian buffers, and other deleterious land use practices. This condition heightens the potential for threshold tolerances being exceeded and quantum reductions in productivity. Wetlands and Wildlife Habitat Areas Intervenor studies indicated that the centerline crossed several scores of important freshwater and marine wetlands ranging in size from less than two acres to complexes such as Davis Slough-West Pass and the Skykomish confluence which exceed 50 acres. Eleven threatened, endangered, or rare species of flora and fauna were documented in close proximity to the centerline. Table 6.3.3 gives a summary of wetlands crossed by the centerline or within the cor- ridor. An inventory performed by Snohomish County (CEIP funded) identified 20 relatively undisturbed wetlands that would be crossed by the route. Several of these are habitats for endangered waterbirds and various species of statewide significance (gyrfalcons, great blue heron, osprey, Vnistling and trumpeter swans). 'M ........... Will" 1@ "iP 0 m I-' @jj,jz"O @a,@O r_U@ @,'h Figure 6.3.2 Northern Tier's centerline crossed 20 wetlands in Snohomish County. Pictured here is one of these, the large wetland complex near the South Fork Stillaguarnish River Crossing. _26- Table 6.3.3 Select Wetlands Along the Pipeline Route Western Washington Within 2 mile County Crossed by Centerline Corridor Clallam County 1 4 Island County 2 Unknown Snohomish County 20* 55* King County 6 Unknown "Snohomish County Inventory; all other data NTPC. Other Critical Habitat Areas Dungeness Bay and Dungeness Spit are located two miles north of the centerline in Clallam County, bordering the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Portions are within a designated national wildlife refuge. Several habitat types are present including mudflats, salt marsh, open water, and eelgrass beds. The area provides habitat for brandt, wigeons, western grebe, Canadian geese, and a variety of other waterbirds. LEGEND 23 Mariculture 231 Oyster and Clam Culture 31 Grassland Substrate 312 Beach Grassland 52 Lake/Pond 524 Coastal Pond 62 Wetland-Vegetated, Nonforested 623 Salt Marsh 625 Salt Meadow 626 Brackish Marsh 627 Seagrass 628 Kelp Community 629 Other Algal Community 63 Beach Substrate 633 Mixed Coarse (MC) 634 Mixed Medium (MM) 636 Sand (S) Figure 6.3.3 Marine Habitat of Dungeness Bay Source: NTPC EIS -27- Discovery Bay Located at the eastern end of the Strait, Discovery Bay, like Dunge- ness Bay and Sequim Bay, is a multi-species habitat. The Army 0 Corps of Engineers has def ined it as important for many species of wintering and migrating waterfowl. Among the species present are osprey, western grebe, and rhino- cerous auklet. Shellfish include clams, crab, oysters, and mussels. Smith Island BLACK This island is a designated na- OYSTERCATCHER tional wildlife refuge. Located northwest of Whidbey Island it is Figure 6.3.4 habitat for black oyster catchers Black Oyster Catcher and pelagic cormorant. Protection Island Located near the mouth of Discovery Bay in the strait, Protection Island is one of the most important habitats for waterbirds in the state. It is the largest breeding colony of rhinocerous auklet south Colockum State Wildlife Recreation of Alaska. Area San Juan Islands West of the Columbia River crossed by the centerline. This is an Located 16 miles north of the important elk winter range with centerline but within spill trajec- densities of approximately six per tories of tankers in the strait, square mile. Other resident mam- the islands possess 10 areas desig- mals include pronghorn antelope, nated by the state as "significant" mountain sheep, black bear, moun- for shellfish. Shrimp, clams, and tain lion, and mule deer. The area crab are abundant. Marine waters also produces important upland game of the islands have also been species and possess an abundance of. designated marine biological pre- rare plant species. serves and provide concentrations of numerous fish species and Gloyd Seeps threatened or endangered marine mammals. Dall porpoise, harbor In eastern Washington crossed by porpoise, minke whales, and killer the centerline. This area is whales are found throughout the managed for waterfowl and pheasant island chain. In addition, gray and is used for nesting by golden whales have been sighted in eagles. It is also a resting site Bellingham and Samish bays. for migrating white pelicans. -28- 7.0 CEIP Role in EFSEC -Certification Process In 1973, the oil embargo focused national attention on the need to develop new domestic sources of energy. Recognizing that energy devel- opment would have significant effects on coastal communities, Congress created CEIP in 1976, through an amendment to the Coastal Zone Manage- ment Act (CZMA). The CEIP assists states and local communities in coping with the social, economic, and environmental consequences of energy development in coastal areas by providing grants and loans. These sources of financial support have been used for planning, environmental mitigation, and for acquiring public facilities and public services required as a result of coastal energy activities. As amended in 1978 and 1980, the program provides funds to address impacts resulting from the transportation and storage of oil, gas, and c'oal and from development of alternative energy sources in the coastal zone. WDOE, as the lead agency under the coastal zone management program, pro- vides state resource agencies and affected local governments with the capability for enhanced consideration of energy impacts. Since the pro- gram was established, it has had a special focus on the Northern Tier certification process. The main objective of the program has been to assist units of government with the identification of environmental, recreational, and other potential Northern Tier-related impacts prior to the construction and operation of the proposed facility, and the devel- opment of impact avoidance or mitigation measures as conditions for a prospective certification order. Allocation of federal funds to local and state agencies was coordinated by WDOE through its intrastate allocation process. Subawards were pre- pared and furnished to those agencies documenting the greatest need based on potential effects and concerns raised by the project. CEIP subawards contained elements allowing for the retention of outside experts familiar with oil transshipment facilities. As indicated in subsequent discussion (especially under Findings), CEIP sponsored studies brought a wealth of new critical information to bear on risk estimation, geological hazards, habitat sensitivity, and other issues. -29- WDOE made its initial CEIP grant application in the summer, 1978. Through June 1982, the agency distributed nearly one million dollars in CEIP funds to other state agencies and local governments potentially affected by the proposal. The subawards were used by state agencies and local jurisdictions to develop expert testimony on important aspects of the projects. This was facilitated by funding project coordinators. Wn. State Dept. of Game Larry McCallum-Curt Leigh Wn. State Dept. of Fisheries Mary Lou Mills-Frances Solomon W.n. State Dept. of Ecology Bill Obert Clallam County Mike Doherty Island County Thom Gunn Jefferson County Rachel Nathanson San Juan County Alan Merson Snohomish County Jim Currie The coordinators identified issues needing additional analysis, retained consultants, and performed a valuable communication function within and between departments and agencies. The result was that a valuable local knowledge of resources and resource impacts was brought to the hearings. In some cases, the coordinators actually performed detailed technical analyses and submitted expert testimony. CEIP monies can also be credited with a considerable portion of expert review by state agencies. The state coordinators, mobilized the resources of their respective agencies and created a multidisciplinary dialogue between agencies. This resulted in a review of the application that was far more coordinated than would likely have occurred without CEIP funding. The review process included numerous inter and intra- agency conferences in which issues were identified and data needs estab- lished. The dialogue, in turn, resulted in structured investigations and divisions of responsibility. An annotated list of environmental, recreation, and socioeconomic studies funded by CEIP is provided in Appendix 11.2. _30- 8.0 Northern Tier's Estimation of Impacts Northern Tier represented one of the largest, most complex projects ever to be considered for certification or licensing by state and local authorities. In this respect it must be considered in the same category with nuclear power plants and the large hydroelectric projects of the Columbia River. 8.1 Linkages Any substantial project is bound to present its own unique set of uncertainties with respect to economic and environmental impacts; however, the Northern Tier proposal, to an extreme degree, pre- sented a probabilistic problem. That is, impacts would be espe- cially dependent upon error sequences, breakdowns in sophisticated technology, and the action of not-well7understood natural pro- cesses. At an early state in application review, the intervenors expressed dissatisfaction and concern over the applicant's treat- ment of these critical relationships. Northern Tier contended that it used conservative assumptions in evaluating both risks and impacts. It cited various design values for evaluating pipe scour hazards at river crossings, earthquake and seismic risks, remote event probability values for fires and explosions. Table 8.0.1 presents a brief overview of several of the most important company findings with espect to risk and impact. It also matches impacts with the concerns of specific intervenors who used CEIP monies to review aspects of the application and develop contrary evidence. From the outset, the application generated skepticism. Although this can partly be ascribed to local interests opposing the project which would levy them the heaviest impacts, controversy was also fueled by deficiencies in the application and EIS. In many import- ant cases there was simply no clear trail of logic that enabled a reviewer to test the Northern Tier conclusions. Where the applicant claimed to have conducted detailed habitat studies, there was often little supporting evidence. Where the applicant claimed to have studied the geology of the submarine route, critical factors were not reported. In general, the trail of logic was nearly always impossible to follow. Moreover, it was clear that many of the worst conceivable impacts would be deter- mined by interrelated factors and functions that were extremely sensitive to initial assumptions. -31- Table 8.0.1 .NORTHERN TIER'S ESTIMATION OF IMPACTS-- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND INTERVENOR CONCERNS Impacts at I Intervenor I -Im'Pacts on Ta'Fllne Water and Intervenor Overland Impacts on Land, Intervenor Issue/Impact Description of Impact Port Anqele5@Tank Farm Concerns at Submarine Segments Concerns Streams, Air, and Grud Water Concerns Electrical Energy Increased demand for power to System would deliver 35.7 E, CCPA Utility districts along route E, CCPA operate the pipeline system quadrillion BTUs and consume would suppl'y pump station power. L aggravating future power 1.3 quadrillion. It would Total pump station requir ments: shortages. consume less energy than exist- 87.3 MW at maximum capacity. ing transshipment :system serving the midwest . Maximum design energy consump- tion at tank farm and Port Angeles pum station: 137,800 MWH, peak load 16.6 MW. Municipal Impacts Deficiencies In supply of No significant need for hospital CCPA No significant amount of,traffic housing, schools, medical facilities, physicians. congestion caused except on transportation networks, Whidbey Island. police and fire services No taxation of existing school caused by construction capacity expected. No significant schools Impact. activity and worker inflow. I Increased traffic in Port CCPA Expected short fall of housing Angeles due to construction. supply during construction In activities, but Impacts miti- several towns; pressure on rents.1 gated through stipulations with 1, city. Slightly aggravated sewage problems In Sequim. Housing demand during construc- CCPA tion could exceed supply by 70% (79 units), translating into Increased rents. Reduction In police service below national standards (construction phase). Potential shortage In P.A. water supply; but stipulations would mitigate. Economic Impacts/ Hardship to local IndustrIesp No effect on marine, fishing, CCPA No effect on fishing industry. T Reduced oil surpluses on west E, CCPA Benefits dislocation of bus inesses as timber Industries, or disruption coast. well as positive effects of ferries due to construction. Including tax base increase, Northern Tier would lessen E, CCPA job creation, supply of 124 direct jobs created by delivery costs, expected energy. operation activities. $1.9 M In petroleum shortfalls In eastern wages to Clallam Co. workers Washington, Northern Tier states.1 Temporary diversion of some $14.7 M In taxes during construc-1 tourist business. tion (state and local). 9-47 operation jobs. CCPA Clallam County/City of Port Angeles concern E -Department of Ecology AV/L22(A2,4-7) J Jefferson County F -Department of Fisheries I Island County G -Department of Came S Snohomish County T - Tulallp Tribes K King County SJ - San Juan County M - Miscellaneous State Agencies Note that impacts are drawn from NTPC application and NTPC testimony. Table 8.0.1 NORTHERN TIER'S ESTIMATION OF IMPACTS-- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND INTERVENOR CONCERNS (Continued) Impacts at Intervenor Impacts on Marine Water and Intervenor Overland Impacts on Land, Intervenor Issue/Impact Description of Impact Port Angeles/Tank Farm Concerns at Submarine Segments Concerns I Streams, Air, and Ground Water Concerns NTPS would generate $11.2 M in Construction will create 1000 expenditures from its payroll. full time jobs. Creating 600 construction jobs. 900 jobs would be created Clallam County - 500 indirectly indirectly in state due to created. At peak construction, NTPS expenditures. 750 jobs created (direct). $7.7 million In State and local $710,000 to Clallam Co. In taxes taxes during construction. during construction, Port Angel es - $58,200. Annual property tax Increase of $2.4 M. Oil Spill Risk Stresses to pipeline Low because design ground CCPA Low. No evidence of bedrock 1, CCPA Low. Pipeline crosses faults Seismic Hazards induced by movement of accelerations of .20g and movement, faulting, submarine but tensile strains accommo- ground. MerCdlI I VII earthquakes landslides; pipeline's "sympa- dated by design. have only 10% exceedence thetic movement" capacity possibility during project life. I reduces hazards. Liquefaction Potential pipe rupture from Low. Soils not expected to CCPA Low. Potential sinking of pipe CCPA, J Low. Potential for lateral C Hazard loss of soil bearing strength,J liquefy at .20g ground 20 feet, but stresses within spreading at river crossings susceptibility of pipe to acceleration. design values. but stresses within design downslope movement, sinking. values. Spillage due to Spills due to tanker colli- Port Angeles; one vessel CCPA NTPC would increase tanker Low. Terrestrial-overland risk tanker collisions; sion, anchor drag, and casualt@ per 7 years. (1200 traffic by 395 calls per year. less than 2.4 bb per 3.7 years. other peline penetration, river scours, barrels P1 other natural causes. spillage. Average tanker spill volume I Quantitative estimates are S 10,116 bpy; one spill per conservative because NTPC 4.7 yrs. technology is state of the art; conservative approaches used 50% chance of spill over 10 K' I, CCPA for burying pipe at river barrels due to tanker accidents crossings. (20 yr. project life). 29% chance of total vessel loss In 20 years. These represent con- servative estimates of risk NTPC. Low risk of submarine pipeline CCPA rupture. 10 K bb spill: 1/3200 years. The existing risk from tankers CCPA, El I and barge traffic would be reduced If NTPS is operated as a common use facility. AV/L22(A3,8-11) Table 8.0.1 NORTHERN TIER'S ESTIMATION OF IMPACTS-- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND INTERVENOR CONCERNS (Continued) I pacts at I Intervenor I Impacts on Marine Wate-r-a-nd---Flntervenor I Overland Impacts o Land "ntervenor m I n Issue/Impact Description of Impact Port Angeles/Tank Farm Concerns at Submarine Segments Concerns Streams, Air, and Gr .. d later Concerns Oil spill migrationj Migration of spills through Port Angeles spill contained NTPC projections - accident In SJ, F, E Applicant performed no tirajec- K, CCA potential. actions of tides winds, within harbor. strait would affect sensitive tory analysis of terrestrial areas In straits, not Puget dispersion through streams, currrent@ terrestrial migra- tion due to river, ground Sound. No methodology is yet ground water. Leak 5 approach- water hydraulics. available to accurately streams, ground water. Leaks estimate migration/dispersion. Ing 0.5% of flow would surface. An Admiralty Inlet spill could conceivably migrate to Inner Puget Sound; however, these areas already exposed to risks. Fire and explosion hazard to life and property Tankers Worst case at Port Angeles: a. Berthing - explosion of a. Low. Tanker explosion In CCPA cargo tanks of berthed port 1/45 years; fires In tankers. harbor 1/18 years. Unlikely health Impacts becau se of distance; minor building damage with no major struc- tural damage. b. Grounding - explosion of b. Potential deaths expected CCPA tanker grounded In within 940 ft. radius). harbor. Waterfront population would experience non-lethal effects. c.,, Worst case fire (from c. .6% over 20 years. 327,000 dwt tanker). Tank farm and Tank farm fire worst a. Worst ese tank fire - 1/4000 CCPA Worst case fire explosion at pump stations case - tank over-fill and years - $500,000 damage. pump station: 1.2% over 20 years. rupture with subsequent Fatality: 1 per 1000 years. Ignition. b. Pump station worst case b. Probability of tank fire I CCPA 46% chance over 20 years of fire explosion of surge relief 1/40 years, expected fatalityl I I causing $1000 damage. tanks with fire. due to fire or explosion: Damage over $500,000. 1 per 1400 years. AV/L22(A3,12-15) Table 8.0.1 NORTHERN TIER'S ESTIMATION OF IMPACTS-- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND INTERVENOR CONCERNS (Continued) Im a t Intervenor Impacts on Marine Water and Intervenor Overland Impacts on Land, Intervenor Issue/Impact Description of Impact Port Anqelc@[email protected] Farm Concerns at Submarine Segments Concerns Streams, Air, and Ground Water Concerns Hazards of Other Impact on littoral drift. Excavation of pipeline slot will CCPA, E G ologlcal- cause only temporary interferencel Hydrological with littoral drift it Green Pt. Processes Air Quality Violations of state air quai- No violations of state S02 E, CCPA ity standards and Increases standards predicted with or over baseline conditions for without project. select chemical compounds. No expected violations of N02 concentrations. No violations of ozone standards predicted based upon worst case senarlos. Predicted concentrations for CO are negligible. Less than 20% Increase over base-1 line hydrocarbon concentrations. Temporary 0 month) Increase In fugitive dust levels due to Un construction. In general, Northern Tier BACT measures include use of would implement "b@est avail- floating roofs and double seals able control technology" for pump stations. (BACT). Measures Include use of low sulphur.fuel. AV/L22(A3,16-19) Table 8.0.1 NORTHERN TIER'S ESTIMATION OF IMPACTS- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND INTERVENOR CONCERNS (Continued) Intervenor Impacts on Marine Water and I Intervenor I Overland Impacts on Impacts at Land' rntervenor I ssue/Impact Description of Impact Port Anqeles/Tank Farm Concer ns at Submarine Segments Concerns Streams, Air, and Gro und Water Concerns Oil Spill Impacts Loss of foraging area. G marine Fauna, Phyiscal effects on water See submarine, marine impacts. Mortality of Individual water F, E, G, Water Birds birds, mammals, fish, and birds due to oiling; species S@3 Invertebrates due to chemical living on water most suscep- toxicity, habitat effects tible (loons, ducks, grebe ducks, puffins). Effects Include both habitat loss and physical dysfunction. Any of Important water birds in G Strait could be affected especially if spill occurred during critical periods. Catastrophic spill contaminating Dungeness Bay could kill 73vOOO birds. Feeding areas could be lost for up to 7 years. No effective way of cleanIng G birds or their habitat after 0@\ fouling. Under most rigorous cleanup, G only 10% of birds treated remain alive. Fish and Marine Salmon show effective avoidance 1, F, T Invertebrates of oil below toxicity levels (both for fry, adults). Potentially high local mortality In shallow marine waters for salmon fry, rocky shore areas. Most detrimental Impact to SJ, F, E Invertebrates would be in confined bays (eg, Crescent Bay, Freshwater Bay). AV/L22(A3,20-23) Table 8.0.1 NORTHERN TIER'S ESTIMATION OF IMPACTS- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND INTERVENOR CONCERNS (Continued) Impacts at Iintervenor I Impacts on Marine Water and Intervenor Overland Impacts on_L_a_nU_,__j Tntervenor Issue/Impact Description of Impact Port Angeles/Tank Farm Concerns at Submarine Segments Concerns I Streams, Air, and Ground Water Concerns Water Impacts - 0111 Temporary increases in turbidity F in harbor and strait due to construction of unloading Surface Water pipelines. Low. Pprobability of signifi- cant construction oil spills. Effluent from oil-water separatorl E I I I will cause limited minor impacts to coastal waters. Ground Water and Potential oil spill contaminationj CCPA I Low Ground water Is at sufficientl CCPA, K, I Water Supplies limited to surface waters - no depth on Whidbey and Camano aquifer contamination. Islands to prevent contamination. Water Impacts Sediment Surface Operation Impacts minimal due to CCPA Construction induced turbidity E, F Low. Surface water may be tempo-1 E, S mitigation measures. due to pipeline trench excava- rarily degraded by several tion, specially near land falls. 100 mg/L but effects temporary. Transport both west and east. Northern Tier would reduce S impacts of sediment by imple- menting effective mitigation measures. R.O.W. erosion will Increase S, G, E with removal of vegetation; revegetation will reduce soil, sediment loss. Ground Water and No construction impacts expected No construction impacts to K Water Supplies to ground water, municipal ground water supplies water supplies. Potential is slight for breech- I Ing Whidbey Island aquifer. Hydrostatic Marine/surface water Withdrawals may Impact aquatic E Testing withdrawal and discharge life but mitigation measures of water for hydrostatic will reduce Impacts (e.g,., testing of pipe Integrity. timing). AV/L22(A3,24-27) NORTHERN TIER'S ESTIMATINC OF IMPACTS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND INTERVENOR CONCERNS (Continued) Impacts at Intervenor I impacts on Marine Water and I Intervenor on Land Piteren.r m ts anF7 Description of Impact ele!VTank Farm Concerns at Submarine Segments Concerns StrevmT,Air, Pand 0 Issue/Impact Port Anq Ground W.'Ier Concerns Oil Spill Imputs Marine Fauna (Continued) Fish and Marine See Submarine Impacts Unpredictable sub lethal Impacts I, SJ, F Invertebrates to organisms due to long-term exposure. marine Mammals Oiling of marine mammal habitat Fq SJo G In Strait - Neah Bay, Tatoosh Island, Dungeness, Protection Island, Smith Island. Primary species affected: seals,J sea lions - through contaminationj 'J of food sources. Other species would be able to avoid oil and adjust foraging. 00 AV/L22(B3,4-7) NORTHERN TIER'S ESTIMATING OF IMPACTS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND INTERVENOR CONCERNS (Continued) t I Intervenor I impacts on Marine Water and I Intervenor I Overland Impacts on Land, I Intervenor Description of Impact 'mpac@T5 nd Concerns Issue/Impact Port An4ele ank Farm Concerns at Submarine Segments Concerns Streams, Air, and Grou Water Construction Mortality; health effects to Impacts to Flora species due to noise; direct and Fauna loss of habitat; sedimenta- tion, nutrient loading. Fauna Impacts to marine mammals and Construction activities dis- G Areas of particular concern: G shore birds at tanker unloading placing mammals and water birds facility short term; will affect will be temporary and local. Coastal areas few Individuals. Keechelus Lake Marine mammals and water birds F,T Yakima River 75 acres of water bird habitat may be disturbed by pipelaying Columbia Basin lost at berths. trenching, but *111 avoid areas Designated refuges of high activity as will adult Adult fish will avoid most marine fish. No need to inventory further 5, G construction activities. sensitive habitats. Increased turbidities may F Unloading pipelines will destroy Increase mortality of demersal No endangered species habitat S, G benthic fauna; mobile species fish or juveniles In eelgrass known along centerline, will avoid activity, areas. corridor. sedimentation. Juvenile salmon could be T Minimal impact to anadromous T, 5, F, G Loss of 140 acres of woodland affected near shorelines. fish due to construction habitat at Green Pt. - No Induced sedimentation. nesting endangered species. Sedentary animals Including F clams will be destroyed in NTPC contends mitigation T, S, F, G pathway of trenching. measures would be effective. Potential release of toxic F, Directional drilling neither S substances Into water column necessary nor desirable. by dredging. Flora No effect on salt marshes No major losses. Removal of riparian vegetation S, G expected. will cause some wildlife dis- placement. In other cases, Loss of second growth at edge will be created. Green Pt. Mitigation measures employed S, T will reduce Impacts to Insignificant levels. S, K No terrestrial wetlands crossed by centerline In W. Washington. No unusual species known to be onl S centerline In Cascade foothills. Unusual species may be affected/ G lost between Colockum and Crescent Bar. 200 acres of farmland lost but S only 58 acres removed from production. AV/L22(63,8-11) The oil spill problem was an example of a complex pathway type issue in which the steps in the estimation-evaluation process were potentially pyramidal. First, there were a number of important spill questions. One in particular was the hazard of a crude oil tanker accident in the Strait of Juan de Fuca. An initial assump- tion had to be made about the quality, age, and size mix of tankers making port calls at Port Angeles. One had to be relatively clear on system throughput in order to work backward to tanker traffic. In addition, one had to make assumptions about hookup. For exam- ple, would NTPS supply North Puget Sound refiners? This would depend on the ability of NTPC to deliver the type of crude oil and petrochemical compounds needed by the refiners. As the hearings progressed it became clear that neither the application nor EIS confronted directly a host of important questions. There were additional interrelationships that needed to be clarified in the evaluation of tanker oil spill risk and resulting impacts. Factors determining accidents. To what degree did exist- ing models specify pertinent variables? (e. g. tanker age, flag, size, port characteristics) Data base validity and reliability of prediction logic. To what extent did the Northern Tier project area (spill impact area) differ significantly from other "environ- ments" for which spill models were developed? Were these models statistically valid? Relationships between accident events and spill events. NTPC inferred spill volumes in a two-stage process. First it established accident frequencies, then it devel- oped spill size distribution. Spill migration and dispersion. Once an event of given characteristics occurs, where will the oil go? How reli- able are estimates of migration? What is the range of possible outcomes? Could significant amounts of oil reach central Puget Sound? How does oil migration change between surface and subsurface spills? Sensitivity of coastal habitats and flushing potential. How long would the oil persist, given particular geohy- draulic conditions? Did the applicant adequately inven- tory sensitive habitats within the probable range of oil migration? Sensitivity of species and trophic networks. To what extent would a spill cause mortalities due to direct lethality and indirect losses from sublethal induction of stress or habitat alteration? Clearly, the problem was prodigious. The complexity and uncer- tainty surrounding a host of other environmental issues was at least as problematic. -40- LEGEND VESSEL CASUALTIES (1971-1976) c C COLLISIONS 27 R RAMMINGS 41 BELLINGHAM G GROUNDINGS ' '19 S SINKINGS 26 G F FIRE/EXPLOSIONS 14 TOTAL T21 C R VICTORI CAPE FLA TTER Y C5 c C -Aff ID E z@' S10 S IS AND C FOSAR10 c C F G S 4> S D PORT ANGELES hidbey cc I d '01i VERETT PORT us F LUDLOW SAY KELTEO INGST SE R c 0 A BREMERT s 34 H @A -7f TAC 0 5 10 15 20 SCALE IN MILES Figure 8.1.1 Cause and Location of All Vessel Casualties. John Bennett, a Clallarn County consultant, critiqued OIW-NTPC analysis of tanker accidents in the Strait, using local, national and international data. He asserted that high incidents of fog was a significant factor accounting for vessel accidents. -41- Hardly less intricate and sensitive linkages were associated with .impact estimates for the submarine pipeline (rupture) due to lique- faction, anchor penetration, and submarine landslides. Terrestrial risks included the possibility that a pipeline could be scoured out of its trench by an extreme flood, or that sediment generated by construction work would be entrapped in salmon spawn- ing gravels and reduce fishery productivity. In each case, defen- sible assumptions had to be made. Geologic hazards were largely a function of seismic activity, currents, and soil conditions. Were the company's analyses of these factors reliable? Again, the out- puts depended upon key assumptions. What were the assumptions about background stresses on fish? How much silt -would be gene- rated? What was the capacity of a stream to flush fine materials generated by wet trenching? Of the environmental impacts evaluat 'ed by the company and its con-- sultants, those that drew the greatest concern and eventually mani- fested the greatest significance in EFSEC findings were fire and explosion at Port Angeles tanker and submarine pipeline spill risk spill migration submarine geological hazards oil spill impacts on flora and fauna.* 8.2 Fire and Explosion at Port Angeles Northern Tier relied upon its own consultants, ERT and OIW (Oceano- graphic Institute of Washington) , to arrive at estimates of tanker explosion risk and oil fires in Port Angeles Harbor. Tanker explo- sions were modeled using assumptions about maximum volumes avail- able for combustion and by making conversions to peak over-pressure at given distances from the source. The company also estimated moderate and severe damages to -structures on the waterfront by establishing radial impact zones from a source. Risk analysis was then performed using historical data. The com- pany concluded that a worst-case tanker explosion would occur once every 45 years. Health impacts would be unlikely because of the distance of the berthing facilities from the waterfront and popu- lation centers. In the event a tanker'broke free and grounded in the harbor, deaths might occur to anyone within 940 feet of the blast. Radial dis- tances would be too great to expect waterfront deaths; but nonle- thal effects could occur. Northern Tier estimated that the prob- ability of such an event was less then once every 11,500 years. *Integral to other concerns. -42- Strait ofJuan de.Fuca 4 3 2 GROUND CONTOU (30 FEE1 41 1 2 5 6 7 0 SCALE IN 1,000 OF FEET LEGEND TANKER SCHOOL An HOSPITAL a 1. EARDRUM RUPTURE THRESHOLD (1900 FEET) 2. MOSTLY SAFE FROM IMPACT INJURIES (1650 FEET) 3. POSSIBLE FRACTURES AND POSSIBLE LUNG DAMAGE (1400 FEET) 4. LETHALITY THRESHOLD (1100 FEET) 5. LETHALITY NEAR 100% (940 FEET) Figure 8.2.1 Potential injuries from Worst Case Tanker Explosion (327,000 dwt). Source: 01W The characterization of worst case fires and explosions at Port Angeles was considered inade quate by intervenor witnesses. With respect to fire, Northern Tier concluded that it had utilized worst case assumptions to arrive at 2.4 percent chance of one or more deaths in any given year. Over a 20-year project life, this would translate into a 39 percent probability. An important issue in the debate was the validity of NTPC assump- tions about such a worst-case event. Northern Tier contended such an event. would derive from a scenario in which. there was ignition of a spill from all tanks of a 327,000 dwt tanker. The spill would cover a large part of the harbor surface. According to the com- pany, the fire would only be sustained one hour. The probability of such an event was estimated at less than .6 percent over 20 years. Intervenor witnesses countered that such a characterization was too sketchy. At a minimum details needed to be developed on factors affecting both spreading and combustion. 8.3 Tanker and Submarine Pipeline Spill Risk Northern Tier presented several studies to the council to define the magnitude of the oil spill hazard. The company emphasized that there was currently a 61 percent chance annually of a significant oil spill from existing tanker 'traffic. This background risk, it argued, resulted in an average annual spill volume of 1,895 bar- rels. Table 8.3.1 Percentage Chance of Oil Spill Source Occurrence over 20 Years 1. Oil tanker spill (total loss only; excludes all losses other than total vessel loss) 29% 2. Submarine pipelines in Port Angeles harbor (unloading lines; all leaks) 17% 3. Submarine pipeline crossing Admiralty Inlet (all leaks) 30% 4. Submarine pipeline crossing at Saratoga Passage (all leaks) 8% 5. Terrestrial pipeline spill (spills of 5,000 barrels or more) 28% 6. Tank farm (major fire or explosion) 20% -44- The company asserted it had employed "state of the art" risk esti- mation methodology. Its analysis was an elaboration on earlier OIW work and made adjustments in predicted values based upon assessment of site specific port characteristics. Northern Tier concluded there was a 50 percent chance of a spill over 10,000 barrels during the project life. This, it asserted, was based upon conservative assumptions. Submarine pipeline estimates were based upon pipeline experience for the Outer Continental Shelf. Because these lines are often unburied and subjected to other hazards, NTPC contended the. Puget Sound crossing would be safer then the predicted values suggested. Its conclusion: a spill of 10,000 barrels or larger could be expected once every 3,200 years. This low appraisal of risk was to be a central issue in contested case hearings. 8.4 Spill Migration Admitting to the infancy of spill migration prediction methodology, the company provided the council with results of modeling performed by ERT for the Strait of Juan de Fuca. NTPC concluded that for the spills it modeled, movement in any direction was possible, depend- ing upon wind conditions, tidal phase, and strength of mean cur- rents. It submitted that there was a net easterly nearshore cur- rent between Port Angeles and Dungeness Spit. Underwater spills from a submarine line were examined by OIW in earlier studies. NTPC referenced these studies to conclude that the bulk of crude oil from a submarine spill would surface rather than be entrained in the water column and dispersed by subsurface vectors. An issue of considerable importance,in the debate was the potential for a spill at the Admiralty crossing to migrate into inner Puget Sound. Northern Tier concluded that oil spilled at -flood tide could move toward inner Puget Sound; but during ebb tide would be pushed into the Strait of Juan de Fuca. -45- 8.5 Submarine Geological Hazards On the basis of a 500-year design criterion, NTPC posited a .2 g ground acceleration and a Mercalli VII+ design earthquake. Those values were utilized in the design and impact evaluations of both above ground and submarine structures. According to the company, this would correspond to an event having less than 10 percent chance of occurring over a 50-year period. The company concluded that the historical record shows less than 20 earthquakes causing disturbances great enough to be potentially damaging (Mercalli VII or greater). The company also concluded there was no indication of faulting or submarine landslides in the vicinity of the submarine lines. Liquefaction of soils was deemed a potential problem only in areas having fine grain soils. Approximately one-third of the Port Angeles Harbor crossing was considered in this category; however, more significant percentages were potentially liquefiable on the Admiralty and Saratoga crossings. Liquefaction would occur under extreme ground accelerations in these areas; however, because the submarine lines would be designed to accommodate such stresses, shear failure and pipe bending were determined unlikely. The com- pany concluded that sufficient information had been provided ". . .to determine that the pipeline can be safely constructed at the proposed underwater crossings." source:NTPC Figure 8.5.1 Admiralty Inlet Submarine Crossing Trenching Methods, Route, Quantities Excavated. Source: NTPC application. -46- 8.6 Oil Spill Impacts on Flora and Fauna As indicated by Table 8.0.1, Northern Tier accepted the possibility of significant damage to coastal and marine habitat in the event of a major spill. Feeding areas for birds could be lost for up to seven years. Mortalities would be greatest among species living on water lost due to oiling. According to the company, a worst-case spill contamination of Dungeness Bay could kill 73,000 birds. Fisheries and marine impacts would depend upon a- myriad of factors and make quantification impossible; however, Northern Tier asserted that several factors were 'present that would lessen damage poten- tial. An EPA report was cited that indicated high concentrations of microorganisms are present in Paget Sound, and Port Angeles, in particular, which can actively biodegrade crude oil. It argued that a fairly thin layer of crude oil floating on sea water could be completely colonized by bacteria within one or two weeks and decomposed in two to three months. Another factor attenuating impact would be the dispersion and resulting dilation of hydrocarbon compounds. Concentrations would be determined not only by spill volume, but by the action of wind and tides. A marine spill would be most detrimental to marine invertebrate habitats if spills were confined to embayments such as Freshwater Bay or Crescent Bay that contain mud, sand, and eel- grass. -47- Direct impacts to fish would be registered through toxicity or physical effects and indirectly through loss of food or habitat. The company contended that most catastrophic open water oil acci- dents have not resulted in major fish losses. This was partly attributed to oil avoidance mechanisms in adult fish. The company also asserted that concentrations strong enough to cause toxic effects do not persist long after accidents. The company made par- ticular reference to salmon species as having tolerances far in excess of likely oil spill concentrations. 9.0 Intervenor Concerns and Activities 'In general, the counties along the route tended to focus on aspects of the application which implied risks or impacts to local resources, espe- cially those over which some regulatory authority had been historically established; and the state agencies concentrated upon areas of statutory functional responsibility (e.g. fisheries, game, water quality). 9.1 Counties Clallam County "The most important questions of life are for the most part only problems of chance." Leplace The majority of the local CEIP allocation was passed through to Clallam County because it would be the site of the proposed super- port and tank farm. The major environmental issues presented to Clall am County by the NTPC proposal involved fire and explosion risks within Port Angeles Harbor from normal tanker operations and catastrophic incidents (off-loading, bunkering, lightering, collision); oil spill risk analysis and oil spill cleanup contingencies; tanker manuevering and potential vessel traffic problems; seismic instability, lique- faction and subsidence; pipeline rupture and failure at major stream crossings and scouring; disruption and displacement of recreational activities within Port Angles Harbor (boat launching, salmon fishing, ferry traffic); and the overall economic impacts on the public and private sectors from construction and operation phases of the proposed project. Hatfield Consultants, Ltd (HCL), of West Vancouver, B.C., was con- tracted to analyze the NTPC proposal in light of these concerns. .HCL's analysis provided the county with an understanding of a wide range of potential impacts and project design deficiencies, and was responsible for developing mitigation measures. A complete des- cription is included in the county's report, An Overview of Envir- onmental Design, Fire, and Explosion Hazards and Oil Spill Conti- gency Plans of the Northern Tier Pipeline Project. A few of the major findings are noted below: -48- HCL found insufficient NTPC data or correlative analysis on pipe- line floatation in case of liquefaction. HCL concluded that some aspects of the project were in a very preliminary design stage, requiring further detailed analysis. Additional areas of concern identified by the consultant included NTPC's deficiencies in sub- marine core borings and the absence of block valves along the sub- merged pipeline (for spill volume reduction). Lack of sufficient data or investigation by NTPC on the potential for anchor penetration in Port Angeles Harbor. Further investiga- tion indicated it was beyond the capability of normal marine dredg- ing and pipeline trenching equipment to excavate to a depth greater than 11 feet in the deeper portion of the harbor. Modified or spe- cially designed equipment would be required, in light of a poten- tial anchor penetration depth of 29 feet. HCL recommended addi- tional field testing and analysis of this potential problem. The lack of site specific data on oil spill risks, in conjunction with the utilization of out-of-date and/or faulty data base. HCL recommended preparation of a more comprehensive and updated spill risk analysis. HCL recommended the design and implementation of a master harbor management plan to address harbor vessel traffic congestion caused by the introduction of supertankers. HCL concluded that the fire and explosion risk posed by a major oil terminal at Port Angeles warranted far more detail than what was presented in NTPC documents. Furthermore, HCL concluded that the causes of many fire and explosion incidents are uncertain, that a breakthrough in reducing these incidents is unlikely in the near future, and that the occurrence of such incidents often leads to uncontrolled chain events. HCL demonstrated that river and open water marine spill case his- tories show spill control techniques to be very ineffectual. More- over, the NTPC application did not seriously consider the logistics of beach cleanup. The consultant identified a number of elements needed in any oil spill response plan. Consultants D. M. Johnson and N. H. Rasmussen (J and R) reviewed the NTPL application and DEIS, emphasizing geologic conditions of Clallam County and their relationship to the proposal. Their report, Geologic and Seismic Studies Related to the Construction of the Northern Tier Pipeline in Clallam County, Washington, was used extensively by the county throughout the EFSEC proceeding. Principal conclusions included the following: Significant potential for elliptical scouring at the Dungeness River crossing: NTPC provided inadequate justification for its scour estimates. Ediz Hook - is not an appropriate location for a major pipeline facility and to liquefaction potential. J and R recommended that NTPC conduct an extensive drilling and soil testing program for Ediz Hook, including dynamic field tests, to substantiate or refute J and R conclusions. -49- ... .. .... . 0 Figure 9.1.1 Figure 9.1 Green Point Landfall, Clallarn County Port Williams Landfall, C CDS/Quest Research, Inc., reviewed and critiqued NTPC's proposed techni- ques for monitoring design, construction, and operational phases of the proposed facility, including the development of a monitoring process for local and state governments. The report, A Proposed System for Pipeline and Operation Monitoring in Washington State, also provided a comprehen- sive set of stipulations for pipeline construction, operation. The key elements of the proposed monitoring program were as follows: Company reimbursement of monitoring costs. Co-authority of disciplines to assure that no interests are overlooked or subordinated. Approval of plans prior to construction in order to ensure compliance with the terms and conditions of a site certifica- tion agreement. Stop-work authority. Public access to design plans and company information to ensure company quality control. Right-to-perform provisions, whereby the state has the author- ity to correct or redress. Applied Economics Associates (AEA) of Seattle was contracted to perform an in-depth economic analysis of the potential impacts on the private economic sector in Clallam County. Upon review of the application, AEA defined nine critical impacts. These included air and water quality, oil spill potential, impacts to fisheries and recreation, conflicts with existing industry (lumber mills), and electric power demand. Measures to mitigate adverse impacts to the local economy were also presented in the report, An Analysis of Impacts of Oil Port Development on the Pri- vate Sector in Clallam County. San Juan County "Those who live in the San Juans believe they have found a rare environment which has been virtually destroyed everywhere else. Alan Merson Northwest Lawyer Lying north of the submarine pipeline, San Juan County would not suffer direct terrestrial impacts but would have been placed at risk by a spill in the 'strait or at Admiralty Inlet. The county was concerned that NTPC did not provide a reliable assessment of spill risk, spill trajectory, and the sensitivity of marine life to oiling. Among the special concerns were the county's herring and shellfish communities. The county also concluded that NTPC failed to assess rigorously the nonlethal, as well as lethal impacts of oil upon these species and upon benthic communities. A reliable determination of impact would have to evaluate more carefully the resistance time of oil in different sediment communities and the differential recovery rates of species. -51- In addition, San Juan County expressed deep concern that a key sociological issue was underbid: the general importance of the sound and the San Juan Islands, in particular, to the 'lifestyle of state residents. The San Juans are viewed, not only by their inha- bitants, but by much of th 'e larger population, as the single great- est extant example within the state of an unspoiled, yet reasonably accessible coastal environment. San Juan County assumed responsi- bility for highlighting the larger context of the issues posed by the project. General accomplishments under the CEIP grant included review of the EFSEC applications, environmental documents, and related materials, preparation of prefiled testimony, participation in the EFSEC pro- cess, and public education. Jefferson County Following the review of information provided by the applicant, a list of concerns was developed. , The anticipated impacts were divided into three elements: alignment, construction impacts, and operation impacts. The issue that created the most concern for Jefferson County was liquefaction potential. According to the engineering reports sub- mitted by the applicant, extensive soils between Protection Island and Discovery Bay could be subjected to, liquefaction. The inte- grity of the pipeline was dependent on its ability to withstand the occurrence of such an event. Reflecting these concerns, the county retained an expert, Dr. Mehmet Sherif, to review pertinent NTPC studies. His findings were instrumental in EFSEC determinations that the NTPC liquefaction analysis was not based on "state of the art" techniques. The county also believed that other geological risks evaluated by the applied needed better study. It was con- cerned that NTPC did not conduct a comprehensive soil sampling and related tests to evaluate the potential for submarine landslides. Jefferson County, perhaps more than any other local jurisdiction, encompassed sensitive habitat that could be devastated by a catas- trophic spill. Such a spill would have an immediate and direct impact on aquaculture activities, the marine birds of Discovery Bay and Protection Island and valuable feeding and spawning grounds. In addition, surrounding shorelines might suffer from oiling, affecting personal property and possibly inhibiting tourism activi- ties. A substantial portion of county testimony was devoted to the definition of these impacts. Island County "The s@ubmarine pipeline has been presented to you as something that is engineeringly a piece of cake." Thom Gunn-,, "From public testimony. -52- Northern Tier's proposal called for approximately 28 miles of pipe- line extending through county lands, including an eight-mile sub- marine crossing. The project called for extensive trenching and modification of both the marine and upland environment. The county's major concerns focused on potential impacts to environ- mental and recreational resources which could result from both construction and operation of the pipeline. The county believed that NTPC had not adequately evaluated the hazard posed to island water resources due to construction (e.g. ,saline intrusion and breaching). A more general concern was the belief that NTPC had not performed reliable routing assessments to minimize recreational and biological impacts. Island County believed NTPC had not properly evaluated the serious aspects of spill risk and the potential for spill migration into sensitive Puget Sound habitats. Moreover, because, of recently developed seismic data, it was known that the pipeline was potentially sub- ject to extreme event earthquake stresses. The county believed that NTPC had not rigorously evaluated this hazard. In order to ferret out the major issues and develop appropriate mitigation measures, Island County retained experts to prepare reports and later submit information to EFSEC. Northwest Environ- mental Consultants (NEC), in their report entitled Assessment of Effects on Island County, Wa., Resources and Economics, of the Proposed Northern Oil Tier Pipeline, identified oil spillage from the submarine crossing as the more signifiiff@ant potential impact. The report documented a high probability that any spill in the Admiralty Inlet crossing could affect much of the western shore of Whidbey Island. Such a spill would result in impaired ecosystem functions and decrease overall productivity of marine habitats. The desirability of shoreline property would be degraded; and the county's commercial and recreational base would be adversely impacted. The potential for a spill/pipeline rupture was consid- ered high due to pipeline malfunction, stress caused by currents, geologic conditions, anchor dragging, or by seismic activity. The NEC report also concluded that oil leakage or rupture of the overland pipeline on Whidbey or Camano islands could cause ground water contaminaton if not detected quickly. This potential impact would be heightened by the fact that Island County residents depend heavily upon ground water sources for drinking water. Two other reports were prepared under the CEIP grant. The first, entitled Oil Spill Risk from the Proposed Northern Tier Pipeline System, A Critique by Christopher H. Achen, Assistant Professor at the University of California at Berkeley, provided the county and EFSEC. with an evaluation of the oil spill risk analysis prepared for Northern Tier by the Oceanographic Institute of Washington. In summary, the report showed that the OIW analysis had underestimated the risk of oil spills by systematically ignoring central factors likely to cause large spills (i.e. tanker size). -5.3- The second report, entitled The Seismic Hazards to the Proposed Northern Tier Pipeline in the Northern Puget Lowland,_Washington. 5eological Sciences provided the county and EFSEC with an analysis of the known and potential faults and historical earthquake acti- .vity. It also provided the agencies with a critique of the seismic analysis presented by Northern Tier's consultants. In addition to the oil spill/pipeline rupture issues, other major potential impacts to environmental and recreational resources which Island County identified included: (1) the alteration and destruc- tion of underwater, @._!ach, and bluff areas as a result of construc- tion of pipeline lan,falls; (2) the alteration and destruction of upland habitats and -',:nd uses as a result of clearing and grading for the terrestrial ---tion of the pipeline; (3) increased traffic rom construction activities; and (4) impacts on roads and ferrie!-. on the historic cha" ter of the Ebey's Landing National Historic Reserve. Mitigation measure!,'- @Jggested by Island County focused on alterna- tive routing, pipe- '@@e construction techniques, and spill preven- tion plans and coL-. More study was suggested to better establish current I ',@:.",terns, spill trajectories, geologic hazards, and critical marin, ..-bitats. The county proposed several general mitigation measure . %ertaining to the submarine crossing. The pipeline, it asse@,'@@ should be located so as to avoid steep marine areas that- stress the pipe. Ballasting of the pipe should be sufficit`,'-%.-.!"o account for high velocity bottom currents. In addition, aro,@""_ d'f bottom scouring should be defined and avoided; and sedi@ should be replaced in the trench to minimize pipe stress and in from foreign objects. Other specific mi.,. ilon measures included the selection of proper soils to underli terrestrial portion of the pipeline, thus reducing or avoid- mpacts to ground water sources from a pipe- line leak of rupt,@@.,'. Bentonite clay could possibly be used below the pipeline as a for the bottom of the trench. Further, the impacts at landf@ ' ,cations could be mitigated by burying the pipeline at the ne"@,*, area at a depth that would prevent scour- ing. Contoured di: @,_d ground to the preexisting topography was recommended to preN.1-'--ts-iterference with longshore drift. With respect to contingency plans, Island County argued that NTPC should prepare a spill prevention and containment plan specifically addressing submarine leaks or pipeline ruptures. And, similarly, it should develop a contingency plan aimed at rapid detection and cleanup of spills affecting the county's important ground water resource. Snohomish County "If there's magic on this planet, it is contained in water."* *Julia Gibb, Snohomish County Deputy Prosecutor referencing prose of Loren Eisley in opening statement. -54- Primary concerns identified by Snohomish County related to poten- tial impacts associated with river crossings and penetration of wetland areas. The Northern Tier proposal called for crossing of 39 rivers and streams in the county. Snohomish County reviewed the application and EIS and found NTPC had provided only superficial treatment of stream crossing impacts. The route appeared to have been based on a nonrigorously employed selection criteria and reconnaissance. The centerline, it found, crossed highly productive fish and wildlife areas unreported by the applicant. Moreover, NTPC appeared to be utilizing a suspect approach for determining river scour and channel migration poten- tial. A further concern was the efficacy of NTPC erosion control mea- sures. A review of the application indicated the proposed measures were far from comprehensive and that construction impacts would include large inputs of right-of-way sediment into waterways. Impacts to wetlands had been a problem of increasing magnitude to Snohomish County. A review of the application and EIS further indicated that NTPC had erroneously concluded that no wetlands would be crossed or impacted by the pipeline. A review of relevant literature indicated that wetland degradation had commonly been associated with pipelines in other parts of the United States and similar impacts appeared likely, in Snohomish given NTPC construc- tion plans. Considerable effort was also expended, by both in-house staff and consultants, in a site-by-site evaluation of both wetland and stream crossings. A major finding of the county was the discovery of previously undisclosed physical and biological conditions at the crossings relevant to potential impact. Consultants were retained to examine stream crossing methods, evaluate channel migration at major crossings, and determine accurate scour depths. They deter- mined that NTPC's river scour estimates and crossing techniques were unreliable due to methodological weaknesses and use of inac- curate data. Channel migration estimates at Davis Slough and the south and north forks of the Stillaquamish River were found unduly conservative. To avoid or mitigate potential impacts to rivers, streamways, and aquatic and riparian resources, the county developed several pre- ferred measures. A superior method for computing maximum flood scour was developed and recommended. "Fish windows" were also developed for 27 streams while alternative crossing techniques were developed for 20 others. Performance standards for erosion and sediment control and fish and wildlife protection were also devel- oped. This information was presented to EFSEC by both county staff and consultants. With respect to wetland impacts, Snohomish County determined a potential loss of habitat in 20 county wetlands crossed by the pro- posed pipeline. The county found that these potentially damaged wetlands provide habitat for as many as 11 rare, threatened, or endangered species (bald eagle, peregrine falcon, and plant spe- cies). -55- To mitigate impacts associated with wetland intrusions, the county suggested a variety of planning, construction, and operations mea- sures. These included rerouting (15 specific wetland areas were identified); fencing, patrolling, posting, directional drilling, reduced right-of-way widths and, a variety of measures to limit human access. 9.2 State Agencies Concerns of state agencies were developed through a coordinated review of the application, DEIS, and supporting materials. In many cases, agencies collaborated in project assessments, including sponsorship of review studies. Fisheries Department Washington State Department of Fisheries' (WDF) concerns largely revolved around oil spill impacts to marine resources. In parti- cular, the department believed it important to establish a reliable inventory of salmonid, ground fish and shellfish resources jeopard- ized by oil spills. The Fisheries Department also believed the impacts of the project would depend heavily upon the effectiveness of both monitoring and quality control system established by the applicant and by EFSEC. No system comparable to the Trans Alaska Pipeline Systems (TAPS) pipeline office or a joint fish and wild- life monitoring team was defined and described in the application. Fisheries believed that reference to the experience on TAPS would provide useful direction in the establishment of such an oversight body. Fisheries was particularly concerned'about marine and coastal habi- tat degradation due to oil spills. Its impact assessment was based upon a review of major international spill incidents and local oceanographic surveys. Drift card studies of Puget Sound indicated that spill associated with the Northern Tier project could oil significant areas of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Puget Sound, the San Juan Islands, and the Washington coast. A spill in Puget Sound would be particularly devastating because of the oceanographic characteristics of the sound: extensive tidal excursions, slow flushing of certain restricted water bodies, high turbulence and mixing in channels, and the long length of convoluted shoreline comprising a variety of valuable intertidal and subtidal habitats. On the basis of this review, the department sponsored witnesses on specific oil spill and construction impacts and performed in-house resource analyses. Major attention was focused on lethal and sub- lethal impacts of oil to shellfish, salmonid, ground fish, and macrobenthic organisms. With respect to mitigatio , OF efforts focused on development of construction provisions and related monitoring procedures in the event the proposal was certified. WDF, through the use of CEIP funds, drew on expertise from people involved in monitoring and -56- control of previous pipeline projects in Washington State and experts familiar with the Trans Alaska Pipeline System construc- tion. WDF found no techniques available to prevent construction and oper- ation impacts; however, timing of the construction operation and the use of certain construction techniques were recommended to reduce impacts on salmon, marine fish, and shellfish. For stream crossings, WDF recommended directional drilling and/or boring, aerial crossings, two-staged ("flip-flop") crossings, and culverting. Wet treching was considered the least acceptable method. Construction timing periods ("windows") were proposed to avoid periods of higher salmon abundance and life phases when salmon would be especially vulnerable to environmental changes. Performance standards were recommended to aid in minimizing the effects of pipeline construction on instream and marine resources. Categories included centerline selection, terrestrial construction, streamside staging areas and construction approaches, instream work, control of toxic substances, oil wastes and solid wastes, and. rehabilitation and revegetation of distrubed areas. In conjunction with other state agencies, WDF also suggested the creation of a state pipeline office. The office would have a tech- nical and field surveillance staff responsible for ensuring imple- mentation of performance standards. Department of Game The Washington State Department of Game (WDG) focused upon the determination of impacts to sports fish and game species. An emphasis was placed on the definition of mitigation measures for stream impacts. WDG believed that a fuller accounting was necessary of marine birds in the strait that could be affected by oil spills. Because of the Davis Slough-West Pass wetland crossing and the proximity of the Skagit estuary to the Saratoga crossing, Game believed several wet- land and terrestrial habitat inventories were also necessary. Game staff, and its retained experts, presented testimony to the siting council on five major topics: 1) Western Washington terres- frial fauna and habitat; 2) marine fauna; 3) freshwater fauna; 4) Eastern Washington terrestrial fauna and habitat; and 5) mitiga- tion. Several examples of Game's analytical results follow. WDG experts documented the significance of the Skagit-Port Susan waterfowl area, bisected by the proposed pipeline route. This area is one of the most important coastal waterfowl habitats in the Pacific Northwest. Significant impacts from the Northern Tier pipeline on some waterfowl habitat were determined likely. The department also documented 13 known bald eagle nests within or near the pipeline corridor. Disruption of breeding and possibly nest abandonment would be risked by construction activities. -57- With respect to fish, WDG verified the presence of cutthroat trout, rainbow trout, steelhead, and mountain whitefish in the many streams crossed by the proposed route. Construction activities, as well as operational oil spills, could cause egg or larvae mortal- ity, damage to spawning beds and habitat, and blockage of migration routes., Game testimony also identified marine mammals and marine birds within or near the proposed pipeline corridor. Protection Island, Jamestown, Cape Flattery, and Smith-Minor islands contain large numbers of marine birds. Harbor seals, sea lions, and killer whales frequently use the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Water birds were identified as species particularly vulnerable to oil spills. Oper- ation of the proposed tanker unloading facility was evaluated for potential losses of birds in the Port Angeles Harbor and the Strait of Juan de Fuca. In order to reduce instream construction impacts to the freshwater fish, Game, like Fisheries, also recommended "fish windows." Department of Ecology The Department of Ecology concerns focused on a number of important statewide interests. These encompassed the adequacy of the appli- cant's oil spill and trajectory analyses, electrical supply system impacts resulting from the 37,800 mwh annual draw to operate the system, and the ozone and hydrocarbon air quality impacts resulting from oil port and tank farm operation. Ecology also shared the interest of other intervenors in effective project monitoring. An additional interest was to develop further data on the economic impacts of the project. What economic impacts would be visited upon the state by a catastrophic oil spill? What petroleum price effects would obtain from hookup to the Washington State refine- ries? Ecology, like Fisheries and Game, was also interested in site spe- cific and species specific impacts resulting from oil spills. Ecology believed there was a need to develop more information than was presented by the applicant on the vulnerability of various beach environments to oil coating. A related issue investigated was the natural recovery rates of coastal habitats from oiling. Ecology's work under the CEIP grant consisted of an in-house anal- ysis of the Northern Tier proposal, combined with technical assist- ance from consultants. In-house staff was responsible for the review of the siting application, draft environmental impact state- ment, and other reports prepared by or for the project sponsor. In addition, staff administered the contracts for consultant services pertaining to the technical analyses of the Northern Tier proposal, and coordinated the flow of information between agency staff, con- sultants, and EFSEC. -58- Consultant efforts were as follows: Review of the proposed construction and operations procedures of submarine crossings with reference to oceanographic and geologic conditions. (Hatfield/Thurber) Analysis of the risk factor associated with tanker traffic and the proposed pipeline and a review of possible spill trajec- tories from various points in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound. (Thomas Reid/Phani Raj) Identification of marine bird populations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound and the possible adverse impacts to these resources from oiling. (Speich/Wahl) Identification, by seasonal abundance and distribution, of marine mammals in the Strait, of Juan de Fuca, and northern Puget Sound. A description of the physiological effects of oil on marine mammals was also included. (Everett) Census of waterfowl populations in the Skagit Bay and Port Susan Bay areas, including the assessment of recreational and economic value of these areas due to waterfowl usage. The possible impacts of oil spills on this resource was discussed. (Jeffrey) Hypothetical characterization of the biological damage to marine fish and invertebrates from large spills in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and northern Puget Sound. Biochemical and physiological responses of organisms to oil were discussed, as well as economic impacts to fisheries. (Cardwell) Oil spill sensitivity indexing of shorelines of northern Puget Sound and the Strait of Juan de Fuca. A quantitative index was developed measuring sensitivity of coastal habitats. The index was applied to coastal areas potentially impacted by an NTPS related spill. (Research Planning Institute) Analysis of the potential economic impact of oil spills on commercial and sports fisheries in Puget Sound. The study focused on the types of economic losses caused in oil spills; methodologies used to assign economic values to sport fishery and other uses of the marine environment; and an estimate of of economic damage to fisheries in Puget Sound. (Sorensen) Evaluation of the potential ozone concentrations in the Port Angeles area from hydrocarbon emissions, as attested by tanker unloading, purging and ballasting, and tank farm operations. (Northwest Environmental Consultants) Analysis of the impacts on electric rates due to Northern Tier's electric demand. Methods to reduce the impact to existing consumers and rate payers were identified. (Power) _59- Analysis of the costs and benefits of transporting crude oil to the northern Puget Sound refineries via a spur line. (Mead/Sorensen) Development of a program for surveillance and including moni- toring environmental and technical stipulations for quality control. This product contained a description of a state pipeline construction review office and indicated methods of program financing. (Ch-ampion/Parker) 10.0 EFSEC Findings--Determinations of Impact "It was an intelligence of satisfactory shape and lines and reflec- tions, an agreeable confusion of these things." Thomas McMahon McKay's Bees "The cuttle fish confuses its pursuers by the ejection of ink." C. Parkinson In August 1981, Judge John von Reis prepared a report of findings based upon the EFSEC record of 43,153 pages that had accumulated since January 1980. The report emphasized three main problems: 1) lack of environ- mental safeguards on the submarine line; 2) fire and explosion hazards at the Port Angeles terminaf; 3) the lack of demonstrated project need. The findings largely reflected testimony of intervenor witnesses and contradicted conclusions reached by Northern Tier. During the next three months, EFSEC deliberated on both the record and the Judge von Reis report and issued findings of its own. These largely concurred with the Judge von Reis report. On October 16,1981, at a full meeting of the council and before a room full of reporters and the general public, a vote was taken on the application and the draft EFSEC findings. With 22 in favor, four opposed, EFSEC recommended denial of the application. With minor changes, the draft EFSEC report was forwarded to the Gover- nor. On April 8, 1982, Governor Spellman issued an order rejecting the appli- cation, accepting the council findings. The Governor found that the proposed submarine route " 'constituted a very real threat to Puget Sound, which is a natural treasure." The operational safeguards to protect the pipeline from leak or rupture were determined insufficient. In addition, he cited problems with the marine terminal location. This location, he stated, jeopardized the lives and safety of the people of Port Angeles in the event of a tanker explosion or fire. The Governor made reference to the council's Findings of Fact and Con- clusions of Law, the 495-page document which treated the specific ele- ments of the application. Known as the "findings," this report reflects the effective use of CEIP monies (see Appendix 11.2). Witnesses spon- sored by such funds provided critical testimony in the tbree.issue areas on which the council expressed its greatest concern, as well as a number of other elements on which the council's recommendation for denial was based. -60- A discussion of significant EFSEC findings is provided below. Reference is made to important questions addressed by the council and the testi- mony of witnesses cited in the council findings. 10.1 Project Need Northern Tier never offered persuasive rebuttal to the testimony of witnesses Tussing, Mead, and Sorenson that the serious supply prob- lem intended to be solved by the project was really illusory. Mead and Sorenson were CEIP witnesses sponsored by Clallam County and the Department of Ecology. Their testimony, demonstrated that "ANS surpluses" on the West Coast were being absorbed and that the mar- ketplace had a self-correcting capacity to respond to regional supply - demand disequilibria. Moreover, Mead and Sorenson made a careful study of the recession in Midwest demand. The evidence was clear that the anticipated shortage was not materializing. The company's own witness, Pugliaresi, proved damaging. Under cross-examination from WDOE Attorney Lean, he offered the observa- tion that market conditions could only justify a pipeline having 167,000 bpd throughput. This concurred with Sorenson and Meade's finding that neither the smaller Trans Mountain project, nor Nor- thern Tier would be built if market conditions were relied upon for the determination of need. The fact that the federal government had not come to Northern Tier's side also eroded the company's contention of need. The council findings emphasize that in March 1978 Chairman Lewis requested federal confirmation of national need; yet no response was received. 10.2 Fire and Explosion Prefile Testimony of Walter J. Mead Is there a West Coast surplus? It became apparent during the A. There is a West Coast surplus. However, due to the cross-examination of Northern Tier market distortions of price controls (which expire on witnesses by both the intervenors October 1, 1981), and excess profit taxes (which expire about and the council tha t the company 1980-1982), a quantification of the West Coast surplus based was proposing a fire protection on Panama Canal shipments is not valid. Further, the price system designed primarily to pro- control and tax distortions lead to artificially high crude tect berthing facilities and not imports, adding to the West Coast crude oil problem. A more for f ighting crude oil fires on complete explanation of the West Coast surplus can be found on pages 38 through 51 of Appendix B. tankers and in the Port Angeles Harbor. The testimony of Fire Q. Is the so-called "West Coast surplus" large enough to justify Chief Hansen of the Seattle Fire a pipeline such as the one proposed by NTPC? Department was particularly influ- A. No. In the absence of Prudhoe Bay size crude oil dis- ential. Northern Tier had not coveries in the Beaufort Sea, and continued high level imports of foreign crude into the West Coast, the West adequately established a design Coast surplus is too small to justify construction of the fire for planning purposes. Such a Northern Tier Pipeline. f ire should be described by a -61- number of variables, including rate Prefile Testimony of Chief B.L. Hansen of spreading, area of tanker deck space involved, and petroleum con- Q. To your knowledge, has Northern Tier determined a certain level of fire stituents, as well as volume. and then designed a fire protection system to respond to that size of fire? Moreover, serious questions were A. No. To my knowledge neither Northern Tier nor the City of Port Angeles raised about secondary fires and has made any determination with regard to the size of fire for which they fire reaction sequences. Northern wish the system to be designed. To the best of my knowledge the system Tier had admitted to the possi- design has been based upon an examination of what similar facilities have bility that most of the harbor and been installed in the way of fire protection equipment. While there is open harbor anchorage would be some merit in examining what has been installed in other terminal facilities within the radius of a worst-case there is also an inherent danger in. designing a facility based on what pool fire, but did not address the others are doing. Simply put, the progress in improving designs of fire possibility that the Standard Oil systems may come very slowly. If I am going to build a car and I look dock, and highly flammable log over to see how you are building a car in order to design my own, it is storage areas, might become in- going to be a long time before we have better cars on the road. I believe volved. Cross-examination estab- the appropriate way to design a system is to make that first, difficult lished the failure of company con- decision of how big a fire you wish to plan for. ' sultants to consider carefully the I believe the problem of deciding the level of fire needs to be faced flammable structures on the water- head on and it must be recognized that if a fire occurs which Is larger front. than that planned for, It may not be extinguished. Q. Do you believe the proposed Northern Tier fire protection system could Even had this damaging information put out a fire on a fully involved tanker? not surfaced, the fire issue had to A. No. In my opinion, a fully Involved tanker of the size proposed to be be considered extremely serious. handled at this facility could probably not be put out with the fire system The company had presented the proposed even including the fireboat. I should also point out that I am council with the results of several not aware of any fire protection system or agency which could be relied studies to establish fire risks. upon to do so. One of these, an OIW report, esti- mated that the Northern Tier faci- Q. Do you agree with Northern Tier's conclusion that the shore-based fire lities would increase the Port protection system is adequate to handle all eventualities of onboard ship Angeles fire risk by 16 times. fires? A. No, I do not. I don't believe there is any fire protection system in the world which is designed to handle all eventualities. Once again, I should The testimony of Chief Hansen was point out that the basic decision which has to be made first is how large again instrumental in establishing of a fire do you wish to design the system to handle? Until you have reservations of the council about answered that question, it is simply academic to discuss what types of the ability of the company to fires the system could not handle. mitigate or reduce risks of such a catastrophe. There was much dis- cussion of the effectiveness of inert gas systems proposed by the company to attenuate the proba- bility of tanker explosion, and, in his respect, the company's position CEIP-sponsored testimony of witness was sustained; however, damaging Bennett (Clallam County and City of testimony accumulated that a fully Port Angeles) was also referenced involved fire would be difficult, in the council findings. Bennett if not impossible, to contain. The established that the site selection council's finding on mitigation of Port Angeles was ill-considered. reflected the chief's position--no It was an exception to the con- fire system, including Northern temporary practice of locating Tier's, is capable of extinguishing super ports away from residential a fully involved fire. and urban settings. -62- 10.3 Oil Spill Risk--Tanker Accidents Robert J. Stewart on Oil Spill Risk Substantial uncertainty of cata- Q. What is your general opinion of 01WIs oil spill incidence analysis? strophic spills was the most A. I find their work very hypothetical and I question the reliability of many Northern Tier was able to offer in of their estimates. I also find that the conceptual framework of their its arguments regarding tanker studies is unsuitable for making the best use of the uncertain information accident hazards. The company pre- they have developed from the data. For example, I find that their sented the council with two some- ranking of alternative sites in their 1978 report is not credible. This what inconsistent studies assessing ranking was based on an estimated T annual oil spill volume that is statis- the potential for tanker colli- tically unreliable (cf. the comparative risk portions of OIW's "Oil Spill .sions, groundings, and resultant Risk Analysis," Chapter 11 and Appendix E). In their more recent work oil spills. The council refused to for Northern Tier, I find their comparison to be flawed by a similar, offer its own judgment on the like- questionable use of the available statistics. They appear to be making lihood of particular tanker-related quantitative predictions, but the factual basis for their estimates is not spills, reflecting its dissatisfac- developed. tion with the reliability and rigor of the presented evidence. Q. Do you agree with 01WIs assertions that their use of "distance travelled per port call" as an exposure variable is substantiated by the "strong" Several CEIP-funded witnesses had correlation they obtained for the eight major U.S. ports and that their done damage to the Northern Tier casualty rate is "statistically significant?" position that it had provided the A. No. The use of "distance travelled per port call" as an exposure vari- council with a reasonable and able is not substantiated by the data and the analysis they present. In sufficient treatment of the pro- my view, their exposure variate selection procedure is simply a hypotheti- blem. The council relied heavily cal speculation regarding a suitable parameter. The use of this variate is on the testimony of CCPA witness not under any circumstances well enough supported to warrant its inclu- Stewart who asserted that the sion in a quantitative model, where I am again using "quantitative" in the quantitative risk analyses provided sense I developed Initially. by the applicant had a number of The statistical test OIW used determined that if their model was IiKe significant defects. These not a standard least squares model then it was very unlikely (1 chance in 20) only stemmed f rom the limitations that the slope of the actual line was zero. Since the Poisson process of the data base from which stati- doesn't satisfy these statistical conditions imposed by the least squares stical coefficients were estimated, model, OIW's conclusion of a "strong" correlation is not valid to begin but from serious methodological with. Second ly, with only eight samples, you cannot develop a "strong" problems. The submitted studies correlation. OIW has simply shown that if a mechanism different from the were based upon dubious models in which key variables were excluded. one they hypothesized generated the data, then it probably has a nonzero Moreover, the company had made slope parameter. unwarranted assumptions about the statistical distribution of spill events. Stewart testified that the conclusions derived from various Other CEIP witnesses on tanker models were therefore unreliable. spill risk included Achen, Bennett, A lengthy cross-examination by Storie, and Armstrong. Bennett, in Northern Tier lawyer, Dan Syrdal, particular, was cited - by the followed during which Stewart was council as it concluded that OIW forced to further detail his con- understated- the tanker spill risk clusions. At end, Stewart's and that probability estimates were testimony was unshaken. unreliable. -63- 10.4 Resources at Risk--Marine The Washington State Department of Fisheries, the Department of Game, and the Department of Ecology pro- vided a traffic of witnesses and exhibits that substantiated the marine resources endangered by a major oil spill. The council made only selective reference to the volume of information that was pro- vided; but throughout the findings is a tone that harmonizes with the testimony of such witnesses. The Department of Fisheries established the economic significance of jeo- pardized marine resources. A maj-or accident in the Strait of Juan de Fuca or surrounding waters could cause economic damages in excess of $200 million. The maps provided by Fisheries located a number of the critical I areas that would be affected by both pipeline construction and operational spills. For example, WDF witnesses located the presence of banks near Protection Island critical to the breeding of Puget Sound codfish. These were proxi- mate to the Admiralty Crossing. In other instances, witnesses expanded upon the Northern Tier resource assessments ' and the data 14 h presented in the EIS. Resources were more completely characterized 2. by seasonal distribution, numbers, variety, limiting habitat factors (e.g. critical areas), and food chain interactions. The result was a clearer apprehension of habitat sensitivity. Several CEIP spon- sored witnesses made important con- tributions, including Jeffrey, Cardwell, Speich, Wahl, and Long. -64- 10.5 Oil Spill Risk--Spill variable winds of the Sound were tb Migration change only slightly in direction or force, the behavior of a slick The council's findings largely bore would change drastically. out the intervenor testimony of Ebbesmeyer, Raj, Stewart, Storie, Late in the proceedings, after and Long that no trajectory analy- intervenor witnesses had been sis could reliably predict the dis- cross -examined, the council called persion and migration of spilled its own witnesses. One of these, a oil. This, as stated above, was NOAA scientist, Dr. Holbrook, had also admitted to by NTPC. The fate originally testified at the request of underwater spills, such as those of the Department of Ecology. originating from a break in the Holbrook established the extreme submarine lines, was considered variability of current depending particularly indeterminate. upon depth, location, time of year, Stewart testified that Northern and tide cycles. Among the most Tier had, in fact, utilized the problematic sites for modeling, he best available trajectory model; testified, was the Admiralty Inlet but still this could provide no submarine crossing site. His reliable determination of the po- testimony amplified the testimony tential problem. He provided the of earlier witnesses that down- council with an analysis demonstra- welling at the Admiralty sill could ting that the outputs of , such a cause spilled oil to be retained at model were highly sensitive to as- depth or transported into inner sumptions regarding winds. If the Puget Sound. @Y- DRIFT CARD RECOVERIES c, -P Expressed as Percentage of Total Recoveries; 0 Westerly Winds Prevailing. rill Cud L-d F.1 I I lo st--I@ Sca IRV T ;,R` i% 5h -.4 04 S rlm 5% a CAIEF ITTERYI g-, 10 C- _7 g s: 4% 62% ;V@ 4%, end . .......... . WMMY z 5LAND N, EVERM Figure 10.5.1 Drift Card Recoveries. (see original). Both Northern Tier and intervenor witnesses referred to drift ca rd studies in the argumeni over oil spill migration. (P. 2-12) Source: BLM EIS -65- 10.6 Oil Spill Risks--Submarine Lines Dr. Donald Winter on Submarine Geology (q. What is your opinion as to the adequacy of the soil sampling which has Alia tentanda via est* been performed by Northern Tier on the Admiralty Sill crossing? One of the several important issues A, In my opinion, the summary Shannon & Wilson profiles cannot be evaluated by the council was the regarded as anything more than a preliminary estimate of general soil hazard to the line posed by high conditions along the route because of the sparse sampling frequency. currents. Northern Tier had An examination of the soil samples shows that bottom material parameters assumed a 6 fps design current. vary widely over the entire route and adjacent soil parameter sets are The council found this too low, poorly correlated. I'perhaps 50 percent too low." The The bottom samples were acquired at locations separated by distances too testimony of Winter and Holbrook great for an estimate to be made of a horizontal scale of the soil type was heavily referenced by the and density variation. council. Winter argued that the applicant's metering period was far Q. In your opinion, can the soil sampling program be relied upon to make too short to justify its conclu- judgments about the properties of the soils along the pipeline route? sions; moreover, the company A. No, it cannot. The distance between samples averages almost 1 mile. employed a methodology that in- In the area northeast of Protection Island where the route has been eluded unjustified extrapolations revised as part of the October, 1980 testimony, there is a distance along and factor reductions. Winter the route of approximately 5 miles where no soil samples have been testified that velocities of over taken. Even on those portions of the route where samples have been 7 fps had actually been recorded in taken, there is an insufficient number of samples to determine the hori- the Admiralty sill area and that zontal scale of variations in density and other properties. stronger currents, on the order of 9 fps, could occur. Q. In your opinion, do the geophysical surveys undertaken by Shannon & The council's concern regarding Wilson on the Admiralty Sill crossing rule out the presence of boulders cu''rrents was paradoxically along the route? heightened by the testimony of NTPC A. No. witness, John Eaton. Eaton elabo- rated on the potential of pipeline rupture, the result of what is called vortex shedding (alternately known as pipe flutter). This phenomenon had been experienced in Alaska at Cook Inlet. The faster the current moves, ovi@r a pipe, the more likely is scouring and pipe flutter, especially if adequate weighting is not provided. The cross-examination of NTPC witness, Timmermans, established the diffi- culty of both adequately weighting a line to prevent floatation and flutter and protecting it from the liquefaction. Johnson testified hazards of liquefaction. This was that liquefaction may occur in an at variance with a contention area four times more extensive than Northern Tier had earlier made in that identified by the applicant. evaluating geologically induced Both Sherif and Johnson testified stresses. that the full extent of potential Witnesses Sherif and Johnson, both soil liquefaction could not be de- CEIP-funded, were relied upon termined from the information pro- .heavily in findings regarding vided by the applicant. *Another way should be tried -66- Several other geological hazards to the integrity of the submarine Richard Sternberg Submarine Hazards lines were considered understated Q. In your opinion, do the geophysical surveys undertaken by Shannon & by the applicant. The sand wave Wilson on the Admiralty Sill crossing rule out t),.e [email protected] of boulders issue was important, not only along the route? because it represented a potential A. No. threat to line integrity, but because it reflected upon the Q. What are your conclusions as to the possibility of boulders and rock in commitment of Northern Tier to the vicinity of the proposed Admiralty Sill crossing? undertake analysis necessary to A. I think that there is a high likelihood that bould -ers of a foot or more in minimize risk. "Northern Tier was diameter are a feature of the sea floor and the region just below the sea aware of the presence of sand waves bottom. Various forms of glacial 'ieposits are found throughout this area in early 1979," stated the council, and many of the deposits contain cobbles and boulders of a wide range of "but performed no geotechnical work sizes. Admiralty Sill is a@ example of such a deposit where large parts to assess them." The council con- of the seabed is covered with these coarse materials. Although a photo- cluded that the existing analysis graphic survey of the proposed Northern Tier crossing has not been was inadequate to ensure that the made, the total geologic composition of the Strait, the Sill and Admiralty submarine pipeline would remain Inlet indicates that if boulders are encountered in regions on either side buried after installation. The of the proposed crossing, there is a strong likelihood that they will be potential for marine current scour encountered at the crossing itself. The Shannon & Wilson soil samples was testified to by Sternberg. show the presence of glacial deposits very near the surface. We know that glacial deposits in the surrounding region do contain cobble and The council also found that "The boulders. presence of scattered boulders represents a potential hazard to Q. What is the material on the Admiralty Sill crossing shown on Exhibit 279 the submarine pipeline." The com- and described as "irregular bottom (barchan-shaped) sand and gravel"? pany's geotechnical studies could A. 'This portion of the route shows a very irregular bottom with wave-like not detect scattered boulders less features extending over a mile in distance. The profiles show the ampli- than a meter in diameter. tude of the largest of these wave-shaped features is of the order of 20 feet. The depth of this material is unknown. The surficial sediment The comprehensiveness of NTPC geo- composition is described by Shannon and Wilson as "sand and gravel." technical studies was a major council concern. An order of Q. What is the significance of barchan-shaped sand waves? August 19 , 1980, required the com- A., This suggests that this nortion of the route may be unstable. Sand pany to conduct further design waves are formed with moving sediment and indeed the strength of the studies of the submarine route. bottom currents in the area, as discussed by W.J. Timmermans, strongly Specific sampling procedures were suggests that sediment movement is a common occurrence. If these are detailed including acoustical pro- sand waves, their configuration may vary over time and they may also be filing, current metering, side scan migrating In a particular direction. If they are migrating or shifting sub- sonar, and borings. Northern Tier stantially, it is possible that the submarine pipeline buried in these returned with only part of the features could become exposed at some future date. data. Excluded were the borings. In addition, the number of sampling points was significantly less than the council specified and the quality of the data collected, extremely poor. -67- 10.7 River Crossing Hazards Although the council concluded that Norman and Garland assessed the river crossings and floodplain methods used by the company's wit- problems were "solvable" through ness, Koloski, to evaluate scour certification conditions, a number and deemed them less precise than of findings were made and testimony other techniques. The testimony of referenced to support the conclu- Garland was particularly signi- sion ". . that the applicant's ficant. Under cross-examination approach to crossing many of the after an erosion of Norman's pre- state's streams is inadequate." file testimony, Garland established the limitations of NTPC's scour The council relied heavily on the methodology and the greater relia- testimony of Snohomish County wit- bility of other approaches. Under- nesses, Veldman and Norman, and estimation of channel migration Ecology witness, Garland. Both potential was also asserted by both Veldman and Norman had prepared Veldman and Norman, based upon CEIP-sponsored studies of river studies of the Stillaguamish River. scour, channel migration, and river The company had made the unsup- crossing techniques. Norman also ported assumption that existing evaluated construction-induced land protection would remain intact siltation. Garland's analysis was during flooding. As a result, pipe conducted independently but, in overbends and sagbends could be part, because of CEIP sponsored subject to scour and exposure--so coordination, was keyed to the concluded the council. points discussed. 10 FA Figure 10.7.1 North Fork Stillaguarnish crossing location. A CEIP sion and was laterally unstable. This site was referenced funded study made by Snohomish County demonstrated in the county challenge to Northern Tier's centerline se- that the crossing site was experiencing severe bank ero- lection procedures. -68- 10.8 Fishery Impacts--Siltation In large measure, the council findings on siltation were drawn from the testimony of David Somers, Tulalip Tribes witness. General support came from several Department of Game and Fisheries wit- nesses. Somers and Norman had collaborated with Snohomish County in an analysis of small streams siltation. This analysis concluded that a typical small stream crossing in Snohomish County would likely be sedimented with large amounts of fine materials. More- over, the silt could not be expected to be flushed quickly from important spawning beds by runoff. The council concluded that silt generated by construction would cause substantial fish losses.- The council accepted Armstrong Creek (the stream analyzed by Norman, Somers, and Snohomish County) as an example of fishery impact that might be low compared to other streams crossed by the line in West- ern Washington. All Ujf @d Figure 10.8.1 Armstrong Creek, one of thirty-nine stream crossings in Snohomish County. The crossing would have occurred at an important spawning site. CUP funds were used to evaluate the impact of pipeline induced sedimentation on fish productiv- ity at this site and demonstrated in-stream construction would cause significant losses. -69- In general, the applicant treated smaller streams lightly. This was evidenced in a number of council findings. The council con- cluded the company had provided inadequate site specific informa- tion of fishery resources and had failed to provide design criteria that would ensure minimal fisheries impacts. The council again cited Somers in concluding that the company had not determined that the small stream crossings (of which there would be 56 in the Sno- homish Basin) could be accomplished within the propos ed 90-day fish window. 10.9-Sensitive Terrestrial Habitat and Wetlands Northern Tier had failed to conduct a careful inventory of sensi- tive habitat in the corridor and, as a result, had proposed a centerline which would have crossed and impacted a large number of wetlands, endangered species habitat, and biologically productive upland. Department of Game witness, Perry, testified that of 103 rare, threatened, or endangered plant species in Washington State, 61 had been found in the Colockum Habitat Management Area that would be crossed by NTPS. Citing the testimony of Snohomish County witnesses, Hirschi and Currie, the council concluded, "Northern Tier underestimated the impact of this project on wetlands." Snohomish County had under- taken a detailed mapping effort and inventory of the corridor and established the fact that the centerline crossed or was tangent to 20 wetlands. Within the corridor, 11 endangered, threatened or rare species had been documented. This CEIP sponsored effort was supported by a detailed slide show that included a site by site discussion of habitat impacts, recommended mitigation measures, and suggested alignment changes. The more general implication of the Snohomish County wetland work was that the applicant's claim of having carefully considered wet- lands in route selection in other areas was rendered dubious. The testimony of Department of Game witnesses, Stendahl, Leschner, and Jeffrey, supported the conclusion that important habitat would be unnecessarily lost if the pipeline were built where proposed, as proposed. Jeffrey, for example, in his CEIP funded report on the Skagit/West Pass crossing, had established that the centerline would pass through the most productive part of the Skagit waterfowl area. He testified that the area is one of the most important coastal waterfowl habitats in the Northwest. -70- ..... . ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . j@A AXI, M PH Figure 10.9.1 Davis SIough-West Pass wetland complex crossed by the Northern Tier centerline near Stanwood. Snohomish County witnesses testified that if this crossing could not be avoided, impacts should be reduced by use of directional drilling. This would be a novel approach to wetland impact mitigation. Witness Veldman testified that directional drilling would be com- petitive with alternative methods. -71- 10.10 Mitigation Because EFSEC recommended against certification, it did not develop a comprehensive set of mitigation measures. However, a consider- able portion of the hearings was devoted to this issue and a con- siderable amount of the CEIP effort. CEIP mitigation products included 1) stipulated agreements between intervenors and the com- pany (see Appendix 4), and 2) testimony provided by the intervenors and attached exhibits detailing general and site specific measures. A state pipeline office was proposed by Clallam County, the Depart- ment of Fisheries, the Department of Ecology, and Snohomish County based upon testimony by CDS Quest, Charles Kay, and Charles Cham- pion. CDS Quest provided a valuable review of mitigation measures employed, not only on the Alaska Pipeline, but on other comparable high pressure, large diameter lines. In addition, the authors drafted a management structure for a proposed monitoring office that would be empowered to oversee various aspects of construction to ensure that performance standards and mitigation measures required by EFSEC were actually employed. The plan con 'tained detailed communication channels and identified field responsibilities. It also examined potential conflicts between environmental inspectors and project engineers and recom- mended structures and rules for conflict resolution. Snohomish County supplemented this proposal by developing guide- lines for site specific plans after certification and prior to con- struction. These guidelines covered the following submittals to the hypothetical state pipeline office: Drainage erosion control plans Revegetation plans Design @tage general construction plans Habitat evaluation analysis River crossing scour analysis Fisheries analysis of select crossings Channel migration analysis of select crossings Siltation analysis of select crossings Under the county's proposal, the NTPC would be required to submit such plans before construction in specific locations along the route. Site@ in Snohomish County were pinpointed based upon the company's centerline and as a result of reconnaissance performed by Snohomish County and the Tulalip Tribes. -72- l4 I, I Mqg M TM WIF M Ilflg i@ Mi, @ -il 'Mlli U @T TMN flfl '; fl3U *or M @41H' .. .......... J@ n5y l% V @il IT !f"' joi OW Figure 10.2.1 The Trans-Alaska Pipeline provided a referent to the array of impacts that might result from 7q construction and operation of the Northern Tier Pipeline. Shown here are the scorched remains of pump station No. 8 shortly after a fire and explosion in 1977. Testimony regarding the relevance of TAPS to the Northern Tier case was offered by biologist Charles Kay. -73- ' Other intervenors developed-both general and site specific mitiga- tion measures. A complete listing i s beyond the scope of this report; however, categories include the following: General terrestrial construction. Fisheries, Game, Snohomish County. Submarine seismic surveys and Clallam Co., Jefferson Co. mitigation measures Streamside staging areas Fisheries, Snohomish County, Dept. of Game Instream work Fisheries, Snohomish County, - Dept. of Game Control of toxic substances -Fisheries, Dept. of Game, Dept. of Ecology Ground water surveys and King County, Island County ground water protection Scour and channel mitigation Snohomish County, Dept. of Ecology Sensitive terrestrial habitat Game, Snohomish County, King and wetlands, including County revegetation Liability Fisheries, Clallam County, Snohomish County Oil spill response Jefferson County, Clallam Co., Dept.,of Fisheries, Dept. of Game Socioeconomic impact mitigation Clallam County, Snohomish County, Island County Marine terminal - fire and Clallam County explosion Air quality Clallam County Water quality Ecology, Clallam County, Dept. of Game -74- Al 41 _75- 11.1 Route Description and Project Characteristics From the tank farm at Green Point, the centerline follows the Milwaukee Road right-of-way approximately two miles, then proceeds generally due east across relatively level agricultural lands to the vicinity of Port Williams. There, the route leaves the Olympic Peninsula to a point southeast. of Protection Island, then north- eastward, crossing north of Admiralty Inlet to a point near Point Partridge on Whidbey Island. The route crosses Saratoga Passage from north of Polnell Point on Whidbey Island to an approach south of Brown Point on Camano Island. It proceeds along the northeast coast of Camano Island, crossing West Pass to the mainland just west of Stanwood. The route parallels existing railroad rights-of-way around Stan- wood, then proceeds eastward across rolling woods and pasture land to a natural gas pipeline corridor north of Arlington. From Arlington, the route follows the natural gas pipeline corridor south to Monroe, then parallels an existing high-voltage transmis- sion line corridor south eastward to a point southeast of North Bead. East of North Bend, the route parallels the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) right-of-way and an American Telephone and Telegraph cable right-of-way for several miles, crossing the Cas- cade Mountains at the King-Kittitas County line near the Hyak ski area. The route then continues south eastward down the east slope of the Cascades, paralleling the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Pacific Railroad (Milwaukee Railroad) along the southwest side of Keechelus Lake. This section is fairly mountainous terrain, mostly forested, with some portions within national forest land. Near Easton, the centerline merges with the BPA corridor and tra- verses Kittitas County, crossing 1-90 and the Yakima River south- east of Cle Elum. This section is rolling-to-hilly timberland. East of the Yakima River crossing, the route continues to parallel the BPA right-of-way over rolling grazing land to a point a few miles west of the Columbia River. The pipeline crosses the Columbia River six miles west of Quincy and passes north of the Quincy Irrigation District to the vicinity of the Ephrata Airport. It then continues due east along the Lincoln-Adams County line across rolling farm and grazing lands to Sprague. At Sprague, the route runs eastward across rolling farm and grazing lands, crossing various small creeks and exiting Wash- ington southeast of Fairfield. Characteristics of Proposed Facilities The system would consist of tanker unloading facilities, onshore storage facilities, and the overland pipeline, including pump and pressure reducing stations, delivery facilities, and support facil- ities. The combination of the tanker unloading facilities and on- shore storage facilities, both located in the Port Angeles area, is referred to as the marine terminal. -78- Marine Terminal Tanker Unloading Facilities NTPC proposed to construct the tanker unloading facilities within the natural, Port Angeles harbor. Fixed tanker berths would be constructed in 100 feet of water, with connecting trestles to the south shore of Ediz Hook. The tanker berths would be located to provide a water depth of 100 feet and would be capable of simul- taneously unloading two crude oil tankers, ranging in size from the 18,000 dead weight tons (DWT) to 300,000 DWT, at rates of up to 100,000 barrels per hour (bph) per berth. Two tanker unloading berths would be constructed for the initial design capacity, with provision for a third if oil were eventually delivered to Washing- ton State refineries. Tanker-carried oil would initially be pumped through two unloading pipelines to the onshore storage facilities located at Green Point, approximately 6.5 miles to the east. The lines would extend from the east end of Ediz Hook to the Green Point bluff and woud cross beneath Port Angeles Harbor. Figure 11. 1. 1 provides an artist's concept of the marine terminal. Booster pumps would be provided to assist ships' cargo unloading pumps in transferring crude oil to the onshore storage facilities. These pumps would be located on a separate booster pump platform serving both berths. Two electric motor driven pumps, 8,000 horse- power (HP) to 10,000 hp each, would be installed. Flow monitoring of unloaded crude would be measured by meters, located on the booster pump platform. Each of the tanker unloading pipelines would be 48 inches or 52 inches in diameter and designed to provide a maximum flow rate of 100,000 bph. A computer-assisted leak detection and shutdown system with a comp'arative accuracy of 0.5 percent of the pipeline throughout would be installed on each unloading pipeline. The system would consist of four subsystems measuring pressure and flow deviation, flow rate balance, and line volume balance. Tanker unloading operations would be controlled from a main control center at the onshore storage facilities. Communications between stations and facilities would include high frequency marine radio, direct and conventional telephone circuits, UHF radio, and port- able/ mobile units. It was anticipated that electrical power for the tanker unloading facilities would be supplied by the City of Port Angeles Lighting Department. The overall power requirements of the terminal unloading system would be 3,600,000 kwh at ultimate capacity. NTPC'committed to provide various services for the tankers using the facilities. These included potable water supply, line handling launches, and bunker fuel supply. Other support services, such as tugging, would be secured from local companies in the Puget Sound area. NTPC would also install facilities to allow tankers to receive bunker fuel from a permanently moored storage barge. Bunker fuel would be supplied primarily by tanker from California refineries. -79- U:9i.7E-OAS'? GUARD AIR STAt EDIZ MOOK 13FRTH R Yr- (J-088JI, p4j.r L.Ir fjog Be,, rh) C> PORT ANGELES z) 1 23-,,@ I-T 12- Figure 11. 1. 1 Tanker Berths in Port Angeles Harbor. -6AST @GUAMD- AFR @STATIO--@@@ 2 Source: NTPC application A detailed firefighting plan was not provided in the application; however, NTPC committed to construct and implement facilities and procedures developed jointly by the Port Angeles and Seattle fire departments and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). One specified measure was a sea water and foam fire protection system installed on the tanker berths and associated structures. A fully equipped and man- ned fireboat would also be provided. NTPC proposed to make available an oil spill recovery vessel to respond to accidents and also identified several specific proce- dures that would be followed in the event of spills. Oil spill containment booms would be deployed around the tankers prior to oil transfer from tankers. Semipermanent containment booms would remain in place between the berths and the shore of Ediz Hook at all times. Oil from small spills would be recovered using a float- ing oil skimmer deployed from the berthing platform or skimming equipment installed on the oil spill recovery vessel. Marine Terminal - Onshore Storage Facilities A 242-acre tank farm would be develop_ed at Green Point to store oil from the submarine lines and deliver it to pump stations before line batching. The facilities would initially occupy approximately 140 acres of this 242-acre site. Onshore storage facilities would be developed in stages as dictated by pipeline system demand. Storage capacity for six million barrels would be provided initi- ally. For the initial design capacity of 709,000 bpd, eleven 545,000 -barrel floating-roof type tanks (285 feet in diameter and 56 feet high) would be constructed. To minimize vapor emissions from the storage tanks, floating roofs would be installed with primary and secondary seals between the roof and the shell of each tank. As the system capacity reached the ultimate design rate of 933,000 bpd, seven additional 545,000-barrel tanks would be added, augment- ing capacity to 38 million barrels. The control center for the NTPS would be located at Green Point. It was anticipated that electrical power to drive the pumps and service NTPS facilities would be supplied by the Clallam County Public Utility District. Firefighting systems at the onshore storage facilities would include both water and halon inert gas, the latter for protection of control and instrument areas. NTPC also committed to a tanker foam system and a fully equipped fire truck. The company indicated that firefighting procedures would be developed in cooperation with the Port Angeles Fire Department and other regional firefighting groups. To prevent escape of oil in the event of leakage, the company-pro- posed diking all tank areas. Diked areas would be designed to drain discharges into holding basins, where any oil present would be skimmed from the surface. In order to comply with federal, state, and local discharge standards, effluent from these basins _81- would be processed before disposal by gravity separation and coal- escing filter-type oil-water separators. Oil from the separators would be reclaimed, and water effluent from the separators dis- charged into the Strait of Juan de Fuca or Siebert Creek, which bounds the property on the northeast. Pipeline system Total System - Submarine and Overland Systems NTPC proposed to construct the submarine and overland pipeline system concurrently with the marine terminal. The pipeline route included two major submarine crossing: approximately 18 miles across the Strait of Juan de Fuca and 4 miles across Saratoga Pass- age in the Puget Sound region. To develop the initial design capacity of 709,000 bpd, 17 pump sta- tions and one pressure reducing station would be required along tile length of the pipeline. Increasing the pipeline capacity to the ul-timate design capacity of 933,000 bpd would necessitate three additional pump stations and additional pump units at the initial pump stations. Seven pump .stations and the one pressure reducing station in Washington would be needed for initial system capacity system operation. NTPC proposed to construct delivery facilities at Clearbrook, Min- n.esota. Here, provisions would be made to deliver oil to the existing Lakehead and Minnesota Pipeline systems. NTPC would also construct certain unspecified facilities to deliver oil- to the Glacier and Western Crude Oil Pipelines in Montana and to the Amoco Pipeline in North Dakota. Overland Sections The company's routing was based upon a "corridor concept." A cor- ridor, first two miles in width, then narrowed after EFSEC order to 1/2 mile, contained a centerline which represented the tentative route. Deviations would be made from the centerline, as dictated by post certification studies, but only within the 1/2-mile limit. At river crossings the discretionary width was limited to 200 feet. The centerline followed a course which paralleled or followed existing utility lines across much of the state (141 miles). This' rout ing scheme was intended to reduce impacts and minimize land use inconsistency. However, no assurances were provided that the pipe- line would actually be constructed within these rights-of-way. According to the company, co-location would depend upon the will- ingness of the other utilities to accept such a proposal. In order to develop such agreements, a number of engineering and liability considerations would have to be worked out, including induced cor- rosion hazards, security, and protection to in-place transmission lines and pipe. -82- TYPICAL PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION SPREAD W, to, Ih- -7 Trenching Clearing, )W- Grubbing and Debris Disposal Welding Bending Pipe stringing Weld Inspection e!,. Field Coating /Backfill Lowering In --Clean-up Artist's Conception Not Drawn to Scale Figure 1.2-6 Source: Northern Tier Pipeline Company Figure 11.1.2 Pipeline Construction Spread Source: NTPC Without such agreement, the pipeline overland route would necessi- tate the clearing of a -construction swath 90 feet wide. Seventy- five feet would remain cleared of trees and woody vegetation during pipeline operation. There would be a need for even larger con- struction width for certain construction phase staging operations, particularly at river and stream crossings. Both the location and dimensions of these cleared areas would be determined as would the exact location of sites following certification by the council. The overland pipeline was divided into 10 sections for construction purposes. Three of the sections would be located-in Washington, as shown on Figure 4.1.1. Construction of terrestrial pipeline would generally proceed west to east and would occur simultaneously with- in each construction section. Construction activity within a sec- tion would range in length from 8 to 16 miles, depending on the terrain and working conditions. An aIrtist's concept of a typical pipeline construction spread is shown on Figure 11.1.2. Except at river crossings and special areas, the pipeline would be buried with a minimum cover of 36 inches. The overall operation of the pipeline system would be controlled and monitored by a supervisory council and data acquisition (SCADA) system from the main control center at the Green Point storage facilities. All pump stations would be designed for remote opera- tion. The communications system for the pipeline would be a com- bination of land lines and microwave transmission. Telephone and mobile UHF or VHF systems would be used for voice communications. A Westinghouse automatic leak detection and shutdown system with a comparative accuracy of 0.5 percent of the pipeline throughput would be used on the pipeline system. NTPC contended that this represented state-of-the-art hardware (see tanker unloading pipe- lines above). Operations and maintenance personnel would be located at the marine terminal an@ at strategic points along the pipeline route. One hundred twenty-four personnel would be employed at Port Angeles to operate the line at the initial design capacity of 709,000 bpd. Construction stage personnel would number 1,600, of which 600 were expected to be engaged in construction near Port Angeles and 1,000 in all of Washington State. During construction, NTPC would segregate and replace any topsoil removed. After pipe burial, disturbed areas would be graded to blend with the existing contours. The right-of-way would then be reseeded with native vegetation where possible, and above ground facilities would be landscaped to reduce the visual impact of the system. NTPC proposed the using of wet trenching techniques for the cross- ing of streams and rivers. Using this method, the line would be laid a minimum of 4 feet below the estimated scour depth of a 100-year flood. Trenching equipment would work directly in the, streams. Spoil material from the trench would be stockpiled on the banks along the nonerodible backfill. The latter would be deposited into the trench after pipelaying. -84- Hydrostatic Testing The entire pipeline would be tested for weld integrity through a conventional hydrostatic procedure. Thirty-four test sections were identified. Each section would be filled with water withdrawn from local sources and then monitored for pressure, temperature change, and other signs of leakage. Northern Tier would conform to state water quality and state water withdrawal guidelines in both the withdrawal and discharge of water. Radiographic Testing Radiographic inspection of field welds would be performed by an independent contractor. All submarine crossing welds would be inspected by X-ray or gamma ray analysis before application of corrosion coating. The company would otherwise comply with USDOT pipeline welding standards. -85- Appendix 11.2 CEIP-SPONSORED PROFILE TESTIMONY AND REPORTS NORTURN TIER PIPELINE Air Quality Impacts Analysis of Hydrocarbon and Ozone Levels Resulting from Proposed Oil Port Facilities, Port Angeles, prepared for Clallam County/Port Angeles, March 1980, by Northwest Environmental Consultants, Inc. Contains information on existing air quality conditions in Port Angeles area, analysis of tanker and shore based emission sources, analysis of hydrocarbon emissions; modeling methodology; review of other air quality reports, effects on human health and plants and wildlife; mitigation measures. Electrical Energy Impacts The Impact of the Northern Tier Pipeline on Electrical Rates in the State of Washington. Thomas M. Power for the State Department of Ecol- ogy, October 1980. Testifies that NTPS will aggravate supply shortfalls for Washington utility and will increase demand for new generation faci- lities; rates paid by existing customers will rise to cover increased average cost. Asserts $10 and $54 million of annual costs of serving NTPS would be paid by other customers, amounting to a subsidy of $18.60 to $30.70 per year. Fire and Explosion An Overview of Environmental Design, Fire and Explosion Hazards and Oil Spill Contingency Plans of the Northern Tier Pipeline Project in Clallam County, Washington, prepared by Hatfield Consultants, Ltd. Assesses the Northern Tier Pipeline proposal with respect to engineering and design; fire and explosion hazards; and oil spill containment and cleanup. Specific topics include: submarine corssing (emphasizing Port Angeles Harbor area); river crossings; terminal facilities; tanker design and offloading operations; transit and maneuvering of vessels; vessel hazards, - tank farm hazards; oil spill cleanup. Measures to improve the facilities, mitigate impacts, or correct deficiencies in the NTPC proposal are included. Authors conclude: 1) risks of fire and explosion warrant more detail than provided by applicant, 2) tanker accident spill estimates were underestimated, 3) submarine geological investigations were superficial. Fiscal Impacts Construction and Operation Impacts of the Northern Tier Pipeline System on Local Governments in Clallam County, Washington. Prepared for Clallam County and the Department of Ecology. Identifies fiscal impacts on general purpose government and special pur- pose districts within Clallam County. Includes statistics on population changes, personal income, property values, property taxes, road fund, etc. Includes suggested mitigation measures. -86- General and Miscellaneous Assessment of Effects on Island County, WA Resources and Economics of the Proposed Northern Tier Oil Pipeline. Prepared for Island County by Northwest Environmental Consultants, Inc. , March 1980. Documents pro- bability that an Admiralty spill would oil west shore of Whidbey affect- ing habitat productivity. Also evaluates geological hazards at cross- ing, concluding there exists high risk due to active geological proces- ses, high currents. Northern Tier Pipeline System, Analysis of Facilities and Effects, pre- pared by Jefferson County, June 1980. Includes a description of Jefferson County environment and potential impacts to the'county which could result from construction and operation of the NTPC project. Details possible mitigation measures with respect to route selection, construction, noise and glare, trenching, oil spills, liquefact 'ion, and other issues. Includes maps of resources and prefiled testimony by Dr. Mehmet Sherif with respect to liquefaction. Combined Right-of-Way Use by the Proposed Northern Tier Pipeline in Snohomish County, Washington, prepared for Snohomish County by Jones Associates, Inc., May 1980. Investigates the possibility of using existing utility easements or rights-of-way in Snohomish County as an impact mitigation measure. Potential problems associated with joint use are identified. Geological Hazards The Seismic Hazards to the Proposed Northern: Tier Pipeline in the Northern Puget Lowland, Washington, Eric Cheney (for Island Co.), June 1980. Reviews seismic data pertinent to pipeline rupture and concludes that the applicant's geological analysis was superficial, particularly with respect to the existence of faults. Report concludes t:he NTPC design stresses would be erroneous. Geologic and Seismic Studies Related to Construction of the Northern Tier Pipeline in Clallam County, Washington. Prepared for Clallam County by Douglas" M. Johnson and Norman H. Rasmussen, June 1980. Contains information resulting from the review of the NTPC proposal with respect to geologic and geophysical conditions in Clallam County. Reviews seismic conditions, liquefaction potential, scour depth at Dun- geness River crossing, depth of anchor penetration, and effects on local water table. Utilizing the Northern Tier sponsored reports, the authors conclude that Ediz Hook is an inappropriate location for a major pipe- line facility. Marine Resources Summary of Recent Information on Marine Mammals in Northern Puget.Sound and the Strait of Juan de Fuca, prepared for the Department of Game and Department of Ecology by Robert Everitt. -87- Describes the seasonal distribution and abundance of marine mammals, identifying important biological areas. Also indicates the relative seasonal vulnerability of species to oil spills. Local Harvest and Estuarine Values of Shellfish, Bait Fish Bottomfish, and Salmon Resources Summarized from the WDF Sponsored Testimonies in the Northern Tier Case, Frances Solomon and Mary Lou Mills, February 1982. Report estimates dollar values for commercially important species, pro- vides details of geographic distributions. This report provides a reference that can be used to evaluate impacts of future energy projects in the Puget Sound coastal zone. Oil Spill Risk Estimation and Trajector Oil Spill Risk from the Proposed Northern Tier Pipeline System, A Critique, August 1980. Christopher H. Achen, prepared for Island County August 1980. This report argues that NTPC ignored many factors likely to explain, the occurrence and size of oil spills from tankers. Author also argues that this has probably resulted in spill probabilities that are too low. Prefiled testimony of Dr. Phani K. Raj. Oil spill trajectories. Pre- pared for the Department of Ecology. Testifies that oil spill migration is a function of several interactive factors and cannot be modeled accur- ately. Especially problematic is the prediction of underwater oil migration. Raj asserts that applicant's testimony (OIW information) was speculative and qualitative, providing no quantitative basis on which a decision maker could take action. In this regard, there was no attempt to quantify the amount of oil that would surface from an underwater spill, that might attach to silt, or evaporate. Prefile testimony of Thomas S. Reid. Oil spill risk. Prepared for the Department of Ecology. Assesses limitations reliability of risk data and models presented to EFSEC. Concludes that the volume or crude oil handled will lead to numerous small operational spills and that the use of large crude carriers will significantly increase the likelihood of a catastrophic oil spill. Oil Spill Impacts Prefiled testimony of Dr. Rick Cardwell. Prepared for the Department of Ecology. Biological impact of spills in marine waters. Testifies on specific effects to organisms of oiling and exposure at various concen- tration levels. Among conclusions: (1) mortalities should be higher intertidally than subtidally, 2) the most vulnerable intertidal food fish. and shellfis are clams, oysters, and mussels and incubating spawn of Pacific herring and surf smelt, 3) oil spill impacts are likely to be greatest in the protected low energy environments, 4) even if salmon juveniles were not impacted directly, mortalities would arise from food source loss, 5) oil reaching Puget Sound habitats is unlikely to be If It weathered, thus increasing toxicity. Operational Oil Spills as Related to the Proposed Northern Tier Pipe- line, by Charles E. Kay. Discusses oil spills resulting from the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS). Reviews NTPS proposed oil spill contingency plan; discusses the applicability of TAPS experience to NTPS; and recommends stipulations to reduce the occurrence of oil spills and lessen adverse impacts to the state's resources. Sensitivity of Coastal Environments to Spilled Oil With Respect to Pro- posed Northern Tier Pipeline Routes, Strait of Juan de Fuca and Northern Puget Sound, prepared for the Department of Ecology by Research Planning lnstit@_t_e, Inc. (Miles Hayes), March 1980. This report characterizes beach morphology in the study area and depicts shoreline sensitivity to oil spills. An index combining oil residence time with anticipated biological impacts is included, together with a description of regional shordline types. The appendix contains excerpts from the consultant's draft report to NOAA on critical species and habi- tats. Oil i'mpacts to shoreline types are discussed and appropriate cleanup activities are recommended. Preliminary Report on Marine Birds in Juan de Fuca Strait and Northern Puget Sound in 1978-1979, prepared for the Department of Game and Department of Ecology by Terrance Wahl and Steven Speich, March 1980. Report documents populations and breeding biology of marine birds in the subject area; elaborates upon population concentrations by time of year -and place and evaluates implications, given the occurrence of a major spill. An Economic Evaluation of the Proposed Northern Tier Pipeline. Walter J. Mead, July 25, 1980. Prepared for the Washington State Department of Ecology. Concludes that NTPS is a highly questionable solution to the current oil disequilibrium; forecasts that the surpluses will disappear; and that regional oil supplies need to be reforecast based upon likely self-correcting market mechanisms. From a transporta- tion cost standpoint, NTPC would be rejected by the market in favor of Trans Mountain. Moreover, because of the uncertainty of west cost Sur- pluses, smaller short-term projects are more reasonable. On the basis of probable crude oil prices, neither NTPS or Trans Mountain are prob- ably viable. Economic Evaluation of Fisheries and Recreational Losses from Oil Spills in the Marine Environment, Philip Sorensen, prepared for the Washington State Department of Fisheries, January 25, 1981. Report provides foundation for prefile testimony. Places Washington State potential losses in international context by referring to other major spills. Report estimates economic damage will range from $5.00-$19.60 per gallon of oil spilled and result in as much as $638,000 in annual losses. An Economic Evaluation of a Hookup System Linking the Proposed Northern Tier Pipeline in the Northern Puget Refineries. Walter J. Mead and Philip E. Sorenson, April 1981. Prepared for the Department of Ecology. The evaluation concludes that north Puget Sound refineries will be refitted to refine ANS crude, that the refineries are strongly opposed -89- to hookup because it would result in transportation cost increases; moreover, a distinct possibility exists that mandated hookup could pro- duce a shutdown of one of the four refineries. Project Monitoring Northern Tier Testimony Before the Energy Facilities Siting Evaluation Council. (Project monitoring) Charles Champion and Walter B. Parker. Prepared for the Washington State Department of Ecology, March 1981. Proposes technical and environmental stipulations to be attached to the certification agreement. A Proposed System for Pipeline Construction and Operation Monitoring in Washington State. Prepared by CDS/Quest Research Inc. , May 1980 for Clallam County. Includes description of a proposed monitoring process for construction and operation of a major pipeline in Washington State. Also provides an exhaustive set of stipulations based on (TAPS). River Crossings and Sensitive Areas Prefiled testimony of Jim D. Currie. Prepared for Snohomish County Planning Department. Aquatic and wetland impacts, mitigation measures. Testimony criticizes NTPC for errors, oversights, and inconsistency in habitat analysis, mapping, and impact evaluation. Together with Somers, Currie evaluates habitat at 39 stream crossings and concludes NTPC eval- uations were inaccurate; with Hirschi remaps and evaluates impacts of 20 wetlands crossed by the centerline. A wide ranging set of mitigation measures is also provided for terrestrial impacts. These include the use of directional drilling to avoid wetland impacts. Testimony also details proposals for post certification plans and reports. Prefile testimony of Tony Eldred. Game fish impacts, aquatic habitat impacts. Prepared for Department of Game. Eldred provides an aggres- sive critique of NTPC assessment of Eastern Washington habitat and potential for siltation impacts; quantification of fishery losses based on extrapolation for Alaska Salcha River experience. Also argues that NTPC mitigation measures are incomplete and habitat assessments error- ridden. Major River Crossings, Minor Stream Crossings and Floodplain Construc- tion as Related to the Proposed Northern Tier Pipeline, prepared for Snohomish County by Charles E. Kay. Report evaluates alternative construction methods employed in river crossings. Discusses methods used on the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) describing adverse impacts to water quality, fisheries, and habi- tat. Also addresses minor stream crossings and proposes mitigation measures. Review of Northern Tier Pipeline Stream Crossings in Snohomish County, Washington. Prepared for Snohomish County Planning Department and Tulalip Tribes by John Norman Associates. Provide analysis of techni- ques used by applicant and alternatives for computation of river scour, _90- channel migration, and siltation. Concludes: 1) NTPC underestimated sediment loads due to construction, 2) NTPC underestimated channel set- backs necessary to protect pipe at the two crossings studied, 3) NTPC's scour depth analysis is inadequate to ensure pipe integrity. Norman suggests a superior procedure for computing scour that includes estima- tion of critical shear stresses. Review of River Crossing Construction Techniques for the Northern Tier Pipeline Company in County of Snohomish, Washington. Prepared for Snohomish County by Hydrocon Engineering (Wm. Veldman). April 15, 1981. Concludes that burial depths at river crossings have not been demonstra- ted as "conservative, and that sagbend locations were not adequately analyzed to account for potential bank migration. Veldman's analysis demonstrates the feasibility of directional drilling as a construction technique for crossing Davis Slough, West Pass, and as a potential method of construction in wetlands that would minimize impact. Shore approaches are also potential applications and were neglected by NTPC. Veldman also assesses other alternative methods for all major river crossings and argues in favor of fluming small streams. Sensitive Areas Prefile testimony of Jerry D. Benson. Habitat impacts and revegetation measures. Prepared for Department of Game. Critique of NTPC revegeta- tion measures, focusing on site inventories and suitable revegetation species by site classes. Prefiled testimony of Chuck Perry. Critique of NTPC's habitat assess- ment methodology, prepared for the Department of Game. Criticizes NTPC habitat analysis and sampling procedure; assesses impacts on wildlife due to vegetation loss, oil spill degradation of wetlands; disputes NTPC contention that right-of-way should be considered "edge" creation. Prefiled testimony of Ron Hirschi. Biological impacts wetlands. Pre- pared for Snohomish County. Documents regional, national, and inter- national wetland losses and establishes habitat value of wetlands crossed by NTPS. Hirschi notes failure of NTPC to map wetlands and to evaluate impacts of construction activities. With Currie provides map of 20 wetlands crossed by centerline as well as a slide show with nar- rative assessing resource values and impacts. Hirschi documents the presence of endangered species and presence of significant wetland values in contradiction to NTPC testimony. Suggested mitigation mea- sures include application of USPWS HEP analysis to establish compensa- tion for wetland losses. An Evaluaton of the Waterfowl of Skagit and Port Susan Bays With.Regard to a Proposed Oil Pipeline, prepared for the Department of Game and Department of Ecology by Robert Jeffrey, April 1980. Describes biolo- gical resources of a particularly important waterfowl area and its vul- nerability to oil pipeline impacts. Prefiled testimony of Doug Pinio. Prepared for the Department of Game. Potential impacts on wildlife and wildlife oriented recreation, focusing on Spokane County. Disputes adequacy of NTPC survey of wildlife and wildlife habitat in corridor. _91- Submarine Geology An Overview of Proposed Northern Tier Submarine Pipeline Construction and Operation Methods in Relation to Features of the Puget Sound Strait of Juan de Fuca Oceanographic and Geologic Environment. Hatfield Con- sultants Ltd., Thurber Consultants Ltd. Prepared for the Department of Ecology, March 1981. Review of NTPC submarine crossing data. Author notes that there is considerable evidence of submarine slumping and landslide activity which needs further examination. Moreover, faulting appears to be more recent then suggested; and the potential liquefaction hazards greater. The report also draws attention to the presence of barchan shaped sand dunes which reflect an acti ve current driven geolo- gical process. Mitigating measures-- are suggested for several of the geological hazards discussed, including the laying of dual lines, realignments across slope lines, relocation of to avoid landslide hazard areas, etc. Soil Liquefaction Study for Jefferson County. Mehmet Sherif. February 1981. Prepared for Jefferson County. Review of application concludes inadequate testing of soils by applicant to ascertain liquefaction hazard on submarine segment. -92- Appendix 11.3 EFSEC Findings - Reference Matrix Topic Finding Intervenor CEIP Funded Source Need-Demand Identification and quantifi- no citation cation of the demand for the Northern Tier proposal are not readily ascertainable. Prudhoe Bay production not no citation absorbed on the west coast is moving readily to second- ary markets by existing means. The ability of west coast no citation refineries to process Alaska oil is increasing. Northern Tier has not demon- no citation strated producers or refiners are ready to use its facilities. The west coast surplus exists no citation only at Valdez. Of the original economic no citation rationales, the only that remains is the greater system flexibility that might result. No need has been demonstrated no citation for a super-port capable of accommodating 327,000 DWT tankers. No supply induced shortages of no citation petroleum in eastern Washington have been shown. Marine Northern Tier did not give no citation terminal serious consideration to any facilities site other than Port Angeles. Northern Tier does not propose no citation a project capable of shipping all crude types now produced or received in Puget Sound. Submarine line-.- The Admiralty crossing includes CCPA X Sternberg general 3 miles of potentially lique- fiable soils and encounters 1'-2 miles of sand waves. The -93- Topic Finding Intervenor CEIP Funded Source crossing also shows evidence of submarine landslides and seismic faults. currents High bottom currents at the cross exam. Admiralty crossing could of Timmerman approach a critical point at which it is not possible to weight the pipe for both cur- rent protection and liquefac- tion potential. Northern Tier did not conduct CCPA X Winter design studies necessary for DOE Holbrook assessing the affects of cur- rents. The applicants sampling and analysis of currents was unreliable. The applicant's design current of 6 ft per second may be 50% too low. Submarine line Boulders can be expected at Holbrook least once every 150 feet CCPA/DOE boulders along the submarine segment CCPA X Sternberg segment. The presence of boulders repre- CCPA X Winter sents a potential hazaid. Damaging stresses could result if the pipe were spanned between boulders. The applicant designed the pipe- CCPA X Sternberg line to deal with less liquefac- tion induced sinking than could be expected under extreme condi- tions along submarine segments. The full extent of potential soil liquefaction cannot be determined from the information Jefferson X Sherif provided by the applicant. CCPA X Johnson liquefaction The applicant did not use state Jefferson X Sherif of the art analytical techni- ques. The actual potential for lique- faction may occur in an area 4 times more extensive than that CCPA_ X Johnson identified by the applicant. Topic Finding Intervenor CEIP Funded Source The applicant did not suffi- ciently study the geology of CCPA X Johnson Admiralty Inlet. Ground acceleration from large earthquakes could cause slope instability and landslides on CCPA Johnson the Admiralty crossing. The occurrence of landslides could subject the pipeline to CCPA X Johnson severe pressures. The applicant did not study the possibility of landslides WDOE Buck caused by liquefaction.. sandwaves Northern Tier was aware of the CCPA X Sternberg presence of sand waves in early 1979, but performed no subsequent technical work to assess them. The existing analysis is inade- quate to demonstrate that the pipeline will remain buried if installed. scouring Scouring by currents could'cause CCPA X Sternberg the submarine pipeline to be suspended off the bottom if the pipe were supported by rocks or fill. pipeline Should there be any increase in no citation engineering submerged weight requirements difficulties of the line (dictated by geological hazards) standard equipment capabilities might be exceeded. Marine terminal The type A sediments in the no citation geologic risks marine terminal area are poten- tially liquefiable under less than design earthquake condi- tions. Vessel traffic If NTPS were used to supply no citation north Puget Sound refineries an additional 110-230 calls would be required at Port Angeles. _95- Topic Finding Intervenor CEIP Funded- --Source Fire and To site the NTPS terminal at CCPA X Bennett explosion Port Angeles would be an exception to the contemporary practice of sitihg superports away from residential and urban settings. The tanker data base used by no citation NTPC does not include experience with large tankers and is out of date. A second analysis refer- enced by the company is invalid. NTPC proposed the use of inert CCPA X Bennett gas systems to reduce tanker explosion risk. If properly designated and operated, such a system could prevent some explosions. Most of the harbor and the open NTPC harbor anchorage would be within the fire radius of a worst case pool fire; and such a fire would damage much of Port Angeles. In assessing potential struc- cross exam. tural damage resulting from of NTPC tanker explosions, no consid- eration was given to the types of buildings in Port Angeles. Northern Tier has not consid- CCPA Beatteay ered secondary or chain reaction fire sequences. The Northern Tier facility NTPC would increase Port Angeles fire risk by 16 times. Northern Tier's proposed fire CCPA cross exam. protection system is designed Beatteay primarily to protect berth- ing facilities and not for fighting crude oil fires on tankers or on water. No fire system including CCPA Hansen Northern Tier's is capable of extinguishing a fully -involved tanker fire. -96- Topic Finding Intervenor CEIP Funded Source A crude oil fire on a tanker or CCPA Beatteay a fire spreading over the water of the harbor could threaten additional vessels and water- front facilities. Northern Tier did not consider cross exam. the risk or consequences of fire of NTPC or the level of fire protection that could be provided when it selected Port Angeles as its terminal. The fire protection system no citation would be ineffective in combat- ting a fire spreading across the harbor or a major fire aboard a vessel. Oil spill risk NTPS would significantly no citation increase oil spill risk both due to numerous small opera- tional spills and large spills (tankers and the submarine line). NTPC would more than double the no citation risks of tanker related spills by virtue of the fact it would add 395 vessel calls to the existing tanker traffic. NTPC presented an assessment no citation of spill risk that was signi- ficantly inaccurate. It under- stated worst case volumes and located events in non-worst case sites. A clean break of the Saratoga no citation segment would produce a maximum spill of 10,000 barrels and at Admiralty Inlet 40,000 bbl. The quantitative risk analyses provided by the applicant had a CCPA Stewart number of significant defects Armstrong that stem from data base prob- lems, the exclusion of important variables, and analytical mis- takes. -97-@ Topic Finding Intervenor CEIP Funded Source The OIW study referred to by CCPA Stewart the applicant understates Bennett spills from tankers. Proba- bility estimates provided are of questionable reliability. Spill migration No methodology currently exists WDOE X Raj which can accurately predict the dispersion and migration of an oil spill. Downwelling over sill zones no citation (i.e. at Admiralty Inlet) could cause spilled oil to be retained at depth or transported into inner Puget Sound waters. Although Northern Tier utilized CCPA Stewart the best available trajectory model, the designers of the model-are not certain of criti- cal model assumptions. A small change in model assumptions regarding the influence of winds would dramatically alter the predicted location of an oil slick. In general, state of the art analyses indicate that spill migration in any direction is conceivable. Oil spilled within the strait could affect the CCPA Long entire Strait, the San Juans, Whidbey, and some Pacific shores. A spill in Port Angeles Harbor, as well as the main basin of Puget Sound, could spread to I/KC X Storie Dungeness Spit', Sequim and CCPA Long Discovery bays; however, spreading cannot be easily predicted. The chances of a spill adversely affecting the most susceptible I/KC Long biological communities increases as the assumed spill point is moved eastward. 98- Topic Finding Intervenor CEIP Funded Source Anchor NTPC underestimated the poten- cross exam. penetration tial for anchor penetration of of NTPC soil in Port Angeles Harbor. According to NTPC, the line would be buried no more than 4 feet below the surface. - Anchors could penetrate more than 19 feet. It may not be possible to cross exam. achieve more from 11 feet of of NTPC cover over the submarine line. Terrestrial Route selection across major no citation pipeline rivers other than the Columbia route was made by an engineer who was selection permitted to work a maximum of 100-300 feet on either side of the original centerline. Though information was avail- cross exam. able, Northern Tier route selec- of NTPC tion failed to discover the Skagit, Gloyd seeps and Colockum wildlife refuge areas. There is no support in the record for the proposition that the choice of the terrestrial centerline was based upon analysis which included environ- mental characteristics within the corridor. Minor river Snohomish X Currie crossings were not examined at Co. all. Geological and The largest possible earth- seismic risks quake which may take place CCPA X Rasmussen along the western Washington segment is a 7.5 R event. A 7.3 R event occurred in Vancouver Island in 1946. NTPC used a design earthquake of 6.0 R and a ground acceleration of .20 g. During the 1949 southern Puget Sound event, a .31 g peak accel- eration was recorded. Design earthquakes of 7.1-7.5 R CCPA X Rasmussen and .31-0.35 g. acceleration should be used for designing critical facilities. _99- Topic Finding Intervenor CEIP Funded Source NTPC failed to provide needed CCPA X Rasmussen data on ground motion. Leakage from the terrestrial cross exam. pipeline could reach the water table through different migra- tional pathways. Resources at A major tanker accident inside risk--oil the Strait of Juan de Fuca or no citation spills surrounding waters could cause app. economic damages in excess of $200 m. NTPC only proposes to carry $35 m. in spill lia- bility insurance. Shellfish are especially vulner- no citation able to spilled oil because of sporadic recruitment; recovery may take several years. Dabob Bay produces the majority no citation of oyster seed used on the west coast. It could be subject to pipeline related oiling. Risk to salmon from oil would no citation depend upon life stage duration of exposure and other variables. An oil spill would not ordinarily be lethal to adults; however, populations could be affected by food chain disruption. The increased threat of oil no citation spills associated with the project could hamper investment and development of the aquacul- ture industry. Diving birds found in the I/KC Long Jamestown/Protection Island area are known to be highly susceptible to the effects of spilled oil. _100- Topic Finding Intervenor CEIP Funded Source Observations from historic oil spills suggest that serious long-term effects could be expected in the unique biolo- gical regions of Puget Sound due CCPA X Hatfield to oiling. In part, these would be a function of species sensiti- vity and the long persistence of toxic oil compounds in certain coastal environments. An oil spill could upset fish- eries and harvest management Tulalip Somers strategies. At present trea- Tribes ties prohibit Indian tribes from moving from one fish run to another. A large spill in one of the Tulalip Somers major rivers could block adult Tribes migrations. A spill in a small stream could prevent use of significant habitats downstream or upstream. The occurrence of construction Snohomish X Kay related oil spills can be County expected. Oil spills could affect any of no citation the important water bird areas in the Strait. Present equipment and tech- CCPA Bennett nology will not proVide the Hatfield capability to recover signi- ficant amounts of oil spilled at the superport or in marine waters. Wind and sea states are critical limiting factors. The success of diversion booming Foget in rivers is dependent upon cross low current speeds. Therefore, no citation no substantial containment can be expected. U.S. law requires tankers to CCPA X Hatfield carry oil spill liability CCPA X Sorenson insurance at a rate of $.75 per CCPA X Bennett gal. However, coastal cleanup expenses have averaged well over $26 per gallon.- _101- Topic Finding Intervenor CEIP Funded Source Water quality Because of the importance of no citation ground water ground water, a ground water inventory is necessary. Insufficient information has been provided to reach firm conclusions concerning ground water impacts in eastern Wash- ington. The applicant did not suffi- IC Thorsen ciently describe and inventory the ground water geology of Island County. There is a potential for breach- Council for Foxworthy ing artesian aquifers at the Environment Whidbey landfalls. Ground Island Co. water would be immediately con- tacted by pipeline oil spills on portions of Whidbey Island. Island County/ Goldsmith Island counties problem is CE compounded by the fact that there is no readily and econo- mically available alternative supply of freshwater. Pipeline trench construction King County Fulmer through floodplains is likely to encounter shallow ground water. Insufficient information has King County cross of been provided to assess risks NTPC, of aquifer pollution and Fulmer measures to prevent such risks.- Fish and game Of 103 rare, threatened or Game X Perry impacts endangered plant species in Washington State, 61 are found in the Columbia HMA crossed by the NTPS. Terrestrial Construction stage equipment Game X Pinio habitat operation will destroy vegeta- impacts tion and compact soil. Only partial replacement will occur during project life. Aquatic The greatest sediment impacts Game Pfeifer fisheries can be expected in smaller impacts streams. -102- Topic Finding Intervenor CEIP Funded Source The NTPS would pass through Game x Jeffrey the most productive part of the Skagit waterfowl area; and this area is one of the most important coastal water- fowl habitats in the north- west. Wetlands The applicant did not suffi- Snohomish x Currie ciently map or otherwise iden- County x Hirschi tify wetlands and riparian habitats and water dependent species on the centerline and in the corridor. Northern Tier underestimated the Snohomish x Currie impacts of this project on Co.- wetlands. Realignment feasibility studies Snohomish x Currie for all wetlands crossed or Co. immediately adjacent to the Snohomish x Hirschi ceterline should be undertaken. Co. Northern Tier's centerline location would cause a direct loss of wetland vegetation and associated riparian habitats. Wetland habitats of 11 rare, Snohomish x Currie threatened, or endangered Co. species have been documented Snohomish x Hirschi in the Snohomish County Co. corridor. Fisheries The applicant has not determined Tulalip Somers impacts that it is feasible to accom- Tribes plish all of the small stream crossings during the proposed fish windows. (A 90-day period; 56 streams in Snohomish and King counties). NTPS would likely disrupt fish Tulalip Somers migration and thereby reduce Tribes productivity of runs. -103- Topic Finding Intervenor CEIP Funded Source The applicant has.an obligation to generally describe physical and biological circumstances Tulalip Somers across the width of the corri- Tribes dor. The applicant did not meet this obligation, and failed to describe impacts reasonably anticipated from contruction (fishery habitat and sediment impacts). Northern Tier would introduce Tulalip X Somers substantial amounts of sediment Tribes/ X Norman into small streams which would Snohomish cause substantial damage to - County fishery habitat and fish which Snohomish use such streams. Northern Tier used an inferior WDOE Garland method for calculating river Snohomish X Veldman scour potential. Co. Northern Tier offered no design Snohomish X Currie criteria to assure that stream Co. crossings would be least impact- ing to fisheries or least likely to create erosion problems. The applicant significantly Snohomish X Norman underestimated the actual sedi- Co. ment loads that will be pro- duced at the major river cross- ings. All river and stream crossings in King County except King Co. Fulmer the South Fork Snoqualmie poten- tially have high sensitivity to sedimentation. Public service Construction of the terminal CCPA Pittis impacts will create substantial land transportation impacts on the City of Port Angeles. Whidbey Island lacks sufficient Island Co. Madsen housing for the expected influx of pipeline workers. NTPC would have substantial impacts on water, sewer and solid waste related services no citation in Clallam County. -104- Topic Finding Intervenor CEIP Funded Source Energy Forecasts predict a 99% cer- tainty that supplies in the region would be unable to meet no citation the anticipated project load. Because NTPC would be a f1priority user," the expected no citation energy deficits would first be suffered by nonpriority cus- tomers. Neither NTPC nor anyone else has indicated how the project's no citation energy requirements could be met. Eight separate utilities would be relied upon to meet NTPC needs. Based on historic spill costs which include cleanup and WDF/WDOE X Sorenson recreational losses, an oil spill could cost between $5.00 and $20.00 per gallon spilled. Economics NTPS would require relocation of the Coast Guard facility at no citation Ediz Hook. Relocation outside -Clallam County would cause major local economic impact. NTPC did not evaluate this issue. If NTPS is constructed, Petro- leum related development in CCPA Conradus Clallam County is more likely with its attendant impacts. None of the barriers to petro- chemical or refinery develop- ment would be insurmountable. Cultural NTPC's inventory of cultural King Co. Onat, Howry impacts and archaeological resources Office of within the corridor is substan- Historic tially incomplete. Preservation Recreation Construction will temporarily CCPA Gillespie disrupt access to beaches, CCPA Frizell parks, and recreational areas Jacobs throughout the route. _105- Topic Finding Intervenor CEIP Funded Source Pollutant NTPC failed to provide the no citation discharges council with sufficient infor- mation to allow review of with- drawal and discharges for hydro- static testing. Water quality Existing state and federal no citation impacts water quality criteria would be exceeded by construction activities in streams and rivers. NTPC made unwarranted assump- WDOE Garland tions regarding the channel Snohomish X Norman migration potential of rivers Co. it would cross. Hookup NTPC failed to apply to EFSEC no citation provisions for hookup. During the hear- ings it advanced arguments conditional upon hookup (oil spill risk) and made promises a hookup application would be forthcoming. NTPC failed to perform engineering..and.environ- mental studies necessary to make such an application. No reduction in tanker traffic CCPA Formway would result from hookup. CCPA Ferguson Reductions asserted by NTPC are CCPA Malseed unsupported. The existing refineries reject the idea of using larger tankers. About 50% of the crude used by CCPA Malseed Shell and Texaco,refineries could CCPA Ferguson not be moved through the pipeline. Hookup would substantially CCPA Formway increase per barrel costs for CCPA Malseed north Puget Sound refineries. CCPA Ferguson Consideration An alternate port site west of no citation of alterna- Port Angeles would be preferable tives to the site proposed by NTPC. NTPC'� selection of Port Angeles no citation was based on a study that empha- sized nonenvironmental factors (e.g. operations concerns). -106- Topic Finding Intervenor CEIP Funded Source The NTPC proposal poses a greater no citation oil spill risk than the alter- natives discussed in the hear- ings. Approval of NTPS could preempt CtPA/Island Co. Philipps future options for east-west CCPA/Island Co. Tussing oil transshipment (e.g. oil exchanges). -107- Appendix 11.4 Stipulated Agreements between Northern Tier and Intervenors The applicant entered into a number of stipulations with state agencies, local governments, and private parties in an effort to mitigate the adverse impacts of the proposed project. a. Stipulation between Northern Tier and Washington State Department of_Transportation (undated) b. Stipulations between Northern Tier and the City of Port Angeles: 1. Negotiating Guidelines and Procedures (April 15, 1980) 2. Amendment to Negotiating Guidelines (June 24, 1980) 3. Payment by Northern Tier for review, analysis, and other activi- ties by City of Port Angeles (May 27, 1980) 4. Housing Survey and Plan (May 27, 1980) 5. Water, Sewer, and Solid Waste (June 24, 1980) 6. Policy of Preferring Qualified Local Workers (September 2, 1980) 7. Transportation (February 17, 1981) 8. Oil Spill Contingency (June 16, 1981) C. Stipulation between Northern Tier and Lincoln County (September 2, 1980) d. Stipulation between Northern Tier and Spokane County (September 18, 1980) e. Stipulation between Northern Tier and Adams County (October 6, 1980) f. Stipulation between Northern Tier and Port of Port Angeles: 1. Regarding Seamen's Center (November 24, 1980) 2. Regarding Construction Inventory (November 24, 1980) g. Stipulation between Northern Tier and the East Columbia Basin Irri- gation District (August 6, 1980) h. Stipulation between Northern Tier and the Quincy Irrigation Dis- trict and the East Columbia Basin Irrigation District (December 3, 1980) _108- i Stipulation between Northern Tier and Grant County (December 15, 1980) j. Stipulations between Northern Tier and Washington State Department of Natural Resources: 1. Regulatory (January 9, 1980) 2. Proprietary (January 9, 1980) k. Agreement and Stipulation re Port Angeles Harbor Facilities (entered into by Port of Port Angeles, ITT Rayonier, Inc., Crown Zellerbach Corporation, Foss Launch and Tug Company, Puget Sound Pilots Asso- ciation, Port Angeles S-@lmon Club, and Northern Tier) (March 24, 1981) 1. Stipulation between Northern Tier and King County (May 6, 1981) M. Stipulation between Northern Tier and Kittitas County (May 19, 1981) n. Stipulation between Northern Tier and Department of Ecology (June 23, 1981) 0. Stipulation between Northern Tier and Clallam County Fire Protec- tion District No. 3 (June 24, 1981) p. Amendment to Stipulation between Northern Tier and Lincoln County (July 2, 1981) q. Amendment to Stipulation between Northern Tier and Adams County (August 26, 1981) r. Stipulation between Northern Tier and Clallam County (July 27, 1981) S. Stipulation between Northern Tier and City of Seattle (July 29, 1981) Draft agreements were developed between Northern Tier and Jefferson and Snohomish counties but were not signed. . Unresolved issues discussed in the mitigation findings included: - Oil spill risk caused' by vessel casualty or submarine pipeline failures; - Fire and explosion risk in Port Angeles Harbor; - Timing of river crossing construction; - Construction in sensitive areas, except Three Forks Park; - Socio-economic impacts as follows: _109- Law enforcement in Port Angeles, Clallam and Island counties; Recreation facilities in Port Angeles; Fire protection in Port Angeles; Educational services in Port Angeles; Risk posed to medical -facilities in Port Angeles-Olympic Memorial Hospital; In Clallam County, housing, fishing and tourism losses, elec- trical energy impacts, ground water contamination, and secondary petroleum-related development. _110- DATE DUE GAYLORD No. 2333 PRINTED IN [email protected]. 1-11 tl@l@l