within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20. It does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded there is no measurable environmental impact associated with the proposed action, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental impact need not be evaluated. The principal alternative to the action would be to deny the request. Such action would not change any current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use of any resources not previously considered in the ''Final Environmental Statement related to the operation of Wolf Creek Generating Station,'' dated June 1982 (NUREG–0878).

Agencies and Persons Consulted

The NRC staff consulted with the State of Kansas regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the licensee's letter dated November 23, 1994, which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC and at the local public document rooms located at the Emporia State University, William Allen White Library, 1200 Commercial Street, Emporia, Kansas 66801, and Washburn University School of Law Library, Topeka, Kansas 66621.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day of January 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Theodore R. Quay,

Director, Project Directorate IV–2, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–1815 Filed 1–24–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket Nos. STN 50–456 and STN 50–457]

Commonwealth Edison Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. NPF–72 and NPF–77 issued to the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) for operation of the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, located in Will County, Illinois.

The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specifications for Braidwood 1 and 2 by deleting Section 4.7.6.e.6 which presently requires a surveillance to verify that the control room ventilation system can be manually isolated and placed in the recirculation mode of operation. This manual isolation would be initiated in response to a report of a chlorine release in the vicinity of the Braidwood Station.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

A. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Elimination of the requirement to test control room ventilation manual isolation capability does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. This requirement had been previously necessary because of the potential of a rail borne chlorine accident. Since that time of the imposed surveillance, the Norfolk and Western railroad line which transported chlorine near Braidwood has been removed. In addition, a study has concluded that there are no potential stationary chlorine release sources within a 10 mile radius that could pose a threat to control room habitability. The evaluation concluded that the realistic probability of a transported source of chlorine passing within the critical distance of 4900 feet of Braidwood Station is practically zero. Even using the very conservative assumption that all transported sources of chlorine use IL 53 or IL 129, the occurrence of an accidental release from these shipments was calculated to be only 2×10^{-6} events per year. Thus the probability of a chlorine release is within the requirements of NUREG–0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP), July 1981 Section 2.2.3, and removal of the requirement to conduct Control Room ventilation isolation tests every 18 months does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

To ensure that no potential stationary chlorine release source is introduced within a ten mile radius of Braidwood Station, the station will perform a survey every three years to ensure that the protection of the control room personnel from risk due to any potential chlorine accident is maintained sufficiently small.

B. The proposed changes does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The probability of a chlorine accident that could impact the control room environment has been shown to be within the requirements of SRP Section 2.2.3. Control Room isolation capability testing was performed only to address a chlorine accident. Therefore, removal of this requirement does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

C. The proposed changes does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Control room ventilation isolation testing was performed as a result of the possibility of a chlorine accident in the vicinity of Braidwood. As demonstrated by a recent study, the probability of this event occurring has been reduced to practically zero within the acceptable limits of SRP Section 2.2.3 for transportable chlorine. Survey of the ten mile radius around Braidwood found no stationary chlorine sources with large enough quantities to pose a hazard to control room personnel. Thus, the removal of the requirement to perform Control Room ventilation isolation tests every 18 months does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be

considered in making any final determination.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will consider all public and State comments received. Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the **Federal Register** a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Rules Review and Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page number of this **Federal Register** notice. Written comments may also be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.

The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below.

By February 24, 1995, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ''Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Wilmington Township Public Library, 201 S. Kankakee Street, Wilmington, Illinois 60481. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made party to the proceeding: (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceedings; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Services Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1–(800) 248–5100 (in Missouri 1–(800) 342–6700). The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the following message addressed to Robert A. Capra: petitioner's name and telephone number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and publication date and page number of this **Federal Register** notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to Michael I. Miller, Esquire; Sidley and Austin, One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois 60690, attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests

for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)–(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment dated January 5, 1994, as supplemented on April 26, 1994, September 30, 1994, and January 12, 1995, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located a the Wilmington Township Public Library, 201 S. Kankakee Street, Wilmington, Illinois 60481.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of January 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Ramin R. Assa,

Project Manager, Project Directorate III–2, Division of Reactor Projects—III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–1814 Filed 1–24–95; 8:45 am]

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[Docket Nos. STN 50–454, STN 50–455, STN 50–456 and STN 50–457]

Commonwealth Edison Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments To Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–37, NPF–66, NPF–72 and NPF–77, issued to the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) for operation of the Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, located in Ogle County, Illinois, and the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, located in Will County, Illinois.

The proposed amendments would revise the Byron Station, Unit 1 and 2, and Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS) Section 3/4.7.6 concerning the Control Room Ventilation (VC) System. These changes are consistent with the revised Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants. Specifically, the allowed outage time for one train of the system would be changed from 7 to 30 days, if the train was declared inoperable only due to an inoperable chiller unit. An alternative action would also be added to TS 3.7.6.a, requiring the cessation of all core alterations, reactivity, additions, and spent fuel movement if one train of the system is inoperable during refueling operations. By letter dated July 19, 1994, the licensee responded to the Commission staff's comments and proposed to revise TS 3/4.7.6 by adding a surveillance requirement to demonstrate the control room ventilation heat load removal capability every 18 months. Revisions to associated Bases and minor editorial changes would also be made for the purpose of updating and clarifying the TS.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

A. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The first proposed change will increase the allowed outage time (AOT) for a VC chiller from seven days to thirty days in Modes 1 through 4. The thirty day AOT is based on the low probability of an event requiring control room isolation concurrent with failure of the redundant train of VC. Therefore, one train of VC will always be available to remove normal and accident heat loads and provide control room isolation. Consequently, this change will not result in an increase to offsite dose rates or the exposure of control room operators.

Increasing the AOT will allow for more extensive maintenance and should increase overall availability of the VC chillers. This provides additional assurance that a chiller will be operable on at least one train of VC. In the unlikely event that both VC chillers became inoperable, alternate non-safety related means to maintain control room temperature are available. Based on the above, the proposed increase to the AOT will not increase the probability or consequences of any previously analyzed accident.

The proposed change to the Action a for Modes 5 and 6 adds an alternative to placing the remaining operable VC train in the makeup mode. The alternative would allow the option to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, and movement of irradiated fuel. In Modes 5 and 6, this greatly reduces the probability of an event that would require control room isolation. The change will have no impact on the consequences of an accident since the remaining train of VC would be capable of isolating the control room on a high radiation signal and providing the necessary temperature control. Based on this review, the proposed Action will not result in an increase in the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident.

As noted above, the proposed amendment adds a restriction to suspend movement of irradiated fuel. This change reduces the probability of the occurrence of a fuel handling accident and has no impact on the consequences of any accident. In addition, the wording in Action b was revised to be consistent with the wording in Action a. This change is purely editorial and, therefore, has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident.

The proposed changes to Section 3/4.7.6 are requested to ensure that surveillances are performed to verify that the Control Room Ventilation System remains capable of performing its design function. Operability of the Control Room Chillers ensures that the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by the Control Room Ventilation System. The ability of the Control Room Ventilation System to limit the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent, is not affected by the addition of this surveillance requirement. The proposed changes do not affect any accident initiators or precursors and do not change or alter the design assumptions for the systems or components used to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Consequently, the changes do not impact any accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

B. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The first proposed change will increase the AOT for a VC chiller from seven days to thirty days in Modes 1 through 4. During the time one chiller is inoperable, the redundant train is capable of handling the heat loads during normal operation and during all accident scenarios. No new operating conditions are created by this change. Therefore, this change will not result in any new or different accident from those previously analyzed.

The proposed change to the Action for Modes 5 and 6 adds an alternative to allow the option to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, and movement of irradiated fuel. In Modes 5 and 6, this greatly reduces the probability of an event that would require control room isolation. Also, the remaining train of VC would still be