[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 62 (Friday, March 31, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16627-16629]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-7892]
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
Record of Decision for the Theater Missile Defense Extended Test
Range Final Environmental Impact Statement
AGENCY: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO).
ACTION: Record of Decision text is as follows:
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INTRODUCTION: This document records [BMDO Director's] decision for the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to conduct tests at two of four
alternative test ranges. The potential for environmental impacts at
these ranges was analyzed and documented in the Theater Missile Defense
Extended Test Range Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), and
the public was notified of its availability on January 13, 1995. The
following ranges were considered for extended range testing: White
Sands Missile Range (WSMR), New Mexico, Eglin Air Force Base (AFB)
Florida, Western Range, California, and Kwajalein Missile Range (KMR),
U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll (USAKA), Republic of the Marshall Islands.
In September 1993, [BMDO] issued [BMDO's] Record of Decision (ROD)
for the TMD Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement which
analyzed potential environmental impacts over the life-cycle of the TMD
Program. That document addressed potential environmental consequences
of the proposed research, development, testing and production, basing,
and eventual decommissioning activities. It serves as the foundation
for the TMD Extended Test Range FEIS. [BMDO Director] have also
carefully considered the requirements of Executive Order 12898, Federal
Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and
Low Income Populations (Feb. 11, 1994), that this action not have a
disproportionate impact on minority or low-income populations.
Need
The proposed extended range testing arises from compelling national
security needs recognized by both the Congress and the Administration.
Effective Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is necessary to protect forward
deployed and expeditionary elements of the Armed Forces of the United
States and U.S. friends and allies overseas. Extended range testing is
critical to the development of an effective theater missile defense.
Purpose
Extended range tests for TMD must realistically test missile
defense systems under circumstances similar to a theater of operations.
This includes construction of target launch facilities; development and
testing of sensors, Battle Management Command, Control, and
Communications components, and defensive missiles; and intercepts of
missiles over land and water areas. System operational needs require
conducting target and other missile system flight tests and intercepts
at altitudes and over distances, greater than can be accommodated by
current ranges. These tests validate system design and operational
effectiveness of ground-based interceptors to protect our forces and
allies overseas from theater ballistic missiles.
Decision
[BMDO Director's] decision is to proceed with the extended range
testing at the WSMR and the KRM. At WSMR, [BMDO Director] select the
option to launch target missiles from Fort Wingate Depot Activity
(FWDA) using Booster Drop Zone C, with intercepts over WSMR. It is part
of [BMDO Director's] decision to take action to reserve a portion of
FWDA for the proposed TMD activities. On February 28, 1994, the BMDO
notified the Secretary of the Army of its potential need for sufficient
property at FWDA to conduct missile launch activities, including
provision [[Page 16628]] for security, safety, and access. The BMDO
will confirm its need for property at FWDA and take other necessary
actions to ensure such property is not disposed of under the provisions
of the Base Realignment and Closure Act. [BMDO Director] have decided
not to select sea-based target missile launches at this time. [BMDO
Director] select only the land-based target launch option from Wake
Island for the KMR alternative. Missile intercepts will take place over
existing impact areas or open sea areas at KMR.
Proposed Action and Alternatives
Background: The proposed action analyzed in the TMD Extended Test
Range FEIS was to conduct extended range tests of target missiles,
defensive missiles, and sensor systems at one or more of four
alternative test range areas. The tests would involve target and
defense missile launches from existing test ranges and from off-range
locations with intercepts over existing ranges or open ocean areas.
Preparations and testing would begin in 1995 and continue into the next
century. The FEIS compared the impacts of alternative test range areas
and a no-action alternative.
As individual TMD system programs mature to the point of defining
specific flight/intercept test requirements, the most appropriate test
range area(s) capable of meeting test requirements will be identified.
The proposed action includes safety measures and standard range
operating procedures to ensure the safety of the public and the
environment. Some of these safety measures include (1) activating new
or existing restricted airspace, (2) the establishment and evacuation
of launch hazard areas and booster drop zones, including temporary
closure of associated roads, and (3) public notification of launch
activities, including Notices to Airmen and Notices to Mariners.
No-Action Alternative: Ongoing activities and operations would
continue to be performed at all locations. The development of ground
based TMD missile and sensor systems would continue, with missile
flight tests and target intercepts being conducted utilizing existing
test ranges. Testing for TMD would likely increase at WSMR and possibly
at the KMR. Ground-based TMD testing of missile and sensor systems at
Eglin AFB and the Western Range would not occur. The missile testing
restrictions associated with existing ranges, particularly with shorter
range missile flights conducted at WSMR, place artificial limits on
system test capabilities. This would make it impossible to fully
validate system design and operational effectiveness in a variety of
realistic theater environments. Although this alternative is the
environmentally preferable alternative, it was not selected because it
fails to meet BMDO's mission requirements. A comparison of the impacts
at the four ranges revealed the least impacts to resources at the KMR.
Impacts to resources at Western Range, Eglin AFB, are roughly
equivalent. The greatest potential impacts were identified for the WSMR
alternative and are primarily related to land use, cultural, and
transportation issues associated with the initial booster drop zones
analyzed in the Draft EIS.
White Sands Missile Range Candidate Test Area Alternative: This
alternative included defensive missile launches from WSMR, New Mexico,
and Fort Bliss, Texas, and off-range target missile launches from FWDA,
New Mexico, and the Green River Launch Complex (GRLC), Utah, with
intercepts over WSMR. Testing of TMD radars, positioned on WSMR, would
occur during these flight tests. This option also included Army
tactical missile launches from FWDA with impacts on WSMR. [BMDO
Director] anticipate approximately 6 to 8 launches per year from FWDA.
Two potential booster Drop Zones (A and B) were analyzed in the
Draft EIS for both the FWDA and GRLC target launch options. Substantial
concerns were raised over the use of these drop zones. Although a
number of mitigations could have been implemented to minimize the land
use and other impacts, they could have become significant. In addition,
[BMDO Director] am sensitive to general concerns about missile
overflight of substantial areas of Native American lands in Utah and
New Mexico. Accordingly, other booster drop zones were identified and
analyzed for both the FWDA and GRLC options in a supplement to the
Draft EIS. In both cases, these drop zones were further away from the
launch position and further along the flight path and required smaller
launch hazard areas at the launch site due to a less vertical
trajectory at launch. This enabled the respective launch hazard areas
to be reduced in size, responsive to the concerns about proximity to
schools, residences, and other potential users of surrounding areas at
FWDA. It also avoided the requirement to close Interstate 70 and
portions of the Green River during launches for the GRLC option.
In the case of the GRLC target launch options, both Booster Drop
Zones A and B would have created significant land use problems
associated with restricting access to Canyonlands National Park and
Dead Horse State Park. Use of either of these drop zones would also
have necessitated temporary closure of Interstate 70 and portions of
the Green River adjacent to the launch area, due to the requirement for
a large launch hazard area. The new Booster Drop Zones C1 and C2 for
GRLC included Bureau of Land Management (BLM) state of Utah, and
private land, as well as the Bridger Jack Mesa and Fish Creek Canyon
Wilderness Study Areas. Concerns included restrictions on public access
for recreation, and hunting. Booster impacts within the wilderness
study area could be avoided, and missile launches could be timed so as
to minimize impacts to recreation and avoid nesting and breeding
seasons of sensitive species. However, the authority to use BLM lands
for military purposes, including the proposed missile tests involving
booster drops, would require a lengthy process that would not be
responsive to current testing needs. Consequently GRLC options are not
under current consideration.
In the case of the FWDA option, use of either Booster Drop Zone A
or B would require a launch hazard area extending up to 4\1/2\ miles
from the launch site. This caused substantial safety concerns for the
local community about a nearby school and residences and other areas at
FWDA. In addition, Booster Drop Zone B included portions of the El
Malpais National Monument and the El Malpais National Conservation
Area, which encompassed wilderness and wilderness study areas. Use of
this drop zone would be considered significant because it restricts
access to recreational areas and conflicts with the statutory purposes
for these special use areas. Booster drop zones A and B will not be
used.
The new Booster Drop Zone C for FWDA includes U.S. Forest Service
and private land. Both the public land manager and private owner have
expressed their willingness to allow use of these lands for booster
drops. Use of this booster drop zone greatly reduces the launch hazard
area at FWDA and significantly improves safety for nearby schools and
residences, in keeping with the purpose of E.O. 12898 to avoid
disproportionate impacts on minorities, such as the Indian communities
in the Fort Wingate area. No significant environmental impacts have
been identified associated with this drop zone.
Kwajalein Missile Range, USAKA, Republic of the Marshall Islands
[[Page 16629]] Alternative: This alternative included missile launches
and sensor testing at KMR and Wake Island. USAKA would be primarily
used for launching defensive missiles, however, there is a possibility
that target missiles may be launched from USAKA. Wake Island would
primarily be used for target missile launches, however, it also could
be used for defensive missile launches. Technical difficulties with
launches and costs removed sea-based target missile launches from
consideration. Existing facilities at KMR and at Wake Island and
planned construction of Wake Island (analyzed in the Wake Island
Environmental Assessment, 1994) would be adequate for TMD interceptor
and target launching activities; therefore minimal environmental
impacts are anticipated. Issues of concern included potential impacts
on sensitive plant and animal species at the KMR and Wake Island,
particularly in undisturbed areas, the potential for damage,
destruction, or vandalism of cultural resources, and safety issues.
Mitigations included avoidance of areas of native vegetation and sea
turtle nesting areas. consultation with appropriate U.S. and
Marshallese officials to establish procedures to protect cultural
resources such as data recovery, and avoidance. Mitigations also
establish hazard areas and place operating restrictions on radars to
avoid significant impacts. No significant environmental impacts are
predicted with the use of KMR or Wake Island.
Eglin Air Force Base Candidate Test Area Alternative: This
alternative would include missile launches and sensor testing at Eglin
AFB on Santa Rosa Island and at Cape San Blas, Florida, with missile
launches from a sea-based platform in the Gulf of Mexico. No
significant impacts are predicted with the use of Eglin AFB. Health and
safety and airspace impacts would be avoided by the issuance of Notices
to Airmen and Notices to Mariners, and ensuring that the launch,
booster drop, and intercept debris impact areas are clear of air and
water traffic before proceeding with the test flights. This alternative
is not selected at this time because test objectives could be met at
other ranges, sea-launch capabilities will not be available, and
additional test instrumentation is needed.
Western Range Test Area Alternative: This alternative would include
missile launches and sensor testing at Vandenberg AFB, San Nicolas
Island of the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, and San
Clemente Island of the Naval Air Station North Island, California, with
off-range missile launches from a sea-based platform in the Pacific
Ocean. No significant impacts are predicted with the use of Western
Range. Health and safety and airspace impacts would be avoided by the
issuance of Notices to Airmen and Notices to Mariners, and ensuring
that the launch, booster drop, and intercept debris impact areas are
clear of all air traffic before proceeding with the test flights. This
alternative is not selected at this time because test objectives could
be met at other ranges, sea-launch capabilities will not be available,
and additional test instrumentation is needed.
Alternatives Considered But Not Carried Forward: Initially eleven
candidate test range areas were considered for TMD testing. Criteria
used to evaluate candidate test ranges included weather, scheduling,
range instrumentation, range safety, and debris recovery. All but the
four ranges analyzed in the FEIS were eliminated by the criteria
established at the beginning of the selection process.
Mitigation, Monitoring, and Enforcement
All practicable means to avoid and minimize environmental harm will
be taken. [BMDO Director] direct BMDO Deputies and Program Executive
Officers to monitor extended range testing activities and ensure the
following mitigation measures described in the TMD Extended Test Range
FEIS are implemented. Specifically, at the WSMR, and the associated
FWDA, mitigations will include implementing the Evacuation Plan,
Booster Recovery Plan, and Emergency Response Plan. Launches will be
avoided during weather conditions that would have adverse effects on
air quality or on test safety. To the extent possible, launches will be
scheduled to avoid major events such as major military maneuvers (i.e.,
Roving Sand Operations), holidays, hunting seasons, cattle roundups, or
local festivities that could be effected by the testing activities.
Maximum advance notice of launch activities will be provided to local
communities, travelers, etc., as described in the FEIS. Prior to
conducting launches and starting construction, consultation with
appropriate Federal and state agencies, as discussed in the EIS will
occur concerning specific debris impact areas, debris recovery
activities, and prelaunch and preconstruction surveys in order to
protect cultural resources and threatened and endangered species.
American Indian concerns regarding access to and disturbance of sacred
lands will be addressed during consultation with each affected American
Indian group on a regular basis and prior to each missile launch.
Consultation with local community groups will establish the procedures,
and coordinate times for use of FWDA lands under BMDO control during
periods of launch inactivity.
At the USAKA, the existing USAKA mitigation plan will be followed.
Other mitigations include: International Notices to Airmen and Notices
to Mariners, timely coordination with the International Civil Aviation
Organization through the Federal Aviation Administration, adherence to
established procedures for keep-out zones, hazard areas, and
limitations on use of radars, and a scheduling plan will be implemented
to minimize airspace and health and safety impacts. Preconstruction
surveys and/or other mitigation measures will be accomplished in
coordination with the appropriate Federal agencies and the Republic of
the Marshall Islands Environmental Protection Authority to protect
cultural resources and threatened and endangered species. [BMDO
Director] will implement appropriate safeguards as subsequent decisions
are made regarding system components and basing locations, and as their
accompanying environmental documents elaborate specific requirements
for monitoring and enforcement.
Date and Signature
Record of Decision was signed March 21, 1995 by Malcolm R. O'Neill,
Lieutenant General, United States Army, Director, Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:Mr. Rick Lehner, BMDO/SRE, Washington,
DC 20301-7100, (703) 695-8743.
Dated: March 27, 1995.
Patricia L. Toppings,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 95-7892 Filed 3-30-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5000-04-M