

statements should be addressed to Charles H. Atherton, Secretary, Commission of Fine Arts, at the above address or call the above number.

Dated in Washington, D.C. 27 July 1995.

Charles H. Atherton,
Secretary.

[FR Doc. 95-20533 Filed 8-17-95; 8:45 am]

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NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Collection of Information Submitted for OMB Review

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act and OMB Guidelines, the National Science Foundation is posting an expedited notice of information collection that will affect the public. Interested persons are invited to submit comments by September 15, 1995. Copies of materials may be obtained at the NSF address or telephone number shown below.

(A) *Agency Clearance Officer.* Herman G. Fleming, Division of Contracts, Policy, and Oversight, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230, or by telephone (703) 306-1243. Comments may also be submitted to:

(B) *OMB Desk Officer.* Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, ATTN: Jonathan Winer, Desk Officer, OMB, 722 Jackson Place, Room 3208, NEOB, Washington, DC 20503.

Title: Evaluation of the National Science Foundation's Science and Technology Centers Program (STC).

Affected Public: Individuals or households and non-profit institutions.

Respondents/Reporting Burden: 850 respondents, 680 total burden hours.

Abstract: NSF needs to evaluate the accomplishments and impacts of its Science and Technology Centers program in order to (1) Make a number of management decisions regarding the future of the program, and (2) report to OMB and the Congress under the GPRA pilot study arrangement; information will be gathered from Principal Investigators, Deans, industry and education users, and Ph.D graduates in industry and their supervisors.

Dated: August 15, 1995.

Herman G. Fleming,
Reports Clearance Officer.

[FR Doc. 95-20523 Filed 8-17-95; 8:45 am]

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-382]

In the Matter of Entergy Operations, Inc., (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3); Exemption

I

Entergy Operations, Inc., (the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License No. NPF-38, which authorizes operation of the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3). The operating license provides, among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now and hereafter in effect.

The facility consists of a pressurized water reactor at the licensee's site in St. Charles Parish, Louisiana.

II

Title 10 CFR 73.55, "Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage," paragraph (a), in part, states that "The licensee shall establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety."

10 CFR 73.55(d), "Access Requirements," paragraph (1), specifies that "The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area." 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) requires that "A numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escort." 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) also states that an individual not employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access to protected areas without escort provided the individual "receives a picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be returned upon exit from the protected area . . ."

The licensee proposed to implement an alternative unescorted access control system which would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve badges at each entrance/exit location and would allow all individuals with unescorted access to keep their badge with them when departing the site.

An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to allow contractors who have unescorted access to take their badges offsite instead of

returning them when exiting the site. By letter dated October 24, 1994, the licensee requested an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) for this purpose.

III

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, "Specific exemptions," the Commission may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the regulations in this part as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the Commission may authorize a licensee to provide alternative measures for protection against radiological sabotage provided the licensee demonstrates that the alternative measures have "the same high assurance objective" and meet "the general performance requirements" of the regulation, and "the overall level of system performance provides protection against radiological sabotage equivalent" to that which would be provided by the regulation.

Currently, employee and contractor identification/access control cards are issued and retrieved on the occasion of each entry to and exit from the protected areas of the Waterford 3 site. Station security personnel are required to maintain control of the badges while the individuals are offsite. This practice has been in effect at the Waterford 3, since the operating license was issued. Security personnel retain each identification access control card, when not in use by the authorized individual, within appropriately designed storage receptacles inside a bullet-resistant enclosure. An individual who meets the access authorization requirements is issued a picture identification card which also serves as an access control card. This card allows entry into preauthorized areas of the station. While entering the plant in the present configuration, an authorized individual is "screened" by the required detection equipment and by the issuing security officer. Having received the badge, the individual proceeds to the access portal, inserts the access control card into the card reader, and passes through the turnstile which is unlocked by the access card. Once inside the station, the access card allows entry into areas if the preauthorized criteria are met.

This present procedure is labor intensive since security personnel are required to verify badge issuance, ensure badge retrieval, and maintain the badges in orderly storage until the next entry into the protected area. The

regulations permit employees to remove their badges from the site, but an exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to permit contractors to take their badges offsite instead of returning them when exiting the site.

Under the proposed system, all individuals authorized to gain unescorted access will have the physical characteristics of their hand (hand geometry) recorded with their badge number. Since the hand geometry is unique to each individual and its application in the entry screening function would preclude unauthorized use of a badge, the requested exemption would allow employees and contractors to keep their badges at the time of exiting the protected area. The process of verifying badge issuance, ensuring badge retrieval, and maintaining badges could be eliminated while the balance of the access procedure would remain intact. Firearm, explosive, and metal detection equipment and provisions for conducting searches will remain as well. The security officer responsible for the last access control function (controlling admission to the protected area) will also remain isolated within a bullet-resistant structure in order to assure his or her ability to respond or to summon assistance.

Use of a hand geometry biometrics system exceeds the present verification methodology's capability to discern an individual's identity. Unlike the photograph identification badge, hand geometry is nontransferable. During the initial access authorization or registration process, hand measurements are recorded and the template is stored for subsequent use in the identity verification process required for entry into the protected area. Authorized individuals insert their access authorization card into the card reader and the biometrics system records an image of the hand geometry. The unique features of the newly recorded image are then compared to the template previously stored in the database. Access is ultimately granted based on the degree to which the characteristics of the image match those of the "signature" template.

Since both the badge and hand geometry would be necessary for access into the protected area, the proposed system would provide for a positive verification process. Potential loss of a badge by an individual, as a result of taking the badge offsite, would not enable an unauthorized entry into protected areas.

The access process will continue to be under the observation of security personnel. The system of identification badges coupled with their associated

access control cards will continue to be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escorts. Badges will continue to be displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area. Addition of a hand geometry biometrics system will provide a significant contribution to effective implementation of the security plan at each site.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff has determined that the proposed alternative measures for protection against radiological sabotage meet "the same high assurance objective," and "the general performance requirements" of the regulation and that "the overall level of system performance provides protection against radiological sabotage equivalent" to that which would be provided by the regulation.

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, an exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, as long as the licensee uses the hand geometry access control system, the Commission hereby grants Entergy Operations, Inc. an exemption from those requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) relating to the returning of picture badges upon exit from the protected area such that individuals not employed by the licensee, i.e., contractors, who are authorized unescorted access into the protected area, can take their badges offsite.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the quality of the human environment (60 FR 40865). This exemption is effective upon issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of August 1995.

For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Elinor G. Adensam,

Acting Director, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95-20512 Filed 8-17-95; 8:45 am]

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[Docket No. 50-289]

GPU Nuclear Corporation; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-50 issued to GPU Nuclear Corporation (the licensee) for operation of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1) located in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.

The proposed amendment would remove Technical Specification (TS) Section 3.2, "Makeup and Purification and Chemical Addition Systems," and its bases. The pertinent requirements and bases applicable to these systems are being incorporated in the TMI-1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). This proposed change is consistent with the Standard Technical Specifications for Babcock and Wilcox Plants (NUREG-1430, September 1992), which do not include requirements for these systems. The proposed change is also consistent with the Commission's criteria to be used to determine which structures, systems, and components are to be included in the TS. These criteria were recently codified in 10 CFR 50.36 of the Commission's regulations as noticed in the **Federal Register** (60 FR 36953, July 19, 1995). The licensee's request for the amendment under consideration is dated August 11, 1995, and supersedes an earlier request dated May 17, 1995. The staff had noticed the earlier request in the **Federal Register** on June 21, 1995 (60 FR 32365).

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The administrative relocation of the existing Technical Specification 3.2 requirements for the Makeup and Purification and Chemical Addition Systems to the TMI-1 UFSAR is