

unprotected openings located in the south wall of the charging pump cubicles. The lack of rated penetration seals was identified in NRC inspection report 50-338, 339/92-18 dated October 19, 1992.

The Commission's technical evaluation of the licensee's proposed amendment to the exemption will be published in a report entitled "Safety Evaluation Related to An Addendum To Exemption From Certain Requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 at North Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2." The evaluation is responsive to the licensee's request for an addendum to the exemption dated December 11, 1992, as supplemented by letter dated August 18, 1994.

#### *The Need for the Proposed Action*

The proposed exemption amendment is needed to clarify which penetrations in the south wall separating the charging pump cubicles are not sealed to a rating of 3 hours. In addition, documentation is required to specify that the lack of fire-rated penetration seals in the south wall of the pump cubicles does not present an undue risk to the public health and safety. Finally, the proposed amended exemption is needed in order to permit the licensee to use alternative fire protection configurations that achieve an equivalent level of safety compared to that attained by compliance with Section III.G of Appendix R.

#### *Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action*

The proposed amendment to the Exemption would not degrade the level of safety attained by compliance with the rule and there would be no change in accident doses to the environment. Consequently, the probability of fires has not been increased and the post-fire radiological releases would not be greater than previously determined; nor does the proposed exemption otherwise affect radiological plant effluents. Therefore, the Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with this proposed exemption amendment.

With regard to potential non-radiological impacts, the proposed exemption amendment involves features located entirely within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It does not affect non-radiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Therefore, the Commission concludes that there is no significant non-radiological environmental impact associated with the proposed exemption amendment.

#### *Alternatives to the Proposed Action*

Since we have concluded that the environmental effects of the proposed action are not significant, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental impacts need not be evaluated.

The principal alternative would be to deny the requested amendment to the exemption. This would not reduce the environmental impacts associated with fire protection modifications and compliance with the rule would accrue unreasonable costs to the licensee without an increase in safety.

#### *Alternative Use of Resources*

This action does not involve the use of any resources not previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement (as amended) for the North Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2.

#### *Agencies and Persons Consulted*

In accordance with its stated policy, on August 3, 1995, the staff consulted with the Virginia State official, James Dekrafft, of the Virginia Department of Health, regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.

#### **Finding of No Significant Impact**

The Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed amendment to the exemption.

Based upon the foregoing environmental assessment, we conclude that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for an addendum to the exemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, section III.G. of Appendix R dated December 11, 1992, as supplemented by letter dated August 18, 1994, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the Board of Supervisors Office, Louisa, County Courthouse, Louisa Virginia 23093, and the Alderman Library, Manuscripts Department, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22901.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of August 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

#### **David C. Trimble,**

*Acting Director, Project Directorate II-1, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.*

[FR Doc. 95-21742 Filed 8-31-95; 8:45 am]

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#### **Generic Letter 95-06, Changes in the Operator Licensing Program; Issued**

**AGENCY:** Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**ACTION:** Notice of issuance.

**SUMMARY:** The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued Generic Letter 95-06 to inform licensees of nuclear power reactors of the NRC's intent to revise the manner in which the NRC administers the initial operator licensing program to allow greater participation of facility licensees, and to solicit volunteers to participate in a pilot program that will evaluate and refine the new examination development process. This generic letter is available in the NRC Public Document Room under accession number 9508110156. The information that was sent to the Committee to Review Generic Requirements for this generic letter will be made available in the NRC Public Document Room.

**DATES:** The generic letter was issued on August 15, 1995.

**ADDRESSES:** Not applicable.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Stuart Richards (301) 415-1031.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** None.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25 day of August, 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

#### **Robert L. Dennig,**

*Acting Chief, Events Assessment and Generic Communications Branch, Division of Reactor Program Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.*

[FR Doc. 95-21741 Filed 8-31-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

#### **Generic Letter 95-07, Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves; Issued**

**AGENCY:** Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**ACTION:** Notice of issuance.

**SUMMARY:** The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued Generic Letter 95-07 to request licensees of nuclear power reactors to describe their consideration of the potential for pressure locking and thermal binding of safety-related power-operated gate valves, and the planned and completed corrective actions for valves that are determined to be susceptible to these problems. This generic letter is available in the NRC Public Document Room under accession number 9508110268. The information that was sent to the Committee to Review Generic Requirements, including the resolution

of public comments received on this generic letter, will be made available in the NRC Public Document Room. This generic letter is also discussed in Commission information paper SECY-95-200 which is available in the NRC Public Document Room.

**DATES:** The generic letter was issued on August 17, 1995.

**ADDRESSES:** Not applicable.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Thomas G. Scarbrough (301) 415-2794.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** None.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of August, 1995.

For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**Robert L. Dennig,**

*Acting Chief, Events Assessment and Generic Communications Branch, Division of Reactor Program Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.*

[FR Doc. 95-21740 Filed 8-31-95; 8:45 am]

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[Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368]

**Entergy Operations, Inc. (Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2); Exemption**

**I**

Entergy Operations, Inc., (the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6, which authorize operation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2. The operating license provides, among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now and hereafter in effect.

The facilities consist of two pressurized water reactors at the licensee's site in Pope County, Arkansas.

**II**

Title 10 CFR 73.55, "Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage," paragraph (a), in part, states that "The licensee shall establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety."

10 CFR 73.55(d), "Access Requirements," paragraph (1), specifies that "The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area." 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) requires that "A numbered

picture badge identification system shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escort." 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) also states that an individual not employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access to protected areas without escort provided the individual "receives a picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be returned upon exit from the protected area \* \* \*."

The licensee proposed to implement an alternative unescorted access control system which would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve badges at each entrance/exit location and would allow all individuals with unescorted access to keep their badges with them when departing the site.

An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to allow contractors who have unescorted access to take their badges offsite instead of returning them when exiting the site. By letter dated October 24, 1994, the licensee requested an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) for this purpose.

**III**

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, "Specific exemptions," the Commission may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the regulations in this part as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the Commission may authorize a licensee to provide alternative measures for protection against radiological sabotage provided the licensee demonstrates that the alternative measures have "the same high assurance objective" and meet "the general performance requirements" of the regulation, and "the overall level of system performance provides protection against radiological sabotage equivalent" to that which would be provided by the regulation.

Currently, employee and contractor identification/access control cards are issued and retrieved on the occasion of each entry to and exit from the protected areas of the Arkansas Nuclear One site. Station security personnel are required to maintain control of the badges while the individuals are offsite. This practice has been in effect at Arkansas Nuclear One since the first operating license was issued. Security personnel retain each identification access control card, when not in use by the authorized individual, within appropriately designed storage

receptacles inside a bullet-resistant enclosure. An individual who meets the access authorization requirements is issued a picture identification card which also serves as an access control card. This card allows entry into preauthorized areas of the station. While entering the plant in the present configuration, an authorized individual is "screened" by the required detection equipment and by the issuing security officer. Having received the badge, the individual proceeds to the access portal, inserts the access control card into the card reader, and passes through the turnstile which is unlocked by the access card. Once inside the station, the access card allows entry into areas if the preauthorized criteria are met.

This present procedure is labor intensive since security personnel are required to verify badge issuance, ensure badge retrieval, and maintain the badges in orderly storage until the next entry into the protected area. The regulations permit employees to remove their badges from the site, but an exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to permit contractors to take their badges offsite instead of returning them when exiting the site.

Under the proposed system, all individuals authorized to gain unescorted access will have the physical characteristics of their hand (hand geometry) recorded with their badge number. Since the hand geometry is unique to each individual and its application in the entry screening function would preclude unauthorized use of a badge, the requested exemption would allow employees and contractors to keep their badges at the time of exiting the protected area. The process of verifying badge issuance, ensuring badge retrieval, and maintaining badges could be eliminated while the balance of the access procedure would remain intact. Firearm, explosive, and metal detection equipment and provisions for conducting searches will remain as well. The security officer responsible for the last access control function (controlling admission to the protected area) will also remain isolated within a bullet-resistant structure in order to assure his or her ability to respond or to summon assistance.

Use of a hand geometry biometrics system exceeds the present verification methodology's capability to discern an individual's identity. Unlike the photograph identification badge, hand geometry is nontransferable. During the initial access authorization or registration process, hand measurements are recorded and the template is stored for subsequent use in the identity verification process