of public comments received on this generic letter, will be made available in the NRC Public Document Room. This generic letter is also discussed in Commission information paper SECY–95–200 which is available in the NRC Public Document Room.

DATES: The generic letter was issued on August 17, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Not applicable.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas G. Scarbrough (301) 415–2794. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: None.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of August, 1995.

For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Robert L. Dennig,

Acting Chief, Events Assessment and Generic Communications Branch, Division of Reactor Program Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–21740 Filed 8–31–95; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368]

Entergy Operations, Inc. (Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2); Exemption

Ι

Entergy Operations, Inc., (the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR–51 and NPF–6, which authorize operation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2. The operating license provides, among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now and hereafter in effect

The facilities consist of two pressurized water reactors at the licensee's site in Pope County, Arkansas.

II

Title 10 CFR 73.55, "Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage," paragraph (a), in part, states that "The licensee shall establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety."

10 CFR 73.55(d), "Access Requirements," paragraph (1), specifies that "The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area." 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) requires that "A numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escort." 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) also states that an individual not employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access to protected areas without escort provided the individual "receives a picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be returned upon exit from the protected area * * *."

The licensee proposed to implement an alternative unescorted access control system which would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve badges at each entrance/exit location and would allow all individuals with unescorted access to keep their badges with them when departing the site.

An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to allow contractors who have unescorted access to take their badges offsite instead of returning them when exiting the site. By letter dated October 24, 1994, the licensee requested an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) for this purpose.

TTT

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, "Specific exemptions," the Commission may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the regulations in this part as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the Commission may authorize a licensee to provide alternative measures for protection against radiological sabotage provided the licensee demonstrates that the alternative measures have "the same high assurance objective" and meet "the general performance requirements" of the regulation, and "the overall level of system performance provides protection against radiological sabotage equivalent" to that which would be provided by the regulation.

Currently, employee and contractor identification/access control cards are issued and retrieved on the occasion of each entry to and exit from the protected areas of the Arkansas Nuclear One site. Station security personnel are required to maintain control of the badges while the individuals are offsite. This practice has been in effect at Arkansas Nuclear One since the first operating license was issued. Security personnel retain each identification access control card, when not in use by the authorized individual, within appropriately designed storage

receptacles inside a bullet-resistant enclosure. An individual who meets the access authorization requirements is issued a picture identification card which also serves as an access control card. This card allows entry into preauthorized areas of the station. While entering the plant in the present configuration, an authorized individual is "screened" by the required detection equipment and by the issuing security officer. Having received the badge, the individual proceeds to the access portal, inserts the access control card into the card reader, and passes through the turnstile which is unlocked by the access card. Once inside the station, the access card allows entry into areas if the preauthorized criteria are met.

This present procedure is labor intensive since security personnel are required to verify badge issuance, ensure badge retrieval, and maintain the badges in orderly storage until the next entry into the protected area. The regulations permit employees to remove their badges from the site, but an exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to permit contractors to take their badges offsite instead of returning them when exiting the site.

Under the proposed system, all individuals authorized to gain unescorted access will have the physical characteristics of their hand (hand geometry) recorded with their badge number. Since the hand geometry is unique to each individual and its application in the entry screening function would preclude unauthorized use of a badge, the requested exemption would allow employees and contractors to keep their badges at the time of exiting the protected area. The process of verifying badge issuance, ensuring badge retrieval, and maintaining badges could be eliminated while the balance of the access procedure would remain intact. Firearm, explosive, and metal detection equipment and provisions for conducting searches will remain as well. The security officer responsible for the last access control function (controlling admission to the protected area) will also remain isolated within a bullet-resistant structure in order to assure his or her ability to respond or to summon assistance.

Use of a hand geometry biometrics system exceeds the present verification methodology's capability to discern an individual's identity. Unlike the photograph identification badge, hand geometry is nontransferable. During the initial access authorization or registration process, hand measurements are recorded and the template is stored for subsequent use in the identity verification process

required for entry into the protected area. Authorized individuals insert their access authorization card into the card reader and the biometrics system records an image of the hand geometry. The unique features of the newly recorded image are then compared to the template previously stored in the database. Access is ultimately granted based on the degree to which the characteristics of the image match those of the "signature" template.

Since both the badge and hand geometry would be necessary for access into the protected area, the proposed system would provide for a positive verification process. Potential loss of a badge by an individual, as a result of taking the badge offsite, would not enable an unauthorized entry into protected areas.

The access process will continue to be under the observation of security personnel. The system of identification badges coupled with their associated access control cards will continue to be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escorts. Badges will continue to be displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area. Addition of a hand geometry biometrics system will provide a significant contribution to effective implementation of the security plan at each site.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff has determined that the proposed alternative measures for protection against radiological sabotage meet "the same high assurance objective," and "the general performance requirements" of the regulation and that "the overall level of system performance provides protection against radiological sabotage equivalent" to that which would be provided by the regulation.

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, an exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, as long as the licensee uses the hand geometry access control system, the Commission hereby grants Entergy Operations, Inc. an exemption from those requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) relating to the returning of picture badges upon exit from the protected area such that individuals not employed by the licensee, i.e., contractors, who are authorized unescorted access into the protected area, can take their badges offsite.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the quality of the human environment. This exemption is effective upon issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day of August 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. **Jack W. Roe**,

Director, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. 95–21743 Filed 8–31–95; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7509–01–P

[Docket No. 30-32493-CivP; EA 93-072; ASLBP No. 95-709-02-CivP]

Radiation Oncology Center at Marlton (ROCM) Marlton, NJ (Byproduct Materials License No. 29–28685–01); Notice of Prehearing Conference

Notice is hereby given that a prehearing conference will be held in this enforcement proceeding, beginning at 9:30 a.m., on Wednesday, October 11, 1995, and continuing (to the extent necessary) at 9:00 a.m., on Thursday, October 12, 1995, at Two White Flint North, Commission Hearing Room, Room 3 B 45, 11545 Rockville Pike. Rockville, Maryland. The purpose of the prehearing conference will be to define further the issues to be litigated during the proceeding, to establish discovery schedules, and to deal with other matters bearing upon the evidentiary hearing (such as the date, time and location of such hearing).

Members of the public are invited to attend the conference but will not be permitted to participate in the proceeding.

Rockville, Maryland, August 28, 1995. For the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.

Charles Bechhoefer,

Chairman, Administrative Judge. [FR Doc. 95–21744 Filed 8–31–95; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7509–01–M

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34–36163; File No. SR–Amex– 95–34]

Self-Regulatory Organizations: Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change by the American Stock Exchange, Inc., Relating to the Listing of Options on the Inter@ctive Week Internet Index

August 29, 1995.

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

("Act"),¹ and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,² notice is hereby given that on August 23, 1995, the American Stock Exchange, Inc. ("Amex" or "Exchange") filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.

I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Proposed Rule Change

The Exchange proposes to list and trade options on the Amex Inter@ctive Week Internet Index ("Index"), a new stock index developed by the Amex and Inter@ctive Week based on stocks (or American Depositary Receipts ("ADRs") thereon) of companies involved in the fields of digital interactive services, software and hardware. In addition, the Amex proposes to amend Rule 901C, Commentary. 01 to reflect that 90% of the Index's numerical index value will be accounted for by stocks that meet the current criteria and guidelines set forth in Rule 915. The text of the proposed rule change is available at the Office of the Secretary, the Exchange, and at the Commission.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change. The text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in Sections (A), (B), and (C) below, of the most significant aspects of such statements.

(A) Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

The Amex has developed a new industry-specific index called the Inter@ctive Week Internet Index, based entirely on shares of widely held companies involved in providing interactive services, developing and marketing digital interactive software and manufacturing digital interactive hardware.³ The industries represented

¹ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).

^{2 17} CFR 240.19b-4.

³ The component securities of the Index are 3Com; Acclaim Entertainment; Activision; Adobe Systems; America Online; Avid Technology; Bolt, Beranek & Newman; Broadband Technologies;