

controlled through the use of picture badges. Positive identification of personnel who are authorized and request access into the protected areas is established by security personnel making a visual comparison of the individual requesting access and that individual's picture badge. The picture badges are issued, stored, and retrieved at the entrance/exit location to the protected area. In accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5), contractor personnel are not allowed to take their picture badges off site. In addition, in accordance with the plant's physical security plan, the licensee's employees are also not allowed to take their picture badges off site. The licensee proposes to implement an alternative unescorted access control system which would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve picture badges at the entrance/exit location to the protected area. The proposal would also allow contractors who have unescorted access to keep their picture badges in their possession when departing the Dresden site. In addition, the site security plans will be revised to allow implementation of the hand geometry system and to allow employees and contractors with unescorted access to keep their picture badges in their possession when leaving the Dresden site.

#### *Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action*

The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action. The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action and concludes that the proposed exemption would not increase the probability or consequences of accidents previously analyzed and would not affect facility radiation levels or facility radiological effluents. Under the proposed system, all individuals with authorized unescorted access will have the physical characteristics of their hand (hand geometry) registered with their picture badge number in a computerized access control system in addition to their picture badges. Therefore, all authorized individuals must not only have their picture badges to gain access into the protected area, but must also have their hand geometry confirmed.

All other access process, including search function capability and access revocation, will remain the same. A security officer responsible for access control will continue to be positioned within a bullet-resistant structure. The proposed system is only for individuals with authorized unescorted access and will not be used for individuals requiring escorts.

The underlying purpose for requiring that individuals not employed by the licensee must receive and return their picture badges at the entrance/exit is to provide reasonable assurance that the access badges could not be compromised or stolen with a resulting risk that an unauthorized individual could potentially enter the protected area. Although the proposed exemption will allow individuals to take their picture badges off site, the proposed measures require not only that the picture badge be provided for access to the protected area, but also that verification of the hand geometry registered with the badge be performed as discussed above. Thus, the proposed system provides an identity verification process that is equivalent to the existing process.

The change will not increase the probability or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no significant increase in the allowable individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed action does involve features located entirely within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

#### *Alternatives to the Proposed Action*

Since the Commission has concluded there is no measurable environmental impact associated with the proposed action, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental impact need not be evaluated. The principal alternative to the proposed action would be to deny the requested action. Denial of the requested action would not significantly enhance the environment in that the proposed action will result in a process that is equivalent to the existing identification verification process.

#### *Alternative Use of Resources*

This action does not involve the use of resources not previously considered in connection with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Final Environmental Statement dated November 1973, related to the operation of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3.

#### *Agencies and Persons Consulted:*

In accordance with its stated policy, on January 9, 1996, the NRC staff consulted with the Illinois State official, Mr. Frank Niziolek, Head, Reactor Safety Section, Division of Engineering, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety, regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.

#### *Finding of no Significant Impact*

Based upon the foregoing environmental assessment, the Commission concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the licensee's letter dated November 20, 1995, which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Morris Public Library, 604 Liberty Street, Morris, Illinois 60451.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day of January 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  
George F. Dick Jr.,  
*Acting Director, Project Directorate III-2,  
Division of Reactor Projects—III/IV, Office of  
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.*  
[FR Doc. 96-284 Filed 1-8-96; 8:45 am]  
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

#### **[Docket No. 70-820]**

#### **United Nuclear Corporation—Wood River Junction Site; Closing of Local Public Document Room**

Notice is hereby given that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is closing the local public document room (LPDR) for records pertaining to the United Nuclear Corporation (UNC) Wood River Junction site located at the Cross Mill Public Library, Charlestown, Rhode Island. This LPDR is no longer needed and will close effective February 2, 1996.

The Cross Mill Public Library has been the LPDR for the Wood River Junction site since September 1980 when it was established for the licensee's proposed decommissioning. Since that time the LPDR has remained operational maintaining documents on the termination of the UNC License No. SNM-777. On October 12, 1995, the NRC terminated the license and released the UNC Wood River Junction site for unrestricted use. Therefore, effective

February 2, 1996, the LPDR will be closed.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of January, 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  
Carlton Kammerer,

*Director, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration.*

[FR Doc. 96-285 Filed 1-8-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

**[Docket No. 50-245]**

**Northeast Utilities—Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206**

In notice document 95-31255 beginning on page 66807, in the issue of Tuesday, December 26, 1995, the complete text of the "Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206" (DD-95-23) was not included. The complete text follows this correction notice.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 3rd day of January 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  
James W. Andersen,

*Project Manager, Project Directorate I-3, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.*

**I. Introduction**

On January 8, 1995, Mr. Anthony J. Ross (Petitioner) filed a Petition with the Executive Director for Operations of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. In the Petition, the Petitioner raised concerns regarding the site paging and site siren evacuation alarm system in the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 maintenance shop.

The Petitioner alleged that on numerous occasions since January 1994, his department manager had instructed the Petitioner's coworkers to shut off or turn down the volume on the site paging and site siren evacuation alarm system in the Millstone Unit 1 maintenance shop, and the Petitioner's first-line supervisor and coworker had complied with this request in violation of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1 and NUREG-0654. The Petitioner requested that the NRC impose at least three sanctions against his department manager, and impose sanctions against the Petitioner's coworker and maintenance first-line supervisor for engaging in deliberate misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 50.5.

On February 23, 1995, I informed the Petitioner that the Petition had been referred to me pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations. I also

informed the Petitioner that the NRC would take appropriate action within a reasonable time regarding the specific concerns raised in the Petition. On the basis of a review of the issues raised by the Petitioner as discussed below, I have concluded that no substantial health and safety issues have been raised that would warrant the action requested by the Petitioner.

**II. Discussion**

In the Petition, the Petitioner raised a concern that on numerous occasions since January 1994, his department manager had instructed the Petitioner's coworkers to shut off or turn down the volume on the site paging and site siren evacuation alarm system in the Millstone Unit 1 maintenance shop, and the Petitioner's first-line supervisor and coworker had complied with this request in violation of TS 6.8.1 and NUREG-0654.

Licensees for nuclear power plants are required to have emergency plans that meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. Under 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response must be provided and maintained. Appendix E of Part 50 establishes minimum requirements for emergency plans for use in attaining an acceptable state of emergency preparedness. Section IV.E.9, in part, requires at least one onsite communications system.

NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," provides guidance for developing radiological emergency plans and improving emergency preparedness. Section II.F.1.e states that each emergency plan shall include provisions for alerting or activating emergency personnel in each response organization. Section II.J.1 states that each licensee shall establish the means and time required to warn or advise onsite individuals and individuals who may be in areas controlled by the licensee. Technical Specification 6.8.1, in part, requires that procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering emergency plan implementation.

The topic of this Petition was one of the maintenance-related issues the NRC staff raised to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), licensee for Millstone Unit 1, in letters dated December 5 and 28, 1994. In those letters, the NRC staff requested NNECO to review the issues and submit a written response. Specifically, the NRC

requested NNECO to review the following: (1) That NNECO management had shut off the site paging and site siren evacuation alarm system or directed workers to shut off the system in the Unit 1 maintenance shop during morning meetings, (2) that on several occasions the system was not turned back on for hours, and (3) that the on/off switches for the speakers in question had been installed without a work order.

The licensee's investigation into this matter, which was described in its January 26, 1995, response to the NRC request, confirmed that the site paging and site siren evacuation alarm system had been routinely turned off at one of the two speakers located in the Millstone Unit 1 maintenance shop area during meetings, and that this practice was not consistent with Emergency Preparedness Department guidance and NUREG-0654.<sup>1</sup> However, NNECO management stated that it was confident that personnel could still hear the other speaker. This configuration was also tested during a special test conducted by NNECO. The results of the test verified that one of the two speakers had sufficient capacity to support event notification in the maintenance shop area. Since the single speaker could be heard, personnel in the maintenance area would be alerted if an emergency existed. NNECO's investigation also concluded that the on/off switches were installed without a work order in 1973 consistent with work performance processes at that time.

NNECO's corrective actions to address this concern included prohibiting the use of any switch that disables any feature of the site paging and site siren evacuation alarm system, removing the two speaker switches, and performing a walkdown of all other system speakers to verify that no other similar switches existed in the system.

The NRC conducted a special safety inspection from May 15 through June 23, 1995, at the Millstone station. During this inspection, the staff reviewed a number of the concerns, the topic of this Petition being one of them, and issued the findings in Inspection Report (IR) 50-245/95-22, 50-336/95-

<sup>1</sup> NUREG-0654, paragraph J.1, states that each licensee shall establish the means and time required to warn or advise onsite individuals and individuals who may be in areas controlled by the licensee. Emergency Preparedness Department guidance (Emergency Plan Administrative Procedure [EPAP] 1.15), at the time, required that the unit services director monitor and maintain emergency preparedness facilities and equipment. In Attachment 2 of EPAP 1.15, the Unit 1 public announcement speakers and evacuation alarm were included as emergency preparedness equipment.