

Autoclave High Pressure Systems to reflect the ability to test all inner and outer penetration isolation valves.

#### **Basis for Finding of No Significance**

1. The proposed amendment will not result in a change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

The proposed TSR changes reflect the autoclave piping modifications that permit independent testing of the inner and outer penetration isolation valves. Testing of these valves demonstrates the ability to establish containment in the event of uranium hexafluoride leakage from the cylinder into the autoclave. The proposed changes provide enhanced assurance that the containment function will be available if needed. These changes have no impact on plant effluents and will not result in any impact to the environment.

2. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The proposed changes provide enhanced assurance that the autoclave containment function will be available if needed. The changes will not result in increased individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

3. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant construction impact.

The proposed changes will not result in any building construction, therefore, there will be no construction impacts.

4. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant increase in the potential for, or radiological or chemical consequences from, previously analyzed accidents.

The proposed changes allow testing of the inner and outer penetration isolation valves. This testing of the autoclave containment function is not involved in any precursor to an evaluated event; therefore, the potential of occurrence of an evaluated event is unaffected. The proposed changes provide enhanced assurance that the function will be available if required; the consequences of previously evaluated accidents are not increased.

5. The proposed amendment will not result in the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

The autoclave piping configuration modifications permit independent testing of the inner and outer penetration isolation valves to demonstrate the ability to establish containment in the event of a leak from the cylinder into the autoclave. The changes affect only the autoclave isolation valves and create no new

operating conditions or new plant configuration that could lead to a new or different type of accident.

6. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant reduction in any margin of safety.

The proposed changes reflect modifications that permit independent testing of the inner and outer penetration isolation valves. The proposed changes enhance the availability of the autoclave containment function. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

7. The proposed amendment will not result in an overall decrease in the effectiveness of the plant's safety, safeguards or security programs.

The proposed changes reflect the autoclave piping configuration modifications made to permit independent testing of inner and outer penetration isolation valves. Testing of these valves demonstrates the ability to establish containment in the event of uranium hexafluoride leakage from the cylinder into the autoclave. The changes do not affect any other equipment functions or administrative requirements. The testing of the autoclave containment function is not addressed in the safeguards and security programs. The effectiveness of the safety, safeguards, and security programs is not decreased.

Effective date: June 23, 1997.

Certificate of Compliance No. GDP-1: Amendment will revise the Technical Safety Requirements.

Local Public Document Room location: Paducah Public Library, 555 Washington Street, Paducah, Kentucky 42003.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of April 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**Carl J. Paperiello,**

*Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.*

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## **NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

[Docket No. 50-368]

### **Entergy Operations, Inc.; Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact**

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an exemption from certain requirements of its regulations to Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee), in connection with

operation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, located in Pope County, Arkansas, under Facility Operating License No. NPF-6.

#### **Environmental Assessment**

##### *Identification of the Proposed Action*

The proposed action would exempt the licensee from the requirement to have an oil collection system for the RCP lube oil addition system, thus allowing the licensee to utilize compensatory actions and procedures to add lube oil to reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) in limited quantities at power. The requirement is contained in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.0, which provides that the licensee shall have a collection system "capable of collecting lube oil from all pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems." It also specifies that "leakage points to be protected shall include lift pump and piping, overflow lines, lube oil cooler, oil fill and drain lines and plugs, flanged connections on oil lines, and lube oil reservoirs where such features exist on the reactor coolant pumps."

The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's application for an exemption dated December 23, 1997.

#### **The Need for the Proposed Action**

The proposed action is needed to reduce dose and personnel hazards to workers who periodically add oil to the RCP lube oil system during power operation.

#### **Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action**

The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action and has concluded that despite not having a lube oil collection system for the reactor coolant pump lube oil fill lines, the design of the oil filling system and the level of protection provided by compensatory measures during oil fill operations provide reasonable assurance that a lube oil fire will not occur. The staff also has concluded that in the event of a worst-case postulated fire, it would be of limited magnitude and extent. In addition, such a fire would not cause significant damage in the containment building and would not prevent the operators from achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions.

The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no significant increase in the allowable individual or cumulative occupational

radiation exposure. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed action involves features located entirely within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

#### **Alternatives to the Proposed Action**

Since the Commission has concluded there is no measurable environmental impact associated with the proposed action, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental impact need not be evaluated. As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff considered denial of the proposed action. Denial of the application would result in no change in current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.

#### **Alternative Use of Resources**

This action does not involve the use of any resources not previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for ANO-2.

#### **Agencies and Persons Consulted**

In accordance with its stated policy, on March 14, 1997, the staff consulted with the Arkansas State official, Mr. David Snellings, Director of Radiation Control and Emergency Management, regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.

#### **Finding of No Significant Impact**

Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the licensee's letter dated April 11, 1996, which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Tomlinson Library, Arkansas Tech University, Russellville, AR 72801.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of April 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  
**William D. Beckner,**  
*Project Director, Project Directorate VI-1,  
 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of  
 Nuclear Reactor Regulation.*  
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### **NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

[Docket No. 50-461]

#### **Illinois Power Company; Clinton Power Station (Unit No. 1); Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact**

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-62, issued to Illinois Power Company (the licensee), for operation of the Clinton Power Station, Unit No. 1 (CPS), located in DeWitt County, Illinois.

#### **Environmental Assessment**

##### *Identification of the Proposed Action*

The proposed amendment would modify Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.3.8.1-1, "Loss of Power Instrumentation." The modification requires that interim administrative controls be maintained in order to minimize the potential that the Class 1E loads will receive inadequate voltage in the event of a degraded voltage condition. These controls are to be maintained until the licensee completes planned modifications for upgrading the degraded voltage protection instrumentation and distribution system for all three divisions of safety-related AC power.

##### *The Need for the Proposed Action*

As described in CPS Licensee Event Report 94-005, the degraded voltage relays at CPS, and their setpoints, are not sufficient to ensure proper operation of all Class 1E equipment, contrary to the current licensing basis for CPS. As interim corrective action, the licensee installed an undervoltage alarm for the Division 1, 2, and 3, 4.16-kV buses and established contingent operator actions in order to minimize the potential that the Class 1E loads would receive inadequate voltage for proper operation. Subsequent licensee review of these interim administrative controls has concluded that, although the use of compensatory administrative controls reduces the risk associated with a degraded voltage condition, reliance on the interim administrative controls can potentially result in a malfunction of

equipment important to safety of a different type than previously evaluated in the CPS Updated Safety Analysis Report and, therefore, constitutes an unreviewed safety question. In addition, the licensee has concluded that the interim administrative controls can result in a small reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the CPS TSs.

The proposed amendment, requested by the licensee in their letter dated April 1, 1997, would modify TS Table 3.3.8.1-1, "Loss of Power Instrumentation." The proposed change requires the interim administrative controls to be maintained to minimize the potential that the Class 1E loads would receive inadequate voltage in the event of a degraded voltage condition. These controls are to be maintained until the licensee completes planned modifications for upgrading the degraded voltage protection instrumentation and distribution system for all three divisions of safety-related AC power. The new interim administrative controls primarily consist of system planning controls on the voltage of the 345-kV offsite grid, notification of plant operators under offsite grid conditions that may result in a degraded voltage condition if CPS tripped off-line, and utilizing an installed degraded voltage alarm that will prompt operators to take action to transfer the 4.16-kV buses to their associated diesel generators in the event voltage is not adequate to ensure proper operation of the Class 1E loads.

##### *Description of the Proposed Change*

The licensee proposes to revise footnote (b) associated with TS Table 3.3.8.1-1, "Loss of Power Instrumentation," which was incorporated by Amendment No. 110 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 to require use of the revised setpoints for the new relays in a particular division based on release for operations (RFO) of the plant modification that installs the new undervoltage relays for that division. Specifically, the licensee proposes to add to the note a new sentence that reads, "Administrative controls as described in the 'Administrative Controls' section of Attachment 2 to Illinois Power Company's letter U-602714, dated April 1, 1997, shall be maintained until RFO of the corresponding plant modifications for Divisions 1, 2, and 3."

##### *Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action*

The Commission has reviewed the proposed action and concludes that there will be no significant changes to the facility or its operation as a result of