

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**Department of the Air Force****Supplemental Record of Decision for Disposal and Reuse; Pease Air Force Base (AFB), New Hampshire**

On April 14, 1997, the Air Force issued a Supplemental Record of Decision (SROD) for Pease Air Force Base. The SROD, signed by Mr. Rodney A. Coleman, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Environment, completes the disposal and reuse decisions for Pease AFB. The SROD was developed based upon review and consideration of the June 1991 Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) and the August 1995 Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS). The SEIS was prepared in response to the U.S. District Court's Order in *CLF v. Air Force*. The SEIS also includes a sensitivity analysis of the special excepted use of a performing arts center which is based upon data contained in the SEIS. Potential environmental impacts addressed in the FEIS and SEIS were taken into consideration prior to making the decisions put forth in the SROD. The SROD does not change property disposal decisions made in previous Records of Decisions, however, it does change the method of conveyance for some of the parcels. All referenced documents are maintained at Pease Air Force Base and the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence offices at Brooks Air Force Base, TX for public review.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. John Corradetti, Program Manager, Division B, Air Force Base Conversion Agency, 1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 2300, Arlington, VA 22209-2809.

Carolyn A. Lunsford,

Air Force Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 97-14083 Filed 5-28-97; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**Department of the Navy, DoD****Board of Advisors to the Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School; Open Meeting**

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. app. 2), notice is hereby given that the Board of Advisors to the Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, will meet on July 15-16, 1997, in Hermann Hall (Bldg 220) at the School. All sessions will be open to the public.

The purpose of the meeting is to elicit the advice of the board on the Navy's Postgraduate Education Program. The board examines the effectiveness with which the Naval Postgraduate School is accomplishing its mission. To this end, the board will inquire into the curricula; instruction; physical equipment; administration; state of morale of the student body, faculty, and staff; fiscal affairs; and any other matters relating to the operation of the Naval Postgraduate School as the board considers pertinent.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS MEETING CONTACT: CDR Richard Grahlman, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943-5000, Telephone: (408) 656-2512.

Dated: May 20, 1997.

D.E. Koenig, Jr.,

LCDR, JAGC, USN, Federal Register Liaison Officer.

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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 97-2]

Continuation of Criticality Safety at Defense Nuclear Facilities in the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice; recommendation.

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a concerning continuation of critically safety at defense nuclear facilities in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation are due on or before June 30, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2901.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth M. Pusateri or Andrew L. Thibadeau at the address above or telephone (202) 208-6400.

Dated: May 21, 1997.

John T. Conway,
Chairman.

Continuation of Criticality Safety at Defense Nuclear Facilities in the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex

May 19, 1997.

In the first two or three decades following the Manhattan Project, nearly

every laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had an active program addressing some phase of the physics of neutron chain-reacting systems. Each such study included a balance of experiment and theoretical analysis, as in common in engineering research. Some of the programs supported the design of nuclear weapons, some were directed at the design of nuclear reactors, and some were conducted simply as basic engineering research.

As a result of these programs, expertise in neutron chain-reacting systems was widespread; there was an abundance of individuals skilled in achieving and controlling neutron chain reactions. These individuals usually became expert as well in methods of avoiding a chain reaction when this is not desired. The state of a self-sustaining chain reaction is commonly called "criticality." Guidance by these knowledgeable individuals helped establish an admirable record of criticality safety in the many programs the AEC conducted with fissionable material. While occasional accidental criticality did occur at the peace of AEC activity, it seldom caused injury to workers, and never led to radiation affecting individuals off site. Furthermore, the last such instance of inadvertent criticality in the United States occurred about 20 years ago.

Some criticality research continued to replenish the supply of these experts through the era of the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and into the period of the Department of Energy (DOE), though at a steadily reduced rate. Today there is almost no theoretical research in criticality being conducted, although university courses continue to instruct students in the theoretical expertise that has already been developed. However, most of the early experts in criticality safety control were drawn from experimental research programs. For a number of years, the DOE complex placed its reliance for criticality safety on the diminishing number of such criticality control experts developed in earlier years. Recently, however, DOE has been forced to supplement that group with engineers trained on the job in the conduct of criticality calculations. The latter group contains few individuals who have conducted critical mass experiments. Thus collectively they have little practical experience