(1) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration or relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, and any other considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment;

(2) the impact of entry of such judgment upon the public generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trail. 15 U.S.C. §16(e) (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently held, the APPA permits a court to consider, among other things, the relationship between the remedy secured and the specific allegations set forth in the government's complaint, whether the decree is sufficiently clear, whether enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, and whether the decree may positively harm third parties. See United States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

In conduction this injury, "the Court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or to engage in extended proceedings which might have the effect of vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement through the consent decree process." 1 Rather, absent a showing of corrupt failure of the government to discharge its duty, the Court, in making its public interest finding, should . . . carefully consider the explanations of the government in the competitive impact statement and its responses to comments in order to determine whether those explanations are reasonable under the circumstances. United States v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 1977-1 Trace Cas ¶61.508, at 71.980 (W.D. Mo. 1977).

Accordingly, with respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by the decree, a court may not "engage in an unrestricted evaluation of what relief would best serve the public." *United States* v. *BNS, Inc.,* 858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988), *quoting United States* v. *Bechtel Corp.*, 648 F.2d 660,666 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); *see also, Microsoft*, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Precedent requires that

[t]he balancing of competing social and political interests affected by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. The court's role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the government has not breached its duty to the pubic in consenting to the decree. The court is required to determine not whether a particular decree is the one that will best serve society, but whether the settlement is 'within the reaches of the public interest,' More elaborate requirements might undermine the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent decree.2

The proposed Final Judgment, therefore, should not be reviewed under a standard of whether it is certain to eliminate every anticompetitive effect of a particular practice or whether it mandates certainly of free competition in the future. Court approval of a final judgment requires a standard more flexible and less strict than the standard required for a finding of liability. "[A] proposed decree must be approved even if it falls short of the remedy the court would impose on its own, as long as it falls within the range of acceptability or is 'within the reaches of public interest.' (citations omitted).3

VIII. Determinative Documents

There are no determinative materials or documents within the meaning of the APPA that were considered by the United States in formulating the proposed Final Judgment.

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Trail Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 1401 H St., N.W., Suite 3000, Washington, D.C. 20530, 202–307– 0924, 202–307–6283 (Facsimile). Dated: July 2, 1997. [FR Doc. 97–19315 Filed 7–22–97; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4410–11–M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division

Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993—CAD Framework Initiative, Inc.

Notice is hereby given that, on May 1, 1997 pursuant to Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 15 U.S.C. §4301 et seq. ("the Act"), CAD Framework Initiative, Inc. ("CFI") has filed written notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing certain changes in its membership. The notifications were filed for the purpose of extending the Act's provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified circumstances. Specifically, Compass Design Automation, San Jose, CA, has reinstated its membership in CFI. SGS Thompson Microelectronics, Argate Brianza, ITALY; CADIS Inc., Boulder, CO; Concurrent CAE Solutions, Inc., Santa Clara, CA; I.C. Master (a division of Hearst Business Publishing/UTP), Garden City, NY; and Synapticad, Inc., Blacksburg, VA, have joined CFI as Corporate Members. Corporate Member High Level Design Systems, Inc., was acquired by Cadence Design Systems, Inc., San Jose, CA.

On December 30, 1988, CFI filed its original notification pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Act. That filing was amended on February 7, 1989. The Department of Justice published a notice concerning the amended filing in the **Federal Register** pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act on March 13, 1989 (54 Fed. Reg. 10456). A correction notice was published on April 20, 1989 (54 Fed. Reg. 16013).

The last notification was filed with the Department on November 7, 1996. A notice was published in the **Federal Register** pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act on April 29, 1997 (62 FR 23266).

Constance K. Robinson,

Director of Operations, Antitrust Division. [FR Doc. 97–19312 Filed 7–22–97; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4410–11–M

¹119 Cong. Rec. 24598 (1973). See also United States v. Gillete Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D. Mass. 1975). A "public interest" determination can be made properly on the basis of the Competitive Impact Statement and Response to Comments filed pursuant to the APPA. Although the APPA authorizes the use of additional procedures, 15 U.S.C. § 16(f), those procedures are discretionary. A court need not invoke any of them unless it believes that the comments have raised significant issues and that further proceedings would aid the court in resolving those issues. See H.R. 93–1463, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. 8–9, reprinted in (1974) U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6535, 6538.

² United States v. Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d at 463; United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 1978); United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. at 716. See also United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 719 F.2d 558, 565 (2d Cir. 1983).

³ United States v. American Tel. and Tel Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 150 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), quoting United States v. Gillette Co., supra, 406 F. Supp. at 716; United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 622 (W.D. Ky 1985).