Vicki A. Novak, Executive Director, Personnel Division, NASA Headquarters
Michael I. Mott, Associate Deputy Administrator (Technical), NASA Headquarters
Robert E. Whitehead, Associate Administrator for Aeronautics and Space Transportation Technology, NASA Headquarters
Spence M. Armstrong, Associate Administrator for Human Resources and Education, NASA Headquarters

Daniel S. Goldin,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 97–22254 Filed 8–20–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7510–01–M

NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

Telecommunications Service Priority System Oversight Committee

AGENCY: National Communications System (NCS).

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

A meeting of the Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) System Oversight Committee will convene Thursday September 25, 1997 from 9 a.m. to 12:00 a.m. The meeting will be held at Booz-Allen & Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Drive, McLean VA.

—Opening/Administrative Remarks
—Status of the TSP Program
—Working Group Reports
—CPAS Program Update

Anyone interested in attending or presenting additional information to the Committee, please contact LCDR Angela Abrahamson, Manager, TSP Program Office, (703) 607–4930, or Betty Hoskin (703) 607–4932 by September 15, 1997.

Frank M. McClelland,

Acting Federal Register Liaison Officer, National Communications System.

[FR Doc. 97–22125 Filed 8–20–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3610–05–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–335 and 50–389]

Florida Power and Light Company, et al., St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2; Exemption

I

The Florida Power and Light Company, *et al.* (FPL or the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–67 and NPF–16, which authorize operation of the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2. The licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.

The facility consists of two pressurized-water reactors at the licensee's site located in St. Lucie County, Florida.

II

Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, ''Criticality Accident Requirements,'' requires that each licensee authorized to possess special nuclear material (SNM) shall maintain a criticality accident monitoring system in each area where such material is handled, used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 specify detection and sensitivity requirements that these monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that all areas subject to criticality accident monitoring must be covered by two detectors. Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed SNM is handled, used, or stored and provides that (1) the procedures ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the sounding of a criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the procedures must include drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and (3) the procedures designate responsible individuals for determining the cause of the alarm and placement of radiation survey instruments in accessible locations for use in such an emergency. Subsection (b)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to have a means to identify quickly personnel who have received a dose of 10 rads or more. Subsection (b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain personnel decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements for a physician and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies, and to maintain arrangements for the transportation of contaminated individuals to treatment facilities outside the site boundary. Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from the requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for SNM used or to be used in the reactor. Paragraph (d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that any licensee who believes that there is good cause why he should be granted an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 may apply to the Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the reasons for the relief requested.

III

The SNM that could be assembled into a critical mass at St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2, is in the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of SNM other than fuel that is stored on site is small enough to preclude achieving a critical mass. The Commission's technical staff has evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent criticality of the nuclear fuel at St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2, and has determined that it is extremely unlikely for such an accident to occur if the licensee meets the following seven criteria:

1. Only one fuel assembly is allowed out of a shipping cask or storage rack at one time.
2. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water.
3. If optimum moderation occurs at low moderator density, then the k-effective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with a moderator at the density corresponding to optimum moderation.
4. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level in the event that the spent fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water.
5. The quantity of forms of special nuclear material, other than nuclear fuel, that are stored on site in any given area is less than the quantity necessary for a critical mass.
6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect excessive radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions.
7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight percent.

By letter dated February 19, 1997, and supplemented July 10, 1997, the licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR 70.24. In this request the licensee addressed the seven criteria given above. The Commission's technical staff has reviewed the licensee's submittals and has determined that St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2, meets the criteria for prevention of inadvertent criticality; therefore, the staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely for an inadvertent criticality to