

Office of AccessAbility, National Endowment for the Arts, 1100 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506, 202/682-5532, TDY-TDD 202/682-5496, at least seven (7) days prior to the meeting.

Further information with reference to this meeting can be obtained from Ms. Kathy Plowitz-Worden, Committee Management Officer, National Endowment for the Arts, Washington, D.C. 20506, or call 202/682-5691.

Dated: September 24, 1997.

**Kathy Plowitz-Worden,**

*Panel Coordinator, Panel Operations, National Endowment for the Arts.*

[FR Doc. 97-25922 Filed 9-29-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7537-01-M

**NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THE ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES**

**National Endowment for the Arts**

**Combined Arts Panel**

Pursuant to Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463), as amended, notice is hereby given that a meeting of the Combined Arts Advisory Panel, Dance Section (Planning & Stabilization category) to the National Council on the Arts will be held on October 23-24, 1997. The panel will meet from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on October 23 and from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. on October 24, in Room 714 at the Nancy Hanks Center, 1100 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506. A portion of this meeting, from 9:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. on October 24, will be open to the public for a policy discussion of guidelines, planning, Leadership Initiatives, and field needs and trends.

The remaining portions of this meeting, from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on October 23 and 10:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. on October 24, are for the purpose of Panel review, discussion, evaluation, and recommendation on applications for financial assistance under the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, as amended, including information given in confidence to the agency by grant applicants. In accordance with the determination of the Chairman of March 31, 1997, these sessions will be closed to the public pursuant to subsection (c)(4), (6) and (9)(B) of section 552b of Title 5, United States Code.

Any person may observe meetings, or portions thereof, of advisory panels which are open to the public, and may be permitted to participate in the panel's discussions at the discretion of the panel chairman and with the

approval of the full-time Federal employee in attendance.

If you need special accommodations due to a disability, please contact the Office of AccessAbility, National Endowment for the Arts, 1100 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506, 202/682-5532, TDY-TDD 202/682-5496, at least seven (7) days prior to the meeting.

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Dated: September 24, 1997.

**Kathy Plowitz-Worden,**

*Panel Coordinator, Panel Operations, National Endowment for the Arts.*

[FR Doc. 97-25923 Filed 9-29-97; 8:45 am]

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**NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION**

**DOE/NSF Nuclear Science Advisory Committee; Committee Management; Renewal**

The Assistant Director for Mathematical and Physical Science has determined that renewal of the DOE/NSF Nuclear Science Advisory Committee is necessary and in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed upon the Director, National Science Foundation (NSF), by 42 U.S.C. 1861 et seq. This determination follows consultation with the Committee Management Secretariat, General Services Administration. Authority for the Advisory Committees will expire on October 1, 1999, unless renewed.

The purpose of the committee is to provide advice on a continuing basis to both the Department of Energy and the National Science Foundation on priorities for basic nuclear science research in the United States.

For more information, please contact Dr. Bradley Keister, Program Director, Nuclear Physics, Room 1015, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 22230 (703) 306-1891.

Dated: September 24, 1997.

**M. Rebecca Winkler,**

*Committee Management Officer.*

[FR Doc. 97-25797 Filed 9-29-97; 8:45 am]

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**NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION**

**Special Emphasis Panel in Materials Research; Notice of Meeting**

In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463 as amended), the National Science Foundation announces the following meeting:

*Name:* Special Emphasis Panel in Materials Research #1203.

*Date and Time:* 14 October 1997, 8:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m.

*Place:* Room 1060, National Science Foundation; 4201 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 22230.

*Type of Meeting:* Closed.

*Contact Person:* Dr. Liselotte J. Schioler, Program Director, Ceramics Program, Division of Materials Research, Room 1065, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230, Telephone (703) 306-1836, (703) 306-0515.

*Purpose of Meeting:* To provide advice and recommendations concerning proposals submitted to NSF for financial support.

*Agenda:* Review and evaluate proposals as part of the selection process to determine finalists considered for Ceramic Program awards.

*Reason for Closing:* The proposals being reviewed include information of a proprietary of confidential nature, including technical information, financial data such as salaries, and personal information concerning individuals associated with the proposals. These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552b.(c)(4) and (6) of the Government in the Sunshine Act.

Dated: September 24, 1997.

**M. Rebecca Winkler,**

*Committee Management Officer.*

[FR Doc. 97-25798 Filed 9-29-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555-01-M

**NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD**

**Sunshine Act Meeting**

*Time:* 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, October 7, 1997.

*Place:* The Board Room, 5th Floor, 490 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20594.

*Status:* Open.

*Matters to be Discussed:*

6813A—*Railroad Special Investigation Report:* Derailment of Amtrak Train No. 12 and Sideswipe of Amtrak Train No. 79 on Portal Bridge Near Secaucus, New Jersey, November 23, 1996.

*News Media Contact: Telephone:* (202) 314-6100.

**FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT:** Bea Hardesty, (202) 314-6065.

Dated: September 26, 1997.

**Bea Hardesty,**

*Federal Register Liaison Officer.*

[FR Doc. 97-26056 Filed 9-26-97; 2:57 pm]

BILLING CODE 7533-01-P

**NUCLEAR REGULATORY  
COMMISSION**

[Docket No. 50-302]

**Florida Power Corporation; Notice of  
Consideration of Issuance of  
Amendment to Facility Operating  
License, Proposed No Significant  
Hazards Consideration Determination,  
and Opportunity for a Hearing**

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR 72, issued to the Florida Power Corporation, (FPC or the licensee), for operation of the Crystal River Nuclear generating Unit 3 (CR3) located in Citrus County, Florida.

The proposed amendment involves a revision to the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) protective relaying scheme at CR3, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Chapter 8. FPC has evaluated the proposed modifications pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 and has determined that these modifications constitute an unreviewed safety question (USQ) based on a resulting increase in the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. Therefore, FPC is requesting amendment of the CR3 license to resolve that USQ. The proposed modification will add new protective relays to each EDG generator output breaker to provide additional protection for a potential electrical fault or overpower condition.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The EDGs perform a support function for Design Basis Accident mitigation by providing a source of emergency AC electrical power for the Engineered Safeguards loads. For most Design Basis Accidents, a coincident Loss-of-Offsite-Power is postulated to occur and any single random electrical failure is considered credible including complete failure for one EDG to energize the associated 4160V ES bus. The failure of an EDG to energize the associated 4160V ES bus is not a precursor for any postulated Design Basis Accident except Station Blackout (SBO). The failure of both EDGs concurrent with a Loss-of-Offsite-Power causes a Station Blackout. Therefore, any increase in the probability that an EDG will not energize the associated 4160V ES bus will increase the probability of a Station Blackout.

The new relaying added to each EDG has a small probability of spuriously actuating, resulting in a small increase in the probability of an EDG failing to energize the associated 4160V ES bus. Spurious actuation of the overcurrent relaying for the load carrying 4160V ES bus offsite power source breaker will cause a loss of power on the 4160V ES bus and prevent the EDG from re-energizing the bus. In addition, a spurious actuation of the device-32X directional power auxiliary relay can cause a loss of offsite power for the associated 4160V ES bus. This spurious actuation also increases the probability of a Station Blackout. The only new system interfaces are between the EDG and 4160V ES bus systems. The modified relaying will not directly affect the fuel cladding, the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary, or the containment building.

The increase in the probability of a Station Blackout is negligible. Although EDG availability is a contributor to the risk of Station Blackout, the CR-3 licensing basis assumes this event without regard to EDG reliability. Therefore, the probability of previously evaluated accidents is not significantly increased. The new protective relaying could shorten the duration of an actual Station Blackout if a 4160V ES bus fault or other similar problem was a contributor to the event by limiting the damage to the station power systems.

The modified relaying will not increase the consequences of a Station Blackout since both EDGs and offsite power are assumed to be unavailable. The new protective relaying will not create any new timing or sequencing impact to the ES loads supplied from the 4160V ES bus. The small increase in probability that an EDG will not energize the associated 4160V ES bus does not invalidate the Design Basis Accident assumption that one EDG successfully energizes the associated 4160V ES bus (single failure proof). Therefore, the conclusions concerning fission product releases in the FSAR will not be changed.

2. Does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The modified relaying will not directly affect the fuel cladding, the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary, or the containment building. The modifications only impact the EDGs and 4160V ES buses.

The failure of one of the EDGs to energize the associated 4160V ES bus during a Design Basis Accident is a standard "single failure" for determining the acceptability of an accident mitigation system. A standby EDG and the associated 4160V ES bus are not capable of creating an accident such as a Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) or Main Steam Line Break (MSLB).

There is a small increase in the probability that an EDG will not successfully energize the associated 4160V ES bus. However, the Design Basis Accident assumption that one EDG does successfully energize the bus remains valid. Therefore, no new accident involving the failure of both EDGs other than a Station Blackout needs to be postulated. The proposed modifications to the EDG relaying and the small increase in the probability that an EDG will not energize the associated 4160V ES bus do not introduce any new interfaces or mechanisms that could challenge any fluid system or fission product barrier in a different way than previously evaluated. Therefore, the modifications cannot create the possibility of an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.

3. Does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The Bases of the CR-3 technical specifications do not identify a "margin of safety" for the EDGs or 4160V ES buses that is applicable to the proposed EDG relaying modifications. Therefore, the plant response to Design Basis Accidents was evaluated. The accident analysis assumptions remain valid with the existing and proposed changes to the EDG and 4160V ES bus protective relaying. Plant response will remain as evaluated in the accident analysis and the calculated primary and secondary pressures and temperatures during evaluated accidents will not be increased by the changes. The reliability of each EDG and associated 4160V ES bus is being insignificantly reduced in order to increase the availability of the EDG and associated 4160V ES bus after a fault or overcurrent condition occurs. A spurious actuation of one of the added relays might cause one EDG to fail to energize one 4160V ES bus but would not result in failure of the other EDG to perform its function. Therefore, the changes do not reduce the margin of safety in the bases for any Improved Technical Specification.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received