

disease free area of the Republic of South Africa from Kruger National Park and the regions along the Republic of South Africa's northern border)," immediately after "Republic of Korea,".

b. In paragraph (a)(3), by adding the words "and the Republic of South Africa" immediately after "Greece".

c. In paragraph (b)(1), the reference "part 92" would be removed and the reference "part 93" would be added in its place.

§ 94.11 [Amended]

3. In § 94.11, paragraph (a) would be amended by adding, in the first sentence, the words "Republic of South Africa (except Kruger National Park and the remainder of the foot-and-mouth disease controlled area that separates the foot-and-mouth disease free area of the Republic of South Africa from Kruger National Park and the regions along the Republic of South Africa's northern border)," immediately after "Republic of Korea,".

Done in Washington, DC, this 10th day of February 1999.

Craig A. Reed,

Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.

[FR Doc. 99-3866 Filed 2-16-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410-34-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 98-NM-323-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 757-200, -200PF, and -200CB Series Airplanes Powered by Rolls-Royce RB211-535C/E4/E4B Turbofan Engines

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 757-200, -200PF, and -200CB series airplanes. This proposal would require modification of the engine thrust control cable installation, and repetitive inspections to detect certain discrepancies of the cables, pulleys, pulley brackets, and cable travel; and repair, if necessary. This proposal is prompted by reports of failure of certain engine thrust control cables. The actions specified by the

proposed AD are intended to prevent such failures, which could result in a severe asymmetric thrust condition during landing, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.

DATES: Comments must be received by April 5, 1999.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 98-NM-323-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kathrine Rask, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-1547; fax (425) 227-1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following

statement is made: "Comments to Docket Number 98-NM-323-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 98-NM-323-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

Discussion

In 1985, the FAA received a report indicating that a Boeing Model 747-100 series airplane had experienced a thrust control 'B' cable failure following application of reverse thrust during landing. This failure caused engine number 1 to advance to full forward thrust with engine numbers 2, 3, and 4 in full reverse thrust. The airplane exited the runway and eventually slid to a stop with consequent hull damage.

In April 1997, during a review of the certification plan for Boeing Model 757-300 series airplanes, Boeing informed the FAA that the thrust control cable installation on Boeing Model 757-200, -200PF, and -200CB series airplanes, equipped with Rolls Royce engines, is similar to the thrust control cable installation on the Boeing Model 747-100 series airplane, and that a similar failure could result in subsequent runway departure. Such a failure mode was examined during the type certification of the Boeing Model 757-200 series airplane and, at that time, the consensus was that the airplane would be controllable following a thrust control 'B' cable failure. The 1985 report and subsequent testing of a Model 757-200 series airplane contradicted this assumption.

The FAA recently has received a report of uncommanded advancement of the right thrust lever on a Boeing Model 757-200 series airplane during flight. Subsequently, the engine power began steadily increasing. In order to reduce the engine power, the flight crew set the lever to the idle stop position; however, the engine power continued to increase. The flight crew then used the cut-off lever to stop the engine as it approached the maximum speed. After the airplane landed, a close visual inspection revealed that the thrust control cable had broken due to continuous chafing against the adjacent wire bundle that supplies power to the right window heater. Such failure of a thrust control cable could result in a severe asymmetric thrust condition during landing, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.

Explanation of Relevant Service Information

The FAA has reviewed and approved the following service bulletins:

- Boeing Service Bulletin 757-76-1, dated May 18, 1984, which describes procedures for removal of the guide bracket of the engine thrust control cable that is located on the front spar of the right wing.

- Boeing Service Bulletin 757-76-0005, dated May 5, 1988, which describes procedures for replacement of sections of the engine thrust control cables with smaller diameter cables, and removal of the engine cable breakaway stop assemblies.

- Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-30A0018, Revision 1, dated September 17, 1998, which describes procedures for installation of a support bracket assembly between the window heat wire bundle and the engine thrust control cable, and adjustment of the wire bundle, if necessary, to maintain necessary clearance.

Accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletins described previously, and the repetitive inspection mandated by this AD, is intended to adequately address the identified unsafe condition.

Explanation of Requirements of Proposed Rule

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require modification of the engine thrust control cable installation and repetitive inspections to detect certain discrepancies of the cables, pulleys, pulley brackets, and cable travel; and repair, if necessary. The actions would be required to be accomplished in accordance with the procedure included in paragraph (a) of this AD, the service bulletins described previously, and the airplane maintenance manual.

Justification of Compliance Time

This proposed AD includes a procedure to inspect the engine thrust control cables, pulleys, pulley brackets, and cable travel, which is similar to the inspection for control cables contained in Chapter 20-20-02 of the 757 Maintenance Manual. Although the Boeing Maintenance Planning Document (MPD) recommends that an inspection of the engine thrust control cables be conducted in accordance with Chapter 20-20-02 at every "2C" check, this proposed AD requires repetitive inspections at intervals of 18 months or 6,000 flight hours (whichever occurs first), which corresponds with a "C"

check interval. The FAA has no evidence that indicates that the Model 757 series airplane that experienced the thrust control cable failure was not adhering to those recommendations; therefore, the FAA has determined that the repetitive inspections of the thrust control cables, pulleys, pulley brackets, and cable travel must be done on a more frequent basis than that specified in the MPD.

Cost Impact

There are approximately 450 airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 228 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD.

It would take approximately 3 work hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed inspection, at an average labor rate of \$60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the inspection proposed by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$41,040, or \$180 per airplane, per inspection cycle.

For airplanes identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-76-1 (8 U.S.-registered airplanes), it would take approximately 2 work hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed guide bracket removal, at an average labor rate of \$60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$960, or \$120 per airplane.

For airplanes identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-76-0005 (14 U.S.-registered airplanes), it would take approximately 14 work hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed replacement, at an average labor rate of \$60 per work hour. Required parts would be provided by the manufacturer at no cost to the operators. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$11,760, or \$840 per airplane.

For airplanes identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-30A0018, Revision 1 (167 U.S.-registered airplanes), it would take approximately 2 work hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed installation and adjustment, at an average labor rate of \$60 per work hour. Required parts would be provided by the manufacturer at no cost to the operators. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$20,040, or \$120 per airplane.

The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would

accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

Boeing: Docket 98-NM-323-AD.

Applicability: Model 757-200, -200PF, and -200CB series airplanes powered by Rolls-Royce RB211-535C/E4/E4B turbofan engines, certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (e) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent engine thrust control cable failure, which could result in a severe asymmetric thrust condition during landing, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane, accomplish the following:

(a) Within 18 months or 6,000 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first: Accomplish the "Thrust Control Cable Inspection Procedure" specified in Appendix 1 (including Figures 1 and 2) of this AD to verify the integrity of the thrust control cables. Prior to further flight, repair any discrepancy found in accordance with the procedures described in the Boeing 757 Maintenance Manual. Repeat the inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 18 months or 6,000 flight hours, whichever occurs first.

(b) For airplanes identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-76-1, dated May 18, 1984: Within 18 months or 6,000 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, remove the guide bracket of the engine thrust control cable located on the front spar of the right wing in accordance with the service bulletin.

(c) For airplanes identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-76-0005, dated May 5, 1988: Within 18 months or 6,000 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, remove the engine thrust control cable breakaway stop assemblies, and replace sections of the engine thrust control cables with smaller diameter cables in accordance with the service bulletin.

(d) For airplanes identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-30A0018, Revision 1, dated September 17, 1998: Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, install a support bracket assembly between the window heat wire bundle and the engine thrust control cable; and adjust the wire bundle clearance, as necessary, to parallel the minimum clearance specified in the alert service bulletin.

(e) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.

(f) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Appendix 1.—Thrust Control Cable Inspection Procedure

1. General

A. Use these procedures to test the integrity of the thrust control cables. The procedures must be performed along the entire cable run for each engine.

B. The first task is an inspection of the control cable. The second task is an inspection of the control cable pulley. The third task is an inspection of the control cable pulley bracket. The fourth task is an inspection of control cable travel.

2. Inspection of the Control Cables

A. Clean the cables (if necessary) for the inspection, in accordance with 757 Maintenance Manual 12-12-31.

B. Examine the cables:

(1) To do a check for broken wires, rub a cloth along the length of the cable. The cloth catches broken wires.

(2) To aid in the visual inspection, remove the tension and bend the cable. Broken wire ends frequently move apart from the cable surface. Use large bend radius to prevent kinks.

Note: Wires break most frequently where cables go through fairleads or around pulleys. Examine these areas carefully.

C. Remove the control cable from the airplane when you find one of these conditions:

(1) If one cable strand has worn wires where one wire cross section is decreased by 40 percent or more in an area that goes over a pulley, through a pressure seal, or through a fairlead (see Figure 1).

(2) A broken wire in the area that goes over a pulley, through a pressure seal, or through a fairlead.

Note: A cable assembly can have one broken wire if the broken wire is in a straight part of the cable assembly. The broken wire

must not go over a pulley or through a pressure seal or fairlead. The cable must agree with the other specifications of this section.

(3) Two or more broken wires.

(4) A nick or cut.

(5) Rust or corrosion.

D. Lubricate the cable (if you removed the lubricant), in accordance with 757 Maintenance Manual 12-12-31.

Note: Do not apply grease to CRES cables.

3. Inspection of the Control Cable Pulley

A. Visually examine the pulleys for roughness, sharp edges, and unwanted material in the grooves.

B. Visually examine the pulley wear pattern (see Figure 2).

C. Do these steps at the same time to examine the pulley for wobble:

(1) Push on the side of the pulley at the outer edge with a 2-pound force, perpendicular to control cable travel.

(2) Make sure the movement of the outer edge is no more than:

(a) 0.10 inch for 8-inch diameter pulleys.

(b) 0.09 inch for 6-inch diameter pulleys.

(c) 0.08 inch for 5-inch diameter pulleys.

(d) 0.07 inch for 4-inch diameter pulleys.

(e) 0.06 inch for 3-inch diameter pulleys.

D. Make sure the pulley bearings have lubrication and turn smoothly.

E. Examine the pulley bolts for wear.

F. Remove the pulley from the airplane when you find one of these conditions:

(1) An unusual pulley wear pattern.

(2) Too much pulley wobble.

(3) The pulley does not turn freely and smoothly.

4. Inspection of the Control Cable Pulley Bracket

A. Examine the brackets and the support structure for cracks or other damage.

B. Replace or repair all brackets or structure that have damage.

5. Inspection of the Cable Travel

A. Make sure the cable guides and fairleads have no worn or broken parts and that the parts are aligned, clean, and attached correctly.

B. Make sure the deflection angle at each fairlead is not more than 3 degrees.

C. Visually examine the cable runs for incorrect routing or twists in the cable.

D. Make sure the cable moves freely through its full travel, and does not contact structure, wire bundles, or tubing.

BILLING CODE 4910-13-U







Figure 1.




CABLE TENSION TOO HIGH




PULLEY NOT ALIGNED CORRECTLY



PULLEY TOO LARGE FOR CABLE



CABLE NOT ALIGNED CORRECTLY



PULLEY WILL NOT TURN



CORRECT CONDITION

Pulley Wear Patterns

Figure 2.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 9, 1999.

John J. Hickey,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 99-3736 Filed 2-16-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-C

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 99-NM-06-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 757-200 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 757-200 series airplanes. This proposal would require modification of the off-wing emergency evacuation slide system. This proposal is prompted by reports that a certain type of off-wing escape slide aboard several airplanes deployed and separated from the airplane during flight. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent separation of the emergency evacuation slide from the airplane, which could result in damage to the fuselage and unavailability of an escape slide during an emergency evacuation.

DATES: Comments must be received by April 5, 1999.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 99-NM-06-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Keith Ladderud, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM-120S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-2780; fax (425) 227-1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket Number 99-NM-06-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 99-NM-06-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

Discussion

The FAA has received reports indicating that in-flight deployment and separation of the off-wing emergency evacuation slide occurred on several Boeing Model 757-200 series airplanes. In each of these incidents, the slide compartment door opened, the slide carrier rotated out, and the slide deployed. In addition, the deployed slide was torn off by the airstream and caused damage to the fuselage located aft of the slide compartment. In one incident, the inboard flaps also were damaged. These deployments are attributed to the fact that, during maintenance, the slide compartment door was not properly latched following

replacement of the slide. Further analysis revealed that a visual inspection of the door latch to verify that the latch is fastened is difficult; the aft location of the door sensor may not show that the door is not latched; and incorrect installation of the lockbase retainer on the door latch tube can prevent locking the door in the latched position. These conditions, if not corrected, could result in in-flight deployment and separation of the emergency evacuation slide from the airplane, damage to the fuselage, and unavailability of an escape slide during an emergency evacuation.

Explanation of Relevant Service Information

The FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Service Bulletin 757-25-0182, Revision 1, dated June 12, 1997; and Boeing Service Bulletin 757-25-0200, dated January 21, 1999; which describe procedures for modification of the left and right off-wing emergency evacuation slide systems.

The modification described in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-25-0182, Revision 1, includes replacement of the bearings and lockbase retainer in the compartment door latch assembly with new bearings and a new lockbase retainer, relocation and adjustment of the sensor target and the sensor proximity switch to forward locations on the evacuation slide compartment doors, and a functional test following modification.

The modification described in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-25-0200 includes installation of a bumper assembly on the off-wing slide carrier and installation of new placards in the area of the maintenance access door.

Accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletins is intended to adequately address the identified unsafe condition.

Explanation of Requirements of Proposed Rule

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require modification of the off-wing emergency evacuation slide system. The actions would be required to be accomplished in accordance with the service bulletins described previously, except as discussed below.

Difference Between Proposed Rule and Service Bulletins

Operators should note that, although the service bulletins recommend accomplishment of the modification at the next scheduled maintenance, or as