[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 11 (Friday, January 16, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 3065-3080]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-914]
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Science and Technology Directorate; Record of Decision for the
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement
AGENCY: Science and Technology Directorate (Office of National
Laboratories within the Office of Research), DHS.
ACTION: Record of Decision (ROD).
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and
Technology Directorate is issuing this ROD on the proposed siting,
construction, and operation of the National Bio and Agro-Defense
Facility (NBAF) (the Proposed Action). This ROD is based on the
information and analysis in the NBAF Final Environmental Impact
Statement (NBAF Final EIS) including public comments, and consideration
of other appropriate factors such as national policy, site evaluation
criteria, threat and risk assessment, costs, security, and other
programmatic requirements. The Notice of Availability for the NBAF
Final EIS was published in the Federal Register (73 FR 75665-75667) on
December 12, 2008.
DHS has decided to implement the Preferred Alternative identified
in Section 2.6 of the NBAF Final EIS. Implementation of this
alternative would result in construction of the NBAF at the Manhattan
Campus Site in Manhattan, Kansas, and initiation of the transition of
mission activities and resources from the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center (PIADC), located on Plum Island, New York, to the Manhattan
Campus Site.
DHS appreciates the significant cost, time, and effort that each
consortium expended during this comprehensive decision process, and DHS
thanks the consortia for their support of the homeland security
mission. The comprehensive and well thought out proposals from states
around the Nation and their consortia reflected the impressive
capabilities of their communities. Each consortium and host state
demonstrated a strong desire to make the Nation safer for animal
agriculture through advanced research on foreign animal and zoonotic
and emerging diseases.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: The NBAF Final EIS (approximately
5,000 pages), Executive Summary, and this ROD are available on the DHS
Web site at http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf. Requests for copies of the NBAF
Final EIS, the Executive Summary, or this ROD should be mailed to Mr.
James V. Johnson: Department of Homeland Security; Science and
Technology Directorate; Office of National Laboratories, Room 10-052,
Mail Stop 2100; 245 Murray Lane, SW., Building 410;
Washington, DC 20528. You may also request copies from: toll-free
facsimile 1-866-508-NBAF (6223); toll-free voice mail 1-866-501-NBAF
(6223); or e-mail at
[[Page 3066]]
[email protected]. For more information or general questions
about the NBAF EIS, contact Mr. James V. Johnson at the address given
previously.
Copies of the NBAF Final EIS, Executive Summary, and this ROD are
also available for review at the following public reading rooms:
Georgia
University of Georgia Main Library, 320 South Jackson Street, Athens,
GA 30602.
Oconee County Library, 1080 Experiment Station Road, Watkinsville, GA
30677.
Kansas
Manhattan Public Library, 629 Poyntz Avenue, Manhattan, KS 66502.
Hale Library, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506.
Mississippi
City of Flora Library, 144 Clark Street, Flora, MS 39071.
New York
Acton Public Library, 60 Old Boston Post Road, Old Saybrook, CT 06475.
Southold Free Library, 53705 Main Road, Southold, NY 11971.
North Carolina
Richard H. Thornton Library, 210 Main Street, Oxford NC 27565-0339.
South Branch Library, 1547 South Campus Drive, Creedmoor, NC 27522.
Texas
Central Library, 600 Soledad, San Antonio, TX 78205.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
DHS prepared this ROD pursuant to the regulations of the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) for implementing the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) and DHS Directive 023-01
(renumbered from management Directive 5100.1), Environmental Planning
Program. This ROD is based on: (1) The site's ability to satisfy the
evaluation criteria published in the ``Public Notice Soliciting
Expressions of Interest (EOIs) for Potential Sites for the NBAF''
(which was published in the Federal Register on January 19, 2006); (2)
the site's ability to satisfy the preferences (including request of
site in-kind contributions to offset infrastructure costs) communicated
to all second round potential NBAF sites (by letter dated December 8,
2006); (3) confirmation of the site offers for site infrastructure
costs (submitted to DHS by March 31, 2008); (4) the environmental
impacts identified in the NBAF Final EIS; and (5) information contained
in the supporting documents (Threat and Risk Assessment, Site Cost
Analysis, Site Characterization Study, and The Plum Island Facility
Closure and Transition Cost Study).
Purpose and Need for Agency Action
DHS is charged with the responsibility and has the national
stewardship mandate for detecting, preventing, protecting against, and
responding to terrorist attacks within the United States. These
responsibilities, as applied to the defense of animal agriculture, are
shared with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and require a
coordinated strategy to adequately protect the Nation against threats
to animal agriculture. Consultations between DHS and USDA on a
coordinated agricultural research strategy, as called for in the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-296) and Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9), ``Defense of United States
Agriculture and Food,'' dated January 30, 2004, revealed a capability
gap that must be filled by an integrated research, development, test,
and evaluation infrastructure for combating agricultural and public
health threats posed by foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. The DHS
Science and Technology Directorate is responsible for addressing the
identified gap.
Accordingly, to bridge the capability gap and to comply with HSPD-
9, DHS proposed to build the NBAF, an integrated research, development,
test, and evaluation facility.
Co-locating DHS with USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service--Veterinary Services (APHIS-VS) and Agricultural Research
Service (ARS) at the NBAF would enable research, diagnostics, and
responses to outbreaks in agricultural animals (i.e. cattle, swine, and
sheep) at a U.S.-based facility. Co-locating these functions in a
single secure facility would maximize synergies and provide enhanced
capabilities for the detection and prevention of foreign animal
diseases in the United States.
The NBAF would meet the capabilities required in HSPD-9 by
providing a domestic, modern, integrated high-containment facility
containing BSL-2, BSL-3E, BSL-3Ag, and BSL-4 laboratories for an
estimated 250 to 350 scientists and support staff to safely and
effectively address the accidental or intentional introduction into the
United States of animal diseases of high consequence.
Currently, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), where
much of the Biosafety Level-3 Agricultural (BSL-3Ag) research on
foreign animal diseases is performed, is an essential component of the
national strategy for protecting U.S. agriculture from threats caused
by intentional attack (i.e., agro-terrorism) or unintentional
introduction of foreign animal disease viruses such as foot and mouth
disease virus (FMDV). However, PIADC was built in the 1950s, is nearing
the end of its lifecycle, and does not contain the necessary biosafety
level facilities to meet the NBAF research requirements. The NBAF would
fulfill the need for a secure U.S. facility that could support
collaborative efforts among researchers from Federal and state
agencies, academia, and international partners to perform necessary
research at the required biosafety levels 3 and 4. Additionally, as
discussed in the recent Report of the Commission on the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation and Terrorism (December
2008), the United States should continue to undertake a series of
mutually reinforcing domestic measures to prevent bioterrorism.
Prior to passage of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008
(H.R. 6124 [2008 Farm Bill]) which became law on May 22, 2008, the
United States Code (21 U.S.C. Section 113a) stipulated that live FMDV
could not be studied on the U.S. mainland unless the Secretary of
Agriculture made a determination that such study was necessary and in
the public interest and issued a permit for such research to be
conducted on the mainland. Section 7524 of the 2008 Farm Bill directs
the Secretary of Agriculture to issue a permit to the Secretary of
Homeland Security for work on the live FMDV at any facility that is a
successor to the Plum Island Animal Disease Center and charged with
researching high-consequence biological threats involving zoonotic and
foreign animal diseases. The permit is limited to a single successor
facility. On December 18, 2008, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
Michael Chertoff sent a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture, Ed
Schafer requesting that a permit be issued if a mainland site is
selected. On January 9, 2009 DHS received a letter from Secretary
Schafer that affirmed USDA's intention of complying with Congressional
direction to issue a permit for the movement and use of live FMDV at
the NBAF.
As stated in Section 2.2.2 of the NBAF EIS, the NBAF may be
operated as a
[[Page 3067]]
Government Owned/Government Operated Facility (GOGO) or as a Government
Owned/Contractor Operated Facility (GOCO). The final decision regarding
the operating model for the NBAF will be made at a later date. The
current planning approach is to utilize the Plum Island operating
model, which is a GOGO facility. Should a decision be made to operate
the NBAF as a GOCO facility, procurement of such services would follow
the Federal Acquisition Regulation and applicable DHS procurement
requirements, and a program management plan, which would set forth
management, supervisory, and contracting activities between the Federal
government and a contractor, would be prepared.
Site Selection Process and Evaluation Criteria
DHS conducted a competitive site selection process to identify and
evaluate potential candidate sites for the NBAF; Plum Island was also
included as an alternative site for evaluation, as described in Chapter
2, Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF Final EIS. The site selection process was
initiated by publication of a Notice of Request for EOI submissions for
Potential Sites for the NBAF in the Federal Register on January 19,
2006 (71 FR 3107-3109). DHS requested EOI submissions from Federal
agencies, state and local governments, industry, academia, and
interested parties and organizations for potential locations that would
accommodate the construction and operation of the NBAF.
Twenty-nine EOI submissions were received from consortia comprised
of various governmental, industry, and academic partners by the March
31, 2006 response deadline. DHS developed and implemented a rigorous
process for the first round evaluation of the 29 EOIs received, against
DHS's four evaluation criteria (i.e., Proximity to Research
Capabilities, Proximity to Workforce, Acquisition/Construction/
Operations (ACO) Requirements, and Community Acceptance) and associated
sub-criteria. These criteria and their associated sub-criteria were
developed by an interagency working group to ensure that the NBAF would
meet the interdependent needs of DHS and USDA to adequately protect the
Nation against biological threats to animal agriculture. DHS emphasizes
that the Proximity to Research Capabilities and Workforce ratings apply
exclusively to the specific research and workforce needs of the
proposed NBAF and are not a general statement on the research
capability and workforce expertise of the proposing states and
consortia. For example, the Proximity to Research evaluation criterion
considered existing research programs that could be linked to NBAF
mission requirements pertaining to large livestock diseases studied in
Biosafety Level 3 and 4 facilities and the Proximity to Workforce
evaluation criterion considered site proximity to a local labor force
with expertise in biocontainment facilities relevant to the NBAF
mission. Included within the ACO criterion were sub-criteria in the
areas of: (1) Land acquisition/development potential, (2) environmental
compatibility, including the presence of existing environmental
concerns/contamination or environmentally sensitive areas, and (3)
adequate utility infrastructure. These factors, in part, enabled DHS to
screen candidate sites for significant environmental constraints prior
to initiating the EIS. Three committees comprised of Federal employees
evaluated the EOI submissions, assessing their strengths, weaknesses,
and deficiencies against the four evaluation criteria and associated
sub-criteria. A Steering Committee, also comprised of Federal
employees, made recommendations to the DHS Selection Authority (DHS
Under Secretary for Science and Technology), who then selected those
sites that had sufficient qualifications with regard to the evaluation
criteria, and eliminated others from further consideration. On August
9, 2006, DHS selected 18 sites submitted by 12 consortia for further
review.
Subsequently, on December 8, 2006, DHS sent a letter to the 12
remaining consortia. This letter requested additional information to
complete the next phase of the evaluations, communicated DHS's
``preferences'' within each of the four criteria, provided instructions
on how to submit the requested information, and provided information on
the next steps in the site selection process. DHS stated it would give
strong preference to six specific ``preferences'' in the next phase of
the evaluation. Two examples of these preferences are: (1) For the
proximity to research criterion, that the proposed site is within a
comprehensive research community that has existing research programs in
areas related to the NBAF mission requirements (veterinary, medical and
public health, and agriculture), and (2) for the ACO criterion, any in-
kind contributions [e.g., deeded land at no cost rather than sale, new
utility provisions and/or upgrades (e.g., sewer, electricity, water,
chilled water, steamed water, etc.) and new roadways] would be offered
to DHS (by the consortium, state government, local government, or
private entities). The decision to offer land, financial offsets or
other incentives was solely at the discretion of the consortium. This
letter is posted on the DHS Web site at http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf.
Upon receipt of the requested additional information and in-kind
offers from the consortia in February 2007, an evaluation team of USDA
and DHS Federal employees conducted site visits to 17 sites. The Hinds
County Site, originally proposed by the Mississippi Consortium, was
withdrawn in a letter DHS received on April 5, 2007. The intent of each
site visit was to: (1) Verify the information provided and
representations made in the EOI submissions and the additional
information submitted, (2) enable evaluation committee representatives
to view any observable physical conditions and constraints at the
proposed sites and, if applicable, (3) to view the sites' utilities and
infrastructure. Based on the evaluation team's analysis of the
additional information and observations on the site visits, the team
provided recommendations to the DHS Selection Authority. Additionally
and independently of the evaluation team, the DHS Selection Authority
(DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology) visited each of the 17
sites.
In July 2007, DHS identified five site alternatives that surpassed
others in meeting the DHS evaluation criteria, sub-criteria, and DHS
preferences, and determined that they, along with the Plum Island Site,
would be evaluated in the EIS as reasonable alternatives for the
proposed NBAF. The Final Selection Memorandum for Site Selection for
the Second Round Potential Sites for the National Bio and Agro-Defense
Facility (NBAF) and the Plum Island Memorandum for the Record, which
are available on the DHS--Web site at http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf,
documented the findings of this process. The site alternatives selected
for evaluation in the EIS were:
South Milledge Avenue Site; Athens, Georgia
Manhattan Campus Site; Manhattan, Kansas
Flora Industrial Park Site; Flora, Mississippi
Plum Island Site; Plum Island, New York
Umstead Research Farm Site; Butner, North Carolina
Texas Research Park Site; San Antonio, Texas
[[Page 3068]]
NEPA Process
On July 31, 2007, DHS published a Notice of Intent in the Federal
Register (72 FR 41764-41765) to prepare the NBAF EIS to evaluate the
environmental impacts of constructing and operating the proposed NBAF
at one of the reasonable site alternatives. The 60-day scoping period
for the NBAF EIS ended on September 28, 2007. Scoping meetings were
held in the vicinity of the six site alternatives (Old Saybrook,
Connecticut; Southold, New York; Manhattan, Kansas; Flora, Mississippi;
San Antonio, Texas; Creedmoor, NC; and Athens, Georgia), along with one
regional meeting in Washington, DC.
More than 1,350 people attended the scoping meetings. Nearly 300
people provided oral comments at the public meetings, and more than
3,870 comments were received during the scoping period. Areas of
concern shared by many commentors during scoping were the placement of
the proposed NBAF in a highly populated area or in an area that houses
institutionalized populations. These concerns focused on the public
health risk should an accidental or intentional (criminal or terrorist)
release occur, its potential effects on the population, and the ability
of affected communities to evacuate the area. Other concerns were:
locating the facility near herds or flocks of animals susceptible to
the diseases studied, environmental effects to biological and natural
resources, and resources required for the construction and operation of
the NBAF, particularly water. Details on the scoping process and issues
identified are documented in the February 2008, NBAF EIS Scoping
Report, which is available on the DHS Web site at http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf and in the aforementioned public reading rooms.
The Notice of Availability of the NBAF Draft EIS was published in
the Federal Register on June 27, 2008 (73 FR 36540-36542). The public
comment period extended through August 25, 2008. Thirteen public
meetings were held between late July and mid-August 2008 at the same
locations as the scoping meetings or at nearby alternate locations as
follows: Washington, DC (one meeting); Butner, North Carolina (two
meetings); Manhattan, Kansas (two meetings); Flora, Mississippi (two
meetings); San Antonio, Texas (two meetings); Old Saybrook, Connecticut
(one meeting); Greenport, New York (one meeting); and Athens, Georgia
(two meetings).
During the 60-day public comment period on the NBAF Draft EIS, more
than 1,770 individuals attended the public meetings on the NBAF Draft
EIS, 378 of whom provided oral comments. Analysis of the oral and
written comment documents received, yielded more than 5,400 delineated
comments. Specifically, a number of comments focused on the ability of
DHS to safely operate the NBAF and the potential for a pathogenic
release to occur through accidents, natural phenomena, and terrorist
actions. The majority of the comments related to the following
concerns: (1) Ability of DHS to safely operate a biosafety facility;
(2) the May 2008 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
regarding whether FMD research could be safely conducted on the U.S.
mainland; (3) impacts of natural phenomena such as tornadoes,
earthquakes, and hurricanes on the NBAF resulting in the release of a
pathogen; (4) the possibility that an escaped infected mosquito vector
would cause a pathogen such as Rift Valley fever virus to become
established in the United States; (5) economic effects of a release or
a perceived release on the local, state, and national livestock
industry or on local deer populations and the hunting industry; (6)
accident risk of transportation of infectious agents; (7) the
likelihood that the NBAF and the surrounding community would become a
prime terrorist target that DHS could not adequately protect from
attack; (8) release of a pathogen due to human error or by disgruntled
employee(s); (9) the availability of appropriate funding to safely
construct and operate the NBAF; (10) use of the NBAF to manufacture
bioweapons; (11) the need for and effects of mosquito control and
spraying of insecticides; (12) the site selection process and the
evaluation criteria used to select the Preferred Alternative; (13)
waste management regarding carcass disposal, including identification
of precise methods of disposal, the effects to local sewage treatment
infrastructure, and possible effects to air quality from incineration;
(14) pollution of ground or surface water resources due to spills and
leaks; (15) the amount of water that would be used by the NBAF in light
of the current regional drought in North Carolina and Georgia; (16) in
Georgia, the proximity of the South Milledge Avenue Site to the State
Botanical Gardens, the Audubon-designated Important Bird Area, and the
Oconee River; (17) in North Carolina, concerns that institutionalized
populations were not afforded the appropriate level of analysis; (18)
in New York, the limited routes from an island location should an
accident requiring evacuation occur; and (19) in Kansas, the number of
cattle in the region and the economic effects of a release impacting
them.
All comments received during the public comment period were
considered. DHS's responses to comments are presented in Appendix H of
the NBAF Final EIS, and the NBAF EIS was revised, as necessary, in
response to comments. The Notice of Availability for the NBAF Final EIS
was published in the Federal Register on December 12, 2008 (73 FR
75665-75667).
As identified in the Notice of Availability of the NBAF Draft EIS
and as further discussed in Section 2.6 of the NBAF Final EIS,
additional studies were performed to provide important decision-making
information, and for formulation of this ROD. The supporting documents
considered include: (1) Threat and Risk Assessment dated October 2008,
(2) Site Cost Analysis, dated July 25, 2008 (3) Site Characterization
Study, dated July 25, 2008 (4) Plum Island Facility Closure and
Transition Cost Study dated July 2008; and (5) a prior analysis of the
alternative sites against DHS's four evaluation criteria (i.e., Final
Selection Memorandum for Site Selection for the Second Round Potential
Sites for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) dated July
2007, and The Plum Island Memorandum for the Record dated November
2008). CEQ regulations (40 CFR 1505.1(e)) encourage agencies to make
ancillary decision documents available to the public before a decision
is made. Accordingly, the Site Cost Analysis, Site Characterization
Study, Plum Island Facility Closure and Transition Cost Study, Final
Selection Memorandum, and other reports were made available in August
2008 on the DHS Web site with redactions to mask certain sensitive
financial and security information. The Threat and Risk Assessment,
which was designated For Official Use Only, was not posted on the Web
site. Relevant information from these reports was used in the
preparation of the NBAF Final EIS.
II. Alternatives Considered
DHS evaluated the potential environmental impacts that could result
from implementation of alternatives for construction and operation of
the NBAF. A No Action Alternative and the six site alternatives were
analyzed in the NBAF EIS.
No Action Alternative
Under the No Action Alternative, consideration of which is required
by NEPA, the NBAF would not be constructed. DHS and USDA would continue
to use the PIADC on Plum
[[Page 3069]]
Island, New York. Plum Island is an 840-acre island located about 12
miles southwest of New London, Connecticut, and 1.5 miles from the
northeast tip of Long Island, New York (i.e., Orient Point). While the
island is technically located in the Village of Greenport, Town of
Southold, Suffolk County, New York, Plum Island is administered wholly
by the Federal government. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 recognized
that protecting the U.S. agricultural infrastructure is a critical
element of homeland security and transferred PIADC from USDA to DHS in
2003. While DHS now has responsibility for operating PIADC, both DHS
and USDA conduct programs there as part of an integrated agro-defense
strategy.
Under the No Action Alternative, investment in necessary facility
upgrades, replacements, and repairs, which are ongoing, would continue
so that PIADC could continue to operate at its current BSL-3Ag
capability. However, PIADC's capabilities would not be expanded to
address the NBAF mission requirements. The BSL-3Ag work at PIADC (large
livestock research on foreign animal diseases and zoonotic diseases in
the United States) would continue, and BSL-4 research would continue to
be performed outside of the United States. This alternative does not
satisfy the purpose of and the need for the Proposed Action.
South Milledge Avenue Site; Athens, Georgia
This alternative would locate the NBAF at the South Milledge Avenue
Site located west of the South Milledge Avenue and Whitehall Road
intersection in Clarke County, Georgia. The site is part of the
University of Georgia Whitehall Farm and is located near the University
of Georgia Livestock Instructional Area. The site is a 67-acre tract of
land consisting of open pastureland and wooded land and is utilized by
the University of Georgia Equestrian Team. The topography is rolling
terrain, which slopes towards the southwest. The site has been
undeveloped land since at least 1936 and is currently zoned for
government use.
Manhattan Campus Site; Manhattan, Kansas
This alternative would locate the NBAF on the campus of Kansas
State University (KSU) immediately adjacent to the Biosecurity Research
Institute. The Biosecurity Research Institute, constructed in 2006, is
a KSU BSL-3Ag research facility. The Manhattan Campus Site consists of
approximately 48.4 acres southeast of the intersection of Kimball
Avenue and Denison Avenue. The site has been used for animal research
since the 1970s. The site includes several structures, including five
research buildings, a residential structure, and a storage building for
recycling materials. The site is currently zoned as University District
and was annexed to the City of Manhattan in 1994. The 48.4-acre site
could be expanded to 70 acres.
Flora Industrial Park Site; Flora, Mississippi
This alternative would locate the NBAF at the Flora Industrial Park
Site, which is located in Madison County, Mississippi. The site is
owned by the Madison County Economic Development Authority. Flora
Industrial Park is a mixed-use commercial park 45 miles from the
Jackson-Evers International Airport. Additional land is available
surrounding the site for support facilities. The site is located on the
east side of U.S. Highway 49, north and east of the intersection with
North 1st Street. The Flora Industrial Park Site is approximately 150
acres of idle pasture land with two small ponds and a few scattered
wooded areas. An overhead power transmission line is present through
the south-central and west-central portions of the site. The site is
currently zoned as limited industrial. Based on historical information,
the site had previously been cultivated and was in pasture land and
previously occupied by two small tenant houses and one hay barn.
Adjoining properties appear to have been predominantly agricultural and
rural residential until construction of the southwest-adjoining Primos
Manufacturing Company in the early 2000s.
Plum Island Site; Plum Island, New York
This alternative would locate the NBAF on Plum Island, New York.
The Plum Island Site consists of approximately 24 acres of land located
directly to the east of the existing PIADC, which is on the western
shore of Plum Island. Although one of the requirements listed in DHS's
request for EOIs stated that a minimum of 30 acres would be required,
the Plum Island Site would not require the full 30 acres. Existing
facilities associated with PIADC would be available for use with the
NBAF and would reduce the amount of space required. The 24-acre site
has no existing structures. Dense underbrush and gravel roads are found
within the southwestern and northeastern portions. The southeastern
portion of the island has previously been used for sand mining and is
generally void of vegetation. The northwestern portion of the island
has minor vegetation. A potable water line bisects the site from east
to west, and an underground electric service borders the site on the
north side. Based on a review of the historical information, the Plum
Island Site was formerly utilized as a landfill area for miscellaneous
non-infectious wastes associated with PIADC, but the site has since
been remediated.
Umstead Research Farm Site; Butner, North Carolina
This alternative would locate the NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm
Site in Butner, North Carolina. The site is currently owned and
operated by North Carolina Department of Agriculture, Research Farms
Division. The site is located north of the terminus of Dillon Drive
along the northern property boundary of the C.A. Dillon Youth
Development Center in Butner. The site is a 249-acre tract of pasture,
grassland, and wooded land that is zoned as institutional. The site
area was operated from early 1942 to June 1943 as part of Camp Butner,
a training facility for light infantry and artillery during World War
II. Other operations included ammunition storage, a redeployment
center, and a general and convalescent hospital. The site has been
undeveloped wooded land since at least 1940, except for one cemetery.
The site has historically been maintained as undeveloped wooded land;
however, in the fall of 2001, the site and surrounding area were
partially logged.
Texas Research Park Site; San Antonio, Texas
The Texas Research Park Site in San Antonio, Texas, extends over
the Bexar County line into a portion of Medina County. The 100.1-acre
site is located west of Lambda Drive, south of the proposed extension
of Omicron Drive, and is currently vacant, undeveloped land covered in
dense vegetation comprised of trees, shrubs, and tall prairie grasses.
The site appears to have consisted of vacant, undeveloped ranch land
before 1938 to the present. The site has no zoning category because it
is outside the San Antonio city limits. The entire Texas Research Park
property is a 1,000-acre industrial district 4 miles outside the San
Antonio city limits.
III. Preferred Alternative
CEQ regulations require an agency to identify its preferred
alternative(s) in the final environmental impact statement (40 CFR
1502.14). The
[[Page 3070]]
preferred alternative is the alternative that the agency believes would
best fulfill its statutory mission, giving consideration to
environmental, economic, technical, and other factors. DHS's Preferred
Alternative and the basis for its selection are described in Section
2.6 of the NBAF Final EIS. Additionally, DHS published the Preferred
Alternative Selection Memorandum in December 2008, which describes in
more detail the basis for the selection of the Preferred Alternative,
on the DHS Web site at http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf. DHS's Preferred
Alternative is to construct and operate the NBAF at the Manhattan
Campus Site in Manhattan, Kansas.
DHS developed and implemented a decision process to identify the
Preferred Alternative in the NBAF Final EIS. A Steering Committee,
comprised of Federal employees from DHS and USDA, was convened to lead
the evaluation process and make recommendations to the DHS Decision
Authority (the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology). The
process involved a qualitative analysis of the strengths and weaknesses
of each action alternative (i.e., site alternative) followed by an
overall data comparison to develop a relative ranking of each site
alternative. The Steering Committee also considered the No Action
Alternative and weighed it against the Proposed Action of constructing
and operating the NBAF at the highest ranked site alternative.
The Steering Committee updated the findings from the previously
described second round evaluation of site alternatives using new and
emerging data collected since July 2007. This data was contained in the
following support documents, as previously discussed: (1) Threat and
Risk Assessment dated October 2008, (2) Site Cost Analysis, dated July
25, 2008, (3) Site Characterization Study, dated July 25, 2008, and (4)
Plum Island Facility Closure and Transition Cost Study dated July 2008.
Additionally, on February 29, 2008, DHS sent a letter to each
consortium requesting they confirm or update the details of their site
offers (in response to the December 8, 2006 DHS letter) and provided a
final opportunity to identify contingences to their offers. DHS also
provided background on the process it would follow to identify its
preferred site alternative. The February 29, 2008 letter was not a
request for financial proposals, but rather an opportunity for the
consortia to verify and update their original in-kind offers received
in February 2007 in response to the December 2006 letter request. DHS
required responses to be postmarked by March 30, 2008 (later changed to
March 31, 2008 to fall on a weekday). The decision to offer land,
funds, or other assets was solely at the discretion of each consortium.
The amount of the contribution and how the contribution would be funded
(e.g., bonds, taxes) was determined by the consortia and/or the state
and local government officials.
The Steering Committee next considered the environmental impacts
presented in the NBAF EIS including the public comments made at the
public meetings and by other means during the 60-day public comment
period on the NBAF Draft EIS, along with the information in the Threat
and Risk Assessment. The Steering Committee found that the NBAF EIS and
the Threat and Risk Assessment presented very little differentiation
between the sites. In fact, the NBAF EIS determined that the risk of
release of a biological pathogen from the NBAF was independent of where
the NBAF was located. The Steering Committee also determined that,
based on its review of the NBAF EIS, the likelihood of a release of a
pathogen was very low, given appropriate attention to the design,
construction, and operation of the NBAF with an array of safety
controls. The Steering Committee further determined that the risk of
release of any identified pathogen proposed for study within the NBAF
could be mitigated by implementation of operational protocols, rigid
security measures, and adherence to the U.S. Government biosecurity
guidelines.
With respect to the economic consequence if a release of FMDV from
the NBAF were to happen, the Steering Committee found that the Nation's
meat export trade status would suffer the greatest impact and that this
is independent of the site of the NBAF. The World Organization for
Animal Health (OIE) affirms the Steering Committee's findings. OIE,
created in 1924 by 28 countries, issues standards, guidelines, and
recommendations which are designated as the international referenced in
the field of animal diseases and zoonoses. As of January 2009, the OIE
consisted of 172 nations, including the U.S. The OIE's determination
regarding a country's FMD status significantly impacts that country's
ability to export meat. Dr. Bernard Vallat, the Director General of the
OIE, in a letter to DHS, dated November 24, 2008, stated the following:
``You asked a specific question as to whether it would make a
difference in terms of the health status of a country if a foot-and-
mouth (FMD) disease outbreak would occur in the mainland or on an
off shore island like Plum Island. My response is based on today's
international recommendations, as published in the Terrestrial
Animal Health Code of the OIE, which constitutes the only
internationally accepted standards. Today's international standards
provide recommendations that significantly reduce the sanitary and
economic impact of the affected country or zone in case of such an
outbreak, provided there is a credible veterinary infrastructure
that can guarantee the early detection and the rapid response in
accordance with the measures recommended by the OIE. However,
regardless of where in the territory of a country an outbreak of FMD
occurs, the FMD status of the country is lost immediately upon the
first notification to the OIE. The difference, in terms of the
national impact of this outbreak, is more related to how the
country's authorities respond to the incursion, rather then where
the outbreak occurs.
As was the case in the recent outbreak at Pirbright, United
Kingdom, the veterinary authorities immediately notified the OIE and
established a ``containment zone'' as defined in the Terrestrial
Animal Health Code. Once they could demonstrate that all cases had
been contained within such zone and that no further cases were
detected within a 30-day period, the entire country regained its
FMD-free status, with the only exception of the containment zone.
The necessary and lengthy period to regain the free status, as
described in the Code is not limited to the containment zone,
something in the past applied to the entire affected country or
zone.''
Chapter 4.3 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Zoning and
Compartmentalization) includes guidance on establishing a containment
zone. Article 4.3.3 of the Code states:
``Establishment of a containment zone should be based on a rapid
response including appropriate standstill of movement of animals and
commodities upon notification of suspicion of the specified disease
and the demonstration that the outbreaks are contained within this
zone through epidemiological investigation (trace-back, trace-
forward) after confirmation of infection. The primary outbreak and
likely source of the outbreak should be identified and all cases
shown to be epidemiologically linked. For the effective
establishment of a containment zone, it is necessary to demonstrate
that there have been no new cases in the containment zone within a
minimum of two incubation periods from the last detected case.''
The Steering Committee determined that, based on the lack of
differentiation among the sites regarding the risk of a release and the
economic consequences of a release, that it was most important to
select a location that would optimize the capability to diagnose and
cure large animal diseases through strong research programs and
expedient diagnostic and response capabilities. Furthermore, the
Steering Committee found that the environmental impacts analyzed in the
[[Page 3071]]
EIS and the site specific threats were all very similar and that there
were only minor differentiators in the EIS and the Threat and Risk
Assessment. Therefore, the key differentiators among the sites were
DHS's initial four evaluation criteria. Because the NBAF is intended to
be the Nation's preeminent research facility for foreign animal and
zoonotic disease research, the site's proximity to research
capabilities that can be linked to NBAF mission requirements was
emphasized among the four evaluation criteria. Overall site evaluations
were followed by the ranking of the sites to determine the recommended
site alternative.
The Steering Committee then considered the No Action Alternative
and weighed it against the Proposed Action of constructing and
operating the NBAF at the highest ranked site alternative to determine
the recommended Preferred Alternative. Based on numerous strengths in
terms of the evaluation criteria, the Steering Committee concluded that
the Manhattan Campus Site best met the purpose and need to site,
construct and operate the NBAF.
The Manhattan Campus Site's location near KSU provides proximity to
existing research capabilities that can be linked to NBAF mission
requirements. Additionally, the site's proximity to the KSU College of
Veterinary Medicine, KSU College of Agriculture, and the Biosecurity
Research Institute is relevant to the NBAF mission and is, therefore, a
significant strength. The NBAF EIS demonstrated that construction and
operation of the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site would be
environmentally acceptable, because almost all environmental impacts
fell into the ``no impacts to minor impacts'' category. As stated in
the NBAF EIS, the risk of release of a pathogen was independent of
where the NBAF was located. The information presented in the Threat and
Risk Assessment was found to be comparable to the other site
alternatives. The Manhattan Campus Site alternative demonstrated very
strong community acceptance from local, state, and Federal officials
and stakeholders. Additionally, the consortium offered a substantial,
unconditional offset package, including the immediate and long-term use
of the existing Biosecurity Research Institute, an existing Biosecurity
Level 3 facility within close proximity to the Manhattan Campus Site in
which research pertaining to livestock disease is conducted. Taking
into consideration the offsets to infrastructure costs and ``in-kind''
contributions offered by the consortia, the Manhattan Campus Site is
among the least expensive location to construct and operate the NBAF.
Following a comparison of this site with the No Action Alternative, DHS
selected the Manhattan Campus Site as the Preferred Alternative for
implementation.
IV. Alternatives Considered But Dismissed
In developing a range of reasonable alternatives early in the NEPA
process, DHS considered other potential alternatives, including
suggestions made by the public during the scoping process. The
following alternatives were considered but were determined not to be
reasonable alternatives for evaluation in the NBAF Draft EIS:
Upgrade PIADC. The proposed NBAF would require BSL-4 capability.
PIADC does not have BSL-4 laboratory space, and the existing
infrastructure is inadequate to support a BSL-4 laboratory.
Refurbishing the existing facilities and obsolete infrastructure to
allow PIADC to meet the new mission would be more costly than building
the NBAF on Plum Island. In addition, for the existing facility to be
refurbished, current research activities might have to be suspended for
extensive periods.
Use Existing Laboratory Facilities. No existing U.S. facility could
meet the NBAF mission needs as determined by DHS and USDA. Although a
number of BSL-3 and BSL-4 facilities are located in the U.S., they do
not have the capacity to conduct the large livestock research required.
Similar facilities in Winnipeg, Canada, and Geelong, Australia, do not
have the capacity to address potential outbreak scenarios in the United
States in a timely manner and cannot guarantee their availability to
meet U.S. research requirements.
Other Locations. Other potential locations were considered during
the NBAF site selection process, but they were eliminated based on
evaluation by the DHS evaluation committee. It was suggested during the
scoping process that the NBAF be constructed in a remote location such
as an island distant from populated areas or in a location that would
be inhospitable (e.g., desert or arctic habitat) to escaped animal
hosts or vectors. However, the evaluation criteria called for proximity
to research programs that could be linked to the NBAF mission and
proximity to a technical workforce with applicable skills for the NBAF
mission. The Plum Island Site represents an isolated location while
meeting the evaluation requirements. It was also suggested that the
NBAF could be constructed beneath a mountain; however, the cost and
feasibility of such a construction project would be prohibitive.
V. Summary of Environmental Impacts
A sliding-scale approach was the basis for the environmental
impacts analysis in the NBAF EIS. This approach reflects CEQ
requirements for implementing NEPA and its instruction that Federal
agencies preparing EISs ``focus on significant environmental issues and
alternatives'' (40 CFR 1502.1) and that impacts be discussed ``in
proportion to their significance'' (40 CFR 1502.2(b)). That is, certain
aspects of the alternatives have a greater potential for creating
environmental effects than others. Thus, the NBAF EIS addressed
resource areas pertinent to the sites considered. Impacts were assessed
for land use and visual resources; infrastructure; air quality; noise;
geology and soils; water resources; biological resources; cultural
resources; socioeconomics; traffic and transportation; existing
hazardous, toxic, or radiological waste; waste management;
environmental justice; as well as operational impacts on human health
and safety and wildlife from normal operations and accidental releases
of pathogens. Environmental impacts of current, proposed, and
reasonably foreseeable activities at candidate sites were included in
the cumulative impacts analysis presented in the NBAF EIS.
DHS has weighed environmental impacts as one factor in its decision
making, analyzing existing environmental impacts and the potential
impacts that might occur for each reasonable alternative, including the
irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources. Under the No
Action Alternative, continued operations of the PIADC would have little
or no incremental environmental impacts, except that construction of
ongoing infrastructure upgrades could have negligible to minor and
temporary effects on such resources as land resources, geology and
soils, and water resources during construction.
As demonstrated in the NBAF Final EIS, short term impacts
associated with the construction of the NBAF and normal facility
operations under the Proposed Action are not expected to result in any
unacceptable environmental consequences at any of the site
alternatives, though each site does have its own unique adverse
environmental aspects. Potential construction impacts have been
minimized through the site selection process and proposed placement of
the proposed NBAF within the boundaries of each site alternative, based
on the
[[Page 3072]]
conceptual design. There would be little or no direct effects to
wetlands, water resources, natural biotic communities, protected
species, or cultural and archaeological resources at any site
alternative. Normal facility operations were determined to have no
potential for adverse impacts on biological resources and human health
and safety. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating
procedures and biocontainment design features to minimize the potential
for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases of
pathogens. Nonetheless, some minor impacts would occur from
construction and operations and are unavoidable under the Proposed
Action.
Land Use and Visual Resources
Under each of the site alternatives, conversion of approximately 30
acres of open land to the NBAF would occur. Land use would be
consistent with the local zoning classifications under all site
alternatives, except that an amendment to the Clarke County, Georgia
comprehensive plan might be required to allow the NBAF to be
constructed at the South Milledge Avenue site. Placement of the NBAF on
undeveloped land would alter the viewshed of each of the sites,
although this effect may be most pronounced at the South Milledge
Avenue Site and least pronounced at the Manhattan Campus Site due to
the adjoining and nearby land uses, respectively. Similarly, during
normal operations, outdoor nighttime lighting would have impacts at all
sites, with the detrimental effects varying based on adjoining land
uses. Use of shielded fixtures and the minimum intensity of lighting
that are necessary to provide adequate security could mitigate the
effects.
Infrastructure
Construction of some infrastructure improvements, including
utilities and roadways would be required at all sites, and their
environmental impacts were evaluated in the NBAF EIS. The need for
infrastructure improvements would be greatest for the Umstead Research
Park Site, the South Milledge Avenue Site, the Plum Island Site, and
the Flora Industrial Park Site with the least for the Manhattan Campus
Site. Utility requirements would be similar for all site alternatives.
Water use would vary to some degree for each site, but NBAF operation
would result in use of approximately 36 million (Plum Island Site) to
52 million (Texas Research Park Site) gallons per year. Electric power
demands would be very similar for all sites ranging from 12.8 to 13.1
megawatts, with connection to existing or new substations required at
all site alternatives. A new substation would be required at the South
Milledge Avenue Site and construction of new underwater power cables
would be required to provide redundant power to the Plum Island Site.
Operation at all sites except the Plum Island Site would use natural
gas as the primary fuel for operating the NBAF. New connecting lines
would be needed at the South Milledge Avenue Site, the Flora Industrial
Park Site, and the Umstead Research Farm Site. For sanitary sewer, the
NBAF operation would generate between 25 million and 30 million gallons
of wastewater per year. Capacity would be available from all existing
or planned wastewater treatment facilities serving the alternative
sites. Wastewater discharged by the NBAF would meet all local
wastewater permit requirements and would be pretreated as necessary.
New sewer lines would be needed at the Flora Industrial Park Site, the
Umstead Research Farm Site, and the Texas Research Park Site.
Air Quality and Severe Weather
Air quality effects would occur with construction and operation of
the NBAF for all sites with similar regulatory air permitting
requirements. Operation of the NBAF would result in air emissions from
boilers, emergency generators, and traffic from employees and
deliveries. Additional air emissions would occur from carcass and
pathologic waste treatment that may include incineration, alkaline
hydrolysis, or rendering. Conservative estimates of air emissions
indicate that operation of the NBAF could affect regional air-quality
standards for PM2.5 (particulate matter with diameter less
than or equal to 2.5 microns). The Plum Island Site is in non-
attainment areas for ozone and PM2.5 therefore, air
emissions from the NBAF would need to comply with the State
Implementation Plan (SIP) to improve air quality and the requirement
that a conformity analysis be performed. Following final design, the
potential and actual NBAF air emissions will be evaluated to
demonstrate compliance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards and
applicable air-quality permitting requirements.
The NBAF would be designed to withstand normal meteorological
conditions and the effects of severe weather events including
tornadoes. Specifically, NBAF would be designed and constructed to meet
or exceed the wind load standards of the International Building Code,
American Society of Civil Engineers Standard No. 7, Minimum Design
Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, and the codes of the local
jurisdiction, which take into account the functional use of the
facility as a laboratory.
Noise
Construction of NBAF would result in some temporary increase in
noise levels near the sites from construction equipment and activities.
As a consequence of the NBAF operations, minor increases in noise
levels from employee traffic and heating and cooling facilities would
occur and operation of emergency generators would result in sporadic
noise increases during testing. Impacts on adjoining properties would
vary based on the associated land uses and presence of sensitive
receptors. Potential impacts could be mitigated by conducting generator
testing during normal business hours. If blasting is required during
construction, a blasting plan would be developed to mitigate potential
noise levels.
Geology and Soils
Effects to geology and soils would be similar for all sites. The
NBAF would be designed to withstand and minimize the effects of
earthquakes including the seismic design provisions of the
International Building Code, American Society of Civil Engineers
Standard No. 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other
Structures, and the codes of the local jurisdiction, which take into
account the functional use of the facility as a laboratory. Temporary
effects to soils would occur due to excavation and site clearing, but
erosion control measures would minimize any adverse effects from
construction and operation. Prime and unique farmland soils would
potentially be affected at all sites. A detailed geotechnical study
would be performed to guide the final facility design in order to
mitigate the effects of any geologic hazards on the NBAF to include
identification of fractures, geologic fault traces, voids or other
solution features, unstable soils, or other subsurface conditions which
could impact facility construction and operations.
Water Resources
Potential effects to water resources could occur with construction
activities and would be similar for all sites. However, the South
Milledge Avenue Site, the Flora Industrial Park Site, and the Umstead
Research Farm Site are closer to surface waters so the potential for
effects are greater at these sites. Runoff from the construction site
has the potential to enter surface or groundwater sources, but
stormwater management during construction would
[[Page 3073]]
minimize the potential for this to occur. Similar effects could occur
with operation of the NBAF. Strict compliance with stormwater pollution
prevention plans and spill management protocols would minimize the
potential and mitigate the potential effects of a spill. Wastewater
would be collected and conveyed to existing wastewater treatment
facilities and pretreated as required to meet all local wastewater
permit requirements.
Biological Resources
Effects to vegetation, wetlands, wildlife, aquatic life, and
threatened or endangered species would be similar for all site
alternatives with a few exceptions. Site clearing would remove
approximately 30 acres of vegetation, although all of the sites have
been previously disturbed to some degree. Wetlands would be affected at
the South Milledge Avenue Site from road and utility crossings (less
than 0.5 acres), and approximately 0.2 acres of forested uplands would
be lost. Threatened or endangered species, aquatic resources, and
wildlife would not be directly affected by construction or normal
operations at any site. Noise and light from the NBAF could affect
wildlife, particularly migratory birds, with this potential determined
to be greatest for the South Milledge Avenue Site and Umstead Research
Farm Site. Mitigation of potential noise and light impacts were
previously described.
During operation, an accidental release of pathogens from the NBAF
would adversely affect susceptible wildlife populations and would be
similar for all sites. To minimize potential impacts in the unlikely
event of a release, DHS would have site-specific standard operating
procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of
research activities at the proposed NBAF.
Socioeconomics
Construction activities at all sites would result in between 1,300
and 1,614 temporary jobs generating between $138.2 million and $183.9
million in labor income and between $12.5 million and $24.7 million in
state and local taxes. Population, housing, and quality of life would
not be affected by construction. Operation of the NBAF would result in
250 to 350 direct jobs and an estimated income of between $26.8 million
and $30.4 million annually. Population growth due to the NBAF would be
a small portion of the estimated growth in the regions surrounding all
sites. The effect of the NBAF on the housing market and quality of life
(i.e., schools, law enforcement, fire protection, medical facilities,
recreation, and health and safety) would be negligible. Law enforcement
and fire protection personnel could be trained by DHS to respond to
incidents at the NBAF.
The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low,
but the economic effect could be substantial for all sites. The primary
economic effect of an accidental release of FMD virus would be the
banning of exports of U.S. livestock products regardless of the
location of the accidental release, which could reach as high as $4.2
billion until the U.S. was declared foot and mouth disease (FMD) free.
Response measures to minimize risks and quickly contain any accidental
release would greatly reduce the potential economic loss.
Traffic and Transportation
Local traffic at all sites would be temporarily affected by general
construction traffic. Operation of the NBAF would result in only minor
increases in daily traffic on roads near all the sites except for roads
near the Umstead Research Farm Site (Range Road and Old Route 75),
which are not heavily used by local traffic and would experience a 140%
increase in average daily traffic. Transportation of research materials
would not significantly increase the risk of a traffic-related
incident.
Existing Hazardous, Toxic, and Radiological Waste
Recent investigations at the Umstead Research Farm Site indicate
that the potential for unexploded materials from past military training
is low. The Plum Island Site was previously used to dispose of military
materials but has been remediated (cleaned up) and should not be a
safety concern for workers. Training for construction workers for
either of these sites may be required prior to initiation of
construction activities to ensure worker safety. None of the other
sites would require remediation or additional considerations for the
protection of workers, the public, or the environment.
Waste Management
Waste generation and management would be similar for all sites,
although the amount of wastewater would vary somewhat for each site
based on total water use. Wastewater discharged by the NBAF would be
pretreated as required to meet all local wastewater permit and
acceptance requirements, as previously described. Construction would
generate construction debris, sanitary solid waste, and wastewater.
Operation of the NBAF would result in generation of wastewater, waste
solids, and medical, hazardous, and industrial solid wastes.
Health and Safety
The effects of the NBAF on health and safety due to construction
and normal operations would be similar for all sites. Standard safety
protocols would minimize the likelihood of accidents and personal
injury at the NBAF, and normal operations pose no threat to the
surrounding communities. An evaluation was conducted to determine the
potential for an accidental or intentional (criminal or terrorist)
release of a pathogen from the NBAF and the potential for the pathogen
to spread from each site alternative. The evaluation considered the
accident scenarios with and without measures to prevent and contain a
release. The hazard analysis concluded that the likelihood of a release
of a pathogen was extremely low, given appropriate attention to the
design, construction and operation of the NBAF with the array of safety
controls, including a robust facility that is capable of withstanding
the various analyzed accident conditions. For all sites the risk of
accidental release was independent of where the facility was located.
The site specific consequences were shown to be essentially the same
between the sites located on the mainland and were slightly lower for
the Plum Island Site, due in part to there being less opportunity for
the pathogen to become established and spread.
Environmental Justice
No disproportionately high adverse effects to minority or low-
income populations were evident at any of the site alternatives. Visual
effects and traffic increases due to construction would be minimized
with proper site management protocols. Potential traffic effects would
be minimized by limiting road closures and rerouting traffic. Economic
benefits would potentially occur to low income or minority populations
within the area due to a rise in construction-related jobs.
VI. The Environmentally Preferred Alternative
The environmentally preferred alternative is the alternative that
causes the least impact to the environment; it is also the alternative
that best protects, preserves, and enhances historic, cultural, and
natural resources as noted by the CEQ, in its ``Forty Most Asked
Questions Concerning CEQ's NEPA Regulations'' (46 FR 18026, dated March
23, 1981), with regard to 40 CFR 1505.2. Under the No Action
Alternative, continued operation of the PIADC
[[Page 3074]]
would have little or no incremental environmental impacts, except for
minor and temporary effects from construction of ongoing infrastructure
upgrades. Therefore, DHS has identified the No Action Alternative as
the environmentally preferred alternative, because it would have the
least environmental impact in the short term. However, the No Action
Alternative does not satisfy the purpose of and need for the Proposed
Action and associated mission drivers.
The NBAF EIS indicated that there would be very little difference
in environmental impacts among the site alternatives. There would be
impacts from construction of the NBAF over the short term and from
subsequent normal facility operations at all sites. The major
discriminator identified would be associated with a release of a
pathogen where the potential impact would be slightly less at the Plum
Island Site. This is due to both the water barrier around the island
and the absence of nearby livestock and susceptible wildlife species.
Regardless, the probability of a release is very low at all sites.
Over the longer term, construction and subsequent operations of the
NBAF at any of the site alternatives would have potential beneficial
effects to wildlife, because the work performed at the NBAF could
result in development of vaccines or new diagnostic tools to protect or
contain outbreaks of foreign animal diseases.
VII. Comments on the NBAF Final EIS
Approximately 3,000 copies of the NBAF Final EIS and/or NBAF Final
EIS Executive Summary were distributed in hard copy or on compact disk
to members of Congress and other elected officials; Federal, state, and
local government agencies; Native American representatives; public
interest groups; public reading rooms; and to individuals. In addition,
both the NBAF Final EIS and the Executive Summary are available online
at http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf and on request.
Following the release of the NBAF Final EIS, DHS received letters
and other correspondence from approximately 60 commentors, including
government agencies, elected officials, organizations, and individuals.
An internal DHS comment was received from the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV expressing concerns about
the approach in the NBAF EIS to evaluating flood risks at the
alternative sites. FEMA suggested that DHS evaluate flood risks at the
Preferred Alternative site in greater detail and directed DHS to the
Peer Review Plan, Manhattan, Kansas Levee--Section 216 Flood Risk
Management Project Feasibility Study (dated January 2008).
DHS notes that the document concerning the feasibility study of the
existing Manhattan, Kansas Levee flood risk management project being
conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Kansas City District is
intended to update and verify data on the level of flood risk
management provided by the project. DHS is aware of the project, and
the NBAF Final EIS acknowledges the flood risk considerations
associated with the 1993 flood along the Big Blue and Kansas Rivers.
Further, DHS responded to a number of comments on the NBAF Draft EIS
relating to concerns about the failure of the Tuttle Creek Dam from
natural phenomena and other events. The NBAF would be designed and
built to meet or exceed all applicable building codes and to include
design provisions sufficient to withstand the effects of site-specific
natural phenomena events, including flooding.
The State of Mississippi cited perceived errors in the
NBAF Final EIS and in DHS's Preferred Alternative Selection Memorandum
(dated December 2008) concerning evaluation of the Flora Industrial
Park Site with regard to its proximity to research capabilities, ample
workforce, and level of community acceptance as compared with other
alternative sites, including the Preferred Alternative site. The State
provided DHS with information about the collaborative university
research and veterinary programs that comprise the Gulf States Bio and
Agro-Defense Consortium along with Battelle Memorial Institute, the
presence of four BSL-3 laboratories in the Jackson metropolitan area,
development of the state's high-technology and manufacturing employment
business sectors and associated workforce, among other information.
They also noted statements made by the DHS Under Secretary for Science
and Technology relative to the strength afforded to the Gulf States Bio
and Agro-Defense Consortium's NBAF proposal by the participation of
Battelle. The State asked that the NBAF Final EIS be amended to correct
the cited inaccuracies relative to the Flora Industrial Park Site.
DHS acknowledges the additional information provided by the State
of Mississippi relative to research capabilities and workforce
availability in Mississippi and, specifically, in the greater Jackson
area. DHS further acknowledges exceptionally strong community support
for the Flora Industrial Site, as well as unwavering support by all
levels of the State's government throughout this process. This
information has been carefully considered by DHS. In the DHS Final
Selection Memorandum for Site Selection for the Second Round Potential
Sites for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) (dated July
2007), the Flora, Mississippi site was included as a site alternative,
because Battelle's participation in the consortium provided additional
benefits that had not been initially considered by the evaluation
committees. However, as part of the Preferred Alternative selection
process, the Steering Committee again reassessed previous ratings that
included Battelle's capabilities and determined that ratings of ``Does
Not Meet Overall Criteria'' were appropriate for the Proximity to
Research and Workforce criteria. As discussed in Part I of this ROD,
DHS emphasizes that the Proximity to Research and Workforce ratings
apply exclusively to the specific research and workforce needs of the
proposed NBAF facility, and are not a general statement on the research
capability and workforce expertise in Mississippi or other proposing
States. DHS continues to believe that the consortium offered a highly
innovative proposal that included Battelle. Battelle was fully
committed to the consortium and offered a partnership with experts that
would benefit the NBAF in Mississippi until such time that a local
workforce with expertise in research and biocontainment facilities
relevant to the NBAF mission could be developed. However, given the
immediacy of the need and the highly competitive package of existing
assets offered by the Preferred Alternative, the Manhattan Campus Site
in Kansas remained the best alternative of all the strong candidates.
The Gulf States Bio and Agro-Defense Consortium commented
that the text found in the NBAF Final EIS did not match the findings
presented in Table ES-3 ``Comparison of Environmental Effects'' of the
NBAF Final EIS.
Section 3.13.6.3 of the NBAF EIS discusses the cumulative impacts
in Madison County due to several public and private activities proposed
or ongoing that would have potential to impact resources. DHS
originally used this analysis to apply the ``moderate'' rating in the
``cumulative effects'' category in Table ES-3 ``Comparison of
Environmental Effects'' of the NBAF Final EIS. Upon further analysis of
the data, DHS acknowledges that this rating is subject to
interpretation and could be changed to ``minor.'' DHS reaffirms that
[[Page 3075]]
the NBAF EIS offered very little differentiation among the sites. The
Flora Industrial Park Site was given the highest overall EIS rating of
``no to minor environmental impacts'' by the Steering Committee. The
changes do not affect the outcome of the decision process by the
Steering Committee or the Decision Authority.
The Greater Jackson Chapter Partnership, submitted
comments on behalf of the Gulf States Bio and Agro-Defense Consortium,
in which they commented on the selection of the Manhattan Campus Site
as the Preferred Alternative and expressed concerns about the
evaluation process for selecting the Preferred Alternative. Comments
submitted were similar to those submitted by the State of Mississippi.
They also cited the differences in costs between the Flora Industrial
Park Site and the Manhattan Campus Site as presented in the NBAF Final
EIS; they questioned how numerical differences in costs could receive
the same qualitative rating by DHS.
DHS shares concerns about costs in a time of fiscal uncertainty for
the Nation. As discussed in the Preferred Alternative Selection
Memorandum, DHS evaluated the total life-cycle costs of the
alternatives and carefully weighed the cost differences among the
alternatives in selecting a Preferred Alternative site. The Steering
Committee's review indicated that the offsets to infrastructure costs
and ``in-kind'' contributions offered by the Heartland BioAgro
Consortium, including immediate and long-term use of the existing
Biosecurity Research Institute at KSU, resulted in the Manhattan Campus
Site being rated among the least expensive sites at which to construct
and operate the NBAF when all factors were considered.
U.S. Senator Thad Cochran of Mississippi expressed his
support for the comments submitted by the Gulf States Bio and Agro-
Defense Consortium regarding DHS's selection of the Preferred
Alternative. Senator Cochran also articulated concerns regarding
information in the DHS Preferred Alternative Selection Memorandum,
dated December 2008, and in the NBAF Final EIS analysis of the costs
associated with building at the site alternatives. Specifically,
Senator Cochran expressed concerns about statements regarding the
estimated costs of building the NBAF at the Manhattan, Kansas site and
at the Flora, Mississippi site. He noted that the NBAF Final EIS cites
a cost savings of $65,011,459 if NBAF were built at the Flora,
Mississippi site rather than the Manhattan, Kansas site. Senator
Cochran also questioned how ``in-kind'' contributions were factored
into the cost analysis, noting his understanding that the in-kind
pledges offered by Mississippi and Kansas were approximately equal in
value, especially when total life-cycle costs of the alternatives are
considered.
As previously discussed, DHS did consider the total life-cycle
costs of the alternatives in selecting a Preferred Alternative. Both
the Gulf States Bio and Agro-Defense Consortium and Heartland BioAgro
Consortium offered in-kind contribution packages that completely offset
estimated site development costs and both received the highest marks
for this criterion. Additionally, the Heartland BioAgro Consortium's
offer of the immediate and long-term use of the existing Biosecurity
Research Institute, a Biosafety Level 3 facility within close proximity
to the Manhattan Campus Site in which research on pathogens threatening
large livestock is conducted, was a very attractive in-kind
contribution which would further offset the cost of locating the NBAF
at the Manhattan Campus Site. It is also important to note that the
life-cycle cost of constructing the NBAF was only one aspect of the
evaluation criteria considered in the final decision. As discussed in
the Preferred Alternative Selection Memorandum and in this ROD, other
evaluation criteria were considered and provided distinguishing
factors.
Congressman Bennie Thompson of Mississippi expressed
support for the NBAF, while also expressing concern regarding the site
selection process. He asked that DHS weigh more heavily the possible
effects of a pathogen release at each site, rather than relying solely
on the tenet that the risk of release is independent of site location.
The Congressman observed that there is precedent for placing national
laboratories in rural areas and noted that remote and rural locations
provide an additional layer of security and reduced risk. Congressman
Thompson also expressed concerns about perceived negative references by
DHS to Mississippi's and the Jackson area's research capabilities and
workforce and urged DHS to amend the NBAF Final EIS for accuracy.
DHS has evaluated the possible effects of a pathogen release at
each site in the NBAF EIS and commissioned the Threat and Risk
Assessment separate from the NBAF EIS. The NBAF Steering Committee, as
discussed in the Preferred Alternative Selection Memorandum, determined
that the risk of release of any pathogen proposed for study at the NBAF
could be mitigated by implementation of operational protocols, rigid
security measures, and adherence to U.S. biosecurity guidelines. From
the perspective of economic consequences should a release of FMDV
occur, it was determined that the major impact would be loss of meat
export trade status regardless of the site, and that the government's
response to an FMD outbreak is the most critical factor regardless
where it occurs. Consequently, DHS determined that it was most
important to select a location for the proposed NBAF that would
optimize the capability to diagnose and cure large animal diseases.
Regarding the comments on perceived negative ratings, DHS again notes
that site evaluations apply exclusively to the specific research and
workforce needs of the proposed NBAF facility, and are not a general
statement on the research capability and workforce availability in
Mississippi. DHS acknowledges that the consortium offered a highly
innovative package in its partnership with Battelle and the strengths
of many of the surrounding schools in Mississippi. However, the
selected site was able to best meet the immediate need of the research
and workforce requirements of the NBAF mission.
The office of Congressman Tim Bishop of New York suggested
consideration of an alternative to keep PIADC in its current BSL-3Ag
state while placing the proposed NBAF BSL-4 elsewhere.
This option was considered by DHS, but it was not analyzed as a
separate alternative, because the environmental impacts were already
considered within the range of reasonable alternatives analyzed in the
NBAF EIS. When analyzing this option against DHS's purpose and need for
action, DHS concluded that it would not provide enhanced capabilities
to detect and prevent threats to animal agriculture. Additionally, the
practical consequences of splitting the NBAF laboratory functions would
produce a fractured workforce, result in decreased efficiencies and
increased costs and was found to not meet the purpose and need as
stated in the NBAF EIS. Therefore, DHS considered but did not select
the option of building a BSL-4 only laboratory and leaving PIADC in its
current state.
The Texas Bio and Agro-Defense Consortium (TBAC) submitted
comments expressing several areas of concern regarding the analysis in
the NBAF Final EIS and the selection of the Manhattan Campus Site as
the Preferred Alterative for the siting, construction, and operation of
the NBAF. TBAC's
[[Page 3076]]
comments were endorsed in a letter submitted by the State of Texas.
Their concerns focused on the following issues: (1) The site evaluation
criteria; (2) the cost analysis in the EIS; (3) risks posed by certain
environmental impacts; and (4) the site selection process.
TBAC commented that DHS erred in its evaluation of Texas research
capabilities, construction costs, workforce, and community acceptance
criteria. They asserted that DHS erred in its evaluation of
construction costs at the various sites, and that additional financing
requirements were unreasonably added in an untimely manner. They
expressed concern regarding the perceived failure of the EIS to
adequately consider risks and environmental impacts, specifically the
risk of a release of hazardous substances due to naturally-occurring
events such as tornadoes. TBAC commented on several aspects of the DHS
site selection procedures such as initial and subsequent ratings and
requests from DHS for supplemental information.
DHS does not agree with TBAC's assertion that the NBAF Final EIS is
flawed because the EIS failed to consider the evaluation criteria. DHS
did consider the evaluation criteria to establish the range of
reasonable alternatives analyzed in the EIS. Any further use of the
evaluation criteria in the EIS is not necessary and is not required by
CEQ's regulations for implementing NEPA (40 Code of Federal Regulation
Parts 1500 et seq.). CEQ regulations state that an EIS ``* * * shall
provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts
and shall inform decision makers and the public of the reasonable
alternatives * * * An environmental impact statement is more than a
disclosure document. It shall be used by Federal officials in
conjunction with other relevant material to plan actions and make
decisions (40 CFR 1502.1).'' DHS believes that the NBAF Final EIS has
been prepared in full compliance with NEPA and CEQ regulations.
DHS's four evaluation criteria, associated sub-criteria, and
preferences were used, in part, to assist DHS in the selection of
reasonable alternatives for analysis in the NBAF EIS and in selection
of a Preferred Alternative. TBAC asserted that DHS unfairly added
additional financing requirements to the process. As discussed under
Part I of this ROD (Site Selection Process and Evaluation Criteria),
DHS communicated its initial criteria, sub-criteria, and preferences
throughout the process. One of the initial sub-criteria and then a DHS
preference, communicated to the consortia in DHS's December 8, 2006
letter, was for ``in-kind'' contributions to assist DHS in the
completion of this project. As discussed previously, DHS sent the
consortia a letter dated February 29, 2008 requesting verification of
their final offers by the due date of March 31, 2008. TBAC submitted
the verification of its final offer by March 31, 2008. The State of
Texas then sent a letter on September 26, 2008 to DHS stating they
would use their ``best efforts to secure appropriation of not less than
the additional $56.3 million from the state funding sources best suited
to meet the NBAF's project timeline.'' DHS responded to this letter
stating ``in order to maintain the fairness and integrity of DHS's NBAF
Decision Process, the additional $56.3 million cannot be considered by
the Steering Committee because it is not a clarification of the
previous offer.'' While DHS maintains that this additional offer could
not be considered, it is notable that even if the additional Texas
financial offsets of the September 26, 2008 letter had been included,
the Manhattan Campus Site would still be the site offering best value
to the Government.
TBAC stated that the NBAF EIS failed to assess risks and impacts of
releases resulting from natural phenomena, specifically tornadoes, and
asked that DHS reevaluate the release threat from tornado activity. The
NBAF Final EIS adequately evaluates the risks and impacts from
tornadoes and natural phenomena at all the alternative sites. DHS
received numerous comments from individuals and organizations regarding
the risks posed to NBAF by natural phenomena hazards such as tornadoes,
earthquakes, hurricanes, etc at the Manhattan Campus Site and the other
site alternatives. DHS has responded to these comments in the NBAF
Final EIS Comment Response Document. As previously stated in this ROD,
the NBAF would be designed to withstand normal meteorological
conditions as well as the effects of severe weather events, including
tornadoes and would meet or exceed the wind load standards of the
International Building Code, American Society of Civil Engineers
Standard No. 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other
Structures, and the codes of the local jurisdiction, which take into
account the use of the facility as a laboratory.
TBAC also questioned the conclusion in the NBAF EIS that noise
effects would be similar for all sites and asserted that the noise
analysis and conclusions dismissed the fact that the Texas Research
Park is located in an unpopulated area. Section 3.5 of the NBAF EIS
begins by describing the methodology for evaluating potential impacts
and then describes the acoustic environment for each site followed by
an assessment of potential impacts. For the Texas Research Park Site,
it is noted that it is ``* * *currently located in a rural, undeveloped
area west of San Antonio but has been designated as a future industrial
and research park site. There are no known sensitive noise receptors at
the site'' (see Section 3.5.8.1 of the NBAF Final EIS). The EIS clearly
acknowledges the current acoustic environment of Texas Research Park
Site. As further described in the methodology section of the NBAF Final
EIS, the noise analysis evaluated noise-generating sources at each site
to assess potential audible effects from facility construction and
operation. The overall conclusion was that noise was not an
environmental impact discriminator and, therefore, all sites received
the same qualitative rating of ``minor'' as presented in the Executive
Summary to the NBAF Final EIS.
Finally, TBAC commented that the text found in the NBAF Final EIS
did not match the findings presented in Table ES-3 ``Comparison of
Environmental Effects'' of the NBAF Final EIS. Table ES-3 is based on
the affected environment and consequence analysis presented in Chapter
3 of the NBAF Final EIS and could be perceived as open to
interpretation. Specifically, a commentor to the NBAF Draft EIS
identified a conflict between the text in Section 3.11.8.3.1 that
indicated minor effects to traffic at the Texas Research Park Site,
while Table ES-3 in the Executive Summary indicated a moderate effect.
The comment response document stated that the ``Moderate'' would be
changed to the correct listing of ``Minor'' as is detailed in Section
3.11.8.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS did not make this modification in the
table as the response indicated. DHS acknowledges that both the
``traffic and transportation'' and ``cumulative effects'' category for
the Texas Research Park Site could be changed to ``Minor'' and is
subject to interpretation. DHS again notes that the NBAF EIS offered
very little differentiation among the sites. The Texas Research Park
Site was given the highest overall EIS rating of ``no to minor
environmental impacts'' by the Steering Committee. The changes do not
affect the outcome of the decision process by the Steering Committee or
the Decision Authority.
A majority of the comments received on the NBAF Final EIS
expressed opposition to the selection of the Preferred Alternative and
expressed concerns such as the following:
[[Page 3077]]
A pathogenic release due to accidents, natural phenomena
such as tornadoes, and terrorist actions;
Risks from FMD virus research on the U.S. mainland or in
any areas with livestock populations;
Economic and human health effects of a pathogen release on
local and national livestock industry, ranchers, and farmers;
The NBAF site and surrounding community becoming terrorist
targets;
The absence in the NBAF EIS of adequate analysis of
physical isolation and water barrier afforded at the Plum Island Site.
These concerns were addressed by DHS in the responses to comments
on the NBAF Draft EIS and in the NBAF Final EIS. Many of the same
commentors who expressed opposition to the Preferred Alternative also
suggested that instead of construction of the NBAF, DHS should upgrade
the existing PIADC on Plum Island, New York.
Commentors are referred to the NBAF Final EIS and associated
Comment Response Document (Appendix H of the NBAF Final EIS) for
information on these issues and DHS's responses to individual comments.
Mrs. Susan Hodges reported that her letter dated August
25, 2008 and submitted to oppose the selection of the South Milledge
Avenue Site was not included in the NBAF Final EIS Comment Response
Document, although her name was listed. DHS regrets this error. Mrs.
Hodges' letter was one of a small number of comment documents that were
postmarked before the end of the comment period (August 25, 2008), but
were not delivered to the NBAF Program Office in time for publication
in the Comment Response Document. However, DHS did consider these
comments and posted the comments and responses on the NBAF Web site as
part of Comment Response Document.
DHS considered all comments received on the NBAF Final EIS during
the preparation of the ROD. However, in reviewing and balancing the
comments received against the decision factors considered in this ROD,
DHS determined that no substantially new, relevant information was
identified. Therefore, DHS has not changed its view regarding the
Preferred Alternative as presented in the NBAF Final EIS and in this
ROD.
VIII. Decision Factors
Analysis of the Alternative Sites
As previously described, a DHS Steering Committee reviewed new and
emerging data relevant to the original site evaluation criteria (i.e.,
Proximity to Research Capabilities, Proximity to Workforce,
Acquisition/Construction/Operations (ACO) Requirements, and Community
Acceptance) for selection of the Preferred Alternative. These same
criteria had been utilized by DHS to identify the five site
alternatives that were analyzed in the NBAF EIS in addition to the Plum
Island Site. DHS emphasizes that the Proximity to Research Capabilities
and Workforce criteria apply exclusively to the specific research and
workforce needs of the proposed NBAF and are not a general statement on
the research capability and workforce expertise of the proposing states
and consortia. Using the new and emerging data contained in supporting
documents, the Steering Committee reevaluated the strengths and
weaknesses of each site relative to the initial site ratings as
documented in the Final Selection Memorandum for Site Selection for the
Second Round Sites for the NBAF, dated July 2007, and the Plum Island
Memorandum for the Record, dated November 2008, with the objective of
updating the site ratings relative to the four evaluation criteria. The
Steering Committee also considered the results of the NBAF Final EIS,
including the public comments made at the public meetings and by other
means during the 60-day public comment period on the NBAF Draft EIS.
Overall EIS and Threat and Risk Assessment Results
As discussed in more detail in Part III (Preferred Alternative) of
this ROD, DHS determined that the NBAF EIS and the Threat and Risk
Assessment presented very little differentiation among the sites. In
fact, the NBAF EIS determined that the risk of release of a biological
pathogen from the NBAF was independent of where the NBAF was located.
DHS also determined that, based on its review of the NBAF EIS, the
likelihood of a release of a pathogen was very low, given appropriate
attention to the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF with
an array of safety controls. Finally, DHS determined that the risk of
release of any identified pathogen proposed for study within the NBAF
could be mitigated by implementation of operational protocols, rigid
security measures, and adherence to the U.S. Government biosecurity
guidelines.
With respect to the economic consequence if a release were to
happen, the Steering Committee found that the major impact of a release
was due to the loss of meat export trade status and that this is
independent of the site of the NBAF. As excerpted more fully in Part
III (Preferred Alternative) of this ROD, the letter DHS received from
Dr. Bernard Vallat, Director General of The World Organization for
Animal Health (OIE), in which Dr. Vallat stated that the trade status
impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus in a
country is ``more related to how the country's authorities respond to
the incursion, rather than where the outbreak occurs'' was particularly
informative.
DHS determined that, based on the lack of differentiation among the
sites regarding the risk of a release and the economic consequences of
a release, that it was most important to select a location that would
optimize the capability to diagnose and cure large animal diseases
through strong research programs and expedient diagnostic and response
capabilities. Furthermore, DHS found that the environmental impacts
analyzed in the EIS and the site specific threats were all very similar
and that there were only minor differentiators in the EIS and the
Threat and Risk Assessment. Therefore, the key differentiators among
the sites were DHS's original initial four evaluation criteria. Because
the NBAF is intended to be the Nation's preeminent research facility
for foreign animal and zoonotic disease research, the site's proximity
to research capabilities that can be linked to NBAF mission
requirements was emphasized among the four evaluation criteria.
South Milledge Avenue Site; Athens, Georgia
While the South Milledge Avenue Site demonstrated numerous
strengths against the evaluation criteria, DHS found that it did not
best meet the purpose and need to site, construct, and operate the NBAF
based on the Research, Workforce, ACO, and Community Acceptance
criteria. This site offers proximity to world class capabilities across
disciplines related to the NBAF and collectively there is significant
expertise in research on infectious diseases and pathogenesis of
animals and humans, as well as zoonoses. However, there is no clear
evidence of integration with the biomedical research community and the
research focus tends to be on poultry which is not related to the NBAF
large livestock animal disease mission. It is attractive that the area
is rich in high containment laboratory building expertise.
Additionally, the Emory BSL3/4 laboratories and Athens Community
College offered training programs for NBAF workers. The EIS
demonstrated that for the South Milledge Avenue Site, almost all
[[Page 3078]]
environmental impacts fell in the ``no impacts to minor impacts''
category. However, the NBAF EIS stated the site may require an
amendment to the Athens-Clarke County Comprehensive Plan based on the
current planned use for the area where it is located. The rating for
the ACO criterion was further weakened because the offset package
offered by the consortium offset only a small percentage of the project
cost. The site continued to experience strong Federal level, state, and
local political support. However, a well organized, vocal opposition
group expressed numerous concerns on siting the NBAF in Athens,
Georgia. Additionally, numerous negative comments about the project
were received at public meetings. The information presented in the
Threat and Risk Assessment was found to be comparable to the other site
alternatives. Based on the lack of proximity to NBAF related research
and workforce in comparison to the Preferred Alternative, the active
community opposition, and the lack of a competitive offset package, DHS
did not select the South Milledge Avenue Site as the Preferred
Alternative for implementation.
Manhattan Campus Site, Manhattan, Kansas (Preferred Alternative)
Based on the numerous strengths that were evident when evaluating
the Manhattan Campus Site against the evaluation criteria, DHS found
that this location best met the purpose and need to site, construct and
operate the NBAF. Specifically, the site location near KSU provides
site proximity to existing research capabilities that can be linked to
NBAF mission requirements. Additionally, the site's proximity to the
KSU College of Veterinary Medicine, KSU College of Agriculture, and the
Biosecurity Research Institute is relevant to the NBAF mission and a
significant strength. The EIS demonstrated that construction and
operation of the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site would be
environmentally acceptable as almost all environmental impacts fell
into the ``no impacts to minor impacts'' category. As stated in the EIS
and agreed to by the Steering Committee, the risk of release of a
pathogen was independent of where the NBAF was located. The information
presented in the Threat and Risk Assessment was found to be comparable
to the other site alternatives. The Manhattan Campus Site alternative
demonstrated very strong community acceptance from local, state, and
Federal officials and stakeholders. Additionally, the consortium
offered a substantial, unconditional offset package, including use of
the existing Biosecurity Research Institute. Taking into consideration
the offsets to infrastructure costs and ``in-kind'' contributions
offered by the consortia, the Manhattan Campus Site is among the least
expensive locations to construct and operate the NBAF. Following a
comparison of this site to the No Action alternative, DHS selected this
site alternative as the Preferred Alternative for implementation.
Flora Industrial Park Site; Flora, Mississippi
While the Flora Industrial Park Site demonstrated numerous
strengths against the evaluation criteria, DHS found that it did not
best meet the purpose and need to site, construct, and operate the NBAF
based on the Research and Workforce criteria. DHS concluded that the
Mississippi consortium's inclusion of Battelle would not offset the
Flora Industrial Park Site's lack of proximity to a critical mass of
NBAF related research institutions, such as the lack of a veterinary
school and other research entities that could be linked to NBAF mission
requirements. While Battelle has strong in-house training programs for
laboratories and animal research and would assist in bringing these
training programs and expertise to NBAF, this strength does not
overcome the lack of an established nearby university or research
institution with related mission areas nor the lack of nearby BSL-3
laboratory with related mission areas. The Flora, Mississippi site was
included as a site alternative, because Battelle's participation in the
consortium provided additional and unique benefits. However, as part of
the Preferred Alternative selection process, the Steering Committee
again reassessed previous ratings that included Battelle's capabilities
and determined that this model did not overcome the previously noted
concerns. DHS notes that these ratings apply exclusively to the
specific research and workforce needs of the proposed NBAF, and are not
a general statement on the research capability and workforce expertise
in Mississippi. Battelle was fully committed to the consortium and
offered a partnership with experts that would benefit the NBAF in
Mississippi until such time that a local workforce with expertise in
research and biocontainment facilities relevant to the NBAF mission
could be developed. However, given the immediacy of the need, DHS
concluded that the lack of existing research and workforce assets
within proximity to the site and relevant to the NBAF mission was a
weakness. Additionally, the Flora Industrial Park Site demonstrated
exceptionally strong community acceptance from local, state, and
Federal officials and stakeholders. Further, the consortium offered an
offset package that covered a significant portion of the project cost
and made this site one of the least expensive upon which to build. The
EIS demonstrated that for the Flora Industrial Park Site, almost all
environmental impacts fell in the ``no impacts to minor impacts''
category. The information presented in the Threat and Risk Assessment
was found to be comparable to the other site alternatives. However,
based on the lack of proximity to NBAF related research and workforce
in comparison to the Preferred Alternative, DHS did not select the
Flora Industrial Park Site as the Preferred Alternative for
implementation.
Plum Island Site; Plum Island, New York
While the Plum Island Site demonstrated numerous strengths against
the evaluation criteria, DHS found that it did not best meet the
purpose and need to site, construct, and operate the NBAF based on the
Research, Workforce, ACO, and Community Acceptance criteria. DHS
concluded that even though the existing PIADC has demonstrated the
ability to effectively carry out its Foreign Animal Disease (FAD)
research mission, the research is focused primarily on FMDV (compared
to the broader NBAF research mission requirements) and there is a lack
of proximity to medical and veterinary schools as well as BSL-3/4
laboratories with related mission areas. While the current PIADC staff
has experience with large animal research, there would still need to be
a significant amount of training for working in BSL-4 spaces.
Additionally, even though there would be a lower cost and risk to
relocate research programs from the PIADC facility to the NBAF, if the
NBAF were to be constructed on Plum Island, these cost savings would be
overshadowed by the much higher construction cost at the Plum Island
Site. There is strong political opposition at Federal, state, and local
levels to having BSL-4 research on Plum Island. The EIS demonstrated
that for the Plum Island Site almost all environmental impacts fell in
the ``no impacts to minor impacts'' category. The information presented
in the Threat and Risk Assessment was found to be comparable to the
other site alternatives. Additionally, in November 2008, the World
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) stated that, a FMD virus outbreak
on an island would be considered no different from an FMDV outbreak on
the mainland with respect to the impact
[[Page 3079]]
such an outbreak would have on the Nation's meat-export trade status
and that, therefore, it was most important to optimize the facility to
diagnose and cure large animal diseases. Accordingly, based on the lack
of proximity to NBAF related research and workforce in comparison to
the Preferred Alternative, the local public and political opposition to
a BSL-4 laboratory on Plum Island, and the significant cost to build
and operate on Plum Island, DHS did not select the Plum Island Site as
the Preferred Alternative for implementation.
Umstead Research Farm Site; Butner, North Carolina
While the Umstead Research Farm Site demonstrated numerous
strengths against the evaluation criteria, DHS found that it did not
best meet the purpose and need to site, construct, and operate the NBAF
based on the ACO and Community Acceptance criteria. A significant
strength is the critical mass of intellectual and scientific capital
(comprised of universities, the private sector, and pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies) all within proximity to the site and that can
be linked to NBAF mission requirements. Three area universities (Duke
University, University of North Carolina, and North Carolina State
University) offer significant opportunities to draw and train a skilled
workforce. Additionally, the biomanufacturing firms and biotechnology
research and development programs within the area, coupled with 24 BSL-
3's, provide a strong base for a skilled workforce. However, the
Umstead Research Farm Site experienced strong local opposition to the
NBAF with limited Federal, state, and stakeholder support. The well-
organized and vocal opposition group to the NBAF grew to such a level
that some federal and state level representatives withdrew their
original support for the project. Additionally, numerous negative
comments about the project were received at public meetings. The North
Carolina rating was not competitive for the ACO criterion because the
North Carolina consortium offered minimal offsets to site costs. The
EIS demonstrated that for the Umstead Research Farm Site almost all
environmental impacts fell in the ``no impacts to minor impacts''
category. The information presented in the Threat and Risk Assessment
was found to be comparable to the other site alternatives. However,
based on the concern for the active community opposition in addition to
the limited Federal, state, and local political support and the lack of
a competitive offset package, DHS did not select the Umstead Research
Farm Site as the Preferred Alternative for implementation.
Texas Research Park Site; San Antonio, Texas
While the Texas Research Park Site demonstrated numerous strengths
against the evaluation criteria, DHS found that it did not best meet
the purpose and need to site, construct, and operate the NBAF based on
the Research and ACO criteria. While a strength is the site's proximity
to other research entities, such as a BSL-4 laboratory and several BSL-
3 laboratories, which could foster research collaboration, this
strength is tempered by the fact that no Veterinary School or College
of Agriculture is nearby. Site proximity to workforce is a strength, as
there is a strong military veterinary infrastructure which possesses
significant worldwide experience with exotic animal diseases. The Texas
Research Park Site also demonstrated very strong community acceptance
from local, state, and Federal officials and stakeholders. However, the
rating for the ACO criterion was not as strong or competitive as the
Manhattan Campus Site. While the Texas consortium offered a very good
offset package, only a small percentage of this package was
unconditional and could be used as a direct offset to the project cost.
The EIS demonstrated construction and operation of the NBAF at the
Texas Research Park Site would be environmentally acceptable as the
impacts fell in the ``no impacts to minor impacts'' category. Finally,
the information presented in the Threat and Risk Assessment was found
to be comparable to the other site alternatives. Therefore, based on
the site's lack of proximity to a Veterinary School or College of
Agriculture and the lack of a competitive offset package, DHS did not
select the Texas Research Park Site as the Preferred Alternative for
implementation.
IX. Decision
DHS has considered environmental impacts, public comments on the
NBAF Draft EIS and the Final EIS, national policy, evaluation criteria,
threat and risk assessments, costs, site characterizations, security,
and other programmatic requirements in its decision to site, construct,
and operate the NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas. It is also noted that the
NBAF Final EIS's risk assessment of FMDV impacts to the mainland
allowed for full public and stakeholder participation. Upon
consultation with the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Agriculture,
the Decision Authority (Under Secretary Cohen) accepted the unanimous
recommendation of the Steering Committee and selected Manhattan, Kansas
as the site for the NBAF. DHS has therefore decided, in consultation
with USDA, to implement its Preferred Alternative to construct and
operate the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site in Kansas. DHS determined
that the Manhattan Campus Site offers the best benefit to the
Government based upon the evaluation criteria and DHS preferences and,
most importantly, meets the intended purpose and need to safely and
successfully site, construct, and operate the NBAF. DHS would also
initiate the transition of mission activities and resources from the
Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located on Plum Island, New
York to the Manhattan Campus Site, including research related to FMD.
DHS anticipates that construction of NBAF would begin in fiscal year
2010 with completion by the end of 2014.
X. Mitigation
As identified in Section 3.15 of the NBAF Final EIS and as
summarized, where appropriate, in this ROD, DHS would implement
specific mitigation measures in the design, construction, and operation
of the NBAF. These include appropriate pollution control and best
management practices during construction so as to minimize adverse
impacts to the environment and to incorporate architectural design
features, biocontainment technologies, operational procedures, training
and protocols, and waste management technologies and procedures to
minimize environmental impacts during routine operations. The NBAF
would be designed and constructed to emphasize strategies for
sustainable site development, water savings, energy efficiency,
material selection, and indoor environmental quality to include
measures consistent with the low-impact design (LID) approach. To
minimize potential impacts in the unlikely event of a release, DHS
would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response
plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the
NBAF. Additionally, DHS intends, where applicable, to consider the
recommendations of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on
perimeter security found in the September 2008 Report to Congressional
Committees entitled Biosafety Laboratories: Perimeter Security
Assessment of the Nation's Five BSL-4 Laboratories. Upon review of the
site specific Threat and Risk Assessment, to be developed during the
[[Page 3080]]
design phase, DHS will implement a comprehensive risk-based physical
and personnel security program for the NBAF.
All practicable and economically feasible means to avoid or
minimize environmental harm from the selected alternative have been
adopted and would, as applicable, be incorporated into the design of
the NBAF. The mitigation measures described in Section 3.15 of the NBAF
EIS are incorporated into this ROD and are considered part of the
selected alternative.
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347 (National Environmental Policy
Act).
Dated: January 12, 2009.
Jay M. Cohen,
Under Secretary, Science & Technology, DHS.
[FR Doc. E9-914 Filed 1-15-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-10-P