7936

## **Repetitive Propeller Inspections**

(n) Thereafter, for all propellers, within every additional 750 operating hours TIS, perform the actions in paragraphs (h) through (m) of this AD.

## **Alternative Methods of Compliance**

(o) The Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, has the authority to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

## Special Flight Permits

(p) Under 39.23, we are limiting the availability of special flight permits for this AD. Special flight permits are available only if:

(1) The operator has not observed abnormal propeller vibration or abnormal engine vibration.

(2) The operator has not made earlier reports of abnormal propeller vibration, abnormal engine vibration, or other abnormal propeller operations that have not been addressed.

#### **Related Information**

(q) Contact Thomas Teplik, Aerospace Engineer, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Wichita, KS 67209; e-mail: *thomas.teplik@faa.gov*; telephone: (316) 946–4196; fax: (316) 946– 4107, for more information about this AD.

#### Material Incorporated by Reference

(r) You must use McCauley Propeller Systems Alert Service Bulletin No. ASB221E, dated January 28, 2010, to perform the inspections, rework, and removals from service required by this AD. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service bulletin in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Contact McCauley Propeller Systems, 5800 E. Pawnee, Wichita, KS 67218, telephone: (800) 621-7767; e-mail: productsupport@mccauley.textron.com; Web: http://www.mccauley.textron.com, for a copy of this service information. You may review copies at the FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html.

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on February 8, 2010.

#### Peter A. White,

Assistant Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2010–3113 Filed 2–22–10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

# DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

**Federal Aviation Administration** 

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2010-0125; Directorate Identifier 2010-CE-005-AD; Amendment 39-16208; AD 2010-04-15]

RIN 2120-AA64

## Airworthiness Directives; SCHEIBE-Flugzeugbau GmbH Model SF 25C Gliders

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. **ACTION:** Final rule; request for comments.

**SUMMARY:** We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

The aileron hinges and the stabilizer are fastened with steel tube rivets and brass tube rivets.

During a complete overhaul, broken brass tube rivets have been detected. It has been determined that, due to production quality issue, the upset heads of the brass tube rivets could break under normal load conditions.

This condition, if not corrected, could possibly lead to loss of control of the powered sailplane.

This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe

condition described in the MCAI.

**DATES:** This AD becomes effective March 15, 2010.

On March 15, 2010, the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this AD.

We must receive comments on this AD by April 9, 2010.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

• Fax: (202) 493–2251.

• *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

• *Hand Delivery:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

## **Examining the AD Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at *http:// www.regulations.gov;* or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and

other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone (800) 647– 5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Greg Davison, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone: (816) 329–4130; fax: (816) 329–4090; e-mail: gregory.davison@faa.gov.

## SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### Discussion

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued Emergency AD No. 2010–0011–E, dated January 25, 2010 (referred to after this as "the MCAI"), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

The aileron hinges and the stabilizer are fastened with steel tube rivets and brass tube rivets.

During a complete overhaul, broken brass tube rivets have been detected. It has been determined that, due to production quality issue, the upset heads of the brass tube rivets could break under normal load conditions.

This condition, if not corrected, could possibly lead to loss of control of the powered sailplane.

For the reason described above, this AD requires an inspection of the affected tube rivets and, if necessary, their replacement.

You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

## **Relevant Service Information**

SCHEIBE-Flugzeugbau GmbH has issued SCHEIBE AIRCRAFT GMBH Service Bulletin 653–64, dated November 10, 2009. The actions described in this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

# FAA's Determination and Requirements of the AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, they have notified us of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all information provided by the State of Design Authority and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

# Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might have also required different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are described in a separate paragraph of the AD. These requirements take precedence over those copied from the MCAI.

# FAA's Determination of the Effective Date

An unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD. The FAA has found that the risk to the flying public justifies waiving notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule because the brass tube rivets that are used to fasten the aileron hinges and the stabilizer are breaking. Investigation revealed that the brass tube rivets could break under normal load conditions. which could result in loss of control of the glider. Therefore, we determined that notice and opportunity for public comment before issuing this AD are impracticable and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in fewer than 30 days.

## **Comments Invited**

This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety, and we did not precede it by notice and opportunity for public comment. We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include "Docket No. FAA–2010–0125; Directorate Identifier 2010–CE–005–AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this AD because of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to *http:// www.regulations.gov*, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this AD.

## Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

## **Regulatory Findings**

We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1) Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866;

(2) Is not a "significant rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and

(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.

# List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

## Adoption of the Amendment

■ Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

## PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

## §39.13 [Amended]

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

2010–04–15 SCHEIBE-Flugzeugbau GmbH: Amendment 39–16208; Docket No. FAA–2010–0125; Directorate Identifier 2010–CE–005–AD.

### **Effective Date**

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective March 15, 2010.

## Affected ADs

(b) None.

#### Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Model SF 25C gliders, serial numbers 44365 through 44370, 44372, 44374, 44375, and 44377 through 44450, certificated in any category.

### Subject

(d) Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Code 55: Stabilizers.

#### Reason

(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states:

The aileron hinges and the stabilizer are fastened with steel tube rivets and brass tube rivets.

During a complete overhaul, broken brass tube rivets have been detected. It has been determined that, due to production quality issue, the upset heads of the brass tube rivets could break under normal load conditions.

This condition, if not corrected, could possibly lead to loss of control of the powered sailplane.

For the reason described above, this AD requires an inspection of the affected tube rivets and, if necessary, their replacement.

### **Actions and Compliance**

(f) Unless already done, do the following actions in accordance with SCHEIBE AIRCRAFT GMBH Service Bulletin 653–64, dated November 10, 2009.

(1) Within the next 2 days after March 15, 2010 (the effective date of this AD), remove the paint of the tube rivet heads at the aileron-hinges at wing rib No. 16 (in the area located at the lower side of the wing), disconnect the aileron from the wings, disconnect the elevator from the stabilizer, and inspect the tube rivet heads at the stabilizer to fuselage fittings to determine if the tube rivet heads are steel or brass.

(2) If the aileron hinges and the stabilizer to fuselage fittings are connected to the ribs and the spar with steel tube rivets, no further action is required.

(3) If the aileron hinges or the stabilizer to fuselage fittings are connected to the ribs and the spar with brass tube rivets 8x0, 75 mm, before further flight after the inspection required in paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, replace the brass tube rivets with screws.

### FAA AD Differences

**Note:** This AD differs from the MCAI and/ or service information as follows: No differences.

## **Other FAA AD Provisions**

(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, Standards Office, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Greg Davison, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone: (816) 329–4130; fax: (816) 329– 4090; e-mail: gregory.davison@faa.gov. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(3) *Reporting Requirements:* For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 *et seq.*), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120–0056.

### **Related Information**

(h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Emergency AD No. 2010–0011–E, dated January 25, 2010, and SCHEIBE AIRCRAFT GMBH Service Bulletin 653–64, dated November 10, 2009, for related information.

#### Material Incorporated by Reference

(i) You must use SCHEIBE AIRCRAFT GMBH Service Bulletin 653–64, dated November 10, 2009, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Scheibe Aircraft GmbH, Am Flugplatz 5, 73540 Heubach, Germany; telephone: +49(0)7173 184286; fax: 4(0)7173 185587.

(3) You may review copies of the service information incorporated by reference for this AD at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For information on the availability of this material at the Central Region, call (816) 329–3768.

(4) You may also review copies of the service information incorporated by reference for this AD at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call (202) 741–6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal\_register/ code\_of\_federal\_regulations/ibr\_locations. html.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on February 12, 2010.

#### Steven W. Thompson,

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2010–3186 Filed 2–22–10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

## **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

### **Federal Aviation Administration**

## 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA–2009–1027; Directorate Identifier 2009–NM–143–AD; Amendment 39–16197; AD 2010–04–04]

#### RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier, Inc. Model CL–600–2C10 (Regional Jet Series 700, 701, & 702), CL–600–2D15 (Regional Jet Series 705), and CL–600– 2D24 (Regional Jet Series 900) Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT). **ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

There have been several in-service cases reported of impact damage to the blowout (decompression) panel protective cage assemblies installed in the aft baggage cargo compartment. When damaged, these cages could prevent proper operation of the blowout panels, with potential degradation of smoke detection and fire extinguishing capabilities in the event of a fire.

We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.

**DATES:** This AD becomes effective March 30, 2010.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of March 30, 2010.

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at *http://www.regulations.gov* or in person at the U.S. Department of Transportation,

Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.

### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Craig Yates, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe and Mechanical Systems Branch, ANE–171, FAA, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 11590; telephone (516) 228– 7355; fax (516) 794–5531.

## SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### Discussion

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. That NPRM was published in the **Federal Register** on November 5, 2009 (74 FR 57264). That NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

There have been several in-service cases reported of impact damage to the blowout (decompression) panel protective cage assemblies installed in the aft baggage cargo compartment. When damaged, these cages could prevent proper operation of the blowout panels, with potential degradation of smoke detection and fire extinguishing capabilities in the event of a fire.

This directive mandates replacement of the existing cages with new cages that have greater damage resistance.

You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

## Comments

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. We received no comments on the NPRM or on the determination of the cost to the public.

# Explanation of Changes Made to This AD

We have revised this AD to identify the legal name of the manufacturer as published in the most recent type certificate data sheet for the affected airplane models.

# Explanation of Change to Costs of Compliance

Since issuance of the NPRM, we have increased the labor rate used in the Costs of Compliance from \$80 per workhour to \$85 per work-hour. The Costs of Compliance information, below, reflects this increase in the specified hourly labor rate.

### Conclusion

We reviewed the available data, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD