

operating conditions (using equipment and machinery in place and ready to operate), normal operating levels (hours per week/weeks per year), time for downtime, maintenance, repair, and cleanup, and a typical or representative product mix); and

(c) the quantity and value of your firm's(s') exports to the United States of *Subject Merchandise* and, if known, an estimate of the percentage of total exports to the United States of *Subject Merchandise* from the *Subject Country* accounted for by your firm's(s') exports.

(12) Identify significant changes, if any, in the supply and demand conditions or business cycle for the *Domestic Like Product* that have occurred in the United States or in the market for the *Subject Merchandise* in the *Subject Country* after 2004, and significant changes, if any, that are likely to occur within a reasonably foreseeable time. Supply conditions to consider include technology; production methods; development efforts; ability to increase production (including the shift of production facilities used for other products and the use, cost, or availability of major inputs into production); and factors related to the ability to shift supply among different national markets (including barriers to importation in foreign markets or changes in market demand abroad). Demand conditions to consider include end uses and applications; the existence and availability of substitute products; and the level of competition among the *Domestic Like Product* produced in the United States, *Subject Merchandise* produced in the *Subject Country*, and such merchandise from other countries.

(13) (OPTIONAL) A statement of whether you agree with the above definitions of the *Domestic Like Product* and *Domestic Industry*; if you disagree with either or both of these definitions, please explain why and provide alternative definitions.

Authority: This review is being conducted under authority of title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930; this notice is published pursuant to section 207.61 of the Commission's rules.

By order of the Commission.

Issued: September 21, 2010.

Marilyn R. Abbott,

Secretary to the Commission.

[FR Doc. 2010-24065 Filed 9-30-10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7020-02-P

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division

United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc., et al.; Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement

Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment, Stipulation and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in *United States of America v. Adobe Systems, Inc., et al.*, Civil Case No. 1:10-CV-01629. On September 24, 2010, the United States filed a Complaint alleging that Adobe Systems, Inc., Apple Inc., Google Inc., Intel Corp., Intuit, Inc., and Pixar entered into various bilateral agreements in which they agreed not to actively solicit each other's highly skilled technical employees, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The proposed Final Judgment, filed the same time as the Complaint, requires Defendants to refrain from entering into similar agreements in the future.

Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement are available for inspection at the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Documents Group, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 1010, Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-514-2481), on the Department of Justice's Web site at <http://www.justice.gov/atr>, and at the Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Copies of these materials may be obtained from the Antitrust Division upon request and payment of the copying fee set by Department of Justice regulations.

Public comment is invited within 60 days of the date of this notice. Such comments, and responses thereto, will be published in the **Federal Register** and filed with the Court. Comments should be directed to James J. Tierney, Chief, Networks and Technology Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 7100, Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-307-6200).

J. Robert Kramer II,

Director of Operations and Civil Enforcement.

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

United States of America, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 7100, Washington, DC 20530, Plaintiff, v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 345 Park Avenue, San Jose, CA 95110; Apple Inc., 1

Infinite Loop, Cupertino, CA 95014; Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheater Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043; Intel Corporation, 2200 Mission College Boulevard, Santa Clara, CA 95054; Intuit, Inc., 2632 Marine Way, Mountain View, CA 94043; and Pixar, 1200 Park Avenue, Emeryville, CA 94608, Defendants.

Case: 1:10-cv-01629.

Assigned to: Kollar-Kotelly, Colleen.

Assign. Date: 9/24/2010.

Complaint

The United States of America, acting under the direction of the Attorney General of the United States, brings this civil antitrust action to obtain equitable relief against Defendants Adobe Systems, Inc. ("Adobe"), Apple Inc. ("Apple"), Google Inc. ("Google"), Intel Corporation ("Intel"), Intuit, Inc. ("Intuit"), and Pixar, alleging as follows:

Nature of the Action

1. This action challenges under Section 1 of the Sherman Act five bilateral no cold call agreements among Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, and Pixar.

2. Defendants compete for highly skilled technical employees ("high tech employees") and solicit employees at other high tech companies to fill employment openings. Defendants' concerted behavior both reduced their ability to compete for employees and disrupted the normal price-setting mechanisms that apply in the labor setting. These no cold call agreements are facially anticompetitive because they eliminated a significant form of competition to attract high tech employees, and, overall, substantially diminished competition to the detriment of the affected employees who were likely deprived of competitively important information and access to better job opportunities.

3. Defendants' agreements are restraints of trade that are per se unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The United States seeks an order prohibiting such agreements.

Jurisdiction and Venue

4. Each Defendant hires specialized computer engineers and scientists throughout the United States, and each sells high technology products throughout the United States. Such activities, including the recruitment and hiring activities at issue in this Complaint, are in the flow of and substantially affect interstate commerce. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 4, and under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1337 to prevent and restrain the Defendants from violating

Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.

5. Venue is proper in this judicial district under Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 22, and under 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2), (c). Defendants transact or have transacted substantial business here.

Defendants

6. Defendant Adobe is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in San Jose, California.

7. Defendant Apple is a California corporation with its principal place of business in Cupertino, California.

8. Defendant Google is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Mountain View, California.

9. Defendant Intel is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Santa Clara, California.

10. Defendant Intuit is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Mountain View, California.

11. Defendant Pixar is a California corporation with its principal place of business in Emeryville, California.

Trade and Commerce

12. High tech labor is characterized by expertise and specialization. Defendants compete for high tech employees, and in particular specialized computer science and engineering talent on the basis of salaries, benefits, and career opportunities. In recent years, talented computer engineers and computer scientists have been in high demand.

13. Although Defendants employ a variety of recruiting techniques, cold calling another firm's employees is a particularly effective method of competing for computer engineers and computer scientists. Cold calling involves communicating directly in any manner (including orally, in writing, telephonically, or electronically) with another firm's employee who has not otherwise applied for a job opening. Defendants frequently recruit employees by cold calling because other firms' employees have the specialized skills necessary for the vacant position and may be unresponsive to other methods of recruiting. For example, several Defendants at times have received an extraordinary number of job applications per year. Yet these companies still cold called engineers and scientists at other high tech companies to fill certain positions.

14. In a well-functioning labor market, employers compete to attract the most valuable talent for their needs. Defendants' concerted behavior both reduced their ability to compete for employees and disrupted the normal price-setting mechanisms that apply in

the labor setting. These no cold call agreements are facially anticompetitive because they eliminated a significant form of competition to attract high tech employees, and, overall, substantially diminished competition to the detriment of the affected employees who were likely deprived of competitively important information and access to better job opportunities.

The Unlawful Agreements

15. The six Defendants entered into five substantially similar agreements not to cold call employees. The agreements were between (i) Apple and Google, (ii) Apple and Adobe, (iii) Apple and Pixar, (iv) Google and Intel, and (v) Google and Intuit. As detailed below, these agreements were created and enforced by senior executives of these companies.

16. These no cold call agreements were not ancillary to any legitimate collaboration between Defendants. None of the agreements was limited by geography, job function, product group, or time period. Thus, they were much broader than reasonably necessary for the formation or implementation of any collaborative effort. The lack of necessity for these broad agreements is further demonstrated by the fact that Defendants engaged in substantial collaborations that either did not include no cold call agreements or contained narrowly tailored hiring restrictions.

Apple-Google Agreement

17. Beginning no later than 2006, Apple and Google agreed not to cold call each other's employees. Senior executives at Apple and Google reached an express no cold call agreement through direct and explicit communications. The executives actively managed and enforced the agreement through direct communications.

18. The Apple-Google agreement covered all Google and all Apple employees and was not limited by geography, job function, product group, or time period. Moreover, employees were not informed of and did not agree to this restriction.

19. In furtherance of this agreement, Apple placed Google on its internal "Do Not Call List," which instructed Apple employees not to cold call employees from the listed companies, including Google. Similarly, in its Hiring Policies and Protocols manual, Google listed Apple among the companies that had special agreements with Google and were part of the "Do Not Cold Call" list. The manual instructed Google employees not to cold call employees of the listed companies.

20. The companies, through their senior executives, policed potential breaches of the agreement. In February 2006 and March 2007, Apple complained to Google regarding recruiting efforts Google had made and, on both occasions, Google investigated the matter internally and reported its findings back to Apple.

Apple-Adobe Agreement

21. Beginning no later than May 2005, Apple and Adobe agreed not to cold call each other's employees. Senior executives at Apple and Adobe reached an express no cold call agreement through direct and explicit communications. The executives actively managed and enforced the agreement through direct communications.

22. The Apple-Adobe agreement covered all Adobe and all Apple employees and was not limited by geography, job function, product group, or time period. Moreover, employees were not informed of and did not agree to this restriction.

23. In furtherance of this agreement, Apple placed Adobe on its internal "Do Not Call List," which instructed Apple employees not to cold call employees from the listed companies, including Adobe. Similarly, Adobe included Apple in its internal list of "Companies that are off limits," instructing recruiters not to cold call candidates from Apple.

Apple-Pixar Agreement

24. Beginning no later than April 2007, Apple and Pixar agreed not to cold call each other's employees. Senior executives at Apple and Pixar reached an express no cold call agreement through direct and explicit communications. The executives actively managed and enforced the agreement through direct communications.

25. The Apple-Pixar agreement covered all Pixar and all Apple employees and was not limited by geography, job function, product group, or time period. Moreover, employees were not informed of and did not agree to this restriction.

26. In furtherance of this agreement, Apple placed Pixar on its internal "Do Not Call List," which instructed Apple employees not to cold call employees from the listed companies, including Pixar. Similarly, Pixar instructed Pixar human resources personnel to adhere to the agreement and maintain a paper trail establishing that Pixar had not actively recruited job applicants from Apple.

Google-Intel Agreement

27. Beginning no later than September 2007, Google and Intel agreed not to cold call each other's employees. Senior executives at Google and Intel reached an express no cold call agreement through direct and explicit communications. The executives actively managed and enforced the agreement through direct communications.

28. The agreement covered all Intel and all Google employees and was not limited by geography, job function, product group, or time period. Moreover, employees were not informed of and did not agree to this restriction.

29. In furtherance of this agreement, Google listed Intel in its Hiring Policies and Protocols manual among the companies that have special agreements with Google and were part of the "Do Not Cold Call" list. The manual instructed Google employees not to cold call employees of the listed companies. Similarly, Intel instructed its human resources staff about the existence of the agreement.

Google-Intuit Agreement

30. In June 2007, Google and Intuit agreed that Google would not cold call any Intuit employee. Senior executives at Google and Intuit reached an express no cold call agreement through direct and explicit communications. The executives actively managed and enforced the agreement through direct communications.

31. The agreement covered all Intuit employees and was not limited by geography, job function, product group, or time period. Moreover, Intuit employees were not informed of and did not agree to this restriction.

32. In furtherance of this agreement, in its Hiring Policies and Protocols manual, Google listed Intuit among the companies that had special agreements with Google and were part of the "Do Not Cold Call" list. The manual instructed Google employees not to cold call employees of the listed companies.

Violation Alleged

Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act

33. The United States hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 32.

34. Defendants are direct competitors for employees, including specialized computer engineers and scientists, covered by the agreements at issue here. Defendants' concerted behavior both reduced their ability to compete for employees and disrupted the normal price-setting mechanisms that apply in the labor setting. These no cold call

agreements are facially anticompetitive because they eliminated a significant form of competition to attract high tech employees, and, overall, substantially diminished competition to the detriment of the affected employees who were likely deprived of competitively important information and access to better job opportunities.

35. Defendants' agreements constitute unreasonable restraints of trade that are per se unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.

Requested Relief

The United States requests that the Court:

(A) Adjudge and decree that Defendants' agreements not to compete constitute illegal restraints of interstate trade and commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act;

(B) Enjoin and restrain Defendants from enforcing or adhering to existing agreements that unreasonably restrict competition for employees between them;

(C) Permanently enjoin and restrain each Defendant from establishing any similar agreement unreasonably restricting competition for employees except as prescribed by the Court;

(D) Award the United States such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper to redress and prevent recurrence of the alleged violations and to dissipate the anticompetitive effects of the illegal agreements entered into by Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, and Pixar; and

(E) The United States be awarded the costs of this action.

Dated this 24th day of September 2010.

Respectfully submitted,

For Plaintiff United States.

Molly S. Boast,

Acting Assistant Attorney General.

J. Robert Kramer II,

Director of Operations.

James J. Tierney,

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Trial Attorneys.

U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Networks and Technology Section, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 7100, Washington, DC 20530. *Telephone:* (202) 307-6200. *Facsimile:* (202) 616-8544. *ryan.struve@usdoj.gov.*

Certificate of Service

I, Ryan Struve, hereby certify that on September 24, 2010, I caused a copy of the Complaint to be served on Defendants Adobe Systems, Inc., Apple, Inc., Google, Inc., Intel Corporation, Intuit, Inc., and Pixar by mailing the document via e-mail to the duly authorized legal representatives of the defendants, as follows:

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United States District Court for the District of Columbia

United States of America, Plaintiff, v.
Adobe Systems, Inc.; Apple Inc.; Google Inc.; Intel Corporation; Intuit, Inc.; and Pixar,
Defendants.

Case No. 1:10-cv-01629.

Assigned to: Kollar-Kotelly, Colleen.

Assign. Date: 9/24/2010.

Competitive Impact Statement

Plaintiff United States of America ("United States"), pursuant to Section

2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act ("APPA" or "Tunney Act"), 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), files this Competitive Impact Statement relating to the proposed Final Judgment submitted for entry in this civil antitrust proceeding.

I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding

The United States brought this lawsuit against Defendants Adobe Systems, Inc. ("Adobe"), Apple Inc. ("Apple"), Google Inc. ("Google"), Intel Corporation ("Intel"), Intuit, Inc. ("Intuit") and Pixar, on September 24, 2010, to remedy violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The Complaint alleges that Defendants entered into a series of bilateral agreements, pursuant to which a Defendant agreed not to cold call another Defendant's employees for employment opportunities. The effect of these agreements was to reduce Defendants' competition for highly skilled technical employees ("high tech employees"), diminish potential employment opportunities for those same employees, and interfere in the proper functioning of the price-setting mechanism that would otherwise have prevailed. Defendants' agreements are naked restraints of trade and violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.

At the same time the Complaint was filed, the United States also filed a proposed Final Judgment, which would remedy the violation by having the Court declare the Defendants' cold calling agreements illegal, enjoin Defendants from enforcing any such agreements currently in effect, and prohibit Defendants from entering similar agreements in the future.

The United States and Defendants have stipulated that the proposed Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA, unless the United States withdraws its consent. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment would terminate this action, except that this Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, and enforce the proposed Final Judgment and to punish violations thereof.

II. Description of the Events Giving Rise to the Alleged Violation of the Antitrust Laws

The six Defendants entered into five substantially similar agreements that restrained competition for employees and were not disclosed to the affected employees. These agreements banned cold calling of employees. Cold calling involves communicating directly in any manner (including orally, in writing, telephonically, or electronically) with

another firm's employee who has not otherwise applied for a job opening. The agreements were between (i) Apple and Google, (ii) Apple and Adobe, (iii) Apple and Pixar, (iv) Google and Intel, and (v) Google and Intuit. Aside from the Google and Intuit agreement, which only prohibited Google from cold calling any Intuit employee, each agreement covered all employees at both firms that were parties to the agreement. Senior executives at each firm entered the express agreements, and implemented and enforced them.

Defendants' agreements disrupted the competitive market forces for employee talent. The agreements are facially anticompetitive because they eliminated a significant form of competition to attract high tech employees, and, overall, substantially diminished competition to the detriment of the affected employees who were likely deprived of competitively important information and access to better job opportunities.

Each of the five agreements was a naked restraint of trade that was per se unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.

Apple-Google Agreement

Beginning no later than 2006, Apple and Google agreed not to cold call each other's employees. Senior executives at Apple and Google reached this express agreement through direct and explicit communications. The executives actively managed and enforced the agreement through direct communications. The agreement covered all employees of both firms and was not limited by geography, job function, product group, or time period. In furtherance of this agreement, Apple placed Google on its internal "Do Not Call List," which instructed employees not to actively solicit employees from the listed companies. Similarly, Google listed Apple among the companies that had special agreements with Google and were part of its "Do Not Cold Call" list. On occasion, Apple complained to Google when it believed the agreement had been breached. Each time, Google conducted an internal investigation to determine whether Google violated the agreement and reported its findings back to Apple.

Apple-Adobe Agreement

Beginning no later than May 2005, Apple requested an agreement from Adobe to refrain from cold calling each other's employees. Faced with the likelihood that refusing would result in retaliation and significant competition for its employees, Adobe agreed. Senior executives at Apple and Adobe reached

this express agreement through direct and explicit communications. The executives actively managed and enforced the agreement through direct communications. The agreement covered all employees of both firms and was not limited by geography, job function, product group, or time period. In furtherance of this agreement, Apple placed Adobe on its internal "Do Not Call List," and similarly, Adobe included Apple in its internal list of "Companies that are off limits."

Apple-Pixar Agreement

Beginning no later than April 2007, Apple and Pixar agreed that they would not cold call each other's employees. Executives at Apple and Pixar reached this express agreement through direct and explicit communications. The executives actively managed and enforced the agreement through direct communications. The agreement covered all employees of both firms and was not limited by geography, job function, product group, or time period. In furtherance of this agreement, Apple placed Pixar on its internal "Do Not Call List" and senior executives at Pixar instructed human resources personnel to adhere to the agreement and maintain a paper trail in the event Apple accused Pixar of violating the agreement.

Google-Intel Agreement

Beginning no later than September 2007, Google and Intel agreed to refrain from cold calling each other's employees. Senior executives at Google and Intel reached this express agreement through direct and explicit communications. The executives actively managed and enforced the agreement through direct communications. The agreement covered all employees of both firms and was not limited by geography, job function, product group, or time period. In furtherance of this agreement, Google listed Intel among the companies that have special agreements with Google and are part of its "Do Not Call" list. Similarly, Intel instructed its human resources staff about the existence of the agreement.

Google-Intuit Agreement

Beginning no later than June 2007, Google and Intuit agreed to prohibit Google from cold calling any Intuit employee. Senior executives at Google and Intel reached this express agreement through direct and explicit communications. The executives actively managed and enforced the agreement through direct communications. The agreement covered all Intuit employees and was

not limited by geography, job function, product group, or time period. In furtherance of this agreement, Google listed Intuit among the companies that have special agreements with Google and are part of its "Do Not Call" list. Google policed the agreement to ensure it was followed, including by investigating complaints from Intuit that Google had violated the agreement. On each occasion, Google determined that it had not violated the agreement and informed Intuit.

III. The Agreements Were Naked Restraints and Not Ancillary To Achieving Legitimate Business Purposes

Section 1 of the Sherman Act outlaws "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States." 15 U.S.C. 1. The Sherman Act is designed to ensure "free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress * * *." *National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla.*, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.27 (1984) (quoting *Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States*, 356 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1958)).

The law has long recognized that "certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." *Northern Pac. Ry.*, 356 U.S. at 545. Such naked restraints of competition among horizontal competitors (*i.e.*, agreements that have a pernicious effect on competition with no redeeming virtue) are deemed per se unlawful.

The United States has previously challenged restraints on employment as per se illegal. In 1996, the United States challenged guidelines designed to curb competition between residency programs for senior medical students and residents of other programs. Members of the Association of Family Practice Residency Directors had agreed not to directly solicit residents from each other, conduct recognized as "per se unlawful" under Section 1. *United States v. Ass'n of Family Practice Residency Doctors*, No. 96–575–CV–W–2, Complaint at 6 (W.D.Mo. May 28, 1996); Competitive Impact Statement, 61 FR 28891, 28894 (W.D.Mo. May 28,

1996). The Court entered an agreed-upon Final Judgment, enjoining the association from restraining competition among residency programs for residents, including enjoining all prohibitions on direct and indirect solicitation of residents from other programs. 1996–2 Trade Cases ¶ 71,533, 28894 (W.D.Mo. Aug. 15, 1996).

In analogous circumstances, the Sixth Circuit has held that an agreement among competitors not to solicit one another's customers was a per se violation of the antitrust laws. *U.S. v. Cooperative Theaters of Ohio, Inc.*, 845 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1988). In that case, two movie theater booking agents agreed to refrain from actively soliciting each other's customers. Despite the defendants' arguments that they "remained free to accept *unsolicited* business from their competitors' customers," *id.* (emphasis in original), the Sixth Circuit found their "no-solicitation agreement" was "undeniably a type of customer allocation scheme which courts have often condemned in the past as a per se violation of the Sherman Act." *Id.* at 1373.

Antitrust analysis of downstream, customer-related restraints is equally applicable to upstream monopsony restraints on employment opportunities. In 1991, the Antitrust Division brought an action against conspirators who competed to procure billboard leases and had agreed to refrain from bidding on each other's former leases for a year after the space was lost or abandoned by the other conspirator. *United States v. Brown*, 936 F.2d 1042 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming jury verdict convicting defendants of conspiring to restrain trade in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1). The agreement was limited to an input market (the procurement of billboard leases) and did not extend to downstream sales (in which the parties also competed). In affirming defendants' convictions, the appellate court held that the agreement was per se unlawful:

The agreement restricted each company's ability to compete for the other's billboard sites. It clearly allocated markets between the two billboard companies. A market allocation agreement between two companies at the same market level is a classic per se antitrust violation.

Id. at 1045.

There is no basis for distinguishing allocation agreements based on whether they involve input or output markets. Anticompetitive agreements in both input and output markets create allocative inefficiencies. Hence, naked restraints on cold calling customers, suppliers, or employees are similarly per se unlawful.

Still, an agreement that would normally be condemned as a per se unlawful restraint on competition may nonetheless be lawful if it is ancillary to a legitimate procompetitive venture and reasonably necessary to achieve the procompetitive benefits of the collaboration. Ancillary restraints therefore are not per se unlawful, but rather evaluated under the rule of reason, which balances a restraint's procompetitive benefits against its anticompetitive effects.¹ To be considered "ancillary" under established antitrust law, however, the restraint must be a necessary or intrinsic part of the procompetitive collaboration.² Restraints that are broader than reasonably necessary to achieve the efficiencies from a business collaboration are not ancillary and are properly treated as per se unlawful.

Although Defendants at times engaged in legitimate collaborative projects, the agreements to ban cold calling were not, under established antitrust law, properly ancillary to those

¹ See generally Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, and Federal Trade Commission, *Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors* § 1.2 (2000) ("*Collaboration Guidelines*"). See also *Major League Baseball v. Salvo*, 542 F.3d 290, 339 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("a per se or quick look approach may apply * * * where a particular restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve any of the efficiency-enhancing benefits of a joint venture and serves only as a naked restraint against competition."); *Dagher v. Saudi Refining, Inc.*, 369 F.3d 1108, 1121 (9th Cir. 2004) ("reasonably necessary to further the legitimate aims of the joint venture"); *rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Texaco v. Dagher*, 547 U.S. 1, 8 (2006); *Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.*, 792 F.2d 210, 227 (DC Cir. 1986) ("the restraints it imposes are reasonably necessary to the business it is authorized to conduct"); *In re Polygram Holdings, Inc.*, 2003 WL 21770765 (F.T.C. 2003) (parties must prove that the restraint was "reasonably necessary" to permit them to achieve particular alleged efficiency), *aff'd*, *Polygram Holdings, Inc. v. F.T.C.*, 416 F.3d 29 (DC Cir. 2005).

² See *Rothery Storage & Van Co.*, 792 F.2d at 227 (national moving network in which the participants shared physical resources, scheduling, training, and advertising resources, could forbid contractors from free riding by using its equipment, uniforms, and trucks for business they were conducting on their own); *Salvo*, 542 F.3d at 337 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (Major League Baseball teams created a formal joint venture to exclusively license, and share profits for, team trademarks, resulting in "decreased transaction costs, lower enforcement and monitoring costs, and the ability to one-stop shop * * *." Such benefits "could not exist without the * * * agreements."); *Addamax v. Open Software Found.*, 152 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 1998) (computer manufacturers formed nonprofit joint research and development venture to develop operating system; agreement on price to be paid for security software that was used by joint venture was ancillary to effort to develop a new system). See also *Collaboration Guidelines* at § 3.2 ("[I]f the participants could achieve an equivalent or comparable efficiency-enhancing integration through practical, significantly less restrictive means, then * * * the agreement is not reasonably necessary.").

collaborations. Defendants' agreements were not tied to any specific collaboration, nor were they narrowly tailored to the scope of any specific collaboration. The agreements extended to all employees at the firms, including those who had little or nothing to do with the collaboration at issue. The agreements were not limited by geography, job function, product group, or time period. This overbreadth and other evidence demonstrated that the no cold calling agreements were not reasonably necessary for any collaboration and, hence, not ancillary. The lack of reasonable necessity for these broad agreements is demonstrated also by the fact that Defendants successfully collaborated with other companies without similar agreements, or with agreements containing more narrowly focused hiring restrictions.

Some Defendants had extensive business relationships with one another and, in some cases, common board memberships. Such generalized relationships, however, cannot themselves justify overly broad restraints on competition.

Defendants' agreements regarding cold calling of employees are per se unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Defendants' concerted behavior both reduced their ability to compete for employees and disrupted the normal price-setting mechanisms that apply in the labor setting. These no cold call agreements are facially anticompetitive because they eliminated a significant form of competition to attract high tech employees, and, overall, substantially diminished competition to the detriment of the affected employees who were likely deprived of competitively important information and access to better job opportunities.

IV. Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgment

The proposed Final Judgment sets forth (1) conduct in which the parties may not engage; (2) conduct in which the parties may engage without violating the proposed Final Judgment; (3) certain actions the parties are required to take to ensure compliance with the terms of the proposed Final Judgment; and (4) oversight procedures the United States may use to ensure compliance with the proposed Final Judgment. Section VI of the proposed Final Judgment provides that these provisions will expire five years after entry of the proposed Final Judgment.

A. Prohibited Conduct

Section IV of the proposed Final Judgment preserves competition for

employees by prohibiting Defendants, and all other persons in active concert or participation with any of the Defendants with notice of the proposed Final Judgment, from agreeing, or attempting to agree, with another person to refrain from cold calling, soliciting, recruiting, or otherwise competing for employees of the other person. It also prohibits each Defendant from requesting or pressuring another person to refrain from cold calling, soliciting, recruiting, or otherwise competing for employees of the other person. Although the Complaint alleges only that the Defendants agreed to ban cold calling of employees, the proposed Final Judgment more broadly enjoins agreements regarding solicitation, recruitment and other methods of competing for employees to provide prophylactic protection against other activities that could interfere with competition for employees.

B. Conduct Not Prohibited

The Final Judgment does not prohibit all agreements related to employee solicitation and recruitment. Section V makes clear that the proposed Final Judgment does not prohibit "no direct solicitation provisions"³ that are reasonably necessary for, and thus ancillary to, legitimate procompetitive collaborations.⁴ Such restraints remain subject to scrutiny under the rule of reason.

Section V.A.1 does not prohibit no direct solicitation provisions contained in existing and future employment or severance agreements with a Defendant's employees. Narrowly tailored no direct solicitation provisions are often included in severance agreements and rarely present competition concerns. Sections V.A.2-4 also makes clear that the proposed Final Judgment does not prohibit no direct solicitation provisions reasonably necessary for:

1. Mergers or acquisitions (consummated or unconsummated), investments, or divestitures, including due diligence related thereto;

³ Section II.H. of the proposed Final Judgment defines "no direct solicitation provision" as "any agreement, or part of an agreement, among two or more persons that restrains any person from cold calling, soliciting, recruiting, or otherwise competing for employees of another person."

⁴ The Complaint alleges a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The scope of the Final Judgment is limited to violations of the Federal antitrust laws. It prohibits certain conduct and specifies other conduct that the Judgment would not prohibit. The Judgment does not address whether any conduct it does not prohibit would be prohibited by other Federal or State laws, including California Business & Professions Code § 16600 (prohibiting firms from restraining employee movement).

2. Contracts with consultants or recipients of consulting services, auditors, outsourcing vendors, recruiting agencies or providers of temporary employees or contract workers;

3. The settlement or compromise of legal disputes; and

4. Contracts with resellers or OEMs; contracts with certain providers or recipients of services; or the function of a legitimate collaboration agreement, such as joint development, technology integration, joint ventures, joint projects (including teaming agreements), and the shared use of facilities.

The investigation focused on anticompetitive agreements related to Defendants' relationships with resellers, OEMs, providers of services, and collaborations with other companies. Section V of the proposed Final Judgment contains additional requirements applicable to no direct solicitation provisions contained in these types of contracts and collaboration agreements. The proposed Final Judgment recognizes that Defendants may sometimes enter written or unwritten contracts and collaboration agreements and sets forth requirements that recognize the different nature of written and unwritten contracts.

Thus, for written contracts, Section V.B of the proposed Final Judgment requires that the Defendants: (1) Identify, with specificity, the agreement to which the no direct solicitation provision is ancillary; (2) narrowly tailor the no direct solicitation provision to affect only employees who are anticipated to be directly involved in the arrangement; (3) identify with reasonable specificity the employees who are subject to the no direct solicitation provision; (4) include a specific termination date or event; and (5) sign the agreement, including any modifications to the agreement.

If the no direct solicitation provision relates to an oral agreement, Section V.C of the proposed Final Judgment requires that the Defendants maintain documents sufficient to show the terms of the no direct solicitation provision, including: (1) The specific agreement to which the no direct solicitation provision is ancillary; (2) an identification, with reasonable specificity, of the employees who are subject to the no direct solicitation provision; and (3) the no direct solicitation provision's specific termination date or event.⁵

⁵ For example, a defendant might document these requirements terms through electronic mail or in memoranda that it will retain.

The purpose of Sections V.B. and V.C. is to ensure that no direct solicitation provisions related to Defendants' contracts with resellers, OEMs, and providers of services, and collaborations with other companies, are reasonably necessary to the contract or collaboration. In addition, the requirements set forth in Sections V.B and V.C of the proposed Final Judgment provide the United States with the ability to monitor Defendants' compliance with the proposed Final Judgment.

At least one Defendant has a large number of routine consulting and services agreements that contain no direct solicitation provisions that may not comply with the terms of the proposed Final Judgment. In many cases, these no direct solicitation provisions are contained in contracts acquired through a merger or were presented to the Defendant by third parties in non-negotiated, pre-printed agreements that were not reviewed in the ordinary course by the Defendant's legal department. To avoid the unnecessary burden of identifying these existing contracts and re-negotiating any no direct solicitation provisions, Section V.D of the proposed Final Judgment provides that, subject to the conditions below, Defendants shall not be required to modify or conform existing no direct solicitation provisions included in consulting or services agreements to the extent such provisions violate this Final Judgment. The Final Judgment further prohibits Defendants from enforcing any such existing no direct solicitation provision that would violate the proposed Final Judgment.

Finally, Section V.E of the proposed Final Judgment provides that a Defendant is not prohibited from unilaterally adopting or maintaining a policy not to consider applications from employees of another person, or not to solicit, cold call, recruit or hire employees of another person, provided that the Defendant does not request or pressure another person to adopt, enforce, or maintain such a policy.

C. Required Conduct

Section VI of the proposed Final Judgment sets forth various mandatory procedures to ensure Defendants' compliance with the proposed Final Judgment, including providing officers, directors, human resource managers, and senior managers who supervise employee recruiting with copies of the proposed Final Judgment and annual briefings about its terms. In addition, because the agreements were not disclosed to employees, Section VI.A.5 requires each Defendant to provide its

employees with reasonably accessible notice of the existence of all agreements covered by Section V.A.5 and entered into by the company.

Under Section VI, each Defendant must file annually with the United States a statement identifying any agreement covered by Section V.A.5., and describing any violation or potential violation of the Final Judgment known to any officer, director, human resources manager, or senior manager who supervises employee recruiting, solicitation, or hiring efforts. If one of these persons learns of a violation or potential violation of the Judgment, the Defendant must take steps to terminate or modify the activity to comply with the Judgment and maintain all documents related to the activity.

D. Compliance

To facilitate monitoring of the Defendants' compliance with the proposed Final Judgment, Section VII grants the United States access, upon reasonable notice, to Defendants' records and documents relating to matters contained in the proposed Final Judgment. Defendants must also make their employees available for interviews or depositions about such matters. Moreover, upon request, Defendants must answer interrogatories and prepare written reports relating to matters contained in the proposed Final Judgment.

V. Remedies Available to Potential Private Litigants

Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the antitrust laws may bring suit in Federal court to recover three times the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither impair nor assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action. Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(a), the proposed Final Judgment has no *prima facie* effect in any subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against Defendants.

VI. Procedures Applicable for Approval or Modification of the Proposed Final Judgment

The United States and Defendants have stipulated that the proposed Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance with the provisions of the APPA, provided that the United States has not withdrawn its consent. The APPA conditions entry upon the

Court's determination that the proposed Final Judgment is in the public interest.

The APPA provides a period of at least sixty (60) days preceding the effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any person may submit to the United States written comments regarding the proposed Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so within sixty (60) days of the date of publication of this Competitive Impact Statement in the **Federal Register**, or the last date of publication in a newspaper of the summary of this Competitive Impact Statement, whichever is later. All comments received during this period will be considered by the United States, which remains free to withdraw its consent to the proposed Final Judgment at any time prior to the Court's entry of judgment. The comments and the response of the United States will be filed with the Court and published in the **Federal Register**.

Written comments should be submitted to: James J. Tierney, Chief, Networks & Technology Enforcement Section, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 7100, Washington, DC 20530.

The proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court retains jurisdiction over this action, and the parties may apply to the Court for any order necessary or appropriate for the modification, interpretation, or enforcement of the Final Judgment.

VII. Alternatives to the Proposed Final Judgment

The United States considered, as an alternative to the proposed Final Judgment, a full trial on the merits against the Defendants. The United States is satisfied, however, that the relief contained in the proposed Final Judgment will quickly establish, preserve, and ensure that employees can benefit from competition by Defendant companies. Thus, the proposed Final Judgment would achieve all or substantially all of the relief the United States would have obtained through litigation, but avoids the time, expense, and uncertainty of a full trial on the merits of the Complaint.

VIII. Standard of Review Under the APPA for Proposed Final Judgment

The Clayton Act, as amended by the APPA, requires that proposed consent judgments in antitrust cases brought by the United States be subject to a sixty-day comment period, after which the Court shall determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment "is in the public interest." 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In

making that determination, the Court, in accordance with the statute as amended in 2004, is required to consider:

(A) The competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, whether its terms are ambiguous, and any other competitive considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment that the court deems necessary to a determination of whether the consent judgment is in the public interest; and

(B) The impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial.

15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In considering these statutory factors, the Court's inquiry is necessarily a limited one as the United States is entitled to "broad discretion to settle with the Defendant within the reaches of the public interest." *United States v. Microsoft Corp.*, 56 F.3d 1448, 1461 (DC Cir. 1995); see generally *United States v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc.*, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (assessing public interest standard under the Tunney Act); *United States v. InBev N.V./S.A.*, 2009–2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 76,736, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, No. 08–1965 (JR), at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009) (noting that the court's review of a consent judgment is limited and only inquires "into whether the government's determination that the proposed remedies will cure the antitrust violations alleged in the complaint was reasonable, and whether the mechanism to enforce the final judgment are clear and manageable").⁶

Under the APPA a court considers, among other things, the relationship between the remedy secured and the specific allegations set forth in the United States' complaint, whether the decree is sufficiently clear, whether enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, and whether the decree may positively harm third parties. See *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1458–62. With respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by the

decree, a court may not "engage in an unrestricted evaluation of what relief would best serve the public." *United States v. BNS, Inc.*, 858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing *United States v. Bechtel Corp.*, 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1460–62; *United States v. Alcoa, Inc.*, 152 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001); *InBev*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3. Courts have held that:

[t]he balancing of competing social and political interests affected by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. The court's role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the government has not breached its duty to the public in consenting to the decree. The court is required to determine not whether a particular decree is the one that will best serve society, but whether the settlement is "within the reaches of the public interest." More elaborate requirements might undermine the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent decree.

Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).⁷ In determining whether a proposed settlement is in the public interest, a district court "must accord deference to the government's predictions about the efficacy of its remedies, and may not require that the remedies perfectly match the alleged violations." *SBC Commc'ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17; see also *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1461 (noting the need for courts to be "deferential to the government's predictions as to the effect of the proposed remedies"); *United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.*, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that the court should grant due respect to the United States' prediction as to the effect of proposed remedies, its perception of the market structure, and its views of the nature of the case).

In addition, "a proposed decree must be approved even if it falls short of the remedy the court would impose on its own, as long as it falls within the range of acceptability or is 'within the reaches of public interest.'" *United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.*, 552 F. Supp. 131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982) (citations omitted) (quoting *United States v. Gillette Co.*, 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975)),

aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see also *United States v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd.*, 605 F. Supp. 619, 622 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (approving the consent decree even though the court would have imposed a greater remedy). To meet this standard, the United States "need only provide a factual basis for concluding that the settlements are reasonably adequate remedies for the alleged harms." *SBC Commc'ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17.

Moreover, the Court's role under the APPA is limited to reviewing the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has alleged in its Complaint, and does not authorize the court to "construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree against that case." *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1459; see also *InBev*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 ("[T]he 'public interest' is not to be measured by comparing the violations alleged in the complaint against those the court believes could have, or even should have, been alleged."). Because the "court's authority to review the decree depends entirely on the government's exercising its prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in the first place," it follows that "the court is only authorized to review the decree itself," and not to "effectively redraft the complaint" to inquire into other matters that the United States did not pursue. *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1459–60. Courts "cannot look beyond the complaint in making the public interest determination unless the complaint is drafted so narrowly as to make a mockery of judicial power." *SBC Commc'ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 15.

In its 2004 amendments, Congress made clear its intent to preserve the practical benefits of utilizing consent decrees in antitrust enforcement, adding the unambiguous instruction that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone to intervene." 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2). This language effectuates what Congress intended when it enacted the Tunney Act in 1974, as Senator Tunney explained: "[t]he court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or to engage in extended proceedings which might have the effect of vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement through the consent decree process." 119 *Cong. Rec.* 24,598 (1973) (statement of Senator Tunney). Rather, the procedure for the public interest determination is left to the discretion of the Court, with the recognition that the court's "scope of review remains sharply proscribed by precedent and the nature

⁶ The 2004 amendments substituted "shall" for "may" in directing relevant factors for a court to consider and amended the list of factors to focus on competitive considerations and to address potentially ambiguous judgment terms. Compare 15 U.S.C. 16(e) (2004), with 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1) (2006); see also *SBC Commc'ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (concluding that the 2004 amendments "effected minimal changes" to Tunney Act review).

⁷ Cf. *BNS*, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the court's "ultimate authority under the [APPA] is limited to approving or disapproving the consent decree"); *United States v. Gillette Co.*, 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way, the court is constrained to "look at the overall picture not hypercritically, nor with a microscope, but with an artist's reducing glass"). See generally *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1461 (discussing whether "the remedies [obtained in the decree are] so inconsonant with the allegations charged as to fall outside of the 'reaches of the public interest.'").

of Tunney Act proceedings.” *SBC Commc’ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11.⁸

IX. Determinative Documents

There are no determinative materials or documents within the meaning of the APPA that the United States considered in formulating the proposed Final Judgment.

Dated: September 24, 2010.

Respectfully submitted,

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United States District Court for the District of Columbia

United States of America, Plaintiff, v.
*Adobe Systems, Inc.; Apple Inc.; Google Inc.;
Intel Corporation; Intuit, Inc.; and Pixar*,
Defendants.

[Proposed] Final Judgment

Whereas, the United States of America filed its Complaint on September 24, 2010, alleging that each of the Defendants participated in at least one agreement in violation of Section One of the Sherman Act, and the United States and the Defendants, by their respective attorneys, have consented to the entry of this Final Judgment without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law;

And whereas this Final Judgment does not constitute any admission by the Defendants that the law has been violated or of any issue of fact or law, other than that the jurisdictional facts as alleged in the Complaint are true;

And whereas, the Defendants agree to be bound by the provisions of this Final Judgment pending its approval by this Court;

⁸ See *United States v. Enova Corp.*, 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the “Tunney Act expressly allows the court to make its public interest determination on the basis of the competitive impact statement and response to comments alone”); *United States v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc.*, 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 61,508, at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (“Absent a showing of corrupt failure of the government to discharge its duty, the Court, in making its public interest finding, should * * * carefully consider the explanations of the government in the competitive impact statement and its responses to comments in order to determine whether those explanations are reasonable under the circumstances.”); S. Rep. No. 93-298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1973) (“Where the public interest can be meaningfully evaluated simply on the basis of briefs and oral arguments, that is the approach that should be utilized.”).

Now therefore, before any testimony is taken, without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and upon consent of the Defendants, it is *ordered, adjudged, and decreed.*

I. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and each of the parties to this action. The Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted against the Defendants under Section One of the Sherman Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1.

II. Definitions

As used in this Final Judgment:

A. “Adobe” means Adobe Systems, Inc., its (i) successors and assigns, (ii) controlled subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and (iii) their directors, officers, managers, agents acting within the scope of their agency, and employees.

B. “Apple” means Apple Inc., its (i) successors and assigns, (ii) controlled subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and (iii) their directors, officers, managers, agents acting within the scope of their agency, and employees.

C. “Google” means Google Inc., its (i) successors and assigns, (ii) controlled subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and (iii) their directors, officers, managers, agents acting within the scope of their agency, and employees.

D. “Intel” means Intel Corporation, its (i) successors and assigns, (ii) controlled subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and (iii) their directors, officers, managers, agents acting within the scope of their agency, and employees.

E. “Intuit” means Intuit, Inc., its (i) successors and assigns, (ii) controlled subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and (iii) their directors, officers, managers, agents acting within the scope of their agency, and employees.

F. “Pixar” means Pixar, its (i) successors and assigns, (ii) controlled subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and (iii) their directors, officers, managers, agents acting within the scope of their agency, and employees. Pixar shall include directors, officers, managers, agents, or employees of any parent of or any entity under common control with Pixar, only when such individuals are acting in

their capacity as directors, officers, managers, agents, or employees of Pixar.

G. “Agreement” means any contract, arrangement, or understanding, formal or informal, oral or written, between two or more persons.

H. “No direct solicitation provision” means any agreement, or part of an agreement, among two or more persons that restrains any person from cold calling, soliciting, recruiting, or otherwise competing for employees of another person.

I. “Person” means any natural person, corporation, company, partnership, joint venture, firm, association, proprietorship, agency, board, authority, commission, office, or other business or legal entity, whether private or governmental.

J. “Senior manager” means any company officer or employee above the level of vice president.

III. Applicability

This Final Judgment applies to Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, and Pixar, as defined in Section II, and to all other persons in active concert or participation with any of them who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise.

IV. Prohibited Conduct

Each Defendant is enjoined from attempting to enter into, entering into, maintaining or enforcing any agreement with any other person to in any way refrain from, requesting that any person in any way refrain from, or pressuring any person in any way to refrain from soliciting, cold calling, recruiting, or otherwise competing for employees of the other person.

V. Conduct Not Prohibited

A. Nothing in Section IV shall prohibit a Defendant and any other person from attempting to enter into, entering into, maintaining or enforcing a no direct solicitation provision, provided the no direct solicitation provision is:

1. Contained within existing and future employment or severance agreements with the Defendant’s employees;

2. Reasonably necessary for mergers or acquisitions, consummated or unconsummated, investments, or divestitures, including due diligence related thereto;

3. Reasonably necessary for contracts with consultants or recipients of consulting services, auditors, outsourcing vendors, recruiting agencies or providers of temporary employees or contract workers;

4. Reasonably necessary for the settlement or compromise of legal disputes; or

5. Reasonably necessary for (i) contracts with resellers or OEMs; (ii) contracts with providers or recipients of services other than those enumerated in paragraphs V.A. 1–4 above; or (iii) the function of a legitimate collaboration agreement, such as joint development, technology integration, joint ventures, joint projects (including teaming agreements), and the shared use of facilities.

B. All no direct solicitation provisions that relate to written agreements described in Section V.A.5.i, ii, or iii, that a Defendant enters into, renews, or affirmatively extends after the date of entry of this Final Judgment shall:

1. Identify, with specificity, the agreement to which it is ancillary;
2. Be narrowly tailored to affect only employees who are anticipated to be directly involved in the agreement;
3. Identify with reasonable specificity the employees who are subject to the agreement;
4. Contain a specific termination date or event; and
5. Be signed by all parties to the agreement, including any modifications to the agreement.

C. For all no direct solicitation provisions that relate to unwritten agreements described in Section V.A.5.i, ii, or iii, that a Defendant enters into, renews, or affirmatively extends after the date of entry of this Final Judgment, the Defendant shall maintain documents sufficient to show:

1. The specific agreement to which the no direct solicitation provision is ancillary;
2. The employees, identified with reasonable specificity, who are subject to the no direct solicitation provision; and
3. The provision's specific termination date or event.

D. Defendants shall not be required to modify or conform, but shall not enforce, any no direct solicitation provision to the extent it violates this Final Judgment if the no direct solicitation provision appears in Defendants' consulting or services agreements in effect as of the date of this Final Judgment (or in effect as of the time a Defendant acquires a company that is a party to such an agreement).

E. Nothing in Section IV shall prohibit a Defendant from unilaterally deciding to adopt a policy not to consider applications from employees of another person, or to solicit, cold call, recruit or hire employees of another person, provided that Defendants are prohibited from requesting that any other person

adopt, enforce, or maintain such a policy, and are prohibited from pressuring any other person to adopt, enforce, or maintain such a policy.

VI. Required Conduct

A. Each Defendant shall:

1. Furnish a copy of this Final Judgment and related Competitive Impact Statement within sixty days of entry of the Final Judgment to each Defendant's officers, directors, human resources managers, and senior managers who supervise employee recruiting, solicitation, or hiring efforts;
2. Furnish a copy of this Final Judgment and related Competitive Impact Statement to any person who succeeds to a position described in Section VI.A.1 within thirty days of that succession;
3. Annually brief each person designated in Sections VI.A.1 and VI.A.2 on the meaning and requirements of this Final Judgment and the antitrust laws;
4. Obtain from each person designated in Sections VI.A.1 and VI.A.2, within 60 days of that person's receipt of the Final Judgment, a certification that he or she (i) has read and, to the best of his or her ability, understands and agrees to abide by the terms of this Final Judgment; (ii) is not aware of any violation of the Final Judgment that has not been reported to the Defendant; and (iii) understands that any person's failure to comply with this Final Judgment may result in an enforcement action for civil or criminal contempt of court against each Defendant and/or any person who violates this Final Judgment;
5. Provide employees reasonably accessible notice of the existence of all agreements covered by Section V.A.5 and entered into by the company; and
6. Maintain (i) a copy of all agreements covered by Section V.A.5; and (ii) a record of certifications received pursuant to this Section.

B. For five (5) years after the entry of this Final Judgment, on or before its anniversary date, each Defendant shall file with the United States an annual statement identifying and providing copies of any agreement and any modifications thereto described in Section V.A.5, as well as describing any violation or potential violation of this Final Judgment known to any officer, director, human resources manager, or senior manager who supervises employee recruiting, solicitation, or hiring efforts. Descriptions of violations or potential violations of this Final Judgment shall include, to the extent practicable, a description of any communications constituting the violation or potential violation,

including the date and place of the communication, the persons involved, and the subject matter of the communication.

C. If any officer, director, human resources manager, or senior manager who supervises employee recruiting, solicitation, or hiring efforts of a Defendant learns of any violation or potential violation of any of the terms and conditions contained in this Final Judgment, that Defendant shall promptly take appropriate action to terminate or modify the activity so as to comply with this Final Judgment and maintain all documents related to any violation or potential violation of this Final Judgment.

VII. Compliance Inspection

A. For the purposes of determining or securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or of determining whether the Final Judgment should be modified or vacated, from time to time authorized representatives of the United States Department of Justice, including consultants and other persons retained by the United States, shall, upon the written request of an authorized representative of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, and on reasonable notice to each Defendant, subject to any legally recognized privilege, be permitted:

1. Access during each Defendant's regular office hours to inspect and copy, or at the option of the United States, to require each Defendant to provide electronic or hard copies of, all books, ledgers, accounts, records, data, and documents in the possession, custody, or control of each Defendant, relating to any matters contained in this Final Judgment; and
2. To interview, either informally or on the record, each Defendant's officers, employees, or agents, who may have their counsel, including any individual counsel, present, regarding such matters. The interviews shall be subject to the reasonable convenience of the interviewee and without restraint or interference by any Defendant.

B. Upon the written request of an authorized representative of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, each Defendant shall submit written reports or responses to written interrogatories, under oath if requested, relating to any of the matters contained in this Final Judgment as may be requested.

C. No information or documents obtained by the means provided in this section shall be divulged by the United States to any person other than an authorized representative of the executive branch of the United States,

except in the course of legal proceedings to which the United States is a party (including grand jury proceedings), or for the purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or as otherwise required by law.

D. If at the time information or documents are furnished by a Defendant to the United States, the Defendant represents and identifies in writing the material in any such information or documents to which a claim of protection may be asserted under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Defendant marks each pertinent page of such material, "Subject to claim of protection under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," then the United States shall give the Defendant ten (10) calendar days notice prior to divulging such material in any legal proceeding (other than a grand jury proceeding).

VIII. Retention of Jurisdiction

This Court retains jurisdiction to enable any party to this Final Judgment to apply to this Court at any time for further orders and directions as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out or construe this Final Judgment, to modify any of its provisions, to enforce compliance, and to punish violations of its provisions.

IX. Expiration of Final Judgment

Unless this court grants an extension, this Final Judgment shall expire five (5) years from the date of its approval by the Court.

X. Notice

For purposes of this Final Judgment, any notice or other communication shall be given to the persons at the addresses set forth below (or such other addresses as they may specify in writing to Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, and Pixar): Chief, Networks & Technology Enforcement Section, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 7100, Washington, DC 20530.

XI. Public Interest Determination

Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest. The parties have complied with the Procedures of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16, including making copies available to the public of this Final Judgment, the Competitive Impact Statement, and any comments thereon and the United States' responses to comments. Based upon the record before the Court, which includes the Competitive Impact Statement and any comments and response to comments

filed with the Court, entry of this final judgment is in the public interest.

Court approval subject to procedures of Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16.

United States District Judge.

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BILLING CODE 4410-11-P

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Notice of Permit Applications Received Under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978 (Pub. L. 95-541)

AGENCY: National Science Foundation.

ACTION: Notice of Permit Applications Received under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978, Public Law 95-541.

SUMMARY: The National Science Foundation (NSF) is required to publish notice of permit applications received to conduct activities regulated under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978. NSF has published regulations under the Antarctic Conservation Act at title 45, part 670 of the Code of Federal Regulations. This is the required notice of permit applications received.

DATES: Interested parties are invited to submit written data, comments, or views with respect to this permit application by November 1, 2010. This application may be inspected by interested parties at the Permit Office, address below.

ADDRESSES: Comments should be addressed to Permit Office, Room 755, Office of Polar Programs, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22230.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nadene G. Kennedy at the above address or (703) 292-7405.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The National Science Foundation, as directed by the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978 (Pub. L. 95-541), as amended by the Antarctic Science, Tourism and Conservation Act of 1996, has developed regulations for the establishment of a permit system for various activities in Antarctica and designation of certain animals and certain geographic areas requiring special protection. The regulations establish such a permit system to designate Antarctic Specially Protected Areas.

The applications received are as follows:

1. *Applicant:* Yu-Ping Chin, Department of Geological Sciences, Ohio State University, 275 Mendenhall

Laboratory, 125 South Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210-1308.

Permit Application No. 2011-018.

Activity for Which Permit Is Requested

Enter Antarctic Specially Protected Areas. The applicant plans to center Cape Royds (ASPA 121) and Backdoor Bay, Cape Royds (ASPA 157) to access Pony Lake to collect water samples. Samples were collected previously from the lake and the microbially derived Dissolved Organic Matter (DOM) from this site is now a reference fulvic acid distributed by the International Humic Substances Society (IHSS). The applicant plans to collect more DOM samples for the purpose of comparing their Cotton Glacier samples to Pony Lake DOM.

Location

Cape Royds (ASPA 121) and Backdoor Bay, Cape Royds (ASPA 157).

Dates

January 1, 2011 to January 31, 2011.

Nadene G. Kennedy,

Permit Officer, Office of Polar Programs.

[FR Doc. 2010-24638 Filed 9-30-10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555-01-P

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

Surrender of License of Small Business Investment Company

Pursuant to the authority granted to the United States Small Business Administration under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, under Section 309 of the Act and Section 107.1900 of the Small Business Administration Rules and Regulations (13 CFR 107.1900) to function as a small business investment company under the Small business Investment Company License No. 06/76-0316 issued to SBIC Partners II, L.P., on June 16, 1998 and said license is hereby declared null and void as of July 28, 2010.

United States Small Business Administration.

Sean J. Greene,

AA/Investment.

[FR Doc. 2010-24612 Filed 9-30-10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE P

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

Surrender of License of Small Business Investment Company

Pursuant to the authority granted to the United States Small Business Administration under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, under