[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 61 (Wednesday, March 30, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 17712-17715]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-7453]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2011-0060; Docket No. 50-271; License No. DPR-28]
In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy
Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station;
Director's Decision
I. Introduction
By letter dated April 19, 2010, Congressman Paul W. Hodes, U.S.
House of Representatives, filed a Petition pursuant to Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 2.206, ``Requests for
action under this subpart,'' with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC or the Commission). The Petition requested that the NRC not allow
the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Vermont Yankee), operated by
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy or the licensee), to restart
in May 2010 after its scheduled refueling outage until the completion
of all environmental remediation work and relevant reports on leaking
tritium at the plant. Specifically, the Petition asked the NRC to
prevent Vermont Yankee from resuming power production until the
following efforts have been completed to the Commission's satisfaction:
(1) The tritiated groundwater remediation process; (2) the soil
remediation process scheduled to take place during the refueling
outage, to remove soil containing tritium and radioactive isotopes of
cesium, manganese, zinc, and cobalt; (3) Entergy's root cause analysis;
and (4) the Commission's review of the documents presented by Entergy
as a result of the Commission's Demand for Information (DFI) imposed on
the licensee on March 1, 2010.
This Petition was assigned to the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (NRR) for review. NRR's Petition Review Board (PRB) met on
May 3, 2010, and made an initial recommendation to accept this Petition
for review. The NRC communicated this decision to the Petitioner's
staff, who told the PRB that the Petitioner did not desire to address
the PRB. The PRB's final recommendation was to accept the Petition for
review. By letter dated May 20, 2010, Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML101310049, the NRC informed
the Petitioner of the PRB's recommendation and also stated that the NRC
did not find cause to prohibit the restart of Vermont Yankee.
By letters dated May 14 and June 16, 2010, the Petitioner provided
the NRC
[[Page 17713]]
with supplements to his Petition. After full consideration of the
Petition and supplements, NRR has concluded that the actions requested
in the Petition have been taken, with the exception of preventing the
restart of Vermont Yankee. Therefore, NRR concludes that the Petition
has been granted in part and denied in part, as explained below.
Copies of the Petition are available for inspection at the
Commission's Public Document Room (PDR) at One White Flint North, Room
O1-F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland 20852,
and from the NRC's ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room on the NRC Web
site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html under ADAMS Accession
No. ML101120663. The supplemental letters are under ADAMS Accession
Nos. ML101370031 and ML101720485. NRC Management Directive 8.11,
``Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions,'' ADAMS Accession No.
ML041770328, describes the petition review process. Persons who do not
have access to ADAMS or who have problems accessing the documents in
ADAMS should contact the NRC PDR reference staff by telephone at 1-800-
397-4209 or 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to [email protected].
The NRC sent a copy of the proposed Director's Decision to the
Petitioner for comment on November 18, 2010, and to the licensee for
comment on November 29, 2010. The Petitioner did not provide any
comments. By e-mail dated December 21, 2010, ADAMS Accession No.
ML110050341, the licensee provided minor comments. The licensee's
comments and the NRC staff responses are discussed in the Attachment to
this Director's Decision.
II. Discussion
On January 7, 2010, Entergy reported to the NRC that water samples
taken from groundwater monitoring well GZ-3 on site at Vermont Yankee
showed tritium levels above background. GZ-3 is about 70 feet from the
Connecticut River. Tritium is another name for the radioactive nuclide
hydrogen-3. Tritium occurs naturally in the environment because of
cosmic ray interactions. It is also produced by nuclear reactor
operations, and can be legally discharged as a radioactive effluent
under NRC regulations. Tritium is chemically identical to normal
hydrogen (hydrogen-1), and, like normal hydrogen, tends to combine with
oxygen to form water, which is referred to as tritiated water. The
detection of tritiated water in the monitoring well indicated abnormal
leakage from the nuclear plant. The Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA's) regulatory standard for tritium in drinking water is 20,000
picocuries per liter (pCi/L). Tritium was initially measured at levels
up to about 17,000 pCi/L in monitoring well GZ-3. Water from monitoring
well GZ-3 is not used for drinking water. Samples at other monitoring
wells have also shown some tritium. The highest reading from any
monitoring well has been about 2.5 million pCi/L, from monitoring well
GZ-10. Entergy immediately started an investigation to identify the
source of the tritium, and later installed additional monitoring wells
to help locate the source.
Upon notification, the NRC staff initiated actions to review and
assess the condition, including review of all available sampling data,
hydrologic information and analyses, on-site inspection and assessment
of Entergy's plans and process for investigating the condition, and
independent determination of public health and safety consequences
based on available information. NRC inspectors provided close
regulatory oversight of Entergy's investigation in order to
independently assure conformance with applicable NRC regulatory
requirements, assess licensee performance, and evaluate the condition
with respect to NRC's radiological release limits.
On February 27, 2010, following excavation and leak testing of the
Advanced Off-Gas (AOG) system pipe tunnel, Entergy reported that it had
identified leakage into the surrounding soil, and therefore to the
groundwater, from an unsealed joint in the concrete tunnel wall. The
AOG pipe tunnel is located about 15 feet underground. Also, piping
inside the tunnel had previously been found to be leaking, and the
drain inside the tunnel had been found to be clogged. Soil samples in
the vicinity showed traces of radioactive isotopes. Entergy reported
that the leakage to the environment had been stopped by isolating the
piping and containing the water leaking from the AOG pipe tunnel.
However, on May 28, 2010, Entergy reported a second leak from AOG
piping into the soil. Entergy quickly isolated this leak and has sealed
off that piping to prevent further leaks in that area. On June 8, 2010,
Entergy reported a leak in the reactor building, which was not
associated with the AOG system. The leak reported on June 8th was from
a relief valve on a heat exchanger that started leaking to the building
drain system. This leakage was collected and processed through the
radioactive waste treatment system, and had no effect on the
environment. The relief valve was replaced.
As part of its oversight effort, NRC staff conducted an evaluation
in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0309, ``Reactive Inspection
Decision Basis for Reactors,'' to determine if the occurrence with the
AOG piping constituted a significant operational event (i.e., a
radiological, safeguards, or other safety-related operational
condition) that posed an actual or potential hazard to public health
and safety, property, or the environment. The evaluation reviewed the
condition against the specified deterministic criteria, which are based
on regulatory safety limits, and determined that none of the criteria
were met. Notwithstanding that determination, NRC staff continued on-
going review, oversight, and assessment of the condition, including
independent evaluation of any potential public health and safety
consequence. These activities included:
1. Several on-site inspections and reviews to assess radiological
and hydrological data to establish reasonable assurance that members of
the public were not, nor expected to be, exposed to radiation in excess
of the dose limits for individual members of the public specified in 10
CFR 20.1301, 100 millirem in a year; and determine if the licensee's
performance was in conformance with applicable regulatory requirements.
2. Engagement of hydrological scientists from NRC's Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Office of Regulatory Research, and the U.S.
Geological Survey to independently assess the licensee's hydrological
and geological data and conclusions on groundwater flow characteristics
of the area.
3. Inspection in accordance with NRC Temporary Instruction TI-2515/
173, ``Review of the Implementation of the Industry Ground Water
Protection Voluntary Initiative,'' to determine the licensee's
implementation of the specifications in the industry's groundwater
initiative document Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)-07-07, ``Industry
Groundwater Protection Initiative--Final Guidance Document,'' ADAMS
Accession No. ML072610036.
4. Independent confirmation of the basis, calculation methodology,
and results obtained by the licensee to estimate a contaminated
groundwater effluent release and off-site dose consequence to members
of the public.
5. Independent analysis of selected groundwater and environmental
samples to aid in determining the adequacy of the licensee's analytical
methods.
6. Establishment of an approved deviation from NRC's normal Reactor
[[Page 17714]]
Oversight Process in order to expend additional NRC inspection
resources to fully evaluate and provide continuing regulatory oversight
of the licensee's investigation and remediation activities.
7. Documentation of inspection scope and conclusions in publicly
available NRC Inspection Reports.
As a result of these activities, the NRC established reasonable
assurance, in a timely manner, that this groundwater condition would
not result in any dose consequence that would jeopardize public health
and safety. To date, information and data continue to support the
finding that the dose consequence attributable to the groundwater
condition at Vermont Yankee remains well below the ``as low as
reasonably achievable'' (ALARA) dose objectives specified in 10 CFR
Part 50, Appendix I; and that the NRC regulatory criteria of 10 CFR
20.1301, ``Dose limits for individual members of the public,'' were
never approached.
In addition, the State of Vermont has provided support from the
Vermont Department of Health, Office of Public Health Preparedness. The
State of Vermont's Radiological Health Chief participated in the
oversight of the tritium investigation, with direct onsite
participation in inspections and data analysis. In addition, the State
of Vermont has performed independent split sampling analyses of the
groundwater monitoring samples.
A. The Tritiated Groundwater Remediation Process
On March 24, 2010, Entergy began removing tritiated water from
extraction well GZ-EW1. On April 7, 2010, Entergy placed into service a
second extraction well, GZ-EW1A, with a higher flow capacity. As the
highest plume concentration progressed toward the Connecticut River,
the extraction wells were sited accordingly, with GZ-15 being used for
groundwater extraction at various times starting on July 28, 2010,
followed by installation of extraction well EW-2, which began operation
along with GZ-14 on September 13, 2010. As of December 21, 2010,
Entergy had pumped approximately 307,000 gallons of groundwater out of
these wells to reduce the amount of tritiated water in the groundwater.
About 298,000 gallons of the extracted water has been shipped offsite
for disposal at a licensed waste disposal facility, and the remainder
was processed in the station's radioactive waste system. Entergy
recently announced it intends to make additional groundwater
withdrawals going forward. A plume of tritiated groundwater extends
from the source of the leak to the Connecticut River, which is the
direction of flow for the groundwater in this location. Although no
detectable tritium has been found in the Connecticut River, the
hydrology model indicates that there has been some flow into the river,
and some flow will continue as rainwater recharges the groundwater. The
NRC's inspections indicate that no federal regulatory limits have been
or are expected to be exceeded, and there are no health or safety
concerns for members of the public or plant workers.
B. The Soil Remediation Process
The soil in the vicinity of the leak was contaminated with small
amounts of other radioactive nuclides associated with nuclear plant
operations, including manganese-54, cobalt-60, zinc-65, strontium-90,
and cesium-137. Sampling indicated very little migration in the
immediate area, which is typical for these radionuclides. Entergy has
removed about 150 cubic feet of contaminated soil, and packaged it for
disposal at a licensed disposal facility. Although some minor amounts
of soil contaminated with these other radionuclides may remain, NRC
inspections indicate that this soil poses no threat to public health
and safety. Areas of minor contamination are evaluated and remediated
as needed during plant decommissioning in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82.
The NRC's experience with decommissioning nuclear plants such as Maine
Yankee, Haddam Neck, and Yankee Rowe indicates that these areas can be
successfully remediated at that time. The NRC's inspections indicate
that no federal regulatory limits have been exceeded, and there are no
health or safety concerns for members of the public or plant workers.
The initial NRC inspection covered the period of January 25 through
April 14, 2010. Inspection results were initially discussed in an NRC
letter with preliminary results, dated April 16, 2010, ADAMS Accession
No. ML101060419. The NRC issued its completed report on May 20, 2010,
ADAMS Accession No. ML101400040, and continues to inspect the
licensee's actions in these areas.
C. Entergy's Root Cause Analysis
As part of its corrective action program, Entergy performed a root
cause analysis (RCA) of the leakage event. The NRC assessed the
comprehensiveness of this analysis and documented this review in NRC
Inspection Report 05000271/2010009 dated October 13, 2010, ADAMS
Accession No. ML102860037. The NRC concluded that Entergy's root and
apparent cause evaluations for the tritium groundwater leakage events
were appropriate, although the agency noted some performance
deficiencies. No violation of NRC requirements was identified.
D. The NRC's Demand for Information
On February 24, 2010, Entergy informed the NRC that it had removed
some employees at Vermont Yankee from their site positions and placed
them on administrative leave. Entergy took these actions as a result of
its independent internal investigation into alleged contradictory or
misleading information provided to the State of Vermont that was not
corrected. In light of Entergy's investigation and resulting actions,
the NRC issued a DFI dated March 1, 2010, ADAMS Accession No.
ML100570237, requiring Entergy to confirm whether communications over
the past 5 years to the NRC by these individuals, that were material to
NRC-regulated activities, were complete and accurate. Entergy responded
to the NRC on March 31, 2010, ADAMS Accession No. ML100910420. The
NRC's review of Entergy's DFI response and Entergy's communications did
not identify any cases of incomplete or inaccurate statements to the
NRC. The NRC closed the review of the DFI response in a letter to
Entergy dated June 17, 2010, ADAMS Accession No. ML101670271. Based on
this review, the NRC concludes that Entergy's communications with the
NRC have been accurate and have met regulatory requirements. The NRC
also concluded that the site employees continue to demonstrate an
appropriate safety culture.
E. NRC Actions Pertaining to Groundwater Contamination
In March of 2010, NRC's Executive Director of Operations (EDO)
established a Groundwater Task Force (GTF) to review the NRC's approach
to overseeing buried pipes given the recent incidents of leaking buried
pipes at commercial nuclear power plants. The charter of the Task Force
was to reevaluate the recommendations made in the Liquid Radioactive
Release Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report dated September 1,
2006, ADAMS Accession No. ML062650312; review the actions taken in the
Commission paper SECY-09-0174 (Staff Progress in Evaluation of Buried
Piping at Nuclear Reactor Facilities, dated December 2, 2009, ADAMS
Accession No. ML093160004); and review the actions taken in response to
recent releases of tritium into groundwater by nuclear facilities.
The GTF completed its work in June 2010 and provided its report to
the EDO.
[[Page 17715]]
The report characterized a variety of issues ranging from policy issues
to communications improvement opportunities. The complete report may be
found under ADAMS Accession No. ML101680435. The GTF determined that
the NRC is accomplishing its stated mission of protecting public
health, safety, and protection of the environment through its response
to groundwater leaks/spills. Within the current regulatory structure,
the NRC is correctly applying requirements and properly characterizing
the relevant issues. However, the GTF reported that there are further
observations, conclusions, and recommendations that the NRC should
consider in its oversight of licensed material outside of its design
confinement.
The EDO appointed a group of NRC senior executives to review the
report and consider its findings. Over the past several months, the
group has been reviewing the GTF final report, including the
conclusions, recommendations, and their bases. They identified
conclusions and recommendations that do not involve policy issues, and
tasked the NRC staff to address them. They have also identified policy
issues, are developing options to address them, and will send a policy
paper to the Commission discussing those options.
The NRC held a public workshop on October 4, 2010, with external
stakeholders to discuss the findings of the GTF report and to receive
input on the potential policy issues. In addition, a request for public
comment was published in the Federal Register (75 FR 57987, September
23, 2010). These efforts help to ensure the NRC is considering the
right issues on which to focus its attention as it moves forward. The
transcript from this meeting is available on the NRC's Web site at:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/buried-pipes-tritium.html.
III. Conclusion
Based on the information summarized above, the NRC staff concludes
that the activities requested by the Petitioner have been completed,
with the exception of preventing the restart of Vermont Yankee.
Therefore, NRR concludes that the Petition has been granted in part and
denied in part. Related documentation includes an NRC letter to Entergy
on increased oversight dated April 8, 2010, ADAMS Accession No.
ML100990458.
As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Director's Decision
will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission
to review. As provided for by this regulation, the Decision will
constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of
the Decision unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a
review of the Decision within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27 day of January 2011.
For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Eric J. Leeds,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
ATTACHMENT TO THE FINAL DIRECTOR'S DECISION; DISCUSSION OF COMMENTS ON
THE PROPOSED DIRECTOR'S DECISION FROM THE LICENSEE, AND THE NRC STAFF
RESPONSES
By e-mail dated December 21, 2010, ADAMS Accession No.
ML110050341, the licensee provided comments on the proposed
Director's Decision on the Petition filed by Congressman Paul Hodes
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206, ``Requests for action under this
subpart.'' The licensee's comments and corresponding response from
the NRC staff are provided below:
Comment 1:
Section II, ``Discussion:
a) GZ-3 is actually located approximately 70 ft from the
Connecticut River. Actual distance depends on river stage.
b) The highest reading from any monitoring well has been 2.52
million pci/L (measured on 2/8/2010) from monitoring well GZ-10.
c) On June 8th, Entergy reported a leak in the reactor building
(June 8th was the date that RHR relief valve leakage was discovered.
This required a 4-hour notification to the NRC).
The NRC Staff Response:
Revised the Director's Decision to reflect the comments.
Comment 2:
A. The Tritiated Groundwater Remediation Process:
a) Monitoring well GZ-15 was utilized for groundwater extraction
from July 28, 2010, until September 2, 2010, and again from October
28, 2010, until November 8, 2010.
b) As of December 21, 2010, Entergy has pumped 307,000 gallons
of groundwater.
c) About 298,000 gallons of water was shipped offsite for
disposal and 9,000 gallons was returned to the station's liquid
radioactive waste system for in-plant use.
d) Evaluation of continued extraction is on-going.
e) On March 23, 2010, Entergy installed an extraction well (GZ-
EW1). (The well was installed on 3/23 and placed in service on 3/
24).
The NRC Staff Response:
Revised the Director's Decision to reflect the comments.
[FR Doc. 2011-7453 Filed 3-29-11; 8:45 am]
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