[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 141 (Friday, July 22, 2011)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 43937-43941]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-18608]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 73
[NRC-2011-0164]
Criminal Penalties for Unauthorized Introduction of Weapons and
Sabotage
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Request for comment; notice of public Webinar.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission)
is seeking input from the public, licensees, certificate holders,
Agreement States, non-Agreement States, and other stakeholders on
whether to conduct further rulemaking to implement the criminal penalty
provisions found under Sections 229 and 236 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended (AEA). To aid in that process, the NRC is requesting
comments on the issues discussed in this document. While the NRC has
not initiated a rulemaking on this subject, it is using the
conventionally established rulemaking comment channels. Additionally,
the NRC will hold a public Webinar to discuss these issues.
DATES: Submit comments on the issues discussed in this document by
October 20, 2011. Comments received after the above date will be
considered if it is practical to do so, but the NRC is able to ensure
consideration only for comments received on or before this date.
ADDRESSES: Please include Docket ID NRC-2011-0164 in the subject line
of your comments. Comments submitted in writing or in electronic form
will be posted on the NRC Web site and on the Federal rulemaking Web
site, http://www.regulations.gov. Because your comments will not be
edited to remove any identifying or contact information, the NRC
cautions you against including any information in your submission that
you do not want to be publicly disclosed.
The NRC requests that any party soliciting or aggregating comments
received from other persons for submission to the NRC inform those
persons that the NRC will not edit their comments to remove any
identifying or contact information, and therefore, they should not
include any information in their comments that they do not want
publicly disclosed. You may submit comments by any one of the following
methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for documents filed under Docket ID NRC-
2011-0164. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher,
telephone: 301-492-3668; e-mail: [email protected].
Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Chief, Rules,
Announcements, and Directives Branch (RADB), Office of Administration,
Mail Stop: TWB-05-B01M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001.
Fax comments to: RADB at 301-492-3446.
You can access publicly available documents related to this
document using the following methods:
NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine
and have copied, for a fee, publicly available documents at the NRC's
PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland 20852.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC
are available online in the NRC Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain entry into ADAMS,
which provides text and image files of the NRC's public documents. If
you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing
the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR reference staff
at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to [email protected].
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Public comments and
supporting materials related to this notice can be found at http://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID NRC-2011-0164.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Fritz Sturz, Office of Nuclear
Security and Incident Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-6678; e-mail:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Section 229 of the AEA provides Federal criminal sanctions for the
wrongful introduction of weapons or explosives into specified classes
of facilities, installations or real property under the jurisdiction,
administration, in the custody of, or subject to the licensing
authority or certification by the Commission. Similarly, Section 236 of
the AEA provides Federal criminal sanctions for sabotage of specified
classes of nuclear facilities or materials.
On August 8, 2005, President Bush signed into law the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 (EPAct), Public Law 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). Section
654 of the EPAct, ``Unauthorized Introduction of Dangerous Weapons''
(119 Stat. 812), amended Section 229 of the AEA, ``Trespass on
Commission Installations'' (42 U.S.C. 2278a), to broaden the list of
facilities covered by Section 229. Similarly, Section 655 of the EPAct,
``Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities, Fuel, or Designated Material'' (119
Stat. 594), amended Section 236 of the AEA, ``Sabotage of Nuclear
Facilities or Fuel'' (42 U.S.C. 2284), to broaden the list of
facilities that are covered by Section 236. Additionally, Section 655
of the EPAct added a provision in Section 236(a) authorizing the NRC to
identify certain radioactive material or other property for inclusion
within the scope of the criminal penalties in Section 236, if the
Commission determines by rulemaking or order that such material
[[Page 43938]]
or other property is of significance to public health and safety or the
common defense and security.
Section 229 of the AEA now authorizes the NRC to issue regulations
``relating to the entry upon or carrying, transporting, or otherwise
introducing or causing to be introduced any dangerous weapon,
explosive, or other dangerous instrument or material likely to produce
substantial injury or damage to persons or property, into or upon any
facility, installation, or real property subject to the jurisdiction,
administration, in the custody of the Commission, or subject to the
licensing authority of the Commission or certification by the
Commission under this Act or any other Act.''
Section 236 of the AEA makes it a Federal crime to knowingly
destroy or cause physical damage, or to attempt or to conspire to
commit such acts, to any of the following: (1) Production facilities or
utilization facilities licensed under the AEA; (2) nuclear waste
treatment, storage, or disposal facilities licensed under the AEA; (3)
nuclear fuel (destined) for such utilization facilities or spent
nuclear fuel from such utilization facilities; (4) uranium enrichment,
uranium conversion, or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities licensed or
certified by the NRC; (5) production, utilization, waste storage, waste
treatment, waste disposal, uranium enrichment, uranium conversion, or
nuclear fuel fabrication facilities subject to licensing or
certification under the AEA during the construction of the facility, if
the destruction or damage caused or attempted to be caused could
adversely affect public health and safety during the operation of the
facility; or (6) primary facilities or backup facilities from which a
radiological emergency preparedness alert and warning system is
activated.
II. Discussion
A. Comments on Proposed Rule
On September 3, 2008, the NRC published a proposed rule in the
Federal Register (73 FR 51378) containing draft regulations
implementing the NRC's authority to impose Federal criminal penalties
on individuals who, without authorization, introduce weapons or
explosives into specified classes of facilities and installations
subject to the regulatory authority of the NRC. In addition to the
proposed regulations, the notice identified several specific issues for
which the NRC sought comments. These issues included whether the rule's
scope should be extended beyond the facilities listed in the proposed
rule to cover hospitals and other classes of facilities licensed to
possess nationally tracked sources that are included in the NRC's
National Source Tracking System (i.e., licensees possessing certain
quantities of radioactive material).
Seventeen comments were received on the proposed rule. Some
commenters addressed the issue of whether a final rule should cover
additional facilities. Some of these comments favored extending
coverage to hospitals and other facilities possessing nuclear or
radioactive material. The reasons given included: (1) Anyone who
introduces a dangerous weapon, explosive, or other dangerous material
into such a facility most likely intends to do harm; (2) anyone
bringing such an item into a hospital or other facility that ``stores
nuclear or radioactive material'' should expect to be penalized for
doing so; (3) warning signs will ensure that the rule is not violated
by accident, although anyone who intends to cause harm in a covered
facility would likely not be deterred by the rule anyway; and (4) those
seeking to access nuclear or radioactive materials in such facilities
for illicit purposes would likely be able to locate those materials
even if there are no warning signs posted pursuant to this rule. A
major medical institution commented on the proposed rule and
recommended against extending the sign-posting requirement to medical
facilities. This commenter reasoned as follows: (1) Warning signs would
attract attention to the location of radioactive material sources
covered by the NRC's National Source Tracking System, thereby
potentially rendering them less secure, given that many licensees
currently try to avoid drawing attention to the locations of such
materials; (2) the strong language in the posting could be frightening
to patients in hospitals, who may already be in a vulnerable state
caused by their medical situations; and (3) persons with unescorted
access to facility areas of concern can simply be trained both to
understand the rule themselves and to warn persons they escort about
the rule's existence.
This commenter also noted that if the NRC expands the National
Source Tracking System in the future to include Category 3 and 1/10th
of Category 3 byproduct material sources \1\, then a corresponding
expansion of byproduct material sources under Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Sec. 73.75, would encompass many
additional hospitals and other facilities.
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\1\ Category 3 equals one-tenth (1/10th) of the Category 2
values listed in 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix I, International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/features/researchreactors/conduct.html/adams.html.
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On September 22, 2009, the Commission, in its Staff Requirements
Memorandum on SECY-09-0087 (ADAMS Accession No. ML092650473), directed
the staff to ``conduct an assessment to determine whether including any
such facilities [under the new authority of Section 229 or Section 236,
or both, of the AEA] is warranted considering existing Federal, State,
and local laws regarding the introduction of firearms and other weapons
into these types of facilities, as well as other relevant facility
specific considerations.'' The Commission further directed that ``[t]he
staff should engage with appropriate stakeholders, including the
Organization of Agreement States [OAS]''; ``[i]f the staff concludes,
based on its assessment, that additional rulemaking is warranted, it
should submit a rulemaking plan for the Commission's approval
explaining the need for the rule and describing the views of
stakeholders.''
The NRC has concluded it would be appropriate to consider whether
the agency should specify certain byproduct material, high-level
radioactive waste, and source material as being of such significance to
public health and safety or the common defense and security as to
warrant criminal sanctions under the AEA for the introduction of
dangerous weapons into, or damage or attempted damage to, facilities
holding these materials.
Accordingly, the NRC is seeking input from the public, licensees,
certificate holders, Agreement States, non-Agreement States, and other
stakeholders on whether to conduct a rulemaking to develop regulations
implementing the criminal penalty provisions of Section 229 or Section
236, or both, of the AEA regarding unauthorized introduction of weapons
or explosives into specified classes of NRC- and Agreement State-
regulated facilities and the sabotage or attempted sabotage of
specified classes of radioactive materials and other property,
respectively.
B. Significant Issues
Section 229 of the AEA establishes Federal criminal penalties for
individuals who trespass upon or introduce dangerous instruments or
material likely to cause harm or damage to NRC-regulated facilities or
otherwise under the jurisdiction of the Commission. Section 236 of the
AEA establishes Federal criminal penalties for individuals who
knowingly commit, attempt or conspire to destroy or cause damage to
certain nuclear facilities or
[[Page 43939]]
materials. Criminal penalties are designed, in part to serve as a
deterrent to such acts. In considering the question of an effective
deterrent, the NRC notes that the punishment for a conviction for a
violation of Section 229 can range from a fine not to exceed $1,000 up
to a fine not to exceed $5,000, or imprisonment for not more than 1
year, or both, depending on the circumstances of the offense. By
contrast, the punishment for a conviction for a violation of Section
236 can be a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more
than 20 years, or both, and, if death results to any person,
imprisonment shall be for any term of years or for life, depending on
the circumstances of the offense. Notwithstanding any changes to
Sections 229 and 236 of the AEA, the States would retain their full
authority to impose appropriate sanctions for violations of state laws.
States typically have a large range of existing statutes to
prosecute individuals who introduce or cause to be introduced dangerous
weapons, explosives, or other dangerous material into, or use such
items in the commission of a crime against, an NRC- or Agreement State-
regulated facility (e.g., murder, attempted murder, assault, assault
with a deadly weapon). However, the variability of State law and
consistency of State prosecution are factors that may limit the
effectiveness and consistency of these penalties as a deterrent
strategy. Relying on Federal statutes for prosecution might create a
more consistent deterrent strategy. Consequently, the NRC is seeking
stakeholder views on whether the NRC should promulgate regulations
implementing the NRC's expanded authority set forth in Sections 229 and
236 of the AEA.
C. Agreement State Compatibility \2\
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\2\ Refer to Handbook 5.9 Management Directive 5.9, ``Adequacy
and Compatibility of Agreement State Programs'' (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/management-directives/volumes/vol-5.html).
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In seeking stakeholder input on whether to include other facilities
containing nuclear and radioactive material, the NRC is also using this
notice to obtain input from stakeholders regarding the bases for the
rulemaking and associated Agreement State compatibility. The
designation of the authority being used for regulations does have
significance in determining whether the Agreement States or the NRC
would be responsible for overseeing the implementation of these
requirements for Agreement State licensees. The NRC relinquishes its
regulatory authority to Agreement States for certain materials, under
Section 274 m. of the AEA. However, if a rulemaking were to be issued
solely under the NRC's authority to protect the common defense and
security, only the NRC would have the authority to impose these
requirements on Agreement State licensees, and the NRC would be
responsible for the inspection and enforcement of these requirements
for Agreement State licensees. When a rulemaking applies to both the
NRC's public health and safety and common defense and security
missions, the operative question is whether NRC oversight is necessary
to fulfill the common defense and security aspects of the regulations.
The NRC believes that a rulemaking implementing the provisions of
Section 229 could have a ``public health and safety'' basis or a
``common defense and security'' basis.
Under the ``Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of
Agreement State Programs'' approved by the Commission on June 30, 1997,
and published in the Federal Register (62 FR 46517; September 3, 1997),
a rulemaking under the NRC's public health and safety authority would
be a matter of compatibility between the NRC and the Agreement States,
thereby providing consistency among the Agreement States and the NRC
requirements. The NRC program elements (including regulations) are
placed into four compatibility categories. In addition, the NRC program
elements can be identified as having particular health and safety
significance or as being reserved solely to the NRC. Compatibility
Category A includes those program elements that are basic radiation
protection standards and scientific terms and definitions that are
necessary to understand radiation protection concepts. An Agreement
State should adopt Category A program elements in an essentially
identical manner to provide uniformity in the regulation of agreement
material on a nationwide basis. Compatibility Category B includes those
program elements that apply to activities that have direct and
significant effects in multiple jurisdictions. An Agreement State
should adopt Category B program elements in an essentially identical
manner. Compatibility Category C includes those program elements that
do not meet the criteria of Category A or B but nonetheless an
Agreement State should adopt the essential objectives of the Category C
program elements to avoid conflict, duplication, gaps, or other
conditions that would jeopardize an orderly pattern in the regulation
of agreement material on a nationwide basis. Compatibility Category D
includes those program elements that do not meet any of the criteria of
Category A, B, or C, above, and thus do not need to be adopted by
Agreement States for purposes of compatibility. The health and safety
category includes program elements that are not required for
compatibility but are identified as having a particular health and
safety role (i.e., adequacy) in the regulation of agreement material
within the State. Although not required for compatibility, the State
should adopt program elements in Category D based on those NRC elements
that embody the essential objectives of the NRC program because of
particular health and safety considerations.
Both the NRC and Agreement States regulate byproduct material under
Section 274 of the AEA. Therefore, several regulatory and process
issues could arise in a rulemaking to add byproduct material licensees
to the classes of facilities covered under Section 229 of the AEA.
Under the NRC's current regulations, classes of licensees specified in
10 CFR 73.75(a) are required to post warning signs on the exterior of
their protected area or the exterior of buildings located outside a
protected area that contain certain radioactive material. These signs
are intended to warn individuals that ``the willful unauthorized
introduction of any dangerous weapons, explosives, or other dangerous
instrument or material likely to produce substantial injury or damage
to persons or property'' is a Federal crime. Were the NRC to establish
regulations implementing Section 229 under its authority to protect the
public health and safety, the required action for compatibility by
Agreement States only involves establishing requirements for applicable
Agreement State licensees to post warning signs. Agreement States would
not have to establish criminal penalties equivalent to Section 229 of
the AEA. Furthermore, an NRC rulemaking would not limit States from
establishing their own penalties under State law. Agreement States
would retain their full authority to impose appropriate sanctions for
violations of state laws. However, the Agreement States would perform
inspections verifying that any affected licensees under their
jurisdiction had installed the warning signs at their facilities.
Likewise, the NRC would perform inspections to verify warning signs at
NRC licensed facilities.
In the case of implementing regulations under the NRC's authority
to protect the common defense and
[[Page 43940]]
security, the compatibility category would be designated as ``NRC.''
Compatibility Category ``NRC'' includes those program elements that
address areas of regulation that cannot be relinquished to Agreement
States pursuant to the AEA or the provisions of 10 CFR. The Agreement
States do not adopt these program elements. In this situation, the
NRC's rulemaking establishes regulations that would apply to both
affected NRC licensees and Agreement State licensees, and the NRC would
be responsible for enforcing the requirements.
The NRC has not previously chosen to issue regulations to implement
the authority of Section 236 of the AEA. Instead, the NRC has viewed
the language of this statute as-plain enough to enable the Department
of Justice (DOJ) to initiate prosecutions for criminal acts, as the DOJ
deemed appropriate. A rulemaking would allow the NRC to identify
certain radioactive material or other property for inclusion within the
scope of Section 236 if the Commission determines that such material or
other property is of significance to the public health and safety or
the common defense and security. The NRC could conduct a rulemaking to
implement the provisions of Section 236 using a ``common defense and
security'' basis without the need for Agreement State-compatible
program elements.
D. Options for Radioactive Material, Nuclear Material, and Other
Property
In deciding whether further rulemaking is warranted, additional
types of radioactive material and other property are being considered.
Materials in Appendix I, ``Category 1 and 2 Radioactive
Materials,'' to 10 CFR Part 73, ``Physical Protection of Plants and
Materials,'' which would be considered under the authority of both
Sections 229 and 236, including multiple radionuclides, in accordance
with the Appendix I aggregation formula\3\.
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\3\ These materials are also provided in other formats in
Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 20 and Appendix P to 10 CFR part 110.
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The consideration of Category 1 and 2 radioactive materials listed
in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 73 as significant to public health and
safety or to the common defense and security is based on ``The 2010
Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report,'' dated
August 11, 2010, (http://www.nrc.gov/security/byproduct/2010-task-force-report.pdf, ADAMS Accession No. ML102230141). The interagency
task force assessed the quantities of radioactive material sufficient
to create a significant radiological dispersal device (RDD) and a
significant radiation exposure device (RED), with consideration of
social, economic, and psychological consequences. These risk-
significant radioactive materials are the same as specified in the 2004
International Atomic Energy Agency's Code of Conduct on the Safety and
Security of Radioactive Sources and as listed in Appendix I to 10 CFR
part 73.
Production-reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and naval-
reactor SNF.
Production-reactor SNF and naval-reactor SNF also present the
potential for significant health hazards and would be considered under
the authority of Section 236. While production facilities are included
in 10 CFR 73.75 under the authority of Section 229, they are not
specifically included in Sections 236.a.(1) through 236.a.(6). Since
these SNFs could be stored alongside SNF from utilization facilities at
an NRC-licensed facility, the same Federal criminal sanctions for
malevolent acts are appropriate and warranted. Including these SNFs as
radioactive material under the authority of Section 236.a.(7) would
also provide the same Federal criminal sanctions for malevolent acts
during transport to and from NRC-licensed facilities.
Source material (either unenriched or depleted uranium) in
the physical form of uranium hexafluoride (UF6).
The UF6 presents the potential for significant health
hazards and would be considered under the authority of Section 236. The
UF6 at uranium enrichment, uranium conversion, or nuclear
fuel fabrication facilities is included in 10 CFR 73.75 under the
authority of Section 229. However, including UF6 as
radioactive material under the authority of Section 236.a.(7) would
also provide the same Federal criminal sanctions for malevolent acts
during transport.
Uranium enrichment technology classified as Confidential--
Restricted Data or Secret--Restricted Data.
The classified material (i.e., components), apart from the SNM, are
of significance to the common defense and security. Uranium enrichment
facilities are included in 10 CFR 73.75 under the authority of Section
229. However, including classified uranium enrichment technologies as
property under the authority of Section 236.a.(7) would provide the
same Federal criminal sanctions for malevolent acts during transport.
E. Options for Rulemaking
The NRC is seeking stakeholder input on four options, including a
no-action alternative:
(1) Take no action (do not conduct further rulemaking on these
statutes).
(2) Conduct further rulemaking to implement the authority of only
Section 229 of the AEA. Under this option, the NRC would incur the cost
of the rulemaking; affected licensees would incur the cost of the
procurement, installment, and maintenance of the warning signs; and
affected licensees would incur the cost of the inspection of their
installation of the warning signs. If a rulemaking is conducted under
the NRC's public health and safety authority, then Agreement States
would also need to adopt compatible program elements for the notice
posting requirement only (e.g., rulemaking, licensing and inspection
etc).
(3) Conduct further rulemaking to implement the authority of only
Section 236 of the AEA. This option would resolve the current inability
to impose Federal criminal sanctions for malevolent acts against SNF
from production reactors or naval reactors located at an NRC-regulated
facility and would allow for the inclusion of additional classes of
radioactive material, nuclear material, and other property designated
by the Commission (including radioactive or nuclear material being
transported on public roads, railways, or waterways). While this option
would not include the specific criminal acts of introducing any
dangerous weapon, explosive, or other dangerous instrument or material
specified in Section 229, it can be argued that the introduction of
such dangerous weapons, explosives, or other dangerous instruments or
materials (without actually using them) is an attempted act of sabotage
under Section 236. Also, this option does not limit the criminal act to
a specific facility. Rather, it includes destruction of radioactive
material or other property wherever it is located (i.e., in transport).
A rulemaking, accomplished under the NRC's authority to protect the
common defense and security, would not require Agreement State or
licensee actions (compatible program elements and warning signs).
(4) Conduct further rulemaking to implement the authority of both
Sections 229 and 236 of the AEA. This option is essentially the same as
Options 2 and 3. However, under Option 4, the NRC could conduct a
rulemaking to implement Section 229 under its authority to protect
``public health and safety'' and to implement
[[Page 43941]]
Section 236 under its authority to protect ``the common defense and
security.''
The Staff believes that Option 1 does not accomplish the objectives
of increasing the deterrence of malevolent acts against NRC- and
Agreement State-regulated facilities, radioactive material, nuclear
material, or property. Option 2 is limited in scope to facilities or
installations with risk-significant radioactive material and would not
provide the desired deterrent value of consistent Federal criminal
sanctions for certain other nuclear material or property, particularly
during transport. Because Section 236 offers greater flexibility and
greater capability for punishment than Section 229, Option 3 would
likely have a greater deterrent value than Option 2. Option 3 would be
simpler for licensees, the NRC, and Agreement States. Option 4
accomplishes the greatest increase in deterrence.
III. Specific Questions
To assist the NRC in evaluating whether additional rulemaking
should be undertaken to implement the criminal penalty provisions of
Sections 229 and 236 of the AEA, the NRC is seeking stakeholder input
on the following specific questions:
Q1.1. Should the NRC conduct further rulemaking to implement the
authority of Section 229 or Section 236 of the AEA, or both?
Q1.2. Should the NRC forgo further rulemaking and rely on State
criminal statutes (for both Agreement States and non-Agreement States)
to deter individuals with malevolent intentions? Why?
Q1.3. If the commenter's view is that the NRC should conduct a
rulemaking, which option for rulemaking is best? Why? The available
options (1 through 4) include no-action, rulemaking implementing the
authority of Section 229 alone, Section 236 alone, or both Sections 229
and 236.
If a rulemaking is undertaken, the NRC is also seeking stakeholder
input on the following questions:
Q2.1. Should the NRC include the range of radioactive materials
specified in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 73 in quantities equal to or
exceeding the Category 2 threshold limits?
Q2.2. Alternatively, should the NRC use a different list of
radionuclides, or different quantity limits? If so, what does the
commenter suggest? Why?
Q3.1. Should the NRC include the waste materials recommended by the
NRC staff, specifically SNF from production reactors and naval
reactors? These new requirements would apply only to activities
regulated by the NRC, not to facilities or activities regulated by the
U.S. Department of Energy.
Q3.2. Should the NRC include source material in the form of
UF6? This would include both natural uranium and depleted
uranium but not SNM, which is already covered as ``nuclear fuel'' under
the current language of Section 236a.(3). Additionally, the NRC notes
that uranium conversion and fuel fabrication facilities are already
covered under the current language of Section 236a.(4). Thus, adding
source material and depleted uranium in the form of UF6
would allow for prosecution of malevolent acts against these materials
while they are in transit.
Q3.3. Should the NRC include the other property recommended by its
staff, specifically, classified enrichment technology components? Since
the language of Section 236a.(4) currently includes uranium enrichment
facilities, adding this classified material would allow for the
prosecution of malevolent acts against classified enrichment technology
while these components are in transit.
Q4.1. If the NRC conducts a rulemaking to implement the authority
of Section 229 (Option 2), should it use a ``public health and safety''
basis or a ``common defense and security'' basis? Why? As noted above,
the NRC is not recommending further rulemaking using the authority of
Section 229; however, the agency is seeking stakeholder views on this
issue.
Q4.2. If the NRC conducts a rulemaking to implement the authority
of Section 236 (Option 3), should it use a ``public health and safety''
basis or a ``common defense and security'' basis? Why? As noted above,
the NRC is recommending conducting a rulemaking to implement the
authority of Section 236, using a ``common defense and security''
basis; however, the agency is seeking stakeholder views on this issue.
Q4.3. Should the NRC conduct a rulemaking implementing the combined
authority of Sections 229 and 236 (Option 4), using either a ``public
health and safety'' basis or a ``common defense and security'' basis?
Why?
Q4.4. If the NRC conducts a rulemaking implementing the authority
of Section 229, Section 236, or a combination of both, and uses a
``public health and safety'' basis, what is the appropriate Agreement
State compatibility category for this rulemaking? Why?
IV. Public Webinar
To facilitate the understanding of the public and other
stakeholders of these issues and the submission of informed comments,
the NRC staff is planning to schedule a Webinar in August or September,
2011. Participants must register to participate in the Webinar.
Registration closes 1 day before the Webinar. When the Webinar is
scheduled, registration information may be found at the NRC's public
Web site under the headings Public Meetings & Involvement > Public
Meeting Schedule; see Web page http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/index.cfm.
Dated this 8th day of July 2011.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michael C. Layton,
Acting Director, Division of Security Policy, Office of Nuclear
Security and Incident Response.
[FR Doc. 2011-18608 Filed 7-21-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P